[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9.  Election Contests]
[M. Summaries of Election Contests, 1931-72]
[Â§ 52. Seventy-eighth Congress, 1943-44]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1162-1174]
 
                               CHAPTER 9
 
                           Election Contests
 
               M. SUMMARIES OF ELECTION CONTESTS, 1931-72
 
Sec. 52. Seventy-eighth Congress, 1943-44

Sec. 52.1 Clark v Nichols

    On May 11, 1943, the Speaker laid before the House a communication 
from the Clerk of the House (20) which notified the House of 
the pending election contest between E. O. Clark, contestant, and Jack 
Nichols, contestee, from the Second Congressional District of Oklahoma. 
It related that contestant had, on Dec. 5, 1942, notified contestee of 
his intention to contest his election of Nov. 3, 1942, and that 
contestee had filed timely answer thereto. Enclosed with it was a 
letter from contestee asking the House to prevent contestant from 
further proceeding in the contest, as contestant had not complied with 
the requirement that testimony taken for contestant be forwarded to the 
Clerk of the House within the 30 days (based on the former statute, 2 
USC Sec. 223, now 2 USC Sec. 231). The Clerk's communication was 
referred on May 11, 1943, to the Committee on Elections No. 3 with 
accompanying papers and ordered printed as a House document.
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20. H. Doc. No. 201, 89 Cong. Rec. 4243, 4244, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 319.
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[[Page 1163]]

    Mr. Hugh Peterson, of Georgia, submitted the committee 
report,(1) which was unanimous, on Feb. 15,
1944. The report did not consider contestee's request that contestant 
be barred from continuing the contest. Rather, the committee 
recommended that the contest be dismissed for failure of contestant to 
bear ``the burden of showing that, due to fraud and irregularity, the 
result of the election was contrary to the clearly defined wish of the 
constituency involved [emphasis supplied].'' The committee determined 
that no fraud had been perpetrated by any election official whereby 
contestant was deprived of votes.
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 1. H. Rept. No. 1120, 90 Cong. Rec. 1675, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 117.
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    The committee determined that contestant had proven certain 
irregularities relating to the failure of local officials in certain 
precincts to keep registration books and to comply with certain other 
administrative requirements imposed by state law. Contestee offered no 
testimony to rebut this evidence. Nevertheless, the committee 
determined that such irregularities would not vitiate the election 
unless the procedures involved were declared by law to be essential to 
the validity of the election. As the pertinent state law did not 
contain such provisions, the committee regarded the state bookkeeping 
requirements as merely directory, and held that the committee could not 
void what it considered the certain decision of the electorate because 
of ``the failure of those responsible for the administration of the law 
to do their duty.''
    The committee stated in its report that ``the precedents are 
uniform in holding that the returns which are made by election 
officials regularly appointed by the laws of the State where the 
election is held are presumed to be correct until they are impeached by 
proof of irregularity and fraud.''
    On Feb. 16, 1944, Mr. Peterson called up as privileged House 
Resolution 440 (2) which the House agreed to without debate 
and by voice vote, and which--
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 2. 90 Cong. Rec. 1761-63, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 121.
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        Resolved, That the election contest of E. O. Clark, contestant, 
    against, Jack Nichols, contestee, Second Congressional District of 
    the State of Oklahoma, be dismissed.

    In his extension of remarks in the Congressional Record at that 
point, Mr. Ross Rizley, of Oklahoma, discussed in detail the alleged 
irregularities which contestant had referred to in the evi-

[[Page 1164]]

dence he presented. He cited two House election cases [Bisbee v 
Finley (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 980) and Benoit v Boatner (1 
Hinds' Precedents Sec. 340)] for the proposition that elections 
held in disregard of registration laws are to be considered void, 
regardless of whether such registration laws are to be considered 
directory or are made mandatory by statute. Mr. Rizley considered 
the evidence which was introduced by contestant and which as not 
contradicted by contestee----

