[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 14. Impeachment Powers]
[D. History of Proceedings]
[§ 18. Impeachment of Judge Ritter]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 2205-2246]
 
                               CHAPTER 14
 
                           Impeachment Powers
 
                       D. HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS
 
Sec. 18. Impeachment of Judge Ritter

Authorization of Investigation

Sec. 18.1 The Committee on the Judiciary reported in the 73d Congress a 
    resolution authorizing an investigation into the conduct of Halsted 
    Ritter, a U.S. District Court judge; the resolution was referred to 
    the Union Calendar and considered and adopted in the House as in 
    the Committee of the Whole by unanimous consent.

    On May 29, 1933, Mr. J. Mark Wilcox, of Florida, placed in the 
hopper a resolution (H. Res. 163) authorizing the Committee on the 
Judiciary to investigate the conduct of Halsted Ritter, District Judge 
for the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida, to 
determine whether in the opinion of the committee he had been guilty of 
any high crime or misdemeanor. The resolution was referred to the 
Committee on the Judiciary.(20~)
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20. 77 Cong. Rec. 4575, 73d Cong. 1st Sess.
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    On June 1, 1933, the Committee on the Judiciary reported House 
Resolution 163 (H. Rept. No. 191) with committee amendments; the 
resolution was referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the 
state of the Union, since the original resolution contained an 
appropriation.(21)
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21. Id. at p. 4796.
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    On the same day, Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, Chairman of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, asked unanimous consent to consider House 
Resolution 163 in the House as in the Committee of the Whole. The 
resolution and committee amendments read as follows:

                            House Resolution 163

        Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized and 
    directed, as a whole or by subcommittee, to inquire into and 
    investigate the official conduct of Halsted L. Ritter, a district 
    judge for the United States District Court for the Southern 
    District of Florida, to determine whether in the opinion of said 
    committee he has been guilty of any high crime or misdemeanor which 
    in the contemplation of the Constitution requires the interposition 
    of the Constitutional powers of the House. Said committee shall 
    report its findings to the House, together with such resolution of 
    impeachment or other recommendation as it deems proper.

        Sec. 2. For the purpose of this resolution, the committee is 
    authorized to

[[Page 2206]]

    sit and act during the present Congress at such times and places in 
    the District of Columbia and elsewhere, whether or not the House is 
    sitting, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearing, to 
    employ such clerical, stenographic, and other assistance, to 
    require the attendance of such witnesses and the production of such 
    books, papers, and documents, and to take such testimony, to have 
    such printing and binding done, and to make such expenditures not 
    exceeding $5,000, as it deems necessary.
        With the following committee amendments:
        Page 2, line 5, strike out the words ``to employ such clerical, 
    stenographic, and other assistance''; and in line 9, on page 2, 
    strike out ``to have such printing and binding done, and to make 
    such expenditures, not exceeding $5,000.''

    After brief debate, the House as in the Committee of the Whole 
adopted the resolution as amended by the committee 
amendments.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Id. at pp. 4784, 4785.
            The House adopted a resolution, reported by the Committee 
        on Accounts, authorizing payment out of the contingent fund for 
        expenses of the Committee on the Judiciary in conducting its 
        investigation under H. Res. 163; see H. Res. 172, 77 Cong. Rec. 
        5429, 5430, 73d Cong. 1st Sess., June 9. 1933.
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    The Committee on the Judiciary made no report to the House, prior 
to the expiration of the 73d Congress, in the matter of charges against 
Judge Ritter, but a subcommittee of the committee investigated the 
charges and gathered testimony and evidence pursuant to House 
Resolution 163.
    The evidence gathered was the basis for House Resolution 422 in the 
74th Congress, impeaching Judge Ritter, and both that resolution and 
the report of the Committee on the Judiciary in the 74th Congress (H. 
Rept. No. 2025) referred to the investigation conducted under House 
Resolution 163, 73d Congress.
    The Chairman of the subcommittee, Malcolm C. Tarver, of Georgia, 
made a report recommending impeachment to the full committee; the 
report was printed in the Record in the 74th Congress.(2)
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 2. 80 Cong. Rec. 408-10, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 14, 1936.
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Presentation of Charges

Sec. 18.2 In the 74th Congress, a Member rose to a question of 
    constitutional privilege and presented charges against Judge 
    Ritter, which were referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.

    On Jan. 14, 1936, Mr. Robert A. Green, of Florida, a member of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, rose to a question of constitutional

[[Page 2207]]

privilege and on his own responsibility impeached Judge Halsted Ritter 
for high crimes and misdemeanors. Although he presented no resolution, 
he delivered lengthy and specific charges against the accused. He 
indicated his intention to read, as part of his speech, a report 
submitted to the Committee on the Judiciary by Malcolm C. Tarver, of 
Georgia, past Chairman of a subcommittee of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, which subcommittee had investigated the charges against 
Judge Ritter pursuant to House Resolution 163, adopted by the House in 
the 73d Congress.
    In response to inquiries, Mr. Green summarized the status of the 
investigation and his reason for rising to a question of constitutional 
privilege:

        Mr. [John J.] O'Connor [of New York]: Of course, ordinarily the 
    matter would be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. Does 
    the gentleman think he must proceed longer in the matter at this 
    time?
        Mr. Green: My understanding is, I may say to the chairman of 
    the Rules Committee, that the articles of impeachment will be 
    referred to the Committee on the Judiciary for its further 
    consideration and action. I do not intend to consume any more time 
    than is absolutely necessary.
        Mr. [Thomas L.] Blanton [of Texas]: Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Green: I yield.
        Mr. Blanton: What action was taken on the Tarver report? If 
    this official is the kind of judge the Tarver report indicates, why 
    was he not then impeached and tried by the Senate?
        Mr. Green: That is the question that is now foremost in my 
    mind. Since Judge Tarver's service as chairman of the Judiciary 
    Subcommittee he has been transferred from the House Judiciary 
    Committee to the House Committee on Appropriations. He is not now a 
    member of the Judiciary Committee.
        I firmly believe that when our colleagues understand the 
    situation thoroughly, there will be no hesitancy in bringing about 
    Ritter's impeachment by a direct vote on the floor of the House. My 
    purpose in this is to get it in concrete form, in compliance with 
    the rules of the House, so that the direct impeachment will be 
    handled by the Committee on the Judiciary. At present impeachment 
    is not before the committee. This will give the Judiciary something 
    to act upon.
        Mr. Blanton: Was he not impeached in the House before when the 
    Tarver investigation was made?
        Mr. Green: No. He was never impeached. There was a resolution 
    passed by the House directing an investigation to be made by the 
    Judiciary Committee.
        Mr. Blanton: Was that not a resolution that followed just such 
    impeachment charges in the House as the gentleman from Florida is 
    now making?
        Mr. Green: I understand that articles of impeachment have not 
    been heretofore filed in this case.
        Mr. Blanton: Was the Tarver report, to which the gentleman has 
    re

[[Page 2208]]

    ferred, filed with the Judiciary Committee?
        Mr. Green: It is my understanding that it is now in their 
    hands.(3)
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 3. 80 Cong. Rec. 404, 405, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Mr. Green inserted the text of the Tarver report, which recommended 
impeachment, in his remarks.(4)
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 4. Id. at pp. 408-410.
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    At the conclusion of Mr. Green's remarks, Mr. O'Connor moved that 
``the proceedings be referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.'' The 
motion was agreed to.(5)
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 5. Id. at p. 410.
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Sec. 18.3 The Committee on the Judiciary reported in the 74th Congress 
    a resolution impeaching Judge Halsted Ritter on four articles of 
    impeachment; the resolution referred to the investigation 
    undertaken pursuant to authorizing resolution in the 73d Congress.

    On Feb. 20, 1936, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, introduced House 
Resolution 422, impeaching Judge Ritter; the resolution was referred to 
the Committee on the Judiciary.(6) On the same day, Mr. 
Sumners, Chairman of the committee, submitted a privileged report on 
the charges of official misconduct against Judge Ritter (H. Rept. No. 
2025). The report, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered 
printed, read as follows:
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 6. 80 Cong. Rec. 2534, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        The Committee on the Judiciary, having had under consideration 
    charges of official misconduct against Halsted L. Ritter, a 
    district judge of the United States for the Southern District of 
    Florida, and having taken testimony with regard to the official 
    conduct of said judge under the authority of House Resolution 163 
    of the Seventy-third Congress, report the accompanying resolution 
    of impeachment and articles of impeachment against Halsted L. 
    Ritter to the House of Representatives with the recommendation that 
    the same be adopted by the House and presented to the 
    Senate.(7)
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 7. Id. at p. 2528.
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    The resolving clause of the resolution recited that the evidence 
taken by a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary under House 
Resolution 163 of the 73d Congress sustained impeachment.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. For the text of the resolution and articles of impeachment, see 
        Sec. 18.7, infra.
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Consideration and Adoption of Articles of Impeachment

Sec. 18.4 The House considered and adopted a resolution and articles of 
    impeachment against Judge Halsted Ritter,

[[Page 2209]]

    pursuant to a unanimous-consent agreement fixing the time for and 
    control of debate.

    On Mar. 2, 1936, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, called up for 
immediate consideration a resolution (H. Res. 422), which the Clerk 
read at the direction of Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of Tennessee. Mr. 
Sumners indicated his intention to conclude the proceedings and have a 
vote on the resolution before adjournment. The House agreed to his 
unanimous-consent request for consideration of the 
resolution:(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 80 Cong. Rec. 3066-69, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The gentleman from Texas asks unanimous consent 
    that debate on this resolution be continued for 4\1/2\ hours, 2\1/
    2\ hours to be controlled by himself and 2 hours by the gentleman 
    from New York [Mr. Hancock]; and at the expiration of the time the 
    previous question shall be considered as ordered. Is there 
    objection?
        There was no objection.

    The resolving clause to the articles read as follows:

                                 Resolution

        Resolved, That Halsted L. Ritter, who is a United States 
    district judge for the southern district of Florida, be impeached 
    for misbehavior, and for high crimes and misdemeanors; and that the 
    evidence heretofore taken by the subcommittee of the Committee on 
    the Judiciary of the House of Representatives under House 
    Resolution 163 of the Seventy-third Congress sustains articles of 
    impeachment, which are hereinafter set out; and that the said 
    articles be, and they are hereby, adopted by the House of 
    Representatives, and that the same shall be exhibited to the Senate 
    in the following words and figures, to wit: . . . (10)
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10. Id. at p. 3066. For the full text of the resolution and articles, 
        see Sec. 18.7, infra.
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    The House then discussed the maintenance of order during debate on 
the resolution:

        Mr. [William B.] Bankhead [of Alabama]: Mr. Speaker, I realize 
    that there is a full membership of the House here today, and 
    properly so, because impeachment proceedings are a matter of grave 
    importance.
        The proceedings are inquisitorial, and in order that we may 
    arrive at a correct judgment with reference to the matter and form 
    an intelligent opinion as to how we shall vote, it is absolutely 
    necessary and essential that we have order in the Chamber during 
    the proceedings.
        I know it is difficult at all times to get gentlemen to refrain 
    from conversation, but I make a special appeal to the membership of 
    the House on this occasion, in view of the serious importance of 
    the proceedings, that they will be quiet and listen to the speakers 
    so that we may vote intelligently on this matter. [Applause.]
        The Speaker: The Chair wishes to emphasize what the gentleman 
    from

[[Page 2210]]

    Alabama has said. There is but one way to maintain order, and that 
    is for Members to cease conversation, because a little conversation 
    here and a little there creates confusion that makes it difficult 
    for speakers to be heard.(11)
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11. Id. at p. 3069.
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    Time for debate having expired, Speaker Byrns stated that pursuant 
to the order of the House the previous question was ordered. By the 
yeas and nays, the House agreed to the resolution of impeachment--yeas 
181, nays 146, present 7, not voting 96.(12)
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12. Id. at p. 3091.
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Election of Managers

Sec. 18.5 The House adopted resolutions appointing managers to conduct 
    the impeachment trial, empowering the managers to employ staff and 
    to prepare and conduct impeachment proceedings, and notifying the 
    Senate that the House had adopted articles and appointed managers.

    On Mar. 6, 1936,(13) following the adoption of articles 
of impeachment on Mar. 2, Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, offered 
resolutions of a privileged nature related to impeachment proceedings 
against Judge Ritter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 80 Cong. Rec. 3393, 3394, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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                      Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter

        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk the three 
    resolutions which are the usual resolutions offered when an 
    impeachment has been voted by the House, and I ask unanimous 
    consent that they may be read and considered en bloc.
        Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, I do not know that I understand the situation 
    we are in at the present time. Will the gentleman restate his 
    request?
        The Speaker: (14) The request is to have read the 
    three resolutions and have them considered en bloc.
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14. Joseph W. Byrns (Tenn.).
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        Mr. Sumners of Texas: I may say to the gentleman from New York, 
    they are the three resolutions usually offered and they are in the 
    language used when the House has voted an impeachment.
        Mr. Snell: And the gentleman from Texas wants them considered 
    at one time?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
        There being no objection, the Clerk read the resolutions, as 
    follows:

                              House Resolution 439

            Resolved, That Hatton W. Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam 
        Hobbs, Members of this House, be, and they are hereby, 
        appointed managers to conduct the impeachment against Halsted 
        L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida; that said managers are hereby instructed 
        to ap

[[Page 2211]]

        pear before the Senate of the United States and at the bar 
        thereof in the name of the House of Representatives and of all 
        the people of the United States to impeach the said Halsted L. 
        Ritter of high crimes and misdemeanors in office and to exhibit 
        to the Senate of the United States the articles of impeachment 
        against said judge which have been agreed upon by this House; 
        and that the said managers do demand that the Senate take order 
        for the appearance of said Halsted L. Ritter to answer said 
        impeachment, and demand his impeachment, conviction, and 
        removal from office.

