[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9. Election Contests]
[M. Summaries of Election Contests, 1931-72]
[§ 64. Ninety-second Congress, 1971-72]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
[Page 1261-1271]
CHAPTER 9
Election Contests
M. SUMMARIES OF ELECTION CONTESTS, 1931-72
Sec. 64. Ninety-second Congress, 1971-72
Sec. 64.1 Tunno v Veysey
On Nov. 9, 1971, Mr. Watkins W. Abbitt, of Virginia, from the
Committee on House Administration, submitted the committee report,
House Report No. 626, on the contested election case of David A. Tunno
v Victor V. Veysey from the 38th Congressional District of California.
Mr. Veysey was certified on Dec. 17, 1970, by the secretary of the
State of California as elected to the office of U.S. Representative in
Congress from the district at the general election held on Nov. 3,
1970. The credentials of Mr. Veysey were presented to the House of
Representatives and he appeared, took the oath of office, and was
seated without objection, on Jan. 21, 1971.(8)
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8. 117 Cong. Rec. 13, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
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[[Page 1262]]
The official canvass of the district showed that a total number of
173,163 votes were cast in the congressional election in the district.
Of this total number of votes cast, Mr. Veysey received 87,479 votes
and Mr. Tunno, the contestant, received 85,684 votes. Mr. Veysey's
majority consisted then of 1,795 votes.
The contestant served notice of contest on the contestee by mail on
Dec. 14, 1970. At the same time a notice of intent to contest was filed
by the contestant's representative with the Clerk of the House for
delivery to the Committee on House Administration.
While the contestant claimed the seat as required by 2 USC
Sec. Sec. 382 and 383,(9) in his notice of contest, the
relief sought by the contestant, as set forth in his notice, was that
the seat be declared vacant. The notice stated:
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9. Pub. L. No. 91-138, Sec. Sec. 3, 4; 83 Stat. 284 (Dec. 5, 1969).
This was the first case arising under the Federal Contested
Elections Act of 1969.
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Contestant requests the House of Representatives of the United
States, 92d Congress, first session, declare a vacancy in the
office of Member of the House of Representatives, U.S., 38th
Congressional District, State of California, and direct the proper
executive authority of the State of California to issue a writ of
election ordering a new election to fill said vacancy of said
office of Member, House of Representatives of the United States,
38th Congressional District, State of California.
The contestant claimed that the affidavits of registration of some
11,137 voters in Riverside County, California, had been wrongfully and
illegally canceled, depriving approximately 10,600 qualified voters of
the right to vote. The notice stated: (10)
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10. H. Rept. No. 92-626, submitted Nov. 9, 1971.
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1. On or about August 15, 1970, the elections supervisor,
Riverside County, State of California (hereinafter referred to as
``supervisor'') wrongfully and illegally canceled the affidavits of
registration of approximately 11,137 voters of Riverside County,
State of California. As a result of said illegal and wrongful
cancellation of said affidavits of registration, approximately
10,616 qualified voters of Riverside County, State of California,
were precluded from voting at said last preceding general election
for Member of the U.S. House of Representatives from the 38th
district.
From facts set out in the committee report, it appeared that local
California election officials may have misinterpreted a state election
statute, a mistake which may have disenfranchised approximately 10,600
voters. There were no facts indicating how many, if any, of these
voters would have voted, had they not been disenfranchised, nor was
[[Page 1263]]
there any indication, of course, of how they would have voted. The
report declared:
On Tuesday, May 11, 1971, the Subcommittee on Elections met to
hear arguments on the motion to dismiss the contest submitted by
the contestee, Victor V. Veysey. Opening statements and rebuttal
statements were given by the attorney for the contestant, Mr.
Robert J. Timlin and the attorney for the contestee, James H.
Kreiger. The contestant, Mr. David Tunno, and the contestee,
Congressman Victor V. Veysey, also submitted statements.
The new Federal Contested Election Act, Public Law 91-138, 83
Stat. 284, provides in section 4(b)(3) this defense to the
contestee, ``Failure of notice of contest to state grounds
sufficient to change result of election.'' This defense was raised
by the present contestee by way of a motion to dismiss. This
provision was included in the new act because it has been the
experience of Congress that exhaustive hearings and investigations
have, in the past, been conducted only to find that if the
contestant had been required at the outset to make proper
allegations with sufficient supportive evidence that could most
readily have been garnered at the time of the election such further
investigation would have been unnecessary and unwarranted.
