[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 13. Powers and Prerogatives of the House]
[B. War Powers]
[§ 4. War Powers Act]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 1782-1792]
CHAPTER 13
Powers and Prerogatives of the House
B. WAR POWERS
Sec. 4. War Powers Act
To ensure proper legislative branch participation in decisions to
deploy American forces, legislation on war powers was introduced in the
91st and 92d Congresses.(14)
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14. See, for example, H.J. Res. 1355, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. (1970); S.
2956, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971); H.J. Res. 1, 92d Cong. 1st
Sess. (1971); S. 731, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
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In 1973 the House approved House Joint Resolution 542. The Senate
struck all after the enacting clause and inserted in lieu thereof the
language of S. 440. Following a conference, a compromise between the
House and Senate versions was agreed to.(1)
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1. See Sec. 4.2, infra, for the vote over-riding the President's veto
of the compromise, H.J. Res. 542.
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The conferees resolved a major difference in the two measures which
related to defining the authority of the Commander in Chief to deploy
troops. S. 440, section 3, provided that in the absence of a
congressional declaration of war armed forces could be introduced only
in certain circumstances, including repulsion of an armed attack,
protection of American citizens being evacuated in situations of danger
abroad, and pursuant to specific statutory authorization. Sections of
the Senate bill which related to reporting, period of commitment,
termination dates, and congressional procedures were expressly tied to
section 3. House Joint Resolution 542 did not contain a similar
provision.
Section 2(c) in the ``Purpose and Policy'' provisions of the
resolution agreed to by the conferees states:
The constitutional powers of the President as Commander in
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is
clearly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant
to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization,
or (3) a national emergency created by attack upon the United
States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.
Unlike the Senate bill, no subsequent section of the resolution re
[[Page 1783]]
fers to section 2(c), the description of war powers of the Commander in
Chief. Much of the debate on the conference report focused on whether
the President could introduce troops only in the situations described
in section 2(c) and in no other situation (2) or whether
that section merely stated his authority in a manner which did not
limit his authority to deploy troops.(3~) The most revealing
expression of the intent of the conferees on this controversy appears
in two sentences in the conference report: (4)
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2. Section 2(a) of the act states that insuring the collective
judgment of Congress and the President in the introduction of
American forces into hostilities is a purpose of the act.
3. In his veto message the President, applying the restrictive
interpretation of Sec. 2(c), stated that America's effective
response in the Berlin crisis of 1961, Cuban missile crisis of
1962, Congo rescue operation of 1964, and the Jordanian crisis
of 1970, would have been ``vastly complicated or even made
impossible.'' (See 119 Cong. Rec. 34990, 34991, 93d Cong. 1st
Sess., Oct. 25, 1973.)
4. H. Rept. No. 93-547, 2 U.S. Code legis. and Adm. News, p. 2364
(1973)
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Section 2(c) is a statement of the authority of the Commander
in Chief respecting the introduction of United States Armed Forces
into hostilities. . . . Subsequent sections of the joint resolution
are not dependent upon thc language of this subsection, as was the
case with a similar provision of the Senate bill (section 3).
This statement supports an inference that section 2(c) does not
exhaustively define all circumstances in which the President may deploy
troops.
A nonrestrictive interpretation of the three situations described
in section 2(c) avoids the question whether Congress may define the
constitutional authority of the Commander in Chief by statute rather
than constitutional amendment. The President in his veto message
asserted that a constitutional amendment is the only way in which
constitutional authorities of another branch of government may be
altered. A statutory attempt to make such alterations is ``clearly
without force.'' (5) The congressional view on this matter
is expressed in section 2(b) of the act. Citing and interpreting
article I, section 8, clause 11, of the Constitution, section 2(b)
states the constitutional provision:
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5. See Sec. 4.1, infra, for the veto message.
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. . . [P]rovided that the Congress shall have power to make all
laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not only its
own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution in
the Government of the United States or in any department or officer
thereof.
Section 3 of the resolution imposes on the President a duty ``in
[[Page 1784]]
every possible instance'' to consult with Congress before introducing
troops and to consult regularly after such introduction until armed
forces are no longer engaged in hostilities or have been removed from
such situations. The conferees explained that this provision is not a
limitation upon or substitute for other provisions of the resolution.
