[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 5, Chapters 18 - 20]
[Chapter 19. The Committee of the Whole]
[E. Points of Order]
[Â§ 19. Generally]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 3424-3432]
 
                               CHAPTER 19
 
                       The Committee of the Whole
 
                           E. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 19. Generally


    Questions of order relating to procedure (as distinguished from 
cases of disorder or contempt) arising in the Committee of the Whole 
are decided by the Chairman, not the Speaker.(18)  However, 
on an occasion when the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole had 
taken an active part in the discussion of a point of order, the 
question was by unanimous consent passed over to be later raised in the 
House.(19)
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18. 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6927, 6928.
            See Sec. 6, supra, for precedents relating to rulings of 
        the Chairman generally. See Ch. 31, infra, for precedents 
        relating to points of order generally. See 4 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. Sec. 4783, 4784, 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6921-6937, 
        6987, and 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 3450, for pre-1936 
        precedents.
19. 7 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 1527.                          -------------------
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Scope of Ruling

Sec. 19.1 The Chair does not rule on points not presented in a point of 
    order.

    On June 27, 1949,(20) during consideration of H.R. 4009, 
the Housing Act of 1949, and after overruling a point of order that 
particular provisions exceeded the jurisdiction of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency because they constituted appropriations,
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20. 95 Cong. Rec. 8536-38, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 3425]]

Chairman Hale Boggs, of Louisiana, declined to rule on an issue which 
had not been presented in a point of order.

        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, the point 
    of order I make is that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of section 102 in 
    title I constitute the appropriation of funds from the Federal 
    Treasury, and that the Committee on Banking and Currency is without 
    jurisdiction to report a bill carrying appropriations under clause 
    4, rule 21, which says that no bill or joint resolution carrying 
    appropriations shall be reported by any committee not having 
    jurisdiction to report appropriations.
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\20.\ 95 CONG. REC. 8536-38, 81st Cong. 1 st Sess
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        This is no casual point of order made as a tactical maneuver in 
    consideration of the bill. I make this point of order because this 
    proposes to expand and develop a device or mechanism for getting 
    funds out of the Federal Treasury in an unprecedented degree
        The Constitution has said that no money shall be drawn from the 
    Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. It must 
    follow that the mechanism which gets the money out of the Treasury 
    is an appropriation.
        I invite the attention of the Chairman to the fact that 
    subparagraph (e) states:

            To obtain funds for loans under this title, the 
        Administrator may issue and have outstanding at any one time 
        notes and obligations for purchase by the Secretary of the 
        Treasury in an amount not to exceed $25,000,000, which limit on 
        such outstanding amount shall be increased by $225,000,000 on 
        July l, 1950, and by further amounts of $250,000,000 on July 1 
        in each of the years 1951, 1952, and 1953, respectively--

        Within the total authorization of $1,000,000,000.
        Further that subparagraph (f) provides that--

            The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed--

        And I call particular attention to the use of the words ``and 
    directed''--

            to purchase any notes and other obligations of the 
        Administrator issued under this title and for such purpose is 
        authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds 
        from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty 
        Bond Act, as amended--

        And so forth. The way in which this particular language extends 
    this device of giving the Secretary authority to subscribe for 
    notes by some authority is this: It includes the words ``and 
    directed.''
        In other words, the Secretary of the Treasury has no 
    alternative when the Administrator presents to him some of these 
    securities for purchase but to purchase them. The Secretary of the 
    Treasury is not limited to purchasing them by proceeds from the 
    sale of bonds or securities. He is directed to purchase these notes 
    and obligations issued by the Administrator. That means he might 
    use funds obtained from taxes, that he might use funds obtained 
    through the assignment of miscellaneous receipts to the Treasury, 
    that he might use funds obtained through the proceeds of bonds.
        This proposal will give to the Committee on Banking and 
    Currency, if it

[[Page 3426]]

    should be permitted, authority which the Committee on 
    Appropriations does not have, for in the reporting of an 
    appropriation bill for a fiscal year, any appropriation beyond the 
    fiscal year would be held out of order. Here this committee is 
    reporting a bill which proposes to make mandatory extractions from 
    the Treasury during a period of 4 years. . . .
        Mr. [John W.] McCormack [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    agree with my friend who has raised the point of order that this is 
    not a casual one, but, on the contrary, is a very sincere one. It 
    presents a new question from a legislative angle to be passed upon 
    in the direct question raised by the point of order. . . .
        The provision in paragraph (f) that my friend has raised a 
    point of order against relates entirely to loans. As we read 
    section 102 of title I it starts out with loans. Throughout the 
    bill, a number of times, there is reference to loans.
        Paragraph (e) says:

            To obtain funds for loans under this title.

