[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 5, Chapters 18 - 20]
[Chapter 19. The Committee of the Whole]
[B. The Chairman]
[Â§ 9. Appeals of Rulings]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 3325-3335]
 
                               CHAPTER 19
 
                       The Committee of the Whole
 
                            B. THE CHAIRMAN
 
Sec. 9.--Appeals of Rulings

    Debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole is under the 
five-minute rule (11) and may be closed by a motion to close 
debate or to rise and report.(12) In recognizing Members for 
debate on an appeal in the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman 
alternates between those favoring and those opposing the 
ruling.(13)
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11.  Sec. 9.6, infra; see also note to Rule I clause 4, House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 628 (1979); and 7 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 1608.
12.  Rule I clause 4, House Rules and Manual Sec. 628 (1979); 5 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 6947, 6950; and 8 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 3453.
            In an exceptional case the Committee of the Whole rose and 
        reported a question of order for decision of the House when an 
        appeal was taken from a ruling of a Chairman; in that instance, 
        the Chairman had ruled that an appeal could not be taken in the 
        Committee. 4 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 4783.
13.  8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 3455.
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    Rule I clause 4,(14) which relates to authority of the 
Speaker, provides that no Member shall speak more than once on appeal, 
unless by permission of the House; and this provision is applicable to 
Members rising for that purpose in the Committee.(15)
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14.  House Rules and Manual Sec. 624 (1979).
15.  See 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1313; and 5 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 6938. Although this principle has not been explicitly 
        extended to the Committee of the Whole, it applies because of 
        Rule XXIII clause 9, House Rules and Manual Sec. 877 (1979), 
        which provides that the rules of proceeding in the House shall 
        be observed in Committees of the Whole House so far as they may 
        be applicable. See Jefferson's Manual, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 340 (1979); 4 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 4737; and 8 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 2605.
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Propriety of Appeal

Sec. 9.1 A decision of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole can 
    be appealed.

    On July 19, 1956,(16) after ruling that an amendment to 
H.R. 627, to provide means of further securing and protecting the civil 
rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States was not 
germane,(17) Chairman Aime J. Forand, of Rhode Island, 
stated his opinion as to whether a decision of the Chairman of the Com
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16.  102 Cong. Rec. 13551, 13552, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
17.  See Sec. 9.2, infra, for that ruling and an appeal.
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[[Page 3326]]

mittee of the Whole was subject to appeal.(18)
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18.  See Sec. Sec. 9.4, 9.5, infra, for examples of the sustaining or 
        overruling of decisions of Chairmen.
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        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I appeal from 
    the decision of the Chair.
        Mr. [Byron G.] Rogers of Colorado: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Rogers of Colorado: Can the decision of the Chairman of the 
    Committee of the Whole be appealed, under the rules?
        The Chairman: It can.

Sec. 9.2 An appeal from the decision of the Chairman of the Committee 
    of the Whole as to the germaneness of an amendment to a bill is in 
    order.

    On July 19, 1956,(19~) during consideration of H.R. 627, 
to provide means of further securing and protecting the civil rights of 
certain persons, Chairman Aime J. Forand, of Rhode Island, stated that 
an appeal from a ruling of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
as to the germaneness of an amendment to a bill was in order.
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19. 102 Cong. Rec. 13551, 13552, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    H.R. 627 contained the following provision relating to the duties 
of the Civil Rights Commission:

            Sec. 103. (a) The Commission shall--(1) investigate the 
        allegations that certain citizens of the United States are 
        being deprived of their right to vote or are being subjected to 
        unwarranted economic pressures by reason of their color, race, 
        religion, or national origin.

    An amendment to this provision was offered, as follows:

        Mr. [Donald L.] Jackson [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Jackson: On page 21 strike out 
        lines 9 through 13 and insert the following:
            ``(1) investigate the allegations that certain citizens of 
        the United States are being deprived of their right to vote or 
        obtain employment, or are being subjected to unwarranted 
        economic pressures, by reason of their color, race, religion, 
        national origin, or membership or nonmembership in a labor or 
        trade organization.''

