[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9.  Election Contests]
[M. Summaries of Election Contests, 1931-72]
[Â§ 59. Eighty-seventh Congress, 1961-62]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1226-1239]
 
                               CHAPTER 9
 
                           Election Contests
 
               M. SUMMARIES OF ELECTION CONTESTS, 1931-72
 
Sec. 59. Eighty-seventh Congress, 1961-62

Sec. 59.1 Roush or Chambers

    In 1961, the House conducted an investigation of the question of 
the right of J. Edward Roush or George O. Chambers, from the Fifth 
Congressional District of Indiana, to a seat in the 87th Congress, 
although the case was not one that had been brought pursuant to the 
contested election statute.

    On the organization of the House of Representatives of the 87th 
Congress on Jan. 3, 1961, Mr. Clifford Davis, of Tennessee, objected to 
the oath being administered to the Member-elect, George O. Chambers, 
from the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana, who was then asked by 
the Chair, under the precedents, to stand aside while other Members-
elect and the Resident Commissioner-elect were sworn.
    Mr. Davis then submitted the following resolution: (16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 107 Cong. Rec. 23-25, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Resolved, That the question of the right of J. Edward Roush or 
    George O. 

[[Page 1227]]

    Chambers, from the Fifth Congressional District of 
    Indiana, to a seat in the Eighty-seventh Congress be referred to 
    the Committee on House Administration, when elected, and said 
    committee shall have the power to send for persons and papers and 
    examine witnesses on oath in relation to the subject matter of this 
    resolution; and be it further
        Resolved, That until such committee shall report upon and the 
    House decide the question of the right of either J. Edward Roush or 
    George O. Chambers to a seat in the Eighty-seventh Congress, 
    neither shall be sworn.

    Mr. Davis immediately moved the previous question on the 
resolution, which was ordered by a roll call vote of 252 yeas to 166 
nays. The House then agreed to the resolution by division, 205 yeas to 
95 nays. Thus the adoption of House Resolution 1 automatically 
nullified the certificate of election which had been issued by the 
Governor of Indiana on Nov. 15, 1960, which certified that Mr. Chambers 
had been elected by a 12-vote majority out of 214,615 ballots cast.
    Upon election and organization of the Committee on House 
Administration, its Subcommittee on Elections, acting pursuant to a 
motion adopted by the full committee to conduct a complete recount of 
ballots, proceeded to the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana to 
conduct the required investigation and recount. The actual counting of 
ballots and auditing of returns was accomplished by 13 auditors of the 
General Accounting Office assigned to the committee. The counting 
procedures as prescribed by the committee were as follows: (1) 
examination and removal of all material pertinent to the congressional 
election; (2) separation of materials by category; (3) counting of 
ballots by categories; (4) recorded count by category for each 
precinct; (5) packaging and labelling all materials to be retained and 
removed from counties by committee; (6) recording data from precinct 
audit sheets on summary analysis sheets for each county; (7) 
summarizing county totals on analysis; and (8) returning remaining 
material to precinct container.
    Prior to the counting by the committee auditors, the subcommittee 
had met in executive session to establish the following criteria for 
classifying ballots examined and categorized by the auditors:
    A. Regular ballots:
    1. Paper ballots were considered regular if, among other 
requirements, they were (a) marked with a blue pencil for 
``nonabsentee'' ballots; (b) marked by a clearly defined ``X''--two 
discernible lines 

[[Page 1228]]