                              House Resolution 440

            Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform 
        them that this House has impeached for high crimes and 
        misdemeanors Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge 
        for the southern district of Florida, and that the House 
        adopted articles of impeachment against said Halsted L. Ritter, 
        judge as aforesaid, which the managers on the part of the House 
        have been directed to carry to the Senate, and that Hatton W. 
        Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam Hobbs, Members of this 
        House, have been appointed such managers.

                              House Resolution 441

            Resolved, That the managers on the part of the House in the 
        matter of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, United States 
        district judge for the southern district of Florida, be, and 
        they are hereby, authorized to employ legal, clerical, and 
        other necessary assistants and to incur such expenses as may be 
        necessary in the preparation and conduct of the case, to be 
        paid out of the contingent fund of the House on vouchers 
        approved by the managers, and the managers have power to send 
        for persons and papers, and also that the managers have 
        authority to file with the Secretary of the Senate, on the part 
        of the House of Representatives, any subsequent pleadings which 
        they shall deem necessary: Provided, That the total 
        expenditures authorized by this resolution shall not exceed 
        $2,500.

        Mr. Snell: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the gentleman from Texas one 
    further question? Is this exactly the procedure that has always 
    been followed by the House under similar conditions?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Insofar as I know, it does not vary from 
    the procedure that has been followed since the beginning of the 
    Government.

    The resolutions were agreed to.

House-Senate Communications

Sec. 18.6 The House having notified the Senate of its impeachment of 
    Judge Halsted Ritter, the Senate communicated its readiness to 
    receive the House managers and discussed the Senate rules for 
    impeachment trials.

    On Mar. 9, 1936, Vice President John N. Garner laid before the 
Senate a communication from the House of Representatives:

                                        House Resolution 440
                                                  In the House
                                             of Representatives,
                                     United States, March 6, 1936.

        Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate to inform them 
    that this House has impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors 
    Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern 
    district of Florida, and that

[[Page 2212]]

    the House adopted articles of impeachment against said Halsted L. 
    Ritter, judge as aforesaid, which the managers on the part of the 
    House have been directed to carry to the Senate, and that Hatton W. 
    Sumners, Randolph Perkins, and Sam Hobbs, Members of this House, 
    have been appointed such managers.

    The Senate adopted the following order:

        Ordered, That the Secretary inform the House of Representatives 
    that the Senate is ready to receive the managers appointed by the 
    House for the purpose of exhibiting articles of impeachment against 
    Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern 
    district of Florida, agreeably to the notice communicated to the 
    Senate, and that at the hour of 1 o'clock p.m. on Tuesday, March 
    10, 1936, the Senate will receive the honorable managers on the 
    part of the House of Representatives, in order that they may 
    present and exhibit the said articles of impeachment against the 
    said Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the 
    southern district of Florida.
        The Vice President: The Secretary will carry out the order of 
    the senate (15)
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15. 80 Cong. Rec. 3423, 3424, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Senator Elbert D. Thomas, of Utah, discussed the function of the 
Senate in sitting as a court of impeachment and inquired whether any 
review was being undertaken of the Senate rules for impeachment trials.
    Senator Henry F. Ashurst, of Arizona, responded that the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary had considered the rules and cited a change 
recently made in the rules for impeachment trials:

        It will be remembered that in the trial of the Louderback case 
    it was suggested that the trial was dreary, involved, and 
    protracted, and that it was not according to public policy to have 
    96 Senators sit and take testimony. Subsequently, not a dozen, not 
    20, but at least 40 Senators urged that the Senate Committee on the 
    Judiciary give its attention to the question whether or not a 
    committee appointed by the Presiding Officer could take the 
    testimony in impeachment trials, whereupon a resolution was 
    introduced by the chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
    and was adopted. I ask that that resolution be incorporated in my 
    remarks at this point.
        The President Pro Tempore:(16) Without objection, it 
    is so ordered.
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16. Key Pittman (Nev.).
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        The resolution is as follows (Submitted by Mr. Ashurst):

            Resolved, That in the trial of any impeachment the 
        Presiding Officer of the Senate, upon the order of the Senate, 
        shall appoint a committee of 12 Senators to receive evidence 
        and take testimony at such times and places as the committee 
        may determine, and for such purpose the committee so appointed 
        and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the committee, shall 
        (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the 
        powers and functions conferred upon the Senate and the 
        Presiding Officer of the Senate, respectively,

[[Page 2213]]

        under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when 
        sitting on impeachment trials.
            Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of 
        procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on 
        impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of 
        the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall 
        report to the Senate in writing a certified copy of the 
        transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given 
        before such committee, and such report shall be received by the 
        Senate and the evidence so received and the testimony so taken 
        shall be considered to all intents and purposes, subject to the 
        right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and 
        materiality, as having been received and taken before the 
        Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent the Senate from 
        sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open 
        Senate, or by order of the Senate having the entire trial in 
        open Senate.

        Mr. Ashurst: The resolution was agreed to by the Senate. It 
    does not provide for a trial by 12 Senators. It simply provides 
    that a committee of 12, appointed by the Presiding Officer of the 
    Senate, may take the testimony, the Senate declaring and 
    determining in advance whether it desires that procedure, or 
    otherwise, and that after such evidence is taken by this committee 
    of 12, the Senate reviews the testimony in its printed form, and 
    the Senate may take additional testimony or may then rehear the 
    testimony of any of the witnesses heard by the committee. The 
    Senate reserves to itself every power and every authority it has 
    under the Constitution.
        It could not be expected that I would draw, present, and urge 
    the Senate to pass such resolution and then subsequently decline to 
    defend it, but I am not defending it more than to say that, in my 
    opinion, it is perfectly constitutional to do what the resolution 
    provides. If the Senate so desired, it could appoint a committee to 
    take the testimony, which would be reduced to writing, and be laid 
    before the Senators the next morning in the Congressional Record. 
    If a Senator were absent during one day of the trial, he could read 
    the testimony as printed the next morning.(17)
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17. 80 Cong. Rec. 3424, 3425, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. For the adoption of 
        the change referred to by Senator Ashurst, see 79 Cong. Rec. 
        8309, 8310, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., May 28, 1935.
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    Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, of the Committee on the 
Judiciary, asked unanimous consent to have printed in the Record a 
ruling, cited in 3 Hinds' Precedents section 2006, that an impeachment 
trial could only proceed when Congress was in session.(18)
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18. Id. at p. 3426.
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Initiation of Impeachment Trial

Sec. 18.7 The managers on the part of the House appeared in the Senate, 
    read the articles, reserved their right to amend them, and demanded 
    that Judge Halsted Ritter be put to answer the charges; the Senate 
    organized for

[[Page 2214]]

    trial as a Court of Impeachment.

    On Mar. 10, 1936, pursuant to the Senate's order of Mar. 9, the 
managers on the part of the House appeared before the bar of the Senate 
and were announced by the Secretary to the majority, who escorted them 
to their assigned seats.
    Vice President John N. Garner directed the Sergeant at Arms to make 
proclamation:

        The Sergeant at Arms, Chesley W. Jurney, made proclamation, as 
    follows:
        Hear ye! Hear ye! Hear ye! All persons are commanded to keep 
    silent, on pain of imprisonment, while the House of Representatives 
    is exhibiting to the Senate of the United States articles of 
    impeachment against Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge 
    in and for the southern district of Florida.(19)
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19. 80 Cong. Rec. 3485, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
            For the text of the proceedings in the Senate upon the 
        appearance of the managers to present the articles of 
        impeachment against Judge Ritter, see Sec. 11.4, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Representative Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, read the resolution 
adopted by the House (H. Res. 439) which directed the managers to 
appear before the bar of the Senate. Representative Sam Hobbs, of 
Alabama, read the articles of impeachment, the Vice President 
requesting that he stand at the desk in front of the Chair: 
(20)
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20. 80 Cong. Rec. 3486-88, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. Manager Hobbs, from the place suggested by the Vice 
    President, said:
        Mr. President and gentlemen of the Senate:

             Articles of Impeachment Against Halsted L. Ritter

         House Resolution 422, Seventy-fourth Congress, second session

                    Congress of the United States of America

               In the House of Representatives, United States
                                                    March 2, 1936.

            Resolved, That Halsted L. Ritter, who is a United States 
        district judge for the southern district of Florida, be 
        impeached for misbehavior and for high crimes and misdemeanors; 
        and that the evidence heretofore taken by the subcommittee of 
        the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives 
        under House Resolution 163 of the Seventy-third Congress 
        sustains articles of impeachment, which are hereinafter set 
        out; and that the said articles be, and they are hereby, 
        adopted by the House of Representatives, and that the same 
        shall be exhibited to the Senate in the following words and 
        figures, to wit:

        Articles of impeachment of the House of Representatives of the 
            United States of America in the name of themselves and of 
            all of the people of the United States of America against 
            Halsted L. Ritter, who was appointed, duly qualified, and 
            commissioned to serve, during good behavior in office, as 
            United

[[Page 2215]]

            States district judge for the southern district of Florida, 
            on February 15, 1929.

                                 Article I

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of a 
        high crime and misdemeanor in office in manner and form as 
        follows, to wit: On or about October 11, 1929, A. L. Rankin 
        (who had been a law partner of said judge immediately before 
        said judge's appointment as judge), as solicitor for the 
        plaintiff, filed in the court of the said Judge Ritter a 
        certain foreclosure suit and receivership proceeding, the same 
        being styled ``Bert E. Holland and others against Whitehall 
        Building and Operating Company and others'' (No. 678-M-Eq.). On 
        or about May 15, 1930, the said Judge Ritter allowed the said 
        Rankin an advance of $2,500 on his fee for his services in said 
        case. On or about July 2, 1930, the said Judge Ritter by letter 
        requested another judge of the United States District Court for 
        the Southern District of Florida, to wit, Hon. Alexander 
        Akerman, to fix and determine the total allowance for the said 
        Rankin for his services in said case for the reason as stated 
        by Judge Ritter in said letter, that the said Rankin had 
        formerly been the law partner of the said Judge Ritter, and he 
        did not feel that he should pass upon the total allowance made 
        said Rankin in that case, and that if Judge Akerman would fix 
        the allowance it would relieve the writer, Judge Ritter, from 
        any embarrassment if thereafter any question should arise as to 
        his, Judge Ritter's favoring said Rankin with an exorbitant 
        fee.
            Thereafterward, notwithstanding the said Judge Akerman, in 
        compliance with Judge Ritter's request, allowed the said Rankin 
        a fee of $15,000 for his services in said case, from which sum 
        the said $2,500 theretofore allowed the said Rankin by Judge 
        Ritter as an advance on his fee was deducted, the said Judge 
        Ritter, well knowing that at his request compensation had been 
        fixed by Judge Akerman for the said Rankin's services in said 
        case, and notwithstanding the restraint of propriety expressed 
        in his said letter to Judge Akerman, and ignoring the danger of 
        embarrassment mentioned in said letter, did fix an additional 
        and exorbitant fee for the said Rankin in said case. On or 
        about December 24, 1930, when the final decree in said case was 
        signed, the said Judge Ritter allowed the said Rankin, 
        additional to the total allowance of $15,000 theretofore 
        allowed by Judge Akerman, a fee of $75,000 for his services in 
        said case, out of which allowance the said Judge Ritter 
        directly profited. On the same day, December 24, 1930, the 
        receiver in said case paid the said Rankin, as part of his said 
        additional fee, the sum of $25,000, and the said Rankin on the 
        same day privately paid and delivered to the said Judge Ritter 
        the sum of $2,500 in cash; $2,000 of said $2,500 was deposited 
        in bank by Judge Ritter on, to wit, December 29, 1930, the 
        remaining $500 being kept by Judge Ritter and not deposited in 
        bank until, to wit, July 10, 1931. Between the time of such 
        initial payment on said additional fee and April 6, 1931, the 
        said receiver paid said Rankin thereon $5,000. On or about 
        April 6, 1931, the said Rankin received the balance of the said 
        additional fee allowed him by Judge Ritter, said balance 
        amounting to $45,000. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 14, 
        1931, the said Rankin paid and delivered to the said Judge 
        Ritter, privately, in cash,

[[Page 2216]]

        an additional sum of $2,000. The said Judge Halsted L. Ritter 
        corruptly and unlawfully accepted and received for his own use 
        and benefit from the said A. L. Rankin the aforesaid sums of 
        money, amounting to $4,500.
            Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor.