        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Celler: I make the point of order that the amendment is not 
    germane. . . .
        Very briefly, Mr. Chairman. I believe the amendment would 
    change the whole complexion of the bill. The purpose of the bill is 
    to prevent and to redress deprivation of constitutional civil 
    rights on the grounds of race, color, religion, or national origin. 
    All through the provisions setting forth the duties of the 
    Commission we find the words

[[Page 3327]]

    ``race, color, religion, or national origin.'' That part that the 
    gentleman read contained the words ``economic pressures'' and the 
    phrase in the bill reads: ``Unwarranted economic pressures by 
    reason of their color, race, religion, or national origin.''
        For that reason, I insist on my point of order. . . 
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Jackson] has offered an amendment to the bill H.R. 
    627 now under consideration. The Chair has examined the amendment 
    and also the language of the bill as referred to by the gentleman 
    from California. The Chairman finds that the bill itself has to do 
    with matters of economic pressure by reason of their color, race, 
    religion, or national origin.
        The amendment of the gentleman from California goes beyond that 
    and extends to membership or nonmembership in labor or trade 
    organizations. The Chair holds that the amendment is not germane. 
    The point of order is sustained.
        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I appeal from 
    the decision of the Chair. . . .
        The Chairman: . . . The question is, Shall the decision of the 
    Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes had it.
        So the decision of the Chairman stood as the judgment of the 
    Committee.

Issues to Be Voted on

Sec. 9.3 On appeal from a ruling of the Chairman of the Committee of 
    the Whole on an amendment, the vote is not on the merits of the 
    proposed amendment, but on the correctness of the decision of the 
    Chair.

    On July 19, 1956,(20) during consideration of H.R. 627, 
to further secure and protect the civil rights of certain persons, an 
appeal was taken from a ruling by the Chair on an 
amendment.(1) Chairman Aime J. Forand, of Rhode Island, 
indicated that the vote on appeal from such a ruling is on sustaining 
or overruling the decision of the Chairman, not on the merits of the 
proposed amendment.
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20. 102 Cong. Rec. 13551, 13552, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
 1. See Sec. 9.2, supra, for a discussion of this appeal.
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        Mr. [Kenneth B.] Keating [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Keating: On this appeal from the ruling of the Chair, do I 
    understand correctly that in voting on it we are voting not on the 
    merits of the proposition submitted by the gentleman from 
    California but rather on whether the Chair is correct in his 
    ruling?
        The Chairman: That is correct.

Effect of Refusal of Tellers

Sec. 9.4 The Committee of the Whole has sustained a ruling

[[Page 3328]]

    of the Chair that, once tellers have been properly refused, they 
    cannot again be demanded on the same question.

    On June 13, 1957,(2) during consideration of H.R. 6127, 
a civil rights bill, an appeal was taken from a ruling of the Chairman 
regarding the sufficiency of the number of Members who rose on a demand 
for tellers.
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 2. 103 Cong. Rec. 9034, 9035, 85th Cong. 1st Sess
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        The Chairman:(3) All time has expired. The question 
    is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. 
    Tuck].
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 3. Aime J. Forand (R.I.).
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        The question was taken and the Chair announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [Jr., of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    demand tellers.
        Tellers were refused.
        Mr. [Kenneth B.] Keating [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I ask for 
    a division.
        Mr. [Frank L.] Chelf [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, the request 
    comes too late.
        Mr. [William M.] Colmer [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order. The request does come too late.
        Mr. [William M.] Tuck: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order 
    that the Chair had already ruled.
        The Chairman: This is the situation. The request for a teller 
    vote was turned down. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Keating] 
    made a request for a division vote. He is within his rights.
        The Committee divided; and there were--ayes 106, noes 114.
        Mr. Colmer: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Colmer: Would it be in order to have tellers?
        The Chairman: Tellers have been refused.
        Mr. [Ross] Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman the tellers were refused 
    after the Chair had ruled and said that the amendment was agreed 
    to. Then tellers were demanded, and those people who now want 
    tellers felt that the amendment was agreed to, so they did not rise 
    to ask for tellers; and I can get the House to agree with me. I 
    make that point of order and ask the Chair to rule on it.
        The Chairman: The Chair will rule that on the demand for 
    tellers an insufficient number of Members rose to their feet.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I disagree with the ruling of the Chair 
    and ask for a vote on the ruling of the Chair. I say that he had 
    already ruled on the vote.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman appeal from the ruling of the 
    Chair?
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I appeal from the ruling of the Chair.
        Mr. [William J.] Green [Jr.] of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, a 
    point of order.

