[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9.  Election Contests]
[L. Disposition of Contests; Resolutions]
[Â§ 43. Committee Reports]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1090-1095]
 
                               CHAPTER 9
 
                           Election Contests
 
                L. DISPOSITION OF CONTESTS; RESOLUTIONS
 
Sec. 43. Committee Reports

    Under the House rules, until the 94th Congress, the Committee on 
House Administration was required to make a final report to the House 
in each contested election case.(16)
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16. Rule XI clause 25, House Rules and Manual Sec. 733 (1973).
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    This report was to be made at such time ``as the committee 
considers practicable in that Congress to which the contestee is 
elected.'' (17) Prior to the adoption of this language, the 
rule required submission of final reports not later than six months 
from the first day of the first regular session of the Congress. Such 
rules have been construed as directory rather than 
mandatory.(18)
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17. Id.
18. Id. (notes).

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 In General; Form of Report

Sec. 43.1 The committee report may be summary in form, and may provide 
    for the disposition of more than one contest in the same report.

    In Woodward v O'Brien (Sec. 54.6, infra), a 1947 Illinois contest, 
the Committee on House Administration disposed of the contest in a 
summary report which also provided for the disposition of two other 
cases. The report recited that no testimony in behalf of the contestant 
had been taken during the required period, and recommended that notices 
of intention to contest the elections be dismissed.

Sec. 43.2 An elections committee report may summarily recommend that a 
    contest be dismissed as lacking in merit.

    In Mankin v Davis (Sec. 54.2, infra), a 1947 Georgia election 
contest in which the contestant disputed the method by which the 
contestee had been nominated in the primary election, the committee 
report indicated that the committee had held full hearings in the 
contest, and had given consideration to the contestee's brief, which 
had been filed more than 30 days after reception of a copy of the 
contestant's brief, and the committee summarily recommended that the 
contest be dismissed ``as lacking in merit.'' Accordingly, the contest 
was dismissed.

Sec. 43.3 The Committee on House Administration has submitted a final 
    report on an election contest brought by a defeated primary 
    candidate although there was no record of transmittal of the 
    contest to the committee.

    In the 1951 Georgia contested election of Lowe v Davis (Sec. 56.3, 
infra), there was no record of transmittal of the contest to the 
Committee on House Administration, nor did the House adopt a resolution 
referring the contest to the committee, but the committee nevertheless 
submitted a unanimous report indicating that the contestant, who had 
not been a candidate in the general election, had been defeated by the 
contestee in the primary election and that ``the contestee had not been 
guilty of any acts in connection with that primary which would 
disqualify him for office.''

Resolution Accompanying Report

Sec. 43.4 A member of an elections committee may submit

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    a report on an election contest from the floor for printing in the 
    Record, and then immediately call up an accompanying privileged 
    resolution relating to the contest by unanimous consent.

    In the 1943 Illinois election contest of Moreland v Schuetz 
(Sec. 52.3, infra), after submitting the election committee report that 
the contestant had not introduced sufficient evidence to warrant a 
complete recount, which he had requested, a Member on the election 
committee then by unanimous consent called up on the same day the 
resolution disposing of the contest.
    The House agreed to the resolution.(19)
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19. This procedure has been followed in almost every election contest.
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Timeliness of Report

Sec. 43.5 The rule that required the Committee on House Elections to 
    submit their final reports within six months from the first day of 
    the first regular session to which the contestee was elected was 
    construed to be directory and not mandatory, so as not to prevent 
    the consideration of an election contest reported after the six 
    months had expired.

    In Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New Hampshire contest, a 
point of order was made against acceptance of a final report on an 
election contest by the House in that it was not timely, being in 
violation of former section 47 of Rule XI, which required the 
submission of such reports not later than six months from the first day 
of the first regular session of the Congress to which the contestee was 
elected. The Speaker overruled the point of order challenging the 
report, noting that a mandatory construction of that rule would be 
inconsistent with the constitutional right of the House to judge the 
election of its Members, and inconsistent with the statutory right of 
parties to collect testimony for a longer period.

Sec. 43.6 The Speaker ruled that a point of order could not be directed 
    against reception by the House of an elections committee report 
    that was not presented to the House until after the period required 
    for its submission had expired.

    As noted above, in Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New 
Hampshire contest, Speaker William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, overruled a 
point of order directed against

[[Page 1093]]

the late filing of an elections committee report; an appeal from this 
decision was laid on the table by a roll call vote.

Minority Reports

Sec. 43.7 By unanimous consent, the minority views of an elections 
    committee may be filed subsequent to the filing of the majority 
    final report.

