[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 14. Impeachment Powers]
[D. History of Proceedings]
[§ 18. Impeachment of Judge Ritter]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 2205-2246]
CHAPTER 14
Impeachment Powers
D. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
Sec. 18. Impeachment of Judge Ritter
Authorization of Investigation
Sec. 18.1 The Committee on the Judiciary reported in the 73d Congress a
resolution authorizing an investigation into the conduct of Halsted
Ritter, a U.S. District Court judge; the resolution was referred to
the Union Calendar and considered and adopted in the House as in
the Committee of the Whole by unanimous consent.
On May 29, 1933, Mr. J. Mark Wilcox, of Florida, placed in the
hopper a resolution (H. Res. 163) authorizing the Committee on the
Judiciary to investigate the conduct of Halsted Ritter, District Judge
for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, to
determine whether in the opinion of the committee he had been guilty of
any high crime or misdemeanor. The resolution was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.(20~)
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20. 77 Cong. Rec. 4575, 73d Cong. 1st Sess.
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On June 1, 1933, the Committee on the Judiciary reported House
Resolution 163 (H. Rept. No. 191) with committee amendments; the
resolution was referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the
state of the Union, since the original resolution contained an
appropriation.(21)
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21. Id. at p. 4796.
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On the same day, Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, Chairman of the
Committee on the Judiciary, asked unanimous consent to consider House
Resolution 163 in the House as in the Committee of the Whole. The
resolution and committee amendments read as follows:
House Resolution 163
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized and
directed, as a whole or by subcommittee, to inquire into and
investigate the official conduct of Halsted L. Ritter, a district
judge for the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida, to determine whether in the opinion of said
committee he has been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which
in the contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition
of the Constitutional powers of the House. Said committee shall
report its findings to the House, together with such resolution of
impeachment or other recommendation as it deems proper.
Sec. 2. For the purpose of this resolution, the committee is
authorized to
[[Page 2206]]
sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places in
the District of Columbia and elsewhere, whether or not the House is
sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearing, to
employ such clerical, stenographic, and other assistance, to
require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such
books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, to have
such printing and binding done, and to make such expenditures not
exceeding $5,000, as it deems necessary.
With the following committee amendments:
Page 2, line 5, strike out the words ``to employ such clerical,
stenographic, and other assistance''; and in line 9, on page 2,
strike out ``to have such printing and binding done, and to make
such expenditures, not exceeding $5,000.''
After brief debate, the House as in the Committee of the Whole
adopted the resolution as amended by the committee
amendments.(1)
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1. Id. at pp. 4784, 4785.
The House adopted a resolution, reported by the Committee
on Accounts, authorizing payment out of the contingent fund for
expenses of the Committee on the Judiciary in conducting its
investigation under H. Res. 163; see H. Res. 172, 77 Cong. Rec.
5429, 5430, 73d Cong. 1st Sess., June 9. 1933.
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The Committee on the Judiciary made no report to the House, prior
to the expiration of the 73d Congress, in the matter of charges against
Judge Ritter, but a subcommittee of the committee investigated the
charges and gathered testimony and evidence pursuant to House
Resolution 163.
The evidence gathered was the basis for House Resolution 422 in the
74th Congress, impeaching Judge Ritter, and both that resolution and
the report of the Committee on the Judiciary in the 74th Congress (H.
Rept. No. 2025) referred to the investigation conducted under House
Resolution 163, 73d Congress.
The Chairman of the subcommittee, Malcolm C. Tarver, of Georgia,
made a report recommending impeachment to the full committee; the
report was printed in the Record in the 74th Congress.(2)
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2. 80 Cong. Rec. 408-10, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 14, 1936.
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Presentation of Charges
Sec. 18.2 In the 74th Congress, a Member rose to a question of
constitutional privilege and presented charges against Judge
Ritter, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
On Jan. 14, 1936, Mr. Robert A. Green, of Florida, a member of the
Committee on the Judiciary, rose to a question of constitutional
[[Page 2207]]
privilege and on his own responsibility impeached Judge Halsted Ritter
for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although he presented no resolution,
he delivered lengthy and specific charges against the accused. He
indicated his intention to read, as part of his speech, a report
submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary by Malcolm C. Tarver, of
Georgia, past Chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, which subcommittee had investigated the charges against
Judge Ritter pursuant to House Resolution 163, adopted by the House in
the 73d Congress.
In response to inquiries, Mr. Green summarized the status of the
investigation and his reason for rising to a question of constitutional
privilege:
Mr. [John J.] O'Connor [of New York]: Of course, ordinarily the
matter would be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Does
the gentleman think he must proceed longer in the matter at this
time?
Mr. Green: My understanding is, I may say to the chairman of
the Rules Committee, that the articles of impeachment will be
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for its further
consideration and action. I do not intend to consume any more time
than is absolutely necessary.
Mr. [Thomas L.] Blanton [of Texas]: Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Green: I yield.
Mr. Blanton: What action was taken on the Tarver report? If
this official is the kind of judge the Tarver report indicates, why
was he not then impeached and tried by the Senate?
Mr. Green: That is the question that is now foremost in my
mind. Since Judge Tarver's service as chairman of the Judiciary
Subcommittee he has been transferred from the House Judiciary
Committee to the House Committee on Appropriations. He is not now a
member of the Judiciary Committee.
I firmly believe that when our colleagues understand the
situation thoroughly, there will be no hesitancy in bringing about
Ritter's impeachment by a direct vote on the floor of the House. My
purpose in this is to get it in concrete form, in compliance with
the rules of the House, so that the direct impeachment will be
handled by the Committee on the Judiciary. At present impeachment
is not before the committee. This will give the Judiciary something
to act upon.
Mr. Blanton: Was he not impeached in the House before when the
Tarver investigation was made?
Mr. Green: No. He was never impeached. There was a resolution
passed by the House directing an investigation to be made by the
Judiciary Committee.
Mr. Blanton: Was that not a resolution that followed just such
impeachment charges in the House as the gentleman from Florida is
now making?
Mr. Green: I understand that articles of impeachment have not
been heretofore filed in this case.
Mr. Blanton: Was the Tarver report, to which the gentleman has
re
[[Page 2208]]
ferred, filed with the Judiciary Committee?
Mr. Green: It is my understanding that it is now in their
hands.(3)
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3. 80 Cong. Rec. 404, 405, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. Green inserted the text of the Tarver report, which recommended
impeachment, in his remarks.(4)
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4. Id. at pp. 408-410.
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At the conclusion of Mr. Green's remarks, Mr. O'Connor moved that
``the proceedings be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.'' The
motion was agreed to.(5)
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5. Id. at p. 410.
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Sec. 18.3 The Committee on the Judiciary reported in the 74th Congress
a resolution impeaching Judge Halsted Ritter on four articles of
impeachment; the resolution referred to the investigation
undertaken pursuant to authorizing resolution in the 73d Congress.
On Feb. 20, 1936, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, introduced House
Resolution 422, impeaching Judge Ritter; the resolution was referred to
the Committee on the Judiciary.(6) On the same day, Mr.
Sumners, Chairman of the committee, submitted a privileged report on
the charges of official misconduct against Judge Ritter (H. Rept. No.
2025). The report, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered
printed, read as follows:
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6. 80 Cong. Rec. 2534, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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The Committee on the Judiciary, having had under consideration
charges of official misconduct against Halsted L. Ritter, a
district judge of the United States for the Southern District of
Florida, and having taken testimony with regard to the official
conduct of said judge under the authority of House Resolution 163
of the Seventy-third Congress, report the accompanying resolution
of impeachment and articles of impeachment against Halsted L.
Ritter to the House of Representatives with the recommendation that
the same be adopted by the House and presented to the
Senate.(7)
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7. Id. at p. 2528.
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The resolving clause of the resolution recited that the evidence
taken by a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary under House
Resolution 163 of the 73d Congress sustained impeachment.(8)
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8. For the text of the resolution and articles of impeachment, see
Sec. 18.7, infra.
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Consideration and Adoption of Articles of Impeachment
Sec. 18.4 The House considered and adopted a resolution and articles of
impeachment against Judge Halsted Ritter,
[[Page 2209]]
pursuant to a unanimous-consent agreement fixing the time for and
control of debate.
On Mar. 2, 1936, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, called up for
immediate consideration a resolution (H. Res. 422), which the Clerk
read at the direction of Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee. Mr.
Sumners indicated his intention to conclude the proceedings and have a
vote on the resolution before adjournment. The House agreed to his
unanimous-consent request for consideration of the
resolution:(9)
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9. 80 Cong. Rec. 3066-69, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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The Speaker: The gentleman from Texas asks unanimous consent
that debate on this resolution be continued for 4\1/2\ hours, 2\1/
2\ hours to be controlled by himself and 2 hours by the gentleman
from New York [Mr. Hancock]; and at the expiration of the time the
previous question shall be considered as ordered. Is there
objection?
There was no objection.
The resolving clause to the articles read as follows:
Resolution
Resolved, That Halsted L. Ritter, who is a United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, be impeached
for misbehavior, and for high crimes and misdemeanors; and that the
evidence heretofore taken by the subcommittee of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives under House
Resolution 163 of the Seventy-third Congress sustains articles of
impeachment, which are hereinafter set out; and that the said
articles be, and they are hereby, adopted by the House of
Representatives, and that the same shall be exhibited to the Senate
in the following words and figures, to wit: . . . (10)
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10. Id. at p. 3066. For the full text of the resolution and articles,
see Sec. 18.7, infra.
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The House then discussed the maintenance of order during debate on
the resolution:
Mr. [William B.] Bankhead [of Alabama]: Mr. Speaker, I realize
that there is a full membership of the House here today, and
properly so, because impeachment proceedings are a matter of grave
importance.
The proceedings are inquisitorial, and in order that we may
arrive at a correct judgment with reference to the matter and form
an intelligent opinion as to how we shall vote, it is absolutely
necessary and essential that we have order in the Chamber during
the proceedings.
I know it is difficult at all times to get gentlemen to refrain
from conversation, but I make a special appeal to the membership of
the House on this occasion, in view of the serious importance of
the proceedings, that they will be quiet and listen to the speakers
so that we may vote intelligently on this matter. [Applause.]
The Speaker: The Chair wishes to emphasize what the gentleman
from
[[Page 2210]]
Alabama has said. There is but one way to maintain order, and that
is for Members to cease conversation, because a little conversation
here and a little there creates confusion that makes it difficult
for speakers to be heard.(11)
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11. Id. at p. 3069.
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Time for debate having expired, Speaker Byrns stated that pursuant
to the order of the House the previous question was ordered. By the
yeas and nays, the House agreed to the resolution of impeachment--yeas
181, nays 146, present 7, not voting 96.(12)
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12. Id. at p. 3091.
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Election of Managers
Sec. 18.5 The House adopted resolutions appointing managers to conduct
the impeachment trial, empowering the managers to employ staff and
to prepare and conduct impeachment proceedings, and notifying the
Senate that the House had adopted articles and appointed managers.
On Mar. 6, 1936,(13) following the adoption of articles
of impeachment on Mar. 2, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, offered
resolutions of a privileged nature related to impeachment proceedings
against Judge Ritter:
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13. 80 Cong. Rec. 3393, 3394, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk the three
resolutions which are the usual resolutions offered when an
impeachment has been voted by the House, and I ask unanimous
consent that they may be read and considered en bloc.
Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, reserving
the right to object, I do not know that I understand the situation
we are in at the present time. Will the gentleman restate his
request?
The Speaker: (14) The request is to have read the
three resolutions and have them considered en bloc.
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14. Joseph W. Byrns (Tenn.).
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Mr. Sumners of Texas: I may say to the gentleman from New York,
they are the three resolutions usually offered and they are in the
language used when the House has voted an impeachment.