        . . . [S]ufficient to warrant the investigation of an election 
    in which the contestee as the candidate of the political party 
    which had control and charge of the election, claims to have been 
    elected in a congressional district by only approximately 385 
    votes. This would seem especially true where a State election board 
    dominated by the same political party denied itself jurisdiction 
    and by so doing suggested that the House should set itself up as a 
    recount committee.

and where the House, in turn----

        . . . [S]ays that it cannot erect itself as a recount board . . 
    . that there were ``gross irregularities'' and flagrant violations 
    of the election laws, ``fairly proven by the contestant.'' 
    (3)
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 3. Id. at p. 1763.
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    Note: Syllabi for Clark v Nichols may be found herein at Sec. 6.1 
(items transmitted by Clerk); Sec. 10.11 (distinction between mandatory 
and directory state laws); Sec. 27.6 (failure to forward testimony to 
Clerk); Sec. 35.4 (burden of showing results of election would be 
changed); Sec. 36.3 (official returns as presumptively correct).

Sec. 52.2 McEvoy v Peterson

    On May 5, 1944, Mr. Ed L. Gossett, of Texas, submitted the report 
(4) from the Committee on Elections No. 2 in the contested 
election case brought by Edward T. McEvoy against Hugh Peterson, from 
the First Congressional District of Georgia. The case had been referred 
to the committee on Sept. 20, 1943, when the Speaker laid before the 
House a letter from the Clerk of the House (5) transmitting 
the necessary papers and documents as required by the statute governing 
contested election cases. This letter was ordered printed as a House 
document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. H. Rept. No. 1423, 90 Cong. Rec. 4087, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 288.
 5. 89 Cong. Rec. 7682, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 607.
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    The unanimous committee report, which accompanied House Resolution 
534, recommended that the election contest be dismissed. The report 
related that contestant (Mr. McEvoy) had attempted to run for the First 
Congressional District of Georgia seat as an 

[[Page 1165]]

independent Republican though there was no such political party in 
Georgia, and that contestant's name had not appeared on any ballots 
and that he had not received any votes. The committee further found 
that contestant had failed to exhaust available state legal remedies, 
had not filed the election contest in good faith, and had failed 
to make out a prima facie case. The committee disallowed contestant's 
petition for reimbursement of expenses.
    House Resolution 534 was called up as privileged (6) by 
Mr. Gossett and agreed to without debate on May 5, 1944. Thereby the 
House dismissed the election contest by voice vote. The resolution 
provided--
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 6. 90 Cong. Rec. 4074, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 288.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Resolved, That the election contest of Edward T. McEvoy, 
    contestant, against Hugh Peterson, contestee, First Congressional 
    District of the State of Georgia, be dismissed.

    Note: Syllabi for McEvoy v Peterson may be found herein at 
Sec. 13.1 (permissible defenses to election contests); Sec. 14.1 
(contestant's standing); Sec. 45.7 (payments conditioned on good faith 
in filing of contest).

Sec. 52.3 Moreland v Schuetz

    On Feb. 17, 1944, Mr. Hugh Peterson, of Georgia, from the Committee 
on Elections No. 1 submitted the final report (7) in the 
contested election case brought by James C. Moreland against Leonard W. 
Schuetz from the Seventh Congressional District of Illinois. The case 
had been initiated in the House on Nov. 15, 1943, at which time a 
letter from the Clerk of the House (8) had been laid before 
the House by the Speaker and referred by him to the committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. H. Rept. No. 1158, 90 Cong. Rec. 1833, 1834, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; 
        H. Jour. 132.
 8. H. Doc. No. 357, 89 Cong. Rec. 9529, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 
        731.
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    On Mar. 1, 1943, the Speaker had laid before the House, during the 
period permitted by statute for taking of testimony for an election 
contest, a letter from the Clerk.(9) This letter conveyed 
contestant's request that the House grant him additional time for 
taking testimony so as to permit him to substantiate his claim of 
certain voting irregularities and miscounts which would change the 
1,975-vote margin of contestee to contestant's favor.
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 9. H. Doc. No. 120, 89 Cong. Rec. 1456, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 
        134, 136.
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    Specifically, contestant claimed that ballots which had been 
counted for contestee (more than 2,000) should be totally voided, as 
such 

