[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 15, Chapter 31]
[Chapter 31. Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 11937-11938]
 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries


[[Page 11937]]



---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Commentary and editing by William Holmes Brown, J.D., and John 
Theodore Fee, J.D. Manuscript editing by Joan Deschler Bamel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A. Points of Order (p. 1)

    Sec. 1. In General; Effect
    Sec. 2. Manner of Making Point of Order
    Sec. 3. Reserving Points of Order
    Sec. 4. Timeliness
    Sec. 5. Timeliness as Against Bills or Provisions Therein
    Sec. 6. Timeliness as Against Amendments
    Sec. 7. Debate
    Sec. 8. Burden of Proof on Points of Order
    Sec. 9. Waiver
   Sec. 10. Role of Committee on Rules in Waiving Points of Order
   Sec. 11. As Related to Other Business
   Sec. 12. Relationship of Quorum Requirements to Points of Order
   Sec. 13. Appeals

B. Parliamentary Inquiries (p. 493)

   Sec. 14. In General
   Sec. 15. When in Order

Index to Precedents (p. 571)





[[Page 11939]]


                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries


 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 1. In General; Effect


    A point of order is in effect an objection that the pending matter 
or proceeding is in violation of some rule or practice of the House. It 
may also constitute a demand for an immediate return to the regular 
order.(1) A point of order is not a vehicle for obtaining 
debate time or for injecting comments about a pending amendment or 
matter under consideration.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. For general discussion of the subject of points of order prior to 
        1936, see 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6863-6957; 8 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 3427-3458.
            Points of order consume less time today than formerly. Mr. 
        Clarence Cannon (Mo.), who was parliamentary clerk at the 
        Speaker's table before becoming a Member, once estimated that 
        discussion of points of order occupied a third of the time of 
        the House in the early 20th century. See 101 Cong. Rec. 10609, 
        84th Cong. 1st Sess., July 14, 1955.
 2. See Sec. 1.42, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule I clause 4 (3) provides that it is the duty of the 
Speaker (4) to decide points of order, subject to a right of 
appeal by any Member. Apart from this rule, the disposition of points 
of order is largely governed by the discretion of the Chair and by 
precedent.(5) The Chair, without prompting from a Member, 
sometimes assumes an affirmative obligation to protect the rights of 
Members.(6) In the exercise of its discretion, the Chair 
may, for example, decide whether to entertain more than one point of 
order at the same time; (7) whether to decide one point or 
another first; (8) or whether to rule on points of order 
simultaneously.(9) On rare occasions,

[[Page 11940]]

the Chair will anticipate a parliamentary situation and--as with a 
question of privilege--rule without a point of order from the 
floor.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. House Rules and Manual Sec. 624 (1997).
 4. In the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman decides questions of 
        order and generally acts with the powers of the Speaker, as 
        provided by Rule XXIII clause 1, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 861 (1997). See 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6828, 6927.
 5. See Sec. 1.1, infra, as to the importance of precedents, generally.
 6. See Sec. 1.3, infra.
 7. See Sec. 1.8, infra.
 8. See Sec. 1.9, infra.
 9. See Sec. 1.13, infra.
            The Chair's discretion in this regard is guided by his 
        understanding of the relative effects resulting from the 
        sustaining of the various points of order.
10. See Sec. 1.51, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    At the beginning of a Congress, before rules are adopted, the Chair 
enforces ``order'' based on precedents and long-established customs--
principles of general parliamentary law--which constitute and define 
proper decorum in debate.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. See Sec. 1.2, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Chair may refuse to rule on matters that are related to but not 
expressly raised in the point of order; (12) and points of 
order do not lie against the Chair's exercise of discretionary 
authority granted by the standing rules.(13) Moreover, the 
Chair does not rule on constitutional questions,(14) 
hypothetical questions,(15) or the effect of a bill's 
provisions.(16) Similarly, the Chair does not pass upon the 
consistency of proposed amendments (17) or resolve 
ambiguities in amendments.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. See Sec. 1.28, infra.
13. See Sec. 1.29, infra.
14. See Sec. Sec. 1.37-1.39, infra.
15. See Sec. 1.40, infra.
16. See Sec. 1.36, infra.
17. See Sec. 1.36, infra
18. See Sec. 1.41, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The effect of sustaining a point of order depends on the matter 
before the House. For example, a point of order against a portion of an 
amendment may cause the whole amendment to fall; (19) and a 
point of order against a conference report, if sustained, may vitiate 
the report and leave the House with the amendments in disagreement 
before it for disposition.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Sec. 1.25, infra.
20. See Sec. 1.27, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The enforcement of committee rules--those which are not explicit 
rules of the House but are internal to a committee--is the 
responsibility of the pertinent committees. Normally, the Speaker is 
not compelled to rule on a point of order relating to the 
interpretation of such a committee rule.(1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Sec. 1.47, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    However, violations of certain committee rules are cognizable in 
the House under Rule XI clause 2.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See, e.g., Rule XI clause 2(g)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 708, 
        and clause 2(l), Sec. 713 (1997). See also Sec. Sec. 1.47, 
        1.48, 1.49, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are special procedures prescribed by standing rule 
(3) relating to words uttered in debate. The proper 
procedure is to demand that ``words be taken down.'' But such demands 
must be time

[[Page 11941]]

ly, before other debate intervenes.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Rule XIV, clauses 1, 4, and 5, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. Sec. 749, 760 (1997).
 4. See Sec. 1.50, infra.

                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Importance of Precedents

Sec. 1.1 The Speaker follows the precedents of the House in deciding 
    points of order.

    On June 24, 1958,(5) Mr. Thomas B. Curtis, of Missouri, 
challenged a practice of the House with which he disagreed and sought 
to have Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, overrule certain precedents 
which prevented discussion on the floor of the House of matters 
occurring in committees, unless the committees in question took action. 
The following exchange, emphasizing the importance of precedent in the 
Speaker's rulings, took place:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 104 Cong. Rec. 12121, 12122, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight 

        The Speaker: Under previous order of the House, the gentleman 
    from Missouri [Mr. Curtis], is recognized for 60 minutes.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: . . . Mr. Speaker, I am very disturbed 
    about the manner in which one of our House subcommittees has been 
    conducting itself in the past few days. I refer to the subcommittee 
    of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on Legislative 
    Oversight. . . .
        . . . Not only is this subcommittee, in my judgment, not doing 
    the job that needs to be done, it has brought the institution 
    again, in my judgment, into disrepute by disregarding the rules of 
    the House and permitting a committee of the House to be used as a 
    forum in this fashion.
        Mr. [Oren] Harris [of Arkansas]: Mr. Speaker, I must object 
    again and ask that those words be deleted.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: I would like to ask the gentleman 
    before he does, just what language is he objecting to?
        Mr. Harris: To the charge that this committee is violating the 
    rules of the House.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Well, I certainly do charge that and I 
    think it is proper to charge such a thing if I have presented the 
    evidence. How else are we going to present the case to the House?
        The Speaker: There is a long line of decisions holding that 
    attention cannot be called on the floor of the House to proceedings 
    in committees without action by the committee. The Chair has just 
    been reading a decision by Mr. Speaker Gillett and the decision is 
    very positive on that point.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, in addressing myself to 
    that, may I say I am unaware of such a rule and I would argue, if I 
    may, in all propriety, that that rule, if it does exist, should be 
    changed because how else will the House ever go into the 
    functioning and actions of its committees?
        The Speaker: That is not a question for the Chair to determine. 
    That is a question for the House to change the rule.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, is it a rule or is it a 
    ruling? If it is

[[Page 11942]]

    a ruling of the Chair, then it is appropriate for the Chair to 
    consider it.
        The Speaker: The precedents of the House are what the Chair 
    goes by in most instances. There are many precedents and this Chair 
    finds that the precedents of the House usually make mighty good 
    sense.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: But the Chair can change a precedent. 
    That is why I am trying to present this matter.
        The Speaker: If the Chair did not believe in the precedents of 
    the House, then the Chair might be ready to do that, but this Chair 
    is not disposed to overturn the precedents of the House which the 
    Chair thinks are very clear. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair has made his ruling, and the Chair 
    thinks it is correct.

Sec. 1.2 At the beginning of a new Congress, before rules are adopted, 
    the Chair will entertain a point of order that proper decorum is 
    not being followed and will enforce those rules relating to the 
    Chair's power of recognition which embody long established custom.

    On Jan. 3, 1991,(6) during debate on House Resolution 5, 
establishing rules for the 102d Congress, Mrs. Nancy L. Johnson, of 
Connecticut, was yielded time under the hour taken to debate the 
resolution. At the conclusion of her time, she refused to relinquish 
the floor and persisted in debate despite repeated admonitions from the 
Chair and the use of the Speaker's gavel. The rather raucous 
proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 137 Cong. Rec. 58, 59, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Solomon] has 1 minute remaining.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Steny H. Hoyer (Md.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Connecticut 
    [Mrs. Johnson].
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman 
    for yielding me this time.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the substance of 
    this proposal, and with deep concern for the subversion of the 
    legislative process contained in this package.

        The substance strikes at the heart of the budget agreement. The 
    process strikes at the heart of democracy, and so I am going to use 
    such time as I may consume, and I am not going to recognize the 
    authority of the Speaker's gavel, because I want to make very clear 
    the implications of what is happening here.
        First of all, this House is operating under precedent, not 
    under rule. Precedent is something that we honor because we hold 
    ourselves to a standard of ethical conduct that requires honoring 
    our rules.
        If we do not hold ourselves to that standard of ethical 
    conduct, then the

[[Page 11943]]

    line between self-government and chaos disintegrates. If we cannot 
    operate ethically, we cannot govern ourselves as a free nation. So, 
    honor is everything; word is bond.
        I choose not to be governed by the gavel, because I want to 
    demonstrate that where word is not bond, democracy cannot survive.
        If we were doing that here today, democracy in its gut and at 
    the level of trust that it demands would not be at risk; but the 
    majority party is not proposing a statutory change for which they 
    could be held accountable.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentlewoman has 
    expired.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: The majority party is proposing a 
    rules change.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would state to the 
    gentlewoman that whatever point she is trying to make that the 
    Chair is going to make a point.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: It does not change the law.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The House will operate under proper 
    decorum.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: . . . What is happening here is 
    that individual desire for spending programs is overriding the 
    public interest in deficit reduction.
        Mr. [Gerry] Sikorski [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, regular 
    order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman is out of order. The 
    gentlewoman is making the point of not following the rules.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: Mr. Speaker, I am sorry. I know 
    this is unpleasant.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman will remove herself 
    from the well within 30 seconds.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]:
        Mr. Speaker, I rise to a point of order. I rise to a point of 
    order, Mr. Speaker.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: As I said, I am not going to talk 
    at length but only for the very few minutes necessary to make clear 
    my concern with the substance and process violations in this rules 
    proposal.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Gonzalez: The gentlewoman is out of order and is defying 
    the Chair's ruling and, therefore, I am imploring the Chair to 
    exercise its authority to enforce the rules of the House by 
    summoning the Sergeant at Arms and presenting the mace.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair may do that.

Speaker Protects Parliamentary Rights of Members

Sec. 1.3 The Speaker may on his own initiative take action to protect 
    the right of Members to raise appropriate points of order.

        Until the 104th Congress adopted its rules on Jan. 4, 1995, 
    points of order had to be ``reserved'' on general appropriation 
    bills when they were reported. Failure to take this step deprived 
    the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the right to ``rule 
    out,'' in re

[[Page 11944]]

    sponse to a point of order, a portion of the bill as being 
    legislative or unauthorized in law as required by Rule XXI clause 
    2.(8) Rule XXI clause 8 (9) was added in 1995 
    and provides: ``At the time any appropriation bill is reported, all 
    points of order shall be considered as reserved.''. The following 
    incident, on May 23, 1994,(10) showed the willingness of 
    the Chair to protect the prerogatives of Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. House Rules and Manual Sec. 834 (1997).
 9. House Rules and Manual Sec. 848a (1997).
10. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ________, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Permission for Committee on Appropriations To File a Privileged 
           Report on Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, 1995

        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Committee on Appropriations may have 
    until midnight tonight, May 23, 1994, to file a privileged report 
    to accompany a bill providing appropriations for Foreign Operations 
    for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (11) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Miss.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, 
    reserving the right to object, we would like to know if the 
    minority has been informed. We are told that they have not been.
        Mr. Obey: If the gentleman will yield, I do not think that is 
    correct.
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Speaker, I stand corrected. I understand that 
    the minority is aware of it, and we have no objection on this side 
    of the aisle.
        Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        There was no objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: All points of order are reserved.

Priority of Committee Members in Recognition for Point of Order

Sec. 1.4 Members of the committee reporting a bill have priority of 
    recognition to make points of order against proposed amendments to 
    bills.

        On Mar. 30, 1949,(12) in the Committee of the Whole, 
    Chairman Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, confronted with points of order 
    offered simultaneously by two Members, recognized the committee 
    member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 95 Cong. Rec. 3520, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 3838, the Interior Department general appropriation bill 
        for 1950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I offer my 
    amendment at this time and ask that it be read.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [Henry M.] Jackson of Washington: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Carl T.] Curtis [of Nebraska]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Washington,

[[Page 11945]]

    a member of the committee, to state a point of order.
        Mr. Jackson of Washington: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of 
    order that this particular amendment is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill and imposes additional duties on the Bureau of 
    Reclamation.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from South Dakota desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman on the point of 
    order. . . .
        Does the gentleman from Nebraska desire to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Curtis: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman briefly.
        Mr. Curtis: I rose to make the same point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. Case] offers an amendment 
    which has been reported, against which the gentleman from 
    Washington [Mr. Jackson] makes a point of order on the ground it is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chair sustains the point of order.

Authority of the Chair To Reverse an Earlier Decision

Sec. 1.5 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole has the authority 
    to reverse his ruling made earlier during the consideration of a 
    bill for amendment and on rare occasions does so when additional 
    information on the point of order is presented to him.

    The Committee on Appropriations has the burden of proving the 
authorization for projects carried in a general bill and has sometimes 
cited an ``organic law'' as the legal basis for a particular item of 
appropriation.
    While the Organic Act creating an agency can be cited to support an 
item of appropriation, on one occasion when such a law was cited and 
the Chair relied upon it to overrule a point of order, he later 
reversed his ruling when it was determined that the Organic Act had 
been amended to remove the portion thereof relied upon in the ruling.
    On June 8, 1983,(13) Chairman Gerry E. Studds, of 
Massachusetts, entertained argument against an appropriation for 
``Salaries and Expenses, Bureau of the Mint.'' The point of order was 
brought by a member of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, Frank Annunzio, of Illinois, who argued that the annual 
authorization for the Bureau had not been enacted into law.

[[Page 11946]]

The chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office 
Appropriations, Edward R. Roybal, of California, cited the provisions 
of law carried in title 31 of the United States Code, which established 
the Bureau of the Mint. The Chair relied upon these citations in 
holding that the appropriation was in fact authorized by law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 129 Cong. Rec. 14854, 14855, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                               Bureau of the Mint

                             Salaries and Expenses

            For necessary expenses of the Bureau of the Mint: 
        $49,558,000.

        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the 
    appropriations for the Bureau of the Mint, salaries and expenses, 
    contained in title I are not authorized by law.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Roybal) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Roybal: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on the point 
    of order.
        The Bureau of the Mint has been operating under one form or 
    another since this country was first founded. The Mint has been 
    minting and issuing coins pursuant to authority found in title 31 
    of the United States Code. Section 251 of title 31 establishes the 
    Bureau and I would just like to read to the Chairman the first part 
    of section 251. It reads as follows:

            There shall be established in the Treasury Department a 
        Bureau of the Mint embracing as an organization and under its 
        control all mints for the manufacture of coin and all assay 
        offices for the stamping of bars which has been or which may be 
        authorized by law.

        Section 253 states:

            The Director of the Mint shall have the general supervision 
        of all mints and assay offices and shall make an annual report 
        to the Secretary of the Treasury of their operations at the 
        close of each fiscal year, and from time to time such 
        additional reports setting forth the operational conditions of 
        such institutions as the Secretary shall require, and shall lay 
        before him the annual estimates for their support; and the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint the number of clerks 
        classified according to law necessary to discharge the duties 
        of said Bureau.

        Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in addition to the 
    sections I have just read, sections 261 through 463 of title 31 set 
    forth in detail the duties of the Bureau of the Mint, and those 
    sections are replete with requirements that the mint must 
    accomplish certain acts.
        I would like to cite Deschler's and Brown's Procedure of the 
    House, chapter 25, section 5.7, which states in part, as follows. 
    Section 5.7 reads as follows:

            The failure of Congress to enact into law separate 
        legislation specifically authorizing appropriations for 
        existing programs does not necessarily render appropriations 
        for those programs subject to a point of order, where more 
        general existing law authorizes appropriations for such 
        programs. Thus, a paragraph in a general appropriation bill 
        purportedly containing some funds not yet specifically 
        authorized by separate legislation was held not to violate

[[Page 11947]]

        Rule XXI clause 2, where it was shown that all of the funds in 
        the paragraph were authorized by more general provisions of law 
        currently applicable to the programs in question.

        It is my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the general existing law 
    which I have just cited authorizes the appropriation. The United 
    States Code specifically establishes the Bureau of the Mint, and 
    because the Code requires the Mint to accomplish certain functions, 
    there is implicit in law the authority for the Congress to 
    appropriate funds to accomplish those objectives which Congress set 
    forth in law.

        Mr. Chairman, I ask that the point of order be overruled.
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio) but the Chair would ask him to address 
    himself to the necessity, as he claims in his point of order, for 
    an annual authorization for these funds.
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, I listened closely to the 
    explanation of the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee of 
    the Committee on Appropriations.
        If the Chair were to sustain the point of order, there would 
    not be any need for authorizing committees to present their 
    authorizations. The Appropriations Committee would be doing the 
    job.
        I would also like to cite that in clause 2, rule XXI of the 
    rules of the House, it states that funds cannot be appropriated 
    with an authorization.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        MR. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I rise 
    in opposition to the point of order.
        The chairman of the subcommittee has cited a number of general 
    authorizations, which taken together constitute authorization 
    within the meaning and the application of rule XXI, clause 2.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of order that there 
    is no authorization for the expenses contained in the line in 
    question.
        The gentleman from California cites an organic statute creating 
    the office in question, namely, the Bureau of the Mint.
        The Chair is aware of the bill, H.R. 2628, passed by the House 
    earlier this year, but not yet law. That bill, if and when it 
    becomes law, will authorize some Bureau of Mint appropriations for 
    fiscal 1984 and provide other permanent authorizations for salaries 
    and expenses. Absent citation to such a statute requiring annual 
    authorization, however, the Chair believes that the gentleman from 
    California may rely on an organic act creating the office and 
    authorizing it as a standing authorization in law for the purposes 
    of the Bureau and, therefore, overrules the point of order.

    Later in the consideration of the bill,(14) more recent 
citations of law were called to the attention of the Chair which showed 
that the Organic Act had been supple

[[Page 11948]]

mented by a requirement in law for annual authorizations. The Chair 
then reversed his earlier decision. The proceedings were as follows: 
(15)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. H.R. 3132 (Treasury, Postal Service appropriation, 1984).
15. 129 Cong. Rec. 14876, 14877, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Roybal: Mr. Chairman, I ask that the Chair return to page 
    5, lines 14 through 17, only for the purpose of hearing further 
    arguments on the point of order raised by the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio).
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Reserving the right to 
    object, Mr. Chairman--
        The Chairman: The gentleman did not propound a unanimous 
    consent request.
        Mr. Frenzel: A point of information, Mr. Chairman. Can the 
    Chair restate what the gentleman from California propounded?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California requested the Chair 
    to entertain a return to a point of order earlier overruled.
        The Chair in rare circumstances may agree to such a request and 
    has recognized the gentleman to be heard.
        Mr. Frenzel: Can the Chair tell us what position in the bill 
    the point of order occurs?
        Mr. Chairman: will hear the gentleman from California and will 
    recognize him for that purpose, and the gentleman will point that 
    out.
        Mr. Roybal: Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio).
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of my distinguished 
    colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota, I am renewing my point of 
    order that the appropriation violates clause 2 of rule XXI, on page 
    5, line 14, of the rules of the House, in that they appropriate 
    funds without an authorization.
        A misunderstanding concerning the point of order has occurred 
    because of a change in the law that took place in 1981, the Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act. Prior to the passage of the act, the mint 
    operated under a permanent authorization and needed only to come 
    before the Appropriations Committee to obtain its funds.
        In 1981, however, the Congress changed that law so that the 
    mint had to first obtain a yearly authorization before obtaining an 
    appropriation.
        The report of the House Banking Committee on this legislation 
    makes that point very clear, that each year a new authorization is 
    needed. The report in part says:

            It is the intent of the Committee to repeal the permanent 
        authorization of the salaries and expenses of the Bureau of the 
        Mint.

        Further, the statement of the managers in the conference report 
    of the committee on the legislation makes the point even more 
    clear, that it is to be a yearly authorization. In part the report 
    states:

            The House bill terminated the permanent authorization for 
        appropriations for salaries and expenses for the Bureau of the 
        Mint. The Senate receded to the House.

        The Chairman: The Chair desires to make a statement. The Chair 
    apologizes in advance to the Members for the length of the 
    statement.

[[Page 11949]]

        Earlier, during consideration of the bill in the Committee of 
    the Whole, the Chair overruled a point of order against the 
    paragraph appropriating funds for the Bureau of the Mint, salaries 
    and expenses, on page 5, lines 14 through 17. In argument on the 
    point of order, the manager of the bill cited provisions of law 
    establishing and delegating functions to the Bureau of the Mint, as 
    sufficient authority to authorize appropriations for annual 
    expenses and salaries. The Chair has since become aware that those 
    provisions of law have been repealed, and that the statutes 
    relating to the mint have been amended, first by the Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act of 1981, then by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
    of 1982, and then by a complete recodification of title 31 of the 
    United States Code. No specific authorization of appropriations for 
    fiscal year 1984 has yet been enacted, but one has passed the House 
    (H.R. 2628).
        The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-35, 
    provided in section 382 that the sentence in the Code (31 U.S.C. 
    369) which had been construed to provide a permanent authorization 
    of appropriations for the Bureau of the Mint be repealed, and 
    replaced that language with an authorization of appropriations for 
    fiscal year 1982 only. The report on that measure in the House 
    stated, on page 129, that by repealing the existing statutory 
    provision and by limiting the authorization to fiscal year 1982 
    only, it is the intent of the committee to repeal the permanent 
    authorization for the salaries and expenses of the Bureau of the 
    Mint. The joint explanatory statement of the conferees on the 
    Reconciliation Act reiterated that the House bill terminated the 
    permanent authorization for appropriations for salaries and 
    expenses of the Bureau of the Mint (page 717). The Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act of 1982, Public Law 97-253, in section 202, 
    changed the 1982 authorization into a fiscal year 1983 
    authorization. Public Law 97-258 codified in its entirety title 31 
    of the United States Code, and carried the 1982 authorization in 
    section 5132 of title 31; all the old provisions of title 31 
    dealing with the mint, previously cited in argument on the point of 
    order, have been repealed. Public Law 97-452 modified the 
    codification to reflect the 1983 authorization carried in the 1982 
    Reconciliation Act. There remains no statutory language relating to 
    the mint which may be construed as a permanent authorization.
        The Chair recognizes that it is unusual for the Chair to 
    reverse a decision or ruling previously made, and it is the opinion 
    of the Chair that he should undertake such a course of action only 
    where new and substantial facts or circumstances, which were not 
    evident or stated in argument on a point of order, are subsequently 
    brought to his attention.
        In rare instances, the Chair has reversed a decision on his own 
    initiative; for example, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    in 1927, as cited in volume 8 of Cannon's Precedents section 3435, 
    held that a provision in a general appropriation bill constituted 
    legislation after reviewing a statute he was not previously aware 
    of when he had rendered a contrary decision.
        For the reasons stated, and in view of the unique and 
    compelling circumstances, the Chair holds that the language in the 
    bill on page 5, lines 14

[[Page 11950]]

    through 17, appropriating funds for the Bureau of the Mint, is 
    unauthorized and, therefore, rules the paragraph out of order.

Chair's Duty To Rule on Point of Order

Sec. 1.6 The Chair only rules on a point of order when required to do 
    so, and will permit withdrawal of an amendment (by unanimous 
    consent in Committee of the Whole) prior to ruling on a point of 
    order raised against the amendment.

    On June 7, 1983,(16) the energy and water development 
appropriation for fiscal 1984 (H.R. 3132), was under consideration in 
Committee of the Whole. An amendment, offered by Mr. Robert W. Edgar, 
of Pennsylvania, was subject to at least two possible points of order: 
it was ``legislation'' in violation of Rule XXI clause 2; and it 
affected the level of excise tax and was thus a violation of Rule XXI 
clause 5(b), which prohibits tax or tariff measures from being in order 
to a measure not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means. Points of 
order were reserved against the amendment, and, after discussion, the 
proponent of the amendment asked that it be withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 129 Cong. Rec. 14656, 14657, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Edgar: On page 8, after line 2, 
        add the following new section:
            ``Sec. 104. Within funds available in the construction 
        general account, including but not limited to funds deferred, 
        the Corps of Engineers is directed to complete the navigation 
        and related features of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway at a 
        total additional Federal cost of $202,000,000. Section 206 of 
        the Inland Waterways Revenue Act of 1978 is amended by adding 
        at the end thereof the following: `(27) Tennessee-Tombigbee 
        Waterway: From the Pickwick Pool on the Tennessee River at RM 
        215 to Demopolis, Alabama, on the Tombigbee River at RM 215.4.' 
        ''.

        Mr. [Tom] Bevill [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point 
    of order on this amendment.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. 
    Bevill) reserves a point of order against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Donald J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ronnie G.] Flippo [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I also make 
    a point of order against the gentleman's amendment on the grounds 
    that it violates paragraph (b), clause 5, rule XXI of the rules of 
    the House.
        The Chairman: Would the gentleman suspend.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman reserves a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, with those assurances, I would like to 
    ask

[[Page 11951]]

    unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment at this time.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania?
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object to the 
    unanimous-consent request.
        I wish to make a point of order against the amendment because 
    the amendment violates paragraph (b), clause 5, rule XXI of the 
    Rules of the House of Representatives.
        The Chairman: If the gentleman would suspend a moment, proper 
    procedure is for the gentleman to object to the unanimous-consent 
    request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, to withdraw his 
    amendment and then to make a point of order.
        Mr. Flippo: I do object to the unanimous-consent request.
        Mr. Edgar: Will the gentleman reserve the right to object?
        Mr. Flippo: I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Edgar: Before the gentleman makes his objection, the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania is attempting to remove the impediment 
    that the gentleman wants to call a point of order against, simply 
    because the gentleman has made the assurances.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I do not object to the gentleman's 
    request and I withdraw my reservation of objection.

        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania to withdraw the amendment?
        There was no objection.

Preliminary Argument on Point of Order

Sec. 1.7 Arguments in support of a point of order may be submitted for 
    the information of the Speaker in advance of raising the point of 
    order.

    On July 12, 1935,(18) Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, 
informed the Speaker of arguments that he intended to use to support 
anticipated points of order, thus enabling Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, to research the applicable precedents and authorities ahead 
of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 79 Cong. Rec. 11113, 11114, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. The discussion 
        pertained to the provisions of the Private Calendar rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Blanton: Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the Chair, I 
    should like to make a point of order with respect to certain bills 
    that will come up next Tuesday, and then let the point of order be 
    pending, so that the Speaker in the meantime may examine the 
    authorities which may be presented by myself or by the 
    Parliamentarian.
        The Speaker: The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The Speaker would have discretion whether 
to recognize for such anticipatory argument and could request its 
informal submission in writing, in lieu of using the time of the House.

Discretion of Chair

Sec. 1.8 It is within the discretion of the Chair whether to en

[[Page 11952]]

    tertain more than one point of order to a paragraph at the same 
    time.

    On Mar. 29, 1966,(19) in the Committee of the Whole, the 
Chair entertained and overruled two points of order made against 
separate language in the same paragraph of a general appropriation bill 
simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 112 Cong. Rec. 7103, 7104, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 14012, the second supplemental appropriation for 
        fiscal 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Melvin R.] Laird [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I raise a 
    point of order against lines 6 through 22 on page 4 of the pending 
    legislation, and desire to be heard on the point of order.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. James G. O'Hara (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, the language contained in lines 15 
    through 22 [is] a clear violation of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
    House of Representatives, wherein clause 2 states: . . .
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order on line 12, 
    which reads ``in any fiscal year.'' Is it in order to make that 
    point now, or should it be made at the conclusion of the Chair's 
    ruling?
        The Chairman: It can be made now. The Chair will rule on both 
    points of order.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    language appearing on line 12 . . . to the words ``any fiscal 
    year,'' on the grounds that it is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill which binds the appropriations for all future times. . . .
        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, I accept the inclusion of the point of 
    order by the gentleman from Illinois, and under the terms of Hinds' 
    Precedents, my point of order is raised against the entire section 
    and I would include the point made by the gentleman from Illinois 
    against the entire section.
        The Chairman: The Chair will pass on both points of order at 
    this moment, and the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair finds that the decision of the Chair on H.R. 11588, a 
    bill providing for supplemental appropriations, on the 14th of 
    October 1965, did include language identical to that subject to the 
    point of order made by the gentleman from Wisconsin and identical 
    to that subject to the point of order made by the gentleman from 
    Illinois. At that time both points of order were ruled upon by the 
    Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House, Mr. Harris, of 
    Arkansas. He ruled that the proviso constituted a limitation 
    negative in nature that did not impose additional duties upon the 
    administration and overruled the point of order on both points.
        The Chair, on the basis of the ruling of the Chairman on the 
    14th of October 1965, referred to, overrules the point of order of 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin and the point of order of the 
    gentleman from Illinois.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Since Mr. Laird incorporated Mr. Yates'

[[Page 11953]]

point of order into his own as against the entire paragraph, it was 
proper for the Chair to rule simultaneously on both.

Sec. 1.9 It is within the discretion of the Chair as to which of 
    several points of order he will hear or decide first.

    On Dec. 15, 1937, in the Committee of the Whole, the following 
proceedings took place: (1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 82 Cong. Rec. 1579, 75th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield to me to make a parliamentary inquiry?
        Mr. [Jere] Cooper [of Tennessee]: Mr. Chairman, I yield.
        Mr. Snell: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that one point of order 
    ought to be disposed of before we start on another point of order, 
    that that would be the better procedure and more orderly than to 
    have all of these points of order made at one time, because they 
    are all entirely different. When the gentleman from Tennessee began 
    to state his point of order I thought it was along the same lines 
    as my own.
        Mr. Cooper: Of course, my point of order was raised at this 
    time at the invitation of the Chair.
        Mr. Snell: I think one point of order should be considered at a 
    time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper: From my viewpoint I think they should all be 
    presented.
        The Chairman: (2) The Chair feels it is within the 
    discretion of the Chair to hear all points of order at the same 
    time that relate to germaneness, and also in the discretion of the 
    Chair as to which one he will rule upon in the first instance. . . 
    .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair feels it would be in the best interest of orderly 
    conduct if the procedure indicated by the Chair is followed.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Although several points of order against a 
proposition may be pending at the same time, the Chair may choose any 
one of them as a basis for ruling out the proposition without citing 
the remaining points of order. The Chair would normally follow the 
principle that he should avoid making an unnecessary ruling, if 
possible, by ruling first on points of order which he would sustain, 
thereby rendering moot the remaining points of order.

Multiple Points of Order Against Paragraph, Chair May Be Selective in 
    Ruling

Sec. 1.10 Every argument raised against a paragraph in an appropriation 
    bill need not be addressed when the Chair responds to a point of 
    order; and if the language is subject to one point of order, since 
    it is unauthorized by law, he need not refute other assertions not 
    necessary to reach this decision.

[[Page 11954]]

    On Sept. 23, 1993,(3) the Department of Transportation 
appropriation bill for fiscal 1994 was being read for amendment. By 
unanimous consent, the Committee permitted a return to a paragraph 
already passed in the reading. A point of order was raised against the 
paragraph and the proceedings were as shown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 139 Cong. Rec. 22172, 22173, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (4) The Chair would advise the 
    gentleman that the Clerk was beginning to read the paragraph 
    beginning on line 16, page 21, but had not commenced the reading of 
    that paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Rick Boucher (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Norman Y.] Mineta [of California]: Let me ask about page 
    21, lines 1 through 7.
        The Chairman: That section has been read.
        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I did not hear that portion being 
    read, and I have a point of order on that provision.
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman that that 
    section of the bill has been passed in the reading and would ask 
    the gentleman if he desires to make a unanimous-consent request 
    that the Committee return to that section.
        Mr. Mineta: Since I did not, and I believe other Members have 
    not heard that portion read, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous 
    consent that that portion be read for consideration at this point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California? . . .
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The Committee will return to line 1 on page 21.
        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            Kentucky Bridge Project

                              (highway trust fund)

            For up to 80 percent of the expenses necessary for 
        continuing construction to replace the Glover Cary Bridge in 
        Owensboro, Kentucky, $12,000,000, to be derived from the 
        Highway Trust Fund and to remain available until September 30, 
        1997. . . .

        The Chairman: Are there any points of order to be raised to 
    that language?

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against page 
    21, lines 1 through 7, on the basis that this provision violates 
    clause 2 of rule XXI. First of all, this project is unauthorized. 
    And while there have been previous appropriations, the project has 
    never been authorized by law.
        In addition, the period of funding availability until September 
    30, 1997, is not authorized.
        Also, this provision appropriates money out of the highway 
    trust fund, contrary to section 9503(C)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
    Code. That section provides that the highway trust fund may only be 
    used to fund programs authorized in the Highway Acts of 1956, 1982, 
    1987, and 1991. Thus, because this provision provides funding from

[[Page 11955]]

    the highway trust fund for a project not authorized by one of these 
    laws, it has the effect of changing existing law, and, therefore, 
    is in violation of rule XXI.
        Finally, this provision does not come within the exception to 
    rule XXI, clause 2(A), for continuation of appropriations for 
    public works and objects which are already in progress.
        It is clear from the precedents that the exception is narrowly 
    construed and has been applied only to Federal projects. As applied 
    specifically to highways, the precedents have required that the 
    United States actually hold title to the road. The project in this 
    paragraph does not meet this test. Thus, Mr. Chairman, for the 
    reasons enumerated above, lines 1 through 7 on page 21 are in 
    violation of rule XXI and subject to a point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Carr] 
    desire to be heard?
        Mr. [Bob] Carr of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I do. This falls 
    within the exceptions in rule XXI for works in progress, and we 
    would ask the Chair to rule.
        The Chairman: Do other Members desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from California [Mr. Mineta] makes the point of 
    order that the funds appropriated in the paragraph entitled 
    ``Kentucky Bridge Project'' are unauthorized and thus in violation 
    of clause 2 of rule XXI. The gentleman from Michigan has argued 
    that although the funds are indeed unauthorized they are in order 
    under the exception to clause 2 of rule XXI which allows 
    unauthorized appropriations to continue funding public works and 
    objects which are already in progress, referred to as the ``works-
    in-progress exception.'' The Chair need not rule on whether this 
    project is exclusively a federally-owned project.
        The legal authority for expending highway trust funds is 
    outlined in section 9503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. That 
    section states in positive terms that highway trust fund moneys 
    shall be available where authorized by specific enumerated acts. 
    The paragraph in question circumvents that requirement. Deschler's 
    Precedents, volume 8, chapter 26, section 8.9, stands for the 
    proposition that the works-in-progress exception may not be invoked 
    to circumvent existing law. Therefore, the Chair sustains the point 
    of order.

Multiple Reasons for Sustaining a Point of Order

Sec. 1.11 Any number of reasons may be advanced at one time to 
    determine whether a matter is subject to a point of order.

    On Apr. 5, 1946,(5) Mr. Adam C. Powell, Jr., of New 
York, offered an amendment to a general appropriation bill prohibiting 
the use of the funds therein provided to any office, agency, or 
department of the District of Columbia which

[[Page 11956]]

segregated the citizens of the District on the basis of race, color, 
creed, or place of national origin. Several points of order based upon 
the germaneness rule [Rule XVI clause 7, House Rules and Manual Sec.  
794 (1997)] and upon the rule precluding legislation on a general 
appropriation bill [Rule XXI clause 2(b), House Rules and Manual Sec.  
834b (1997)] were immediately raised against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 92 Cong. Rec. 3227, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 5990, a District of Columbia appropriation bill for fiscal 
        1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: (6) The gentleman will state the point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Aime J. Forand (R.I.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    amendment is not germane, and that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill, in that it attempts to change the fundamental 
    laws of the District of Columbia. . . .
        Mr. [John M.] Coffee [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order that the amendment proposes to incorporate a 
    legislative provision in an appropriation bill that does not come 
    within the purview of the Holman rule and that it sets up an 
    affirmative agency in the law.
        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I desire to 
    add further points of order upon which I should like to be heard at 
    a later time in the discussion.
        These points of order led to the following exchange, which is 
    illustrative of the rule:
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Marcantonio: Then there will be two points of order pending 
    at the same time.
        The Chairman: Any number of reasons can be given for the point 
    of order.

Chair's Obligation in Case of Multiple Points of Order

Sec. 1.12 If several points of order are made against an amendment and 
    the Chair sustains one of them, it is not necessary that he rule on 
    the remainder as the amendment is no longer pending.

    When the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary appropriation bill 
for fiscal 1979 was under consideration in the Committee of the Whole 
on June 14, 1978,(7) an amendment, phrased as a restriction 
of all funds in the bill for certain types of advertising of unsafe 
products, was offered by Mr. Mark Andrews, of North Dakota. Mr. Bob 
Eckhardt, of Texas, raised two points of order against the amendment. 
The proceedings were as indicated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 124 Cong. Rec. 17644, 17646, 17647, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.

[[Page 11957]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: on page 
        51 after line 16, insert the following:
            Sec. 605. Except for funds appropriated to the Judiciary in 
        title IV of this act, no part of any appropriation contained in 
        this act may be used to pay the salary or expenses of any 
        person to limit the advertising of: (1) any food product that 
        contains ingredients that have been determined to be safe for 
        human consumption by the Food and Drug Administration or are 
        considered to be ``Generally Recognized as Safe'' (GRAS) and 
        does not contain ingredients that have been determined to be 
        unsafe for human consumption by the FDA; (2) any toy which has 
        not been declared hazardous or unsafe by the Consumer Product 
        Safety Commission.

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (8) The gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
    Eckhardt) reserves a point of order. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Does the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) desire to press 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Eckhardt: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Eckhardt: The amendment is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill, and as such is subject to a point of order under rule XXI, 
    clause 2.
        Mr. Chairman, it is provided in the very first section of 
    Deschler on this particular point that:

            When an amendment, while curtailing certain uses of funds 
        carried in the bill, explicitly places new duties on officers 
        of the government or implicitly requires them to make new 
        investigations, compile evidence, or make judgments and 
        determinations not otherwise required of them by law, then it 
        assumes the character of legislation and is subject to a point 
        of order.

        That is the main thrust of my point of order but I also believe 
    that in the colloquy it becomes rather apparent that this amendment 
    was directed at the Federal Trade Commission section of the bill 
    which has come out. Therefore, I would also offer alternatively, or 
    additionally, the point of order that this is not germane to the 
    bill as it is now before us.
        On that latter objection, which I will speak to only very 
    briefly, the argument and the thrust of the amendment clearly goes 
    toward rulemaking authority. But I should primarily like to speak 
    on the point of order based on the proposition that I just read, 
    that is, that this constitutes legislation on an appropriations 
    bill and gives to officers of the Government very, very large 
    additional duties as the result of the passage of this amendment, 
    should it be passed.
        I point primarily to the case which I believe is directly in 
    point. On June 21, 1974, there was a point of order made by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) to a provision in the 
    appropriations bill at that time, section 511. The gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Moss), asserted that the language would impose 
    additional duties on every agency subject to the bill and was 
    legislation on an appropriation. The language of the section was as 
    follows:

            Except as provided in existing law, funds provided in this 
        act shall be

[[Page 11958]]

        available only for the purposes for which they are 
        appropriated.

        Mr. Moss correctly pointed out that if that provision was 
    sustained, it would be necessary in the use of any funds by an 
    agency involved to go back and show that the Appropriations 
    Committee had addressed the specific object of the use of those 
    funds. The gentleman from California (Mr. Moss), pressed that point 
    very strongly. The gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Whitten) then 
    contended that he considered this only as limiting the legislation 
    to existing law, and the present speaker joined in supporting the 
    Moss point of order.
        I said at that time that as I understood the gentleman from 
    Mississippi, Mr. Whitten's, position on the provision, it meant 
    that each of the specific appropriations would have to be 
    considered with respect to the process brought forth in that 
    committee's hearings.
        The Chair ruled as follows:

            The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order. If the 
        language means what the gentleman from Mississippi now says it 
        does, then the language is a nullity because it just repeats 
        existing law. The Chair is of the opinion, though, that there 
        is a possibility, as earlier indicated during general debate 
        and as suggested by the gentleman from California, that the 
        amendment imposes an additional burden, and the Chair, 
        therefore, sustains the point of order.

        There are a number of cases, of course, in Deschler around this 
    area that I have cited that bear out the point that I have made, 
    but I know that the Chair is familiar with the general proposition 
    and I shall not recite them. But I do want to say and show on that 
    point of order if its facts should be sustained, then our 
    contention that there is an additional burden on administrators is 
    demonstrated in spades in this amendment. This amendment says that 
    none of the funds appropriated ``in this act may be used to pay the 
    salary or expenses of any person to limit the advertising of: 
    First, any food product that contains ingredients that have been 
    determined to be safe for human consumption by the Food and Drug 
    Administration or are considered to be `generally recognized as 
    safe.'.''
        The Food and Drug Administration does not list food products as 
    safe or unsafe. The Food and Drug Adminis-tration only determines 
    whether or not ingredients in food products are safe or unsafe. 
    Therefore, if this restriction were placed in law, it would be 
    necessary for an agency like the Federal Communications Commission, 
    when it is determining whether or not funds might be used in order 
    to take some action respecting unsafe foods, to look to see what 
    ingredients were included in the particular food involved. In other 
    words, the Federal Communications Commission would have to exercise 
    the same type of expertise, the same type of technical research 
    that the other agency has had to go through. In addition to this, 
    the amendment says that none of these funds can be used with regard 
    to any toy which has not been declared hazardous or unsafe by the 
    Consumer Product Safety Commission. The Consumer Product Safety 
    Commission does not list specific toys as unsafe.
        The Consumer Product Safety Commission determines what minimum 
    design or what minimum standards, per

[[Page 11959]]

    formance standards, are necessary in order for a toy to be 
    permitted to go on the market. For instance, a toy that melts lead 
    to make toy soldiers might be unsafe because of the method in which 
    it melts the lead and exposes persons to heat.
        The point, though, is that the Commission does not establish 
    that this particular toy is unsafe. If we pass this restriction, we 
    would place the burden on the FTC to go in and look at every toy 
    and then apply the standards of the Consumer Product Agency to 
    those toys to find out whether they could be advertised.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a classic example of placing 
    on every agency to whom this restriction would apply very extensive 
    duties beyond that which they are now called upon to exercise.
        In addition, it would place the same burden on other agencies, 
    like the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to change their rules 
    to make different modes of establishing and identifying unsafe 
    toys.
        Mr. Chairman, I urge that the point of order be sustained.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. 
    Andrews) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the House of Representatives has 
    accepted as ``in order'' amendments to appropriations bills which 
    are negative prohibitions, descriptive of employment not mandated 
    by law which may not be undertaken if those individuals are to be 
    compensated by funds in the bill.
        This type of amendment is clearly described in Deschler's 
    Procedure. The following are two examples of such an amendment:
        On June 21, 1974, the House held in order an amendment by 
    Representative Whitten of Mississippi to limit funds used by the 
    FTC to collect line of business data.
        On October 9, 1974, the House held in order an amendment to 
    prohibit EPA from using funds to tax, limit or regulate parking 
    facilities.
        Mr. Chairman, addressing the question of germaneness, the House 
    Manual, section 795, states that an amendment in the form of a new 
    paragraph must be germane to the bill as a whole.
        It certainly is, because the bill contains funding for the 
    Federal Communications Commission, which is the only agency which 
    has so far put in detail an investigation of this type of action.
        Second, addressing the issue of legislation on an appropriation 
    bill, to implement the limitation the agency only need examine 
    information which it now receives under existing laws; so there are 
    no additional substantive duties, judgments or determinations.
        Therefore, since this amendment is based on a clearly 
    discernible standard and since chapter 25, section 10.4 says:

            Where the manifest intent of a proposed amendment is to 
        impose a limitation on the use of funds appropriated in the 
        bill, the fact that the administration of the limitation will 
        impose certain incidental but additional burdens on executive 
        officers does not destroy the character of the limitation.

        Mr. Chairman, based on this, I feel that the amendment is in 
    order. I would hope the Chair would rule accordingly.

[[Page 11960]]

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Norman D.] Dicks [of Washington]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, just to reiterate on this point, this amendment 
    was aimed at limiting the Federal Trade Commission. Now that that 
    section has been stricken, the only way it can apply is to the FCC. 
    The FCC does not have to regulate itself for advertising. That 
    jurisdiction falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
    Commission.
        Therefore, it creates new legal duties for the FCC, which are 
    beyond the scope of an appropriation bill, which makes it 
    legislation within an appropriation bill and, therefore, subject to 
    rule XXI, clause 2.
        Also the ruling made by the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
    is accurate. The language does not go to unsafe toys, and they 
    would have additional duties created by this amendment.
        Mr. Chairman, I also believe that clause 2, rule XXI, applies 
    in this case.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) makes the point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Dakota 
    (Mr. Andrews) constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill. In 
    addition, he makes the point that because it was drafted originally 
    to be applicable to the Federal Trade Commission and that section 
    of the bill has been stricken, it is no longer germane to the bill.
        The Chair does not find it necessary to rule, however, on the 
    point of germaneness.
        The amendment would prohibit use of any funds in the bill to 
    limit advertising of food products and toys in relation to which 
    determinations have been made by the Food and Drug Administration 
    and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. As indicated by the 
    arguments made on the point of order, this bill now contains no 
    funds for the Federal Trade Commission but does contain funds for 
    the Federal Communications Commission. The Chair feels it is 
    necessary to lay that basis in order to determine whether the 
    amendment requires new duties or determinations of a particular 
    agency which are not now required by law.
        The Federal Communications Commission has the authority under 
    the law to regulate interstate and foreign communications and 
    transmissions in wire and radio, but existing law contains no 
    mandate that the Commission consider whether food and toy products 
    are safe or unsafe in regulating broadcasts within its 
    jurisdiction. The amendment would disallow funds for the Commission 
    to limit advertising of certain products, even if the purpose for 
    such regulatory limitations was totally unrelated to the safety of 
    the product in question. In considering any proposal to limit 
    advertising of food or toy products, the Commission would be 
    required to first determine the scope and extent of determinations 
    of other agencies on the safety of those products, and it is far 
    from clear whether such determinations are readily available or 
    sufficiently certain to determine whether the limitation would 
    apply in a particular case.
        Furthermore, in relation to food products, the Commission would 
    have to determine whether the finished food

[[Page 11961]]

    product contained ingredients which have been declared safe if the 
    Food and Drug Administration had made no determination on the 
    safety of such a finished product.

        The Chair would also note that the amendment would prohibit 
    advertising of food products containing ingredients considered to 
    be generally recognized as safe, without specifically indicating 
    whether that determination is to be made by the FDA or by the 
    Federal Communications Commission.
        For the reasons stated, the Chair finds that the amendment 
    would impose substantial new duties and requirements on the Federal 
    Communications Commission beyond its authorities under existing law 
    and, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Points of Order Against En Bloc Amendments

Sec. 1.13 Where amendments to the pending paragraph of an appropriation 
    bill and to the following section were, by unanimous consent, 
    considered en bloc, a point of order was lodged against both 
    amendments based on identical legislative language therein and was 
    sustained by the Chair.

    On July 31, 1969,(9) where amendments to a bill were 
considered en bloc in the Committee of the Whole, Chairman Chet 
Holifield, of California, ruled simultaneously on points of order 
against two amendments containing identical language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 115 Cong. Rec. 21675, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 13111, the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and 
        Welfare appropriations for fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments and I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be 
    considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts?
        There was no objection. . . .
        Mr. [Robert L. F.] Sikes [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to 
    make a point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Sikes: Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that the rulings of 
    the Chair heretofore on this bill this afternoon show clearly that 
    this is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule. The Chair 
    recognizes that this is a very difficult matter. The proposed 
    amendment for section 408 is different from section 408 of the bill 
    in that it has added the words ``in order to overcome racial 
    imbalance.''. . .
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard for a minute?
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, 
    regular order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will please desist until the Chair 
    has finished his ruling on the second amend

[[Page 11962]]

    ment because they are being considered en bloc.
        The additional words in the amendment to section 409 are ``in 
    order to overcome racial imbalance'' and this clearly requires 
    additional duties on the part of the officials. Therefore, it is 
    not negative in nature and is legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Sec. 1.14 If a point of order is sustained against any portion of a 
    package of amendments being considered ``en bloc'' on a general 
    appropriation bill, all the amendments are ruled out and those not 
    subject to a point of order must be reoffered separately.

    On Sept. 16, 1981,(10) the House had under consideration 
the military construction appropriations for fiscal 1982. Amendments 
were offered, and by unanimous consent, were considered en bloc. The 
proceedings are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 127 Cong. Rec. 20735-38, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ronald B. (Bo)] Ginn [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read and open to 
    amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: (11) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Georgia?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Philip R. Sharp (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against the bill? 
    The Chair hears none. . . .
        Mr. [M. Caldwell] Butler [of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments, and I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be 
    considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Virginia?
        There was no objection. . . .

            Amendments offered by Mr. Butler: Page 2, line 11, strike 
        out ``$1,029,519,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$1,009,276,400''.
            Page 3, line 6, strike out ``$1,404,883,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$1,354,096,100'' . . .
            Page 6, line 16, strike out ``$36,000,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$34,345,000''.
            Page 6, line 22, strike out ``$37,400,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$35,855,000''.
            Page 14, after line 13, insert the following new section:
            Sec. 123. The provisions of the Act of March 3, 1931 (40 
        U.S.C. 276a-276a-5; 46 Stat. 1494), commonly referred to as the 
        Davis-Bacon Act, shall not apply to the wages paid to laborers 
        and mechanics for any work or services performed under any 
        contract entered into on or after the date of enactment of this 
        Act for the construction of any project funds for which are 
        appropriated by this Act.

                               POINT OF ORDER

        Mr. Ginn: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendments.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Ginn: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendments because they constitute legislation in

[[Page 11963]]

    an appropriations bill, which is in violation of clause 2, rule 
    XXI.
        The amendments proposed constitute a change in existing law, 
    which under House rules is not allowed through an appropriations 
    bill.
        The amendments are legislative in nature and are in violation 
    of clause 2, rule XXI. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I ask for a ruling 
    from the Chair. . . .
        Mr. [Thomas F.] Hartnett [of South Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Hartnett: We do not have a whole lot of on-the-job training 
    for new Members who just arrived in the 97th Congress. In the event 
    I would want to raise a point of order, as did the distinguished 
    chairman from Georgia, that the amendment is what I would call 
    double or triple barreled, that I, as a Member, although I may want 
    to vote for some of the changes that are proposed by the gentleman 
    from Virginia (Mr. Butler) in his amendment to the bill, I may not 
    want to vote for others.
        My inquiry is: Is this amendment being offered as one 
    amendment, and if it is, would the point of order be in order that 
    the amendment was not properly drawn and that I was being precluded 
    from voting for--I would have to vote for or against all of them 
    where, in fact, I may want to vote for one or the other?
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the gentleman's inquiry 
    by stating that the gentleman from Virginia has already gotten 
    unanimous consent to offer his amendments en bloc. However, if a 
    point of order is sustained against those amendments or any portion 
    thereof, under the precedent the remaining amendments will have to 
    be reoffered, at which point the gentleman from Virginia will again 
    have to ask permission to have them offered en bloc. If that is 
    denied, then the amendments would have to be offered individually.
        Mr. Hartnett: Mr. Chairman, what you are telling me is, in 
    order for the gentleman from Virginia to offer a series of 
    amendments like that, the gentleman has to obtain unanimous consent 
    prior to doing that or, in fact, he would have to offer each one of 
    them individually?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. The very first action 
    the gentleman from Virginia engaged in was to ask for such 
    unanimous consent.
        Mr. Hartnett: I thank the Chair.

Multiple Points of Order Against Paragraph in General Appropriation 
    Bill

Sec. 1.15 Where two points of order are made against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill which has just been read, one against a 
    proviso in the paragraph and the other against the totality of the 
    paragraph, it is the broader point of order which the Chair must 
    address and upon which he must rule.

    During the reading for amendment of the supplemental appropriation 
bill, fiscal 1978, on Oct. 19, 1977,(12) a paragraph dealing

[[Page 11964]]

with the Federal Energy Administration was read by the Clerk. Mr. Frank 
Horton, of New York, made a point of order against a proviso in the 
paragraph which contained a waiver of existing law. Mr. Robert L. 
Ottinger, of New York, then raised a point of order against the entire 
paragraph, addressing not only the change in law highlighted by Mr. 
Horton, but the unauthorized items funded in the paragraph. Chairman 
Sam Gibbons, of Florida, ultimately ruled out the entire paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 123 Cong. Rec. 34245, 34246, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                RELATED AGENCIES

                         Federal Energy Administration

                             Salaries and Expenses

            For an additional amount for ``Salaries and expenses'', 
        $293,611,000, of which $266,145,000 shall become available only 
        upon enactment of authorizing legislation as follows: (1) for 
        conservation grants for schools and health care facilities, 
        $200,000,000; for conservation grants for local government 
        buildings, $25,000,000; for grants for financial assistance to 
        utility regulatory commissions, $11,250,000; for solar heating 
        and cooling installations in federal buildings, $25,000,000; to 
        remain available for obligation until September 30, 1979; and 
        (2) for administration of grants for schools and health care 
        facilities, local government buildings, and utility rate 
        reform, $1,480,000; and for a federal vanpooling program, 
        $3,415,000: Provided That of the total amount of this 
        appropriation, not to exceed $6,000,000, shall remain available 
        until expended for a reserve to cover any defaults from loan 
        guarantees issued to develop underground coal mines as 
        authorized by Public Law 94-163: Provided further, That the 
        indebtedness guaranteed or committed to be guaranteed under 
        said law shall not exceed the aggregate of $62,000,000: 
        Provided further, That notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) 
        government-owned vehicles may be used to initiate vanpool 
        demonstration projects.

        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    portion of this chapter which appropriates funds for a Federal 
    vanpooling program. The appropriation is contained in lines 15 and 
    16 of page 8--in the words ``; and for a Federal vanpooling 
    program, $3,415,000''. Related language, to which my point of order 
    should also apply since these words have no meaning in the bill 
    except as they pertain to the vanpooling appropriation, is 
    contained in lines 23 and 24 of page 8 and lines 1 and 2 of page 9:

            Provided further, That notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) 
        government-owned vehicles may be used to initiate vanpool 
        demonstration projects.

        Mr. Chairman, these provisions violate rule XXI, clause 2, of 
    the Rules of the House. This rule states, in pertinent part:

            No appropriation shall be reported in any general 
        appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for 
        any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in

[[Page 11965]]

        continuation of appropriations for such public works and 
        objects as are already in progress.

        A Federal vanpooling program has never been authorized and is 
    not now in progress. In fact, the House has rejected such a program 
    twice, the second time by an even larger margin than the first. We 
    considered vanpooling as section 701 of H.R. 8444, the National 
    Energy Act, in August of this year. I moved to strike that section 
    from the bill, and my amendment carried with strong bipartisan 
    support, 232 to 184. When the bill was reported back to the House 
    by the Committee of the Whole, a separate vote was demanded on my 
    amendment. In the separate vote, the amendment was agreed to by a 
    vote of 239 to 180.
        Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the House creating by a few words 
    in an appropriation bill a program which it has twice explicitly 
    rejected in the past. That is why I have raised this point of order 
    against H.R. 9375's appropriation of funds for a Federal vanpooling 
    program.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    portion of the bill H.R. 9375 appropriating salaries and expenses 
    for the Federal Energy Administration.

        The particular provision appropriates $266,145,000 for several 
    purposes all of which are prefaced by the phrase that such 
    appropriation is subject to ``enactment of authorizing 
    legislation.''
The purposes are:

        Conservation grants for schools and health care facilities, 
    $200 million;
        Conservation grants for local government buildings, $25 
    million;
        Grants for financial assistance to utility regulatory 
    commissions, $11,250,000;
        Solar heating and cooling installations in Federal buildings, 
    $25 million;
        Administration of grants for schools and health care 
    facilities, local government buildings, and utility rate reform, 
    $1,480,000; and
        Federal vanpooling programs, $3,415,000.
        Mr. Chairman, rule XXI, clause 2, provides that no 
    appropriations shall be reported in any general appropriation bill 
    for any expenditure not previously authorized by law. All of the 
    above provisions are unauthorized. They are now a part of the 
    versions of the National Energy Act legislation pending in the 
    House and the Senate. The vanpooling provision was soundly rejected 
    by the House last August in connection with H.R. 8444. The 
    precedents show that an authorization must be enacted before the 
    appropriation may be included in an appropriation bill. Thus, 
    delaying the availability of an appropriation pending enactment of 
    the authorization, as is done in H.R. 9375, does not protect the 
    item of appropriation against the point of order under rule XXI, 
    clause 2. See, Congressional Record, April 26, 1972, page 14455. 
    See also, 114 Congressional Record, 15354, 90th Congress, second 
    session, May 28, 1968, where it was ruled that an appropriation for 
    a maritime ship construction operation and research not yet 
    authorized by law for the fiscal year of the appropriation was

[[Page 11966]]

    conceded to be unauthorized and was ruled in violation of rule XXI, 
    clause 2. . . .
        The Chairman: Does any other Member desire to be heard?
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I think I 
    should respond to the point of order. The gentleman is correct 
    insofar as the point of order is concerned. The purpose of the 
    subcommittee in placing these appropriations in this bill was in 
    order to expedite the activities of the Federal Energy 
    Administration at a critical time. It is my understanding that the 
    conferees for both the House and the Senate have very nearly 
    reached agreement on the bill.
        The action of the gentleman in offering the point of order, in 
    my judgment, will slow down the activities of the Federal Energy 
    Administration. However, let me say that as far as the point of 
    order itself is concerned, we are constrained to concede it. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Exactly what lines were stricken by the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: The point of order requests the striking of the 
    language on page 8, line 2, through page 9, line 2; the entire 
    section.
        Mr. Yates: Up to the line, ``strategic petroleum reserve.''
        The Chairman: Does anyone else desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I did not understand what the Chair 
    said as to the language that is to be stricken.
        The Chairman: The language the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
    Ottinger) wishes to be stricken on the point of order is the 
    language beginning on page 8, line 2, going through page 9, line 2. 
    All of that language, which includes the part the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Horton) has raised his point of order against.
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The point of order has been conceded, and the point of order is 
    sustained. The language on page 8, line 2, through page 9, line 2, 
    is stricken.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Part of Paragraph in 
    Appropriation Bill

Sec. 1.16 When part of a pending paragraph in a general appropriation 
    bill is subject to be stricken on a point of order as being 
    legislation, the entire paragraph is also subject to a point of 
    order.

    On Apr. 15, 1957,(13) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, found it necessary to sustain a 
point of order against an entire paragraph after sustaining one against 
language in part of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 103 Cong. Rec. 5684-86, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6870, the Second Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act 
        of 1957.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert E.] Jones [Jr.] of Alabama: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order.

[[Page 11967]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Jones of Alabama: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the language commencing on page 2, line 23, after the 
    words, ``as amended'' and reading: ``And to be made available from 
    the loan authorization contained in section 606(a) of the act of 
    August 7, 1956 (Public Law 1020).''. . .
        I submit that this is legislation on an appropriation bill and 
    is subject to a point of order. . . .
        Mr. [Frank T.] Bow [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order against the entire paragraph on loan authorizations. . . .
        Mr. Jones of Alabama: I insist on the point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, we concede 
    the point of order.
        Mr. Bow: I insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The point of order made by the gentleman from Alabama on line 
    23, page 2, is against the three lines beginning with the word 
    ``and'' as being legislation upon an appropriation bill, which it 
    obviously is.
        Now, the gentleman from Ohio, however, offers a point of order 
    against the entire paragraph. As the language which is sought to be 
    stricken by the gentleman from Alabama is subject to a point of 
    order and is part of the paragraph, then the whole paragraph is 
    subject to a point of order, and the Chair is constrained to 
    sustain both points of order.

Sec. 1.17 If any part of a paragraph of an appropriation bill is 
    subject to a point of order, it is sufficient for the rejection of 
    the entire paragraph.

    On Mar. 15, 1945,(14) after it was conceded, in the 
Committee of the Whole, that certain lines in a paragraph were subject 
to a point of order, the Chair sustained a point of order against the 
entire paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 91 Cong. Rec. 2305, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 2603, a State, Justice, Commerce, Judiciary, and Federal 
        Loan Agency appropriation for 1946.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (15) Does the gentleman from Michigan 
    [Mr. Rabaut] desire to be heard?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Louis C.] Rabaut: Mr. Chairman, I think the point of order 
    might apply to the language appearing in lines 20 and 21. That is 
    because of the excesses.
        The Chairman: Permit the Chair to understand the gentleman. The 
    gentleman concedes that the language in lines 20 and 21 is bad and 
    subject to a point of order?
        Mr. Rabaut: Yes.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Rees] insist 
    on his point of order against the entire paragraph? . . .
        Mr. [Edward H.] Rees of Kansas: I insist on the point of order 
    to the entire paragraph, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: In view of the fact that certain language in the 
    paragraph is conceded to be subject to a point of

[[Page 11968]]

    order, the entire paragraph is subject to a point of order.
        The Chair sustains the point of order.

Sec. 1.18 A point of order may be made against a part of a paragraph in 
    a general appropriation bill and, if sustained, will not affect the 
    remainder of such paragraph if no point of order is made against 
    it.

    On Mar. 30, 1954,(16) in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. 
Jacob K. Javits, of New York, raised a point of order against only part 
of a paragraph, but declined to make his point of order against the 
remainder of the paragraph. Chairman Louis E. Graham, of Pennsylvania, 
then ruled that only the affected language was out of order and the 
balance of the paragraph would remain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 100 Cong. Rec. 4108, 4109, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 8583, the independent offices appropriations bill of 
        1955.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. Javits: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    proviso appearing on page 28, lines 13 to 18, on the ground it is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [John] Phillips [of California]: No, Mr. Chairman. I think 
    we are compelled to concede the point of order and I submit an 
    amendment to replace it. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair sustains the point of order.
        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, is it possible to make a point of 
    order to one part of a paragraph and have it limited to that 
    particular part?
        The Chairman: A Member may make a point of order to any 
    objectionable language in the paragraph.
        Mr. Whitten: Separating it from the remainder of the paragraph?
        The Chairman: Yes.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Portion of Amendment

Sec. 1.19 A point of order against a portion of an amendment to a 
    general appropriation bill is sufficient, if sustained, to rule out 
    the entire amendment.

    On June 25, 1976,(17) during consideration of the 
Interior appropriation bill, fiscal 1977, an amendment of two parts was 
offered to the pending paragraph and one following. The amendments 
were, by general consent, considered en bloc. A point of

[[Page 11969]]

order was directed specifically against one portion of the amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 122 Cong. Rec. 20551, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gilbert] Gude [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Mr. Gude: Amendment No. 1: Page 10, 
        line 2, strike out ``$272,635,000.'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$284,399,871, except that $856,000 of this appropriation 
        shall be available for obligation only upon the enactment into 
        law of authorizing legislation providing for the establishment 
        of the Valley Forge National Historical Park in the 
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.''
            Amendment No. 2: Page 10, beginning on line 19, strike out 
        ``$37,228,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$44,228,000''.

        Mr. Gude (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendments be considered as read and printed in 
    the Record, and that they be considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: (18) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Maryland?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Walter Flowers (Ala.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, reserving 
    the right to object, I want to make a point of order against the 
    amendments, and I do not know whether my rights are protected if I 
    consent to the unanimous-consent request. So I object.
        The Chairman: Objection is heard. The Chair will protect the 
    gentleman on his point of order.
        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk concluded reading the amendments.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gude), as it 
    violates clause 2, rule XXI, which states in part that:

            No appropriation shall be reported in any general 
        appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for 
        any expenditure not previously authorized by law.

        Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Maryland (Mr. Gude) specifically provides for the allocation of 
    funds for the Valley Forge National Historical Park. There is no 
    authorization for the Valley Forge National Historical Park.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Maryland wish to be 
    recognized on the point of order?
        Mr. Gude: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment reads that the money will be 
    allocated to the Park Service. The fact that a part of it would be 
    available for the Valley Forge Park I do not feel works to the 
    entire amendment being out of order.
        Mr. [Roy A.] Taylor of North Carolina: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Gude: I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. 
    Taylor).
        Mr. Taylor of North Carolina: I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman is correct in stating that 
    the authorization for Valley Forge National Historical Park has not 
    yet become law. It has passed the House. In all probability, it 
    shall become law. The act provides for the transfer to take place 
    as of the beginning of the fiscal year 1977. We wanted the State

[[Page 11970]]

    of Pennsylvania to operate it under this law. The fact is that we 
    are going to have to have more personnel in order to have this 
    park. Are we just going to have to take them away from other parks 
    and spread the existing personnel more thin? They are too thin now.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I insist upon my point of order.
        I cite, additionally, the following language:

            Delaying the availability of an appropriation pending 
        enactment of an authorization does not protect the item of 
        appropriation against a point of order under this clause.

        The Chairman: A point of order has been interposed against the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gude).
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland 
    contemplates in its own language that there has been no 
    authorization which has become law and, inasmuch as the point of 
    order must be sustained to that part of it, under Deschler's 
    chapter 26, section 8.1, it would apply to the entire amendment. 
    The Chair must sustain the point of order raised by the gentleman 
    from Illinois (Mr. Yates).

If Part of Amendment Is Legislative, the Whole Can Be Ruled Out

Sec. 1.20 If any portion of an amendment on a general appropriation 
    bill constitutes legislation, the entire amendment is out of order.

    On Aug. 7, 1978,(19) Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, of 
Illinois, ruled out an amendment, the first part of which might have 
qualified as a proper limitation but which was tainted by language in 
the amendment restricting discretion on the part of federal officials. 
The amendment, the point of order, and the ruling are set forth herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 124 Cong. Rec. 24707, 24708, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. John T. Myers [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. John T. Myers: On page 8, after 
        line 10, add the following new section:
            None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
        in this Act shall be obligated or expended for salaries or 
        expenses during the current fiscal year in connection with the 
        demilitarization of any arms as advertised by the Department of 
        Defense, Defense Logistics Agency sale number 31-8118 issued 
        January 24, 1978, and listed as ``no longer needed by the 
        Federal Government'' and that such arms shall not be withheld 
        from distribution to purchasers who qualify for purchase of 
        said arms pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 
        4308. . . .

        Mr. [Abner J.] Mikva [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Mikva: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the 
    amendment on the ground that I believe that it is leg

[[Page 11971]]

    islation within a general appropriation bill and, therefore, 
    violates the rules of the House.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. John T. 
    Myers) wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. John T. Myers: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
        Mr. John T. Myers: Mr. Chairman, this is a simple limitation 
    amendment. It merely limits the Secretary of the Treasury to 
    continue to carry out existing law. It does not provide any new 
    law. It simply says that the Secretary of the Treasury shall carry 
    out the prevailing, existing law.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) wish 
    to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, rule 21, clause 2, of the Rules of 
    the House (House Rules and Manual pages 426-427) specifies that an 
    amendment to an appropriation bill is in order if it meets certain 
    tests, such as:
        First. It must be germane;
        Second. It must be negative in nature;
        Third. It must show retrenchment on its face;
        Fourth. It must impose no additional or affirmative duties or 
    amend existing law.

                  Why the Amendment Complies with Rule 21

        First. It is germane. As the amendment applies to the 
    distribution of arms by the Defense Logistics Agency, it is not 
    exclusively an Army of civilian marksmanship amendment, so should 
    not be placed elsewhere in the bill. The overall Defense Department 
    allocates sale and distribution to various military components 
    (foreign sales, Navy, ROTC, Air Force, Division of Civilian 
    Marksmanship, et cetera). It is therefore proper to place the 
    amendment in the general Defense Department section of the bill: 
    ``Operation and maintenance, Defense Agencies.''

        Second. It is negative in nature. It limits expenditure of 
    funds by the Defense Department by prohibiting the destruction and 
    scrapping of arms which qualify for sale through the civilian 
    marksmanship program, which is a division of the executive created 
    by statute.
        Third. It shows retrenchment on its face. Retrenchment is 
    demonstrated in that the Department of Defense if prohibited from 
    expending funds to destroy surplus military arms, and that the arms 
    previously earmarked for destruction will be made available in 
    accordance with existing statute. Actual cost savings is not a 
    necessary element in satisfying the retrenchment test under rule 
    21. However, the Defense Department has attempted destruction of 
    290,000 M-1 rifles, leading to the waste by scrapping of a valuable 
    stock of arms. The House, in adding this amendment, will secure 
    additional funds for the Treasury which the General Accounting 
    Office has determined is adequate to pay costs of handling the 
    arms. For example, the M-1 rifles are to be sold at a cost of $110 
    each. These are the arms most utilized by the civilian marksmanship 
    program. The Defense Department will not be

[[Page 11972]]

    required to spend additional funds to process the sale of 
    additional arms.
        Fourth. Does not impose additional or affirmative duties or 
    amend existing law. Title 10, United States Code, section 4308 
    provides in part:

            (a) The secretary of the Army, under regulations approved 
        by him upon the recommendation of the National Board for the 
        Promotion of Rifle Practice, shall provide for . . .
            (5) the sale to members of the National Rifle Association, 
        at cost, and the issue to clubs organized for practice with 
        rifled arms, ammunition, targets, and other supplies and 
        appliances necessary for target practice . . .

        In fact, the Army regulations relating to issuance of these 
    arms contain no caveat that distribution shall be limited to any 
    quantity. (AR 725-1 and AR 920-20.) By passing this amendment, we 
    will see that additional funds are placed in the Treasury--
    certainly more than by scrapping the arms. Thus, by statute and 
    regulation, such arms must be sold to qualified civilians. This 
    amendment specifies that 290,800 of an available pool of 760,000 
    arms shall not be destroyed, and shall be available for use by this 
    program. If my amendment prevails, the test as to whether these 
    arms will be distributed will be:
        First. Does the applicant qualify under the law?
        Second. Are sufficient arms in this pool of 290,800 available 
    for distribution?
        Regulations issued (see tab M) AR 725-1 and AR 920-20 provide 
    for the issuance of arms by application and qualification through 
    the Director of Civilian Marksmanship. The DCM shall then submit 
    sale orders for the Armament Readiness Military Command (ARMCOM) to 
    fill the requests of these qualified civilians. Thus, the amendment 
    simply requires the performance of duties already imposed by the 
    Army's own regulation.
        Minor administrative ministerial duties required by this 
    amendment will not mandate such affirmative action, so as to exceed 
    the responsibilities already imposed by statute. Assessing needs 
    and communicating the needs by the Board would not cross the 
    threshold so as to raise to the level of a newly created positive 
    duty.

    precedents supporting the overruling of point of order to my motion

        There is ample precedent for language of this nature. A similar 
    motion was offered by Mr. Myers of Indiana in connection with the 
    curtailment of funds for implementation of an executive order 
    pardoning draft evaders. Mr. Myers' amendment provided that the 
    executive could not expend funds to pardon the evaders. This was an 
    after-the-fact amendment following President Carter's Executive 
    order. My amendment does nothing more than to track the same form 
    of executive limitation as did the Myers amendment of March 16, 
    1977, when the parliamentarian ruled that amendment in order. This 
    precedent will be found in the Congressional Record, pages 7706-
    7754, on H.R. 4877, a supplemental appropriations bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Mikva) wish 
    to be heard further on the point of order?
        Mr. Mikva: I do, Mr. Chairman.

[[Page 11973]]

        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Mikva: Mr. Chairman, I particularly call attention of the 
    Chair to the second half of the amendment, which imposes an 
    affirmative duty on the Secretary, saying that such arms shall not 
    be withheld from distribution to purchasers who qualify for 
    purchase of said arms pursuant to title 10, United States Code, 
    section 4308.
        Under the general existing law, there are all kinds of 
    discretions that are allowed to the Secretary to decide whether or 
    not such arms shall be distributed. Under this amendment, the 
    existing law is to be changed and those arms may not be withheld. 
    The practical purpose is to turn lose 400,000 to 500,000 rifles 
    into the body politic.
        But the parliamentary effect is clearly to change the existing 
    law under which the Secretary can exercise all kinds of discretion 
    in deciding whether or not those arms will be distributed. Under 
    this amendment it not only limits the fact that the funds may be 
    obligated but it specifically goes on to affirmatively direct the 
    Secretary to distribute such arms under title X, which is an 
    affirmative obligation, which is exactly the kind of obligation the 
    rules prohibit, and I renew my point of order.
        Mr. John T. Myers: Mr. Chairman, section 4307 provides for the 
    sale of these surplus weapons. This amendment does nothing more 
    than provide that, in this title of section X.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair has read the section to which the gentleman refers, 
    title 10, United States Code, section 4308, and is of the opinion 
    that it does not require that all firearms be distributed to 
    qualified purchasers. The Chair further feels that while the first 
    part of the amendment is a limitation, the last part of the 
    amendment is a curtailment of Executive discretion, and the Chair 
    sustains the point of order.
        The Clerk will read.

Effect of Point of Order Sustained Against a Portion of a Paragraph in 
    a General Appropriation Bill

Sec. 1.21 A point of order, if sustained against a proviso containing 
    legislation in a paragraph in a general appropriation bill, is 
    sufficient to cause the whole paragraph to be stricken, even if the 
    remainder of the paragraph is authorized.

    On June 8, 1977,(20) while a general appropriation bill 
was being read for amendment under the five-minute rule in Committee of 
the Whole, a paragraph was read pertaining to the care and maintenance 
of the official residence of the Vice President. A point of order was 
directed at the proviso carried in the paragraph. Proceedings were as 
indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 123 Cong. Rec. 17922, 17923, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 11974]]

                    Official Residence of the Vice President

                               Operating Expenses

            For the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, 
        furnishing, improvement, heating and lighting, including 
        electric power and fixtures, of the official residence of the 
        Vice President, $61,000: Provided That advances or repayments 
        or transfers from this appropriation may be made to any 
        department or agency for expenses of carrying out such 
        activities.

        Mr. [Herbert E.] Harris [II, of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I make 
    a point of order against this portion of the bill on the basis 
    previously stated.
        The Chairman: (1) Does the gentleman from Oklahoma 
    (Mr. Steed) desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. B. F. Sisk (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tom] Steed [of Oklahoma]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, in this case there is authorization for the item. 
    In the 93d Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 202, passed July 12, 
    1974, provides for the inclusion of this item in the bill. It is 
    Public Law 93-346.
        The Chairman: Let the Chair direct a question to the gentleman 
    from Virginia (Mr. Harris) so that the gentleman may clarify his 
    point.
        Against what portion of this paragraph does the gentleman make 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Harris: Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with official 
    entertaining expenses in this item, and that is not authorized 
    under law.
        The Chairman: To what line is the gentleman referring? Will the 
    gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Harris) explain it so we will know to 
    what specific lines of the paragraph he directs his point of order?
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard, I believe the 
    gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Harris) made the point of order 
    against the entire item.
        Mr. Harris: Mr. Chairman, this is the item on the Official 
    Executive Residence of the Vice President, Operating Expenses.
        The Chairman: Let the Chair state to the gentleman from 
    Virginia (Mr. Harris) that there is authorization for 
    appropriations for the official residence of the Vice President, if 
    that is the point the gentleman is attempting to address in this 
    matter. Therefore, that portion of the paragraph would not be 
    subject to a point of order.
        Mr. Harris: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Edward J.] Derwinski [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I rise 
    to make a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Derwinski) will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Derwinski: Mr. Chairman, let me read this to be sure we are 
    speaking of the same item.
        I make a point of order against the language of the bill on 
    page 8, lines 20 through 25, and on page 9, lines 1 and 2. That 
    item is entitled ``Official Residence of the Vice President--
    Operating Expenses,'' and this language violates rule XXI, clause 
    2, of the Rules of the House. That is the basis for the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard further, we have had previous 
    points of order sustained against this item, and, in fact, in last 
    year's appropriation bill a similar point of order was sustained.

[[Page 11975]]

        The Chairman: Let the Chair state that the present occupant of 
    the chair was the occupant of the chair last year and considered 
    the proviso starting on line 25 of page 8 and continuing through 
    line 26 and lines 1 and 2 on page 9. On that basis the point of 
    order was sustained. However, the earlier designation, as the Chair 
    understood the statement of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
    Harris), would not follow, because basically there is authority for 
    the Vice President's residence.
        That is the reason the Chair is giving ample opportunity to the 
    Members to clarify the point of order. A point of order was in fact 
    sustained on the proviso mentioned last year. I understand the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Derwinski) is making a point of order 
    based on that proviso.
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard on the point of 
    order, if we read section 3 of this act, it says that the Secretary 
    of the Navy shall, subject to the supervision and control of the 
    Vice President, provide for the staffing, upkeep, alteration, and 
    furnishing of an official residence and grounds for the Vice 
    President.
        Mr. Chairman, I do not know what more authority we need.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that in line with the like 
    ruling last year, a paragraph in a general appropriation bill 
    containing funds for the official residence of the President and of 
    the Vice President and providing for advances repayments or 
    transfers of those funds to other departments or agencies--not just 
    to General Services Administration--was conceded to change existing 
    law and was ruled out as being in violation of clause 2, rule XXI.

        Therefore, on the basis of the proviso, the point of order is 
    sustained against the entire paragraph.

Reinserting Language Stricken by Point of Order

Sec. 1.22 Where a point of order is sustained against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill because a portion thereof is 
    unauthorized and contains legislation, and the entire paragraph is 
    therefore stricken, the authorized portion may then be reinserted 
    by amendment.

    When the legislative branch appropriations bill for fiscal 1978 was 
read for amendment in Committee of the Whole on June 29, 
1977,(2) a point of order was made against the paragraph 
carrying appropriations for ``Capitol Grounds''. The paragraph 
contained a proviso amendment a prior appropriation law,(3) 
was conceded to be legislative. After

[[Page 11976]]

the paragraph was stricken by the Chair, the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations offered an amendment, 
deleting not only the legislative provision but with a lump sum 
appropriation figure which deleted funding for a Capitol parking 
facility which was not authorized by law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 123 Cong. Rec. 21402, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
 3. The proviso in existing law amended by the paragraph was a 
        provision in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, 
        authorizing the Architect to use certain lands as a park area 
        pending development of a contemplated Residential Page School, 
        project which never materialized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (4) The Clerk will read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. John M. Murphy (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                capitol grounds

            For care and improvement of grounds surrounding the 
        Capitol, the Senate and House Office Buildings, and the Capitol 
        Power Plant; personal and other services; care of trees; 
        planting; fertilizer; repairs to pavements, walks, and 
        roadways; waterproof wearing apparel; maintenance of signal 
        lights; and for snow removal by hire of men and equipment or 
        under contract without regard to section 3709 of the Revised 
        Statutes, as amended, $2,402,500, including $483,000 to develop 
        Square 764 into a temporary parking facility for the House of 
        Representatives: Provided That chapter V of the Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act, 1973 (Public Law 92-607, approved October 
        31, 1972, 86 Stat. 1513), is hereby amended by striking the 
        words ``green park area'' in the third further proviso of the 
        paragraph entitled ``Acquisition of Property as an Addition to 
        the Capitol Grounds'', and inserting in lieu thereof, the 
        following: ``temporary parking facility''.

        Mr. [R. Lawrence] Coughlin [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    make a point of order against the entire paragraph starting on page 
    19, line 16, through line 7 on page 20, on the ground that in two 
    respects it violates rule XXI, clause 2.
        Mr. Chairman, this is a provision for the creation of a parking 
    lot at the old Providence Hospital site about which the Chairman of 
    the Committee on House Administration, the gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) and I have had colloquy. There is no 
    authorization in law for the development of this parking lot 
    provided for in lines 23 to 25 on page 19.
        Mr. [George E.] Shipley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Coughlin: I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Shipley: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        The committee understands that this is subject to a point of 
    order, as the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration, 
    Mr. Thompson, mentioned earlier. The committee will concede the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Coughlin: I thank the gentleman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained 
    against the entire paragraph.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Shipley: On page 19, after line 
        15, insert the following:
            For care and improvement of grounds surrounding the 
        Capitol, the Senate and House Office Buildings, and the Capitol 
        Power Plant; personal and other services; care of trees; 
        planting; fertilizer; repairs to pavements, walks, and 
        roadways;

[[Page 11977]]

        waterproof wearing apparel; maintenance of signal lights; and 
        for snow removal by hire of men and equipment or under contract 
        without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as 
        amended, $1,919,500.

        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply restores the 
    appropriation language for the Capitol grounds at the lower figure, 
    reflecting the reduction of the $483,000 for the temporary parking 
    facility, which was eliminated by the point of order.

Special Rule Creating Jurisdictional Point of Order Against Portion of 
    Text

Sec. 1.23 Pursuant to a special rule (5) permitting points 
    of order against any ``title, part or section'' of a committee 
    substitute within the jurisdiction of another committee, the Chair 
    sustained a point of order against a section which contained a 
    subsection outside that committee's jurisdiction (although the 
    section as a whole was within that jurisdiction) under the 
    principle that if a point of order is sustained against a portion 
    of a pending section the entire section may be ruled out of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. H. Res. 661, agreed to Oct. 27, 1971. 117 Cong. Rec. 37765-69, 92d 
        Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On Nov. 4, 1971,(6) in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. 
David N. Henderson, of North Carolina, raised a point of order relating 
to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 
with respect to legislation prepared by the Committee on Education and 
Labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 117 Cong. Rec. 39287, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7248, amending and extending the Higher Education Act of 
        1965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Henderson: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet seeking 
    recognition. I raise a point of order against section 1085 of this 
    title.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (7) The Chair will hear 
    the gentleman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Edward P. Boland (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Henderson: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against 
    section 1805 of title XVIII.
        Section 1805 authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
    Welfare to establish a Council on Higher Education Relief 
    Assistance, and includes provisions that the Secretary may appoint 
    not more than 10 individuals, without regard to the civil service 
    or classification laws, as members of the staff of the Council.
        An exemption to the civil service or classification laws is a 
    matter clearly within the Federal civil service generally. Under 
    clause 15 of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
    a matter relating to the Federal civil service generally is a 
    matter clearly within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Post 
    Office and Civil Service.

[[Page 11978]]

        Mr. Chairman, I urge that the point of order be sustained on 
    the basis that section 1805 includes matters that are within the 
    jurisdiction of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. . . .
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair is ready to rule. . . .
        Clause 15(f), rule XI, gives the Committee on Post Office and 
    Civil Service jurisdiction over the status of officers and 
    employees of the United States, including their compensation, 
    classification, and retirement. Section 1805 includes a portion 
    which, if considered separately, contains subject matter within the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. 
    Under the precedents of the House, if a point of order is sustained 
    against a portion of a pending section or paragraph, the entire 
    section or paragraph may be ruled out of order.
        The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order against 
    section 1805, and the language of the section is stricken from the 
    committee amendment.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Part of Amendment in 
    Legislative Bill

Sec. 1.24 If a point of order is made against an amendment, the entire 
    amendment is ruled out, although only a portion of such amendment 
    is objectionable.

    On June 30, 1955,(8) in the Committee of the Whole, the 
Chairman invoked the general principle that a point of order against a 
part of an amendment renders the whole amendment subject to a point of 
order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 101 Cong. Rec. 9662, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        S. 2090, amending the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Wilbur D.] Mills [of Arkansas]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order against the amendment, of course, that it is not 
    germane to the bill.
        The Chairman: (9) Does the gentleman from South 
    Carolina desire to be heard?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James P.] Richards [of South Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, may 
    I ask if the gentleman raises the point of order in both instances?
        Mr. Mills: I base the point of order on the language of the 
    amendment on page 19, lines 1 through 6. I am not advised as to the 
    remainder of the amendment, but I do know that the language 
    referred to is not germane to this bill. . . .
        Mr. Richards: I concede the point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and the point of 
    order is sustained. A point of order to a part of an amendment 
    makes the whole amendment subject to a point of order, so the whole 
    amendment goes out on the point of order.

Sec. 1.25 A point of order against any part of an amendment, if 
    sustained, has the effect of invalidating the entire amendment.