Under the new law then the present contestant, and any future
contestant, when challenged by motion to dismiss, must have
presented, in the first instance, sufficient allegations and
evidence to justify his claim to the seat in order to overcome the
motion to dismiss.
The major problem raised is, on the basis of the contestant's
allegations and evidence, are a sufficient number of potential
votes in actual contention to warrant the committee granting the
relief sought and declaring the seat vacant and calling for a new
election? This may be restated as, what standards has the House of
Representatives applied in contests wherein declaring a vacancy was
either contemplated or actually done where registration
irregularities were alleged.
With regard to the problem, the contested election case of
Carney v. Smith [6 Cannon's Precedents 911 in the 63d Congress
considered a request that the seat be declared vacant and in
response to the request set forth the following standards as a
criteria for taking such action.
We do not believe that a committee of this House, looking for
the truth to determine who in fact was elected by the voters,
should, on account of this irregularity, disfranchise the electors
of this township. No question is made but that the ballots cast in
this precinct were cast by legal voters and in good faith. Nor is
it claimed that the contestee received a single vote more than was
intended to be cast for him, or that the contestant lost a single
vote. We do not believe that the facts warrant the rejection of the
entire poll of this township, nor does the law as practiced in
almost every jurisdiction warrant such a result. McCrary on
Elections [George McCrary, A Treatise on the American Law of
Elections, Chicago, Callaghan & Co., 1897] section 488, says:
The power to reject an entire poll is certainly a dangerous
power, and, though it belongs to whatever tribunal has
jurisdiction to pass upon the merits of a contested-election
[[Page 1264]]
case, it should be exercised only in an extreme case; that is
to say, where it is impossible to ascertain with reasonable
certainty the true vote.
Paine's Treatise on the Law of Elections [Halbert Paine, A
Treatise on the Law of Elections, Boston, Little, Brown & Co.,
1890] section 497, says:
Ignorance, inadvertence, mistake, or even intentional wrong
on the part of the local officers should not be permitted to
disfranchise a district.
Section 498 says:
The rules prescribed by the law for conducting an election
are designed chiefly to afford an opportunity for the free and
fair exercise of the elective franchise, to prevent illegal
votes, and to ascertain with certainty the result.
The departure from the mode prescribed will not vitiate an
election, if the irregularity does not deprive any legal voter
of his vote, or admit an illegal vote, or cast uncertainty on
the result and has not been occasioned by the agency of a party
seeking to derive a benefit from them.
Power to throw out the vote of an entire precinct should be
exercised only under circumstances which demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that there has been such a disregard of law or
such fraud that it is impossible to determine what votes were
lawful or unlawful, or to arrive at any result whatever, or
whether a great body of voters have been prevented from
exercising their rights by violence or intimidation. (Case of
Daley v. Petroff, 10 Philadelphia Rep., 289.)
There is nothing which will justify the striking out of an
entire division but an inability to decipher the returns or a
showing that not a single legal vote was polled or that no
election was legally held. (In Chadwick v. Melvin, Bright's
Election Cases, 489.)
Nothing short of an impossibility of ascertaining for whom
the majority of votes were given ought to vacate an election,
especially if by such decision the people must, on account of
their distant and dispersed situation, necessarily go
unrepresented for a long period of time. [McCrary, A Treatise
on the Law of Elections, 489.]
If there has been a fair vote and an honest count, the election
is not to be declared void because the force conducting it were not
duly chosen or sworn or qualified. [6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 91.]
In the contested election case of Reid v. Julian [2 Hinds'
Precedents Sec. Sec. 881, 882], 41st Congress the committee in its
report, House Report 116 stated that:
It has long been held by all the judicial tribunals of the
country, as well as by the decisions of Congress and the
legislatures of the several States, that an entire poll should
always be rejected for any one of the three following reasons:
1. Want of authority in the election board.
2. Fraud in conducting the election.
3. Such irregularities or misconduct as rendered the result
uncertain. [2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 881].
In the Michigan election case of Beakes v. Bacon in the 65th
Congress [6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 144], the same standards were
reiterated.
