[Deschler's Precedents, Volume 2, Chapters 7 - 9]
[Chapter 7.  The Members]
[A. The Speaker]
[Â§ 1. In General; Rights and Privileges; Term of Office]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 657-668]
 
                               CHAPTER 7
 
                              The Members
 
                            A. INTRODUCTORY
 
Sec. 1. In General; Rights and Privileges; Term of Office

    Membership in the House of Representatives entitles the Members to 
compensation, to miscellaneous privileges and allowances, and to 
immunities protecting their independence and integrity. But a Member-
elect must first satisfy the House that he has met all the 
qualifications for membership required of him. Those rights, 
immunities, and qualifications are the subject of this 
chapter.(1)
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 1. Delegates and Resident Commissioners enjoy in full or in part the 
        rights and duties arising from congressional membership. Their 
        status is analyzed specifically in Sec. 3, infra, and other 
        sections refer to them where applicable.
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    Ancillary matters dealing primarily with parliamentary procedure, 
such as questions of privilege relating to Members,(2) are 
treated elsewhere.
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 2. For privilege, see Ch. 11, infra.
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    The qualifications for membership, are mandated by the United 
States Constitution.(3) Members' allowances and the methods 
of disbursement thereof are governed by statute, principally title 2 of 
the United States Code. Other matters relating to Members, such as 
seniority and derivative rights, are based on the custom and practice 
of the House.
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 3. See U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, clause 2.
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    The term of office for a Member is mandated by the 20th amendment 
to the Constitution to begin on Jan. 3 of the odd-numbered year for 
which elected, and to extend for two years to noon on Jan. 3 of the 
next odd-numbered year.(4) Prior to the ratification of the 
amendment, the terms of

[[Page 658]]

Members had begun on Mar. 4 of the odd-numbered years and terminated on 
Mar. 3 two years later.(5) If Congress assembles for its 
first session after Jan. 3, Representatives-elect receive salary from 
Jan. 3 if credentials have been filed with the Clerk of the 
House.(6)
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 4. Section 1 of the amendment, ratified in 1933, states that the terms 
        of Senators and Representatives shall end ``at noon on the 3d 
        day of January, of the years in which such terms would have 
        ended if this article had not been ratified'', and section 2 
        states that the first assembly of a Congress ``shall begin at 
        noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint 
        a different day.'' For commentary on the provisions, see House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. 6 (comment to U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, 
        clause 1) and Sec. 279 (comment to amendment 20) (1973).
 5. A joint committee of the First Congress determined that under a 
        resolution of the Continental Congress (First Congress to meet 
        on Mar. 4, 1789) and under U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 2, clause 1 
        (Members to be chosen every second year), the terms of 
        Representatives and Senators of the first class commenced on 
        the 4th of March and terminated two years later on Mar. 3 (see 
        1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 3, 11). That construction was 
        followed until the adoption of the 20th amendment.
 6. 2 USC Sec. 34.
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    Under the Code of Official Conduct, a Member is prohibited from 
accepting any gift of substantial value from any person or organization 
having a direct interest in legislation.(7) A Member is 
required to disclose the amounts of any gifts received for campaign 
expenditures, which are likewise regulated and must be kept separate 
from personal funds under the code.(8) In relation to 
``honorariums,'' a Member is prohibited from accepting more than the 
usual and customary value thereof,(9) and he is required to 
disclose honorariums from a single source aggregating $300 or 
more.(10)
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 7. Rule XLIII clause 4, House Rules and Manual Sec. 939 (1973).
            The Code of Conduct was adopted in the 90th Congress (see 
        Sec. 1.1, infra). For matters relating to the Code of Conduct, 
        see Ch. 12, infra.
 8. Rule XLIII clauses 6, 7, House Rules and Manual Sec. 939 (1973). 
        For disclosure of campaign expenditures, see Ch. 8, infra.
 9. Rule XLIII clause 5, House Rules and Manual Sec. 939 (1973) 
        prohibits Members from receiving more than the ``usual and 
        customary value'' for making a speech, writing for publication, 
        or other similar activity. The rule was adopted in the 90th 
        Congress (see Sec. 1.1, infra).
10. Rule XLIV, part A, clause 3(d) (financial disclosure), House Rules 
        and Manual Sec. 940 (1973). The portion of the rule relating to 
        disclosure of honorariums was adopted in the 91st Congress (see 
        Sec. 1.2, infra).
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    By statute, Congress has consented, pursuant to article I, section 
9, clause 8, to the acceptance by a federal employee of a foreign 
decoration awarded him, subject to the approval of the division of the 
government in which he is employed and the concurrence of the Secretary 
of State.(11) When