crossing at any angle; (c) and marked by two initials 
on the lower left of the reverse side.
    2. All machine ballots, determined from reading the voting 
machine registers assigned to the respective candidate, were classified 
as regular.
    B. Questionable ballots (all ballots not meeting the criteria 
established for regular ballots) were characterized by:
    1. Any mark other than an acceptable mark.
    2. Any apparently distinguishing mark, erasure, or strikeover.
    3. A mark made other than with blue pencil for nonabsentee ballots.
    4. A mark not in the proper place, as lines not crossing within a 
box.
    5. Multiple markings for the same office.
    6. Ballots without proper markings on the reverse side, lower left 
corner.
    C. Absentee ballots, regular or questionable: the same criteria as 
above were applied except:
    1. Marking was permissible with any color ink or pencil, and
    2. Ballots were examined for seal and signature or initials of 
county clerk on reverse side in lower left corner.
    D. Ballots with no votes for Congressman.
    In its initial investigation conducted in the Fifth Congressional 
District of Indiana, the subcommittee also examined and retained 
absentee and nonabsentee ballots which had not been counted by precinct 
officials, as well as all other materials relevant to the congressional 
election. Voters' poll lists and tally sheets were compared with 
certificates of total votes cast, and discrepancies noted.
    The Subcommittee on Elections, meeting in executive session on Mar. 
15, 1961, in Washington, directed that ballots classified as 
questionable or questionable absentee ballots or ballots not counted by 
precinct officials, be held by the committee for further review. 
(Regular ballots, determined as such during the first investigation, 
were not held for further review.) The above categories were further 
classified into 30 subcategories. The subcommittee, considering the 
lack of uniformity in the interpretation of the Indiana election laws 
by various local officials, adopted, on Apr. 12, 1961, a motion 
designed to achieve uniformity. The adoption of such motion resulted in 
several actions taken by the Subcommittee on Elections which were not 
consistent with Indiana statutes and court opinions in point. One 
effect 

[[Page 1229]]

of the adoption of these rules was validation of the ballots 
marked with some instrument other than a blue pencil, some of which had 
been counted and some of which had been rejected by the precinct 
officials. There were 436 such ballots, 10 of which had been rejected 
by local officials. The subcommittee ruled that all 436 ballots were 
valid, despite Indiana court opinions which had invalidated ballots 
(nonabsentee paper ballots) marked with ink or lead pencil. With 
respect to absentee ballots either marked and then retraced with red 
lead pencil, or marked with black lead pencil but having one line of 
the ``X'' retraced and crossing two parallel lines at least one-
sixteenth of an inch apart, the subcommittees disregarded state court 
opinions which had ruled such ballots invalid. The subcommittee cited 
instances [Goodich v Bullock (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1038) and Kearby 
v Abbott (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1076)] in which the House had held 
that state statutory requirements that ballots be marked with 
designated instruments were directory and not mandatory, particularly 
where the proper instrument was not available to the voter. [See also 
Denny, Jr. v Owens (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1088).] Further, the 
subcommittee ruled that where state law does not declare ballots void 
when an improper instrument is used, as was the case under Indiana 
``Rules for Counting Votes,'' which were silent on the matter, the law 
designating use of certain instruments was merely directory.

    In adopting as valid the distinction between mandatory and 
directory provisions of state law pertaining to elections, the 
subcommittee cited the Nebraska case of Waggonner v Russell, 34 Neb. 
116, 51 N.W. 465 (1892), which had incorporated language from Paines' 
treatise on elections as follows:

        In general, those statutory provisions which fix the day and 
    the place of the election and the qualifications of the voters are 
    substantial and mandatory, while those which relate to the mode of 
    procedure in the election, and to the record and the return of the 
    results, are formal and directory. Statutory provisions relating to 
    elections are not rendered mandatory, as to the people, by the 
    circumstance that the officers of the election are subjected to 
    criminal liability for their violation.

    Adoption by the subcommittee of the motion referred to above also 
had the effect of validating all regular ballots and absentee ballots 
not properly initialed on the back by the precinct clerks. Absentee 
ballots were accepted where the county clerk's initials 