The conferees intended that consultations take place even when advance
consultation is not possible.(6)
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6. See H. Rept. No. 93-547, 2 U.S. Code Legis. and Adm. News, p. 2364
(1973).
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Section 4 provides that in the absence of a declaration of war, in
any case in which United States Armed Forces are introduced in certain
circumstances, the President must submit within 48 hours to the Speaker
and President pro tempore specified information as well as any other
information Congress requests. The President must continue to make
reports periodically as long as troops are engaged in hostilities but
not less often than once every six months. The objective of this
section, explained the conferees, is to insure that Congress by right
and as a matter of law will be provided with all the information it
needs to carry out its responsibilities.
Section 5 relates to referral of the report to committee and
appropriate action by the Congress, and requires the President to
terminate use of armed forces within 60 days after submission of the
report, unless Congress (1) has declared war or enacted specific
authorization, (2) has by law extended the 60-day period, or (3) is
physically unable to meet. The 60-day period may be extended not more
than 30 days. Notwithstanding the 60-day provision, forces engaged in
hostilities outside the United States, its possessions, and territories
must be removed by the President if Congress so directs by concurrent
resolution.(7)
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7. Id. Statutes have been adopted which authorize the use of
concurrent resolutions to achieve congressional purposes and
which apply procedures patterned after the War Powers Act.
Thus, the statute implementing the United States proposal for
an early warning system in Sinai empowers Congress by
concurrent resolution to remove U.S. civilian personnel from
Sinai if it determines that their safety is jeopardized or that
continuation of their role is no longer necessary. 22 USC
Sec. 2441 note, Pub. L. No. 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, Oct. 13,
1975. The National Emergencies Act authorizes Congress by
concurrent resolution to terminate a national emergency. 50 USC
Sec. 1622, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255, Sept. 14, 1976.
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Section 6 mandates that a joint resolution or bill declaring war or
[[Page 1785]]
authorizing use of armed forces introduced at least 30 days prior to
the 60-day period specified in section 5 be referred in the House to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs (renamed the Committee on
International Relations on Mar. 19, 1975). When reported by the
committee, the measure becomes the pending business and is voted on
within three calendar days thereafter unless otherwise determined by
the yeas and nays. After passage in one House, the measure is to be
referred to the counterpart committee of the other House and reported
out not later than 14 calendar days before the expiration of the 60-day
period and then voted on. In the case of disagreement between the two
Houses, conferees are appointed, and the conference committee must
report on the measure no later than four calendar days before the
expiration of the 60-day period. If conferees cannot agree within 48
hours, they report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
Notwithstanding any rule concerning printing or delay of consideration
of conference reports, the report must be acted on by both Houses not
later than the expiration of the 60-day period.
Section 7 provides that a concurrent resolution introduced pursuant
to section 5 directing the President to remove forces engaged in
hostilities be referred to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs or to
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as the case may be. Such
committee must report with recommendations within 15 calendar days
unless otherwise determined by the yeas and nays. Such resolution
becomes the pending business of the House in question. After passage in
one House, the resolution is to be referred to the counterpart
committee in the other House, and is to be reported out with
recommendations within 15 calendar days, at which time it becomes the
pending business of that House. In the case of disagreement between the
two Houses, conferees must be promptly appointed. The conference
committee must report on the measure within six calendar days after
referral to the committee of conference. Such report must be acted on
by both Houses not later than six calendar days after the report is
filed.
Section 8, relating to interpretation of the joint resolution,
states that authority to introduce troops shall not be inferred from
any provision of law unless such provision specifically authorizes
introduction of forces, or from any treaty unless it is implemented by
legislation specifically authorizing in
[[Page 1786]]
troduction of forces. The joint resolution does not necessitate further
specific statutory authorization to permit American participation in
headquarters operations with armed forces of one or more foreign
countries. The term ``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' is
clarified. The joint resolution does not alter constitutional authority
of the President or Congress. It does not grant any authority to the
President which he would not have had in the absence of the joint
resolution.
Sections 9 and 10 relate to separability of provisions and the
effective date, respectively.
Collateral References (~8)
Congress, the President, and War Powers, hearings before the
Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific
Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs 91st Cong.
2d Sess. (1970).
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8. See also the collateral references in Sec. 3, supra, and Sec. 10,
infra, relating to war powers generally and Vietnam era
restrictions on military activity.
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Congress and the War Powers. 37 Mo. L. Rev. 1-32 (Winter 1972).
