[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 17, Chapters 34 - 40]
[Ch. 40. Adjournment]
[C. Adjournment Sine Die]
[Â§ 16. Where Required or Prohibited by Law]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 929-945]
 
                               CHAPTER 40
 
                              Adjournment
 
                        C. Adjournment Sine Die
 
Sec. 16. Where Required or Prohibited by Law

    The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 provides for a sine die 
adjournment of ``not later than July 31 of each year; or (2) in case of 
an odd-numbered year, provide, not later than July 31 of such year, by 
concurrent resolution adopted in each House by roll call vote, for the 
adjournment of the two Houses from that Friday in August which occurs 
at least thirty days before the first Monday in

[[Page 930]]

September (Labor Day) of such year to the second day after Labor 
Day.''(1) The section is not applicable if the Nation is in 
a state of war declared by Congress.(2) In even-numbered 
years and some odd-numbered years, the House has agreed to concurrent 
resolutions waiving the provisions of this law to provide that the two 
Houses shall not adjourn for more than three days or sine die until 
they have adopted a concurrent resolution to that effect.(3) 
To obviate the necessity of adoption of such a concurrent resolution 
waiving Sec. 132 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the two 
Houses have included language ``in consonance with section 132(a)'' in 
its concurrent resolutions providing for adjournments from July until 
September.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 1105, 1106 (2007); 2 USC 
        Sec. 198.
 2. Ibid.
 3. See Sec. 16.2, infra. See also 145 Cong. Rec. 18763, 106th Cong. 
        1st Sess., July 30, 1999 (H. Con. 266); 140 Cong. Rec. 18611-
        15, 103d Cong. 2d Sess., July 29, 1994 (H. Con. Res. 275); 132 
        Cong. Rec. 18146, 18147, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., July 30, 1986 (H. 
        Con. Res. 374); 128 Cong. Rec. 18562, 18563, 97th Cong. 2d 
        Sess., July 29, 1982 (H. Con. Res. 386); and 120 Cong. Rec. 
        25008, 93th Cong. 2d Sess., July 24, 1974 (H. Con. Res. 568).
 4. See Sec. 16.1, infra. See also Sec. 12.1, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The 1970 Act superseded the provisions of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 which required that Congress adjourn sine 
die by the end of July each year unless there existed a state of war or 
national emergency declared by the President. Presidentially declared 
national emergencies of Sept. 8, 1939,(5) May 27, 
1941,(6) and Dec 16, 1950,(7) made the July 31 
adjournment provision moot.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Presidential Proclamation 2352 (54 Stat. 2643).
 6. Presidential Proclamation 2487 (55 Stat. 1647).
 7. Presidential Proclamation 2914 (64 Stat. A454).
 8. See, e.g., Sec. 16.3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement in former Sec. 310(f) of the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 that sine die adjournment resolutions cannot be considered 
until Congress has completed action on the second concurrent resolution 
on the budget and on any required reconciliation legislation was 
repealed by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 
1985.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 1127 (2007); 2 USC Sec. Sec. 601 et 
        seq.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970

Sec. 16.1 The House by unanimous consent considered a

[[Page 931]]

    concurrent resolution of adjournment for its ``August'' recess 
    rendered unprivileged by Sec. 309 and Sec. 310 of the Budget Act.

    On July 27, 2000,(1) the Speaker pro tempore laid before 
the House a Senate concurrent resolution providing for adjournment (or 
recess) of each House for more than three days, from separate alternate 
departure dates, to separate dates certain, subject to joint leadership 
recall. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 146 Cong. Rec. 16620, 16621, 106th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         PROVIDING FOR CONDITIONAL ADJOURNMENT OR RECESS OF THE SENATE 
          AND CONDITIONAL ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

        The SPEAKER pro tempore.(2) Without objection, the 
    Chair lays before the House the following Senate concurrent 
    resolution (S. Con. Res. 132), providing for a conditional 
    adjournment or recess of the Senate and conditional adjournment of 
    the House of Representatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Edward A. Pease (IN).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the Senate concurrent resolution, as follows:

                                S. Con. Res. 132

            Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives 
        concurring), That, in consonance with section 132(a) of the 
        Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, when the Senate 
        recesses or adjourns at the close of business on Thursday, July 
        27, 2000, Friday, July 28, 2000, or on Saturday, July 29, 2000, 
        on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent resolution by 
        its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand recessed or 
        adjourned until noon on Tuesday, September 5, 2000, or until 
        noon on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, or until such time on 
        either day as may be specified by its Majority Leader or his 
        designee in the motion to recess or adjourn, or until noon on 
        the second day after Members are notified to reassemble 
        pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever 
        occurs first; and that when the House adjourns on the 
        legislative day of Thursday, July 27, 2000, or Friday, July 28, 
        2000, on a motion offered pursuant to this concurrent 
        resolution by its Majority Leader or his designee, it stand 
        adjourned until 2:00 p.m. on Wednesday, September 6, 2000, or 
        until noon on the second day after Members are notified to 
        reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, 
        whichever occurs first.
            Sec. 2. The Majority Leader of the Senate and the Speaker 
        of the House, acting jointly after consultation with the 
        Minority Leader of the Senate and the Minority Leader of the 
        House, shall notify the Members of the Senate and House, 
        respectively, to reassemble whenever, in their opinion, the 
        public interest shall warrant it.