    In Roy v Jenks (Sec. 49.1, infra), a 1938 New Hampshire contest, 
the minority of the Committee on Elections was granted one week, by 
unanimous consent, to file its views.

Sec. 43.8 The minority views of an election committee, though filed 
    subsequent to the views of the majority, were by unanimous consent 
    printed to accompany the views of the majority.

    In the 1932 Illinois election contest of Kunz v Granata (Sec. 46.2, 
infra), the report from the majority on the Committee of Elections No. 
3 was submitted on Mar. 11, 1932, and the following day a member of the 
committee minority was given unanimous consent by the House to print 
the minority views to accompany the majority report.

Sec. 43.9 Dissenting members of a subcommittee on elections have 
    presented minority views and recommendations, together with a 
    chronological chart of events, the rules of the Committee on 
    Elections, and the laws governing contested elections.

    In the 1949 Michigan contested election of Stevens v Blackney 
(Sec. 55.3, infra), the minority report took strong exception to the 
actions of the subcommittee and filed a minority report citing 
precedents of the House, court decisions and federal statutes.

Effect of Contestant's Withdrawal or Abandonment of Contest

Sec. 43.10 The report of an elections committee may recite the fact 
    that contestant had withdrawn his notice of contest, and may 
    include a resolution recommending that contestee be held entitled 
    to his seat.

    In Smith v Polk (Sec. 50.3, infra), a 1939 Ohio contest, a 
unanimous report of the Committee on Elections recited the fact that 
contestant had withdrawn the contest and recommended the following 
resolution:

        Resolved, That the Honorable James G. Polk was duly elected as 
    Representative from the Sixth Congressional

[[Page 1094]]

    District of the State of Ohio to the Seventy-sixth Congress and is 
    entitled to his seat.

Sec. 43.11 There have been instances in which an elections committee 
    has failed to submit a final report, particularly in those cases 
    where the House has been informed that the contestant has abandoned 
    his contest.

    In the 1937 Tennessee contested election case of Rutherford v 
Taylor (Sec. 49.2, infra), the Clerk transmitted a letter to the 
Speaker advising that the contestant had initiated an election contest 
on Dec. 4, 1936, by serving notice on the contestee, a returned Member, 
and had taken testimony on Jan. 27, 29, and again on Apr. 27, 1937, but 
that no further testimony had been adduced. The Clerk advised in the 
letter that the contest had abated. The Speaker referred the letter, 
along with copies of the notice and answer, to the Committee on 
Elections No. 1 and ordered the materials printed as a House 
document.(20)
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20. See also LaGuardia v Lanzetta (Sec. 47.10, infra), a 1934 New York 
        election contest.
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Sec. 43.12 A report of a committee on elections, containing its 
    recommendations as to the disposition of the contest, may include a 
    transcript of contestant's letter of withdrawal.

    In the 1934 Mississippi election contest of Reese v Ellzey 
(Sec. 47.13, infra), the Committee on Elections report contained a 
letter from the contestant withdrawing from the contest, stating in 
part that ``while so many matters of vital importance require the 
attention of the Congress, it would be unpatriotic on my part to 
attempt to occupy the time of Congress about a matter of such trivial 
importance to the welfare of our country.''

Failure of Committee to Submit Report

Sec. 43.13 There have been instances in which an elections committee 
    did not submit a report and the House did not dispose of a contest 
    in which testimony had been taken by the parties and forwarded 
    pursuant to statute.

    In the 1934 Pennsylvania election contest of Felix v Muldowney 
(Sec. 47.7, infra), the Speaker laid before the House a letter from the 
Clerk transmitting the contest instituted by the contestant. That 
communication, containing also original testimony taken by the parties 
and other accompanying

[[Page 1095]]

papers, was referred to the Committee on Elections and ordered printed. 
The committee, however, did not submit a report relating to this 
election contest during the 73d Congress, and the House took no other 
action with respect to the contest.

Sec. 43.14 There have been instances in which the report of the 
    Subcommittee on Elections has been printed and adopted by the full 
    Committee on House Administration, but no further action taken on 
    the election contest.

    In the 1963 Minnesota election contest of Odegard v Olson 
(Sec. 60.1, infra), neither a resolution dismissing the contest or 
declaring the contestee entitled to his seat nor the report of the 
Subcommittee on Elections, was submitted by the Committee on House 
Administration to the House, although the full committee had adopted 
the subcommittee report finding that time for taking testimony had 
expired.