Eagleton, Thomas F. August 15 Compromise and the War Powers of
Congress. 18 St. Louis U.L. Jour. 1-11 (Fall 1973).
Emerson, J. T. War Powers Legislation, 74 W. Va. L.R. 53 (Nov.-Jan.
1971-1972).
Javits, Jacob K. Congress and the President: A Modern Delineation of
the War Powers. 35 Albany L. Rev. 632-37 (1971).
Jenkins, Gerald L. The War Powers Resolution: Statutory Limitation on
the Commander in Chief. 11 Harv. Jour. on Legislation 181-204 (Feb.
1974).
Rostow, Eugene V. Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act. 50 Tex.
L. Rev. 833-900 (May 1972).
Scribner, Jeffrey L. The President Versus Congress on War-Making
Authority. 52 Military Rev. 87 (Apr. 1972).
Spong, W. B., Jr. Can Balance Be Restored in the Constitutional War
Powers of the Prcsident and Congress? 6 U. of Richmond L. Rev. 1-47
(Fall 1971).
Wallace, Don, Jr. War-making Powers: A Constitution Flaw? 57 Cornell L.
Rev. 719-76 (May 1972).
War Powers Legislation, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (1971).
Wooters, Garry J. The Appropriations Power as a Tool of Congressional
Foreign Policy Making, 50 Boston U.L.R. 34; reprinted in The
Vietnam War and International Law: The Widening Context, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, N.J., 606
(1972). -------------------
Veto of War Powers Resolution
Sec. 4.1 The War Powers Resolution was vetoed by the President.
On Oct. 25, 1973,(9) the President's veto message
outlining his
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9. 119 Cong. Rec. 34990, 34991, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 1787]]
objections to the War Powers Resolution was laid before the House.
The Speaker (10) laid before the House the following
veto message from the President of the United States:
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10. Carl Albert (Okla.).
To the House of Representatives:
I hereby return without my approval House Joint Resolution
542--the War Powers Resolution. While I am in accord with thc
desire of the Congress to assert its proper role in the conduct
of our foreign affairs the restrictions which this resolution
would impose upon the authority of the President are both
unconstitutional and dangerous to the best interests of our
Nation.
The proper roles of the Congress and the Executive in the
conduct of foreign affairs have been debated since the founding
of our country. Only recently, however, has there been a
serious challenge to the wisdom of the Founding Fathers in
choosing not to draw a precise and detailed line of demarcation
between the foreign policy powers of the two branches.
The Founding Fathers understood the impossibility of
foreseeing every contingency that might arise in this complex
area. They acknowledged the need for flexibility in responding
to changing circumstances. They recognized that foreign policy
decisions must be made through close cooperation between the
two branches and not through rigidly codified procedures. . . .
House Joint Resolution 542 would attempt to take away, bv a
mere legislative act, authorities which the President has
properly exercised under the Constitution for almost 200 years.
One of its provisions would automatically cut off certain
authorities after sixty days unless the Congress extended them.
Another would allow the Congress to eliminate certain
authorities merely by the passage of a concurrent resolution--
an action which does not normally have the force of law, since
it denies the President his constitutional role in approving
legislation.
I believe that both these provisions are unconstitutional.
The only way in which the constitutional powers of a branch of
the Government can be altered is by amending the Constitution--
and any attempt to make such alterations by legislation alone
is clearly without force.
While I firmly believe that a veto of House Joint
Resolution 542 is warranted solely on constitutional grounds, I
am also deeply disturbed by the practical consequences of this
resolution. For it would seriously undermine this Nation's
ability to act decisively and convincingly in times of
international crisis. . . .
I am particularly disturbed by the fact that certain of the
President's constitutional powers as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces would terminate automatically under this
resolution 60 days after they were invoked. No overt
Congressional action would be required to cut off these
powers--they would disappear automatically unless the Congress
extended them. . . .
This Administration is dedicated to strengthening
cooperation between the Congress and the President in the
conduct of foreign affairs and to preserving the constitutional
prerogatives of both branches of our Government. I know that
the Congress shares that goal. A commission on the
constitutional roles of the Congress and the President would
provide a useful opportunity for both branches to work together
toward that common objective.
Richard Nixon,
The White House,
October 24, 1973.