[[Page 3329]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Green of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, it is too late for the 
    gentleman to appeal from the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has appealed from the ruling of the 
    Chair.
        The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the 
    judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes apparently had it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, I demand a division.
        The Committee divided; and there were--ayes 222, noes 4.

        So the decision of the Chair stands as the judgment of the 
    Committee.
        Mr. [Clare E.] Hoffman [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Chairman, is it now in order to ask for 
    tellers after the rising vote?
        The Chairman: It is not in order. The question was taken on the 
    amendment and the question was decided.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The Chair's actual count on a vote is not 
subject to challenge by appeal.(4)
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 4. See Ch. 31, infra, for discussion of appeals from rulings of the 
        Chair. See also Ch. 30, infra, for general discussion of 
        voting.
            For other instances in which a ruling of the Chair was 
        sustained on appeal, see Sec. 9.2, supra, Sec. Sec. 9.6, 9.7, 
        infra; 106 Cong. Rec. 5477-79, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., Mar. 14, 
        1960 (a germaneness ruling during consideration of H.R. 8601, 
        ``to enforce constitutional rights''); 96 Cong. Rec. 2178, 81st 
        Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 22, 1950 (a ruling regarding a Member's 
        right to yield for the purpose of offering a motion to rise 
        during consideration of H.R. 4453, the Federal Fair Employment 
        Practice Act); 91 Cong. Rec. 9846, 9867-70, 79th Cong. 1st 
        Sess., Oct. 19, 1945 (a germaneness ruling during consideration 
        of H.R. 5407, reducing appropriations); 88 Cong. Rec. 1708-12, 
        77th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 26, 1942 (a germaneness ruling during 
        consideration of S. 2208, the second war powers bill, 1942); 88 
        Cong. Rec. 606, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 23, 1942 (a ruling on 
        timeliness of a point of order during consideration of H.R. 
        6448, the fourth supplemental national defense appropriation 
        bill, 1942); 81 Cong. Rec. 7698-7701, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., 
        July 27, 1937 (a germaneness ruling during consideration of 
        H.R. 7730, authorizing the President to appoint administrative 
        assistants).
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Power to Overrule Decision on Appeal

Sec. 9.5 On appeal the Committee of the Whole has overruled a decision 
    of the Chairman on a point of order.

    On Feb. 1, 1938,(~5) during consideration of H.R. 9181, 
the Dis
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 5. 83 Cong. Rec. 1372, 1373, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. See also Ch. 31, 
        infra, for appeals of the Chair's rulings on points of order.
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[[Page 3330]]

trict of Columbia appropriation bill of 1939, the Committee of the 
Whole heard an appeal on a decision of the Chairman that a point of 
order against an amendment was not timely.