Because the contestant's allegations and the relief he seeks
fall under No. 3, ``Such irregularities or misconduct as render the
result uncertain,'' it is necessary to survey those instances in
contested election cases wherein ``such
[[Page 1265]]
irregularities or misconduct . . .'' involved registration
procedures. Consideration of the above-mentioned cases will, of
necessity, involve an ancillary problem, the problem of the
potential voter, because the House in its consideration of
irregularities and misconduct has traditionally dealt not only with
such irregularities and misconduct in a vacuum but also with their
effect on the election, the effect of the irregularities on the
potential voter, and the amount of proof necessary to overcome the
regular election returns as a result of such irregularities.
It should be noted as a preface to the contests involving
registration procedures that in these the contestant had made an
attempt to show with a great deal of specificity how those who were
disfranchised by the irregularities in registration would have
voted had they been given the opportunity and that, in general, the
contests revolved around this point rather than around the mere
fact of irregularity or misconduct on the part of the registration
officials. The fact that the contestant in the present case makes
absolutely no attempt to make such a showing as to how those who
were disfranchised by being stricken from the registration lists
would have voted had they been given the opportunity thus removes
his case somewhat from the scope of the precedents. The problem
lies basically in the fact that the contestant does not carry
forward his claim to the seat.
One contest which concerns itself with almost the same issues
that are involved in the present contest is Wilson v. McLaurin [2
Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1075] which arose out of an election in
South Carolina for a seat in the 54th Congress. In the Wilson case
the committee found that a South Carolina registration law
needlessly disfranchised a significant number of otherwise
qualified voters. The problems that the committee was then
confronted with were (1) should the seat be declared vacant because
of irregularities and (2) how to treat the potential vote of these
individuals who should have been allowed to vote. In the following
passage which is taken from the committee report, House Report
1566, 54th Congress first sess., particular attention should be
paid to the manner in which the contestant attempted to prove that
his claim to the seat was justified and the standards which the
committee adopted in regard to such offers of proof.
A majority of this committee has reached the conclusion
that the voters of the district now in consideration, who were
qualified under the constitution of South Carolina and who were
rejected under color of the enforcement of the registration
law, are entitled to be heard in this contest.
In this conclusion no violence is done to the doctrine that
``where the proper authorities of a State have given a
construction to their own statutes that construction will be
followed by the Federal authorities.'' While the supreme court
of South Carolina has not passed decisively upon the statute in
question the people themselves, the highest authority in that
State have decreed its disappearance from the statute book.
From this standpoint we look for the course to be followed.
Shall the election be set aside and the seat in question
vacated? Under the authorities we think not.
Beyond doubt the usual formalities of an election were for
the most part observed. No substantial miscount of
[[Page 1266]]
votes actually cast is alleged. There are no charges of
violence or intimidation seriously affecting the result which
have been verified. If fraud be alleged, under sanction of
legislative enactment, it was a general fraud and the returns
are in general unchallenged for correctness. The votes actually
cast are not in controversy; the votes not cast are the ones
presented for computation.
[McCrary], Treatise on the American Law of Elections, in
section 483, says--
``The election is only to be set aside when it is
impossible from any evidence within reach to ascertain the true
result--when neither from the returns, nor from other proof,
nor from all together can the truth be determined.''
The same authority quotes the following (sec. 489):
``Nothing short of the impossibility of ascertaining for
whom the majority of votes were given ought to vacate an
election.''
It is a matter of serious import and precedent to introduce
into an election the count of a large disfranchised class. But
if the principle is good as to 4 or 40 or 400 it should
certainly be no less available for a large number; or, briefly,
the number is immaterial if capable of correct computation.
In the case of Waddill v. Wise, [2 Hinds' Precedents
Sec. 1026] reported by the Committee on Elections to the House
in the 51st Congress, the doctrine is discussed, the authority
is collated, and the opinion adopted by the House expressed in
these words ( p. 224):
``If the fraudulent exclusion of votes would, if
successful, secure to the party of the wrongdoer a temporary
seat in Congress, and the only penalty for detection in the
wrong would be merely a new election, giving another chance for
the exercise of similar tactics, such practices would be at a
great premium and an election indefinitely prevented. But if
where such acts are done the votes are counted upon clear proof
aliunde the wrong is at once corrected in this House and no
encouragement is given to such dangerous and disgraceful
methods.''
In following this opinion the testimony is presented for
scrutiny.