                                {time}  1815

        The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Pease). Without objection, the 
    concurrent resolution is agreed to.
        There was no objection.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
        The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, House Resolution 
    567 is laid on the table.
        There was no objection.

[[Page 932]]

Sec. 16.2 By unanimous consent, the House considered and then agreed to 
    a concurrent resolution providing that notwithstanding the 
    requirement of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 (2 USC 
    Sec. 198) that the two Houses adjourn sine die by July 31 in an 
    even-numbered year, the House and Senate not adjourn for more than 
    three days or sine die until they had adopted a concurrent 
    resolution to that effect.

    On July 25, 1972,(1) the House, by unanimous consent, 
took up a concurrent resolution providing that the two Houses would 
remain in session beyond the day specified by the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970. The relevant section of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970 (2 USC Sec. 198) to which the concurrent 
resolution addressed itself states that unless otherwise provided by 
Congress, the two Houses shall either (a) adjourn sine die by July 31 
of each year; or (b) in odd-numbered years, adjourn from the first 
Friday in August until the second day after Labor Day pursuant to a 
concurrent resolution adopted by roll call vote in each House. The 
following proceedings then occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 118 Cong. Rec. 25145, 25146, 92d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Hale] BOGGS [of Louisiana]. Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 648) and ask unanimous consent 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as. follows:

                                H. Con. Res. 648

            Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
        concurring), That notwithstanding the provisions of Sec. 132(a) 
        of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 USC 198), as 
        amended by Section 461 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 
        1970 [Pub. Law 91-510; 84 Stat. 1193], the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate shall not adjourn for a period 
        in excess of three days, or adjourn sine die, until both Houses 
        of Congress have adopted a concurrent resolution providing 
        either for an adjournment (in excess of three days) to a day 
        certain, or for adjournment sine die.

        The SPEAKER.(2) Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Louisiana?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Carl Albert (OK).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Durward G.] HALL [of Missouri]. Mr. Speaker, reserving the 
    right to object--as I understand the Clerk's reading of this 
    resolution, and from contact with the distinguished majority leader 
    just prior to its presentation, this requested approval will for 
    all intents and purposes obviate the intent of the Joint Commission 
    on the Reorganization of Congress and indeed the statute evolving 
    from the Reorganization Act of 1970.
        It was the hope of that Commission, which held 3 years of 
    hearings, and of

[[Page 933]]

    the Committee on Rules, which later submitted the bill that became 
    the Reorganization Act of 1970, that the Congress could obviate the 
    impasse between the legislative and/or authorizing committees vis-
    a-vis the operating or appropriations committees to the place where 
    we could accomplish our work in a so-called constitutionally 
    defined short session of any given Congress, and be out of here at 
    least by the end of July.
        I understand the need and the necessity for the House-Senate 
    concurrent resolution as submitted by the gentleman from Louisiana. 
    I do not understand why it needs to be open ended as to date.
        I wonder if the distinguished majority leader can explain, Mr. 
    Speaker, why it is until such time as subsequent concurrent action 
    or joint action sets a date certain, or adjourns for over 3 days.
        Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. HALL. I am glad to yield to my friend from Louisiana.
        Mr. BOGGS. The gentleman is, of course, correct in his 
    principal statement that under the terms of the so-called 
    Reorganization Act passed several years ago, unless some action is 
    taken, the Congress would be forced to adjourn by July 31. The 
    gentleman, of course, is well aware of the fact that there are a 
    number of very important authorization bills, and still a series of 
    appropriation bills that have not cleared one body or the other.
        The idea at this time of attempting to set a date certain for 
    adjournment is something that is just without the knowledge either 
    of the Speaker or of the majority leader. We just do not know.
        As the gentleman has been informed heretofore, we do not expect 
    to complete the work of this session prior to the Friday before the 
    Republican National Convention, which convenes, I believe, on 
    August 21.
        So the best answer I can give the gentleman is we just do not 
    have a date certain. Until such time as we were in a position to 
    write a date certain, it would be a vain and useless thing to do so 
    now.
        Mr. HALL. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, I 
    appreciate the gentleman's efforts, and those of the leadership[.] 
    . . .
        Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Louisiana?
        Mr. [H. R.] GROSS [of Iowa]. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the 
    right to object, could the House have any assurance, the slightest 
    assurance, that having returned after Labor Day, following the 
    Republican Convention, there will be a sine die adjournment of 
    Congress sometime in September?
        Mr. BOGGS. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. GROSS. I am happy to yield to the gentleman.
        Mr. BOGGS. The gentleman knows that the leadership prepared a 
    schedule of days off for this session and, if the gentleman will 
    refer to this, he will note that we expressed the hope then that we 
    would have completed the business of this session by August 18, 
    which is the Friday before the Republican National Convention.