        It is a loan.
        The meat of the two paragraphs, as I see it, is this:

        Paragraph (f), line 23, page 8, says:

            The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to 
        purchase any notes and other obligations of the Administrator 
        issued under this title and for such purpose is authorized to 
        use as a public-debt transaction the proceeds from the sale of 
        any securities issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as 
        amended, and the purposes for which securities may be issued 
        under such act, as amended, are extended to include any 
        purchases of such notes and other obligations.

        It seems to me that that is the meat. Certainly, the language 
    there does not amount to an appropriation. It is entirely for loan 
    purposes. . . .
        I respectfully submit that it must call for an appropriation 
    out of the general funds of the Treasury in order to violate the 
    rules of the House. This permits the use of money raised by the 
    sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act for loans to these 
    public agencies, such loans to be repaid with interest.
        I respectfully submit, complimenting my friend for having 
    raised the point of order--and certainly, it is not a dilatory one, 
    nor a casual one, one that demands respect--that the point of order 
    does not lie against the language contained in the pending bill. . 
    . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair agrees with the gentleman from South Dakota that the 
    point which has been raised is not a casual point of order. As a 
    matter of fact, as far as the Chair has been able to ascertain, 
    this is the first time a point of order has been raised on this 
    issue as violative of clause 4 of rule XXI.
        As the Chair sees the point of order, the issue involved turns 
    on the meaning of the word ``appropriation.'' ``Appropriation,'' in 
    its usual and customary interpretation, means taking money out of 
    the Treasury by appropriate legislative language for the support of 
    the general functions of Government. The language before us does 
    not do that. This language authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
    to use pro

[[Page 3427]]

    ceeds of public-debt issues for the purpose of making loans. Under 
    the language, the Treasury of the United States makes advances 
    which will be repaid in full with interest over a period of years 
    without cost to the taxpayers.
        Therefore, the Chair rules that this language does not 
    constitute an appropriation, and overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Would the Chair hold then that that 
    language restricts the Secretary of the Treasury to using the 
    proceeds of the securities issued under the second Liberty Bond Act 
    and prevents him from using the proceeds from miscellaneous 
    receipts or tax revenues?
        The Chairman: The Chair does not have authority to draw that 
    distinction. The Chair is passing on the particular point which has 
    been raised.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: However, Mr. Chairman, it would seem 
    implicit in the ruling of the Chair and I thought perhaps it could 
    be decided as a part of the parliamentary history. It might help 
    some courts later on.
        The Chairman: The Chair can make a distinction between the 
    general funds of the Treasury and money raised for a specific 
    purpose by the issuance of securities. That is the point involved 
    here.

Scope of Debate

Sec. 19.2 Debate on a point of order raised in the Committee of the 
    Whole is within the discretion of the Chairman and must be confined 
    to the point of order.

    On Apr. 13, 1951,(1) during consideration of S. 1, 1951 
Amendments to the Universal Military Training and Service Act, Chairman 
Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, stated that debate on a point of order is 
controlled by the Chair and must be confined to the point of order.
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 1. 97 Cong. Rec. 3909, 3910, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Antoni N.] Sadlak [of Connecticut]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will report the amendment, but the 
    Chair will state that all time for debate has been exhausted.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Sadlak: Page 26, following the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Walter, insert the following: ``Any 
        citizen of a foreign country. . . .''

        Mr. [Carl] Vinson [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point 
    of order against the amendment that it is not germane to the 
    pending bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Connecticut desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Sadlak: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Sadlak: Mr. Chairman, how much time will be allotted to me 
    for that purpose?

[[Page 3428]]

        The Chairman: That is in the discretion of the Chair. The 
    gentleman's argument must be confined to the point of order.

