[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 4, Chapters 15 - 17]
[Chapter 17. Committees]
[F. Committee Reports]
[Â§ 60. Comparative Prints; The Ramseyer Rule]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 3144-3170]
 
                               CHAPTER 17
 
                               Committees
 
                          F. COMMITTEE REPORTS
 
Sec. 60. Comparative Prints; The Ramseyer Rule

    The Ramseyer rule provides that whenever a committee reports a bill 
or joint resolution repealing or amending any statute or part thereof, 
the committee report is to include the text of the statute or part 
thereof to be repealed, as well as a comparative print showing the 
proposed omissions and insertions by stricken-through type and italics, 
parallel columns, or other appropriate typographical 
devices.(13)
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13. Rule XIII clause 3, House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979). The 
        rule dates from Jan. 28, 1929, when the House passed H. Res. 
        278, 70 Cong. Rec. 2371-74, 70th Cong. 2d Sess.
            The rule is commonly known as the ``Ramseyer rule'' in 
        honor of its sponsor, Mr. Christian W. Ramseyer, of Iowa, who 
        served in the House from 1915 to 1933.
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    The purpose of the Ramseyer rule is to inform Members of any 
changes in existing law to occur through proposed legislation. The rule 
was adopted by the House on Jan. 28, 1929, at which time Mr. Ramseyer 
explained its import and meaning as follows:

        The proposal in this new rule is simply this: Many bills which 
    are introduced are to amend statutes. Such bills are reported back 
    to the House, and there is nothing either in the bill or in the 
    report accompanying the bill to advise Members of the House just 
    what specific changes the bill proposes to make in the statute 
    under consideration. If this amendment to Rule XIII is adopted, 
    then hereafter a committee which reports a bill to amend an 
    existing statute must show in the report just what changes are 
    proposed. Suppose a bill is to amend a statute--we will just call 
    it section 100--by omitting some words and adding thereto other 
    words. The proposal is that the report shall show by stricken-
    through type the words to be omitted and by italics the words that 
    are added, so that a Member who is interested in knowing just what 
    changes it is proposed to make in the statute under consideration 
    can get the report, read it, and have before him exactly the 
    changes which are proposed to be made.

    Despite some criticism of the resolution on the basis that it did 
not go far enough,(14) the House adopted the measure and it 
has survived with only one change in the succeeding decades. That
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14. Mr. Henry Allen Cooper (Wisc.), preferred passing a bill that would 
        have amended the United States Code to require a comparative 
        printing of all bills and resolutions introduced in both the 
        House and Senate.
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[[Page 3145]]

change, added Sept. 22, 1961,(15) provides that ``[I]f a 
committee reports such a bill or joint resolution with amendments or an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute for the entire bill, such 
report shall include a comparative print showing any changes in 
existing law proposed by the amendments or substitute instead of as in 
the bill as introduced.'' (16)
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15. 107 Cong. Rec. 20823, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
16. See Rule XIII clause 3, House Rules and Manual Sec. 745 (1979).
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    Under the doctrine of ``substantial compliance,'' the Speaker has 
overruled points of order against committee reports, based on the 
Ramseyer rule, on the rationale that the committee had substantially 
complied with the requirements of the rule and the deviations were 
minor and inconsequential.(17) Also, the rules now provide 
that committees may submit supplemental reports to correct technical 
errors in a previous report.(18)
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17. Sec. Sec. 60.11-60.14, infra.
18. Rule XI clause 2(1)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 714 (1979). 
        This change in the rules was brought about by the 1970 
        Legislative Reorganization Act; see Pub. L. No. 91-510, 84 
        Stat. 1140 (Oct. 26, 1970).
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    Points of order based on the Ramseyer rule must be raised at the 
proper time. A point of order based on the rule must be made when the 
bill is called up in the House and before the House resolves itself 
into the Committee of the Whole.(19) The point of order 
comes too late after the House has resolved itself into the Committee 
of the Whole for the purpose of consideration of the measure and debate 
has begun.(20) Compliance with the Ramseyer rule may be 
waived by unanimous consent or by special rule. This can be 
accomplished either by a general waiver of all points of order against 
consideration of the bill, or by an express waiver of the provisions of 
the Ramseyer rule.(1)
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19. Sec. 60.16, infra.
20. Sec. 60.18, infra.
 1. Sec. Sec. 60.19, 60.20, infra.
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Application of Ramseyer Rule Generally

Sec. 60.1 The Ramseyer rule requires that when reporting a bill 
    repealing or amending existing law, the committee must include a 
    comparative print showing, by italic or other typographical device, 
    the changes proposed; but if the reported measure does not 
    specifically amend existing law, a point of order based on the 
    Ramseyer rule will not lie.

[[Page 3146]]

    On Oct. 1, 1963,(2) after Mr. Armistead I. Selden, Jr., 
of Alabama, moved the House resolve itself into the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of a bill (H.R. 7044), Mr. Frank T. Bow, of 
Ohio, raised a point of order that the report on the bill violated the 
Ramseyer rule. Mr. Bow stated that section 2 of the bill provided ``The 
Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission shall cease to exist upon 
completion of the construction authorized by this act, or on May 6, 
1967, whichever shall first occur.'' Mr. Bow stated that this language 
was not contained in the italic required under the Ramseyer rule, and 
did not show a change in the existing law. Mr. Bow further stated that 
the same language was in a 1958 law giving the time as to when the 
commission was to cease to exist, and that the present bill amended 
that law by setting a different date for the expiration of the 
commission. In response, Mr. Selden contended that section 2 did not 
make a specific change in the provisions of the law. The proceedings 
were as follows:
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 2. 109 Cong. Rec. 18412, 88th Cong.1st Sess. For other illustrations, 
        see 103 Cong. Rec. 8484, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., June 6, 1957 
        [H.R. 6127]; and 79 Cong. Rec. 11051, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., 
        July 11, 1935 [H. Res. 240].
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        The Speaker:(3) The gentleman will state the point 
    of order.
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 3. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
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        Mr. Bow: Mr. Speaker, the report on this bill violates rule 
    XIII, the so called Ramseyer rule. I shall not read the rule as I 
    know the Speaker is familiar with it.
        Mr. Speaker, I would point out that the bill, H.R. 7044, is a 
    bill to amend Public Law 193, 83d Congress, relating to the 
    Corregidor-Bataan Memorial Commission.
        I further point out in the bill under section (i) there is a 
    change in the plans for the memorial, changing it into the type 
    that is set forth in the bill; and that in the report under changes 
    in existing law made by the bill, as reported, the report does show 
    in italic that portion of the amendment.
        I further call the Chair's attention to the fact that section 2 
    of the bill now pending provides ``The Corregidor-Bataan Memorial 
    Commission shall cease to exist upon completion of the construction 
    authorized by this act, or on May 6, 1967, whichever shall first 
    occur.''
        I further call attention to the report of the committee in 
    which they attempt to comply with the Ramseyer rule and in that, 
    although they do comply in the one instance with the italics on the 
    construction, later, in the next paragraph of the report, is this 
    language: ``and the Commission shall cease to exist 90 days after 
    such submission of such final report.'' This is contained in roman 
    printing. It is not

[[Page 3147]]

    in the italic required under the Ramseyer rule. It does not show 
    that this is a change in existing law and, inasmuch as section 2 
    says that the Commission shall cease to exist upon the completion 
    of the construction authorized, the Speaker will find the same 
    language in the bill of 1958 giving the time as to when the 
    Commission will cease to exist. This bill does amend that law by 
    setting a different date for the expiration of the Commission and 
    it does not comply with the Ramseyer rule.
        I desire, if I may, to point out the precedents of the House 
    appearing in volume 8 from page 2236 on, and particularly that 
    precedent that says, ``Although a bill proposed one minor and 
    obvious change in existing law, the failure to indicate this 
    change'' is ``in violation of the law.'' Admittedly this is in a 
    minor and rather obvious position. Nevertheless the report of the 
    committee does not show in italic and it is a change in existing 
    law, and I submit it is a violation of the Ramseyer rule.