[[Page 1166]]

ballots had been illegally marked by write-in attempts to vote for 
certain local judicial candidates in contravention of state law. 
Contestant also alleged error by election officials in that they 
failed to credit him with ``split-ticket'' ballots, bearing votes 
cast for him, and that they counted such ballots as ``straight-ticket''
ballots for the Democratic party and, therefore, for contestee. 
Contestant asked for an extension of time to establish these 
allegations, which he could not do in the time required by law, 
as the time and facilities of the responsible election officials was 
then being totally consumed in preparation for local elections.
    Mr. Peterson submitted House Report No. 345 (10) on Apr. 
6, 1943, to accompany House Resolution 201,(11) which was 
agreed to without debate on that date, and which extended time for 
taking testimony for a total of 65 days. The report unanimously agreed 
that the circumstances as cited above by contestant set forth ``good 
cause'' as required by House precedents cited in the report.
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10. 89 Cong. Rec. 3024, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 219.
11. Id. at p. 2982.
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    The resolution recommended in the committee report was agreed to by 
the House as follows:

        Resolved, That the time allowed for taking testimony in the 
    election contest, James C. Moreland, contestant, against Leonard W. 
    Schuetz, contestee, Seventh Congressional District of Illinois, 
    shall be extended for a period of 65 days, beginning April 12, 
    1943, and the testimony shall be taken in the following order:
        The contestant shall take testimony during the first 30 days, 
    the contestee shall take the testimony during the succeeding 30 
    days, and the contestant shall take testimony in rebuttal only 
    during the remaining 5 days of said period.

    After the extension of time, the final committee report related 
that the parties to the contest had agreed to conduct a recount in 
those wards where the vote had been questioned by contestant. This 
recount, which was terminated by contestant prior to expiration of his 
time for taking additional testimony, covered 42 percent of total votes 
cast and included over 56 percent of the votes cast for contestee. The 
committee found that the recount reduced contestee's majority by 898 
votes, an insufficient number to change the outcome, and that 
contestant had not sustained the burden of proving, from this partial 
recount in precincts where contestee had received a heavy vote, that a 
recount of all votes would establish a majority for contestant. Thus, 
the committee concluded that the contestant had not introduced 
sufficient evidence to warrant a complete recount.

[[Page 1167]]

    The committee report made reference to such errors as improper 
initialing of ballots by election holders, improper marking of ballots, 
failure of election holders to initial ballots, spoilation of ballots, 
etc., but said:

        There is no evidence whatsoever of fraud on the part of the 
    election officials. So, it is evident that this condition was 
    general and prevailed among all of the ballots cast and it can, 
    therefore, be seen that the gains made by the contestant in the 
    partial review or recount which included only 42 percent of the 
    total ballots cast, but which included at the same time over 56 
    percent of the ballots cast for the contestee, is by no means 
    conclusive proof that the trend of the change as shown by the 
    recount in favor of the contestant would have continued throughout 
    the recount of all the remainder of the ballots.
        [Whether] the contestant desired to recount all of the ballots 
    cast in this election for the purpose of securing evidence to 
    submit in support of his contest, he did not exhaust the remedy 
    afforded him for such a recount.
        It is the duty of the contestant to produce evidence sufficient 
    to support the allegations set forth in his petition, and, as this 
    committee has heretofore held, it is not the duty of this committee 
    to take upon itself the obligation of securing evidence for either 
    party.