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Collins: On page 68, line 20, 
        after the period, insert a new paragraph as, follows:
            ``Street lighting: For purchase, installation, and 
        maintenance of public lamps, lampposts, street designations, 
        lanterns, and fixtures of all kinds on streets, avenues, roads, 
        alleys, and for all necessary expenses in connection therewith, 
        including rental of storerooms, extra labor, operation, 
        maintenance, and repair of motortrucks, this sum to be expended 
        in accordance with the provisions of existing law, $765,000: 
        Provided, That this appropriation shall not be available for 
        the payment of rates for electric street lighting in excess of 
        those authorized to be paid in the fiscal year 1927, and 
        payment for electric current for new forms of street lighting 
        shall not exceed 2 cents per kilowatt-hour for current 
        consumed.''

        Mr. [Ross A.] Collins [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    language that is incorporated in the amendment--
        Mr. [Jack] Nichols [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment.
        Mr. Collins: Eliminates the language against which the 
    gentleman made the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the gentleman's 
    point of order comes too late.
        The Chairman: (~6) The gentleman from Oklahoma makes 
    a point of order on the amendment, and the gentleman from 
    Mississippi makes the point of order that the point of order made 
    by the gentleman from Oklahoma comes too late.
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 6. William J. Driver (Ark.).
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        The point of order of the gentleman from Mississippi is 
    sustained. . . .
        Mr. Nichols: If the Chair did recognize the gentleman from 
    Mississippi I may say the Chair recognized him while I was on my 
    feet taking the only opportunity presented to me to address the 
    Chair, in order that I might direct my point of order to the Chair.
        The Chairman: That may be true. The Chair does not care to 
    indulge in any controversy on that question with the gentleman from 
    Oklahoma. The Chair is merely stating what occurred. The Chair may 
    state further to the gentleman from Oklahoma, in deference to the 
    situation which has developed here, that if that had been true, 
    under the rules it would have been the duty of the Chair to have 
    recognized a member of the committee in preference to any other 
    Member on the floor. The Chair was acting under the limitations of 
    the rule. . . .
        Mr. [Jesse P.] Wolcott [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, the rule, 
    as I understand it, is that if any action is taken on the 
    amendment, then the point of order is dilatory. The only action 
    that could have been taken was recognition by the Chair of the 
    gentleman from Mississippi to debate his amendment.
        I want to call the attention to the Chair to the fact that the 
    only manner in which the Chair can recognize a

[[Page 3331]]

    Member to be heard on this floor is to refer to the gentleman 
    either by name or by the State from which the gentleman comes, and 
    I call the attention of the Chair to the fact that the Chair in 
    this particular instance did not say he recognized the gentleman 
    from Mississippi or the gentleman [Mr. Collins], and for that 
    reason there was no official proceeding and no official action 
    taken between the time that the amendment was offered and the time 
    the gentleman from Oklahoma made his point of order, and therefore 
    the point of order was not dilatory.
        The Chairman: The Chair desires, in all fairness, to make this 
    statement to the Committee, as well as directly to the gentleman 
    from Michigan. Not only was the gentleman from Mississippi 
    recognized, but he began an explanation of his amendment, and the 
    Chair certainly presumes that the gentleman being on the floor at 
    the time heard that; and when that occurred, the Chair does not 
    think the gentleman will disagree with the Chair about the fact 
    that the Chair is required, under the rules, to rule in deference 
    to the situation that developed. The Chair does not desire to 
    forestall proceedings and would be pleased to hear points of order, 
    but the Chair must act within the definition of the rule.
        Mr. Wolcott: If the Chair will indulge me for a moment in that 
    respect, the point I wish to make is this. The gentleman from 
    Mississippi had no authority to address this Committee until he had 
    been recognized by the Chair, and if the gentleman from Oklahoma 
    made his point of order during a brief sentence by someone which 
    had no right under the rules of this House even to be reported by 
    the official reporter, then he cannot be estopped, under those 
    circumstances, from making his point of order. The Chair of 
    necessity must have recognized the gentleman from Mississippi to 
    debate the amendment.
        The offering of an amendment is not a proceeding which will 
    estop the gentleman from Oklahoma from making his point of order. 
    It is recognition by the Chair of another gentleman to discuss the 
    amendment, and the gentleman could have discussed the amendment 
    only after recognition was given.
        I want respectfully to call this to the attention of the Chair 
    in order that the Chair may correct any error which has been made 
    or any seeming injustice to the gentleman from Oklahoma, and I 
    respectfully submit that the Chair did not recognize the gentleman 
    from Mississippi, and I believe the Record will bear this out. . . 
    .
        Mr. Nichols: If the Chair has made a final ruling, I would, in 
    the most respectful manner I know, request an appeal from the 
    decision of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Oklahoma appeals from the 
    decision of the Chair on the ruling of the Chair on the point of 
    order, as stated.
        The question before the Committee is, Shall the ruling of the 
    Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the noes 
    had it.
        So the decision of the Chair does not stand as the judgment of 
    the Committee.