[[Page 11979]]

    On June 15, 1970,(10) Speaker Pro Tempore Carl Albert, 
of Oklahoma, answered a parliamentary inquiry, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 116 Cong. Rec. 19841, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Being discussed was H. 
        Res. 1077, providing for consideration of H.R. 17070, the 
        Postal Reform Act of 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [H. Allen] Smith of California: Mr. Speaker . . . I make a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Smith of California: Mr. Speaker, on H.R. 17966, the so-
    called Udall substitute, that is in my understanding one amendment 
    in the nature of a substitute. If any part of that bill is not 
    germane or subject to a point of order, would not the entire H.R. 
    17966 be subject to a point of order if points of order are not 
    waived against it? That was my understanding of the situation.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman has correctly stated the 
    rule. Should points of order not be waived, then if any part of the 
    amendment is not in order, the entire amendment is not in order.

Reinserting Remainder of Section Where Part Is Subject to Point of 
    Order

Sec. 1.26 Where a portion of a section of a legislative bill is out of 
    order, the entire section is rejected, but it is in order to offer 
    an amendment reinserting that part of the section which would 
    otherwise have been in order.

    On July 13, 1939,(11) Mr. John Taber, of New York, made 
a point of order against part of a bill as being an appropriation of 
funds by a committee not having such jurisdiction, which point of order 
Chairman John W. Boehne, Jr., of Indiana, sustained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 84 Cong. Rec. 9060, 9061, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. S.J. Res. 118, to 
        provide for the establishment and maintenance of the Franklin 
        D. Roosevelt Library.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Sec. 205. (a) A Board to be known as the Trustees of the 
    Franklin D. Roosevelt Library is hereby established. . . .
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    section on the ground that it contains an appropriation of public 
    funds and that it is reported by a committee not having 
    jurisdiction to bring into the House an appropriation bill.

    Mr. Taber called attention to specific language that he deemed 
improper.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York limit his point 
    of order to the sentence which he read?
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I made the point of order against the 
    section. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair is of the opinion that the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from New York against the section is

[[Page 11980]]

    well taken, and therefore sustains the point of order.

    Subsequently, Mr. Sam Rayburn, of Texas, offered an amendment, 
whose purpose he explained as follows:

 0      The amendment I offer leaves out the language objected to by 
    the gentleman from New York in lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 on page 6. . . 
    .

    The amendment was agreed to.

Where Point of Order Sustained Against Conference Report

Sec. 1.27 A conference report containing new spending authority not 
    subject to advance appropriations having been ruled out as in 
    violation of the Congressional Budget Act, the manager of the bill 
    moved to recede and concur in the Senate amendment containing the 
    offending language with an amendment rendering the new spending 
    authority subject to amounts specified in advance in appropriation 
    acts.

    When the conference report on the Health Professional Education 
Assistance Act of 1976 was called up by the chairman of the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, a point of order was lodged against 
the report by Mr. Brock Adams, of Washington, chairman of the House 
Committee on the Budget. The proceedings of Sept. 27, 
1976,(12) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 122 Cong. Rec. 32655, 32656, 32679, 32685, 32703, 94th Cong. 2d 
        Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Conference Report on H.R. 5546, Health Professions Educational 
                           Assistance Act of 1976

        Mr. [Harley O.] Staggers [of West Virginia]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 5546), to amend the 
    Public Health Service Act to revise and extend the programs of 
    assistance under title VII for training in the health and allied 
    health professions, to revise the National Health Service Corps 
    program, and the National Health Service Corps scholarship training 
    program, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the 
    statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order on the 
    conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (13) The gentleman from 
    Washington will state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. John J. McFall (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, the conference agreement on H.R. 5546, 
    the Health Professions Assistance Act of 1976, contains a provision 
    which appears to provide borrowing authority which is not subject 
    to advance appropriations. Consequently, it would be subject to a 
    point of order under section 401(a) of the Congressional Budget 
    Act.
        Section 401(a) provides:

[[Page 11981]]

            It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or resolu- 
        tion which provides new spending authority described in 
        subsection (c)(2)(A) or (B) (or any amendment which provides 
        such new spending authority), unless that bill, resolution, or 
        amendment also provides that such new spending authority is to 
        be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such 
        amounts as are provided in appropriation acts.

        Section 401(c)(2)(B) of the Budget Act defines spending 
    authority as authority ``to incur indebtedness-other than 
    indebtedness incurred under the second Liberty Bond Act-for the 
    repayment of which the United States is liable, the budget 
    authority for which is not provided in advance by appropriation 
    acts.'' This form of spending authority is commonly known as 
    borrowing authority.
        The conference report accompanying H.R. 5546 contains a 
    provision creating a student loan insurance fund under section 734 
    of the Public Health Service Act.
        Clearly, the requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury 
    purchase these obligations constitutes borrowing authority.
        And since the provision contains no requirement that the 
    authority be limited to amounts provided in advance in 
    appropriation acts, it appears to give rise to a section 401(A) 
    point of order.
        The fact that the provision relates to default payments which 
    might arise pursuant to a loan guarantee program does not bring the 
    provision within the ``loan guarantee'' exception to section 401 of 
    the Budget Act. Although the loan guarantee itself may not be 
    subject to advance appropriation, the default payment made pursuant 
    to the provision in question does not constitute a loan guarantee 
    and it is fully subject to the requirements of section 401.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Adams: I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia, the 
    chairman of the committee.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I concede the point of order.
        Mr. Speaker, I have a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. 
    Staggers) concedes the point of order.
        Therefore, the point of order is sustained.
        The Clerk will report the Senate amendment in disagreement.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, it was my understanding that the 
    gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. Staggers) called up a conference 
    report, and a point of order was made against that conference 
    report, which was sustained.
        Is the conference report still before the House, Mr. Speaker?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The conference report is not, but the 
    Senate amendment in disagreement is; and a motion will be offered, 
    the Chair will state to the gentleman from Maryland, that could 
    cure the point of order. Therefore, if the gentleman will bear with 
    us for the sake of orderly proce

[[Page 11982]]

    dure, we will have this matter properly before the House. . . .
        [Reading of the amendment in disagreement was dispensed with.]
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Staggers moves that the House recede from its 
        disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill H.R. 
        5546, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate 
        amendment insert the following:

                         short title: reference to act

            Section 1. (a) This Act may be cited as the ``Health 
        Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976''. . . .

                         ``student loan insurance fund

            ``Sec. 734. (a) There is hereby established a student loan 
        insurance fund (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 
        `fund') which shall be available without fiscal year limitation 
        to the Secretary for making payments in connection with the 
        default of loans insured by him under this subpart. . . .
            . . . but only in such amounts as may be specified from 
        time to time in appropriations Acts. . . .

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from West Virginia?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object to the 
    unanimous consent request made by the gentleman from West Virginia 
    (Mr. Staggers).
        My inquiry of the Chair is the same as I made before, and that 
    is that in view of the fact that a point of order has been made to 
    any consideration of the conference report, is the motion that is 
    being made to agree with the Senate amendment to the amendment of 
    the House deleting the offending phrase?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: When a conference report is ruled out 
    of order, as this one was, then the Senate amendment in 
    disagreement is before the House. This motion, if passed, would 
    remedy the point of order that was made.

Rulings on Matters Not Raised in Point of Order

Sec. 1.28 The Chair does not rule on statutory interpretations not 
    presented in a point of order or comment upon le-gal questions 
    which might collaterally result from an interpretation of the 
    challenged language.

    On June 28, 1949,(14) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Hale Boggs, of Louisiana, declined to rule on more than was 
necessary to resolve a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 95 Cong. Rec. 8536-38, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4009, the Housing Act of 1949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, the point 
    of order I make is that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of section 102 in 
    title I constitute the appropriation of funds from the Federal 
    Treasury, and that the Committee on Banking and Currency is without 
    jurisdiction to report a bill car

[[Page 11983]]

    rying appropriations under clause 4, rule 21, which says that no 
    bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall be reported 
    by any committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations. 
    . . .
        . . . I make this point of order because this proposes to 
    expand and develop a device or mechanism for getting funds out of 
    the Federal Treasury in an unprecedented degree.
        The Constitution has said that no money shall be drawn from the 
    Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. It must 
    follow that the mechanism which gets the money out of the Treasury 
    is an appropriation.
        I invite the attention of the Chairman to the fact that 
    subparagraph (e) states:

            To obtain funds for loans under this title, the 
        Administrator may issue and have outstanding at any one time 
        notes and obligations for purchase by the Secretary of the 
        Treasury in an amount not to exceed $25,000,000, which limit on 
        such outstanding amount shall be increased by $225,000,000 on 
        July 1, 1950, and by further amounts of $250,000,000 on July 1 
        in each of the years 1951, 1952, and 1953, respectively--

        Within the total authorization of $1,000,000,000.
        Further that subparagraph (f) provides that--

            The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed--

        And I call particular attention to the use of the words ``and 
    directed''--

            to purchase any notes and other obligations of the 
        Administrator issued under this title and for such purpose is 
        authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds 
        from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty 
        Bond Act, as amended--

        And so forth. The way in which this particular language extends 
    this device of giving the Secretary authority to subscribe for 
    notes by some authority is this: It includes the words ``and 
    directed.''
        In other words, the Secretary of the Treasury has no 
    alternative when the Administrator presents to him some of these 
    securities for purchase but to purchase them. The Secretary of the 
    Treasury is not limited to purchasing them by proceeds from the 
    sale of bonds or securities. He is directed to purchase these notes 
    and obligations issued by the Administrator. That means he might 
    use funds obtained from taxes, that he might use funds obtained 
    through the assignment of miscellaneous receipts to the Treasury, 
    that he might use funds obtained through the proceeds of bonds.
        This proposal will give to the Committee on Banking and 
    Currency, if it should be permitted, authority which the Committee 
    on Appropriations does not have, for in the reporting of an 
    appropriation bill for a fiscal year, any appropriation beyond the 
    fiscal year would be held out of order. Here this committee is 
    reporting a bill which proposes to make mandatory extractions from 
    the Treasury during a period of 4 years. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, this is not, as I said earlier, a casual point of 
    order; we are here dealing with the fundamental power of the 
    Congress to control appropriations. No such device has ever before, 
    so far as I can find out, been pre

[[Page 11984]]

    sented to the Congress for getting money in the guise of a 
    legislative bill without its having been considered by the 
    Committee on Appropriations. It is a mandatory extraction of funds 
    from the Public Treasury, and, consequently, constitutes an 
    appropriation and is beyond the authority or the jurisdiction of 
    the Committee on Banking and Currency to report in this bill. . . .
        Mr. [Brent] Spence [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, the raising of 
    funds by public debt transaction has been frequently authorized by 
    the Congress: The Export-Import Bank raises funds by that method; 
    the Bretton Woods Agreement, in my recollection, is carried out by 
    that method; the British loan was financed by that method, and the 
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was also financed by that 
    method. It does not seem to me that this is a seasonable objection. 
    This has been the policy of the Congress for years.
        Mr. Chairman, this is not raising money to be appropriated for 
    the purposes that ordinary appropriation bills carry. All of this 
    money is to be used as loans.
        The gentleman says that in other acts the Secretary of the 
    Treasury is ``authorized'' but not ``directed.'' I contend that the 
    meaning of ``authorized'' and ``directed'' in this act is 
    absolutely the same.
        Do you think when you authorize the Secretary of the Treasury 
    to raise funds to carry out a great public purpose it is in his 
    discretion whether he shall raise those funds and that that shall 
    depend on the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury? I say 
    ``authorized'' in this sense means ``directed.'' It could not mean 
    anything else, otherwise you would be delegating to an officer of 
    the Government entire discretion as to whether or not great 
    national acts should be carried out and the purposes of Congress 
    should be subserved.

        Mr. Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, in most of the acts 
    which the gentleman has suggested, points of order were waived, and 
    I refer to Bretton Woods and some of the other bills. But as to the 
    particular point here in issue, the question whether the words 
    ``and directed'' have any meaning, if they do not have any meaning 
    why are they there? The present housing act merely authorizes the 
    Secretary of the Treasury to purchase. It does not say ``and 
    directed.'' The very inclusion of the words ``and directed'' is 
    evidence of the fact they have a special meaning. They create a 
    mandatory extraction of funds from the Public Treasury. . . .
        Mr. [John W.] McCormack [of Massachusetts]: . . . The gentleman 
    from South Dakota has referred to the Constitution. The 
    Constitution says:

            No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in 
        consequence of appropriations made by law.

        The word ``appropriations'' is used.
        The rule referred to, clause 4, rule 21, says:

            No bill or resolution carrying appropriations shall be 
        reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
        appropriations.

        You will note the word ``appropriations'' is used. Now, let us 
    see what ``appropriations'' means.
        I have before me Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary and 
    ``appropriations'' is defined as follows:

[[Page 11985]]

            To set apart for a particular use. To take for one's own 
        use.

        The provisions of this bill are not taking for one's own use, 
    because this is a loan designed purely for loan purposes. It is not 
    a definite appropriation. It is giving authority to utilize for 
    loan purposes and the money comes back into the Treasury of the 
    United States with interest. . . .
        The provision in paragraph (f) that my friend has raised a 
    point of order against relates entirely to loans. As we read 
    section 102 of title I it starts out with loans. Throughout the 
    bill, a number of times, there is reference to loans. . . .
        . . . Certainly, the word ``appropriations'' is used in the 
    Constitution. And, I think it is the rule of the House that must 
    govern, and that is what the Chair has to pass upon, because the 
    Congress could determine by proper legislation what the word 
    ``appropriation'' means as contained in the Constitution itself. . 
    . . Now, if the House intended that it should apply to provisions 
    of this kind, instead of saying, ``No bill or joint resolution 
    carrying appropriations shall be reported'' the House might have 
    said, ``No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations or 
    having directly or indirectly the effect.'' There is a difference 
    between cause and effect. Certainly, it applies to this case. The 
    House, in its wisdom, in adopting this rule, confined it to 
    appropriations made to an agency of Government for use by that 
    agency in carrying out what the Congress considered to be 
    essentially the function of the Government during the coming fiscal 
    year or during the period for which the appropriation has been 
    made.
        I respectfully submit that it must call for an appropriation 
    out of the general funds of the Treasury in order to violate the 
    rules of the House. This permits the use of money raised by the 
    sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act for loans to these 
    public agencies, such loans to be repaid with interest. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair agrees with the gentleman from South Dakota that the 
    point which has been raised is not a casual point of order. As a 
    matter of fact, as far as the Chair has been able to ascertain, 
    this is the first time a point of order has been raised on this 
    issue as violative of clause 4 of rule XXI.
        As the Chair sees the point of order, the issue involved turns 
    on the meaning of the word ``appropriation.'' ``Appropriation,'' in 
    its usual and customary interpretation, means taking money out of 
    the Treasury by appropriate legislative language for the support of 
    the general functions of Government. The language before us does 
    not do that. This language authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
    to use proceeds of public-debt issues for the purpose of making 
    loans. Under the language, the Treasury of the United States makes 
    advances which will be repaid in full with interest over a period 
    of years without cost to the taxpayers.
        Therefore, the Chair rules that this language does not 
    constitute an appropriation, and overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

[[Page 11986]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Would the Chair hold then that that 
    language restricts the Secretary of the Treasury to using the 
    proceeds of the securities issued under the second Liberty Bond Act 
    and prevents him from using the proceeds from miscellaneous 
    receipts or tax revenues?
        The Chairman: The Chair does not have authority to draw that 
    distinction. The Chair is passing on the particular point which has 
    been raised.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: However, Mr. Chairman, it would seem 
    implicit in the ruling of the Chair and I thought perhaps it could 
    be decided as a part of the parliamentary history. It might help 
    some courts later on.
        The Chairman: The Chair can make a distinction between the 
    general funds of the Treasury and money raised for a specific 
    purpose by the issuance of securities. That is the point involved 
    here.

Point of Order Against Speaker's Appointment of Conferees

Sec. 1.29 A point of order does not lie against the Speaker's exercise 
    of his discretionary authority under Rule X clause 6(e) in 
    appointing conferees who ``generally supported the House position, 
    as determined by the Speaker.''

    The portion of Rule X clause 6(f) involved in the following point 
of order raised by Mr. Erlenborn explicitly gives the Speaker 
discretion to make the determination in appointing conferees who 
generally supported the House position. Other provisions of the clause 
are mandatory on the Speaker: he must name Members who are primarily 
responsible for the legislation, for example. Speaker O'Neill's 
response to the Erlenborn point of order as excerpted from the 
proceedings of Oct. 12, 1977,(15) is carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 123 Cong. Rec. 33434, 33435, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: (16) The Chair appoints the following 
    conferees: Messrs. Perkins, Dent, Phillip Burton, Gaydos, Clay, 
    Biaggi, Zeferetti, Quie, Erlenborn, and Ashbrook; and an additional 
    Member, Mr. Pickle, solely for the consideration of section 12 of 
    the House bill and modifications thereof committed to conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Thomas P. O'Neill (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John N.] Erlenborn [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the naming of the conferees as not being in 
    compliance with the provisions of section 701(e), rule X of the 
    Rules of the House.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) 
    wish to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. Erlenborn: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, rule X, section 701(e) provides in part:

            In appointing members to conference committees the Speaker 
        shall appoint no less than a majority of members who generally 
        supported the House position as determined by the Speaker.

[[Page 11987]]

        Mr. Speaker, as I pointed out in debate earlier today, the 
    three items in contention between this body and the other body are 
    the rate structure, the tip credit, and the small business 
    amendment. Every one of the majority Members, with the exception of 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gaydos), did not support the 
    House position during the consideration of the bill on the floor.
        I will admit, Mr. Speaker, that all of the Members who were 
    present did vote for the passage of the bill. The passage of the 
    bill is not in contention. Those items that are in contention 
    between this body and the other body are the three items that I 
    have mentioned, and the majority of the conferees named by the 
    Speaker are not among those Members who supported the majority 
    position in the House.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Perkins) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Carl D.] Perkins [of Kentucky]: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, there were numerous amendments offered to the 
    minimum wage bill. Perhaps the major amendment that was adopted was 
    the one increasing the exceptions from $250,000 to $500,000 for 
    small businesses. The Speaker has taken care of that situation by 
    appointing the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Pickle).
        If we were to follow the argument of the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn), as it might apply to a situation in which 
    some 30 or 40 Members outside the committee had offered amendments, 
    I would think that it would set a precedent that this House could 
    not live with.
        But notwithstanding that, the Members who have been suggested 
    to the Speaker by myself as chairman of the Committee on Education 
    and Labor, the seven ranking members of the Subcommittee on Labor 
    Standards, headed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent), 
    voted for the majority of the amendments that were offered to the 
    bill on the floor of the House. By and large, all the conferees 
    suggested to the Speaker generally supported the legislation, and 
    that is the rule.
        We must look at this picture as a whole and not pick out one or 
    two select amendments that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
    Erlenborn) is primarily interested in and overlook all the other 
    amendments that the other members supported and that the suggested 
    conferees supported.
        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) is 
    without merit and should be overruled.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        This is the judgment of the Chair concerning the following 
    language: ``The Speaker shall appoint no less than a majority of 
    Members who generally supported the House position as determined by 
    the Speaker, and the Speaker shall name Members who are primarily 
    responsible for the legislation and shall, to the fullest extent 
    feasible, include the principal proponents of the major provisions 
    of the bill as it passed the House.''
        That language is found in clause 6(e) of rule X of the Rules of 
    the House.

        In the opinion of the Chair, after looking over the list of 
    conferees, and

[[Page 11988]]

    in view of the fact that the Chair has only had one additional 
    request to name a conferee--and that is the gentleman from Texas 
    (Mr. Pickle), whom the Chair has named as a limited conferee--the 
    Members that the Chair has named as conferees meet the 
    qualification of being ``primarily responsible for the 
    legislation.''
        The Chair's appointment under the remaining provisions of the 
    rule is ultimately a matter within his discretion, which the Chair 
    feels he has properly exercised, and there is nothing in the rule 
    requiring the Chair to consider the conferees' positions solely on 
    the matter in dispute.
        The Chair overruled the point of order.

Chair's Recognition Not Subject to Point of Order

Sec. 1.30 Recognition for unanimous-consent requests to address the 
    House for one minute before legislative business is within the 
    discretion of the Chair, and the Chair's refusal to entertain such 
    requests is not subject to a point of order.

    When the House convened on July 25, 1980,(17) Speaker 
Pro Tempore James C. Wright, Jr., of Texas, announced that the conduct 
of legislative business should precede recognition for one-minute 
speeches. Several Members sought recognition to challenge this exercise 
of the Speaker's power of recognition. Attempts to state opposition to 
this policy by raising questions of the privilege of the House were 
unsuccessful. The Chair's announcement and the events which followed 
are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 126 Cong. Rec. 19762-64, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  announcement by the speaker pro tempore

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair desires to make an 
    announcement.
        As the Chair announced yesterday, requests to address the House 
    for 1 minute will be entertained at the conclusion of the 
    legislative business today, rather than at the beginning. This 
    should not deprive any Member of the privilege of being heard on 
    any subject of his choice, so long as the Member is willing to 
    await the conclusion of the business of the House.
        The Chair believes there is genuine value in the 1-minute rule 
    in the exercise of free expression on subjects, the variety of 
    which is limited only by the individual imaginations of the 
    Members. The Chair would not desire to deny any Member this 
    privilege. For all its value, however, the Chair does not believe 
    that the 1-minute rule must necessarily precede, nor be permitted 
    to postpone, the business of the House. On several occasions this 
    year, the exercise of the 1-minute rule has delayed a beginning on 
    the business of the day by periods extending from 45 minutes to 1 
    hour.
        Only 38 legislative days remain, including Mondays and Fridays, 
    between now and October 4, the date of our re

[[Page 11989]]

    cess or adjournment sine die. Nine major appropriations bills 
    remain to be acted upon by the House. No major appropriations bill 
    at this time has completed the legislative process.
        In addition to those very basic and indispensable legislative 
    priorities, there are other bills, including the budget 
    reconciliation legislation, the second budget resolution for fiscal 
    year 1981, and a considerable number of important legislative 
    initiatives, which, in the public interest, must be completed 
    before the Congress can adjourn.
        Under those circumstances, the Chair requests the understanding 
    and cooperation of all the Members in expediting the necessary 
    legislative business of the House, which is of course our first 
    duty to the American people. The Chair assures all Members, to the 
    extent that any such reassurance may be desired, that their rights 
    under the rules will be fully respected and assiduously protected.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland asks a 
    parliamentary inquiry. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the gentleman from Maryland 
    heard the Chair answer a question regarding 1-minute speeches. The 
    gentleman from Maryland asked the Chair whether or not limits on 
    such speeches is to be a policy to be followed for the remainder of 
    the session, and the Chair, as recorded on page H6404, said that 
    the Chair was not announcing a policy for the remainder of the 
    session, but only for Thursday and Friday.
        Do I take the Chair's announcement this morning to mean that 
    this will be the policy for the remainder of this session?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: No; as the Chair stated yesterday in 
    response to a question from the gentleman from Maryland, the 
    present occupant of the chair is not in a position to announce a 
    policy for the remainder of the session, and so stated.
        The policy for the remainder of the session would be more 
    appropriately determined and stated by Speaker O'Neill. At this 
    present time, that is all the Chair has to say, or all that he 
    properly should or could say.

                     question of privilege of the house

        Mr. [E. G. (Bud)] Shuster [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    rise to a point of privilege.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    privilege.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Whereas the custom of allowing one-minute speeches is a 
        longstanding tradition of the House, begun by Speaker Sam 
        Rayburn in the 1940's;
            Whereas the ability of the Minority to be heard rests to a 
        large degree on the one-minute speeches; permitted in a timely 
        fashion; and
            Whereas the integrity of the proceedings of the House is 
        impugned where all Members are not accorded a full opportunity 
        to speak; Now, therefore, be it

[[Page 11990]]

            Resolved, That the Speaker exercise his prerogative and 
        reinstitute the custom of allowing one-minute speeches at the 
        beginning of the session.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair must declare that a question 
    of the privileges of the House under rule IX cannot impinge upon 
    the Speaker's right of recognition. The gentleman's proposal is 
    not, under rule IX, a privileged resolution, and the Chair will so 
    rule. The Chair does not entertain the resolution at this time.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a point of privilege.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    privilege.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly send a second 
    privileged resolution to the desk.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the second 
    resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                  H. Res. 753

            Whereas the structural deficiencies of the West Front of 
        the Capitol include walls that are ``cracked, the stones are 
        misaligned, the ties have rusted away, and the walls are held 
        in place by a system of shores and braces;'' and
            Whereas the portico ceiling at the West Capitol Front is 
        composed of ``stone joints that have failed;'' and
            Whereas ``the exterior walls of the west central portion of 
        the Capitol are distorted and cracked, and require corrective 
        action for safety and durability;'' now, therefore, be it
            Resolved, That an independent investigation be immediately 
        initiated into the safety of the Members of the House.

                  motion to table offered by mr. brademas

        Mr. [John] Brademas [of Indiana]: Mr. Speaker, I move to table 
    the resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to table 
    offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The Chair will state that the vote is on the motion offered by 
    the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas) to table the resolution 
    offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    222, nays 137, not voting 74, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                               point of order

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, prior to the privileged or nonprivileged motions 
    just offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the Chair 
    unilaterally issued a ruling regarding the 1-minute speeches and 
    stated in essence, if I recall, that these speeches would not be 
    permitted today

[[Page 11991]]

    or during his tenure as Speaker pro tempore because of the press of 
    legislative business in the remainder of the session. I believe 
    that was the import of his remarks.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would correct the gentleman, 
    if the gentleman would permit.
        The Chair did not exactly say that, but the gentleman will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Bauman: I make a point of order against the ruling of the 
    Chair. I make a point of order that the Chair cannot in fact deny 
    the 1-minute speeches on the ground which he stated, and as 
    authority for that, I cite chapter 21, section 7 of Deschler's, 
    wherein there are several instances, including those referring to 
    July 22, 1968; June 17, 1970; and October 19, 1966, where the Chair 
    declined to recognize Members for 1-minute speeches because of the 
    press of business, a heavy legislative schedule, which is 
    Deschler's phrase, and proceeding to unfinished business.
        Mr. Speaker, my point of order is that the traditions of the 
    House, as evidenced in these precedents, indicate the Chair has the 
    discretion to deny 1-minute speeches on those grounds, but that the 
    ruling of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright), the Speaker pro 
    tempore, has, in fact, allowed an arbitrary ground to be used at a 
    time when there is no press of heavy legislative business 
    manifested by the fact that the Speaker and others have announced 
    that we will adjourn today at 3 o'clock when we can easily stay 
    here and deal with any pressing legislative business if that 
    exists.
        Further my point of order is that the Speaker has departed from 
    past traditions and, therefore, has exceeded his discretion in 
    regard to 1-minutes as supported by the traditions of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule on the 
    point of order, unless other Members insist on being heard. The 
    Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman's point of order in the first place comes too 
    late. But the Chair is prepared to state that in any event it is 
    not a sustainable point of order.
        The gentleman from Maryland is aware, because he is a scholar 
    of the rules of the House, and he is aware of the great thrust of 
    the very section to which he made reference, paragraph 7 of chapter 
    21 of Deschler's Procedure.
        The Chair would simply recite one or two of the precedents 
    therein reported. Recognition for 1-minute speeches is within the 
    discretion of the Speaker, and his evaluation of the time consumed 
    is a matter for the Chair and is not subject to challenge or 
    question by parliamentary inquiry.
        Now that was May 9, 1972.
        On December 16, 1971, the Speaker pro tempore announced that he 
    would recognize Members to address the House for longer than 1 
    minute for reasons that he felt desirable. On a number of 
    occasions, July 22, 1968; June 17, 1970; October 19, 1966, the same 
    rule was applied. Recognition for 1-minute speeches is within the 
    discretion of the Speaker, and when the House has a heavy 
    legislative schedule, he sometimes refuses to recognize Members for 
    that purpose.
        So the traditions of the House are clear, and the customs have 
    not been

[[Page 11992]]

    broken; and the Chair has tried to state to the gentleman his 
    intention and his firm determination assiduously to protect the 
    rights of all Members, minority as well as majority.
        The Chair has had a conversation with the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania, and with the Chairman who will preside in the 
    Committee of the Whole House and has asked that Chairman as a favor 
    to the Chair and as an exercise in abundant fairness to be 
    extremely tolerant of the rules of relevance so as to permit the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania to speak his mind on an amendment that 
    he will be offering.
        Now, the Chair has bent over backward in an effort to be fair 
    with the minority, and the Chair believes the gentleman from 
    Maryland is aware of that fact; and so the point of order is 
    overruled.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland appeals 
    from the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        Mr. Brademas: Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the appeal on the 
    table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion offered 
    by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    233, nays 139, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 60, as follows: . 
    . .

Chair's Recognition Not Subject to Appeal

Sec. 1.31 The decision of the Chair on a matter of recognition is not 
    subject to a point of order, since recognition is largely within 
    the discretion of the Chair.

        On July 7, 1980,(18) there was a contest for 
    recognition in the Committee of the Whole when it had under 
    consideration H.R. 7235, the Rail Act of 1980. The proceedings were 
    as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 126 Cong. Rec. 18285, 18290-92, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James J.] Florio [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Florio: Page 103, line 14, insert 
        ``or (c)'' immediately after ``subsection (b)''.
            Page 104, line 20, strike out the closing quotation marks 
        and the following period.
            Page 104, after line 20, insert the following new 
        subsection: . . .

        Mr. [Edward R.] Madigan [of Il-linois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Madigan as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Florio:
            Page 103, line 14, insert ``or (c)'' immediately after 
        ``subsection (b)''.

[[Page 11993]]

            Page 104, line 20, strike out the closing quotation marks 
        and the following period.
            Page 104, after line 20, insert the following new 
        subsection: . . .

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, this amendment includes a number of 
    provisions designed to resolve problems which had been expressed by 
    agricultural groups since the bill was reported from committee. . . 
    .
        Mr. [Robert C.] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman will state his 
    inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Les AuCoin (Oreg.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I was not aware at the time that 
    this amendment was offered that it would purport to deal with a 
    number of very different subjects. I assume that it would not be in 
    order to raise a point of order concerning germaneness at this late 
    time, not having reserved it, but I would like to ask if the 
    question may be divided. There are several subjects that are quite 
    divisible in the amendment offered here, and that deal with 
    different matters.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from Texas 
    that he is correct, it is too late to raise a point of order on the 
    question of germaneness.
        The Chair will further advise the gentleman from Texas that a 
    substitute is not divisible.

     amendment offered by mr. eckhardt to the amendment offered by mr. 
      madigan as a substitute for the amendment offered by mr. florio

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will re-port the amendment to the 
    substitute amendment.

                               point of order

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, I understand that the procedure is 
    that the members of the subcommittee would be recognized for 
    amendments first, and that the gentleman from Texas sought 
    recognition for the purpose of making a parliamentary inquiry and 
    was recognized for that purpose, and was not recognized for the 
    purpose of offering an amendment.
        I further understand that the gentlewoman from Maryland, a 
    member of the subcommittee, was on her feet seeking recognition for 
    the purpose of offering an amendment, as well as the gentleman from 
    North Carolina (Mr. Broyhill).
        Ms. [Barbara A.] Mikulski [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, that is 
    correct.
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the gentleman by saying 
    to him that the normal procedure is to recognize members of the 
    full committee by seniority, alternating from side to side, which 
    the Chair has been doing. The gentleman was recognized under that 
    procedure, and the Chair's recognition is not in any event subject 
    to challenge.
        Therefore, the gentleman is recognized, and any point of order 
    that the gentleman from Illinois would make on that point would not 
    be sustained.

[[Page 11994]]

        Mr. Madigan: Further pursuing my point of order, and with all 
    due respect to the Chair, am I incorrect in assuming that the 
    gentleman from Texas was recognized for the point of raising a 
    parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. He was recognized for 
    that purpose; then separately for the purpose of the amendment that 
    he is offering, which the Clerk will now report.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Eckhardt to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Madigan as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. 
        Florio: page 3, strike out lines 14 through 20.
            Page 3, line 5, strike out ``(i)''.
            Page 3, line 13, strike out ``; or'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof a period.
            Pages 4 and 5, strike out ``20,000'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof ``5,000''.

        Mr. Florio: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New Jersey reserves a point of 
    order.
        Mr. Florio: We have not got a copy of the amendment, and what 
    was just shown does not comply with what was just read.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from New 
    Jersey that the amendment that has been read is the amendment that 
    is pending. The fact that the gentleman does not have a copy of the 
    amendment does not give rise to a point of order.
        Mr. Florio: I would like to reserve a point of order until we 
    have an opportunity to see the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman reserves a point of order.

Order of Amendments, Chair's Discretion

Sec. 1.32 Recognition to offer amendments in the Committee of the Whole 
    is within the discretion of the Chair, and no point of order lies 
    against the Chair's recognition of one Member over another, absent 
    a special rule which gives one amendment a special priority.

    During consideration of the Panama Canal Act of 1979, which had 
been considered by several committees of the House and was being 
debated under the provisions of a rather complicated special order, a 
dispute arose about the order of recognition to offer the next 
amendment. The pertinent proceedings of June 21, 1979,(20) 
were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 125 Cong. Rec. 15999, 16000, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John M.] Murphy of New York: Mr. Chairman, I move to 
    strike the last word.
        Mr. Chairman, I rise at this time with so many Members in the 
    well and on the floor to ask as many Members as possible to try to 
    stay on the floor throughout the next hour and 50 minutes. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 11995]]

            Amendment offered by Mr. Bauman: Page 187, strike out line 
        19 and all that follows through line 20 on page 189 and insert 
        in lieu thereof the following:

                             Chapter 2--IMMIGRATION

            Sec. 1611. Special Immigrants.--(a) Section 101(a)(27) of 
        the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), 
        relating to the def-inition of special immigrants, is amended-- 
        . . .

        Ms. [Elizabeth] Holtzman [of New York] (during the reading): 
    Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a point of order. My point of order 
    is that under the rule the Committee on the Judiciary was given the 
    right to offer an amendment to strike section 1611, and I believe 
    that is the import of the amendment offered. The gentleman's 
    amendment goes to that section, and I was on my feet.
        The Chairman: (1) First the amendment should be 
    read, and then the Chair will recognize the gentlewoman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk continued the reading of the amendment.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, I renew the point of order that I 
    tried to state at an earlier time.
        The Chairman: The gentlewoman will state the point of order.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, at the time that the last amendment 
    was voted on, I was on my feet seeking to offer an amendment on 
    behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary with respect to striking 
    in its entirety section 1611 of the bill. The right to offer that 
    amendment is granted under the rule, in fact on page 3 of House 
    Resolution 274. I want to ask the Chair whether I am entitled to be 
    recognized or was entitled to be recognized to make first a motion, 
    which was a motion to strike the entire section before amendments 
    were made to the text of the bill.
        The Chairman: Unless an amendment having priority of 
    consideration under the rule is offered, it is the Chair's practice 
    to alternate recognition of members of the several committees that 
    are listed in the rule, taking amendments from the majority and 
    minority side in general turn, while giving priority of recognition 
    to those committees that are mentioned in the rule.
        The gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Holtzman) is a member of 
    such a committee, but following the adoption of the last amendment 
    the gentleman from New York (Mr. Murphy), the chairman of the 
    Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, sought recognition to 
    strike the last word. Accordingly, the Chair then recognized the 
    gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) to offer a floor amendment, 
    which is a perfecting amendment to section 1611 of the bill.
        The rule mentions that it shall be in order to consider an 
    amendment as recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary, to 
    strike out section 1611, if offered, but the rule does not give any 
    special priority to the Committee on the Judiciary to offer such 
    amendments, over perfecting amendments to that section.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further? The 
    gentleman said that he was going to recognize members of the 
    committees that had a right to offer amendments under the rule al

[[Page 11996]]

    ternately. I would suggest to the Chair that no member of the 
    Committee on the Judiciary has been recognized thus far in the 
    debate with respect to offering such an amendment and, therefore, 
    the Chair's principle, as I understood he stated it, was not being 
    observed in connection with recognition.
        The Chairman: The Chair would observe that the Chair is 
    attempting to be fair in recognizing Members alternately when they 
    are members of committees with priority and that the rule permits 
    but does not give the Committee on the Judiciary special priority 
    of recognition over other floor amendments, which under the 
    precedents would take priority over a motion to strike.
        Second, the Chair would like to advise the gentlewoman from New 
    York that recognition is discretionary with the Chair and is not 
    subject to a point of order. Does the gentlewoman have any further 
    comment to make on the point of order?
        The Chair overrules the point of order and recognizes the 
    gentleman in the well.

Addressing Rules of Procedure Through Question of Privilege of House

Sec. 1.33 While ordinary questions of procedure or interpretations of 
    the House rules cannot be raised by a question of privilege under 
    Rule IX, since it is the duty of the Speaker under Rule I clause 4 
    to rule on all questions of order, a question of privilege was once 
    based upon the assertion that integrity of House proceedings would 
    be violated if the House could not determine as a question of 
    privilege the vote required to extend the time for ratification of 
    a constitutional amendment already submitted to the states.

    The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed to the states for 
ratification in the 92d Congress. In the text of that joint resolution, 
there was a provision stating that ratification should be completed 
within seven years of its submission to the states. In the 95th 
Congress, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported another joint 
resolution (H.J. Res. 638) proposing to extend the time for 
ratification. The difficult question presented was the vote needed to 
pass this joint resolution.
    After the House had adopted a special rule making consideration of 
H.J. Res. 638 in order, Mr. Quillen, of the Committee on Rules, offered 
H. Res. 1315 as a question of privilege under Rule IX. This resolution 
declared that a two-thirds vote was required to pass the joint 
resolution extending the ratification period. The proceedings of Aug. 
15, 1978,(2) are carried in full.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 124 Cong. Rec. 26203, 26204, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 11997]]

     Providing for a Two-Thirds Vote of Members Present and Voting on 
                Final Passage of House Joint Resolution 638

        (Mr. Quillen asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute.)
        Mr. [James H.] Quillen [of Tennessee]: Mr. Speaker, at the 
    conclusion of my remarks I shall offer a resolution involving a 
    question of the privileges of the House and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        Mr. Speaker, the ``Resolved'' clause of my resolution demands a 
    two-thirds vote on final passage of the constitutional resolution 
    extending the ERA. At the appropriate time I will offer my 
    privileged resolution.
        The Speaker: (3) The Chair will state to the 
    gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Quillen) that now is the time for the 
    gentleman to offer his resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Privileges of the House--Providing for a Two-Thirds Vote of Members 
     Present and Voting on Final Passage of House Joint Resolution 638

        Mr. Quillen: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of the 
    privileges of the House and offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 
    1315) involving a question of the privileges of the House, and I 
    ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the resolution.
        First, the Chair will state that he has had an opportunity to 
    examine the resolution as offered by the gentleman from Tennessee 
    (Mr. Quillen), and in the opinion of the Chair the resolution 
    presents a question of the privileges of the House and may be 
    considered under rule IX of the rules of the House.
        The Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 1315

            Whereas H.J. Res. 638 of this Congress amends H.J. Res. 208 
        of the 92nd Congress, proposing an amendment to the 
        Constitution;

            Whereas H.J. Res. 208 of the 92nd Congress was passed by an 
        affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members present and 
        voting, as required by Article V of the Constitution, and 
        submitted for ratification on March 22, 1972;
            Whereas the integrity of the process by which the House 
        considers changes to H.J. Res. 208 of the 92nd Congress would 
        be violated if H.J. Res. 638 were passed by a simple majority 
        of the Members present and voting; and
            Whereas the constitutional prerogatives of the House to 
        propose amendments to the Constitution and to impose necessary 
        conditions thereto in accordance with Article V of the 
        Constitution would be abrogated if H.J. Res. 638 were passed by 
        a simple majority of the Members present and voting;
            Resolved, That an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
        Members present and voting, a quorum being present, shall be 
        required on final passage of H.J. Res. 638.

        Mr. [Don] Edwards of California: Mr. Speaker, I move to table 
    the resolution.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Edwards).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.

[[Page 11998]]

        Mr. Quillen: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    230, nays 183, not voting 19, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Edwards) to offer a motion. . . .
        Mr. [Charles E.] Wiggins [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Wiggins: Mr. Speaker, upon the conclusion of our 
    consideration of House Joint Resolution 638, including the adoption 
    of any amendments to it, when the question is put on the final 
    passage of that resolution, must the vote of the House to adopt the 
    joint resolution be by a simple majority of those present and 
    voting or by two-thirds of those present and voting?
        The Speaker: In response to the parliamentary inquiry raised by 
    the gentleman from California, the Chair feels that the action of 
    the House in laying on the table House Resolution 315 was an 
    indication by the House that a majority of the Members feel a 
    majority vote is required for the final passage of House Joint 
    Resolution 638. The Chair would cite the precedent contained in 
    Cannon's VIII, section 2660, that affirmative action on a motion to 
    lay on the table, while not a technical rejection, is in effect an 
    adverse disposition equivalent to rejection.
        The Chair, by ruling that House Resolution 1315 properly raised 
    a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX, believed 
    it essential that the question of the vote required to pass House 
    Joint Resolution 638 be decided by the House itself. The House now 
    having laid that resolution on the table, the Chair feels that the 
    result of such a vote, combined with the guidance on this question 
    furnished by the Committee on the Judiciary on page 6 of its 
    report, justifies the Chair in responding that, following the 
    expression of the House, House Joint Resolution 638 will be 
    messaged to the Senate if a majority of those present and voting, a 
    quorum being present, vote for passage.
        Mr. Wiggins: I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Wiggins: Do I understand the ruling of the Chair correctly 
    to be that a vote not to consider a privileged resolution is 
    equivalent to a rejection of the text of the resolution itself?
        The Speaker: The vote was not on the question of consideration. 
    The Chair will state that he believes he has answered the question 
    raised in the gentleman's original inquiry. The Chair has stated 
    that a motion to table is an adverse disposition.
        Mr. Wiggins: Mr. Speaker, I understood the answer, then, to be 
    ``Yes?''
        The Speaker: The answer is ``Yes.''

    Parliamentarian's Note: The question of the vote required, a 
majority or two-thirds, was unique. Section 508, Jefferson's Manual, 
states that ``The voice of the majority decides; for the lex majoris 
partis is the law of all

[[Page 11999]]

councils, elections, etc. where not otherwise expressly provided.''
    A supermajority is required in the Constitution, Article V: ``The 
Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution. . . .''
    Since 1917, Congress has, when proposing a constitutional amendment 
for ratification, provided in the joint resolution a time limit within 
which the requisite number of states must ratify; in four cases since 
that date the time limit has appeared in the text of the constitutional 
amendment, but since the 23d amendment the time limit has appeared 
independently in the proposing clause.

Chair Does Not Rule on Consistency of Pending Bill

Sec. 1.34 The Speaker does not rule on a point of order alleging that a 
    pending bill is not consistent with existing law.

    On May 3, 1949,(4) Mr. Adam C. Powell, Jr., of New York, 
pointed out the apparent incongruity of language in proposed 
legislation that referred to federal courts under nomenclature that was 
obsolete because of court reorganization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 95 Cong. Rec. 5543, 5544, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 2032, the National Labor Relations Act of 1949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Powell: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: (5) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Sam Rayburn (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Powell: If this bill uses language which is no longer in 
    keeping with our laws, I raise the point of order that it is 
    incorrectly drawn. On page 53, line 13, this bill uses the 
    language, ``to review by the appropriate circuit court of 
    appeals.'' I make the point of order that there is no longer any 
    circuit court of appeals.
        The Speaker: There might be 203 Members take the same position 
    that the gentleman from New York does, but that does not alter the 
    situation.
        The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the 
    bill.

Chair Does Not Rule on Consistency of Amendments

Sec. 1.35 The Chair does not rule on the consistency of a proposed 
    amendment with another amendment already adopted to a different 
    portion of the bill.

    When the Committee of the Whole had under consideration the bill 
H.R. 3744, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1977, an amendment was 
offered and agreed to which established the minimum wage levels for 
three years. Later during the consideration of the

[[Page 12000]]

measure, another amendment relating to minimum wage levels was offered 
by Mr. Burton. The proceedings of Sept. 15, 1977,(6) were as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 123 Cong. Rec. 29431, 29436, 29440, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John N.] Erlenborn [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Erlenborn: Page 4, strike out 
        lines 16 and 17 and insert in lieu thereof ``INCREASE IN 
        MINIMUM WAGE''.
            Page 4, line 18, redesignate ``SEC. 2.(a)(1)'' as ``SEC. 
        2.(a)'', and beginning with line 20 strike out everything 
        through line 21 on page 5 and insert in lieu thereof:
            ``(1) not less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1978, not less than $2.85 an hour during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1979, and not less than $3.05 an hour 
        after December 31, 1979, except as otherwise provided in this 
        section;''. . . .

        The Chairman: (7) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. William H. Natcher (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Erlenborn: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. . . .
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    223, noes 193, not voting 18, as follows: . . .
        Mr. Phillip Burton [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Phillip Burton: Page 9, insert 
        after line 5 of the following:
            (b) Section 6 (29 U.S.C. 206) is amended by adding at the 
        end the following:
            ``(9)(1) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees 
        who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production 
        of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged 
        in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages 
        at the following rates: during the period ending December 31, 
        1977, not less [than] $2.30 an hour, during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1978, not less than $2.65 an hour, during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1979, not less than 52 per centum of the 
        average hourly earnings excluding overtime, during the twelve-
        month period ending in June 1978, of production and related 
        workers on manufacturing payrolls, during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1980, and during each of the next three years, not 
        less than 53 per centum of the average hourly earnings 
        excluding overtime, during the twelve-month period ending in 
        June of the year preceding such year, or production and related 
        workers on manufacturing payrolls, and during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1984, and during each succeeding year, not 
        less than the minimum wage rate in effect under this paragraph 
        for the year beginning January 1, 1983. For purposes of 
        computing the minimum wage prescribed by this paragraph, the 
        Secretary shall, not later than August 1, 1979, and August 1 of 
        each of the next five years, publish in the Federal Register an 
        estimate of the average hourly earnings (excluding overtime), 
        during the twelve-month period ending in June of such year, of 
        production and related workers on manufacturing payrolls, and 
        shall, not later than November 1, 1978, and November 1 of each 
        of the next five years, publish in the Fed

[[Page 12001]]

        eral Register such earnings for such period.''.
            ``(2) the minimum wage rate prescribed by paragraph (1) 
        shall apply in any year, in lieu of the wage rate prescribed by 
        subsection (a)(1), in which the wage rate prescribed by 
        paragraph (1) is higher than that prescribed by subsection 
        (a)(1).''.

        Mr. Erlenborn: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the amendment. . . .
        Mr. [Clifford R.] Allen [of Tennessee]: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order. I can find no copy of this amendment. I would like to be 
    able to read the amendment and I believe under the rules a certain 
    number of copies are supposed to be available.
        The Chairman: The gentleman does not state a point of order.
        Mr. Phillip Burton: Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of 
    my time.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) 
    insist upon his point of order?
        Mr. Erlenborn: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        I must first say I have had only a few minutes to look at the 
    amendment which is thrown together rather hastily in an attempt, as 
    the gentleman said, to get a recount on the issue of indexing, but, 
    Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment on the 
    ground that the Committee has voted on the issue of indexing, has 
    expressed its will, and this is an amendment which merely would 
    have the House again vote on the same issue already disposed of.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Phillip 
    Burton) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Phillip Burton: No, other than to say that we have 
    developed this amendment so that a point of order does not lie.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Phillip Burton) simply adds a new subsection to the end of the 
    section. In the opinion of the Chair the amendment is germane. As 
    to whether or not it is inconsistent with the amendment of the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) adopted a few moments ago, 
    the Chair cannot rule upon that. The Chair holds the amendment to 
    be germane and not to directly change the amendment already 
    adopted. The point of order is overruled. . . .
        So the amendment was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Sec. 1.36 The Chair does not pass upon the consistency of proposed 
    amendments or on their legal effect, if adopted.

    On Aug. 22, 1949,(8) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Walter A. Lynch, of New York, refused to rule on the 
consistency of an amendment to an authorization bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 95 Cong. Rec. 11994, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 5472, dealing with public works on rivers and harbors for 
        navigation and flood control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Usher L.] Burdick [of North Dakota]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 12002]]

            Amendment offered by Mr. Burdick: On page 19, line 10, 
        strike out lines 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 and insert 
        ``$250,000,000.''

        Mr. [William M.] Whittington [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    make a point of order against the amendment, that the amendment is 
    really without meaning or significance, because it authorizes no 
    appropriation. The Congress cannot make an appropriation unless it 
    is authorized by law. There is no authorization. The gentleman from 
    North Dakota wants to strike out the entire paragraph and merely 
    insert $250,000,000. He wants to strike out on page 19 this 
    language:

            In addition to previous authorizations there is hereby 
        authorized to be appropriated the sum of $250,000,000 for the 
        prosecution of the comprehensive plan for the Missouri River 
        Basin to be undertaken by the Corps of Engineers, approved by 
        the act of June 28, 1938, as amended and supplemented by 
        subsequent acts of Congress.

        He wants to insert ``$250,000,000'', without saying it is an 
    authorization or what it is. The amendment is without meaning. It 
    is frivolous--meaningless. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will address himself to the point of 
    order and say that, in the opinion of the Chair, the point of order 
    is not well taken, for the reason that whether or not this is 
    consistent is not within the province of the Chair.

The Chair Does Not Rule on Questions of Constitutionality

Sec. 1.37 The Speaker does not rule on the question of whether a bill 
    is constitutional or unconstitutional.

    On July 21, 1947,(9) it was demonstrated that the Chair 
does not rule on the constitutionality of proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 93 Cong. Rec. 9522, 9523, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order against the bill that it violates the Constitution 
    of the United States and that the Congress has no right to pass 
    such legislation, and I should like to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        The Speaker: (10) The Chair will hear the gentleman 
    from Mississippi briefly on the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rankin: . . . I submit, Mr. Speaker, that this bill is not 
    legally before the House, and that my point of order should be 
    sustained.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule. The bill is properly 
    before the House. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Chair to 
    determine what is constitutional and what is not constitutional. 
    The point of order is overruled.

Sec. 1.38 It is for the House and not the Chair to determine on the 
    constitutionality of a bill; and the Chair has declined to respond 
    to a parliamentary inquiry about whether a bill contravenes the 
    Constitution.

    On Feb. 7, 1995,(11) during debate on H.R. 729, a bill 
dealing

[[Page 12003]]

with the imposition of the death penalty under federal sentencing 
procedures, an inquiry was raised about the vote required on passage of 
the bill. The question and the Chair's response are carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Cleo] Fields of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (12) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Frank D. Riggs (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, since we are about to 
    vote on this measure, I have a question: Since this bill that is 
    before us modifies the Constitution to some degree, would this not 
    call for a two-thirds vote of the House?
        The Chairman: The simple answer is no. The amendment before us 
    is not a constitutional amendment.
        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman:
        My inquiry was on the bill and not the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will issue the same ruling:
        This is a bill and not a constitutional amendment.

        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman:
        The bill precisely says that evidence which is obtained as a 
    result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding 
    in a court of the United States on the grounds that the search or 
    seizure was in violation of the fourth amendment.
        How is that not, Mr. Chairman, making the fourth amendment of 
    the Constitution moot or at least revising it?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is not stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry. He is raising a question of constitutional law.
        That is a matter for the House to decide.

Sec. 1.39 The constitutional requirement that ``All Bills for raising 
    Revenue shall originate in the House . . .'' may be raised when a 
    measure is before the House for consideration, and the issue is 
    determined by the House, voting on a question of privilege which 
    may provide for returning the offending measure to the Senate. But 
    the challenge is in order only when the House is in possession of 
    the papers and cannot be raised collaterally or after the fact when 
    the bill has passed and is no longer in possession of the House.

    On Apr. 6, 1995,(13) a resolution was offered from the 
floor as a question of privilege under Rule IX. The resolution provided 
as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Peter] Deutsch [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of

[[Page 12004]]

    privilege under rule IX of the House rules and I offer a House 
    Resolution No. 131.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (14) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Scott McInnis (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 131

            Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives provides that questions of privilege shall 
        arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are 
        affected;
            Whereas, under the precedents, customs, and traditions of 
        the House pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has 
        arisen in cases involving the constitutional prerogatives of 
        the House;
            Whereas section 7 of Article I of the Constitution requires 
        that revenue measures originate in the House of 
        Representatives; and
            Whereas the conference report on the bill H.R. 831 
        contained a targeted tax benefit which was not contained in the 
        bill as passed the House of Representatives and which was not 
        contained in the amendment of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it
            Resolved, That the Comptroller General of the United States 
        shall prepare and transmit, within 7 days after the date of the 
        adoption of this resolution, a report to the House of 
        Representatives containing the opinion of the Comptroller 
        General on whether the addition of a targeted tax benefit by 
        the conferees to the conference report on the bill H.R. 831 (A 
        bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently 
        extend the deduction for the health insurance costs of self-
        employed individuals, to repeal the provision permitting 
        nonrecognition of gain on sales and exchanges effectuating 
        policies of the Federal Communications Commission, and for 
        other purposes) violates the requirement of the United States 
        Constitution that all revenue measures originate in the House 
        of Representatives.

    The Chair ruled that the resolution did not qualify as a proper 
question of Rule IX privilege. After debate, the Chair's decision was 
sustained on appeal.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
    Deutsch] wish to be heard on whether the question is one of 
    privilege? . . .
        Mr. Deutsch: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Speaker, article I, section 7 of the Constitution 
    specifically states that revenue measures must originate in this 
    Chamber, in the House of Representatives. It is an infringement of 
    the House prerogatives when that is not done, and in fact this 
    House has consistently ruled that as a question of privilege when 
    that occurs. It consistently occurs when the other body does a 
    revenue provision.
        What occurred in this case, as most Members at this point are 
    well aware, is that this revenue measure which did originate in the 
    House, then went to the other body, went to a conference committee. 
    . . .
        The House has consistently held that that type of instance is a 
    violation of our prerogatives.
        Furthermore, the Chair has consistently ruled that on issues of 
    this nature the House has the right, and the appropriate action is 
    for the House to decide itself what is a prerogative and what is a 
    violation in terms of the privileges of the House. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule.

[[Page 12005]]

        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair rules that the resolution does not constitute a 
    question of privilege under rule IX.
        The resolution offered by the gentleman from Florida 
    collaterally questions actions taken by a committee of conference 
    on a House-originated revenue bill by challenging the inclusion in 
    the conference report of additional revenue matter not contained in 
    either the House bill nor the Senate amendment committed to 
    conference. The resolution calls for a report by the Comptroller 
    General on the propriety under section 7 of article I of the 
    Constitution of those proceedings and conference actions on a bill 
    that has already moved through the legislative process.
        In the opinion of the Chair, such a resolution does not raise a 
    question of the privileges of the House. As recorded in Deschler's 
    Precedents, volume 3, chapter 13, section 14.2, a question of 
    privilege under section 7 of article I of the Constitution may be 
    raised only when the House is ``in possession of the papers.'' In 
    other words, any allegation of infringement on the prerogatives of 
    the House to originate a revenue measure must be made 
    contemporaneous with the consideration of the measure by the House 
    and may not be raised after the fact.
        The Chair rules that the resolution does not constitute a 
    question of the privileges of the House. . . .
        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker, I respectfully appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Florida has 
    appealed the ruling of the Chair. The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker, I believe I am recognized for an 
    hour.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will suspend.

                   motion to table offered by mr. walker

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I offer 
    a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Walker moves to lay the appeal on the table.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to 
    table.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Gene] Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from the State of 
    Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] is recognized.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, since the rules of the 
    House clearly state that when the question of the integrity of the 
    proceedings of this House have been violated, that is indeed a 
    privileged resolution. Now, I realize that the Chair responded to 
    the written request of my colleague, but I have also asked the 
    Chair to respond to whether or not it is prima facie evidence that 
    a question relating to the integrity of the proceedings of this 
    body are called into question when one individual who earlier this 
    session offered the Speaker of the House an over $4 million book 
    deal which the Speaker

[[Page 12006]]

    turned down, but he still offered it and with--that is a 
    parliamentary inquiry. I have just as much right as the Members.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Regular order. This is a parliamentary 
    inquiry. The gentleman will suspend. The Chair has ruled previously 
    on all points on this issue as textually raised by the resolution. 
    We now have the motion before the House.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The motion is not debatable.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. [Kweisi] Mfume [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. 
    Taylor] may state a legitimate parliamentary inquiry. . . .
        Mr. Mfume: Mr. Speaker, yesterday evening when there was an 
    appeal of the ruling of the Chair; then there was from the other 
    side of the aisle a request to table. Following that, there were 
    questions raised on this side of the aisle about why is it so 
    difficult to get a vote on an appeal of the ruling of the Chair? . 
    . .
        The gentleman has legitimately appealed it and ought to, at 
    least at some point in time, have a vote, so I would say to my 
    distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that, 
    while we will vote on the motion to table the appeal, that there 
    may in fact be another motion to appeal the Chair, and another one 
    after that, and, if that is what it is going to take to get one 
    vote on the appeal of the Chair, then this side is prepared to do 
    that. I would rather not do it. They will win in either case, but 
    this side is just asking for a clean vote on the appeal of the 
    Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: It is the Chair's ruling that the 
    motion that is currently pending is, in fact, a proper motion under 
    the rules of the House.
        Mr. Mfume: I do not dispute that, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question before the House is the 
    motion to table.
        Are there further parliamentary inquiries?
        The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] to lay on the table the appeal of the 
    ruling of the Chair.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    230, nays 192, not voting 12, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of 
    the Chair was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

[[Page 12007]]

Chair Does Not Rule on Hypothetical Questions

Sec. 1.40 Although the Chair responds to parliamentary inquiries 
    concerning the rules of order and decorum in debate, he does not 
    rule on hypothetical questions; rule retrospectively on questions 
    not timely raised; or rule anticipatorily on questions not yet 
    presented.

    On Nov. 20, 1989,(15) the House had under debate House 
Resolution 295 providing for consideration of a measure relating to 
appropriations for foreign operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 135 Cong. Rec. 30225, 30226, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the hour, the debate became somewhat intemperate.

        Mr. [Bob] McEwen [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, it is a difficult time 
    to represent the interest of the left when around the world from 
    Managua to Moscow it is being exposed that communism is a violation 
    of human rights and human dignity. Indeed, those who have supported 
    the Marxist guerrillas in Central America this week, having killed 
    hundreds of innocent civilians throughout El Salvador, have not 
    taken the floor to make any protestation of that death. . . .
        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) For what purpose does 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Pat Williams (Mont.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Obey: Mr. Speaker, I am about to ask that the gentleman's 
    words be taken down.
        Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman yield for a possible 
    correction? I do not want to make a motion to embarrass the 
    gentleman. Would the gentleman yield?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Would the gentleman from Ohio yield to 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        Mr. McEwen: I yield to the gentleman. . . .
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Speaker, I would simply suggest--I would be happy 
    to give him another minute because I will not take more than a 
    minute.
        I think I heard the gentleman say that those who support 
    Marxist revolutions around the world have not taken specific action 
    on this floor. I hope that the gentleman is not suggesting that 
    anyone on this floor is in support of Marxist revolutions. We are 
    going to have an acrimonious enough debate today without leaving 
    mistaken impressions like that. . . .

                  announcement by the speaker pro tempore

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Before the Chair recognizes the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts, the Chair would like to say to 
    Members on both sides of the aisle that the Chair may intervene to 
    prevent the arraignment of the motives of other Members. The Chair 
    would, therefore, echo the sentiments expressed by the honorable 
    minority leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], this 
    morning when he asked the Members to debate the issue and the 
    policy and not to become involved in attacking or laying for 
    question the motives of other Members.

[[Page 12008]]

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, I just would like to clarify on the 
    ruling of the Chair right now.
        Does the Chair believe, if someone did suggest that Members, 
    not by name, but that Members of this body supported Marxist 
    revolution, that would be unparliamentary language?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is not called upon to rule 
    on possible prior violation of the rules of the House or 
    Jefferson's Manual.

Ambiguities in Legislative Language

Sec. 1.41 The Chair does not rule on points of order as to whether an 
    amendment is ambiguous.

    On July 5, 1956,(17) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, pointed out that the Chair 
does not rule on the ambiguity of proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 102 Cong. Rec. 11875, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7537, dealing with federal assistance to states for school 
        construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Amendment offered by Mr. [James] Roosevelt [of California] 
        to the Powell amendment: Strike the word ``provisions'' and 
        insert the word ``decisions.''

        Mr. [Ross] Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I make the point of order that the 
    amendment is not germane to the bill.
        The Chairman: It is certainly germane to the amendment offered 
    by the gentleman from New York to substitute the word ``decisions'' 
    for the word ``provisions.'' The Chair so rules.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, a further point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I make the point of order that the word 
    ``provisions'' is ambiguous and has no meaning whatever and would 
    make the amendment not germane.
        The Chairman: The Chair does not rule on the question of 
    ambiguity. It is a question of germaneness solely, and the Chair 
    has ruled that the amendment is germane.

Legal Effect of Bill Not Subject of Point of Order

Sec. 1.42 It is not a proper point of order to inquire as to the legal 
    effect of the adoption of an amendment.

    On Aug. 7, 1986,(18) during consideration of the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1986 (H.R. 
3129) in the Committee of the Whole,

[[Page 12009]]

Chairman Bob Traxler, of Michigan, declined to respond to a point of 
order seeking information concerning the effect of an amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 132 Cong. Rec. 19675, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Rod] Chandler [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I demand a 
    recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        Ms. [Bobbi] Fiedler [of California]: I have a point of order, 
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman will state her point 
    of order.
        Ms. Fiedler: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask whether or not a 
    vote in favor of this particular amendment would require the 
    elimination of such signs along a route for hospitals or other 
    urgent or emergency care.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair would like to state to the 
    gentlewoman that that is not a point of order.
        A recorded vote has been ordered.

Point of Order Does Not Lie Against Competency of Drafting of Amendment

Sec. 1.43 The issue of whether an amendment is properly and competently 
    drafted to accomplish its legislative purpose is not questioned by 
    a point of order but is a matter to be disposed of by debate on the 
    merits.

    The purpose of raising a point of order is to determine whether a 
motion or action is in compliance with the rules. It is not properly 
used to question whether an amendment is properly drafted to achieve 
its stated purpose. The proceedings of Feb. 4, 1976,(19) 
illustrate this distinction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 122 Cong. Rec. 2371, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William M.] Brodhead [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Brodhead to the amendment in the 
        na-ture of a substitute offered by Mr. Krueger: Strike out 
        section 105 and designate the succeeding sections of title I 
        accordingly.

        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman from Ohio reserves 
    a point of order on the amendment. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) insist on his point of 
    order?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, my point of order against the 
    amendment mentioned is that while it has a purpose with which I am 
    not totally unsympathetic, it does not make the conforming 
    amendments necessary to accomplish that purpose without leaving a 
    lot of loose ends hanging in the legislation. For example, it 
    strikes section 105, which is entitled, ``Prohibition

[[Page 12010]]

    of the Use of Natural Gas as Boiler Fuel.''
        In section 102, the ``purpose'' section of the amendment, it 
    says:

            . . . to grant the Federal Energy Administration authority 
        to prohibit the use of natural gas as boiler fuel; . . .
    That would be left in the legislation without any language under 
    this section 105 which provides for that.

        I think there are other references in the language that I have 
    not had a chance to dig out.
        I would suggest that if the gentle-man from Michigan would like 
    to withdraw his amendment, I think that we can provide the 
    gentleman with an amendment that would have all the necessary 
    conforming language.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from Ohio 
    (Mr. Brown) is no longer speaking on his point of order. The Chair 
    will state that the question the gentleman from Ohio raises is not 
    a valid point of order, it is rather a question of draftsmanship 
    and the Chair overrules the point of order.
        If the gentleman from Ohio desires to be heard in opposition to 
    the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Brodhead) 
    then the Chair would be glad to recognize the gentleman for 5 
    minutes.

Points of Order Against Relevancy of Debate

Sec. 1.44 Where a special rule provides that general debate in the 
    Committee of the Whole shall be confined to the bill, a Member must 
    confine his remarks to the bill, and if he continues to talk of 
    other matters after repeated points of order, the Chairman will 
    request that he take his seat.

    On Mar. 29, 1944,(1) Chairman James Domengeaux, of 
Louisiana, sustained a point of order against Emanuel Celler, of New 
York, after the Member repeatedly strayed from the subject before the 
House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 90 Cong. Rec. 3263, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4257, dealing with the expatriation of persons evading 
        military service.
            Absent language in the special rule (H. Res. 482, 78th 
        Cong.) confining general debate to the subject of the bill, 
        debate would have been permitted in the Committee of the Whole 
        on any subject. See 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 5233-38; 8 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 2590; 120 Cong. Rec. 21743, 93d Cong. 
        2d Sess., June 28, 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Adolph J.] Sabath [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the point of order.
        Mr. Sabath: The gentleman is not speaking to the bill. He has 
    been admonished several times, he has refused, and I am obliged to 
    make the point of order myself, though I regret it.
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained and the gentleman 
    is again requested to confine himself to the bill.

[[Page 12011]]

        Mr. [Noah M.] Mason [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry. How many times do we have to call the 
    gentleman to order and try to get him to confine his remarks to the 
    bill before the privilege of the House is withdrawn?
        The Chairman: This will be the last time. If the gentleman does 
    not proceed in order, he will be requested to take his seat.

Point of Order Based on Violation of Ramseyer Rule Lies Only in House

Sec. 1.45 A point of order that a committee report fails to comply with 
    the Ramseyer rule will not lie in the Committee of the Whole.

        On July 25, 1966,(2) Chairman Richard Bolling, of 
    Missouri, ruled that a point of order raised by Mr. John Bell 
    Williams, of Mississippi, against consideration of the bill on the 
    ground that the report of the Committee on the Judiciary 
    accompanying the bill did not comply with requirements of the 
    Ramseyer rule, would not lie in the Committee of the Whole. Mr. 
    Williams had attempted to raise the point of order prior to the 
    House's resolving itself into the Committee of the Whole, but, as 
    Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, later acknowledged, 
    the Chair did not hear Mr. Williams make his point of order. After 
    initial debate in the Committee of the Whole, the Committee voted 
    to rise; and the Speaker resumed the Chair. The Speaker then stated 
    that under the circumstances Mr. Williams could make his point of 
    order at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966. For more on the 
        Ramseyer rule, see Ch. 17, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The dialogue was as follows:
        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    14765) to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury 
    selection and service, to facilitate the desegregation of public 
    education and other public facilities, to provide judicial relief 
    against discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties 
    for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other 
    purposes.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: All those in favor of the motion will let it be 
    known by saying ``aye.'' All those opposed by saying ``no.'' The 
    motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of 
    the bill, H.R. 14765, with Mr. Bolling in the chair.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a point of order. I was on my feet--
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was 
    dispensed with.

[[Page 12012]]

        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Celler] will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Ohio 
    [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [William M.] McCulloch: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Ohio 
    rise?
        Mr. McCulloch: Mr. Chairman, I rise for a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. McCulloch: I would like to know if the resolution 
    unqualifiedly guarantees the minority one-half of the time during 
    general debate and nothing untoward will happen so that it will be 
    diminished or denied contrary to gentlemen's agreements.
        The Chairman: The Chairman will reply by rereading that portion 
    of his opening statement. Under the rule, the gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Celler] will be recognized for 5 hours, the gentleman 
    from Ohio [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours. The Chair 
    will follow the rules.
        Mr. McCulloch: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
    care to use.
        Mr. Chairman, Negroes propose to be free. Many rights have been 
    denied and withheld from them. The right to be equally educated 
    with whites. The right to equal housing with whites. The right to 
    equal recreation with whites.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        Mr. Celler: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, immediately before the House 
    resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House I was on my 
    feet on the floor seeking recognition for the purpose of making a 
    point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765 on the ground 
    that the report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill 
    does not comply with all the requirements of clause 3 of rule XIII 
    of the rules of the House known as the Ramseyer rule and intended 
    to request I be heard in support of that point of order. I was not 
    recognized by the Chair. I realize technically under the rules of 
    the House at this point, my point of order may come too late, after 
    the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: But I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I sought to 
    raise the point of order before the House went into session. May I 
    ask this question? Is there any way that this point of order can 
    lie at this time?
        The Chairman: Not at this time. It lies only in the House, the 
    Chair must inform the gentleman from Mississippi.

        Mr. Williams: May I say that the Parliamentarian and the 
    Speaker were notified in advance and given copies of the point of 
    order that I desired to raise, and I was refused recognition 
    although I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time.

[[Page 12013]]

        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I appeal 
    the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair will have to repeat that the gentleman 
    from Mississippi is well aware that this present occupant of the 
    chair is powerless to do other than he has stated.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    stand as rendered?
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Williams) there were--ayes 139, noes 101.
        The decision of the Chair was sustained.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now 
    rise, and on that I demand tellers.
        Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. 
    Celler and Mr. Williams.
        The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that 
    there were--ayes 168, noes 144.
        So the motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed 
    the chair, Mr. Bolling, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, 
    having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14765) to assure 
    nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service, 
    to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other 
    public facilities, to provide judicial relief against 
    discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties for 
    certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes, 
    had come to no resolution thereon.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, the House resolved itself into the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union a moment 
    ago. When the question was put by the Chair, I was on my feet 
    seeking recognition for the purpose of offering a point of order 
    against consideration of the legislation. Although I shouted rather 
    loudly, apparently the Chair did not hear me. Since the Committee 
    proceeded to go into the Committee of the Whole, I would like to 
    know, Mr. Speaker, if the point of order which I had intended to 
    offer can be offered now in the House against the consideration of 
    the bill; and, Mr. Speaker, I make such a point of order and ask 
    that I be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair did not hear 
    the gentleman make his point of order. There was too much noise. 
    Under the circumstances the Chair will entertain the point of 
    order.

Chairman of Committee of the Whole Does Not Rule on House Procedure

Sec. 1.46 The Speaker, and not the Chairman of the Committee of the 
    Whole, rules on the propriety of amendments included in a motion to 
    recommit with instructions.

    On July 28, 1983,(3) during consideration of H.R. 2760, 
a bill pro

[[Page 12014]]

hibiting covert assistance to Nicaragua in 1983, Chairman William H. 
Natcher, of Kentucky, responding to a parliamentary inquiry, stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 129 Cong. Rec. 21471, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair would advise the gentleman that the rule does not 
    protect such a motion to recommit, but that would be up to the 
    Speaker when we go back into the House to answer that question 
    specifically.
        Points of Order Against Committee Procedure

Sec. 1.47 A point of order that a measure was reported from a committee 
    in violation of a committee rule requiring advance notice of the 
    committee meeting will not lie in the House--the interpretation of 
    committee rules being with the cognizance of the committee.

    On Oct. 12, 1978,(4) Mr. Bolling filed a privileged 
report emanating from the Committee on Rules. Mr. Bauman, a member of 
that committee, complained about the procedure used in the Committee on 
Rules in ordering the resolution reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 124 Cong. Rec. 36382, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bolling, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a 
    privileged report (Rept. No. 95-1769) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    1426) providing for the consideration of reports from the Committee 
    on Rules, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to 
    be printed.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I do not 
    think the gentleman from Missouri has properly filed his report. 
    The resolution was considered this morning in the Rules Committee 
    with no agenda, no notice. It was the intention of the gentleman 
    from Maryland to move to reconsider this resolution. Now, it is 
    jammed through here when we have been in session in the Rules 
    Committee for only 15 minutes.
        I think the members of the Rules Committee deserve something 
    better than that. I question whether a quorum was even present.
        The Speaker: (5) The report has been filed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: I make a point of order that a quorum was not 
    present in the Rules Committee at the time the action was taken.
        Mr. [Richard] Bolling [of Missouri]: If the gentleman will 
    yield----
        Mr. Bauman: I do not have the floor.
        The Speaker: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 
    Missouri.
        Mr. Bolling: Mr. Speaker, there was a quorum present. The vote 
    was perfectly proper. No objection was heard, and I filed the 
    report.
        Mr. Bauman: And there was no notice given, as the rules of the 
    Rules Committee require, of that proposed action.
        The Speaker: Is the gentleman addressing the Chair?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is addressing the 
    gentleman

[[Page 12015]]

    from Missouri, who filed this; through the Chair.
        The Speaker: Well, as far as notice is concerned, that is a 
    matter of the interpretation of the rules of the Rules Committee, 
    to be raised within the committee and not in the House.

--May Be Raised in House Only if Improperly Disposed of in Committee

Sec. 1.48 Certain points of order based on procedures in committees 
    retain viability in the House only if first raised and improperly 
    disposed of in committee; and the Speaker Pro Tempore has advised 
    that a point of order that a bill was reported to the House without 
    a majority of the committee actually being present does not lie in 
    the House unless made in committee in a timely manner and 
    improperly disposed of therein.

    On Aug. 10, 1994,(6) the Speaker was about to declare 
the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole for the 
consideration of a pending measure. A Member pressed a parliamentary 
inquiry, pointing out that the report accompanying the bill stated that 
a quorum was present when the bill was ordered reported from the 
committee. The Member then averred that the facts were to the contrary 
and that committee records disputed the assertion in the report. The 
proceedings are carried here in full (after a special order providing 
for consideration of the bill had been adopted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Parliamentary Inquiry

        Mr. [David] Dreier [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Jose E. Serrano (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, House rule XI, in clause (l)(2)(A) 
    reads: ``No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any 
    committee unless a majority of the committee was actually present, 
    which shall be deemed the case if the records of the committee 
    establish that a majority of the committee responded on a rollcall 
    vote on that question.''
        Mr. Speaker, I realize that the rule goes on to say a point of 
    order will lie in the House that a quorum was not present unless it 
    was first made in the committee.
        But my question is this: If the records of the committee show a 
    quorum was not present on a rollcall vote to report a measure, can 
    a committee still claim in its report that a quorum was present?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman has correctly stated the 
    rule.
        Mr. Dreier: I know I have correctly stated the rule. I wonder 
    if the com

[[Page 12016]]

    mittee can still claim in its report that a quorum was present?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is giving the gentleman 
    credit for stating the rule properly. In response to the 
    gentleman's first inquiry, the Chair would state that, while it may 
    not be accurate or proper for a committee to state in its report 
    that a quorum was present if its records show a quorum was not 
    actually present, that is an issue which must first be raised and 
    preserved in the committee by a committee member for a point of 
    order to survive in the House.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, continuing my parliamentary inquiry, 
    can a committee report a measure without a quorum being present, 
    even when there is a rollcall vote, or must the committee then 
    utilize a rolling quorum until an actual majority of the members 
    respond to their names?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the gentleman's second 
    inquiry, the Chair would state that if a point of no quorum is 
    raised by a committee member when the measure is ordered reported, 
    then the chairman of the committee must either await the appearance 
    of a quorum if there is not to be a rollcall vote, or a rollcall 
    vote must reveal a majority of the committee having responded at 
    some point in time before the measure is ordered reported.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, if I could pose one final question on 
    my parliamentary inquiry, if a committee can order a measure 
    reported with less than a majority being present, can the committee 
    report a bill with just the chairman present as long as he does not 
    make a point of order against himself?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the third inquiry, the 
    Chair would state that it would be the responsibility of any and 
    all committee members, at a properly convened meeting of the 
    committee, to remain available to assure that at the time the 
    measure is ordered reported a point of order is made that a quorum 
    is not present in order to preserve that point of order in the 
    House.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair for that very cogent 
    explanation.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Pursuant to House Resolution 514 and 
    rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
    bill, H.R. 4822.

Timing of Point of Order Against Sufficiency of Committee Report

Sec. 1.49 Responding to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair indicated 
    that the proper time to raise a point of order against deficiencies 
    in a committee report would be pending the Speaker's declaration 
    that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole for 
    consideration of the measure reported.

    The rules of the House prescribe that certain information relating 
to the committee process leading up to the filing of a committee re

[[Page 12017]]

port be set out in the report. Failure to include such information may 
subject the report to a point of order.
    Inquiries relating to the proper time to make a point of order of 
deficiencies in a committee report were directed to the Speaker on Jan. 
19, 1995,(8) pending the consideration of H.R. 5, the 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Paul E.] Kanjorski [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (9) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Steve Gunderson (Wis.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as I understand the new rule in 
    clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI, adopted on January 4 of this year as 
    the new rules of the House, each committee report must accurately 
    reflect all rollcall votes on amendments in committee; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as a further parliamentary inquiry, 
    the report accompanying H.R. 5, as reported from the Committee on 
    Government Reform and Oversight, House Report 104-1, part 2, lists 
    many rollcall votes on amendments. On amendment 6, the report 
    states that the committee defeated the amendment by a rollcall vote 
    of 14 yes and 22 no. However, the tally sheet shows 35 members 
    voting ``aye'' and 1 member voting ``nay.''
        Mr. Speaker, would a point of order under clause 2(l)(2)(B) of 
    rule XI apply?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, the 
    gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, if that were the case, it is clear 
    that this bill could not proceed under its present rule; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct, if it is an 
    error on behalf of the committee. If it is a printing error. That 
    would be a technical problem which would not be sustained in the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, I am not going to insist or raise a 
    point of order. However, I bring this to the attention of the Chair 
    and to my colleagues on the other side. Some of the hesitancy to 
    proceed as quickly as we are proceeding on this bill and others 
    that are part of the Contract With America is the fear on the 
    minority side that this haste may bring waste, that speed may bring 
    poor legislation. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania has 
    been recognized for the purpose of a parliamentary inquiry. The 
    gentleman may continue regarding the inquiry. . . .
        Mrs. [Carolyn B.] Maloney [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, this was 
    my amendment, and it is a printing record error. The Republicans 
    voted against exempting the most vulnerable citizens in our 
    society, children, that cannot vote, cannot speak for themselves in 
    the unfunded mandates bill. But it is a

[[Page 12018]]

    printing error. They did not vote for it. . . .
        Mrs. [Cardiss] Collins of Illinois: A parliamentary inquiry, 
    Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, under clause 2(j)(1) of rule XI it states 
    ``Whenever any hearing is conducted by any committee upon any 
    measure or matter, the minority party members on the committee 
    shall be entitled, upon request to the chairman by a majority of 
    them before completion of the hearing, to call witnesses selected 
    by the minority to testify with respect to that measure or matter 
    during at least 1 day of hearing thereon.''
        Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
    is the committee of original jurisdiction on this bill. On January 
    10, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight began its 
    markup on H.R. 5.
        Mr. [David] Dreier [of California]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: There is a parliamentary inquiry 
    before the House at the present time. . . .
        Mrs. Collins of Illinois: After two opening statements, the 
    chairman of the committee invited a member of the majority party 
    who was not a member of the committee to testify before the 
    committee. At the conclusion of his testimony, the witness thanked 
    the chairman of the committee for holding the hearing.
        Mr. Speaker, minority members of the committee protested in a 
    timely fashion. No opportunity was given to Members on our side of 
    the aisle to question the witness. Democrats requested that an 
    additional formal hearing be conducted on this measure so that 
    their witnesses could be called. That request was denied and the 
    minority was told that the only procedure allowed would be to 
    continue the full committee markup of the bill. Efforts on the part 
    of the minority members to raise questions over possible violations 
    of House rules were dismissed by the chairman.
        Mr. Speaker, in my view, allowing a Member not on the committee 
    to testify changed the meeting from a straight markup to a hearing.
        It is true that in many committee markups the majority requests 
    the presence of certain experts, usually administration officials 
    or committee staff, to answer questions about the interpretation or 
    effect of different proposals.
        The Member's appearance before the committee, the Member who is 
    not a member of the committee, was not like that. Questions were 
    not put to him. He provided a statement and read his testimony in 
    the way any witness testifies at any hearing.
        Mr. Speaker, we do not protest the presence of Members not on 
    the committee at the markup and hearing. Our complaint is that we 
    were denied the opportunity to ask questions and to call our own 
    witnesses, as we were entitled to do under the rules.
        The only remedy, Mr. Speaker, is a point of order at this stage 
    of deliberation.
        Is it correct that I would be required to raise a point of 
    order, Mr. Speaker, when the committee resolves itself into the 
    Committee of the Whole?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the gentlewoman insists on her 
    point of order, that point of order would be timely at this point 
    in the process.

[[Page 12019]]

        Mrs. Collins of Illinois: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. However, 
    because, Mr. Speaker, I do not want to engage in any kind of 
    dilatory tactics, such as I have heard before in the 103d Congress 
    and previous Congresses, I will not insist upon a point of order at 
    this time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentlewoman seek a response 
    from the Chair regarding the inquiry?
        Mrs. Collins of Illinois. Not at this time, Mr. Speaker. I 
    think I have made my point.

Point of Order Against Words Used in Debate

Sec. 1.50 A point of order may not be made or reserved against remarks 
    delivered in debate after subsequent debate has intervened, the 
    proper remedy being a demand that words be taken down as soon as 
    they are uttered.

    On Aug. 20, 1980,(10) a brief exchange relating to the 
procedure for ``taking down words'' occurred during the five-minute 
debate on the Treasury, Postal Service, and general government 
appropriations, 1981. The exchange between Mr. Robert K. Dornan, of 
California, and Mr. Henry A. Waxman, of California, followed a 
contentious amendment offered and then withdrawn by Mr. Dornan. Both 
the prior statement by Mr. Dornan, the Chair's admonition about 
referring, even indirectly, to a member of the Senate, and the exchange 
at issue are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 126 Cong. Rec. 22151-54, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan was allowed to proceed for 3 
    additional minutes.)
        Mr. Dornan: I want to repeat that line, listen to it well, 
    every Member of this body. . . .
        He tells me there is a criminal investigation of the elected 
    Federal official and that I cannot question this prisoner about 
    this particular elected official. Then lo and behold, 2 days after 
    I confront this elected Federal official in his office, he is on an 
    airplane with Justice Department help, and he gets to see the 
    felon. . . .
        . . . The FEC never asked for the proof. It was all on 
    supposition, on the word of this felon, sitting in the former 
    General Counsel's office, the office of William Oldaker, and ``the 
    elected Federal official.'' . . .
        (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan was allowed to proceed for 1 
    additional minute.)
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Dornan) has also asked unanimous consent to withdraw his 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Richardson Preyer (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    California?
        Mr. [Ronnie G.] Flippo [of Alabama]: Reserving the right to 
    object, if I might reserve the right to object and I shall not 
    object, the gentleman is making some statements in regard to

[[Page 12020]]

    his opinion of the Federal court's action on the matter regarding 
    Alabama, and he is speaking with great conviction. I wonder if the 
    gentleman has been following the trials taking place in Alabama in 
    regard to this matter. I wish the gentleman would refrain from 
    referring to the Senator from Alabama, and give the Senator an 
    opportunity to do what he needs to do to explain the situations. He 
    does not need to be tried by the Jack Andersons of this world. We 
    have a proper court procedure and a way to proceed in that regard.
        I would hope that the gentleman would refrain from bringing up 
    the name of any official from Alabama, or any other State 
    official's name up, in a manner that would tend to encourage people 
    to believe that they had done something wrong, when no such thing 
    exists or it has not been proven in a court of law. I know the 
    gentleman's high regard for court proceedings.
        Mr. Dornan: If the gentleman will yield, I believe I have 
    discovered a major coverup; a terribly inept, if not illegal 
    obstruction of justice by Justice Department people assigned to the 
    fair State of Alabama. I gave the Senator mentioned before a face-
    to-face opportunity, alone in his office, to explain his 
    involvement but he would not do so.
        Mr. Flippo. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman's words be 
    taken down.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may not refer to Members of the 
    other body.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the gentleman's 
    words be taken down.
        I will yield to what the gentleman wants, then.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Dornan) that under the rules of the House it is not 
    in order to refer to Members of the other body and in the light of 
    that the Chair would ask the gentleman from California if he wishes 
    to withdraw his remarks concerning the Member of the other body.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, as of about a year-and-a-half ago, 
    video tape records of House proceedings have been made. Taking that 
    into consideration I will accede to the Chair's suggestion and 
    remove all statements in the written Record pertaining to Members 
    of the other body.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will proceed. The gentleman has 
    agreed to remove all the statements in question from the Record. . 
    . .
        Does the gentleman from Alabama still reserve his point of 
    order?
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I no longer reserve the right to 
    object. . . .
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, I am not familiar 
    with the allegations being made. This amendment has been offered 
    for the purpose of our colleague using the time of the House of 
    Representatives to engage in a good number of accusations attacking 
    the integrity of men in public office and those who would seek to 
    be in public office and those who have assisted them. The gentleman 
    may be absolutely correct; I just do not know. It does, however, 
    seem to me quite curious to have an amendment offered for the sole 
    purpose of using the time of the House to air all these 
    accusations. If there are accusations of serious moment they ought 
    to be brought to the proper authorities: the law en

[[Page 12021]]

    forcement authorities, if a crime is committed; the Federal 
    Election Commission which has jurisdiction over the questions of 
    violations of the law should that be involved.
        Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to take this opportunity to say 
    this strikes me as curious and gives me a great deal of hesitancy 
    to see that an amendment would be offered solely for the purpose of 
    discussing other matters than what is proposed in the amendment and 
    that relates to the gentleman's campaign for reelection. . . .
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his 
    additions.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) to withdraw his amendment? 
    If not, the amendment is withdrawn.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order in 
    opposition to the Member's words against me.
        To suggest that someone's remarks are demagogic is impugning 
    the motives of that Member. I could have had my good colleague's 
    words taken down. I reserve the point of order, but add that I am 
    emotionally concerned about a 1-year coverup by the Federal 
    officials who are charged with investigating these matters here. 
    Please have some sympathy, if not empathy, for my position. That is 
    why I do not mind your initial and quick analysis of my motives 
    here. It is understandable, but wrong.
        Mr. Waxman: Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Dornan: I will be glad to yield.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has no standing to raise the point 
    of order at this point. Debate has intervened. There is no other 
    amendment before the Committee, and the Chair will ask the Clerk to 
    read.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .

Speaker's Responsibility To Rule on Questions of Privilege of the House 
    Under Rule IX

Sec. 1.51 It is the duty of the Speaker to decide whether a resolution 
    offered as privileged qualifies for the special privileged status 
    bestowed by Rule IX on questions of ``privilege of the House'' and 
    he may rule on this question without awaiting a point of order from 
    the floor.

    On Jan. 23, 1984,(12) Mr. William E. Dannemeyer, of 
California, rose to a question of privilege of the House and offered a 
resolution. The Speaker (13) asked the gentleman why he 
thought the resolution qualified for that special status under Rule IX, 
listened to the presentation, and then ruled that the resolution, since 
it was in effect a change in House rules, did not qualify. The resolu

[[Page 12022]]

tion, the arguments, and the ruling are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 130 Cong. Rec. 78, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
13. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The Chair had intended to recognize Members for 1-
    minute speeches at this time, unless the gentleman has a question 
    of privilege.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Mr. Speaker, I raise a question of the 
    privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged resolution (H. 
    Res. 390) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 390

            Resolved, That effective 30 days after the adoption of this 
        resolution, each Standing and Select Committee of the House, 
        except for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 
        shall be constituted in a ratio which is proportionate to the 
        membership of the two political parties in the House as a 
        whole; and each subcommittee thereof shall also be so 
        constituted; and insofar as practicable, the staffs of each 
        Committee shall also reflect these same ratios.

        The Speaker: The gentleman from California has been kind enough 
    to advise the Chair that he was going to offer this resolution as a 
    question of privilege at the appropriate time, and now is the 
    appropriate time.
        Would the gentleman state why he feels the resolution 
    constitutes a question of privilege?
        Mr. Dannemeyer: I would be happy to, Mr. Speaker. It has long 
    been recognized that the integrity of the proceedings by which 
    bills are considered is a matter of privilege. (Hinds' Precedents 
    III, 2597-2601, 2614; and IV, 3383, 3388, 3478).
        I especially draw the Chair's attention to III, 2602 and III, 
    2603 which show that error or obstruction of minority views are 
    matters of privilege. In the first instance, in the year 1880, it 
    was held that the matter of correcting the reference of a public 
    bill presented a question of privilege at a time when there was not 
    any other means of correction provided for in the rules. The point 
    was made on the floor that this matter was one involving the 
    integrity of the proceedings of the House and as such was 
    privileged.
        In the next reference, a charge investigated in 1863 as a 
    question of privilege was ``the charge that the minority views of a 
    committee had been abstracted from the Clerk's office by a Member * 
    * *.'' Both of these precedents indicate that it is a longstanding 
    matter that the minority is granted its ``day in court'' on 
    questions such as these which are questions impacting on the 
    integrity of the proceedings of the House. And further, these 
    questions indicate that it is the process by which legislation is 
    developed which affects the integrity of the proceedings of the 
    House. I submit that the disproportional ratio of committee 
    membership and staffing even more profoundly impacts on the process 
    by which legislation is developed and that there is no question 
    that my resolution involves a question of privilege.
        Some might argue that my resolution does not fall within the 
    ambit of privilege because they would say it is a motion to amend 
    the rules of the House or would ``effect a change in the rules of 
    the House of their interpretation.'' (Ruling by Speaker O'Neill, 
    Dec. 7, 1977, pp. 38470-73.) However, upon close examination the 
    Chair will find

[[Page 12023]]

    that my resolution is indeed a question of privilege and that the 
    December 7, 1977, ruling does not apply here.
        My resolution does not amend the rules of the House because the 
    practice we are attempting to change is not a rule. It is a 
    custom--a longstanding custom of the majority party that suppresses 
    the legitimate representation of the rights of the minority. I have 
    been unable to find--and I challenge any Member of the House to 
    show me where in the House rules it says the ratio in the Rules 
    Committee, for example, shall be nine majority and four minority. 
    It is certainly not in rules X and XI which set forth the 
    establishment and conduct of committees.
        The first and only mention of this ratio appears in official 
    records of the House when the committee assignments are made by the 
    Democratic Caucus or the Republican Conference after the Speaker 
    has notified the Republican leader of the number of party vacancies 
    on each of the several committees.
        Mr. Speaker, my resolution is not effecting a change in the 
    rules. I am simply attempting to change the arbitrary political 
    policy of the House--an arbitrary custom which indeed adversely 
    affects the integrity of the proceedings of the House.
        The Speaker: The Chair knows it is the duty of the Chair to 
    preside and to determine questions of privilege.
        Under the precedents of the House cited on page 329 of the 
    House Rules and Manual, a question of the privileges of the House 
    may not be invoked to effect a change in the rules of the House or 
    their interpretation. The gentleman from California contends that 
    the resolution which he has presented addresses not a specific 
    standing rule of the House, but the customs and traditions of the 
    House, and is thus not to be governed by the precedents in the 
    manual.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the resolution does constitute a 
    change in the rules of the House, by imposing a direction that the 
    composition of all standing committees be changed within 30 days. 
    The rules of the House do address the question of the procedure by 
    which full committee membership and staff selections are to be 
    accomplished. As indicated on page 399 of the manual, rule X, 
    clause 6, the respective party caucus and conference perform an 
    essential role in presenting privileged resolutions to the House, 
    both at the commencement of a Congress and subsequently to fill 
    vacancies. Because the issue of committee ratios can be properly 
    presented to the House in a privileged manner by direction of the 
    party conference or caucus, and because rule XI, clause 6, 
    establishes a procedure for selection of permanent committee 
    professional and clerical staff, the Chair rules that the 
    resolution constitutes an attempt to change procedures established 
    under the rules of the House and does not therefore present a 
    question of the privileges of the House.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: I thank the Speaker.

Sec. 1.52 On his own volition, without a question from the floor, the 
    Speaker ruled that a motion offered in the House to correct the 
    Record, no allegation being made

[[Page 12024]]

    that the integrity of the proceedings of the House were involved, 
    failed to qualify as a question of privilege under Rule IX. An 
    appeal from his decision was tabled.

    The proceedings of Apr. 25, 1985,(14) offer another 
illustration of the Chair's responsibility under Rule IX to qualify 
motions or resolutions as questions of ``privilege of the House.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 131 Cong. Rec. 9419, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Motion offered by Mr. Weber: Mr. Weber moves to correct the 
        Congressional Record by striking out on page 2281 the remarks 
        beginning with the words ``We'' down to and including the word 
        ``confederation'' and inserting the word ``are'' before ``a''.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) The Chair does not 
    believe the motion as offered by the gentleman states a question of 
    privilege.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Tommy Robinson (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I move to 
    lay the appeal on the table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to lay 
    on the table offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].

        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device and there were--yeas 
    200, nays 156, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 76. . . .

The Chair Rules Whether a Resolution States a Question of Privilege 
    Under Rule IX and No Longer Submits the Question to the House

Sec. 1.53 Although an earlier practice in the House was for the Speaker 
    to submit the question of whether a resolution raised a question of 
    privilege, the Speaker now rules directly on such matters without 
    waiting for a point of order from the floor.

    On Feb. 7, 1995,(16) Mr. Gene Taylor, of Mississippi, 
offered a resolution alleging unconstitutional actions on the part of 
the President. House Resolution 57 was directed to the Comptroller 
General and demanded an accounting of certain public funds. The 
resolution, the Chair's ruling, and a portion of the colloquy which 
followed are carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I would like to use 
    this 1 minute to inform my colleagues that

[[Page 12025]]

    within a matter of minutes this House will be given the privilege 
    that the President of the United States did not give us; and that 
    is, to decide for ourselves whether or not we thought the Mexican 
    bailout was a good idea.
        The privileged motion that will be before the House in just a 
    few minutes is to require the comptroller general to tell us if the 
    law was obeyed when the President used $20 billion from the 
    stabilization fund to bail out Mexico. . . .

         Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability to the House in 
                        Expenditure of Public Money

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 57) to preserve the constitutional role of the 
    House of Representatives to provide for the expenditure of public 
    money and ensure that the executive branch of the U.S. Government 
    remains accountable to the House of Representatives for each 
    expenditure of public money, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                   H. Res. 57

            Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives provides that questions of privilege shall 
        arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are 
        affected;
            Whereas, under the precedents, customs, and traditions of 
        the House pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has 
        arisen in cases involving the constitutional prerogatives of 
        the House;
            Whereas section 8 of Article I of the Constitution vests in 
        Congress the power to ``coin money, regulate the value thereof, 
        and of foreign coins''; Whereas section 9 of Article I of the 
        Constitution provides that ``no money shall be drawn from the 
        Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law''; . 
        . .
            Whereas the obligation or expenditure of funds by the 
        President without consideration by the House of Representatives 
        of legislation to make appropriated funds available for 
        obligation or expenditure in the manner proposed by the 
        President raises grave questions concerning the prerogatives of 
        the House and the integrity of the proceedings of the House; . 
        . .
            Whereas the commitment of $20,000,000,000 of the resources 
        of the exchange stabilization fund to Mexico by the President 
        without congressional approval may jeopardize the ability of 
        the fund to fulfill its statutory purposes: Now, therefore, be 
        it
            Resolved, That the Comptroller General of the United States 
        shall prepare and transmit, within 7 days after the adoption of 
        this resolution, a report to the House of Representatives 
        containing the following:
            (1) The opinion of the Comptroller General on whether any 
        of the proposed actions of the President, as announced on 
        January 31, 1995, to strengthen the Mexican peso and support 
        economic stability in Mexico requires congressional 
        authorization or appropriation. . . .

        The Speaker: (17) Does the gentleman from 
    Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] wish to be heard briefly on whether the 
    resolution constitutes a question of privilege?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Newt Gingrich (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, in the past few days a dozen Members of Congress, 
    ranking

[[Page 12026]]

    from people on the ideological right, like the gentleman from 
    Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Hunter], all the way to people on the ideological left, like the 
    gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], have asked the question of 
    whether or not the role of Congress has been shortchanged in the 
    decision by the President to use this fund to guarantee the loans 
    to Mexico. . . .
        One provision of our Nation's Constitution that is most clearly 
    mandatory in nature is article I, section 9, clause 7. It states, 
    ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of 
    appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of 
    the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be 
    published from time to time.''
        Mr. Speaker, this Congress cannot stand idly by and avoid our 
    constitutional duty, a duty mandatory in nature.
        I request that the Chair rule immediately on this resolution, 
    and in making that ruling abide by section 664 of rule IX, General 
    Principles, as to precedents of question and privilege.
        Once again, it states that ``Certain matters of business 
    arising under the provisions of the Constitution mandatory in 
    nature have been held to have a privilege which has superseded the 
    rules establishing the order of business.'' . . .
        Mr. Speaker, since there were a dozen cosponsors of this 
    resolution, each of us with an equal input, I would like the Chair 
    to oblige those other Members who would like to speak on the 
    matter.
        The Speaker: The Chair is willing to hear other Members. The 
    Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].
        Ms. [Marcy] Kaptur [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I rise as an 
    original sponsor of this legislation and in full support of our 
    bipartisan efforts to get a vote on this very serious matter. Our 
    resolution is very straightforward in attempting to reassert our 
    rightful authority under the Constitution of the United States. . . 
    .
        We believe that this is a question of privilege of the House 
    because of the constitutional role of the House of Representatives 
    to provide for the expenditure of public money and ensure that the 
    executive branch of the U.S. Government remains accountable to the 
    House for each such expenditure of public money. . . .
        The Speaker: Having heard now from five Members, the Chair is 
    prepared to rule on this. The Chair would first of all point out 
    that the question before the House right now is not a matter of the 
    wisdom of assistance to Mexico, nor is the question before the 
    House right now a question of whether or not the Congress should 
    act, nor is what is before the House a question of whether or not 
    this would be an appropriate topic for committee hearings, for 
    legislative markup, and bills to be reported.
        What is before the House at the moment is a very narrow 
    question of whether or not the resolution offered by the gentleman 
    from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] is a question of privilege. On that 
    the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The privileges of the House have been held to include questions 
    relating to the constitutional prerogatives of the House with 
    respect to revenue leg

[[Page 12027]]

    islation, clause 1, section 1, article I of the Constitution, with 
    respect to impeachment and matters incidental, and with respect to 
    matters relating to the return of a bill to the House under a 
    Presidential veto.
        Questions of the privileges of the House must meet the 
    standards of rule IX. Those standards address privileges of the 
    House as a House, not those of Congress as a legislative branch.
        As to whether a question of the privileges of the House may be 
    raised simply by invoking one of the legislative powers enumerated 
    in section 8 of article I of the Constitution or the general 
    legislative ``power of the purse'' in the seventh original clause 
    of section 9 of that article, the Chair finds helpful guidance in 
    the landmark precedent of May 6, 1921, which is recorded in 
    Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 48. On that occasion, the 
    Speaker was required to decide whether a resolution purportedly 
    submitted in compliance with a mandatory provision of the 
    Constitution, section 2 of the 14th amendment, relating to 
    apportionment, constituted a question of the privileges of the 
    House.
        Speaker Gillett held that the resolution did not involve a 
    question of privilege. . . .
        The House Rules and Manual notes that under an earlier practice 
    of the House, certain measures responding to mandatory provisions 
    of the Constitution were held privileged and allowed to supersede 
    the rules establishing the order of business. Examples included the 
    census and apportionment measures mentioned by Speaker Gillett. But 
    under later decisions, exemplified by Speaker Gillett's in 1921, 
    matters that have no other basis in the Constitution or in the 
    rules on which to qualify as questions of the privileges of the 
    House have been held not to constitute the same. The effect of 
    those decisions has been to require that all questions of privilege 
    qualify within the meaning of rule IX.
        The ordinary rights and functions of the House under the 
    Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules of the 
    House, without necessarily being accorded precedence as questions 
    of the privileges of the House. . . .
        The Chair will continue today to adhere to the same principles 
    enunciated by Speaker Gillett. The Chair holds that neither the 
    enumeration in the fifth clause of section 8 of article I of the 
    Constitution of Congressional Powers ``to coin money, regulate the 
    value thereof, and of foreign coins,'' nor the prohibition in the 
    seventh original clause of section 9 of that article of any 
    withdrawal from the Treasury except by enactment of an 
    appropriation, renders a measure purporting to exercise or limit 
    the exercise of those powers a question of the privileges of the 
    House. . . .
        It bears repeating that questions of privileges of the House 
    are governed by rule IX and that rule IX is not concerned with the 
    privileges of the Congress, as a legislative branch, but only with 
    the privileges of the House, as a House.
        The Chair holds that the resolution offered by the gentleman 
    from Mississippi does not affect ``the rights of the House 
    collectively, its safety, dignity, or the integrity of its 
    proceedings'' within the meaning of clause 1 of rule IX. Although 
    it may address the aspect

[[Page 12028]]

    of legislative power under the Constitution, it does not involve a 
    constitutional privilege of the House. Were the Chair to rule 
    otherwise, then any alleged infringement by the executive branch, 
    even, for example, through the regulatory process, on a legislative 
    power conferred on Congress by the Constitution would give rise to 
    a question of the privileges of the House. In the words of Speaker 
    Gillett, ``no one Member ought to have the right to determine when 
    it should come in in preference to the regular rules of the 
    House.'' . . .
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I would also like to 
    point out that the original custom of this body was to present any 
    question of a privilege of the House to the Members and let the 
    Members decide whether they felt it was a privilege of the House 
    that was being violated. Is the Speaker willing to grant the 
    Members of this House that same privilege?
        The Speaker: The Chair would simply note that the Chair is 
    following precedent as has been established over the last 70 years 
    and that that precedent seems to be more than adequate. And in that 
    context, the Chair has ruled this does not meet the test for a 
    question of privilege.

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary 
    inquiry: What is the procedure for----
        The Speaker: The only appropriate procedure, if the gentleman 
    feels that the precedents are wrong, would be to appeal the ruling 
    of the Chair and allow the House to decide whether or not to set a 
    new precedent by overruling the Speaker.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair, and I would like Members of Congress to be granted the 1 
    hour that the House rules allow for to speak on this matter.

                  preferential motion offered by mr. armey

        Mr. [Richard K.] Armey [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Armey moves to lay on the table the appeal of the 
        ruling of the Chair.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Ms. Kaptur: I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentlewoman will state the parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Ms. Kaptur: Mr. Speaker, am I correct in understanding that the 
    motion to table this appeal is not debatable?
        The Speaker: The gentlewoman is correct.
        Ms. Kaptur: And thus, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress will be 
    deprived by this vote without any type of a debate on the authority 
    vested in our constitutional rights to vote on this issue?
        The Speaker: The Chair would say to the gentlewoman that the 
    motion is not debatable.
        The question is on the preferential motion offered by the 
    gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the 
    ``ayes'' appeared to have it.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on 
    the

[[Page 12029]]

    ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        This vote will be 17 minutes total.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    288, nays 143, not voting 3, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of 
    the Chair was agreed to.

Floor Manager of Bill May Press Point of Order Against His Own Bill

Sec. 1.54 Instance where the manager of a general appropriation bill 
    made (on behalf of another) and then conceded a point of order 
    against a paragraph of his own bill.

    On June 18, 1993,(18) during consideration of the 
Treasury-Postal appropriation bill, fiscal 1994, the bill manager made 
a point of order against a provision therein, honoring a commitment he 
had made to an absent colleague.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 139 Cong. Rec. 13364, 13365, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Steny H.] Hoyer [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hoyer: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the 
    language beginning with the words, ``Provided further,'' on page 
    17, line 2, through the word ``Code,'' on line 5.
        Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order on behalf of the 
    gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay], the chairman of the Committee 
    on Post Office and Civil Service, pursuant to the colloquy that 
    just occurred with the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] who is 
    the sponsor of this amendment and which is included in our bill.
        The language in fact constitutes legislation on an 
    appropriation bill and we, therefore, concede the point that would 
    be made by the chairman that it violates clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        If not, for the reasons stated, and because the point of order 
    was not waived by the rule, the point of order is sustained and the 
    language is stricken.

Bill Manager's Motivation in Making Points of Order

Sec. 1.55 Motivation for raising points of order against pro-visions in 
    a bill are varied; and the manager of a bill has pressed points of 
    order against his own bill to expedite its consideration.

    On Sept. 30, 1993,(20) Mr. John P. Murtha, of 
Pennsylvania,

[[Page 12030]]

Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, raised points of order against vulnerable provisions in 
his own bill where their inclusion was opposed by the Chairman of the 
committee having jurisdiction over the ``legislative provisions'' in 
the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 139 Cong. Rec. 23110, 23123, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        [The following paragraph was reached in the reading.]

                  Global Cooperative Initiatives, Defense-wide

                         (including transfer of funds)

            For support of Department of Defense responses to national 
        and international natural disasters and the expenses of other 
        global disaster relief activities of the Department of Defense; 
        . . . Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated 
        under this heading shall be obligated or expended for costs 
        incurred by United States Armed Forces in carrying out any 
        international humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, 
        peacemaking or peace-enforcing operation unless, at least 
        fifteen days before approving such operation, the President 
        notifies the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of 
        each House of Congress in accordance with established 
        reprogramming procedures: Provided further, That any such 
        notification shall specify--
            (1) the estimated cost of the operation;
            (2) whether the method by which the President proposes to 
        pay for the operation will require supplemental appropriations, 
        or payments from international organizations, foreign 
        countries, or other donors;
            (3) the anticipated duration and scope of the operation;
            (4) the goals of the operation; and . . .

        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    bill, through page 125, line 19, be considered as read, printed in 
    the Record, and open to amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: (1) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

                              points of order

        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I have four points of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the points of order.
        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I make points of order against the 
    following language in the bill. Beginning on page 27, line 23, 
    through line 25;
        Beginning with ``Provided'' on page 20, line 17, through 
    ``operations'' on page 21, line 21, of the bill;
        Against section 8099, beginning on page 198, line 20, through 
    page 109, line 5; and
        Against section 8113, beginning on page 114, line 3, through 
    page 115, line 10.
        These provisions give affirmative direction, impose additional 
    duties, set aside existing law, go beyond the funding in this bill 
    and appropriate for an unauthorized project.
        This constitutes legislation in an appropriations bill and is 
    in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Florida wish to be heard 
    on the points of order?
        Mr. [C. W. Bill] Young of Florida: Mr. Chairman, we reluctantly 
    concede the points of order.

[[Page 12031]]

        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana 
    [Mr. Hamilton].
        Mr. [Lee H.] Hamilton [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, let me just 
    express my appreciation for the consideration by the chairman in 
    accepting these points of order. As chairman of the Committee on 
    Foreign Affairs, I appreciate that very much.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    points of order?
        If not, the points of order are conceded.

    Following disposition of the points of order, Mr. Murtha asked 
unanimous consent to curtail debate on the remainder of the bill and 
amendments thereto.

Priority of Points of Order Over Debate

Sec. 1.56 Points of order against a paragraph in a general 
    appropriation bill are entertained and disposed of before 
    recognizing Members to debate the provision under pro forma 
    amendments.

    On Sept. 23, 1993,(2) during the reading of a general 
appropriation bill under the five-minute rule, a Member sought 
recognition to strike out the last word to debate the pending portion 
of the bill. Another Member wished to make a point of order. The Chair 
indicated that the point of order should be disposed of first.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 139 Cong. Rec. 22177, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Norman Y.] Mineta [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (3) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Rick Boucher (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Clerk has now read 
    page 23, line 14, does this preclude me from raising a point of 
    order if the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized?
        The Chairman: The point of order will have to be made first.

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order on page 23, 
    line 14.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will read the paragraph beginning on 
    line 14.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            Highway Project Studies

                              (highway trust fund)

            For up to 80 percent of the expenses necessary for 
        feasibility and environmental studies for certain highway and 
        surface transportation projects and parking facilities that 
        improve safety, reduce congestion, or otherwise improve surface 
        transportation, $7,150,000, to be derived from the Highway 
        Trust Fund and to remain available until September 30, 1996.

        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from 
    California rise?

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the 
    provision on page 23, lines 14 through 22.

[[Page 12032]]

        This provision violates clause 2 of rule XXI because it would 
    appropriate $7.150 million out of the highway trust fund for 
    general feasibility and environmental studies. These studies are 
    not authorized.
        In addition, the period of funding availability until September 
    30, 1996, is not authorized. Thus this provision constitutes an 
    unauthorized appropriation and is subject to a point of order.

        The Chairman: Do other Members desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        Mr. [Bob] Carr of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas 
    rise?
        Mr. [Tom] DeLay [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be 
    heard on the point of order. . . .
        One could argue that the request for $250,000 for this highway 
    study is authorized. Under section 1105 of the ISTEA legislation 
    titled ``High Priority Corridors on National Highway System'' U.S. 
    Highway 59, including the portion of the highway I propose to 
    study, has been designated a high priority corridor. Under this 
    designation there are several interesting factual points the ISTEA 
    legislation makes. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, this is an authorized project, it 
    is authorized money, and I urge the Chair to rule against the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        For those reasons stated by the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Mineta] in making the point of order, and sustained in prior points 
    of order, the point of order is sustained.

Where Point of Order Is Determined by Voting on Consideration; Unfunded 
    Mandate Legislation

Sec. 1.57 Under the Unfunded Mandates Act, where a point of order is 
    raised against a provision in a bill or amendment which contains 
    such a mandate, the decision on the point of order is made by the 
    House, by voting on a motion to consider the provision, rather than 
    by a ruling of the Chair.

        On Jan. 31, 1995,(4) the House was continuing its 
    consideration of H.R. 5, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995. 
    During the consideration of title III for amendment, Mr. David 
    Dreier, of California, offered an amendment which provided in 
    essence that points of order under Sections 425 and 426 of the 
    Budget Act would be disposed of by a vote, and not be dependent on 
    a ruling by the Chair. The amendment is carried herein, along with 
    the explanation of its proponent, Mr. Dreier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          ``sec. 425. point of order.

            ``(a) In General.--It shall not be in order in the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider--
            ``(1) any bill or joint resolution that is reported by a 
        committee unless the committee has published the statement of 
        the Director pursuant to section 424(a) prior to such 
        consideration, except that this para

[[Page 12033]]

        graph shall not apply to any supplemental statement prepared by 
        the Director under section 424(a)(4); or
            ``(2) any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
        conference report that contains a Federal intergovernmental 
        mandate having direct costs that exceed the threshold specified 
        in section 424(a)(1)(A), or that would cause the direct costs 
        of any other Federal intergovernmental mandate to exceed the 
        threshold specified in section 424(a)(1)(A), unless--. . .

           ``sec. 426. 5enforcement in the house of representatives.

            ``It shall not be in order in the House of Representatives 
        to consider a rule or order that waives the application of 
        section 425(a): Provided however, That pending a point of order 
        under section 425(a) or under this section a Member may move to 
        waive the point of order. Such a motion shall be debatable for 
        10 minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and 
        an opponent but, if offered in the House, shall otherwise be 
        decided without intervening motion except a motion that the 
        House adjourn. The adoption of a motion to waive such a point 
        of order against consideration of a bill or joint resolution 
        shall be considered also to waive a like point of order against 
        an amendment made in order as original text.''. . . .

                    sec. 303. exercise of rulemaking powers.

            The provisions of this title (except section 305) are 
        enacted by Congress--
            (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powers of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate, and as such they shall be 
        considered as part of the rules of the House of Representatives 
        and the Senate, respectively, and such rules shall supersede 
        other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent 
        therewith; and
            (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
        the House of Representatives and the Senate to change such 
        rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent 
        as in the case of any other rule of the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate, respectively. . . .

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Dreier: In section 301, in the 
        proposed section 425 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
        strike subsection (d) and redesignate subsection (e) as 
        subsection (d).
            In section 301, in the proposed section 426 of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974, strike: ``Provided however,'' 
        and all that follows through the close quotation marks.
            In section 301, after such proposed section 426, add the 
        following:

                  ``sec. 427. disposition of points of order.

            ``(a) In General.--As disposition of points of order under 
        section 425(a) or 426, the Chair shall put the question of 
        consideration with respect to the proposition that is the 
        subject of the points of order.
            ``(b) Debate and Intervening Motions.--A question of 
        consideration under this section shall be debatable for 10 
        minutes by each Member initiating a point of order and for 10 
        minutes by an opponent on each point of order, but shall 
        otherwise be decided without intervening motion except one that 
        the House adjourn or that the Committee of the Whole rise, as 
        the case may be.
            ``(c) Effect on Amendment in Order as Original Text.--The 
        disposition of the question of consideration under this section 
        with respect

[[Page 12034]]

        to a bill or joint resolution shall be considered also to 
        determine the question of consideration under this section with 
        respect to an amendment made in order as original text.''. . . 
        .

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, during consideration of H.R. 5 in the 
    Committee on Rules, an amendment to section 426 was adopted that 
    creates a mechanism to allow any Member to make a motion to waive 
    points of order against a mandate in any bill, joint resolution, 
    amendment or conference report that does not include a CBO cost 
    estimate or a means for paying for the mandate.
        The language currently in section 426 is preferable to the 
    language in H.R. 5 as introduced for several reasons.
        First, it more directly achieves the goal of the authors of 
    H.R. 5 to guarantee votes in the House specifically on unfunded 
    mandates. Second, it does not place undue constraints on the 
    legislative schedule by requiring our Committee on Rules to report 
    two rules every time a decision is made to waive the application of 
    section 425.
        Third, it relieves some of the burden on the presiding officer 
    when making a determination with respect to a point of order.
        Since H.R. 5 was reported to the House, I have been working 
    with the Parliamentarian and a lot of other Members have been 
    working with the Parliamentarian on language to address two 
    additional concerns raised by section 426. The language is 
    contained in the amendment that I am now offering, Mr. Chairman.
        First, the amendment further reduces the burden on the 
    presiding officer to rule on points of order with respect to not 
    only the existence of a mandate but whether the cost of the mandate 
    exceeds the threshold of $50 million. This will be particularly 
    troublesome in situations where a motion to waive such a point of 
    order is not made.
        Second, the amendment addresses a concern raised by a number of 
    my colleagues on the other side of the aisle with respect to the 
    role of the chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and 
    Oversight in advising the Chair about the question of unfunded 
    mandates. Under my amendment, that advice would no longer be 
    necessary.
        Essentially, Mr. Chairman, the amendment provides that whenever 
    points of order are raised pursuant to section 425(a) or 426, the 
    points of order shall be disposed of by a vote of the Committee of 
    the Whole.
        The question would be debatable for 20 minutes, 10 minutes by 
    the Member initiating the point of order and 10 minutes by an 
    opponent of the point of order. . . .

     amendment offered by mr. moakley to the amendment offered by mr. 
                                   dreier

        Mr. [John Joseph] Moakley [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment to the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Moakley to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Dreier:
            In the proposed new section 427, insert the following new 
        subsection (a) (and redesignate the existing subsections 
        accordingly):
            ``(a) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of 
        order under sec

[[Page 12035]]

        tion 425(a) or 426 must specify the precise language on which 
        it is premised.''. . .

        Mr. Moakley: Mr. Chairman, the Dreier amendment is a major 
    improvement over the text of the bill. I would, however, make one 
    suggestion. . . .
        My amendment makes the Member who is raising the point of order 
    show exactly where the unfunded mandate exists and explain how that 
    language constitutes a violation. . . .
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. . 
    . .
        It seems to me that on this issue the burden of proof should in 
    fact lie with the Member raising the point of order. This is a very 
    effective way to address that concern. I strongly support the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley] 
    to the amendment I have offered. The gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    [Mr. Clinger] will be let off the hook with this amendment. . . .
        Mr. [William F.] Clinger [Jr., of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, 
    that is precisely what I wanted to say. In the legislation 
    presently drafted, the task of determining what was or was not an 
    unfunded mandate would have fallen on the shoulders of the chairman 
    of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and/or perhaps 
    the ranking member of that committee, so I certainly appreciate the 
    fact that this is now going to ensure that this matter will be 
    decided by the House itself. That is the appropriate place for this 
    decision to be made. I am pleased to support the amendment.
        The Chairman: (5) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley] to the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Bill Emerson (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier] as amended.
        The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 2. Manner of Making Point of Order

    The formalities followed in making a point of order are relatively 
simple. Members making points of order must address the Chair and be 
recognized before proceeding,(6) the Member should be 
specific as to the language to which he objects,(7) and the 
Member should make clear that he is making a point of 
order.(8) The Chair controls debate on a point of order, and 
a Member recognized on a point of order may not yield to another Member 
for debate thereon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. See Sec. 2.1, infra.
 7. See Sec. 2.2, infra.
 8. See Sec. 2.3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Addressing the Chair

Sec. 2.1 Members making points of order must address the Speaker and be 
    recognized before proceeding.

[[Page 12036]]

    On Oct. 24, 1945,(9) Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, 
asserted himself when the discussion on the floor grew particularly 
acrimonious.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 91 Cong. Rec. 10033, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 1834, proscribing procedures of investigative committees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, we have 
    just witnessed one of the most ridiculous performances that has 
    taken place in this House since I have been in Congress. These 
    unjustified attacks on the Committee on Un-American Activities, 
    these smear attacks on the Daughters of the American Revolution by 
    the Jewish gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler], have been shocking 
    indeed, to say the least of it.
        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order that the gentleman is out of order when he refers to 
    me as ``the Jewish gentleman from New York.'' I ask that the words 
    be taken down.
        The Speaker: If the gentleman will allow the Chair, there is 
    one way to refer to a Member of the House of Representatives and 
    that is, ``the gentleman from'' the State from which he comes. Any 
    other appellation is a violation of the rules.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Speaker, if he objects to being called a 
    ``Jewish gentleman'' I withdraw it.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, I ask that the words be taken down.
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: I ask that those words be 
    taken down.
        Mr. Rankin: I am withdrawing the words. I have not the time to 
    argue such matters.
        Mr. Marcantonio: I object to his withdrawing the words. I 
    request that the words be taken down.
        The Speaker: The Chair has already stated the rule with 
    reference to the language of the gentleman from Mississippi.
        Mr. Marcantonio: But he repeated it, sir.
        Mr. Rankin: But I withdrew it. I have something else to talk 
    about.
        Mr. Marcantonio: But I object to his withdrawing it.
        The Speaker: The Chair has already ruled on the matter and that 
    is the end of it.
        The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. Rankin] will proceed in 
    order.
        Mr. Marcantonio: He repeated it despite the Speaker's ruling.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Speaker, it is exceedingly strange that a man 
    presuming to arrogate to himself the prerogative of speaking for a 
    minority group will rise on this floor and denounce the Daughters 
    of the American Revolution, in the manner the Member from New York 
    [Mr. Celler] did and then raise a protest when he is even referred 
    to as a gentleman of his race.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Celler: The gentleman by inference and innuendo has simply 
    repeated what he said at the inception of his remarks when he 
    attempted to state that I was a Jewish gentleman. That is the 
    second time he did it by indirection. I think the gentleman should

[[Page 12037]]

    be called to order and cautioned not to repeat that kind of 
    language.
        The Speaker: The gentleman refers to the gentleman, if he 
    referred to him at all, as the member of a minority race. The Chair 
    does not think that is a violation of the rule.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry. I wish to 
    proceed in order. Does the Member from New York [Mr. Celler] object 
    to being called a Jew or does he object to being called a 
    gentleman? What is he kicking about?
        Mr. Marcantonio: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair desires to make a little statement.
        The Chair trusts that points of order may be properly points of 
    order hereafter, and that a Member before he makes a point of order 
    secures the recognition of the Chair.
        The gentleman from Mississippi will proceed in order, and the 
    Chair trusts that the gentleman from Mississippi understands what 
    the Chair means.

Sec. 2.2 In making a point of order, a Member should be specific as to 
    the objectionable language.

        On Feb. 7, 1940,(10) Chairman Harry P. Beam, of 
    Illinois, instructed that a point of order should be specific.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 86 Cong. Rec. 1194, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 8319, a State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary 
        appropriations bill for fiscal 1941.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Millard F.] Caldwell [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, I send to 
    the desk a further amendment. This takes the place of the language 
    stricken on the point of order made by the gentleman from New York 
    [Mr. Taber].
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Caldwell: On page 18, line 2, 
        after the figures and the semicolon insert the following: 
        ``Bureau of Interparliamentary Union for Promotion of 
        International Arbitration, $20,000, including not to exceed 
        $10,000 for the expenses of the American group of the 
        Interparliamentary Union, including personal services in the 
        District of Columbia and elsewhere, traveling expenses, 
        purchase of necessary books, documents, newspapers, 
        periodicals, maps, stationery, official cards, printing and 
        binding, entertainment, and other necessary expenses to be 
        disbursed on vouchers approved by the president and ex-ecutive 
        secretary of the American group.''

        Mr. [John] Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that 
    the language is still beyond the authorization of the law.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman be specific and point out the 
    language he objects to in the amendment offered by the gentleman 
    from Florida?
        Mr. Taber: The words ``and other necessary expenses to be 
    disbursed on vouchers approved by the president and executive 
    secretary of the American group.''
        Mr. Caldwell: Mr. Chairman, I believe it proper, in view of the 
    scope of the act which authorizes our participation in the 
    Interparliamentary Union, that it be held that all of the purposes 
    now included in the amendment are authorized. Even the word 
    ``entertainment,'' which was complained of in the point of order 
    previously considered, must of necessity be included here.

[[Page 12038]]

        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The act of June 28, 1935, among other things, in the second 
    paragraph has the following language:
        Such appropriation to be disbursed on vouchers to be approved 
    by the president and the executive secretary of the American group.
        Considering this language in connection with the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Florida, the Chair is constrained to 
    overrule the point of order.

Sec. 2.3 A point of order should be stated explicitly, so that it is 
    clearly understood to be a point of order and not a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

    On June 28, 1967,(11) after a teller vote had commenced, 
Chairman John J. Flynt, Jr., of Georgia, ignored ``points of order'' 
which were stated as questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 113 Cong. Rec. 17748, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 10340, authorizing appropriations for the National 
        Aeronautics and Space Administration. See also 118 Cong. Rec. 
        13114, 13115, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 18, 1972. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 45, establishing an institute for 
        continuing studies of juvenile justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Donald] Rumsfeld [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Rumsfeld: Is it not correct that there should be a teller 
    in favor of the amendment and a teller in opposition?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Illinois has asked a question 
    rather than making a point of order.
        Mr. [James G.] Fulton of Pennsylvania: I am here. I am against 
    the amendment.
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Waggonner: Is it not necessary, under the rules of the 
    House, in the instance of a teller vote, that the Chair name one 
    Member as a teller who supports the amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from 
    Louisiana has not made a point of order, but rather has asked a 
    question. The Chair designated as tellers the gentleman from 
    Indiana [Mr. Roudebush], the author of the amendment, and the 
    gentleman from California [Mr. Miller]. No point was raised until 
    the vote had begun to be taken.
        The vote will proceed.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Pursuant to Rule I clause 5, the Chair is 
required to name tellers ``on each side of the question,'' and a timely 
point of order, before the vote had commenced, would have been 
entertained.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 3. Reserving Points of Order

    By reserving a point of order against an amendment, instead of 
making it, a Member may hear

[[Page 12039]]

the debate on the merits of a proposition or ask a preliminary 
question, and later determine whether to press or withdraw his point of 
order.(12) Such a reservation is in the discretion of the 
Chair (13) who must entertain and rule on the point of order 
immediately, if a demand for regular order is made.(14) 
Where all debate time has expired, the reservation of a point of order 
is not possible. Where there is no time for debate, a point of order 
must be immediately stated and ruled upon.(15) The 
reservation of a point of order by one Member against an amendment at 
the proper time reserves all points of order against the provision 
(16) and inures to all Members,(17) but the 
reservation of a point of order by one Member does not preclude another 
from insisting upon a point of order immediately.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. See Sec. 3.1, infra. Of course, if the Member pressed his point of 
        order at that time, instead of reserving it, debate on the 
        point of order, if permitted at all by the Chair, would be 
        confined to the point of order only. See Sec. 3.2, infra.
13. See Sec. Sec. 3.17, 3.18, infra.
14. See Sec. 3.15, infra.
15. See Sec. 3.30, infra.
16. See Sec. 3.11, infra.
17. See Sec. 3.10 et seq., infra.
18. See Sec. 3.9, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The practice of ``reserving a point of order'' applies to 
amendments and not to a paragraph in the bill text.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Sec. 3.5, infra; but see also Sec. 3.6, 
        infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In General

Sec. 3.1 A Member may reserve a point of order against a measure and 
    then, after debate on the measure, either insist upon or withdraw 
    the point of order.

        On Oct. 28, 1969,(20) Mr. George H. Mahon, of Texas, 
    and Mr. Frank T. Bow, of Ohio, reserved points of order against an 
    amendment offered by Mr. Jeffery Cohelan, of California, but after 
    some discussion on the amendment, Mr. Mahon decided not to press 
    his point of order, while Mr. Bow determined to proceed and the 
    Chair then requested that he state it:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 115 Cong. Rec. 31886, 31888, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration were continuing appropriations for fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Cohelan: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Cohelan: Page 4, line 22, after 
        ``lower:'', insert the following:
            ``Provided, That in the case of activities for which 
        appropriations would be available to the Office of Education 
        under the Act making appropriations for the Departments of 
        Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare for the fiscal year 
        1970, as passed by the House, the amount available for each 
        such activity shall

[[Page 12040]]

        be the amount provided therefor by the House action.''

        Mr. Mahon: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (1) The gentleman from Texas reserves 
    a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bow: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order also.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio reserves a point of 
    order. . . .
        The Chair notes that a point of order is pending.
        Mr. Mahon: Mr. Chairman, I have now had an opportunity to read 
    the gentleman's amendment, and I withdraw my point of order.
        Mr. Bow: Mr. Chairman, I renew the point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Bow: The amendment provides for activities for which 
    appropriations would be available for the Office of Education under 
    the act making appropriations for the Departments of Labor, and 
    Health, Education, and Welfare for fiscal 1970, as passed by the 
    House. Now, there is no act making appropriations for the 
    Departments of Labor, and Health, Education, and Welfare. Since 
    there is no act, this becomes an action of this House in making an 
    appropriation to the Department when no act has been passed by the 
    Congress.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Cohelan: Mr. Chairman, I submit that the amendment was 
    carefully drafted, and to the very best of my knowledge, it is a 
    proper amendment. I urge that it be so recognized.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from 
    California offered an amendment to page 4, line 22, of the bill, to 
    which the gentleman from Ohio made a point of order. The gentleman 
    from Ohio in making his point of order has not pointed out to the 
    Chair any rule of the House that the amendment violates. The point 
    raised by the gentleman from Ohio is not one for the Chair to pass 
    on, but presumably is one for the committee itself to pass on. The 
    Chair does not sustain the point of order.

Effect of Reservation

Sec. 3.2 Where points of order are reserved, debate may be had on the 
    merits of the proposition under consideration, but where points of 
    order are made, discussion is confined to the question of order 
    presented.

    On Apr. 2, 1937,(2) Chairman Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, 
explained the effect of reserving a point of order to Mr. Jack Nichols, 
of Oklahoma.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 81 Cong. Rec. 3096-98, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        an appropriation bill for the District of Columbia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Nichols: Will the Chair explain the effect of reserving a 
    point of order instead of making it? . . .
        The Chairman: It is within the right of the gentleman from 
    Oklahoma ei

[[Page 12041]]

    ther to make his point of order or to reserve his point of order. 
    If the gentleman makes the point of order, discussion would be 
    confined to the point of order. If he reserves the point of order 
    it would permit debate on the provision of the bill against which 
    the point of order is reserved.
        Mr. Nichols: Then, Mr. Chairman, I decline to reserve the point 
    of order, but make it.

Yielding for Amendment While Reservation of Point of Order Is Pending

Sec. 3.3 A Member who has offered an amendment against which a point of 
    order has been reserved may not during his time for debate yield to 
    another Member to offer an amendment to the amendment.

        During consideration of a bill under the five-minute rule, in 
    Committee of the Whole, on Mar. 21, 1979,(3) an 
    amendment was offered by Mr. Theodore S. Weiss, of New York, 
    against which a point of order was reserved. The proceedings are 
    carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 125 Cong. Rec. 5779-81, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Amendment offered by Mr. Weiss: Page 3, insert after line 5 
        the following:

        Sec. 5. (a) Section 3(b) of the Council on Wage and Price 
    Stability Act is amended by striking out ``Nothing in this Act'' 
    and inserting in lieu thereof ``Except as provided in section 8, 
    nothing in this Act''.

            (b) Such Act is amended by adding after section 7 the 
        following new section:

                            ``presidential authority

            ``Sec. 8. (a) The President is authorized to issue such 
        orders and regulations as he may deem appropriate to stabilize 
        prices, rents, wages, and salaries at levels not less than 
        those prevailing on January 1, 1979, and to stabilize interest 
        rates and corporate dividends and similar transfers at levels 
        consistent with orderly economic growth. Such orders and 
        regulations may provide for the making of such adjustments as 
        may be necessary to prevent gross inequities. . . .

        Mr. [William S.] Moorhead of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order against the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss).
        The Chairman: (4) The gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    (Mr. Moorhead) will be protected on his reservation of the point of 
    order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Butler Derrick (S.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak on the amendment. . . 
    .
        Mr. [Marc L.] Marks [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Weiss: I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Marks: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment to the amendment offered by 
    the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss).
        The Chairman: The Chair will remind the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania (Mr. Marks) that his amendment is not in order at this 
    point.

[[Page 12042]]

        Mr. Marks: May I ask the Chair a question?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Moorhead) 
    has reserved a point of order against the pending amendment.
        Mr. Moorhead of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I would now like to 
    insist on my point of order against the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss).
        The Chairman: The Chair will point out that the time is under 
    the control of the gentleman from New York (Mr. Weiss).
        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Marks) had asked if I would yield to him, and I am pleased to yield 
    to him at this point.
        Mr. Marks: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Chairman, it was my purpose to offer an amendment to the 
    suggestion or the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York 
    (Mr. Weiss), seeking to give the President the authority to impose 
    mandatory wage and price controls, whereby we would give the 
    Congress the authority to nullify the controls imposed by the 
    President by the passage of a concurrent resolution.
        It is my purpose, if it is in order, to ask the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Weiss) if he would accept such an amendment.
        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to accept that 
    language and make it part of my amendment, if that is satisfactory 
    to the Chair.
        Mr. Marks: I would ask the opportunity in that case, Mr. 
    Chairman, on my own time, if I may, to speak to the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that a point of order has 
    been reserved, and the time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
    Weiss) has not expired. It would be improper for the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania (Mr. Marks) to offer his amendment to the amendment at 
    this time.
        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, if the Chair would allow me to 
    proceed, I understood that what we had was a reservation of the 
    point of order, and pending that, it is my understanding that the 
    debate could proceed as if in fact there had been no intervention. 
    I would ask if that is accurate.
        The Chairman: But the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Weiss) is the amendment that is pending before the 
    Committee, and that is the subject at this moment.
        Mr. Weiss: That is right, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: When the Chair disposes of the point of order, 
    then the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Marks) may offer his 
    amendment to the amendment, if it remains pending. . . .

    After further argument, the Chair sustained the point of order.

A Member Reserving a Point of Order Does Not Thereby Get Five Minutes 
    of Debate Time

Sec. 3.4 A Member who reserves a point of order against an amendment is 
    not entitled to debate time at that point, for the proponent has 
    the right to explain his amendment

[[Page 12043]]

    under the five-minute rule when the point of order is reserved.

    On Oct. 7, 1985,(5) Mr. John D. Dingell, Jr., of 
Michigan, reserved a point of order and attempted to control the debate 
on an amendment offered as a substitute to an amendment to H.R. 2100, 
the Food Security Act of 1985. Of course, if the point of order is made 
against the amendment, rather than reserved, the Member making the 
point of order is immediately recognized for argument thereon, prior to 
debate on the merits of the amendment. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 131 Cong. Rec. 26444, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Tauke as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Jones of Oklahoma: Page 509, after 
        line 13, insert:

                          lead additives in farm fuel

            Sec. 1896. (a) Except as provided in subsection (f), any 
        regulation issued under any provision of law before or after 
        the date of enactment of this section regarding the control or 
        prohibition of lead additives in gasoline shall be amended to 
        provide that the average lead content per gallon of gasoline 
        distributed and sold for use on a farm for farming purposes 
        shall not be less than 0.5 grams per gallon. The purpose of 
        such amendment shall be to ensure that adequate supplies of 
        gasoline containing sufficient lead additives to protect and 
        maintain farm machinery will be available in all States for use 
        on farms for farming purposes. Nothing in this section shall 
        affect the control of lead or lead additives in gasoline 
        distributed and sold for other uses. For purposes of this 
        section, the term ``gasoline used on a farm for farming 
        purposes'' has the same meaning as when used in section 6420 of 
        the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. . . .

        Mr. [Thomas J.] Tauke [of Iowa] (during the reading): Mr. 
    Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered 
    as read and printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: (6) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Iowa?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. David E. Bonior (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan reserves a point of 
    order on the amendment.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I do not have any reason to believe 
    it will be necessary for me to insist on the point of order. I make 
    the reservation of objection for purposes of a colloquy with my 
    three distinguished friends, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
    Madigan], the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Tauke], and of course my 
    dear friend from Texas, the chairman of the Committee on 
    Agriculture, Mr. de la Garza.
        I understand when this matter reaches the conference stage that 
    you have agreed to keep the Committee on Energy and Commerce----
        The Chairman: The gentleman, Mr. Dingell, will suspend for 1 
    second, please.
        The Chair would respectfully advise the gentleman that he 
    cannot proceed

[[Page 12044]]

    with the debate on a reservation of a point of order. If the 
    gentleman from Iowa wishes to yield to the gentleman for that 
    purpose, he has the time.
        The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Tauke] is recognized for 5 
    minutes.

Sec. 3.5 It is not the practice to permit the reservation of a point of 
    order against part of a bill and then consider amendments.

    On Apr. 13, 1949,(7) following the reading of an 
amendment by the Clerk, Mr. Frederic R. Coudert, Jr., of New York, 
threatened to press his reserved point of order if the amounts 
authorized in the military appropriation bill under consideration were 
increased by the amendment. Chairman Eugene J. Keogh, of New York, 
prevented the Member from reserving the point of order, however, by 
requiring it be disposed of before any amendments be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 95 Cong. Rec. 4521, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 1146, the national military establishment appropriation 
        bill of 1950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:
        Mr. Coudert: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.

        Mr. Coudert: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order with 
    respect to the last three lines of that paragraph . . . as 
    legislation on an appropriation bill. If the total amount specified 
    in the bill is not increased, I shall not insist upon the point of 
    order. If it is increased by amendment, I shall be compelled to 
    insist upon the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is of the opinion that the point of 
    order should be disposed of before any amendment is considered.
        Mr. Coudert: In that event, Mr. Chairman, I make the point of 
    order against that language.
        Mr. Chairman, may I state a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Coudert: Mr. Chairman, is it the final decision of the 
    Chairman that I may not reserve the point of order until the 
    amendment is disposed of?
        The Chairman: The Chair is informed that it has not been the 
    practice to reserve points of order and then consider amendments. 
    The Chair will entertain the gentleman's point of order if the 
    gentleman presses it. . . .
        Mr. Coudert: Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I must insist upon the 
    point of order to the entire paragraph, including the amount.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The rationale behind disposing of points of 
order against paragraphs in a general appropriation bill, before 
entertaining amendments thereto, is that points of order, if sustained, 
might result in the striking of the paragraph, in which event 
amendments to such paragraph would be precluded.

[[Page 12045]]

Instance Where a Reservation of Point of Order Against Paragraph in 
    Bill Was Permitted

Sec. 3.6 Although it is contrary to established practice, in one 
    instance the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole permitted a 
    Member to reserve a point of order against a paragraph in a general 
    appropriation bill, allowed limited debate thereon, and then 
    recognized the Member who had made the reservation.

    On Sept. 19, 1983,(8) during the reading of H.R. 3222, 
the Commerce, State, Justice, and the Judiciary and related agencies 
appropriations, fiscal 1984, one Member sought recognition to debate 
the pending paragraph by a pro forma amendment while another reserved a 
point of order pending that debate. Chairman George E. Brown, Jr., of 
California, permitted this to happen to avoid a point of order being 
immediately pressed against the paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 129 Cong. Rec. 24638, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                       international trade administration

                         operations and administration

            For necessary expenses for international trade activities 
        of the Department of Commerce, including trade promotional 
        activities abroad without regard to the provisions of law set 
        forth in 44 U.S.C. 3702 and 3703; full medical coverage for 
        dependent members of immediate families of employees stationed 
        overseas; employment of Americans and aliens by contract for 
        services abroad; rental of space abroad for periods not 
        exceeding five years, and expenses of alteration, repair, or 
        improvement; purchase or construction of temporary demountable 
        exhibition structures for use abroad; payment of tort claims, 
        in the manner authorized in the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. 
        2673 when such claims arise in foreign countries; not to exceed 
        $165,200 for official representation expenses abroad; awards of 
        compensation to informers under the Export Administration Act 
        of 1979, and authorized by 22 U.S.C. 401(b); purchase of 
        passenger motor vehicles for official use abroad and motor 
        vehicles for law enforcement use; $183,831,000, to remain 
        available until expended: Provided, That the provisions of the 
        first sentence of section 105(f) and all of section 108(c) of 
        the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 
        U.S.C. 2455(f) and 2458(c)) shall apply in carrying out these 
        activities. During fiscal year 1984 and within the resources 
        and authority available, gross obligations for the principal 
        amount of direct loans shall not exceed $15,000,000. During 
        fiscal year 1984, total commitments to guarantee loans shall 
        not exceed $30,000,000 of contingent liability for loan 
        principal.

        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I move to 
    strike the last word.
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, will 
    the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Frenzel: I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

[[Page 12046]]

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    this section of the bill.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walker) 
    reserves a point of order against this section of the bill.
        Mr. Frenzel: Mr. Chairman, I take this time simply to indicate 
    that this is an unauthorized section, as was noted in the general 
    debate. But, after discussing this matter with the distinguished 
    chairman and the distinguished ranking member, I think that it will 
    not be necessary to make a point of order.
        The House authorization bill, which was only passed last week, 
    contained about $27\1/2\ million for this total range of programs. 
    This authorization bill contains $40 million plus $30 million in 
    loan guarantee authority. The chairman and ranking member have 
    indicated that they would like to follow the House authorization as 
    closely as possible when the bill moves into conference.
        This is a section of the law which has not been terribly 
    effective, but on the other hand, in light of our present 
    difficulties in this trade area, it is considered important to many 
    Members. I would hope that the Committee of the Whole would stand 
    easy on this one and trust the Appropriations Committee to carry it 
    through in conference.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania insist upon 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, in light of the remarks of the 
    distinguished ranking member of the committee that handles this 
    legislation, I withdraw my reservation of a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman withdraws his reservation of a 
    point of order.

Reservation of Points of Order

Sec. 3.7 A point of order may not be reserved against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill but must be made immediately after the 
    portion of the bill is read or considered as read, before 
    amendments are offered.

    During the reading of a general appropriation bill in Committee of 
the Whole, a point of order against an amendment may be ``reserved'' so 
that the text of the amendment may be examined before a point of order 
has to be stated. However, this rationale for permitting a reservation 
of a point of order does not exist with respect to the bill text, since 
Rule XXI clause 7, requires the report to be available for three days 
before the bill is called up and the reported text has been before the 
Members during the general debate on the bill.
    Often the manager of the bill will ask unanimous consent that a 
portion of the bill encompassing many paragraphs be ``considered as 
read.'' When this happens, points of order against the bill text must 
be made immediately after the request is agreed to and

[[Page 12047]]

come too late after amendments have been offered to the pending text. 
The proceedings of Sept. 16, 1980,(9) are illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 126 Cong. Rec. 25604, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (10) The Clerk will read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 736. No part of the funds appropriated under this Act 
        shall be used to pay salaries of any Federal employee who is 
        convicted in any Federal, State, or local court of competent 
        jurisdiction, of inciting, promoting, or carrying on a riot, or 
        any group activity resulting in material damage to property or 
        injury to persons, found to be in violation of Federal, State, 
        or local laws designed to protect persons or property in the 
        community concerned.

        Mr. [Joseph P.] Addabbo [of New York] (during the reading): Mr. 
    Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be 
    considered as read and open to amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from New York?
        Mr. [Theodore S.] Weiss [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, reserving 
    the right to object, I ask simply to propound a parliamentary 
    inquiry. I will have a point of order to raise against one of the 
    sections in this title. Under the unanimous-consent request that 
    has been asked for, would that point of order be in order at any 
    time during consideration of title VII?
        The Chairman: Immediately after the unanimous-consent request 
    is agreed to.
        Mr. Weiss: I thank the Chair, and I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from New York?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against title VII?
        Mr. [Elliott H.] Levitas [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order on section 761.
        The Chairman: Is the gentleman making the point of order now?
        Mr. Addabbo: Mr. Chairman, it will be my intention, after 
    unanimous consent has been agreed to, to move to strike section 
    761.
        Mr. Levitas: I thank the gentleman.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order at this time?

                               point of order

        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Weiss: Mr. Chairman, I object to section 736 and rise to 
    make a point of order against section 736.
        This provision violates rule XXI, clause 2, of the rules of the 
    House of Representatives, which forbids legislation in an 
    appropriations bill.
        By permitting the Department of Defense to impose funding 
    sanctions against its employees who are convicted of ``inciting, 
    promoting, or carrying on a riot, or any group activity resulting 
    in material damage to property or injury to persons,'' section 736 
    is legislation as to the qualifications of the recipients of these 
    appropriations. This cannot be done under the House rules--see 
    Deschler's chapter 26, sections 11.36 and 11.26.

[[Page 12048]]

        In addition, the section requires a State-by-State analysis of 
    differing criminal statutes, and a review of personnel activities 
    at all levels of the military. This creation of a new affirmative 
    duty on the part of a Federal official is legislation and thus 
    impermissible in an appropriations bill--see Deschler's chapter 26, 
    sections 10.7, 11.38, and 8.9.
        The precedents of the House clearly state that legislative 
    changes may not be made on an appropriations bill. I urge the 
    Chairman to uphold the rules of this body and rule this provision 
    out of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York (Mr. Addabbo) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Addabbo: I do, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, this is strictly a limitation on the funds in 
    this bill. They pertain only to the Federal employees as the 
    language is contained in the bill, and, therefore, it is strictly a 
    limitation and not legislation.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule, based on the 
    precedents suggesting that when a Federal official is called upon 
    to subjectively evaluate the propriety of individual conduct; such 
    language constitutes legislation.
        For example:

            An amendment providing that no part of the funds carried in 
        a general appropriations bill may be used for financial 
        assistance for students who have engaged in conduct of a 
        serious nature contributing to a substantial campus disruption 
        and who have used force or the threat thereof to prevent the 
        pursuit of academic aims was held to be imposing new duties and 
        exercise of judgment on the part of Federal officials and was 
        ruled out as legislation--Deschler's; chapter 26, section 16, 
        12.

        Based on this precedent and because the section would require 
    the determinations of material damage and the purpose of local 
    governments in enacting laws, the Chair sustains the point of 
    order, and section 736 is stricken from the bill.

Sec. 3.8 The reservation of a point of order against an amendment at 
    the proper time reserves all points of order against the amendment.

    On July 19, 1973,(11) Chairman William H. Natcher, of 
Kentucky, upheld the right of Mr. Thomas S. Foley, of Washington, to 
make a point of order that he had reserved earlier, although at the 
time of his reservation, he had indicated another basis for a point of 
order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 119 Cong. Rec. 24950, 24951, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 8860, to amend and extend the 
        Agricultural Act of 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William L.] Armstrong [of Colorado]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. Foley: Mr. Chairman, I suggest a point of order would lie 
    against this amendment. I believe we have gone past this section of 
    the bill, and I reserve a point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The time of the gentleman from Colorado has 
    expired.
        The Chair would ask the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Foley) 
    whether

[[Page 12049]]

    the gentleman insists upon his point of order?
        Mr. Foley: Mr. Chairman, I do.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Foley: Mr. Chairman, I must insist upon my point of order, 
    because the amendment offered by the gentleman from Colorado is not 
    germane to the bill.
        H.R. 8860 is an agriculture and farm program and deals only 
    with a program specified under the jurisdiction of the Department 
    of Agriculture. This amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Colorado, which amends the Economic Stabilization Act, was not be- 
    fore the Committee on Agriculture for its consideration and 
    jurisdiction. Accordingly I suggest the amendment is not germane to 
    the bill.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Colorado desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Chairman, I do. I would respectfully point 
    out that this is not the point of order which the gentleman from 
    Washington earlier reserved, and I would, therefore, inquire of the 
    Chair at this point if such a point of order is timely.
        The Chairman: The Chair would like to advise the gentleman from 
    Colorado that the gentleman from Washington was heard [to reserve] 
    a point of order, and at that time he did not have to state the 
    basis for his reservation. His point of order is now in order.

Sec. 3.9 The reservation of a point of order by one Member does not 
    preclude another from pressing the same point of order.

    On July 19, 1967,(12) Mr. H. R. Gross, of Iowa, insisted 
on making his point of order immediately, although Mr. Edwin E. Willis, 
of Louisiana, had expressed his desire to reserve the same point of 
order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 113 Cong. Rec. 19412, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 421, prescribing penalties for travel in interstate 
        commerce to incite riots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Willis: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the amendment.
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (13) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Joseph L. Evins (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the 
    amendment on the grounds that the amendment is not germane to the 
    pending legislation.
        Mr. Willis: That is the reservation that I had in mind.
        Mr. Gross: I have no reservation. I am making the point of 
    order.

Reservation of Point of Order Inures to All Members

Sec. 3.10 A timely reservation of a point of order by one Member inures 
    to all, and Members other than the one lodging the reservation may 
    later press a point of order.

    A point of order may be reserved against a motion to recom

[[Page 12050]]

mit with instructions to report back forthwith, with an amendment, 
since such a motion may be debated for 10 minutes under Rule XVI clause 
4.
    On July 18, 1990,(14) during consideration of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1990, a point of order was reserved by Mr. John 
Conyers, Jr., of Michigan, against an amendment offered by Mr. Willis 
D. Gradison, Jr., of Ohio. The point of order was first pressed by 
another Member and then, after argument, renewed by Mr. Conyers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 136 Cong. Rec. 17920, 17930, 17931, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Balanced Budget Act of 1990

        Mr. [Butler] Derrick [of South Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, I call 
    up the bill (H.R. 5258) to require that the President transmit to 
    Congress, that the congressional Budget Committees report, and that 
    the Congress consider a balanced budget for each fiscal year, and 
    ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The text of H.R. 5258 is as follows:

                                   H.R. 5258

            Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
        the United States of America in Congress assembled,

               title i--amendment to title 31, united states code

           sec. 101. submission of balanced budget by the president.

            Section 1105 of title 31, United States Code, is amended by 
        inserting at the end the following new subsection:
            ``(g)(1) Except as provided by paragraph (2), any budget 
        submitted to Congress pursuant to subsection (a) for the 
        ensuing fiscal year shall not be in deficit.
            ``(2) For any fiscal year with respect to which the 
        President determines that it is infeasible to submit a budget 
        in compliance with paragraph (1), the President shall submit on 
        the same day two budgets, one of which shall be in compliance 
        with paragraph (1), together with written reasons in support of 
        that determination.''. . . .

                 motion to recommit offered by mr. gradison

        Mr. Gradison: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) Is the gentleman 
    opposed to the bill?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. David E. Skaggs (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gradison: I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion to 
    recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Gradison moves to recommit the bill (H.R. 5258) to the 
        Committee on Rules and the Committee on Government Operations 
        with instructions to report the same to the House forthwith 
        with the following amendment:
            Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
        following:

           SEC. 101. AMENDMENTS CHANGING ``CONCURRENT'' TO ``JOINT'' 
                                  RESOLUTIONS.

            (a) The table of contents set forth in section 1(b) of the 
        Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 is 
        amended by striking ``concurrent'' in the items relating to

[[Page 12051]]

        sections 301, 303, and 304 and inserting ``joint''. . . .

        Mr. Conyers: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object on a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Conyers: Mr. Speaker, I have not seen the language that has 
    been presented.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
    Conyers] reserves a point of order.
        The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Gradison] is recognized for 5 
    minutes. . . .
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, is the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
    Conyers] reserving the right to object on the question of the 
    reading of the motion, or is he reserving simply a point of order? 
    I understood he was reserving the right to object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair understood the gentleman 
    from Michigan [Mr. Conyers] to reserve a point of order against the 
    motion.
        Mr. Gradison: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume. . . .
        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, I have a point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, the motion of the gentleman from Ohio 
    [Mr. Gradison] is out of order. It goes beyond the scope of the 
    Budget Act. It is entirely out of the scope of what we are dealing 
    with. It requires a complete revision of the Budget Act in that we 
    ask the President to sign it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. 
    Conyers] reserved the point of order. Is it in order for the 
    gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Derrick] to make the point of 
    order that was reserved by the gentleman from Michigan?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Under the rules of the House, a timely 
    reservation of a point of order by one Member inures to any other 
    Member that wishes to press it, and so the gentleman from South 
    Carolina [Mr. Derrick] is sentitled to press that point of order. . 
    . .
        Mr. Conyers: Mr. Speaker, if I may be heard on my point of 
    order, I believe that the motion of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. 
    Gradison] is not germane because it amends the table of contents to 
    make it a joint resolution. This is the only way it can be done, 
    and in effect it affects all budget resolutions, not just the 
    Balanced Budget Act, H.R. 5258.
        So, therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge that the point of order be 
    sustained because it is not germane. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will apply the fundamental 
    purpose test of germaneness to this motion. The underlying 
    legislation is described primarily in the second paragraph of page 
    2 of the Rules Committee report filed with the bill. . . .
        For that reason it fails the test of germaneness, and the point 
    of order is sustained.

[[Page 12052]]

Sec. 3.11 Because the reservation of a point of order by one Member 
    inures to all Members, where one Member reserves a point of order 
    against an amendment and the point of order is thereafter overruled 
    or withdrawn, another Member may immediately make another point of 
    order before further debate is had on the amendment.

    On June 22, 1972,(16) upon the overruling of a point of 
order raised by Mr. Thomas J. Steed, of Oklahoma, to an amendment 
proposed by Mr. Morris K. Udall, of Arizona, Mr. Howard W. Robison, of 
New York, immediately raised another point of order before any debate 
could intervene.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 118 Cong. Rec. 22098, 22099, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 15585, dealing with Treasury, Postal Service, and 
        general government appropriations for fiscal 1973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Udall: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman from Oklahoma 
    reserves a point of order against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. John S. Monagan (Conn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Udall) is recognized. . . .
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve my point of 
    order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Maryland is recognized.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: At what point does the reservation expire, 
    and at what point must the Chair decide the point of order?
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, I insist upon my point of order.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman state his point of order.
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment on the grounds that it is legislation on a general 
    appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. . . .
        . . . [I]t is the opinion of the Chair that these are 
    legitimate limitations. They do not constitute legislation on an 
    appropriation bill, and the point of order is overruled.
        Mr. Robison of New York: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman. . . .
        Mr. Udall: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on a point of 
    order; in the first place, my esteemed friend from New York (Mr. 
    Robison) did not reserve a point of order. He is either making the 
    same one my friend from Oklahoma made, or he is making a different 
    one, and the gentleman from Oklahoma's point of order has been 
    ruled upon.

[[Page 12053]]

        He has no right to make a point of order, since he did not 
    reserve one, and debate had intervened.
        On the second ground, I think the Chairman has already covered 
    in his earlier ruling the precise point the gentleman has raised.
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further?
        The Chairman: Yes, the gentleman is recognized.

    Mr. Steed here discussed the point of order.

        The Chairman: The point made by the gentleman from New York is 
    essentially that already made by the gentleman from Oklahoma. This 
    bill does contain appropriations for the Executive Office of the 
    President and the Chair reads the amendment as being a limitation 
    upon those appropriations. And, as pointed out before, the specific 
    provision is that no part of the appropriations made by this act 
    shall be expended for certain purposes--detailed in the first four 
    paragraphs of the amendment. The Chair is constrained, therefore, 
    to overrule the point of order.

Sec. 3.12 The reservation of a point of order by one Member inures to 
    all, and any Member may raise other points of order if the 
    reservation is withdrawn or the point of order is disposed of.

    At the conclusion of the consideration of the Labor, Health and 
Human Services appropriation bill, fiscal 1994, a motion to rise and 
report was defeated, thus permitting an amendment in the nature of a 
limitation to be offered. On this occasion, the so-called Hyde 
amendment relating to abortion services was offered. No point of order 
was actually pressed against this ``made-known'' amendment, but a point 
of order was reserved and several inquiries addressed to the Chair. The 
pertinent proceedings of June 30, 1993,(18) are carried 
herewith:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 139 Cong. Rec. 14891-93, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (19) All time for debate has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Philip R. Sharp (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will read the remaining sentence of the bill.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            This Act may be cited as the ``Departments of Labor, Health 
        and Human Services, and Education, and Related Agencies 
        Appropriations Act, 1994''.

        Mr. [William H.] Natcher [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I move 
    that the Committee do now rise and report the bill back to the 
    House with sundry amendments, with the recommendation that the 
    amendments be agreed to, and that the bill, as amended, do pass.
        The Chairman: The question is on the motion to rise and report 
    offered by the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. Natcher].
        The question was taken, and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes appeared to have it.

[[Page 12054]]

                               recorded vote

        Mr. [Henry J.] Hyde [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I demand a 
    recorded vote.

        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were-ayes 
    190, noes 244, not voting 6, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to rise and report was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        Mr. Natcher: Mr. Chairman, after the amendment of the gentleman 
    from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] is offered, I ask unanimous consent that 
    the time to be consumed on the amendment be limited to 30 minutes, 
    equally divided, with 15 minutes controlled by the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Porter] and 15 minutes by myself.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Kentucky?
        Ms. [Corrine] Brown of Florida: I object, Mr. Chairman. . . .
        The Chairman: Objection is heard.

                       amendment offered by mr. hyde

        Mr. Hyde: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Chairman: Let the Chair remind Members of the status of our 
    procedural situation. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] has 
    offered his amendment. It will be read by the Clerk. At that point 
    we will turn to a vote in the absence of a unanimous-consent 
    request for time to debate. No time is allocated at this point in 
    the proceedings. The Chair has recognized the gentleman from 
    Illinois to offer the amendment and will ask the Clerk to read. In 
    the absence of a point of order or otherwise, the Chair must have 
    the Clerk read at this point.
        Mr. [Henry A.] Waxman [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California [Mr. Waxman] 
    reserves a point of order on the amendment.
        The Clerk will report the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: Amendment offered by Mr. Hyde of 
    Illinois: On page 62, after line 10, add the following new section:

            Sec. 507. None of the funds appropriated under this Act 
        shall be expended for any abortion except when it is made known 
        to the federal entity or official to which funds are 
        appropriated under this Act that such procedure is necessary to 
        save the life of the mother or that the pregnancy is the result 
        of an act of rape or incest. . . .

        Mr. [John] Linder [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, reserving the 
    right to object, is it correct that this is a nondebatable motion 
    unless it is debated in the unanimous-consent request?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct, there will be no debate 
    on this amendment unless this or another unanimous-consent request 
    is agreed to.
        Mr. Linder: Mr. Chairman, I object.
        The Chairman: The gentleman objects to the unanimous-consent 
    request. Objection is heard.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr.

[[Page 12055]]

    Yates], a member of the Appropriations Committee for a 
    parliamentary inquiry, but would state first that still pending is 
    the reservation of the gentleman from California [Mr. Waxman], who 
    has reserved a point of order against the amendment.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, that is the basis for my parliamentary 
    inquiry. Is the point of order still pending?
        The Chairman: The point of order has not been made. The 
    gentleman reserved a point of order, and we will have to proceed to 
    that in the absence of other procedures here.
        Mr. Yates: I should like to reserve a point of order as well, 
    Mr. Chairman. . . .
        The Chairman: Regular order. Regular order at this point is the 
    reservation of the point of order. Does the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Waxman] or the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Yates] 
    wish to pursue the point of order against the amendment of the 
    gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]?
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Chairman, I will not pursue my point of order.
        Mr. Yates: I will pursue my point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair could not hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I will pursue my point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman indicates that he will pursue the 
    point of order. The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, point 
    of order is not timely.
        The Chairman: The Chair will indicate that a reservation by one 
    Member of a point of order [protects] that right for all Members 
    until a point of order is disposed of.
        Therefore, as long as Mr. Waxman held a point of order in 
    reservation, any other Member could ride on that reservation. That 
    is what the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Yates] has done.
        Does the gentleman wish to pursue his point of order?
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.
        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]. . . .
        So the amendment was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        Mr. Natcher: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now 
    rise and report the bill back to the House with sundry amendments, 
    with the recommendation that the amendments be agreed to and that 
    the bill, as amended, do pass.
        The motion was agreed to.

Reservation of Point of Order Protects All Members Who Wish To Make a 
    Point of Order

Sec. 3.13 One Member's reservation of a point of order against an 
    amendment protects the rights of all Members to insist on a point 
    of order if the reservation is later withdrawn.

    During the consideration of agricultural appropriations for fiscal

[[Page 12056]]

1985,(20) Mr. David R. Obey, of Wisconsin, offered a 
substitute for the pending Walker amendment. Mr. Robert S. Walker, of 
Pennsylvania, reserved a point of order which he later withdrew. Mr. 
Jamie L. Whitten, of Mississippi, then pressed a point of order. The 
proceedings are included herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 130 Cong. Rec. 15120-22, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., June 6, 1984.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Walker: On page 60, after line 18, 
        insert the following new section:
            Sec. 629. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, 
        each amount appropriated or otherwise made available in this 
        Act is hereby reduced by one percent. . . .
            Amendment offered by Mr. Obey as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Walker:
            Sec. 629. All amounts appropriated by this Act not required 
        to be appropriated by previously enacted law shall be reduced 
        by 64 percent.

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the [Obey] amendment. . . .
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (1) Does the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania wish to be heard?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. David E. Bonior (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.

                               point of order

        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment on the grounds that it would constitute legislation on an 
    appropriations bill.
        The Chairman: Against the substitute, Mr. Obey's?
        Mr. Whitten: Against the substitute.
        Mr. Obey: I do not recall the chairman reserving a point of 
    order at the time, and I would think his point comes too late.
        The Chairman: If the gentleman from Wisconsin would repeat 
    himself for the Chair, please.
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Chairman, it is my impression that the chairman 
    did not reserve a point of order at the time that I offered my 
    amendment, and, under those circumstances, I would think that his 
    objection comes too late.
        The Chairman: The reservation by any Member protects all 
    Members. So the gentleman from Mississippi's point of order is 
    timely and in order.
        Mr. Obey: But my understanding is that Mr. Walker withdrew his 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: That is correct, but the reservation still 
    prevails.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, the facts are that I was on my feet 
    when Mr. Walker was recognized. He made the point of order; I did 
    not. I relied on the point of order he made. I asked him if he was 
    going to push his point of order; when he said no, I asked to be 
    recognized on a point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Wisconsin wish to be 
    heard against the point of order?
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Chairman, if the Chair is entertaining comments 
    on the point of order being lodged, I would simply submit that all 
    the amendment

[[Page 12057]]

    does is to reduce by a specified amount every account in the bill 
    which is not required to be appropriated at a specific level by 
    previous law. I would think, under the circumstances, that it would 
    be in order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Mississippi wish to be 
    heard?
        Mr. Whitten: I insist, Mr. Chairman.
        May I say I still have not seen a copy of the amendment. I 
    listened as best I could when it was read, but my colleague has not 
    given me a copy of the amendment. I was trying to get a copy.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment I have before me, all amounts 
    appropriated by this act shall not be required to be appropriated 
    by previously enacted law shall be reduced by ``blank'' percent.
        The Chairman: Sixty-four percent.
        Mr. Whitten: That is the copy that I have; ``blank'' percent.
        The Chairman: The copy at the desk says 64 percent.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, we have a little fun here from time 
    to time, but if this were to be adopted, and goodness knows I hope 
    not, it would require how much work on the part of the executive 
    branch? It certainly would require additional duties by the 
    executive branch, the amount of which would be almost limitless.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Wisconsin wish to be 
    heard further?
        Mr. Obey: I would simply say, Mr. Chairman, that this does not 
    impose any duties on the executive branch; it is a direct reduction 
    in the accounts affected.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule that this is not 
    legislation on an appropriation bill. It provides for a specific 
    percentage reduction in discretionary accounts in the base bill 
    accounts identifiable as a matter of law. The point of order is 
    overruled.

Reservation of Point of Order, Renewal Must Be Timely

Sec. 3.14 While the reservation of a point of order by one Member 
    inures to all, the point of order, if withdrawn by the Member who 
    made the reservation, must be renewed by another in a timely 
    fashion and comes too late after debate on the amendment.

    Chairman Don Fuqua, of Florida, presiding during deliberation on 
the International Security Assistance Act, fiscal 1979, on Aug. 2, 
1978,(2) declined to recognize a Member to press a point of 
order after the proponent of the amendment had been recognized for 
debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 124 Cong. Rec. 23921, 23922, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tom] Harkin [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Harkin: Page 19, immediately after 
        line 14, insert the following new section 21:
            Termination of Deliveries of Defense Articles to Chile.

[[Page 12058]]

            Sec. 21. Section 406(a)(2) of the International Security 
        Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 is amended by 
        adding at the end thereof the following new sentence:
            ``After the date of enactment of the International Security 
        Assistance Act of 1978, no deliveries of defense articles or 
        services may be made to Chile pursuant to any sale made before 
        the date of enactment of this section, until the Government of 
        Chile has turned over to U.S. custody those Chileans indicted 
        for the murder of Orlando Letelier and Ronni Moffitt.
            Redesignate existing section 21 of the bill as section 22 
        and correct any cross references thereto.

        Mr. [Clement J.] Zablocki [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order against the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Wisconsin insist on his 
    point of order?
        Mr. Zablocki: I do not insist on my point of order, to save 
    time.
        Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Wisconsin is recognized.
        Mr. Zablocki: Mr. Chairman, I think the substantive part of 
    this amendment is identical to the amendment introduced earlier by 
    the gentleman from California (Mr. Stark). The Committee has voiced 
    its opinion and I urge and expect the same fate for this amendment. 
    . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Zablocki: I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        I would like to ask the Chair, since the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin reserved a point of order, and the gentleman from 
    Maryland who was also on his feet did not reserve a point of order 
    because he thought the gentleman from Wisconsin was going to make a 
    point of order, whether or not it would be in order for the 
    gentleman from Maryland to make a point of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair had recognized the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin (Mr. Zablocki) for 5 minutes, so the point of order could 
    not be made at this time.
        Mr. Bauman: Can the gentleman from Wisconsin still make his 
    point of order at this time?
        The Chairman: No, he cannot.
        Mr. Bauman: I thank the Chair.

Discretion of Chair

Sec. 3.15 Reservation of a point of order against an amendment is 
    within the discretion of the Chair; and if the regular order is 
    called for, the Chair hears and rules on the point of order as 
    expeditiously as possible.

    On Apr. 10, 1963,(3) following the Clerk's reading in 
the Committee of the Whole, of an amendment offered by Mr. Edward P. 
Boland, of Massachusetts, Mr.

[[Page 12059]]

Melvin R. Laird, of Wisconsin, reserved a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 109 Cong. Rec. 6130-32, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 5517, making supplemental appropriations for fiscal 
        1963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After debate on the amendment, the following proceedings took 
place:

        The Chairman: (4) Does the gentleman from Wisconsin 
    [Mr. Laird] desire to withdraw his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve the point of 
    order until we study [the amendment].
        The Chairman: The Chair feels that this matter should be 
    disposed of before we proceed further.
        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, if that is the case, the only option I 
    have is to insist upon the point of order at this point. I would 
    like to study the point, but if the Chair insists that I make the 
    point of order now, I will.
        The Chairman: The Chair thinks that this is the proper 
    parliamentary procedure.
        Mr. Laird: I make the point of order against the amendment on 
    the basis that you are legislating in an appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chairman has had an opportunity to examine 
    the amendment and feels that the matter discussed is a limitation 
    on the appropriation. Therefore the Chair overrules the point of 
    order.

Chair's Discretion Regarding Reservation of Point of Order

Sec. 3.16 The Chair has the discretion whether to permit a point of 
    order to be reserved against an amendment or whether to dispose of 
    the point of order before debate.

    On Oct. 14, 1981,(5) the Chairman of the Committee of 
the Whole allowed a point of order to be reserved against an amendment 
although the proponent of the amendment argued for immediate 
disposition of the point of order as the more orderly method of 
proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 127 Cong. Rec. 23882, 23884, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Amendment offered by Mr. Findley: Page 1, Section 101 of 
        Title I as amended is amended by striking the punctuation marks 
        and the word ``and'' at the end of paragraph (1) and inserting 
        in lieu thereof the following: ``; Provided That, 
        notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, if the 
        Secretary estimates as of September 29, 1982, or any date 
        thereafter through September 30, 1985, that net government 
        purchases of dairy products, for any such fiscal year, will 
        equal or exceed four billion pounds of milk equivalent, the 
        support price for such fiscal year shall not be in excess of 
        that which was in effect at the end of the previous fiscal 
        year.''.

        Mr. [Tom] Harkin [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of 
    order against this amendment.
        The Chairman: (6) The gentleman from Iowa reserves a 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Matthew F. McHugh (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Paul] Findley [of Illinois]: Does the gentleman make a 
    point of order against the amendment?
        Mr. Harkin: The gentleman wants to hear some of the 
    explanation. The

[[Page 12060]]

    gentleman is about to raise a point of order.
        Mr. Findley: Mr. Chairman, I think it would facilitate our 
    proceedings if the gentleman would just make the point of order and 
    get the question settled.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may reserve his point of order at 
    the Chair's discretion.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve the point of 
    order until I hear the gentleman's explanation. At that point I 
    would like to decide whether or not to raise that point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will exercise discretion. The gentleman 
    reserves a point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will inquire of the gentleman from Iowa 
    whether he continues to insist upon his reservation.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation.

Chair's Discretion in Permitting Reservation of Point of Order

Sec. 3.17 The Chair has the discretion to permit the reservation of a 
    point of order against an amendment to permit debate on the merits 
    or he may choose to dispose of the points of order to conserve 
    debate time.

    On Mar. 16, 1995,(7) the Committee of the Whole was 
continuing the consideration of the emergency supplemental 
appropriation bill, fiscal 1995. The rule providing for the 
consideration of the bill required amendments to be pre-printed, so 
they could not be redrafted to accommodate the changing amendment 
situation. Mr. Christopher Shays, of Connecticut, offered an amendment 
which, in part, amended a figure already changed in the amendment 
process. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       in the committee of the whole

        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further 
    consideration of the bill (H.R. 1158) making emergency supplemental 
    appropriations for additional disaster assistance and making 
    rescissions for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1995, and for 
    other purposes, with Mr. Bereuter in the chair.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Chairman: (8) . . . Two hours and 3 minutes 
    remain for consideration of amendments under the 5-minute rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Douglas Bereuter (Nebr.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Are there further amendments to the bill? . . .

                       amendment offered by mr. shays

        Mr. Shays: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment listed in the 
    March 13 Congressional Record as amendment No. 70.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will designate the amendment.

[[Page 12061]]

        The text of the amendment is as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Shays: Page 50, beginning on line 
        6, strike ``$186,000,000 shall be from amounts earmarked for 
        housing opportunities for persons with AIDS;''.
            Conform the aggregate amount set forth on page 49, line 14, 
        accordingly.
            Page 54, line 18, strike ``$38,000,-000'' and insert 
        ``$224,000,000''.

        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] reserves 
    a point of order.
        Is the gentleman opposed to the amendment as well?
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment, Mr. Chairman, and I claim the time in opposition.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. Shays] will 
    be recognized for 15 minutes, and the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
    Obey] will be recognized for 15 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. 
    Shays].
        Mr. [Tom] Delay [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I also reserve a 
    point of order on this amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] wish 
    to press or withdraw his reservation of a point of order?
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation. I would also 
    withdraw my request to manage time against the amendment. I thought 
    the gentleman was offering a different amendment, and I do not have 
    an objection to this amendment.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member insist on a point of order 
    at this time?
        Mr. [Robert] Livingston [of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] is 
    recognized on his point of order.
        Mr. Livingston: Mr. Chairman, I will not make a point of order, 
    but I would like to address a colloquy to the gentleman from 
    Connecticut.
        The Chairman: Is the gentleman from Louisiana requesting time 
    in opposition to the amendment?
        Mr. Livingston: I am asking for the time, Mr. Chairman. . . .
        The Chairman: Does any Member insist on a point of order?
        Mr. DeLay: Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve my point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair would ask the gentlemen to insist upon 
    or withdraw their points of order at this time in order to conserve 
    debate time.

        Mr. Livingston: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Livingston] 
    withdraws his point of order.
        Mr. Shays: Mr. Chairman, I have a question to ask of the Chair, 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The Chair would recognize the gentleman from 
    Connecticut [Mr. Shays]. Does the gentleman ask unanimous consent 
    to withdraw his amendment?
        Mr. Shays: No, I do not ask that. I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry before I make that decision.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Shays: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12062]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Shays: Mr. Chairman, I want to be up front with every 
    Member on both sides, even if I do not happen to agree with them.
        I want the opportunity to use my 15 minutes to state the case 
    on this issue. If the gentleman withdraws his point of order, is he 
    allowed to bring it up in the future?
        The Chairman: The Chair will not insist upon the gentleman from 
    Texas [Mr. DeLay] insisting upon or withdrawing his point of order 
    at this time. He may continue his reservation if he wishes.
        With that ruling, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Connecticut [Mr. Shays] on the remainder of his 15 minutes.
        Mr. Shays: I thank the Chair.
        My understanding is that I have 9 minutes remaining. Is that 
    correct? . . .
        Mr. Chairman, based on the dialog that has taken place in this 
    instance with the chairman, and based on the courtesy of this House 
    for allowing me to proceed on an amendment that could have been 
    declared out of order, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw this 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Connecticut?
        Mr. [Gerry E.] Studds [of Massachusetts]: . . . Mr. Chairman, 
    in Boston this means 244 people sick and homeless. That is 
    unacceptable, and I object.
        The Chairman: Objection is heard.

