[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 3, Chapters 10 - 14]
[Chapter 11. Questions of Privilege]
[E. Basis of Questions of Personal Privilege]
[Â§ 33. Criticism of Members Collectively]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1694-1696]
 
                               CHAPTER 11
 
                         Questions of Privilege
 
              E. BASIS OF QUESTIONS OF PERSONAL PRIVILEGE
 
Sec. 33. Criticism of Members Collectively

Criticism of Unnamed Members

Sec. 33.1 A statement in a radio address by a cabinet officer that 
    persons advocating a certain measure were deliberately misleading 
    the public was held not to give grounds for a question of personal 
    privilege to a Member who had advocated the measure, but who had 
    not been named in the address.

    On Apr. 17, 1935,(9) Mrs. Edith Nourse Rogers, of 
Massachusetts, as an advocate of the repeal of a certain textile 
processing tax, presented as involving a question of personal privilege 
the statement made during a radio address by a cabinet officer that 
persons advocating the repeal of the tax were deliberately misleading 
the public. A point of order was made by Mr. Hampton P. Fulmer, of 
South Carolina, that she had not stated a question of personal 
privilege. In his ruling sustaining the point of order, the Speaker 
(10) stated: (11)
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 9. 79 Cong. Rec. 5854, 5855, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
10. Joseph W. Byrns (Tenn.).
11. 79 Cong. Rec. 5855, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.

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[[Page 1695]]

        The Chair will state that the rule provides that a Member may 
    rise to a question of personal privilege where the rights, 
    reputation, and conduct of Members in their individual capacity 
    only are assailed.
        The name of the gentlewoman from Massachusetts was not 
    mentioned, in the first place, and the Chair fails to see where 
    there is a question of personal privilege involved in the statement 
    referred to by the gentlewoman from Massachusetts, and therefore 
    must, of course, rule that she has not raised a question of 
    personal privilege.

Sec. 33.2 A newspaper article charging Members of the House with 
    demagoguery and willingness to punish the District of Columbia was 
    held a criticism of the House and not to constitute a question of 
    personal privilege.

    On May 21, 1941,(12) Mr. Clare E. Hoffman; of Michigan, 
rose to a question of personal privilege and read from a newspaper 
article which charged the Members of the House with demagoguery and 
with a willingness to punish the District of Columbia to win votes at 
home. After the submission of the article for the Chair's inspection, 
the following exchange occurred:
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12. 87 Cong. Rec. 4307, 4308, 77th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Speaker: (13) Where does the article refer to 
    the gentleman from Michigan personally?
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13. Sam Rayburn (Tex.).
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        Mr. Hoffman: It does not so refer, but it refers to all those 
    Members of the House who voted in opposition to that bill. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair will read that part of the rule which 
    affects Members, so far as personal privilege is concerned:

            Second, the rights, reputation, and conduct of Members 
        individually in their representative capacity only.

        There is nothing in this matter that refers to the gentleman 
    from Michigan [Mr. Hoffman] either individually or in his official 
    capacity. The Chair would hesitate to hold a question of personal 
    privilege of Members of the House lies in a general criticism of 
    the action of the House. Therefore, the Chair is inclined to hold 
    that the gentleman has not stated a question of personal privilege.

Sec. 33.3 A newspaper article incorporating the statement that anyone 
    who charged the CIO with communistic control was ``a knave, a liar, 
    and a poltroon,'' was held not to give rise to a question of 
    personal privilege.

    On Mar. 27, 1939,(14) Mr. Clare E. Hoffman, of Michigan, 
rising to a question of personal privilege, called the attention of the 
House to a newspaper article quoting labor union leader John L. Lewis 
as saying that anyone who charged the CIO with com

[[Page 1696]]

munistic control was ``a knave, a liar, and a poltroon,'' it being 
acknowledged that the Member had made such charges in debate on June 1, 
1937. After the Member's presentation of the question, the Speaker 
(15) made the following statement:
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14. 84 Cong. Rec. 3362, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.
15. William B. Bankhead (Ala.).
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        The Chair is ready to rule on this question of personal 
    privilege presented by the gentleman from Michigan.
        The question now raised is the following language that was 
    purported to have been quoted in the March 23, 1939, issue of the 
    New York Times as coming from John L. Lewis, chairman of the 
    Congress of Industrial Organizations:

            Maintaining that the C.I.O. was an American institution, 
        Mr. Lewis denied that it was controlled by Communists, saying 
        that anyone who charged such communistic control was a knave, a 
        liar, and a poltroon.

        The gentleman from Michigan takes the position that because of 
    something that he may have said heretofore on the floor of the 
    House, brings him within the purview of the definition given by Mr. 
    Lewis. But in the language quoted there is certainly no reference 
    to any particular individual. The gentleman is not named, and for 
    aught appearing in this statement that has been made, the gentleman 
    who is quoted may have been referring entirely to some other 
    individual or some other group of individuals rather than the 
    gentleman from Michigan.
        The Chair is clearly of the opinion that it would be stretching 
    the rule too far to construe the general statement here made as 
    giving the gentleman from Michigan a question of privilege.
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