[[Page 1230]]

or signature appeared on the back so long as there also appeared on 
the back the seal of the county clerk. Thus, 2,492 ballots consid- 
ered questionable were validated under this rule, though 562 of those 
ballots were reconsidered under other questionable categories. In 
resolving that the initialing requirements of state law were directory 
rather than mandatory, provided that the clerk's seal was affixed and 
his initials were upon absentee ballots, the subcommittee obviated 
state law requiring that two precinct clerks initial in ink the backs 
of nonabsentee ballots in the lower left corner and that the voter fold 
the ballot to expose the initials, and stating that ballots not bearing 
clerk's initials were void. The subcommittee agreed with an Indiana 
Supreme Court opinion which had held that a precinct clerk's initials 
need not be in ink. The subcommittee, however, overruled state court 
decisions that ballots which did bear two sets of initials were void. 
The subcommittee did accept state law that the clerk's seal was 
mandatory on the absent voter's ballot, as well as state court opinions 
that absentee ballots were valid without the initials of the precinct 
or poll clerks, but with the initials (not necessarily the signature) 
of the county clerk. The subcommittee then considered precedents of the 
House, citing Moss v Rhea (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1120) for the 
proposition that ``the failure of the clerks to initial the ballots was 
a mistake of which the voter himself was not a participant and the 
ballots should be counted.'' Citing McCrary, A Treatise on the Law of 
Elections (1897 ed., 522, 523) the committee report affirmed the 
proposition that the ``acts of election officials are merely directory 
and the voter will not be disfranchised for failure of these officials 
to perform their duty.''
    The committee report then distinguished two House election contests 
[Steward v Childs (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1056) and Belknap v 
Richardson (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1042)] in which the Committee on 
House Elections in its report had rejected ballots which did not bear 
initials of precinct clerks as required by state law, but upon which 
reports the House did not act. The committee report then cited the 
contest of Taylor v England (6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 177) in which 
case the Committee on House Elections had unanimously agreed that:

        The House of Representatives should not consider itself 
    obligated to follow the drastic statute of the State of West 
    Virginia, under the provisions of which 

[[Page 1231]]

    all ballots not personally signed by the clerks of election in 
    strict compliance with the  manner prescribed had been rejected, 
    but should retain the discretionary right to follow the rule of en- 
    deavoring to discover the clear intention of the voter.

    As part of the motion described above, the Subcommittee on 
Elections had agreed to accept as valid those ballots so marked as to 
indicate the clear intention of the voter, provided that the ballots 
did not bear any distinguishing mark, that is, a mark which would 
enable a person to single out and separate the particular ballot from 
others cast, thereby evading the law insuring the secrecy of the 
ballot. The committee report cited the provisions of state law which 
governed the form of county ballots to be used and the way they were to 
be marked, as well as the statutory rules for counting votes, as 
interpreted by the Indiana Supreme Court. The subcommittee found that 
there had been no uniform application of the counting rules by precinct 
officials. The subcommittee also found that there was no provision of 
state law authorizing a state recount for a legislative offlce. 
Consequently, by the adoption of its ground rules, the Subcommittee on 
Elections took the following initial action before ruling on the 
counting of ballots marked apparently not in strict conformity with 
what the subcommittee deemed very narrow court interpretations of very 
strict statutory rules for marking of a ballot:

        Resolved, That the Subcommittee on Elections hereby agrees that 
    it will accept the precedents of the House of Representatives as 
    binding in reaching its decision to the extent that the power to 
    examine ballots and to correct both deliberate and inadvertent 
    mistakes be vested in the subcommittee, the decisions of the 
    Indiana courts being not necessarily conclusive but guiding and 
    controlling only when such decisions commend themselves to the 
    subcommittee's consideration.

    The committee report posed as the central issue to be decided, the 
question of whether the ``House will necessarily follow state court 
decisions in ruling on validity of questionable ballots, particularly 
when those decisions seem to be contrary to the intention of the voter 
in honestly trying to indicate a choice between candidates.'' The 
report then cited several ``instances in which the House, through its 
Committee on Elections, has held that decisions of a state court are 
not binding on the House in the examination of ballots to correct 
deliberate or inadvertent mistakes and errors.'' [Brown v Hicks (6 
Cannon's Precedents Sec. 143) and Carney v Smith (6 Cannon's Precedents 

[[Page 1232]]

Sec. 146).] The committee report then stated as follows:

        Although the House of Representatives generally follows State 
    law and the rulings of State courts in resolving election contests, 
    this is not necessarily so with respect to the validity of ballots 
    where the intention of the voter is clear and there is no evidence 
    of fraud.