        Mr. Selden: Mr. Speaker, I contend that section 2 does not make 
    a specific change in the provisions of the law. Therefore the 
    report of the committee does comply with the Ramseyer rule....
        Mr. Bow: Mr. Speaker, may I reply to the gentleman from 
    Alabama?
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.
        Mr. Bow: . . . I further point out that there is a complete 
    change in the law as to the time of the expiration of the Bataan-
    Corregidor Commission.
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule. In connection with 
    section 2 that the gentleman from Ohio referred to, that is, 
    section 2 of the pending bill, the Chair will state that this 
    section does not amend existing law specifically and applies only 
    to this bill. Therefore, the report does not, in that respect, have 
    to meet the requirements of the Ramseyer rule. The portion of the 
    bill which specifically amends existing law, as the Chair sees it, 
    is paragraph (i) starting on page 1 and finishing on line 19 of 
    page 2 of that section, and it is very clear that the committee has 
    complied with the Ramseyer rule in connection with that paragraph. 
    So, for the reason stated, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Effect of Noncompliance With Rule

Sec. 60.2 Where a report failed to comply with the provisions of the 
    Ramseyer rule and a point of order is sustained on that ground, the 
    bill is recommitted to the committee reporting it.

    On May 3, 1937,(4) after the Clerk read the title of a 
bill about to be considered, Mr. Jesse P. Wolcott, of Michigan, raised 
a point of order against the consideration of the bill on the ground 
that the report did not comply with the Ramseyer rule. When Speaker 
William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, sustained the point of
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 4. 81 Cong. Rec. 4123, 4124, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was S. 709, a bill to incorporate the National Education 
        Association of the United States.
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[[Page 3148]]

order, the bill was recommitted to the Committee on Education, which 
had reported it.

        The Clerk called the next bill, S. 709, to amend the act 
    entitled ``An act to incorporate the National Education Association 
    of the United States'', approved June 30, 1906, as amended.
        Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, if it appears from the report that 
    subsection 2 (a) of rule XXIII, commonly known as the Ramseyer 
    rule, has not been complied with, is the bill automatically 
    recommitted to the committee from which it was reported?
        The Speaker: If the point of order should be sustained, under 
    the provision governing such cases the bill would automatically be 
    recommitted to the committee from which it was reported.
        Mr. Wolcott: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order against the 
    consideration of the bill (S. 709) that the so-called Ramseyer rule 
    has not been complied with.
        The Speaker: A very casual reading of the report on the bill 
    indicates the Ramseyer rule has not been complied with. .
        Does the gentleman from Michigan insist on the point of order?
        Mr. Wolcott: I insist on the point of order, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The point of order is sustained, and the bill is 
    recommitted to the Committee on Education.

Purpose of Rule

Sec. 60.3 The purpose of the Ramseyer rule is to require that committee 
    reports furnish information relating to changes the bill proposes 
    to make in existing law.

    On Dec. 3, 1963,(5) following a motion by Mr. Harold D. 
Cooley, of North Carolina, that the House resolve itself into the 
Committee of the Whole for consideration of a bill (H.R. 6196), Mr. H. 
R. Gross, of Iowa, raised a point of order against consideration of the 
bill. Mr. Gross' point of order was that House Report No. 88-336 
accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of Rule XIII 
clause 3, the Ramseyer rule. Following debate on the point of order, 
Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled on the point of 
order and commented on the purpose of the Ramseyer rule:
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 5. 109 Cong. Rec. 23038, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 6196, to encourage increased consumption of cotton; see H. 
        Rept. No. 88-366.
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        It is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the committee 
    complies with the Ramseyer rule, the purpose of which is to give 
    Members information in relation to any change in existing law.
        If a report includes some other references to other laws which 
    in a sense would be surplusage or unnecessary, it is the Chair's 
    opinion that the committee was attempting to give to the

[[Page 3149]]

    Members of the House as full information as was possible.
        The Chair rules that the report does comply with the Ramseyer 
    rule, and the point of order is overruled.

Showing Changes Proposed by Bill as Amended

Sec. 60.4 In the 87th Congress, the Ramseyer rule was amended to 
    provide that where a committee reports a bill with amendments the 
    comparative print required by the rule must show the changes in 
    existing law proposed by the bill, as amended, instead of by the 
    bill as introduced.

    On Sept. 22, 1961,(6) the Chairman of the Committee on 
Rules, Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, called up House Resolution 407, 
amending Rule XIII clause 3. Following the Clerk's reading of the 
resolution Mr. Smith and Mr. Clarence J. Brown, of Ohio, explained the 
purpose of the resolution.
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 6. 107 Cong. Rec. 20823, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

        Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives are 
    hereby amended as follows: In rule XIII, clause 3, strike out the 
    period at the end thereof, insert a colon, and add ``Provided, 
    however, That if a committee reports such a bill or joint 
    resolution with amendments or an amendment in the nature of a 
    substitute for the entire bill, such report shall include a 
    comparative print showing any changes in existing law proposed by 
    the amendments or substitute instead of as in the bill as 
    introduced.''
        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the 
    gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown] and at this time yield myself such 
    time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, this resolution provides for a change in the so-
    called Ramseyer rule of the House of Representatives. The Ramseyer 
    rule provides that when a bill is reported by a legislative 
    committee, the committee report on the bill shall contain a 
    statement in comparative print, setting forth the changes in 
    existing law that are supposed to be made by the new bill. The way 
    that that rule has been construed and the way it has operated in 
    the past has been that if a bill is introduced and referred to a 
    legislative committee, then when the bill is reported by that 
    committee, the changes in the law are pointed not at the bill which 
    is reported, but are pointed at the original bill, as introduced. 
    It, therefore, causes confusion and is not of any use to the 
    Members who are trying to find out what the changes are because, as 
    I said, the comparative print explaining the changes are not 
    pointed toward the bill you are really going to consider. So this 
    change which has been worked out by the Parliamentarian in 
    connection with the Committee on Rules and which has the unanimous 
    approval of the Committee on Rules would make it so that in order 
    to comply with the Ramseyer