A careful examination has been made of a record which
covers 683 closely printed pages. The contestant claims to be
allowed the votes of several thousand alleged voters, whose
names are given, but whose qualifications rest upon varying
testimony. These names of voters appear in lists executed in
most of the election precincts on the day of the election,
signed by the parties or by authorization, and (with few
exceptions) are appended to a form of petition, which is as
follows:
``To the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States in Congress assembled:
``The petition of the subscribers, citizens of the State of
South Carolina, respectfully sheweth:
``That your petitioners are over the age of twenty-one (21)
years and male residents of the county of __________, and the
voting precinct of __________, in the county and State
aforesaid, and are legally qualified to register and vote.
``That on this the sixth day of November eighteen hundred
and ninety four, they did present themselves at said voting
precinct in order to vote for Member of Congress, and that they
were denied the right to vote.
``That your petitioners have made every reasonable effort
to become qualified to vote according to the registration law
of this State, but have been denied an equal chance and the
same opportunity to register as are accorded to others of their
fellow-citizens.
[[Page 1267]]
``Your petitioners desired and intended to vote for Joshua
E. Wilson for Member of Congress.
``Wherefore your petitioners pray that you investigate the
facts herein stated and the practical workings of the
registration and election laws of this State and devise some
means to secure to us the free exercise of the rights
guaranteed to us by the constitution of this State and the laws
and Constitution of the United States, and your petitioners
will ever pray, etc., etc.''
These petitions are not usually verified by affidavit, but
are generally supplemented by testimony of those who had them
in charge, with such explanations and corroborations as the
witnesses could give.
It is considered by a majority of this committee that these
lists are not per se evidence in the pending contest. They are
declarations, important parts of which should be proven in
accordance with usual legal forms. It is not impossible so to
do, and consequently we think it is necessary for reaching
trustworthy results.
Under the authority of Vallandigham v. Campbell (1
Bartlett, p. 31) these declarations might serve a use beyond a
mere list for verification. For it was there held--
``The law is settled that the declaration of a voter as to
how he voted or intended to vote, made at the time, is
competent testimony on the point.''
We propose to compute the ballots of those who were
entitled to cast them, and there is ample support in a line of
authorities and precedents. A few only are selected.
Delano v. Morgan (2 Bartlett, 170), Hogan v. Pile (20
Bartlett, 285), Niblack v. Walls (Forty-second Congress, 104,
January, 1873), Bell v. Snyder (Smith's Rep., 251), are
uniformly for--
``the rule, which is well settled, that where a legal voter
offers to vote for a particular candidate, and uses due
diligence in endeavoring to do so, and is prevented by fraud,
violence, or intimidation from depositing his ballot, his vote
shall be counted.''
In Bisbee, Jr. v. Finley [2 Hinds' Precedents
Sec. Sec. 977-981], it was stated--
``as a question of law we do not understand it to be
controverted that a vote offered by an elector and illegally
rejected should be counted as if cast.''
In Waddill v. Wise (supra) the same doctrine was
elaborately discussed and a further step taken by holding--
``That the ability to reach the window and actually tender
the ticket to the judges is not essential in all cases to
constitute a good offer to vote.''
Referring to the evidence given in connection with the
lists in this record it seems proper to adopt some general
principles as a standard for the examination, and the following
have been used as suitable and in accord with the precedents
quoted:
First. The evidence should establish that the persons named
in the lists as excluded voters were voters according to the
requisites of the constitution of South Carolina.
Second. The proof should show that said persons were
present at or near the Congressional voting place of their
respective precincts, for the purpose of voting and would have
voted but for unlawful rejection or obstruction.
Third. That said excluded voters would have voted for the
contestant.
Another election contest which involved irregularities in the
application of a registration law resulting in the disfranchisement
of a number of otherwise qualified voters was Buchanan v. Manning
[2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 972] in the 47th Congress. In this
contest the
[[Page 1268]]
evidence of a disqualification of potential voters was somewhat
stronger than in the present case because it appears that the
registrars unlawfully refused to register ``many electors.'' In
regard to such action by the registrars, its effect on the
election, and the efforts which are necessary for a potential voter
to undertake in order that his vote may be counted the committee
investigating the matter held:
It appears in the evidence that very many electors in the
various counties of this district were deprived of the right of
voting because they were not registered. The registry law of
Mississippi provides the manner in which registration shall be
made. An unlawful refusal on the part of the registration
officers to register a qualified elector is a good ground for
contest; but in order to make it available the proof should
clearly show the name of the elector who offered to register;
that he was a duly qualified voter, and the reason why the
officer refused to register him, and, under the statutes of the
United States, if he offered to perform all that was necessary
to be done by him to register, and was refused, and afterwards
presented himself at the proper voting place and offered to
vote and again offered to perform everything required of him
under the law, and his vote was still refused, it would be the
duty of the House to see to it that he is not deprived of his
right to participate in the choice of his officers.