                                 Article II

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office 
        of United States district judge for the southern district of 
        Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United 
        States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly 
        qualified and commissioned, and while acting as a United States 
        district judge for the southern district of Florida, was and is 
        guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and misdemeanors in 
        office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            On the 15th day of February 1929 the said Halsted L. 
        Ritter, having been appointed as United States district judge 
        for the southern district of Florida, was duly qualified and 
        commissioned to serve as such during good behavior in office. 
        Immediately prior thereto and for several years the said 
        Halsted L. Ritter had practiced law in said district in 
        partnership with one A. L. Rankin, which partnership was 
        dissolved upon the appointment of said Ritter as said United 
        States district judge.
            On the 18th day of July 1928 one Walter S. Richardson was 
        elected trustee in bankruptcy of the Whitehall Building & 
        Operating Co., which company had been adjudicated in said 
        district as a bankrupt, and as such trustee took charge of the 
        assets of said Whitehall Building & Operating Co., which 
        consisted of a hotel property located in Palm Beach in said 
        district. That the said Richardson as such trustee operated 
        said hotel property from the time of his said appointment until 
        its sale on the 3d of January 1929, under the foreclosure of a 
        third mortgage thereon. On the 1st of November and the 13th of 
        December 1929, the said Judge Ritter made orders in said 
        bankruptcy proceedings allowing the said Walter S. Richardson 
        as trustee the sum of $16,500 as compensation for his services 
        as trustee. That before the discharge of said Walter S. 
        Richardson as such trustee, said Richardson, together with said 
        A. L. Rankin, one Ernest Metcalf, one Martin Sweeney, and the 
        said Halsted L. Ritter, entered into an arrangement to secure 
        permission of the holder or holders of at least $50,000 of 
        first-mortgage bonds on said hotel property for the purpose of 
        filing a bill to foreclose the first mortgage on said premises 
        in the court of said Halsted L. Ritter, by which means the said 
        Richardson, Rankin, Metcalf, Sweeney, and Ritter were to 
        continue said property in litigation before said Ritter. On the 
        30th day of August 1929, the said Walter S. Richardson, in 
        furtherance of said arrangement and understanding, wrote a 
        letter to the said Martin Sweeney, in New York, suggesting the 
        desirability of contacting as many first mortgage bondholders 
        as possible in order that their cooperation might be secured, 
        directing special attention to Mr. Bert E. Holland, an 
        attorney, whose address was in the Tremont Building in Boston, 
        and who, as cotrustee, was the holder of $50,000 of first-
        mortgage bonds, the amount of bonds required to institute the 
        contemplated proceedings in Judge Ritter's court.
            On October 3, 1929, the said Bert E. Holland, being 
        solicited by the said Sweeney, requested the said Rankin and 
        Metcalf to prepare a complaint to file in said Judge Ritter's 
        court for foreclosure of said first mortgage and the 
        appointment of a receiver. At this time Judge Ritter was 
        holding court in Brooklyn, N.Y.,

[[Page 2217]]

        and the said Rankin and Richardson went from West Palm Beach, 
        Fla., to Brooklyn, N.Y., and called upon said Judge Ritter a 
        short time previous to filing the bill for foreclosure and 
        appointment of a receiver of said hotel property.
            On October 10, 1929, and before the filing of said bill for 
        foreclosure and receiver, the said Holland withdrew his 
        authority to said Rankin and Metcalf to file said bill and 
        notified the said Rankin not to file the said bill. 
        Notwithstanding the said instructions to said Rankin not to 
        file said bill, said Rankin, on the 11th day of October, 1929, 
        filed said bill with the clerk of the United States District 
        Court for the Southern District of Florida, but with the 
        specific request to said clerk to lock up the said bill as soon 
        as it was filed and hold until Judge Ritter's return so that 
        there would be no newspaper publicity before the matter was 
        heard by Judge Ritter for the appointment of a receiver, which 
        request on the part of the said Rankin was complied with by the 
        said clerk.
            On October 16, 1929, the said Holland telegraphed to the 
        said Rankin, referring to his previous wire requesting him to 
        refrain from filing the bill and insisting that the matter 
        remain in its then status until further instruction was given; 
        and on October 17, 1929, the said Rankin wired to Holland that 
        he would not make an application on his behalf for the 
        appointment of a receiver. On October 28, 1929, a hearing on 
        the complaint and petition for receivership was heard before 
        Judge Halsted L. Ritter at Miami, at which hearing the said 
        Bert E. Holland appeared in person before said Judge Ritter and 
        advised the judge that he wished to withdraw the suit and asked 
        for dismissal of the bill of complaint on the ground that the 
        bill was filed without his authority.
            But the said Judge Ritter, fully advised of the facts and 
        circumstances hereinbefore recited, wrongfully and oppressively 
        exercised the powers of his office to carry into execution said 
        plan and agreement theretofore arrived at, and refused to grant 
        the request of the said Holland and made effective the 
        champertous undertaking of the said Richardson and Rankin and 
        appointed the said Richardson receiver of the said hotel 
        property, notwithstanding that objection was made to Judge 
        Ritter that said Richardson had been active in fomenting this 
        litigation and was not a proper person to act as receiver.
            On October 15, 1929, said Rankin made oath to each of the 
        bills for intervenors which were filed the next day.
            On October 16, 1929, bills for intervention in said 
        foreclosure suit were filed by said Rankin and Metcalf in the 
        names of holders of approximately $5,000 of said first-mortgage 
        bonds, which intervenors did not possess the said requisite 
        $50,000 in bonds required by said first mortgage to bring 
        foreclosure proceedings on the part of the bondholders.

            The said Rankin and Metcalf appeared as attorneys for 
        complainants and intervenors, and in response to a suggestion 
        of the said Judge Ritter, the said Metcalf withdrew as attorney 
        for complainants and intervenors and said Judge Ritter 
        thereupon appointed said Metcalf as attorney for the said 
        Richardson, the receiver.
            And in the further carrying out of said arrangement and 
        understanding, the said Richardson employed the said Martin 
        Sweeney and one Bemis, together with Ed Sweeney, as managers of 
        said property, for which they were paid the sum of $60,000 for 
        the management of said hotel for the two seasons the property 
        remained in the custody of said Richardson as receiver.
            On or about the 15th of May 1930 the said Judge Ritter 
        allowed the

[[Page 2218]]

        said Rankin an advance on his fee of $2,500 for his services in 
        said case.
            On or about July 2, 1930, the said Judge Ritter requested 
        Judge Alexander Akerman, also a judge of the United States 
        District Court for the Southern District of Florida, to fix the 
        total allowance for the said Rankin for his services in said 
        case, said request and the reasons therefor being set forth in 
        a letter by the said Judge Ritter, in words and figures as 
        follows, to wit:
                                                     July 2, 1930.
        Hon. Alexander Akerman,
        United States District Judge,
        Tampa, Fla.

            My Dear Judge: In the case of Holland et al. v. Whitehall 
        Building & Operating Co. (No. 678-M-Eq.), pending in my 
        division, my former law partner, Judge A. L. Rankin, of West 
        Palm Beach, has filed a petition for an order allowing 
        compensation for his services on behalf of the plaintiff.
            I do not feel that I should pass, under the circumstances, 
        upon the total allowance to be made Judge Rankin in this 
        matter. I did issue an order, which Judge Rankin will exhibit 
        to you, approving an advance of $2,500 on his claim, which was 
        approved by all attorneys.
            You will appreciate my position in the matter, and I 
        request you to pass upon the total allowance which should be 
        made Judge Rankin in the premises as an accommodation to me. 
        This will relieve me from any embarrassment hereafter if the 
        question should arise as to my favoring Judge Rankin in this 
        matter by an exorbitant allowance.
            Appreciating very much your kindness in this matter, I am,
            Yours sincerely,
                                                Halsted L. Ritter.

            In compliance with said request the said Judge Akerman 
        allowed the said Rankin $12,500 in addition to the $2,500 
        theretofore allowed by Judge Ritter, making a total of $15,000 
        as the fee of the said Rankin in the said case.
            But notwithstanding the said request on the part of said 
        Ritter and the compliance by the said Judge Akerman and the 
        reasons for the making of said request by said Judge Ritter of 
        Judge Akerman, the said Judge Ritter, on the 24th day of 
        December 1930, allowed the said Rankin an additional fee of 
        $75,000.
            And on the same date when the receiver in said case paid to 
        the said Rankin as a part of said additional fee the sum of 
        $25,000, said Rankin privately paid and delivered to said Judge 
        Ritter out of the said $25,000 the sum of $2,500 in cash, 
        $2,000 of which the said Judge Ritter deposited in a bank and 
        $500 of which was put in a tin box and not deposited until the 
        10th day of July 1931, when it was deposited in a bank with an 
        additional sum of $600.
            On or about the 6th day of April 1931, the said Rankin 
        received as a part of the $75,000 additional fee the sum of 
        $45,000, and shortly thereafter, on or before the 14th day of 
        April 1931, the said Rankin paid and delivered to said Judge 
        Ritter, privately and in cash, out of said $45,000 the sum of 
        $2,000.
            The said Judge Halsted L. Ritter corruptly and unlawfully 
        accepted and received for his own use and benefit from the said 
        Rankin the aforesaid sums of $2,500 in cash and $2,000 in cash, 
        amounting in all to $4,500.
            Of the total allowance made to said A. L. Rankin in said 
        foreclosure suit, amounting in all to $90,000, the following 
        sums were paid out by said Rankin with the knowledge and 
        consent of said Judge Ritter, to wit, to said Walter S. 
        Richardson, the sum of $5,000; to said Metcalf, the sum of 
        $10,000; to Shutts and Bowen, also attorneys for the receiver, 
        the sum of

[[Page 2219]]

        $25,000; and to said Halsted L. Ritter, the sum of $4,500.
            In addition to the said sum of $5,000 received by the said 
        Richardson, as aforesaid, said Ritter by order in said 
        proceedings allowed said Richardson a fee of $30,000 for 
        services as such receiver.
            The said fees allowed by said Judge Ritter to A. L. Rankin 
        (who had been a law partner of said judge immediately before 
        said judge's appointment as judge) as solicitor for the 
        plaintiff in said case were excessive and unwarranted, and said 
        judge profited personally thereby in that out of the money so 
        allowed said solicitor he received personally, privately, and 
        in cash $4,500 for his own use and benefit.
            While the Whitehall Hotel was being operated in 
        receivership under said proceeding pending in said court (and 
        in which proceeding the receiver in charge of said hotel by 
        appointment of said judge was allowed large compensation by 
        said judge) the said judge stayed at said hotel from time to 
        time without cost to himself and received free rooms, free 
        meals, and free valet service, and, with the knowledge and 
        consent of said judge, members of his family, including his 
        wife, his son, Thurston Ritter, his daughter, Mrs. M. R. 
        Walker, his secretary, Mrs. Lloyd C. Hooks, and her husband, 
        Lloyd C. Hooks, each likewise on various occasions stayed at 
        said hotel without cost to themselves or to said judge, and 
        received free rooms, and some or all of them received from said 
        hotel free meals and free valet service; all of which expenses 
        were borne by the said receivership to the loss and damage of 
        the creditors whose interests were involved therein.
            The said judge willfully failed and neglected to perform 
        his duty to conserve the assets of the Whitehall Building & 
        Operating Co. in receivership in his court, but to the 
        contrary, permitted waste and dissipation of its assets, to the 
        loss and damage of the creditors of said corporation, and was a 
        party to the waste and dissipation of such assets while under 
        the control of his said court, and personally profited thereby, 
        in the manner and form hereinabove specifically set out.
            Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of misbehavior and was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office.

                                Article III

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was 
        guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of 
        the United States of America (U.S.C. Annotated, title 28, sec. 
        373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the 
        authority of the United States to exercise the profession or 
        employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the 
        practice of the law, in that after the employment of the law 
        firm of Ritter & Rankin (which, at the time of the appointment 
        of Halsted L. Ritter to be judge of the United States District 
        Court for the Southern District of Florida, was composed of 
        Halsted L. Ritter and A. L. Rankin) in the case of Trust Co. of 
        Georgia and Robert G. Stephens, trustees, against Brazilian 
        Court Building Corporation and others, No. 5704 in the Circuit 
        Court of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and after 
        the final decree had been entered in said cause, and after the 
        fee of $4,000 which had been agreed upon at the

[[Page 2220]]

        outset of said employment had been fully paid to the firm of 
        Ritter & Rankin, and after Halsted L. Ritter had on, to wit, 
        February 15, 1929, become judge of the United States District 
        Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter on, to 
        wit, March 11, 1929, wrote a letter to Charles A. Brodek, of 
        counsel for Mulford Realty Corporation (the client which his 
        former law firm had been representing in said litigation), 
        stating that there had been much extra and unanticipated work 
        in the case; that he was then a Federal judge; that his 
        partner, A. L. Rankin, would carry through further proceedings 
        in the case, but that he, Judge Ritter, would be consulted 
        about the matter until the case was all closed up; and that 
        ``this matter is one among very few which I am assuming to 
        continue my interest in until finally closed up''; and stating 
        specifically in said letter:
            ``I do not know whether any appeal will be taken in the 
        case or not; but if so, we hope to get Mr. Howard Paschal or 
        some other person as receiver who will be amenable to our 
        directions, and the hotel can be operated at a profit, of 
        course, pending the appeal. We shall demand a very heavy 
        supersedeas bond, which I doubt whether D'Esterre can give.''
            And further that he was ``of course, primarily interested 
        in getting some money in the case,'' and that he thought 
        ``$2,000 more by way of attorneys' fees should be allowed''; 
        and asked that he be communicated with direct about the matter, 
        giving his post-office box number. On, to wit, March 13, 1929, 
        said Brodek replied favorably, and on March 30, 1929, a check 
        of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, a law firm of New York City, 
        representing Mulford Realty Corporation, in which Charles A. 
        Brodek, senior member of the firm of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, 
        was one of the directors, was drawn, payable to the order of 
        ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter'' for $2,000, and which was duly 
        endorsed ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter. H. L. Ritter'' and was paid 
        on, to wit, April 4, 1929, and the proceeds thereof were 
        received and appropriated by Judge Ritter to his own individual 
        use and benefit, without advising his said former partner that 
        said $2,000 had been received, without consulting with his said 
        former partner thereabout, and without the knowledge or consent 
        of his said former partner, appropriated the entire amount thus 
        solicited and received to the use and benefit of himself, the 
        said Judge Ritter.
            At the time said letter was written by Judge Ritter and 
        said $2,000 received by him, Mulford Realty Corporation held 
        and owned large interests in Florida real estate and citrus 
        groves, and a large amount of securities of the Olympia 
        Improvement Corporation, which was a company organized to 
        develop and promote Olympia, Fla., said holdings being within 
        the territorial jurisdiction of the United States district 
        court, of which Judge Ritter was a judge from February 15, 
        1929.
            Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his 
        office into disrepute, constitute a violation of section 258 of 
        the Judicial Code of the United States of America (U.S.C., 
        Annotated, title 28, sec. 373), and constitute a high crime and 
        misdemeanor within the meaning and intent of section 4 of 
        article II of the Constitution of the United States.
            Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