Mr. Snell: And the gentleman from Texas wants them considered
at one time?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
There being no objection, the Clerk read the resolutions, as
follows:
House Resolution 439
Resolved, That Hatton W. Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam
Hobbs, Members of this House, be, and they are hereby,
appointed managers to conduct the impeachment against Halsted
L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida; that said managers are hereby instructed
to ap
[[Page 2211]]
pear before the Senate of the United States and at the bar
thereof in the name of the House of Representatives and of all
the people of the United States to impeach the said Halsted L.
Ritter of high crimes and misdemeanors in office and to exhibit
to the Senate of the United States the articles of impeachment
against said judge which have been agreed upon by this House;
and that the said managers do demand that the Senate take order
for the appearance of said Halsted L. Ritter to answer said
impeachment, and demand his impeachment, conviction, and
removal from office.
House Resolution 440
Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform
them that this House has impeached for high crimes and
misdemeanors Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge
for the southern district of Florida, and that the House
adopted articles of impeachment against said Halsted L. Ritter,
judge as aforesaid, which the managers on the part of the House
have been directed to carry to the Senate, and that Hatton W.
Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam Hobbs, Members of this
House, have been appointed such managers.
House Resolution 441
Resolved, That the managers on the part of the House in the
matter of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, be, and
they are hereby, authorized to employ legal, clerical, and
other necessary assistants and to incur such expenses as may be
necessary in the preparation and conduct of the case, to be
paid out of the contingent fund of the House on vouchers
approved by the managers, and the managers have power to send
for persons and papers, and also that the managers have
authority to file with the Secretary of the Senate, on the part
of the House of Representatives, any subsequent pleadings which
they shall deem necessary: Provided, That the total
expenditures authorized by this resolution shall not exceed
$2,500.
Mr. Snell: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman from Texas one
further question? Is this exactly the procedure that has always
been followed by the House under similar conditions?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Insofar as I know, it does not vary from
the procedure that has been followed since the beginning of the
Government.
The resolutions were agreed to.
House-Senate Communications
Sec. 18.6 The House having notified the Senate of its impeachment of
Judge Halsted Ritter, the Senate communicated its readiness to
receive the House managers and discussed the Senate rules for
impeachment trials.
On Mar. 9, 1936, Vice President John N. Garner laid before the
Senate a communication from the House of Representatives:
House Resolution 440
In the House
of Representatives,
United States, March 6, 1936.
Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them
that this House has impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors
Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, and that
[[Page 2212]]
the House adopted articles of impeachment against said Halsted L.
Ritter, judge as aforesaid, which the managers on the part of the
House have been directed to carry to the Senate, and that Hatton W.
Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam Hobbs, Members of this House,
have been appointed such managers.
The Senate adopted the following order:
Ordered, That the Secretary inform the House of Representatives
that the Senate is ready to receive the managers appointed by the
House for the purpose of exhibiting articles of impeachment against
Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, agreeably to the notice communicated to the
Senate, and that at the hour of 1 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, March
10, 1936, the Senate will receive the honorable managers on the
part of the House of Representatives, in order that they may
present and exhibit the said articles of impeachment against the
said Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the
southern district of Florida.
The Vice President: The Secretary will carry out the order of
the senate (15)
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15. 80 Cong. Rec. 3423, 3424, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Senator Elbert D. Thomas, of Utah, discussed the function of the
Senate in sitting as a court of impeachment and inquired whether any
review was being undertaken of the Senate rules for impeachment trials.
Senator Henry F. Ashurst, of Arizona, responded that the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary had considered the rules and cited a change
recently made in the rules for impeachment trials:
It will be remembered that in the trial of the Louderback case
it was suggested that the trial was dreary, involved, and
protracted, and that it was not according to public policy to have
96 Senators sit and take testimony. Subsequently, not a dozen, not
20, but at least 40 Senators urged that the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary give its attention to the question whether or not a
committee appointed by the Presiding Officer could take the
testimony in impeachment trials, whereupon a resolution was
introduced by the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
and was adopted. I ask that that resolution be incorporated in my
remarks at this point.
The President Pro Tempore:(16) Without objection, it
is so ordered.
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16. Key Pittman (Nev.).
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The resolution is as follows (Submitted by Mr. Ashurst):
Resolved, That in the trial of any impeachment the
Presiding Officer of the Senate, upon the order of the Senate,
shall appoint a committee of 12 Senators to receive evidence
and take testimony at such times and places as the committee
may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed
and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall
(unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the
powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the
Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively,
[[Page 2213]]
under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when
sitting on impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of
procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on
impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of
the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall
report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the
transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given
before such committee, and such report shall be received by the
Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken
shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the
right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and
materiality, as having been received and taken before the
Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from
sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open
Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in
open Senate.
Mr. Ashurst: The resolution was agreed to by the Senate. It
does not provide for a trial by 12 Senators. It simply provides
that a committee of 12, appointed by the Presiding Officer of the
Senate, may take the testimony, the Senate declaring and
determining in advance whether it desires that procedure, or
otherwise, and that after such evidence is taken by this committee
of 12, the Senate reviews the testimony in its printed form, and
the Senate may take additional testimony or may then rehear the
testimony of any of the witnesses heard by the committee. The
Senate reserves to itself every power and every authority it has
under the Constitution.
It could not be expected that I would draw, present, and urge
the Senate to pass such resolution and then subsequently decline to
defend it, but I am not defending it more than to say that, in my
opinion, it is perfectly constitutional to do what the resolution
provides. If the Senate so desired, it could appoint a committee to
take the testimony, which would be reduced to writing, and be laid
before the Senators the next morning in the Congressional Record.
If a Senator were absent during one day of the trial, he could read
the testimony as printed the next morning.(17)
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17. 80 Cong. Rec. 3424, 3425, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. For the adoption of
the change referred to by Senator Ashurst, see 79 Cong. Rec.
8309, 8310, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., May 28, 1935.
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Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, of the Committee on the
Judiciary, asked unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a
ruling, cited in 3 Hinds' Precedents section 2006, that an impeachment
trial could only proceed when Congress was in session.(18)
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18. Id. at p. 3426.
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Initiation of Impeachment Trial
Sec. 18.7 The managers on the part of the House appeared in the Senate,
read the articles, reserved their right to amend them, and demanded
that Judge Halsted Ritter be put to answer the charges; the Senate
organized for
[[Page 2214]]
trial as a Court of Impeachment.
On Mar. 10, 1936, pursuant to the Senate's order of Mar. 9, the
managers on the part of the House appeared before the bar of the Senate
and were announced by the Secretary to the majority, who escorted them
to their assigned seats.
Vice President John N. Garner directed the Sergeant at Arms to make
proclamation:
The Sergeant at Arms, Chesley W. Jurney, made proclamation, as
follows:
Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep
silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives
is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of
impeachment against Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge
in and for the southern district of Florida.(19)
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19. 80 Cong. Rec. 3485, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
For the text of the proceedings in the Senate upon the
appearance of the managers to present the articles of
impeachment against Judge Ritter, see Sec. 11.4, supra.
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Representative Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, read the resolution
adopted by the House (H. Res. 439) which directed the managers to
appear before the bar of the Senate. Representative Sam Hobbs, of
Alabama, read the articles of impeachment, the Vice President
requesting that he stand at the desk in front of the Chair:
(20)
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20. 80 Cong. Rec. 3486-88, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Mr. Manager Hobbs, from the place suggested by the Vice
President, said:
Mr. President and gentlemen of the Senate:
Articles of Impeachment Against Halsted L. Ritter
House Resolution 422, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session
Congress of the United States of America
In the House of Representatives, United States
March 2, 1936.
Resolved, That Halsted L. Ritter, who is a United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, be
impeached for misbehavior and for high crimes and misdemeanors;
and that the evidence heretofore taken by the subcommittee of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
under House Resolution 163 of the Seventy-third Congress
sustains articles of impeachment, which are hereinafter set
out; and that the said articles be, and they are hereby,
adopted by the House of Representatives, and that the same
shall be exhibited to the Senate in the following words and
figures, to wit:
Articles of impeachment of the House of Representatives of the
United States of America in the name of themselves and of
all of the people of the United States of America against
Halsted L. Ritter, who was appointed, duly qualified, and
commissioned to serve, during good behavior in office, as
United
[[Page 2215]]
States district judge for the southern district of Florida,
on February 15, 1929.
Article I
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of a
high crime and misdemeanor in office in manner and form as
follows, to wit: On or about October 11, 1929, A. L. Rankin
(who had been a law partner of said judge immediately before
said judge's appointment as judge), as solicitor for the
plaintiff, filed in the court of the said Judge Ritter a
certain foreclosure suit and receivership proceeding, the same
being styled ``Bert E. Holland and others against Whitehall
Building and Operating Company and others'' (No. 678-M-Eq.). On
or about May 15, 1930, the said Judge Ritter allowed the said
Rankin an advance of $2,500 on his fee for his services in said
case. On or about July 2, 1930, the said Judge Ritter by letter
requested another judge of the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, to wit, Hon. Alexander
Akerman, to fix and determine the total allowance for the said
Rankin for his services in said case for the reason as stated
by Judge Ritter in said letter, that the said Rankin had
formerly been the law partner of the said Judge Ritter, and he
did not feel that he should pass upon the total allowance made
said Rankin in that case, and that if Judge Akerman would fix
the allowance it would relieve the writer, Judge Ritter, from
any embarrassment if thereafter any question should arise as to
his, Judge Ritter's favoring said Rankin with an exorbitant
fee.
Thereafterward, notwithstanding the said Judge Akerman, in
compliance with Judge Ritter's request, allowed the said Rankin
a fee of $15,000 for his services in said case, from which sum
the said $2,500 theretofore allowed the said Rankin by Judge
Ritter as an advance on his fee was deducted, the said Judge
Ritter, well knowing that at his request compensation had been
fixed by Judge Akerman for the said Rankin's services in said
case, and notwithstanding the restraint of propriety expressed
in his said letter to Judge Akerman, and ignoring the danger of
embarrassment mentioned in said letter, did fix an additional
and exorbitant fee for the said Rankin in said case. On or
about December 24, 1930, when the final decree in said case was
signed, the said Judge Ritter allowed the said Rankin,
additional to the total allowance of $15,000 theretofore
allowed by Judge Akerman, a fee of $75,000 for his services in
said case, out of which allowance the said Judge Ritter
directly profited. On the same day, December 24, 1930, the
receiver in said case paid the said Rankin, as part of his said
additional fee, the sum of $25,000, and the said Rankin on the
same day privately paid and delivered to the said Judge Ritter
the sum of $2,500 in cash; $2,000 of said $2,500 was deposited
in bank by Judge Ritter on, to wit, December 29, 1930, the
remaining $500 being kept by Judge Ritter and not deposited in
bank until, to wit, July 10, 1931. Between the time of such
initial payment on said additional fee and April 6, 1931, the
said receiver paid said Rankin thereon $5,000. On or about
April 6, 1931, the said Rankin received the balance of the said
additional fee allowed him by Judge Ritter, said balance
amounting to $45,000. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 14,
1931, the said Rankin paid and delivered to the said Judge
Ritter, privately, in cash,
[[Page 2216]]
an additional sum of $2,000. The said Judge Halsted L. Ritter
corruptly and unlawfully accepted and received for his own use
and benefit from the said A. L. Rankin the aforesaid sums of
money, amounting to $4,500.
Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor.
Article II
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office
of United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United
States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly
qualified and commissioned, and while acting as a United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, was and is
guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and misdemeanors in
office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
On the 15th day of February 1929 the said Halsted L.
Ritter, having been appointed as United States district judge
for the southern district of Florida, was duly qualified and
commissioned to serve as such during good behavior in office.
Immediately prior thereto and for several years the said
Halsted L. Ritter had practiced law in said district in
partnership with one A. L. Rankin, which partnership was
dissolved upon the appointment of said Ritter as said United
States district judge.