[[Page 659]]

such an award is tendered to a Member of the House, it is the Speaker's 
function to approve or disapprove of the accepting and wearing of the 
award.(12) In one instance where the Speaker himself was 
tendered such an award, a private law was enacted so as not to place 
him in the position of reviewing his own application.(13)
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11. 5 USC Sec. 7342(d) approves a decoration ``tendered in recognition 
        of active field service in time of combat operations or awarded 
        for other outstanding or unusually meritorious performance.'' 
        In the absence of the requisite approval and concurrence, the 
        decoration must be deposited as the property of the United 
        States. See 22 USC Sec. 2625 for the disposal of nonapproved 
        decorations.
12. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 159 (comment to U.S. Const. art. I, 
        Sec. 9, clause 8) (1973).
13. See Sec. 1.4, infra.
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    An incidental privilege drawn from statute is the right of a 
Member, Delegate, and the Resident Commissioner to nominate persons for 
appointment to the United States military academies.(14) 
Their power extends to nominating alone, as the power to appoint is 
held by the President.(15)
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14. The principle provisions are 10 USC Sec. 4342 (United States 
        Military Academy), 10 USC Sec. 6954 (United States Naval 
        Academy), and 10 USC Sec. 9342 (United States Air Force 
        Academy).
            For an occasion where a Member resigned from the House 
        under threat of expulsion for allegedly having sold 
        appointments to military academies, see 2 Hinds' Precedents 
        Sec. 1273. The House excluded him when he was re-elected to the 
        same Congress (1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 464).
15. ``All cadets are appointed by the President.'' 10 USC Sec. 4342(d); 
        10 USC Sec. 9342(d). ``Midshipmen at the Naval Academy shall be 
        appointed by the President alone.'' 10 USC Sec. 6953. The 
        latter provision was passed on Aug. 10, 1956, 70 Stat. 429, Ch. 
        1041, to make clear that the appointment power rested in the 
        President alone. See note to 10 USCA Sec. 6953.
            See also Walbach v U.S., 93 Ct. Cl. 494 (1941), holding 
        that Members of Congress have no power of appointment to the 
        Military Academy, but can only nominate for positions.
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    Since 1964, each Congressman has been entitled to a maximum quota 
of five nominated positions in each of the academies at any one 
time.(16) The Delegate from the District of Columbia and the 
Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico are entitled to nominate for 
five openings,(17) and the Delegates from Guam and the 
Virgin Islands are entitled to nominate for one opening.(18) 
Members may request from the secretary of the respective branch of the 
armed services the name of the

[[Page 660]]