Unfortunately, in this case the proof falls far short of that
which is required to enable the House to apply the proper
remedy. That there were many instances in which the officers of
the registration arbitrarily refused to do their duty is
apparent. That many electors were deprived of their right to
vote in consequence of this action is also apparent; but in
going through the testimony in this case the number thus
refused registration and refused the right to vote if added to
contestant's vote would not elect him. Neither is it shown
sufficiently for whom the nonregistered voters would have voted
had they been allowed that right.
As can be seen from the above mentioned cases the problem
involved not so much the registration irregularities themselves
but, rather, conceding the irregularities, the amount of and nature
of the proof required of the contestant to substantiate his claim
of a right to the seat in question. Where the proof offered by the
contestant shows how those who were not permitted to vote would
have voted and that they tendered a vote and were wrongfully
rejected, the House has generally found that this is sufficient to
warrant counting the votes as cast. Then if in counting these votes
the contestant receives more votes than the contestee he gets the
seat. This line of reasoning conforms with the earlier stated
standard of preserving and correcting the return if it is at all
possible, and with the concept that contestant bears the burden of
proof in seeking to have certified returns rejected.
The House of Representatives has rather consistently been
hesitant in declaring a seat vacant preferring rather to measure
the wrong and correct the returns, if this is at all possible.
This preference for protecting the initial returns and
correcting them if the evidence shows that they are incorrect is
amply illustrated in the contests wherein fraud has been proven,
and in contests involving possible rejection of returns. In fact in
the index to Hinds and Cannon under Election of Rep
[[Page 1269]]
resentatives, section 376 is entitled ``Returns, Purging of.--Not
To Be Rejected If Corrections May Be Made'' and section 377 is
entitled ``Returns, Purging of.--Not To Be Rejected Even for Fraud
If Correction May Be Made.'' Under these two headings are three
full pages of citations.
Considering the above precedents along with the statement from
the committee report in the election contest of Gormley v. Goss
[Sec. 47.9, supra], House Report No. 893, 73d Congress, second
session wherein it was held that:
. . . your committee has been guided by the following
postulates deemed established by law and the rules and
precedents of the House of Representatives:
1. The official returns are prima facie evidence of the
regularity and correctness of official action.
2. That election officials are presumed to have performed
their duties loyally and honestly.
3. The burden of coming forward with evidence to meet or
resist these presumptions rests with the contestants. It is
clear that the contestant in this case has failed to meet these
presumptions and requirements.
The major flaw in the contestant's case is that he fails to
carry forward with his claim to the seat as required by the
precedents of the House of Representatives and the Federal
Contested Election Act. A bare claim to the seat as the
contestant makes in his notice of contest without
substantiating evidence ignores the impact of this requirement
and any contest based on this coupled with a request for the
seat to be declared vacant must under the precedents fail. The
requirement that the contestant make a claim to the seat is not
a hollow one. It is rather the very substance of any contest.
Such a requirement carries with it the implication that the
contestant will offer proof of such nature that the House of
Representatives acting on his allegations alone could seat the
contestant.
That the contestant in the present case fails to do this is
quite clear. If all of his allegations were found to be correct
he would still not be entitled to the seat. It is perhaps
stating the obvious but a contest for a seat in the House of
Representatives is a matter of most serious import and not
something to be undertaken lightly. It involves the possibility
of rejecting the certified returns of a state and calling into
doubt the entire electoral process. Thus the burden of proof
placed on the contestant is necessarily substantial.
In this case the contestant has not met this burden of
proof. He makes no substantial offer to show any of the
following elements, much less all of them which are necessary
to his case: (1) that those whose names were stricken from the
registration list were, at the time of the election, qualified
resident voters of the 38th Congressional District of
California; (2) that those whose names were so stricken offered
to vote; and (3) that a sufficient number to change the result
offered to vote and were denied by election officials because
their names had been stricken from the registration lists would
have voted for the contestant had they not been so denied. Had
all of the criteria been met then it would have been incumbent
upon the committee to pass, in the first instance, on the
actions of the registrars in Riverside County and then on the
validity of the evidence offered, but such is not the ease
here.