[[Page 934]]

        Now, in truth and in fact, the House has done, in my judgment, 
    quite well. But we still have the foreign aid bills, the foreign 
    aid authorization and the foreign aid appropriation, the military 
    construction appropriation bill, and the defense appropriation. 
    These are very important matters, particularly the defense 
    appropriation bill. There is also the Water Quality Act which is 
    still in conference and there is the debt limit extension and a 
    housing bill.
        I will not seek to enumerate all of them, but there are matters 
    of importance pending before this body. . . .
        Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Iowa?
        Mr. [Joe D.] WAGGONNER [Jr., of Louisiana]. Mr. Speaker, 
    reserving the right to object, I want to ask my distinguished 
    colleague from Louisiana if he meant he was taking the position 
    that as majority leader he was not going to allow this House to 
    adjourn or this Congress to adjourn sine die until all of the 
    legislative proposals he recommended had been signed into law.
        Mr. BOGGS. No. Not at all. . . .
        Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Louisiana?
        There was no objection.
        The concurrent resolution was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946

Sec. 16.3 The Speaker responded to parliamentary inquiries as to 
    whether it was necessary for the Congress to provide for the 
    continuance of its session beyond July 1949, and whether committees 
    may sit and act in view of the provisions of Sec. 132 of the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, requiring that adjournment 
    take place the last of July unless otherwise provided by the 
    Congress.

    The Speaker stated that a concurrent resolution to continue the 
session beyond July 1949 was not necessary inasmuch as the United 
States was still at war and that the national emergencies proclaimed by 
the President in 1939 and in 1941 were still in effect.
    There was inserted in the Congressional Record opinion and 
supporting evidence of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library 
of Congress to the effect that a concurrent resolution to continue the 
session beyond July 1949 was not necessary because of the current state 
of war and the national emergencies proclaimed by the President in 1939 
and in 1941.
    On July 27, 1949,(1) the Minority Leader posed the 
following parliamentary inquiry:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 95 Cong. Rec. 10290-93, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 935]]

                 continuation of sessions beyond july 31, 1949

        Mr. [Joseph W.] Martin, [Jr., of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER.(2) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Sam Rayburn (TX).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. MARTIN of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I rise to propound an 
    inquiry to the Speaker and the majority leader.
        Three years ago in response to a wide public demand the then 
    Democratic Congress passed what was known as the reorganization 
    bill. The purpose of the legislation was to initiate legislative 
    reforms. The bill was warmly supported by the press, magazines, 
    labor leaders, business executives, eminent educators, and students 
    of public affairs. One of the reforms particularly stressed was the 
    establishment of a fixed date for the adjournment of Congress.
        In that bill was a paragraph, which I read:

            Sec. 132. Except in time of war in a national emergency 
        proclaimed by the President, the two Houses shall adjourn sine 
        die not later than the last day (Sundays excepted) in the month 
        of July in each year unless otherwise provided by the Congress.

        You will note that this is mandatory language, subject only to 
    emergencies. Unless the House is ready to accept the flimsy excuse 
    that 4 years after the ending of a shooting war we are still at 
    war, there are only two other ways we can continue legally to 
    legislate after August 1. One is through the passage of a 
    concurrent resolution, and the other the proclaiming by the 
    President of an emergency. There may be emergencies at this time, 
    and if so, I would like to have them specified.
        As I stated, there has been talk of keeping the Congress in 
    session on the pretext we are in war. Technically that, of course, 
    is true, but I submit, Mr. Speaker, that will not ring true with 
    the American people. It is doubtful from the progress we are making 
    toward the ending of the war that we will ever reach the time when 
    the war shall be officially ended. Certainly there will never be 
    peace if we are obliged to get the consent of Russia.
        I further submit that to continue without a resolution will 
    place in jeopardy legislation which we pass after August 1. The 
    Supreme Court only the other day in the Christoffel case said a 
    tribunal that is not competent is no tribunal. It might say in this 
    instance that a Congress sitting without a legal right to sit is 
    not qualified to enact legislation. Surely we are playing risky and 
    throwing a ``cloud'' over our work.
        Now, as to the war-emergency excuse. The President and the 
    Congress have both given adequate evidence that they do not believe 
    there is now an emergency. This has been indicated through the 
    frequent relaxation of emergency controls.
        President Truman, in his message to Congress on February 19, 
    1947, said:

        To the Congress of the United States:

            During the year and a half that have elapsed since the 
        defeat of our last enemy in battle we have progressively 
        eliminated the great majority of emergency controls over the 
        Nation's economy. The progress of reconversion now makes it 
        possible to take an additional step toward freeing our economy 
        of wartime controls.