On the 18th day of July 1928 one Walter S. Richardson was
elected trustee in bankruptcy of the Whitehall Building &
Operating Co., which company had been adjudicated in said
district as a bankrupt, and as such trustee took charge of the
assets of said Whitehall Building & Operating Co., which
consisted of a hotel property located in Palm Beach in said
district. That the said Richardson as such trustee operated
said hotel property from the time of his said appointment until
its sale on the 3d of January 1929, under the foreclosure of a
third mortgage thereon. On the 1st of November and the 13th of
December 1929, the said Judge Ritter made orders in said
bankruptcy proceedings allowing the said Walter S. Richardson
as trustee the sum of $16,500 as compensation for his services
as trustee. That before the discharge of said Walter S.
Richardson as such trustee, said Richardson, together with said
A. L. Rankin, one Ernest Metcalf, one Martin Sweeney, and the
said Halsted L. Ritter, entered into an arrangement to secure
permission of the holder or holders of at least $50,000 of
first-mortgage bonds on said hotel property for the purpose of
filing a bill to foreclose the first mortgage on said premises
in the court of said Halsted L. Ritter, by which means the said
Richardson, Rankin, Metcalf, Sweeney, and Ritter were to
continue said property in litigation before said Ritter. On the
30th day of August 1929, the said Walter S. Richardson, in
furtherance of said arrangement and understanding, wrote a
letter to the said Martin Sweeney, in New York, suggesting the
desirability of contacting as many first mortgage bondholders
as possible in order that their cooperation might be secured,
directing special attention to Mr. Bert E. Holland, an
attorney, whose address was in the Tremont Building in Boston,
and who, as cotrustee, was the holder of $50,000 of first-
mortgage bonds, the amount of bonds required to institute the
contemplated proceedings in Judge Ritter's court.
On October 3, 1929, the said Bert E. Holland, being
solicited by the said Sweeney, requested the said Rankin and
Metcalf to prepare a complaint to file in said Judge Ritter's
court for foreclosure of said first mortgage and the
appointment of a receiver. At this time Judge Ritter was
holding court in Brooklyn, N.Y.,
[[Page 2217]]
and the said Rankin and Richardson went from West Palm Beach,
Fla., to Brooklyn, N.Y., and called upon said Judge Ritter a
short time previous to filing the bill for foreclosure and
appointment of a receiver of said hotel property.
On October 10, 1929, and before the filing of said bill for
foreclosure and receiver, the said Holland withdrew his
authority to said Rankin and Metcalf to file said bill and
notified the said Rankin not to file the said bill.
Notwithstanding the said instructions to said Rankin not to
file said bill, said Rankin, on the 11th day of October, 1929,
filed said bill with the clerk of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, but with the
specific request to said clerk to lock up the said bill as soon
as it was filed and hold until Judge Ritter's return so that
there would be no newspaper publicity before the matter was
heard by Judge Ritter for the appointment of a receiver, which
request on the part of the said Rankin was complied with by the
said clerk.
On October 16, 1929, the said Holland telegraphed to the
said Rankin, referring to his previous wire requesting him to
refrain from filing the bill and insisting that the matter
remain in its then status until further instruction was given;
and on October 17, 1929, the said Rankin wired to Holland that
he would not make an application on his behalf for the
appointment of a receiver. On October 28, 1929, a hearing on
the complaint and petition for receivership was heard before
Judge Halsted L. Ritter at Miami, at which hearing the said
Bert E. Holland appeared in person before said Judge Ritter and
advised the judge that he wished to withdraw the suit and asked
for dismissal of the bill of complaint on the ground that the
bill was filed without his authority.
But the said Judge Ritter, fully advised of the facts and
circumstances hereinbefore recited, wrongfully and oppressively
exercised the powers of his office to carry into execution said
plan and agreement theretofore arrived at, and refused to grant
the request of the said Holland and made effective the
champertous undertaking of the said Richardson and Rankin and
appointed the said Richardson receiver of the said hotel
property, notwithstanding that objection was made to Judge
Ritter that said Richardson had been active in fomenting this
litigation and was not a proper person to act as receiver.
On October 15, 1929, said Rankin made oath to each of the
bills for intervenors which were filed the next day.
On October 16, 1929, bills for intervention in said
foreclosure suit were filed by said Rankin and Metcalf in the
names of holders of approximately $5,000 of said first-mortgage
bonds, which intervenors did not possess the said requisite
$50,000 in bonds required by said first mortgage to bring
foreclosure proceedings on the part of the bondholders.
The said Rankin and Metcalf appeared as attorneys for
complainants and intervenors, and in response to a suggestion
of the said Judge Ritter, the said Metcalf withdrew as attorney
for complainants and intervenors and said Judge Ritter
thereupon appointed said Metcalf as attorney for the said
Richardson, the receiver.
And in the further carrying out of said arrangement and
understanding, the said Richardson employed the said Martin
Sweeney and one Bemis, together with Ed Sweeney, as managers of
said property, for which they were paid the sum of $60,000 for
the management of said hotel for the two seasons the property
remained in the custody of said Richardson as receiver.
On or about the 15th of May 1930 the said Judge Ritter
allowed the
[[Page 2218]]
said Rankin an advance on his fee of $2,500 for his services in
said case.
On or about July 2, 1930, the said Judge Ritter requested
Judge Alexander Akerman, also a judge of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, to fix the
total allowance for the said Rankin for his services in said
case, said request and the reasons therefor being set forth in
a letter by the said Judge Ritter, in words and figures as
follows, to wit:
July 2, 1930.
Hon. Alexander Akerman,
United States District Judge,
Tampa, Fla.
My Dear Judge: In the case of Holland et al. v. Whitehall
Building & Operating Co. (No. 678-M-Eq.), pending in my
division, my former law partner, Judge A. L. Rankin, of West
Palm Beach, has filed a petition for an order allowing
compensation for his services on behalf of the plaintiff.
I do not feel that I should pass, under the circumstances,
upon the total allowance to be made Judge Rankin in this
matter. I did issue an order, which Judge Rankin will exhibit
to you, approving an advance of $2,500 on his claim, which was
approved by all attorneys.
You will appreciate my position in the matter, and I
request you to pass upon the total allowance which should be
made Judge Rankin in the premises as an accommodation to me.
This will relieve me from any embarrassment hereafter if the
question should arise as to my favoring Judge Rankin in this
matter by an exorbitant allowance.
Appreciating very much your kindness in this matter, I am,
Yours sincerely,
Halsted L. Ritter.
In compliance with said request the said Judge Akerman
allowed the said Rankin $12,500 in addition to the $2,500
theretofore allowed by Judge Ritter, making a total of $15,000
as the fee of the said Rankin in the said case.
But notwithstanding the said request on the part of said
Ritter and the compliance by the said Judge Akerman and the
reasons for the making of said request by said Judge Ritter of
Judge Akerman, the said Judge Ritter, on the 24th day of
December 1930, allowed the said Rankin an additional fee of
$75,000.
And on the same date when the receiver in said case paid to
the said Rankin as a part of said additional fee the sum of
$25,000, said Rankin privately paid and delivered to said Judge
Ritter out of the said $25,000 the sum of $2,500 in cash,
$2,000 of which the said Judge Ritter deposited in a bank and
$500 of which was put in a tin box and not deposited until the
10th day of July 1931, when it was deposited in a bank with an
additional sum of $600.
On or about the 6th day of April 1931, the said Rankin
received as a part of the $75,000 additional fee the sum of
$45,000, and shortly thereafter, on or before the 14th day of
April 1931, the said Rankin paid and delivered to said Judge
Ritter, privately and in cash, out of said $45,000 the sum of
$2,000.
The said Judge Halsted L. Ritter corruptly and unlawfully
accepted and received for his own use and benefit from the said
Rankin the aforesaid sums of $2,500 in cash and $2,000 in cash,
amounting in all to $4,500.
Of the total allowance made to said A. L. Rankin in said
foreclosure suit, amounting in all to $90,000, the following
sums were paid out by said Rankin with the knowledge and
consent of said Judge Ritter, to wit, to said Walter S.
Richardson, the sum of $5,000; to said Metcalf, the sum of
$10,000; to Shutts and Bowen, also attorneys for the receiver,
the sum of
[[Page 2219]]
$25,000; and to said Halsted L. Ritter, the sum of $4,500.
In addition to the said sum of $5,000 received by the said
Richardson, as aforesaid, said Ritter by order in said
proceedings allowed said Richardson a fee of $30,000 for
services as such receiver.
The said fees allowed by said Judge Ritter to A. L. Rankin
(who had been a law partner of said judge immediately before
said judge's appointment as judge) as solicitor for the
plaintiff in said case were excessive and unwarranted, and said
judge profited personally thereby in that out of the money so
allowed said solicitor he received personally, privately, and
in cash $4,500 for his own use and benefit.
While the Whitehall Hotel was being operated in
receivership under said proceeding pending in said court (and
in which proceeding the receiver in charge of said hotel by
appointment of said judge was allowed large compensation by
said judge) the said judge stayed at said hotel from time to
time without cost to himself and received free rooms, free
meals, and free valet service, and, with the knowledge and
consent of said judge, members of his family, including his
wife, his son, Thurston Ritter, his daughter, Mrs. M. R.
Walker, his secretary, Mrs. Lloyd C. Hooks, and her husband,
Lloyd C. Hooks, each likewise on various occasions stayed at
said hotel without cost to themselves or to said judge, and
received free rooms, and some or all of them received from said
hotel free meals and free valet service; all of which expenses
were borne by the said receivership to the loss and damage of
the creditors whose interests were involved therein.
The said judge willfully failed and neglected to perform
his duty to conserve the assets of the Whitehall Building &
Operating Co. in receivership in his court, but to the
contrary, permitted waste and dissipation of its assets, to the
loss and damage of the creditors of said corporation, and was a
party to the waste and dissipation of such assets while under
the control of his said court, and personally profited thereby,
in the manner and form hereinabove specifically set out.
Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office.
Article III
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was
guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of
the United States of America (U.S.C. Annotated, title 28, sec.
373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the
authority of the United States to exercise the profession or
employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the
practice of the law, in that after the employment of the law
firm of Ritter & Rankin (which, at the time of the appointment
of Halsted L. Ritter to be judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, was composed of
Halsted L. Ritter and A. L. Rankin) in the case of Trust Co. of
Georgia and Robert G. Stephens, trustees, against Brazilian
Court Building Corporation and others, No. 5704 in the Circuit
Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and after
the final decree had been entered in said cause, and after the
fee of $4,000 which had been agreed upon at the
[[Page 2220]]
outset of said employment had been fully paid to the firm of
Ritter & Rankin, and after Halsted L. Ritter had on, to wit,
February 15, 1929, become judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter on, to
wit, March 11, 1929, wrote a letter to Charles A. Brodek, of
counsel for Mulford Realty Corporation (the client which his
former law firm had been representing in said litigation),
stating that there had been much extra and unanticipated work
in the case; that he was then a Federal judge; that his
partner, A. L. Rankin, would carry through further proceedings
in the case, but that he, Judge Ritter, would be consulted
about the matter until the case was all closed up; and that
``this matter is one among very few which I am assuming to
continue my interest in until finally closed up''; and stating
specifically in said letter:
``I do not know whether any appeal will be taken in the
case or not; but if so, we hope to get Mr. Howard Paschal or
some other person as receiver who will be amenable to our
directions, and the hotel can be operated at a profit, of
course, pending the appeal. We shall demand a very heavy
supersedeas bond, which I doubt whether D'Esterre can give.''
And further that he was ``of course, primarily interested
in getting some money in the case,'' and that he thought
``$2,000 more by way of attorneys' fees should be allowed'';
and asked that he be communicated with direct about the matter,
giving his post-office box number. On, to wit, March 13, 1929,
said Brodek replied favorably, and on March 30, 1929, a check
of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, a law firm of New York City,
representing Mulford Realty Corporation, in which Charles A.
Brodek, senior member of the firm of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner,
was one of the directors, was drawn, payable to the order of
``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter'' for $2,000, and which was duly
endorsed ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter. H. L. Ritter'' and was paid
on, to wit, April 4, 1929, and the proceeds thereof were
received and appropriated by Judge Ritter to his own individual
use and benefit, without advising his said former partner that
said $2,000 had been received, without consulting with his said
former partner thereabout, and without the knowledge or consent
of his said former partner, appropriated the entire amount thus
solicited and received to the use and benefit of himself, the
said Judge Ritter.