[[Page 3150]]

    rule, the report would have to print in comparative columns or 
    italic or other distinguishing symbols the changes in existing law 
    which would be made by the bill which is under consideration and 
    not by the bill which was originally introduced
        Mr. Speaker, I hope that explanation is clear to the Members, 
    but if it is not, I will be glad to yield or any questions to any 
    Member who may wish to ask about it.
        If there are no questions, Mr. Speaker, I yield now to my 
    colleague, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Brown].
        Mr. Brown: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may use.
        Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Virginia, the chairman of 
    the Committee on Rules, Mr. Smith, has explained, this resolution 
    provides for an amendment to rule XIII, clause 3, through an 
    amendment which I believe is very much needed, has been requested 
    by many Members of the House, and which, as the gentleman from 
    Virginia has stated, would simply provide, instead of following the 
    present procedure of printing in a committee report the original 
    bill and the changes in the present law made by the original bill, 
    the report would carry the bill, as amended, and the differences 
    between the present law as provided in the final bill as presented.
        In other words, the adoption of this resolution making this 
    change in the rules will eliminate a great deal of confusion and 
    make it much easier for all Members of Congress, even members of 
    the Committee on Rules itself, in considering legislation to 
    understand just exactly what is in the bill that may be before them 
    and what changes are made by such legislation from existing law. 
    This has been long needed. It is a very good amendment of the rule.
        This resolution was reported unanimously from the Committee on 
    Rules, and I hope it will have the unanimous support of the House.
        Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, 1 have no further requests 
    for time.
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The resolution was agreed to.

Supplemental Reports Complying With Rule

Sec. 60.5 By unanimous consent, a committee may be permitted to file a 
    supplemental report on a bill so as to conform to the Ramseyer rule 
    and show the changes in existing law proposed by the committee 
    amendments as well as by the provisions of the bill as introduced.

    On Jan. 11, 1962,(7) Mr. Adam C. Powell, of New York, 
sought and obtained unanimous consent that the Committee on Education 
and Labor be permitted to file a supplemental report on a bill 
(H. R. 8890). Mr. Powell stated to Speaker John W. McCormack, of
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 7. 108 Cong. Rec. 67, 87th Cong. 2d Sess.
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[[Page 3151]]

Massachusetts, that he was making the request so that the committee 
report would comply with the Ramseyer rule, which Mr. Powell noted had 
been amended by the House since the filing of the original report on 
the bill.(8)
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 8. Parliamentarian's Note: Today, unanimous consent is not required to 
        file a supplemental report correcting a technical error, such 
        as a violation of the Ramseyer rule, in a previous report. See 
        Rule XI clause 2(l)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 714 (1979).
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Application of Rule to Subsections

Sec. 60.6 Where a bill amends one subsection of existing law but does 
    not affect other parts of the section, a comparative print which 
    shows only the affected subsection is in substantial compliance 
    with the Ramseyer rule.

    On July 25, 1966,(9~) Mr. John Bell Williams, of 
Mississippi, made a point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765, 
on the ground that the report of the Committee on the Judiciary 
accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of the 
Ramseyer rule. In response to the point of order, Mr. Emanuel Celler, 
of New York, stated that the report disclosed no information with 
respect to certain sections of the bill. Mr. Celler explained that 
there were no changes in or amendments to those provisions, so that 
there was no need to set forth explanatory material on them:
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 9. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840-42, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 14765 (H. Rept. No. 89-1678), the Civil Rights Act of 
        1966.
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        . . . Since there were no changes, there was no need to make 
    any comment. There was no ambiguity there. There was no 
    misinformation. There is nothing that is misleading. There is no 
    confusion. It is . . . substantial compliance.

    As debate on the point of order continued, Mr. Joe D. Waggonner, 
Jr., of Louisiana, questioned whether substantial compliance was 
sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule, stating:

        Mr. Speaker, under the rules of the House of Representatives no 
    provision is made for use of the word ``substantial'' is it deemed 
    sufficient in this case that compliance is only substantial and not 
    technically complete?

    After studying the precedents of the House, Speaker John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled that there was substantial 
compliance, stating:

        Well, as the Chair states . . . the Chair cannot analyze every 
    word, but there are parts here apparent to the Chair that, of 
    course, are not only substantial compliance but which are cer

[[Page 3152]]

    tainly over compliance, which is not violative of the rule, as has 
    been advanced.

    The Chair therefore overruled the point of order.
    On a parliamentary inquiry following the Chair's ruling, Mr. 
Waggonner asked:

        Do I correctly understand the ruling of the Speaker that in 
    this instance . . . ``substantial compliance'' is all that is 
    necessary and technicalities are irrelevant? Is compliance in fact 
    with the rules to be ignored?

    The Speaker replied:

        The Chair will state that substantial compliance, as the Chair 
    is not in a position to analyze every word, would comply with and 
    be in conformance with the rule.

Showing Statutory Waivers and Exemptions

Sec. 60.7 Provisions in a bill, merely waiving certain statutory 
    requirements, were held not to be specially amendatory of existing 
    law and the Ramseyer rule did not apply to language in a bill 
    merely exempting personnel of a proposed agency from conflict of 
    interest statutes.

    On June 6, 1957,(10) after Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New 
York, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of H.R. 6127, a civil rights bill, Mr. 
Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, made a point of order against the bill on 
the basis of noncompliance with the Ramseyer rule.
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10. 103 Cong. Rec. 8484-88, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    The initial exchange went as follows:

        Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself 
    into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for 
    the consideration of the bill (H.R. 6127) to provide means of 
    further securing and protecting the civil rights of persons within 
    the jurisdiction of the United States.
        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order 
    against the bill.
        The Speaker:(11) The gentleman will state his point 
    of order.
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11. Sam Rayburn (Tex.)
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        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order 
    that the report on the bill does not comply with the provisions of 
    the Ramseyer rule, which is rule XIII, clause 3.
        I call the Speaker's attention to the provision of the bill 
    appearing on page 7, line 12, which reads as follows:

            Members of the Commission, voluntary and uncompensated 
        personnel whose services are accepted pursuant to subsection 
        (b) of this section, and members of advisory committees 
        constituted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall 
        be exempt from the operation of sections 281, 283, 284, 434, 
        and 1914 of title 18 of the United States Code, and section 190 
        of the Revised Statutes.

[[Page 3153]]

        Now, Mr. Speaker, I also call attention to the provision of the 
    bill providing on page 9, line 8, for the appointment of another 
    and additional Assistant Attorney General, which changes existing 
    law and which fixes the number of Assistant Attorneys General and 
    which changes the provision of existing law that fixes the 
    qualification of Assistant Attorneys General in that it omits the 
    requirement that an Assistant Attorney General must be a member of 
    the legal profession.
        Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to discuss the matter in some detail 
    unless the gentleman from New York is prepared to concede the point 
    of order.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is not prepared to 
    concede anything.

        The point of order is not well taken. With reference to the 
    statement referring to the members of the Commission, the gentleman 
    called attention to page 7, lines 12 to 19. That is a waiver of the 
    conflict-of-interest statutes which involves no change whatsoever 
    in those statutes. It simply provides for the waiver of the 
    statutes. That is very frequently done. The Committee on the 
    Judiciary has jurisdiction over matters of that sort; namely, 
    waiver of conflict-of-interest statutes.
        With reference to the gentleman's opinion concerning the part 
    II provision for an additional Assistant Attorney General, lines 6 
    to 14 on page 9, I wish to state that no law is amended. We simply 
    provide for an additional Assistant Attorney General.