                               point of order

        Mr. DeLay: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. DeLay: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's amendment seeks to 
    amend a paragraph previously amended, and the procedures in the 
    U.S. House of Representatives, chapter 27, section 27.1, states the 
    following:
        It is fundamental that it is not in order to amend an amendment 
    previously agreed to. Thus the text of a bill perfected by 
    amendment cannot thereafter be amended.
        Mr. Chairman, this amendment seeks to amend text previously 
    amended, and is, therefore, not in order. I respectfully ask the 
    Chair to sustain my point of order. . . .
        Ms. [Nancy] Pelosi [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be 
    heard on the point of order. I wish to state that if the point of 
    order of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay] is in order, that 
    just points to the ultra-restrictiveness of the rule under which 
    this bill was brought to the floor because we did abide by----
        Mr. DeLay: Regular order, Mr. Chairman. . . .
        Mrs. [Nita M.] Lowey [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be 
    heard on the gentleman's point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentlewoman will state her point. . . .
        Mr. DeLay: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        Under the precedents recorded in section 31 in chapter 27 of 
    Deschler's Procedure, the point of order of the gentleman from 
    Texas [Mr. DeLay] is sustained. It is consistent with the

[[Page 12063]]

    Chair's ruling yesterday on the amendment offered by the 
    gentlewoman from Connecticut [Ms. DeLauro].

Sec. 3.18 A point of order may not be reserved against an amendment 
    upon a demand for the regular order by any Member; but the Chair 
    may in his discretion permit the continued reservation of the point 
    of order until the regular order is demanded.

    On Dec. 14, 1973,(9) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Richard Bolling, of Missouri, explained the nature of the 
reservation of a point of order to Mr. Craig Hosmer, of California.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 119 Cong. Rec. 41738, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 11450, the Energy Emergency Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan insist on his 
    point of order?
        Mr. Hosmer: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        It is my understanding that when a point of order is made that 
    the rules require that the ruling be made thereon, and that when a 
    Member reserves the point of order it is in the nature only of a 
    unanimous-consent request and, therefore, when that request is 
    objected to, that thereafter he can no longer pursue the point of 
    order which he has reserved.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, the Chair 
    has already ruled on this.
        The Chairman: The Chair needs no assistance in this matter.
        The gentleman is in error. It is entirely at the discretion of 
    the Chair as to whether the point of order will be reserved unless 
    another Member demands the regular order. A reservation of a point 
    of order is not in the nature of a unanimous-consent request.
        Regular order was not demanded. Therefore it is in order for 
    the gentleman to persist in his point of order.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.

Right of Members

Sec. 3.19 Reservation of a point of order against an amendment or the 
    continuation of such a reservation may be permitted by leave of the 
    Committee of the Whole, but any Member may demand that the point of 
    order be disposed of.

    On Apr. 4, 1973,(10) on demand for regular order by Mr. 
H. R. Gross, of Iowa, Mr. Gerald R. Ford, of Michigan, was compelled to 
either make or withdraw his reserved point of order:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 119 Cong. Rec. 10935, 10936, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 5683, which was to amend the Rural 
        Electrification Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John R.] Rarick [of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Rarick: Page 15, after line 11 
        insert:
            ``Sec. 10. No funds provided under the Rural 
        Electrification Act of 1936,

[[Page 12064]]

        as amended, shall be used outside the United States or any of 
        its possessions. (And renumber the remaining paragraphs.)''

        The Chairman: (11) For what purpose does the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Gerald R. Ford) rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on 
    the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Rarick) is 
    recognized for 5 minutes. . . .
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the 
    gentleman from Texas several questions before I either renew or 
    withdraw my reservation.
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, regular order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has permission to reserve his point 
    of order.
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that he must 
    institute his reservation.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman wish to withdraw his point of 
    order and seek recognition?
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: No. I want to make the point of order. I do 
    not think the amendment is germane to the general purposes of the 
    bill.
        I appreciate the gentleman from Iowa giving me an opportunity 
    to ask the gentleman from Texas a question or two.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule on the point of order.
        It is the opinion of the Chair that the amendment is a 
    restriction on the use of funds authorized under the REA program 
    and is germane to the bill.
        The Chair therefore overrules the point of order.

Effect of Demanding Regular Order Where a Point of Order Has Been 
    Reserved Against an Amendment

Sec. 3.20 Where the proponent of an amendment against which a point of 
    order has been reserved has been recognized to debate the 
    amendment, he cannot during his five minutes be taken from the 
    floor by a ``demand for the regular order.''

    On Aug. 1, 1975,(12) the Committee of the Whole had 
under consideration the Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 1975. 
During the reading of the bill for amendment under the five-minute 
rule, an amendment was offered by Mr. Clarence J. Brown, of Ohio, 
against which two Members reserved points of order. The proponent of 
the amendment was then recognized for his five minutes, during which 
time, he was asked to yield for a parliamentary inquiry. The 
proceedings are carried below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 121 Cong. Rec. 26945, 26946, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 12065]]

            Amendment offered by Mr. Brown of Ohio: Strike out Title 
        III, as amended, and reinsert all except for Section 301, as 
        amended.

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order against the amendment.
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I also reserve a 
    point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, the thrust of this amendment 
    is to strike from the bill the provisions of the Staggers pricing 
    amendment, section 301, by revising title III to strike the whole 
    title and to reinsert all in the title, except section 301.
        Mr. Chairman, may I speak on the amendment?
        The Chairman: (13) The gentleman has been recognized 
    for 5 minutes, so the gentleman may proceed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, may I reserve 2 minutes of my 
    time to speak on the points of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman to speak 
    on the points of order at the appropriate time.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I have not yet made the point of 
    order. I reserved it.
        The Chairman: The Chair has recognized the gentleman from Ohio 
    to speak on the gentleman's amendment for 5 minutes. Then the 
    gentlemen who reserved the points of order may press them or they 
    may not.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment, 
    as I said, is to strike section 301, the pricing section, from the 
    bill.
        The reason for striking the pricing section from the bill is an 
    effort to improve the bill so that we can proceed from the point at 
    which we find ourselves to a bill which could be improved to the 
    extent that perhaps it can be signed into law, which ought to be 
    our objective, I think, as Members of Congress. . . .
        Mr. [William A.] Steiger of Wisconsin: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield for a parliamentary inquiry?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

        Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin: Mr. Chairman, if the regular order 
    were demanded, would the point of order have to be stated?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman that it is 
    proper for a Member to reserve a point of order.
        Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin: I thank the Chairman.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin. . . .
        We were very close to agreement a few days ago, and that 
    agreement fell apart. I think there is a chance for us to get an 
    energy bill. But there is no chance with this provision in it. My 
    objective is only to try to get a bill, get this part out of it 
    that will prevent us from getting a bill and will give us an 
    opportunity to proceed in a rational manner.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against 
    the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it. . . .
        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) desire to be heard on 
    the point of order?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, it would be 
    appropriate to

[[Page 12066]]

    hear both points of order. Or does the Chair desire me to respond 
    to each point of order as it is raised?
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed as he wishes in 
    response to the points of order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, let me say, in response to the 
    first ground for the point of order that the gentleman from Texas 
    (Mr. Eckhardt) raised, stating that this amendment comes too late, 
    it is appropriate to offer the amendment because the title is open 
    now at any point for amendment, and this is an amendment to title 
    III.

Effect of Withdrawal of Reservation

Sec. 3.21 The reservation of a point of order being withdrawn, another 
    Member may immediately renew it.

    On July 28, 1959,(14) Chairman Wilbur D. Mills, of 
Arkansas, had occasion to address the propriety of a point of order 
raised after another point had been withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 105 Cong. Rec. 14524, 14525, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 8385, making appropriations for certain 
        programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Charles E.] Bennett of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [Otto E.] Passman [of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment, and will reserve the point of 
    order. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point 
    of order that this is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .
        Mr. Bennett of Florida: Mr. Chairman, does not the point of 
    order come too late? The gentleman from New York did not reserve a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: It did not.

Sec. 3.22 Where a point of order is reserved against an amendment and 
    later withdrawn, another Member may press another point of order.

    On Mar. 27, 1962,(15) during debate on an amendment 
offered by Mr. William Fitts Ryan, of New York, to an appropriations 
bill, Mr. John E. Fogarty, of Rhode Island, first reserved a point of 
order, then withdrew it before Mr. James C. Davis, of Georgia, was 
recognized to make his point of order. The Chairman ruled the point of 
order by Mr. Davis did not come too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 108 Cong. Rec. 5164, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 10904, involving appropriations for the Department of 
        Health, Education, and Welfare for fiscal 1963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fogarty: Mr. Chairman, I reserve the point of order. . . .
        Mr. James C. Davis: Mr. Chairman, is it in order for me at this 
    time to make a point of order against the amendment?
        The Chairman: (16) The gentleman from Rhode Island 
    has reserved his

[[Page 12067]]

    point of order. Does the gentleman from Rhode Island insist on the 
    point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Omar T. Burleson (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fogarty: Mr. Chairman, I waive the point of order. I have 
    stated my reasons as to why the amendment should be defeated and I 
    ask the committee to vote down the amendment.
        Mr. James C. Davis: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. James C. Davis: Mr. Chairman, is it in order for me to make 
    a point of order against the amendment? . . .
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, has not the 
    point of order been waived by the gentleman from Rhode Island 
    speaking to the question?
        The Chairman: The Chair understood that the gentleman from 
    Rhode Island was speaking to his point of order and insisted then 
    on the defeat of the amendment.
        Mr. Yates: That is correct, Mr. Chairman, and, therefore, no 
    point of order is proper at this time.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. James C. Davis] 
    now states he was on his feet attempting to press a point of order 
    against the amendment, but the Chair had understood that the 
    gentleman from Rhode Island did insist on his point of order. 
    However, the Chair was in error as to that and the gentleman from 
    Georgia is now recognized to make his point of order.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, one final parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, does not the point of order by the 
    gentleman from Georgia come too late?
        The Chairman: Not under the circumstances. The Chair would 
    assume there is a possibility of more than one point of order being 
    made and for more than one reason.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
        Mr. James C. Davis: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the amendment on the ground that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill.
        Similarly, on Feb. 28, 1939,(17) Mr. Abe Murdock, of 
    Utah, was allowed to make a point of order after Mr. Louis Ludlow, 
    of Indiana, withdrew a point of order that he had earlier reserved:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 84 Cong. Rec. 2021-23, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4492, involving the Treasury and printing office 
        appropriation for fiscal 1940.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Ludlow: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the amendment.
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Why not make the point of 
    order?
        Mr. Ludlow: My attention was diverted from the reading of the 
    amendment, and I should like to know more about the amendment 
    before making the point of order. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of a point of order.
        Mr. Murdock of Utah: Mr. Chairman, on the question of the point 
    of order----
        The Chairman: (18) For what purpose does the 
    gentleman from Utah rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. John W. Boehne, Jr. (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Murdock of Utah: On the question of the point of order to 
    the amendment of the gentleman from New York, and may I propound 
    this parliamentary inquiry?

[[Page 12068]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Murdock of Utah: As I understood the gentleman from Indiana 
    [Mr. Ludlow], he reserved all points of order against the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from New York.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Murdock of Utah: Then, as I understand the rules, the 
    gentleman cannot deprive me, after making that reservation, in the 
    event he does not want to make the point of order, of making a 
    point of order myself against the amendment at this time.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has the right to make the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Murdock of Utah: Then I make the point of order at this 
    time, Mr. Chairman.

Sec. 3.23 Where a Member reserves a point of order against an amendment 
    and then, after debate on the amendment, withdraws the point of 
    order, the point of order may yet be renewed and pressed by another 
    Member.

    On Oct. 28, 1969,(19) after the withdrawal of a point of 
order reserved by Mr. George H. Mahon, of Texas, the point of order was 
renewed by another Member.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 115 Cong. Rec. 31886, 31888, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.J. Res. 966, dealing with continuing 
        appropriations for fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Jeffrey] Cohelan [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. Mahon: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman from Texas reserves 
    a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Frank T.] Bow [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point 
    of order also.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio reserves a point of 
    order. . . .
        The Chair notes that a point of order is pending.
        Mr. Mahon: Mr. Chairman, I have now had an opportunity to read 
    the gentleman's amendment, and I withdraw my point of order.
        Mr. Bow: Mr. Chairman, I renew the point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.

Withdrawal of Reserved Point of Order

Sec. 3.24 While the reservation of a point of order by one Member 
    inures to all, withdrawal of a reservation by the Member requires 
    other Members to either make or continue to reserve the point of 
    order at that point, and a further reservation comes too late after 
    there has been debate.

    On Dec. 15, 1982,(1) a point of order had been reserved 
against an amendment offered in the

[[Page 12069]]

Committee of the Whole. When the reservation was withdrawn, the 
amendment was debated and then another Member attempted to reserve a 
point of order. The proceedings are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 128 Cong. Rec. 30938, 30939, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio (during the reading): Mr. 
    Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered 
    as read and printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: (2) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Leon E. Panetta (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        (Mr. Brown of Ohio asked and was given permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.)
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) will be 
    recognized for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.
        The Chair will inquire, does the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
    Ottinger) continue to reserve his point of order on the amendment?

        Mr. [Richard L.] Ottinger [of New York]: No, Mr. Chairman, I 
    will drop my reservation of a point of order.
        Mr. [Thomas P.] O'Neill [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, will 
    the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I yield to the distinguished Speaker.
        Mr. O'Neill: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, 
    and I would just like to make the following statement: . . .
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished 
    Speaker.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair understands that the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Dingell) reserves a point of order?
        Mr. Dingell: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I think the point of order is 
    too late, is it not?
        The Chairman: It is a reservation of a point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, may I ask, can a reservation 
    of a point of order come at any time? I had yielded to the Speaker, 
    and the debate had begun on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. A point of order was 
    reserved and then withdrawn, and the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. 
    Brown) was recognized for 5 minutes on his amendment and had 
    yielded. The point of order cannot be reserved at this time.
        The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) is recognized for 5 
    minutes.

Reserving Points of Order Against General Appropriation Bills

Sec. 3.25 Points of order against general appropriation bills are now 
    ``considered as reserved'' when the bill is reported.

    Before clause 8 was added to Rule XXI in the 104th Congress, points 
of order against general appropriation bills had to be reserved, on the 
floor of the House, when the bill was reported and referred to the 
Union Calendar. If this window of opportunity was

[[Page 12070]]

missed, points of order could thereafter be reserved only by unanimous 
consent.
    The rationale for reserving points of order had its basis in the 
requirement that the consideration of an appropriation bill had to 
occur in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. It 
followed that the enforcement of Rule XXI clause 2 prohibiting 
legislative provisions in a general appropriation bill, either in the 
measure as reported or introduced by amendment, had to occur in that 
Committee. While offending provisions could be stricken by amendment, 
they could be eliminated from the bill as the result of a ruling on a 
point of order only if the House gave such permission.

        An instance where points of order were not reserved when the 
    report was filed, but were subsequently reserved, occurred on Aug. 
    23, 1976.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 122 Cong. Rec. 27141, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Permission To Reserve All Points of Order on H.R. 15194, Public 
                  Works Employment Appropriation Act, 1977

        Mr. [Clarence E.] Miller of Ohio: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that I may reserve all points of order on the bill H.R. 
    15194 making appropriations for public works employment for the 
    period ending September 30, 1977, and for other purposes, on which 
    a report was filed by the Committee on Appropriations on August 12, 
    1976, pursuant to permission granted on August 10, 1976.
        The Speaker: (4) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

Reservation of Points of Order, General Appropriation Bills

Sec. 3.26 Under Rule XXI clause 8, adopted in the 104th Congress, 
    points of order on general appropriation bills are ``considered as 
    reserved'' when the report is filed.

    The proceedings of Feb. 10, 1995,(5) demonstrate that 
when a general appropriation bill is filed from the floor as 
privileged, the Speaker indicates that points of order are reserved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Report on H.R. 889, Department of Defense Emergency Supplemental 
                            Appropriations, 1995

        Mr. [Robert] Livingston [of Louisiana], from the Committee on 
    Appropriations, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 104-29) on 
    the bill (H.R. 889) making emergency supplemental appropriations 
    and rescissions to preserve and enhance the military readiness of 
    the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 
    1995, and for other purposes, which

[[Page 12071]]

    was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (6) All points of order are 
    reserved on the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. J. Dennis Hastert (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reserving Points of Order

Sec. 3.27 A point of order against a paragraph in a general 
    appropriation bill must be raised (and may not be reserved) 
    immediately after the paragraph is read.

    In the practice of the House, points of order may be reserved 
against amendments but not against provisions in a bill being read for 
amendment. Permitting a point of order to be reserved when an amendment 
is offered does not unduly interfere with the consideration of the 
matter before the House or Committee of the Whole, so long as the point 
of order is disposed of, or the reservation withdrawn, before an 
amendment in the second degree is offered or before the question is put 
on the amendment. The reservation of a point of order against an 
amendment is at the Chair's discretion and he, or any Member, may press 
for the ``regular order'' which causes the point of order to be 
withdrawn or stated and decided.
    On Apr. 16, 1975,(7) the bill making annual 
appropriations for the Department of Education, for fiscal 1976, was 
under consideration in Committee of the Whole. One of the ``general 
provisions'' of the bill was read by the Clerk and Mr. Fortney H. 
(Pete) Stark, of California, attempted to reserve a point of order so 
that debate on the provision could proceed. Chairman James C. Wright, 
Jr., of Texas, stated that the point of order had to be made, not 
reserved. Proceedings were as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 121 Cong. Rec. 10375, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 805. No part of the funds appropriated under this Act 
        shall be used to provide a loan, guarantee of a loan, a grant, 
        the salary of or any remuneration whatever to any individual 
        applying for admission, attending, employed by, teaching at, or 
        doing research at an institution of higher education who has 
        engaged in conduct on or after August 1, 1969, which involves 
        the use of (or the assistance to others in the use of) force or 
        the threat of force or the seizure of property under the 
        control of an institution of higher education, to require or 
        prevent the availability of certain curriculum, or to prevent 
        the faculty, administrative officials, or students in such 
        institution from engaging in their duties or pursuing their 
        studies at such institution.

        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve a point of 
    order against section 305.
        The Chairman: The Chair advises that this is the time to make a 
    point of order against section 305. The Chair recognizes the 
    gentleman from California for a point of order.

[[Page 12072]]

        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I rise to make a point of order 
    against section 305 on the grounds that it imposes additional 
    burdens and duties on Government executives and is legislation on 
    an appropriations bill, and is in violation of clause 2 of rule 
    XXI. . . .
        So I submit this is legislation on an appropriations act and 
    should be ruled out of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Daniel J.] Flood [of Pennsylvania]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, this language has been in this bill for many, 
    many years, since 1969 anyhow. We have always considered this to be 
    a limitation on an appropriation bill.
        Mr. Chairman, I refer the Chair to ``Deschler's Procedure,'' 
    chapter 25, page 280, section 15.4, where I find this language:

            An amendment providing that no part of the funds carried in 
        a pending general appropriation bill may be used for financial 
        assistance for students who have engaged in force or have used 
        the threat of force to prevent faculty or students from 
        carrying out their duties or studies, was held in order as a 
        limitation. 115 Cong. Rec. 21636, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., July 
        31, 1969 (H.R. 13111).

        That was sustained in the 91st Congress, 1st session. I 
    remember that very well, indeed. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order. . . .
        In the case cited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Chairman 
    Holifield on July 31, 1969, while presiding over the Committee of 
    the Whole House, in considering an appropriation bill for 
    education, was confronted with the same point of order.
        The Chair finds that the provision under contest in the 
    precedent, cited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, was for all 
    purposes identical to the provision contained in the present bill. 
    It was held on that occasion that it was a legitimate limitation on 
    an appropriation bill. Consistent with that precedent, and because 
    the precedents cited by the gentleman from California are clearly 
    distinguishable, the Chair overrules the point of order.

Sec. 3.28 Where a point of order was reserved against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill, the manager of the bill then ``modified 
    the paragraph'' and the point of order was subsequently not 
    pressed.

    On Mar. 7, 1991,(8) during consideration of the dire 
emergency supplementary bill, a point of order was reserved against a 
paragraph containing legislative provisions. The following colloquy 
then took place, the paragraph was modified to satisfy a jurisdictional 
concern, and the point of order withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 137 Cong. Rec. 5497, 5498, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (9) . . . The Clerk will report the 
    next paragraph in dispute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Dennis E. Eckart (Ohio).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12073]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Page 28, beginning on line 13,

                                   Chapter X

                        General Services Administration

            None of the funds made available by this or any other Act 
        with respect to any fiscal year may be used by the General 
        Services Administration to obligate or expend any funds for the 
        award of contracts for the construction of the Northern 
        Virginia Naval Systems Command Headquarters project without 
        advance approval in writing of the House Committee on 
        Appropriations.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe] wish 
    to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. [Robert A.] Roe [of New Jersey]: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order against the provision of title II, chapter 
    X, entitled ``General Services Administration'' beginning on page 
    28, lines 14 through 21. That provision violates clause 2 of rule 
    XXI because it again is recommending legislation in an 
    appropriations bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia 
    [Mr. Wolf].
        Mr. [Frank R.] Wolf [of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the provision entitled ``General Services 
    Administration'' be modified by inserting in line 21, after the 
    word ``the,'' the words, ``House Committee on Public Works and 
    Transportation and the''. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] seeks 
    unanimous consent to modify the language subject to the reservation 
    of the point of order of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe].
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Virginia?
        There was no objection.
        The text of chapter X, as modified, is as follows:

                                   Chapter X

                        General Services Administration

            None of the funds made available by this or any other Act 
        with respect to any fiscal year may be used by the General 
        Services Administration to obligate or expend any funds for the 
        award of contracts for the construction of the Northern 
        Virginia Naval Systems Command Headquarters project without 
        advance approval in writing of the House Committee on Public 
        Works and Transportation and the House Committee on 
        Appropriations.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe] 
    insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Roe: No, I do not, Mr. Chairman. I withdraw my point of 
    order.

Reservation of Point of Order Against Bill Text Not in Order

Sec. 3.29 A point of order may not be reserved against a portion of 
    text of an appropriation bill (as opposed to an amendment) but must 
    be stated and pressed immediately after the paragraph is read and 
    before debate or amendments are offered.

    During the reading of the Treasury-Postal appropriation bill, 
fiscal 1992, a long paragraph

[[Page 12074]]

funding named projects in different states was offered. The paragraph 
had in it a long and complicated series of provisos. During the reading 
of the paragraph, Mr. James A. Traficant, Jr., of Ohio, attempted to 
reserve a point of order. The proceedings of June 18, 
1991,(10) were as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 137 Cong. Rec. 15208, 15209, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Georgia:
            Atlanta, Center for Disease Control, $5,000,000
            Florida:
            Fort Myers, Federal Building and U.S. Courthouse, $977,000
            Tallahassee, U.S. Courthouse Annex, $3,764,000. . . .

                               point of order

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of order.
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I raise now a point of order 
    starting on page 31, line 1, with the word ``provided,'' and 
    continue it down to and including line 15, up to ``in other such 
    projects.''
        The Chairman: What is the point of order of the gentleman?
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I further reserve the right to 
    object to other elements within that section, and wait for a ruling 
    on this section.
        The Chairman: First let the Clerk read that paragraph.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Provided That each of the immediately foregoing limits of 
        costs on new construction projects may be exceeded to the 
        extent that savings are effected in other such projects, but by 
        not to exceed 10 per centum: Provided further, That all funds 
        for direct construction projects shall expire on September 30, 
        1993, and remain in the Federal Buildings Fund except funds for 
        projects as to which funds for design or other funds have been 
        obligated in whole or in part prior to such date: Provided 
        further, That claims against the Government of less than 
        $100,000 arising from direct construction projects, 
        acquisitions of buildings and purchase contract projects 
        pursuant to Public Law 92-313, be liquidated with prior 
        notification to the Committees on Appropriations of the House 
        and Senate to the extent savings are effected in other such 
        projects: Provided further, That to the extent that savings can 
        be effected in other Federal Buildings Fund activities, the GSA 
        shall seek reprogramming of up to $16,200,000 to supplement 
        funds previously authorized and appropriated for the NOAA 
        laboratory, Boulder, Colorado, subject to the approval of the 
        House and Senate Committees on Appropriations according to 
        existing reprogramming procedures: Provided further, That such 
        funds will be obligated only upon the advance approval of the 
        House Committee on Public Works and Transportation; (2) not to 
        exceed $569,251,000 which shall remain available until 
        expended, for repairs and alterations: Provided further, That 
        funds in the Federal Buildings Fund for Repairs and Alterations 
        shall, for prospectus projects, be limited to the amount by 
        project as follows: except each project may be increased by an 
        amount not to exceed 10 per centum unless advance approval is 
        obtained from the Commit

[[Page 12075]]

        tees on Appropriations of the House and Senate of a greater 
        amount:

                               point of order

        The Chairman: Does the Chair understand that the point of order 
    of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is directed solely to 
    page 31, lines 1 through 15?
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, the first part of that is line 1 
    through line 15, including and up to ``in other such projects.''
        Then I want to reserve a point of order commencing later on on 
    that page. I am prepared to object to those other items now, if it 
    would be the will of the Chair.
        The Chairman: It would be appropriate for the gentleman to make 
    any and all points of order he may have against that paragraph at 
    this time.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, in addition to that, commencing on 
    line 22, with the words, ``provided further,'' and continuing on, 
    until page 32, line 8.
        The Chairman: The Chair understands the point of order of the 
    gentleman from Ohio to go to the entirety of the paragraph 
    beginning on page 31, line 1. Is that correct?
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, all except line 15, ``provided 
    further,'' through line 22, ``provided further.'' That section, 
    with Federal building funds activities, I do not strike.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order, now 
    that he has designated it.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, under clause 2, rule XXI of House 
    rules, for constituting legislation in an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California [Mr. Roybal] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Edward R.] Roybal [of California]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    committee concedes the point of order.
        The Chairman: The committee concedes the point of order, the 
    point of order is sustained, and the language in question is 
    stricken, but the proviso on lines 15 through 22 of page 31 remains 
    in the bill.

    Parliamentarian's Note: All of the paragraph was stricken by the 
point of order except for the proviso shown in italics in the excerpt 
above.

Reservation of Point of Order Not Possible Where No Debate Time Remains

Sec. 3.30 Where an amendment is not subject to debate, a point of order 
    may not be reserved against it but must be stated and pressed 
    immediately following the reading of the amendment.

    On June 19, 1991,(12) during prolonged consideration of 
the International Cooperation Act under the five-minute rule, an 
amendment was offered by Mr. Lee H. Hamilton, of Indiana. The amendment 
was not subject to debate because of the terms of the

[[Page 12076]]

special rule which governed the debate on this measure. Proceedings 
were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 137 Cong. Rec. 15477, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Amendment Offered by Mr. Hamilton to the Amendment Offered by Mr. 
    Volkmer as a Substitute for the Amendment Offered by Mr. Burton of 
                            Indiana, as Amended

        Mr. Hamilton: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment, as amended.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Hamilton to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Volkmer as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. 
        Burton of Indiana, as amended: Strike out the period at the end 
        of the section proposed to be added by the Volkmer substitute 
        and insert in lieu thereof the following: ``unless the 
        President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees 
        that such assistance is in the national interest of the United 
        States.''.

        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (13) The Chair will state 
    that this amendment will have no debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Jim McDermott (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order on the amendment.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Dan] Burton of Indiana: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Chairman, I may be following the 
    same train of thought as my colleague, the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania.
        No. 1, I would ask, is this amendment in order? And No. 2, 
    would it not in effect emasculate the Volkmer amendment so that aid 
    could go to Jordan?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that the 
    Hamilton amendment is drafted as an amendment to the Volkmer 
    substitute. The Chair cannot characterize the amendment.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    [Mr. Walker] insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair states that no debate is in 
    order on this amendment, so the point of order should be disposed 
    of now.

                               point of order

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the 
    amendment, that the amendment is being offered in the third degree, 
    and, therefore, it is not eligible for consideration in the House.

        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that the 
    amendment to the substitute is not in the third degree, but is in 
    the second degree.
        The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Indiana [Mr. Hamilton] to the amendment offered by the gentleman 
    from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer] as a substitute for the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton], as amended.

[[Page 12077]]

Reserving a Point of Order

Sec. 3.31 A Member may reserve a point of order against an offered 
    amendment to ascertain from its author the intention or meaning of 
    the language.

    On May 4, 1994,(14) the House had under consideration 
the National Science Foundation authorization bill (H.R. 3254). During 
consideration of the bill for amendment under the five-minute rule, Mr. 
Gerald B. H. Solomon, of New York, offered an amendment and the manager 
of the bill, Mr. Rick Boucher, of Virginia, reserved a point of order. 
The resulting colloquy is carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      amendment offered by mr. solomon

        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Solomon:
            At the end of Title II, add the following new section:

             sec. 213. denial of awards of grants or contracts to 
          educational institutions which prevent military recruiting.

            (a) Denial of Funds.--The Director may not make a grant or 
        award a contract to any educational institution that has a 
        policy of denying, or which effectively prevents, any of the 
        military services of the United States from obtaining for 
        military recruiting purposes--
            (1) entry to campuses or access to students on campuses; or
            (2) access to directory information pertaining to students; 
        consistent with applicable law. . . .

        Mr. Boucher: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order with 
    respect to the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York 
    [Mr. Solomon].
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Boucher] 
    reserves a point of order against the amendment. The gentleman from 
    New York [Mr. Solomon] is recognized for 5 minutes in support of 
    his amendment.
        Mr. Boucher: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Solomon: I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.
        Mr. Boucher: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding 
    to me.
        Mr. Chairman, I rise to propound a question with respect to how 
    the gentleman interprets the recent addition that was made to the 
    base text amendment. The addition that is written in on this 
    amendment on line 7, following the phrase that is denumerated 
    paragraph number 2, says, ``consistent with applicable law.''. . .
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, I say to the gentleman from Virginia 
    that he knows that we had a problem in drafting the amendment to 
    make it germane. Even though I believe that it is a limitation 
    amendment, which should be allowed, I have every reason to believe 
    the Parliamentarians would rule against me and in favor of the 
    gentleman raising a point of order against it.
        Therefore, we had to modify it by adding the terms ``consistent 
    with applicable law.''

[[Page 12078]]

        It does apply to line 6 as well. In effect, it makes this a 
    sense-of-Congress resolution rather than binding. We would hope to 
    pass it over here in this forum and then have the Senate adopt it 
    in its original form where it will become law.
        Mr. Boucher: Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue to 
    yield, I thank the gentleman for his explanation. . . .
        I ask the gentleman this additional question: Does the 
    gentleman believe that he is adding any requirements that do not 
    already exist in present law through the general text of his 
    amendment? Will this amendment, if adopted, change the required 
    conduct of universities in terms of the access and information they 
    provide?
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, let me say to the gentleman, it is 
    not my intention, by rendering this new modification, to create new 
    law. It is applicable law. That is my intent. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Boucher] has 
    reserved a point of order. Does the gentleman wish to press the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Boucher: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the reservation of the 
    point of order.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 4. Timeliness

    It is essential that a point of order be raised at the proper time 
if it is to be entertained by the Chair. Generally, a point of order 
comes too late after debate on the matter has commenced; but the 
precedents are sometimes more explicit in defining when a point of 
order is timely. For example, a point of order against a privileged 
resolution is properly raised when it is called up, before debate is 
had on the resolution.(15) Similarly, a point of order 
against ``consideration'' is timely when the measure is called 
up.(16) A point of order against a report involving the 
privileges of the House is properly raised after the report is 
read,(17) whereas points of order against conference reports 
are made after the reading of the report and before the reading of the 
statement of the managers in explanation of the report.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. See Sec. 4.1, infra.
16. See Sec. 4.2, infra.
17. See Sec. 4.5, infra.
18. See Sec. 4.4 and Ch. 33, 
        infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Challenging Privileged Status of a Resolution

Sec. 4.1 A point of order questioning the privilege of a resolution 
    reported by the Committee on Rules has been entertained when the 
    resolution was called up before the reading of the resolution by 
    the Clerk.

    On Aug. 19, 1964,(19) before the Clerk read the text of 
a privileged

[[Page 12079]]

resolution, it was determined to be timely for a Member to raise a 
point of order against it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 110 Cong. Rec. 20212, 20213, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H. Res. 845, providing for the consideration 
        of H.R. 11926, which was to limit the jurisdiction of federal 
        courts in reapportionment cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I call up House 
    Resolution 845 and ask for its immediate consideration.
        Mr. [James G.] O'Hara of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, I make a point 
    of order.
        The Speaker: (20) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. O'Hara of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order 
    against the consideration of House Resolution 845 on the grounds 
    that the Committee on Rules is without jurisdiction to bring such 
    resolution to the floor of the House under the provisions of rule 
    16 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and I ask 
    permission to be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will hear the gentleman.

    Following argument, the Speaker overruled the point of order.

Points of Order Against Consideration of Measure

Sec. 4.2 Under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, one of the 
    enforcement measures permitted a point of order against the 
    consideration of a bill providing new spending authority not 
    subject to the appropriations process.

    The House of Representatives and the Senate have sometimes reached 
different interpretations of provisions of the Congressional Budget Act 
of 1974. Such was the case in 1975 when the House, acting first on the 
legislation, permitted consideration of the International Development 
Act of 1975, H.R. 9005, the Speaker overruling a point of order that 
the bill could not be considered because of a provision defining 
certain loan receipts under the bill as being ``authorized to be made 
available.'' The Speaker found evidence in the bill that the receipts 
were available only through the appropriations process.
    The House proceedings of Sept. 10, 1975,(1) were as 
indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 121 Cong. Rec. 28270, 28271, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1975

        Mr. [Thomas E.] Morgan [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I move 
    that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House 
    on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    9005) to authorize assistance for disaster relief and 
    rehabilitation, to provide for overseas distribution and production 
    of agricultural commodities, to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 
    1961, and for other purposes.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of

[[Page 12080]]

    order against the present consideration of the bill H.R. 9005 on 
    the grounds that on page 15 of this bill, in section 302(e), lines 
    6 to 17, there is contained a provision which in essence changes 
    the law governing repayments on previous foreign assistance loans 
    making these sums available for certain purposes without 
    reappropriation by Congress. At the present time the proceeds from 
    repayments of these loans are returned to the Treasury for later 
    reappropriation by the Congress.
        Apparently this provision allows at least $200 million in loan 
    reflows, as the report refers to them, to be respent without either 
    authorization or further appropriation by the Congress each year.
        It would be my contention that this provision violates Public 
    Law 93-344, section 401(a), the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
    which in effect prohibits the consideration by the House of any 
    bill or resolution which provides any new spending authority. In 
    effect this is back-door spending without authorization and 
    appropriation each year by the Congress.
        The Speaker: (2) Does the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Morgan: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the point of order.
        Mr. Speaker, the proposed section 103 of the Foreign Assistance 
    Act of 1961 contained in section 301(a) of House Resolution 905 as 
    reported, which authorizes the repayment on prior year foreign aid 
    loans to be made available for specific purposes, does not in 
    effect appropriate funds and, therefore, is not subject to a point 
    of order under clause 5 of rule XXI. The funds referred to in 
    section 103 will not be available for reuse unless they are 
    appropriated. . . . The clear language of the bill, Mr. Speaker, 
    proposed in section 103 specifically provides that amounts repaid 
    are authorized to be available for use and authorized for 
    appropriation. It does not provide that they be available for use 
    as an appropriation.
        The Speaker: The Chair would like to address a question to the 
    gentleman from Maryland.
        Is the gentleman raising a point of order under the Budget Act 
    for the purpose of preventing the consideration of the legislation, 
    or is he attempting to make a point of order that this is an 
    appropriation on a legislative bill?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I am making the point of order for the 
    express purpose of preventing the consideration of the bill, 
    inasmuch as the public law to which I have referred says that it 
    shall not be in order for either House to consider a bill which 
    contains such a provision.
        I would, therefore, in response to the statement of the 
    chairman of the committee, refer to the committee report on page 46 
    which says:

            The third subsection added to section 103 authorizes 
        repayments on prior year aid loans to be made available for 
        specified purposes.

        This would remove it from the appropriation process.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from 
    Maryland is making the point of order that the por

[[Page 12081]]

    tion of the bill under section 302(e) constitutes new spending 
    authority and violates section 401(a) of the Budget Act, Public Law 
    93-344.
        The Chair has reviewed the language shown in the bill and in 
    the report which shows that it is subject to the appropriation 
    process because the whole intent and thrust is predicated on the 
    words ``are authorized to be made available.'' In other words, the 
    reflow funds are to be appropriated by the Committee on 
    Appropriations and by subsequent legislative actions and not as a 
    result of the passage of this bill.
        The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.

    In the Senate, a point of order against consideration was 
sustained, but then the Senate permitted the point of order to be 
withdrawn and the bill modified to pass muster under the Budget Act. 
The Senate proceedings of Nov. 3, 1975,(3) which carry a 
description of how the House resolved the parliamentary situation, are 
carried below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 121 Cong. Rec. 34732-34, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Daniel K.] Inouye [of Hawaii]: Mr. President, I raise a 
    point of order with reference to section 492(d), page 5, line 17) 
    and section 302(e), (page 23, line 6), authorizing funds ``to be 
    made available'' which violates section 401(a) of the Budget Act, 
    Public Law 93-344, which states:

            It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or 
        resolution which provides new spending authority described in 
        subsection (c)(2) (A) or (B) (or any amendment which provides 
        such new spending authority), unless that bill, resolution, or 
        amendment also provides that such new spending authority is to 
        be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such 
        amounts as are provided in appropriations Acts.

        The Presiding Officer: (4) The Chair rules the point 
    of order is well taken under section 401(a) of Public Law 93-344. 
    Therefore, the bill cannot be considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        What is the pleasure of the Senate?
        Mr. [Hubert H.] Humphrey [of Minnesota]: Mr. President----
        The Presiding Officer: The Senator from Minnesota.
        Mr. Humphrey: Mr. President, I understand the concern that the 
    Senator from Hawaii has expressed. Might I say most respectfully 
    that in the other body, and I say this to the Parliamentarian, as 
    the Parliamentarian knows, the ruling of the Parliamentarian was 
    that the language was in order in the bill.
        This is the language from the other body, but we have our own 
    rules; I understand that.
        I suggest to the Senator from Hawaii that the report indicates 
    what has been our practice, that the use of funds for these 
    purposes, whatever the purposes as outlined were, would of course 
    be contingent upon the appropriations action. So it might be, if 
    the Senator will withhold his point of order, that we might be able 
    to reconcile our differences here, because there is no de

[[Page 12082]]

    sire to escape the appropriations process.
        For example: On line 6, the language ``after July 1, 1975, are 
    authorized to be appropriated for each of the fiscal years 1976 and 
    1977'' instead of ``authorized to be made available.''
        The Presiding Officer: The Chair would advise the Senator from 
    Minnesota that to vitiate the point of order and the rulings would 
    require unanimous consent. . . .
        Mr. Humphrey: Large sums of money, and that is why in this 
    language we are authorizing their use only on the basis of the 
    appropriations process. We authorize them for specific purposes, 
    such as for the International Fund for Agricultural Development the 
    sum of $200 million. But it is not to bypass the Appropriations 
    Committee. And I think it should be noted that when this point was 
    raised in the other body, the chairman of the House International 
    Relations Committee rose in opposition to the point of order.
        He noted some of the same points that are being made here. . . 
    .

    Senator Humphrey then quoted from the debate and the ruling by 
Speaker Albert.

        The Presiding Officer: The Chair advises, in that regard, based 
    on the point of order originally made and the ruling by the Chair, 
    that the bill is not before the Senate to be so amended, unless by 
    unanimous consent, and the point of order would be withdrawn, even 
    though that would allow the point of order to be raised again, but, 
    if by unanimous consent the point of order were withdrawn, the 
    Senate could move to consideration of such an amendment. . . .
        Mr. Inouye: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw 
    my point of order.
        The Presiding Officer: Does the Senator ask unanimous consent 
    that his point of order be withdrawn?
        Mr. Inouye: I do.
        The Presiding Officer: Without objection, it is so ordered.
        Mr. Humphrey: Mr. President, in light of the discussion which 
    we have had, both here and in the colloquy, as well as our private 
    discussions, I now move, on page 23, on line 6, after the words, 
    ``to be'', to strike the words ``made available'', and insert in 
    lieu thereof the word ``appropriated''. The line will then read: 
    ``and after July 1, 1975, are authorized to be appropriated'' for 
    each of the fiscal years, and so on.
        The Presiding Officer: The question is on agreeing to the 
    amendment.
        The amendment was agreed to.

Budget Act Point of Order Against Consideration

Sec. 4.3 While the Budget Act prohibits consideration of a bill, 
    amendment or conference report which would cause the total level of 
    budget outlays for the current year to be exceeded, the point of 
    order must be made when the bill, amendment, or conference report 
    is called up and comes too late after debate.

    On Dec. 15, 1982,(5) the Chairman of the Committee on 
Appro

[[Page 12083]]

priations called up a conference report on the agricultural 
appropriation bill, fiscal 1983. The conference report was considered 
as read and then Mr. Jamie L. Whitten, of Mississippi, was recognized 
to debate the report. The following proceedings are pertinent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 128 Cong. Rec. 30912, 30923, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Agriculture, Rural Development and Related Agencies Appropriation, 
                                    1983

        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on 
    the bill (H.R. 7072) making appropriations for the agriculture, 
    rural development, and related agencies programs for the fiscal 
    year ending September 30, 1983, and for other purposes.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (6) Pursuant to the rule, 
    the conference report is considered as having been read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the 
    House of December 10, 1982.)
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. 
    Whitten) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentlewoman 
    from Nebraska (Mrs. Smith) will be recognized for 30 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. 
    Whitten). . . .

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [William E.] Dannemeyer [of California]: Mr. Speaker, 
    before I consume that 1 minute, may I have a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The parliamentary inquiry would be 
    made as part of your 1 minute. All time is controlled.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Then this is my request in the nature of a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        If the funding level of this conference report is $31.7 
    billion-plus, and the budget resolution passed by the House earlier 
    this year listed as a maximum amount for this area of spending 
    something a little below $23 billion, my parliamentary inquiry is: 
    If we have passed the budget resolution providing a level of 
    spending for this category or function of the Federal budget, how 
    do we have the ability now to consider a conference report that 
    proposes to spend an amount substantially in excess of that figure? 
    Where do we get that right?
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) No point of order was 
    made against the conference report when it was brought up. If one 
    had been raised, the Chair would have ruled at that time. A timely 
    point of order was not made and, therefore, there is no ruling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Donald J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dannemeyer: Does the Speaker mean that if a Member had 
    raised this in the way of a point of order when it was first 
    brought up----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If there had been a point of order 
    raised on a timely basis, the Chair would have ruled on the point 
    of order.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Ruled which way?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot engage in 
    speculation.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield to me?

[[Page 12084]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Dannemeyer) has expired.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.

Point of Order Against Privileged Resolution Does Not Reflect Committee 
    Action

Sec. 4.4 A point of order that the text of a privileged resolution does 
    not reflect the action of the Committee on House Administration in 
    ordering it reported comes too late after there has been debate on 
    the resolution.

    On Aug. 5, 1970,(8) a privileged report was filed from 
the Committee on House Administration and immediately called up for 
consideration. Following the reading of the resolution and several 
minutes of discussion as to the merits of raising the salaries of two 
House employees, a parliamentary inquiry was made as to the timeliness 
of a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 116 Cong. Rec. 27450, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H. Res. 1117, which provided additional compensation for two 
        positions created by H. Res. 543 [89th Cong.].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: (9) The gentleman will state the 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William L.] Dickinson [of Alabama]: Mr. Speaker, according 
    to the rules of the House would a point of order lie to this bill 
    inasmuch as it is not as was reported out of the committee 
    yesterday, and is not identical? Would a point of order lie at this 
    point?
        The Speaker: The resolution is already under consideration and 
    there has been debate.
        Any point of order against its consideration would come too 
    late at this time.

Point of Order Against Report Relating to Privilege of House

Sec. 4.5 A point of order against a report involving the privileges of 
    the House is properly raised after the report is read.

    On Oct. 18, 1966,(10) Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, responded to an inquiry as to when was the proper time 
to raise a point of order against a privileged report filed by the 
Committee on Un-American Activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 112 Cong. Rec. 27439, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H. Rept. No. 89-2302, which related to H. Res. 1060, involving 
        the refusal of a witness to testify before the Committee on Un-
        American Activities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Edwin E.] Willis [of Louisiana]: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a 
    question of the privilege of the House, and by direction of the 
    Committee on Un-American Activities I submit a privileged report--
    House Report No. 2302.
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12085]]

        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Yates: At what point is it in order for me to present a 
    point of order to the resolution?
        The Speaker: After the report is read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                   Proceedings Against Milton Mitchell Cohen

            The Committee on Un-American Activities, as created and 
        authorized by the House of Representatives, through the 
        enactment of Public Law 601 of the 79th Congress, section 121, 
        subsection (q)(2), under House Resolution 8 of the 89th 
        Congress, duly authorized and issued a subpena to Milton 
        Mitchell Cohen. . . .
            Pursuant to resolution of the Committee on Un-American 
        Activities duly adopted at a meeting held January 13, 1966, the 
        facts relating to the aforesaid failures of Milton Mitchell 
        Cohen are hereby reported to the House of Representatives, to 
        the end that the said Milton Mitchell Cohen may be proceeded 
        against for contempt of the House of Representatives in the 
        manner and form provided by law.

    After the reading of the voluminous report was dispensed with by 
unanimous consent, the Chair entertained the point of order by Mr. 
Yates.
    The Speaker overruled the point of order after extensive argument 
on the proper interpretation of Rule XI clause 26(m).(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. House Rules and Manual Sec. 735 (1965). For the current rule, see 
        House Rules and Manual Sec. 712 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A privileged resolution, certifying the report to the United States 
Attorney, was then offered, debated, and agreed to.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. H. Res. 1060, 112 Cong. Rec. 27448-85, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Point of Order Falls When Motion at Which It Is Directed Is Withdrawn

Sec. 4.6 A motion that the House resolve into the Committee of the 
    Whole for consideration of a bill may be withdrawn pending a point 
    of order against consideration of the bill (for failure of the 
    report to comply with the ``Ramseyer'' rule), and if withdrawn, the 
    Chair is not obligated to rule on the point of order.

    On Dec. 3, 1979,(13) Mr. Henry A. Waxman, of California, 
moved that the House resolve into the Committee of the Whole to 
consider the Child Health Assurance Act of 1979. Before the question 
was put by the Speaker Pro Tempore, a point of order was raised against 
consideration. The proceedings are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 125 Cong. Rec. 34385, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself 
    into the Committee of the Whole House on the

[[Page 12086]]

    State of the Union for the considera-tion of the bill (H.R. 4962) 
    to amend title XIX of the Social Security Act to strengthen and 
    improve medicaid services to low-income children and pregnant 
    women, and for other purposes.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (14) The gentleman from 
    Maryland will state the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. John Joseph Moakley (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    present consideration of the bill, H.R. 4962, on the grounds that 
    the committee report fails to comply with the provisions of clause 
    3 of rule XIII, the so-called Ramseyer rule.
        The relevant provision of clause 3 of rule XIII requires that--

            Whenever a committee reports a bill or a joint resolution 
        repealing or amending any statute or part thereof it shall 
        include in its report or in an accompanying document--a 
        comparative print of that part of the bill or joint resolution 
        making the amendment and of the statute or part thereof 
        proposed to be amended, showing by stricken-through type and 
        italics, parallel columns, or other appropriate typographical 
        devices the omissions and insertions proposed to be made.

        Section 4 of the bill amends subparagraph (B) of section 
    1905(a)(4) of title XIX of the Social Security Act. This amendment 
    is properly shown in italic type on page 111 of the report (H. 
    Rept. 96-568). Section 4 further amends section 1905(a)(4) by 
    adding a new subparagraph (D). This amendment is also properly 
    shown in italic type. Subparagraph (C) of this section of the 
    Social Security Act is not amended, but the committee report also 
    has this provision shown in italic type indicating that it is a 
    change in existing law, and is, therefore, in violation of the 
    House rule. Subparagraph (C) is not an amendment nor is it amended 
    by the bill and, therefore, the committee report is in violation of 
    the provisions of clause 3 of rule XIII, which has the purpose of 
    clearly showing existing law and proposed amendments to that law.
        The purpose of the rule is to make it readily apparent what 
    change in existing law is intended. I cite volume 8, chapter 236, 
    section 2236 of ``Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
    Representatives'' in support of this. On Monday, February 3, 1930, 
    the House was considering bills on the Consent Calendar, when the 
    bill--H.R. 8156--to change the limit of cost for the construction 
    of the Coast Guard Academy was reached.
        Mr. Fiorello H. La Guardia, of New York, made the point of 
    order that the change proposed in the law was not properly 
    indicated in the report.
        The Speaker, the great Mr. Longworth of Ohio, sustained the 
    point of order and said:

            It is perfectly apparent to anyone reading the bill that 
        its language is not exactly in the form prescribed by the 
        Ramseyer rule, which provides that--
            ``Whenever a committee reports a bill or joint resolution 
        repealing or amending any statute or part thereof it shall 
        include in its report or in an accompanying document--
            ``(1) the text of the statute or part thereof which is 
        proposed to be repealed; and

[[Page 12087]]

            ``(2) a comparative print of that part of the bill or joint 
        resolution making the amendment and of the statute or part 
        thereof proposed to be amended showing by stricken-through type 
        and italics, parallel columns or other appropriate 
        typographical devices, the omissions and insertions proposed to 
        be made.''
            The Chair does not think that the rule has been complied 
        with. What is required under the second part has not been done. 
        Of course the rule is intended to make it evident just what 
        change in a bill or resolution is intended. It is to make this 
        change apparent to anybody without consulting the statute which 
        it is intended to amend.

        Mr. Speaker, the report on H.R. 4962 does not make it evident 
    just what change is intended. The report does not make it apparent 
    what is being amended without consulting the statute. In fact, the 
    report clearly and erroneously indicates a section of existing law 
    is amended when it is not.
        Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, I note that the report has not even 
    ``substantially'' complied with the rule. The precedents 
    demonstrate that substantial compliance is achieved even though the 
    report may contain errors of punctuation, capitalization, or 
    abbreviations which are at variance with the bill. The report error 
    here goes far beyond these minor problems and causes difficulty in 
    clearly discerning what this amends and what is now statutory law. 
    The fact that this appears in italic type signifies it as an 
    amendment, which it is not. The report causes confusion rather than 
    clarification and is, therefore, clearly in violation of the rule.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from California 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Waxman: Yes, Mr. Speaker, I do desire to be heard on the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Speaker, there are over 20 pages in the proposed bill. The 
    gentleman is referring to one paragraph, in which I am informed has 
    a typographical error; but the point that I would make in 
    opposition to the point of order that is made is that the Ramsayer 
    is in substantial compliance with the rule and that on that basis 
    the point of order ought to be overruled.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would ask the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Waxman) to withhold his motion until the Chair can 
    ascertain whether the Ramsayer rule was violated by the committee 
    or whether a typographical error by the Government Printing Office 
    exists in the report.
        Will the gentleman withdraw his motion?
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Speaker, I will withhold my motion.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, if I may be heard further, for the 
    Chair's deliberations I would only indicate that the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Waxman) has offered as his only rebuttal that this 
    is substantial compliance and not anything more than an error.
        The fact of the matter that the section is involved I 
    discovered only because of the substantive nature of that section 
    in my own desire to possibly offer amendments. Now, if this 
    gentleman was misled, I am sure other Members may have been misled, 
    and I think the purpose of this rule is to prevent that.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The motion to go into committee has 
    been withdrawn, so the Chair will at the present time withhold its 
    ruling.

[[Page 12088]]

Against Ramseyer Rule Violations

Sec. 4.7 A point of order that a report fails to comply with the 
    requirement that proposed changes in law be indicated 
    typographically, as required by the Ramseyer rule, is properly made 
    when the bill is called up in the House and before the House 
    resolves into the Committee of the Whole.

    On July 13, 1959,(15) immediately after Mr. Thomas G. 
Abernethy, of Mississippi, moved that the House resolve itself into the 
Committee of the Whole for the consideration of the bill, Mr. H. R. 
Gross, of Iowa, inquired of the Speaker:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 105 Cong. Rec. 13226, 13227, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 6893, a bill to amend the District of 
        Columbia Stadium Act of 1957 with respect to motor vehicle 
        parking areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gross: Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a point of order 
    against the consideration of the bill and the report. When is the 
    proper time to seek recognition for this purpose?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) This is the proper 
    time for the gentleman to make his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Thereupon, Mr. Gross made a point of order against language found 
in the bill which, under the Ramseyer rule, was not stated in the 
accompanying report in italicized or other distinctive print. Mr. 
Abernethy then obtained unanimous consent that the motion be withdrawn 
and that the bill be recommitted to the committee.

Sec. 4.8 The proper time to raise a point of order that a committee 
    report fails to comply with the Ramseyer rule is when the motion is 
    made to go into the Committee of the Whole to consider the bill.

    On July 30, 1968,(17) during debate on House Resolution 
1218, which provided that it should be in order to move that the House 
resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole for the consideration of 
a bill to amend the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965, Mr. Paul Findley, 
of Illinois, unsuccessfully attempted to raise a point of order against 
further consideration of the resolution on the ground that the 
committee report accompanying the bill did not comply with the 
provisions of the Ramseyer rule. Speaker Pro Tempore John J. Rooney, of 
New York,

[[Page 12089]]

then ruled that a point of order on that ground was not appropriate at 
that time. Mr. Findley then inquired as to when the point would be in 
order. The Speaker Pro Tempore then stated that it could be raised when 
the motion was made to go into the Committee of the Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 114 Cong. Rec. 24245, 24252, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 17126, the extension of the 1965 Food 
        and Agriculture Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    After the previous question was ordered on the resolution and the 
resolution was agreed to, Mr. William R. Poage, of Texas, moved that 
the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole for the 
consideration of the bill. Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, 
then heard Mr. Findley on his point of order.

Sec. 4.9 Where, pending a motion to consider a bill in Committee of the 
    Whole, a point of order was made against a bill on the ground that 
    the report did not comply with the Ramseyer rule, and the 
    contention was made that the point of order came too late, the 
    House having already adopted a resolution making consideration of 
    the bill in order, the Chair overruled the point of order, but by 
    so doing indicated that the point of order was timely.

    On Oct. 1, 1963,(18) Mr. Armistead I. Selden, Jr., of 
Alabama, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of a bill and Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, immediately put the question on the motion. Mr. Frank T. 
Bow, of Ohio, then stated a point of order against the bill on the 
basis that the report accompanying the bill did not comply with the 
Ramseyer rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 109 Cong. Rec. 18412, 88th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7044, a bill to amend Pub. L. No. 193 [83d Cong.], 
        relating to the Corregidor-Bataan Memorial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In debate on the point of order, Mr. Selden contended that the 
point of order was too late because a resolution had been adopted to 
provide for the consideration and that the provision questioned by Mr. 
Bow did not make a specific change in the provisions of the law as Mr. 
Bow had argued. To this Mr. Bow responded that under the rules of the 
House, even though a resolution had been adopted, the point of order 
under the Ramseyer rule had to come immediately before the House went 
into the Committee of the Whole. Consequently, argued Mr. Bow, the 
point of order did not come too late.

[[Page 12090]]

    The Chair overruled the point of order, holding that there had been 
an adequate compliance with the Ramseyer rule, and, thus, by 
implication, indicating that the point of order was timely.

Time for Making Point of Order Against Conference Report

Sec. 4.10 A point of order against a conference report must be made 
    after the reading of the report and before the reading of the joint 
    statement.

    A Member wishing to make a point of order against a portion of a 
conference report on a bill carrying a Senate number, on the basis that 
one of the provisions proposed by the Senate and included in the 
conference agreement would not have been germane if offered to the 
House version when the bill was under consideration in the House, has a 
narrow window of opportunity. The proceedings of Dec. 15, 
1975,(19) illustrate one of the first applications of the 
new rule adopted in the 93d Congress.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 121 Cong. Rec. 40671, 40675-77, 40680, 40681, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
20. The original concept of permitting points of order to address 
        ``non-germane'' provisions in conference agreements was 
        included in amendments to the rules adopted in the 92d 
        Congress. See H. Res. 11532, Oct. 13, 1972, p. 36023. The 
        pertinent rule, Rule XXVIII clause 4(a), was further amended in 
        the 93d Congress to bring within the application of the rule 
        provisions in a Senate bill sent to conference if they would 
        not have been considered germane if offered to the House 
        version. See H. Res. 998, Apr. 9, 1974, which added the last 
        sentence to clause 4(a). See House Rules and Manual Sec. 913(b) 
        (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      conference report on s. 622, energy policy and conservation act

        Mr. [Harley O.] Staggers [of West Virginia]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    call up the conference report on the Senate bill (S. 622) to 
    increase domestic energy supplies and availability; to restrain 
    energy demand; to prepare for energy emergencies; and for other 
    purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        Mr. [Barry] Goldwater [Jr., of California]: Mr. Speaker, I make 
    a point of order.
        The Speaker: (1) The gentleman from California will 
    state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against 
    title V, part B.
        The Speaker: The Chair would request that the gentleman 
    withhold his point of order until we have had the title of the bill 
    read by the Clerk.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from West Virginia?

[[Page 12091]]

        Mr. [Olin E.] Teague [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I reserve a right 
    to object.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Teague) reserves a 
    right to object.

        The Chair states that the right of the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Goldwater) will be protected. . . .
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from West Virginia (Mr. Staggers)?
        Mr. [John B.] Anderson of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, reserving the 
    right to object, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Anderson of Illinois: I address the Chair with the 
    following parliamentary inquiry: At which point would it be in 
    order to offer or make a point of order against section 102 of the 
    conference report?
        The Speaker: If objection to the reading of the statement is 
    not made, or at any time prior to reading the statement. The Chair 
    has promised he is going to recognize the gentleman from California 
    first on that issue, either now or at that point.
        Mr. Anderson of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, if I still have the 
    floor, I make a point of order against section 102 of the 
    conference report.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will not be recognized because there 
    is a unanimous-consent request pending.
        Mr. Anderson of Illinois: May I reserve a point of order 
    against that section?
        The Speaker: The gentleman's rights will be protected, but the 
    Chair has already promised the gentleman from California that he 
    would recognize him first on his point of order. . . .
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from West Virginia?
        There was no objection.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Goldwater).
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order to that 
    part of section 301 which adds to the new motor vehicle 
    improvements and cost saving account a new title V, part B, 
    entitled ``Application Advanced Automotive Technology.''
        My point of order is that it is nongermane, pursuant to clause 
    4, rule XXVIII.
        Part B of title V was not in the House bill, as passed in H.R. 
    7014, but it was in the Senate version and it is in the conference 
    report.
        If the section had been offered as an amendment on the House 
    floor, it would have been subject to a point of order as 
    nongermane. Hence, it is subject to a nongermaneness point of order 
    now under rule XXVIII, clause 4.
        May I point out to the Speaker that the automotive R & D part 
    of title V is wholly unrelated to the oil pricing and conservation 
    thrust of the bill. Besides, the Science and Technology Committee 
    has jurisdiction of all nonnuclear energy R. & D. matters, and this 
    is an R. & D. incentive program which clearly falls in that 
    jurisdiction.
        The original Senate version of section 546 was contained in 
    title II of the

[[Page 12092]]

    Senate bill (S. 1883). H.R. 9174 was introduced on July 31, 1975, 
    by the gentleman from Washington (Mr. McCormack) and was referred 
    to the Committee on Science and Technology. H.R. 9174 basically 
    included all of title II of the Senate bill (S. 1883), specifically 
    the loan guarantee provision. The committee jurisdiction was 
    positively established by that referral.
        Mr. Speaker, I insist on my point of order.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, my parliamentary inquiry is that I 
    had asked unanimous consent that the statement on the part of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to go through with that before any 
    other unanimous-consent requests or any other points of order are 
    made against the bill. It does not jeopardize any point of order 
    and then I would be glad to answer any questions.
        The Speaker: The Chair had asked whether there was any 
    objection to the request and there was no objection. It was so 
    ordered.
        Mr. Staggers: So, Mr. Speaker, it is now considered as read?
        The Speaker: The request that the statement be read in lieu of 
    the report has been granted. It does not jeopardize any point of 
    order.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Texas 
    (Mr. Teague).
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman wish to be heard further on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Teague: Mr. Speaker, I would like to be heard on the point 
    of order.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I would like 
    to be heard on the point of order at the appropriate time.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, I yield back my time. I have made 
    my point of order.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I think that this is not a good point 
    of order, but out of grace and in order to give the House a chance 
    to vote on this as an orderly procedure--I protested the disorderly 
    procedure with the ERDA bill which was before us--but in order to 
    have orderly procedure I will not contest the point of order, and I 
    do not think my good friend from West Virginia, the chairman of the 
    committee (Mr. Staggers) will contest it. Under those 
    circumstances, I think it is appropriate for the Chair to rule on 
    the point of order with regard to germaneness in order that we may 
    proceed.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I would say that we have a separate 
    vote on the point of order and then under those circumstances we 
    would be able to proceed.
        The Speaker: The point of order is conceded and sustained.
        Mr. Staggers: I would say to the gentleman from California that 
    it is without prejudice----
        Mr. Teague: Whether he concedes it or not, I would like to be 
    heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair is going to sustain the point of order.
        Mr. Teague: Mr. Speaker, may I reserve the right to make a 
    point of order? I am going to make a point of order against the 
    whole conference report.

[[Page 12093]]

        The Speaker: That would come later.
        Mr. Teague: But the Speaker will reserve my right?
        The Speaker: Could the Chair make himself clear to the 
    gentleman? That might depend upon the outcome of the motion the 
    gentleman from California will make.
        Mr. Dingell: I think the gentleman wants to be heard; he 
    desires to be heard.
        I ask unanimous consent that he be heard at this time on the 
    point of order which, by concession, without waiving questions of 
    jurisdiction----
        The Speaker: The Chair has no authority to hear arguments on 
    matters not related to the point of order made by the gentleman. If 
    the gentleman from California makes a motion, the business which 
    transpires after the motion made by the gentleman will determine 
    whether certain other points of order will be in order.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Goldwater: Has the Chair ruled on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair sustained the point of order.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Goldwater moves that part B, title V in section 301 of 
        S. 622 be rejected.

        The Speaker: The gentleman from California (Mr. Goldwater) is 
    recognized for 20 minutes and the gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. 
    Staggers) is recognized for 20 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. . . .
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Goldwater).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that he was 
    in doubt.
        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    300, nays 103, not voting 31, as follows. . . .

Sec. 4.11 Rule XXVIII clause 4(a), was amended in the 96th Congress to 
    provide that if a conference report is considered read, then a 
    point of order should be made immediately when consideration of the 
    report begins.

    Rule XXVIII, dealing with conference reports and amendments in 
disagreement, now provides that if the report or amendments reported in 
disagreement have been available for three calendar days (excluding any 
Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday) after filing and if printed in the 
Record, can be considered as read when called up for consideration. 
Clause 4(a) now reflects this reality, and so points of order on the 
germaneness of amendments included in the conference agreement or 
reported in disagreement must be made immediately at the inception of 
consideration.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See the current provisions of Rule XXVIII clause 4(a) House Rules 
        and Manual (1997), particularly the annotations thereto in 
        Sec. 913, wherein it is stated ``The clause was . . . amended 
        in the 96th Congress (H. Res. 5, Jan. 15, 1979, pp. 7-16) to 
        provide that if the conference report is considered read under 
        clause 2(c) of this rule, a point of order under this clause 
        must be made immediately upon consideration of the conference 
        report.''

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12094]]

Sec. 4.12 A point of order against a conference report can only be 
    raised after the reading of the report has been completed or has 
    been dispensed with by unanimous consent.

    Until the addition of clause 2(c) of rule XXVIII, which provides 
that a conference report which has been available in accordance with 
clause 2(a) shall be ``considered as having been read when called up 
for consideration,'' a point of order could be raised against a 
conference report only after the reading of the report had been 
completed or waived. The proceedings of Sept. 30, 1976,(3) 
show the application of this earlier practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 122 Cong. Rec. 34224, 34225, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     conference report on h.r. 12572, u.s. grain standards act of 1976

        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I call up 
    the conference report on the bill (H.R. 12572) to amend the U.S. 
    Grain Standards Act to improve the grain inspection and weighing 
    system, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the 
    statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        Mr. [W. Hensen] Moore [of Louisiana]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against consideration of this conference report.
        The Speaker: (4) The gentleman will state his point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Moore: Mr. Speaker, the conference report, in particular 
    section 8, subparagraph (5), violates clause 3 of rule XXVIII of 
    the rules of the House.
        The Speaker: Will the gentleman withhold his point of order, 
    because the gentleman is premature. We have to read the report 
    before the point of order would lie.
        Mr. Moore: My rights will be protected to raise the point of 
    order, Mr. Speaker?
        The Speaker: The gentleman's rights will be protected. . . .
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Washington?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. Moore: Mr. Speaker, I reserve my point of order on the 
    conference report.

        The Speaker: The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Moore) reserves 
    a point of order on the conference report.
        Does the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Foley) request that 
    this matter be put over and be made the first order of business 
    tomorrow?
        Mr. Foley: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    further consideration of this conference report be

[[Page 12095]]

    postponed, and that it be made the first order of business 
    tomorrow.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Washington?
        There was no objection.

Sec. 4.13 A point of order against a conference report (which has not 
    been printed in the Record for three days and is therefore not 
    ``considered as read'' when called up) must be made or reserved 
    before the reading of the joint statement where by unanimous 
    consent the statement is read in lieu of the report.

    Rule XXVIII, ``Conference Reports,'' was amended in 1979 by the 
addition of clause 2(c),(5) which specifies that any 
conference report or a Senate amendment in disagreement which has been 
filed and printed in the Record for three days is ``considered as 
having been read when called up for consideration.'' However, if a 
conference report is called up before the three-day requirement is met, 
it must still be read. The following sequence of events on Oct. 1, 
1980,(6) illustrate how a point of order against a 
conference report has to be made in a timely fashion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. House Rules and Manual Sec. 912d (1997).
 6. 126 Cong. Rec. 28637-40, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Neal] Smith of Iowa: Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference 
    report on the bill (H.R. 5612) to amend section 8(a) of the Small 
    Business Act, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        Mr. [George E.] Danielson [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I make 
    a point of order against this conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman will be 
    protected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. William H. Natcher (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?
        Mr. [Dan] Rostenkowski [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Objection is heard.
        The Clerk will read the report.
        The Clerk proceeded to read the report.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa (during the reading): Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in 
    lieu of the report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Iowa?
        Mr. Danielson: Mr. Speaker, a while ago I raised a point of 
    order against the conference report. I understood the Speaker to 
    say that my point of order will be protected.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Danielson: If I am not waiving any rights, I will withdraw 
    my reservation of objection.

[[Page 12096]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Without objection, the statement of 
    the managers will be read in lieu of the report.
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the statement.
        (For conference report and statement, see proceedings of the 
    House of September 30, 1980.)

Points of Order Against Conference Reports

Sec. 4.14 The Chair entertains and rules upon points of order against 
    conference reports which, if sustained, will vitiate the entire 
    conference report (as under the Congressional Budget Act) before 
    entertaining points of order against portions of the report (under 
    Rule XXVIII clause 4, e.g.) which, if sustained, merely permit a 
    motion to reject the nongermane portion of the report.

    On Sept. 23, 1976,(8) Mr. Joseph P. Vigorito, of 
Pennsylvania, called up a conference report on the bill H.R. 10339, the 
Farmer to Consumer Direct Marketing Act of 1976. Mr. John H. Rousselot, 
of California, raised two points of order against the report, one under 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, which if sustained, would have 
prevented consideration of the report. The second point of order was 
against a nongermane portion of the conference agreement. Speaker Carl 
Albert, of Oklahoma, ruled on only the first point of order for the 
reasons which he stated at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 122 Cong. Rec. 32099, 32100, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        conference report on h.r. 10339, farmer to consumer direct 
                           marketing act of 1976

        Mr. Vigorito: Mr. Speaker, I call up the conference report on 
    the bill (H.R. 10339) to encourage the direct marketing of 
    agricultural commodities from farmers to consumers, and ask 
    unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in 
    lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania?
        Mr. Rousselot: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Rousselot: Mr. Speaker, I have two points of order to raise 
    against the conference report on H.R. 10339 (H. Rept. 94-1516).
        The first is under the Budget Control Act. The second is under 
    House Rule XXVIII.
        Section 401(b)(1) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
    Control Act (Public Law 93-344) provides as follows:

            (b) Legislation Providing Entitlement Authority.--

[[Page 12097]]

            (1) It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or 
        resolution which provides new spending authority described in 
        subsection (c)(2)(C) (or any amendment which provides such new 
        spending authority) which is to become effective before the 
        first day of the fiscal year which begins during the calendar 
        year in which such bill or resolution is reported.

        The text of the conference agreement as set forth in the 
    amendment adding a new section 8 is as follows:

                             emergency hay program

            Sec. 8. In carrying out any emergency hay program for 
        farmers or ranchers in any area of the United States under 
        section 305 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 because of an 
        emergency or major disaster in such area, the President shall 
        direct the Secretary of Agriculture to pay 80 percent of the 
        cost of transporting hay (not to exceed $50 per ton) from areas 
        in which hay is in plentiful supply to the area in which such 
        farmers or ranchers are located. The provisions of this section 
        shall expire on October 1, 1977.

        It is clear from a literal reading of this proposed language 
    that certain livestock owners will be entitled to a hay subsidy 
    immediately upon enactment of this bill.
        This bill is effective during the so-called transition period 
    of July 1-September 30, 1976.
        In any event it is a new spending authority effective before 
    October 1, 1976, which marks the beginning of fiscal year 1977 but 
    occurs in the calendar year in which the conference report is being 
    called up in the House.
        ``New spending authority'' is defined in section 401(c)(2)(C) 
    to include ``payments . . . the budget authority for which is not 
    provided for in advance by appropriation Acts, to any person . . . 
    if . . . the United States is obligated to make such payments to 
    persons . . . who meet the requirements established by such law.''
        In the instance at hand, hay payments are mandated by the 
    language directing that the President shall direct the Secretary of 
    Agriculture to pay 80 percent of hay transportation costs--up to 
    $50 per ton.
        The second point of order is that section 8 of the conference 
    report is not in compliance with rule XXVIII, clause 4, and if such 
    language were offered to H.R. 10339 during its consideration in the 
    House it would not be deemed to be germane under rule XI, clause 7.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Vigorito) desire to be heard on the points of order?
        Mr. Vigorito: Yes, Mr. Speaker, I would like to be heard on the 
    two points of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized.
        Mr. Vigorito: Mr. Speaker, my understanding is that if this 
    program is an entitlement program under section 401 of the Budget 
    Act, the funding could not be given an authorization in this bill 
    until the beginning of the next fiscal year, or, in this case, 
    October 1, 1976. If that is the case, I would think that we could 
    develop legislative intent here in that none of the funding would 
    begin in this bill until fiscal year 1977. As a practical matter, 
    the bill will probably not have cleared the President prior to that 
    time, anyway, and consequently we will not be delaying the impact 
    of the bill for any substan

[[Page 12098]]

    tial length of time. We have less than a week before October 1 
    comes about. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair is having difficulty with the argument 
    made by the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania, because, as 
    the Chair understands it, theoretically and legally it would be 
    possible to begin the payments before October 1, 1976, which would 
    be in violation of the Budget Impoundment and Control Act, as the 
    entitlement to those payments might vest prior to October 1. If, as 
    the Chair understands it, the entitlement to payments only vested 
    after October 1, 1976, there would be no violation of the Budget 
    Control Act.
        What is the gentleman's answer to that?
        Mr. Vigorito: The intent is only to begin after October 1, 
    1976.
        The Speaker: Of course, the Chair sees before him language 
    which it seems to the Chair--and the Chair is sympathetic with what 
    the gentleman is trying to do--indicates that:

            In carrying out any emergency hay program for farmers or 
        ranchers in any area of the United States under section 305 of 
        the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 because of an emergency or 
        major disaster in such area, the President shall direct the 
        Secretary of Agriculture to pay 80 percent of the cost of 
        transporting hay (not to exceed $50 per ton) from areas in 
        which hay is in plentiful supply to the area in which such 
        farmers or ranchers are located. The provisions of this section 
        shall expire on October 1, 1977.

        This language does not say when the entitlement to payments 
    vests and does not imply when the payments begin. It does say when 
    the payments end. But the point is that the payments cannot begin 
    before October 31, 1976, without violating the Congressional Budget 
    Act. . . .
        The Chair thinks that under the present circumstances he should 
    insist that the gentleman consider another procedure, because he 
    thinks it can be worked out. Therefore, the Chair must sustain the 
    point of order.
        The Chair will not rule on the second point of order, on 
    germaneness grounds, because one point of order against the entire 
    conference report has been sustained.
        Will the gentleman undertake to work that out within the next 
    day or two?
        Mr. Vigorito: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to pull this 
    off so that we can work this out.
        The Speaker: The conference report is no longer before the 
    House. The gentleman can dispose of the Senate amendments under 
    another procedure.

Sec. 4.15 Where a conference report is considered as having been read 
    and then further proceedings are postponed by unanimous consent, 
    points of order against the report may still be raised when the 
    report is again before the House as unfinished business.

    On Sept. 23, 1976,(9) the chairman of the Select 
Committee on the Outer Continental Shelf called

[[Page 12099]]

up the conference report on the measure S. 521, a bill which had been 
reported by the ad hoc committee. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 122 Cong. Rec. 32102, 32103, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1976

        Mr. [John M.] Murphy of New York: Mr. Speaker, I call up the 
    conference report on the Senate bill (S. 521) to increase the 
    supply of energy in the United States from the Outer Continental 
    Shelf; to amend the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act; and for 
    other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
        The Speaker: (10) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from New York?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Hamilton] Fish [Jr., of New York]: Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, I should like to ask the chairman of the ad 
    hoc select committee at this time if he will withdraw this report 
    from consideration or seek to postpone further consideration of the 
    report. If not, those on this side will be constrained to object to 
    the request of the gentleman from New York.
        Mr. Speaker, the House should not squander its precious 
    remaining hours on a bill that is clearly destined, if not 
    designed, to be vetoed.
        Mr. Murphy of New York: Mr. Speaker, I have no intention to 
    withdraw the conference report.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, then I object.
        The Speaker: Objection is heard. The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:
        (For Conference Report and statement see proceedings of the 
    House of September 20, 1976.) . . .

            Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1976

        Mr. Murphy of New York: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to 
    dispense with further reading of the report, and that consideration 
    thereof be the unfinished business when the House convenes on 
    Tuesday next.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (11) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from New York?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object.
        Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object--and I shall not 
    object--I wish to be sure that I understand the request of the 
    gentleman from New York. The gentleman is asking that: First, the 
    rest of the report be considered as read; second, that further 
    consideration today be dispensed with; and, third, that it not be 
    considered until next Tuesday at the earliest.
        Also, Mr. Speaker, I reserve several points of order against 
    the conference report, and would ask, is this the understanding 
    with my reservation of these points of order?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The points of order will still be in 
    order.
        Mr. Fish: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Murphy of New York: I would clarify for my colleague that 
    the unanimous-consent request specifically stated that this would 
    be the first order of business on Tuesday next.

[[Page 12100]]

        Mr. Fish: On Tuesday next?
        Mr. Murphy of New York: Tuesday next.
        Mr. Fish: Not before that?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The first order of unfinished business 
    on Tuesday next.
        Mr. Murphy of New York: That is correct.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, 
    is the Chairman also of the opinion that the several points of 
    order which I have so reserved will be protected when we take this 
    matter up?
        Mr. Murphy of New York: If the gentleman will yield, the Chair 
    always protects the points of order of the minority.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from New York?
        There was no objection.

Consideration of Conference Report, Precedence Over Point of Order

Sec. 4.16 Where further consideration of a conference report (which had 
    been considered as read by unanimous consent) has been postponed to 
    a date certain, it is in order to raise the question of 
    consideration when the report is again called up as unfinished 
    business, and the question of consideration is disposed of before 
    the Chair entertains points of order against the report.

    The question of consideration of a conference report is in order 
immediately after its reading and before debate begins, and, as the 
proceedings of Sept. 28, 1976,(12) illustrate, where the 
reading of a report is, by unanimous consent, dispensed with and then 
consideration postponed, the question of consideration remains 
available when the conference report is called up as unfinished 
business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 122 Cong. Rec. 33018, 33019, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Conference Report on S. 521, Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
                             Amendments of 1976

        The Speaker: (13) The unfinished business is the 
    further consideration of the conference report on the Senate bill 
    S. 521, which the Clerk will report by title.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
        Mr. [Hamilton] Fish [Jr., of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I demand 
    the question of consideration.
        The Speaker: The question is, Will the House now consider the 
    conference report on the Senate bill S. 521.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    236, nays 150, not voting 44, as follows: . . .

[[Page 12101]]

        So consideration of the conference report was ordered.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, my parliamentary inquiry is as to 
    whether my reserved points of order are in order at this time?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that they are.

Point of Order Against Failure To Have ``Open Conference''

Sec. 4.17 Where the minutes of a conference meeting indicate that an 
    open meeting of the House and Senate managers had been held and 
    that a motion was adopted which finally disposed of all matters in 
    disagreement, as reflected by the signatures of a majority of the 
    conferees from each House, a Member must show that there was a 
    subsequent meeting of the conferees in violation of the rule 
    requiring open conference meetings for a point of order to lie.

    Until clause 6 was added to Rule XXVIII on Jan. 14, 1975, conferees 
often met behind closed doors. But with the adoption of clause 
6,(14) all conference meetings had to be open to the public 
unless, by roll call vote in the conference, a majority of the managers 
of both Houses voted to close the meeting. This clause was further 
amended on Jan. 4, 1977,(15) to require a roll call vote in 
the House to permit the managers to exercise their discretion to close 
a meeting. Another amendment to the rule occurred in the 96th 
Congress,(16) to provide that if the conference report is 
considered as read because it has been printed and is available under 
clause 2(c), a point of order under this ``open conference'' rule must 
be made immediately when the conference report is called up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. H. Res. 5, 121 Cong. Rec. 20-33, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
15. H. Res. 5, 123 Cong. Rec. 53-70, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
16. H. Res. 5, 125 Cong. Rec. 7-16, 96th Cong. 1st Sess., Jan. 5, 1979.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The discussion which occurred on the House floor on Sept. 28, 
1976,(17) illustrates the application of the current rule 
and the importance of having a final meeting of the conferees which 
complies with this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 122 Cong. Rec. 33019, 33020, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The conference report on S. 521, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act, had been called up and read on Sept. 23, 1976.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See Sec. 4.13, supra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12102]]

    On Sept. 28, 1976, it was before the House as unfinished business. 
The question of consideration having been decided in the affirmative, 
points of order were entertained.

        Mr. [Hamilton] Fish [Jr., of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the conference report on grounds that it has 
    been reported in violation of Rule XXVIII, clause 6, which requires 
    that conference meetings be open to the public except when ordered 
    closed by rollcall vote in open session.
        Mr. Speaker, on the first day of this Congress, as one of its 
    first moves toward reform, the House voted to amend its rules and 
    open up conferences to public scrutiny. The Senate soon passed a 
    similar measure, and the rule took effect.
        At the first open meeting of the conference committee, one of 
    the managers on the part of the Senate moved that the Senate recede 
    from its disagreement to the House amendment with several 
    amendments which he had caused to be printed as part of a 
    conference document. Additional linear amendments were proposed by 
    other Senate managers in the form of amendments to the motion, and 
    in due course a majority of the Senators voted for the motion as 
    amended.
        The chairman of the conference committee, the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Murphy) then moved that the House agree to the 
    amendments of the Senate. This motion was presumably amendable, 
    although the chairman refused to allow any amendments to be 
    offered. If he had, they would have been restricted to germane 
    modifications of the various Senate amendments which would have 
    been the only items in disagreement at that time. The motion was 
    rushed to a vote and agreed to by the House managers, and the 
    conference meeting was adjourned.
        Mr. Speaker, the conference committee must have met again. It 
    must have met without any notice to the minority and far from 
    public view. It must have met in closed session without first 
    having voted to do so in open session. I must assume that there was 
    a closed session of the conference committee, because instead of 
    reporting linear Senate amendments, as had been agreed to in open 
    session, the committee reported a Senate amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute. . . .
        There must have been one more meeting--a closed meeting--in 
    which a majority of the Senate conferees and a majority of the 
    House conferees agreed to switch from linear amendments to an 
    amendment in the nature of a substitute without giving minority 
    House managers a chance to offer amendments and without being open 
    to the public. . . .
        The Speaker: (19) Does the gentleman from New York 
    (Mr. Murphy) desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John M.] Murphy of New York: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, on the point of order, I would refer to the 
    recorded minutes of the conference on page 2 of the opening day of 
    the conference. Senator Jackson moved that the conference be open 
    to the public. The motion was sec

[[Page 12103]]

    onded by Senator Jackson and adopted by the conference without 
    objection. If my colleague, the gentleman from New York, had been 
    present at all sessions of the conference, I doubt if he would make 
    this point of order. The motion made by Senator Jackson at the 
    conference and on page 8 of the first day's minutes of the 
    conference is as follows:

            Mr. Chairman, I therefore move the Senate recede from its 
        disagreement with the House and accept the House amendment with 
        the amendment set forth in the September 13 conference print, 
        except the technical amendments that occur on page 123 of the 
        print.

        Mr. Speaker, if I understand the gentleman's argument, he is 
    asserting that the Chair is to find an implied or ``constructive'' 
    secret meeting of the majority of the conferees because the 
    conference report is not consistent with the gentleman's 
    interpretation of the procedures of the conference committee.
        In the first place, there was no secret meeting and thus the 
    rule relied upon by the gentleman was not violated.
        In addition, I would point out that the conference report is 
    consistent with the actions of the conference. Senator Jackson 
    moved that the Senate recede from its disagreement and agree to the 
    amendment of the House with an amendment. During the course of the 
    deliberations, the Senate conferees agreed to modify Senator 
    Jackson's proposed amendments. The Senate conferees then approved 
    the Jackson motion.
        The House conferees then agreed to adopt the language agreed to 
    by the Senate conferees, to be inserted in lieu of the House 
    amendment.

        The conference report properly reflects these actions.
        Moreover, rules of the House make it clear that once a 
    conference report is filed by the required number of conferees 
    there is a conclusive presumption as to the validity of the 
    conference.
        The Speaker will not look behind the signatures as to the 
    procedures in conference.
        Mr. Speaker, the gentleman's point of order should not be 
    sustained. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from New York has made a point of order directed 
    against conference procedure alleging a violation of clause 6, rule 
    XXVIII.
        The gentleman's point of order is that the form of the 
    conference report does not conform to his understanding as to which 
    motion was agreed to by the House conferees. The gentleman contends 
    that there was a further constructive meeting of the conferees 
    which was closed and unannounced.
        The chief manager of the conference report has reported that in 
    a meeting of the conferees which was open to the public, pursuant 
    to the provisions of clause 6, rule XXVIII, a proper motion was 
    made to agree to an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the 
    House amendment to the Senate bill, and the signatures of a 
    majority of the conferees of both Houses reflecting this agreement 
    appear on the conference report.
        The Chair does not feel that a violation of conference rules 
    has been shown, and the Chair overrules the point of order.

[[Page 12104]]

Where Multiple Points of Order Directed Against Conference Report

Sec. 4.18 The Chair may in his discretion require all points of order 
    against a conference report for alleged violation of a particular 
    House rule to be stated before he rules on any, to allow the Chair 
    to determine the order in which he will decide the questions of 
    order.

    When the voluminous conference report on the Outer Continental 
Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1976 (S. 521, 94th Cong.) was called up 
on Sept. 28, 1976,(20) the Speaker was informed that several 
points of order would be lodged against the report. He first heard 
argument on and ruled on a point of order brought under the ``open 
conference rule.'' (1) After overruling this point of order, 
the Chair then turned to arguments based on the ``scope of conference'' 
rule.(2) The proceedings are carried in full below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 122 Cong. Rec. 33020, 33021, 33023, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
 1. Rule XXVIII clause 6(a), House Rules and Manual Sec. 913d (1997).
 2. Rule XXVIII clause 3, House Rules and Manual Sec. 913a (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Hamilton] Fish [Jr., of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the conference report.
        The Speaker: (3) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    conference report on the grounds that in section 208 the managers 
    have exceeded their authority in several instances and in section 
    101 in one instance, and the report, therefore, is in violation of 
    clause 3 of rule XXVIII.
        Mr. Speaker, so as not to burden the House with unnecessary 
    discussion, I will ask the Chair to rule on these questions of 
    scope one at a time, because as soon as one is upheld, 
    consideration of the others will not be needed.
        The Speaker: The Chair must state that when more than one point 
    of order is going to be made under a particular House rule, it is 
    proper under the precedents for the Chair to require all such 
    points of order to be stated and for the Chair then to make his 
    decision on the separate points of order, and the Chair intends to 
    follow that procedure.
        Mr. Fish: Very good, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The Chair will hear all the arguments of the 
    gentleman.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, prior to 1971, managers considering a 
    bill and an amendment in the nature of a substitute were free to 
    exercise wide discretion in discarding language appearing in both 
    versions and in making germane amendments, even beyond the scope of 
    the various issues in disagreement. All this was changed by the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970. Section 125(B) of that act 
    revised clause 3 of rule 28, so that each spe

[[Page 12105]]

    cific topic, question, issue, or proposition must now be looked at 
    individually, as if linear amendments had been made by one House to 
    the bill of the other. Under this rule the conferees cannot report 
    new matter not committed by either House. Also, where the two 
    Houses propose different language on a particular issue, the two 
    versions set the boundaries for conference consideration of that 
    issue. Amendments outside those boundaries may not be reported, 
    even if germane. Where one House is silent on an issue proposed by 
    the other, the silent House is deemed to be incorporating current 
    law, if any, on the subject into its version. If both versions 
    contain matter on a given issue, that issue must be reported by the 
    conference, in disagreement if necessary. Finally, since the 
    substitute is being handled as if it were several linear 
    amendments, it is not in order for the managers to modify or fail 
    to report language which is identical in both versions. . . .