At the time said letter was written by Judge Ritter and
said $2,000 received by him, Mulford Realty Corporation held
and owned large interests in Florida real estate and citrus
groves, and a large amount of securities of the Olympia
Improvement Corporation, which was a company organized to
develop and promote Olympia, Fla., said holdings being within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States district
court, of which Judge Ritter was a judge from February 15,
1929.
Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his
office into disrepute, constitute a violation of section 258 of
the Judicial Code of the United States of America (U.S.C.,
Annotated, title 28, sec. 373), and constitute a high crime and
misdemeanor within the meaning and intent of section 4 of
article II of the Constitution of the United States.
Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
Article IV
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office
of United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United
States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly
qualified and commissioned, and while acting as a
[[Page 2221]]
United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes
and misdemeanors in office in manner and form as follows, to
wit:
The said Judge Ritter by his actions and conduct, as an
individual and as such judge, has brought his court into
scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and
public confidence in the administration of justice in his said
court, and to the prejudice of public respect for and
confidence in the Federal judiciary:
1. In that in the Florida Power Co. case (Florida Power &
Light Co. against City of Miami and others, No. 1183-M-Eq.),
which was a case wherein said judge had granted the complainant
power company a temporary injunction restraining the
enforcement of an ordinance of the city of Miami, which
ordinance prescribed a reduction in the rates for electric
current being charged in said city, said judge improperly
appointed one Cary T. Hutchinson, who had long been associated
with and employed by power and utility interests, special
master in chancery in said suit, and refused to revoke his
order so appointing said Hutchinson. Thereafter, when criticism
of such action had become current in the city of Miami, and
within 2 weeks after a resolution (H. Res. 163, 73d Cong.) had
been agreed to in the House of Representatives of the Congress
of the United States authorizing and directing the Judiciary
Committee thereof to investigate the official conduct of said
judge and to make a report concerning said conduct to said
House of Representatives, an arrangement was entered into with
the city commissioners of the city of Miami or with the city
attorney of said city by which the said city commissioners were
to pass a resolution expressing faith and confidence in the
integrity of said judge, and the said judge recuse himself as
judge [in] said power suit. The said agreement was carried out
by the parties thereto, and said judge, after the passage of
such resolution, recused himself from sitting as judge in said
power suit, thereby bartering his judicial authority in said
case for a vote of confidence. Nevertheless, the succeeding
judge allowed said Hutchinson as special master in chancery in
said case a fee of $5,000, although he performed little, if
any, service as such, and in the order making such allowance
recited: ``And it appearing to the court that a minimum fee of
$5,000 was approved by the court for the said Cary T.
Hutchinson, special master in this cause.''
2. In that in the Trust Co. of Florida cases (Illick
against Trust Co. of Florida et al., No. 1043-M-Eq., and
Edmunds Committee et al. against Marlon Mortgage Co. et al.,
No. 1124-M-Eq.) after the State banking department of Florida,
through its comptroller, Honorable Ernest Amos, had closed the
doors of the Trust Co. of Florida and appointed J. H. Therrell
liquidator for said trust company, and had interviewed in the
said Illick case, said Judge Ritter wrongfully and erroneously
refused to recognize the right of said State authority to
administer the affairs of the said trust company, and appointed
Julian S. Eaton and Clark D. Stearns as receivers of the
property of said trust company. On appeal, the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the
said order or decree of Judge Ritter, and ordered the said
property surrendered to the State liquidator. Thereafter, on,
to wit, September 12, 1932, there was filed in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida the
Edmunds Committee case, supra. Marion Mortgage Co. was a
subsidiary of the Trust Co. of Florida. Judge Ritter being
absent from his district at the time of the filing of said
case, an application for the appointment of receivers therein
was
[[Page 2222]]
presented to another judge of said district, namely, Honorable
Alexander Akerman. Judge Ritter, however, prior to the
appointment of such receivers, telegraphed Judge Akerman,
requesting him to appoint the aforesaid Eaton and Stearns as
receivers in said case, which appointments were made by Judge
Akerman. Thereafter the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the order of Judge Akerman,
appointing said Eaton and Stearns as receivers in said case. In
November 1932 J. H. Therrell, as liquidator, filed a bill of
complaint in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla.--a court of
the State of Florida--alleging that the various trust
properties of the Trust Co. of Florida were burdensome to the
liquidator to keep, and asking that the court appoint a
succeeding trustee. Upon petition for removal of said cause
from said State court into the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter took
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the previous rulings of the
United States Circuit Court of Appeals above referred to, and
again appointed the said Eaton and Stearns as the receivers of
the said trust properties. In December 1932 the said Therrell
surrendered all of the trust properties to said Eaton and
Stearns as receivers, together with all records of the Trust
Co. of Florida pertaining thereto. During the time said Eaton
and Stearns, as such receivers, were in control of said trust
properties, Judge Ritter wrongfully and improperly approved
their accounts without notice or opportunity for objection
thereto to be heard. With the knowledge of Judge Ritter, said
receivers appointed the sister-in-law of Judge Ritter, namely,
Mrs. G. M. Wickard, who had had no previous hotel-management
experience, to be manager of the Julia Tuttle Hotel and
Apartment Building, one of said trust properties. On, to wit,
January ], 1933, Honorable J. M. Lee succeeded Honorable Ernest
Amos as comptroller of the State of Florida and appointed M. A.
Smith liquidator in said Trust Co. of Florida cases to succeed
J. H. Therrell. An appeal was again taken to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the then
latest order or decree of Judge Ritter, and again the order or
decree of Judge Ritter appealed from was reversed by the said
circuit court of appeals, which held that Judge Ritter, or the
court in which he presided, had been without jurisdiction in
the matter of the appointment of said Eaton and Stearns as
receivers. Thereafter, and with the knowledge of the decision
of the said circuit court of appeals, Judge Ritter wrongfully
and improperly allowed said Eaton and Stearns and their
attorneys some $26,000 as fees out of said trust-estate
properties, and endeavored to require, as a condition precedent
to releasing said trust properties from the control of his
court, a promise from counsel for the said State liquidator not
to appeal from his order allowing the said fees to said Eaton
and Stearns and their attorneys.
3. In that the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such Federal
judge, accepted, in addition to $4,500 from his former law
partner as alleged in article I hereof, other large fees or
gratuities, to wit, $7,500 from J. R. Francis, on or about
April 19, 1929, J. R. Francis at this said time having large
property interests within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court of which Judge Ritter was a judge. On, to wit, the 4th
day of April 1929 the said Judge Ritter accepted the sum of
$2,000 from said Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, representing Mulford
Realty Corporation, through his attorney, Charles A. Brodek, as
a fee or gratuity, at which time the said Mulford Realty
Corporation held and owned large
[[Page 2223]]
interests in Florida real estate and citrus groves, and a large
amount of securities of the Olympia Improvement Corporation,
which was a company organized to develop and promote Olympia,
Fla., said holdings being within the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States District Court of which Judge Ritter was a
judge from February 15, 1929.
4. By his conduct as detailed in articles I and II hereof.
Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of misbehavior, and was and is guilty of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office.
Attest:
Joseph W. Byrns,
Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
South Trimble,
Clerk.
Representative Sumners entered a reservation of the right of the
House to amend or supplement the articles and demanded that the
respondent be put to trial:
Mr. Manager Sumners: Mr. President, the House of
Representatives, by protestation, saving themselves the liberty of
exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles of accusation
or impeachment against the said Halsted L. Ritter, district judge
of the United States for the southern district of Florida, and also
of replying to his answers which he shall make unto the articles
preferred against him, and of offering proof to the same and every
part thereof, and to all and every other article of accusation or
impeachment which shall be exhibited by them as the case shall
require, do demand that the said Halsted L. Ritter may be put to
answer the misdemeanors in office which have been charged against
him in the articles which have been exhibited to the Senate, and
that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments may be
thereupon had and given as may be agreeable to law and justice.
Mr. President, the managers on the part of the House of
Representatives, in pursuance of the action of the House of
Representatives by the adoption of the articles of impeachment
which have just been read to the Senate, do now demand that the
Senate take order for the appearance of the said Halsted L. Ritter
to answer said impeachment, and do now demand his impeachment,
conviction, and removal from office.
The Vice President: The Senate wild take proper order and
notify the House of Representatives.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Id. at p. 3488.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most senior Member of the Senate, Senator William E. Borah, of
Idaho, then administered the oath to Vice President Garner, who
administered the oath to the other Senators present.
The Sergeant at Arms made proclamation that the Senate was then
sitting as a Court of Impeachment. Orders were adopted notifying the
House of the organization of the court and issuing a summons to the
respondent.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Id. at pp. 3488, 3489. For the text of the proceedings whereby the
Senate organized for the Ritter impeachment trial, see
Sec. 11.5, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 18.8 In response to a summons, Judge Halsted Ritter
[[Page 2224]]
appeared before the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
On Mar. 12, 1936, respondent Halsted Ritter appeared before the
Court of Impeachment pursuant to the summons previously issued, and
filed an entry of appearance: (3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. 80 Cong. Rec. 3646, 3647, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Vice President: (4) . . . The Secretary will
read the return of the Sergeant at Arms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. John N. Garner (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Chief Clerk read as follows:
Senate of the United States, Office of the Sergeant at Arms.
The foregoing writ of summons addressed to Halsted L.
Ritter, and the foregoing precept, addressed to me, were duly
served upon the said Halsted L. Ritter by me by delivering true
and attested copies of the same to the said Halsted L. Ritter
at the Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C., on Thursday, the 12th
day of March 1936, at 11 o'clock in the forenoon of that day.
Chesley W. Jurney,
Sergeant at Arms,
United States Senate.
The Vice President: The Secretary of the Senate will administer
the oath to the Sergeant at Arms.
The Secretary of the Senate, Edwin A. Halsey, administered the
oath to the Sergeant at Arms, as follows:
You, Chesley W. Jurney, do solemnly swear that the return
made by you upon the process issued on the 10th day of March
1936 by the Senate of the United States against Halsted L.
Ritter, United States district judge for the southern district
of Florida, is truly made, and that you have performed such
service as therein described. So help you God.
The Vice President: The Sergeant at Arms will make
proclamation.
The Sergeant at Arms made proclamation as follows:
Halsted L. Ritter! Halsted L. Ritter! Halsted L. Ritter! United
States district judge for the southern district of Florida, appear
and answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of
Representatives against you.
The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, and his counsel, Frank P.
Walsh, Esq., of New York City, N.Y., and Carl T. Hoffman, Esq., of
Miami, Fla., entered the Chamber and were conducted to the seats
assigned them in the space in front of the Secretary's desk, on the
right of the Chair.
The Vice President: Counsel for the respondent are advised that
the Senate is now sitting for the trial of articles of impeachment
exhibited by the House of Representatives against Halsted L.
Ritter, United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida.
Mr. Walsh (of counsel): May it please you, Mr. President, and
honorable Members of the Senate, I beg to inform you that, in
response to your summons, the respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, is now
present with his counsel and asks leave to file a formal entry of
appearance.
The Vice President: Is there objection? The Chair hears none,
and the appearance will be filed with the Secretary, and will be
read.
The Chief Clerk read as follows:
[[Page 2225]]
In the Senate of the United States of America Sitting as a Court of
Impeachment
March 12, 1936.
The United States of America v. Halsted L. Ritter
The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, having this day been
served with a summons requiring him to appear before the Senate
of the United States of America in the city of Washington,
D.C., on March 12, 1936, at 1 o'clock afternoon to answer
certain articles of impeachment presented against him by the
House of Representatives of the United States of America, now
appears in his proper person and also by his counsel, who are
instructed by this respondent to inform the Senate that
respondent stands ready to file his pleadings to such articles
of impeachment within such reasonable period of time as may be
fixed.
Dated March 12, 1936.