    While Mr. Smith and proponents of his view contended that any 
technical defect in the committee report for failure to comply with the 
Ramseyer rule was fatal to the bill, Mr. Celler responded that a waiver 
of conflict of interest statutes did not fall within the requirements 
of the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Celler stated: ``[W]hen you waive the 
provisions of a statute, you do not change the provisions of that 
statute and you do not amend the provisions of that statute.'' 
(12) Mr. Celler further stated that language in the bill 
adding a new assistant attorney general merely created a new position 
and did not amend a statute.
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12. 103 Cong. Rec. 8486, 85th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    After continued debate on the point of order, Speaker Rayburn 
overruled the point of order as follows: (13)
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13. Id. at pp. 8487, 8488.
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        The Chair is prepared to rule.
        This question, or parallel questions, has been raised many 
    times. The rulings of the Chair have been uniform. . . .
        Turning to the first part of the bill on page 7, paragraph (d), 
    which reads as follows: ``(d) Members of the Commission, voluntary 
    and uncompensated personnel whose services are accepted pursuant to 
    subsection (b) of this section, and members of advisory committees 
    constituted pursuant to subsection (c) of this section, shall be 
    exempt from the operation of sections 281, 283, 284, 434, and 1914 
    of title 18 of the United

[[Page 3154]]

    States Code, and section 190 of the Revised Statutes (5 U.S.C. 
    99),'' the Chair holds that that is simply a waiver of the statute 
    and not a specific amendment to any existing law. Therefore, the 
    Chair overrules the point of order with respect to that.
        Section 111, page 9, which reads as follows: ``Sec. 111. There 
    shall be in the Department of Justice one additional Assistant 
    Attorney General, who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
    with the advice and consent of the Senate, who shall assist the 
    Attorney General in the performance of his duties, and who shall 
    receive compensation at the rate prescribed by law for other 
    Assistant Attorneys General,'' does not amend any specific law, 
    because it does not refer to any. Congress has the right at any 
    time it pleases, the Chair thinks, to provide for an additional 
    Assistant Attorney General or an additional assistant in any other 
    department.
        Now then, we come to the part of the bill where specific 
    statutes are amended. And, the Chair might say here that Mr. Snell, 
    Speaker pro tem on February 7, 1931--Cannon's Precedents, volume 
    VIII, section 2235--made this ruling: In order to fall within the 
    purview of the rule requiring indication of proposed changes in 
    existing law by a typographical device, a bill must repeal or amend 
    the statute in terms, and general reference to the subject treated 
    in a statute without proposing specific amendment is not 
    sufficient.
        Mr. O'Connor of New York on April 13, 1932--Cannon's 
    Precedents, Volume VIII, section 2240--made a ruling on this 
    specific question, and the gist of that is that the bill is not 
    subject to the rule requiring comparative prints unless it 
    specifically amends existing law.
        Now, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Cooper] on April 15, 
    1940, as Speaker pro tempore, went just a little further than that. 
    The substance of his ruling was: In determining whether or not a 
    committee in reporting a bill has complied with the Ramseyer rule, 
    the duty does not devolve upon the Chair of analyzing every word of 
    existing law and the changes sought to be made. Hence, Mr. Cooper 
    held that an effort to substantially comply with the rule only was 
    necessary.
        Now, let the Chair read portions of part III and part IV of the 
    bill, where specific law is specifically amended: . . .
        Remembering what has gone before, the Chair finds on page 16 of 
    the committee report changes in existing law set forth as follows:

            In compliance with clause 3 of rule XIII of the House of 
        Representatives, there is printed below in roman existing law 
        in which no change is proposed by enactment of the bill as here 
        reported; matter proposed to be stricken by the bill as here 
        reported is here enclosed in black brackets: new language 
        proposed by the bill as here reported is printed in italic.

        And there follows then the existing law proposed to be amended.
        The Chair has examined this bill carefully and has examined 
    this committee report very carefully, and must hold that the 
    committee did comply in substance and in fact with clause 3 of rule 
    XIII.
        Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Changes in Court Rules

Sec. 60.8 The Ramseyer rule requirement that a compara

[[Page 3155]]

    tive print be provided in reports on bills reported by a committee 
    is not applicable to a bill changing the rules of evidence for 
    District of Columbia courts.

    On June 12, 1961,(14) Mr. John L. McMillan, of South 
Carolina, called up the bill (H.R. 7053), providing for the admission 
of certain evidence in the courts of the District of Columbia, and 
asked unanimous consent that the bill be considered in the House as in 
the Committee of the Whole. Mr. Byron G. Rogers, of Colorado, objected 
to the consideration of the bill on the ground that it did not comply 
with the Ramseyer rule, and said that in the report of the committee no 
reference was made to the law which was being amended. In the debate on 
the point of order, Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, argued that the 
change was directed at court rules, not a statute. Speaker Sam Rayburn, 
of Texas, then overruled the point of order, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 107 Cong. Rec. 10068, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
            For a similar ruling see also 83 Cong. Rec. 1147, 75th 
        Cong. 3d Sess., Jan. 26, 1938, involving H.R. 2890, fixing 
        annual compensation for postmasters of the fourth class.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair in examining this bill cannot see where it amends any 
    law or repeals any law specifically, and therefore does not think 
    the report is in violation of the Ramseyer rule, and therefore 
    overrules the point of order.

References to Laws Unaffected by Bill

Sec. 60.9 A point of order will not lie against a committee report 
    merely because the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule 
    incorporates laws which are not affected by the reported bill but 
    which are included to give full information to the Members.

    On Dec. 3, 1963,(15) Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa, raised a 
point of order against the consideration of H.R. 6196, alleging that 
House Report No. 88-366 accompanying the bill did not comply with the 
requirements of the Ramseyer rule. In debate on the point of order Mr. 
Harold D. Cooley, of North Carolina, acknowledged that there was 
extraneous and unneeded material in the report but this did not 
constitute a violation of the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Cooley stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 109 Cong. Rec. 23036-38, 88th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        I want to make just one additional observation. I think the 
    Speaker of the House and the Parliamentarian will find that all 
    changes in existing law

[[Page 3156]]

    have been shown in our report under the Ramseyer rule. The rule 
    does not say that you cannot have something else in the report 
    which might be surplus and which might not be needed. But if you 
    will look at section 104 on page 25 that is a strict compliance 
    with the Ramseyer rule insofar as this legislation is concerned.
        The reference to section 330, I think, is irrelevant and 
    immaterial and is not even needed, perhaps, in this report. But we 
    believe this is a meticulous compliance with the Ramseyer rule and 
    we ask that the point of order be overruled.

    Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, then overruled the 
point of order. The Speaker stated:

        It is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the committee 
    complies with the Ramseyer rule, the purpose of which is to give 
    Members information in relation to any change in existing law.
        If a report includes some other references to other laws which 
    in a sense would be surplusage or unnecessary, it is the Chair's 
    opinion that the committee was attempting to give to the Members of 
    the House as full information as was possible.

Application of Rule to Discharged Bills

Sec. 60.10 The Ramseyer rule applies only when a committee reports a 
    bill. Hence, a point of order alleging noncompliance with the rule 
    will not lie where a committee is discharged from consideration of 
    a bill.