    Mr. Peterson called up as privileged House Resolution 
444,(12) on the same day he submitted the report of the 
Committee on Elections No. 3 for printing in the Record. House 
Resolution 444 was agreed to by the House without debate and by voice 
vote, and it--
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12. 90 Cong Rec. 1834, 78th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 17, 1944; H. Jour. 
        127.
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        Resolved, That the election contest of James C. Moreland, 
    contestant, against Leonard W. Schuetz, contestee, Seventh 
    Congressional District of the State of Illinois, be dismissed.

    Note: Syllabi for Moreland v Schuetz may be found herein at 
Sec. 6.3 (items transmitted by Clerk); Sec. 27.10 (extensions of time 
for taking testimony); Sec. 27.11 (extensions of time for good cause); 
Sec. 39.1 (recount by stipulation of parties); Sec. 40.5 (burden of 
proving recount would change election result); Sec. 43.4 (resolution 
accompanying report).

Sec. 52.4 Schafer v Wasielewski

    On Mar. 29, 1944, Mr. James Domengeaux, of Louisiana, submitted the 
unanimous report (13) of the Committee on Elections No. 1 in 
the contested election case of John C. Schafer against Thaddeus F. 
Wasielewski, from the Fourth Congressional District of Wisconsin. The 
case had come to the House pursuant to the provisions of the federal 
statute (see 2 USC Sec. Sec. 381 et seq.), governing election 

[[Page 1168]]

contests on Sept. 20, 1943, when the Speaker laid before the House 
a letter from the Clerk (14) transmitting the necessary 
testimony and documents. The letter was referred to the committee on 
that date and ordered printed by the Speaker.
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13. 90 Cong. Rec. 3252, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 227.
14. H. Doc. No. 282, 89 Cong. Rec. 7682, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 
        607.
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    The contestant, defeated in the election by contestee by 
approximately 17,000 votes, alleged that contestee had himself expended 
more money during his campaign than was permitted by the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act and by the election laws of Wisconsin and that 
contestee had failed to file correct reports of expenditures as 
required by law. As stated in the report, ``the Wisconsin statutes 
limit to $875 the amount of money that can be spent by a candidate for 
Congress in the general election. The Wisconsin statutes, however, 
place no limitation upon receipts and expenditures of individuals or 
groups that might voluntarily interest themselves in behalf of a 
candidate.''
    The Federal Corrupt Practices Act (2 USC Sec. 248) requires:

        (a) A candidate, in his campaign for election, shall not make 
    expenditures in excess of the amount which he may lawfully make 
    under the laws of the State in which he is a candidate, not in 
    excess of the amount which he may lawfully make under the 
    provisions of this title ($2,500).

    As further stated in the report--

        Thaddeus F. Wasielewski filed with the Clerk of the House of 
    Representatives on November 5, 1942, a statement, as required by 
    Federal law, showing receipts of $1,689 and total expenditures of 
    $1,172.

    The committee determined that the expense reports filed by 
contestee had disclosed on their face, figures in excess of amounts 
permitted by state law and by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The 
committee found, however, that certain sums listed actually represented 
expenditures of a ``voluntary committee'' rather than expenditures of a 
``personal campaign committee'' as defined by state law, and were, 
therefore, not to be considered personal expenditures of contestee, 
and, thus, not limited by state law.

    The committee also determined that it should not deprive contestee 
of his seat as a result of his negligence in preparing expenditure 
accounts filed with the Clerk. The committee found no evidence of 
fraud.
    Immediately upon submission of the committee report (H. Rept. No. 
1308), Mr. Domengeaux called up as privileged House Resolution 

[[Page 1169]]

490,(15) which was agreed to by the House without debate 
and by voice vote, and which--
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15. 90 Cong. Rec. 3253, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 227.
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        Resolved, That the election contest of John C. Schafer, 
    contestant, against Thaddeus F. Wasielewski, contestee, Fourth 
    Congressional District of the State of Wisconsin, be dismissed.