                                 Article IV

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office 
        of United States district judge for the southern district of 
        Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United 
        States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly 
        qualified and commissioned, and while acting as a

[[Page 2221]]

        United States district judge for the southern district of 
        Florida, was and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes 
        and misdemeanors in office in manner and form as follows, to 
        wit:
            The said Judge Ritter by his actions and conduct, as an 
        individual and as such judge, has brought his court into 
        scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and 
        public confidence in the administration of justice in his said 
        court, and to the prejudice of public respect for and 
        confidence in the Federal judiciary:
            1. In that in the Florida Power Co. case (Florida Power & 
        Light Co. against City of Miami and others, No. 1183-M-Eq.), 
        which was a case wherein said judge had granted the complainant 
        power company a temporary injunction restraining the 
        enforcement of an ordinance of the city of Miami, which 
        ordinance prescribed a reduction in the rates for electric 
        current being charged in said city, said judge improperly 
        appointed one Cary T. Hutchinson, who had long been associated 
        with and employed by power and utility interests, special 
        master in chancery in said suit, and refused to revoke his 
        order so appointing said Hutchinson. Thereafter, when criticism 
        of such action had become current in the city of Miami, and 
        within 2 weeks after a resolution (H. Res. 163, 73d Cong.) had 
        been agreed to in the House of Representatives of the Congress 
        of the United States authorizing and directing the Judiciary 
        Committee thereof to investigate the official conduct of said 
        judge and to make a report concerning said conduct to said 
        House of Representatives, an arrangement was entered into with 
        the city commissioners of the city of Miami or with the city 
        attorney of said city by which the said city commissioners were 
        to pass a resolution expressing faith and confidence in the 
        integrity of said judge, and the said judge recuse himself as 
        judge [in] said power suit. The said agreement was carried out 
        by the parties thereto, and said judge, after the passage of 
        such resolution, recused himself from sitting as judge in said 
        power suit, thereby bartering his judicial authority in said 
        case for a vote of confidence. Nevertheless, the succeeding 
        judge allowed said Hutchinson as special master in chancery in 
        said case a fee of $5,000, although he performed little, if 
        any, service as such, and in the order making such allowance 
        recited: ``And it appearing to the court that a minimum fee of 
        $5,000 was approved by the court for the said Cary T. 
        Hutchinson, special master in this cause.''
            2. In that in the Trust Co. of Florida cases (Illick 
        against Trust Co. of Florida et al., No. 1043-M-Eq., and 
        Edmunds Committee et al. against Marlon Mortgage Co. et al., 
        No. 1124-M-Eq.) after the State banking department of Florida, 
        through its comptroller, Honorable Ernest Amos, had closed the 
        doors of the Trust Co. of Florida and appointed J. H. Therrell 
        liquidator for said trust company, and had interviewed in the 
        said Illick case, said Judge Ritter wrongfully and erroneously 
        refused to recognize the right of said State authority to 
        administer the affairs of the said trust company, and appointed 
        Julian S. Eaton and Clark D. Stearns as receivers of the 
        property of said trust company. On appeal, the United States 
        Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the 
        said order or decree of Judge Ritter, and ordered the said 
        property surrendered to the State liquidator. Thereafter, on, 
        to wit, September 12, 1932, there was filed in the United 
        States District Court for the Southern District of Florida the 
        Edmunds Committee case, supra. Marion Mortgage Co. was a 
        subsidiary of the Trust Co. of Florida. Judge Ritter being 
        absent from his district at the time of the filing of said 
        case, an application for the appointment of receivers therein 
        was

[[Page 2222]]

        presented to another judge of said district, namely, Honorable 
        Alexander Akerman. Judge Ritter, however, prior to the 
        appointment of such receivers, telegraphed Judge Akerman, 
        requesting him to appoint the aforesaid Eaton and Stearns as 
        receivers in said case, which appointments were made by Judge 
        Akerman. Thereafter the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
        for the Fifth Circuit reversed the order of Judge Akerman, 
        appointing said Eaton and Stearns as receivers in said case. In 
        November 1932 J. H. Therrell, as liquidator, filed a bill of 
        complaint in the Circuit Court of Dade County, Fla.--a court of 
        the State of Florida--alleging that the various trust 
        properties of the Trust Co. of Florida were burdensome to the 
        liquidator to keep, and asking that the court appoint a 
        succeeding trustee. Upon petition for removal of said cause 
        from said State court into the United States District Court for 
        the Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter took 
        jurisdiction, notwithstanding the previous rulings of the 
        United States Circuit Court of Appeals above referred to, and 
        again appointed the said Eaton and Stearns as the receivers of 
        the said trust properties. In December 1932 the said Therrell 
        surrendered all of the trust properties to said Eaton and 
        Stearns as receivers, together with all records of the Trust 
        Co. of Florida pertaining thereto. During the time said Eaton 
        and Stearns, as such receivers, were in control of said trust 
        properties, Judge Ritter wrongfully and improperly approved 
        their accounts without notice or opportunity for objection 
        thereto to be heard. With the knowledge of Judge Ritter, said 
        receivers appointed the sister-in-law of Judge Ritter, namely, 
        Mrs. G. M. Wickard, who had had no previous hotel-management 
        experience, to be manager of the Julia Tuttle Hotel and 
        Apartment Building, one of said trust properties. On, to wit, 
        January ], 1933, Honorable J. M. Lee succeeded Honorable Ernest 
        Amos as comptroller of the State of Florida and appointed M. A. 
        Smith liquidator in said Trust Co. of Florida cases to succeed 
        J. H. Therrell. An appeal was again taken to the United States 
        Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the then 
        latest order or decree of Judge Ritter, and again the order or 
        decree of Judge Ritter appealed from was reversed by the said 
        circuit court of appeals, which held that Judge Ritter, or the 
        court in which he presided, had been without jurisdiction in 
        the matter of the appointment of said Eaton and Stearns as 
        receivers. Thereafter, and with the knowledge of the decision 
        of the said circuit court of appeals, Judge Ritter wrongfully 
        and improperly allowed said Eaton and Stearns and their 
        attorneys some $26,000 as fees out of said trust-estate 
        properties, and endeavored to require, as a condition precedent 
        to releasing said trust properties from the control of his 
        court, a promise from counsel for the said State liquidator not 
        to appeal from his order allowing the said fees to said Eaton 
        and Stearns and their attorneys.
            3. In that the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such Federal 
        judge, accepted, in addition to $4,500 from his former law 
        partner as alleged in article I hereof, other large fees or 
        gratuities, to wit, $7,500 from J. R. Francis, on or about 
        April 19, 1929, J. R. Francis at this said time having large 
        property interests within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
        court of which Judge Ritter was a judge. On, to wit, the 4th 
        day of April 1929 the said Judge Ritter accepted the sum of 
        $2,000 from said Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, representing Mulford 
        Realty Corporation, through his attorney, Charles A. Brodek, as 
        a fee or gratuity, at which time the said Mulford Realty 
        Corporation held and owned large

[[Page 2223]]

        interests in Florida real estate and citrus groves, and a large 
        amount of securities of the Olympia Improvement Corporation, 
        which was a company organized to develop and promote Olympia, 
        Fla., said holdings being within the territorial jurisdiction 
        of the United States District Court of which Judge Ritter was a 
        judge from February 15, 1929.
            4. By his conduct as detailed in articles I and II hereof.
            Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of misbehavior, and was and is guilty of high crimes and 
        misdemeanors in office.
            Attest:
                                              Joseph W. Byrns,
                                                  Speaker of the
                                       House of Representatives.
                                                South Trimble,
                                                            Clerk.

    Representative Sumners entered a reservation of the right of the 
House to amend or supplement the articles and demanded that the 
respondent be put to trial:

        Mr. Manager Sumners: Mr. President, the House of 
    Representatives, by protestation, saving themselves the liberty of 
    exhibiting at any time hereafter any further articles of accusation 
    or impeachment against the said Halsted L. Ritter, district judge 
    of the United States for the southern district of Florida, and also 
    of replying to his answers which he shall make unto the articles 
    preferred against him, and of offering proof to the same and every 
    part thereof, and to all and every other article of accusation or 
    impeachment which shall be exhibited by them as the case shall 
    require, do demand that the said Halsted L. Ritter may be put to 
    answer the misdemeanors in office which have been charged against 
    him in the articles which have been exhibited to the Senate, and 
    that such proceedings, examinations, trials, and judgments may be 
    thereupon had and given as may be agreeable to law and justice.
        Mr. President, the managers on the part of the House of 
    Representatives, in pursuance of the action of the House of 
    Representatives by the adoption of the articles of impeachment 
    which have just been read to the Senate, do now demand that the 
    Senate take order for the appearance of the said Halsted L. Ritter 
    to answer said impeachment, and do now demand his impeachment, 
    conviction, and removal from office.
        The Vice President: The Senate wild take proper order and 
    notify the House of Representatives.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Id. at p. 3488.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The most senior Member of the Senate, Senator William E. Borah, of 
Idaho, then administered the oath to Vice President Garner, who 
administered the oath to the other Senators present.
    The Sergeant at Arms made proclamation that the Senate was then 
sitting as a Court of Impeachment. Orders were adopted notifying the 
House of the organization of the court and issuing a summons to the 
respondent.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Id. at pp. 3488, 3489. For the text of the proceedings whereby the 
        Senate organized for the Ritter impeachment trial, see 
        Sec. 11.5, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 18.8 In response to a summons, Judge Halsted Ritter

[[Page 2224]]

    appeared before the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.

    On Mar. 12, 1936, respondent Halsted Ritter appeared before the 
Court of Impeachment pursuant to the summons previously issued, and 
filed an entry of appearance: (3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 80 Cong. Rec. 3646, 3647, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Vice President: (4) . . . The Secretary will 
    read the return of the Sergeant at Arms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. John N. Garner (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chief Clerk read as follows:

          Senate of the United States, Office of the Sergeant at Arms.

            The foregoing writ of summons addressed to Halsted L. 
        Ritter, and the foregoing precept, addressed to me, were duly 
        served upon the said Halsted L. Ritter by me by delivering true 
        and attested copies of the same to the said Halsted L. Ritter 
        at the Carlton Hotel, Washington, D.C., on Thursday, the 12th 
        day of March 1936, at 11 o'clock in the forenoon of that day.
                                            Chesley W. Jurney,
                                               Sergeant at Arms,
                                             United States Senate.

        The Vice President: The Secretary of the Senate will administer 
    the oath to the Sergeant at Arms.
        The Secretary of the Senate, Edwin A. Halsey, administered the 
    oath to the Sergeant at Arms, as follows:

            You, Chesley W. Jurney, do solemnly swear that the return 
        made by you upon the process issued on the 10th day of March 
        1936 by the Senate of the United States against Halsted L. 
        Ritter, United States district judge for the southern district 
        of Florida, is truly made, and that you have performed such 
        service as therein described. So help you God.

        The Vice President: The Sergeant at Arms will make 
    proclamation.
        The Sergeant at Arms made proclamation as follows:
        Halsted L. Ritter! Halsted L. Ritter! Halsted L. Ritter! United 
    States district judge for the southern district of Florida, appear 
    and answer to the articles of impeachment exhibited by the House of 
    Representatives against you.
        The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, and his counsel, Frank P. 
    Walsh, Esq., of New York City, N.Y., and Carl T. Hoffman, Esq., of 
    Miami, Fla., entered the Chamber and were conducted to the seats 
    assigned them in the space in front of the Secretary's desk, on the 
    right of the Chair.
        The Vice President: Counsel for the respondent are advised that 
    the Senate is now sitting for the trial of articles of impeachment 
    exhibited by the House of Representatives against Halsted L. 
    Ritter, United States district judge for the southern district of 
    Florida.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): May it please you, Mr. President, and 
    honorable Members of the Senate, I beg to inform you that, in 
    response to your summons, the respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, is now 
    present with his counsel and asks leave to file a formal entry of 
    appearance.
        The Vice President: Is there objection? The Chair hears none, 
    and the appearance will be filed with the Secretary, and will be 
    read.
        The Chief Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 2225]]

    In the Senate of the United States of America Sitting as a Court of 
                                Impeachment
                                                   March 12, 1936.

               The United States of America v. Halsted L. Ritter

            The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, having this day been 
        served with a summons requiring him to appear before the Senate 
        of the United States of America in the city of Washington, 
        D.C., on March 12, 1936, at 1 o'clock afternoon to answer 
        certain articles of impeachment presented against him by the 
        House of Representatives of the United States of America, now 
        appears in his proper person and also by his counsel, who are 
        instructed by this respondent to inform the Senate that 
        respondent stands ready to file his pleadings to such articles 
        of impeachment within such reasonable period of time as may be 
        fixed.
            Dated March 12, 1936.