Congressman or other nominating authority responsible for the 
nomination of a named individual to an academy.(19)
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16. 10 USC Sec. 4342(a)(4) (Military Academy); 10 USC Sec. 6954(a) (4) 
        (Naval Academy); 10 USC Sec. 9342 (a) (4) (Air Force Academy).
17. 10 USC Sec. 4342(a) (5), (7) (Military Academy); 10 USC 
        Sec. 6954(a) (5), (7) (Naval Academy); 10 USC Sec. 9342(a) (5), 
        (7) (Air Force Academy).
18. 10 USC Sec. 4342(a) (6), (9) (Military Academy); 10 USC 
        Sec. 6954(a) (6), (9) (Naval Academy); 10 USC Sec. 9342(a) (6), 
        (9) (Air Force Academy).
19. 10 USC Sec. 4342(h) (Military Academy); 10 USC Sec. 6954(e) (Naval 
        Academy); 10 USC Sec. 9342(h) (Air Force Academy).
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     The Members are also allotted quotas for nomination of persons to 
the Merchant Marine Academy, depending on state 
population.(20)
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20. See 46 USC Sec. 1126(b)(1).
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                            Cross References
Rights and status of Members before being sworn, see Ch. 1, supra 
    (assembly of Congress) and Ch. 2, supra (enrolling Members and 
    administering the oath).
Number and apportionment of Members, see Ch. 8, infra.
Rights and duties of Members in committees, see Ch. 17, infra.
Conduct, punishment, censure, and expulsion of Members, see Ch. 12, 
    infra.
Status of Members-elect and Delegates-elect, see Ch. 2, supra.
Resignation of Members, see Ch. 37, infra.
Personal privilege of Members, see Ch. 11, infra.
Elections and campaigns of Members, see Ch. 8 and Ch. 9, infra.
Party organization and Members, see Ch. 3, supra.

                          Collateral Reference
Senate Report, Armed Services Committee, Report Relating to the 
    Nomination and Selection of Candidates for Appointment to the 
    Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 
    (1964).                          -------------------

Gifts, Awards, and Honorariums

Sec. 1.1 The House adopted in the 90th Congress a standing rule 
    restricting the acceptance of gifts and honorariums by Members.

    On Apr. 3, 1968, the House passed House Resolution 1099, reported 
from the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, providing for a 
Code of Official Conduct to become part of the rules of the 
House.(1) Clause 4 of the resolution prohibited a Member (or 
officer or employee of the House) from accepting a gift of 
``substantial'' value from persons, corporations, or organizations 
having a direct interest in legislation before Congress.(2) 
Clause 5 of the resolution prohibited a Member (or officer or employee 
of

[[Page 661]]

the House) from accepting an honorarium in excess of the usual and 
customary value of such services.(3)
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 1. 114 Cong. Rec. 8811, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Debate on the resolution 
        begins at p. 8777.
 2. Rule XLIII clause 4, House Rules and Manual Sec. 939 (1973). When 
        the House was considering the resolution, Charles M. Price 
        (Ill.), Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official 
        Conduct, explained clause 4 at 114 Cong. Rec. 8878.
 3. Rule XLIII clause 5, House Rules and Manual Sec. 939 (1973). The 
        Chairman of the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct 
        explained clause 5 at 114 Cong. Rec. 8778, 8779.
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Sec. 1.2 The House amended in the 91st Congress the rules relating to 
    financial disclosure to require disclosure by Members of certain 
    honorariums.

    On May 26, 1970, the House passed House Resolution 796, reported by 
the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, amending standing Rule 
XLIV on financial disclosure.(4) One section of the 
resolution amended paragraph 3 of part A of Rule XLIV by adding the 
requirement that Members (or officers and employees of the House) 
disclose honorariums from a single source aggregating $300 or 
more.(5)
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 4. 116 Cong. Rec. 17020, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Debate on the resolution 
        begins at p. 17013.
 5. Rule XLIV, part A, clause 3(d), House Rules and Manual Sec. 940 
        (1973). Charles M. Price (Ill.), Chairman of the Committee on 
        Standards of Official Conduct, explained the amendment at 116 
        Cong. Rec. 17014.
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Receipt of Foreign Awards

Sec. 1.3 Before Congress consented by statute to the acceptance by 
    federal employees of foreign decorations,(6) the House 
    practice was to pass bills authorizing named Members to accept and 
    wear awards tendered by foreign governments.
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 6. By the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-
        673, 80 Stat. 952, as amended, Pub. L. No. 90-83, 81 Stat. 208 
        (codified as 5 USC Sec. 7342), Congress has granted its consent 
        to the accepting, retaining, and wearing by a federal employee 
        of a decoration tendered in recognition of active field service 
        or awarded for other outstanding or unusually meritorious 
        performance, subject to the approval of his employer and to the 
        concurrence of the Secretary of State.
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    On July 23, 1956,(7) the House passed H.R. 12358, 
discharged from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The bill authorized 
four Members of the House to accept and wear the award of the Cross of 
Grand Commander of the Royal Order of the Phoenix, tendered by the 
Government of the Kingdom of Greece. The bill also provided that 
notwithstanding contrary provisions of the United States Code, the said 
Members could

