[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 13. Powers and Prerogatives of the House]
[B. War Powers]
[Â§ 4. War Powers Act]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1782-1792]
 
                               CHAPTER 13
 
                  Powers and Prerogatives of the House
 
                             B. WAR POWERS
 
Sec. 4. War Powers Act

    To ensure proper legislative branch participation in decisions to 
deploy American forces, legislation on war powers was introduced in the 
91st and 92d Congresses.(14)
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14. See, for example, H.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); S. 
        2956, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); H.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong. 1st 
        Sess. (1971); S. 731, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
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    In 1973 the House approved House Joint Resolution 542. The Senate 
struck all after the enacting clause and inserted in lieu thereof the 
language of S. 440. Following a conference, a compromise between the 
House and Senate versions was agreed to.(1)
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 1. See Sec. 4.2, infra, for the vote over-riding the President's veto 
        of the compromise, H.J. Res. 542.
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    The conferees resolved a major difference in the two measures which 
related to defining the authority of the Commander in Chief to deploy 
troops. S. 440, section 3, provided that in the absence of a 
congressional declaration of war armed forces could be introduced only 
in certain circumstances, including repulsion of an armed attack, 
protection of American citizens being evacuated in situations of danger 
abroad, and pursuant to specific statutory authorization. Sections of 
the Senate bill which related to reporting, period of commitment, 
termination dates, and congressional procedures were expressly tied to 
section 3. House Joint Resolution 542 did not contain a similar 
provision.
    Section 2(c) in the ``Purpose and Policy'' provisions of the 
resolution agreed to by the conferees states:

        The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in 
    Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or 
    into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is 
    clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant 
    to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, 
    or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United 
    States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.

Unlike the Senate bill, no subsequent section of the resolution re

[[Page 1783]]

fers to section 2(c), the description of war powers of the Commander in 
Chief. Much of the debate on the conference report focused on whether 
the President could introduce troops only in the situations described 
in section 2(c) and in no other situation (2) or whether 
that section merely stated his authority in a manner which did not 
limit his authority to deploy troops.(3~) The most revealing 
expression of the intent of the conferees on this controversy appears 
in two sentences in the conference report: (4)
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 2. Section 2(a) of the act states that insuring the collective 
        judgment of Congress and the President in the introduction of 
        American forces into hostilities is a purpose of the act.
 3. In his veto message the President, applying the restrictive 
        interpretation of Sec. 2(c), stated that America's effective 
        response in the Berlin crisis of 1961, Cuban missile crisis of 
        1962, Congo rescue operation of 1964, and the Jordanian crisis 
        of 1970, would have been ``vastly complicated or even made 
        impossible.'' (See 119 Cong. Rec. 34990, 34991, 93d Cong. 1st 
        Sess., Oct. 25, 1973.)
 4. H. Rept. No. 93-547, 2 U.S. Code legis. and Adm. News, p. 2364 
        (1973)
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        Section 2(c) is a statement of the authority of the Commander 
    in Chief respecting the introduction of United States Armed Forces 
    into hostilities. . . . Subsequent sections of the joint resolution 
    are not dependent upon thc language of this subsection, as was the 
    case with a similar provision of the Senate bill (section 3).

This statement supports an inference that section 2(c) does not 
exhaustively define all circumstances in which the President may deploy 
troops.

    A nonrestrictive interpretation of the three situations described 
in section 2(c) avoids the question whether Congress may define the 
constitutional authority of the Commander in Chief by statute rather 
than constitutional amendment. The President in his veto message 
asserted that a constitutional amendment is the only way in which 
constitutional authorities of another branch of government may be 
altered. A statutory attempt to make such alterations is ``clearly 
without force.'' (5) The congressional view on this matter 
is expressed in section 2(b) of the act. Citing and interpreting 
article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution, section 2(b) 
states the constitutional provision:
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 5. See Sec. 4.1, infra, for the veto message.
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        . . . [P]rovided that the Congress shall have power to make all 
    laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its 
    own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in 
    the Government of the United States or in any department or officer 
    thereof.