    The committee report then cited precedents of the House in which 
the Committee on House Elections (1) had declined to reject ballots 
because not marked strictly within the square as required by state law 
[Moss v Rhea (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1121), H. Rept. No. 1959, 57th 
Cong.]; (2) had gone behind the ballot to ascertain the intent of the 
voter by bringing in evidence of circumstances surrounding the election 
so as to explain ambiguities (not to contradict ballots) [Lee v Rainey 
(1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 641), H. Rept. No. 578, 44th Cong.]; (3) had 
held that ``there being no doubt of the intent of the voter, the wrong 
spelling of a candidate's name does not vitiate the ballot'' [Stroback 
v Herbert (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 966), H. Rept. No. 1521, 47th 
Cong.]; and (4) where there was no ambiguity, had declined to go beyond 
the ballots to derive intention of voters [Wallace v McKinley (2 Hinds' 
Precedents Sec. 987), H. Rept. No. 1548, 48th Cong.].

    Having cited these precedents, the subcommittee proceeded to 
evaluate the various categories of questionable ballots to determine 
``whether the intent of the voter was clear from the markings on the 
ballots and whether the ballots were cast by properly registered 
voters.''
    With respect to sustaining the intention of the voter in judging 
many ballots irregularly marked, certain members of the subcommittee 
voted against validating many such ballots, contending that the motion 
adopted by the subcommittee regarding intention of the voter was being 
too liberally construed by the subcommittee, in contradiction to 
precedents which had voided similar ballots. Mr. John Lesinski, Jr., of 
Michigan, ``felt that the intention of the voter was not sufficiently 
clear . . . where the party was marked and the voter also marked the 
square for individual candidates for other offices in the same party 
column but did not mark the square opposite the congressional 
candidate.''
    The subcommittee evaluated the validity of 85 absentee servicemen's 
ballots, or ballots of dependents of servicemen, which had been 
rejected, 28 of them having been marked ``not registered'' by local 
election officials. In 1953 the 

[[Page 1233]]

Indiana legislature had adopted a general absentee registration law 
which made it mandatory for the clerk of the circuit court or the 
board of registration of a county to register without further 
application any member of the armed forces upon application, properly 
executed, for an absentee ballot. In 1957 the legislature attempted to 
repeal that provision making a member of the armed forces application 
for an absentee ballot sufficient to constitute registration.
    The committee elicited and accepted as binding opinions from the 
bipartisan state election board, all of which construed the above 
statute to require that if such an application be received by the 
county clerk, that an application for registration shall be sent to the 
serviceman so applying and that an absentee ballot sent to a serviceman 
not registered as provided by law could not be counted because there 
was no automatic system of registration under state law.
    The subcommittee found that 918 more ballots had been voted than 
the total number of persons who had signed voters' poll lists or whose 
names were written in as absentee voters. The subcommittee 
investigation disclosed no evidence of fraud, but numerous instances 
wherein precinct election officials had not required voters to sign 
poll lists, although affidavits of registration were marked to reflect 
that only eligible voters had voted. Thus the subcommittee validated 
all ballots cast by persons who had not signed poll lists, which were 
otherwise valid.
    Following the election in November 1960, two candidates filed 
affidavits with the Special Campaign Expenditures Committee of the 86th 
Congress. Mr. Roush alleged that more absentee ballots had been 
recorded as cast than had been cast, and the special committee, upon 
conducting an investigation, reported that Mr. Chambers had been 
incorrectly credited with 11 too many absentee votes, and that Mr. 
Roush had incorrectly received four too many, a net loss of seven votes 
to Chambers. Mr. Chambers alleged that a tally sheet error in another 
precinct would add five votes to his total, and would thereby re-
establish his overall majority at three votes. The special committee 
did not investigate Mr. Chambers' petition. This action by the Special 
Campaign Expenditures Committee prompted Mr. Glenard P. Lipscomb, of 
California, Mr. John B. Anderson, of Illinois, Mr. Charles E. 
Chamberlain, of Michigan, and Mr. Charles E. Goodell, 