Violation of Ramseyer Rule

Sec. 19.3 A point of order that a committee report fails to comply with 
    Rule XIII clause 3,(2) the Ramseyer rule, will not lie 
    in the Committee of the Whole.
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 2. House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979).
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    On July 5, 1966,(3) during consideration of H.R. 14765, 
the Civil Rights Act of 1966, Chairman Richard Bolling, of Missouri, 
ruled whether a point of order that a committee report that failed to 
comply with Rule XIII clause 3, the Ramseyer rule, would lie in the 
Committee of the Whole.
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 3. 112 CONG. REC. 16840, 89th Cong, 2d Sess.
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        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    14765) to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury 
    selection and service . . . and for other purposes.
        Mr. [John Bell] Willians [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, a point 
    of order.
        The Speaker: (4) The question is on the motion 
    offered by the gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].
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 4. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
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        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: All those in favor of the motion will let it be 
    known by saying ``aye.'' All those opposed by saying ``no.''
        The motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of 
    the bill, H.R. 14765. with Mr. Bolling in the chair.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a point of order. I was on my feet----
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was 
    dispensed with.
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggoner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Celler] will be recognized for 5 hours. . . .
        Mr. Williams:  Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
    care to use.
        Mr. Chairman, Negroes propose to be free. Many rights have been 
    denied and withheld from them. The right to be equally educated 
    with whites. The right to equal housing with whites.
        The right to equal recreation with whites.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        Mr. Celler: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, immediately before the House 
    resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House I was on my 
    feet on the floor

[[Page 3429]]

    seeking recognition for the purpose of making a point of order 
    against consideration of H.R. 14765 on the ground that the report 
    of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill does not comply 
    with all the requirements of clause 3 of rule XIII of the rules of 
    the House known as the Ramseyer rule and intended to request I be 
    heard in support of that point of order. I was not recognized by 
    the Chair. I realize technically under the rules of the House at 
    this point, my point of order mav come too late, after the House 
    resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State 
    of the Union.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: But I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I sought to 
    raise the point of order before the House went into session. May I 
    ask this question? Is there any way that this point of order can 
    lie at this time?
        The Chairman: Not at this time. It lies only in the House, the 
    Chair must inform the gentleman from Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: May I say that the Parliamentarian and the 
    Speaker were notified in advance and given copies of the point of 
    order that I desired to raise, and I was refused recognition 
    although I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time.
        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the 
    ru]ing of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair will have to repeat that the gentleman 
    from Mississippi is well aware that this present occupant of the 
    chair is powerless to do other than he has stated.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    stand as rendered?
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Williams) there were--ayes 139, noes 101.
        The decision of the Chair was sustained.

Sec. 19.4 After brief debate on whether a point of order that a 
    committee report violated the Ramseyer rule could be entertained in 
    the Committee of the Whole, the Committee on motion rose; the 
    Speaker announced that because of confusion in the Chamber he had 
    not heard the Member seeking recognition on the point of order and, 
    since the Member stated that he had been seeking recognition, 
    agreed to hear his point of order.

    On July 5, 1966,(5) after the Chairman of the Committee 
of the Whole refused to entertain a point of order that a committee 
report violated the Ramseyer Rule (6) and the Committee on 
appeal sustained that ruling, the Committee on motion rose. Speaker 
John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, agreed to hear this point of order
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 5. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840, 16842, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
 6. House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979).
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[[Page 3430]]

because he had not heard the Member, John Bell Williams, of 
Mississippi, seek recognition before the House resolved itself into the 
Committee of the Whole.

        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed 
    the chair, Mr. Bolling, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, 
    having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14765) to assure 
    nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service, 
    to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other 
    public facilities, to provide judicial relief against 
    discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties for 
    certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes, 
    had come to no resolution thereon.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, the House resolved itself into the 
    committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union a moment 
    ago. When the question was put by the Chair, I was on my feet 
    seeking recognition for the purpose of offering a point of order 
    against consideration of the legislation. Although I shouted rather 
    loudly, apparently the Chair did not hear me. Since the Committee 
    proceeded to go into the Committee of the Whole, I would like to 
    know, Mr. Speaker, if the point of order which I had intended to 
    offer can be offered now in the House against the consideration of 
    the bill; and, Mr. Speaker, I make such a point of order and ask 
    that I be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair did not hear 
    the gentleman make his point of order. There was too much noise. 
    Under the circumstances the Chair will entertain the point of 
    order.