    Note: Syllabi for Schafer v Wasielewski may be found herein at 
Sec. Sec. 10.1, 10.3 (Corrupt Practices Act).

Sec. 52.5 Sullivan v Miller

    On Jan. 25, 1943, the Speaker laid before the House a letter 
(16) from the Clerk of the House, relating that his office 
had unofficial knowledge that the election held on Nov. 3, 1942, for a 
House seat from the 11th Congressional District of Missouri was being 
contested. On Dec. 9, 1942, contestant John B. Sullivan served notice 
of intention to contest the election on contestee Louis E. Miller, with 
answer by contestee on Dec. 28, 1942, from which date the time for 
taking testimony under the statute (2 USC Sec. 203) began to run. The 
Clerk's letter related that on Jan. 20, 1943, the parties had filed a 
joint application proposing that the House order the Missouri Board of 
Election Commissioners to conduct a recount. The Clerk's letter, 
accompanied by the joint letter signed by the parties to the contest 
and by drafts of resolutions ordering the recount and extending time 
for taking testimony, together with depositions in support thereof 
taken of members of the Board of Election Commissioners in St. Louis, 
and accompanied by contestant's charts showing recapitulation of all 
votes cast in the district, were referred to the Committee on Elections 
No. 3 on Jan. 25 and ``ordered printed with an illustration,'' as a 
House document.
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16. H. Doc. No. 58, 89 Cong. Rec. 368, 369, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 67.
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    The parties' application for a recount and accompanying supporting 
documents alleged that a state recount which had been conducted in a 
local election for Recorder, where those candidates had been on the 
same ballot as the parties in this case, indicated a miscount of 1,385 
votes. On Feb. 25, 1943, Mr. Hugh Peterson, of Georgia, submitted a 
report,(17) which was unanimous, to accompany House 
Resolution 137,(18) which Mr. Peterson called up as 


[[Page 1170]]

privileged on that date. The report stated that no election contest had 
been formally presented to the House at that time, and there was thus 
no contest pending before the Committee on Elections, nor did this 
filing of a joint application for recount constitute such a 
presentation. The report recommended, therefore, that the House should 
not ``intervene in an election contest that has been initiated but has 
not been brought officially to the House of Representatives simply for 
the purpose of procuring evidence for the use of the parties to the 
contest.'' The report expressed no opinion as to whether a recount of 
the ballots should be made in the event that an election contest was 
properly brought before the House. The report stated--
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17. H. Rept. No. 180 (joint application for recount not granted), 89 
        Cong. Rec. 1353, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 129.
18. 89 Cong. Rec. 1324, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 129.
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        It appears to the committee that the parties to this 
    application could bring or might have brought this election contest 
    to the House of Representatives in the manner prescribed by law and 
    the House of Representatives could then itself determine whether or 
    not it desired to recount the ballots.

    The committee report stated that there was no precedent in the 
House whereby the House had ordered a state or local board of election 
commissioners to take a recount. The report distinguished cases cited 
in the joint application brief where recounts were made by the House 
itself through an elections committee.
    In the brief debate in the House on House Resolution 137, Mr. 
Charles A. Plumley, of Vermont, stated that the Committee on Elections, 
by its unanimous report, would establish--

        . . . [T]he fact, the law, and a precedent for all time that 
    jurisdiction of an alleged contested-election case cannot be 
    conferred on the House or on one of its committees by any joint 
    agreement of parties to an alleged election contest unofficially or 
    otherwise submitted.

    House Resolution 137 was thereupon agreed to without further debate 
and by voice vote, and it--

        Resolved, That the joint application for order of recount of 
    John B. Sullivan, contestant, against Louis E. Miller, contestee, 
    Eleventh District of Missouri, be not granted.