    Section 3 of the resolution imposes on the President a duty ``in

[[Page 1784]]

every possible instance'' to consult with Congress before introducing 
troops and to consult regularly after such introduction until armed 
forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from 
such situations. The conferees explained that this provision is not a 
limitation upon or substitute for other provisions of the resolution. 
The conferees intended that consultations take place even when advance 
consultation is not possible.(6)
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 6. See H. Rept. No. 93-547, 2 U.S. Code Legis. and Adm. News, p. 2364 
        (1973).
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    Section 4 provides that in the absence of a declaration of war, in 
any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced in certain 
circumstances, the President must submit within 48 hours to the Speaker 
and President pro tempore specified information as well as any other 
information Congress requests. The President must continue to make 
reports periodically as long as troops are engaged in hostilities but 
not less often than once every six months. The objective of this 
section, explained the conferees, is to insure that Congress by right 
and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it 
needs to carry out its responsibilities.
    Section 5 relates to referral of the report to committee and 
appropriate action by the Congress, and requires the President to 
terminate use of armed forces within 60 days after submission of the 
report, unless Congress (1) has declared war or enacted specific 
authorization, (2) has by law extended the 60-day period, or (3) is 
physically unable to meet. The 60-day period may be extended not more 
than 30 days. Notwithstanding the 60-day provision, forces engaged in 
hostilities outside the United States, its possessions, and territories 
must be removed by the President if Congress so directs by concurrent 
resolution.(7)
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 7. Id. Statutes have been adopted which authorize the use of 
        concurrent resolutions to achieve congressional purposes and 
        which apply procedures patterned after the War Powers Act. 
        Thus, the statute implementing the United States proposal for 
        an early warning system in Sinai empowers Congress by 
        concurrent resolution to remove U.S. civilian personnel from 
        Sinai if it determines that their safety is jeopardized or that 
        continuation of their role is no longer necessary. 22 USC 
        Sec. 2441 note, Pub. L. No. 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, Oct. 13, 
        1975. The National Emergencies Act authorizes Congress by 
        concurrent resolution to terminate a national emergency. 50 USC 
        Sec. 1622, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, Sept. 14, 1976.
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    Section 6 mandates that a joint resolution or bill declaring war or

[[Page 1785]]

authorizing use of armed forces introduced at least 30 days prior to 
the 60-day period specified in section 5 be referred in the House to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs (renamed the Committee on 
International Relations on Mar. 19, 1975). When reported by the 
committee, the measure becomes the pending business and is voted on 
within three calendar days thereafter unless otherwise determined by 
the yeas and nays. After passage in one House, the measure is to be 
referred to the counterpart committee of the other House and reported 
out not later than 14 calendar days before the expiration of the 60-day 
period and then voted on. In the case of disagreement between the two 
Houses, conferees are appointed, and the conference committee must 
report on the measure no later than four calendar days before the 
expiration of the 60-day period. If conferees cannot agree within 48 
hours, they report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. 
Notwithstanding any rule concerning printing or delay of consideration 
of conference reports, the report must be acted on by both Houses not 
later than the expiration of the 60-day period.
    Section 7 provides that a concurrent resolution introduced pursuant 
to section 5 directing the President to remove forces engaged in 
hostilities be referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs or to 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case may be. Such 
committee must report with recommendations within 15 calendar days 
unless otherwise determined by the yeas and nays. Such resolution 
becomes the pending business of the House in question. After passage in 
one House, the resolution is to be referred to the counterpart 
committee in the other House, and is to be reported out with 
recommendations within 15 calendar days, at which time it becomes the 
pending business of that House. In the case of disagreement between the 
two Houses, conferees must be promptly appointed. The conference 
committee must report on the measure within six calendar days after 
referral to the committee of conference. Such report must be acted on 
by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the report is 
filed.
    Section 8, relating to interpretation of the joint resolution, 
states that authority to introduce troops shall not be inferred from 
any provision of law unless such provision specifically authorizes 
introduction of forces, or from any treaty unless it is implemented by 
legislation specifically authorizing in

[[Page 1786]]

troduction of forces. The joint resolution does not necessitate further 
specific statutory authorization to permit American participation in 
headquarters operations with armed forces of one or more foreign 
countries. The term ``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' is 
clarified. The joint resolution does not alter constitutional authority 
of the President or Congress. It does not grant any authority to the 
President which he would not have had in the absence of the joint 
resolution.
    Sections 9 and 10 relate to separability of provisions and the 
effective date, respectively.