[[Page 662]]

wear and display such decorations.
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 7. 102 Cong. Rec. 14121, 14122, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Similarly, on July 25, 1956,(8) the House passed H.R. 
12396 authorizing a Member to accept and wear the award of the medal 
for distinguished military service, tendered by the President of the 
Republic of Cuba
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 8. 102 Cong. Rec. 14557, 14558, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Again, on July 25, 1956,(9) the House authorized by H.R. 
12408 two Members of the House and an ambassador to accept and wear the 
award of the Order Al Merito della Republica Italiana tendered by the 
Government of the Republic of Italy.
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 9. 102 Cong. Rec. 14564, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
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Sec. 1.4 Where the Speaker was tendered a decoration from a foreign 
    country, the House agreed to a joint resolution authorizing him to 
    accept and wear the decoration, in order to avoid a conflict of 
    interest.

    On Dec. 21, 1970,(10) the House passed House Joint 
Resolution 1420, authorizing Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, to accept and wear an award conferred by the Government 
of the Republic of Italy. The resolution stated in section 2 that the 
Speaker could wear and display the decoration notwithstanding 5 USC 
Sec. 7342 or any other provision of law to the contrary.
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10. 116 Cong. Rec. 43068, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Parliamentarian's Note: 5 USC Sec. 7342 provides for the granting 
of the consent of Congress to officers and employees of the government 
to accept certain gifts and decorations from foreign governments under 
enumerated conditions. Under section 6 of that statute, the Speaker 
must approve the presentation of such awards to Members of the House. 
In this instance the House passed the resolution to avoid a possible 
conflict wherein the Speaker would approve an award to himself.

Communications With Executive Branch

Sec. 1.5 The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, under 
    authority of the House rules, has issued guidelines for Members and 
    employees in communicating with federal agencies on constituent 
    matters.(11)
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11. Under Rule XI clause 19(e) (4), House Rules and Manual Sec. 720 
        (1973), the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct may 
        issue, on request, advisory opinions with respect to the 
        general propriety of any current or proposed conduct of a 
        Member or employee.

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[[Page 663]]

    On Jan. 26, 1970, Charles M. Price, of Illinois, the Chairman of 
the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, inserted in the Record 
an advisory opinion which established guidelines for Members and 
employees in communicating with departments and agencies of the 
executive branch in relation to problems and complaints of 
constituents.(12)
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12. 116 Cong. Rec. 1077, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.; see also Ch. 12, infra.
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Standing of Member-elect to Sue House Officer

Sec. 1.6 The Speaker announced the institution of a suit by an excluded 
    Member-elect to enjoin the Speaker and other defendants from 
    enforcing the resolution excluding the plaintiff from the House, 
    and seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Speaker to administer 
    him the oath of office as a Member of the 90th Congress.

    On Mar. 9, 1967,(13) Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, informed the House that a summons had been issued, in 
connection with a suit brought by Mr. Adam C. Powell, Jr., of New York, 
and by other parties plaintiff, against Mr. McCormack and against the 
following Members and officers of the House: Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, 
Majority Leader, Gerald R. Ford, of Michigan, Minority Leader, Mr. 
Emanuel Celler, of New York, Mr. Arch A. Moore, Jr., of West Virginia, 
W. Pat Jennings, Clerk, Zeake W. Johnson, Jr., Sergeant at Arms, and 
William M. Miller, Doorkeeper.
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13. 113 Cong. Rec. 6035, 90th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    The summons and the complaint were inserted in the Congressional 
Record.(14) The summons prayed for an injunction against 
enforcement of House Resolution 1 of the 90th Congress, excluding Mr. 
Powell from the House of Representatives, and sought a writ of mandamus 
directing the Speaker to administer Mr. Powell the oath of office as a 
Member of the Congress.(15) The Supreme Court later held, in 
the final determination of the suit referred to by the Speaker, that 
Mr. Powell was improperly excluded from the House.(16)
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14. Id. at pp. 6035-40.
15. Id. at p. 6038.
16. Powell v McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1971), discussed in Sec. 9, 
        infra.
            For other briefs and memoranda relating to the suit brought 
        by Mr. Powell, see 113 Cong. Rec. 8729-62, 90th Cong. 1st 
        Sess., Apr. 10, 1967.