    On Aug. 19, 1964,(16) Mr. James G. O'Hara, of Michigan, 
made a point of order against the consideration of a bill on the ground 
it had not been properly reported and that it purported to amend title 
28 of the United States Code. He contended that there was no 
comparative print of the bill amending the statute. Speaker John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, overruled the point of order, noting that 
the Ramseyer rule applied only when a committee reports a bill. In this 
case, the Committee on the Judiciary, having been discharged from 
consideration of the bill, did not file a report, and a comparative 
print was not required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 110 Cong. Rec. 20221, 20222, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 11926, limiting the jurisdiction of 
        federal courts in apportionment cases, considered pursuant to 
        H. Res. 845.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

``Substantial Compliance'' With Rule

Sec. 60.11 A point of order raised against a committee report alleged 
    to be in violation of the Ramseyer rule will not lie where there is 
    substantial compliance with the require

[[Page 3157]]

    ment that the report disclose changes in existing law. Thus, a 
    letter from the head of an agency in a committee report, setting 
    out proposed changes in existing law, was held to be a substantial 
    compliance with the Ramseyer rule.

    On Jan. 26, 1938,(17) Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, made 
a point of order against H.R. 8176, a bill dealing with retirement pay 
for military officers, based on alleged violation of the Ramseyer rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 83 Cong. Rec. 1143-46, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Speaker William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, overruled the point of 
order, finding that the report was in substantial compliance with the 
rule. It appeared that a letter to the committee from an Army General, 
explaining certain changes that the bill would make in existing law, 
substantially satisfied the requirement, although Mr. Patman pointed 
out that the letter had been written a month before the committee 
reported the bill and that some changes in the bill had been made 
subsequent to the date of the letter.

        Mr. Patman: Mr. Speaker, I have a further point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Patman: That is, that the Ramseyer rule is not complied 
    with in the report of the committee in reporting the bill. Section 
    3 of the bill undertakes to amend existing law. The Ramseyer rule 
    requires that a committee report shall disclose where there is an 
    effort made specifically to change existing law and shall set out 
    in parallel columns or in some way make it clear and plain to the 
    Members of the House just exactly how the proposed amendment will 
    affect existing law. I know that rule does not require any 
    particular method to be used. I am aware of the fact that in the 
    committee's report, although the committee's report says nothing 
    about this amendment--that is, it is not set out specifically in 
    italics, brackets, or otherwise--but in the letter from General 
    Hines to the Honorable Lister Hill, commencing on page 4 of the 
    report, there is mention, on page 5 of the report, in that letter, 
    that a certain amendment is proposed but it does not say that that 
    is the only amendment in that particular section. I do not know; I 
    am unable to find out whether or not that is all or just a part 
    that General Hines happens to be discussing. He does not say that 
    is the only way that section is amended. He is just saying that it 
    is amended to that extent. I submit that is not a compliance with 
    the letter and spirit of the Ramseyer rule, which is part of the 
    parliamentary rules of this House, and I make the point of order 
    against the report on that ground.
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order. The gentleman from Texas makes the point of order that the 
    report of the committee does not conform to the provisions of the 
    Ramseyer rule. . . .
        With reference to the particular point of order made by the 
    gentleman

[[Page 3158]]

    from Texas, the Chair has examined with some care the report of the 
    committee which accompanies this bill, and, indeed, the gentleman 
    from Texas has referred to the matter occurring in the letter on 
    page 4 of the report, the letter from General Hines to the then 
    chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, in which upon page 5 of 
    the report in subsection (b) of section 212, there is set out in 
    italics the only amendment to the existing law that is proposed in 
    the bill, as the Chair understands it. The Chair is of opinion that 
    if the rule itself had not provided that those changes might be 
    incorporated in the report by citing an accompanying document, very 
    probably the point of order made by the gentleman from Texas would 
    be good, but the Chair feels, upon examination of this matter, 
    inasmuch as the only amendment to existing law is set out in 
    italics in an accompanying document to the report of the committee, 
    that a substantial compliance with the rule has been made. . . .
        The Chair will state--and this is the final statement of the 
    Chair upon this matter--that the Chair has examined the bill with 
    considerable care. The Chair feels justified in saying that section 
    3 of the bill is, as a matter of fact, the only specific change in 
    existing law proposed by the bill.
        The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from Texas.

Sec. 60.12 A point of order will not lie against a committee report on 
    the ground that the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule 
    contains a minor typographical error, where the committee has made 
    a substantial effort to comply with the rule.

    On July 26, 1965,(18) after Mr. Adam C. Powell, of New 
York, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of a bill, Mr. Robert P. Griffin, of 
Michigan, made a point of order against the motion on the ground that 
the report (H. Rept. No. 89-540), on the bill failed to comply with the 
provisions of the Ramseyer rule (Rule XIII clause 3), in that it did 
not correctly indicate the changes proposed in the first proviso of 
section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Mr. Griffin called 
attention to the fact that the matter in italics on page 5 of the 
report read ``or in any constitution of [sic] law of any State or 
political subdivision thereof,'' whereas the same language in the bill 
read ``or in any constitution or law of any State or political 
subdivision thereof.'' The difference was that the report showed the 
word ``of,'' where the bill used the word ``or.'' Mr. Griffin argued 
that the failure to re

[[Page 3159]]

port on the bill to indicate this change was in violation of the rule, 
and that the bill should therefore be recommitted to the Committee on 
Education and Labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 111 Cong. Rec. 18100, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 77, a bill to repeal Sec. 14(b) of the National Labor 
        Relations Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts overruled the point of 
order, stating:

        The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair will state that this situation has arisen on several 
    occasions in the past.
        Speaker pro tempore Cooper, on April 15, 1940, having a similar 
    question presented to him on a point of order, ruled that ``it is 
    the opinion of the Chair that the duty does not devolve upon the 
    Chair to analyze every word of existing law or to pass upon the 
    sufficiency or compliance with the provisions of the so-called 
    Ramseyer rule.'' The Chair then was of the opinion that the 
    committee reporting the bill had made an effort to comply with the 
    provisions of the Ramseyer rule, and the present occupant of the 
    Chair expresses the same opinion and makes the same ruling, that 
    is, that the committee made a substantial effort to comply with the 
    requirements of the rule.
        Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Sec. 60.13 Where a point of order is raised against consideration of a 
    bill on the ground that the report thereon does not adequately 
    reflect all the changes in existing law as required by the Ramseyer 
    rule, the Speaker may overrule the point of order on the ground 
    that the committee has ``substantially complied'' with the rule.

    On July 30, 1968,(19) Mr. Paul Findley, of Illinois, 
raised a point of order against a motion by Mr. William R. Poage, of 
Texas, that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole 
for the consideration of a bill. Mr. Findley's point of order against 
consideration of the bill was based on the grounds the committee report 
failed to comply with the provisions of the Ramseyer rule in that the 
comparative print required thereby contained errors of four types. He 
stated the report failed to show by ``stars'' the omission of certain 
sections not carried in the Ramseyer print, typographical errors, 
errors of punctuation, and a failure to indicate one out of 28 date 
changes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 114 Cong. Rec. 24245, 24252-54, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 17126, with its accompanying committee 
        report, H. Rept. No. 90-1374, the Extension of Food and 
        Agriculture Act of 1965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, in overruling the 
point of order, stated:

        There appear to be 22 pages in the committee report referring 
    to changes in existing law.

