[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 14. Impeachment Powers]
[C. Trial in the Senate]
[Â§ 12. Conduct of Trial]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 2111-2121]
 
                               CHAPTER 14
 
                           Impeachment Powers
 
                         C. TRIAL IN THE SENATE
 
Sec. 12. Conduct of Trial

    The conduct of an impeachment trial is governed by the standing 
rules of the Senate on impeachment trials and by any supplemental rules 
or orders adopted by the Senate for a particular trial.(2)
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 2. For the text of the rules for impeachment trials, see Sec. 11, 
        supra. For supplemental rules adopted by the Senate, see 
        Sec. Sec. 11.7, 11.8, supra. For examples of orders adopted 
        during or for the trial, see Sec. Sec. 11.12, supra 
        (appointment of Presiding Officer), 12.1, infra (opening 
        arguments), 12.9, infra (return of evidence), and 12.12, infra 
        (final arguments).
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    An impeachment trial is a full adversary proceeding, and counsel 
are admitted to appear, to be heard, to argue on preliminary and 
interlocutory questions, to deliver opening and final arguments, to 
submit motions, and to present evidence and examine and cross-examine 
witnesses.(3)
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 3. See Rules XV-XXII of the rules for impeachment trials set out in 
        Sec. 11, supra.
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    The Presiding Officer rules on questions of evidence and on 
incidental questions subject to a demand for a formal vote, or may 
submit questions in the first instance to the Senate under Rule VII of 
the rules for impeachment trials.(4)
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 4. See Sec. 12.7, infra, for rulings on admissibility of evidence and 
        Sec. Sec. 12.3, 12.4, infra, for rulings on motions to strike 
        articles.
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    The trial may be temporarily suspended for the transaction of 
legislative business or for the reception of messages.(5)
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 5. See Sec. Sec. 12.5, 12.6, infra. Rule XIII of the rules for 
        impeachment trials provides that the adjournment of the Senate 
        sitting as a Court of Impeachment shall not operate to adjourn 
        the Senate, but that the Senate may then resume consideration 
        of legislative and executive business.
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                          Collateral Reference
Riddick, Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in the United 
    States Senate, S. Doc. No. 93-102 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 
    (1974).                          -------------------

Opening Arguments

Sec. 12.1 The Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment customarily 
    adopts an order providing for opening arguments to be made by one 
    person on behalf of the man

[[Page 2112]]

    agers and one person on behalf of the respondent.

    On Apr. 6, 1936, the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment for 
the trial of Judge Halsted L. Ritter adopted the following order on 
opening arguments:

        Ordered, That the opening statement on the part of the managers 
    shall be made by one person, to be immediately followed by one 
    person who shall make the opening statement on behalf of the 
    respondent.(6)
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 6. 80 Cong. Rec. 4971, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Identical orders had been adopted in past impeachment 
trials.(7)
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 7. See, for example, 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 524 (Harold 
        Louderback); 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 509 (Robert Archbald).
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Motions to Strike

Sec. 12.2 During an impeachment trial, the managers on the part of the 
    House made and the Senate granted a motion to strike certain 
    specifications from an article of impeachment.

    On Apr. 3, 1936,(8) the following proceedings occurred 
on the floor of the Senate during the impeachment trial of Judge 
Halsted L. Ritter:
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 8. 80 Cong. Rec. 4899, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. Manager [Hatton W.] Sumners [of Texas] (speaking from the 
    desk in front of the Vice President): Mr. President, the suggestion 
    which the managers desire to make at this time has reference to 
    specifications 1 and 2 of article VII. These two specifications 
    have reference to what I assume counsel for respondent and the 
    managers as well, recognize are rather involved matters, which 
    would possibly require as much time to develop and to argue as 
    would be required on the remainder of the case.
        The managers respectfully move that those two counts be 
    stricken. If that motion shall be sustained, the managers will 
    stand upon the other specifications in article VII to establish 
    article VII. The suggestion on the part of the managers is that 
    those two specifications in article VII be stricken from the 
    article.
        The Presiding Officer: (9) What is the response of 
    counsel for the respondent?
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 9. Nathan L. Bachman (Tenn.).
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        Mr. [Charles L.] McNary [of Oregon]: Mr. President, there was 
    so much rumbling and noise in the Chamber that I did not hear the 
    position taken by the managers on the part of the House.
        The Presiding Officer: The managers on the part of the House 
    have suggested that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be 
    stricken on their motion. . . .
        Mr. Hoffman [of counsel]: Mr. President, the respondent is 
    ready to file his answer to article I, to articles II and III as 
    amended, and to articles IV, V, and VI. In view of the announcement 
    just made asking that specifications 1 and 2 of article VII be 
    stricken, it will be necessary for us to revise our