[[Page 936]]

            Accordingly I am recommending that the Congress repeal 
        certain temporary statutes still in effect by virtue of the 
        emergencies proclaimed by the President in 1939 and 1941, and I 
        have requested the executive departments and agencies to cease 
        operations under powers derived from certain permanent statutes 
        that are effective only during emergencies, to the extent that 
        such operations are related to the 1939 and 1941 emergencies.

        Note that he ordered those powers should be suspended which 
    were effective only during emergencies.

            The recommendations I have present for the consideration of 
        the Congress will, if accepted materially assist in further 
        freeing the country of war controls and will help make possible 
        an early ending of the emergencies. I have under continuing 
        study the question of terminating the emergencies proclaimed in 
        1939 and 1941, and intend to take action as soon as 
        circumstances permit.
            In my recent message to the Congress on the state of the 
        Union I outlined the following program with respect to the 
        termination of emergency and wartime powers:
            ``Two groups of temporary laws still remain: The first are 
        those which by congressional mandate are to last during the 
        `emergency'; the second are those which are to continue until 
        the `termination of the war.'
            ``I shall submit to the Congress recommendations for the 
        repeal of certain of the statutes which by their terms continue 
        for the duration of the `emergency.' I shall at the same time 
        recommend that others within this classification be extended 
        until the state of war has been ended by treaty or by 
        legislative action. As to those statutes which continue until 
        the state of war has been terminated, I urge that the Congress 
        promptly consider each statute individually, and repeal such 
        emergency legislation where advisable.''
            Accordingly, I now submit recommendations with respect to 
        more than 100 laws which are affected by the limited emergency 
        declared September 8, 1939, or the unlimited emergency declared 
        May 27, 1941.
            In the case of those statutes that remain in force until 
        termination of the war, I have directed the executive 
        departments and agencies to assist the Congress in its 
        consideration of these statutes, individually, by making 
        available full information concerning them to the appropriate 
        congressional committees. The work done on this subject in the 
        Seventy-ninth Congress by the Committee on the Judiciary of 
        both Houses, with the assistance of the Office of War 
        Mobilization and Reconversion, the Department of Justice, and 
        other Government agencies, should offer valuable aid to the 
        Congress in accomplishing the task which remains. At a later 
        date it may prove desirable to send a further communication to 
        the Congress concerning these statutes.
            Emergency laws dealt with in this message fall into five 
        broad classes: (a) Temporary statutes which are no longer 
        needed, and which consequently should be repealed forthwith; 
        (b) permanent statutes under which operations related to the 
        1939 or 1941 emergencies have been or are being discontinued, 
        but which should remain for possible use during future 
        emergencies; (c) statutes appropriating funds, which should, 
        when the funds are no longer required be handled by rescission 
        of funds rather than by repeal of the statutes; (d) statutes 
        which should be temporarily extended by the Congress pending 
        consideration of permanent legislation or other disposition as 
        indicated below; (e) statutes which should continue in force 
        for the period or purpose stipulated.

[[Page 937]]

            In appendixes to this message the statutes under reference 
        are enumerated according to the above classifications.

        It will be observed there is no mention of this particular 
    restriction in Congress adjournment. Furthermore, I am informed 
    that the committee which framed this resolution in 1946 came very 
    nearly omitting the reference to emergencies. It was only included 
    by the House as an extreme precautionary measure. At the time the 
    reorganization bill was adopted there was no emergency in their 
    minds, and we are now 3 years later.
        On January 1, 1947, the President said:

            Although a state of war still exists, it is at this time 
        possible to declare, and I find it to be in the public interest 
        to declare, that hostilities are terminated.

        Then he went on to talk about the controls that should be 
    eliminated.
        The President on February 19, 1947, sent another message to the 
    Congress, and he said:

            During the year and a half that have elapsed since the 
        defeat of our last enemy in battle, we have progressively 
        eliminated the great majority of emergency controls over the 
        Nation's economy. The progress of reconversion now makes it 
        possible to take an additional step toward freeing our economy 
        of wartime controls.
            Accordingly, I am recommending that the Congress repeal 
        certain temporary statutes still in effect by virtue of the 
        emergencies proclaimed by the President in 1939 and 1941, and I 
        have requested the executive departments and agencies to cease 
        operations under powers derived from certain permanent statutes 
        that are effective only during emergencies, to the extent that 
        such operations are related to the 1939 and 1941 emergencies.
            The recommendations I here present for the consideration of 
        the Congress will, if accepted, materially assist in further 
        freeing the country of war controls and will help make possible 
        an early ending of the emergencies. I have under continuing 
        study the question of terminating the emergencies proclaimed in 
        1939 and 1941, and intend to take action as soon as 
        circumstances permit.
            In my recent message to the Congress on the state of the 
        Union I outlined the following program with respect to the 
        termination of emergency and wartime powers:
            ``Two groups of temporary laws still remain: The first are 
        those which by Congressional mandate are to last during the 
        `emergency'; the second are those which are to continue until 
        the `termination of the war'.
            ``Accordingly, I now submit these recommendations.''