Debate on Appeal

Sec. 9.6 An appeal in the Committee of the Whole is debat

[[Page 3332]]

    able under the five-minute rule and such debate is confined to the 
    appeal.

    On Feb. 22, 1950,(7) during general debate on H.R. 4453, 
the Federal Fair Employment Practices Act, Chairman Francis E. Walter, 
of Pennsylvania, set forth the limitations on debate on an appeal in 
the Committee of the Whole.
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 7. 96 Cong. Rec. 2178, 81st Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Chairman: The gentleman from South Carolina . . . cannot 
    yield to the gentleman from Virginia for the purpose of offering 
    that motion [that the Committee rise].
        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I respectfully 
    appeal from the decision of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    be sustained?
        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, is that appeal debatable?
        The Chairman: Under the 5-minute rule; yes.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is recognized. The Chair will say 
    that the discussion is now on the appeal. . . .
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Chairman; a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Marcantonio: I make the point of order that the gentleman 
    from Mississippi must direct his remarks to the question of the 
    appeal from the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. . . .
        The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair be the 
    judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken; and the Chair being in doubt, the 
    Committee divided and there were--ayes, 123, noes, 77.
        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I demand tellers.
        Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. 
    Powell and Mr. Smith of Virginia.
        The Committee again divided; and the tellers reported that 
    there were--ayes 148, noes 83.
        So the decision of the Chair stands as the judgment of the 
    Committee.(8)
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 8. See also 88 Cong. Rec. 1708-12, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 26, 1942, 
        for a similar ruling.
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Vacating Chair to Put Appeal

Sec. 9.7 After an appeal was taken from a decision of the Chairman of 
    the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman left the chair to permit 
    another Chairman to put the question.

    On Oct. 19, 1945,(9) after sustaining a point of order 
that a proposed amendment was not ger
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 9. 91 Cong. Rec. 9846, 9868-70, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 3333]]

mane to H.R. 4407, reducing appropriations, and hearing debate on an 
appeal of that ruling, Chairman Fritz G. Lanham, of Texas, left the 
chair to permit Chairman Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, to put the question 
whether the decision of the Chair should stand as the judgment of the 
Committee of the Whole.(10)
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10. The decision whether to permit another Member to put the question 
        on an appeal is within the discretion of the Chairman. 8 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 3101.
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        The Clerk read as follows:

            Be it enacted, etc., That the appropriations and 
        contractual authorizations of the departments and agencies 
        available in the fiscal year 1946, and prior year unreverted 
        appropriations, are hereby reduced in the sums hereinafter set 
        forth. . . .
            The officer and enlisted personnel strengths of the Army, 
        Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard shall be demobilized at a 
        rate not less than would be necessary to keep within the 
        amounts available for their pay in consequence of the 
        provisions of this act, unless the President otherwise shall 
        direct. . . .