[[Page 2113]]

    answer to article VII and to eliminate paragraphs 1 and 2 thereof. 
    That can be very speedily done with 15 or 20 minutes if it can be 
    arranged for the Senate to indulge us for that length of time.
        The Presiding Officer: Is there objection to the motion 
    submitted on the part of the managers?
        Mr. Hoffman: We have no objection.
        The Presiding Officer: The motion is made. Is there objection? 
    The Chair hears none, and the motion to strike is granted.

Sec. 12.3 Where the respondent in an impeachment trial moves to strike 
    certain articles or, in the alternative, to require election as to 
    which articles the managers on the part of the House will stand 
    upon, the Presiding Officer may rule on the motion in the first 
    instance subject to the approval of the Senate.

    On Mar. 31, 1936, the respondent in an impeachment trial, Judge 
Halsted Ritter, offered a motion to strike certain articles, his 
purpose being to compel the House to proceed on the basis of Article I 
or Article II, but not both. On Apr. 3, the Chair (Presiding Officer 
Nathan L. Bachman, of Tennessee) ruled that the motion was not well 
taken and overruled it. The proceedings were as follows: 
(10)
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10. 80 Cong. Rec. 4656, 4657, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Mar. 31, 1936, and 
        80 Cong. Rec. 4898, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 3, 1936.
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        The motion as duly filed by counsel for the respondent is as 
    follows:

          In the Senate of the United States of America sitting as a 
        Court of Impeachment. The United States of America v Halsted L. 
                               Ritter, respondent

        Motion to Strike Article I, or, in the Alternative, to Require 
        Election as to Articles I and II; and Motion to Strike Article 
                                      VII

            The respondent, Halsted L. Ritter, moves the honorable 
        Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, for an order 
        striking and dismissing article I of the articles of 
        impeachment, or, in the alternative, to require the honorable 
        managers on the part of the House of Representatives to elect 
        as to whether they will proceed upon article I or upon article 
        II, and for grounds of such motion respondent says:
            1. Article II reiterates and embraces all the charges and 
        allegations of article I, and the respondent is thus and 
        thereby twice charged in separate articles with the same and 
        identical offense, and twice required to defend against the 
        charge presented in article I.
            2. The presentation of the same and identical charge in the 
        two articles in question tends to prejudice the respondent in 
        his defense, and tends to oppress the respondent in that the 
        articles are so framed as to collect, or accumulate upon the 
        second article, the adverse votes, if any, upon the first 
        article.
            3. The Constitution of the United States contemplates but 
        one vote of the Senate upon the charge contained in each 
        article of impeachment, whereas articles I and II are 
        constructed and arranged in such

[[Page 2114]]

        form and manner as to require and exact of the Senate a second 
        vote upon the subject matter of article I.

                          Motion To Strike Article VII

            And the respondent further moves the honorable Senate, 
        sitting as a Court of Impeachment, for an order striking and 
        dismissing article VII, and for grounds of such motion, 
        respondent says:
            1. Article VII includes and embraces all the charges set 
        forth in articles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI.
            2. Article VII constitutes an accumulation and massing of 
        all charges in preceding articles upon which the Court is to 
        pass judgment prior to the vote on article VII, and the 
        prosecution should be required to abide by the judgment of the 
        Senate rendered upon such prior articles and the Senate ought 
        not to countenance the arrangement of pleading designed to 
        procure a second vote and the collection or accumulation of 
        adverse votes, if any, upon such matters.
            3. The presentation in article VII of more than one subject 
        and the charges arising out of a single subject is unjust and 
        prejudicial to respondent.
            4. In fairness and justice to respondent, the Court ought 
        to require separation and singleness of the subject matter of 
        the charges in separate and distinct articles, upon which a 
        single and final vote of the Senate upon each article and 
        charge can be had.
                    Frank P. Walsh,
                    Carl T. Hoffman,
                                        Of Counsel for Respondent.