        You will note from that the President had progressively ended 
    war controls because the emergencies were over.
        Mr. Speaker, I bring this up, I assure you, not in any partisan 
    manner; not in any manner except to clarify the situation, that we 
    may know properly where we stand. I want to remove if possible the 
    cloud over our legislative acts. I believe that this can only 
    legally be assured through the adoption of a resolution by both 
    branches of the Congress. The fact it is so easy for Congress to 
    continue its session by resolution is sufficient reason that 
    emergency wartime proposals should not be utilized to keep Congress 
    in session. If the Congress by any chance was in such a position 
    that it could not help

[[Page 938]]

    itself, there might be some reason to defend the restriction. 
    Congress is here. Congress could simply pass a resolution extending 
    it indefinitely or to a given date. But I submit, Mr. Speaker, that 
    not only for today but for the years to come, unless we exercise 
    common sense and reason we will go on indefinitely being deprived 
    of one of the essential reforms of the reorganization act because 
    we are at war.
        Mr. Speaker, I submit this question to you with confidence in 
    your integrity. I do it as a contribution to orderly procedure and 
    in an effort to clarify a grave doubt.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair is prepared to answer the parliamentary 
    inquiry of the gentleman from Massachusetts. The gentleman from 
    Massachusetts was kind enough to advise the Chair on last Monday 
    that he intended to raise this question so that the House might 
    have an interpretation for its guidance.
        Section 132 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 
    provides:

            Sec. 132. Except in time of war or during a national 
        emergency proclaimed by the President, the two Houses shall 
        adjourn sine die not later than the last day (Sundays excepted) 
        in the month of July in each year unless otherwise provided by 
        the Congress.

        It is indisputable that we were on August 2, 1946, the time the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act was passed, in a state of war, and 
    that the national emergencies declared by the President on 
    September 8, 1939, and May 27, 1941, were still in effect. That 
    same state of affairs continues today. The state of war still 
    exists, and the national emergencies declared by the President 
    still exist.
        That fact--that the state of war and national emergencies have 
    continued to exist--has been recognized on numerous occasions. 
    Following the passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act the 
    President on December 31, 1946, issued his proclamation declaring 
    the cessation of hostilities of World War II. At that time the 
    President stated that his proclamation did not effect the 
    termination of the national emergencies or of the state of war.
        The Supreme Court on at least two occasions since the passage 
    of the Legislative Reorganization Act, and as recently as February 
    1948, recognized the distinction between the termination of 
    hostilities and the termination of the war itself.
        In Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co. (331 U. S. 111), 
    decided in 1947, the Supreme Court unanimously upholding the 
    exercise of authority by the President under title I of the First 
    War Powers Act of 1941, which the President was authorized to use 
    only in matters relating to the conduct of the present war, said:

            The cessation of hostilities does not necessarily end the 
        war power.

        In Woods v. Miller Co. (333 U. S. 138), decided in 1948, the 
    Supreme Court again, and once more unanimously, upheld the 
    constitutionality of the Housing and Rent Act of 1947 as a valid 
    exercise by the Congress of its war powers, saying:

            Whatever may be the consequences when war is officially 
        terminated, the war power does not necessarily end with the 
        cessation of hostilities.

        The Congress itself in enacting Senate Joint Resolution 123, 
    Eightieth

[[Page 939]]

    Congress, a year after the passage of the Legislative 
    Reorganization Act, recognized the continued existence of the state 
    of war and of the emergencies.
        It will be recalled that Senate Joint Resolution 123, which 
    became Public Law 239 of the Eightieth Congress, provided that with 
    respect to a number of specified statutory provisions the war and 
    the emergencies should be considered terminated. But the central 
    principle--that the state of war and the national emergencies 
    continued to exist--was clearly recognized and reinforced.
        The Chair is not aware that either the Congress or the 
    President has taken any step whatever which would have the effect 
    of terminating World War II as such or the national emergencies as 
    such. For the foregoing reasons it is clear that section 132 of the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act has no effect at this time because 
    in its own words it is not effective ``in time of war or during a 
    national emergency proclaimed by the President.''
        Mr. [Charles A.] HALLECK [of Indiana]. Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. HALLECK. I assume, of course, from the response of the 
    Speaker that we are to continue with the session after August 1, 
    with no further action in the way of a resolution by the Congress.
        The SPEAKER. That would be the interpretation of the Chair, 
    that it would not be necessary to pass a concurrent resolution for 
    the continuance of the Congress beyond the 1st of August.
        Mr. HALLECK. Then, Mr. Speaker, since it is apparent that we 
    are going to go beyond the 1st of August, I wonder if the Speaker 
    can give us any information as to when we may reasonably expect 
    that the work of the House of Representatives may be concluded in 
    order that we may be in a little better position to make our plans 
    for the rest of the year and, I believe, to make some 
    determinations as to the legislative program. I understand, that it 
    may well be that the Speaker is not in any position at this time to 
    say anything to us about this matter about which I am inquiring, 
    but I can see around me what I am sure is a lot of interest in the 
    matter about which I have inquired. I am quite sure that my 
    colleagues will join with me in expressing the hope that very 
    shortly we can come to the end of the labors of this session and 
    get back home.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair may say, in response to the inquiry of 
    the gentleman from Indiana, that anything he may say about the 
    length of this session would be only the expression of a hope.
        Mr. [John E.] RANKIN [of Mississippi]. Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, if the Supreme Court should decide 
    that the war has terminated, would that not vitiate every law that 
    we would pass from now on without passing a resolution?
        May I say to the Speaker that I am somewhat alarmed at a recent 
    decision of the Supreme Court setting aside the conviction of a man 
    for committing perjury before a committee of the House