[[Page 1788]]
Passage of War Powers Resolution
Sec. 4.2 By a two-thirds vote in each body, the House and Senate
overrode the President's veto of the War Powers Resolution.
On Nov. 7, 1973, the House by a vote of yeas 284, nays 135, not
voting 14,(11) and the Senate by a vote of yeas 75, nays
18,(12) two-thirds in each body voting in the affirmative,
agreed to override the President's veto of House Joint Resolution 542,
the War Powers Resolution, which became law on Nov. 7, 1973, in the
following form: (l3)
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11. 119 Cong. Rec. 36202, 36221, 36222, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. See also
119 Cong. Rec. 24707, 24708, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., July 18,
1973, for initial House approval of this joint resolution (H.
Rept. No. 93-287, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. [1973]); and 119 Cong.
Rec. 33858, 33873, 33874, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 12, 1973,
for consideration and approval of the conference report (H.
Rept. No. 93-547) by a vote of yeas 238, nays 123, not voting
73.
12. 119 Cong. Rec. 36175, 36197, 36198, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. See also
119 Cong. Rec. 25120, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., July 20, 1973, for
unanimous-consent agreement to strike from H.J. Res. 542 all
after the resolving clause and substitute therefor the text of
the Senate version of the War Powers Resolution, S. 440, which
the Senate had just approved (p. 25119) by a vote of yeas 72,
nays 18 (S. Rept. No. 220, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. [1973]); and 119
Cong. Rec. 33569, 93d Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 10, 1973, for
Senate approval of the conference report by a vote of yeas 75,
nays 20.
13. This excerpt is taken from 87 Stat. 555, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. (Pub.
L. No. 93-148). It is codified at 50 USC Sec. Sec. 1541 et seq.
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Short Title
Section 1. This joint resolution may be cited as the ``War
Powers Resolution''.
Purpose and Policy
Sec. 2. (a) It is the purpose of this joint resolution to
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United
States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in
hostilities or in such situations.
(b) Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is
specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to
make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, not
only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof.
(c) The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces
[[Page 1789]]
into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, are
exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific
statutory authorization, or (3) a national emergency created by
attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or
its armed forces.
Consultation
Sec. 3. The President in every possible instance shall consult
with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into
hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and after
every such introduction shall consult regularly with the Congress
until United States Armed Forces are no longer engaged in
hostilities or have been removed from such situations.
Reporting
Sec. 4. (a) In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case
in which United States Armed Forces are introduced--
(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign
nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which
relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of
such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States
Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign
nation;
the President shall submit within 48 hours to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and to the President pro tempore of the
Senate a report in writing, setting forth--
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under
which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement.
(b) The President shall provide such other information as the
Congress may request in the fulfillment of its constitutional
responsibilities with respect to committing the Nation to war and
to the use of United States Armed Forces abroad.
(c) Whenever United States Armed Forces are introduced into
hostilities or into any situation described in subsection (a) of
this section, the President shall], so long as such armed forces
continue to be engaged in such hostilities or situation, report to
the Congress periodically on the status of such hostilities or
situation as well as on the scope and duration of such hostilities
or situation, but in no event shall he report to the Congress less
often than once every six months.
Congressional Action
Sec. 5. (a) Each report submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1)
shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and to the President pro tempore of the Senate on the same calendar
day. Each report so transmitted shall be referred to the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate for appropriate
action. If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has
adjourned sine die or has ad
[[Page 1790]]
journed for any period in excess of three calendar days, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro
tempore of the Senate, if they deem it advisable (or if petitioned
by at least 30 percent of the membership of their respective
Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in
order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action
pursuant to this section.
(b) Within sixty calendar days after a report is submitted or
is required to be submitted pursuant to section 4(a) (1), whichever
is earlier, the President shall terminate any use of United States
Armed Forces with respect to which such report was submitted (or
required to be submitted), unless the Congress (1) has declared war
or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of United
States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-day period,
or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an armed attack
upon the United States. Such sixty-day period shall be extended for
not more than an additional thirty days if the President determines
and certifies to the Congress in writing that unavoidable military
necessity respecting the safety of United States Armed Forces
requires the continued use of such armed forces in the course of
bringing about a prompt removal of such forces.
(c) Notwithstanding subsection (b), at any time that United
States Armed Forces are engaged in hostilities outside the
territory of the United States, its possessions and territories
without a declaration of war or specific statutory authorization,
such forces shall be removed by the President if the Congress so
directs by concurrent resolution.