Sec. 18.9 The Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, excused a
Senator from service at his request, fixed a trial date, allowed
respondent 18 days to file his answer, and adopted supplemental
rules for trial.
On Mar. 12, 1936, the Senate convened as a Court of Impeachment in
the Halsted Ritter case. Preceding the administration of the oath to
members not theretofore sworn, the court granted the request of Senator
Edward P. Costigan, of Colorado, that he be excused from service on the
Court of Impeachment. Senator Costigan caused to be printed in the
Record the reasons for his request, based on a long personal
acquaintance with the respondent.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. 80 Cong. Rec. 3646, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate ratified an agreement, between the managers and counsel
for the respondent, as to the time permitted the respondent to file his
answer with the Court of Impeachment:
Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, I think
there is not a clear understanding as to the arrangement which has
been entered into between the managers and the counsel for the
respondent. It is my understanding, and if I am in error someone
who is better informed will please correct me, that the agreement
is that counsel for the respondent will place their response in the
possession of the managers on the part of the House not later than
the 26th instant, and that the Court may reconvene again on the
30th when the response will be filed in the Senate.
The Vice President: (6) Is there objection to that
agreement?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. John N. Garner (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There was no objection.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. 80 Cong. Rec. 3647, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Court of Impeachment adopted a motion fixing the trial date at
Apr. 6, 1936.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Id. at p. 3648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The court adopted supplemental rules, which Senator Henry F.
[[Page 2226]]
Ashurst, of Arizona, stated to be the same as those adopted in the
trial of Judge Harold Louderback:
Ordered, That in addition to the rules of procedure and
practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials,
heretofore adopted, and supplementary to such rules, the following
rules shall be applicable in the trial of the impeachment of
Halsted L. Ritter, United States judge for the southern district of
Florida:
1. In all matters relating to the procedure of the Senate,
whether as to form or otherwise, the managers on the part of the
House or the counsel representing the respondent may submit a
request or application orally to the Presiding Officer, or, if
required by him or requested by any Senator, shall submit the same
in writing.
2. In all matters relating immediately to the trial, such as
the admission, rejection, or striking out of evidence, or other
questions usually arising in the trial of causes in courts of
justice, if the managers on the part of the House or counsel
representing the respondent desire to make any application,
request, or objection, the same shall be addressed directly to the
Presiding Officer and not otherwise.
3. It shall not be in order for any Senator, except as provided
in the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting
on impeachment trials, to engage in colloquy or to address
questions either to the managers on the part of the House or to
counsel for the respondent, nor shall it be in order for Senators
to address each other; but they shall address their remarks
directly to the Presiding Officer and not otherwise.
4. The parties may, by stipulation in writing filed with the
Secretary of the Senate and by him laid before the Senate or
presented at the trial, agree upon any facts involved in the trial;
and such stipulation shall be received by the Senate for all
intents and purposes as though the facts therein agreed upon had
been established by legal evidence adduced at the trial.
5. The parties or their counsel may interpose objection to
witnesses answering questions propounded at the request of any
Senator, and the merits of any such objection may be argued by the
parties or their counsel; and the Presiding Officer may rule on any
such objection, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the
Senate, unless some Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal
vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the
Senate for decision; or he may, at his option, in the first
instance submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the
Senate. Upon all such questions the vote shall be without debate
and without a division, unless the ayes and nays be demanded by
one-fifth of the Members present when the same shall be
taken.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amendment of Articles of Impeachment
Sec. 18.10 The House adopted a resolution, reported as privileged by
the managers on the part of the House in the Halsted Ritter
impeachment, amending the articles previously voted by the House.
[[Page 2227]]
On Mar. 30, 1936,(10) Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas,
called up the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 471) amending
the articles of impeachment against Judge Ritter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 80 Cong. Rec. 4597-99. 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resolved, That the articles of impeachment heretofore adopted
by the House of Representatives in and by House Resolution 422,
House Calendar No. 279, be, and they are hereby, amended as
follows:
Article III is amended so as to read as follows:
Article II
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was
guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of
the United States of America (U.S.C., Annotated, title 28, sec.
373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the
authority of the United States to exercise the profession or
employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the
practice of the law, in that after the employment of the law
firm of Ritter & Rankin (which at the time of the appointment
of Halsted L. Ritter to be judge of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida, was composed of
Halsted L. Ritter and A. L. Rankin) in the case of Trust Co. of
Georgia and Robert G. Stephens, Trustee v. Brazilian Court
Building Corporation et al., no. 5704, in the Circuit Court of
the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and after the fee of
$4,000 which had been agreed upon at the outset of said
employment had been fully paid to the firm of Ritter & Rankin,
and after Halsted L. Ritter had, on, to wit, February 15, 1929,
become judge of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter on, to wit, March
11, 1929, wrote a letter to Charles A. Brodek, of counsel for
Mulford Realty Corporation (the client which his former law
firm had been representing in said litigation), stating that
there had been much extra and unanticipated work in the case,
that he was then a Federal judge; that his partner, A. L.
Rankin, would carry through further proceedings in the case,
but that he, Judge Ritter, would be consulted about the matter
until the case was all closed up; and that ``this matter is one
among very few which I am assuming to continue my interest in
until finally closed up''; and stating specifically in said
letter:
``I do not know whether any appeal will be taken in the
case or not, but, if so, we hope to get Mr. Howard Paschal or
some other person as receiver who will be amenable to our
directions, and the hotel can be operated at a profit, of
course, pending the appeal. We shall demand a very heavy
supersedeas bond, which I doubt whether D'Esterre can give'';
and further that he was ``of course primarily interested in
getting some money in the case'', and that he thought ``$2,000
more by way of attorney's fees should be allowed''; and asked
that he be communicated with direct about the matter, giving
his post-office box number. On, to wit, March 13, 1929, said
Brodek replied favorably, and on March 30, 1929, a check of
Brodek, Raphael & Eisner,
[[Page 2228]]
a law firm of New York City, representing Mulford Realty
Corporation, in which Charles A. Brodek, senior member of the
firm of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, was one of the directors, was
drawn, payable to the order of ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter'' for
$2,000 and which was duly endorsed ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter. H.
L. Ritter'' and was paid on, to wit, April 4, 1929, and the
proceeds thereof were received and appropriated by Judge Ritter
to his own individual use and benefit, without advising his
said former partner that said $2,000 had been received, without
consulting with his former partner thereabout, and without the
knowledge or consent of his said former partner, appropriated
the entire amount thus solicited and received to the use and
benefit of himself, the said Judge Ritter.
At the time said letter was written by Judge Ritter and
said $2,000 received by him, Mulford Realty Corporation held
and owned large interests in Florida real estate and citrus
groves, and a large amount of securities of the Olympia
Improvement Corporation, which was a company organized to
develop and promote Olympia, Fla., said holdings being within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States district
court, of which Judge Ritter was a judge from, to wit, February
15, 1929.
After writing said letter of March 11, 1929, Judge Ritter
further exercised the profession or employment of counsel or
attorney, or engaged in the practice of the law, with relation
to said case.
Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his
office into disrepute, constitute a violation of section 258 of
the Judicial Code of the United States of America (U.S.C.,
Annotated, title 28, sec. 373), and constitute a high crime and
misdemeanor within the meaning and intent of section 4 of
article II of the Constitution of the United States.
Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
By adding the following articles immediately after article III
as amended:
Article IV
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was
guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of
the United States of America (U.S.C., Annotated, title 28, sec.
373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the
authority of the United States to exercise the profession or
employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the
practice of the law, in that Judge Ritter did exercise the
profession or employment of counsel or attorney, or engaged in
the practice of the law, representing J. R. Francis, with
relation to the Boca Raton matter and the segregation and
saving of the interest of J. R. Francis therein, or in
obtaining a deed or deeds to J. R. Francis from the Spanish
River Land Co. to certain pieces of realty, and in the
Edgewater Ocean Beach Development Co. matter, for which
services the said Judge Ritter received from the said J. R.
Francis the sum of $7,500.
Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his
office into disrepute, constitute a violation of the law above
recited, and constitute a high crime and misdemeanor within the
meaning and intent of section 4 of article II of the
Constitution of the United States.
[[Page 2229]]
Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
Article V
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was
guilty of violation of section 146(b) of the Revenue Act of
1928, making it unlawful for any person willfully to attempt in
any manner to evade or defeat the payment of the income tax
levied in and by said Revenue Act of 1928, in that during the
year 1929 said Judge Ritter received gross taxable income--over
and above his salary as judge--to the amount of some $12,000,
yet paid no income tax thereon.
Among the fees included in said gross taxable income for
1929 were the extra fee of $2,000 solicited and received by
Judge Ritter in the Brazilian Court case, as described in
article III, and the fee of $7,500 received by Judge Ritter
from J. R. Francis.
Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
Article VI
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by
the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of
the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while
acting as a United States district judge for the southern
district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and
misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was
guilty of violation of section 146(b) of the Revenue Act of
1928, making it unlawful for any person willfully to attempt in
any manner to evade or defeat the payment of the income tax
levied in and by said Revenue Act of 1928, in that during the
year 1930 the said Judge Ritter received gross taxable income--
over and above his salary as judge--to the amount of, to wit,
$5,300, yet failed to report any part thereof in his income-tax
return for the year 1930, and paid no income tax thereon.
Two thousand five hundred dollars of said gross taxable
income for 1930 was that amount of cash paid Judge Ritter by A.
L. Rankin on December 24, 1930, as described in article I.
Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
Original article IV is amended so as to read as follows:
``Article VII
``That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office
of United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United
States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly
qualified and commissioned, and, while acting as a United
States district judge for the southern district of Florida, was
and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
``The reasonable and probable consequence of the actions or
conduct of Halsted L. Ritter, hereunder specified or indicated
in this article, since he became judge of said court, as an
individual or as such judge, is to bring his court into scandal
and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public
confidence in the admin
[[Page 2230]]
istration of justice therein, and to the prejudice of public
respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary, and to
render him unfit to continue to serve as such judge:
``1. In that in the Florida Power Co. case (Florida Power &
Light Co. v. City of Miami et al., no. 1183-M-Eq.), which was a
case wherein said judge had granted the complainant power
company a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of
an ordinance of the city of Miami, which ordinance prescribed a
reduction in the rates for electric current being charged in
said city, said judge improperly appointed one Cary T.
Hutchinson, who had long been associated with and employed by
power and utility interests, special master in chancery in said
suit, and refused to revoke his order so appointing said
Hutchinson. Thereafter, when criticism of such action had
become current in the city of Miami, and within 2 weeks after a
resolution (H. Res. 163, 73d Cong.) had been agreed to in the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States,
authorizing and directing the Judiciary Committee thereof to
investigate the official conduct of said judge and to make a
report concerning said conduct to said House of
Representatives, an arrangement was entered into with the city
commissioners of the city of Miami or with the city attorney of
said city by which the said city commissioners were to pass a
resolution expressing faith and confidence in the integrity of
said judge, and the said judge recuse himself as judge in said
power suit. The said agreement was carried out by the parties
thereto, and said judge; after the passage of such resolution,
recused himself from sitting as judge in said power suit,
thereby bartering his judicial authority in said case for a
vote of confidence. Nevertheless, the succeeding judge allowed
said Hutchinson as special master in chancery in said case a
fee of $5,000, although he performed little, if any, service as
such, and in the order making such allowance recited: `And it
appearing to the court that a minimum fee of $5,000 was
approved by the court for the said Cary T. Hutchinson, special
master in this cause.'
``2. In that in the Trust Co. of Florida cases (Illick v.
Trust Co. of Florida et al., no. 1043-M-Eq., and Edmunds
Committee et al. v. Marion Mortgage Co. et al., no. 1124-M-
Eq.), after the State Banking Department of Florida, through
its comptroller, Hon. Ernest Amos, had closed the doors of the
Trust Co. of Florida and appointed J. H. Therrell liquidator
for said trust company, and had intervened in the said Illick
case, said Judge Ritter wrongfully and erroneously refused to
recognize the right of said State authority to administer the
affairs of the said trust company and appointed Julian S. Eaton
and Clark D. Stearns as receivers of the property of said trust
company. On appeal the United States Circuit Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit reversed the said order or decree of
Judge Ritter and ordered the said property surrendered to the
State liquidator. Thereafter, on, to wit, September 12, 1932,
there was filed in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida the Edmunds Committee case, supra.