    Mr. Fish then proceeded to make several specific points of order, 
all charging that the conference report violated Rule XXVIII clause 3, 
by including matters ``beyond the scope'' of the text submitted to 
conference. The Speaker heard all the points of order, all the 
refutations by the manager, Mr. Murphy, as shown, and then ruled.

        Mr. [John M.] Murphy of New York: Mr. Speaker, before reviewing 
    as the specific points of order, I must review the rules and 
    procedures of the House. Rule 28, paragraph three, indicates 
    whenever a disagreement to a bill through an amendment in the 
    nature of a substitute has been committed to a conference 
    committee, the conference may report a total substitute so long as 
    no additional topic, question, issue, or proposition is included 
    and so long as any modification suggested by the conference. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from New York (Mr. Fish) argues in his first 
    point of order under clause 3, rule XXVIII, that the conferees have 
    exceeded the scope of the matter committed to conference by 
    removing from the Secretary of the Department in which the Coast 
    Guard is operating concurrent responsibility for considering 
    allegations of violations of safety regulations. It is the Chair's 
    opinion that the portions of the conference report dealing with 
    safety regulations and enforcement must be read as a whole. The 
    House and Senate versions had differing provisions on the various 
    aspects of that subject and gave regulatory and enforcement 
    responsibility to differing officials. The conference report 
    compromise gives the authority to the Interior and Labor 
    Departments and makes the conforming change in the provision 
    dealing with consideration of allegations of violations. For the 
    reasons stated by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Murphy) the 
    Chair overrules the point of order.
        The gentleman's second point of order on scope deals with the 
    findings at the beginning of the conference report, wherein the 
    conferees agreed to language finding adverse impacts on the various 
    States. . . . The conference language is no broader than

[[Page 12106]]

    the House language and the Chair overrules the point of order.
        In his third point of order on scope, the gentleman from New 
    York only points to language in the statement of managers and 
    argues that a statement of intent by the conferees exceeds the 
    scope of conference. Such a point of order must lie against 
    language in the conference report itself and not in the joint 
    statement and the Chair overrules the point of order.
        The gentleman's fourth point of order on scope deals with the 
    section of the conference report relating to judicial review. . . . 
    The conference language clarifies the fact that the limitation on 
    judicial review of the Secretary's determination does not inhibit 
    seeking judicial review of the underlying activities on the Outer 
    Continental Shelf and does not exceed the scope of the matter 
    committed to conference.
        The gentleman makes several additional points of order on 
    scope. . . .
        The last argument of the gentleman from New York is that the 
    conferees have added the word ``new'' in a provision that did not 
    contain that word in either the Senate bill or the House amendment. 
    A careful reading of the Senate bill demonstrates that the two 
    provisions were not identical, as the Senate bill contained the 
    word ``re-promulgate,'' not contained in the House amendment. 
    Therefore, the issue whether the regulations were to be new 
    regulations or could be existing regulations was a matter before 
    the conferees.
        For the reasons stated, the Chair overrules all the points of 
    order.

Point of Order Against Conference Reports Entertained Pending Request 
    That Statement Be Read in Lieu of Report

Sec. 4.19 The House rule which precludes managers on the part of the 
    House at a conference with the Senate from agreeing to Senate 
    amendments providing for appropriations in a conference agreement 
    absent specific authority, applies only to Senate amendments which 
    are sent to conference and not to appropriations contained in 
    Senate legislative bills which are before the conferees.

    On June 30, 1976,(4) when the conference report on S. 
3295, a bill extending the National Housing Act, was called up for 
consideration in the House, the Member handling the report asked 
unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in lieu of 
the report. Pending this request, a point of order was raised against 
the report on the ground that it contained a provision permitting a new 
use of previously appropriated funds. Speaker Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, 
entertained

[[Page 12107]]

the point of order. The arguments presented and the Chair's decision 
are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 122 Cong. Rec. 21632-34, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Henry S.] Reuss [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I call up the 
    conference report on the Senate bill (S. 3295) to extend the 
    authorization for annual contributions under the U.S. Housing Act 
    of 1937, to extend certain housing programs under the National 
    Housing Act, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that 
    the statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Wisconsin?
        Mr. [Garry] Brown of Michigan: Reserving the right to object, 
    Mr. Speaker, I raise a point of order against the conference 
    report.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order 
    against the conference report on S. 3295 on the basis that the 
    House managers exceeded their authority by agreeing to two matters 
    not in the original House amendment to the Senate bill and which 
    violates clause 2, rule XX, of the House Rules and Precedents of 
    the House. Clause 2, rule XX, reads in part as follows:

            Nor any amendment of the Senate providing for an 
        appropriation upon any bill other than a general appropriation 
        bill shall be agreed to by the managers on the part of the 
        House unless specific authority to agree to such amendment 
        shall first be given by the House by a separate vote on every 
        such amendment.

        The Senate-passed bill contains section 9(a)(2) and 9(b) which 
    in effect provide for expenditures to be made from the various FHA 
    insurance funds to honor claims made eligible for payment by the 
    provisions of section 9 generally. These amendments are to section 
    518(b) of the National Housing Act and relate to sections 203 and 
    221 housing programs for which the authority of the Secretary of 
    HUD to pay claims related to certain structural defects has expired 
    if the claims were not filed by March 1976.
        Both sections 9(a)(2) and 9(b) include identical language which 
    states as follows:

            Expenditures pursuant to this subsection shall be made from 
        the insurance fund chargeable for insurance benefits on the 
        mortgage covering the structure to which the expenditures 
        relate.

        The words ``Expenditures pursuant to this subsection shall be 
    made from the insurance fund'' constitute an appropriation within 
    the meaning of clause 2, rule XX. Based on precedents under clause 
    5, rule XXI, it is clear that payments out of funds such as the FHA 
    insurance fund are within the meaning of the term ``appropriation'' 
    and that the action taken by the House managers is violative of 
    clause 2, rule XX.
        In support of this point of order, I cite the ruling of the 
    Chair on a point of order raised by H. R. Gross on October 1, 1962, 
    to the conference report on H.R. 7927. A Senate provision agreed to 
    in that report provided that--

            The benefits made payable . . . by reason of enactment of 
        this part shall be paid from the civil service retirement and 
        disability fund.

[[Page 12108]]

        Inasmuch as when the House agreed to go to conference, it did 
    not give specific authority to agree to such an amendment. I 
    therefore submit that it is not in order for such language to be 
    included in the conference report.
        The FHA insurance funds are designed to provide the reserves 
    for payments on defaulted mortgages and for the operation of HUD 
    related to the various insurance programs and any diversion of the 
    use of such funds such as for payment for defects in the structure 
    would violate clause 5 of rule XXI. In further support of this 
    point of order, and specifically on the point that the provisions 
    constitute a diversion of funds for a separate purpose not within 
    the intention of the legislation establishing the fund, I cite the 
    ruling of the Chair on October 5, 1972, which holds that an 
    amendment allowing for the use of highway trust fund moneys to 
    purchase buses, would seem to violate clause 4 of rule XXI in that 
    it would divert or actually reappropriate for a new purpose funds 
    which have been appropriated and allocated and are in the pipeline 
    for purposes specified by the law under the original 1956 act.

        I say, Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    conference report on this basis.
        I would note, Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman from Oklahoma is 
    the one who sustained the point of order raised by Mr. Gross in the 
    case which I have referred to.
        Mr. Speaker, I am inclined to anticipate a ruling against my 
    point of order, but if that should be the case, Mr. Speaker, I 
    suggest we are making a mockery of the rules of the House.
        Since some of my comrades may not be aware of it, the rules of 
    the House in clause 5, rule XXI, provide:

            No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall 
        be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
        appropriations, nor shall an amendment proposing an 
        appropriation be in order during the consideration of a bill or 
        joint resolution reported by a committee not having that 
        jurisdiction. A question of order on an appropriation in any 
        such bill, joint resolution, or amendments thereto may be 
        raised at any time.

        Mr. Speaker, that is a rule of the House. Now, since the House 
    in its rules cannot have extraterritorial effect or extra body 
    effect, in order to protect the House from having its rules 
    violated by the Senate, we adopted clause 2 of rule XX which 
    related to action that the Senate might take that would be 
    violative of the House rules. But the very fact that this is not a 
    Senate amendment on a House bill is insignificant if the rules of 
    the House are going to have any real meaning because what we are 
    saying is any time we want to violate the House rules, we can have 
    the rule provide that after consideration of the bill it shall be 
    in order for the such-and-such Senate bill to be taken from the 
    Speaker's desk and everything after the enacting clause stricken 
    and apply the House language, or we can, when the bill is under 
    consideration before the House get consent to strike everything 
    after the enacting clause of the Senate bill and substitute the 
    House language. In either of those cases that for all intents and 
    purposes precludes a Member of this House from saying that the 
    rules of this House are violated with respect to action by the 
    Senate.

[[Page 12109]]

        I respectfully suggest, Mr. Speaker, at this point in time when 
    we are having some questions raised about the integrity of the 
    House rules and House administration, this is not the time to 
    render a decision on a point of order that gives in effect further 
    credence to the fact that we do not intend to maintain integrity in 
    this House with respect to the rules of the House if the procedure 
    is carried out in a circuitous way.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Ohio care to be heard on 
    the point of order?
        Mr. [Thomas L.] Ashley [of Ohio]: Very briefly, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, clause 2 of rule XX of the rules of the House 
    makes out of order any provision in a Senate amendment which 
    provides for an appropriation. However, the rule does not address 
    itself to provisions in Senate bills. The conferees accepted the 
    provision in question, without change, from a Senate bill and not 
    from a Senate amendment. Therefore, no violation of the House rules 
    is involved even if the provision is considered to be an 
    appropriation.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from Michigan has made a point of order against 
    the conference report, referring to the language of rule XX, clause 
    2, which places certain restrictions on the managers on the part of 
    the House in a conference with the Senate.
        The Chair has ruled on this matter before.
        On January 25, 1972, the Chair ruled in connection with a point 
    of order made by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross) against the 
    conference report on a foreign military assistance authorization 
    bill (S. 2819) on the ground that the House conferees had exceeded 
    their authority by including in the conference report an 
    appropriation entirely in conflict with clause 2, rule XX. That 
    rule provides, in relevant part, that ``no amendment of the 
    Senate''--that is the important language--no amendment of the 
    Senate providing for an appropriation upon any bill other than a 
    general appropriation bill, shall be agreed to by the managers on 
    the part of the House.
        The Chair would point out that it was a Senate bill which was 
    sent to conference with a House amendment thereto. The rule is 
    restricted in its application to Senate amendments and, thus, is 
    not applicable in the present situation.
        The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, in view of the ruling of 
    the Chair, I just would like to point out that in the conference 
    report the paragraph appears:

            That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the 
        amendment of the House to the text of the bill and agree to the 
        same with an amendment.

        In other words, with a Senate amendment.
        Now, I respectfully suggest that for all intents and purposes, 
    by using the circuitous route of taking up the Senate bill and 
    including the House language, we nullify totally the basic 
    directive of the House rules that this House shall not concur in 
    any appropriation in a legislation bill not a gen

[[Page 12110]]

    eral appropriations act, and for the Chair to rule that we will 
    accept a circuitous violation of the House rules, that we will not 
    accept a direct violation, I think is not in the best interests of 
    the House.
        The Speaker: The Chair just thinks there are other rules that 
    govern and that can protect the House in situations of this type. 
    The gentleman has referred to the language of the conference 
    agreement; and the Chair would point out that the managers have 
    proposed that the Senate recede and concur in the House amendment 
    with an amendment. There is no Senate amendment before the House at 
    this time.
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin that the statement be read in lieu of the report?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the statement.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The procedural safeguards mentioned by the 
Speaker against the inclusion of appropriations in Senate bills 
include: (1) possible points of order under section 401 of the 
Congressional Budget Act, if the Senate provision can be construed as 
new spending authority not subject to amounts specified in advance in 
appropriations acts where budget authority has not been provided in 
advance (in this case, the money had already been appropriated and was 
in a revolving fund, so section 401 was not applicable); and (2) 
returning Senate bills which contain appropriations to the Senate by 
asserting the constitutional prerogative of the House to originate 
``revenue'' measures (construed under the precedents to include at 
least ``general appropriation bills'').

Points of Order Against Consideration of Conference Reports

Sec. 4.20 A point of order against consideration of a conference report 
    based upon the fact that the managers had affixed their signatures 
    prior to their formal appointment must be made prior to 
    consideration of the conference report in the House.

    On Mar. 25, 1980,(5) the chairman of the Committee on 
Banking and Currency asked that a conference report on S. 662, a bill 
authorizing funds for International Banks, be recommitted to the 
conference. A series of inquiries followed which revealed that there 
had not been a formal, open meeting of the conference as required by 
Rule XXVIII. The conferees had been meeting informally with their 
Senate counterparts and had affixed their signatures about 30 minutes 
before their formal appointment. While this informal

[[Page 12111]]

meeting had been in an ``open'' situation, it could not qualify as an 
``open meeting'' since the managers had not been appointed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 126 Cong. Rec. 6429-31, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Henry S.] Reuss [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent to recommit the Senate bill, S. 662, to 
    conference.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (6) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. John P. Murtha (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, reserving 
    the right to object, could the gentleman tell me the title of the 
    bill?
        Mr. Reuss: Yes; this is the bill containing authorization for 
    the Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, 
    and the African Development Fund.
        Mr. Bauman: Could the gentleman from Wisconsin explain to me 
    why the chairman is asking to recommit this bill?
        Mr. Reuss: Yes, though not without some embarrassment. 
    Technically, it turned out that the conferees had conferred and 
    done their business a few minutes before the House conferees were, 
    in fact, appointed. That was one of those slips betwixt the cup and 
    the lip which occur because of the length of our corridors. So, the 
    report as it comes back to us is technically imperfect, and it is 
    to correct that imperfection that I ask this unanimous-consent 
    request.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, I assume 
    what the gentleman is saying is that the consideration of the 
    report in conference did not comply with rule XXVIII, which 
    requires an open conference meeting unless the House votes 
    otherwise?
        Mr. Reuss: I believe that is the relevant section. In any 
    event, whether it is rule XXVIII or not, and I do not have it in 
    front of me, it obviously was unintentionally improper, and we seek 
    to correct that by doing it right.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, I would like 
    to make a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        If no Member made a point of order against the consideration of 
    the conference report it could be considered; could it not?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, does the 
    gentleman from Wisconsin know of anyone who is going to make a 
    point of order?
        Mr. Reuss: No, I do not, but I realize that a valid point of 
    order would lie, and I did not want to be in the position of having 
    something on the calendar for tomorrow or the next day, knowing how 
    fragile it is. I cannot speak for 434 other Members.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, 
    I would like to make a further parliamentary inquiry.
        If this request is granted, the House is then asking the other 
    body for a conference. At that point it allows the other body to 
    act first under the rules, and that would preclude a motion to 
    recommit with instructions on the part of any Member of the House. 
    Is that correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: This request would not change the 
    order of consideration of the new report. It

[[Page 12112]]

    merely asks for a recommital of the conference report to the same 
    conference.
        Mr. Bauman: If the motion is granted, is a motion to recommit 
    or a motion to instruct in order at this time?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The House would still act first on the 
    conference report.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, the 
    gentleman from Maryland, knowing the outcome of the consideration 
    of the conference, would very much like to make a motion to 
    instruct but does not have one prepared at this time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair advises that would not be in 
    order at this time in any event.

        Mr. Bauman: That was the question the gentleman put to the 
    Chair, whether a motion to instruct would be in order at this time. 
    The Chair says ``No.'' If this request is not granted and a point 
    of order is made against the consideration of the conference 
    report, as the gentleman from Wisconsin suggested, it might be that 
    no motion to instruct would be in order under rule XXVIII at that 
    time, would it?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If a point of order were sustained 
    under clause 6 to rule 28 a new conference would be considered as 
    requested and conferees appointed without intervening motion and 
    the Senate would probably agree to a new conference and would 
    probably act first on the new conference report.
        Mr. Bauman: Further reserving the right to object, I would 
    inquire of the Chair, if in either case a motion to recommit with 
    instructions would be precluded by any Member of the House, whether 
    this request is granted, or whether a point of order is made, and 
    the rule automatically recommits the conference report?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Not in this case, if the request is 
    granted for recommittal to the same conference.
        Mr. Bauman: Well, I would say that the gentleman from Maryland 
    is trying to protect the rights of the minority, or actually the 
    majority who voted on this bill and who might seek a way of 
    vindicating their position in a motion to instruct the conferees, 
    or a motion to recommit.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If this request is granted to recommit 
    the conference report, the motion to recommit would be protected 
    for the minority.
        Mr. Bauman: But if the other body acts, Mr. Speaker, that 
    precludes a motion to recommit with instructions; does it not?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If this goes back to the same 
    conference the other body, of course, does not have to agree to a 
    request for a new conference.
        Mr. Bauman: But the other body can act first, thereby 
    precluding any motion to recommit?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the papers are traded in 
    conference, that is possible, but not the normal sequence. . . .
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, 
    is it within the province of the senior conferee to return the 
    papers to this House for action first, in order to protect a motion 
    to recommit?
        Mr. Reuss: Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, that is 
    absolutely right. That would be the normal course.

[[Page 12113]]

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, 
    do I have the guarantee of the gentleman from Wisconsin that that 
    will be his course of action? . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        There was no objection.

Procedure for Raising Point of Order Against Nongermane Provision in 
    Conference Report; Timing of Motion To Reject

Sec. 4.21 Where the Chair sustains a point of order that conferees have 
    agreed to and included in a conference report a nongermane 
    provision, a motion to reject that provision is in order under Rule 
    XXVIII clause 4(b), and is debatable for 40 minutes, equally 
    divided between the Member making the motion and a Member opposed; 
    and if the motion to reject is defeated, the debate commences on 
    the conference report itself.

    The text of the conference report on H.R. 6027,(7) the 
Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, considered in the House on Oct. 
11, 1984,(8) the resulting point of order, and subsequent 
proceedings are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 130 Cong. Rec. 31441, 98th Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 10, 1984.
 8. 130 Cong. Rec. 32219, 32220, 32223, 32224, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rodino submitted the following conference report and 
    statement on the bill (H.R. 6027) to clarify the application of the 
    Federal antitrust laws to the official conduct of local 
    governments:

                    Conference Report (H. Rept. No. 98-1158)

            The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
        two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
        6027) to clarify the application of the Federal antitrust laws 
        to the official conduct of local governments, having met, after 
        full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do 
        recommend to their respective Houses as follows:
            That the House recede from its disagreement to the 
        amendment of the Senate to the text of the bill and agree to 
        the same with an amendment as follows:
            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate 
        amendment insert the following:
        This Act may be cited as the ``Local Government Antitrust Act 
        of 1984.''.

            Sec. 2. For purposes of this Act--
            (1) the term ``local government'' means--
            (A) a city, county, parish, town, township, village, or any 
        other general function governmental unit established by State 
        law, or
            (B) a school district, sanitary district, or any other 
        special function governmental unit established by State law in 
        one or more States,
            (2) the term ``person'' has the meaning given it in 
        subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act (15 
        U.S.C. 12(A)), but does not include any local government as 
        defined in paragraph (1) of this section, and

[[Page 12114]]

            (3) the term ``State'' has the meaning given it in section 
        4G(2) of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15g(2)).
            Sec. 3. (a) No damages, interest on damages, costs, or 
        attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of 
        the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) from any local 
        government, or official or employee thereof acting in an 
        official capacity.
            (b) Subsection (a) shall not apply to cases commenced 
        before the effective date of this Act unless the defendant 
        establishes and the court determines, in light of all the 
        circumstances, including the stage of litigation and the 
        availability of alternative relief under the Clayton Act, that 
        it would be inequitable not to apply this subsection to a 
        pending case. In consideration of this section, existence of a 
        jury verdict, district court judgment, or any stage of 
        litigation subsequent thereto, shall be deemed to be prima 
        facie evidence that subsection (a) shall not apply.
            Sec. 4. (a) No damages, interest on damages, costs or 
        attorney's fees may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of 
        the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. 15, 15a, or 15c) in any claim 
        against a person based on any official action directed by a 
        local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an 
        official capacity.
            (b) Subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to cases 
        commenced before the effective date of this Act.
            Sec. 5. Section 510 of the Department of Commerce, Justice, 
        and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation 
        Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-411), is repealed.
            Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect 30 days before the date 
        of the enactment of this Act.
            And the Senate agree to the same.
                    Peter W. Rodino,
                    Jack Brooks,
                    Don Edwards,
                    John F. Seiberling,
                    Bill Hughes,
                    Mike Synar,
                    Geo. W. Crockett, Jr.,
                    Charles Schumer,
                    Edward Feighan,
                    Hamilton Fish,
                    Carlos J. Moorhead,
                    Henry Hyde,
                    Daniel E. Lungren,
                                  Managers on the Part of the House.
                    Strom Thurmond,
                    Orrin Hatch,
                    Howard Metzenbaum,
                           Managers on the Part of the Senate. . . .

        Mr. [Peter W.] Rodino [Jr., of New Jersey]: Mr. Speaker, 
    pursuant to House Resolution 616, I call up the conference report 
    on the bill (H.R. 6027) to clarify the application of the Clayton 
    Act to the official conduct of local governments, and for other 
    purposes.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (9) The Clerk will read the 
    conference report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Steny H. Hoyer (Md.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk proceeded to read the conference report. . . .
        Mr. Rodino (during the reading): Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the conference report be considered as read.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from New Jersey?
        There was no objection.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Charles] Wilson [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I have a point of 
    order.
        I make the point of order that the last section of the 
    conference report contains nongermane matters within the definition 
    of clause 4 of rule XXVIII.

[[Page 12115]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from New Jersey 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Rodino: The gentleman from New Jersey desires to be heard 
    on the point of order.
        Mr. Wilson: I would also like to be heard, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Texas.
        Mr. Wilson: Mr. Speaker, if the objectionable section had been 
    offered to the House bill, it would have been in violation of the 
    provisions of clause 7 of rule XVI of the House rules. The 
    provision is a repeal of appropriations law.
        That provision deals with spending levels for the Federal Trade 
    Commission for this fiscal year. The legis- lation is a permanent 
    piece of legislation that amends our antitrust laws. These 
    amendments reduce monetary damages that local governments may be 
    liable for in antitrust suits.
        That has nothing to do with the provision of the last section 
    of this conference report to which my point of order is directed.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from New Jersey [Mr. Rodino].
        Mr. Rodino: Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the point of 
    order against section 5 of the conference report. The fundamental 
    purpose of this conference report is to provide for continued 
    enforcement of the antitrust laws without severely damaging local 
    governments. This legislation before us continues to ensure that 
    antitrust violations will be prosecuted; but limits the amount of 
    damages which can be assessed in such a case against a local 
    governmental unit. It allows the aggrieved party to ensure that 
    injunctive relief will be available to terminate anticompetitive 
    activity of a local government.
        The fundamental purpose of the section against which the 
    gentleman raises a point of order is to permit the Federal Trade 
    Commission to continue to bring antitrust suits against 
    municipalities. The Federal Trade Commission is limited in the 
    remedies that it may pursue: The FTC cannot seek damages, only 
    injunctive relief. That is what this bill is all about, preventing 
    damage suits while leaving injunctive remedies in place.
        Mr. Speaker, I believe that the provisions of section 5 are 
    wholly consistent with the fundamental purpose of the rest of the 
    conference report and are therefore germane and the point of order 
    should not be sustained.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from New York 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Hamilton] Fish [Jr., of New York]: Yes, I do, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from New York on the point of order.
        Mr. Fish: Mr. Speaker, H.R. 6027 protects local governments, as 
    well as its officials and employees, against money damages in suits 
    under our antitrust laws.
        However, it implicitly continues to allow suits for injunctive 
    relief, when no money damages are involved, to enforce these 
    antitrust laws against possible anticompetitive actions by units of 
    local governments.
        These suits for injunctive relief may be brought either by a 
    private party or

[[Page 12116]]

    by the antitrust enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice, 
    or the FTC.
        The so-called taxicab rider which would be repealed by section 
    5 of this bill currently impedes the ability of the FTC to bring 
    the very type of injunctive relief enforcement which the bill 
    before us envisions and presumes. While removing the threat of 
    money damages, we do not intend that local governments be totally 
    immune from Federal antitrust laws. Suits for injunctive relief 
    will be a safety net against potential anticompetitive activities 
    by localities.
        This repeal of section 510 of Public Law 98-411 is fully 
    consistent with the overall purposes of this bill. To remove 
    section 5 from this legislation would, ironically, prevent the FTC 
    enforcement when a locality is involved in anticompetitive conduct.
        Again, the FTC would not recover money damages under the 
    structure of H.R. 6027, but it could seek an injunction to bring 
    anticompetitive activities by localities to a halt. The fair 
    balance in this legislation would be distorted if the FTC remains 
    unable to exercise its normal statutory responsibilities to enforce 
    compliance with our antitrust laws.
        Section 5 is consistent with the fundamental purposes of this 
    legislation and should remain in this bill. It is germane in a 
    logical, substantive sense. This is an antitrust bill. The FTC is 
    an antitrust enforcement agency. H.R. 6027 is an amendment to the 
    Clayton Act. The FTC, along with the Department of Justice, 
    enforces that very same Clayton Act.
        Section 510 of Public Law 98-411 was, in reality, legislation 
    on an appropriation bill, so its repeal is germane, but the fact is 
    that its original enactment was not germane.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
    Wilson] wish to be heard further on his point of order?
        Mr. Wilson: No, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If not, the Chair has had the 
    opportunity of reviewing the point of order raised by the gentleman 
    from Texas that pursuant to clause 4 of rule XXVIII, the conferees 
    on H.R. 6027 have agreed to a nongermane Senate provision. Section 
    5 of the conference report on H.R. 6027 contains the substance of 
    section 3 of the Senate amendment, which repealed section 510 of 
    Public Law 98-411, the State, Justice, Commerce Appropriation Act 
    for fiscal year 1985. The section proposed to be repealed prohibits 
    the expenditure of funds in that appropriation act for the Federal 
    Trade Commission to conduct antitrust actions against 
    municipalities or other units of local government.
        H.R. 6027 as passed by the House only addresses the issue of 
    antitrust remedies for claims against local governments, and merely 
    limits monetary relief for a Federal or private cause of action 
    against a local government under the Clayton Act. While the House 
    bill may limit the remedies which the FTC may obtain in such suits, 
    in the same way it limits any claimant, the House bill does not 
    address the general authority of the FTC to prosecute antitrust 
    actions, or the conditions under which the FTC may use its 
    appropriated funds for the coming fiscal year. The Chair would also 
    point out that the conference report

[[Page 12117]]

    and Senate amendment directly amend a general appropriation act not 
    addressed in the House bill.
        For the reasons stated, the Chair sustains the point of order.
        Does the gentleman from Texas have a motion pursuant to clause 
    4 of rule XXVIII?

                        motion offered by mr. wilson

        Mr. Wilson: Mr. Speaker, I move, pursuant to clause 4(b) of 
    rule XXVIII, to strike section 5 of the conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Wilson] 
    is entitled to 20 minutes in support of his motion.
        Does the gentleman from Texas wish to use his time?
        Mr. Wilson: Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to yield back my time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
    Rodino] is entitled to 20 minutes in opposition to the motion. . . 
    .
        The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from 
    Texas [Mr. Wilson].
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Wilson) there were--yeas 8, nays 23.
        Mr. Philip M. Crane [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I object to the 
    vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point 
    of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    36, nays 298, not voting 98. . . .
        So the motion was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (10) The gentleman from New 
    Jersey [Mr. Rodino] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the 
    gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] will be recognized for 30 
    minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Frank Harrison (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. 
    Rodino].

Order of Responding to Points of Order

Sec. 4.22 Where a conference report is vulnerable to several points of 
    order that sections included therein are not germane, the Speaker 
    entertains one point of order at a time, rules on whether it is 
    germane, and if he sustains the point of order entertains a motion 
    to reject that provision. After a vote on one motion to reject, he 
    then entertains the next point of order under Rule XXVIII clause 4. 
    If any motion to reject is agreed to, the conference report falls, 
    and a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, with an 
    amendment eliminating the rejected provisions, is entertained.

[[Page 12118]]

    The proceedings of Oct. 15, 1986,(11) when the House had 
before it the conference report on the Commodity Futures Trading Act of 
1986, provide a good illustration of the steps required by Rule XXVIII 
clause 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 132 Cong. Rec. 31498, 31499, 31502-06, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Conference Report on H.R. 4613, Futures Trading Act of 1986

        Mr. de la Garza submitted the following conference report and 
    statement on the bill (H.R. 4613) to reauthorize appropriations to 
    carry out the Commodity Exchange Act, and to make technical 
    improvements to that Act: (12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. See 132 Cong. Rec. 30824-26, 99th Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 14, 1986.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      Conference Report (H. Rept. 99-995)

            The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the 
        two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 
        4613) to reauthorize appropriations to carry out the Commodity 
        Exchange Act, and to make technical improvements to that Act, 
        having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to 
        recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as 
        follows:
            That the House recede from its disagreement to the 
        amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment 
        as follows:
            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate 
        amendment, insert the following:

                 section 1. short title and table of contents.

            (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Futures 
        Trading Act of 1986''.
            (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as 
        follows:
        Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.

                            TITLE I--FUTURES TRADING

                        sec. 101. fraudulent practices.

            Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act (7 U.S.C. 6b) is 
        amended--. . .

        Mr. [E (Kika)] de la Garza [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to 
    the provisions of House Resolution 590, the rule just adopted, I 
    call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 4613) to 
    reauthorize appropriations to carry out the Commodity Exchange Act, 
    and to make technical improvements to that act.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Charles O.] Whitley [of North Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    make a point of order against the nongermane amendment contained in 
    the conference report relating to the transfer of national forest 
    lands in the State of Nebraska.
        The Speaker: (13) The gentleman from North Carolina 
    (Mr. Whitley) will identify that portion of the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Whitley: Mr. Speaker, the point of order is specifically 
    made against section 207 of title II of the conference report.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Texas desire to be heard 
    on the point of order?
        Mr. de la Garza: Yes, Mr. Speaker, briefly.
        Mr. Speaker, the committee and the conference committee agreed 
    on the

[[Page 12119]]

    text of the legislation which is the Commodity Futures Trade 
    Commission.
        The other body then added various and sundry other bills and we 
    have to concede the point that they were not germane and they were 
    extraneous to the matter. Therefore, I find myself in the situation 
    where I could not but otherwise yield to the point of order, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker: The point of order is conceded and sustained.
        Does the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley) move to 
    reject that part of the conference committee report?
        Mr. Whitley: Mr. Speaker, I do.

                       motion offered by mr. whitley

        Mr. Whitley: Mr. Speaker, I move to delete section 207 from the 
    conference report.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley) is 
    recognized for 20 minutes.
        Mr. Whitley: Mr. Speaker, section 207 of title II of the 
    conference report authorizes the conveyance of approximately 173 
    acres of land in the Nebraska National Forest to the Nebraska Game 
    and Parks Commission, to be added to the Chadron State Park in 
    Nebraska. . . .
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley).
        The motion was agreed to.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Edward R.] Madigan [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the conference report to H.R. 4613 under 
    rule XXVIII, clause 4, of the House rules for the reason that it 
    contains a Senate amendment that is in violation of rule XVI, 
    clause 7, because it contains matter nongermane to H.R. 4613 as 
    passed by the House.
        H.R. 4613, as reported by the Committee on Agriculture, and 
    adopted in the House, was a bill ``to authorize appropriations to 
    carry out the Commodity Exchange Act, and to make technical 
    improvements in that act.'' . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (14) Does the gentleman 
    from Texas (Mr. de la Garza) desire to be heard on this point of 
    order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. John Joseph Moakley (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. de la Garza: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, the House version of the CFTC, as I have explained 
    previously, did not contain this item of legislation. The other 
    body amended the bill and added other items. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: . . . In the opinion of the Chair, 
    section 202 of the conference report as added in the Senate would 
    not have been germane to the House-passed bill; so the point of 
    order is sustained.

                       motion offered by mr. madigan

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Speaker, I move to reject the matter in the 
    conference report originally contained in section 504 of the Senate 
    amendment to H.R. 4613 and now contained in section 202 of the 
    conference report entitled ``Basis for Computation of Emergency 
    Compensation Under the 1986 Wheat Program'' (H. Rept. 99-995).
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
    Madigan) is recognized for 20 minutes. . . .

[[Page 12120]]

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Speaker, is it correct that I am entitled to 
    close the debate?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is not correct. The 
    gentleman from Texas (Mr. Stenholm) has the right to close debate.
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert in 
    the Record a letter from the Director of the Congressional Budget 
    Office relative to the item of discussion before the House this 
    morning.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Illinois?
        There was no objection.
        The text of the letter is as follows: . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion offered 
    by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Madigan).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    162, nays 239, not voting 31, as follows: . . .

        [So the motion to reject was not agreed to.]
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Are there any other points of order 
    against this bill?

    vacating proceedings by which section 207 of the conference report 
                          on h.r. 4613 was deleted

        Mrs. [Virginia] Smith of Nebraska: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent to set aside and vacate the proceedings on the motion of 
    the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley) to reject the 
    Senate amendment to section 406 of H.R. 4613 that is now section 
    207 of the conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentlewoman from Nebraska?
        Mr. Whitley: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I want 
    to advise the Members that earlier in the proceedings today I made 
    a point of order against one of the sections of the bill. I do not 
    have the language in front of me at this moment. My point of order 
    was sustained, and I moved that that section of the bill be 
    stricken. Speaker O'Neill was in the chair at the time. He ruled 
    that the motion had carried and announced that the section was 
    stricken.
        Subsequent to that time, the gentlewoman from Nebraska 
    approached me and told me that the proceedings were somewhat hasty, 
    that she was taken by surprise and did not have an opportunity to 
    present arguments in opposition to my motion.
        Mr. Speaker, I will not object to the gentlewoman's request 
    with the clear understanding that I will have the same time to 
    argue in support of my motion that I was originally assigned if the 
    proceeding is vacated.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If there is no objection and the 
    proceeding is vacated, the Chair will resume as if nothing had 
    happened so that the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley) 
    will be protected and will have his time.
        Mr. Whitley: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

[[Page 12121]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentlewoman from Nebraska?
        There was no objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. 
    Whitley) is recognized for 20 minutes. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion offered 
    by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Whitley).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        0Mrs. Smith of Nebraska: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on 
    the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    274, nays 130 . . . .
        [The motion to reject was agreed to.]
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) Pursuant to clause 4, 
    rule XXVIII, the conference report is considered as rejected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Kenneth J. Gray (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question is on the motion to recede and concur in the 
    Senate amendment with an amendment consisting of the text of the 
    conference report without section 207. . . .

                     motion offered by mr. de la garza

        Mr. de la Garza: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. de la Garza moves that the House recede from its 
        disagreement to the Senate amendment to H.R. 4613 and concur 
        therein with an amendment:

        In lieu of the matter inserted by the Senate amendment, insert 
    the text of the conference report on H.R. 4613 without section 207 
    thereof.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Texas (Mr. de la 
    Garza) will be recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Madigan) will be recognized for 30 minutes.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas (Mr. de la 
    Garza).

Points of Order at Conference Stage

Sec. 4.23 A point of order against a conference report on a legislative 
    bill on the basis that it carries in its text an appropriation is 
    not valid if the appropriation was in the bill as it passed the 
    House and allowed to remain because of waiver or inaction.

        On May 1, 1975,(16) during consideration of the 
    conference report on the bill H.R. 6096, the Vietnam Humanitarian 
    and Evacuation Assistance Act of 1975, a point of order was raised 
    against the report on the ground that it carried an appropriation 
    in violation both of clause 2 of Rule XX and clause

[[Page 12122]]

    5 of Rule XXI. After debate, the Speaker overruled the point of 
    order. The discussion on the point of order and the ruling follow:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 121 Cong. Rec. 12752, 12753, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas E.] Morgan [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I call 
    up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 6096) to authorize funds 
    for humanitarian assistance and evacuation programs in Vietnam and 
    to clarify restrictions on the availability of funds for the use of 
    U.S. Armed Forces in Indochina, and for other purposes, and ask 
    unanimous consent that the statement of the managers be read in 
    lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker: (17) there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ms. [Elizabeth] Holtzman [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I would 
    like to make a point of order against the conference report.
        The Speaker: The gentlewoman will state it.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Speaker, section 7 of the conference report 
    in the last sentence refers to evacuation programs authorized by 
    this act. It permits a waiver of a series of laws for the purpose 
    of allowing those evacuation programs to take place.
        In the House bill (H.R. 6096), section 3 dealt with evacuation 
    programs referred to in section 2 of the bill and waived the same 
    series of laws with respect thereto. In order for section 3 to be 
    considered, it required a rule from the Rules Committee. And a rule 
    was granted waiving points of order against section 3 of the bill. 
    But section 7 of the conference report, in speaking of evacuation 
    programs authorized by the entire act and not just by one section, 
    exceeds the scope of section 3 of the bill and exceeds the waiver 
    that was permitted under the rule. It therefore violates rule XXI, 
    clause 5, and violates rule XX, clause 2, which prohibits House 
    conferees from accepting a Senate amendment providing for an 
    appropriation on a nonappropriation bill in excess of the rules of 
    the House.
        Mr. Speaker, last week the Committee of the Whole deliberated 
    on an amendment that exceeded the limitations of the rule granted 
    by the Rules Committee. That was the Eckhardt amendment, and it was 
    ruled out of order by the Chairman. The language in section 7 of 
    the conference report in essence has the same flaw as the Eckhardt 
    amendment.
        The last sentence of section 7 of the conference report would 
    waive various provisions of law with respect to $327 million, 
    whereas the last sentence of section 3 of the House bill waived 
    these laws only with respect to $150 million. Section 7 of the 
    conference report, therefore, is broader than section 3 of the 
    House bill.
        Had the language of section 7 been offered as an amendment to 
    the House bill, it would have been subject to a point of order. 
    Since the authority of the House conferees is no broader than the 
    waiver originally granted to the bill by the Rules Committee, 
    section 7 of the conference report should be ruled out of order.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Morgan: Yes, Mr. Speaker.

[[Page 12123]]

        The point of order has no standing. Section 3 of the House bill 
    and section 7 of the conference report referred to use of funds of 
    the Armed Forces of the United States for the protection and 
    evacuation of certain persons from South Vietnam. The language of 
    the conference report does not increase funds available for that 
    purpose. Both the House bill and the conference report simply 
    removed limitations on the use of funds from the DOD budget. These 
    limitations were not applicable to the funds authorized in H.R. 
    6096. The scope of the waiver is the same in the conference report 
    and the House bill.
        Mr. Speaker, the changes in language are merely conforming 
    changes. Section 2 of the House bill was a section which authorized 
    the evacuation programs in the House bill. The conference version 
    contains the evacuation programs authority in several sections plus 
    reference to the entire act rather than to one specific section.

        Mr. Speaker, the point of order has no standing and I hope it 
    is overruled.
        The Speaker: Does the gentlewoman from New York desire to be 
    heard further on the point of order?
        Ms. Holtzman: No, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentlewoman from New York makes the point of order that 
    section 7 of the conference report constitutes an appropriation on 
    a legislative bill in violation of clause 5, rule XXI, to which the 
    House conferees were not authorized to agree pursuant to clause 2, 
    rule XX.
        The Chair would first point out that the provisions of clause 
    2, rule XX, preclude House conferees from agreeing to a Senate 
    amendment containing an appropriation on a legislative bill, and do 
    not restrict their authority to consider an appropriation which 
    might have been contained in the House-passed version. In this 
    instance, the conferees have recommended language which is 
    virtually identical to section 3 of the House bill, and they have 
    not agreed to a Senate amendment containing an appropriation. 
    Therefore, clause 2, rule XX, is not applicable to the present 
    conference report.
        While clause 5, rule XXI, permits a point of order to be raised 
    against an appropriation in a legislative bill ``at any time'' 
    consistent with the orderly consideration of the bill to which 
    applied--Cannon's VII, sections 2138-39--the Chair must point out 
    that H.R. 6096 was considered in the House under the terms of House 
    Resolution 409 which waived points of order against section 3 of 
    the House bill as constituting an appropriation of available funds 
    for a new purpose.
        The Chair feels that an analogous situation may be found in 
    Deschler's Procedure, chapter 25, section 23.11. There, points of 
    order had been waived against portions of a general appropriation 
    bill which were unauthorized by law, and the bill passed the House 
    containing those provisions and was sent to conference; the 
    conferees were permitted to report their agreement as to those 
    provisions, since the waiver carried over to the consideration of 
    the same provision when the conference report was before the House.
        The gentlewoman from New York also has in effect made the point 
    of order that section 7 of the conference report goes beyond the 
    issues in dif

[[Page 12124]]

    ference between the two Houses committed to conference in violation 
    of clause 3, rule XXVIII.
        In the House-passed bill, section 3 contained waivers of 
    certain provisions of law in order to make available funds already 
    appropriated to the Department of Defense to be used for the Armed 
    Forces in ``evacuation programs referred to in section 2 of the 
    act.'' The conferees have recommended that the same waivers of law 
    shall apply to ``evacuation programs authorized by this act.''
        In the opinion of the Chair, a conforming change in phraseology 
    in a conference report from language contained in the House or 
    Senate version to achieve consistency in the language thereof, 
    absent proof that the effect of that change is to broaden the scope 
    of the language beyond that contained in either version, does not 
    necessarily render the conference report subject to a point of 
    order. In this instance, it appears to the Chair that the only 
    effect of the language in the conference report was to accomplish 
    the same result that would have been reached by section 3 of the 
    House bill, namely to remove certain limitations on the use of 
    funds in the Defense budget for military evacuation programs under 
    this bill.
        The Chair therefore holds that the conferees have not exceeded 
    their authority and overrules the point of order.
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read the statement.
        (For conference report and statement see proceedings of the 
    House of April 28, 1975.)

Gaining Floor for Point of Order

Sec. 4.24 The Chair must recognize a Member to state a point of order 
    relative to the conduct of debate at any time, and it is not 
    necessary that the Member having the floor yield for that purpose.

    As the 2d session of the 95th Congress was drawing to a close, the 
Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978 was being considered for 
amendment under the five-minute rule. Time for debate on the bill and 
remaining amendments was limited to 40 minutes. An amendment was 
offered by Mr. Duncan and he and Mr. Dingell, the bill manager, were 
each recognized briefly to debate the amendment. The proceedings of 
Oct. 14, 1978,(18) were as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 124 Cong. Rec. 38153-55, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert L.] Leggett [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I move 
    to strike the last word.
        Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that we have been 
    considering this bill now for 4 hours. It is everybody's knowledge 
    that we have to complete this bill before the session ends. We do 
    not want to take all day on it.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate on all 
    amendments and on the bill close in 30 minutes.

[[Page 12125]]

        The Chairman: (19) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from California? . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. B. F. Sisk (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Leggett: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that debate 
    on all amendments and on the bill close in 40 minutes.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [John] Buchanan [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, reserving the 
    right to object, those of us who have amendments printed in the 
    Record would, of course, be protected by the rules under the 
    scenario?
        The Chairman: Let the Chair state that that is correct, 5 
    minutes on each side.
        Mr. Buchanan: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Members standing at the time the unanimous-
    consent agreement was entered into will be recognized for 2\1/2\ 
    minutes each.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. 
    Hughes). . . .
        Mr. [Robert] Duncan of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Duncan of Oregon: Page 24, strike 
        out line 1 and all that follows down through line 4, and insert 
        in lieu thereof the following:
            ``(13) The term `species' means a group of fish, wildlife, 
        or plants, consisting of physically similar organisms capable 
        of interbreeding but generally incapable of producing fertile 
        offspring through breeding with organisms outside this 
        group.'';

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    points of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) 
    reserves points of order against the amendment.
        Mr. Duncan of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, without repeating the 
    significance of these amendments that I have already discussed in 
    connection with the first amendment to redefine ``critical 
    habitat,'' this one goes to the definition of ``species.'' The 
    committee bill, at the top of page 24, defines the term ``species'' 
    as including any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any 
    distinct segment of the population of any species of vertebrate 
    fish or wildlife which interbreeds when mature. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan desire to insist 
    upon his point of order?
        Mr. Dingell: No, I do not, I wish to speak in opposition to the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan withdraws his point 
    of order and is recognized for 2\1/2\ minutes. . . .
        Mr. Duncan of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Dingell: I do not yield.
        Mr. Duncan: of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of 
    order.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I ask for regular order.
        Mr. Duncan: of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I ask for regular order. I do not 
    yield to the gentleman. He understands the rules.
        Mr. Duncan: of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, may I state a point of 
    order.

[[Page 12126]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Duncan: of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, the point of order is----
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I do not yield for a point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair has stated that the gentleman will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Duncan: of Oregon: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order. 
    The gentleman is addressing himself and his argument to the 
    amendment----
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I do not yield to the gentleman from 
    Oregon.
        Mr. Chairman, I demand the protection of the Chair. This is a 
    frivolous point of order. I do not yield for that purpose. I ask 
    that the gentleman be instructed to take his seat and behave 
    himself.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) 
    please recognize that the Chair is trying to conform to the rules.
        The gentleman has made a point of order; and of course, the 
    Chair must recognize that point of order.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I do not yield for the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that it is not necessary 
    that the gentleman yield for that purpose. The Chair has a right at 
    any time to recognize a Member on a point of order.
        The gentleman from Michigan will continue to proceed in order.
        Mr. Dingell: I am proceeding in order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will proceed. . . .
        Mr. [William J.] Hughes [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I yield 
    1 minute to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Duncan).
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that he 
    already used his time under the allocation.
        Mr. Hughes: Mr. Chairman, I had two amendments at the desk.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has used his time.
        The Chair was trying to be fair in recognizing either the 
    chairman or the ranking member, if either desires to comment on the 
    amendment.

Point of Order Against Motion To Recommit

Sec. 4.25 A point of order against a motion to recommit must be made 
    immediately after the motion is read and comes too late after 
    debate thereon.

    On May 13, 1982,(20) Mr. Dan Glickman, of Kansas, 
attempted to raise a point of order against a pending motion to 
recommit. The gist of the argument he attempted to make was that the 
motion amended an amendment already adopted by the House. The motion in 
this instance was not protected by language in the special order 
providing for consideration of the bill and specifying that the motion 
to recommit could be ``with or without instructions.'' In any event, 
the point of order against the motion came too late, the pro

[[Page 12127]]

ponent having entered into the five-minute debate permitted by the 
rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 128 Cong. Rec. 9838, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (1) Under the rule, the 
    previous question is ordered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Gillis W. Long (La.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair 
    will put them en gros.
        The amendments were agreed to.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the engrossment and 
    third reading of the bill.
        The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and 
    was read the third time.

                   motion to recommit offered by mr. dunn

        Mr. [Jim] Dunn [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to 
    recommit.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
        Mr. Dunn: I am, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman qualifies.
        The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Dunn moves to recommit the bill H.R. 5890 to the 
        Committee on Science and Technology with instructions to report 
        back the same forthwith with the following amendment: On page 
        2, line 22, strike ``$267,100,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$232,700,000''.

        Mr. Dunn: Mr. Speaker, the point of this is to say to this 
    body, and even though I am a member of the committee and a strong 
    supporter of our space program in its entirety, that if we cannot 
    in a $6.6 billion budget deal with between us reducing $35 million, 
    then I would have to ask the Members of this body, where are we 
    going to begin to cut?
        The proposal that came from the administration represented an 
    11-percent increase--an 11-percent increase for NASA at a time when 
    many other areas of our Government are being asked to cut back. If 
    we cannot between us find $35 million, then--

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Glickman: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman yield for the 
    inquiry?
        Mr. Dunn: I yield just for an inquiry. The gentleman will state 
    his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Glickman: Mr. Speaker, I would ask if the numbers in the 
    motion to recommit are in fact the same numbers in the committee 
    bill as amended by the Winn amendment?
        Mr. Dunn: Yes, Mr. Speaker. They are the same numbers as in the 
    Winn amendment.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will inquire, is the 
    gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Glickman) raising a point of order?
        Mr. Glickman: Yes, Mr. Speaker, I am raising a point of order.
        Mr. Dunn: Regular order, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that, the 
    gentleman's point of order is not timely. It comes too late.
        The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dunn) will proceed.

[[Page 12128]]



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 5. Timeliness as Against Bills or Provisions Therein

    The principles governing the timeliness of points of order against 
bills or provisions therein and amendments are similar. Points of order 
against a bill are considered by the Chair prior to recognition of 
Members to offer amendments; (2) and a point of order 
against a section of a bill must be made immediately after the section 
is read and comes too late after an amendment to that section has been 
considered.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See Sec. Sec. 5.1-5.8, infra.
 3. See Sec. 5.10, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On the other hand, it is not too late to make a point of order 
against a paragraph merely because there has been argument on a point 
of order against a proviso within the paragraph.(4) A point 
of order against a part of a paragraph or section, if sustained, 
results in the elimination of the whole,(5) unless it is the 
desire of the offeror of the point of order to limit his point to only 
part of the paragraph.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See Sec. 5.13, infra.
 5. See Sec. Sec. 1.16-1.18, supra.
 6. See Sec. 1.19, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The time for making points of order against unauthorized items or 
legislation in an appropriation bill is after the House has resolved 
itself into the Committee of the Whole and after the paragraph 
containing such items has been read for amendment.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Sec. Sec. 5.12-5.15, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    But points of order against appropriations in legislative bills, 
under Rule XXI clause 5, can be raised ``at any time,'' which has been 
held to mean during consideration of that portion of the bill, or of 
the amendment, under the five-minute rule.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. See Sec. Sec. 5.28, 5.29, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A point of order against a paragraph in a general appropriation 
bill comes too late after the sponsor of an amendment to it is 
recognized to debate his amendment,(9) or after the 
amendment has been read and agreed to.(10) It is too late to 
make such points after the Clerk has begun reading the next 
paragraph.(11) The Chair often displays some leniency, 
however, to Members who missed their opportunity to raise a point of 
order, when such Members were on their feet seeking recognition at the 
appropriate time.(12)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. See Sec. 5.18, infra.
10. See Sec. 5.20, infra.
11. See Sec. 5.21, infra.
12. See Sec. Sec. 5.23, 5.24, infra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12129]]

                          -------------------

Prior to Recognition for Amendments

Sec. 5.1 Points of order against a paragraph of a bill are considered 
    by the Chairman before Members are recognized to offer amendments 
    to that paragraph.

        On June 4, 1970,(13) the Committee of the Whole had 
    under consideration H.R. 17867, the foreign assistance 
    appropriation for fiscal 1971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 116 Cong. Rec. 18395, 18396, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                              economic assistance

            Technical assistance: For necessary expenses as authorized 
        by law $310,000,000, distributed as follows:
            (1) World-wide, $150,000,000 (section 212);
            (2) Alliance for Progress, $75,000,000 (section 252(a)); 
        and
            (3) Multilateral organizations, $85,000,000 (section 
        302(a)), of which not less than $13,000,000 shall be available 
        only for the United Nations Children's Fund: Provided That no 
        part of this appropriation shall be used to initiate any 
        project or activity which has not been justified to the 
        Congress, except projects or activities relating to the 
        reduction of population growth: Provided further, That the 
        President shall seek to assure that no contribution to the 
        United Nations Development Program authorized by the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, shall be used for projects 
        for economic or technical assistance to the Government of Cuba, 
        so long as Cuba is governed by the Castro regime.

        Mr. [Clement J.] Zablocki [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (14) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Hale Boggs (La.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Zablocki: If a Member desired to raise a point of order to 
    paragraph (3) on page 2, would he have to wait until the Clerk has 
    read the entire title?
        The Chairman: No, he would have to wait only until the Clerk 
    had read the paragraph carrying the language to which the gentleman 
    wishes to make his point of order.
        Mr. Zablocki: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order to language 
    appearing on page 2. The gentleman from Wisconsin was on his feet.
        The Chairman: The Clerk has read the section to which the 
    gentleman wishes to make his point of order.
        Mr. [Richard H.] Ichord [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Ichord: I wish to offer an amendment affecting lines 9, 10, 
    11, 12, 13 and 14 on page 2. Is the amendment in order at this 
    time?
        Mr. [Otto E.] Passman [of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Passman: It is my understanding that the Clerk has already 
    read that section and has even gone into a reading of the third 
    page of the bill.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Wisconsin was on his feet 
    seeking rec

[[Page 12130]]

    ognition, and the Chair will protect his rights.
        Mr. Zablocki: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Missouri will defer offering 
    his amendment. The Chair will hear the gentleman from Wisconsin on 
    his point of order.
        Mr. Zablocki: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    entire proviso beginning on line 20 and ending on line 25 of page 2 
    is legislation in an appropriation. I am for its objectives, but in 
    effect it simply says that the President should try to enforce 
    existing law. The provisions in existing law, section 620 of the 
    Foreign Assistance Act are stronger and there is no sense in this 
    useless repetition in an appropriation.
        Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that this is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Louisiana wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Passman: Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. The proviso was added by 
    the Committee on Appropriations for the foreign assistance 
    appropriation bill for fiscal year 1971 in order to insure that no 
    U.S. contribution to the UNDP would be used to give any type of 
    economical or technical assistance to Cuba as long as Cuba is 
    governed by the Castro regime.
        I would like to interpret this as a limitation on an 
    appropriation bill and ask for a ruling.
        The Chairman: The language in question is as follows: Line 20, 
    page 2:

            Provided further, That the President shall seek to assure . 
        . .

        And so forth.
        That is obviously a directive to the President of the United 
    States, it is not limited in application to the funds appropriated 
    in this bill or any section thereof, and the Chair sustains the 
    point of order.

    The Chair then recognized Mr. Ichord to offer an amendment.

Sec. 5.2 Points of order reserved against a proposition must be 
    disposed of before amendments thereto are in order.

    On May 14, 1937,(15) it was ruled that one could not 
reserve a point of order and offer an amendment simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 81 Cong. Rec. 4596, 4597, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6958, the Interior Department appropriation for 1938.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [Gerald J.] Boileau [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    the point of order against the proviso. . . .
        The Chairman: (16) The time of the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin has expired. Without objection the pro-forma amendment 
    will be withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Boileau: I do not withdraw my reservation to the point of 
    order, Mr. Chairman, but I have an amendment that I desire to 
    offer.
        The Chairman: The point of order will have to be disposed of 
    before an amendment is in order.
        Mr. Boileau: I reserve the point of order, if that reservation 
    does not continue.

[[Page 12131]]

        The Chairman: The reservation does not continue if the 
    gentleman wants to offer an amendment.
        Mr. Boileau: It can continue by unanimous consent, can it not?
        The Chairman: The Chair thinks it is his duty to protect the 
    bill to that extent.
        Mr. Boileau: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the point of order.

Before Amendments Are Offered

Sec. 5.3 Where, by unanimous consent, an authorization bill is 
    considered read and open to amendment at any point, points of order 
    against possible appropriations therein, though in order ``at any 
    time,'' should be stated before amendments are offered.

    On Oct. 3, 1962,(17) the principle was expressed that 
points of order should be raised before taking up amendments to a bill, 
although in actuality the principle was waived by unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 108 Cong. Rec. 21883, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 13273, concerning omnibus river and harbors authorizations 
        for 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John A.] Blatnik  [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that titles I and II be considered as read.
        The Chairman: (18) And open for amendment at any 
    point?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Francis E. Walter (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Blatnik: Open at any point for amendment.
        Mr. [William C.] Cramer [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, reserving 
    the right to object, that does not preclude the right to raise 
    points of order at any time, does it?
        The Chairman: Of course not.
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Minnesota [Mr. Blatnik], that the first two titles will be 
    considered as read?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [John F.] Baldwin [of California]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Baldwin: Mr. Chairman, do points of order have to be 
    brought up before any amendments are offered?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that they should be, but 
    they may be raised.
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that points of order be in order at any time.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Iowa?
        There was no objection.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Since, under rules in effect in the 87th 
Congress, no other points of order would have been in order against a 
provision in a legislative bill except one directed at an appropriation 
in violation of Rule XXI clause 5(a), which would have been in order at 
any time, whether or not debate or amendments

[[Page 12132]]

had intervened, this unanimous-consent request was unnecessary. Had the 
bill under consideration been a general appropriation bill, or a 
highway bill providing for a specific road in violation of present Rule 
X clause 1(p), then Mr. Gross' unanimous-consent request would have 
been relevant.

Permitting Points of Order Against Portion of Bill Not Yet Read

Sec. 5.4 Where the Committee of the Whole had agreed by unanimous 
    consent to consider points of order directed to paragraphs not yet 
    read, the Chair directed the Clerk to report each such provision 
    and entertained points of order as they were presented.

    The special order reported from the Committee on Rules which 
protected legislative provisions in the dire emergency supplemental 
appropriation bill, funding expenses of the Desert Storm military 
operation against Iraq, waived all points of order against three 
provisions, which the Committee on Public Works and Transportation had 
argued should remain vulnerable to points of order. The special order, 
adopted Mar. 7, 1991,(19) read, in pertinent part, as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 137 Cong. Rec. 5478, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Martin] Frost [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 103, and ask for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 103

            Resolved, That all points of order for failure to comply 
        with the provisions of sections 302(f) and 311(a) of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with clause 2(l)(6) of 
        rule XI and clause 7 of rule XXI are hereby waived against 
        consideration of the bill (H.R. 1281) making dire emergency 
        supplemental appropriations for the consequences of Operation 
        Desert Storm/Desert Shield, food stamps, unemployment 
        compensation administration, veterans compensation and 
        pensions, and other urgent needs for the fiscal year ending 
        September 30, 1991, and for other purposes. During 
        consideration of the bill, all points of order against 
        provisions in the bill for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clauses 2 and 6 of rule XXI are hereby waived, 
        except against the provisions beginning on page 24, line 17 
        through page 25, line 10; beginning on page 28, lines 14 
        through 21; and beginning on page 32, lines 15 through 22. . . 
        .

    During the consideration of the bill H.R. 1281 in Committee of the 
Whole on Mar. 7, 1991,(20) the chairman of the legislative 
committee wished to address the un

[[Page 12133]]

protected paragraphs as soon as consideration under the five-minute 
rule began.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Id. at pp. 5496-98.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (1) All time for general debate on 
    this bill has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Dennis E. Eckart (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                   H.R. 1281

            Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
        the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
        following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the 
        Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to provide dire emergency 
        supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending 
        September 30, 1991, and for other purposes, namely: . . .

        Mr. [Robert A.] Roe [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I have three 
    points of order to paragraphs not protected by the rule, and I ask 
    unanimous consent that the paragraphs beginning on page 24, line 
    17, through page 25, line 10; page 28, lines 14 through 21; and 
    page 32, lines 15 through 22, be considered at this time so I can 
    exercise my rights under the rule. . . .
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from New Jersey?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Pursuant to the unanimous-consent order, the 
    Clerk will report the first paragraph against which the gentleman 
    from New Jersey may raise a point of order.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            Architect of the Capitol

                            administrative provision

                              (transfer of funds)

            Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to 
        approval by the Joint Committee on the Library, the Architect 
        of the Capitol is authorized (1) to procure, through a rental, 
        lease, or other agreement, not more than 25,000 square feet of 
        temporary storage and warehouse space outside the Capitol 
        Grounds for use by the Library of Congress during fiscal year 
        1991, and (2) to incur incidental expenses in connection with 
        such use. Subject to approval by the Committee on 
        Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Appropriations of the Senate, amounts for the 
        purposes of the preceding sentence may be transferred from the 
        appropriation ``Library of Congress, Salaries and expenses'' to 
        the appropriation ``Architect of the Capitol, Library buildings 
        and grounds, Structural and mechanical care''. Amounts so 
        transferred shall be available for expenditure upon vouchers 
        approved by the Architect of the Capitol.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe] have 
    a point of order on this paragraph?
        Mr. Roe: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the provision in 
    title II, chapter VI, entitled ``Architect of the Capitol,'' 
    beginning on page 24, line 17 through page 25, line 10. That 
    provision violates clause 2 of rule XXI because it is legislation 
    in an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida 
    [Mr. Smith].
        Mr. [Lawrence J.] Smith of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I would hope 
    the gen

[[Page 12134]]

    tleman would not insist on his point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    point of order raised by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe]?
        Mr. [John Paul] Hammerschmidt [of Arkansas]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    would like to be heard. . . .
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Roe: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further? . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        Based on the reasons asserted by the gentleman from New Jersey 
    [Mr. Roe], the point of order is sustained, and the paragraph is 
    stricken.
        The Clerk will report the next paragraph in dispute. The Clerk 
    read as follows:
        Page 28, beginning on line 13,

                                   Chapter X

                        General Services Administration

            None of the funds made available by this or any other Act 
        with respect to any fiscal year may be used by the General 
        Services Administration to obligate or expend any funds for the 
        award of contracts for the construction of the Northern 
        Virginia Naval Systems Command Headquarters project without 
        advance approval in writing of the House Committee on 
        Appropriations.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe] wish 
    to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. Roe: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the provision of title II, chapter X, entitled ``General Services 
    Administration'' beginning on page 28, lines 14 through 21. That 
    provision violates clause 2 of rule XXI because it again is 
    recommending legislation in an appropriations bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia 
    [Mr. Wolf].
        Mr. [Frank R.] Wolf [of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the provision entitled ``General Services 
    Administration'' be modified by inserting in line 21, after the 
    word ``the,'' the words, ``House Committee on Public Works and 
    Transportation and the''. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] seeks 
    unanimous consent to modify the language subject to the reservation 
    of the point of order of the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Roe].
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    Virginia?
        There was no objection.

    The remaining unprotected paragraphs were then reported and points 
of order were entertained.

Where Bill ``Considered Read and Open to Amendment,'' the Chair Takes 
    Points of Order Before Amendments

Sec. 5.5 Where the Committee of the Whole agrees to a request that 
    ``the remainder of the paragraphs of the appropriation bill be 
    considered as read and open to amendment,'' the Chair queries for

[[Page 12135]]

    points of order before entertaining amendments to or debate on the 
    paragraphs.

    During the reading for amendment of the legislative branch 
appropriation bill for fiscal 1992, Mr. Vic Fazio, of California, 
subcommittee chairman and manager of the bill, asked unanimous consent 
that the remainder of the bill (except the last two lines) be 
considered read and open to amendment. There being no objection, the 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Brian J. Donnelly, of 
Massachusetts, solicited points of order to the portion considered 
read. The following proceedings occurred on June 5, 1991: 
(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 137 Cong. Rec. 13567, 13571, 13572, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    remainder of the bill, except for lines 22 and 23 on page 40, be 
    considered as read, printed in the Record, and open to amendment at 
    any point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California?
        There was no objection.
        The text of the remainder of the bill, through line 21 on page 
    40 is as follows:

                            salaries, officers and 
                                employees . . .

            Sec. 310. (a) The Clerk of the House of Representatives 
        shall maintain and operate a child care center (to be known as 
        the ``House of Representatives Child Care Center'') to furnish 
        pre-school child care--
            (1) for children of individuals whose pay is disbursed by 
        the Clerk of the House of Representatives or the Sergeant at 
        Arms of the House of Representatives and children of support 
        personnel of the House of Representatives; and . . .

        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against that 
    section of the bill?

                               point of order

        Mr. [Joel] Hefley  [of Colorado]: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point 
    of order against section 310 on the ground that it violates clause 
    2(b) of rule XXI of the House of Representatives by changing 
    existing law. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, I thought that the Chair had passed 
    the point in the bill where this was appropriate to be offered. 
    That is my understanding, that the gentleman has passed that point, 
    and the gentleman no longer has the right to offer that.
        Mr. Chairman: The bill is open for amendment at any point. The 
    Chair then queries whether there be any points of order. The Chair 
    has requested whether there be any points of order against that 
    section of the bill that was open, and that is when the gentleman 
    arose and made his point of order.
        Does the gentleman from California wish to speak on that point?
        Mr. Fazio: Not at the moment.
        The Chairman: Are there any other Members requesting to speak 
    on the gentleman's point of order?

[[Page 12136]]

        If not, the Chair is then prepared to rule. For the reasons 
    stated by the gentleman from Colorado, the point of order is 
    sustained. Section 310 is stricken from the bill. Are there any 
    amendments to that section of the bill?

Points of Order Against Provisions and Amendments Where Bill ``Open'' 
    at Any Point

Sec. 5.6 Where the Committee of the Whole agrees that the remainder of 
    an appropriation bill be considered as read and open at any point 
    to points of order and amendments, the Chairman asks if there are 
    any points of order and then if there are any amendments, and 
    points of order made against items in the bill subsequent to the 
    offering of amendments are not recognized.

        On Aug. 19, 1949,(3) it was emphasized that, 
    following the dispensing of the reading of the remainder of a bill, 
    points of order should be made immediately, before the offering of 
    amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 95 Cong. Rec. 11870, 11876, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 6008, a supplemental appropriation bill 
        for 1950.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Louis C.] Rabaut [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the remainder of the bill be considered as 
    read and be open at any point to points of order and amendments.
        The Chairman: (4) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Michigan?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Aime J. Forand (R.I.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order?
        If not, are there any amendments?
        Mr. [William M.] Wheeler [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [James P.] Sutton [of Tennessee]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Sutton: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the 
    language on page 19 that it is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill.
        The Chairman: The point of order comes too late. At the time 
    the further reading of the bill was dispensed with the Chair 
    requested Members desiring to make points of order to do so at that 
    time.

Sec. 5.7 Where a general appropriation bill is considered as read and 
    open to amendment at any point, points of order must be made before 
    amendments are offered and cannot be ``reserved'' pending 
    subsequent action on amendments, since points of order lie 
    separately against provisions in the reported bill and then 
    separately against amendments in the reported bill.

[[Page 12137]]

        On Dec. 1, 1982,(5) Chairman Don Fuqua, of Florida, 
    was presiding over the Labor, Health and Human Services 
    appropriation bill, fiscal 1983, when the manager of the bill, Mr. 
    William H. Natcher, of Kentucky, asked unanimous consent that the 
    bill be considered read and open to amendment at any point. No 
    objection being heard, a point of order was raised against one 
    paragraph of the bill. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 128 Cong. Rec. 28174, 28175, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Natcher (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the bill be considered as read and open to amendment 
    at any point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Kentucky?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against the bill?

                               point of order

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I have 
    a point of order against a section of the bill.
        The portion of the bill to which the point of order relates is 
    as follows:

                        higher and continuing education

            For carrying out titles III; VI, part A; VIII; IX, parts B, 
        D and E; title X; and sections 417, 420, and 734 of the Higher 
        Education Act; section 406A(2) of the General Education 
        Provisions Act (20 U.S.C. 1221e-1b(2)); section 102(b)(6) of 
        the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961; title 
        XIII, part H, subparts 1 and 2 of the Education Amendments of 
        1980; H.R. 3598 as passed the House on November 4, 1981; and 
        title V, section 528(5) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
        Act of 1981, without regard to section 512(b) of the Omnibus 
        Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, $400,990,000: Provided, That 
        $9,000,000 shall be available in connection with the 
        establishment and construction of the General Daniel James 
        Memorial Education Center at Tuskegee Institute, Tuskegee, 
        Alabama, and such sums shall be used for an aerospace science 
        and engineering center and shall remain available for 
        obligation until September 30, 1988: Provided further, That 
        funds made available in Public Law 96-536, section 110 for the 
        Wayne Morse Chair of Law and Politics shall remain available 
        for obligation until September 30, 1985: Provided further, That 
        $3,000,000 shall be available until expended for the Carl 
        Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center: Provided 
        further, That $25,000,000 made available for interest subsidy 
        grants under section 734 of the Higher Education Act shall 
        remain available until expended: Provided further, That 
        sections 922(b)(2) and 922(e)(2) of the Higher Education Act 
        shall not apply to funds in this Act.

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the point of order.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, on page 44, lines 11 through 13, 
    there is a section of the bill which is in violation of rule XXI, 
    clause 2, because there is no authorization legislation that has 
    been passed by the Congress for the funding which is appropriated 
    in the bill, and I make a point of order against that language in 
    the bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Natcher) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Natcher: On the point of order, yes, Mr. Chairman, I would 
    like to be

[[Page 12138]]

    heard, but I would like to have a colloquy at this time, with the 
    permission of the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walker).
        The Chairman: The Chair will permit the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania to yield to the gentleman from Kentucky although 
    ordinarily the Chair controls debate on a point of order.
        Mr. Walker: I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.
        Mr. Natcher: Mr. Chairman, let me say to the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania that, as he knows, this project has been authorized in 
    the House. As I understand, it is before the committee on the other 
    side. I would hope that the gentleman from Pennsylvania would not 
    insist on his point of order at this time. This facility, as the 
    gentleman knows, is being utilized at the present time in honor of 
    one of the great Members who served in this body, the Honorable 
    Carl Albert from Oklahoma, a distinguished Member of the House for 
    many years, later serving as Speaker of the House before his 
    retirement.
        I would hope that the gentleman would not insist on his point 
    of order. As the gentleman knows, this project has not yet been 
    authorized on the other side. It has been authorized on this side. 
    We would hope that the gentleman would not insist on his point of 
    order. Then we would see if it could not be handled quickly on the 
    other side by way of authorization, so that this amount could stay 
    in the 1983 bill and not have to wait until the next appropriation 
    bill. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Smith) wish to 
    be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Neal] Smith of Iowa: Not on this point of order, no, Mr. 
    Chairman. I do have a parliamentary inquiry concerning another 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will protect the gentleman.
        Will the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walker) clarify for 
    the Chair the exact language to which he objects in insisting on 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, the language the gentleman objects to 
    under the point of order is beginning at line 11 on page 44, ``That 
    $3,000,000 shall be available until expended for the Carl Albert 
    Congressional Research and Studies Center:'' ending with the colon 
    on line 13.
        The Chairman: The appropriation is not yet authorized by law 
    and the Chair sustains the point of order. Are there any other 
    points of order against the bill?

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The portion of the bill to which the parliamentary inquiry 
    relates is as follows:

                                special programs

            For carrying out the consolidated programs and projects 
        authorized under chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and 
        Improvement Act of 1981; title IX, part C of the Elementary and 
        Secondary Education Act; title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 
        1964; the Follow Through Act; sections 1524 and 1525 of the 
        Education Amendments of 1978; and Public Law 92-506, 
        $538,920,000: Provided That $454,810,000 to carry out chapter 2 
        of the Education Consolidation

[[Page 12139]]

        and Improvement Act shall become available for obligation on 
        July 1, 1983, and shall remain available until September 30, 
        1984: Provided further, That $29,030,000 for the purpose of 
        subchapter D of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act 
        shall become available for obligation on October 1, 1982: 
        Provided further, That $3,000,000 of the amount appropriated 
        above shall be for the purpose of Public Law 92-506 of which 
        $1,500,000 shall become available on July 1, 1983, and shall 
        remain available until September 30, 1984.

        The Chairman: The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Smith) will state 
    his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, is it possible, since the bill 
    is open to amendment at any point, to reserve a point of order and 
    to make it at a later time against certain lines in the bill?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the point of order must 
    be made at this time, before amendments are offered.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: Then, Mr. Chairman, if it is made at this 
    time, would it be possible to replace the language to which I am 
    making a point of order at a later time?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman that a 
    proper amendment could be offered to replace the language.

Sec. 5.8 Where unanimous consent is granted that the remainder of a 
    general appropriation bill be considered as read and all portions 
    thereof be subject to amendments and to points of order, the 
    Chairman suggests that points of order be disposed of first since 
    it would be too late to make such points after amendments to the 
    bill have been considered.

    On Apr. 25, 1947,(6) the following proceedings took 
place:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 93 Cong. Rec. 4098, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 3123, an Interior Department appropriation bill for 1948.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert F.] Jones of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the remainder of the bill be considered as read and 
    that all portions thereof be subject to amendment and to points of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (7) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Earl C. Michener (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The Chair suggests that the points of order be 
    disposed of first under this procedure, before the amendments.

Points of Order Against Paragraph Not Entertained During General Debate

Sec. 5.9 The proper time for raising a point of order that a paragraph 
    in a general appropriation bill violates Rule XXI clause 2 
    (legislation on an appropriation bill) is when the paragraph is 
    reached in the reading for

[[Page 12140]]

    amendment under the five-minute rule, and not during general debate 
    on the bill.

    On June 28, 1989,(8) during general debate on the energy 
and water appropriation bill, fiscal 1990, an inquiry was directed to 
the Chair as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 135 Cong. Rec. 13669, 13670, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       in the committee of the whole

        Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
    bill, H.R. 2696, with Mr. Pease in the chair.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        By unanimous consent, the bill was considered as having been 
    read the first time.
        The Chairman: (9) Under the unanimous-consent 
    agreement, the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bevill) will be 
    recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. 
    Myers) will be recognized for 30 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Don J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Bevill).

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [John Paul] Hammerschmidt [of Arkansas]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Hammerschmidt: Mr. Chairman, would this be the proper time 
    to raise a point of order on section 110 and section 112 of the 
    bill?
        The Chairman: It would not be the proper time. The proper time 
    would be when those sections are read under the 5-minute rule.
        Mr. [Tom] Bevill [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 
    such time as I may consume.

Point of Order Against Paragraph Must Precede Amendment

Sec. 5.10 A point of order against a section of a general appropriation 
    bill must be made immediately after the section is read and comes 
    too late after an amendment to that section has been considered.

    On June 3, 1944,(10) Chairman William M. Whittington, of 
Mississippi, ruled that a point of order came too late after the 
offending section had been read, amended, and the next section read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 90 Cong. Rec. 5245, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4937, the Foreign Economic Administration Act of 1945.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 103. This title may be cited as ``Defense Aid 
        Appropriation Act, 1945.''
    Mr. [Joseph P.] O'Hara [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I had a point 
of order to submit against section 102 which has not been completely 
read, and which point of order I wish to submit at this time.

        The Chairman: The Clerk has just read section 103.

[[Page 12141]]

        Mr. O'Hara: Mr. Chairman, the Clerk was just reading section 
    102, and I wish to make a point of order against that section.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Bell] offered an 
    amendment which was considered by the Committee and agreed to by 
    the Committee, an amendment to section 2 after it had been read.
        Mr. O'Hara: Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a point of order 
    against section 102 on the ground that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Minnesota makes a point of 
    order that section 102 is legislation on an appropriation bill. The 
    point of order comes too late. As the Chair has previously 
    announced, the Committee has already considered and agreed to an 
    amendment to section 102 offered by the gentleman from Missouri 
    [Mr. Bell].
        The point of order is overruled.

Timing of Point of Order Against Provision in Bill Text

Sec. 5.11 A point of order against a paragraph of a general 
    appropriation bill comes too late after amendments have been 
    offered thereto.

    On Apr. 16, 1975,(11) a general appropriation bill was 
being read for amendment in Committee of the Whole. Section 314 of the 
bill was read, and by unanimous consent an amendment was offered, and 
agreed to, which amended that section as well as the following section, 
315, which had not been read. Ms. Abzug then offered two amendments, 
designed to strike out both sections 314 and 315. The proceedings 
transpired as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 121 Cong. Rec. 10377, 10378, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Ms. [Bella S.] Abzug [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Ms. Abzug: on page 16, after line 11, 
        strike out sections 314 and 315 and renumber accordingly.

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (12) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: Have not these sections already been read for 
    amendment?
        The Chairman: Only section 314 has been read for amendment.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    amendment comes too late.
        The Chairman: Section 315 has not been read. Therefore, it 
    would not foreclose consideration at this time of a further 
    amendment offered to section 314.
        The amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York contains 
    an additional part proposing to strike section 315, which has not 
    been read. Absent a unanimous-consent agreement, she could not 
    offer an amendment to strike section 315 if it had not been read.

[[Page 12142]]

        Ms. Abzug: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    amendments be considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentlewoman from New York?
        Mr. [Fortney H. (Pete)] Stark [of California]: Mr. Chairman, 
    reserving the right to object, would this preclude my making a 
    point of order against section 314?
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman that section 
    314 has already been read and subject to legislative action in the 
    form of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Louisiana and, 
    therefore, a point of order would not be timely against section 
    314. The Chair would advise the gentleman that if he wishes to make 
    a point of order against section 315, the moment for that would be 
    after the Clerk has read that section and before someone offers an 
    amendment and legislative consideration has taken place.

Point of Order Too Late After Amendment Offered

Sec. 5.12 A point of order against a paragraph of a general 
    appropriation bill comes too late after amendments have been 
    offered to that paragraph.

    The proceedings in Committee of the Whole on June 8, 
1977,(13) illustrate two important principles relating to 
the application of clause 2, Rule XXI relating to unauthorized 
appropriations. The first is that where an unauthorized appropriation 
is permitted, by waiver or failure to raise a point of order, the 
paragraph can then be perfected by an amendment which merely changes 
the unauthorized figure in the paragraph. Second, the proceedings 
demonstrate that a point of order must be timely and comes too late 
after the paragraph has been considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 123 Cong. Rec. 17941, 17942, 17945, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The bill under consideration was the Department of Transportation 
appropriation bill for fiscal 1978.

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                  coast guard

                               Operating Expenses

                         (including transfer of funds)

            For necessary expenses for the operation and maintenance of 
        the Coast Guard, not otherwise provided for; purchase of not to 
        exceed twelve passenger motor vehicles, for replacement only; 
        and recreation and welfare; $871,865,000 of which $205,977 
        shall be applied to Capehart Housing debt reduction: Provided 
        That the number of aircraft on hand at any one time shall not 
        exceed one hundred and seventy-nine exclusive of planes and 
        parts stored to meet future attrition: Provided further, That 
        amounts equal to the obligated balances against the 
        appropriations for ``Operating expenses'' for the two preceding 
        years shall be transferred to and merged with this 
        appropriation, and such

[[Page 12143]]

        merged appropriation shall be available as one fund, except for 
        accounting purposes of the Coast Guard, for the payment of 
        obligations properly incurred against such prior year 
        appropriations and against this appropriation.

        Mr. [Mario] Biaggi [of New York]: Madam Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Biaggi: On page 3, line 7, strike 
        ``$871,865,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$878,865,000''.

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Madam Chairman, I 
    make a point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: (14) The gentleman from Massachusetts 
    will state the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Barbara Jordan (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Conte: Madam Chairman, the amendment under rule XXI, clause 
    2, the amendment of the gentleman from New York is out of order 
    because it has not been authorized. The authorization for this is 
    pending and the House has requested a conference on this.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Biaggi: Yes, Madam Chairman. . . .
        Madam Chairman, I will address myself to the point of order.
        The point of order now is whether or not there is any 
    authorization. I will stick to that point of order, and if the 
    Chair maintains that the point of order is a valid one, then I 
    would only concede that it is valid. If that be a valid point of 
    order, then it is precedent for a subsequent point of order which I 
    will offer immediately after this one is settled.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair has before it the amendment which is offered by the 
    gentleman from New York (Mr. Biaggi). That amendment simply changes 
    an unauthorized appropriations figure in the bill, striking that 
    figure and inserting in lieu thereof another. The gentleman does 
    not seek, in his amendment, to earmark these additional funds at 
    all.
        Under the precedents, then, where an amendment only seeks to 
    change an unauthorized amount permitted to remain in the bill by 
    failure to raise a point of order or by a waiver, and does not add 
    any legislative language or earmark for a specific unauthorized 
    project, that amendment is in order. (Deschler's ch. 25, sec. 
    2311.)
        Therefore, the point of order is overruled and the gentleman is 
    recognized for 5 minutes. . . .
        The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Biaggi).
        The amendment was agreed to. . . .
        The Chairman: Are there other amendments to this section?
        There being none, the Clerk will read. . . .
        Mr. Conte: Madam Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Conte: Madam Chairman, is the Clerk through reading 
    ``operating expenses''? If not, I would like to raise a point of 
    order against that section.

        The Chairman: The Clerk has read the ``operating expenses'' 
    paragraph of the bill.

[[Page 12144]]

        Mr. Conte: Madam Chairman, am I in order to raise a point of 
    order against that section?
        The Chairman: Not against the ``operating expenses'' paragraph, 
    that is the paragraph which has been read and has been amended, and 
    the point of order would come too late.
        Mr. Conte: All right, then I am out of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Massachusetts will be seated 
    and the Clerk will read.

Points of Order Considered Seriatim

Sec. 5.13 A point of order against a proviso having been disposed of, 
    it is not too late to make a point of order against the paragraph 
    of which the proviso is a part merely because debate has been had 
    on the point of order against such proviso.

    On Feb. 26, 1943,(15) a point of order was held timely 
although debate on another point of order against a proviso in the 
paragraph had intervened after the reading of the paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 89 Cong. Rec. 1369, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 1975, the first deficiency appropriation of 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Edward H.] Rees of Kansas: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    further point of order against the language in lines 6 to 13 on 
    page 23 that it is legislation on an appropriation bill, not 
    authorized by law.
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, the point of 
    order comes too late. There has been debate since the paragraph was 
    read. It is now too late to interpose a point of order.
        The Chairman: (16) The Chair will remind the 
    gentleman from Missouri that we have not gone beyond the point at 
    which a point of order can be made. The paragraph is still under 
    consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Howard W. Smith (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Does the gentleman desire to point out to the Chair anything 
    further the Chair may consider in view of the second point of order 
    made against the language in the paragraph?
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: We have passed the proposition, Mr. 
    Chairman; we are now on the proviso. The point of order made by the 
    gentleman did not apply to the first portion, which is a separate 
    entity as against the proviso. Inasmuch as the point of order was 
    not interposed at the time, it now comes too late.
        The Chairman: The Chair advises the gentleman from Missouri 
    that he will hold that the point of order does not come too late, 
    in view of the fact that the proviso is a part of the paragraph.

Items in General Appropriation Bills

Sec. 5.14 The time for making points of order against items in an 
    appropriation bill is after the House has resolved

[[Page 12145]]

    itself into the Committee of the Whole and after the paragraph 
    containing such items has been read for amendment.

    On July 4, 1945,(17) after Mr. Clarence Cannon, of 
Missouri, moved that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the 
Whole for the consideration of the bill at hand, another Member, Vito 
Marcantonio, of New York, inquired as to when would be the proper time 
to make points of order against many items in the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 91 Cong. Rec. 7226, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 3649, the war agencies appropriation for fiscal 1946.
            For further discussion of appropriations bills, see Ch. 25, 
        supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Marcantonio: Mr. Speaker, if, as in this case, the bill 
    contains many items that are subject to a point of order, is it not 
    in order to make a point of order against sending this bill to the 
    Committee of the Whole?
        The Speaker: (18) Under the rules of the House, it 
    is not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Sam Rayburn (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Marcantonio: Then the procedure to make the point of order 
    is to make it as the bill is being read for amendment?
        The Speaker: As the paragraphs in the bill are reached.

Sec. 5.15 In the Committee of the Whole, a point of order against a 
    paragraph of an appropriation bill is not in order until that 
    paragraph is read for amendment.

    On Feb. 19, 1970,(19) Chairman Chet Holifield, of 
California, ruled that a point of order was raised prematurely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 116 Cong. Rec. 4012, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 15931, involving the Departments of Labor and Health, 
        Education, and Welfare, and related agencies appropriations for 
        fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Carl D.] Perkins [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, we have a 
    couple of points of order to make, particularly as to the Michel 
    amendment. When will it be in order to make the point of order to 
    the Michel amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair will ask the gentleman from Kentucky, 
    to what section of the bill is the gentleman referring?
        Mr. Perkins: Section 411.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that it will not be in order 
    until that section of the bill is read.
        The Clerk will read.

Timing of Points of Order Against Paragraph in Bill

Sec. 5.16 A point of order against a paragraph in a general 
    appropriation bill must be made immediately following the reading 
    of the paragraph or following unanimous-con

[[Page 12146]]

    sent permission to consider the title of the bill containing the 
    paragraph as having been read.

    The manager of a general appropriation bill will often strive to 
expedite the reading of the bill for amendment under the five-minute 
rule. One device is to ask unanimous consent that portions of the bill 
be considered as read and open for amendment, rather than proceeding 
paragraph by paragraph. Mr. John M. Slack, of West Virginia, the 
subcommittee chairman and manager of the bill under consideration on 
June 18, 1976,(20) employed this tactic. Proceedings were as 
indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 122 Cong. Rec. 19308, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (1) The Clerk will read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Otis G. Pike (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk proceeded to read the bill.
        Mr. Slack (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that title V be considered as read and open for amendment 
    at any point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from West Virginia?
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, reserving the 
    right to object, I have a point of order which would be lodged at 
    the provisions contained on page 44, starting with line 9, through 
    line 25 and I should like to be sure as to whether my position will 
    be jeopardized if this unanimous-consent request were granted, and 
    where and when I would have to make the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that if the unanimous-
    consent request is granted, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) 
    will be recognized to make his point of order immediately 
    thereafter.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from West Virginia?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        (The portion of the bill to which the point of order refers is 
    as follows:)

            No part of these funds may be used to pay the salary of any 
        employee, including Commissioners, of the Federal Trade 
        Commission who--
            (1) make any publication based on the line-of-business data 
        furnished by individual firms without taking reasonable 
        precautions to prevent disclosure of the line-of-business data 
        furnished by any particular firm; or
            (2) permits anyone other than sworn officers and employees 
        of the Federal Trade Commission to examine the line-of-business 
        reports from individual firms; or
            (3) uses the information provided in the line-of-business 
        program for any purpose other than statistical purposes. Such 
        information for carrying out specific law enforcement 
        responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission shall be 
        obtained under existing practices and procedures or as changed 
        by law.