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[[Page 664]]

Standing of Members to Sue in Representative Capacity

Sec. 1.7 The Members of Congress have standing to sue in their 
    representative capacity where the suit would enable them to inquire 
    into certain actions in the discharge of their constitutional 
    duties regarding legislation.

    On May 25, 1971, Mr. Parren J. Mitchell, of Maryland, was 
recognized, under a previous order of the House, to address the House 
for 20 minutes.(17) Mr. Mitchell informed the House that he 
and 12 other Members of the House had filed on Apr. 7, 1971, a suit in 
a U.S. District Court asserting that the war in Indochina was illegal 
because it lacked a decision by Congress to fight such war.
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17. 117 Cong. Rec. 16846, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
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    Mr. Mitchell then inserted in the Record copies of the complaint 
and all briefs filed in that action. The complaint indicated that Mr. 
Mitchell and the other Members were filing suit in their official 
capacity as Representatives in Congress.
    In Mitchell v Laird, the court, in upholding the standing of the 
Members of the House to bring the suit in their representative 
capacity, said:

        However, plaintiffs are not limited by their own concepts of 
    their standing to sue. We perceive that in respects which they have 
    not alleged they may be entitled to complain. If we, for the 
    moment, assume that defendants' actions in continuing the 
    hostilities in Indo-China were or are beyond the authority 
    conferred upon them by the Constitution, a declaration to that 
    effect would bear upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether 
    to impeach defendants, and upon plaintiffs' quite distinct and 
    different duties to make appropriations to support the hostilities, 
    or to take other legislative actions related to such hostilities, 
    such as raising an army or enacting other civil or criminal 
    legislation. In our view, these considerations are sufficient to 
    give plaintiffs a standing to make their complaint. Cf. Flast v 
    Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968); Association of Data Processing Service 
    Organizations, Inc. v Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow v Collins, 
    397 U.S. 159 (1970).(18)
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18. See Mitchell v Laird, 488 F2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
            For other decisions relating to standing to file suit in an 
        official capacity, see Reed et al. v The County Commissioners, 
        277 U.S. 376 (1928); Coleman v Miller, 407 U.S. 433 (1939).
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    On Jan. 26, 1970,(19) Mr. Jerry L. Pettis, of 
California, addressed the House in relation to a brief which he and 31 
other Members had filed in the Federal Appellate Court in the District 
of Columbia

[[Page 665]]

in a case brought against the Civil Aeronautics Board. Mr. Pettis and 
the other Members had asked the court to reverse the decision of the 
board that had recently allowed all domestic interstate airlines to put 
fare increases into effect. The brief and memoranda filed by those 
Members, inserted in the Record,(20) stated that 
``petitioners are proceeding in their capacities as users of the 
airways and Representatives of their respective constituencies and of 
other members of the public who travel by air.'' (1)
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19. 116 Cong. Rec. 1089, 1090, 91st Cong. 21 Sess.
20. Id. at pp. 1089 et seq.
 1. Id. at p. 1090.
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    On June 23, 1971, there was inserted in the Record by Mr. Robert C. 
Eckhardt, of Texas, a brief in support of a motion for intervention in 
an action in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia.(2) The case involved the application by the U.S. 
government for an injunction against the publication by the Washington 
Post of a Defense Department test study on the Vietnam 
conflict.(3) The brief stated that the Members of Congress 
had standing to sue as intervenors because of their ``interest in not 
being deprived of information which would normally flow to them but for 
an intervening act of government restraining that flow.''
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 2. 117 Cong. Rec. 21750-54, 92d Cong. 1st Sess.
 3. Civil Action No. 1235-71, U.S. District Court for the District of 
        Columbia. The controversy was resolved by the Supreme Court in 
        N.Y. Times Co. v U.S., 403 U.S. 713 (1971), where the court 
        ruled the federal government could not restrain publication of 
        the information.
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    On June 28, 1971, Mr. Eckhardt inserted in the Congressional Record 
a second brief on the same case, filed on behalf of 27 Members of 
Congress in opposition to the injunction.(4) The brief 
described the interest of the Members of Congress in the suit as 
follows:
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 4. Mr. Eckhardt's introduction of the brief appears at 117 Cong. Rec. 
        22561, 92( Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Members of Congress, on whose behalf this brief is filed, 
    have a vital interest in the outcome of these cases, distinct from 
    that of the plaintiff, the defendants, or the general public. As 
    members of the national legislature they must have information of 
    the kind involved in these suits in order to carry out their law-
    making and other functions in the legislative branch of the 
    government. They seek to vindicate here a legislative right to 
    know.
        In addition as elected representatives of the people in their 
    districts, Members of Congress have a particular and profound 
    interest in having their constituents obtain all the information 
    necessary to perform their functions as voters and citizens. More 
    than any other officials of government, Members