[[Page 940]]

    on the ground there was not a quorum present. Suppose the Supreme 
    Court should go off on a similar tangent and decide that the war 
    has been terminated, would that not vitiate any legislation we 
    might pass unless we passed a resolution to continue the session, 
    as the law provides, and would it not be a simple matter to bring 
    in a resolution extending the regular session as provided by law 
    and thus eliminate that danger?
        The SPEAKER. Of course, the Chair is not in position or not of 
    a disposition to guess or prognosticate on what the Supreme Court 
    of the United States will do.
        Mr. RANKIN. I would not impose that burden on the Chair, of 
    course.
        The SPEAKER. But if and when that time comes the Congress could 
    by its own action clear up those things.
        Mr. RANKIN. The trouble is, Mr. Speaker, that after we have 
    legislated for 6 weeks more, and I think we will be here until the 
    middle of September, if the Supreme Court were to hold that the war 
    had terminated and that we were sitting without authority, it might 
    affect every law that we would pass in the next 6 weeks.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair would think that the Supreme Court of 
    the United States reads the Congressional Record.
        Mr. [Earl C.] MICHENER [of Michigan]. Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, we all appreciate that this is a 
    very vital question, that it is a question of law and in the final 
    analysis has to be decided by the Supreme Court of the United 
    States.
        The Chair has made his ruling and that ruling is binding upon 
    the House and can only be challenged in the courts.
        This question gave me some concern and on yesterday I asked the 
    American Law Division of the Legislative Reference Service to 
    prepare a brief for me on the questions involved. That brief was 
    delivered to me a few minutes ago. I have not had time to 
    thoroughly digest it. Some of the brief is not in keeping with what 
    my views were; however, I may possibly be wrong.
        Inasmuch as this is a legal proposition to be decided by the 
    law and the precedents, I think the entire membership of the House 
    is entitled to the conclusion of this agency which the Congress has 
    set up in the Library of Congress for the express purpose of 
    advising the Congress as to what the decisions indicate, as well as 
    its conclusions.
        I therefore ask unanimous consent, Mr. Speaker, that the 
    opinion rendered by Mr. Frank B. Horne, American Law Section, of 
    July 26, be included at this point in the Record.
        The SPEAKER. Would the gentleman be willing to have that 
    inserted in the Appendix of the Record?
        Mr. MICHENER. If the Speaker desires, I would be willing, but 
    inasmuch as this whole question is so vital and should all be 
    considered together, I believe it should be inserted at this point. 
    I may say to the Chair that the opinion is not at variance with the 
    ruling which the Speaker has made, even though it is not in keeping 
    with my preconceived views.

[[Page 941]]

        The cases to which the Speaker has referred are cited as well 
    as many others. I think it would be for the benefit of all those 
    interested to have these views at one spot in the Congresssional 
    Record. Of course, I shall be pleased to abide by whatever the 
    Speaker says.
        Mr. RANKIN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I 
    shall not object, I would like to say to the gentleman from 
    Michigan, and to the House, that it seems to me that the wise thing 
    to do is to pass a continuing resolution immediately. I do not 
    think there would be any particular objection to it, and it would 
    eliminate the danger of having the laws we pass during the rest of 
    the session set aside by the Supreme Court.
        Mr. MICHENER. There is no question about that. I was on the 
    Reorganization Committee, and the intent and the purpose was to fix 
    a final and a definite date which would control the annual sine die 
    adjournment unless the Congress, in its wisdom, decided otherwise 
    before the date specified, on the 31st day of July in each year, 
    arrived. The Speakers ruling holds that we are still at war 
    technically, that an emergency declared by the President in 1937 
    and another one declared in 1941 still exists. Therefore, the only 
    solution, if we want to adjourn, is to pass a resolution of 
    adjournment, fixing the date. That will remove all doubt.
        The SPEAKER. As to the request of the gentleman from Michigan, 
    of course, the gentleman from Michigan knows that the Chair has no 
    more respect for any other Member of the House than he has for him, 
    but the Chair would prefer, if the gentleman does not object, that 
    the matter he speaks of be extended in the Appendix of the Record.
        Mr. MICHENER. Mr. Speaker, may I suggest, in view of what I 
    said, that if it is not objectionable, that the decision be 
    inserted immediately preceding the ruling of the Chair? It is not 
    at variance with the ruling; it is amplifying.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair, of course, would not object to that 
    himself.
        Mr. [Clare E.] HOFFMAN of Michigan. I object, Mr. Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. But the Chair thinks that that would hardly be the 
    place for it to go.
        Mr. [John M.] VORYS [of Ohio]. Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. VORYS. The Chair has given an expression of his views, but 
    is this not the case, that the only way in which the Chair could 
    rule on the point would be if a point of order were made after July 
    31 to some action of the House on the ground that the House is not 
    in session? The Chair cannot rule in advance.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair assumes that the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts [Mr. Martin] made his parliamentary inquiry today in 
    order to obviate a thing like that.