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order which I 
    make at

[[Page 12147]]

    lines 9 through 25 on page 44 in that the provisions contained 
    therein constitute legislation on an appropriation bill in that new 
    duties are imposed upon the Federal Trade Commission, particularly 
    with respect to the language beginning on lines 12 through 16. It 
    is provided that no part of these funds may be used to pay the 
    salaries of any employee who makes any publication based on line of 
    business data furnished by individual firms without taking 
    reasonable precautions to prevent disclosure of the line of 
    business data furnished by any particular firm. The only thing that 
    limits or controls the question of divulging information respecting 
    such line of business information is contained in the Freedom of 
    Information Act, and this is only to provide an exception from the 
    Freedom of Information Act which would embrace such material, but 
    the Freedom of Information Act leaves it wholly to the Federal 
    Trade Commission to devise whatever systems it desires with respect 
    to such information.
        The provisions in the appropriations bill to which I have 
    referred would require a standard of reasonable precautions to 
    prevent disclosure of the line of business data furnished by any 
    particular firm, and in so doing would create a new and different 
    standard from that which exists in existing law.
        Second, the point of order is specifically lodged to lines 22 
    through 25 in which it is said:

            Such information for carrying out specific law enforcement 
        responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commis-sion shall be 
        obtained under existing practices and procedures or as changed 
        by law.

        It has been held that even though a duty imposed on a 
    commission may be a duty now accepted by that commission, to place 
    it as a duty in law constitutes specific legislation on an 
    Appropriation Act.
        I cite here in support of the point of order provisions in 
    Deschler's procedure, page 305 and the following pages, chapter 26, 
    paragraphs 11 et sequentia. I may say that I do level the point of 
    order at lines 9 through 25.
        Mr. Slack: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of order.
        The language which the gentleman refers to was designed to 
    protect the privacy and the security of data obtained in the line 
    of a business program. However, if the gentleman insists on the 
    point of order, of course, we will concede the point of order.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained and 
    the paragraph is stricken.
        Are there any other points of order against the remainder of 
    title V?

When Point of Order Comes Too Late in Reading Bill for Amendment

Sec. 5.17 Where a chapter of a general appropriation bill is considered 
    read by unanimous consent and open to amendment at any point, and 
    no amendments are offered, the Clerk begins to read the next 
    chapter, and it is then too late to raise a point of order against 
    a paragraph in the chapter passed in the reading.

[[Page 12148]]

    On June 11, 1985,(2) during the reading of a general 
appropriation bill in Committee of the Whole, Chairman Pro Tempore 
Philip R. Sharp, of Indiana, in response to a point of order from the 
floor, ruled that it was too late to lodge a point of order against a 
provision in the preceding chapter of the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 131 Cong. Rec. 15181, 15182, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      The Chairman Pro Tempore: . . .
    The Clerk will read.

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                   Chapter X

                          Department of Transportation

                            Office of the Secretary

                              working capital fund

            The ``Limitation on working capital fund'' is reduced to 
        $65,470,000. . . .

                           railroad-highway crossings

                             demonstration projects

            For an additional amount for ``Railroad-highway crossings 
        demonstration projects'', to remain available until expended, 
        $5,300,000, of which $3,533,333 shall be derived from the 
        Highway Trust Fund. . . .

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi] (during the reading): 
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that chapter X be considered 
    as read, printed in the Record, and open to amendment at any point.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Mississippi?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Are there any points of order against 
    chapter X?
        Are there any amendments to chapter X?
        The Clerk will read.
        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair has asked if there are any 
    amendments to chapter X.
        Hearing no requests, the Clerk will read.
        Mr. Conte: Reserving a point of order, the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] wanted to reserve a point of order on 
    page 65, I believe, on the bottom there.
        The Chairman Pro tempore: Would the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts indicate what he is trying to indicate to the Chair?

        Mr. Conte: The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] made a 
    request.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order on page 65.
        Mr. [William] Lehman of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I think that 
    chapter has been passed already.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Florida is making 
    the point of order that the chapter has already been passed in the 
    reading and that no one raised a timely point of order; is that the 
    gentleman's point of order?
        Mr. Lehman of Florida: It is, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Does anyone contest that point?
        If not, the Chair will sustain the gentleman's point of order.

[[Page 12149]]

A Point of Order Comes Too Late--After Amendment Has Been Offered

Sec. 5.18 A point of order against a paragraph in an appropriation bill 
    comes too late after an amendment to it has been reported and the 
    sponsor of such amendment is recognized to debate it.

    On Nov. 28, 1945,(3) it was ruled that a point of order 
came too late even though the Member, Arthur L. Miller, of Nebraska, 
had been standing to make the point of order when the sponsor of an 
amendment rose to speak.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 91 Cong. Rec. 11128, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4805, the Defense appropriation bill for fiscal 1946.
 4. But see Sec. Sec. 6.22-6.24, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Cleveland M.] Bailey [of West Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        The Chairman: (5) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from West Virginia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. R. Ewing Thomason (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield for a unanimous-consent request?
        Mr. Bailey: I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, 
    that all debate on this amendment close in 20 minutes, the last 5 
    minutes to be reserved to the committee.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Missouri?
        Mr. Miller of Nebraska: Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to 
    object, I wish to make a point of order against the last part of 
    the paragraph.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's point of 
    order comes too late.
        Mr. Miller of Nebraska: I asked for recognition on the point of 
    order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from West Virginia has already been 
    recognized, and the gentleman from Nebraska made no remarks prior 
    to that time.
        Mr. Miller of Nebraska: I asked for recognition, and I was 
    standing here.
        The Chairman: The Chair did not know for what purpose the 
    gentleman had risen. The point of order comes too late.

--After Amendment Has Been Adopted

Sec. 5.19 A point of order against legislation in a paragraph of a 
    general appropriation bill must be lodged immediately after the 
    paragraph is read and comes to late after an amendment has been 
    adopted thereto.

    The proceedings of Nov. 30, 1982,(6) illustrate the 
importance

[[Page 12150]]

of being timely when pressing a point of order during the reading of a 
general appropriation bill for amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 128 Cong. Rec. 28057, 28058, 28060, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (7) The Clerk will read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                         United States Customs Service

                             salaries and expenses

            For necessary expenses of the United States Customs 
        Service, including purchase of two hundred passenger motor 
        vehicles for replacement only, including one hundred and ninety 
        for police-type use; acquisition (purchase of 1), operation and 
        maintenance of aircraft; hire of passenger motor vehicles and 
        aircraft; and awards of compensation to informers, as 
        authorized by section 1 of title VI of the Act of June 15, 1917 
        (22 U.S.C. 401); $528,700,000, of which not to exceed $150,000 
        should be available for payment for rental space in connection 
        with preclearance operations: Provided, That none of the funds 
        made available by this Act shall be available for 
        administrative expenses to pay any employee overtime pay in an 
        amount in excess of $25,000: Provided further, That the 
        Commissioner or his designee may waive this limitation in 
        individual cases in order to prevent excessive costs or to meet 
        emergency requirements of the Service: Provided further, That 
        none of the funds made available by this Act shall be available 
        for administrative expenses to reduce the number of Customs 
        Service regions below nine during fiscal year 1983 without 
        advance approval from both House and Senate Committees on 
        Appropriations: Provided further, That none of the funds made 
        available by this Act may be used for administrative expenses 
        in connection with the proposed redirection of the Equal 
        Employment Opportunity Program.

                       amendment offered by mr. conte

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Conte: On page 4, line 22, strike 
        out ``$528,700,000,'' and insert in lieu thereof the following: 
        ``$548,700,000, of which not to exceed $30,000,000 shall be 
        available for Project Exodus, and''. . . .

        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte), as amended.
        The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the language in lines 6 through 10 on page 5 of 
    H.R. 7158. These lines constitute legislation on an appropriation 
    bill and are, therefore, in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI. If 
    the Chair will permit me, I would like to be heard on my point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from 
    Minnesota that the paragraph in question has already been read and 
    amended. Therefore, a point of order to the paragraph comes too 
    late.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Frenzel: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Frenzel: Mr. Chairman, at what point would a point of order 
    have been timely?

[[Page 12151]]

        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that a point 
    of order would be in order between the time when the paragraph had 
    been read by the Clerk and the time when an amendment to that 
    paragraph had been offered or the Committee had gone to another 
    paragraph.
        Mr. Frenzel: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet when the previous 
    amender was recognized, and I do not recall having heard that 
    language being read. Can the Chair give me some assurance on that?
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that the 
    first amendment offered to the paragraph in question was offered by 
    the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte). The Chair observed 
    the gentleman on his feet, although not pressing a point of order, 
    at the time that the amendment to the amendment was offered, but 
    not at the time the original amendment was offered.
        Mr. Frenzel: And to be timely, my point of order would have to 
    have been made before the gentleman from Massachusetts offered his 
    amendment?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Frenzel: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.

Sec. 5.20 A point of order against language in a paragraph of an 
    appropriation bill comes too late after the paragraph has been read 
    and an amendment thereto has been agreed to.

    On June 13, 1961,(8) a Member was advised that his point 
of order came too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 107 Cong. Rec. 10178, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7577, making appropriations for the executive office and 
        Department of Commerce for fiscal 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Wright] Patman [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [George W.] Andrews [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    committee accepts the amendment.
        The Chairman: (9) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Texas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The amendment was agreed to.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gross: Is a point of order to the language on page 29 in 
    order?
        The Chairman: If it is to language preceding line 5 on page 29 
    it is not in order.
        Mr. Gross: It does precede line 5 on page 29. The Clerk did not 
    read the language on page 29, lines 1 to 5.
        The Chairman: The Clerk has read and an amendment has been 
    adopted to the paragraph starting on page 28, line 8, and ending on 
    page 29, line 5.
        Mr. Gross: Then a point of order to the language on page 29, 
    line 5, is not in order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman it comes too 
    late at this time.

--After Next Paragraph Is Read

Sec. 5.21 Points of order must be made immediately after a

[[Page 12152]]

    paragraph of an appropriation bill is read, and it is too late to 
    make such points of order after the Clerk has begun reading the 
    next paragraph.

    On Apr. 15, 1943,(10) Chairman William M. Whittington, 
of Mississippi, ruled that a point of order against a paragraph came 
too late after the Clerk had completed reading the next paragraph, even 
though the Member protested that he was on his feet seeking recognition 
during the reading.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 89 Cong. Rec. 3420, 3421, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 2481, an agricultural appropriation bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Hampton P.] Fulmer [of South Carolina]: I make the point 
    of order that the language on page 22 beginning in line 19 and 
    ending in line 25 . . . is legislation on an appropriation bill.
        Mr. [Malcolm C.] Tarver [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Tarver: I make the point of order that the point of order 
    comes too late inasmuch as the portion of the bill against which 
    the point of order is made has been read and the Clerk was reading 
    the next paragraph.
        The Chairman: The Chair sustains the point of order raised by 
    the gentleman from Georgia. The Clerk had read a substantial part 
    of the following paragraph and had reached line 17 on page 23.
        Mr. Fulmer: I think, Mr. Chairman, I made my point of order in 
    time. Maybe the Clerk had started the following paragraph, but I 
    was on my feet and feel that I made my point of order in time.
        The Chairman: The Chair has ruled that the reading of the 
    paragraph had been completed. Under the rules it is essential that 
    a point of order against a paragraph be made immediately after the 
    reading of the paragraph.

--After Debate

Sec. 5.22 After debate has been had on a paragraph of an appropriation 
    bill it is too late to make a point of order against that 
    paragraph.

    On Mar. 15, 1945,(11) certain Members debated the 
subject of a paragraph before one of them made a point of order, but 
the delay was fatal to the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 91 Cong. Rec. 2306 et seq., 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 2603, the State, Justice, Commerce, 
        Judiciary, and Federal Loan Agency appropriation bill for 1946.
            See also 88 Cong. Rec. 754, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 27, 
        1942. Under consideration was H.R. 6460, the Navy Department 
        appropriation for 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I move to strike 
    out the last word.

[[Page 12153]]

        I do this for the purpose of asking the majority leader a 
    question. I am wondering if the majority leader can tell us what is 
    to be the program for the balance of this week and the first part 
    of next week? . . .
        Mr. [Carl] Hinshaw [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I have asked 
    for this time in order to inquire of the chairman of the committee 
    regarding the language appearing in the bill beginning in line 17 
    on page 23 and ending in line 23 on page 24. I do not see where any 
    money item is included. Is this intended to be an authorization for 
    construction or is it an appropriation?
        Mr. [Louis C.] Rabaut [of Michigan]: That is just the preamble, 
    general language.
        Mr. Hinshaw: Is that in the nature of an authorization to do 
    this work, or is there any law cited that would authorize it?
        Mr. Rabaut: It is based on law and on a treaty.
        Mr. Hinshaw: There is no law quoted in this language to which I 
    refer, and I do not know of any treaty that authorizes it; none is 
    stated here.
        Mr. Chairman, I am forced to make a point of order against the 
    language contained in the lines beginning in line 17 on page 23 and 
    ending in line 23 on page 24, as not being authorized by law.
        Mr. Rabaut: It is language that has always been carried, I may 
    say to the gentleman.
        Mr. Hinshaw: That may well be; but I insist on the point of 
    order.

        The Chairman: (12) The Chair must inform the 
    gentleman from California that his point of order comes too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hinshaw: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Hinshaw: Did not the Clerk finish reading it?
        The Chairman: The subject matter of the paragraph was discussed 
    under the gentleman's amendment to strike out the last word [and] 
    also under the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York. 
    Business having intervened the point of order comes too late. The 
    Chair therefore overrules the point of order.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. For similar rulings, see 103 Cong. Rec. 5032, 85th Cong. 1st Sess., 
        Apr. 3, 1957 [H.R. 6287, making appropriations for the 
        Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare]; 89 
        Cong. Rec. 3485, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 16, 1943 [H.R. 
        2481, an agriculture appropriation for 1944]; and 89 Cong. Rec. 
        3421, 3422, 78th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 14, 1943 [H.R. 2481].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Diligence of Members in Seeking Recognition

Sec. 5.23 In a few instances, a Member who was on his feet seeking 
    recognition at the proper time to make a point of order has been 
    recognized even though the Clerk had read past the paragraph to 
    which the point of order was directed.

    Although failure to raise a point of order immediately after the

[[Page 12154]]

reading of a paragraph by the Clerk is usually fatal to the point of 
order, an exception to this rule may be invoked where a Member was on 
his feet, actively seeking recognition at the time the Clerk was 
reading the paragraph. For example, on Sept. 15, 1961,(14) 
Chairman Oren Harris, of Arkansas, entertained such a point of order 
under the following circumstances:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 107 Cong. Rec. 19729, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 9169, making supplemental appropriations for fiscal 1962. 
        To the same effect, see 116 Cong. Rec. 18395, 91st Cong. 2d 
        Sess., June 4, 1970. Under consideration was H.R. 17867, a 
        foreign assistance appropriation bill for fiscal 1971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of 
    order against the language on page 9, line 8 through line 12, on 
    the same ground, that it changes existing law. It is, therefore, in 
    violation of the rules.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas desire to be heard 
    on the point of order?
        Mr. [Albert] Thomas [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, the objection 
    came too late. We will waive that point of order because the Clerk 
    started reading the next paragraph, and we will not press that 
    point that his objection came too late. The point is well taken, 
    but I would remind my friend again that not 1 penny of that 
    expenditure is taxpayers' money. It is a limitation on the funds 
    they have earned by virtue of that operation. Will not my friend 
    withdraw it?
        Mr. Gross: No.
        Mr. Thomas: Well I am not going to press my point of order that 
    his point came too late.
        Mr. [Wayne L.] Hays [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point 
    of order that the gentleman's point of order came too late.
        The Chairman: The Chair observed that the gentleman was on his 
    feet seeking recognition while the Clerk was reading.
        Does the gentleman from Texas concede the point of order?
        Mr. Thomas: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained.

Sec. 5.24 A point of order against language in a paragraph of a bill is 
    not precluded by intervening debate where the Member raising the 
    point of order was on his feet, seeking recognition before debate 
    began.

    On May 11, 1959,(15) intervening debate did not preclude 
a point of order against language in an appropriation bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 105 Cong. Rec. 7905, 86th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7040, the independent offices appropriation for 1960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: I must insist on my point of order 
    in protection of the committee and in protection of the Civil 
    Service Commission.

[[Page 12155]]

        Mr. [Albert] Thomas [of Texas]: I oppose the point of order 
    because the paragraph was read.
        The Chairman: (16) The Chair thinks the gentleman 
    from Iowa was within his rights to make the point of order. He 
    observed the gentleman standing when unanimous consent was granted 
    to go back to the previous section.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Frank N. Ikard (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Thomas: Well, the point of order is good, then. We admit 
    it, then.
        The Chairman: The Chair sustains the point of order.

Sec. 5.25 The mere fact that a Member was on his feet does not entitle 
    him to make a point of order where he has not affirmatively sought 
    recognition of the Chair at the time the language complained of was 
    read for amendment.

    On Apr. 14, 1970,(17) in the Committee of the Whole, 
despite the assertion of Mr. William D. Ford, of Michigan, that he had 
been on his feet seeking recognition, Chairman Chet Holifield, of 
California, ruled that his point of order came too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 116 Cong. Rec. 11648, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 16916, Office of Education appropriations, fiscal 1971.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Michigan 
    (Mr. William D. Ford) rise?
        Mr. William D. Ford: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order as 
    to the language in the proviso in the paragraph entitled ``School 
    Assistance in Federally Affected Areas.'' The point I make goes to 
    the language which appears on line 6, page 2, extending down 
    through and including all of line 12. I make the point of order, it 
    is in violation of rule XXI of the rules of the House.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Flood), 
    care to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Daniel J.] Flood: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do.
        I do not like to operate this way, but I am the chairman of the 
    subcommittee and obviously I must object, and make a point of order 
    because the point of order comes much, much too late. We have 
    passed that point in the bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the Clerk had read past 
    that paragraph of the so-called title I, and stopped at line 14 on 
    page 3. The gentleman was not on his feet seeking recognition at 
    the time the first section, down through line 12 on page 2, was 
    read.
        Mr. William D. Ford: Mr. Chairman, the paragraphs are not being 
    read. The bill is being read by paragraph headings. I was on my 
    feet at the beginning of the reading. As a matter of fact, I moved 
    from there to here as soon as the Clerk began to read. I was never 
    off my feet from the moment he started the reading. I was trying to 
    get to the point in the bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair cannot observe the movements of the 
    Members from place to place. The gentleman was not seeking 
    recognition at the time when he should have been,

[[Page 12156]]

    under the rules. He should have been seeking recognition vocally, 
    not by standing.
        The Chair sustains the point of order made by the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania (Mr. Flood).

Reading General Appropriation Bill for Amendment

Sec. 5.26 General appropriation bills are read by paragraphs, and where 
    one section of the bill contains several paragraphs, a point of 
    order must be made immediately after a paragraph is read and cannot 
    be delayed until the entire section is read.

    On July 29, 1982,(18) during consideration of the 
supplemental appropriation bill, fiscal 1982, the Clerk had proceeded 
to read two paragraphs in a particular section of the bill. Mr. Robert 
S. Walker, of Pennsylvania, wished to lodge a point of order against 
the first two paragraphs. The proceedings which denied him that 
opportunity are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 128 Cong. Rec. 18626, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, on page 17 under Administrative 
    Provisions now being read by the Clerk, I raise a point of order 
    against those sections, that they are legislation on an 
    appropriations bill and therefore violate clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: (19) Does the gentleman make his point 
    against all four paragraphs on page 17 in that section?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: That is correct, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I would 
    point out that the Clerk had read the first two sections.
        We would concede the point of order to the remainder.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Mississippi is correct, the 
    first two paragraphs of that section had been read and hence the 
    gentleman's point of order comes too late with regard to those two 
    sections.
        Mr. Walker: In that case, Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman withdraws his point of order.
        The Clerk will read.

Proper Time To Determine Whether Bill Requires a Three-fifths Vote 
    Because It Carries a Tax Rate Increase

Sec. 5.27 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair stated that 
    the proper time to raise a point of order under Rule XXI clause 
    5(c) that a bill carries a ``federal income tax rate increase'' is 
    when the question is put on final passage.

    H.R. 1215, the Contract with American Tax Relief Act of 1995, was 
to be considered in the House on Apr. 5, 1995.(20) The 
Speaker

[[Page 12157]]

was asked by Mr. James P. Moran, of Virginia, if the provisions of the 
bill did in fact carry a tax rate increase which would require a three-
fifths vote, and while the Chair stated that the question was 
premature, he did indicate that the proper time to press a point of 
order on that basis would be when the question of final passage was 
before the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Moran: I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (1) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Robert W. Goodlatte (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Moran: Mr. Speaker, it is my recollection that this body 
    passed legislation earlier this term, in fact, on the first day of 
    this session, that required that any tax increase be passed with a 
    three-fifths vote of this body.
        Since there is a tax increase to be leveled on Federal 
    employees, in the case of the Federal Employees Retirement System, 
    a 313 percent increase on their retirement contribution; in the 
    case of the Civil Service Retirement System there was a 35 percent 
    increase in their retirement contribution. This is clearly a tax 
    increase, Mr. Speaker.
        Therefore, it seems to me, to be consistent with the 
    legislation this body previously passed, it would require a three-
    fifths vote. I would reserve my point of order, but I would make 
    that parliamentary inquiry at this time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will take the gentleman's 
    inquiry under advisement and rule on it at the appropriate time.
        Mr. Moran: Mr. Speaker, I would ask, when would be the 
    appropriate time for a ruling on this parliamentary inquiry?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Pending final passage of the 
    legislation.
        Mr. Moran: Mr. Speaker, when would I be able to get a division 
    of the question on that issue?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that the rule 
    relates to the vote on passage. The question becomes ripe for the 
    House upon passage of the legislation. . . . 
        If the gentleman will suspend. At this point the Chair is 
    merely not responding to an anticipatory parliamentary inquiry. The 
    Chair will rule at the appropriate time.
        Mr. [Kweisi] Mfume [of Maryland]: When is the appropriate time, 
    Mr. Speaker? When is the appropriate time?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The appropriate time is upon final 
    passage.

Points of Order Which May Be Raised ``at Any Time''

Sec. 5.28 A waiver of points of order against an appropriation in a 
    legislative bill does not inure to the protection of an amendment 
    containing an identical appropriation, as under Rule XXI clause 5, 
    a point of order against any such bill or amendment can be raised 
    ``at any time.''

[[Page 12158]]

    On Apr. 23, 1975,(2) the House had under consideration, 
in Committee of the Whole, the Vietnam Humanitarian and Evacuation 
Assistance Act (H.R. 6096). The bill was called up under a special rule 
reported from the Committee on Rules which waived points of order 
against appropriations in the language of the bill but did not 
explicitly protect amendments which contained appropriation language. 
In a case of ``first impression,'' Chairman Otis G. Pike, of New York, 
sustained a point of order against an amendment, as amended. 
Proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 121 Cong. Rec. 11512, 11513, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: . . . Are there any other amendments?
        If not, the question is on the substitute offered by the 
    gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) to the amendment in the nature 
    of a substitute offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Edgar).
        The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Robert W.] Edgar [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I demand 
    a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    272, noes 146, not voting 14, as follows: . . .
        So the substitute amendment for the amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute was agreed to. . . .
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania will state his 
    point of order.
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that my 
    substitute is not in order at this time because of the Eckhardt 
    substitute, and I reserve a point of order according to rule XXI of 
    our rules.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania will have to 
    state his point of order at this time. The point of order, as the 
    Chair understands, was against the Edgar amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute, as amended by the Eckhardt substitute?
        Mr. Edgar: That is correct.
        I make that point of order for two reasons: In the original 
    rule that brought the committee bill to the floor, all points of 
    order against section 3 and section 6 were waived. Our rules say 
    that no general appropriation bill or amendment thereto shall be 
    received or considered if it contains a provision reappropriating 
    unexpended balances of appropriations; except that this provision 
    shall not apply to appropriations in continuation of appropriations 
    for public works.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I first wish to point out that the point of order 
    comes too late, and I assert that the point of order may not be 
    timely considered after the vote has occurred.
        In addition to that, of course, this is not an appropriation 
    bill. This is an authorization bill, as I understand it.

[[Page 12159]]

        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, I might 
    say that we checked with our legal counsel when we originally 
    drafted the bill, and we had in my substitute some of the things 
    contained in the original House bill, and we were informed that 
    those parts of the House bill were not in order in my substitute 
    simply because we did not have a waiver.
        Ms. [Bella S.] Abzug [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, if the 
    gentleman from Texas will yield, the point of order raised has been 
    that an amendment which provides funds for certain purposes derived 
    from funds previously appropriated is in violation of clause 5 of 
    rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Did the gentlewoman say clause 5 of rule XXI?
        Mr. [Robert N.] Giaimo [of Connecticut]: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order.
        I make a point of order against the point of order as coming 
    too late.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the Chair desires to 
    hear the point of order before the Chair is able to rule on the 
    question of its timeliness.
        The Chair will read clause 5 of rule XXI of the 94th Congress. 
    The Chair will state that the Chair does not believe it is that 
    which was cited by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Edgar):

            No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall 
        be reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
        appropriations, nor shall an amendment proposing an 
        appropriation be in order during the consideration of a bill or 
        joint resolution reported by a committee not having that 
        jurisdiction. . . .

        The Chair will state that the Chair believes that what the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania read was clause 4 of rule XXI in the 
    old version.
        Is the gentleman now referring to the same language which the 
    Chair has just read?
        MR. EDGAR: We are referring to the same language which the 
    Chair has read.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) 
    desire to be heard further?
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I only want to make it clear that I 
    am raising the point of order that this point of order is made too 
    late. I wish to reiterate the statement that I made before. The 
    point of order is too late and, therefore, it is itself not in 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair did not read the entirety of that section. The 
    section ends

            A question of order on an appropriation in any such bill, 
        joint resolution, or amendment thereto, may be raised at any 
        time.

        Accordingly, the rule under which this legislation was 
    considered waived points of order against the original bill. It did 
    not waive points of order against the amendment. The rule does 
    provide that the point of order may be raised at any time (Deschler 
    chapter 25, section 3.2).
        The point of order is sustained. The Edgar amendment, as 
    amended, is now ruled out of order.
        The Clerk will read.

``At Any Time'' Means While the Amendment Is Pending

Sec. 5.29 The provision in Rule XXI clause 5, that a point of

[[Page 12160]]

    order against an amendment containing an appropriation to a 
    legislative bill can be made ``at any time'' has been interpreted 
    to require the point of order to be raised during the pendency of 
    the amendment under the five-minute rule.

    On Apr. 28, 1975,(3) where the Committee of the Whole 
had completed consideration of a measure, had adopted an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, and reported the bill, as amended back to 
the House, the following events occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 121 Cong. Rec. 12043, 12044, 12048, 12049, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Carl D.] Perkins [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Perkins to the amendment in the 
        nature of a substitute offered by Mr. O'Hara: Page 7, line 17, 
        strike out ``the following new paragraph:'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof ``the following: Beginning with the fiscal year ending 
        June 30, 1976, the income guidelines prescribed by each State 
        educational agency for reduced price lunches for schools in 
        that State under the fifth sentence of this paragraph shall be 
        100 per centum above the applicable family size income levels 
        in the income poverty guideline prescribed by the Secretary, 
        and any child who is a member of a household, if that household 
        has an annual income which falls between (A) the applicable 
        family size income level of the income guideline for free 
        lunches prescribed by the State educational agency in 
        accordance with the third and fourth sentences of this 
        paragraph and (B) 100 per centum above the applicable family 
        size income levels in the income poverty guideline prescribed 
        by the Secretary, shall be served a reduced price lunch at a 
        price not to exceed 20 cents.'' . . .

        The Chairman: (4) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Perkins) to the 
    amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman 
    from Michigan (Mr. O'Hara).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Frank E. Evans (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
    was agreed to. . . .
        The Chairman: The question is on the committee amendment in the 
    nature of a substitute, as amended.
        The committee amendment, in the nature of a substitute, as 
    amended, was agreed to.
        The Chairman: Under the rule, the Committee rises.
        Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore 
    (Mr. O'Neill) having assumed the chair, Mr. Evans, of Colorado, 
    Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the 
    Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration 
    the bill (H.R. 4222) to amend the National School Lunch and Child 
    Nutrition Acts in order to extend and revise the special food 
    service program for children and the school breakfast program, and 
    for other purposes related to strengthening the school lunch and 
    child nutrition programs, pursuant

[[Page 12161]]

    to House Resolution 352, he reported the bill back to the House 
    with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (5) Under the rule, the 
    previous question is ordered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is a separate vote demanded on any 
    amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute 
    adopted in the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on 
    the amendment.
        The amendment was agreed to.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against 
    further consideration of the bill on the ground that the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Perkins) on page 17, 
    line 7, constitutes an appropriation in a legislative authorization 
    bill in that it gives to the Secretary of Agriculture the duty of 
    providing all necessary funds to carry out and maintain certain 
    other programs to be used as sources of these funds, but leaves to 
    his discretion the other programs that might possibly be used as 
    sources for these funds and, therefore, constitutes an 
    appropriation of moneys in a legislative authorization bill.
        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    bill.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. 
    Perkins) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Perkins: Mr. Speaker, I desire to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Speaker, the point of order made by the gentleman from 
    Maryland (Mr. Bauman), comes too late, would be my first point. 
    But, Mr. Speaker, on the merits of the bill, the point of order is 
    not well taken because, on page 22 of the amendment in the nature 
    of a substitute offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. O'Hara) 
    we find this language:

            (b) In order to carry out the program provided for under 
        subsection (a) of this section during each of the fiscal years 
        ending June 30, 1976, September 30, 1977, and September 30, 
        1978, there is authorized to be appropriated the sum of 
        $250,000,000 for each such fiscal year.

        So that the authorization is plain, and the only thing we do is 
    to mandate some regulations to the effect if the money is 
    appropriated that the Secretary may be required to spend the money.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, may I be heard further on the point of 
    order?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland will 
    proceed.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, under the rules of the House, 
    specifically, this point of order lies at any time, and it does not 
    come too late. The rules of the House provide that it may be made 
    at any time prior to the final consideration of the bill.
        In this respect, Mr. Speaker, I refer the Chair to the question 
    that was ruled on last week on either Wednesday or Thursday in 
    regard to the Vietnamese war.

[[Page 12162]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) comes at a 
    time when the amendment is not being considered, and cannot be 
    directed against consideration of the bill itself. In view of the 
    fact that the gentleman from Maryland did not raise his point of 
    order at the time of the consideration of the amendment the Chair 
    holds that the point of order is out of order.
        Mr. Bauman: But, Mr. Speaker, the rules of the House directly 
    provide for this.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair again will state that the 
    point of order is not well taken.
        The Chair has already ruled.
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: A parliamentary 
    inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Waggonner: My parliamentary inquiry is this: Does the Chair 
    rule this way in view of the decision of the Chair last week when 
    the gentleman from New York (Mr. Pike) was the Chairman of the 
    Committee of the Whole, and who ruled that a point of order could 
    be made at any time?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state it can be made at 
    any time that the House is in the Committee of the Whole, and the 
    amendment is pending. The House is not in the Committee of the 
    Whole at this time, and the amendment has been agreed to.
        Mr. Waggonner: The words ``at any time,'' then, may be 
    interpreted in a different way today than they were last week?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: No; the rulings are consistent.
        Mr. Waggonner: I thank the Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the engrossment and 
    third reading of the bill.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 6. Timeliness as Against Amendments

    Generally, a point of order against an amendment is properly made 
immediately after the reading thereof by the Clerk.(6) At 
the Chair's discretion, the point of order may be raised even before 
the Clerk has finished the reading, when enough of the text has been 
read to show that it is out of order.(7) While there is a 
requirement that copies of an amendment be made available to Members, 
no point of order lies against the failure of the Clerk to comply with 
this instruction.(8) A point of order against an amendment 
is not entertained where some business has intervened between the 
reading of the amendment and the making of the point of order. Such 
disqualifying business may consist of the granting of a unanimous-
consent request,(9) a res

[[Page 12163]]

ervation of objection against a unanimous-consent 
request,(10) except one to dispense with reading of the 
amendment,(11) the intervention of a parliamentary inquiry 
after a Member has been recognized for debate,(12) but not 
the intervention of another point of order if no debate has 
intervened.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. See Sec. Sec. 6.1, 6.2, infra.
 7. See Sec. 6.10, infra.
 8. See Sec. 6.12, infra.
 9. See Sec. 6.17, infra.
10. See Sec. 6.19, infra.
11. See Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6, 6.18, infra.
12. See Sec. Sec. 6.20, 6.21, infra.
13. See Sec. 6.22, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The making of a point of order against an amendment after the 
``mere recognition'' for debate of the Member who has proposed the 
amendment has been permitted,(14) although there are rulings 
to the effect that points of order may be held too late if the Chair 
has already recognized the Member who offered the amendment to make his 
remarks on the amendment and some intervening business, such as a 
unanimous-consent request to revise and extend or to proceed for more 
time, has been conducted.(15) Where a Member begins speaking 
on his amendment, before being recognized, a point of order may still 
be timely.(16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Sec. Sec. 6.23, 6.24, infra.
15. See Sec. Sec. 6.27-6.29, infra.
16. See Sec. 6.30, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Where a Member has exhibited due diligence and has been overlooked 
by the Chair while he was on his feet seeking recognition at the 
appropriate time, then a point of order may be permitted 
notwithstanding its lateness.(17)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. See Sec. Sec. 6.38-6.42, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A Member seeking to raise a point of order must actively seek 
recognition, by standing and addressing the Chair.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See Sec. 6.8, infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In General

Sec. 6.1 A point of order against an amendment is properly made 
    immediately after the reading thereof.

    On Mar. 29, 1966,(19) Chairman James G. O'Hara, of 
Michigan, ruled that it was not too late for Mr. Joseph L. Evins, of 
Tennessee, to make a point of order immediately following the Clerk's 
reading of an amendment, al

[[Page 12164]]

though the Chairman had been about to put the question.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 112 Cong. Rec. 7118, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 14012, the second supplemental appropriations bill of 
        fiscal 1966. A unanimous-consent request had been agreed to 
        that debate on the pending paragraph and all amendments thereto 
        be concluded in 15 minutes.
            See also 86 Cong. Rec. 2904, 2905, 76th Cong. 3d Sess., 
        Mar. 14, 1940. Under consideration was H.R. 7079, dealing with 
        the appointment of additional federal judges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Elford A.] Cederberg [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Cederberg: On page 4, line 22, 
        after ``program'' and before the period add, ``Provided 
        further, That no part of these funds shall be obligated until 
        funds made available for the construction of family housing for 
        the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Defense agencies 
        in Public Law 89-202, have been obligated.''

        Mr. Evins of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order.
        Mr. [Melvin R.] Laird [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, the point 
    of order comes too late. The Chair was about to state the question.
        The Chairman: The question had not yet been put. The Chair was 
    about to state the question, but the question had not yet been put. 
    The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Evins of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the amendment on the ground that it relates to funds 
    previously appropriated and which are not carried in this bill and 
    interferes with executive discretion given to the President under 
    existing law to do what he wishes with the funds. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order.
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan places an 
    unrelated contingency upon the use of funds provided in this 
    paragraph, and as such is legislation in an appropriation bill, and 
    not germane to the paragraph.
        The point of order is sustained.

Sec. 6.2 A point of order may be made or reserved against an amendment 
    only when the amendment has been offered and read by the Clerk.

        On Mar. 10, 1971,(20) Chairman George W. Andrews, of 
    Alabama, indicated that a Member could not logically reserve a 
    point of order against an amendment which had not yet been offered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 117 Cong. Rec. 5857, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4246, extending laws relating to interest rates, mortgage 
        credit controls, and cost-of-living stabilization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the Clerk has not read 
    the amendment as yet.
        Mr. [Wright] Patman [of Texas]: Then I will reserve a point of 
    order, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [H.R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Gross: My parliamentary inquiry is this, Mr. Chairman. How 
    can a point of order be reserved to an amendment that has not been 
    read?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from Iowa 
    that the gentleman is correct. The Chair has already stated that 
    the Clerk has not read the amendment as yet.
        However, the Chair will state to the gentleman from Texas that 
    if the gentleman has a point of order to raise

[[Page 12165]]

    concerning the amendment, the gentleman can raise his point of 
    order at the proper time after the Clerk has read the amendment.

Chair's Observations on Germaneness of Amendment

Sec. 6.3 Although the Chair may indicate in response to a parliamentary 
    inquiry that a pending amendment might not be germane to the 
    proposition to which offered, he will not declare the amendment out 
    of order unless a proper point of order is made.

    On Apr. 4, 1979,(1) an amendment in the second degree 
was offered during consideration of the International Development 
Cooperation Act. Before the amendment was offered, its proponent asked 
if his contemplated amendment would be in order. Chairman Elliott H. 
Levitas, of Georgia, responded to parliamentary inquiries immediately 
before and then after the amendment was read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 125 Cong. Rec. 7242, 7245, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William H.] Harsha [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Harsha: Page 18, after line 25, 
        insert the following:

                             assistance for nigeria

            Sec. 127. None of the funds authorized to be appropriated 
        by the amendments made by this title may be made available for 
        assistance for Nigeria unless the President determines, and 
        reports to the Congress, that assistance for Nigeria is in the 
        national interest of the United States.

        (Mr. Harsha asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
    his remarks.) . . .
        Mr. [John] Buchanan [of Alabama]: If the gentleman added the 
    other countries, that would improve the amendment; but in my 
    judgment, it would still constitute a mistake and it is unlikely 
    that I would support it.
        Mr. [Joseph G.] Minish [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Buchanan: Certainly, I would be glad to.
        Mr. Minish: Mr. Chairman, I will satisfy the gentleman's 
    wishes, because I have an amendment that deals with all the OPEC 
    countries.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Minish: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Minish: Mr. Chairman, would my amendment be in order as a 
    substitute for the Harsha amendment?

        The Chairman: If the gentleman desires to offer his amendment, 
    the Chair will be better able to respond to the gentleman's inquiry 
    when the amendment is offered.

     amendment offered by mr. minish as a substitute for the amendment 
                           offered by mr. harsha

        Mr. Minish: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute 
    for the amendment.

[[Page 12166]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Minish as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Harsha: Page 18, immediately after 
        line 25, insert the following new section:

          prohibition on assistance to members of the organization of 
                         petroleum exporting countries

            Sec. 127. Funds authorized to be appropriated by this title 
        may not be used to provide assistance to any country which is a 
        member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.

        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the gentleman's 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The subject matter of the gentleman's amendment is broader than 
    the specific subject matter of the amendment of the gentleman from 
    Ohio and, therefore, technically might not be germane. However, 
    unless a point of order is made against it, the Chair will not rule 
    on that question.
        Mr. Harsha: Mr. Chairman, reserving a point of order, and I 
    shall not insist upon my point of order, does the gentleman's 
    amendment strike out the amendment that I offered?
        The Chairman: The amendment of the gentleman from New Jersey is 
    a substitute for the amendment of the gentleman from Ohio and 
    applies to any country which is a member of the Organization of 
    Petroleum Exporting Countries.
        Mr. Harsha: In the event the gentleman's amendment were adopted 
    it would take the place of my amendment and Nigeria would not be in 
    it, if Nigeria is not an OPEC country. Is that not correct?
        The Chairman: The Chair is not in a position to interpret the 
    effect of the amendment.

Sec. 6.4 While the Chair will or- dinarily not render antici-patory 
    rulings on whether an amendment might be in order, he has responded 
    to a parliamentary inquiry about the germaneness of an amendment 
    printed in the Record and whether it could be in order as a 
    substitute for a pending amendment.

    Where a perfecting amendment relating to the budget for one fiscal 
year was pending to a concurrent resolution on the budget, the Chair 
indicated that a noticed amendment in the nature of a substitute, 
encompassing other fiscal years, would not be germane at that point in 
the proceedings. The pertinent excerpts from the Record of May 9, 
1979,(2) are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 125 Cong. Rec. 10485, 10486, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Marjorie S.] Holt [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer a 
    perfecting amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Perfecting amendment offered by Mrs. Holt: Strike out 
        sections 1 through 5 and insert in lieu thereof the following:
        That the Congress hereby determines and declares, pursuant to 
        sec

[[Page 12167]]

        tion 301(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, that for 
        the fiscal year beginning on October 1, 1979-- . . .

        Mr. [Parren J.] MItchell of Maryland: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (3) The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
    Mitchell) will state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. William H. Natcher (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Mitchell of Maryland: Mr. Chairman, this gentleman had 
    planned to offer his amendment as a substitute for the Holt-Regula 
    amendment.
        It is my understanding that when the gentlewoman spoke to her 
    amendment, the gentlewoman called it a perfecting amendment. I do 
    not know whether that embraces fiscal year 1979 and 1980. My 
    amendment does.
        This inquiry is whether mine can be offered as a substitute to 
    the Holt-Regula amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from Maryland 
    (Mr. Mitchell) that since the gentleman's amendment which is at the 
    desk would go to the fiscal years 1979 and 1980 and is in the 
    nature of a substitute for the entire resolution, it would not be 
    germane or otherwise in order, since the amendment offered by the 
    gentlewoman from Maryland (Mrs. Holt) is perfecting in nature and 
    only goes to the fiscal year 1980.

Timing of Point of Order Against Offered Amendment

Sec. 6.5 A point of order against an amendment must be made or reserved 
    immediately after the amendment is read, and where unanimous 
    consent is granted that the amendment be considered as read, the 
    point of order must be raised following the disposition of that 
    request.

    On Mar. 29, 1972,(4) Chairman Neal Smith, of Iowa, 
informed Mr. H. John Heinz, III, of Pennsylvania, that a point of order 
could be reserved after the disposition of a unanimous-consent request 
following the reading of the amendment by the Clerk:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 118 Cong. Rec. 10749, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 11896, to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Heinz (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent to dispense with the reading of the amendment and ask that 
    it be printed at this point in the Record.
        Mr. [William H.] Harsha [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, reserving the 
    right to object, I want to make a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Harsha: Mr. Chairman, I intend to make a point of order 
    against this amendment and, if the unanimous-consent request is 
    granted, do I then waive my right to make that point of order at 
    the appropriate time?
        The Chairman: The gentleman will not waive his right if he 
    makes it immediately after the unanimous consent is granted.

[[Page 12168]]

        Mr. Harsha: I reserve a point of order against the amendment, 
    and if the waiver of the reading of the amendment will not waive my 
    right to a point of order----
        The Chairman: The gentleman can make his point of order 
    immediately following the granting of the unanimous-consent 
    request.

Sec. 6.6 A point of order may be made or reserved against an amendment 
    after it is ``considered as read'' but before the proponent of the 
    amendment has been recognized to debate it.

    On Mar. 9, 1978,(5) during the reading of an amendment 
which he had offered, Mr. James M. Jeffords, of Vermont, asked 
unanimous consent that it be considered as read. The following inquiry 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 124 Cong. Rec. 6285, 6286, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        amendments offered by mr. jeffords as a substitute for the 
                     amendments offered by mr. sarasin

        Mr. Jeffords: Mr. Chairman, I offer amendments as a substitute 
    for the amendments offered by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. 
    Sarasin).
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Mr. Jeffords as a substitute for the 
        amendments offered by Mr. Sarasin: Page 64, line 16, strike out 
        ``and productivity'' and insert in lieu thereof ``productivity, 
        and reasonable price stability''.
            Page 64, line 22, before ``and'' insert ``reasonable price 
        stability, which shall be set at a rate which would, within 
        five years, bring the annual rate of inflation, as measured by 
        the Consumer Price Index as determined by the Bureau of Labor 
        Statistics in the Department of Labor, to not more than 3 
        percent''.
            Page 69, after the period in line 6 add the following new 
        sentence: ``Beginning with the third Economic Report submitted 
        after the date of the enactment of the Full Employment and 
        Balanced Growth Act of 1978, the President shall set forth in 
        each Economic Report the programs and policies being used to 
        reduce inflation and the degree of progress made.''.
            Strike out line 13 on page 73 and all that follows down 
        through line 5 on page 75, and insert in lieu thereof the 
        following:
            ``Sec. 9. (a) The Congress determines that reasonable 
        stability as described in section 3(a)(3) and sections 4(a) and 
        4(b)(2) will be achieved under the procedures and requirements 
        of section 5(b). . . .

        Mr. Jeffords (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the amendments offered as a substitute be 
    considered as read and printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: (6) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Vermont?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. William H. Natcher (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Augustus F.] Hawkins [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order on the amendments.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California reserves a point of 
    order on the amendments.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12169]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Vermont has 
    already made the request that the amendment be considered as read 
    and that request was granted, therefore I think the point of order 
    comes too late.
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman from 
    Maryland that the point of order can still be made or reserved 
    before the gentleman proceeds with his remarks. Therefore, the 
    reservation is in order.

Sec. 6.7 A point of order may be made against an amendment before 
    debate on the amendment begins.

    On Mar. 31, 1937, after the Clerk's reading of an amendment, but 
prior to debate on it, a Member sought to make a point of order, which 
was challenged as coming too late.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 81 Cong. Rec. 2980, 2981, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 5966, the legislative appropriation bill for 1938.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment by Mr. [Ross] Collins [of Mississippi]: Page 19, 
        after line 19, insert a new paragraph, as follows:
            ``For additional services in the office of each Member and 
        Delegate and the Resident Commissioner from Puerto Rico, in the 
        discharge of his official and representative duties, at a rate 
        not to exceed $1,800 per annum, as to each such office, 
        $783,000.''

        Mr. Collins: Mr. Chairman, I ask recognition.
        The Chairman: (8) The gentleman from Mississippi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Scott W. Lucas (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Lindsay C.] Warren [of North Carolina]: Mr. Chairman----
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from North 
    Carolina rise?
        Mr. Warren: I rise to make the point of order that [the 
    appropriation] is not authorized by law.
        Mr. Fred M. Vinson [of Kentucky]: The point of order comes too 
    late, Mr. Chairman. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman had not begun his remarks. . . .
        The Chair does not believe that the point of order comes too 
    late. The gentleman from North Carolina was on his feet seeking 
    recognition at the time the gentleman rose.

A Point of Order Against an Amendment Must Be Timely

Sec. 6.8 A point of order against an amendment comes too late after the 
    proponent has made his introductory comments in explanation of the 
    amendment.

    A point of order against an amendment must be made or reserved as 
soon as the amendment is read or its reading is dispensed with. When 
the Chamber is crowded and noisy, due diligence requires the Member 
wishing to make the point of order to address the Chair, and merely 
being on

[[Page 12170]]

his feet does not protect his right. The events of Oct. 1, 
1985,(9) during the reading of the Food Security Act of 
1985, show how a Member may lose his opportunity to raise a point of 
order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 131 Cong. Rec. 25439, 25440, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Barney] Frank [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment as a substitute for the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Frank as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Dorgan of North Dakota: Page 70, 
        strike out line 19 and all that follows thereafter through page 
        71, line 19, and insert in lieu thereof the following:
            ``(C) The established price for wheat shall be $4.38 per 
        bushel for the 1986 crop; $4.16 per bushel for the 1987 crop; 
        $3.96 per bushel for the 1988 crop; $3.76 per bushel for the 
        1989 crop; and $3.57 per bushel for the 1990 crop, 
        respectively.

        Mr. Frank (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
    Record.
        The Chairman: (10) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Massachusetts?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. David E. Bonior (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        Mr. Frank: Mr. Chairman, I realize that this bill, in its short 
    stay on the floor, has apparently already outlasted the 
    membership's attention span, but this is a very important amendment 
    which I choose to offer anyway.
        This is an amendment which embodies the position of the Reagan 
    administration on this particular bill.
        Mr. Robert F. Smith [of Oregon]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on this amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair would point out to the gentleman from 
    Oregon that it is too late to reserve a point of order. The point 
    of order has to be reserved before the gentleman from Massachusetts 
    begins his remarks.
        Mr. Robert F. Smith: If I may, Mr. Chairman, it was very 
    difficult to hear. I did not even hear the amendment proposed and I 
    was timely in my reservation of my point of order, Mr. Chairman. I 
    was attempting to get order, as the Chair was. I suggest that I did 
    not even hear the amendment offered.
        The Chairman: The Chair asked if there was objection to the 
    waiving of the reading of the amendment and the Chair did not hear 
    an objection.
        Mr. Robert F. Smith: Mr. Chairman, with due respect, I did not 
    even hear the amendment offered, and it has never been read. I was 
    standing here before you, sir.
        The Chairman: The Chair would note that there were literally 
    dozens of people standing. The Chair was not addressed by the 
    gentleman from Oregon and there was a waiving of the reading of the 
    amendment.

Chair's Responsibility Where Amendment Improperly Read

Sec. 6.9 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may direct the re-
    reporting of an amendment where it was not read in its entirety 
    when offered.

[[Page 12171]]

    When an improper reporting of an amendment by the Clerk is called 
to the Chair's attention, he may direct it to be reported again so that 
Members have a proper reference for deciding whether to raise a point 
of order. An amendment must be read in full unless the further reading 
is dispensed with by special rule or unanimous consent. When part of 
the amendment was omitted by the Clerk, the Chair correctly directed 
that it be read again, in full. The proceedings of June 16, 
1983,(11) are illustrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 129 Cong. Rec. 16031, 16032, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Dan] Burton [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Burton: On page 12, between lines 
        17 and 18, insert the following new paragraph:
            (14) Commodities provided under this Act shall be 
        distributed by means of a system developed by the Secretary of 
        Agriculture and State agencies.

        Mr. Burton: Mr. Chairman, I think we all want to help the truly 
    needy, but we also want to make sure we do not at the same time 
    hurt the private sector. . . .
        Mr. [Bill] Emerson [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I move to 
    strike the last word.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment as read by the Clerk does not 
    conform with the amendment that was delivered to me. I wonder if 
    the Clerk might read the amendment again so that we know what we 
    are talking about.
        The Chairman: (12) Without objection, the Clerk will 
    re-report the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Charles E. Bennett (Fla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Burton: On page 12, between lines 
        17 and 18, insert the following new paragraph.
            (14) Commodities provided under this Act shall be 
        distributed by means of a system developed by the Secretary of 
        Agriculture and State agencies.
            Eligible organizations must acknowledge receipt of such 
        commodities. Eligible individual recipients shall be provided 
        such commodities by means of commodity coupons distributed 
        under the food stamp program pursuant to rules and regulations 
        issued by the Secretary of Agriculture as authorized by the 
        Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended.

        Mr. Emerson: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. [E (Kika)] de la Garza [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield to me?
        Mr. Emerson: I yield to the chairman of the committee.
        Mr. de la Garza: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact the 
    amendment has been read, but there is some confusion here. Is this 
    a re-reporting of the amendment or just a re-reading of the 
    amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that it is a re-reporting. 
    The Clerk did not report the entire amendment.
        Mr. de la Garza: Mr. Chairman, I make that inquiry because, as 
    the gen

[[Page 12172]]

    tleman from Texas recollects, there was no unanimous consent to 
    dispense with further reading. Therefore, the amendment was not 
    read in its entirety, and I would have raised a point of order at 
    that time had the amendment been correctly read.
        Mr. Chairman, I will inquire, is it proper at this point, if 
    the amendment has been re-reported, to raise a point of order?
        Mr. Chairman, since there was some confusion, I felt obligated 
    to bring the matter before the House, but I will state now that I 
    would not raise a point of order at this time, and we may proceed 
    on the amendment.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Discretion of Chair

Sec. 6.10 While a point of order may be pressed in the Chair's 
    discretion against an amendment when enough of the text has been 
    read to show that it is out of order, the Chairman may decline to 
    rule on the point of order until the entire amendment has been 
    read.

    On Dec. 14, 1973,(13) a Member sought to press his point 
of order during the reading of an amendment with the following result:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 119 Cong. Rec. 41717, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 11450, the Energy Emergency Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk continued to read the amendment.
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas] (during the reading): Mr. 
    Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (14) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, would it be in order for me to 
    press my point of order at this time?
        The Chairman: Did the Chair understand the gentleman to say, to 
    press his point of order?
        Mr. Eckhardt: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Would it be in order for me to urge my point of order at this 
    time?
        The Chairman: The Chair feels that the reading of the amendment 
    should be concluded.

The Chair, on His Own Initiative, May Rule Out an Amendment Which Is 
    Not in Proper Form

Sec. 6.11 The Chair may examine an offered amendment to determine its 
    propriety and may rule it out of order even where no point of order 
    is raised.

    On May 8, 1980,(15) when the Committee of the Whole 
resumed consideration of the Food Stamp Amendments of 1980, the Chair 
announced that amendments to section 1 were in order. Mr. Robert S. 
Walker, of Pennsylvania, offered what he termed ``an amend

[[Page 12173]]

ment in the nature of a substitute.'' Mr. Walker asked that reading be 
dispensed with and was recognized to begin his explanation. The Chair 
interrupted his presentation to inform him that the amendment offered 
was not ``a proper amendment in the nature of a substitute.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 126 Cong. Rec. 10421, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (16) When the Committee of the Whole 
    rose on Wednesday, May 7, section 1 had been considered as having 
    been read and open to amendment at any point. It shall be in order 
    to consider an amendment to title I of said substitute printed in 
    the Congressional Record on April 30, 1980, and said amendment 
    shall not be subject to amendment except for the offering of pro 
    forma amendments for the purpose of debate. No further amendments 
    are in order which further change or affect the Internal Revenue 
    Code.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Paul Simon (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Are there any amendments to section 1?

       amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by mr. walker

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute. . . .
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. 
        Walker: Page 39, after line 22 insert the following new title:

        Mr. Walker (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
    Record.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection. . . .

        The Chairman: The gentleman will suspend for just a moment. The 
    Chair is advised by the Parliamentarian that the gentleman has not 
    offered a proper amendment in the nature of a substitute here. An 
    amendment in the nature of a substitute would strike everything 
    after the enacting clause. This is an amendment adding a new title 
    III.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, it was my understanding that the 
    amendment was prepared in the form of a substitute.
        The Chairman: The amendment at the desk is not prepared in that 
    form, the Chair is advised. When the committee reaches title II, 
    the first part of the gentleman's amendment would be in order. The 
    Chair will rule that the amendment is not pending at this time.
        Mr. Walker: I thank the Chairman, and I am sorry for that 
    confusion.
        The Chairman: Are there any amendments to section 1?
        Mr. [Steven D.] Symms [of Idaho]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Idaho has an amendment to 
    section 1. This is the short title of the bill.
        Mr. Symms: It is on page 24, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair doubts that that is an amendment to 
    section 1. The amendment of the gentleman from Idaho (Mr. Symms) is 
    not to section 1, but to title I.
        The Clerk will read title I.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 12174]]

     TITLE I--REDUCTION IN FOOD STAMP ERROR AND FRAUD AND REVISION OF 
                                 DEDUCTIONS

Points of Order Against Amendments Because Copies Unavailable

Sec. 6.12 While the rules impose a duty on the Clerk to transmit copies 
    of an amendment to the majority and minority, a point of order does 
    not lie based on the Clerk's inability to comply with this 
    requirement.

    Rule XXIII clause 5(a), specifies that ``Upon the offering of any 
amendment by a Member, when the House is meeting in the Committee of 
the Whole, the Clerk shall promptly transmit to the majority committee 
table five copies of the amendment and five copies to the minority 
committee table. Further, the Clerk shall deliver at least one copy of 
the amendment to the majority cloak room and at least one copy to the 
minority cloak room.'' (17) This rule was added as part of 
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970,(18) but from its 
inception it has been interpreted as an assignment of responsibility to 
the Clerk but not as a provision which inhibits the consideration of an 
amendment. The proceedings of Mar. 25, 1976,(19) are 
illustrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Rule XXIII clause 5(a), House Rules and Manual Sec. 870 (1997).
18. The concept was included in Sec. 124, 84 Stat. 1140 and was 
        included in Rule XXIII in the 92d Cong., H. Res. 5, Jan. 22, 
        1971, p. 144.
19. 122 Cong. Rec. 7997, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Bauman: On page 6, line 3 insert 
        the following new section, and renumber the succeeding 
        sections:
            ``Sec. 9. Notwithstanding any other provision of law the 
        Director of the National Science Foundation shall keep all 
        Members of Congress including the members of the Committee on 
        Science and Technology of the House of Representatives and the 
        Committee on Labor and Public Welfare of the Senate fully and 
        currently informed with respect to all the activities of the 
        National Science Foundation. Upon the receipt of a written 
        request from any Member of Congress for information regarding 
        the activities, programs, grants, or contracts of the National 
        Science Foundation, the Director shall furnish such information 
        within 15 days. . . .

        Mr. [James W.] Symington [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order. We do not have five copies of the amendment as far as I 
    can tell.
        The Chairman: (20) That is not a point of order, 
    although the Chair hopes the copies will be provided.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. George E. Danielson (Calif.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12175]]

No Point of Order Where Copies of Offered Amendment Are Not Available

Sec. 6.13 No point of order lies against an amendment on the ground 
    that copies thereof have not been made available to Members by the 
    Clerk.

    Rule XXIII clause 5, places up-on the Clerk the responsibility of 
making copies of an offered amendment available to the majority and 
minority tables and to the cloakrooms. This portion of clause 5 was 
adopted as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, and from 
its inception, it has been held that noncompliance does not inhibit the 
consideration of an amendment. The Chair has consistently held that 
failure or inability of the Clerk to comply does not state a point of 
order. For an example of such a ruling, see the proceedings of Sept. 
15, 1977, during consideration of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1977 
(H.R. 3744) carried in Sec. 1.35, supra.

Timeliness of Ruling on Pending Points of Order

Sec. 6.14 A pending point of or-der against certain language must be 
    decided prior to recognition of another Member to offer an 
    amendment to the challenged language.

    On May 18, 1966,(1) Chairman Eugene J. Keogh, of New 
York, informed Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, that his substitute 
amendment was premature until the pending point of order against a 
pending committee amendment was disposed of.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 112 Cong. Rec. 10894, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 14544, the Participation Sales Act of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Charles R.] Jonas [of North Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from North Carolina will state the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Jonas: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas desire to be heard 
    on the point of order?
        Mr. Patman: Yes. I have a substitute amendment, and I hope it 
    will be acceptable.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from Texas 
    that we are under the obligation of disposing of the point of 
    order.

Sec. 6.15 Points of order raised against a proposition must be disposed 
    of before amendments to the challenged language are in order.

    On May 14, 1937,(2) a Member unsuccessfully attempted to 
re

[[Page 12176]]

serve a point of order and offer a substitute amendment at the same 
time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 81 Cong. Rec. 4596, 4597, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6958, the Interior Department appropriation for 1938.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gerald J.] Boileau [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    the point of order against the proviso and move to strike out the 
    last word, to ask the gentleman from Oklahoma the reason for the 
    language in lines 17 and 18. . . .
        I do not withdraw my reservation of the point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman, but I have an amendment that I desire to offer.
        The Chairman: (3) The point of order will have to be 
    disposed of before an amendment is in order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Timing of Point of Order Against Amendment

Sec. 6.16 A point of order against an amendment must be raised 
    immediately after the reading of the amendment and before there is 
    any debate on the amendment.

    Where a substitute amendment was offered in Committee of the Whole 
to a bill under consideration, a point of order was raised after the 
proponent of the amendment had begun the explanation of this amendment. 
The proceedings of Mar. 17, 1975,(4) were as indicated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 121 Cong. Rec. 6798, 6799, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John F.] Seiberling [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment as a substitute for the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. Andrews).
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Seiberling as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: page 194, 
        line 9, adopt the sentence starting on line 9, but change 
        ``35'' to ``50''.

        Mr. Seiberling: Mr. Chairman, the effect of my substitute is 
    simply to adopt the language presently appearing on line 9 in the 
    sentence beginning in that line on page 194 with the change offered 
    by the gentleman from North Dakota but with an additional change.
        I would simply change the rate that appears on line 11 from 35 
    cents per ton to 50 cents per ton.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Sam] Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (5) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Neal Smith (Iowa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that the 
    gentleman from Ohio has made a parliamentary error. His intention 
    is not compatible with the substitution of his amendment for that 
    of the gentleman from North Dakota.
        The Chairman: The gentleman's point of order comes too late.
        Mr. [Mark] Andrews of North Dakota: A parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.

[[Page 12177]]

        Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: My amendment is on page 194, line 
    15.
        I would point out that the amendment of the gentleman from Ohio 
    would probably be better standing on its own, since it affects 
    strip mining all over the country and my amendment affects strip 
    mining only in two or three States.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the amendment of the 
    gentleman from North Dakota beginning on page 194, line 15, while 
    it might have been subject to a point of order earlier, it is not 
    subject to a point of order at the present time.

Intervention of Unanimous-consent Request

Sec. 6.17 A point of order against an amendment is not entertained 
    where business (the granting of a unanimous-consent request) has 
    intervened between the reading of the amendment and the making of 
    the point of order; but if, by unanimous consent, the intervening 
    business is vacated, the Chairman may then entertain the point of 
    order.

    On June 24, 1969,(6) Chairman John S. Monagan, of 
Connecticut, suggested to Mr. William F. Ryan, of New York, that his 
point of order, which was untimely because of intervening business 
between the point of order and reading of the amendment, could be 
perfected by seeking unanimous consent to have the intervening business 
vacated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 115 Cong. Rec. 17081, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 12307, the independent offices and housing and urban 
        development appropriation bill for fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        [Mr. William Steiger, of Wisconsin, after his amendment was 
    read, asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
    remarks.]
        Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman's point 
    of order comes a little late.
        Mr. Ryan: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin (Mr. Steiger) had obtained a unanimous-consent request 
    prior to the gentleman from New York being observed by the Chair.
        The Chair will ask the gentleman if the gentleman was on his 
    feet prior to the unanimous-consent request made by the gentleman 
    from Wisconsin?
        Mr. Ryan: The gentleman was on his feet at the point the 
    amendment was read.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York was on his feet 
    during the reading of the amendment?
        Mr. Ryan: That is correct.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman was 
    simply not observed by the Chair prior to the granting of the 
    unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from Wisconsin. Unless 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin de

[[Page 12178]]

    sires to make a unanimous-consent request that his previous 
    unanimous-consent request be vacated, the Chair will state that 
    there is no way the gentleman from New York can be heard on his 
    point of order.
        Mr. Steiger of Wisconsin: Mr. Chairman, I do not wish to make 
    such a request.

Timeliness of Point of Order; a Mere Request for Permission To Revise 
    and Extend Not ``Intervening Business''

Sec. 6.18 The mere making of a unanimous-consent request to dispense 
    with further reading of an amendment and that the proponent be 
    permitted to revise and extend is not ``intervening business'' or 
    ``debate'' which would render a point of order against the 
    amendment as untimely.

    During the reading of an amendment to the American Technology 
Preeminence Act of 1991, Mr. Robert S. Walker, of Pennsylvania, offered 
an amendment and during the reading by the Clerk made a request. The 
proceedings of July 16, 1991,(7) are shown herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 137 Cong. Rec. 18391, 18392, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

          title iv--national commission on reducing capital costs for 
                              emerging technology

          sec. 401. national commission on reducing capital costs for 
                              emerging technology.

            (a) Establishment and Purpose.--There is established a 
        National Commission on Reducing Capital Costs for Emerging 
        Technology (hereafter in this section referred to as the 
        ``Commission''), for the purpose of developing recommendations 
        to increase the competitiveness of United States industry by 
        encouraging investments in research, the development of new 
        process and product technologies, and the production of those 
        technologies. . . .

                      amendment offered by mr. walker

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Walker: Page 40, after line 7, 
        insert the following new title:

        title v--comprehensive national policy for commercialization of 
                             emerging technologies

         sec. 501. comprehensive national policy for commercialization 
                           of emerging technologies.

            It is the sense of the Congress that in order to improve 
        the competitiveness of United States industry--
            (1) the research and experimentation tax credit should be 
        raised to 25 percent and made permanent;
            (2) the capital gains tax should be reduced to levels 
        comparable to that of our major trading partners; and
            (3) the National Cooperative Research Act of 1984 should be 
        extended to include joint production ventures.
            Redesignate existing titles V and VI as titles VI and VII, 
        and redesig

[[Page 12179]]

        nate the sections in such titles accordingly.

        Mr. Walker (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
    Record, and I ask unanimous consent to revise and extend my 
    remarks.
        The Chairman: (8) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Pat Williams (Mont.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               point of order

        Mr. [Dan] Rostenkowski [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I raise the 
    point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Rostenkowski: Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order that 
    the amendment is not germane to the bill under consideration.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: The point of order comes too late.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman reserve his point of order? 
    Does the gentleman wish to make the point of order?
        Mr. Rostenkowski: Mr. Chairman, I intended to make a point of 
    order against the gentleman's amendment.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, the point of order comes too late. 
    Business has taken place in the House that would preclude the point 
    of order from being made.
        Mr. Rostenkowski: Mr. Chairman, I was seeking recognition. I 
    was on my feet. I reserved the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania the point of order is timely. Debate has not yet begun 
    on the amendment.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I asked unanimous consent to revise 
    and extend my remarks, which means that debate had in fact begun 
    and the unanimous consent was agreed to, which means that the point 
    of order does not come timely.
        The Chairman: No order of the Committee has been entered on 
    that manner. The point of order has been reserved.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
    Rostenkowski] on the point of order.

Sec. 6.19 After an amendment has been read by the Clerk and a 
    reservation of objection has been made against a unanimous-consent 
    request for an additional five minutes' debate, it is too late to 
    raise a point of order against the amendment.

    On Feb. 1, 1938,(9) a point of order against an 
amendment was ruled untimely by Chairman William J. Driver, of 
Arkansas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 83 Cong. Rec. 1364, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 9181, the District of Columbia appropriation for 1939.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Everett M.] Dirksen [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.

[[Page 12180]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Dirksen: On page 57, in line 19, 
        strike out ``$900,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$1,900,000.''

        Mr. Dirksen: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to proceed 
    for an additional 5 minutes.
        Mr. [Ross A.] Collins [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, reserving 
    the right to object----
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make the point 
    of order against the amendment that this increase is not authorized 
    by law.
        The Chairman: The point of order of the gentleman from New York 
    comes too late. A request has already been presented, and there has 
    been a reservation of objection to it.

Intervention of Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 6.20 A point of order against an amendment is properly raised 
    immediately after the reading thereof and comes too late after the 
    Chairman has entertained and responded to a parliamentary inquiry 
    from another Member.

    On Nov. 5, 1969,(10) immediately after the reading of a 
substitute amendment, Chairman Chet Holifield, of California, responded 
to a parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 115 Cong. Rec. 33133, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 6778, amending the One Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Bennett as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Bevill: strike lines 12 through 23 and 
        insert:
            ``d. The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 is amended by 
        adding at the end of section 2 the following new subsection:
            `` `Sec. 4. The provisions of this law shall not apply to 
        one-bank holding companies with bank-assets of less than 
        $30,000,000 and non-bank assets of less than $10,000,000.' ''

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Benjamin B.] Blackburn [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Blackburn: Mr. Chairman, do I understand we are preparing 
    to vote, and if so, what will we be voting upon? I understand there 
    is another amendment now. . . .
        Mr. [Gary E.] Brown of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point 
    of order on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida 
    (Mr. Bennett) in that it is not germane to the bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman wish to be heard on his point 
    of order?
        Mr. Brown of Michigan: Yes, Mr. Chairman; I would like to be 
    heard on my point of order.]
        Mr. [Charles E.] Bennett: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    that I think the point of order . . . is too late, but I think the 
    amendment is germane, anyway.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the point of order 
    raised by the gentleman from Michigan is too late. The gentleman 
    from Georgia had arisen for a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Brown of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, if I could be heard on 
    that, as I

[[Page 12181]]

    recall the activity of the House at that time the amendment was 
    offered, it was read, the parliamentary inquiry was made as to what 
    was before the Committee, the Chair explained what was before the 
    Committee at that time, and at that time I made my point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman's point 
    of order comes too late because we have had a parliamentary inquiry 
    in the meantime, and the Chair has responded.

Sec. 6.21 A point of order must be made immediately after the reading 
    of an amendment and comes too late if a parliamentary inquiry 
    intervenes.

    On Dec. 11, 1947,(11) Chairman Earl C. Michener, of 
Michigan, answered an inquiry suggesting the importance of making a 
point of order immediately after the reading of an amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 93 Cong. Rec. 11279, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4604, a foreign aid bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James G.] Fulton [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, may I 
    have a specific ruling as to whether a parliamentary inquiry made 
    before a point of order makes a point of order out of order?
        The Chairman: A point of order must be made immediately after 
    the reading of the amendment. No business must intervene between 
    the reading of an amendment and the raising of the point of order. 
    A point of order comes too late if a parliamentary inquiry 
    intervenes.

Intervention of Another Point of Order

Sec. 6.22 After a point of order against an amendment has been 
    overruled, the Chairman may entertain a further point of order if 
    the Member offering the amendment has not yet begun debate thereon.

    On Nov. 17, 1971,(12) Chairman Daniel D. Rostenkowski, 
of Illinois, entertained a further point of order after overruling the 
first, as nothing else had intervened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 117 Cong. Rec. 41801, 41802, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 11731, the Department of Defense 
        appropriations for 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, am I 
    recognized?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 
    minutes.
        Mr. [John J.] Rhodes [of Arizona]: Mr. Chairman, a further 
    point of order.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I understand the point of order has 
    been overruled.
        The Chairman: The Chair has overruled the point of order of the 
    gentleman from Texas, but the gentleman from Illinois has not yet 
    begun his remarks.
        Mr. Rhodes: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry, is not a 
    further point of order in order?

[[Page 12182]]

        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman from Arizona on 
    the parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I thought I had been recognized.
        Mr. Rhodes: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry is whether or 
    not a further point of order can be made at this time?
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the point of order.

Effect of Recognition for Debate

Sec. 6.23 Mere recognition for debate does not preclude a point of 
    order against an amendment if no debate has intervened.

    On July 30, 1969,(13) following the reading of the 
amendment by the Clerk, Chairman Chet Holifield, of California, 
recognized the proponent, Mr. Torbert H. Macdonald, of Massachusetts, 
to speak on it, but, before Mr. Macdonald could begin his remarks, Mr. 
Daniel J. Flood, of Pennsylvania, raised a point of order, which led to 
the following exchange:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 115 Cong. Rec. 21458, 21459, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 1311, the Departments of Labor and 
        Health, Education, and Welfare appropriations for fiscal 1970. 
        But see 99 Cong. Rec. 2106, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., Mar. 18, 1953.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts (Mr. Macdonald) for 5 minutes in support of his 
    amendment.
        Mr. Flood: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, the point 
    comes too late.
        Mr. Flood: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the point of order. . . 
    .
        Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts: Could I be enlightened as to 
    when a Member who has been recognized and starts to talk has given 
    up his right of recognition?
        The Chairman: A point of order can intervene before debate is 
    conducted on an amendment, particularly when the chairman of the 
    subcommittee is on his feet seeking recognition. There had been no 
    debate on the merits of the amendment.

Sec. 6.24 Mere recognition by the Chairman of a Member proposing an 
    amendment does not preclude a point of order being raised by a 
    Member who has shown due diligence.

    On Mar. 31, 1937,(14) Mr. Ross A. Collins, of 
Mississippi, had

[[Page 12183]]

been recognized to speak on his amendment when Chairman Scott W. Lucas, 
of Illinois, permitted another Member, Lindsay C. Warren, of North 
Carolina, to raise a point of order that the amendment was an 
unauthorized appropriation on a general appropriation bill. The 
Chairman allowed the point of order to be made because Mr. Warren had 
been on his feet seeking recognition at the time Mr. Collins rose.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 81 Cong. Rec. 2980, 2981, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 5966, an appropriations bill fixing compensation of 
        employees of the legislative branch for fiscal 1938.
            See also 101 Cong. Rec. 12408, 84th Cong. 1st Sess., July 
        30, 1955. Under consideration was H.R. 6857, authorizing the 
        General Services Administration to convey realty to the city of 
        Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Collins: Mr. Chairman, I offer the following amendment, 
    which I send to the desk.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Mississippi.
        Mr. Warren: Mr. Chairman----
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from North 
    Carolina rise?
        Mr. Warren: I rise to make the point of order that it is not 
    authorized by law.
        Mr. Fred M. Vinson [of Kentucky]: The point of order comes too 
    late, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman make the point of order?
        Mr. Warren: I make the point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Collins: And I make the further point of order that I had 
    secured recognition from the Chair before the point of order was 
    made, and therefore the point of order comes too late.
        The Chairman: The gentleman had not begun his remarks. The 
    Chair will hear the gentleman from Mississippi on the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Collins: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    point of order comes too late. I was on my feet and had been 
    recognized by the Chair, as will be shown by the stenographic 
    notes.
        The Chairman: The Chair does not believe that the point of 
    order comes too late. The gentleman from North Carolina was on his 
    feet seeking recognition at the time the gentleman rose.
        Mr. Collins: On the contrary, I had secured recognition from 
    the Chair and was approaching the Well of the House for the purpose 
    of speaking to my amendment before the gentleman addressed the 
    Chair, all of which will be shown by the stenographic notes.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Mississippi had not begun 
    debate on the amendment, and even though the Chair had recognized 
    the gentleman from Mississippi, the gentleman from North Carolina 
    was on his feet at practically the same time, and the Chair does 
    not believe that the point of order has been raised too late.

Sec. 6.25 Points of order against proposed amendments come too late 
    after a Member has been recognized to debate his amendment and a 
    unanimous-consent request has

[[Page 12184]]

    been granted on that Member's time.

    On Mar. 18, 1953,(15) Chairman Kenneth B. Keating, of 
New York, recognized the proponent of an amendment, William L. Dawson, 
of Illinois, but, before the Member could speak, Mr. Clare E. Hoffman, 
of Michigan, made a unanimous-consent request that the amendment be 
reread, which request was granted. Mr. Hoffman then attempted to make a 
point of order, still before Mr. Dawson had commenced his remarks, but 
the Chair ruled the point of order came too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 99 Cong. Rec. 2106, 83d Cong. 1st Sess., relating to H.J. Res. 223, 
        providing that Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1953 take effect 
        within 10 days.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The gentleman from Illinois is recognized in 
    support of his amendment.
        Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
    that the amendment be read again.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk reread the Dawson amendment.
        Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the amendment.
        Mr. Dawson of Illinois: Mr. Chairman, the point of order comes 
    too late.
        Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: It does not specify wherein the 
    resolution that is now before the Committee is to be amended and, 
    further, Reorganization Plan No. 1 is not before the Committee at 
    this time.
        The Chairman: The gentleman's point of order comes too late. 
    The gentleman from Illinois had already been recognized.

Point of Order Precluded by Proponent's Requests To Revise and Extend 
    and That the Amendment Be Reread

Sec. 6.26 Where a Member had been recognized to debate his proposed 
    amendment, had asked permission to revise and extend, and had 
    received unanimous consent to have the amendment reread (since a 
    quorum call intervened between the offering of the amendment and 
    his recognition), the Chair stated that it was too late to raise a 
    point of order.

        Until Jan. 4, 1977, it was still possible to make a point of 
    order that a quorum of the Committee of the Whole was not present 
    at any time during the five-minute rule.(16) In the 
    proceedings

[[Page 12185]]

    of June 26, 1975,(17) when an amendment was offered at a 
    point when few Members were on the floor, Mr. Robert E. Bauman, of 
    Maryland, made the point that a quorum was not present. A call of 
    the Committee followed, and after one hundred Members responded, 
    the Chair terminated proceedings under the call and recognized the 
    proponent of the amendment for debate. The Congressional Record 
    shows the following exchange:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Rule XXIII clause 2, was amended in the 95th Congress to permit a 
        point of no quorum, after a quorum of the Committee has once 
        been established on that day, only when the Chair has put the 
        question on a pending proposition. See House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 863 and annotation thereto (1997).
17. 121 Cong. Rec. 20945, 20946, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [M. G. (Gene)] Snyder [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Snyder: On page 16, after line 14, 
        add the following new section:
            ``Sec. 104. None of the funds appropriated in this title 
        shall be used for the purposes of negotiating the surrender or 
        relinquishment of any U.S. rights in the Panama Canal Zone.''

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: (18) The Chair will count. Thirty-six 
    Members are present, not a quorum.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Charles A. Vanik (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair announces that he will vacate proceedings under the 
    call when a quorum of the Committee appears.

        Members will record their presence by electronic device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.
        The Chairman: One hundred Members have appeared. A quorum of 
    the Committee of the Whole is present. Pursuant to rule XXIII, 
    clause 2, further proceedings under the call shall be considered as 
    vacated.
        The Committee will resume its business.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Snyder).
        (Mr. Snyder asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
    his remarks.)
        Mr. Snyder: Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that there are a 
    few Members on the floor who were not here a while ago, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Clerk reread my amendment.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Kentucky?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will reread the amendment.
        The Clerk reread the amendment.
        Mr. [Robert L.] Leggett [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Leggett: Mr. Chairman, is it too late to make a point of 
    order with respect to the amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair informs the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Leggett) that it is too late.

Sec. 6.27 A point of order against an amendment came too late after the 
    proponent of the amendment had been recognized and had been granted 
    permission to revise and extend his remarks.

    On July 26, 1973,(19) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chair

[[Page 12186]]

man Charles M. Price, of Illinois, ruled a point of order raised by Mr. 
Thomas E. Morgan, of Pennsylvania, came too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 119 Cong. Rec. 26191, 26192, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 9360, the Mutual Development and 
        Cooperation Act of 1973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Andrew] Young of Georgia: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .

    Parliamentarian's Note: Mr. Young had been recognized and had asked 
and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.

        Mr. Morgan: Mr. Chairman, I just wonder if this section is the 
    proper place for this amendment. I would like to reserve a point of 
    order until we find out whether this is the proper location.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Georgia has already been 
    recognized.

Sec. 6.28 A point of order against the germaneness of an amendment must 
    be made or reserved immediately after the amendment is read and 
    comes too late after the proponent of the amendment has been 
    recognized and has asked and received permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.

    The proceedings of Sept. 17, 1975,(20) which illustrate 
the above headnote, are as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 121 Cong. Rec. 28937, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (1) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Maine (Mr. Emery) for 5 minutes in support of his amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (Mr. Emery asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
    his remarks.)
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to 
    reserve a point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Dingell) that his reservation comes too late. The 
    Chair had already recognized the gentleman from Maine (Mr. Emery), 
    and the point of order comes too late.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Maine for 5 minutes in 
    support of his amendment.

Sec. 6.29 After a Member had been granted 15 minutes to address the 
    Committee of the Whole on his amendment, it was held to be too late 
    to make a point of order against the amendment.

    On Apr. 17, 1943,(2) a point of order raised by Mr. 
Usher L. Burdick, of North Dakota, against an amendment to an 
agricultural appropriation bill was ruled untimely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 89 Cong. Rec. 3510, 78th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 2481, the agricultural appropriation for 1944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent to speak for 15 minutes . . . .

[[Page 12187]]

        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: (3) The gentleman is recognized for 15 
    minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. William M. Whittington (Miss.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Burdick: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: The point of order comes too late. The gentleman 
    has been recognized and has been granted permission to proceed for 
    15 minutes.

Effect of Failure To Obtain Recognition To Debate

Sec. 6.30 Recognition of a Member by the Chair to offer an amendment 
    does not give such Member the privilege of debating his amendment; 
    consequently a point of order against an amendment may be made in a 
    proper case even though a Member has started debate thereon if he 
    did not obtain recognition for that purpose (the Committee 
    overruling the Chair on appeal).

    On Feb. 1, 1938,(4) during consideration of amendments 
to H.R. 9181, the District of Columbia appropriations bill of 1939, it 
was contended that a point of order against an amendment was untimely 
in that it had been made after debate had begun. The proceedings were 
as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 83 Cong. Rec. 1372, 1373, 75th Cong. 3d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Collins: On page 68, line 20, 
        after the period, insert a new paragraph, as follows:
            ``Street lighting: For purchase, installation, and 
        maintenance of public lamps, lampposts, street designations, 
        lanterns, and fixtures of all kinds on streets, avenues, roads, 
        alleys, and for all necessary expenses in connection therewith, 
        including rental of storerooms, extra labor, operation, 
        maintenance, and repair of motor trucks, this sum to be 
        expended in accordance with the provisions of existing law, 
        $765,000: Provided, That this appropriation shall not be 
        available for the payment of rates for electric street lighting 
        in excess of those authorized to be paid in the fiscal year 
        1927, and payment for electric current for new forms of street 
        lighting shall not exceed 2 cents per kilowatt-hour for current 
        consumed.''

        Mr. [Ross A.] Collins [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    language that is incorporated in the amendment----
        Mr. [Jack] Nichols [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment.
        Mr. Collins: Eliminates the language against which the 
    gentleman made the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the gentleman's 
    point of order comes too late.
        The Chairman: (5) The gentleman from Oklahoma makes 
    a point of order on the amendment, and the gentleman from 
    Mississippi makes the point of order that the point of order made 
    by the gentleman from Oklahoma comes too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. William J. Driver (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The point of order of the gentleman from Mississippi is 
    sustained. . . .

[[Page 12188]]

        Mr. Nichols: If the Chair did recognize the gentleman from 
    Mississippi I may say the Chair recognized him while I was on my 
    feet taking the only opportunity presented to me to address the 
    Chair, in order that I might direct my point of order to the Chair.
        The Chairman: That may be true. The Chair does not care to 
    indulge in any controversy on that question with the gentleman from 
    Oklahoma. The Chair is merely stating what occurred. The Chair may 
    state further to the gentleman from Oklahoma, in deference to the 
    situation which has developed here, that if that had been true, 
    under the rules it would have been the duty of the Chair to have 
    recognized a member of the committee in preference to any other 
    Member on the floor. The Chair was acting under the limitations of 
    the rule. . . .
        Mr. [Jesse P.] Wolcott [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, the rule, 
    as I understand it, is that if any action is taken on the 
    amendment, then the point of order is dilatory. The only action 
    that could have been taken was recognition by the Chair of the 
    gentleman from Mississippi to debate his amendment.
        I want to call the attention of the Chair to the fact the only 
    manner in which the Chair can recognize a Member to be heard on 
    this floor is to refer to the gentleman either by name or by the 
    State from which the gentleman comes, and I call the attention of 
    the Chair to the fact that the Chair in this particular instance 
    did not say he recognized the gentleman from Mississippi or the 
    gentleman [Mr. Collins], and for that reason there was no official 
    proceeding and no official action taken between the time that the 
    amendment was offered and the time the gentleman from Oklahoma made 
    his point of order, and therefore the point of order was not 
    dilatory.
        The Chairman: The Chair desires, in all fairness, to make this 
    statement to the Committee, as well as directly to the gentleman 
    from Michigan. Not only was the gentleman from Mississippi 
    recognized, but he began an explanation of his amendment, and the 
    Chair certainly presumes that the gentleman being on the floor at 
    the time heard that; and when that occurred, the Chair does not 
    think the gentleman will disagree with the Chair about the fact 
    that the Chair is required, under the rules, to rule in deference 
    to the situation that developed. The Chair does not desire to 
    forestall proceedings and would be pleased to hear points of order, 
    but the Chair must act within the definition of the rule.
        Mr. Wolcott: If the Chair will indulge me for a moment in that 
    respect, the point I wish to make is this. The gentleman from 
    Mississippi had no authority to address this Committee until he had 
    been recognized by the Chair, and if the gentleman from Oklahoma 
    made his point of order during a brief sentence by someone which 
    had no right under the rules of this House even to be reported by 
    the official reporter, then he cannot be estopped, under those 
    circumstances, from making his point of order. The Chair of 
    necessity must have recognized the gentleman from Mississippi to 
    debate the amendment.
        The offering of an amendment is not a proceeding which will 
    estop the gentleman from Oklahoma from making his point of order. 
    It is recognition by

[[Page 12189]]

    the Chair of another gentleman to discuss the amendment, and the 
    gentleman could have discussed the amendment only after recognition 
    was given. . . .
        Mr. Nichols: If the Chair has made a final ruling, I would, in 
    the most respectful manner I know, request an appeal from the 
    decision of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Oklahoma appeals from the 
    decision of the Chair on the ruling of the Chair on the point of 
    order, as stated.
        The question before the Committee is, Shall the ruling of the 
    Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the noes 
    had it.
        So the decision of the Chair does not stand as the judgment of 
    the Committee.

After Debate on Amendment

Sec. 6.31 A point of order against an amendment comes too late after 
    there has been debate on the amendment.