Sec. 18.9 The Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, excused a 
    Senator from service at his request, fixed a trial date, allowed 
    respondent 18 days to file his answer, and adopted supplemental 
    rules for trial.

    On Mar. 12, 1936, the Senate convened as a Court of Impeachment in 
the Halsted Ritter case. Preceding the administration of the oath to 
members not theretofore sworn, the court granted the request of Senator 
Edward P. Costigan, of Colorado, that he be excused from service on the 
Court of Impeachment. Senator Costigan caused to be printed in the 
Record the reasons for his request, based on a long personal 
acquaintance with the respondent.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 80 Cong. Rec. 3646, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Senate ratified an agreement, between the managers and counsel 
for the respondent, as to the time permitted the respondent to file his 
answer with the Court of Impeachment:

        Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, I think 
    there is not a clear understanding as to the arrangement which has 
    been entered into between the managers and the counsel for the 
    respondent. It is my understanding, and if I am in error someone 
    who is better informed will please correct me, that the agreement 
    is that counsel for the respondent will place their response in the 
    possession of the managers on the part of the House not later than 
    the 26th instant, and that the Court may reconvene again on the 
    30th when the response will be filed in the Senate.
        The Vice President: (6) Is there objection to that 
    agreement?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. John N. Garner (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There was no objection.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 80 Cong. Rec. 3647, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Court of Impeachment adopted a motion fixing the trial date at 
Apr. 6, 1936.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 3648.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The court adopted supplemental rules, which Senator Henry F.

[[Page 2226]]

Ashurst, of Arizona, stated to be the same as those adopted in the 
trial of Judge Harold Louderback:

        Ordered, That in addition to the rules of procedure and 
    practice in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials, 
    heretofore adopted, and supplementary to such rules, the following 
    rules shall be applicable in the trial of the impeachment of 
    Halsted L. Ritter, United States judge for the southern district of 
    Florida:
        1. In all matters relating to the procedure of the Senate, 
    whether as to form or otherwise, the managers on the part of the 
    House or the counsel representing the respondent may submit a 
    request or application orally to the Presiding Officer, or, if 
    required by him or requested by any Senator, shall submit the same 
    in writing.
        2. In all matters relating immediately to the trial, such as 
    the admission, rejection, or striking out of evidence, or other 
    questions usually arising in the trial of causes in courts of 
    justice, if the managers on the part of the House or counsel 
    representing the respondent desire to make any application, 
    request, or objection, the same shall be addressed directly to the 
    Presiding Officer and not otherwise.
        3. It shall not be in order for any Senator, except as provided 
    in the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting 
    on impeachment trials, to engage in colloquy or to address 
    questions either to the managers on the part of the House or to 
    counsel for the respondent, nor shall it be in order for Senators 
    to address each other; but they shall address their remarks 
    directly to the Presiding Officer and not otherwise.
        4. The parties may, by stipulation in writing filed with the 
    Secretary of the Senate and by him laid before the Senate or 
    presented at the trial, agree upon any facts involved in the trial; 
    and such stipulation shall be received by the Senate for all 
    intents and purposes as though the facts therein agreed upon had 
    been established by legal evidence adduced at the trial.
        5. The parties or their counsel may interpose objection to 
    witnesses answering questions propounded at the request of any 
    Senator, and the merits of any such objection may be argued by the 
    parties or their counsel; and the Presiding Officer may rule on any 
    such objection, which ruling shall stand as the judgment of the 
    Senate, unless some Member of the Senate shall ask that a formal 
    vote be taken thereon, in which case it shall be submitted to the 
    Senate for decision; or he may, at his option, in the first 
    instance submit any such question to a vote of the Members of the 
    Senate. Upon all such questions the vote shall be without debate 
    and without a division, unless the ayes and nays be demanded by 
    one-fifth of the Members present when the same shall be 
    taken.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Amendment of Articles of Impeachment

Sec. 18.10 The House adopted a resolution, reported as privileged by 
    the managers on the part of the House in the Halsted Ritter 
    impeachment, amending the articles previously voted by the House.

[[Page 2227]]

    On Mar. 30, 1936,(10) Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of Texas, 
called up the following privileged resolution (H. Res. 471) amending 
the articles of impeachment against Judge Ritter:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 80 Cong. Rec. 4597-99. 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Resolved, That the articles of impeachment heretofore adopted 
    by the House of Representatives in and by House Resolution 422, 
    House Calendar No. 279, be, and they are hereby, amended as 
    follows:
        Article III is amended so as to read as follows:

                                 Article II

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was 
        guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of 
        the United States of America (U.S.C., Annotated, title 28, sec. 
        373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the 
        authority of the United States to exercise the profession or 
        employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the 
        practice of the law, in that after the employment of the law 
        firm of Ritter & Rankin (which at the time of the appointment 
        of Halsted L. Ritter to be judge of the United States District 
        Court for the Southern District of Florida, was composed of 
        Halsted L. Ritter and A. L. Rankin) in the case of Trust Co. of 
        Georgia and Robert G. Stephens, Trustee v. Brazilian Court 
        Building Corporation et al., no. 5704, in the Circuit Court of 
        the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida, and after the fee of 
        $4,000 which had been agreed upon at the outset of said 
        employment had been fully paid to the firm of Ritter & Rankin, 
        and after Halsted L. Ritter had, on, to wit, February 15, 1929, 
        become judge of the United States District Court for the 
        Southern District of Florida, Judge Ritter on, to wit, March 
        11, 1929, wrote a letter to Charles A. Brodek, of counsel for 
        Mulford Realty Corporation (the client which his former law 
        firm had been representing in said litigation), stating that 
        there had been much extra and unanticipated work in the case, 
        that he was then a Federal judge; that his partner, A. L. 
        Rankin, would carry through further proceedings in the case, 
        but that he, Judge Ritter, would be consulted about the matter 
        until the case was all closed up; and that ``this matter is one 
        among very few which I am assuming to continue my interest in 
        until finally closed up''; and stating specifically in said 
        letter:
            ``I do not know whether any appeal will be taken in the 
        case or not, but, if so, we hope to get Mr. Howard Paschal or 
        some other person as receiver who will be amenable to our 
        directions, and the hotel can be operated at a profit, of 
        course, pending the appeal. We shall demand a very heavy 
        supersedeas bond, which I doubt whether D'Esterre can give''; 
        and further that he was ``of course primarily interested in 
        getting some money in the case'', and that he thought ``$2,000 
        more by way of attorney's fees should be allowed''; and asked 
        that he be communicated with direct about the matter, giving 
        his post-office box number. On, to wit, March 13, 1929, said 
        Brodek replied favorably, and on March 30, 1929, a check of 
        Brodek, Raphael & Eisner,

[[Page 2228]]

        a law firm of New York City, representing Mulford Realty 
        Corporation, in which Charles A. Brodek, senior member of the 
        firm of Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, was one of the directors, was 
        drawn, payable to the order of ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter'' for 
        $2,000 and which was duly endorsed ``Hon. Halsted L. Ritter. H. 
        L. Ritter'' and was paid on, to wit, April 4, 1929, and the 
        proceeds thereof were received and appropriated by Judge Ritter 
        to his own individual use and benefit, without advising his 
        said former partner that said $2,000 had been received, without 
        consulting with his former partner thereabout, and without the 
        knowledge or consent of his said former partner, appropriated 
        the entire amount thus solicited and received to the use and 
        benefit of himself, the said Judge Ritter.
            At the time said letter was written by Judge Ritter and 
        said $2,000 received by him, Mulford Realty Corporation held 
        and owned large interests in Florida real estate and citrus 
        groves, and a large amount of securities of the Olympia 
        Improvement Corporation, which was a company organized to 
        develop and promote Olympia, Fla., said holdings being within 
        the territorial jurisdiction of the United States district 
        court, of which Judge Ritter was a judge from, to wit, February 
        15, 1929.
            After writing said letter of March 11, 1929, Judge Ritter 
        further exercised the profession or employment of counsel or 
        attorney, or engaged in the practice of the law, with relation 
        to said case.
            Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his 
        office into disrepute, constitute a violation of section 258 of 
        the Judicial Code of the United States of America (U.S.C., 
        Annotated, title 28, sec. 373), and constitute a high crime and 
        misdemeanor within the meaning and intent of section 4 of 
        article II of the Constitution of the United States.
            Wherefore, the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

        By adding the following articles immediately after article III 
    as amended:

                                 Article IV

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was 
        guilty of a violation of section 258 of the Judicial Code of 
        the United States of America (U.S.C., Annotated, title 28, sec. 
        373), making it unlawful for any judge appointed under the 
        authority of the United States to exercise the profession or 
        employment of counsel or attorney, or to be engaged in the 
        practice of the law, in that Judge Ritter did exercise the 
        profession or employment of counsel or attorney, or engaged in 
        the practice of the law, representing J. R. Francis, with 
        relation to the Boca Raton matter and the segregation and 
        saving of the interest of J. R. Francis therein, or in 
        obtaining a deed or deeds to J. R. Francis from the Spanish 
        River Land Co. to certain pieces of realty, and in the 
        Edgewater Ocean Beach Development Co. matter, for which 
        services the said Judge Ritter received from the said J. R. 
        Francis the sum of $7,500.
            Which acts of said judge were calculated to bring his 
        office into disrepute, constitute a violation of the law above 
        recited, and constitute a high crime and misdemeanor within the 
        meaning and intent of section 4 of article II of the 
        Constitution of the United States.

[[Page 2229]]

            Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

                                 Article V

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was 
        guilty of violation of section 146(b) of the Revenue Act of 
        1928, making it unlawful for any person willfully to attempt in 
        any manner to evade or defeat the payment of the income tax 
        levied in and by said Revenue Act of 1928, in that during the 
        year 1929 said Judge Ritter received gross taxable income--over 
        and above his salary as judge--to the amount of some $12,000, 
        yet paid no income tax thereon.

            Among the fees included in said gross taxable income for 
        1929 were the extra fee of $2,000 solicited and received by 
        Judge Ritter in the Brazilian Court case, as described in 
        article III, and the fee of $7,500 received by Judge Ritter 
        from J. R. Francis.
            Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.

                                 Article VI

            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, having been nominated by 
        the President of the United States, confirmed by the Senate of 
        the United States, duly qualified and commissioned, and, while 
        acting as a United States district judge for the southern 
        district of Florida, was and is guilty of a high crime and 
        misdemeanor in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such judge, was 
        guilty of violation of section 146(b) of the Revenue Act of 
        1928, making it unlawful for any person willfully to attempt in 
        any manner to evade or defeat the payment of the income tax 
        levied in and by said Revenue Act of 1928, in that during the 
        year 1930 the said Judge Ritter received gross taxable income--
        over and above his salary as judge--to the amount of, to wit, 
        $5,300, yet failed to report any part thereof in his income-tax 
        return for the year 1930, and paid no income tax thereon.
            Two thousand five hundred dollars of said gross taxable 
        income for 1930 was that amount of cash paid Judge Ritter by A. 
        L. Rankin on December 24, 1930, as described in article I.
            Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of a high misdemeanor in office.
            Original article IV is amended so as to read as follows:

                               ``Article VII

            ``That the said Halsted L. Ritter, while holding the office 
        of United States district judge for the southern district of 
        Florida, having been nominated by the President of the United 
        States, confirmed by the Senate of the United States, duly 
        qualified and commissioned, and, while acting as a United 
        States district judge for the southern district of Florida, was 
        and is guilty of misbehavior and of high crimes and 
        misdemeanors in office in manner and form as follows, to wit:
            ``The reasonable and probable consequence of the actions or 
        conduct of Halsted L. Ritter, hereunder specified or indicated 
        in this article, since he became judge of said court, as an 
        individual or as such judge, is to bring his court into scandal 
        and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public 
        confidence in the admin