    On Mar. 2, 1943, the Speaker laid before the House a letter 
(19) from the Clerk of the House transmitting contestant's 
application for an extension of time for taking testimony, which 
request was based upon time consumed by both parties in preparing their 
joint application for order of recount and supporting papers thereto. 
Contestant asked for 40 

[[Page 1171]]

additional days in which to prepare his testimony, and for 40 
days thereafter for contestee to take testimony. The Clerk's letter was 
referred to the Committee on Elections No. 3 and ordered printed with 
accompanying papers (contestant's application) by the Speaker as a 
House document.
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19. H. Doc. No. 122, 89 Cong. Rec. 1473, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 
        137, 138.
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    On May 17, 1943, Mr. Peterson submitted the unanimous committee 
report (20) which recommended that each party be given a 30-
day extension of time for taking testimony, with an additional five 
days for contestant to compile rebuttal testimony. The report reviewed 
and affirmed six House contested election precedents wherein the House 
had determined that extensions of time for taking testimony are to be 
permitted ``for good and sufficient reason only.'' Upon submission of 
the report, Mr. Peterson called up as privileged House Resolution 
240,(1) which was agreed to without debate and by voice vote 
and which adopted the following committee recommendation:
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20. H. Rept. No. 454, 89 Cong. Rec. 4562, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 328.
 1. 89 Cong. Rec. 4529, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 328.
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        Resolved, That the time allowed for taking testimony in the 
    election contest, John B. Sullivan, contestant, against Louis E. 
    Miller, contestee, Eleventh Congressional District of Missouri, 
    shall be extended for a period of 65 days, beginning May 18, 1943, 
    and the testimony shall be taken in the following order:
        The contestant shall take testimony during the first 30 days, 
    the contestee shall take testimony during the succeeding 30 days, 
    and the contestant shall take testimony in rebuttal only during the 
    remaining 5 days of said period.

    On Nov. 24, 1943, Mr. Peterson submitted the unanimous final report 
(2) from the Committee on Elections No. 3, which accompanied 
House Resolution 368, with the recommendation that the contest be 
dismissed. The report related that the parties had, between the time 
their joint application for recount had been denied and the time the 
House had granted the extension of time for taking testimony, agreed to 
conduct their own recount. The results of this informal recount were 
determined on May 4, 1943, and they showed that contestee had received 
a majority of all votes cast, regardless of certain changes in the 
vote. Thus, both parties had ``entered into a stipulation in which the 
contestant agreed that his pending election contest be dismissed and 
the contestee 

[[Page 1172]]

agreed that his pending counter election contest be dismissed.''
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 2. H. Rept. No. 887, 89 Cong. Rec. 9975, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. 
        Jour. 757.
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    House Resolution 368 (3) was called up as privileged by 
Mr. Peterson on Nov. 24, 1943, and agreed to without debate and by voice 
vote. The resolution provided--
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 89 Cong. Rec. 9974, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 756.
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        Resolved, That the election contest of John B. Sullivan, 
    contestant, against Louis E. Miller, contestee, Eleventh 
    Congressional District of Missouri, be dismissed.

    Note: Syllabi for Sullivan v Miller may be found herein at Sec. 3.1 
(House lacking authority over state or local election boards); Sec. 3.2 
(intervention by House in state or local elections); Sec. 4.1 (notice 
of contest as basis for House jurisdiction); Sec. 6.9 (items 
transmitted by Clerk); Sec. 18.2 (compliance with statutory 
requisites); Sec. 27.12 (extensions of time for good cause); Sec. 39.2 
(recount by stipulation of parties); Sec. 41.4 (joint applications for 
recount); Sec. 42.10 (disposal by stipulation of parties).