    The following amendment was offered:

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: 
        On page 36, line 7, after the word ``direct'', strike out the 
        period, insert a colon and the following:
            ``Provided, That (a) there shall be discharged from, or 
        released from active duty in, the military or naval forces of 
        the United States without delay, any person who requests such 
        discharge or release and who--
            ``(1) has served on active duty 18 months or more since 
        September 16, 1940; or
            ``(2) has, at the time of making such request, a wife or a 
        child or children with whom he maintains (or would but for his 
        service maintain) a bona fide family relationship in his home. 
        . . .''

        Mr. [Emmet] O'Neal [of Kentucky]: . . . I make the point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi 
    is not germane to the bill. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Kentucky desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. O'Neal: . . . This is writing a legislative bill in here. 
    It is so far beyond anything in this bill that I do not believe 
    there is any question but that the Chair will have to declare it 
    not germane, and therefore not in order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The question before the Chair does not concern the merits of 
    the provisions of the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Mississippi. It is the duty of the Chair simply to pass upon the 
    point of order from a parliamentary standpoint, as to whether or 
    not the amendment is germane.
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi is 
    clearly a general legislative expression and proposes substantive 
    law, whereas the provision in the bill to which the amendment is 
    offered is merely the expression of a hope that within the amounts 
    available for their pay and in consequence of the provisions of 
    this act demobilization will be carried on as rapidly as possible.

[[Page 3334]]

        In the opinion of the Chair, clearly, under the limitations of 
    the general provision on page 36, this amendment, being a general 
    legislative provision with reference to demobilization and having 
    the effect of substantive law, and not being restrictive is not 
    germane. The Chair therefore sustains the point of order.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, with all the deference in the world 
    for the distinguished Chairman, whom we all love, I respectfully 
    appeal from the ruling of the Chair. . . .
        The Chairman: The question at issue is, Shall the decision of 
    the Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee of the Whole?
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I ask for recognition on my appeal if 
    it is debatable.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 
    5 minutes on the appeal.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I merely wish to say, with all 
    deference to the Chairman who labored considerably with this 
    proposition that I think the amendment is clearly germane. I have 
    taken this appeal because it is our chance to get these boys out of 
    the service. It is no reflection on the Chair to overrule the 
    decision of the Chair. I trust the decision of the Chair will be 
    overruled. If it is overruled, that will give us a chance to vote 
    on my amendment, which you can see the Members are anxious to 
    support. . . .
        Mr. O'Neal: I beg to differ with the statement of the gentleman 
    from Mississippi. The Chair has made a decision and ruled on a 
    point of order. This appeal is not on the merits of the amendment. 
    The gentleman from Mississippi has appealed to you that the Chair 
    has decided wrongly. Your decision, just as though you were a judge 
    on the bench, is to decide whether or not the Chair was in error 
    when he ruled that the point of order was well taken.
        The Chairman (Mr. Cooper): The question is: Shall the decision 
    of the Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee of the Whole?
        The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the 
    ``ayes'' had it.
        So the decision of the Chair stands as the judgment of the 
    Committee of the Whole.

Appeal as Subject to Motion to Table

Sec. 9.8 The motion to lay on the table an appeal from a decision of 
    the Chair is not in order in the Committee of the Whole.

    On Oct. 19, 1945,(11) after ruling that a proposed 
amendment was not germane to H.R. 4407, reducing appropriations, 
Chairman Fritz G. Lanham, of Texas, stated that a motion to table a 
decision of the Chair is not in order in the Committee of the Whole.
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11. 91 Cong. Rec. 9846, 9868-70, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, with all 
    the deference in the world for the distinguished Chairman, whom we 
    all love, I respectfully appeal from the ruling of the Chair.

[[Page 3335]]

        Mr. [Emmet] O'Neal [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I move to lay 
    the appeal on the table.

        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, the appeal cannot be laid on the 
    table. The Committee has a right to vote on it.
        The Chairman: The motion to lay on the table is not in order in 
    the Committee.(12)
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12. See also 81 Cong. Rec. 7698-7700, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., July 27, 
        1937, for another illustration of this principle.
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