[[Page 666]]

    of Congress have relations with the public that gives them a 
    crucial concern with the public's right to know.(5)
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 5. Id. at . 22562.
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Sec. 1.8 In the 92d Congress, a Senator instituted an action in a 
    federal district court to challenge the constitutionality of a 
    pocket veto by the President, and was held to have standing to 
    bring such suit in his representative capacity.

    On Aug. 9, 1972, Senator Edward M. Kennedy, of Massachusetts, 
addressed the Senate in relation to his efforts to seek a judicial 
determination of the legal and constitutional issues surrounding the 
President's pocket veto power. He contended that the action of the 
President in withholding his approval of the Family Practice of 
Medicine Act (S. 3418) did not result in a pocket veto because it took 
effect while the Congress was on a brief holiday recess, and not 
adjourned sine die after a Congress or after a session.(6)
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 6. 118 Cong. Rec. 27457, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
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    By unanimous consent, Senator Kennedy inserted in the Congressional 
Record a statement of his contentions, his complaint before the 
District Court for the District of Columbia, and other materials 
relating to the vetoed bill.(7) In the case to which Senator 
Kennedy referred,(8) the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit held, in reliance upon Sierra Club v 
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), Flast v Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), 
Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v Camp, 397 U.S. 150 
(1970), Coleman v Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), and Baker v Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), that the appellee, a United States Senator, had 
standing to maintain a suit, in his capacity as an individual Senator 
who voted in favor of a bill, to challenge the effectiveness of a 
Presidential ``pocket veto'' during an intra-session recess of 
Congress.
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 7. 118 Cong. Rec. 27457-61, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
 8. See Kennedy v Sampson, ____F2d____ (D.C. Cir., Aug. 14, 1974).
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    On the issue of standing, the court concluded that ``appellee's 
object in this lawsuit is to vindicate the effectiveness of his vote. 
No more essential interest could be asserted by a legislator. We are 
satisfied, therefore, that the purposes of the standing doctrine are 
fully served in this litigation.''
    The court then held, on the issue whether the bill allegedly 
pocket-vetoed became a law, that it did become a law, an intra-ses

[[Page 667]]

sion adjournment not preventing the return of a vetoed bill to Congress 
where appropriate arrangements had been made for receipt of 
Presidential messages during the adjournment. (The Secretary of the 
Senate had been authorized by unanimous consent to receive messages 
from the President during the adjournment to a day certain.) 
(9)
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 9. 116 Cong. Rec. 43221, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., Dec. 22, 1970. See also 
        Ch. 24, infra, for discussion of the veto power generally.
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Sec. 1.9 The Senate adopted a resolution authorizing payment from its 
    contingent fund of expenses incurred by a Senator as a party in 
    litigation involving the Speech and Debate Clause of the United 
    States Constitution, and providing for the appointment of a select 
    committee to appear as amicus curiae before the United States 
    Supreme Court and to file a brief on behalf of the Senate in the 
    action.