Marion Mortgage Co. was a subsidiary of the Trust Co. of
Florida. Judge Ritter being absent from his district at the
time of the filing of said case, an application for the
appointment of receivers therein was presented to another judge
of said district, namely, Hon. Alexander Akerman. Judge Ritter,
however, prior to the appointment of such receivers,
telegraphed Judge Akerman, requesting him to appoint the
aforesaid Eaton and Stearns as receivers in said case, which
appointments were made by Judge Akerman. Thereafter the United
[[Page 2231]]
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the order of Judge Akerman, appointing said Eaton and Stearns
as receivers in said case. In November 1932 J. H. Therrell, as
liquidator, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of
Dade County, Fla.--a court of the State of Florida--alleging
that the various trust properties of the Trust Co. of Florida
were burdensome to the liquidator to keep, and asking that the
court appoint a succeeding trustee. Upon petition for removal
of said cause from said State court into the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge
Ritter took jurisdiction, notwithstanding the previous rulings
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals above referred
to, and again appointed the said Eaton and Stearns as the
receivers of the said trust properties. In December 1932 the
said Therrell surrendered all of the trust properties to said
Eaton and Stearns as receivers, together with all records of
the Trust Co. of Florida pertaining thereto. During the time
said Eaton and Stearns, as such receivers, were in control of
said trust properties. Judge Ritter wrongfully and improperly
approved their accounts without notice or opportunity for
objection thereto to be heard. With the knowledge of Judge
Ritter, said receivers appointed the sister-in-law of Judge
Ritter, namely, Mrs. G. M. Wickard, who had had no previous
hotel-management experience, to be manager of the Julia Tuttle
Hotel and Apartment Building, one of said trust properties. On,
to wit, January 1, 1933, Hon. J. M. Lee succeeded Hon. Ernest
Amos as comptroller of the State of Florida and appointed M. A.
Smith liquidator in said Trust Co. of Florida cases to succeed
J. H. Therrell. An appeal was again taken to the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the then
latest order or decree of Judge Ritter, and again the order or
decree of Judge Ritter appealed from was reversed by the said
circuit court of appeals which held that the State officer was
entitled to the custody of the property involved and that said
Eaton and Stearns as receivers were not entitled to such
custody. Thereafter, and with the knowledge of the decision of
the-said circuit court of appeals, Judge Ritter wrongfully and
improperly allowed said Eaton and Stearns and their attorneys
some $26,000 as fees out of said trust-estate properties and
endeavored to require, as a condition precedent to releasing
said trust properties from the control of his court, a promise
from counsel for the said State liquidator not to appeal from
his order allowing the said fees to said Eaton and Stearns and
their attorneys.
``3. In that the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such Federal
judge, accepted, in addition to $4,500 from his former law
partner, as alleged in article I hereof, other large fees or
gratuities, to wit, $7,500 from J. R. Francis, on or about
April 19, 1929, J. R. Francis at this said time having large
property interests within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court of which Judge Ritter was a judge; and on, to wit, the
4th day of April 1929 the said Judge Ritter accepted the sum of
$2,000 from Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, representing Mulford
Realty Corporation as its attorneys, through Charles A. Brodek,
senior member of said firm and a director of said corporation,
as a fee or gratuity, at which time the said Mulford Realty
Corporation held and owned large interests in Florida real
estate and citrus groves and a large amount of securities of
the Olympia Improvement Corporation, which was a company
organized to develop and promote Olympia, Florida, said
holdings being within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States District
[[Page 2232]]
Court of which Ritter was a judge from, to wit, February 15,
1929.
``4. By his conduct as detailed in articles I, II, III, and
IV hereof, and by his income-tax evasions as set forth in
articles V and VI hereof.
``Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is
guilty of misbehavior, and was and is guilty of high crimes and
misdemeanors in office.''
The House adopted the resolution amending the articles after Mr.
Sumners discussed its provisions and stated his opinion that the
managers had the power to report amendments to the articles:
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, the resolution which has
just been read proposes three new articles. The change is not as
important as that statement would indicate. Two of the new articles
deal with income taxes, and one with practicing law by Judge
Ritter, after he went on the bench. In the original resolution, the
charge is made that Judge Ritter received certain fees or
gratuities and had written a letter, and so forth. No change is
proposed in articles 1 and 2. In article 3, as stated, Judge Ritter
is charged with practicing law after he went on the bench. That
same thing, in effect, was charged, as members of the committee
will remember, in the original resolution, but the form of the
charge, in the judgment of the managers, could be improved. These
charges go further and charge that in the matter connected with J.
R. Francis, the judge acted as counsel in two transactions after he
went on the bench, and received $7,500 in compensation. Article 7
is amended to include a reference to these new charges. There is a
change in the tense used with reference to the effect of the
conduct alleged. It is charged, in the resolution pending at the
desk, that the reasonable and probable consequence of the alleged
conduct is to injure the confidence of the people in the courts--I
am not attempting to quote the exact language--which is a matter of
form, I think, more than a matter of substance.
Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, will the
gentleman yield?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
Mr. Snell: I may not be entirely familiar with all this
procedure, but as I understand, what the gentleman is doing here
today, is to amend the original articles of impeachment passed by
the House.
Mr. Sumners of Texas: That is correct.
Mr. Snell: The original articles of impeachment came to the
House as a result of the evidence before the gentleman's committee.
Has the gentleman's committee had anything to do with the change or
amendment of these charges?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: No; just the managers.
Mr. Snell: As a matter of procedure, would not that be the
proper thing to do?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: I do not think it is at all necessary,
for this reason: The managers are now acting as the agents of the
House, and not as the agents of the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr.
Manager Perkins and Mr. Manager Hobbs have recently extended the
investigation made by the committee.
[[Page 2233]]
Mr. Snell: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
Mr. Snell: Do I understand that the amendments come because of
new information that has come to you as managers that never was
presented to the Committee on the Judiciary?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: Perhaps it would not be true to answer
that entirely in the affirmative, but the changes are made largely
by reason of new evidence which has come to the attention of the
committee, and some of these changes, more or less changes in form,
have resulted from further examination of the question. This is
somewhat as lawyers do in their pleadings. They often ask the
privilege of making an amendment.
Mr. Snell: And the gentleman's position is that as agents of
the House it is not necessary to have the approval of his
committee, which made the original impeachment charges?
Mr. Sumners of Texas: I have no doubt about that; I have no
doubt about the accuracy of that statement.
Sec. 18.11 Following the amendment of the articles of impeachment
against Judge Halsted Ritter, the House adopted a resolution to
inform the Senate thereof.
On Mar. 30, 1936,(11) following the amendment by the
House of the articles in the impeachment against Judge Ritter, the
Senate was informed by resolution thereof:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 80 Cong. Rec. 4601, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. [Hatton W.] Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, I offer the
following privileged resolution.
The Clerk read as follows:
House Resolution 472
Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate by the Clerk
of the House informing the Senate that the House of
Representatives has adopted an amendment to the articles of
impeachment heretofore exhibited against Halsted L. Ritter,
United States district judge for the southern district of
Florida, and that the same will be presented to the Senate by
the managers on the part of the House.
And also, that the managers have authority to file with the
Secretary of the Senate, on the part of the House any
subsequent pleadings they shall deem necessary.
The resolution was agreed to.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
On Mar. 31, the amendments to the articles were presented to the
Court of Impeachment and printed in the Record; (12) counsel
for the respondent was granted 48 hours to file his response to the new
articles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Id. at pp. 4654-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Motions to Strike Articles
Sec. 18.12 During the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter, the
respondent moved to strike Article I or, in the
[[Page 2234]]
alternative, to require election as to Articles I and II, and moved
to strike Article VII.
On Mar. 31, 1936,(13) the respondent, Judge Ritter,
filed the following motion:
In the Senate of the United States of America sitting as a Court of
Impeachment. The United States of America v. Halsted L. Ritter,
respondent
Motion to Strike Article I, or, in the Alternative, to Require
Election as to Articles I and II; and Motion to Strike Article VII
The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, moves the honorable Senate,
sitting as a Court of Impeachment, for an order striking and
dismissing article I of the articles of impeachment, or, in the
alternative, to require the honorable managers on the part of the
House of Representatives to elect as to whether they will proceed
upon article I or upon article II, and for grounds of such motion
respondent says:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 80 Cong. Rec. 4656, 4657, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Article II reiterates and embraces all the charges and
allegations of article I, and the respondent is thus and thereby
twice charged in separate articles with the same and identical
offense, and twice required to defend against the charge presented
in article I.
2. The presentation of the same and identical charge in the two
articles in question tends to prejudice the respondent in his
defense, and tends to oppress the respondent in that the articles
are so framed as to collect, or accumulate upon the second article,
the adverse votes, if any, upon the first article.
3. The Constitution of the United States contemplates but one
vote of the Senate upon the charge contained in each article of
impeachment, whereas articles I and II are constructed and arranged
in such form and manner as to require and exact of the Senate a
second vote upon the subject matter of article I.
Motion to Strike Article VII
And the respondent further moves the honorable Senate, sitting
as a Court of Impeachment, for an order striking and dismissing
article VII, and for grounds of such motion, respondent says:
1. Article VII includes and embraces all the charges set forth
in articles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI.
2. Article VII constitutes an accumulation and massing of all
charges in preceding articles upon which the Court is to pass
judgment prior to the vote on article VII, and the prosecution
should be required to abide by the judgment of the Senate rendered
upon such prior articles and the Senate ought not to countenance
the arrangement of pleading designed to procure a second vote and
the collection or accumulation of adverse votes, if any, upon such
matters.
3. The presentation in article VII of more than one subject and
the charges arising out of a single subject is unjust and
prejudicial to respondent.
4. In fairness and justice to respondent, the Court ought to
require separa
[[Page 2235]]
tion and singleness of the subject matter of the charges in
separate and distinct articles, upon which a single and final vote
of the Senate upon each article and charge can be had.
(Signed) Frank P. Walsh,
Carl T. Hoffman,
Of Counsel for Respondent.
Mr. Hoffman, counsel for respondent, argued that Article II
duplicated charges set forth in Article I. He also contended that the
rule of duplicity, or the principle of civil and criminal pleading that
one count should contain no more than one charge or cause of action,
was violated by Article VII.
Mr. Sumners argued in response that Article II was clearly not a
duplication of Article I, two distinct charges being presented. As to
Article VII, Mr. Sumners contended that impeachment was essentially an
ouster proceeding as opposed to a criminal proceeding. He referred to
the fact that the articles of impeachment against Judge Harold
Louderback had contained a similar article charging that ``by
specifically alleged conduct'' the respondent ``has done those things
the reasonable and probable consequences of which are to arouse a
substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Id. at p. 4658.
For Article V, as amended, in the Louderback impeachment,
charging such conduct as to destroy public confidence in the
court, see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the suggestion of the Chair, decision on the motions of
respondent were reserved for investigation and deliberation:
Mr. [Henry F.] Ashurst [of Arizona]: Mr. President, I assume
that the Presiding Officer will desire to take some time to examine
all the pleadings and will not be prepared to announce a decision
on this point until the next session of the Court?
The Presiding Officer [Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.)]: It is the
opinion of the present occupant of the chair that while the
necessity for early decision is apparent, the importance of the
matter would justify the occupant of the chair in saying that no
decision should be made until the proceedings are printed and every
member of the Court has an opportunity to investigate and consider
them. Is there objection to that suggestion of the Chair? The Chair
hears none.(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Id. at p. 4659.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 18.13 On the respondent's motion to strike, the Chair overruled
that part of the motion which sought to strike Article I or to
require election between Articles I and II; the Chair submitted
that part of the motion which sought to strike Article VII to the
Court of Impeachment, which overruled that part of the motion.