[[Page 1234]]

of New York, to file additional views to the final report of the 
Committee on House Administration in this contest. These minor- 
ity members of the committee objected to the action taken by the House 
in the adoption of House Resolution 1, whereby the House had declared 
the seat from the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana vacant 
pending final report of the committee. These members in their 
additional views cited the House Rules and Manual, Sec. 236 as follows:

        [B]ut the House admits on his prima facie showing and without 
    regard to final right a Member-elect from a recognized constituency 
    whose credentials are in due form and whose qualifications are 
    unquestioned (1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 528-534).

    These members claimed that a document circulated by the Clerk of 
the House, containing a compilation purporting to certify that Mr. 
Roush had been elected by two votes, but which had taken cognizance 
only of the claims made by the Special Committee on Campaign 
Expenditures, was partially instrumental in denying Mr. Chambers the 
prima facie right to his seat.
    In its investigation of the question of the final right to the 
congressional seat from the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana, 
the Subcommittee on Elections considered both petitions filed by the 
candidates with the Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures of the 
86th Congress, though that special committee had only investigated Mr. 
Roush's petition. The subcommittee found that Mr. Chambers had not been 
denied five votes due to failure to count five tally marks in 
unnumbered blanks. The subcommittee ruled that only one of the two 
tally sheets from the precinct in question showed these five tally 
marks, but that this tally sheet had not been filed with the precinct 
material, and that ``the congressional ballots counted by the auditors 
for the entire precinct total agreed with the total vote for both 
congressional candidates as shown on the precinct certification.'' The 
subcommittee investigation confirmed the report of the special 
committee with respect to the petition filed by Mr. Roush, which 
claimed that 15 more absentee ballots had been recorded as cast than 
had been cast. The subcommittee therefore ruled that in Jefferson 
Precinct No. 1, Mr. Chambers had suffered a net loss of seven votes.
    The subcommittee found that in Precinct No. 4 of Madison County, 42 
absentee ballots had been illegally procured and cast, though there was 
no proof as to the per-

[[Page 1235]]

son for whom they were cast. The subcommittee applied the ``general 
rule followed in the House for deduction of illegal votes where it is 
impossible to determine for which candidate they were counted.''
    Thus the subcommittee first determined the total votes cast for 
each candidate in the precinct (615 for Mr. Roush and 352 for Mr. 
Chambers), then determined the number of absentee votes counted for 
each candidate in the precinct (20 for Mr. Roush and 42 for Mr. 
Chambers), a total of 62 absentee ballots counted, 68 percent of which 
were cast for Mr. Chambers and 32 percent for Mr. Roush. Applying these 
percentages to the 42 votes to be deducted, the subcommittee deducted 
29 votes from Mr. Chambers' total and 13 votes from Mr. Roush's total. 
The committee report then proceeded to cite precedents of the House in 
which the proportionate deduction method had been followed [for 
example, Oliver v Hale, H. Rept. No. 2482, 85th Cong.; Macy v 
Greenwood, H. Rept. No. 1599, 82d Cong.; Finley v Walls (2 Hinds' 
Precedents Sec. 903); Platt v Goode (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 923); 
Finley v Bisbee (2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 934); Wickersham v Sulzer and 
Grigsby (6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 113); Chandler v Bloom (6 Cannon's 
Precedents Sec. 160); Bailey v Walters (6 Cannon's Precedents 
Sec. 166); and Paul v Harrison (6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 158)].