              Ruling on the Motion of Respondent to Strike Out

        The Presiding Officer: On the motion of the honorable counsel 
    for the respondent to strike article I of the articles of 
    impeachment or, in the alternative, to require the honorable 
    managers on the part of the House to make an election as to whether 
    they will stand upon article I or upon article II, the Chair is 
    ready to rule.
        The Chair is clearly of the opinion that the motion to strike 
    article I or to require an election is not well taken and should be 
    overruled.
        His reason for such opinion is that articles I and II present 
    entirely different bases for impeachment.
        Article I alleges the illegal and corrupt receipt by the 
    respondent of $4,500 from his former law partner, Mr. Rankin.
        Article II sets out as a basis for impeachment an alleged 
    conspiracy between Judge Ritter; his former partner, Mr. Rankin; 
    one Richardson, Metcalf & Sweeney; and goes into detail as to the 
    means and manner employed whereby the respondent is alleged to have 
    corruptly received the $4,500 above mentioned.
        The two allegations, one of corrupt and illegal receipt and the 
    other of conspiracy to effectuate the purpose, are, in the judgment 
    of the Chair, wholly distinct, and the respondent should be called 
    to answer each of the articles.
        What is the judgment of the Court with reference to that 
    particular phase of the motion to strike?
        Mr. [William H.] King [of Utah]: Mr. President, if it be 
    necessary, I move that the ruling of the honorable Presiding 
    Officer be considered as and stand for the judgment of the Senate 
    sitting as a Court of Impeachment.
        The Presiding Officer: Is there objection? The Chair hears 
    none, and the ruling of the Chair is sustained by the Senate.

[[Page 2115]]

Sec. 12.4 Where the respondent in an impeachment trial moves to strike 
    an article on grounds that have not been previously presented in 
    impeachment proceedings in the Senate, the Presiding Officer may 
    submit the motion to the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment 
    for decision.

    On Mar. 31, 1936,(11) Judge Halsted Ritter, the 
respondent in an impeachment trial, moved to strike Article VII of the 
articles presented against him, on the following grounds:
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11. 80 Cong. Rec. 4656, 4657, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        1. Article VII includes and embraces all the charges set forth 
    in articles I, II, III, IV, V, and VI.
        2. Article VII constitutes an accumulation and massing of all 
    charges in preceding articles upon which the Court is to pass 
    judgment prior to the vote on article VII, and the prosecution 
    should be required to abide by the judgment of the Senate rendered 
    upon such prior articles and the Senate ought not to countenance 
    the arrangement of pleading designed to procure a second vote and 
    the collection or accumulation of adverse votes, if any, upon such 
    matters.
        3. The presentation in article VII of more than one subject and 
    the charges arising out of a single subject is unjust and 
    prejudicial to respondent.
        4. In fairness and justice to respondent, the Court ought to 
    require separation and singleness of the subject matter of the 
    charges in separate and distinct articles, upon which a single and 
    final vote of the Senate upon each article and charge can be had.

    On Apr. 3, 1936, Presiding Officer Nathan L. Bachman, of Tennessee, 
submitted the motion to the Court of Impeachment for decision: 
(12)
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12. Id. at p. 4898.
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        The Presiding Officer: . . . With reference to article VII of 
    the articles of impeachment, formerly article IV, the Chair desires 
    to exercise his prerogative of calling on the Court for a 
    determination of this question.
        His reason for so doing is that an impeachment proceeding 
    before the Senate sitting as a Court is sui generis, partaking 
    neither of the harshness and rigidity of the criminal law nor of 
    the civil proceedings requiring less particularity.
        The question of duplicity in impeachment proceedings presented 
    by the honorable counsel for the respondent is a controversial one, 
    and the Chair feels that it is the right and duty of each Member of 
    the Senate, sitting as a Court, to express his views thereon.
        Precedents in proceedings of this character are rare and not 
    binding upon this Court in any course that it might desire to 
    pursue.
        The question presented in the motion to strike article VII on 
    account of duplicity has not, so far as the Chair is advised, been 
    presented in any impeachment proceeding heretofore had before this 
    body.

        The Chair therefore submits the question to the Court.