Congressional Priority Procedures for Joint Resolution or Bill
Sec. 6. (a) Any joint resolution or bill introduced pursuant to
section 5(b) at least thirty calendar days before the expiration of
the sixty-day period specified in such section shall be referred to
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives or
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, as the case may
be, and such committee shall report one such joint resolution or
bill, together with its recommendations, not later than twenty-four
calendar days before the expiration of the sixty-day period
specified in such section, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents), and shall be voted on within three
calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a joint resolution or bill passed by one House shall
be referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out not later than fourteen calendar days
before the expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section
5(b). The joint resolution or bill so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question and shall be voted on
within three calendar days after it has been reported, unless such
House shall determine by yeas and otherwise nays.
(d) ln the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress
[[Page 1791]]
with respect to a joint resolution or bill passed by both Houses,
conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of
conference shall make and file a report with respect to such
resolution or bill not later than four calendar days before the
expiration of the sixty-day period specified in section 5 (b). In
the event the conferees are unable to agree within 48 hours, they
shall report back to their respective Houses in disagreement.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of
conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the
consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by
both Houses not later than the expiration of such sixty-day period.
Congressional Priority Procedures for Concurrent Resolution
Sec. 7. (a) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to
section 5(c) shall be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives or the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate, as the case may be, and one such
concurrent resolution shall be reported out by such committee
together with its recommendations within fifteen calendar days,
unless such House shall otherwise determine by the yeas and nays.
(b) Any concurrent resolution so reported shall become the
pending business of the House in question (in the case of the
Senate the time for debate shall be equally divided between the
proponents and the opponents) and shall be voted on within three
calendar days thereafter, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(c) Such a concurrent resolution passed by one House shall be
referred to the committee of the other House named in subsection
(a) and shall be reported out by such committee together with its
recommendations within fifteen calendar days and shall thereupon
become the pending business of such House and shall be voted upon
within three calendar days, unless such House shall otherwise
determine by yeas and nays.
(d) In the case of any disagreement between the two Houses of
Congress with respect to a concurrent resolution passed by both
Houses, conferees shall be promptly appointed and the committee of
conference shall make and file a report with respect to such
concurrent resolution within six calendar days after the
legislation is referred to the committee of conference.
Notwithstanding any rule in either House concerning the printing of
conference reports in the Record or concerning any delay in the
consideration of such reports, such report shall be acted on by
both Houses not later than six calendar days after the conference
report is filed. In the event the conferees are unable to agree
within 48 hours, they shall report back to their respective Houses
in disagreement.
Interpretation of Joint Resolution
Sec. 8. (a) Authority to introduce United States Armed Forces
into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances shall not be
inferred--
(1) from any provision of law (whether or not in effect before
the date of the enactment of this joint resolution), including any
provision contained in any appropriation Act, unless such provi
[[Page 1792]]
sion specifically authorizes the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into such situations and states
that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization
within the meaning of this joint resolution; or
(2) from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless
such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing
the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or
into such situations and stating that it is intended to constitute
specific statutory authorization within the meaning of this joint
resolution.
(b) Nothing in this joint resolution shall be construed to
require any further specific statutory authorization to permit
members of United States Armed Forces to participate jointly with
members of the armed forces of one or more foreign countries in the
headquarters operations of high-level military commands which were
established prior to the date of enactment of this joint resolution
and pursuant to the United Nations Charter or any treaty ratified
by the United States prior to such date.
(c) For purposes of this joint resolution, the term
``introduction of United States Armed Forces'' includes the
assignment of members of such armed forces to command, coordinate,
participate in the movement of, or accompany the regular or
irregular military forces of any foreign country or government when
such military forces are engaged, or there exists an imminent
threat that such forces will become engaged, in hostilities.
(d) Nothing in this joint resolution--
(1) is intended to alter the constitutional authority of
the Congress or of the President, or the provisions of existing
treaties; or
(2) shall be construed as granting any authority to the
President with respect to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein
involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances which authority he would not have had in the
absence of this joint resolution.
Separability Clause
Sec. 9. If any provision of this joint resolution or the
application hereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remainder of the joint resolution and the application of such
provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby.
Effective Date
Sec. 10. This joint resolution shall take effect on the date of
its enactment.