[[Page 2236]]
On Apr. 3, 1936,(16) the following disposition was made
of the motion of the respondent, Judge Halsted Ritter, to strike
certain articles:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Presiding Officer [Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.)]: On the
motion of the honorable counsel for the respondent to strike
article I of the articles of impeachment or, in the alternative, to
require the honorable managers on the part of the House to make an
election as to whether they will stand upon article I or upon
article II, the Chair is ready to rule.
The Chair is clearly of the opinion that the motion to strike
article I or to require an election is not well taken and should be
overruled.
His reason for such opinion is that articles I and II present
entirely different bases for impeachment.
Article I alleges the illegal and corrupt receipt by the
respondent of $4,500 from his former law partner, Mr. Rankin.
Article II sets out as a basis for impeachment an alleged
conspiracy between Judge Ritter; his former partner, Mr. Rankin;
one Richardson, Metcalf & Sweeny; and goes into detail as to the
means and manner employed whereby the respondent is alleged to have
corruptly received the $4,500 above mentioned.
The two allegations, one of corrupt and illegal receipt and the
other of conspiracy to effectuate the purpose, are, in the judgment
of the Chair, wholly distinct, and the respondent should be called
to answer each of the articles.
What is the judgment of the Court with reference to that
particular phase of the motion to strike?
Mr. [William H.] King [of Utah]: Mr. President, if it be
necessary, I move that the ruling of the honorable Presiding
Officer be considered as and stand for the judgment of the Senate
sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection? The Chair hears
none, and the ruling of the Chair is sustained, by the Senate.
With reference to article VII of the articles of impeachment,
formerly article IV, the Chair desires to exercise his prerogative
of calling on the Court for a determination of this question.
His reason for so doing is that an impeachment proceeding
before the Senate sitting as a Court is sui generis, partaking
neither of the harshness and rigidity of the criminal law nor of
the civil proceedings requiring less particularity.
The question of duplicity in impeachment proceedings presented
by the honorable counsel for the respondent is a controversial one,
and the Chair feels that it is the right and duty of each Member of
the Senate, sitting as a Court, to express his views thereon.
Precedents in proceedings of this character are rare and not
binding upon this Court in any course that it might desire to
pursue.
The question presented in the motion to strike article VII on
account of duplicity has not, so far as the Chair is advised, been
presented in any impeachment proceeding heretofore had before this
body.
The Chair therefore submits the question to the Court.
[[Page 2237]]
Mr. [Henry F.] Ashurst [of Arizona]: Mr. President, under the
rules of the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, all such
questions, when submitted by the Presiding Officer, shall be
decided without debate and without division, unless the yeas and
nays are demanded by one-fifth of the Members present, when the
yeas and nays shall be taken.
The Presiding Officer: The Chair therefore, will put the
motion. All those in favor of the motion of counsel for the
respondent to strike article VII will say ``aye.'' Those opposed
will say ``no.''
The noes have it, and the motion in its entirety is overruled.
Sec. 18.14 During the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter, the
managers on the part of the House made and the Senate granted a
motion to strike certain specifications from an article of
impeachment.
On Apr. 3, 1936,(17) during the impeachment trial of
Judge Ritter, the managers on the part of the House moved that two
counts be stricken. The motion was granted by the Senate:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 80 Cong. Rec. 4899, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Manager [Hatton W.] Sumners [of Texas] (speaking from the
desk in front of the Vice President): Mr. President, the suggestion
which the managers desire to make at this time has reference to
specifications 1 and 2 of article VII. These two specifications
have reference to what I assume counsel for respondent and the
managers as well, recognize are rather involved matters, which
would possibly require as much time to develop and to argue as
would be required on the remainder of the case.
The managers respectfully move that those two counts be
stricken. If that motion shall be sustained, the managers will
stand upon the other specifications in article VII to establish
article VII. The suggestion on the part of the managers is that
those two specifications in article VII be stricken from the
article.
The Presiding Officer: (18) What is the response of
counsel for the respondent?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. [Charles L.] McNary [of Oregon]: Mr. President, there was
so much rumbling and noise in the Chamber that I did not hear the
position taken by the managers on the part of the House.
The Presiding Officer: The managers on the part of the House
have suggested that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be
stricken on their motion. . . .
Mr. Hoffman [of counsel]: Mr. President, the respondent is
ready to file his answer to article I, to articles II and III as
amended, and to articles IV, V, and VI. In view of the announcement
just made asking that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be
stricken, it will be necessary for us to revise our answer to
article VII and to eliminate paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof. That can
be very speedily done with 15 or 20 minutes if it can be arranged
for the
[[Page 2238]]
Senate to indulge us for that length of time.
The Presiding Officer: Is there objection to the motion
submitted on the part of the managers?
Mr. Hoffman: We have no objection.
The Presiding Officer: The motion is made. Is there objection?
The Chair hears none, and the motion to strike is granted.
Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, it would
seem that in the interest of the conservation of time and for the
convenience of the Court, the motion should have been made prior to
the decision on the question involved in the motion of counsel to
strike certain articles. I merely make that observation for the
consideration of the Court.
Answer and Replication
Sec. 18.15 In the Ritter impeachment trial, an answer to the charges
was filed by the respondent, and a replication thereto was
submitted by the managers.
On Apr. 3, 1936, the answer of the respondent in the Ritter
impeachment was read in the Senate, ordered printed, and messaged to
the House. The answer stated that the facts set forth therein did not
constitute impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors and that the
respondent was not guilty of the offenses charged.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 80 Cong. Rec. 4899-4906, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Apr. 6, the respondent's answer was laid before the House and
referred to the managers on the part of the House.(20) On
the same day, the managers filed a replication in the Senate, sitting
as a Court of Impeachment, to the answer of the respondent Judge
Ritter. The replication was prepared and submitted by the managers on
their own initiative, the House not having voted thereon:(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Id. at p. 5020.
1. Id. at pp. 4971, 4972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Replication of the House of Representatives of the United States of
America to the Answer of Halsted L. Ritter, District Judge of the
United States for the Southern District of Florida, to the Articles
of Impeachment, as Amended, Exhibited Against him by the House of
Representatives of the United States of America
The House of Representatives of the United States of America,
having considered the several answers of Halsted L. Ritter,
district judge of the United States for the southern district of
Florida, to the several articles of impeachment, as amended,
against him by them exhibited in the name of themselves and of all
the people of the United States, and reserving to themselves all
advantages of exception to the insufficiency, irrelevancy, and
impertinency of his answer to each and all of the several articles
of impeachment, as amended, so exhibited against the said Halsted
L. Ritter, judge as aforesaid, do say:
[[Page 2239]]
(1) That the said articles, as amended do severally set forth
impeachable offenses, misbehaviors, and misdemeanors as defined in
the Constitution of the United States, and that the same are proper
to be answered unto by the said Halsted L. Ritter, judge as
aforesaid, and sufficient to be entertained and adjudicated by the
Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
(2) That the said House of Representatives of the United States
of America do deny each and every averment in said several answers,
or either of them, which denies or traverses the acts, intents,
misbehaviors, or misdemeanors charged against the said Halsted L.
Ritter in said articles of impeachment, as amended, or either of
them, and for replication to said answers do say that Halsted L.
Ritter, district judge of the United States for the southern
district of Florida, is guilty of the impeachable offenses,
misbehaviors, and misdemeanors charged in said articles, as
amended, and that the House of Representatives are ready to prove
the same.
Hatton W. Sumners,
On behalf of the Managers.
The Trial; Arguments
Sec. 18.16 Opening statements and closing arguments in an impeachment
trial may consist of statements by the managers on the part of the
House and statements by counsel for the accused.
On Apr. 6, 1936,(2) in the impeachment trial of Judge
Halsted Ritter, opening statements were made in the Senate by the
managers on the part of the House and by counsel for the
accused.(3) The respondent himself testified before the
Court of Impeachment.(4) Final arguments were made on Apr.
13 and 14 first by Mr. Sam Hobbs, of Alabama, for the managers, then by
Mr. Walsh for the respondent, and finally by Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of
Texas, for the managers, the arguments being limited by an order
adopted on Apr. 13:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. 80 Cong. Rec. 4972-82, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
3. For precedents during the trial as to the evidence, see
Sec. Sec. 12.7-12.9, supra.
4. 80 Cong. Rec. 5370-86, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 11 and Apr. 13,
1936.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ordered, That the time for final argument of the case of
Halsted L. Ritter shall be limited to 4 hours, which said time
shall be divided equally between the managers on the part of the
House of Representatives and the counsel for the respondent, and
the time thus assigned to each side shall be divided as each side
for itself may determine.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Id. at p. 5401.
For final arguments on Apr. 13, 1936, see id. at pp. 5401-
10; for Apr. 14, 1936, see id. at pp. 5464-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hobbs argued three principles bearing on the weight of evidence
and burden of proof in an impeachment trial:
The statement of the law of the case, as we see it, will
largely be left to the distinguished chairman of the Judici
[[Page 2240]]
ary Committee of the House [Mr. Manager Sumners], the chairman of
the managers on the part of the House in this case, and I will not
attempt to go into that, save to observe these three points which,
to my mind, should be in the minds of the Members of this high
Court of Impeachment at all times in weighing this evidence:
First, that impeachment trials are not criminal trials in any
sense of the word.
Second, that the burden of proof in this case is not ``beyond a
reasonable doubt'', as it is in criminal cases.
Third, that the presumption of innocence, which attends a
defendant in a criminal case, is not to be indulged in behalf of
the respondent in an impeachment trial. Those three principles of
law, I believe, are well recognized, and we respectfully ask the
Members of this high Court of Impeachment to bear them in mind.
The present distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska [Mr.
Norris], when acting as one of the managers on the part of the
House in the impeachment trial of Judge Robert W. Archbald, made as
clear and cogent a statement as has ever been made upon the subject
of impeachable conduct. With his kind permission, I should like to
take that as my text, so to speak, for the remarks that will
follow:
If judges can hold their offices only during good behavior,
then it necessarily and logically follows that they cannot hold
their offices when they have been convicted of any behavior
that is not good. If good behavior is an essential of holding
the office, then misbehavior is a sufficient reason for removal
from office.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. Id. at p. 5401.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Walsh concluded his argument based on the lack of evidence of
charges and on the good character and reputation of the respondent:
Gentlemen, all I can say to you is that if this case were being
tried in an ordinary court a demurrer to the evidence would be
sustained. The law is that those bringing these charges must prove
the receipt of income; they must prove the amount that was paid out
against that income; they must prove what his exemptions were; they
must prove what his allowances were; they must prove a tax
liability. Those matters would all have been looked into, and as we
look into them in this case there is no tax liability. When Judge
Ritter swears he did not defraud the Government of a dollar, when
he says that the $6.25 tax was not due because his exemptions
exceeded that sum, the court would direct a verdict in his favor.
In 1930 Judge Ritter had a loss which, added to his taxes and
other expenditures, gave him a leeway of $4,600 over and above the
income that he could be charged with having received. He testified
to this, and you ought to believe that he testified to the truth,
for a charge must be supported by something greater, I say, than
the mere assertion of counsel, and nothing else has been introduced
in this case in support of that charge. If Judge Ritter were found
guilty upon that charge, which was filed in this Court on March 30,
1936--after he came here to defend himself against the other
charges--that would be a monstrous thing. Those bringing the charge
did not, nor
[[Page 2241]]
could they, make proof that Judge Ritter owed his Government a cent
of income taxes or that Judge Ritter did anything improper in the
filing of his return. It ought to be the pleasure of this body to
acquit him of the charges with respect to income taxes, because the
law protects him, because he is innocent of any offense in that
regard.
Take this whole case in its entirety, gentlemen. I have tried
to argue it on the facts. I have drawn no conclusions which I did
not honestly believe came from these facts. My argument is backed
up by the belief that you must recognize and accept his innocence
as he stood here, a brave and manly man, testifying in opposition
to these charges which have been made against him. It will not do
to say that he undermined the dignity or the honor of the court. He
did nothing in his whole career in Florida, according to the
witnesses, which would belittle that dignity or besmirch his honor.