[[Page 2116]]

        Mr. [Henry F.] Ashurst [of Arizona]: Mr. President, under the 
    rules of the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, all such 
    questions, when submitted by the Presiding Officer, shall be 
    decided without debate and without division, unless the yeas and 
    nays are demanded by one-fifth of the Members present, when the 
    yeas and nays shall be taken.
        The Presiding Officer: The Chair, therefore, will put the 
    motion. All those in favor of the motion of counsel for the 
    respondent to strike article VII will say ``aye.'' Those opposed 
    will say ``no.''
        The noes have it, and the motion in its entirety is overruled.

Suspension of Trial for Messages and Legislative Business

Sec. 12.5 While the Senate is sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the 
    impeachment proceedings may be suspended by motion in order that 
    legislative business be considered.

    On Apr. 6, 1936, the Senate was sitting as a Court of Impeachment 
in the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter. A motion was made and adopted to 
proceed to the consideration of legislative business, the regular order 
for the termination of the session (5 :30 p.m.) not having arrived:

        Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, I move 
    that the Court suspend its proceedings and that the Senate proceed 
    to the consideration of legislative business; and I should like to 
    make a brief statement as to the reasons for the motion. Some 
    Senators have said that they desire an opportunity to present 
    amendments to general appropriation bills which are pending, and 
    that it will be necessary that the amendments be presented today in 
    order that they may be considered by the committee having 
    jurisdiction of the subject matter. I make the motion.
        The motion was agreed to; and the Senate proceeded to the 
    consideration of legislative business.(13)
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13. 80 Cong. Rec. 4994, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Sec. 12.6 Impeachment proceedings in the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
    Impeachment, may be suspended for the reception of a message from 
    the House.

    On Apr. 8, 1936, the Senate was sitting as a Court of Impeachment 
in the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter and examination of witnesses was 
in progress. A message was then received:

        Mr. [Joseph T.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Mr. President, may I 
    interrupt the proceedings for a moment? In order that a message may 
    be received from the House of Representatives, I ask that the 
    proceedings of the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment be 
    suspended temporarily, and that the Senate proceed with the 
    consideration of legislative business.

[[Page 2117]]

        The President Pro Tempore: (14) Is there objection?
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14. Key Pittman (Nev.).
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        There being no objection, the Senate resumed the consideration 
    of legislative business.
        (The message from the House of Representatives appears 
    elsewhere in the legislative proceedings of today's Record.)

                      Impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter

        Mr. Robinson: I move that the Senate, in legislative session, 
    take a recess in order that the Court may resume its business.
        The motion was agreed to; and the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
    Impeachment, resumed the trial of the articles of impeachment 
    against Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the 
    southern district of Florida.(15)
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15. 80 Cong. Rec. 5129, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Evidence

Sec. 12.7 The Presiding Officer at an impeachment trial rules on the 
    admissibility of documentary evidence when a document is offered 
    and specific objection is made thereto.

    During the impeachment trial of Judge Halsted Ritter in the 74th 
Congress, the Presiding Officer set out guidelines under which rulings 
on the admissibility of evidence would be made. At issue was a large 
number of letters, to which a general objection was raised: 
(16)
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16. 80 Cong. Rec. 5245-53, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 9, 1936.
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        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): For the sake of saving time, we have 
    these letters which have gotten into our possession, which have 
    been given to us, and I suggest to the House managers that we have 
    copies of this entire correspondence, a continuous list of them 
    chronologically copied. We are going to ask you, if you will agree, 
    that instead of reading these letters to Mr. Sweeny we be permitted 
    to offer them all in evidence and give you copies of them.
        Mr. Manager [Randobph] Perkins [of New Jersey]: Mr. President, 
    the managers on the part of the House object to that procedure. 
    These letters are incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant, and will 
    only encumber the record.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): I desire to say that these letters 
    predate and antedate this transaction. They show the effort that 
    was being made, and they throw a strong light upon the proposition 
    that this was not a champertous proceeding, but that it was a 
    proceeding started by these men who had invested their money, and 
    upon whose names and credit these bonds were sold. It is in answer 
    to that.
        The Presiding Officer: (17) It is the ruling of the 
    Chair that the letters shall be exhibited to the managers on the 
    part of the House, and that the managers on the part of the House 
    may make specific objections to each document to which they wish to 
    lodge