    On Mar. 23, 1972,(10) the Senate discussed its possible 
intervention in the case of Gravel v United States, involving the 
Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution then pending in the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Senator Maurice R. Gravel, of 
Alaska, being a party thereto. The Senate adopted a resolution (S. Res. 
280) authorizing the President pro tempore, Allen J. Ellender, of 
Louisiana, to appoint Members of the Senate to a committee to seek 
permission to appear as amicus curiae in the case: (11)
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10. 118 Cong. Rec. 9902, 9907, 9915, 9920, 9921, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
11. Gravel v United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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                                 Resolution
    Authorizing Senate intervention in the Supreme Court proceedings on 
        the issue of the scope of article I, section 6, the so-called 
        speech and debate clause of the Constitution

        Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States on Tuesday, 
    February 22, 1972, issued writs of certiorari in the case of Gravel 
    against United States; and
        Whereas this case involves the activities of the junior Senator 
    from Alaska, Mr. Gravel; and
        Whereas in deciding this case the Supreme Court will consider 
    the scope and meaning of the protection provided to Members of 
    Congress by article I, section 6, of the United States 
    Constitution, commonly referred to as the ``Speech or Debate'' 
    clause, including the application of this provision to Senators, 
    their aides, assistants, and associates, and the types of activity 
    protected; and
        Whereas this case necessarily involves the right of the Senate 
    to govern its own internal affairs and to deter

[[Page 668]]

    mine the relevancy and propriety of activity and the scope of a 
    Senator's duties under the rules of the Senate and the 
    Constitution; and
        Whereas this case therefore concerns the constitutional 
    separation of powers between legislative branch and executive and 
    judicial branches of Government; and
        Whereas a decision in this case may impair the constitutional 
    independence and prerogatives of every individual Senator, and of 
    the Senate as a whole; and
        Whereas the United States Senate has a responsibility to insure 
    that its interests are properly and completely represented before 
    the Supreme Court: Now, therefore, be it
        Resolved, That the President pro tempore of the Senate is 
    hereby authorized to appoint a bipartisan committee of Senators to 
    seek permission to appear as amicus curiae before the Supreme Court 
    and to file a brief on behalf of the United States Senate; and be 
    it further
        Resolved, That the members of this bipartisan committee shall 
    be charged with the responsibility to establish limited legal fees 
    for services rendered by outside counsel to the committee, to be 
    paid by the Senate pursuant to these resolutions; be it further
        Resolved, That any expenses incurred by the Committee pursuant 
    to these resolutions including the expense incurred by the Junior 
    Senator from Alaska as a party in the above mentioned litigation in 
    printing records and briefs for the Supreme Court shall be paid 
    from the contingent fund of the Senate on vouchers authorized and 
    signed by the President pro tempore of the Senate and approved by 
    the Committee on Rules and Administration; be it further
        Resolved, That these resolutions do not express any judgment of 
    the action that precipitated these proceedings; and be it further
        Resolved, That the Secretary of the Senate transmit a copy of 
    these resolutions to the Supreme Court.
        Mr. [Michael J.] Mansfield [of Montana]: Mr. President, there 
    are some recommendations relative to the counsel to be appointed 
    from the Democratic side and three associate counsel to assist the 
    chief counsel. Would the Chair make those nominations at this time 
    on behalf of the majority?
        The President Pro Tempore: Under the resolution just agreed to, 
    the Chair appoints the Senator from North Carolina (Mr. Ervin) 
    chief counsel, and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. Eastland), the 
    Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. Pastore), and the Senator from 
    Georgia (Mr. Talmadge) as associate counsel.

        The Presiding Officer (Mr. Stafford) subsequently stated: The 
    Chair, on behalf of the President pro tempore, under Senate 
    Resolution 280, makes the following appointments to the committee 
    established by that resolution: The Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. 
    Cotton), the Senator from Colorado (Mr. Dominick), the Senator from 
    Maryland (Mr. Mathias), and the Senator from Ohio (Mr. Saxbe).



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