[[Page 2230]]

        istration of justice therein, and to the prejudice of public 
        respect for and confidence in the Federal judiciary, and to 
        render him unfit to continue to serve as such judge:
            ``1. In that in the Florida Power Co. case (Florida Power & 
        Light Co. v. City of Miami et al., no. 1183-M-Eq.), which was a 
        case wherein said judge had granted the complainant power 
        company a temporary injunction restraining the enforcement of 
        an ordinance of the city of Miami, which ordinance prescribed a 
        reduction in the rates for electric current being charged in 
        said city, said judge improperly appointed one Cary T. 
        Hutchinson, who had long been associated with and employed by 
        power and utility interests, special master in chancery in said 
        suit, and refused to revoke his order so appointing said 
        Hutchinson. Thereafter, when criticism of such action had 
        become current in the city of Miami, and within 2 weeks after a 
        resolution (H. Res. 163, 73d Cong.) had been agreed to in the 
        House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, 
        authorizing and directing the Judiciary Committee thereof to 
        investigate the official conduct of said judge and to make a 
        report concerning said conduct to said House of 
        Representatives, an arrangement was entered into with the city 
        commissioners of the city of Miami or with the city attorney of 
        said city by which the said city commissioners were to pass a 
        resolution expressing faith and confidence in the integrity of 
        said judge, and the said judge recuse himself as judge in said 
        power suit. The said agreement was carried out by the parties 
        thereto, and said judge; after the passage of such resolution, 
        recused himself from sitting as judge in said power suit, 
        thereby bartering his judicial authority in said case for a 
        vote of confidence. Nevertheless, the succeeding judge allowed 
        said Hutchinson as special master in chancery in said case a 
        fee of $5,000, although he performed little, if any, service as 
        such, and in the order making such allowance recited: `And it 
        appearing to the court that a minimum fee of $5,000 was 
        approved by the court for the said Cary T. Hutchinson, special 
        master in this cause.'
            ``2. In that in the Trust Co. of Florida cases (Illick v. 
        Trust Co. of Florida et al., no. 1043-M-Eq., and Edmunds 
        Committee et al. v. Marion Mortgage Co. et al., no. 1124-M-
        Eq.), after the State Banking Department of Florida, through 
        its comptroller, Hon. Ernest Amos, had closed the doors of the 
        Trust Co. of Florida and appointed J. H. Therrell liquidator 
        for said trust company, and had intervened in the said Illick 
        case, said Judge Ritter wrongfully and erroneously refused to 
        recognize the right of said State authority to administer the 
        affairs of the said trust company and appointed Julian S. Eaton 
        and Clark D. Stearns as receivers of the property of said trust 
        company. On appeal the United States Circuit Court of Appeals 
        for the Fifth Circuit reversed the said order or decree of 
        Judge Ritter and ordered the said property surrendered to the 
        State liquidator. Thereafter, on, to wit, September 12, 1932, 
        there was filed in the United States District Court for the 
        Southern District of Florida the Edmunds Committee case, supra. 
        Marion Mortgage Co. was a subsidiary of the Trust Co. of 
        Florida. Judge Ritter being absent from his district at the 
        time of the filing of said case, an application for the 
        appointment of receivers therein was presented to another judge 
        of said district, namely, Hon. Alexander Akerman. Judge Ritter, 
        however, prior to the appointment of such receivers, 
        telegraphed Judge Akerman, requesting him to appoint the 
        aforesaid Eaton and Stearns as receivers in said case, which 
        appointments were made by Judge Akerman. Thereafter the United

[[Page 2231]]

        States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
        the order of Judge Akerman, appointing said Eaton and Stearns 
        as receivers in said case. In November 1932 J. H. Therrell, as 
        liquidator, filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of 
        Dade County, Fla.--a court of the State of Florida--alleging 
        that the various trust properties of the Trust Co. of Florida 
        were burdensome to the liquidator to keep, and asking that the 
        court appoint a succeeding trustee. Upon petition for removal 
        of said cause from said State court into the United States 
        District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Judge 
        Ritter took jurisdiction, notwithstanding the previous rulings 
        of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals above referred 
        to, and again appointed the said Eaton and Stearns as the 
        receivers of the said trust properties. In December 1932 the 
        said Therrell surrendered all of the trust properties to said 
        Eaton and Stearns as receivers, together with all records of 
        the Trust Co. of Florida pertaining thereto. During the time 
        said Eaton and Stearns, as such receivers, were in control of 
        said trust properties. Judge Ritter wrongfully and improperly 
        approved their accounts without notice or opportunity for 
        objection thereto to be heard. With the knowledge of Judge 
        Ritter, said receivers appointed the sister-in-law of Judge 
        Ritter, namely, Mrs. G. M. Wickard, who had had no previous 
        hotel-management experience, to be manager of the Julia Tuttle 
        Hotel and Apartment Building, one of said trust properties. On, 
        to wit, January 1, 1933, Hon. J. M. Lee succeeded Hon. Ernest 
        Amos as comptroller of the State of Florida and appointed M. A. 
        Smith liquidator in said Trust Co. of Florida cases to succeed 
        J. H. Therrell. An appeal was again taken to the United States 
        Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit from the then 
        latest order or decree of Judge Ritter, and again the order or 
        decree of Judge Ritter appealed from was reversed by the said 
        circuit court of appeals which held that the State officer was 
        entitled to the custody of the property involved and that said 
        Eaton and Stearns as receivers were not entitled to such 
        custody. Thereafter, and with the knowledge of the decision of 
        the-said circuit court of appeals, Judge Ritter wrongfully and 
        improperly allowed said Eaton and Stearns and their attorneys 
        some $26,000 as fees out of said trust-estate properties and 
        endeavored to require, as a condition precedent to releasing 
        said trust properties from the control of his court, a promise 
        from counsel for the said State liquidator not to appeal from 
        his order allowing the said fees to said Eaton and Stearns and 
        their attorneys.
            ``3. In that the said Halsted L. Ritter, while such Federal 
        judge, accepted, in addition to $4,500 from his former law 
        partner, as alleged in article I hereof, other large fees or 
        gratuities, to wit, $7,500 from J. R. Francis, on or about 
        April 19, 1929, J. R. Francis at this said time having large 
        property interests within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
        court of which Judge Ritter was a judge; and on, to wit, the 
        4th day of April 1929 the said Judge Ritter accepted the sum of 
        $2,000 from Brodek, Raphael & Eisner, representing Mulford 
        Realty Corporation as its attorneys, through Charles A. Brodek, 
        senior member of said firm and a director of said corporation, 
        as a fee or gratuity, at which time the said Mulford Realty 
        Corporation held and owned large interests in Florida real 
        estate and citrus groves and a large amount of securities of 
        the Olympia Improvement Corporation, which was a company 
        organized to develop and promote Olympia, Florida, said 
        holdings being within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
        United States District

[[Page 2232]]

        Court of which Ritter was a judge from, to wit, February 15, 
        1929.
            ``4. By his conduct as detailed in articles I, II, III, and 
        IV hereof, and by his income-tax evasions as set forth in 
        articles V and VI hereof.
            ``Wherefore the said Judge Halsted L. Ritter was and is 
        guilty of misbehavior, and was and is guilty of high crimes and 
        misdemeanors in office.''

    The House adopted the resolution amending the articles after Mr. 
Sumners discussed its provisions and stated his opinion that the 
managers had the power to report amendments to the articles:

        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, the resolution which has 
    just been read proposes three new articles. The change is not as 
    important as that statement would indicate. Two of the new articles 
    deal with income taxes, and one with practicing law by Judge 
    Ritter, after he went on the bench. In the original resolution, the 
    charge is made that Judge Ritter received certain fees or 
    gratuities and had written a letter, and so forth. No change is 
    proposed in articles 1 and 2. In article 3, as stated, Judge Ritter 
    is charged with practicing law after he went on the bench. That 
    same thing, in effect, was charged, as members of the committee 
    will remember, in the original resolution, but the form of the 
    charge, in the judgment of the managers, could be improved. These 
    charges go further and charge that in the matter connected with J. 
    R. Francis, the judge acted as counsel in two transactions after he 
    went on the bench, and received $7,500 in compensation. Article 7 
    is amended to include a reference to these new charges. There is a 
    change in the tense used with reference to the effect of the 
    conduct alleged. It is charged, in the resolution pending at the 
    desk, that the reasonable and probable consequence of the alleged 
    conduct is to injure the confidence of the people in the courts--I 
    am not attempting to quote the exact language--which is a matter of 
    form, I think, more than a matter of substance.
        Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
        Mr. Snell: I may not be entirely familiar with all this 
    procedure, but as I understand, what the gentleman is doing here 
    today, is to amend the original articles of impeachment passed by 
    the House.
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: That is correct.
        Mr. Snell: The original articles of impeachment came to the 
    House as a result of the evidence before the gentleman's committee. 
    Has the gentleman's committee had anything to do with the change or 
    amendment of these charges?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: No; just the managers.
        Mr. Snell: As a matter of procedure, would not that be the 
    proper thing to do?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: I do not think it is at all necessary, 
    for this reason: The managers are now acting as the agents of the 
    House, and not as the agents of the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. 
    Manager Perkins and Mr. Manager Hobbs have recently extended the 
    investigation made by the committee.

[[Page 2233]]

        Mr. Snell: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Yes.
        Mr. Snell: Do I understand that the amendments come because of 
    new information that has come to you as managers that never was 
    presented to the Committee on the Judiciary?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: Perhaps it would not be true to answer 
    that entirely in the affirmative, but the changes are made largely 
    by reason of new evidence which has come to the attention of the 
    committee, and some of these changes, more or less changes in form, 
    have resulted from further examination of the question. This is 
    somewhat as lawyers do in their pleadings. They often ask the 
    privilege of making an amendment.
        Mr. Snell: And the gentleman's position is that as agents of 
    the House it is not necessary to have the approval of his 
    committee, which made the original impeachment charges?
        Mr. Sumners of Texas: I have no doubt about that; I have no 
    doubt about the accuracy of that statement.

Sec. 18.11 Following the amendment of the articles of impeachment 
    against Judge Halsted Ritter, the House adopted a resolution to 
    inform the Senate thereof.

    On Mar. 30, 1936,(11) following the amendment by the 
House of the articles in the impeachment against Judge Ritter, the 
Senate was informed by resolution thereof:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 80 Cong. Rec. 4601, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Hatton W.] Sumners of Texas: Mr. Speaker, I offer the 
    following privileged resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            House Resolution 472

            Resolved, That a message be sent to the Senate by the Clerk 
        of the House informing the Senate that the House of 
        Representatives has adopted an amendment to the articles of 
        impeachment heretofore exhibited against Halsted L. Ritter, 
        United States district judge for the southern district of 
        Florida, and that the same will be presented to the Senate by 
        the managers on the part of the House.
            And also, that the managers have authority to file with the 
        Secretary of the Senate, on the part of the House any 
        subsequent pleadings they shall deem necessary.

        The resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

    On Mar. 31, the amendments to the articles were presented to the 
Court of Impeachment and printed in the Record; (12) counsel 
for the respondent was granted 48 hours to file his response to the new 
articles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Id. at pp. 4654-56.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Motions to Strike Articles

Sec. 18.12 During the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter, the 
    respondent moved to strike Article I or, in the

[[Page 2234]]

    alternative, to require election as to Articles I and II, and moved 
    to strike Article VII.

    On Mar. 31, 1936,(13) the respondent, Judge Ritter, 
filed the following motion:
    In the Senate of the United States of America sitting as a Court of 
        Impeachment. The United States of America v. Halsted L. Ritter, 
        respondent

      Motion to Strike Article I, or, in the Alternative, to Require 
     Election as to Articles I and II; and Motion to Strike Article VII

        The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, moves the honorable Senate, 
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment, for an order striking and 
    dismissing article I of the articles of impeachment, or, in the 
    alternative, to require the honorable managers on the part of the 
    House of Representatives to elect as to whether they will proceed 
    upon article I or upon article II, and for grounds of such motion 
    respondent says:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 80 Cong. Rec. 4656, 4657, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        1. Article II reiterates and embraces all the charges and 
    allegations of article I, and the respondent is thus and thereby 
    twice charged in separate articles with the same and identical 
    offense, and twice required to defend against the charge presented 
    in article I.
        2. The presentation of the same and identical charge in the two 
    articles in question tends to prejudice the respondent in his 
    defense, and tends to oppress the respondent in that the articles 
    are so framed as to collect, or accumulate upon the second article, 
    the adverse votes, if any, upon the first article.
        3. The Constitution of the United States contemplates but one 
    vote of the Senate upon the charge contained in each article of 
    impeachment, whereas articles I and II are constructed and arranged 
    in such form and manner as to require and exact of the Senate a 
    second vote upon the subject matter of article I.

                        Motion to Strike Article VII

        And the respondent further moves the honorable Senate, sitting 
    as a Court of Impeachment, for an order striking and dismissing 
    article VII, and for grounds of such motion, respondent says:
        1. Article VII includes and embraces all the charges set forth 
    in articles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI.
        2. Article VII constitutes an accumulation and massing of all 
    charges in preceding articles upon which the Court is to pass 
    judgment prior to the vote on article VII, and the prosecution 
    should be required to abide by the judgment of the Senate rendered 
    upon such prior articles and the Senate ought not to countenance 
    the arrangement of pleading designed to procure a second vote and 
    the collection or accumulation of adverse votes, if any, upon such 
    matters.
        3. The presentation in article VII of more than one subject and 
    the charges arising out of a single subject is unjust and 
    prejudicial to respondent.
        4. In fairness and justice to respondent, the Court ought to 
    require separa

[[Page 2235]]

    tion and singleness of the subject matter of the charges in 
    separate and distinct articles, upon which a single and final vote 
    of the Senate upon each article and charge can be had.

                                     (Signed)  Frank P. Walsh,
                                                Carl T. Hoffman,
                                        Of Counsel for Respondent.

    Mr. Hoffman, counsel for respondent, argued that Article II 
duplicated charges set forth in Article I. He also contended that the 
rule of duplicity, or the principle of civil and criminal pleading that 
one count should contain no more than one charge or cause of action, 
was violated by Article VII.
    Mr. Sumners argued in response that Article II was clearly not a 
duplication of Article I, two distinct charges being presented. As to 
Article VII, Mr. Sumners contended that impeachment was essentially an 
ouster proceeding as opposed to a criminal proceeding. He referred to 
the fact that the articles of impeachment against Judge Harold 
Louderback had contained a similar article charging that ``by 
specifically alleged conduct'' the respondent ``has done those things 
the reasonable and probable consequences of which are to arouse a 
substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Id. at p. 4658.
            For Article V, as amended, in the Louderback impeachment, 
        charging such conduct as to destroy public confidence in the 
        court, see 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 520.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the suggestion of the Chair, decision on the motions of 
respondent were reserved for investigation and deliberation:

        Mr. [Henry F.] Ashurst [of Arizona]: Mr. President, I assume 
    that the Presiding Officer will desire to take some time to examine 
    all the pleadings and will not be prepared to announce a decision 
    on this point until the next session of the Court?
        The Presiding Officer [Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.)]: It is the 
    opinion of the present occupant of the chair that while the 
    necessity for early decision is apparent, the importance of the 
    matter would justify the occupant of the chair in saying that no 
    decision should be made until the proceedings are printed and every 
    member of the Court has an opportunity to investigate and consider 
    them. Is there objection to that suggestion of the Chair? The Chair 
    hears none.(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Id. at p. 4659.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 18.13 On the respondent's motion to strike, the Chair overruled 
    that part of the motion which sought to strike Article I or to 
    require election between Articles I and II; the Chair submitted 
    that part of the motion which sought to strike Article VII to the 
    Court of Impeachment, which overruled that part of the motion.