There is another thing I wish to call to your attention. I know
and you know that a judge ought to have a good reputation. In this
case, however, where a charge is made against his integrity, where
a charge of corruption is made against him, he put his reputation
in that community in evidence before this body.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
7. Id. at p. 5468.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Sumners began and concluded his argument, the final argument in
the case, as follows:
We do not assume the responsibility, Members of this
distinguished Court, of proving that the respondent in this case is
guilty of a crime as that term is known to criminal jurisprudence.
We do assume the responsibility of bringing before you a case,
proven facts, the reasonable and probable consequences of which are
to cause the people to doubt the integrity of the respondent
presiding as a judge among a free people.
We take the position, first, that justice must be done to the
respondent. The respondent must be protected against those who
would make him afraid. But we take the position also that when a
judge on the bench, by his own conduct, does that which makes an
ordinary person doubt his integrity, doubt whether his court is a
fair place to go, doubt whether he, that ordinary person, will get
a square deal there; doubt whether the judge will be influenced by
something other than the sworn testimony, that judge must go.
This august body writes the code of judicial ethics. This Court
fixes the standard of permissible judicial conduct. It will not be,
it cannot be, that someone on the street corner will destroy the
confidence of the American people in the courts of this country.
That cannot happen if the courts are kept clean. If confidence in
the courts of this country is destroyed it is going to be destroyed
from within by the judges themselves. I declare to you, standing in
my place of responsibility, that that is one thing which neither
the House nor the Senate can permit to be tampered with or which
they can be easy about. . . .
Now, let us look at this case. I do not know anything about
what happened in Colorado, but when we see this respondent in this
record he is down there in Florida as the secretary of a real-
estate concern. After that he forms
[[Page 2242]]
a copartnership with Mr. Rankin. Two years and three months after
that time he occupies a position on the Federal bench, and when the
Government put him there, when the people put him there, they said
to him, ``All we ask of you is to behave yourself.'' Good behavior!
What does that mean? It means obey the law, keep yourself free from
questionable conduct, free from embarrassing entanglements, free
from acts which justify suspicion; hold in clean hands the scales
of justice. That means that he shall not take chances that would
tend to cause the people to question the integrity of the court,
because where doubt enters confidence departs. Is not that sound?
When a judge on the bench, by his own conduct, arouses a
substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity he commits the
highest crime that a judge can commit under the Constitution. It is
not essential to prove guilt. There is nothing in the Constitution
and nothing in the philosophy of a free government that holds that
a man shall continue to occupy office until it can be established
beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not fit for the office. It is
the other way. When there is resulting from the judge's conduct a
reasonable doubt as to his integrity he has no right to stay
longer. He has forfeited his right. It is the high duty of this
Court to write the judgment and make effective the terms of that
contract. . . .(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. Id. at p. 5469.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Manager Sumners: I do not want to be tedious, but this is
very important, because these things go down to the depths of this
man's character.
When he wrote this letter he referred to him as ``A. L. Rankin,
of Andalusia, Ala.'' Why did he do that? Because the job Rankin was
trying to get was in Alabama. Just think of that, and weigh it.
In another letter he said:
I want to say that Judge Rankin is a man of the highest
character and integrity. He is one of the ablest common-law
lawyers in the South.
That is a statement made by a judge upon his responsibility.
We were partners in the practice of law in West Palm Beach
before my appointment on the bench. I know of no man better
qualified from the standpoint of experience, ability, and
character for the position.
And so forth. Then he writes again in another letter that if he
is appointed he will raise the bench to a high place.
I say a man who will not speak the truth above his signed name
will not swear it, and a man who will not state the truth, and who
does those things which arouse doubt as to his integrity must go
from the bench.
I appreciate profoundly the attention which the Members of this
honorable Court have given the case.
There ought to be a unanimous judgment in this case, and let it
ring out from this Chamber all over the Nation that from now on men
who hold positions in the Federal judiciary must be obedient to the
high principles which in the nature of things it is essential for a
judge to manifest.
A few Federal judges can reflect upon the great body of
honorable men who hold these high positions.
There is another thing I was about to forget. Of course, the
bondholders in Chicago did not protest the $90,000 fee to Rankin.
The attorneys for the bond
[[Page 2243]]
holders and Mr. Holland were in the respondent's court at the same
time. They came to represent 93 percent of the $2,500,000 of the
first-mortgage bonds. They heard the respondent advised of the
champertous conduct of Richardson, Rankin et al., and they saw the
respondent approve. They were virtually kicked out of the court.
They wanted the case out of that court and away from Rankin and the
respondent just as quickly as they could get it out, and they would
have stood not only for that fee of $90,000 but for more; and any
of you practicing law would have done the same thing under the
circumstances. You remember McPherson said respondent was positive,
very positive, about Mr. Holland. Respondent was a great deal
stronger with regard to the attorney for the bondholders. Remember
the judge asked Holland, ``Who bought you off?'' of course they
were glad to get out at almost any price.
Members of the Court, there is a great deal more which ought to
be said, but you have the record and my time has about expired. I
have a duty to perform and you have yours. Mine is finished.
The House has done all the House can do toward protecting the
judiciary of the country. The people have trusted in you. Counsel
for the respondent kept emphasizing the fact that this respondent
stood and swore, stood and swore, stood and swore. I remember that
I saw the Members of this honorable Court lift their hands to God
Almighty, and, in that oath which they took, pledge themselves to
rise above section and party entanglements and to be true to the
people of the Nation in the exercise of this high power. I have no
doubt you will do it.
I thank this honorable Court for the courtesy and consideration
which have been shown to my colleagues and to me as we have tried
to discharge our constitutional duty in this matter.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
9. Id. at pp. 5472, 5473.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberation and Judgment
Sec. 18.17 Deliberation was followed by conviction on a general article
of impeachment and by judgment of removal from office in the trial
of Judge Halsted Ritter.
Final arguments in the Ritter trial having been concluded on Apr.
14, 1936, the Court of Impeachment adjourned until Apr. 15, when the
doors of the Senate were closed for deliberation on motion of Senator
Henry F. Ashurst, of Arizona. The Senate deliberated with closed doors
for 4 hours and 37 minutes. A unanimous-consent agreement entered into
while the Senate was deliberating with closed doors was printed in the
Record; the order provided for a vote on the articles of impeachment on
Friday, Apr. 17.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 80 Cong. Rec. 5505, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deliberation with closed doors was continued on Apr. 16, 1936, for
5 hours and 48 minutes. When the doors were opened, the Senate adopted
orders to return evidence
[[Page 2244]]
to proper persons, to allow each Senator to file written opinions
within four days after the final vote, and to provide a method of vote.
The latter order read as follows:
Ordered, That upon the final vote in the pending impeachment of
Halsted L. Ritter, the Secretary shall read the articles of
impeachment separately and successively, and when the reading of
each article shall have been concluded the Presiding Officer shall
state the question thereon as follows:
``Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, Halsted L. Ritter,
guilty or not guilty?''
Thereupon the roll of the Senate shall be called, and each
Senator as his name is called, unless excused, shall arise in his
place and answer ``guilty'' or ``not guilty.'' (11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Id. at pp. 5558, 5559.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On Apr. 17, 1936, the Senate convened as a Court of Impeachment to
vote on the articles against Judge Ritter. Senator Joseph T. Robinson,
of Arkansas, announced those Senators absent and excused and announced
that pairs would not be recognized in the proceedings. Eighty-four
Senators answered to their names on the quorum call.
President pro tempore Key Pittman, of Nevada, proceeded to put the
vote on the articles of impeachment, a two-thirds vote being required
to convict. The vote was insufficient to convict on the first six
articles: Article I: 55 ``guilty'';--29 ``not guilty''; Article II: 52
``guilty''--32 ``not guilty''; Article III: 44 ``guilty''--39 ``not
guilty''; Article IV: 36 ``guilty''--48 ``not guilty''; Article V: 36
``guilty''--48 ``not guilty''; Article VI: 46 ``guilty''--37 ``not
guilty.'' But on the final Article, Article VII, the vote was: 56
``guilty''--28 ``not guilty.'' So the Senate convicted Judge Ritter on
the seventh article of impeachment, charging general misbehavior and
conduct that brought his court into scandal and disrepute.
Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, made a point of order against
the vote on the ground that two-thirds had not voted to convict,
Article VII being an accumulation of facts and circumstances. The
President pro tempore sustained a point of order that Senator Austin
was indulging in argument rather than stating the grounds for his point
of order, and overruled Senator Austin's point of order.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Id. at p. 5606.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senator Ashurst submitted an order both removing Judge Ritter from
office and disqualifying him from holding and enjoying any office of
honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Senator Robert M. La
Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin,
[[Page 2245]]
asked for a division of the question, but Senator George W. Norris, of
Nebraska, suggested that Senator Ashurst should submit two orders,
since removal followed from conviction but disqualification did not.
Senator Ashurst thereupon withdrew the original order and submitted an
order removing Judge Ritter from office. The President pro tempore
ruled that no vote was required on the order, removal automatically
following conviction for high crimes and misdemeanors under section 4
of article II of the U.S. Constitution. The President pro tempore then
pronounced judgment:
Judgment
The Senate having tried Halsted L. Ritter, United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, upon seven
several articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House
of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present having
found him guilty of charges contained therein: It is therefore
Ordered and adjudged, That the said Halsted L. Ritter be, and
he is hereby, removed from office.
Senator Ashurst submitted a second order disqualifying the
respondent from holding an office of honor, trust, or profit under the
United States. It was agreed, in reliance on the Robert Archbald
proceedings, that only a majority vote was required for passage. The
order for disqualification failed on a yea and nay vote--yeas 0, nays
76.
The Senate adopted an order communicating the order and judgment to
the House, and the Senate adjourned sine die from the Court of
Impeachment.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Id. at pp. 5606, 5607.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsequent to his conviction and removal from office, the
respondent brought an action in the U.S. Court of Claims for back
salary, claiming that the Senate had exceeded its jurisdiction in
trying him for nonimpeachable charges. The Court of Claims dismissed
the claim for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the impeachment
power was vested in Congress and was not subject to judicial
review.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Ritter v United States, 84 Ct. Cl 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300
U.S. 668 (1937). The opinion of the Court of Claims cited dicta
in the case of Mississippi v Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866), to
support the conclusion that the impeachment power was political
in nature and not subject to judicial review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sec. 18.18 The order and judgment of the Senate in the Ritter
impeachment trial were messaged to the House.
On Apr. 20, 1936,(15) the order and judgment in the
Halsted Rit
[[Page 2246]]
ter impeachment trial were received in the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 80 Cong. Rec. 5703, 5704, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Message From the Senate
A message from the Senate, by Mr. Home, its enrolling clerk,
announced that the Senate had ordered that the Secretary be
directed to communicate to the President of the United States and
the House of Representatives the order and judgment of the Senate
in the case of Halsted L. Ritter, and transmit a certified copy of
same to each, as follows:
I, Edwin A. Halsey, Secretary of the Senate of the United
States of America, do hereby certify that the hereto attached
document is a true and correct copy of the order and judgment
of the Senate, sitting for the trial of the impeachment of
Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the
southern district of Florida, entered in the said trial on
April 17, 1936.
In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name and
affix the seal of the Senate of the United States of America,
this the 18th day of April, A.D. 1936.
Edwin A. Halsey,
Secretary of the Senate
of the United States.
In the Senate of the United States of America, sitting for the
trial of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, United
States district judge for the southern district of Florida
Judgment
April 17, 1936.
The Senate having tried Halsted L. Ritter, United States
district judge for the southern district of Florida, upon seven
several articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the
House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators
present having found him guilty of charges contained therein:
It is therefore
Ordered and adjudged, That the said Halsted L. Ritter be,
and he is hereby, removed from office.
Attest:
Edwin A. Halsey
Secretary.
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