    The subcommittee took special precautions to insure the integrity 
of the questionable ballots by adopting a motion requiring the 
separation and sealing of all ballots ruled valid or invalid, without 
having been counted, and then requiring all previously sealed ballots 
to be opened and the final results of the election determined by two 
teams composed of a subcommittee member and a staff auditor. The count 
of the 6,072 questionable ballots was then rechecked by the audit 
staff, and no differences were noted. Thus the recount conducted by the 
Subcommittee on Elections showed Mr. Roush to have received a majority 
of 99 votes.
    The additional views cited above expressed concern over what 
appeared to be inconsistent positions taken by the subcommittee, which 
had validated nonabsentee ballots in disregard of previous decisions of 
local precinct boards, but which had invalidated absentee ballots by 
adopting a policy of accepting the decisions of the local authorities, 
particularly with respect to servicemen's ballots, rather than 
``persisting in its liberal interpretation 

[[Page 1236]]

of the law when the servicemen's ballots were before us.'' The 
members signing the additional views also expressed a hope that future 
contests would be decided according to statutes governing contested 
election cases, at a greatly reduced cost. These members advocated new 
federal legislation.
    Robert T. Ashmore, of South Carolina, Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Elections, submitted the unanimous report from the Committee on 
House Administration, which report had been unanimously recommended by 
the subcommittee, on June 13, 1961. This report (H. Rept. No. 513) 
accompanied House Resolution 339,(17) which was referred to 
the House Calendar and ordered printed as follows:
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17. 107 Cong. Rec. 10186, 87th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Whereas the Committee on House Administration has concluded its 
    investigation, including a recount of the ballots cast at the 
    election of November 8, 1960, in the Fifth Congressional District 
    of Indiana, pursuant to House Resolution 1; and
        Whereas such investigation and recount reveals that J. Edward 
    Roush received a majority of the votes cast in said district for 
    Representative in Congress: Therefore, be it
        Resolved, That J. Edward Roush was duly elected as a 
    Representative to the Eighty-seventh Congress from the Fifth 
    Congressional District of Indiana, and is entitled to a seat 
    therein.

    On June 14, 1961, preceding debate in the House on the above 
resolution, John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, the Majority Leader, 
requested:

        Mr. Speaker, in connection with the debate on the Roush-
    Chambers election matter today, I ask unanimous consent that 
    general debate may continue for not longer than two hours; in other 
    words, to provide an additional hour of general debate. That time, 
    under my unanimous-consent request, is to be equally divided 
    between the chairman of the subcommittee and the ranking minority 
    member, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Schenck]; also, that upon the 
    termination of debate, the previous question shall be considered as 
    ordered.

    During the debate which ensued, Mr. Ashmore, the subcommittee 
chairman, emphasized that ``the intention of the voter was usually the 
controlling factor in passing upon these questionable ballots by your 
committee.'' He then pointed to the practice adopted by the 
subcommittee of separating and sealing ballots by category, and then 
examined and either validated or invalidated by the subcommittee by 
groups, without the subcommittee knowing for whom they had been cast.
    Mr. Paul F. Schenck, of Ohio, the ranking minority member of the 
full committee, questioned ``the possible overlap of jurisdiction of a 
special committee ap-


[[Page 1237]]

pointed each two years for the purpose of studying campaign 
expenditures . . . that the special 
committee in this past 86th Congress went too far and went beyond its 
proper jurisdiction in the actions recommended by its chairman on 
January 3 of this year.''
    Mr. Charles A. Halleck, Mr. E. Ross Adair, Mr. Richard L. 
Roudebush, Mr. William G. Bray, Mr. Earl Wilson, Mr. Ralph Harvey, and 
Mr. Donald C. Bruce, Members of the 87th Congress from Indiana, all 
joined with Mr. William C. Cramer, of Florida, ranking minority member 
of the Special Committee on Campaign Expenditures of the 86th Congress, 
to (1) dispute the initial need for a recount contrary to the three 
certifications of the Indiana secretary of state that Mr. Chambers had 
been duly elected, which fact was not understood by many majority 
members who were led to believe by the document circulated by the Clerk 
that both candidates had been certified; (2) to protest the action by 
the House in declaring the seat vacant with out permitting debate; and 
(3) to dispute the uniform ``ground rules'' adopted by the 
subcommittee, which did not follow the laws of the State of Indiana, to 
determine the validity of questionable ballots. They contended that the 
fact that local officials had not uniformly applied state election laws 
was no reason for the subcommittee to prescribe new rules, but rather 
that the subcommittee should better have uniformly applied State law.
    In response to (3) above, Mr. Ashmore stated that the Committee on 
House Elections has always been reluctant to refuse to follow state 
elections laws, but that, under the Constitution which makes each House 
the final judge of the elections and returns of its members, the House 
is free to regard state law when it so desires.