[[Page 2236]]

    On Apr. 3, 1936,(16) the following disposition was made 
of the motion of the respondent, Judge Halsted Ritter, to strike 
certain articles:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 80 Cong. Rec. 4898, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Presiding Officer [Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.)]: On the 
    motion of the honorable counsel for the respondent to strike 
    article I of the articles of impeachment or, in the alternative, to 
    require the honorable managers on the part of the House to make an 
    election as to whether they will stand upon article I or upon 
    article II, the Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair is clearly of the opinion that the motion to strike 
    article I or to require an election is not well taken and should be 
    overruled.
        His reason for such opinion is that articles I and II present 
    entirely different bases for impeachment.
        Article I alleges the illegal and corrupt receipt by the 
    respondent of $4,500 from his former law partner, Mr. Rankin.
        Article II sets out as a basis for impeachment an alleged 
    conspiracy between Judge Ritter; his former partner, Mr. Rankin; 
    one Richardson, Metcalf & Sweeny; and goes into detail as to the 
    means and manner employed whereby the respondent is alleged to have 
    corruptly received the $4,500 above mentioned.
        The two allegations, one of corrupt and illegal receipt and the 
    other of conspiracy to effectuate the purpose, are, in the judgment 
    of the Chair, wholly distinct, and the respondent should be called 
    to answer each of the articles.
        What is the judgment of the Court with reference to that 
    particular phase of the motion to strike?
        Mr. [William H.] King [of Utah]: Mr. President, if it be 
    necessary, I move that the ruling of the honorable Presiding 
    Officer be considered as and stand for the judgment of the Senate 
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
        The Presiding Officer: Is there objection? The Chair hears 
    none, and the ruling of the Chair is sustained, by the Senate.
        With reference to article VII of the articles of impeachment, 
    formerly article IV, the Chair desires to exercise his prerogative 
    of calling on the Court for a determination of this question.
        His reason for so doing is that an impeachment proceeding 
    before the Senate sitting as a Court is sui generis, partaking 
    neither of the harshness and rigidity of the criminal law nor of 
    the civil proceedings requiring less particularity.
        The question of duplicity in impeachment proceedings presented 
    by the honorable counsel for the respondent is a controversial one, 
    and the Chair feels that it is the right and duty of each Member of 
    the Senate, sitting as a Court, to express his views thereon.
        Precedents in proceedings of this character are rare and not 
    binding upon this Court in any course that it might desire to 
    pursue.
        The question presented in the motion to strike article VII on 
    account of duplicity has not, so far as the Chair is advised, been 
    presented in any impeachment proceeding heretofore had before this 
    body.
        The Chair therefore submits the question to the Court.

[[Page 2237]]

        Mr. [Henry F.] Ashurst [of Arizona]: Mr. President, under the 
    rules of the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, all such 
    questions, when submitted by the Presiding Officer, shall be 
    decided without debate and without division, unless the yeas and 
    nays are demanded by one-fifth of the Members present, when the 
    yeas and nays shall be taken.
        The Presiding Officer: The Chair therefore, will put the 
    motion. All those in favor of the motion of counsel for the 
    respondent to strike article VII will say ``aye.'' Those opposed 
    will say ``no.''
        The noes have it, and the motion in its entirety is overruled.

Sec. 18.14 During the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter, the 
    managers on the part of the House made and the Senate granted a 
    motion to strike certain specifications from an article of 
    impeachment.

    On Apr. 3, 1936,(17) during the impeachment trial of 
Judge Ritter, the managers on the part of the House moved that two 
counts be stricken. The motion was granted by the Senate:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 80 Cong. Rec. 4899, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Manager [Hatton W.] Sumners [of Texas] (speaking from the 
    desk in front of the Vice President): Mr. President, the suggestion 
    which the managers desire to make at this time has reference to 
    specifications 1 and 2 of article VII. These two specifications 
    have reference to what I assume counsel for respondent and the 
    managers as well, recognize are rather involved matters, which 
    would possibly require as much time to develop and to argue as 
    would be required on the remainder of the case.
        The managers respectfully move that those two counts be 
    stricken. If that motion shall be sustained, the managers will 
    stand upon the other specifications in article VII to establish 
    article VII. The suggestion on the part of the managers is that 
    those two specifications in article VII be stricken from the 
    article.
        The Presiding Officer: (18) What is the response of 
    counsel for the respondent?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Charles L.] McNary [of Oregon]: Mr. President, there was 
    so much rumbling and noise in the Chamber that I did not hear the 
    position taken by the managers on the part of the House.
        The Presiding Officer: The managers on the part of the House 
    have suggested that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be 
    stricken on their motion. . . .
        Mr. Hoffman [of counsel]: Mr. President, the respondent is 
    ready to file his answer to article I, to articles II and III as 
    amended, and to articles IV, V, and VI. In view of the announcement 
    just made asking that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be 
    stricken, it will be necessary for us to revise our answer to 
    article VII and to eliminate paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof. That can 
    be very speedily done with 15 or 20 minutes if it can be arranged 
    for the

[[Page 2238]]

    Senate to indulge us for that length of time.
        The Presiding Officer: Is there objection to the motion 
    submitted on the part of the managers?
        Mr. Hoffman: We have no objection.
        The Presiding Officer: The motion is made. Is there objection? 
    The Chair hears none, and the motion to strike is granted.
        Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, it would 
    seem that in the interest of the conservation of time and for the 
    convenience of the Court, the motion should have been made prior to 
    the decision on the question involved in the motion of counsel to 
    strike certain articles. I merely make that observation for the 
    consideration of the Court.

Answer and Replication

Sec. 18.15 In the Ritter impeachment trial, an answer to the charges 
    was filed by the respondent, and a replication thereto was 
    submitted by the managers.

    On Apr. 3, 1936, the answer of the respondent in the Ritter 
impeachment was read in the Senate, ordered printed, and messaged to 
the House. The answer stated that the facts set forth therein did not 
constitute impeachable high crimes and misdemeanors and that the 
respondent was not guilty of the offenses charged.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 80 Cong. Rec. 4899-4906, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On Apr. 6, the respondent's answer was laid before the House and 
referred to the managers on the part of the House.(20) On 
the same day, the managers filed a replication in the Senate, sitting 
as a Court of Impeachment, to the answer of the respondent Judge 
Ritter. The replication was prepared and submitted by the managers on 
their own initiative, the House not having voted thereon:(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Id. at p. 5020.
 1. Id. at pp. 4971, 4972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Replication of the House of Representatives of the United States of 
     America to the Answer of Halsted L. Ritter, District Judge of the 
    United States for the Southern District of Florida, to the Articles 
     of Impeachment, as Amended, Exhibited Against him by the House of 
              Representatives of the United States of America

        The House of Representatives of the United States of America, 
    having considered the several answers of Halsted L. Ritter, 
    district judge of the United States for the southern district of 
    Florida, to the several articles of impeachment, as amended, 
    against him by them exhibited in the name of themselves and of all 
    the people of the United States, and reserving to themselves all 
    advantages of exception to the insufficiency, irrelevancy, and 
    impertinency of his answer to each and all of the several articles 
    of impeachment, as amended, so exhibited against the said Halsted 
    L. Ritter, judge as aforesaid, do say:

[[Page 2239]]

        (1) That the said articles, as amended do severally set forth 
    impeachable offenses, misbehaviors, and misdemeanors as defined in 
    the Constitution of the United States, and that the same are proper 
    to be answered unto by the said Halsted L. Ritter, judge as 
    aforesaid, and sufficient to be entertained and adjudicated by the 
    Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
        (2) That the said House of Representatives of the United States 
    of America do deny each and every averment in said several answers, 
    or either of them, which denies or traverses the acts, intents, 
    misbehaviors, or misdemeanors charged against the said Halsted L. 
    Ritter in said articles of impeachment, as amended, or either of 
    them, and for replication to said answers do say that Halsted L. 
    Ritter, district judge of the United States for the southern 
    district of Florida, is guilty of the impeachable offenses, 
    misbehaviors, and misdemeanors charged in said articles, as 
    amended, and that the House of Representatives are ready to prove 
    the same.
                                              Hatton W. Sumners,
                                        On behalf of the Managers.

The Trial; Arguments

Sec. 18.16 Opening statements and closing arguments in an impeachment 
    trial may consist of statements by the managers on the part of the 
    House and statements by counsel for the accused.

    On Apr. 6, 1936,(2) in the impeachment trial of Judge 
Halsted Ritter, opening statements were made in the Senate by the 
managers on the part of the House and by counsel for the 
accused.(3) The respondent himself testified before the 
Court of Impeachment.(4) Final arguments were made on Apr. 
13 and 14 first by Mr. Sam Hobbs, of Alabama, for the managers, then by 
Mr. Walsh for the respondent, and finally by Mr. Hatton W. Sumners, of 
Texas, for the managers, the arguments being limited by an order 
adopted on Apr. 13:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 80 Cong. Rec. 4972-82, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
 3. For precedents during the trial as to the evidence, see 
        Sec. Sec. 12.7-12.9, supra.
 4. 80 Cong. Rec. 5370-86, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 11 and Apr. 13, 
        1936.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ordered, That the time for final argument of the case of 
    Halsted L. Ritter shall be limited to 4 hours, which said time 
    shall be divided equally between the managers on the part of the 
    House of Representatives and the counsel for the respondent, and 
    the time thus assigned to each side shall be divided as each side 
    for itself may determine.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Id. at p. 5401.
            For final arguments on Apr. 13, 1936, see id. at pp. 5401-
        10; for Apr. 14, 1936, see id. at pp. 5464-73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Hobbs argued three principles bearing on the weight of evidence 
and burden of proof in an impeachment trial:

        The statement of the law of the case, as we see it, will 
    largely be left to the distinguished chairman of the Judici

[[Page 2240]]

    ary Committee of the House [Mr. Manager Sumners], the chairman of 
    the managers on the part of the House in this case, and I will not 
    attempt to go into that, save to observe these three points which, 
    to my mind, should be in the minds of the Members of this high 
    Court of Impeachment at all times in weighing this evidence:
        First, that impeachment trials are not criminal trials in any 
    sense of the word.
        Second, that the burden of proof in this case is not ``beyond a 
    reasonable doubt'', as it is in criminal cases.
        Third, that the presumption of innocence, which attends a 
    defendant in a criminal case, is not to be indulged in behalf of 
    the respondent in an impeachment trial. Those three principles of 
    law, I believe, are well recognized, and we respectfully ask the 
    Members of this high Court of Impeachment to bear them in mind.
        The present distinguished senior Senator from Nebraska [Mr. 
    Norris], when acting as one of the managers on the part of the 
    House in the impeachment trial of Judge Robert W. Archbald, made as 
    clear and cogent a statement as has ever been made upon the subject 
    of impeachable conduct. With his kind permission, I should like to 
    take that as my text, so to speak, for the remarks that will 
    follow:

            If judges can hold their offices only during good behavior, 
        then it necessarily and logically follows that they cannot hold 
        their offices when they have been convicted of any behavior 
        that is not good. If good behavior is an essential of holding 
        the office, then misbehavior is a sufficient reason for removal 
        from office.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Id. at p. 5401.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Walsh concluded his argument based on the lack of evidence of 
charges and on the good character and reputation of the respondent:

        Gentlemen, all I can say to you is that if this case were being 
    tried in an ordinary court a demurrer to the evidence would be 
    sustained. The law is that those bringing these charges must prove 
    the receipt of income; they must prove the amount that was paid out 
    against that income; they must prove what his exemptions were; they 
    must prove what his allowances were; they must prove a tax 
    liability. Those matters would all have been looked into, and as we 
    look into them in this case there is no tax liability. When Judge 
    Ritter swears he did not defraud the Government of a dollar, when 
    he says that the $6.25 tax was not due because his exemptions 
    exceeded that sum, the court would direct a verdict in his favor.
        In 1930 Judge Ritter had a loss which, added to his taxes and 
    other expenditures, gave him a leeway of $4,600 over and above the 
    income that he could be charged with having received. He testified 
    to this, and you ought to believe that he testified to the truth, 
    for a charge must be supported by something greater, I say, than 
    the mere assertion of counsel, and nothing else has been introduced 
    in this case in support of that charge. If Judge Ritter were found 
    guilty upon that charge, which was filed in this Court on March 30, 
    1936--after he came here to defend himself against the other 
    charges--that would be a monstrous thing. Those bringing the charge 
    did not, nor