[[Page 3160]]

        A few years ago the Chair passed on the basic question of 
    substantial compliance in connection with another bill. It seems to 
    the Chair that the committee has substantially complied with the 
    requirements of the Ramseyer rule. I have used the words ``at 
    least.'' If a higher test was called for, I could probably say the 
    committee has complied with the requirements of the Ramseyer rule. 
    In any event, it is the opinion of the Chair that the report of the 
    committee at least shows substantial compliance with the provisions 
    of the Ramseyer rule, and accordingly, the Chair overrules the 
    point of order.

Sec. 60.14 Where the comparative print required by the Ramseyer rule 
    contained errors of three types (1) punctuation at variance with 
    that in the bill, (2) capitalization of certain words not 
    capitalized in the bill, and (3) abbreviations which did not appear 
    in the bill--the Speaker held that there was substantial compliance 
    with the provisions of the rule and overruled a point of order 
    against the report.

    On July 25, 1966,(20) Mr. John Bell Williams, of 
Mississippi, made a point of order against consideration of a bill 
(H.R. 14765), on the ground that the report of the Committee on the 
Judiciary accompanying the bill did not comply with the requirements of 
the Ramseyer rule. Mr. Williams stated, in part:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840-42, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 14765 and its accompanying report, H. Rept. No. 89-
        1678, the Civil Rights Acts of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The first error I would like to call to the attention of the 
    Chair is set forth on page 49 of the committee report, at the 
    bottom of the page, purporting to show amendments made to section 
    16-1312 of the District of Columbia Code. The bill, in section 
    103(e), found on page 52, lines 1 through 5, states as follows:

            Section 16-1312 of the District of Columbia Code is 
        amended--

        And so on--yet the report does not set out the section 
    amended--it merely sets out selected excerpts from the sections.
        I cannot tell from looking at the material on page 49 of the 
    report just what the amendments to the section accomplish, and I 
    defy any other Member to do so. Subsection (a) of that section sets 
    out the duties of the jury commission, but the matter printed in 
    the report fails to set out all the duties as prescribed by the 
    section. Then the printed matter completely omits subsection (b) of 
    the amended section, and subsection (c) as printed in the report 
    states:

            (c) Except as provided by this section, Chapter 121 of 
        title 28, U.S.C., insofar as it may be applicable, governs 
        qualifications of jurors.

        But how can a Member tell what is provided by the section, when 
    the section is not set out for him to see?
        This section 16-1312 which is amended by the bill also contains 
    a

[[Page 3161]]

    subsection (d), which is not printed in the report.
        Mr. Speaker, this failure of the report to show the law which 
    is changed by the bill makes it impossible for Members to be able 
    to determine just what changes are actually being made in the 
    section, and therefore fails to comply with either the spirit or 
    the letter of the Ramseyer rule. Of course, for that matter, even 
    the material printed in the subsection (c) at the bottom of page 49 
    of the report fails to comply literally with the rule, since the 
    material in italic is not literally the same as the material 
    proposed to be inserted by the bill--the Ramseyer abbreviates to 
    ``U.S.C.'' the words ``United States Code'' appearing in the bill. 
    The same erroneous abbreviation also appears in the amendment made 
    to subsection (a) of that section.
        Another failure to follow the literal text of the bill can also 
    be found on page 52 of the report, Mr. Speaker, where the text of 
    the proposed new section 303 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
    differs substantially in form from the section 303 added to that 
    act by the bill, on page 79, lines 10 through 19.
        Most serious of the deficiencies in this report, however, Mr. 
    Speaker, is the matter appearing on page 53 of the report, where 
    the report purports to show changes in title III of the Civil 
    Rights Act of 1960 made by section 701 of the bill, which appears 
    on page 80, line 9. Section 701 states ``Title III of the Civil 
    Rights Act of 1960 is amended'' and so on--yet the report does not 
    even purport to show title III of that act or any part thereof--all 
    that Members have to guide them as to the provisions of title III 
    is a row of asterisks, which I must confess I do not find very 
    helpful--especially since the proposed new section 307 of the Civil 
    Rights Act of 1960 refers back to section 301 of the Civil Rights 
    Act of 1960 stating--page 80 lines 12 and 13 of the bill--``Any 
    officer of election or custodian required under section 301 of this 
    Act to retain and preserve records and papers may'' and so forth. 
    This portion of the committee's report is completely worthless, in 
    my judgment, in helping Members to understand the changes made in 
    existing law made by the bill.
        The Ramseyer rule requires that the report show, and I quote:

            That part of the bill or joint resolution making the 
        amendment and of the statute or part thereof proposed to be 
        amended.

        I submit, most respectfully, Mr. Speaker, that with respect to 
    title III of the Civil Rights Act of 1960, there has been a 
    complete failure to comply with the portion of the Ramseyer rule 
    requiring that the statute proposed to be amended be shown. The 
    report does not show the statute, and it does not even show any 
    part of the statute--not even the part of the statute most 
    necessary to understand what the proposed section 307 is all about; 
    namely, section 301 which is cross-referenced to in the proposed 
    section 307.
        Mr. Speaker, on page 43 of the report, sections 1873 and 1874 
    of title 18 of the United States Code are shown as repealed, and 
    new language added in their place; also the Ramseyer on the same 
    page shows two new sections added--sections 1875 and 1876. I have 
    not been able to find any place in the bill which repeals any of 
    these sections, or which adds new text as sec

[[Page 3162]]

    tions 1875 and 1876, although the explanatory matter on page 35 of 
    the report, under the heading ``Changes in existing law'' states as 
    follows:

            Matter proposed to be stricken by the bill as reported is 
        enclosed in black brackets. New language proposed by the bill 
        as reported is printed in italic.

        I, for one, find this very confusing, if the intent is to show 
    the changes in section numbers made by section 103 of the bill, 
    especially since the language preceding the Ramseyer states that 
    ``there is printed below in roman existing law in which no change 
    is proposed.''
        This is, at best, a very odd way to show a renumbering of 
    sections--so odd, in fact, that I think its potential for confusion 
    is such as to render it a violation of the Ramseyer rule.
        In summary, Mr. Speaker, the committee report fails to comply 
    with the Ramseyer rule by showing language in the report as a 
    purported change in existing law which is not the same as language 
    contained in the bill; the report fails to show the entire text of 
    a section which is proposed to be amended by the bill, but leaves 
    Members to guess as to what the amendment actually does; the report 
    fails to show any part whatsoever of a provision of law amended by 
    the bill, even where the setting forth of such provision is 
    essential to understanding of the changes made; and shows 
    nonexistence repeals and amendments as a means of showing 
    renumbering of sections.
        I respectfully submit that this point of order should be 
    sustained and the bill recommitted to the Committee on the 
    Judiciary in accordance with the rules of the House.

    Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New York, citing the technical and 
insubstantial nature of Mr. Williams' objections, stated with respect 
to sections of title III of the statute not quoted in the report, that 
no changes in those sections were proposed by the bill. Speaker John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, then overruled the point of order. 
Implicitly adopting the view that only those portions of existing law 
directly affected by a bill need be shown in a comparative print (see 
Sec. 60.6, supra), the Speaker indicated that there had been 
substantial compliance with the Ramseyer rule in the report in 
question, and that substantial compliance was a sufficient basis for 
overruling the point of order under that rule. Citing as a precedent a 
ruling on the same subject on Apr. 15, 1940, by Speaker pro tempore 
Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, Speaker McCormack stated:

        Now, on the pending point of order, the Chair calls attention 
    to the fact that there are approximately 18 pages in the committee 
    report which relate to complying with the Ramseyer rule.
        It is the opinion of the Chair that the committee has 
    substantially complied with the Ramseyer rule, and follows the 
    decision which I have referred to, and which was made in 1940 by 
    Speaker pro tempore Cooper, and reaffirms that decision.
        The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.