    On June 1, 1961,(6) Chairman W. Homer Thornberry, of 
Texas, indicated that a point of order made by Mr. John J. Rooney, of 
New York, against an amendment offered by Mr. Clare E. Hoffman, of 
Michigan, came too late, as Mr. Hoffman had already begun his remarks 
on the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 107 Cong. Rec. 9349, 9350, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. [H.R. 7371].
            See also 113 Cong. Rec. 32662, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., Nov. 
        15, 1967 [S. 2388]; 113 Cong. Rec. 19417, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., 
        July 19, 1967 [H.R. 421]; 101 Cong. Rec. 3947, 3948, 84th Cong. 
        1st Sess., Mar. 29, 1955 [H.R. 3659]; and 93 Cong. Rec. 4079, 
        80th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 25, 1947 [H.R. 3123].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gross of Iowa: ``On page 7, strike 
        out all of lines 21 through 25 and on page 8, strike all of 
        lines 1 through 3.'' . . .

        The amendment was rejected.

        Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: ``On page 8, 
        lines 2 and 3, strike all after the semicolon.''

    Parliamentarian's Note: Mr. Hoffman asked and was given permission 
to revise and extend his remarks.

        Mr. Hoffman of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, being a realist I 
    understand----
        Mr. Rooney: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Rooney: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    amendment now offered by the gentleman from Michigan is the same in 
    effect as that which was offered by the gentleman from Iowa and 
    just defeated.
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    point of order comes too late. The gentleman from Michigan had been 
    recognized and started to speak.

[[Page 12190]]

        The Chairman: While the point of order does come too late, the 
    amendment does strike out language different from that stricken out 
    by the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa.

Sec. 6.32 A point of order against an amendment must be made or 
    reserved immediately after it is read by the Clerk, and comes too 
    late after debate has begun on the amendment.

        On Nov. 25, 1970,(7) Chairman Chet Holifield, of 
    California, ruled that a reservation of a point of order by Mr. 
    George H. Fallon, of Maryland, came too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 116 Cong. Rec. 38991, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 19504, the Federal Highway Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William H.] Harsha [of Ohio] (during the reading): Mr. 
    Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the 
    amendment [offered by the gentleman from New York, Mr. Bingham] be 
    dispensed with, since both the majority and the minority have 
    copies of the amendment, and that it be printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Ohio?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York is recognized.
        Mr. [Jonathan B.] Bingham [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    purpose of the amendment, which is to section 142 of the bill, is 
    to strike out certain words in that section which limit the 
    supplementary assistance that this bill now provides for mass 
    transportation to highway transportation.
        Mr. Fallon: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Bingham: the gentleman can get me additional time, I shall 
    be glad to yield.
        Mr. Fallon: It will take less than a minute.
        Mr. Bingham: I yield to the chairman of the committee.
        Mr. Fallon: Would the gentleman's amendment transfer money out 
    of the trust fund to be used for any other purpose?
        Mr. Bingham: I cannot answer that question that way, Mr. 
    Chairman. If the chairman would allow me to proceed----
        Mr. Fallon: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman rises too late for that purpose. 
    The gentleman from New York will proceed.

Sec. 6.33 A point of order against the germaneness of an amendment must 
    be raised prior to debate thereon, and comes too late if the 
    proponent has commenced his remarks.

        On June 16, 1975,(8) a point of order was held to 
    come too late where the amendment had been read, the proponent had 
    received permission to revise and extend and had begun his brief 
    remarks. The Record excerpt is as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 121 Cong. Rec. 19073, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William L.] Armstrong [of Colorado]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an

[[Page 12191]]

    amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute for the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            An amendment offered by Mr. Armstrong to the amendment 
        offered by Mr. Burke of Massachusetts as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Vanik: Amend the Burke amendment by 
        adding the following: and on line 6, strike the word 
        ``temporarily.''

        (Mr. Armstrong asked and was given permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.)
        Mr. Armstrong: Mr. Chairman, I will take only a moment.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Herman T.] Schneebeli [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order, that the amendment is not germane.
        The Chairman: (9) The gentleman's point of order 
    comes too late. The gentleman from Colorado has already commenced 
    his statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. James J. Delaney (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 6.34 A point of order against an amendment must be made or 
    reserved immediately following the reading of the amendment, and 
    comes too late after the proponent of the amendment has begun his 
    remarks.

        On Mar. 20, 1975,(10) a Member attempted to reserve 
    a point of order against an amendment offered during consideration 
    of a bill providing emergency price supports for 1975 crops. The 
    Chairman of the Committee of the Whole declared that the attempted 
    reservation came too late, the proponent of the amendment having 
    uttered a few words in explanation of his amendment. The 
    proceedings were as shown below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 121 Cong. Rec. 7665, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     amendment offered by mr. jeffords

        Mr. [James M.] Jeffords [of Vermont]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Jeffords: Page 3, after line 6 
        strike out ``the support price of milk shall be established at 
        no less than 80 per centum of the parity price therefor, on the 
        date of enactment, and the support price shall be adjusted 
        thereafter by the Secretary at the beginning of each quarter 
        beginning with the second quarter of the calendar year 1975,'' 
        and insert ``the support price of milk shall be established at 
        no less than 80 per centum of the parity price therefor, on the 
        date of enactment, and the support price shall be adjusted 
        thereafter by the Secretary to no less than 82 per centum of 
        the parity price therefor, at the beginning of each quarter, 
        beginning with the third quarter of the calendar year 1975,''.

        Mr. Jeffords: Mr. Chairman, this amendment merely does this. It 
    says that the 80 percent----
        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I was on 
    my feet earlier when the amendment was read. I would like to 
    reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: (11) The Chair must advise the 
    gentleman from Washington that his point of order comes too late.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. John Brademas (Ind.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12192]]

Sec. 6.35 A point of order against an amendment cannot be reserved 
    after the proponent of the amendment has been recognized and has 
    begun his explanation of the amendment.

        On May 27, 1969,(12) Chairman John H. Dent, of 
    Pennsylvania, ruled that an attempted reservation of a point of 
    order by Mr. Silvio O. Conte, of Massachusetts, came too late after 
    the proponent of the amendment had been recognized and started his 
    remarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 115 Cong. Rec. 14074, 91st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Neal] Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 5 
    minutes.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, this is really a simple 
    amendment.
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman--
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from 
    Massachusetts rise?
        Mr. Conte: I reserve a point of order to the amendment.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: The reservation comes too late. I object.
        The Chairman: The Chair is of the opinion that the request of 
    the gentleman from Massachusetts comes a little too late. The 
    gentleman from Iowa is proceeding.

Sec. 6.36 A point of order against an amendment comes too late after 
    debate has begun on the amendment, and the rereading of the 
    amendment by unanimous consent after there has been debate does not 
    permit the intervention of a point of order against the amendment.

        On Nov. 4, 1971,(13) debate had already begun on an 
    amendment when Mr. Hugh L. Carey, of New York, sought, and 
    obtained, a rereading of the amendment. Chairman Pro Tempore Edward 
    P. Boland, of Massachusetts, then advised Mr. Gerald R. Ford, of 
    Michigan, that he could not then make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 117 Cong. Rec. 39302, 39303, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 7248, to amend and extend the Higher 
        Education Act of 1965 and other acts dealing with higher 
        education.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Carey of New York: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
    that the amendment be read again.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the unanimous-
    consent request that the amendment be read again?
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Chairman, reserving the right to 
    object, may I make a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: If the amendment is read again it will not 
    then be subject to a point of order if it is not germane?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that a point of 
    order relative to the germaneness of this amendment would come too 
    late.

[[Page 12193]]

Sec. 6.37 A point of order against an amendment in the House comes too 
    late after there has been debate thereon and the previous question 
    has been ordered.

        On Mar. 1, 1967,(14) after an amendment was offered, 
    debated for an hour, and the previous question on the amendment 
    voted upon, the following exchange took place:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 113 Cong. Rec. 5020, 5036-38, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H. Res. 278, relating to the right of 
        Representative-elect Adam Clayton Powell to be sworn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The result of the vote was as above recorded.
        Mr. [Phillip] Burton of California: Mr. Speaker, I raise a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker: (15) The gentleman will state his point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Burton of California: In view of the fact that this 
    resolution, among other things, states that the Member from New 
    York is ineligible to serve in the other body, and therefore 
    clearly beyond our power to so vote; and in addition to that fact 
    it anticipates election results in the 18th District of New York, a 
    matter upon which we cannot judge at this time, I raise the point 
    of order that the resolution is an improper one for the House to 
    consider, and that it clearly exceeds our authority.
        The Speaker: The Chair will observe to the gentleman that if 
    the point of order would be in order it would have been at a 
    previous stage in the proceedings, and the gentleman's point of 
    order comes too late.

Effects of Diligence in Seeking Recognition

Sec. 6.38 A point of order against an amendment does not come too late 
    where the Member raising the point was on his feet, seeking 
    recognition, at the time the amendment was read.

    On Sept. 29, 1969,(16) after recognition of the 
proponent of an amendment, Chairman Charles E. Bennett, of Florida, 
permitted Mr. John P. Saylor, of Pennsylvania, to make a point of order 
that would otherwise have come too late, when Mr. Saylor explained that 
he had been on his feet trying to obtain recognition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 115 Cong. Rec. 27351, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 13369, extending the authority of the Administrator of 
        Veterans' Affairs to set interest rates on mortgages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 
    minutes in support of his amendment.
        Mr. [Wright] Patman [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Saylor: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman makes his point too late. The 
    gentleman from Texas was recognized.
        Mr. Saylor: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet trying to get 
    recognition.
        The Chairman: The gentleman states he was on his feet at the 
    time the amendment was read?

[[Page 12194]]

        Mr. Saylor: I have been on my feet for the last 5 minutes. . . 
    .
        Mr. Chairman, my point of order is that the gentleman's 
    amendment comes too late. The committee amendment has been adopted.
        The Chairman: The committee amendment, as amended, is still 
    pending and the Chair has not put the question thereon. The 
    gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his 
    amendment.

Sec. 6.39 A point of order against an amendment is not precluded by the 
    Chairman's recognition of the Member offering the amendment if the 
    Member raising the point of order was on his feet, seeking 
    recognition, before debate on the amendment began.

    On Aug. 30, 1961,(17) following the reading of an 
amendment to a bill dealing with the prevention and control of juvenile 
delinquency, Mr. James Roosevelt, of California, sought to make a point 
of order, although the proponent had already been recognized and 
started his remarks. Chairman Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, 
nevertheless permitted the point of order to be raised as Mr. Roosevelt 
was on his feet actively seeking recognition at the time the proponent, 
Mr. Robert P. Griffin, of Michigan, started his remarks:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 107 Cong. Rec. 17612, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. [H.R. 8028].
            See also 115 Cong. Rec. 21458, 91st Cong. 1st Sess., July 
        30, 1969 [H.R. 13111].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5 
    minutes on his amendment.
        Mr. Griffin: Mr. Chairman, these are conforming amendments to 
    draw the bill in accordance with the previous amendment and to make 
    sense in the legislation. I ask that they be adopted.
        Mr. Roosevelt: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against 
    the amendments.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Griffin: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    point of order comes too late.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California was on his feet.
        Mr. Griffin: The amendment was offered and I was recognized to 
    explain the amendment, and I proceeded to explain the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California was on his feet 
    seeking recognition. The gentleman from California will state his 
    point of order.

Time of Making or Reserving Point of Order

Sec. 6.40 A point of order against an amendment may be made or reserved 
    immediately after an amendment is read; but where several Members 
    are on their feet, and the

[[Page 12195]]

    Chair recognizes the offeror of the amendment, another Member who 
    has exercised due diligence and persists in his attempt to gain the 
    attention of the Chair can still be recognized to reserve a point 
    of order.

    It is the duty of the Chair to protect the rights of Members 
seeking recognition. He did so, over objections, when he allowed a 
point of order to be reserved against an amendment offered by Mr. Henry 
B. Gonzalez, of Texas, on June 11, 1987.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 133 Cong. Rec. 15541, 15543, 100th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     amendment offered by mr. gonzalez to the amendment offered by mr. 
                                   hiler

        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gonzalez to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Hiler: In the matter proposed to be inserted by the 
        amendment--
            (1) strike ``in excess of'' and insert ``, the amounts 
        provided shall not exceed''; and
            (2) strike ``as passed'' and all that follows through 
        ``applicable level.''
            (3) strike ``or subfunction'' the first place it appears.

        Mr. [John] Hiler [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point 
    of order on the amendment.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Brian J. Donnelly (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, did the Chair recognize the 
    gentleman's interposition of a point of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from 
    Indiana was on his feet and he has properly maintained his right to 
    reserve a point of order.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, may I pursue my parliamentary 
    inquiry?
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, it is my recollection that I had 
    been recognized by the Chair on my amendment, at which time the 
    gentleman interposed his objection.
        In my opinion and according to the precedents I have listened 
    to, that is not in a timely fashion interposing a motion.
        The Chairman: The Chair states that the gentleman was on his 
    feet at the time that the gentleman from Texas was recognized. The 
    matter of precedent does not lie on this case.
        Does the gentleman from Indiana insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Hiler: Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve my point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Indiana reserves his point of 
    order. . . .
        Does the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hiler) press his point of 
    order?
        Mr. Hiler: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my point of order.

[[Page 12196]]

        The Chairman: The point of order is withdrawn.
        Mr. Hiler: Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number 
    of words, and I rise in opposition to the gentleman's amendment.

Sec. 6.41 Although the proponent of an amendment had been recognized 
    and had begun his discussion, the Chairman entertained a point of 
    order against the amendment by a Member who stated he had been on 
    his feet, seeking recognition for that purpose when the discussion 
    began.

    On Sept. 26, 1967,(20) Chairman Charles E. Bennett, of 
Florida, allowed Mr. Carl D. Perkins, of Kentucky, to make a point of 
order after the time therefor had passed, because Mr. Perkins had been 
on his feet seeking recognition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 113 Cong. Rec. 26878, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 12120, the Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act 
        of 1967.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer two amendments, and I ask unanimous consent that they be 
    considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Waggonner]?
        There was no objection.
        The Clerk read as follows:
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, these two amendments----
        Mr. Perkins: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        I hate to raise the question, but I do make the point of order 
    that the amendments are not germane.
        My point of order being that we are now by these amendments 
    trying to reach other acts and exclude.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order that the gentleman's point of order comes too late.
        The gentleman from Louisiana had started his discussion of the 
    amendment, and there was no previous point of order made prior to 
    the discussion.
        Mr. Perkins: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet seeking recognition 
    at the time the gentleman commenced to address the Chair.
        The Chairman: Was the gentleman from Kentucky on his feet 
    seeking recognition?
        Mr. Perkins: I was, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair then overrules the point of order made 
    by the gentleman from Michigan, and the Chair will hear the 
    gentleman from Kentucky on his point of order.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Chairman, how far in the discussion of 
    a man who offers an amendment can such a point of order be made, 
    then?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from 
    Kentucky was on his feet seeking recognition, and so stated. 
    Therefore, the gentleman from Kentucky will be recognized to make 
    his point of order.

[[Page 12197]]

Sec. 6.42 A member who has shown due diligence is recognized to make a 
    point of order against a proposed amendment even though the sponsor 
    of the amendment had commenced his remarks.

    On June 23, 1945,(1) Chairman Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, 
allowed Mr. Brent Spence, of Kentucky, to make a late point of order 
because Mr. Spence had been on his feet seeking recognition when the 
Chair recognized Mr. Francis H. Case, of South Dakota, to explain the 
amendment which he had proposed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 91 Cong. Rec. 6597, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.J. Res. 101, extending the Price Control and Stabilization 
        Acts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, this amendment 
    proposes----
        Mr. Spence: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman's 
    point of order comes too late, because I had been recognized and 
    started to debate the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Kentucky was on his feet, and 
    the point of order does not come too late.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 7. Debate

    The Chair allows debate on a point of order at his discretion and 
the Chair normally refuses to allow Members to yield to other Members 
during arguments on points of order.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. See Sec. Sec. 7.1, 7.2, 7.4-7.7, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is clear from the precedents that debate on a point of order is 
limited to it and may not go to the merits of the legislative 
proposition involved.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Sec. Sec. 7.9-7.11, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although a Member, even one sponsoring an amendment against which a 
point of order has been raised, may concede a point of order, the Chair 
still rules on the point of order.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See Sec. 7.20, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The time consumed in argument on a point of order is not charged 
against that allotted to the proponent of an amendment,(5) 
but where a limitation is imposed on total debate time, or time is 
fixed ``by the clock,'' argument on a point of order may reduce the 
time an individual Member may be allotted.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See Sec. Sec. 7.12, 7.20, infra.
 6. See Sec. 7.19, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Chair does not permit Members to ``revise and extend'' their 
remarks on a point of order,(7) and since the 104th 
Congress, the Chair's ability to edit his own ruling has been 
curtailed.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Sec. 7.22, infra.
 8. See Rule XIV clause 9(a) House Rules and Manual Sec. Sec. 764a, 
        764b (1997); and see Sec. 7.23, infra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12198]]

Discretion of the Chair

Sec. 7.1 Debate on a point of order is within the discretion of the 
    Chair.

    On Apr. 13, 1951,(9) there was an exchange in the 
Committee of the Whole, which exemplifies the discretionary power of 
the Chair in permitting debate on a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9.  97 Cong. Rec. 3910, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (10) Does the gentleman from 
    Connecticut desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Antoni N.] Sadlak [of Connecticut]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Sadlak: Mr. Chairman, how much time will be allotted to me 
    for that purpose?
        The Chairman: That is in the discretion of the Chair. The 
    gentleman's argument must be confined to the point of 
    order.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. See also 102 Cong. Rec. 6891, 84th Cong. 2d Sess., Apr. 24, 1956.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 7.2 Recognition and time for debate on a point of order are within 
    the discretion of the Chair, and a Member speaking on a point of 
    order does not control a fixed amount of time which he can reserve 
    or yield.

    On Sept. 30, 1976,(12) during consideration of the 
conference report on H.R. 13367, to extend the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972, a point of order was made, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 122 Cong. Rec. 34075, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. See also 124 Cong. Rec. 
        4451, 95th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 23, 1978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Brock] Adams [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I raise a point 
    of order against the conference agreement on H.R. 13367, to extend 
    the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. The conference 
    agreement contains a provision, not included in the House bill, 
    which provides new spending authority for fiscal years 1978 and 
    1979 over the amounts provided for fiscal year 1977. This new 
    entitlement increment for succeeding fiscal years violates section 
    303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act. . . .

    After some debate on the point of order, the following exchange 
occurred:

        Mr. Adams: I yield to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I refer to Public Law 93-344, the language that 
    exists on page 22(d)(2).
        Mr. Adams: Would the gentleman refer to the motion, please? I 
    am using both the conference report and the statute.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Section 401.
        Mr. Adams: Is the gentleman referring to the statute or the 
    conference report?

[[Page 12199]]

        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Section 401 of the statute.
        The Speaker: (13) The Chair has been liberal in 
    enforcing the rules on arguing on a point of order. The Chair 
    controls the time and each individual Member desiring to be heard 
    should address the Chair and not yield to other Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Securing Time To Oppose Point of Order

Sec. 7.3 The proper method for opposing a point of order is for a 
    Member to seek recognition from the Chair for that purpose at the 
    proper time, not by making a point of order against the point of 
    order.

    On Sept. 18, 1975,(14) during consideration under the 
five-minute rule of the Energy Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 1975, 
two points of order were reserved immediately after an amendment was 
read. The proceedings and inquiries were as indicated below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 121 Cong. Rec. 29333, 29334, 29335, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (15) Are there further amendments to 
    title VI?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gonzalez: On page 338, after line 
        25, insert a new section.
            ``Sec. 507. An additional $100,000,000 is authorized for 
        the Energy Research and Development Administration for a high 
        priority program exclusively geared to the practical 
        application of fusion energy.''

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to 
    reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan reserves a point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Mike] McCormack [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to 
    reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Washington reserves a point of 
    order.
        (Mr. Gonzalez asked and was given permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.)
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, is there such a thing as a point of 
    order against a point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman can oppose the point of order when 
    it is made for any proper reason. The gentleman could insist that 
    the point of order be made now.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have my say that I 
    have been recognized for. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
    McCormack) insist on his point of order?
        Mr. McCormack: I do insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman. 
    May I speak on my point of order at this time?

[[Page 12200]]

        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman on his point of 
    order.
        Mr. McCormack: Mr. Chairman, my point of order is that the 
    amendment comes to the wrong bill and to the wrong committee. The 
    authorization for nuclear research should come to the Joint 
    Committee on Atomic Energy and the Energy Research and Development 
    Administration. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) also 
    reserved a point of order against the amendment.
        Does the gentleman wish to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I do wish to be heard.
        I would like to commend my good friend, the gentleman from 
    Texas (Mr. Gonzalez) for offering what I think is a very well 
    written amendment. Unfortunately, no hearings have been held on it, 
    and it has not been considered. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
    Gonzalez) on the points of order.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, it is almost getting monotonous. 
    Almost exactly 24 hours ago I heard the same trite argument in the 
    name of ger- maneness.
        In arguing the point of germaneness, I will address myself 
    first to the remarks of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
    McCormack).
        I in no way intended to transgress on the jurisdiction of his 
    committee. I know he has developed and he wants to have these 
    10,000 little electric cars running around, but what I am saying is 
    that we need more than that. That is not what the country needs.
        If we are going to debate on a point of order the merits of the 
    amendment, it is contrary to the clear indication in Deschler's 
    Procedure, one of which decisions I quoted yesterday, on page 73, 
    which says that one does not look to the material content of the 
    general purposes of the bill to determine the specificity-there is 
    a good Watergate word-the specificity of the pending amendment. . . 
    .
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The title of title VI is exceptionally broad, in the opinion of 
    the Chair.
        If the content of title VI were as broad as the title, the 
    Chair believes that the arguments of the eloquent gentleman from 
    Texas (Mr. Gonzalez) might bear more weight. But it is the content 
    of the pending title and not its heading against which the 
    germaneness of the amendment must be weighed.
        The Chair has had the opportunity to examine with some care all 
    of title VI and also language on pages 17 and 18 of the committee 
    report which deals with title VI. The Chair will not read from 
    those words except to say that the Chair only refers to those words 
    in that they support his view that title VI actually deals with the 
    conversion from oil or gas to coal and thus the scope of the title 
    is quite narrow. The amendment therefore does not fit the rule of 
    germaneness despite the eloquence of the gentleman from Texas and 
    the Chair feels compelled to rule that the amendment is not germane 
    to title VI and therefore sustains the various points of order.

Controlling Argument on Point of Order

Sec. 7.4 Recognition and time for debate on a point of order

[[Page 12201]]

    are within the discretion of the Chair, and a Member speaking on a 
    point of order can neither yield or reserve time.

    During consideration of a bill providing supplementary financing 
for the International Monetary Fund, on Feb. 23, 1978,(16) 
under the five-minute rule there were several amendments offered. Some 
of the amendments were adopted which had the effect of narrowing the 
scope of the measure, thus making it possible to challenge some 
anticipated amendments as not germane. When an amendment was offered by 
Mr. Tom Harkin, of Iowa, a point of order was in fact raised on this 
basis. A portion of the amendment process is shown below, as well as 
the argument on the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 124 Cong. Rec. 4426, 4427, 4451, 4452, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                            committee amendment

        The Chairman: (17) The Clerk will report the next 
    committee amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Lucien N. Nedzi (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Committee amendment: On page 2, after line 15, insert:
            Sec. 2. Section 3(c) of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act 
        (22 U.S.C. 286a(c)) is amended by inserting ``(1)'' immediately 
        after ``(c)'' and by adding at the end thereof the following:
            (2) The United States executive director to the Fund shall 
        not be compensated by the Fund at a rate in excess of the rate 
        provided for an individual occupying a position at level IV of 
        the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United 
        States Code. The United States alternate executive director to 
        the Fund shall not be compensated by the Fund at a rate in 
        excess of the rate provided for an individual occupying a 
        position at level V of the Executive Schedule under section 
        5316 of title 5, United States Code.
            ``(3) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
        United States executive director to the Fund to pre-sent to the 
        Fund's Executive Board a comprehensive set of proposals, 
        consistent with maintaining high lev- els of competence of Fund 
        personnel and consistent with the Articles of Agreements with 
        the objective of assuring that salaries of Fund employees are 
        consistent with levels of similar responsibility within 
        national government service or private industry. The Secretary 
        shall report these proposals together with any measures adopted 
        by the Fund's Executive Board to the relevant committees of the 
        Congress prior to July 1, 1978.

        Mr. [Stephen L.] Neal [of North Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment to the committee amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Neal to the committee amendment:
            Page 2, strike out line 20 and insert in lieu thereof ``The 
        individual who represents the United States in matters 
        concerning the Supplementary Financing Facility''.
            Page 2, lines 24 and 25, strike out ``The United States 
        alternate executive director to the Fund'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof ``The alternate to the individual who represents the

[[Page 12202]]

        United States in matters concerning the Supplementary Financing 
        Facility''.
            Page 3, line 5, strike ``United States executive director 
        to the Fund'' and insert in lieu thereof ``individual who 
        represents the United States in matters concerning the 
        Supplementary Financing Facility''.

        Mr. [M. Dawson] Mathis [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I rise in 
    opposition to the amendment to the committee amendment. . . .
        So the amendment to the committee amendment was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The Chairman: The question is on the committee amendment, as 
    amended.
        The committee amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
        Mr. [John J.] Cavanaugh [of Nebraska]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Cavanaugh: At the end of the bill 
        add the following:
            The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 U.S.C. 286-286k-2), as 
        amended, is further amended by adding at the end thereof the 
        following new section:
            Sec. 29. The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the 
        United States Executive Director to seek to assure that no 
        decision by the International Monetary Fund on use of the 
        Facility undermines or departs from United States policy 
        regarding the comparability of treatment of public and private 
        creditors in cases of debt rescheduling where official United 
        States credits are involved. . . .

        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Cavanaugh).
        The amendment was agreed to.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Harkin: Page 3, immediately after 
        line 14, insert the following:
            Sec. 3. The Bretton Woods Agreements Act (22 USC 286-286k-
        2), as amended, is further amended by adding at the end thereof 
        the following new section:
            ``Sec. 29. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct 
        the United States Executive Director on the Executive Board of 
        the International Monetary Fund to initiate a wide consultation 
        with the Managing Director of the Fund and other member country 
        Executive Directors with regard to encouraging the IMF staff to 
        formulate stabilization programs which, to the maximum feasible 
        extent, foster a broader base of productive investment and 
        employment, especially in those productive activities which are 
        designed to meet basic human needs.
            ``(b) In accordance with the unique character of the 
        International Monetary Fund, the Secretary of the Treasury 
        shall direct the U.S. Executive Director to take all possible 
        steps to the end that all Fund transactions, including economic 
        programs developed in connection with the utilization of Fund 
        resources, do not contribute to the deprivation of basic human 
        needs, nor to the violation of basic human rights, such as 
        torture, cruel or inhumane treatment or degrading punishment, 
        prolonged detention without charge, or other flagrant denials 
        of life, liberty and the security of person; and to oppose all 
        such transactions which would contribute to such deprivations 
        or violations.
            ``(c) In order to gain a better understanding of the 
        social, political

[[Page 12203]]

        and economic impact of the Fund's stabilization programs on 
        borrowing countries, especially as it relates to the poor 
        majority within those countries, the U.S. Governor of the Fund 
        shall prepare and submit, not later than 180 days after the 
        close of each calendar year, a report to the Congress. Such 
        report shall evaluate, with respect to countries to which loans 
        are made by the Fund during the year, the effects of the 
        policies of those countries which result from the standby 
        agreement(s) on the ability of the poor in such countries to 
        obtain:
            ``(1) an adequate supply of food with sufficient 
        nutritional value to avoid the debilitating effects of 
        malnutrition;
            ``(2) shelter and clothing;
            ``(3) public services, including health care, education, 
        clean water, energy resources, and transportation;
            ``(4) productive employment that provides a reasonable and 
        adequate wage.''. . .

        Mr. Neal: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Neal: Mr. Chairman, we have just established that we are 
    only considering the so-called Witteveen Facility of the 
    International Monetary Fund, and this amendment goes far beyond 
    that.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Harkin) desire 
    to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Harkin: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
        I would respond to that argument by saying that my amendment is 
    entirely in order because, if we look at the different sections, 
    the first section of my amendment goes toward instructing the U.S. 
    Executive Director of the IMF to do certain positive things about 
    initiating wide consultations, and so forth, which would help to 
    promote those kinds of programs that would help meet the basic 
    human needs in other countries. This is a directive to our Director 
    on the Board of the International Monetary Fund.
        The last part of my amendment, subparagraph (c) also mandates 
    that the Executive Director do other positive things by submitting 
    a report to the Congress not later than 180 days after the close of 
    each calendar year outlining the effects of the policies that were 
    followed on the Fund which were designed to meet these basic human 
    needs of people in other countries.
        As far as the Fund or the Witteveen Facility itself is 
    concerned, by subparagraph (b), which is the human rights section, 
    speaks directly to the Witteveen Facility and directs the U.S. 
    Executive Director to make sure that the basic human rights of 
    people are not violated.

        Mr. Mathis: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Harkin: Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.
        Mr. Mathis: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, 
    and I would like very much to have the attention of the Chair while 
    the point of order is being argued.
        The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Neal) is attempting now 
    to say that the legislation before us has been narrowed in scope to 
    the point where it only deals with the Witteveen Facility, and that 
    has been the thrust of the previous committee amendments that I

[[Page 12204]]

    have argued against, because I knew we were going to arrive at a 
    point where the gentleman was going to raise this point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, the clumsy attempt to do that has obviously 
    failed in this fashion because subsection (3) of section 2 of the 
    bill still deals with the question of the Secretary of the Treasury 
    instructing the Executive Director of the Fund to present a 
    comprehensive set of proposals that do not deal with that issue. So 
    the committee amendment, which has already been adopted, very 
    clearly deals with the original Bretton Woods Act, and it is not 
    restrictive in its scope.
        Mr. [Henry S.] Reuss [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield on his point of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman on the 
    point of order.
        Has the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Harkin) concluded?
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I have not concluded. I would like to 
    reserve the balance of my time to speak further on the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: It is not in order to reserve debate time on a 
    point of order. The gentleman has no dock of time to reserve.
        Mr. Harkin: Then I would like to continue, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair is hearing arguments on the point of 
    order at the present time. The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Harkin) 
    will be recognized in support of his amendment at a subsequent time 
    if the point of order is not sustained.
        Mr. Harkin: Then, Mr. Chairman, do I understand I will be 
    recognized further?
        The Chairman: Yes. The gentle- man will be recognized to debate 
    his amendment if the point of order is not sustained.
        Mr. Harkin: No. Mr. Chairman, I want to speak further before 
    the Chair rules on the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from Georgia 
    (Mr. Mathis) has raised an interesting point. In the bill, under 
    paragraph (3) on page 3, it does in fact provide that the U.S. 
    Executive Director to the Fund has to do a certain positive thing. 
    He has to present to the Fund's Executive Board a comprehensive set 
    of proposals, et cetera. So it does not speak simply about the 
    Witteveen Facility.
        I think that my amendment, which mandates that the Executive 
    Director do other positive things, fits in very nicely with 
    subparagraph (3).
        I am not making any kind of argument for any other amendments 
    that might be offered or I am not speaking about any other 
    amendments that might go beyond the scope of instructing the 
    Executive Director of the IMF to do certain things. That would be 
    for the Chair to rule later on, on the germaneness of those. In 
    terms of instructing the Executive Director to do certain things, 
    my amendment is quite germane.
        Mr. Mathis: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Iowa yield 
    further on the point of order?
        The Chairman: Has the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Harkin) 
    concluded his statement on the point of order?
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I would like to yield to the 
    gentleman.

[[Page 12205]]

        The Chairman: There is no yielding on a point of order.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia 
    (Mr. Mathis).
        Mr. Mathis: Mr. Chairman, I think, after consultation with the 
    Parliamentarian, I am now told that the amendment that was offered 
    by the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Neal) has been changed 
    beyond what was read into the Record to go to page 3, line 5, where 
    the language of the amendment very clearly says page 2, line 5, as 
    it was read by the Clerk at the time.
        The Chairman: That is the gentleman's copy and not the copy 
    which was handed to the desk.
        Mr. Mathis: Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the procedure is 
    for having words read back. But I think this is an attempt to try 
    to close off amendments which are going to be offered. The 
    Parliamentarian now explains to me that changing the words 
    ``Executive Director'' can preclude this amendment on the basis of 
    germaneness.
        If that is so, I would point out that this House has just 
    adopted an amendment offered by the gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. 
    Cavanaugh) that contains the words ``Executive Director.'' So we 
    are still talking about the Executive Director to the Fund.
        It is a clumsy attempt to try to prevent the Members of this 
    House from offering amendments.
        Very clearly, Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Iowa is germane to the bill, just as much as the 
    Cavanaugh amendment. If the distinguished chairman of the committee 
    is going to make a point of order, he should have made it on the 
    Cavanaugh amendment, because that went back to the Executive 
    Director of the Fund.
        Mr. Neal: Mr. Chairman, I would say that the amendment before 
    us is not germane because it is not germane to the fundamental 
    purpose of the bill nor does it relate exclusively to the subject 
    matter under consideration.
        Under the Rules of the House, no motion or proposition on a 
    subject different from that under consideration shall be admitted 
    under disguise of an amendment.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Iowa is recognized.
        Mr. Harkin: Mr. Chairman, I am interested in why there was not 
    a point of order raised against the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Cavanaugh). He speaks of ``Executive 
    Director,'' just as I do.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule and perhaps clarify 
    that question for the gentleman from Iowa.
        The gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Neal) made a point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. 
    Harkin) is not germane to the bill H.R. 9214 in its perfected form. 
    In its perfected form the bill, while amending the Bretton Woods 
    Agreement Act, relates only to the authority of the United States 
    to participate in the supplementary financing facility of the 
    International Monetary Fund and to the salaries of the IMF 
    employees who are employees who administer that supplemental fi

[[Page 12206]]

    nancing facility, the so-called Witteveen Facility, but it does not 
    deal with the other operations of the International Monetary Fund.
        The precedents indicate:

            To a bill amending one section of existing law to 
        accomplish a particular purpose, an amendment proposing changes 
        in another section of that law in a matter not within the terms 
        of the bill is not germane. (Deschler's Procedure, chapter 28, 
        section 32.1, section 32.14.)
            In passing on the germaneness of an amendment, the Chairman 
        considers the relationship of the amendment to the bill as 
        modified by the Committee of the Whole. (Deschler's Procedure, 
        chapter 28, section 2.4.)

        The bill as modified by the Committee of the Whole is not 
    sufficiently broad, in the opinion of the Chair, to permit 
    amendments affecting operations of the IMF which are not directly 
    and solely related to the Witteveen Facility. As indicated 
    throughout the report on the bill, that special function of the IMF 
    is separate and distinct from other operations of the IMF, both 
    from the standpoint of qualification for participation in the 
    facility and from the point of view of disposition of assets and 
    the liabilities of participating nations.
        Let the Chair just add that the Cavanaugh amendment to H.R. 
    9214 reserved itself to decisions by the IMF on the use of the 
    facility, referring to the Witteveen Facility, thereby confining 
    itself to that narrow aspect of the bill and not amending the 
    entire act.
        Accordingly, the Chair sustains the point of order.

Argument on Points of Order; Chair's Discretion

Sec.  7.5 Discussion on a point of order is within the discretion of 
    the Chair, and a Member recognized to argue on a point of order may 
    not yield to other Members.

    Where a point of order is raised against consideration of a 
conference report, the Chair may entertain debate, in the nature of 
argument on the point of order, before making a decision to sustain or 
overrule it. If a Member recognized for this purpose attempts to yield 
to another, the Chair may intervene to reassert his control of this 
debate. The proceedings of Sept. 30, 1976,(18) are 
illustrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 122 Cong. Rec. 34074, 34075, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Jack] Brooks [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I call up the 
    conference report on the bill (H.R. 13367) to extend and amend the 
    State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, and for other 
    purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.(19). . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. For provisions of the conference report, see 122 Cong. Rec. 33132-
        44, 94th Cong. 2d Sess., legislative day Sept. 28, 1976.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Brook] Adams [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I raise a point 
    of order against the conference agreement.

[[Page 12207]]

        The Speaker: (20) The gentleman will state the point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I raise a point of order against the 
    conference agreement on H.R. 13367, to extend the State and Local 
    Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. The conference agreement contains a 
    provision, not included in the House bill, which provides new 
    spending authority for fiscal years 1978 and 1979 over the amounts 
    provided for fiscal year 1977. This new entitlement increment for 
    succeeding fiscal years violates section 303(a) of the 
    Congressional Budget Act which provides in part:

            It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or 
        resolution (or amendment thereto) which provides-- . . . new 
        spending authority described in section 401(c)(2)(C) to become 
        effective during a fiscal year . . . until the first concurrent 
        resolution on the budget for such year has been agreed to 
        pursuant to section 301.

        By increasing the fiscal year 1978 entitlement by $200 million 
    over the amounts for fiscal year 1977, H.R. 13367 does provide new 
    spending authority to become effective for a fiscal year for which 
    a budget resolution has not been adopted. It would thereby allow 
    that new spending increment to escape the scrutiny of the fiscal 
    year 1978 budget process. While section 303 provides an exception 
    for new budget authority and revenue changes for a succeeding 
    fiscal year, entitlement programs were expressly omitted from the 
    exception by the House-Senate conference on the Congressional 
    Budget Act.
        Mr. [Frank] Horton [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I rise in 
    opposition to the point of order.
        The applicable provision of the Budget Act in this matter 
    concerns section 303(d)(1). This provision provides an exception 
    for any bills on the full fiscal year for which the current 
    resolution applies. The $200 million increase contained in the 
    conference report begins in fiscal year 1978, the next fiscal year 
    beyond 1977, the year for which our present budget resolution 
    applies.
        The $200 million increase, since it begins in fiscal year 1978, 
    technically conforms with the Budget Act and deserves to be 
    retained in the conference report. I might say to the membership 
    that in making this point of order, this was brought up in the 
    conference and we purposely did not provide for any increase in 
    fiscal year 1977. We purposely skipped the first three-quarters. We 
    agreed upon a term of 3\3/4\ years for the Revenue Sharing Act to 
    be in effect, but we skipped the first three-quarter year and 
    applied a $200 million increment for the first fiscal year 
    thereafter, namely, 1978, and for each of the 3 years subsequent 
    thereto; or a total of $600 million. So, we purposely skipped this 
    fiscal year 1977 so that we would not violate the budget 
    resolution.
        Accordingly, I believe that the point of order should be 
    overruled.
        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Speaker, I also would like 
    to be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman is recognized. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington 
    (Mr. Adams).

[[Page 12208]]

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, in response to the comments made by the 
    gentleman from New York (Mr. Horton), the provision that he refers 
    to regards new budget authority, not entitlement programs where 
    there is a reference over to the Committee on Appropriations and it 
    is controlled in that fashion. . . .
        I would say to the Members that the same amount of money will 
    go in fiscal year 1977 to the cities, regardless of what happens, 
    so long as the bill is passed this year. There is no dispute about 
    the amount for this year. It is the violation of the budget process 
    for fiscal year 1978, fiscal year 1979, and fiscal year 1980.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask that my point of order be sustained.
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Adams: I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Horton).
        Mr. Horton: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, the gentleman understands, does he not, there is 
    no additional amount in fiscal year 1977?
        Mr. Adams: That is correct.
        Mr. Horton: The amount involved, $200 million, would not be 
    applicable until fiscal year 1978. And in the next Congress, the 
    next session, the Budget Committee would at that time have an 
    opportunity to act on that budget.
        Mr. Adams: No, the gentleman is not correct, because this 
    represents one of the worst kinds of problems in budgeting. . . .
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Adams: I yield to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown).
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, I refer to Public Law 93-344, the language that 
    exists on page 22(d)(2).
        Mr. Adams: Would the gentleman refer to the motion, please? I 
    am using both the conference report and the statute.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Section 401.
        Mr. Adams: Is the gentleman referring to the statute or the 
    conference report?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Section 401 of the statute.
        The Speaker: The Chair has been liberal in enforcing the rules 
    on arguing on a point of order. The Chair controls the time and 
    each individual Member desiring to be heard should address the 
    Chair and not yield to other Members.

        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) desire to be heard?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Yes, Mr. Speaker, I do desire to be heard.
        Mr. Speaker, I refer to Public Law 93-344 of the 93d Congress 
    which was enacted July 12, 1974, and I refer to page 22 of that 
    legislation, section 401(d)(2). Section 401(d) is entitled 
    ``Exceptions.'' Subsection (d)(2), under ``Exceptions,'' says as 
    follows: . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule. The Chair thinks he 
    has heard about all the arguments he needs to hear.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Speaker, may I make one final comment in 
    response to the statement of the gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
    Adams)?
        The Speaker: The Chair will hear the gentleman briefly. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.

[[Page 12209]]

        The gentleman from Washington (Mr. Adams) makes a point of 
    order against the conference report on the bill H.R. 13367 on the 
    ground that section 5(a) of the conference report provides new 
    spending authority and entitlement increment for fiscal years 1978 
    and 1979 over the amounts provided for in fiscal year 1977, in 
    violation of section 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 
    1974.
        The gentleman from New York (Mr. Horton) and the gentleman from 
    Ohio (Mr. Brown) rebut this argument by contending that a mere 
    incremental increase in an entitlement for subsequent fiscal years 
    is not new spending authority as prescribed in section 401(c)(2)(C) 
    to become effective during the subsequent fiscal years, but rather, 
    a continuation of the spending authority for fiscal year 1977, 
    which is permitted under section 303(a).
        The Chair has examined the conference report, and section 5(a) 
    is structured so as to provide separate authorization for 
    entitlement payments for each of the fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 
    1979, with a higher authorization for 1978 and 1979 than for 1977.
        In the opinion of the Chair, such a separate increase in 
    entitlement authorizations is new spending authority to become 
    effective during those subsequent fiscal years, which may not be 
    included in a bill or an amendment prior to the adoption of the 
    first concurrent resolution for fiscal years 1978 and 1979, which 
    does not come within the exception contained in section 303(b) for 
    new budget authority, and which does not come within the section 
    401(d) revenue-sharing exception--applicable only to . . . spending 
    authority as defined in subsections (a) and (b) of section 401(c)--
    cited by the gentleman from Ohio.
        The Chair therefore sustains the point of order against the 
    conference report.

                         amendment in disagreement

        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the Senate amendment in 
    disagreement.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Senate amendment: Strike out all after the enacting clause 
        and insert:

                            Section 1. Short Title.

            This Act may be cited as the ``State and Local Fiscal 
        Assistance Amendments of 1976''.

Controlling Debate on Point of Order

Sec. 7.6 Debate on a point of order is within the discretion of the 
    Chair, and Members recognized on a point of order may not yield to 
    other Members.

    The Chair has a responsibility to control the argument on a point 
of order, and within his discretion, he can recognize Members who wish 
to argue the point before the Chair renders his decision. The following 
excerpt from the proceedings of Nov. 14, 1980,(1) are 
illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 126 Cong. Rec. 29615-17, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Les] Aucoin [of Oregon]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.

[[Page 12210]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. AuCoin: On page 69, after line 17, 
        insert:
            (n)(1) The Administrator may not acquire any resource 
        derived from a new nuclear generating facility until such time 
        as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has licensed the operation 
        of a permanent storage facility for high level nuclear waste 
        and spent fuel from commercial nuclear generating facilities.
            (2) For purposes of this subsection, the term ``new nuclear 
        generating facility'' shall not include any nuclear generating 
        facility for which a construction permit was issued by the 
        Nuclear Regulatory Commission before the date of enactment of 
        this Act.

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: (2) Does the gentleman from Michigan 
    (Mr. Dingell) insist upon his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Matthew F. McHugh (N.J.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dingell: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, the bill before us establishes a 
    planning council. It provides for a planning council. It provides 
    for a program for conservation and for a fish and wildlife program. 
    It provides for the sale of power. It provides for the establishing 
    of rates, and it provides for the acquisition of resources to 
    produce power. . . .
        These nuclear generating facilities are not within the 
    Bonneville Power market area but are anywhere in the United States. 
    And it could include those in the Northeast, the Southeast, the 
    Southwest, in Alaska, or in Hawaii--none of them within the area 
    served. The amendment is much more broad than the bill and deals 
    with quite different matters.
        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        The Chairman: The Chair controls the time. Does the gentleman 
    from Ohio wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on 
    the point of order, but I would like to exchange a view with the 
    gentleman from Michigan to reinforce the point of order.
        Mr. John L. Burton [of California]: Regular order, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: There is no colloquy on a point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to speak on 
    the point of order, to reinforce the position of the gentleman from 
    Michigan. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AuCoin) wish 
    to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Aucoin: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon.
        Mr. Aucoin: Mr. Chairman, I am somewhat surprised to hear 
    suggestions in defending the point of order that the people of the 
    Pacific Northwest ought to be inflicted with a burden of building 
    additional nuclear powerplants without safeguards. It is the people 
    in the region who will have to live with the consequences of 
    cooling towers in the Pacific Northwest. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?

[[Page 12211]]

        Mr. John L. Burton: I would like to speak in opposition to the 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. John L. Burton).
        Mr. John L. Burton: Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that the 
    statement of the distinguished gentleman from Texas saying that the 
    NRC cannot license nuclear powerplants without safeguarding the 
    people by dealing with the hazardous waste that is involved is a 
    horrendous task placed on the NRC. I think that the point of order 
    should be overruled. And I think that the bill is the biggest rape 
    and ripoff of the public that I have ever seen in my life.
        Mr. AuCoin: Mr. Chairman, could I be heard on one additional 
    point?
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oregon 
    (Mr. AuCoin).
        Mr. AuCoin: Mr. Chairman, my friend from Texas, the 
    subcommittee chairman, for whom I have a great deal of respect, 
    has, I think, confused, momentarily, the difference between an 
    amendment that would force the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to 
    take an action as opposed to imposing on the Nuclear Regulatory 
    Commission a new responsibility. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Oregon would impose a contingency which is not 
    solely related to the issue of purchase and transmission of power 
    in the Northwest region and which addresses potentially new NRC 
    licensing authority for all Government and privately owned storage 
    facilities on a national basis.
        The Chair would cite, specifically, chapter 28 of Deschler's 
    Procedures, section 24.15:

            An amendment delaying the effectiveness of a bill pending 
        the enactment of other legislation and requiring actions by 
        committees and agencies not involved in the administration of 
        the program affected by the bill was ruled out as not germane.

        On that basis, the Chair is constrained to sustain the point of 
    order.

The Chair Controls Debate or Argument on a Point of Order

Sec. 7.7 A Member may not yield for purposes of debate under a 
    reservation of a point of order; the Chair controls the debate by 
    recognizing Members to speak in favor of or in opposition to the 
    point of order.

        On Oct. 1, 1985,(3) during the reading for amendment 
    of the Food Security Act of 1985, Chairman David E. Bonior, of 
    Michigan, invited amendments to the title of the bill which was 
    open to amendment. An amendment was then offered which went to the 
    pending title and the next. A point of order was first reserved, 
    then pressed, against the amendment for this reason.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 131 Cong. Rec. 25418-20, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: When the Committee of the Whole rose on Thursday, 
    September 26, title IV was open to amendment at any point to amend

[[Page 12212]]

    ments printed in the Congressional Record before September 24, 
    1985.
        Are there amendments to title IV?

                     amendment offered by mr. glickman

        Mr. [Daniel R.] Glickman [of Kansas]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        Mr. [Edward R.] Madigan [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order on the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Glickman: Title IV of H.R. 2100 is 
        amended by--
            On page 65, after line 8, striking all through ``shall'' on 
        line 11 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
            ``(2) If the Secretary determines that the availability of 
        nonrecourse loans and purchases will not have an adverse effect 
        on the program provided for in paragraph (3), the Secretary 
        may'';
            On page 67, after line 5, striking ``The Secretary may'' 
        and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
            ``(3)(A) Unless the Secretary, at the Secretary's 
        discretion, makes available nonrecourse loans and purchases to 
        producers under paragraph (2) for a crop of wheat, the 
        Secretary shall'';
            On page 68, line 23 before the ``.'' inserting the 
        following: ``, except that the Secretary shall not make 
        available payments under this paragraph to any producer with a 
        wheat acreage base of less than 15 acres for the crop.'';
            On page 70, after line 11, striking all through line 12, 
        page 71 and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
            ``(C) For each crop of wheat, the established price shall 
        not be less than the following levels for each farm:
            ``(i) $4.50 per bushel for any portion of the crop produced 
        on each farm that does not exceed fifteen thousand bushels and
            ``(ii) $4.00 per bushel for any portion of the crop 
        produced on each farm that exceeds fifteen thousand bushels.'';
            On page 86, line 15 striking ``may not'' and inserting in 
        lieu thereof the following: ``shall'';
            On page 86, line 18 striking ``may'' and inserting in lieu 
        thereof the following: ``shall''; and
            Title V of H.R. 2100 is amended by--
            On page 87, after line 15, striking all through ``shall'' 
        on line 18 and inserting in lieu thereof the following-- . . .

        There was no objection.
        Mr. Glickman: Mr. Chairman, rather than taking the time of the 
    full House, rather than talking about the substance of the 
    amendment, in order to expedite the process, I wonder if we might 
    deal with the point of order right now, and if the Chair rules that 
    it is out of order, there is no reason why I have to spend 5 or 10 
    minutes explaining the amendment.

                              points of order

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois insist on his 
    point of order?
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, under my reservation, I yield to the 
    gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Robert F. Smith].
        The Chairman: The gentleman will suspend. Under a reservation 
    of a point of order, the gentleman cannot yield time. If other 
    Members have points of order, they can make them and they will be 
    so recognized.
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, I believe a point of order would lie 
    against

[[Page 12213]]

    the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] 
    because the amendment, if I understand the amendment that is being 
    offered, goes to more than one title of the bill, and I think that 
    because it goes to more than one title of the bill, it would not be 
    in order at this point.
        Mr. Glickman: Mr. Chairman, may I speak to the point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] is 
    recognized.
        Mr. Glickman: Mr. Chairman, the amendment amends two titles of 
    the bill. To be frank with the Chair, it was submitted as one 
    amendment, but the intention of the author of this amendment as 
    well as the other authors was to deal with the issues as they 
    affected title IV and then title V. I put it in one title of the 
    bill, but, to be honest with the Chair, the issues are divisible, 
    they are separate. I could have amended it and put it in two 
    separate amendments. I did not because that is not the way the 
    issue came up in the Committee on Agriculture.
        The issues relating to the issue of targeting deficiency 
    payments to small- and medium-sized farmers and utilizing a device 
    called the marketing loan as a way to deal with our exports; they 
    are in the wheat section, title IV, and there is a separate matter, 
    deals with it separately in the feed grains section, title V.
        The amendments are divisible. The language is divisible, and I 
    would hope that the Chair would understand that it was the intent 
    of the author of the amendment to really consider these two as two 
    separate concepts, but I put them together for the ease of putting 
    them in one amendment, since feed grains in the committee were 
    dealt with as one basic issue.
        Mr. Robert F. Smith [of Oregon]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.

        Mr. Robert F. Smith: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Chairman, rule III of the rules provides that 
    considerations can only be by title, not by section. I think the 
    point remains that there is no question that this amendment does 
    affect two titles. There are several other amendments, Mr. 
    Chairman, that I will rise on this same issue affecting both sides 
    of the aisle. I think to keep this whole discussion clean, we 
    should follow the rule. The rule clearly states that you cannot 
    amend two titles in one amendment.
        The Chairman: Are there others who wish to be heard?
        Does the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Stangeland] make a point 
    of order on this?
        Mr. [Arlan] Stangeland [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    the right to make a point of order. I reserve the point of order.
        The Chairman: Is the gentleman making a point of order on this 
    amendment?
        Mr. Stangeland: Mr. Chairman, I am arguing against the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized.
        Mr. Stangeland: I thank the Chair. I just want to make the 
    point that the amendment was printed in two distinctly separate 
    sections. One portion of the amendment dealt with wheat

[[Page 12214]]

    and target prices and marketing loans. The second section of the 
    amendment deals with title V, the feed grain section. Two 
    distinctly different amendments but introduced in the Record as, 
    unfortunately, one amendment. But they deal with the two sections 
    separately. I would just appeal to the Chair that the intent of the 
    authors was that because they were handled en bloc in committee, we 
    would run that way, but they are divisible, they can be addressed 
    to title IV and title V very distinctly in the amendment.
        I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair would state that the Chair can only look at the form 
    in which the amendment has been submitted for printing in the 
    Record. According to the rule, the substitute shall be considered 
    for amendment by title instead of by sections, and only amendments 
    to the bill which have been printed in the Record by September 24 
    may be offered.
        Therefore, the only way in which the amendment that the 
    gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Glickman] wishes to offer could be 
    considered is by unanimous consent.
        The Chair sustains the point of order.

Parliamentary Inquiry; Who Gets Charged for Time

Sec. 7.8 While time for a parliamentary inquiry is normally charged to 
    the Member controlling time who yields for such an inquiry, the 
    Chair may exercise his discretion to recognize for an inquiry 
    between speakers when time is not running against any Member.

    Time for general debate on the concurrent resolution on the budget, 
fiscal 1994-1998, having been fixed by a special rule, and placed by 
that rule in the control of certain named Members, the Committee of the 
Whole, by unanimous consent, reconstituted the time used in a colloquy 
and did not deduct it from the Member controlling time. On another 
point during the debate, the Chair recognized for a parliamentary 
inquiry before recognizing a Member to control a block of two hours 
time. The pertinent proceedings of Mar. 17, 1993,(4) are set 
out below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 139 Cong. Rec. 5394-96, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (5) The gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Solomon] reserves the balance of his time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Jose E. Serrano (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, is the process now that we are going 
    to the discussion of another budget, the Black Caucus budget?

[[Page 12215]]

        The Chairman: The process is that the gentleman from Maryland 
    [Mr. Mfume] is going to be recognized for 2 hours.
        Mr. Walker: And that would be pursuant to the rule, House 
    Resolution 131; is that correct?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Walker: And this is the 2 hours of time controlled by the 
    gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume] under that rule; is that 
    correct?
        The Chairman: Those 2 hours have not changed. . . .
        The Chair clarifies that the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. 
    Mfume] controls the 2 hours.
        Mr. Walker: But it is permissible for him to yield that time to 
    the opposition if he so wishes?
        The Chairman: The gentleman can do with his 2 hours whatever he 
    wishes.
        Mr. Walker: I thank the Chair for that, and, if in fact he were 
    to do that, that would, in fact, even up the time between the 
    majority and minority where right now there is a disparity of about 
    an hour of time between the majority and minority as a result of 
    the way the rule was structured, thereby leaving the minority short 
    of its time to present its case.
        So, it would have that impact; is that correct?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is drawing a conclusion, and that 
    is not part of an inquiry.
        The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume] will be recognized for 
    2 hours.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. [Kweisi] Mfume [of Maryland]: I yield to the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Maryland 
    [Mr. Mfume] for yielding to me. . . .
        Mr. Mfume: Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Mfume: I would like to ask the Chair whether or not the 
    time for the colloquy was counted against the time allotted.
        The Chairman: Yes. That colloquy consumed 6 minutes.
        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, that is 
    really not in order. I mean this was a colloquy. We were not 
    propounding parliamentary procedures, but we were speaking out of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York [Mr. Solomon] did ask 
    the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume] to yield, and he yielded 
    three times to three different Members.
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, I do not think that is fair. I 
    understand why it is being done, but I ask unanimous consent that 
    the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Mfume] be given an extra 6 minutes 
    to restore his 2 hours. That is only fair in this body.
        The Chairman: Without objection, so ordered.
        There was no objection.

Scope of Debate

Sec. 7.9 Debate on a point of order is limited to the question of order 
    and may not go to the merits of the legislative proposition.

[[Page 12216]]

    On July 19, 1967,(6) during consideration of a bill 
prescribing penalties for interstate travel to incite riots, a Member, 
Richard D. McCarthy, of New York, proposed an amendment dealing with 
gun control, particularly mail order guns. This amendment was 
challenged as being not germane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 113 Cong. Rec. 19412, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 421, prescribing penalties for travel in interstate 
        commerce to incite riots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (7) Does the gentleman from New York 
    [Mr. McCarthy] wish to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Joseph L. Evins (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. McCarthy: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I think this amendment is germane. There is no 
    doubt about it in my mind.
        Let me explain that H.R. 421 would become section 2 of that 
    bill, and with this amendment added it would create a new section 
    1, which is essentially, with a very slight change at the 
    beginning, the administration's firearms bill, which would prohibit 
    the mail-order sales of firearms and require anyone dealing in, 
    manufacturing, or importing firearms to have a Federal license.
        Mr. Chairman, this amendment is germane because the pattern of 
    these riots is clear. Guerrilla warfare in the streets with snipers 
    pouring deadly gunfire from roofs and windows above at ambulances 
    with children in them. In Newark killing a fire captain. There was 
    the shooting of firearms and even the shooting up of a hospital.
        Friday a tired Governor Hughes said this.
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, I would hope that 
    the gentleman would confine his remarks to the point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York will confine himself 
    to the point of order.
        Mr. McCarthy: I am trying to point out, Mr. Chairman, that in 
    my view this amendment is germane to the intent of this 
    legislation.
        The Governor said that the riots and the sniping, with the use 
    of even automatic weapons and machineguns, pointed to the need for 
    an interstate firearms law. It can be said that New Jersey already 
    has a strict law. I say to that it is 1 year old. Many of these 
    guns were in possession of these people before that. Second, we 
    have ample evidence----
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gross: I submit that the gentleman is not directing his 
    argument to the point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman must confine his remarks to the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Gross: There is no relevancy of the law in the State of New 
    Jersey.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will confine himself to the merits 
    of the point of order and not the substance of the bill.

Argument on Point of Order Should Not Address Merits of Amendment

Sec. 7.10 Argument on a point of order must be confined to

[[Page 12217]]

    the point of order and should not go to the merits of the 
    proposition being challenged.

    During consideration of the Labor and Health, Education, and 
Welfare appropriation bill for fiscal 1977, on June 24, 
1976,(8) Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, of New Jersey, offered an 
amendment. Two Members sought recognition to speak to a point of order 
raised against the amendment. Another raised the issue of whether their 
debate was directed to the point of order. Proceedings were as shown 
below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 122 Cong. Rec. 20370, 20371, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. Fenwick: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a 
    substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas 
    (Mr. Skubitz).
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mrs. Fenwick as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Skubitz: On page 7, strike the period 
        at the end of line 25, and insert in lieu thereof: ``: Provided 
        That none of the funds appropriated under this paragraph shall 
        be obligated or expended to prescribe, issue, administer, or 
        enforce any standard, rule, regulation, or order under the 
        Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 which is applicable 
        to any person who is engaged in a farming operation which 
        employs five or fewer employees.'' . . .

        Mr. [Gary] Myers of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute for the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania to the 
        amendment offered by Mrs. Fenwick as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Skubitz: At the end of the amendment 
        offered by Mrs. Fenwick strike the period and add the 
        following: ``Provided further, That the funds appropriated 
        under this paragraph shall be obligated or expended to assure 
        full compliance of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
        1970 by Members of Congress and their staffs.''

        Mr. [William D.] Ford of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: (9) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Michigan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Ford of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, the amendment is not 
    germane. It is also in violation of the rule against legislating on 
    an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers).
        Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, because of my great 
    concern for the safety of all workers and because of the fact that 
    Members of Congress are allowed in fact to have several offices and 
    up to 18 full-time employees, some of those who travel vehicular 
    equipment on the highways are exposed to extreme hazards, and 
    because of my background and experience in the steel industry, 
    knowing

[[Page 12218]]

    what the regulations are, I see a noncompliance in many of the 
    offices, such as boards across walkways, people standing on chairs 
    instead of ladders, storage facilities not properly put in place. I 
    have a concern about industry and for those people who work in 
    industry.
        It applies also to employees in our offices.
        The objective of this bill is to appropriate money to see that 
    OSHA is bringing under compliance all workers who work in an 
    environment such as an industrial office or similar facilities.
        Mr. [Ronald A.] Sarasin [of Connecticut]: Mr. Chairman, I make 
    a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers) is 
    being heard on a point of order.
        Mr. Sarasin: Mr. Chairman, it would appear that the gentleman 
    is not addressing himself to the point of order, but he is 
    addressing himself to the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers), at this point, 
    should address his comments to the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Ford), to--wit, that the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers) would not be 
    germane to the language of the substitute which it would seek to 
    amend and, further, that it would constitute legislation on an 
    appropriation bill.
        Does the gentleman desire to touch on that?
        Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I was simply laying 
    the groundwork for my response to the point of order.
        It simply is that in this bill we are communicating to OSHA 
    their commitments, and it is simply that message I want to address 
    and require that they do set aside funds for this compliance.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Fenwick) has offered a 
    substitute for an amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas 
    (Mr. Skubitz).
        Both the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. 
    Skubitz) and the proposed substitute offered by the gentlewoman 
    from New Jersey (Mrs. Fenwick) are applicable to farmworkers and 
    have a precise reference to the number of employees engaged by a 
    farmer.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Myers) would add to the 
    substitute additional provisions requiring that funds appropriated 
    under the program shall be obligated and expended to assure 
    compliance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act by Members 
    of Congress and their staffs.
        Manifestly, this does constitute legislation on an 
    appropriation bill; and, beyond that, it would not be germane, in 
    the opinion of the Chair, to the pending substitute.
        For those reasons, the Chair sustains the point of order.
        Mr. Myers of Pennsylvania: I thank the Chairman for his even-
    handed evaluation of the situation.

Sec. 7.11 Debate on a point of order against an amendment is limited to 
    the question of order and may not go to the merits of the 
    amendment.

[[Page 12219]]

    On Nov. 25, 1970,(10) during discussion of the 
provisions of a federal highway bill, Mr. Samuel S. Stratton, of New 
York, introduced an amendment dealing with the plight of prisoners of 
war. A point of order was then raised against the amendment. In the 
ensuing debate on the point of order, the Member repeatedly referred to 
the amendment, not the point of order. This in turn provoked another 
point of order, with the ultimate result that Chairman Chet Holifield, 
of California, had to rule the Member out of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 116 Cong. Rec. 38971, 38972, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 19504, the Federal Highway Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: A point of order is made against the amendment by 
    the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Harsha).
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard on the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman from New York 
    on the point of order. . . .
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, this amendment seeks to enlist the 
    support of this House for action taken in an effort to rescue these 
    prisoners. This is a resolution which the gentleman from Illinois 
    (Mr. Findley) and I have introduced and on which we are seeking 
    support. I think it is appropriate for two reasons.
        This is an amendment----
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Iowa will state the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Gross: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is not addressing 
    himself to the point of order.
        Mr. Stratton: I am addressing myself to the point of order, if 
    the gentleman from Iowa will allow me to continue.
        Mr. Chairman, this amendment----
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York will suspend. This 
    bill is a bill having to do with the highway system of the United 
    States. The Chair regrets to rule that the gentleman----
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, allow me to make my point. I have a 
    couple of very valid points.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has not addressed himself to the 
    point of order and the Chair is constrained to rule that the 
    gentleman is out of order.

Sec. 7.12 Debate on a point of order is confined to the question of 
    order, may not extend to the merits of the bill, and is for the 
    edification of the Chair who may decline to hear further argument.

        On June 13, 1991,(11) while the Committee of the 
    Whole was debating amendments under the five-minute rule during 
    consideration of a general appropriation measure, Mr. Richard K. 
    Armey, of Texas, raised a point of order against an amendment 
    offered by Mr. Byron L. Dorgan, of North Dakota. Several Members 
    seemed inclined to discuss not the amendment or the

[[Page 12220]]

    point of order but the broader ``savings and loan'' crisis. The 
    following colloquy illustrates the efforts of the Chair to confine 
    the debate to the question of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 137 Cong. Rec. 14690, 14691, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I desire to be heard on my point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (12) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. George E. Brown (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that this 
    amendment violates clause 2 of rule XXI which prohibits this in 
    appropriations bills.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from North Dakota desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Dorgan of North Dakota: Mr. Chairman, my understanding is 
    the gentleman has not asserted a point of order at this moment, is 
    that correct?

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, it is my understanding that once I 
    stipulate the point of order, I have an opportunity to discuss my 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has stated his point of order. He 
    does have the opportunity to be heard. The Chair thought that he 
    had expressed it.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I had intended to discuss my point of 
    order and my reasons for holding that.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, let me say first of all I have 
    enormous respect not only for the gentleman from North Dakota, but 
    in particular, for what it is he is attempting to do.
        I have a concern, on the other hand, Mr. Chairman, that we 
    would be doing it in this matter with respect to legislative 
    procedure, encumber the work of the Committee on Appropriations and 
    circumvent the work of several committees, including the Committee 
    on the Judiciary, the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
    Affairs, and his own Committee on Ways and Means. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair would just like to state that the 
    gentleman should speak rather narrowly to the point of order, not 
    to the merits of the proposal.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the Chair's advice.
        Mr. Chairman, very narrowly, let me say I hold a point of order 
    that the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. Dorgan], for all his good 
    work, all his good intentions, violates clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from North Dakota desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Dorgan of North Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I indicated in my 
    opening remarks that I understood a point of order could lie on 
    this provision. The gentleman from Texas fully understands the 
    conditions under which this legislation is being discussed on the 
    floor today. . . .
        Mr. [Harold] Rogers [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be 
    heard on the point of order.
        The question is, whether or not there is legislative procedure 
    on an appropriations bill. That is the object of my discussion in 
    these 5 minutes, or the time the Chair allows me.

[[Page 12221]]

        Mr. Chairman, there is already established in the current law 
    in the Department of Justice a financial institutions fraud unit. 
    It is already there. It is in the law. We appropriate money to it 
    in this bill.
        Now, they want to call it a savings and loan criminal fraud 
    unit.
        The Chairman: Would the gentleman merely talk to the merits of 
    the point of order?
        Mr. Rogers: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from North Dakota spoke 
    broadly about the merits.
        The Chairman: He did, and the Chair is trying to discourage 
    others from making his mistake.
        Mr. Rogers: I insist upon the privilege of doing so.

        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman to speak 
    to the point of order. . . .
        Are there additional Members who desire to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. [Dennis E.] Eckart [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
    be heard on the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair would like to advise the gentleman to 
    stick to the point of order. . . .

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, is there something in the rules of the 
    House that I have not found that says that there is more latitude 
    granted to Members who speak in opposition to a point of order than 
    the person who makes the point of order?
        The Chairman: There is nothing in the rules that states that.
        Mr. Armey: Then, Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of 
    order with as much latitude to speak about the crime bill?
        The Chairman: The gentleman has already been heard on the point 
    of order. The Chair thinks enough Members have been heard.
        Mr. Armey: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard to speak on the crime 
    bill?
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        A point of order has been raised by the gentleman from Texas 
    [Mr. Armey] against the proposed amendment of the gentleman from 
    North Dakota on the grounds that it violates clause 2 of rule XXI 
    in that it constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill.
        For the reasons stated by the gentleman from Texas and others, 
    the Chair agrees with the point of order and rules that the 
    amendment violates the rules of the House and is therefore not in 
    order.

Debate on Point of Order Does Not Come Out of Time to Which the 
    Proponent of an Amendment Is Entitled Under the Five-minute Rule.

Sec. 7.13 The proponent of an amendment against which a point of order 
    has been reserved may not reserve a portion of his time under the 
    five-minute rule to oppose any points of order, if made, since the 
    Chair has discre

[[Page 12222]]

    tion to recognize for separate debate time on any point of order.

    Where points of order are reserved against an offered amendment, 
the proponent may proceed under the five-minute rule to discuss the 
merits of his amendment and need not reserve time to refute any point 
of order which is pressed. The proceedings of Aug. 1, 
1975,(13) illustrate how the Chair differentiates between 
debate on the merits and argument on a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 121 Cong. Rec. 26945, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (14) Are there further amendments to 
    title III?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   amendment offered by mr. brown of ohio

        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Brown of Ohio: Strike out Title 
        III, as amended, and reinsert all except for Section 301, as 
        amended.

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order against the amendment.
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I also reserve a 
    point of order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, the thrust of this amendment 
    is to strike from the bill the provisions of the Staggers pricing 
    amendment, section 301, by revising title III to strike the whole 
    title and to reinsert all in the title, except section 301.
        Mr. Chairman, may I speak on the amendment?
        The Chairman: The gentleman has been recognized for 5 minutes, 
    so the gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, may I reserve 2 minutes of my 
    time to speak on the points of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman to speak 
    on the points of order at the appropriate time.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I have not yet made the point of 
    order. I reserved it.
        The Chairman: The Chair has recognized the gentleman from Ohio 
    to speak on the gentleman's amendment for 5 minutes. Then the 
    gentlemen who reserved the points of order may press them or they 
    may not.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this amendment, 
    as I said, is to strike section 301, the pricing section, from the 
    bill.

Time Consumed on Point of Order When Overall Time Is Limited

Sec. 7.14 Where debate under the five-minute rule has been limited to a 
    time certain, time consumed in argument on a point of order comes 
    out of the total time under the limitation, thus reducing the time 
    which can be allotted to other Members seeking recognition. The 
    time is not

[[Page 12223]]

    charged only against the proponent of the amendment against which 
    the point of order is made.

        On Apr. 26, 1978,(15) debate under the five-minute 
    rule was proceeding the Public Disclosure of Lobbying Act of 1978. 
    Mr. George E. Danielson, of California, moved that all debate on 
    the bill and amendments end at 7:30 that evening. The events 
    following the imposition of this limitation were as follows.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 124 Cong. Rec. 11641, 11642, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Danielson: Mr. Chairman, I move that all debate on this 
    bill and all amendments thereto be terminated at the hour of 7:30 
    o'clock p.m. tonight.
        The Chairman: (16) The question is on the motion 
    offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Danielson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Lloyd Meeds (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman being in doubt, the 
    Committee divided, and there were--ayes 22, noes 20.
        Mr. Gary A. Myers [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gary A. Myers: Page 39, insert the 
        following after line 7:
            (g) If any lobbying communication was made on the floor of 
        the House of Representatives or adjoining rooms thereof, or on 
        the floor of the Senate or adjoining rooms thereof, a statement 
        that such lobbying communication was made.

        Mr. Danielson: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Danielson: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that 
    this amendment is not germane to the bill. The bill calls for 
    disclosure of lobbying activities under the terms of expenditure 
    and the like, and related lobbying activities as to influencing the 
    conduct and disposition of legislation. This has to do with 
    activities within the Capitol Building and is not necessarily 
    within the purview of the bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gary A. 
    Myers) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Gary A. Myers: I do, Mr. Chairman. I would like to be heard 
    on the point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Gary A. Myers: Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that 
    the amendment is more narrowly drafted than the amendment which I 
    offered last year. It only requires an item of disclosure by those 
    individuals who otherwise would have to be reporting. This bill 
    does not in any way define the geographical location in which 
    lobbying activity would not be reported. Nowhere in the bill does 
    it say that if the lobbyist speaks to a House Member in the Capitol 
    that that is not a reportable item. The only thing this amendment 
    would do would require the reporting of any specific activity 
    discussed on the floor of the House. In last year's amendment there 
    was a point of order raised about the invasion of the House rules. 
    It would seem to me that article I, section 5 of the Constitution 
    clearly states that:

[[Page 12224]]

            . . . each House may determine the rules of its 
        proceedings.

        Numerous precedents have held that the power to make rules is 
    not impaired by rules of previous Congresses or by laws passed by 
    previous Congresses. So that this amendment in no way adds to or 
    impairs the rules of the House.
        It has been recognized that a law passed by an existing 
    Congress can bind that Congress in matters of procedure--and I 
    refer to Hinds' Precedents, volume 5, sections 6767 and 6768. 
    However, this amendment does not even go that far since it in no 
    way binds this or any other Congress. It merely makes available 
    information to the Congress and to the general public. If the 
    Congress chooses to act on that information it can do so according 
    to its rules and procedures.
        Mr. Chairman, it seems to me the amendment is germane, it is 
    simply another item of reporting.
        I also believe it would be inappropriate for this House to 
    object to this type of reporting.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        For the reasons stated by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Gary A. Myers), and in addition, since this amendment does not seek 
    to restrain or regulate conduct but only requires disclosure, the 
    Chair will rule that the point of order is not well taken and the 
    amendment is germane as adding a further reporting requirement to 
    those contained in the bill. . . .
        The Chair will notify the members of the committee that time 
    taken from the allotted time for the discussion of the point of 
    order was not allotted to the gentleman from Pennsylvania but will 
    come out of the general time and will reduce everyone's time to 5 
    minutes each.
        Are there further amendments?

Sec. 7.15 Time consumed on a point of order that debate is not relevant 
    does not come out of that allotted to the Member holding the floor 
    under the five-minute rule.

    On June 15, 1983,(17) the House had under consideration 
the Defense Department Authorization Act of 1984 (H.R. 2969). The 
following exchange occurred during the five-minute rule:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 129 Cong. Rec. 15818, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ed] Bethune [of Arkansas]: . . . Nineteen years they have 
    been working on this bomb, and they finally decided to test it 
    under something similar to what they might actually face in the 
    modern combat world, and it blew up on them.
        Mr. [Samuel S.] Stratton [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to 
    make a point of order.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (18) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. John P. Murtha, Jr. (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    gentleman from Arkansas. The gentleman is discussing a munition 
    that is not funded in this section of the bill, and he is spending 
    considerable time of the Committee in discussing that, although 
    there are no funds for the production

[[Page 12225]]

    of the weapon that he refers to. I think he is proceeding out of 
    order.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Arkansas is 
    discussing chemical weapons, and it is difficult to restrict the 
    gentleman to a narrow interpretation of that in the comments he is 
    making.
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard further on the 
    point of order, there are a number of things that are funded in the 
    bill. Binary systems is the basic issue which the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin addressed himself to. But the particular one that the 
    gentleman from Arkansas is debating is something that is not funded 
    in this portion of the bill, and it seems to me that this is a 
    proceeding out of order and abusing the time of the Committee.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. 
    Bethune) wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Bethune: Mr. Chairman, is my time protected while the 
    gentleman from New York makes his point of order?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman's time is protected.
        Mr. Bethune: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Chairman, I would just simply say that the bill does ask 
    for moneys to build buildings, facilities, to do tooling work, to 
    build the casings for the Big Eye bomb. I do not know what could be 
    more relevant than to discuss whether or not it works before we 
    start building facilities and the QL mix that would go in the bomb.
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further on the point 
    of order?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from New York may be 
    heard further on the point of order.
        Mr. Stratton: Mr. Chairman, the thrust of the gentleman's 
    argument in discussing an item that is not funded in the 
    legislation is to create the impression that all of the activities 
    of the Department of the Army in dealing with chemical weapons, and 
    particularly the binary weapons which are funded in this section, 
    is defective. But the item which he is constantly referring to, and 
    with all of its mistakes, is not included; and the problems that it 
    had led the committee to remove the money for that particular 
    weapon. If the gentleman wants to discuss it, it ought to be 
    discussed in the research and development title of the bill rather 
    than in the procurement and production title with which we are 
    engaged now.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will rule.
        The money in the bill is unearmarked and the arguments of the 
    gentleman from Arkansas are considered relevant to the debate on 
    his amendment which is pending and which addresses the issues being 
    debated.
        The Chair will overrule the point of order.

Time Consumed by Parliamentary Inquiries

Sec. 7.16 When the Member holding the floor in debate refuses to yield 
    for a parliamentary inquiry, the time consumed by repeated requests 
    for him to yield does not come out of his allotted time.

[[Page 12226]]

    Where the Member making a statement during general debate on a bill 
in Committee of the Whole refuses to yield for an inquiry until he has 
finished his statement, the minutes taken by repeated requests for him 
to yield is not taken from his time. Proceedings on Nov. 22, 
1993,(19) were as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 139 Cong. Rec. 31981, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Christopher] Cox [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 
    minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey], chairman of the 
    Republican conference.
        Mr. [Dick] Armey [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding the time. . . .
        I will not yield to the gentleman, so do not bother asking.
        Mr. [Ronald D.] Coleman [of Texas]: Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman from Texas [Mr. 
    Armey] has the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. William J. Hughes (N.J.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Coleman: Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas 
    rise?
        Mr. Coleman: I want to ask a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey] yield 
    to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Coleman] for a parliamentary 
    inquiry?
        Mr. Armey: I will not yield to the gentleman from Texas until I 
    have finished my statement.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Texas has the time and the 
    gentleman does not yield.
        Mr. Coleman: Parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Texas does not yield for a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Coleman: He does not have to. I am asking a question.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Texas does not yield for a 
    parliamentary inquiry. The gentleman from Texas has the time.
        Mr. Armey: I would ask the Chair, if he does not mind, that 
    time used to explain the rules will not come out of my time?
        The Chairman: That will not count against the time of the 
    gentleman from Texas.
        Mr. Coleman: Mr. Chairman, do you mean to tell me when I ask a 
    parliamentary inquiry, it does not ask that of the Chair?
        The Chairman: Under the rules, the gentleman does not have to 
    yield, as long as he has the floor, for a parliamentary inquiry. 
    The gentleman from Texas has the time, and this time will not be 
    counted against the gentleman from Texas.

Chair Controls Argument on Point of Order

Sec. 7.17 Argument on a point of order is at the discretion of the 
    Chair, and Members seeking to be heard must address the Chair and 
    cannot engage in ``colloquies'' on the point of order.

[[Page 12227]]

    On Sept. 18, 1986,(1) the House had under consideration 
in Committee of the Whole a bill dealing with minimum altitude for 
aircraft flying over national parks. When a section dealing with the 
restrictions pertaining to the Grand Canyon was reached in the reading, 
Mr. Robert K. Dornan, of California, offered an amendment that required 
the installation of collision avoidance systems in all aircraft. A 
portion of the amendment and the related proceedings are carried 
herewith.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 132 Cong. Rec. 24082-84, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (2) Are there any amendments to 
    section 2? If not, the Clerk will designate section 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. J. J. Pickle (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The text of section 3 is as follows:

                    Sec. 3. Grand Canyon National Park.

            (a) Noise associated with aircraft overflight at the Grand 
        Canyon National Park is causing a significant adverse effect on 
        the natural quiet and experience of the park and current 
        aircraft operations at the Grand Canyon National Park have 
        raised serious concerns regarding public safety, including 
        concerns regarding the safety of park users.

        Mr. Dornan of California: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Dornan of California: At the end 
        of the bill add the following:

                    Sec. 4. Collision Avoidance System.

            Section 312(c) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 
        U.S.C. App. 1353(c)), which relates to research and 
        development, is amended by inserting ``(1)'' immediately after 
        ``(c)'' and by adding at the end thereof the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(2) In carrying out his functions, powers, and duties 
        under this section pertaining to aviation safety, the Secretary 
        of Transportation shall coordinate and take whatever steps 
        necessary (including research and development) to promulgate 
        standards for an airborne collision avoidance system for all 
        United States aircraft, civil and military, to improve aviation 
        safety. The Secretary of Transportation shall promulgate such 
        standards within one year after the date of enactment of this 
        Act. Such standards shall require that such collision avoidance 
        system be designed-- . . .
            [A point of order was reserved against the amendment.]

        The Chairman: The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Dornan) has expired.
        Does the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. Vento) insist on his 
    point of order?
        Mr. [Bruce F.] Vento [of Minnesota]: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I 
    insist on my point of order.

            The Chairman: The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized.

                               point of order

        Mr. Vento: Mr. Chairman, under the rule of germaneness, rule 
    XVI, clause 7, no subject different from that under consideration 
    shall be admitted under the color of an amendment. The amendment of 
    the gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) violates that rule and I 
    must reluctantly insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?

[[Page 12228]]

        Mr. Dornan of California: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
    speak to it.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California is recognized.
        Mr. Dornan of California: Mr. Chairman, I understand the 
    gentleman's objection and I would ask for some help. Under my 5 
    minutes here, I would like to ask for a colloquy with my good 
    friend and distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Mineta).
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that he 
    cannot have a colloquy during a point of order.
        Mr. Dornan of California: All right, Mr. Chairman, here is what 
    I will ask rhetorically and publicly. . . .
        Now, I would ask the gentleman from California (Mr. Mineta) if 
    there is any way that we can get some kind of a hearing in the 
    remaining 2 or 3 weeks, God forbid that we come back into a special 
    session, so that this 99th Congress, which suffered a midair 
    collision over the Grand Canyon on June 18 does something in this 
    Congress.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask the gentleman to withdraw his objection.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from 
    California that he is still not speaking to the point of order and 
    will ask the gentleman to conclude his remarks on the point of 
    order, without the colloquy or the questions.
        The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Dornan of California: That is all, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) has offered an 
    amendment adding a section 4 pertaining to the collision avoidance 
    system.
        The Chair has had an opportunity to examine the amendment and 
    it is the opinion of the Chair that the amendment is not germane. 
    The bill before us, H.R. 4430, is a narrow one addressing only 
    overflights over certain national park areas.
        The amendment goes to an unrelated subject amending an act not 
    amended by the bill.
        Therefore, the Chair sustains the point of order.

Scope of Debate on Point of Order; on Motion To Recommit

Sec. 7.18 Debate on a point of order raised against a motion to 
    recommit a conference report with instructions to the conferees 
    must be confined to the question of order and may not go to the 
    merits of the underlying proposition.

    Where a point of order was raised against the instructions included 
in a motion to recommit a conference report on the ground that the 
instructions exceeded the differences committed to conference, the 
argument on the point of order tended to roam to the merits of the bill 
in conference and away from the merits of the point of order. At one 
point, the Chair had to bring the debate back to the issue at hand. The

[[Page 12229]]

proceedings of Apr. 9, 1992,(3) are set out below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 138 Cong. Rec. 9021, 9022, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (4) The question is on the 
    conference report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Dennis E. Eckart (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  motion to recommit offered by mr. walsh

        Mr. [James T.] Walsh [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    motion to recommit.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is the gentleman opposed to the 
    conference report in its present form?
        Mr. Walsh: Mr. Speaker, I am.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion to 
    recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Walsh moves to recommit the conference report on the 
        bill S. 3 to the Committee of Conference with instructions to 
        the managers on the part of the House to include in the 
        conference report the provisions of H.R. 3770 including:
            1. The requirement that a majority of a candidate's 
        contributions come from individuals residing in the candidate's 
        district.
            2. A limit of $1,000 on PAC contributions to candidates.
            3. A total ban on soft money contributions to political 
        parties.
            And to further include the requirement that no taxpayer 
        dollars may be used to finance congressional campaigns.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Sam] Gejdenson [of Connecticut]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Gejdenson: Mr. Speaker, I would make a point of order that 
    the instructions exceed the scope of the conference report. It is 
    clear that the requirement of in-district funding is beyond the 
    scope of the conference report, and I would move that therefore the 
    motion to recommit should be ruled out of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Walsh] wish to be heard in opposition to the point of order?
        Mr. Walsh: Mr. Speaker, I believe that this motion adds to the 
    fairness of the conference report, and I would urge that it be 
    added.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Walsh] concede the point of order?
        Mr. Walsh: Mr. Speaker, I do not.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does anyone else wish to be heard on 
    the point of order?
        Mr. [Paul B.] Henry [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I wish to be 
    heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The point of order is contested. The 
    gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Henry] is recognized on the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Henry: Mr. Speaker, I want to be sure we understand what 
    the point of order is and what the question is and what the contest 
    is. . . .
        Mr. Gejdenson: Mr. Speaker, the objection is because it is 
    beyond the scope of the conference. At this stage of the game to 
    try to rewrite the whole conference is really in fact an attempt to 
    kill campaign finance reform, at least at this session, in my 
    perspective. . . .

[[Page 12230]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. 
    Leach] wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Jim] Leach [of Iowa]: Mr. Speaker, I do think this body 
    ought to understand what is taking place here. The minority 
    resolution talked about a $1,000 cap on PAC's. The House bill 
    passed a $5,000 limit. The Senate bill passed a zero or up to a 
    thousand, if the court threw it out.
        So what the majority is attempting to do is stifle a very 
    thoughtful amendment of the minority for real reform of the 
    political action system and is using the Rules of the House against 
    real reform. And there is nothing more germane to this bill.
        The subject matter of this bill is containing political action 
    committees. I think the public record ought to indicate it.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Leach] is 
    entitled to be heard on the point of order under the rules of the 
    House. That does not entitle the gentleman to be heard on the 
    merits of the bill.
        If the gentleman has remarks to make, they should be confined 
    to the point of order before the House. . . .
        The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Connecticut makes a point of order against 
    the motion offered by the gentleman from New York on the ground 
    that the instructions therein exceed the scope of the conference.
        The motion offered by the gentleman from New York proposes to 
    instruct the managers on the part of the House to include in the 
    conference report three features of a separate bill, H.R. 3770. 
    Each of these three initiatives falls outside the matters committed 
    to the conference as disagreements between the Senate bill and the 
    House amendment thereto.
        Therefore, under clause 3 of rule XXVIII, a conference report 
    may not include a matter although germane that was not committed to 
    the conference of either House.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the instructions proposed in the 
    motion offered by the gentleman from New York exceed the scope of 
    the differences committed to the conference and the point of order 
    is sustained.

Senate Rules as Authority

Sec. 7.19 Parliamentarian's Note: It is in order in debate on a 
    question of order to read a rule of the House or Senate for the 
    Chair's information if it relates to the point of order.