[[Page 2241]]

    could they, make proof that Judge Ritter owed his Government a cent 
    of income taxes or that Judge Ritter did anything improper in the 
    filing of his return. It ought to be the pleasure of this body to 
    acquit him of the charges with respect to income taxes, because the 
    law protects him, because he is innocent of any offense in that 
    regard.
        Take this whole case in its entirety, gentlemen. I have tried 
    to argue it on the facts. I have drawn no conclusions which I did 
    not honestly believe came from these facts. My argument is backed 
    up by the belief that you must recognize and accept his innocence 
    as he stood here, a brave and manly man, testifying in opposition 
    to these charges which have been made against him. It will not do 
    to say that he undermined the dignity or the honor of the court. He 
    did nothing in his whole career in Florida, according to the 
    witnesses, which would belittle that dignity or besmirch his honor.
        There is another thing I wish to call to your attention. I know 
    and you know that a judge ought to have a good reputation. In this 
    case, however, where a charge is made against his integrity, where 
    a charge of corruption is made against him, he put his reputation 
    in that community in evidence before this body.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Id. at p. 5468.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Sumners began and concluded his argument, the final argument in 
the case, as follows:

        We do not assume the responsibility, Members of this 
    distinguished Court, of proving that the respondent in this case is 
    guilty of a crime as that term is known to criminal jurisprudence. 
    We do assume the responsibility of bringing before you a case, 
    proven facts, the reasonable and probable consequences of which are 
    to cause the people to doubt the integrity of the respondent 
    presiding as a judge among a free people.
        We take the position, first, that justice must be done to the 
    respondent. The respondent must be protected against those who 
    would make him afraid. But we take the position also that when a 
    judge on the bench, by his own conduct, does that which makes an 
    ordinary person doubt his integrity, doubt whether his court is a 
    fair place to go, doubt whether he, that ordinary person, will get 
    a square deal there; doubt whether the judge will be influenced by 
    something other than the sworn testimony, that judge must go.
        This august body writes the code of judicial ethics. This Court 
    fixes the standard of permissible judicial conduct. It will not be, 
    it cannot be, that someone on the street corner will destroy the 
    confidence of the American people in the courts of this country. 
    That cannot happen if the courts are kept clean. If confidence in 
    the courts of this country is destroyed it is going to be destroyed 
    from within by the judges themselves. I declare to you, standing in 
    my place of responsibility, that that is one thing which neither 
    the House nor the Senate can permit to be tampered with or which 
    they can be easy about. . . .
        Now, let us look at this case. I do not know anything about 
    what happened in Colorado, but when we see this respondent in this 
    record he is down there in Florida as the secretary of a real-
    estate concern. After that he forms

[[Page 2242]]

    a copartnership with Mr. Rankin. Two years and three months after 
    that time he occupies a position on the Federal bench, and when the 
    Government put him there, when the people put him there, they said 
    to him, ``All we ask of you is to behave yourself.'' Good behavior! 
    What does that mean? It means obey the law, keep yourself free from 
    questionable conduct, free from embarrassing entanglements, free 
    from acts which justify suspicion; hold in clean hands the scales 
    of justice. That means that he shall not take chances that would 
    tend to cause the people to question the integrity of the court, 
    because where doubt enters confidence departs. Is not that sound? 
    When a judge on the bench, by his own conduct, arouses a 
    substantial doubt as to his judicial integrity he commits the 
    highest crime that a judge can commit under the Constitution. It is 
    not essential to prove guilt. There is nothing in the Constitution 
    and nothing in the philosophy of a free government that holds that 
    a man shall continue to occupy office until it can be established 
    beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not fit for the office. It is 
    the other way. When there is resulting from the judge's conduct a 
    reasonable doubt as to his integrity he has no right to stay 
    longer. He has forfeited his right. It is the high duty of this 
    Court to write the judgment and make effective the terms of that 
    contract. . . .(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Id. at p. 5469.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Manager Sumners: I do not want to be tedious, but this is 
    very important, because these things go down to the depths of this 
    man's character.
        When he wrote this letter he referred to him as ``A. L. Rankin, 
    of Andalusia, Ala.'' Why did he do that? Because the job Rankin was 
    trying to get was in Alabama. Just think of that, and weigh it.

        In another letter he said:

            I want to say that Judge Rankin is a man of the highest 
        character and integrity. He is one of the ablest common-law 
        lawyers in the South.

        That is a statement made by a judge upon his responsibility.

            We were partners in the practice of law in West Palm Beach 
        before my appointment on the bench. I know of no man better 
        qualified from the standpoint of experience, ability, and 
        character for the position.

        And so forth. Then he writes again in another letter that if he 
    is appointed he will raise the bench to a high place.
        I say a man who will not speak the truth above his signed name 
    will not swear it, and a man who will not state the truth, and who 
    does those things which arouse doubt as to his integrity must go 
    from the bench.
        I appreciate profoundly the attention which the Members of this 
    honorable Court have given the case.
        There ought to be a unanimous judgment in this case, and let it 
    ring out from this Chamber all over the Nation that from now on men 
    who hold positions in the Federal judiciary must be obedient to the 
    high principles which in the nature of things it is essential for a 
    judge to manifest.
        A few Federal judges can reflect upon the great body of 
    honorable men who hold these high positions.
        There is another thing I was about to forget. Of course, the 
    bondholders in Chicago did not protest the $90,000 fee to Rankin. 
    The attorneys for the bond

[[Page 2243]]

    holders and Mr. Holland were in the respondent's court at the same 
    time. They came to represent 93 percent of the $2,500,000 of the 
    first-mortgage bonds. They heard the respondent advised of the 
    champertous conduct of Richardson, Rankin et al., and they saw the 
    respondent approve. They were virtually kicked out of the court. 
    They wanted the case out of that court and away from Rankin and the 
    respondent just as quickly as they could get it out, and they would 
    have stood not only for that fee of $90,000 but for more; and any 
    of you practicing law would have done the same thing under the 
    circumstances. You remember McPherson said respondent was positive, 
    very positive, about Mr. Holland. Respondent was a great deal 
    stronger with regard to the attorney for the bondholders. Remember 
    the judge asked Holland, ``Who bought you off?'' of course they 
    were glad to get out at almost any price.
        Members of the Court, there is a great deal more which ought to 
    be said, but you have the record and my time has about expired. I 
    have a duty to perform and you have yours. Mine is finished.
        The House has done all the House can do toward protecting the 
    judiciary of the country. The people have trusted in you. Counsel 
    for the respondent kept emphasizing the fact that this respondent 
    stood and swore, stood and swore, stood and swore. I remember that 
    I saw the Members of this honorable Court lift their hands to God 
    Almighty, and, in that oath which they took, pledge themselves to 
    rise above section and party entanglements and to be true to the 
    people of the Nation in the exercise of this high power. I have no 
    doubt you will do it.
        I thank this honorable Court for the courtesy and consideration 
    which have been shown to my colleagues and to me as we have tried 
    to discharge our constitutional duty in this matter.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Id. at pp. 5472, 5473.
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Deliberation and Judgment

Sec. 18.17 Deliberation was followed by conviction on a general article 
    of impeachment and by judgment of removal from office in the trial 
    of Judge Halsted Ritter.

    Final arguments in the Ritter trial having been concluded on Apr. 
14, 1936, the Court of Impeachment adjourned until Apr. 15, when the 
doors of the Senate were closed for deliberation on motion of Senator 
Henry F. Ashurst, of Arizona. The Senate deliberated with closed doors 
for 4 hours and 37 minutes. A unanimous-consent agreement entered into 
while the Senate was deliberating with closed doors was printed in the 
Record; the order provided for a vote on the articles of impeachment on 
Friday, Apr. 17.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 80 Cong. Rec. 5505, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Deliberation with closed doors was continued on Apr. 16, 1936, for 
5 hours and 48 minutes. When the doors were opened, the Senate adopted 
orders to return evidence

[[Page 2244]]

to proper persons, to allow each Senator to file written opinions 
within four days after the final vote, and to provide a method of vote. 
The latter order read as follows:

        Ordered, That upon the final vote in the pending impeachment of 
    Halsted L. Ritter, the Secretary shall read the articles of 
    impeachment separately and successively, and when the reading of 
    each article shall have been concluded the Presiding Officer shall 
    state the question thereon as follows:
        ``Senators, how say you? Is the respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, 
    guilty or not guilty?''
        Thereupon the roll of the Senate shall be called, and each 
    Senator as his name is called, unless excused, shall arise in his 
    place and answer ``guilty'' or ``not guilty.'' (11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Id. at pp. 5558, 5559.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On Apr. 17, 1936, the Senate convened as a Court of Impeachment to 
vote on the articles against Judge Ritter. Senator Joseph T. Robinson, 
of Arkansas, announced those Senators absent and excused and announced 
that pairs would not be recognized in the proceedings. Eighty-four 
Senators answered to their names on the quorum call.
    President pro tempore Key Pittman, of Nevada, proceeded to put the 
vote on the articles of impeachment, a two-thirds vote being required 
to convict. The vote was insufficient to convict on the first six 
articles: Article I: 55 ``guilty'';--29 ``not guilty''; Article II: 52 
``guilty''--32 ``not guilty''; Article III: 44 ``guilty''--39 ``not 
guilty''; Article IV: 36 ``guilty''--48 ``not guilty''; Article V: 36 
``guilty''--48 ``not guilty''; Article VI: 46 ``guilty''--37 ``not 
guilty.'' But on the final Article, Article VII, the vote was: 56 
``guilty''--28 ``not guilty.'' So the Senate convicted Judge Ritter on 
the seventh article of impeachment, charging general misbehavior and 
conduct that brought his court into scandal and disrepute.
    Senator Warren R. Austin, of Vermont, made a point of order against 
the vote on the ground that two-thirds had not voted to convict, 
Article VII being an accumulation of facts and circumstances. The 
President pro tempore sustained a point of order that Senator Austin 
was indulging in argument rather than stating the grounds for his point 
of order, and overruled Senator Austin's point of order.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Id. at p. 5606.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Senator Ashurst submitted an order both removing Judge Ritter from 
office and disqualifying him from holding and enjoying any office of 
honor, trust, or profit under the United States. Senator Robert M. La 
Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin,

[[Page 2245]]

asked for a division of the question, but Senator George W. Norris, of 
Nebraska, suggested that Senator Ashurst should submit two orders, 
since removal followed from conviction but disqualification did not. 
Senator Ashurst thereupon withdrew the original order and submitted an 
order removing Judge Ritter from office. The President pro tempore 
ruled that no vote was required on the order, removal automatically 
following conviction for high crimes and misdemeanors under section 4 
of article II of the U.S. Constitution. The President pro tempore then 
pronounced judgment:

                                  Judgment

        The Senate having tried Halsted L. Ritter, United States 
    district judge for the southern district of Florida, upon seven 
    several articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the House 
    of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators present having 
    found him guilty of charges contained therein: It is therefore
        Ordered and adjudged, That the said Halsted L. Ritter be, and 
    he is hereby, removed from office.

    Senator Ashurst submitted a second order disqualifying the 
respondent from holding an office of honor, trust, or profit under the 
United States. It was agreed, in reliance on the Robert Archbald 
proceedings, that only a majority vote was required for passage. The 
order for disqualification failed on a yea and nay vote--yeas 0, nays 
76.
    The Senate adopted an order communicating the order and judgment to 
the House, and the Senate adjourned sine die from the Court of 
Impeachment.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Id. at pp. 5606, 5607.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Subsequent to his conviction and removal from office, the 
respondent brought an action in the U.S. Court of Claims for back 
salary, claiming that the Senate had exceeded its jurisdiction in 
trying him for nonimpeachable charges. The Court of Claims dismissed 
the claim for want of jurisdiction on the ground that the impeachment 
power was vested in Congress and was not subject to judicial 
review.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Ritter v United States, 84 Ct. Cl 293 (1936), cert. denied, 300 
        U.S. 668 (1937). The opinion of the Court of Claims cited dicta 
        in the case of Mississippi v Johnson, 71 U.S. 475 (1866), to 
        support the conclusion that the impeachment power was political 
        in nature and not subject to judicial review.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 18.18 The order and judgment of the Senate in the Ritter 
    impeachment trial were messaged to the House.

    On Apr. 20, 1936,(15) the order and judgment in the 
Halsted Rit

[[Page 2246]]

ter impeachment trial were received in the House:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 80 Cong. Rec. 5703, 5704, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          Message From the Senate

        A message from the Senate, by Mr. Home, its enrolling clerk, 
    announced that the Senate had ordered that the Secretary be 
    directed to communicate to the President of the United States and 
    the House of Representatives the order and judgment of the Senate 
    in the case of Halsted L. Ritter, and transmit a certified copy of 
    same to each, as follows:

            I, Edwin A. Halsey, Secretary of the Senate of the United 
        States of America, do hereby certify that the hereto attached 
        document is a true and correct copy of the order and judgment 
        of the Senate, sitting for the trial of the impeachment of 
        Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the 
        southern district of Florida, entered in the said trial on 
        April 17, 1936.
            In testimony whereof, I hereunto subscribe my name and 
        affix the seal of the Senate of the United States of America, 
        this the 18th day of April, A.D. 1936.
                                              Edwin A. Halsey,
                                         Secretary of the Senate
                                             of the United States.

        In the Senate of the United States of America, sitting for the 
            trial of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, United 
            States district judge for the southern district of Florida

                                  Judgment
                                                   April 17, 1936.

            The Senate having tried Halsted L. Ritter, United States 
        district judge for the southern district of Florida, upon seven 
        several articles of impeachment exhibited against him by the 
        House of Representatives, and two-thirds of the Senators 
        present having found him guilty of charges contained therein: 
        It is therefore
            Ordered and adjudged, That the said Halsted L. Ritter be, 
        and he is hereby, removed from office.
            Attest:
                                                 Edwin A. Halsey
                                                        Secretary.



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