[[Page 2118]]

    objection. There can be no ruling with respect to a large number of 
    documents without specific objection.
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17. Walter F. George (Ga.).
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        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): Will you take that suggestion of the 
    Presiding Officer and go through these documents?
        Mr. Manager Perkins: Mr. President, we understand that these 
    letters are to be offered, and objection made as they are offered; 
    or are we to examine the file and find out what documents we object 
    to?
        The Presiding Officer: The ruling of the Chair was that the 
    letters shall be exhibited to the managers on the part of the 
    House, and that specific objection shall be lodged to documents to 
    which the managers wish to lodge objections.
        Mr. Manager Perkins: Mr. President, we will examine them during 
    the recess and be prepared to follow that procedure. . . .
        Mr. Manager [Sam] Hobbs [of Alabama]: . . .
        Q. Judge, I will ask you if the matter of the requirement of a 
    supersedeas bond, and fixing the amount thereof, was one of the 
    questions which would probably come up immediately after the final 
    decree was rendered.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): I wish to object to that question for 
    the reason that the record in the case and the papers in the case 
    are the best evidence. I should like to have them here. I should 
    like to have them identified, so that, if we thought it necessary, 
    we could interrogate the witness on cross-examination.

        The President Pro Tempore: (18) The Presiding 
    Officer thinks, if the witness knows matters that he himself 
    attended to, the original documents not being in question, he has a 
    right to answer the question.
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18. Key Pittman (Nev.).
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        [Judge Ritter]: A. I have no independent recollection of the 
    matter at all. The official court records or this memorandum would 
    have to control.

Sec. 12.8 Exhibits in evidence in an impeachment trial should be 
    identified and printed in the Record if necessary.

    On Apr. 8, 1936, a proposal was made in the Senate, sitting as a 
Court of Impeachment in the Halsted Ritter trial, as to the 
identification of certain exhibits: (19)
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19. 80 Cong. Rec. 5137, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): Have you the letter that is referred to 
    in that letter?
        Mr. Manager [Randolph] Perkins [of New Jersey]: I have not it 
    at hand at this moment, but I have it here somewhere.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): I should like to see the letter if it 
    is here.
        Mr. Manager Perkins: I understood that Mr. Rankin would resume 
    the stand at this time.
        Mr. [Sherman] Minton [of Indiana]: Mr. President, far be it 
    from me to suggest to eminent counsel engaged in this case how they 
    should conduct a lawsuit, but I respectfully suggest that they 
    identify their exhibits in some way, and also the papers that are 
    introduced in the record, so that we may keep track of them.

[[Page 2119]]

        The Presiding Officer: (20) The Chair takes the 
    liberty of suggesting that the statement made by the Senator from 
    Indiana is a wise one, and is followed in court. The Chair sees no 
    reason why identification should not be made of the exhibits which 
    are received in evidence. Counsel will proceed.
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20. William H. King (Utah).
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    Certain exhibits were ordered printed, while others were merely 
introduced in evidence. One exhibit was printed in the Record by 
unanimous consent.(21)
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21. 80 Cong. Rec. 5341, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 10, 1936.
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        Mr. [Homer T.] Bone [of Washington]: Mr. President, may I 
    inquire of the Chair if all the exhibits counsel are introducing 
    are to be printed in the daily Record?
        The Presiding Officer: (1) The Chair thinks not.
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 1. Matthew M. Neely (W. Va.).
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        Mr. Bone: I am wondering how we may later scrutinize them if 
    counsel are going to rely on them.
        The Presiding Officer: Some of the exhibits are being ordered 
    printed and others are merely introduced in evidence for the use of 
    counsel upon argument and consideration of the court.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): I had supposed that all correspondence 
    would be printed in full in the Record.
        The Presiding Officer: The Chair assumes that all documents and 
    correspondence which have been read or which have been ordered 
    printed have been or will be printed in the Record.
        Mr. Walsh (of counsel): I think perhaps a mere reference to 
    this order would be sufficient to advise those of the Senators who 
    have not heard it. However, as to this particular order, I will ask 
    that it be printed in the Record.
        The Presiding Officer: Is there objection?