                 Collateral References (~8)
Congress, the President, and War Powers, hearings before the 
    Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific 
    Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 91st Cong. 
    2d Sess. (1970).
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 8. See also the collateral references in Sec. 3, supra, and Sec. 10, 
        infra, relating to war powers generally and Vietnam era 
        restrictions on military activity.
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Congress and the War Powers. 37 Mo. L. Rev. 1-32 (Winter 1972).
Eagleton, Thomas F. August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of 
    Congress. 18 St. Louis U.L. Jour. 1-11 (Fall 1973).
Emerson, J. T. War Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L.R. 53 (Nov.-Jan. 
    1971-1972).
Javits, Jacob K. Congress and the President: A Modern Delineation of 
    the War Powers. 35 Albany L. Rev. 632-37 (1971).
Jenkins, Gerald L. The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on 
    the Commander in Chief. 11 Harv. Jour. on Legislation 181-204 (Feb. 
    1974).
Rostow, Eugene V. Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act. 50 Tex. 
    L. Rev. 833-900 (May 1972).
Scribner, Jeffrey L. The President Versus Congress on War-Making 
    Authority. 52 Military Rev. 87 (Apr. 1972).
Spong, W. B., Jr. Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War 
    Powers of the Prcsident and Congress? 6 U. of Richmond L. Rev. 1-47 
    (Fall 1971).
Wallace, Don, Jr. War-making Powers: A Constitution Flaw? 57 Cornell L. 
    Rev. 719-76 (May 1972).
War Powers Legislation, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations 
    Committee, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
Wooters, Garry J. The Appropriations Power as a Tool of Congressional 
    Foreign Policy Making, 50 Boston U.L.R. 34; reprinted in The 
    Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context, Princeton 
    University Press, Princeton, N.J., 606 
    (1972).                          -------------------

Veto of War Powers Resolution

Sec. 4.1 The War Powers Resolution was vetoed by the President.

    On Oct. 25, 1973,(9) the President's veto message 
outlining his
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 9. 119 Cong. Rec. 34990, 34991, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 1787]]

objections to the War Powers Resolution was laid before the House.

        The Speaker (10) laid before the House the following 
    veto message from the President of the United States:
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10. Carl Albert (Okla.).

                                    To the House of Representatives:

            I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution 
        542--the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with thc 
        desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct 
        of our foreign affairs the restrictions which this resolution 
        would impose upon the authority of the President are both 
        unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our 
        Nation.
            The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the 
        conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding 
        of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a 
        serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in 
        choosing not to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation 
        between the foreign policy powers of the two branches.
            The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of 
        foreseeing every contingency that might arise in this complex 
        area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding 
        to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy 
        decisions must be made through close cooperation between the 
        two branches and not through rigidly codified procedures. . . .
            House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, bv a 
        mere legislative act, authorities which the President has 
        properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years. 
        One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain 
        authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them. 
        Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain 
        authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution--
        an action which does not normally have the force of law, since 
        it denies the President his constitutional role in approving 
        legislation.
            I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional. 
        The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of 
        the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution--
        and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone 
        is clearly without force.
            While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint 
        Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I 
        am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this 
        resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's 
        ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of 
        international crisis. . . .
            I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the 
        President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the 
        Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this 
        resolution 60 days after they were invoked. No overt 
        Congressional action would be required to cut off these 
        powers--they would disappear automatically unless the Congress 
        extended them. . . .
            This Administration is dedicated to strengthening 
        cooperation between the Congress and the President in the 
        conduct of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional 
        prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that 
        the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the 
        constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would 
        provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together 
        toward that common objective.

                                                Richard Nixon,
                                                The White House,
                                                 October 24, 1973.

[[Page 1788]]

Passage of War Powers Resolution

Sec. 4.2 By a two-thirds vote in each body, the House and Senate 
    overrode the President's veto of the War Powers Resolution.

    On Nov. 7, 1973, the House by a vote of yeas 284, nays 135, not 
voting 14,(11) and the Senate by a vote of yeas 75, nays 
18,(12) two-thirds in each body voting in the affirmative, 
agreed to override the President's veto of House Joint Resolution 542, 
the War Powers Resolution, which became law on Nov. 7, 1973, in the 
following form: (l3)
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11. 119 Cong. Rec. 36202, 36221, 36222, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. See also 
        119 Cong. Rec. 24707, 24708, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., July 18, 
        1973, for initial House approval of this joint resolution (H. 
        Rept. No. 93-287, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. [1973]); and 119 Cong. 
        Rec. 33858, 33873, 33874, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 12, 1973, 
        for consideration and approval of the conference report (H. 
        Rept. No. 93-547) by a vote of yeas 238, nays 123, not voting 
        73.
12. 119 Cong. Rec. 36175, 36197, 36198, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. See also 
        119 Cong. Rec. 25120, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 1973, for 
        unanimous-consent agreement to strike from H.J. Res. 542 all 
        after the resolving clause and substitute therefor the text of 
        the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution, S. 440, which 
        the Senate had just approved (p. 25119) by a vote of yeas 72, 
        nays 18 (S. Rept. No. 220, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. [1973]); and 119 
        Cong. Rec. 33569, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 10, 1973, for 
        Senate approval of the conference report by a vote of yeas 75, 
        nays 20.
13. This excerpt is taken from 87 Stat. 555, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (Pub. 
        L. No. 93-148). It is codified at 50 USC Sec. Sec. 1541 et seq.
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                                Short Title

        Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the ``War 
    Powers Resolution''.