Rising of Committee Pending Decision

Sec. 19.5 A point of order having been raised in the Committee of the 
    Whole against a bill reported by a nonappropriating committee, on 
    grounds that it proposed an appropriation contrary to Rule XXI 
    clause 5,(7) the Committee rose pending decision by the 
    Chair on the point of order.
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 7. House Rules and Manual Sec. 846 (1979).
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    On June 4, 1957,(8) during consideration of H.R. 6974, 
extending the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
1954, the Committee of the Whole rose pending a decision by the 
Chairman on a point of order.
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 8. 103 Cong. Rec. 8298, 8318, 8319, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Clerk read as follows:

            Be it enacted, etc., That the Agricultural Trade 
        Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended, is amended 
        as follows: . . .

        Mr. [John J.] Rodney [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a 
    point of order against the entire bill, H.R. 6974, on the ground 
    that it is a bill from a committee not having authority to report 
    an appropriation. . . .

[[Page 3431]]

        Mr. [Harold D.] Cooley [of North Carolina]: . . . I am a little 
    bit apprehensive that the point of order may be sustained, if the 
    Chair is called upon to rule on it. But, I think it would be very 
    unfortunate for us to delay final action on the bill, and in the 
    circumstances we have no other alternative other than to move that 
    the Committee do now rise, and so, Mr. Chairman, I make that 
    motion.
        The Chairman: (9) The Chair is prepared to rule on 
    the point of order, but the motion offered by the gentleman from 
    North Carolina that the Committee do now rise is in order, and the 
    Chair will put the question.
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 9. Brooks Hays (Ark.).
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        The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from 
    North Carolina.
        The motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed 
    the chair, Mr. Hays of Arkansas, Chairman of the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that 
    Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 6974) to 
    extend the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 
    1954, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

Disposing of Points of Order Before Consideration of Bill for Amendment

Sec. 19.6 The Committee of the Whole agreed by unanimous consent to 
    dispense with the reading of an appropriation bill for amendment 
    and that points of order and then amendments could be submitted 
    immediately after the first reading of the bill had been dispensed 
    with.

    On July 5, 1945,(10) the Committee of the Whole agreed 
to dispense with the reading of an appropriation bill, that the bill be 
considered as read, and that points of order and amendments be in order 
thereafter.
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10. 91 Cong. Rec. 7226, 7227, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
    bill (H.R. 3649) with Mr. Sparkman in the chair.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        On motion of Mr. Cannon of Missouri the first reading of the 
    bill was dispensed with.
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read and that all 
    Members desiring to submit amendments or points of order have leave 
    to submit them at this time
        The Chairman: (11) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Missouri?
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11. John J. Sparkman (Ala.).
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        There was no objection.
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, in view of 
    the unanimous consent request that has just been granted, I make 
    the point of order against the first item, National War Labor 
    Board, on the ground that it is an appropriation not authorized by 
    law.

[[Page 3432]]

        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained.
        Mr. Marcantonio: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the 
    same grounds against the item for the Office of Defense 
    Transportation on page 5.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: The point of order is conceded, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York [Mr. Marcantonio] 
    makes a point of order which the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. 
    Cannon] concedes. The Chair sustains the point of order.

Sec. 19.7 Where unanimous consent is granted that the remainder of an 
    appropriation bill be considered as read and that all portions 
    thereof be subject to amendments and to points of order, the Chair 
    suggests that points of order be disposed of first since it will be 
    too late to make such points after amendments to the bill have been 
    considered.

    On Apr. 25, 1947,(1~2) during consideration of H.R. 
3123, the Department of the Interior appropriations bill, 1948, 
Chairman Earl C. Michener, of Michigan, suggested a time for the 
raising of points of order against amendments to the bill.
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12. 93 Cong. Rec. 4098, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Robert F.] Jones of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the remainder of the bill be considered as read and 
    that all portions thereof be subject to amendment and to points of 
    order.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Ohio?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The Chair suggests that the points of order be 
    disposed of first under this procedure, before the amendments.
        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order. . . .
        My point of order, Mr. Chairman, is that that is legislation 
    amending a previous act and not within the purview of this bill 
    making appropriations for fiscal 1948. It constitutes legislation 
    on an appropriation bill for it destroys existing legislation.
        The Chairman: This language changes a contract authorization 
    contained in a previous appropriation bill passed by another 
    Congress. The Chair sustains the point of order.
        Are there any further points of order to be made to the bill? 
    If so, they will be taken up first since it will be too late to 
    make points of order after amendments to the bill have been 
    considered.