[[Page 3163]]

Timeliness in Invoking Rule

Sec. 60.15 The proper time to raise a point of order that a committee 
    report fails to comply with the Ramseyer rule is when the motion is 
    made to resolve into the Committee of the Whole to consider the 
    bill.

    On July 30, 1968,(1) during debate on House Resolution 
1218, which provided that it should be in order to move that the House 
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of 
a bill, Mr. Paul Findley, of Illinois, unsuccessfully attempted to 
raise a point of order against further consideration of the motion on 
the ground that the committee report accompanying the bill did not 
comply with the provisions of the Ramseyer rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 114 Cong. Rec. 24245, 24252, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 17126, the extension of the 1965 Food 
        and Agriculture Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Speaker pro tempore John J. Rooney, of New York, ruled that a point 
of order on that ground was not appropriate at that time. Mr. Findley 
then inquired as to when the point would be in order. The Speaker pro 
tempore replied that it could be raised when the motion was made to 
resolve into the Committee of the Whole. After the previous question 
was ordered on the resolution and the resolution was agreed to, Mr. 
William R. Poage, of Texas, moved that the House resolve itself into 
the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the bill. Speaker 
John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, then heard Mr. Findley on his 
point of order.

Sec. 60.16 A point of order that a committee report fails to comply 
    with the Ramseyer rule will not lie in the Committee of the Whole.

    On July 25, 1966,(2) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Richard Bolling, of Missouri, ruled untimely a point of order 
raised by Mr. John Bell Williams, of Mississippi, against consideration 
of a civil rights bill on the ground that the report of the Committee 
on the Judiciary accompanying the bill did not comply with requirements 
of the Ramseyer rule. On appeal, the Chair's ruling was upheld by a 
division vote of 139-101. Mr. Williams had attempted to raise the point 
of order prior to the House's resolving itself into the Committee of 
the Whole, but, as Speaker John W. McCormack,
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 3164]]

of Massachusetts, later acknowledged, the Chair did not hear Mr. 
Williams make his point of order. After the Committee rose on motion of 
Mr. Williams before general debate had commenced, the Speaker stated 
that under the circumstances Mr. Williams could make his point of order 
at that time.

    The proceedings were as follows:

        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    14765) to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury 
    selection and service, to facilitate the desegregation of public 
    education and other public facilities, to provide judicial relief 
    against discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties 
    for certain acts of violence or intimidation. and for other 
    purposes.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: All those in favor of the motion will let it be 
    known by saying ``aye.'' All those opposed by saying ``no.''
        The motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of 
    the bill, H.R. 14765, with Mr. Bolling in the chair.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a point of order. I was on my feet----
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was 
    dispensed with.
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Celler) will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Ohio 
    [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [William M.] McCulloch: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Ohio 
    rise?
        Mr. McCulloch: Mr. Chairman, I rise for a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. McCulloch: I would like to know if the resolution 
    unqualifiedly guarantees the minority one-half of the time during 
    general debate and nothing untoward will happen so that it will be 
    diminished or denied contrary to gentlemen's agreements.
        The Chairman: The Chairman will reply by rereading that portion 
    of his opening statement. Under the rule, the gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Celler], will be recognized for 5 hours, the gentleman 
    from Ohio [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours. The Chair 
    will follow the rules.
        Mr. McCulloch: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
    care to use. Mr. Chairman, Negroes propose to be

[[Page 3165]]

    free. Many rights have been denied and withheld from them. The 
    right to be equally educated with whites. The right to equal 
    housing with whites. The right to equal recreation with whites.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        Mr. Celler: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, immediately before the House 
    resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House I was on my 
    feet on the floor seeking recognition for the purpose of making a 
    point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765 on the ground 
    that the report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill 
    does not comply with all the requirements of clause 3 of rule XIII 
    of the rules of the House known as the Ramseyer rule and intended 
    to request I be heard in support of that point of order. I was not 
    recognized by the Chair. I realize technically under the rules of 
    the House at this point, my point of order may come too late, after 
    the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union.

        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: But I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I sought to 
    raise the point of order before the House went into session. May I 
    ask this question? Is there any way that this point of order can 
    lie at this time?
        The Chairman: Not at this time. It lies only in the House, the 
    Chair must inform the gentleman from Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: May I say that the Parliamentarian and the 
    Speaker were notified in advance and given copies of the point of 
    order that I desired to raise, and I was refused recognition 
    although I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time.
        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: I appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair will have to repeat that the gentleman 
    from Mississippi is well aware that this present occupant of the 
    chair is powerless to do other than he has stated.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    stand as rendered?
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Williams) there were--ayes 139, noes 101.
        The decision of the Chair was sustained.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now 
    rise, and on that I demand tellers.
        Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. 
    Celler and Mr. Williams.
        The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that 
    there were-- ayes 168, noes 144.
        So the motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed 
    the chair, Mr. Bolling, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, 
    having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14765) to assure 
    nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service, 
    to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other 
    public facilities, to provide

[[Page 3166]]

    judicial relief against discriminatory housing practices, to 
    prescribe penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation, 
    and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, the House resolved itself into the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union a moment 
    ago. When the question was put by the Chair, I was on my feet 
    seeking recognition for the purpose of offering a point of order 
    against consideration of the legislation. Although I shouted rather 
    loudly, apparently the Chair did not hear me. Since the Committee 
    proceeded to go into the Committee of the Whole, I would like to 
    know, Mr. Speaker, if the point of order which I had intended to 
    offer can be offered now in the House against the consideration of 
    the bill; and, Mr. Speaker, I make such a point of order and ask 
    that I be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair did not hear 
    the gentleman make his point of order. There was too much noise. 
    Under the circumstances the Chair will entertain the point of 
    order.

Sec. 60.17 A point of order that a report fails to comply with the 
    requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated 
    typographically, as required by the Ramseyer rule, is properly made 
    when the bill is called up in the House and before the House 
    resolves into the Committee of the Whole.

    On July 13, 1959,(3) immediately after Mr. Thomas G. 
Abernethy, of Mississippi, moved that the House resolve itself into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
consideration of the bill, Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa, inquired of the 
Speaker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 105 Cong. Rec. 13226, 13227, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 6893, a bill to amend the District of 
        Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 with respect to motor vehicle 
        parking areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a point of order against the 
    consideration of the bill and the report. When is the proper time 
    to seek recognition for this purpose?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore:(4) This is the proper time 
    for the gentleman to make his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thereupon, Mr. Gross made a point of order against language found 
in the bill which, under the Ramseyer rule, was not stated in the 
accompanying report in italicized or other distinctive print. Mr. 
Abernethy then withdrew the motion and obtained unanimous consent that 
the bill be recommitted to the committee.