Sec. 52.6 Thill v McMurray

    On Jan. 31, 1944, Mr. Hugh Peterson, of Georgia, submitted the 
unanimous report (4) of the Committee on Elections No. 3 in 
the contested election case brought by Lewis D. Thill against Howard J. 
McMurray from the Fifth Congressional District of Wisconsin. The 
contest had been first brought to the attention of the House, when, on 
Sept. 20, 1943, the Speaker laid before the House a letter from the 
Clerk (5) transmitting the required testimony and documents. 
The Speaker had referred the communication and accompanying papers to 
the committee, and had ordered it printed as a House document.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. H. Rept. No. 1032, 90 Cong. Rec. 962, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 
        66.
 5. H. Doc. No. 284, 89 Cong. Rec. 7683, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.; H. Jour. 
        607.
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    Contestant claimed that contestee, who had been elected by a 
majority of 6,000 votes, had received contributions and made 
expenditures in violation of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act and of 
Wisconsin law by filing incorrect statements of expenditures and 
contributions.
    Contestee had filed statements with state officials showing no 
personal contributions or expenditures and showing about $8,000 
``voluntary committee'' contributions. This was consistent with the 
state statute. As stated in the report--

        The Wisconsin statutes limit to $875 the amount of money that 
    can be spent 

[[Page 1173]]

    by a candidate for Congress in the general election. The 
    Wisconsin statutes, however, place no limitation upon receipts 
    and expenditures of individuals or groups that might voluntarily 
    interest themselves in behalf of a candidate.

    Contestant alleged that contestee's statement filed with 
the Clerk of the House as required by federal law listed sizable 
personal contributions and expenditures in contradiction of his 
statement filed with the state. As stated in the committee report--

        (Contestee) filed with the Clerk of the House of 
    Representatives on December 1, 1942, a statement, as required by 
    Federal law, showing receipts of $8,458.78 and total expenditures 
    of $7,360.91. This statement . . . contradicted the statements 
    filed by him with the secretary of state of the State of Wisconsin 
    which showed ``no receipts, disbursements, or obligations.''

    Contestant had filed a petition under state law challenging 
contestee's expenditure statement filed with the state, which petition 
had been denied.
    With respect to contestee's statement filed with the Clerk of the 
House pursuant to federal law, the committee considered evidence which 
showed that it had been erroneously prepared by counsel and signed by 
contestee without knowledge of its contents. Contestee, upon discovery 
thereof, ``had contacted the Clerk of the House of Representatives 
admitting the mistake and attempting to correct the same by filing an 
amended statement'' showing that the expenditures had been made by two 
``voluntary committees'' without his consent.
    The report stated that--

        The committee in this report does not attempt to express any 
    opinion on the laws of the State of Wisconsin which seem to limit 
    the personal contributions and expenditures of the candidate 
    himself, while placing no limit upon the contributions or 
    expenditures which may be made through volunteer groups. Neither 
    does it attempt to condone the action of the contestee, Mr. 
    McMurray, in signing under oath the statement filed with the Clerk 
    of the House of Representatives, without being familiar with the 
    contents of the statement or the irregularities which it contained.

    The report recommended that--

        Under these circumstances, the committee is of the opinion that 
    Mr. McMurray, who received a substantial majority of votes in the 
    general election of November 3, 1942, over Mr. Thill, his nearest 
    opponent, should not be denied his seat in the House of 
    Representatives on account of this error made in the statement 
    filed by Mr. McMurray with the Clerk of the House of 
    Representatives.

    Mr. Peterson called up as privileged House Resolution 426 
(6) on 
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 6. 90 Cong. Rec. 933, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.; H. Jour. 65.
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[[Page 1174]]


Jan. 31, 1944, immediately upon submission of the 
committee report. The resolution, which dismissed the contest, was 
agreed to by the House by voice vote after a short debate. House 
Resolution 426 provided as follows:

        Resolved, That the election contest of Lewis D. Thill, 
    contestant, against Howard J. McMurray, contestee, Fifth 
    Congressional District of the State of Wisconsin, be dismissed.

    Note: Syllabi for Thill v McMurray may be found herein at Sec. 10.4 
(Corrupt Practices Act).