[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 9.  Election Contests]
[J. Evidence]
[Â§ 34. Generally]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 1054-1056]
 
                               CHAPTER 9
 
                           Election Contests
 
                              J. EVIDENCE
 
Sec. 34. Generally


    The ordinary rules of evidence govern in election contests as in 
other cases; thus, the evidence must be relevant and confined to the 
point in issue.(3)~
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 3.  Cannon's Precedents Sec. 77.
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    Evidence taken ex parte and not in conformity with the election 
contests statutes will not be considered.(4)~ Evidence 
gathered by a

[[Page 1055]]

special committee investigating campaign expenditures, however, has 
been submitted to the Committee on House Administration in anticipation 
of the filing of an election contest.(5)~
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 4. Sec. 34.3, infra.
 5. Sec. 34.1, infra.                          -------------------
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Collecting Evidence for Future Use

Sec. 34.1 The findings of a special committee to investigate campaign 
    expenditures for the House, a committee established by the 
    preceding Congress, were given to the Committee on House 
    Administration in the event that a contest would be filed, to be 
    used by the parties to the contest to support their case.

    In the New York contested election of Macy v Greenwood (Sec. 56.4, 
infra), arising from the 1950 elections, the Committee on House 
Administration accepted the findings of the Special Committee to 
Investigate Campaign Expenditures. This committee had been specially 
created by the preceding Congress, the 81st, and directed to report to 
the House by Jan. 3, 1951. The special committee reported that the 
votes in this election had been fairly tabulated.
    The House subsequently agreed to a resolution that the contestee 
was duly elected and entitled to his seat.

Necessity of Producing Evidence

Sec. 34.2 The Subcommittee on Elections informed a contestant, after 
    the filing of notice but before referral, that the House would not 
    order a recount without evidence and before testimony had been 
    taken.

    In the 1949 Michigan contested election case of Stevens v Blackney 
(Sec. 55.3, infra), the Subcommittee on Elections responded on Feb. 15, 
1949, to a letter from a contestant, informing him that the House 
could, ``on recommendation from the committee, order a recount after 
all testimony had been taken, in precincts where the official returns 
were impugned by such evidence.'' [Emphasis supplied.]
    As the minority report later pointed out, before the contest was 
presented to the House on Sept. 22, 1949, ``There was nothing before 
the subcommittee or the House except the contestant's notice and 
contestee's answer thereto.''

Evidence From Ex Parte Proceedings

Sec. 34.3 Transcripts of testimony before local canvassing

[[Page 1056]]

    boards, taken ex parte and prior to the initiation of the election 
    contest in the House, are incompetent as evidence and will not be 
    considered by the Committee on Elections.

    In Hicks v Dondero (Sec. 53.1, infra), a 1945 contest, the 
contestant submitted two copies of transcripts of proceedings before 
the Wayne County, Michigan Canvassing Board, which were held prior to 
the initiation of his election contest in the House. The Committee on 
Elections ruled that such transcripts were entirely ex parse and 
incompetent as proof of any issues urged by contestant.

Testimony at State Inquiry

Sec. 34.4 A committee on elections stated that it was not bound by the 
    actions of a state court in supervising a recount; but the 
    committee denied contestant's motion to suppress testimony obtained 
    at a state inquiry where the contestant had initiated the state 
    recount procedure and would be estopped from offering rebuttal 
    testimony as to the result of the recount.

    In Kent v Coyle (Sec. 46.1, infra), proceedings took place as 
described above. A partial recount had been conducted by a state court 
pursuant to state law; but a committee on elections held that 
contestant had failed to sustain the burden of proof of fraud where a 
discrepancy between the official returns and the partial recount was 
inconclusive.