    Mr. McCormack argued that the House was fully justified in 
declaring the seat vacant, as the certificates of election, being 
merely prima facie evidence of election, had been sufficiently 
contradicted by certificates of error filed by county clerks and by the 
facts found by the Special Committee to Investigate Campaign 
Expenditures.
    All time having expired for general debate on the resolution, the 
resolution was agreed to by a division vote demanded by Mr. Wilson, of 
Indiana, of 138 yeas to 51 nays. Mr. Roush was thereby declared 
entitled to the seat from the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana, 
and immediately ap-


[[Page 1238]]

peared at the bar of the House and took the oath of office.
    On June 13, 1961, Mr. Ashmore had also submitted the unanimous 
committee report (H. Rept. No. 514) to accompany House Resolution 
540,(18) which provided:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Id. at p. 10391.
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        Resolved, That the House of Representatives having considered 
    the question of the right of J. Edward Roush or George O. Chambers, 
    from the Fifth Congressional District of Indiana, to a seat in the 
    House in the Eighty-seventh Congress, House Resolution 1, Eighty-
    seventh Congress, and having decided that the said J. Edward Roush 
    is entitled to a seat in the House in such Congress with the result 
    that the said J. Edward Roush is entitled to receive and will be 
    paid the compensation, mileage, allowances, and other emoluments of 
    a Member of the House from and after January 3, 1961, there shall 
    be paid out of the contingent fund of the House such amounts as are 
    necessary to carry out the provisions of this resolution in 
    connection with such decision of the House, as follows:
        (1) The said George O. Chambers shall be paid an amount equal 
    to compensation at the rate provided by law for Members of the 
    House for the period beginning January 3, 1961, and ending on the 
    date of such decision of the House.
        (2) The said J. Edward Roush and the said George O. Chambers 
    each shall be paid an amount equal to the mileage at the rate of 10 
    cents per mile, on the same basis as now provided by law for 
    Members of the House, for each round-trip between his home in the 
    Fifth Congressional District of Indiana and Washington, District of 
    Columbia, in response to the request of the Committee on House 
    Administration for his appearance between the committee in 
    connection with the investigation authorized by House Resolution 1, 
    Eighty-seventh Congress.
        (3) The said J. Edward Roush and the said George O. Chambers 
    each shall be reimbursed for those expenses actually incurred by 
    him in connection with the investigation by the Committee on House 
    Administration authorized by House Resolution 1. Eighty-seventh 
    Congress, in accordance with that part of the first section of the 
    Act of March 3, 1879 (20 stat. 400; 2 USC 226), which provides for 
    payment of expenses in election contests.

    The resolution was agreed to without debate and by voice vote. The 
committee report reasoned that ``had the investigation . . . been an 
actual 'election contest,' both the contestant and contestee would have 
been authorized to [claim] reimbursement of those expenses actually 
incurred in connection with the investigation conducted by the 
committee.''
    Note: Syllabi for Roush or Chambers may be found herein at Sec. 9.3 
(certificates of election); Sec. 10.6 (distinction between mandatory 
and directory laws); Sec. 17.2 (alternatives to election contests); 


[[Page 1239]]

Sec. 37.3 (method of proportionate deduction); Sec. 37.18 (marking 
ballot with improper instrument); Sec. 38.4 (state law as an aid in 
interpreting voter intention); Sec. 41.5 
(use of auditors); Sec. 45.4 (payments to candidates involved in 
alternatives to statutory election contests); Sec. 45.5 (retroactive 
payments).