Sec. 60.18 A point of order that a committee report on a measure does 
    not comply with the Ramseyer rule comes too late

[[Page 3167]]

    after the House has resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole 
    to consider the measure and debate has begun.

    On Apr. 29, 1941,(5) after the House had resolved itself 
into the Committee of the Whole, Mr. John Taber, of New York, made a 
point of order against a measure on the basis that it apparently 
amended an earlier 1938 agriculture act, a change not disclosed in the 
committee report. After some substantiation of Mr. Taber's point of 
order, Mr. Hampton P. Fulmer, of South Carolina, in turn made a point 
of order against the prior point of order, on the ground that it came 
too late and should have been made before the House resolved itself 
into the Committee of the Whole. Chairman Harry P. Beam, of Illinois, 
then sustained Mr. Fulmer's point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
  5. 87 Cong. Rec. 3421, 77th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.J. Res. 149, concerning corn and wheat quotas and loans. See 
        also 87 Cong. Rec. 3585, 77th Cong. 1st Sess., May 5, 1941.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proceedings were as follows:

        The Chairman: All time has expired. The Clerk will read.
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the 
    bill and the report of the committee that the report does not 
    comply with the Ramseyer rule.
        The Chairman: The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman on 
    the point of order. . . .
        Mr. Fulmer rose.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from South 
    Carolina rise?
        Mr. Fulmer: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    point of order of the gentleman from New York comes too late. The 
    point of order should have been made in the House instead of in the 
    Committee of the Whole.
        The Chairman: The Chairman will be glad to hear the gentleman 
    from South Carolina on the point of order.
        Mr. Fulmer: I do not care to say anything further on the point 
    of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York has made a point of 
    order that the report on the joint resolution does not comply with 
    the Ramseyer rule. The gentleman referred first to subparagraph 11 
    on page 7 of the joint resolution, which reads as follows:

            The provisions of this resolution are amendatory of and 
        supplementary to the act, and all provisions of law applicable 
        in respect of marketing quotas and loans under such act as so 
        amended and supplemented shall be applicable, but nothing in 
        this resolution shall be construed to amend or repeal section 
        301(b)(6), 323(b) (except as provided in par. (7)), or 335(d) 
        of the act.

        The gentleman from New York has pointed out various other 
    paragraphs

[[Page 3168]]

    of the joint resolution to substantiate his statement that there 
    has been no compliance with the Ramseyer rule.
        Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, volume 8, 
    page 51, section 2243, reads as follows:

            The point of order that a report fails to comply with the 
        requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated 
        typographically is properly made when the bill is called up in 
        the House and it comes too late after the House has resolved 
        into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the 
        hill.

        Again, the Chair points out that on February 10, 1937, the 
    Chairman [Mr. Lanham], while proceeding in the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union, substantiating the language 
    the Chair has just read, held, in effect, that:

            A point of order that a committee report does not comply 
        with the Ramseyer rule comes too late after the House has 
        resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole for the purpose 
        of considering the bill and debate thereon has begun. Points of 
        order against the consideration of bills on the ground that the 
        reports accompanying said bills do not conform to the Ramseyer 
        rule come too late after the House has resolved itself into the 
        Committee of the Whole and consideration has begun.

        In view of the circumstances of the case and under the 
    precedents and rules of the House, the Chair is of the opinion that 
    the point of order which the gentleman from New York [Mr. Taber] 
    has stated comes too late. The point of order should have been made 
    in the House and for these reasons the Chair overrules the point of 
    order.

Waiver of Rule by Unanimous Consent

Sec. 60.19 The House granted unanimous consent for the waiving of the 
    provisions of the Ramseyer rule relative to a report to be 
    submitted subsequently by a committee of the House.

    On Mar. 8, 1945,(6) Mr. John J. Cochran, of Missouri, by 
direction of the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive 
Departments, reported on H.R. 2504, to repeal certain laws requiring 
reports to be made to Congress. Mr. Cochran explained that the bill 
would repeal a total of 64 reports required by law. In order to save 
money, manpower, and paper, Mr. Cochran requested unanimous consent 
that the requirements of the Ramseyer rule be waived, or else all 64 
laws would have to be printed. Mr. Cochran gave assurances that the 
report would fully explain the bill and all items therein. There was no 
objection to the request.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 91 Cong. Rec. 1922, 1923, 79th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Waiver of Rule by Resolution

Sec. 60.20 Where the House adopts a resolution providing for the 
    consideration

[[Page 3169]]

    of a bill, any rule of the House to the contrary notwithstanding, 
    such action waives the requirement of compliance with the Ramseyer 
    rule.

    On Feb. 15, 1949,(7) after the House had voted to adopt 
House Resolution 99, which provided in part ``That, notwithstanding any 
rule of the House to the contrary, it shall be in order on Tuesday, 
February 15, 1949, to move that the House resolve itself into the 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for 
consideration of the bill'' [H.R. 2632, a deficiency appropriation bill 
for 1949]. Mr. Francis H. Case, of South Dakota, made a point of order 
based on the Ramseyer rule against consideration of the bill. Citing 
the above language, Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, overruled the point 
of order. The proceedings were as follows: (8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 95 Cong. Rec. 1214, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.
 8. Id. at pp. 1218, 1219.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of 
    order that the report accompanying the bill, H.R. 2632, does not 
    comply with the so-called Ramseyer rule.
        I call the attention of the Chair to the fact that although the 
    resolution which has been adopted waives points of order against 
    the bill by the provisions contained therein it does not 
    specifically waive or exempt the so-called Ramseyer rule which 
    requires that a report accompanying a bill, including appropriation 
    bills, shall set forth in appropriate type the text of the statute 
    it is proposed to repeal.
        In this connection I invite the Chair's attention to the fact 
    that on page 8 of the proposed bill, line 6, it is proposed to 
    repeal a title in a previous act of Congress, and again on page 16, 
    lines 15 and 16, the bill carries this language: ``and the first, 
    fourth, and fifth provisos under said head are hereby repealed.''
        I have diligently searched the entire report on the bill and 
    can find no citation of the statute to be repealed in order to 
    comply with the Ramseyer rule.
        I make the point of order which, if sustained, as I understand 
    it, would automatically recommit the bill to the committee.
        The Speaker: The Chair will read the rule:

            Notwithstanding any rule of the House to the contrary, it 
        shall be in order--

        And so forth--
        and all points of order against the bill or any of the 
        provisions contained therein are hereby waived.

        The Chair overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Speaker, will the Chair indulge 
    me for a moment?
        The Speaker: The Chair will indulge the gentleman.

[[Page 3170]]

        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Under the rule in the House Manual, a 
    citation is made to a precedent in the Congressional Record of the 
    Seventy-first Congress, second session, page 10595. This citation 
    reads:

            Special orders providing for consideration of bills, unless 
        making specific exemption, do not preclude the point of order 
        that reports on such bills fail to indicate proposed changes in 
        existing law. (Cannon's, sec. 9220a; 71st Cong., 2d sees., 
        Congressional Record, p. 10595.)

        I fail to see any provision in the rule adopted which 
    specifically exempts clause 2a of rule XIII, the Ramseyer rule.
        The Speaker: The Ramseyer rule is a rule of the House, and this 
    resolution states ``all rules to the contrary notwithstanding,'' it 
    shall be in order to consider the bill.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.