    Federal income-tax returns of the respondent, offered in evidence 
by the managers, were printed in full in the, Record.(2)
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 2. 80 Cong. Rec. 5256-61, 74th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 9, 1936.
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Sec. 12.9 The Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment may at the 
    conclusion of the trial provide by order for the return of evidence 
    to proper owners or officials.

    On Apr. 16, 1936, the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment in 
the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter adopted, at the conclusion of trial, 
orders for the return of evidence: (3)
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 3. 80 Cong. Rec. 5558, 5559, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Ordered, That the Secretary be, and he is hereby, directed to 
    return to A. L. Rankin, a witness on the part of the United States, 
    the two documents showing the lists of cases, pending and closed, 
    in the law office of said A. L. Rankin, introduced in evidence 
    during the trial of the impeachment of Halsted L. Ritter, United 
    States district judge for the southern district of Florida. . . .
        Ordered, That the Secretary of the Senate be, and he is hereby, 
    directed

[[Page 2120]]

    to return to the clerk of the United States District Court for the 
    Southern District of Florida and the clerk of the circuit court, 
    Palm Beach County, Fla., sitting in chancery, the original papers 
    filed in said courts which were offered in evidence during the 
    proceedings of the Senate sitting for the trial of the impeachment 
    of Halsted L. Ritter, United States district judge for the southern 
    district of Florida.

    In the Harold Louderback trial, the Senate returned papers by order 
to a U.S. District Court.(4)
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 4. 77 Cong. Rec. 4142, 73d Cong. 1st Sess., May 25, 1933.
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Witnesses

Sec. 12.10 The Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment has adopted 
    orders requiring witnesses to stand while giving testimony during 
    impeachment trials.

    On Apr. 6, 1936, during the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter before 
the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment, an order was adopted as 
to the position of witnesses while testifying: (5)
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 5. 80 Cong. Rec. 4971, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. See also 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. 488.
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        Mr. [William H.] King [of Utah]: Pursuant to the practice 
    heretofore observed in impeachment cases, I send to the desk an 
    order, and ask for its adoption.
        The Vice President: (6) The order will be stated.
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 6. John N. Garner (Tex.).
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        The legislative clerk read as follows:

            Ordered, That the witnesses shall stand while giving their 
        testimony.

        The Vice President: Is there objection to the adoption of the 
    order? The Chair hears none, and the order is entered.

Sec. 12.11 The respondent may take the stand and be examined and cross-
    examined at his impeachment trial.

    On Apr. 11, 1936, Judge Halsted Ritter, the respondent in a trial 
of impeachment, was called as a witness by his counsel. He was cross 
examined by the managers on the part of the House and by Senators 
sitting on the Court of Impeachment, who submitted their questions in 
writing.(7)
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 7. 80 Cong. Rec. 5370-86, 74th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Parliamentarian's Note: The respondent in an impeachment trial is 
not required to appear, and the trial may proceed in his absence. 
Impeachment rules VIII and IX provide for appearance and answer by 
attorney and provide for continuance of trial in the absence of any 
appearance. The respondent first testified in his own behalf in the 
Robert Archbald impeachment trial in 1913, and Judge Harold Louderback 
testified at his trial in 1933.(8)
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 8. See 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. Sec. 511 (Archbald), 524 
        (Louderback).

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[[Page 2121]]

Final Arguments

Sec. 12.12 Following the presentation of evidence in an impeachment 
    trial, the Court of Impeachment adopts an order setting the time to 
    be allocated for final arguments.

    On Apr. 13, 1936, the Senate sitting as a Court of Impeachment in 
the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter adopted, at the close of the 
presentation of evidence, an order limiting final arguments:

        Ordered, That the time for final argument of the case of 
    Halsted L. Ritter shall be limited to 4 hours, which said time 
    shall be divided equally between the managers on the part of the 
    House of Representatives and the counsel for the respondent, and 
    the time thus assigned to each side shall be divided as each side 
    for itself may determine.(9)
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 9. 80 Cong. Rec. 5401, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. An identical order was 
        adopted in the Harold Louderback impeachment trial (see 6 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 524).
            Orders for final arguments have varied as to the time and 
        number of arguments permitted, although in one instance--the 
        trial of President Andrew Johnson--no limitations were imposed 
        as to the time for and number of final arguments. See 3 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. 2434.
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