    The proceedings continued in the House on Aug. 1, 
1949:(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 95 Cong. Rec. 10486, 81st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The House met at 12 o'clock noon.
        The Acting Chaplain, Rev. James P. Wesberry, LL. D., offered 
    the . . . prayer[.]. . .

[[Page 942]]

        Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. HALLECK. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the 
    House is not legally in session. I make it at this time because I 
    am quite sure that the point should be made before the Journal is 
    read.
        I make the point of order for the reason that under the 
    Reorganization Act recently passed by the Congress which is now the 
    law of the land, it is provided that Congress shall adjourn on the 
    last day of July unless the Nation is at war, or there is a 
    national emergency proclaimed by the President, or unless the 
    Congress determines otherwise.
        The Congress has not determined otherwise. No action has been 
    taken by the Congress in line with the provisions of the 
    Reorganization Act. I insist, Mr. Speaker, that there is no such 
    state of war existing, and there is no such national emergency 
    declared by the President existing as contemplated by the 
    Reorganization Act, which would avoid the necessity of the Congress 
    acting affirmatively as provided in the act if we are to be legally 
    in session.
        Mr. Speaker, I am, of course, familiar with the Speaker's 
    response of last week to the inquiry addressed to the Chair by the 
    minority leader, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Martin]. 
    Being so convinced, however, that there should be no cloud whatever 
    upon the legality of the action of the Congress that may hereafter 
    be taken, and because I am convinced that the only way to remove 
    any threat to such legality is for the Congress to act 
    affirmatively, I am constrained at this time to raise the point of 
    order.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair is prepared to rule.
        In response to the parliamentary inquiry propounded by the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Martin] on last July 27, the 
    Chair stated what the Chair thought and still thinks is the law: 
    that the Congress is legally in session. The Chair therefore 
    overrules the point of order made by the gentleman from Indiana.
        Mr. [Ralph E.] CHURCH [of Illinois]. Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. CHURCH. Mr. Speaker, I make a further point of order. This 
    goes beyond what the Speaker has ruled with reference to the point 
    of order just made by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Halleck]. 
    First, let me say that there is nothing to prevent the President 
    from calling a special session today, or any day, to begin 
    immediately.
        Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the House is not 
    legally in session, that when the House adjourned last Thursday and 
    the Senate adjourned last Friday the adjournment constituted a sine 
    die adjournment pursuant to section 132 of the Legislative 
    Reorganization Act of 1946.
        Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact, not merely that Congress has 
    not by concurrent resolution adjourned, but in addition thereto, 
    that the President has not yet called us today or on tomorrow into 
    special session, I raise this further point of order and insist on 
    my objection with respect to every measure before the Congress.

[[Page 943]]

        While the Speaker has ruled that no formal action is necessary 
    to prevent a sine die adjournment as provided by section 132 of the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, there is nonetheless some 
    doubt as to the validity of our proceedings. The ruling of the 
    Speaker can be challenged in the courts should occasion arise where 
    any of the measures we pass should be challenged.
        In order to remove all possible doubt as to the validity of our 
    proceedings after the last day of July, I had hoped that the 
    leadership would bring in a formal resolution. Such action not 
    having been taken, I believe that the President should call a 
    special session. He should do this in order to give formal legal 
    status to our proceedings. He should do this in order that the 
    question may never arise at some future date as to the validity 
    under our Constitution of what we may attempt to do in the coming 
    days that it is proposed we continue in session.
        I repeat that there is nothing to prevent the President from 
    calling a special session today to begin immediately.
        Mr. Speaker, I do this with a view to certainty and for the 
    dignity of this Congress. The people who sent us here, expect the 
    Congress to legislate, and not a President and not a Speaker. I do 
    this in all seriousness in order that the President may, before the 
    day is over, instanter, now, call us in special session.
        I make that point of order.
        The SPEAKER. In response to the point of order, the Chair has 
    already held that the Congress is legally assembled and in session; 
    therefore, there is no reason for the President to call a special 
    session of the Congress at this time.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.