The type of relief that the contestant seeks is not a
proper one. The contestant is limited, as was noted above, to
claiming the seat in question and offering proof to
substantiate that claim. Declaring a vacancy in the seat is one
of the options
[[Page 1270]]
available to the House of Representatives and is generally
exercised when the House decides that the contestant, while he
has failed to justify his claim to the seat, has succeeded in
so impeaching the returns that the House believes that the only
alternative available to determine the will of the electorate
is to hold a new election.
The committee also takes note of the time factor involved
in the contest. It appears from the record available to the
committee that the contestant had, at the very minimum, three
months notice in advance of the election of the actions here
protested of the registrars. It would seem that if the
contestant had any reservations about such actions the proper
forum in which to test such reservations would have been the
California courts. In election matters the courts have
generally been inclined to expedite the case and we feel
certain that such would have been the case in California had
the contestant chosen to so act. From the record it appears
rather that the contestant decided to take his chances and we
feel constrained to abide by that decision.
On Nov. 9, 1971, Mr. Abbitt, by direction of the Committee on House
Administration, called up House Resolution 507 (accompanying H. Rept.
No. 92-626) which provided:
H. Res. 507
Resolved, That the election contest of David A. Tunno,
contestant, against Victor V. Veysey, contestee, Thirty-eighth
Congressional District of the State of California, be dismissed.
The resolution dismissing the contest was agreed to by the House
and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.(11)
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11. 117 Cong. Rec. 40017, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
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Note: Syllabi for Tunno v Veysey may be found herein at Sec. 35.7
(burden of showing results of election would be changed); Sec. 35.8
(burden of establishing claim to seat); Sec. 42.11 (disposal by
resolution declaring seat vacant).
ELECTION CONTESTS--APPENDIX
DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS
[[Page 1271]]
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 9
Note.--Chapter 9 discusses contested election cases in the House of
Representatives beginning with the year 1931. This appendix to Chapter
9 contains a digest of contested election cases for the years 1917
through 1931 (the 65th through the 71st Congresses), arranged by
Congress and case name. It was thought necessary to include this
material in an appendix to provide a more comprehensive coverage than
now exists of election cases for the years cited.
Contested election cases from the first 64 Congresses have been
presented in other works. In 1901, Mr. Chester H. Rowell completed
preparation of a digest of all contested election cases in the House of
Representatives from the 1st through the 56th Congresses. Mr. Rowell's
intention was to summarize earlier compilations of such cases. As he
stated in a preface to his work:
Most of the reports in the first fifty-two Congresses are included
in the nine volumes known from the name of their compilers as: (1)
Clarke and Hall (First to Twenty-third Congress), (2) 1 Bartlett
(Twenty-fourth to Thirty-eighth Congress), (3) 2 Bartlett (Thirty-ninth
to Forty-first Congress), (4) Smith (Forty-second to Forty-fourth
Congress), (5) 1 Ellsworth (Forty-fifth and Forty-sixth Congresses),
(6) 2 Ellsworth (Forty-seventh Congress), (7) Mobley (Forty-eighth to
Fiftieth Congress), (8) Rowell (Fifty-first Congress), and (9) Stofer
(Fifty-second Congress).
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Commentary and editing by Assistant Parliamentarian Charles W. Johnson.
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The volumes referred to, he noted, were largely unedited and in
some degree incomplete. To correct these deficiencies, Mr. Rowell
compiled his one-volume digest, the first half of which contained
condensations of case reports arranged chronologically by Congress,
with headnotes and a summary of actions taken by the House. The second
part of Mr. Rowell's work consisted of a digest of the law and
precedents established by the cases.
In 1919, Mr. Merrill Moores continued the presentation of contested
election cases by compiling a digest of such cases in the House arising
from the 57th through the 64th Congresses (1901-1917). (See H. Doc. No.
2052, 64th Cong.)
It is hoped that Chapter 9 and this appendix thereto, together with
the above-mentioned works, will provide a sufficiently comprehensive
treatment of all precedents arising from contested election cases.
[[Page 1273]]