                             Purpose and Policy

        Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to 
    fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United 
    States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress 
    and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
    Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent 
    involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
    circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in 
    hostilities or in such situations.
        (b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is 
    specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to 
    make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not 
    only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the 
    Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
    department or officer thereof.
        (c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
    Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces

[[Page 1789]]

    into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in 
    hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are 
    exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific 
    statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by 
    attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
    its armed forces.

                                Consultation

        Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult 
    with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into 
    hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in 
    hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after 
    every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress 
    until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in 
    hostilities or have been removed from such situations.

                                 Reporting

        Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case 
    in which United States Armed Forces are introduced--

            (1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent 
        involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
        circumstances;
            (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign 
        nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which 
        relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of 
        such forces; or
            (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States 
        Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign 
        nation;
    the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the 
    House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the 
    Senate a report in writing, setting forth--

            (A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of 
        United States Armed Forces;
            (B) the constitutional and legislative authority under 
        which such introduction took place; and
            (C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or 
        involvement.

        (b) The President shall provide such other information as the 
    Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional 
    responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and 
    to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
        (c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into 
    hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of 
    this section, the President shall], so long as such armed forces 
    continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to 
    the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or 
    situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities 
    or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less 
    often than once every six months.

                            Congressional Action

        Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1) 
    shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives 
    and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar 
    day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee 
    on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the 
    Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate 
    action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has 
    adjourned sine die or has ad

[[Page 1790]]

    journed for any period in excess of three calendar days, the 
    Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro 
    tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned 
    by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective 
    Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in 
    order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action 
    pursuant to this section.
        (b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or 
    is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever 
    is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States 
    Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or 
    required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war 
    or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United 
    States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period, 
    or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack 
    upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for 
    not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines 
    and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military 
    necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces 
    requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of 
    bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
        (c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United 
    States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the 
    territory of the United States, its possessions and territories 
    without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization, 
    such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so 
    directs by concurrent resolution.

       Congressional Priority Procedures for Joint Resolution or Bill

        Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to 
    section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of 
    the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to 
    the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or 
    the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may 
    be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or 
    bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four 
    calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period 
    specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise 
    determine by the yeas and nays.
        (b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the 
    pending business of the House in question (in the case of the 
    Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the 
    proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three 
    calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise 
    determine by yeas and nays.
        (c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall 
    be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection 
    (a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days 
    before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 
    5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the 
    pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on 
    within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such 
    House shall determine by yeas and otherwise nays.
        (d) ln the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of 
    Congress

[[Page 1791]]

    with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses, 
    conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of 
    conference shall make and file a report with respect to such 
    resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the 
    expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5 (b). In 
    the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they 
    shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement. 
    Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of 
    conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the 
    consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by 
    both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.

        Congressional Priority Procedures for Concurrent Resolution

        Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to 
    section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
    of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign 
    Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such 
    concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee 
    together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days, 
    unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
        (b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the 
    pending business of the House in question (in the case of the 
    Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the 
    proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three 
    calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise 
    determine by yeas and nays.
        (c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be 
    referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection 
    (a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its 
    recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon 
    become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon 
    within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise 
    determine by yeas and nays.
        (d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of 
    Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both 
    Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of 
    conference shall make and file a report with respect to such 
    concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the 
    legislation is referred to the committee of conference. 
    Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of 
    conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the 
    consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by 
    both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference 
    report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree 
    within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses 
    in disagreement.

                     Interpretation of Joint Resolution

        Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces 
    into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in 
    hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be 
    inferred--
        (1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before 
    the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any 
    provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provi

[[Page 1792]]

    sion specifically authorizes the introduction of United States 
    Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states 
    that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization 
    within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
        (2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless 
    such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing 
    the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or 
    into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute 
    specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint 
    resolution.
        (b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to 
    require any further specific statutory authorization to permit 
    members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with 
    members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the 
    headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were 
    established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution 
    and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified 
    by the United States prior to such date.
        (c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term 
    ``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' includes the 
    assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate, 
    participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or 
    irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when 
    such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent 
    threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.
        (d) Nothing in this joint resolution--

            (1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of 
        the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing 
        treaties; or
            (2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the 
        President with respect to the introduction of United States 
        Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein 
        involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 
        circumstances which authority he would not have had in the 
        absence of this joint resolution.

                            Separability Clause

        Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the 
    application hereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, 
    the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such 
    provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected 
    thereby.

                               Effective Date

        Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of 
    its enactment.