    On Aug. 2, 1949,(4) Rep. Church raised the following 
point of order:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Id. at p. 10591.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        legality of session of congress

        Mr. CHURCH. Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. CHURCH. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the 
    House is not legally in session, and again cite section 132 of the 
    Reorganization Act passed by the Congress. Today, Mr. Speaker, the 
    situation is different in one particular from the situation on 
    yesterday, when the two points of order were raised by the 
    gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Halleck] and myself.
        Mr. Speaker, section 132 reads as follows:

                           congressional adjournment

            Sec. 132. Except in time of war or during a national 
        emergency proclaimed by the President, the two Houses shall 
        adjourn sine die not later than the last day (Sundays excepted) 
        in the month of July in each year unless otherwise provided by 
        Congress.

        Mr. Speaker, I emphasize the words in parenthesis ``Sundays 
    excepted.'' If through any interpretation the words ``Sundays 
    excepted'' give legality to the session of yesterday, then, Mr. 
    Speaker, that interpretation could not carry

[[Page 944]]

    that legality to include today. Therefore, I renew my point of 
    order that the House is not legally in session, for the reasons 
    stated by the gentleman from Massachusetts last July 27 and by the 
    gentleman from Indiana and me on yesterday, and in addition for the 
    reason that I have just stated, namely, that the words ``Sundays 
    excepted'' cannot carry a legal session into today. Mr. Speaker, 
    the President can instanter call a ``special session'' to meet 
    immediately, and thereby remove the doubt as to the legality of the 
    future proceedings of the Congress.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair makes the statement again that on July 27, in 
    response to the parliamentary inquiry propounded by the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts [Mr. Martin], the Chair held, and he so holds 
    today, that the Congress is in session.
        The point of order is overruled.

    On Aug. 4, 1949,(5) Mr. John E. Lyle, Jr., of Texas, 
called up, by direction of the Committee on Rules, House Resolution 
310, providing for the consideration of H. R. 1758, a bill to amend the 
Natural Gas Act approved June 21, 1938, as amended, and asked for its 
immediate consideration. The following point of order was then made:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Id. at pp. 10777, 10778.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John W.] HESELTON [of Massachusetts]. Mr. Speaker, a point 
    of order.
        The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. HESELTON. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the 
    House is not legally in session.
        I recognize that this matter has been raised in a general sense 
    on at least two occasions. I do not wish to burden the Speaker, the 
    membership or the record with repetition. Therefore, I would like 
    to recognize and incorporate by references the parliamentary 
    inquiry of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Martin] on July 
    27, the further parliamentary inquiries of the gentlemen from 
    Indiana [Mr. Halleck], from Mississippi [Mr. Rankin], from Michigan 
    [Mr. Michener], and from Ohio [Mr. Vorys], as well as the several 
    rulings of the Speaker; also the points of order of August 1 by the 
    gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Halleck], and the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Church], as well as the rulings of the Speaker on 
    those occasions.
        My reason for making this point of order at this time is more 
    specific. I have been advised upon what I believe to be reliable 
    authority that if H. R. 1758, the resolution we will now consider, 
    is enacted into law, with or without the proposed amendments, its 
    legality will be challenged. Obviously, this might have a far-
    reaching effect not only upon the industry concerned but upon the 
    entire problem of developing an effective fuel policy involving our 
    energy resources.
        In view of this possibility, it would seem to me that I would 
    be derelict in my obligations as a Member of this body if I did not 
    raise the point of order in terms of the consideration of this 
    specific legislation.
        Moreover, another problem is involved by reason of the recent 
    decision

[[Page 945]]

    of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Christoffel case. 
    It seems to me that it is the primary responsibility of proponents 
    of H. R. 1758, particularly during the reading of the bill for 
    amendment, to establish affirmatively at all times that a quorum is 
    present and voting. However, I do not think that this is of major 
    importance in terms of the point of order which I have raised and 
    wish to submit to the Speaker.
        The SPEAKER. The Chair will repeat, as he will repeatedly 
    repeat when questions of this kind are raised, that on July 27, in 
    answer to a parliamentary inquiry by the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts [Mr. Martin] the Chair ruled that the House is 
    legally in session, committees may legally meet, and may legally 
    report bills.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.

    On Aug. 5, 1949,(6) Mr. Heselton was recognized for the 
following parliamentary inquiry in the Committee of the Whole:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Id. at p. 10858.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. HESELTON. Mr. Chairman, yesterday, when the resolution 
    reporting the rule was before the House, I made the point of order 
    that the House was not legally in session, which point of order was 
    overruled. I have been advised that in order to properly present 
    the matter in terms of the consideration of this bill, now that we 
    have it at the point where it is being read for amendment, I should 
    renew the point of order.
        I would like to inquire whether that is in order or whether it 
    should be submitted at the conclusion of the reading of the bill 
    and when it is reported back to the House?
        The CHAIRMAN.(7) The point raised by the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts is not for the Committee of the Whole to pass 
    on. If he will reserve the point of order, it should be propounded 
    in the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Brooks Hays (AR).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------