    On July 16, 1935,(5) during debate on a point of order 
in the House, a Member was permitted to read aloud excerpts from the 
Senate rules as authority for his argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 79 Cong. Rec. 11262, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas L.] Blanton [of Texas]: I refer the Chair to the 
    following portion of rule XXVIII of the United States Senate:

            Messages shall be sent to the House of Representatives by 
        the Secretary, who shall previously certify the determination 
        of the Senate

[[Page 12231]]

        upon all bills, joint resolutions, and other resolutions.

        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order that the gentleman cannot read from any document or 
    from any other papers.
        The Speaker: (6) This is for the information of the 
    Chair, and the point of order is overruled. The gentleman from 
    Texas will proceed in order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Joseph W. Byrns (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Conceding Points of Order During Debate

Sec. 7.20 Where a point of order is made against language in a bill and 
    the point is conceded in debate by the Member handling the bill, 
    the Chair rules on the point of order unless there is further 
    argument by another Member against the validity of the point of 
    order.

    For example, on Apr. 12, 1960,(7) in the Committee of 
the Whole, Chairman W. Homer Thornberry, of Texas, ruled on a point of 
order against an amendment immediately after the proponent conceded 
during debate that the point of order was well taken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 106 Cong. Rec. 7941, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 11666, which made appropriations for certain departments 
        of the executive branch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: . . . Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order that this violates rule 21, paragraph 2, of Cannon's 
    Procedures which provides that no appropriation shall be made 
    without prior authorization.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [John J.] Rooney [of New York]: Yes, Mr. Chairman. . . .
        . . . I am now constrained to concede that the point of order 
    is well taken and I shall immediately offer an amendment.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained.

Argument on Point of Order; Revisions and Extensions Not Permitted

Sec. 7.21 The Chair will not entertain unanimous-consent requests to 
    revise and extend remarks when hearing argument on a point of 
    order.

    On Oct. 7, 1977,(8) a rather involved point of order was 
raised against a conference report on the Energy Research and 
Development Administration Authorization Act of 1978. The report was 
called up by Mr. Teague, Chairman of the Committee on Science and 
Technology. The argument in favor of the point of order was advanced by 
Mr. Udall, Chairman of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. 
The proceedings

[[Page 12232]]

leading up to the unanimous-consent request cited above, were as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 123 Cong. Rec. 33770, 33771, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       conference report on s. 1811, energy research and development 
                  administration authorization act of 1978

        Mr. [Olin E.] Teague [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I call up the 
    conference report on the Senate bill (S. 1811) to authorize 
    appropriations to the Energy Research and Development 
    Administration in accordance with section 261 of the Atomic Energy 
    Act of 1954, as amended, section 305 of the Energy Reorganization 
    Act of 1974, and section 16 of the Federal Nonnuclear Energy 
    Research and Development Act of 1974, as amended, and for other 
    purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker: (9) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Texas?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection. . . .
        Mr. [Morris K.] Udall [of Arizona]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Udall: Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a point of order 
    against the conference report. Is this the appropriate time?
        The Speaker: It is.
        Mr. Udall: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    conference report.
        The Speaker: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Udall: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order. Section 
    106(d)(3), adopted by the conference committee on the bill now 
    before the House, exceeds the authority of the conference committee 
    in that it inserts new substantive provisions in the legislation 
    which were not included in the bill, either as passed by the House 
    or passed by the Senate.
        I would like to be heard briefly on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Arizona is recognized. . . .
        Mr. Udall: The point of order, Mr. Speaker, is based on the 
    conference report violation of rule 28, which requires that the 
    report shall not include matter not committed to the conference 
    committee by either House. The offending provision of the 
    conference report is section 106. It amends section 103 of Public 
    Law 91-273 as amended, and imposes new requirements on the Clinch 
    River breeder project. . . .

    After several other Members were heard on the point of order, Mr. 
Carr sought recognition.

        Mr. [M. Robert] Carr [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I desire to 
    rise in support of the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Carr: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I may be 
    permitted to revise and extend my remarks.
        The Speaker: The Chair will inform the gentleman that his 
    request to revise and extend his remarks is not in order on a 
    point-of-order discussion.
        The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Carr) will be heard.

[[Page 12233]]

Sanctity of Argument on Point of Order

Sec. 7.22 The Chair will not entertain unanimous-consent requests by 
    Members to ``revise and extend'' their arguments on points of 
    order.

    Since it is essential that the Chair's ruling on a point of order 
be responsive to the arguments actually made in support of the point of 
order, requests to revise and extend those remarks are not entertained. 
In the proceedings which are carried herein, the arguments on the point 
of order were complex and the Chair had to have the benefit of all the 
presentations to make his decision.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 129 Cong. Rec. 30542, 30545-47, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., Nov. 2, 1983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Dan R.] Coats [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Coats: Page 36, after line 4, 
        insert the following:

        sec. 11. ineffectiveness of act in case of compensation by, or 
           retaliation against, united states agricultural or other 
                                   industries

            Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the 
        Secretary nor any other party shall take any action under this 
        act if the implementation of any provision of this Act either--
            (1) would violate the obligations of the United States 
        under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and could 
        therefore result in retaliation by another country; or
            (2) would entitle any other country to compensation from 
        the United States in the form of reduced restrictions on 
        imports of agricultural, industrial or other products from 
        other countries or to retaliation against the United States in 
        the form of increased restrictions against exports of 
        agricultural, industrial or other products from the United 
        States.
        Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the United 
        States district court for the appropriate judicial district 
        shall have jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising under this 
        section.

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [Jr., of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order against the amendment. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the amendment is 
    not germane.
        Mr. Chairman, it is within the rules of the House and the 
    interpretation of the rule of germaneness that the amendment must 
    relate to the purposes of the legislation before the House.
        I would observe that the purposes of the legislation before the 
    House are to assure that automobiles will have a certain percentage 
    of domestic content in automobiles which are sold inside the United 
    States. The legislation before the House at this time deals with 
    automobiles and the trade in automobiles inside the boundaries of 
    the United States. The legislation before the House sets up no new 
    causes of action.
        There are provisions in the legislation which are essentially 
    disclaimers. The Chair will note that on page 15, in

[[Page 12234]]

    line 5, there is language which relates to disclaimers of an 
    intention to violate GATT and which do not confer any new 
    jurisdiction upon any court in the United States to consider or to 
    resolve conflicts related to GATT or ``to alter or amend any law 
    existing on the date of enactment. . . ..''
        I would observe that the amendment is much more broad, and I 
    would like the attention of the Chair with regard to a number of 
    points.
        First of all, in the last four lines of the amendment, the 
    language is:

            Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the United 
        States district court for the appropriate judicial district 
        shall have jurisdiction to resolve disputes arising under this 
        section.

        That is a very broad conferral of jurisdiction upon all of the 
    Federal courts of the United States in their respective judicial 
    districts to deal with disputes. That kind of an amendment would 
    necessarily have either gone initially or sequentially to the 
    Judiciary Committee because of the jurisdiction of that committee 
    relative to disputes and causes of action. I would refer the Chair 
    to the letter which relates to this matter as written by Chairman 
    Rodino on judicial matters.
        Mr. Chairman, there are some other points I would like to make 
    concerning the scope and the sweep of this matter. First of all, 
    the jurisdiction conferred upon U.S. district courts would be to 
    determine whether the Secretary had carried out his 
    responsibilities under lines 4 through 7 of the amendment, as to 
    whether the Secretary or any other party had taken any other action 
    under the act if the implementation of any provision of this act--
    and then it goes on to say this--``would violate the obligations of 
    the United States under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
    . . .''
        So that question would be reviewable. The question would also 
    be reviewable as to whether or not the action of the Secretary 
    would result in retaliation by another country. I would observe 
    that an amendment which is contingent upon some future 
    indeterminate action is also violative of the rules on germaneness.
        Beyond this, the question would be placed before the courts 
    upon action by any citizen feeling aggrieved, under the last four 
    lines, lines 19 through 22, as to whether any other country would 
    be entitled to compensation from the United States in the form of 
    reduced restrictions on imports of agricultural, industrial, or 
    other products.
        This section confers jurisdiction relative to actions which 
    would be taken in other countries regarding a whole series of other 
    commodities, agricultural, industrial, and whatever they might 
    happen to otherwise be.
        In addition to this, it says, ``or other products from other 
    countries or to retaliation against the United States in the form 
    of increased restrictions. . . .''
        So those matters would again be subject to judicial review and 
    independent litigation by any person under the provisions of this 
    amendment.
        I would point out further that the amendment says, Mr. 
    Chairman, that the Secretary may not take action to implement the 
    law if it violates GATT. It also says, if it would entitle any 
    other country to compensation from the United States.

[[Page 12235]]

        Now, in Cannon's, VIII, 3029, it states that an amendment 
    delaying operation of a proposed enactment pending an ascertainment 
    of a fact is germane when the fact to be ascertained relates solely 
    to the subject matter of the bill.
        Here the condition to be ascertained, whether the act violates 
    GATT or would entitle another country to compensation, is not 
    germane.
        There are general foreign policy questions and concerns that 
    have to be addressed, as in the case of the prior amendment offered 
    by the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Glickman) and which caused that 
    to be ruled out of order as not germane.
        Mr. Chairman, the bill also creates a broad new jurisdiction in 
    the U.S. district court, a form of judicial relief to determine if 
    the act violates GATT. That is, of course, an entirely new 
    provision relating to commodities, agricultural, industrial, or 
    other, which is far more broad than that in the bill.
        While this bill does allow the district court to enforce the 
    bill, this is an entirely new form of review and confers a cause of 
    action far more broad than any found anywhere else in the 
    legislation.
        Mr. Chairman, I would point out that this would confer broad 
    jurisdiction on private persons to enter the courts of the United 
    States. A provision of this sort would necessarily involve 
    jurisdiction of the committee having jurisdiction over that matter, 
    and that is, of course, the Judiciary Committee.
        The Chairman: (11) Does the gentleman from Indiana 
    (Mr. Coats) wish to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Leon E. Panetta (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Coats: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Coats) may 
    proceed.
        Mr. Coats: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that I may be 
    permitted to revise and extend my remarks.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that in 
    presenting his remarks on the point of order, he cannot make a 
    request to revise and extend.

        Mr. Coats: I will withdraw my unanimous consent to revise and 
    extend my remarks, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Coats: Mr. Chairman, the committee report issued by the 
    Committee on Energy and Commerce chaired by the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Dingell) specifically states in section 2(c), which 
    was an amendment to the bill adopted by the committee, that:

            It is the intent of Congress that this act shall not be 
        deemed to modify or amend the terms or conditions of any 
        international treaty, convention, or agreement ***.

        That alone expands the jurisdiction of the bill beyond specific 
    auto content.
        Second, we also adopted an amendment which directed the 
    Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Trade Commission, in 
    fact it mandated a study as to the impact on agriculture. That 
    again expands the jurisdiction beyond what the gentleman claimed in 
    his point of order, that it is auto-specific. It is broader that 
    auto-specific because the bill itself as adopted by the committee 
    contains a direction that a study be conducted of the impact on 
    agriculture and that goes directly to

[[Page 12236]]

    the heart of the amendment that I am offering.
        In addition, let me just make a couple comments about the 
    jurisdiction of the courts. In the Energy and Commerce Committee, 
    the bill's proponents offered language which would in effect strip 
    the U.S. courts of jurisdiction to hear disputes under the act. 
    After lengthy debate on this issue, some of that language was 
    withdrawn and the bill now purports to be neutral on jurisdiction.
        This language in the amendment simply makes clear that as is 
    the normal case in any other case, U.S. courts would have 
    jurisdiction under this section to resolve disputes. These matters 
    of conflict between U.S. international obligations and U.S. 
    statutes should be decided by U.S. tribunals and not left solely to 
    international machinery.
        So I think it is clear that the amendment before us clearly 
    fits within the bill that we are taking up, that the jurisdiction 
    is broader than just an auto-specific content, as stated by the 
    congressional findings, purpose, and disclaimer, section 2(c) and 
    as stated in section 8(G) on page 33, which mandates a study as to 
    the effect on agriculture by the Secretary of Transportation and 
    the Federal Trade Commission.
        For that reason, I urge the Chair to rule against the point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard 
    against the point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Minnesota is recognized.
        Mr. Frenzel: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to repeat the 
    arguments of the gentleman from Indiana that his amendment is 
    clearly germane to section 2(c) on page 15 of the bill, but I think 
    the Chair's perusal of that section will verify that fact.
        The point I would like to add in addition is that when the 
    Chair ruled against the Glickman amendment, it took pains to 
    specifically point out that the effect of the Glickman amendment or 
    its effectuation would take place because of items external to the 
    workings of the bill.
        The Coats amendment, on the other hand, would be effectuated 
    clearly by items that are covered by the bill and, therefore, it 
    is, to use a pardonable phrase, ``a horse of quite a different 
    color.''
        The Chairman: Is there any further argument with regard to the 
    point of order?
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell).
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I would just observe that my good 
    friend, the gentleman from Minnesota, has been reading the language 
    of a disclaimer. Never, I believe, in the history of the House has 
    a disclaimer been used to expand the jurisdiction or to expand the 
    purposes or the scope of legislation for purposes of defining 
    whether or not a matter is germane.
        Now, if the Chair will refer to the report of the committee, 
    the Chair will find that the disclaimer is constructed, and it says 
    how the disclaimer is to be constructed, and the disclaimer says as 
    follows:

            The subsection also contains a disclaimer that the Act 
        should not be construed to confer new jurisdiction on any 
        Federal court to consider and resolve such conflicts. In short, 
        it states that the Act is not to be con

[[Page 12237]]

        strued to confer jurisdiction where none presently exists. At 
        the same time, it declares that the Act does not alter or amend 
        any law existing on the date of enactment of this Act which may 
        confer such jurisdictions on the courts.

        Mr. [Richard L.] Ottinger [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, may I be 
    heard on the point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York is recognized.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, under the General Agreement on 
    Tariff and Trade, there is an elaborate procedure that is 
    prescribed with respect to complaints under that act. There is no 
    jurisdiction in the Federal courts at the present time that 
    somebody can go in and seek to enforce the provisions of GATT in 
    our courts.
        What the bill says on page 15 is that nothing in this act shall 
    be construed to confer jurisdiction.
        Were we to have gone ahead and sought to confer jurisdiction, 
    it clearly would have been beyond the jurisdiction of our 
    committee. It would have had to go to the Judiciary Committee.
        The disclaimer was put in to protect that at the express 
    request of Chairman Rodino.
        Therefore, since this amendment does seek to confer 
    jurisdiction which presently is not there, and that is a matter not 
    within the jurisdiction of the bill, I urge that the Chair sustain 
    the point of order.
        The Chairman: Are there any further arguments with regard to 
    the point of order?
        If not, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        First of all, the Chair would note that the bill before the 
    House at the present time differs from the bill that was before the 
    House in the last session.
        In the legislation that is currently before the House, the 
    committee dealt with the issue of the relationship between this 
    legislation and other law in section 2(c) which states:
        It is the intent of Congress that this Act shall not be deemed 
    to modify or amend the terms or conditions of any international 
    treaty, convention, or agreement that may be applicable to 
    automotive products entered for sale and distribution in interstate 
    commerce and to which the United States, on the date of the 
    enactment of this Act, is a party, including, but not limited to, 
    the terms or conditions of any such treaty, convention, or 
    agreement which provide for the resolution of conflicts between the 
    parties thereto. Nothing in this Act shall be construed (1) to 
    confer jurisdiction upon any court of the United States to consider 
    and resolve such conflicts, or (2) to alter or amend any law 
    existing on the date of enactment of this Act which may confer such 
    jurisdiction in such courts.
        Section 2(c) therefore addresses the issue of interpretation of 
    the bill as it applies to treaties, conventions, and other 
    agreements applicable to automotive products.
        The amendment that has been offered by the gentleman from 
    Indiana deals specifically with the actions of the Secretary in the 
    implementation of provisions that may relate to treaties, 
    specifically the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
        It would appear, therefore, that the amendment does relate to 
    subject matter that has already been introduced in the bill by 
    virtue of section 2(c).

[[Page 12238]]

        With regard to the court jurisdiction argument, that issue is 
    addressed within the bill, specifically on page 30, relating to 
    appropriate judicial circuits for judicial review and other 
    provisions that relate to the jurisdiction of Federal courts. So 
    the Chair feels that the issue of court jurisdiction has, in fact, 
    been presented within the legislation.
        With regard to the disclaimer argument, it is the position of 
    the Chair that if the provision in the bill was merely a narrow and 
    technical disclaimer, then the argument of the gentleman from 
    Michigan might prevail; but since it can be read as an overall 
    provision that relates to the broad interpretation of the bill as 
    it applies to trade agreements, and since the test the Chair must 
    apply is the relationship of the amendment to the bill as a whole, 
    it is the position of the Chair that the point of order should not 
    be sustained.
        Is there any further discussion with regard to the amendment?

Chair's Right To Clarify Ruling in Record

Sec. 7.23 The Chair formerly exercised the right under the precedents 
    and applicable standards regarding ``accuracy in the Record'' to 
    refine his ruling on a point of order in the Record to clarify, but 
    not to change the substance of, the ruling.

    On Feb. 19, 1992,(12) Mr. Robert S. Walker, of 
Pennsylvania, who had debated the Chair at length following his ruling 
of Feb. 5, again raised the issue. Comparing the audio transcripts of 
the Chair's ruling with what appeared in the Record on the Feb. 5 
proceedings, Mr. Walker determined that a change had been made. The 
Chair had in the ruling used the word ``because'' as a conjunction 
between two independent clauses. He had stated that House Resolution 
258 came within the exception in clause 5(c), Rule XI. The change made 
in the transcript was as follows: ``It is the ruling of the Chair at 
this time that the task force comes under that exception because the 
task force is a subunit of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and not a 
separate entity. In the revisions, the Chair replaced ``because'' with 
a comma and made the two clauses independent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 138 Cong. Rec. 2461, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Chair's exchange with Mr. Walker is carried in full.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (13) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Michael R. McNulty (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, if a Member has reason to believe that 
    the Chair has made an inaccurate ruling, and if, further, that 
    Member has rea

[[Page 12239]]

    son to believe that that inaccurate ruling was further made 
    problematic by the addition of words to the Record spoken by the 
    Chair or the deletion of words in the Record spoken by the Chair, 
    what is the recourse of action available to the Member to bring 
    about the appropriate correction?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Would the Member discuss the nature of 
    the concern with the Chair so that he can further understand the 
    concern?
        Mr. Walker: I will be glad to, Mr. Speaker. On Wednesday, 
    February 5, the Chair was asked to rule on the matter of the rule 
    on the task force concerning the holding of hostages by Iran in 
    1980.
        At that time, this Member suggested that the Chair had ruled 
    inaccurately by suggesting that this matter did not apply, because 
    we were dealing with a subunit of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
        When I go back and find the Record, I discover that that is 
    precisely what the Chair ruled. I at that point challenged the 
    ruling of the Chair. We had a vote. The Chair was upheld despite 
    the fact that the ruling is inaccurate.
        Later on, in raising questions about that, the Chair then made 
    a number of statements to clarify its position. When I put the 
    Record of the House, the written Record of the House, against the 
    tapes of that day, I find that words were added to the Chair's 
    message. I also find that things were deleted from what the Chair 
    actually said in the course of clarifying its decision. . . .
        I would now like to figure out how it is we can go about 
    correcting both the ruling of the Chair and the fact that the 
    Record has been changed with regard to the words of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would remind the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania that the ruling of the Chair that day was 
    sustained by a vote, and that the Chair subsequently has the right 
    to clarify his ruling. . . .
        And it did not change the thrust of the ruling.
        Mr. Walker: In clarifying its ruling, does not the Chair have 
    an obligation to the House to accurately reflect his ruling in the 
    presentation to the House and not then modify that statement later 
    on by both adding words and deleting words from the Chair's 
    statement as the official Record appears? . . .
        Well, if that is the case, then why does the permanent Record 
    of the House as reflected on the videotape differ with the Record 
    reflected in the printed Record of the House?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Because the gentleman was attempting 
    to clarify his ruling as a result of the inquiry from the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Walker: So a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: Even in matters then where precedent is being set, 
    we can have the person who occupies the Chair modify their words in 
    the Record and thereby change, in my opinion, the intent of the 
    ruling.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Without changing the ruling, the Chair 
    may do that.
        Mr. Walker: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.

[[Page 12240]]

        Mr. Walker: Is it not true that Members are not granted that 
    right, so therefore that is a special right that has now been 
    created for the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Members have the right to revise and 
    extend their remarks continuously.
        Mr. Walker: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Walker: Under recent rulings, Members have been admonished 
    very clearly that they are not to change in any way the substantive 
    value of what they say in those revisions and extensions. In my 
    opinion, the Chair has done that here.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: To the best of the knowledge of the 
    Chair, the person who was in the Chair on that day did not change 
    the substance of his ruling.

Sec. 7.24 The Speaker announced that consistent with clause 9 of Rule 
    XIV, adopted in the 104th Congress, statements and rulings of the 
    Chair appearing in the Record would be a substantially verbatim 
    account of those words as spoken during the proceedings of the 
    House, subject only to technical, grammatical, and typographical 
    corrections.

        The Speaker made the following announcement on Jan. 20, 1995: 
    (14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: (15) The Chair announces that 
    consistent with clause 9 of rule XIV, statements and rulings of the 
    Chair appearing in the Record will be a substantially verbatim 
    account of those words as spoken during the proceedings of the 
    House, subject only to technical, grammatical, and typographical 
    corrections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Newt Gingrich (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Without objection, the permanent Record of January 18 at pages 
    301 and 303 will reflect this policy.
        There was no objection.

    This announcement was precipitated by a point of order raised under 
clause 9 of Rule XIV on Jan. 19, 1995,(16) against 
modifications made in certain statements by the Chair. The point of 
order and inquiries on that earlier day are carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               point of order

        Mr. [Barney] Frank of Massachusetts: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (17) The gentleman from 
    Massachusetts is recognized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. David Dreier (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of 
    this session, the House adopted a new rule which says the 
    Congressional Record shall be a substantially verbatim account of 
    remarks made during the proceedings of the House, subject only to 
    technical, grammatical, and typographical corrections authorized by 
    the Member making the remarks involved.

[[Page 12241]]

        In the Congressional Record that we received this morning, 
    reflecting yesterday's proceedings, at page H301 in the transcript 
    of the remarks of the Speaker pro tempore, the gentleman from 
    Florida, there are two changes that were made between what he, in 
    fact, said and what is in the Record.
        The first change is as follows:
        He said yesterday with regard to the statements of the 
    gentlewoman from Florida about the book of the Speaker, ``It is the 
    Speaker's opinion that innuendo and personal references to the 
    Speaker's conduct are not in order.''
        That has been altered and that does not appear verbatim in the 
    Congressional Record. Instead, it says, ``It is the Speaker's 
    opinion that innuendo and critical references to the Speaker's 
    personal conduct are not in order.''
        Additionally, later on in response to a parliamentary inquiry 
    from the gentleman from Missouri, the Speaker pro tempore said, as 
    I recollect it, ``it has been the Chair's ruling, and the 
    precedents of the House support this, a higher level of respect is 
    due to the Speaker.''
        In the Congressional Record that has been changed to ``a proper 
    level of respect.''
        Now, I do not believe that changing ``personal'' to 
    ``critical'' and ``proper'' to ``higher'' is either technical, 
    grammatical, or typographical. Both make quite substantive changes. 
    Indeed, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that by the standard that the 
    Speaker yesterday uttered, the gentlewoman from Florida was judged, 
    but if you take today's standard of revised, illegitimately revised 
    version that is in the Record, there would be no objection to what 
    the gentlewoman from Florida said.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair might respond to the 
    gentleman.
        The Chair would recite from the manual that in accordance with 
    existing accepted practices, the Speaker may make such technical or 
    parliamentary insertions, or corrections in transcript as may be 
    necessary to conform to rule, custom, or precedent. The Chair does 
    not believe that any revision changed the meaning of the ruling.
        The Chair would under the circumstances inform the House on 
    behalf of the Parliamentarian that the new rule is as it might 
    apply to the role of the Chair will be examined.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: Mr. Speaker, I am puzzled, and I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Massachusetts is 
    recognized.
        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: The Speaker cited previous 
    references to the House rules and manual. That predates the rules 
    change adopted this year. This is not simply a case of making a 
    technical change in a ruling. We are talking also about substantive 
    changes in the debate in the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has made it very clear, the 
    Chair would say to the gentleman.
        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: No, the Chair has not.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has made it clear that the 
    Parliamentarian plans to examine this issue.
        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: Mr. Speaker, I have a further 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12242]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Massachusetts is 
    recognized.
        Mr. Frank of Massachusetts: In the first instance, I thought 
    the Speaker was the responsible ruler in this situation, while the 
    Parliamentarian advised him.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.


 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 8. Burden of Proof on Points of Order

    When a point of order is stated on the floor, the Speaker or the 
Chairman of the Committee of the Whole has the obligation under the 
rules (18) to decide the question presented.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See House Rules and Manual (1997) Rule I clause 4 Sec. Sec. 624 and 
        627; and Rule XXIII clause 1a Sec. 861b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    He may be guided in making the decision by argument on the point of 
order, which is for the Chair's information. In deciding questions of 
order, the Chair is constrained to give precedent its proper respect, 
for one of the duties of the Chair is to preserve and enforce the 
authority of parliamentary law.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Rule I clause 4, House Rules and Manual Sec. 627 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under the precedents interpreting various rules which create or 
permit a point of order, certain precepts about which party to a 
dispute has the burden of proof have been established.(20) 
When a point of order is directed at the germaneness of an amendment, 
for example, the burden is on the proponent of the amendment to show 
its relationship to the pending text.(1) On a general 
appropriation bill, the burden of proof that an appropriation carried 
in the bill has proper authorization in law falls on the 
committee.(2) The proponent of an amendment carrying an 
appropriation has the burden of showing authorization.(3) 
Similarly, where an amendment is offered and supported as a 
``limitation'' on funds, it is for the proponent of the amendment to 
show that it does not change existing law.(4) On the other 
hand, a Member challenging an amendment under Rule XXI clause 
5(b),(5) as a ``tax measure'' must show the inevitability of 
tax consequences to support his contention that the cited rule has been 
violated.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. See, for example, Rule XVI clause 7, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 794 (1997); see also Sec. 8.15, infra.
 1. See 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 2995; and Sec. 8.1, infra.
 2. See Sec. 8.4, infra.
 3. See Sec. 8.11, infra.
 4. See Rule XXI clause 2(f), House Rules and Manual Sec. 835 (1997); 
        and see Sec. Sec. 8.4, 8.5, and 8.7, infra.
 5. See House Rules and Manual Sec. 846b (1997).
 6. See Sec. 8.15, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under some parts of the Congressional Budget Act, the Chair is 
guided in making a decision by

[[Page 12243]]

estimates of costs provided by the Committees on the 
Budget.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Sec. 8.14, infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Burden of Proof on Question of Germaneness

Sec. 8.1 When a point of order is raised against an amendment on the 
    ground that it is not germane, the burden of proof is on the 
    proponent of the amendment to sustain the germaneness.

    Where an amendment is challenged by a point of order on the ground 
that it is not germane, and the amendment is ambiguous and susceptible 
to an interpretation that would render it not germane, the Chair will 
sustain the point of order. Proceedings in the Committee of the Whole 
on June 20, 1975,(8) when an amendment was offered by Mr. 
Barry Goldwater, Jr., of California, illustrate the importance of 
drafting an amendment precisely so that it cannot be read and 
interpreted more broadly than intended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 121 Cong. Rec. 19934, 19966, 19967, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Sec. 307. The Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and 
        Development Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1878; 42 U.S.C. 5901) is 
        amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
            ``Sec. 17. The Administrator shall establish, develop, 
        acquire, and maintain a central source of information on all 
        energy resources and technology, including proved and other 
        reserves, for research and development purposes. This 
        responsibility shall include the acquisition of proprietary 
        information, by purchase, donation, or from another Federal 
        agency, when such information will carry out the purposes of 
        this Act. In addition the Administrator shall undertake to 
        correlate, review, and utilize any information available to any 
        other Government agency to further carry out the purposes of 
        this Act. The information maintained by the Administrator shall 
        be made available to the public, subject to the provisions of 
        section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and section 1905 of 
        title 18, United States Code, and to other Government agencies 
        in a manner that will facilitate its dissemination.'' . . .

        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Goldwater: Page 43, line 6, before 
        the period, insert the following ``: Provided That any such 
        proprietary information obtained by compulsory process by any 
        Federal agency shall not be subject to the mandatory disclosure 
        provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552 and further, where the Administrator 
        so finds, any proprietary information obtained by other means 
        shall be deemed to qualify for exemption from mandatory 
        disclosure under 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(4)''.

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order against the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Goldwater).

[[Page 12244]]

        The Chairman: (9) The gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Goldwater) is recognized for approximately 1 minute.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. J. Edward Roush (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Goldwater: Mr. Chairman, would it be possible for us not to 
    take up the time of this body to have the ruling on the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) 
    wish to pursue his point of order?
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman wishes, I will 
    pursue the point of order at this time.

                               point of order

        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment is, among other things, not 
    germane.

        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman from 
    Michigan that the time limit pertains to the clock, and not to 
    minutes.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I have asked to be heard on the 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: And the Chair recognizes the gentleman on the 
    point of order, and in doing so gently reminds the gentleman of the 
    factor of time.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Goldwater) is not germane to the 
    legislation before us, and I am prepared to be heard on the point 
    of order at the pleasure of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair has recognized the gentleman from 
    Michigan to make his point of order.
        Mr. Dingell: The point of order is that the amendment is not 
    germane. The amendment appears to relate to the language of the 
    bill at page 43, line 6. In point of fact, the amendment seeks to 
    amend the Freedom of Information Act, 5 United States Code 552, 
    which is cited therein. It might appear that the amendment is 
    subject to a number of different meanings. I can think of at least 
    two at the moment, and perhaps three or four others. The first 
    instance is that any proprietary information received by compulsory 
    process by any Federal agency shall not be subject to the mandatory 
    disclosure provisions of 5 United States Code 552--and I am 
    literally quoting from the language of the amendment--and that 
    being so, the amendment is defective as seeking to amend 
    legislation not presently before the House and not within the 
    jurisdiction of the particular committee that is presenting the 
    legislation before us, and relating to entirely different matters.
        It is possible that it refers to earlier legislation or, 
    rather, refers to earlier clauses and sentences of the legislation 
    before us. It is also possible that the legislation that the 
    amendment would have the law amended is that once proprietary 
    information had fallen into the hands of the Federal Government by 
    compulsory process and had, through any methodology whatsoever, 
    arrived in the hands of ERDA, that the original Federal agency 
    which had ownership or custody of that information would thereupon 
    be sterilized in making that information available pursuant to the 
    provisions of 5 United States Code 552, the Freedom of Information 
    Act.
        In either the first instance or in the second instance the 
    amendment seeks to amend legislation not properly be

[[Page 12245]]

    fore us at this time, the Freedom of Information Act, which is not 
    under the jurisdiction of the committee or which, by notice, has 
    not properly been available to the Members as to the offer of this 
    amendment.
        The amendment is, therefore, in my view, on at least two of the 
    three interpretations violative of the rules of the House, and 
    violative of the rules of germaneness, and is subject to a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Goldwater), desire to be heard upon the point of order?
        Mr. Goldwater: I do, Mr. Chairman. I rise in opposition to the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I would point out to the gentleman from Michigan 
    that if the gentleman will read the amendment it refers to not all 
    proprietary information, but any such proprietary information, 
    specifically narrowing it to ERDA as this particular bill addresses 
    itself.
        This amendment does not seek to amend the Freedom of 
    Information Act, but merely to apply the Freedom of Information 
    Act. It is, in essence, a limitation upon ERDA and as specifically 
    authorized by the Freedom of Information Act under subsection (d), 
    subsection (3). That this section, in other words, the Freedom of 
    Information Act, does not apply to matters that are specifically 
    exempted from disclosure by statute. The other statute is what, in 
    essence, I am speaking. It is not an amendment to the Freedom of 
    Information Act, but in essence is a limitation on the activities 
    of ERDA, and merely applies the regulations of the Freedom of 
    Information Act.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) 
    desire to be heard upon the point of order?
        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: I do, Mr. Chairman. I rise to 
    speak on the point of order.
        The amendment states that any such proprietary information 
    obtained by a compulsory process by a Federal agency shall not be 
    subject to mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information 
    Act. Such information refers back to the sentence immediately 
    preceding the amendment in the bill on page 43, beginning in line 
    2:

            This responsibility shall include the acquisition of 
        proprietary information, by purchase, donation, or from another 
        Federal agency.

        So if information is obtained from another Federal agency, and 
    that Federal agency has obtained such by compulsory process, such 
    purports to say that such information, wherever it may appear, is 
    excluded from the effect of the Freedom of Information Act. The 
    Freedom of Information Act provides that each agency in accordance 
    with published rules shall make available for public inspection and 
    copying any information of the type described here which appears in 
    a final opinion or statement of policy on administrative staff 
    manual or instructions to staff, et cetera. If that information has 
    ultimately found its way to ERDA, it becomes such information, and 
    under the terms of the amendment would, thus, be insulated from the 
    Freedom of Information Act wherever it might appear. That, I think, 
    clearly alters the Freedom of Information Act which specifically 
    states in its last clause that the exceptions to the Freedom of 
    Infor

[[Page 12246]]

    mation Act do not authorize withholding of information or limit the 
    availability of records to the public except as specifically stated 
    in this section.
        This adds another exception, and that is the exception of 
    information that has passed into the hands of ERDA.
        If the language is ambiguous, or if it is reasonably subject to 
    more than one construction, and if a reasonable construction of the 
    language alters another act, then it is the burden of the person 
    offering the amendment to clarify the amendment to make absolutely 
    certain that the amendment does not affect the other act.
        The gentleman has not done so. The language is, therefore, 
    subject reasonably to the construction of changing processes of 
    other agencies and is, therefore, not germane.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on this rather 
    difficult question which confronts the committee at this time.
        The burden of sustaining the ger-maneness of the amendment lies 
    with the author. In the opinion of the Chair, the author of the 
    amendment has not sustained that burden, and it does appear to the 
    Chair that the amendment as presently offered would possibly mean 
    that this restriction on the information would apply wherever the 
    information might reside not just within ERDA. The amendment is, 
    therefore, ambiguous and could be construed to go beyond the scope 
    of the bill before the committee at this time.
        The point of order is sustained.

In Ruling on Germaneness, the Chair Relies on the Text of the Amendment

Sec. 8.2 In ruling on the ger-maneness of an amendment, the Chair 
    confines his analysis to its text and should not be guided by 
    conjecture as to other legislation and administrative actions, 
    within the jurisdiction of other committees, which might but are 
    not required to result from adoption of the amendment.

    On July 27, 1977,(10) the Committee of the Whole had 
under consideration the bill H.R. 7171, the Agricultural Act of 1977. 
An amendment was offered by Mr. Jeffords dealing with the recovery of 
excess food stamp benefits paid to persons whose income exceeded 
certain minimum requirements. During the argument on a point, Mr. 
Stark, a member of the Committee on Ways and Means, argued that the 
administration of the amendment would fall on the Internal Revenue 
Service, within the jurisdiction of his Committee. A portion of the 
argument on the germaneness point of order and

[[Page 12247]]

the Chair's response are indicated below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 123 Cong. Rec. 25249, 25252, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James M.] Jeffords [of Vermont]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Jeffords to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Foley:
            In title XIII, page 28, insert after line 8 the following 
        new section:

        ``recovery of benefits where individual's adjusted gross income 
                      for year exceeds twice poverty level

            ``Sec. 1210. (a)(1) If--
            ``(A) any individual receives food stamps during any 
        calendar year after 1977, and
            ``(B) such individual's adjusted gross income for such 
        calendar year exceeds the exempt amount,

    then such individual shall be liable to pay the United States the 
    amount determined under subsection (b) with respect to such 
    individual for such calendar year. Such amount shall be due and 
    payable on April 15 of the succeeding calendar year and shall be 
    collected in accordance with the procedures prescribed pursuant to 
    subsection (g). . . .

            ``(2) In the case of any individual whose taxable year is 
        not a calendar year, this section shall be applied under 
        regulations prescribed by the Secretary.
            ``(f) All funds recovered pursuant to the provisions of 
        this section shall be deposited as miscellaneous receipts of 
        the Treasury and shall be available to the Secretary of the 
        Treasury to defray administrative costs incurred in carrying 
        out the provisions of this section and shall be available to 
        the Secretary of Agriculture to carry out the provisions of 
        this Act in such amounts as may be specified in appropriation 
        Acts.
            ``(g) The Secretary of the Treasury shall collect any 
        liability imposed by this section in accordance with 
        regulations prescribed by him (after consultation with the 
        Secretary).
            ``(h) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affect 
        . . . the application of any provision of the Internal Revenue 
        Code of 1954.'' . . .

        The Chairman: (11) Does the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Stark) insist on his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Frank E. Evans (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Fortney Hl (Pete)] Stark [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order. I would like to engage the author of the 
    amendment in colloquy.
        Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Jeffords: I yield to the gentleman from California.
        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the distinguished 
    gentleman from Vermont who or what branch of Government the 
    gentleman feels would collect this money from the people?
        Mr. Jeffords: Under the amendment, the Department of the 
    Treasury would be required to collect the money.
        Mr. Stark: It would be the Treasury Department and in no way 
    did the gentleman intend that the Internal Revenue Service 
    participate in any of the collection or in collecting the forms or 
    collecting revenue?
        Mr. Jeffords: No, on the contrary, it is my understanding and 
    belief that the Internal Revenue Service would be charged with and 
    do the collecting.

[[Page 12248]]

        Mr. Stark: They would do the collecting?
        Mr. Jeffords: Yes, that is correct.
        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I would press my point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the point of order.
        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the 
    jurisdiction of the Internal Revenue Service lies wholly within the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means.
        This amendment, as the gentleman has stated it, would be 
    counting on the Internal Revenue Service to perform the functions 
    as put down under this amendment. The amendment would not be in 
    order and would not be within the jurisdiction of this committee.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Vermont wish to be heard?
        Mr. Jeffords: I certainly do, Mr. Chairman.
        As I understand the rules here, I can ask for an amendment that 
    can be proposed, as can anybody, to the collection. We could make 
    the State Department or anyone else do the collection, but we 
    cannot do what I have not done, and very specifically have not done 
    in this amendment, which is to change any statute of the way it is 
    done, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and 
    Means. If I am wrong on this, there are so many places in this bill 
    where the same thing is done that I do not know why a number of 
    Members have not raised points of order.
        We have asked the Postal Service to do something; we have asked 
    the social security office to do things; we have mandated different 
    agencies all over the place. We do not interfere with any statutes 
    which are under committee jurisdiction of other committees. I have 
    not done so here. The question is, do we change any statute which 
    is under the jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee, and we 
    do not. They are the guardian over those statutes, but they are not 
    the guardian over any agency which happens to be involved with 
    those statutes.
        Mr. Stark: Mr. Chairman, I think it is quite clear that the 
    gentleman, in terms of both the committee report and in his 
    response to questions here, in his statement on the floor that this 
    amendment, although it really says that the Secretary of the 
    Treasury shall collect any liability, clearly the intention is that 
    the Internal Revenue Service shall collect W-2 forms, match them 
    against income figures which are now under the law not to be given 
    even to the Secretary of the Treasury, but are for collecting 
    income tax and Internal Revenue matters.
        Clearly, the intent of the amendment is to direct the Internal 
    Revenue Service to participate in that. The jurisdiction of the 
    Internal Revenue Service and all matters pertaining thereto is 
    under the Committee on Ways and Means. I would ask that this 
    amendment be ruled out of order on that basis.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from California makes the point of order that the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. Jeffords) is 
    not germane to the food stamp title of the pending bill. The thrust 
    of the gentleman's point of order is that the collection procedure 
    for overpayments of

[[Page 12249]]

    food stamp benefits to persons above the poverty level involves 
    responsibilities of the Treasury Department, and in effect mandates 
    the establishment of regulations which would involve the disclosure 
    of tax returns and tax information and utilization of the Internal 
    Revenue Service--all matters within the jurisdiction of the 
    Committee on Ways and Means.
        The Chair notes that the amend-ment does contain the provision 
    that ``nothing in this section shall be construed to affect in any 
    manner the application of any provision of the Internal Revenue 
    Code of 1954,'' and it seems to the Chair to follow that, under the 
    explicit provisions of the amendment. Secretary of the Treasury 
    would therefore have to establish an independent collection 
    procedure separate and apart from the mandated use of the Internal 
    Revenue Service. The Chair does not have to judge the germaneness 
    of the amendment by contemplating possible future legislative 
    actions of the Congress not mandated by the amendment.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the authority of the Secretary of 
    the Treasury under the rules of the House as collector of 
    overpayments of any sort is not subject explicitly and exclusively 
    within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means under 
    rule X, and even if this were true, committee jurisdiction is not 
    an exclusive test of germaneness where, as here, the basic thrust 
    of the amendment is to modify the food stamp program--a matter now 
    before the Committee of the Whole.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.

Burden of Proof on Whether Amendment Is Germane

Sec. 8.3 The burden of proof is on the proponent of an amendment to 
    establish that it is germane, and where the proponent admits to an 
    interpretation which would render it not germane, the Chair will 
    rule it out of order.

    Argument on a point of order sometimes determines whether a point 
of order will be sustained or overruled by the Chair. An example of the 
Chair's reliance on an explanation of an amendment offered by its 
proponent is found in the proceedings of Dec. 11, 1979,(12) 
when the Committee of the Whole had under consideration the bill H.R. 
4962, a bill providing Medicare services to low-income children and 
pregnant women. A pertinent part of the bill text follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 125 Cong. Rec. 35425, 35438, 35439, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

       study and report on effectiveness of health assurance program

            Sec. 14. (a)(1) The Secretary shall conduct or arrange 
        (through grants or contracts) for the conduct of an ongoing 
        study of the effectiveness of the child health assurance 
        program under section 1913 of the Social Security Act. Not 
        later than two years after the effective date prescribed by 
        section 16(a)(1) and each two years thereafter, the Secretary 
        shall report

[[Page 12250]]

        to Congress the results of the study and include in the report 
        (1) the effect of preventive and primary care services on the 
        health status of individuals under the age of 21 assessed under 
        such program, (2) the incidence of the various disorders 
        identified in assessments conducted under the program, and (3) 
        the costs of identifying, in such program, such disorders.
            (2) The authority of the Secretary to enter into contracts 
        under paragraph (1) shall be effective for any fiscal year only 
        to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in advance in 
        appropriations Acts.
            (b) For the fiscal year ending September 30, 1981, and for 
        each fiscal year thereafter there are authorized to be 
        appropriated for purposes of carrying out subsection (a) an 
        amount equal to one-eighth of 1 percent of the amount 
        appropriated in the preceding fiscal year for payments to 
        States under title XIX of the Social Security Act for the 
        provision of ambulatory services for individuals under the age 
        of 21 . . . 

                  amendment offered by mr. philip m. crane

        Mr. Philip M. Crane [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Philip M. Crane: On page 38, 
        following line 15, insert the following new subsection:
            (2)(a) No officer, employee, or agent of the Federal 
        Government or of an organization conducting medical reviews for 
        purposes of carrying out the study provided for in subsection 
        (a)(1) of this section shall inspect (or have access to) any 
        part of an individually identifiable medical record (as 
        described in subsection (c)) of a patient which relates to 
        medical care not provided directly by the Federal Government or 
        paid for (in whole or in part) under a Federal program or under 
        a program receiving Federal financial assistance, unless the 
        patient has authorized such disclosure and inspection in 
        accordance with subsection (b).
            (b) A patient authorizes disclosure and inspection of a 
        medical record for purposes of subsection (a) only if, in a 
        signed and dated statement, he--
            (1) authorizes the disclosure and inspection for a specific 
        period of time;
            (2) identifies the medical record authorized to be 
        disclosed and inspected; and
            (3) specifies the agencies which may inspect the record and 
        to which the record may be disclosed.
            (c) For purposes of this section:
            (1) The term ``individually identifiable medical record'' 
        means a medical, psychiatric, or dental record concerning an 
        individual that is in a form which either identifies the 
        individual or permits identification of the individual through 
        means (whether direct or indirect) available to the public.
            (2) The term ``medical care'' includes preventive and 
        primary medical, psychiatric, and dental assessments, care and 
        treatment.

        Mr. [Henry A.] Waxman [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order on the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: (13) Does the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Waxman) insist upon his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Bruce F. Vento (Minn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Waxman: I would like a clarification, Mr. Chairman, if I 
    might, before I pursue whether I have a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California reserves his point 
    of order, and the gentleman is recognized for his remaining time 
    under the allocation.

[[Page 12251]]

        Mr. Waxman: I would like to make an inquiry of the gentleman 
    from Illinois (Mr. Philip M. Crane) who has offered the amendment, 
    if I might. The section (2)(a) on page 38 following line 15 as it 
    would be inserted by this amendment says:

            No officer, employee, or agent of the Federal Government or 
        of an organization conducting medical reviews for purposes of 
        carrying out the study provided for in subsection (a)(1) of 
        this section shall inspect (or have access to). . . .

        Is this a parenthetical clause: ``Or of an organization 
    conducting medical reviews for purposes of carrying out the study 
    provided for,'' or are we also referring only to the officers, 
    employees, or agents of the Federal Government who are conducting 
    medical reviews for purposes of carrying out the study?
        Mr. Philip M. Crane: If the gentleman will yield, the reason 
    for the seeming redundancy of language was to guarantee that there 
    would not be any commission or what I would classify as an agent, 
    but which might be open to some debate, or group of private 
    individuals performing a function under the auspices of the Federal 
    Government. I would define that as an agent and, therefore, that 
    language would be, then, redundant to that extent. My concern is 
    quibbling over fine points of definitions, and to the extent that 
    there is a potential here for some private group with the full 
    authority of the Federal Government to conduct these kinds of 
    studies, I want to make sure that those do not in any way have the 
    possibility of falling into the hands of Government officials 
    without the written consent of the patient involved.
        Mr. Waxman: If I might further inquire, is it fair to say that 
    the limitation, ``No officer, employee, or agent of the Federal 
    Government'' pertains specifically to the carrying out of the study 
    provided for in subsection (a)(1)? Is it specifically addressed to 
    carrying out that study?
        Mr. Philip M. Crane: In the process of carrying out the study, 
    my understanding is there is a potential for examination, 
    obviously, of medical records, and to the extent there is, then I 
    think if they are identifiable medical records, the potential 
    exists for those to come into the hands of Government officials 
    unbeknownst to the patient.
        Mr. Waxman: But I am trying to ascertain whether it is limited 
    to carrying out the study provided for in subsection (a)(1) and the 
    medical records are viewed only for the purpose of carrying out 
    that study.
        Mr. Philip M. Crane: Does the gentleman mean is it confined to 
    that?
        Mr. Waxman: Yes.
        Mr. Philip M. Crane: No, it is not. That would not be my 
    understanding of the amendment.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Waxman) 
    insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Chairman, I am going to pursue my point of 
    order, then.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Chairman, as I read this section without the 
    limitation that I tried to determine was included there, I believe 
    it is overly broad and, therefore, not germane, and I make a point 
    of order of the fact that it is not germane to the bill before us.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Philip M. 
    Crane) wish to be heard on the point of order?

[[Page 12252]]

        Mr. Philip M. Crane: I do, Mr. Chairman. I think it is, indeed, 
    germane because, Mr. Chairman, the language of the amendment, I 
    think, addresses the specific narrow concern that the Chairman has 
    upon which he bases his point of order, but, on the other hand, 
    there are implications in the language of the bill that I think 
    this additional language in this paragraph addresses, and that is 
    the potential to go beyond those narrow constraints that I think 
    the gentleman, the Chairman, would presume exist within this 
    legislation.
        I am less sure and less confident that those restraints are 
    there. I would argue that the specificity of the first part of this 
    sentence that ``No officer, employee, or agent of the Federal 
    Government or of an organization conducting medical reviews for 
    purposes of carrying out the study provided for in'' that 
    subsection indicated is language narrow enough to be germane to the 
    intent of the bill.
        The Chairman: Are there further Members who wish to be heard on 
    the point of order? If not, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair, in listening to and weighing the arguments, finds 
    that the point of order is well taken. The argument seems to 
    establish that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois 
    (Mr. Philip M. Crane) could go to confidentiality of other medical 
    records that would not otherwise be covered by the pending 
    legislation and as such represents, then, too broad an amendment. 
    The records could deal with additional information that would 
    usually be under the confidentiality of physician-and-patient 
    relationship, that would be outside the services rendered through 
    this program if the conduct of Federal officers is not to be 
    confined to the carrying out of the study in section 14. Therefore, 
    the Chair states that the point of order is well taken.
        Mr. Philip M. Crane: Mr. Chairman, may I direct a question to 
    the chairman of the committee?
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained. The amendment is 
    ruled out of order.

Burden of Proof, Point of Order Against Content of Bill

Sec. 8.4 The burden falls on the proponents of a provision in a general 
    appropriation bill to show that it does not constitute legislation, 
    and the Chair will sustain the point of order if the committee or 
    other Members do not fulfill this responsibility.

    During debate under the five-minute rule during consideration of 
the Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare appropriation bill for 
fiscal 1978, a provision in the bill was read by the Clerk, and a point 
of order was then raised against the proviso carried in the paragraph. 
The point of order was raised by a member of the Committee on Ways and 
Means, Mr. James C. Corman, of California, who argued that the proviso 
created new and additional duties for officials administering the 
welfare programs

[[Page 12253]]

funded in the paragraph. The rather elaborate arguments for and against 
the point of order illustrate the complexities which sometimes confront 
the Chair in determining the effect of a so-called ``limitation'' in a 
general appropriation bill. The proceedings of June 16, 
1977,(14) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 123 Cong. Rec. 19362-64, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

          grants to states for unemployment insurance and employment 
                                    services

            For grants for activities authorized by the Act of June 6, 
        1933, as amended (29 U.S.C. 49-49n; 39 U.S.C. 3202(a)(1)(E); 
        Veterans' Employment and Readjustment Act of 1972, as amended 
        (38 U.S.C. 2001-2013); title III of the Social Security Act, as 
        amended (42 U.S.C. 501-503); sections 312 (e) and (g) of the 
        Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, as amended; 
        and necessary administrative expenses for carrying out 5 U.S.C. 
        8501-8523, 19 U.S.C. 1941-1944, 1952, and chapter 2, title II, 
        of the Trade Act of 1974, including, upon the request of any 
        State, the payment of rental for space made available to such 
        State in lieu of grants for such purpose, $53,600,000, together 
        with not to exceed $1,529,000,000, which may be expended from 
        the Employment Security Administration account in the 
        Unemployment Trust Fund, and of which $174,400,000 shall be 
        available only to the extent necessary to meet increased costs 
        of administration resulting from changes in a State law or 
        increased salary costs resulting from changes in insurance 
        claims filed and claims paid or increased salary costs 
        resulting from changes in State salary compensation plans 
        embracing employees of the State generally over those upon 
        which the State's basic grant was based, which cannot be 
        provided for by normal budgetary adjustments: Provided That any 
        portion of the funds granted to a State in the current fiscal 
        year and not obligated by the State in that year shall be 
        returned to the Treasury and credited to the account from which 
        derived: Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated 
        or otherwise made available in this paragraph shall be 
        obligated or expended to pay Federally funded unemployment 
        compensation to an individual who refuses employment which pays 
        at least the prevailing wage and which meets the labor 
        standards specified in section 3304(a)(5) of the Internal 
        Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, after having received 
        unemployment compensation for 26 or more consecutive weeks, 
        unless such individual is enrolled in a training program under 
        the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, as 
        amended.

        Mr. Corman: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order.
        The Chairman: (15) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Corman: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order with respect 
    to the proviso on page 5, beginning with the words ``Provided 
    further'' on line 6 and continuing through line 16. This proviso is 
    in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI, of the Rules of the House.
        Clause 2 of rule XXI provides that no provision in an 
    appropriation bill that changes existing law will be in order.

[[Page 12254]]

        The proviso on page 5 would prohibit the use of these 
    appropriated funds for any administrative costs associated with the 
    payment of federally funded unemployment compensation benefits to 
    an individual who had refused a job paying the prevailing wage, 
    after that individual had collected 26 or more weeks of 
    unemployment compensation.
        In order to be in compliance with this proviso, unemployment 
    compensation agencies will have to either deny benefits to such 
    individuals, or pay for the administrative costs associated with 
    the payment of benefits to such individuals out of State or other 
    Federal funds. Either alternative will impose new duties and 
    require additional determinations, not required under present 
    Federal law, on the part of the administrators of the unemployment 
    compensation program.
        Specifically, both of these alternatives would require the 
    administering agency, with regard to every claimant who had 
    collected 26 or more weeks of unemployment compensation, to 
    determine whether or not the individual had refused a job paying 
    prevailing wages. This determination would have to be made either 
    for the purpose of denying benefits to such individuals or to 
    identify that portion of a State's administrative costs that could 
    not be paid out of Federal funds provided in this appropriation 
    bill.
        Such a determination is not required under present Federal law. 
    This proviso changes present law in that it requires this new and 
    costly determination on the part of UC administrators. Furthermore, 
    there are no funds provided to cover the costs associated with this 
    additional determination and responsibility.
        It has been argued that this proviso requires no new duties or 
    determinations beyond those required under section 3304(a)(5) of 
    the Internal Revenue Code. This argument is incorrect.
        Section 3304(A)(5) prohibits a State from denying benefits to 
    an individual who has refused a job that pays less than prevailing 
    wages. This section of present law, in other words, prohibits a 
    State from taking certain actions. It does not require a State to 
    do anything, unless a claimant appeals a prior State action. In 
    fact, a State can comply with this section of present law by never 
    denying UC benefits to anyone on grounds of a refusal to accept 
    work.
        The proviso on page 5 of the appropriation bill before us is 
    just the reverse. It requires unemployment compensation 
    administrators to make certain determinations and take certain 
    actions based on those determinations. Specifically, for every 
    claimant who has collected 26 or more weeks of UC benefits, the 
    administrator must determine whether or not he has refused any job 
    that paid prevailing wages, and, if so, the administrator must 
    either deny him any additional benefits or recover costs associated 
    with the processing and payments of additional benefits from a new 
    source of funds.
        Furthermore, the proviso is in conflict with the work 
    requirement provisions of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
    Act of 1977, Public Law 95-19, as it applies to individuals who 
    apply for or are collecting Federal supplemental benefits. This 
    law, enacted in April of this year, prohibits the payment of 
    Federal supplemental benefits to an individual who refuses a job, 
    if the job:

[[Page 12255]]

        Is within his capabilities;
        Pays the minimum wage and gross wages equal to the individual's 
    unemployment benefits, including any supplemental unemployment 
    benefits for which the individual is entitled because of agreements 
    with previous employers;
        Is offered in writing or listed with the employment service;
        Meets other requirements of Federal and State law pertaining to 
    suitable or disqualifying work that are not inconsistent with the 
    three conditions just stated.
        The effect of the proviso would be that, in the 20 States where 
    Federal supplemental benefits are presently being paid, there will 
    be two different and inconsistent Federal work requirements for 
    claimants of Federal supplemental benefits who have collected 26 or 
    more weeks of benefits.
        Present Federal law pertaining to the Federal supplemental 
    benefits program denies supplemental benefits to an individual who 
    refuses a job paying the minimum wage, and provides a number of 
    carefully worked out conditions, protections, and procedures 
    necessary for the proper and effective administration of this kind 
    of a Federal standard. Whereas, the proviso on page 5 of the bill 
    before us refers to ``prevailing'' rather than ``minimum'' wages, 
    which can be substantially different. Also the proviso would appear 
    to negate all the other conditions, procedures, and protections 
    contained in present law and carefully developed by the Committee 
    on Ways and Means. This clearly constitutes a change in present 
    Federal law pertaining to the Federal supplemental benefits 
    program.
        As I have explained, the proviso on page 5 imposes a new 
    responsibility on the part of the agencies that administer the 
    unemployment compensation program. It requires a costly 
    determination not required under present law and provides no funds 
    to cover the costs of this additional determination.
        With respect to the Federal supplemental benefits program, it 
    changes, or is in conflict with, a provision that, over a period of 
    many weeks, was very carefully formulated and specified.
        Consequently, this provision is in violation of clause 2 of 
    rule XXI of the Rules of the House.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Flood) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Daniel J.] Flood [of Pennsylvania]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        We believe that this language is simply a limitation on the use 
    of the appropriated funds in the bill. It gives no affirmative 
    direction to the executive branch, in our judgment. It imposes no 
    new or additional duties and requires no determination that would 
    not normally be made.
        Therefore, Mr. Chairman, we ask the Chair to overrule the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Michel) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Robert H.] Michel [of Illinois]: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I 
    would like to be heard on the point of order.

            Nor shall any provision in any such bill or amendment 
        thereto changing existing law be in order, . . .

        This appears to be the real question involved in the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from California (Mr.

[[Page 12256]]

    Corman). But I would like to ask the present occupant of the chair, 
    who is so well skilled in the rules and parliamentary procedures 
    and the precedents of the House, to examine the rest of that 
    clause.
        Historically this provision has been amended many times. At one 
    time the Committee on Rules could not agree as to the proper 
    position after questions arose of increased power which some said 
    would come to the Committee on Appropriations.
        I mention this for a special reason. Our appropriations process 
    has now been modified by enactment of the Budget Act and is 
    constantly challenged, as we will no doubt find during 
    consideration of the present bill. The challenge to the 
    appropriation process is currently in the form of limitation 
    amendments such as the one on this subject, and upon which the 
    Chair is constantly being called upon for a ruling as to whether it 
    is a proper limitation under this rule and the existing precedents 
    and statutes.
        Having said that, the question again is whether the language 
    does in effect change the existing law. I contend it does not 
    change existing law and does not place an additional duty upon the 
    executive officer as a result of this position. I do not believe 
    that the gentleman from California (Mr. Corman) has adequately 
    demonstrated that the language does change existing law.
        The rationale behind the precedent on the rule for limitations 
    in appropriation bills, is that this body has the right to decline 
    to appropriate for any purpose which they deem improper, although 
    that purpose may be authorized by law. Based on this premise, there 
    are many rulings that if the House has the right not to appropriate 
    funds for a specific purpose authorized by law, then it has the 
    right to appropriate for only a part of that purpose and prohibit 
    the use of money for the rest of the purpose authorized by law.

        This language, I contend, is not a change of law but rather a 
    restriction on the use of funds to pay federally funded 
    unemployment compensation to those who do not meet certain 
    qualifications.
        If the Chair will indulge us a few further moments, 
    specifically, as the chairman of the subcommittee, the gentleman 
    from Pennsylvania (Mr. Flood) has said, the language is simply a 
    limitation. It was written as such. It is limited to the funds 
    appropriated in this bill. It does not change existing law. It is 
    very similar in nature to the Findley OSHA limitation 3 years ago 
    and to the OSHA and busing limitations we considered in connection 
    with the Labor-HEW bill last year, all of which were subject to 
    points of order and overruled then by the Chair.
        This limitation, like the others, is simply a negative 
    restriction on the moneys contained in this bill.
        As to those supposedly additional duties imposed upon the 
    executive branch that my friend the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Corman) alludes to, let me say:
        Prevailing wages are already determined by the Labor 
    Department. They are determined under Davis-Bacon for construction 
    jobs, under the Service Contracts Act for jobs involved in such 
    contracts, as part of the certification process for the employment 
    of aliens, and for in-season agricultural jobs. In

[[Page 12257]]

    addition, and most importantly, when an employer lists a job with 
    the Employment Service, the Employment Service must determine 
    whether or not the wages paid are ``substandard.'' The Employment 
    Service considers standard wages as prevailing wages and 
    substandard wages are thus those wages falling below prevailing 
    wages. If substandard wages are paid, the job listing is so 
    designated, and the Employment Service does not refer applicants to 
    such jobs.
        We can refer further for authority to the employment security 
    manual on that item. Furthermore, under the requirements of the 
    Federal Unemployment Tax Act, an individual cannot be recruited for 
    employment, and unemployment benefits cannot be denied to an 
    individual who refuses to accept work, ``if the wages, hours, or 
    other conditions of the work offered are substantially less 
    favorable to the individual than those prevailing for similar work 
    in the locality.''
        On that we have authority again from the head, Mr. Weatherford, 
    of the Unemployment Compensation Office in the Department of Labor. 
    Both of these last two standards, in other words, require the 
    Employment Service to determine the prevailing wage in order to 
    carry out the standards, and this is being done. Under regulations 
    prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, individuals receiving 
    unemployment benefits are required to register with the Employment 
    Service. The limitations in the bill thus apply to individuals 
    registered with the Employment Service and jobs listed with the 
    Employment Service. Since a determination of the prevailing wage is 
    made for the jobs listed and to which individuals are referred, 
    there will be no extra effort required on the part of the 
    Department then to carry out the limitation language.
        Let me address myself now to the 26 weeks the gentleman 
    referred to. The limitation does not apply to any benefits until 
    after an individual has received benefits for 26 weeks. The 
    Unemployment Insurance Office keeps track of how long each 
    individual has received benefits. In addition, when a recipient of 
    unemployment benefits registers with the Employment Service, the 
    Unemployment Insurance Office tells the Employment Service the date 
    when the individual started receiving benefits. So the information 
    as to the length of time benefits have been received and, thus, the 
    point when 26 weeks have passed is readily available and will not 
    require any extra effort.
        As to when the Federal benefits begin, after the State has 
    concluded its obligation or there is a shared benefit, the 
    Unemployment Insurance Office retains separate accounts for 
    benefits paid by different sources of funds, so that when there is 
    a change in the source of funding for an individual's benefits such 
    as after 26 weeks when the Federal Government in most cases pays 
    half, a new bookkeeping transaction takes place. It is a simple 
    matter for the unemployment insurance arm to notify the Employment 
    Service arm of this without any increased effort, since both are 
    part of the same State employment security agency and most of the 
    time are located in the same suite or facility around the country.
        I think there are some other specific points to which we might 
    make ref

[[Page 12258]]

    erence, but I think that pretty well ought to give the Chair good 
    grounds upon which he could overrule the point of order raised by 
    the gentleman from California.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Corman) 
    desire to be heard further?
        Mr. Corman: I would like to be heard for just a moment. There 
    seems to be some confusion in some minds about how unemployment 
    compensation works. The first 26 weeks is not necessarily the State 
    program. The first half of one's entitlement is that. We have just 
    spelled out in substantial detail the work requirements under FSB. 
    About 25 percent of those who draw FSB draw it within the first 26 
    weeks in which they work. After that period of time we would have 
    legislated to separate inconsistent work requirements, and that is 
    clearly legislation on an appropriation bill. It would be next to 
    impossible for an administrator to administer because the job 
    requirements would be inconsistent.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California has made a very 
    scholarly and thorough point of order, and he has received a very 
    scholarly and thorough reply. This is a very complicated matter and 
    a difficult one for the Chair to rule on.
        The Chair feels that the crux of the matter lies in whether or 
    not the Federal officials who now process unemployment compensation 
    claims are presently required to make a judgment with regard to the 
    refusal of work paying the prevailing wage.
        The Chair does not believe that the arguments on either side 
    have done anything to demonstrate that this would not be an 
    additional duty for those particular officials. Therefore the Chair 
    feels that on this ground and some that he would like to read the 
    point of order is valid and the Chair will sustain the point of 
    order at the conclusion of his statement.
        The gentleman from California makes a point of order against 
    the proviso in the bill on the grounds that it constitutes 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The proviso prohibits the use of funds in the bill for 
    processing of unemployment compensation benefits after 26 weeks to 
    individuals refusing work which pays the prevailing wage. As 
    indicated by the argument of the gentleman from California, the 
    executive officials administering the program are not under a 
    responsibility as they process claims pursuant to existing Federal 
    law, to make case-by-case determinations as to the prevailing wage 
    for positions of employment. The proviso in the bill would place 
    affirmative duties on persons whose salaries are paid by funds in 
    this bill to make such determinations.
        Despite the excellence of the argument of the gentleman from 
    Illinois, the Chair still feels that the weight of the argument 
    lies on the side of the gentleman from California, and therefore 
    the Chair, for those reasons and the reasons that he has suggested, 
    sustains the point of order and the proviso is stricken.

Burden of Proof That Appropriation Authorized

Sec. 8.5 The burden of proving that an item carried in a gen

[[Page 12259]]

    eral appropriation bill is in fact authorized by law falls to the 
    Committee on Appropriations, which must cite specific authority for 
    the appropriation.

    On Aug. 3, 1978,(16) during consideration of the Foreign 
Aid Appropriation bill for fiscal 1979, an item was read allowing 
certain funds in the bill to be used for entertaining expenses. When an 
amendment was raised against the paragraph as legislation, the manager 
of the bill responded in an imprecise manner. The proceedings were as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 124 Cong. Rec. 24252, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 111. Of the funds appropriated or made available 
        pursuant to this Act, not to exceed $73,900 shall be for 
        entertainment expenses relating to the Military Assistance 
        Program, International Military Education and Training, and 
        Foreign Military Credit Sales during fiscal year 1979: 
        Provided, That appropriate steps shall be taken to assure that, 
        to the maximum extent possible, United States-owned foreign 
        currencies are utilized in lieu of dollars.

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Abraham Kazan, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    total section 111 on the grounds it is not authorized in law and 
    lines 17 through 19 constitute legislation on an appropriation 
    bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Long) 
    desire to speak to the point of order?
        Mr. [Clarence D.] Long of Maryland: Mr. Chairman, I oppose the 
    point of order being made by the gentleman.
        The language the gentleman refers to is not legislation in that 
    it does not direct nor does it require a U.S. Government official 
    to use U.S.-owned foreign currencies. It merely states that steps 
    should be taken, where possible, to utilize U.S.-owned foreign 
    currencies in lieu of dollars.
        In addition, in section 612(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
    1961, as amended, which is the paragraph that authorizes the use of 
    foreign currencies, the following language appears:

            The President shall take all appropriate steps to assure 
        that, to the maximum extent possible, United States-owned 
        foreign currencies are utilized in lieu of dollars.

        Therefore, the language the gentleman is raising a point of 
    order against is merely a restatement of the language contained in 
    the authorizing legislation and does not constitute legislation in 
    an appropriation bill. I ask for a ruling by the Chair.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) 
    desire to be heard further on the point of order?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, the language of section 111 goes well 
    beyond assigning duties by the President and assumes by its proviso 
    that the duties are assigned to anyone that

[[Page 12260]]

    might have the appropriate authority and that certainly goes beyond 
    the scope which the gentleman has cited as legislative authority 
    for that amount of money, which is entertainment expenses.
        The Chairman: The Chair feels that the question of 
    authorization may be a valid point of order. The Chair will call on 
    the chairman of the committee to show that this sum is authorized. 
    Can the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Long) make such a showing?
        Mr. Long of Maryland: Mr. Chairman, we have no specific 
    authorization, merely citations.
        The Chairman: The Chair then will sustain the point of order 
    and the entire section is stricken.

Sec. 8.6 A Member wishing to make a point of order against a pending 
    paragraph of a bill being read for amendment must specify the 
    precise text to which he objects, and a generalized point of order 
    against ``anything in the paragraph which is not authorized'' will 
    not be entertained by the Chair.

    On June 7, 1991,(18) during the consideration in 
Committee of the Whole of the Defense appropriation bill for fiscal 
1992, the bill manager, Mr. John P. Murtha, of Pennsylvania, asked that 
the title of ``Operation and Maintenance'' be considered read and open 
for amendment. Following agreement to this request, the Chairman 
invited points of order. Mr. James A. Traficant, Jr., of Ohio, then 
raised a generalized inquiry as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 137 Cong. Rec. 13973-76, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                      TITLE II--OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

                        Operation and Maintenance, Army

                         (including transfer of funds)

            For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the 
        operation and maintenance of the Army, as authorized by law; 
        and not to exceed $14,437,000 can be used for emergencies and 
        extraordinary expenses, to be expended on the approval or 
        authority of the Secretary of the Army, and payments may be 
        made on his certificate of necessity for confidential military 
        purposes; $18,-362,945,000: . . .

                        Operation and Maintenance, Navy

            For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the 
        operation and maintenance of the Navy and the Marine Corps, as 
        authorized by law; . . .

                    Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps

            For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the 
        opera-tion and maintenance of the Marine Corps, as authorized 
        by law; $2,082,500,000; . . .

                      Operation and Maintenance, Air Force

            For expenses, not otherwise provided for, necessary for the 
        operation and maintenance of the Air Force, as authorized by 
        law; . . .

[[Page 12261]]

        Mr. Murtha (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that title II be considered as read, printed in the Record, 
    and open to amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: (19) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. James L. Oberstar (Minn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. I 
    would like to inquire of the Chairman if it is in order to ask if 
    there is any legislating on this section of the bill that has not 
    been, in fact, waived from such legislating or allowed to legislate 
    by the Rules Committee. I would then be forced to object to any 
    legislating language that is appropriating in title II of the bill.
        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, the only 
    thing that it protected in the language is the normal appropriation 
    paragraph protection that we afford to the bill or to parts of the 
    bill when there is no final authorization. . . .
        Mr. Traficant: Further reserving my right to object, I am not 
    so sure I have an answer. I want to know if there is any 
    legislation in title II that has not been specifically protected 
    from objection on the floor.
        Mr. Murtha: Sure.
        Mr. Traficant: If there are some that have not been protected 
    by the Rules Committee, then I will object to any section of title 
    II that is not officially protected by the Rules Committee as in 
    fact legislating on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman from Ohio 
    that the gentleman must be specific as to the provisions against 
    which he makes points of order.
        Mr. Traficant: Is the Chair instructing the Member that a 
    Member cannot request a blanket prohibition of legislation on an 
    appropriation bill in title II of the defense bill?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. The Chair is advising 
    the gentleman that a point of order may be made but it must specify 
    the provision of the bill against which it is made.
        Mr. Traficant: The specificity is, in fact, that any part of 
    the legislation that has not been in fact protected from objection 
    and to be stricken by the Rules Committee.
        The Chairman: The Chair would restate for the gentleman from 
    Ohio that he must specify the provisions in the bill to which he 
    objects and on which he wishes to make a point of order.
        Mr. Traficant: So the Chair then has ruled that a Member must 
    be specific in stating what legislative language there is?
        The Chairman: Those are the rules of the House. The gentleman 
    may not enter a general objection to ``such legislation as may be 
    unprotected by waiver.'' His point of order must identify text and 
    articulate grounds.
        Mr. Traficant: That he cannot ask for a specific blanket 
    objection for all legislative language on an appropriation bill 
    that has not been protected under the rule? Is that what the 
    Chair's ruling is?
        The Chairman: The Chair will elaborate further for the 
    gentleman.
        The Chair cannot accept the gentleman's assumption that 
    language may

[[Page 12262]]

    be objectionable merely because there is not a waiver provided for 
    it. That is why the practice and precedents of the House require 
    that such points of order be specific.
        Mr. Traficant: Would it be in order then, Mr. Chairman, for the 
    gentleman to read each section of title II and object to them 
    officially and to, in fact, reserve the right to object on each 
    specific section for, in fact, legislating on an appropriation 
    bill?
        The Chairman: If the gentleman objects to opening this title, 
    then the Clerk will read by paragraph. . . .
        Mr. Murtha: This is the operation and maintenance title for the 
    entire armed services. This title provides the training money for 
    the services that you are deleting. This is training money and 
    operation and maintenance money for the services.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I certainly would like to have a 
    Buy American in that section. . . .
        The Chairman: Is there objection to opening up title II of the 
    bill?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against title II?

                              points of order

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I bring a point of order against 
    title II of the bill on page 9, line 10, Operation and Maintenance 
    of the Navy, for language which is, in fact, specifically 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman restate his point of order? 
    The gentleman makes a point of order against which line?
        Mr. Traficant: Reserving my right to further object, on page 9, 
    line 10, the section under title II, Operation and Maintenance, 
    Navy, that, in fact, that section from page 9, line 10, through, in 
    fact, page 10, line 17, constitutes legislating on an appropriation 
    bill. I say it should be stricken unless specifically protected by 
    the rule.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that the text 
    from page 9, line 10 through the first portion of page 9, line 23 
    is protected under the rule. The balance, beginning with ``Provided 
    further'' on line 23 through line 17 on page 10 is not protected.
        Mr. Traficant: The gentleman then officially objects to title 
    II, starting on page 9, line 23, through and continuously through 
    page 10, line 17, for, in fact, being legislating on an 
    appropriation bill that has not passed through an authorizing 
    committee, and it should be stricken.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Murtha] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Murtha: We concede it is legislation. However, we want the 
    gentleman to know that he is very seriously harming the defense of 
    this country by making these deletions which he admits himself he 
    is not aware of the impact that they are having on the bill. . . . 
    But I have to concede the point of order. If you want to knock it 
    out, it would be knocked out under the point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio will refrain from 
    debating the merits of the bill on his point of order.
        The Chair wishes to advise, again, that the point of order is 
    made against the two provisos, one beginning on line 23, on page 9, 
    and the other beginning on line 11 on page 10.

[[Page 12263]]

        The gentleman from Pennsylvania has conceded the point of 
    order. Accordingly, the two provisos are stricken. . . .
        Mr. Traficant: The point of order is legislating on an 
    appropriation bill, page 11, line 1, through line 11, of the 
    section of Operation, Maintenance, Marine Corps, and I ask that it 
    be stricken for legislating on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is advised that on page 11, only 
    lines 1 through 8, after ``September 1, 1992,'' are unprotected.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I move that language be stricken.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I would like an answer on this.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has made his point of order. The 
    Chair has inquired of the chairman of the committee whether he 
    wishes to be heard on the point of order.
        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I concede the point of order. . . .
        I agree with what the gentleman is trying to do, but what the 
    gentleman is doing here is decimating things under the normal 
    procedure that are important to the defense of this country.
        Mr. Traficant: Continuing my point of order, Mr. Chairman, and 
    to respond----
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear argument on the point of 
    order, not on collateral issues.
        Mr. Traficant: Continuing on my point of order, Mr. Chairman, 
    this gentleman is not here on any ego trip. I think the procedures 
    of the House have finally brought us to this.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Traficant: I insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The point of order has been conceded and is 
    sustained, and accordingly, the language on line 1 of page 11 
    beginning with ``Provided further,'' through line 8, concluding 
    with ``decision:'' is stricken.
        Are there other points of order against the provisions of title 
    II?

Burden of Proof Where Point of Order Is Made Against ``Legislation'' in 
    a General Appropriation Bill

Sec. 8.7 The proponent of an amendment to a general appropriation bill 
    has the burden of refuting a point of order accompanied by argument 
    that the amendment-although phrased as a limitation on funds-
    changes existing law, and the Chair will sustain the point of order 
    where the proponent of the amendment does not cite law or precedent 
    supporting her position.

    On July 17, 1975,(20) during consideration of the 
Treasury, Postal Service and general government appropriations for 
fiscal 1976, an amendment was offered in the form of a limitation on 
funds in

[[Page 12264]]

the bill. The chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office 
Appropriations, Mr. Tom Steed, of Oklahoma, who was managing the bill, 
raised a point of order that the limitation in fact interfered with the 
discretionary authority of the Postal Rate Commission. The proponent of 
the amendment declined to be heard on the point of order, and the Chair 
then ruled based on the argument presented by Mr. Steed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 121 Cong. Rec. 23239, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Millicent] Fenwick [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mrs. Fenwick: Add a new section 613 on 
        page 45, line 21: ``None of the funds appropriated under this 
        Act shall be available to permit Parcel Post to be handled at 
        less than its attributable cost.''

        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (1) The gentleman from Oklahoma 
    reserves a point of order. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. B. F. Sisk (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Oklahoma insist on his 
    point of order?
        Mr. Steed: I insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman. This 
    amendment would have the effect of changing existing law. The 
    Congress enacted the Postal Service Corporation bill and created 
    the Rate Commission and delegated to the Rate Commission the sole 
    and final authority on all postal rates. The impact of this 
    amendment would be to limit and change that postal ratemaking power 
    that is inherent in the law creating the Postal Corporation.
        If the amendment here is permitted to prevail then all sorts of 
    amendments affecting the operation of the Postal Service would be 
    applicable and the whole purpose of the Postal Service Corporation 
    law would be destroyed. So I think it is very imperative since this 
    does change the law and the powers invested in the Rate Commission 
    that we hold it is obviously legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentlewoman from New Jersey desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mrs. Fenwick: No, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Permit the Chair to direct a question to the 
    gentleman from Oklahoma.
        Is the gentleman's position such that in his opinion this 
    amounts to a change in law? Would the gentleman speak to that 
    point?
        Mr. Steed: Yes. The sole authority to determine what will be 
    charged for parcel post, whether it is more or less than cost, is 
    vested in the Postal Rate Commission and to accept this amendment 
    here would limit that authority which would change the law which 
    vests that total power in that Commission. So it would require an 
    action on the part not only of the ratemaking Commission but the 
    Postmaster General in that he does not now have to abide by this 
    sort of demand.
        The whole purpose of the corporation was to take the power to 
    do that sort of thing out of Congress and leave it in the Postal 
    Corporation for the postal rate commitment.

[[Page 12265]]

        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule. The gentleman from 
    Oklahoma makes a point of order against the amendment offered by 
    the gentlewoman from New Jersey dealing with the availability of 
    funds in connection with the matter of parcel post where the Postal 
    Service permits parcel post to be handled at less than attributable 
    costs.
        The Chair feels that the point of order made by the gentleman 
    from Oklahoma to the effect that, in essence, this changes basic 
    law, must be sustained in light of the fact that the Chair does not 
    feel that the gentlewoman from New Jersey has made a sufficient 
    case that it would be otherwise.
        Therefore, the Chair is constrained to sustain the point of 
    order.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Subsequent analysis of the law surrounding 
the responsibilities of the Postal Rate Commission (39 USC 3622 (b)(3)) 
and precedents dealing with limitation language which may curtail 
discretion suggest that a well-documented argument against the point of 
order might have been successful.
    Before the proceedings reported above there was a paucity of strong 
precedent on who has the burden of proof where an amendment is 
challenged as being legislative. But by analogy to the precedents under 
Rule XXI clause 2, requiring the committee or Member offering an 
amendment to show an authorization for a proposed appropriation, it 
seems that the proponent of an amendment should at least have the 
burden to come forward with some showing that the language offered is 
not legislative in effect.

Burden of Proof, Amendment to General Appropriation Bill

Sec. 8.8 The burden of proof is on the proponent of an amendment to a 
    general appropriation bill to show that the amendment does not have 
    the effect of changing existing law.

    On June 16, 1977,(2) Chairman Bolling, presiding in 
Committee of the Whole during the consideration of the Labor and 
Health, Education, and Welfare appropriation bill for fiscal 1978, 
having ruled out a proviso in the bill as legislative in effect, was 
faced with an amendment which addressed the same issue but with a 
modified approach. Again, the burden of proof was on the advocates of 
the amendment and the Chair ruled that the burden was not met.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 123 Cong. Rec. 19364, 19365, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        MR. [Robert H.] Michel [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (3) The Chair feels that under the 
    circumstances he must recognize the gentleman from Illinois.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Richard Bolling (Mo.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12266]]

        The Clerk will report the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Michel: On page 5, line 6, after 
        ``derived'', strike the period and insert in lieu thereof, ``: 
        Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated or 
        otherwise made available in this paragraph shall be obligated 
        or expended to pay federally funded unemployment compensation 
        to an individual who refuses employment which pays the higher 
        of the minimum wage or the average unemployment benefit in a 
        state and which meets the labor standards specified in Section 
        3304(a)(5) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act after having 
        received unemployment compensation for 26 or more consecutive 
        weeks, unless such individual is enrolled in a training program 
        under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973, as 
        amended.''

        Mr. [James C.] Corman [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve 
    a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California has reserved a 
    point of order, and the gentleman from Illinois is recognized for 5 
    minutes.
        Mr. Michel: Mr. Chairman, in view of the ruling by the Chair, I 
    am offering amended language which seeks to overcome the point of 
    order problem. Instead of using the prevailing wage as the 
    standard, I am using the minimum wage or the average State 
    unemployment benefit payment level, whichever is higher.
        This is the language which is already in the law for recipients 
    of Federal supplemental benefits. That standard applies to 
    recipients after 39 weeks of benefits, and I am simply proposing to 
    extend it to all Federal benefits after 26 weeks of having received 
    unemployment benefits. This standard is consistent with the 
    authorizing legislation, and certainly does not result in any 
    additional effort because it is already determined by the 
    Department of Labor.
        I offer this amendment because I believe it is particularly 
    important that we zero in on the problem whereby many of the long-
    term unemployed seem to find it more comfortable to continue to 
    receive unemployment benefits rather than take a job that may be a 
    couple of cuts below what they may desire. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California make the point 
    of order and insist on the point of order?
        Mr. Corman: Mr. Chairman, I insist on the point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will listen to the gentleman, of 
    course, to make the point of order and the argument for it; but the 
    Chair, while no expert on unemployment, is concerned about having 
    the argument go to the question of when the Federal official, who 
    must make a determination on the payment of unemployment 
    compensation, has to make a determination with regard to a job that 
    has been refused, that pays a certain level of wage. The Chair is 
    interested in knowing the timing on that in the discussion that 
    will come forth.
        Mr. Corman: Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chairman for that 
    guidance.
        There is considerable confusion as to what periods of time, 
    which programs pay an unemployed worker. Those who are entitled to 
    the maximum period of unemployment insurance have 26

[[Page 12267]]

    weeks of regular insurance paid for out of State employer taxes, 
    the adminis-tration for which is paid for out of Federal employer 
    taxes.
        At the end of that 26 weeks, if he has not been employed, he 
    has an additional 13 weeks called extended unemployment benefits. 
    That is paid, one-half out of State employer tax, one-half out of 
    Federal employer tax, and the administration for which is paid out 
    of Federal funds. During all of that period of time the suitability 
    of work requirement is based on State law, with a Federal minimum 
    below which suitability may not fall.
        After that 39-week period there is a Federal supplemental 
    benefit program which has been triggered in some 22 States. In 
    those States where the unemployment rate is over 6 percent, one 
    draws an additional 13 weeks financed totally out of the Federal 
    Treasury. For that 13 weeks, there is a Federal suitability of work 
    requirement which was adopted by this House this year. It is a 
    reasonably good one; it is not the one read by the gentleman from 
    Illinois; it is very different from that.
        Now, the dilemma is that about a third of the employees who are 
    drawing benefits do not draw the maximum benefit, and so in that 
    first 26 weeks some would be totally under the State program; some 
    for a portion of the time would be under State and State/Federal; 
    and some would be under State, State/Federal and totally Federal. 
    There is nothing that can disclose at what period of time one 
    triggers in, because whatever his entitlement may be, it is one-
    half State, a quarter State/Federal, and a quarter Federal.
        The greatest problem of all for the administrator would be 
    attempting to apply suitability of work requirement, which is 
    totally inconsistent, but was the direction of the Congress for 
    those people drawing FSB within the first 23 weeks. There is no 
    question but that there would be an additional requirement on 
    administrators to ascertain the suitability of work inconsistent 
    with and different from their own State requirements and the 
    recently-passed Federal requirement. That is my point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois desire to be 
    heard?
        Mr. Michel: Only to say, Mr. Chairman, that what the gentleman 
    is saying about what conditions do prevail, other than the wage, 
    after 39 weeks, we are simply seeking to impose at the expiration 
    of the 26 weeks. All that information is at hand, and there are 
    absolutely no additional duties required. We are simply tightening 
    up 13 weeks on what the gentleman's position is with respect to 
    what flows after 39 weeks.
        It is perfectly in order that what we are doing here again, I 
    say, is a limitation. Under chapter 25, section 10, Deschler's 
    Procedure, it is not in order in an appropriation bill to insert by 
    way of amendment a proposition which places additional duties on 
    the executive officer, but the mere requirement that the executive 
    officer be the recipient of information is not considered as 
    imposing upon him any additional burdens, and is in order. There 
    are, of course, ample precedents for that. I rest my case.
        Mr. Corman: I may just respond to the one point, Mr. Chairman, 
    by saying that the amendment proposed is not consistent with the 
    Federal supple

[[Page 12268]]

    mental benefit requirements. Even if it were, I believe a point of 
    order would lie, but it is not consistent.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state again that this is a very 
    difficult and complicated problem. The Chair feels that, although 
    the gentleman from Illinois has made a strong argument, that the 
    Chair is required by the precedents to construe limitations 
    strictly. The weight of the argument, in the Chair's opinion, falls 
    on the side of the gentleman from California, and the Chair, for 
    the reasons stated in his prior ruling (4) and after 
    hearing the additional argument made by the gentleman from 
    California, sustains the point of order against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See Sec. 8.4, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Construing the Rule Against Legislating in Appropriation Bill

Sec. 8.9 Where an amendment to a general appropriation bill is subject 
    to two interpretations, one of which would render the amendment 
    subject to a point of order, the Chair strictly construed the rule 
    against legislating in an appropriation bill and sustained a point 
    of order against the amendment.

    Where an amendment was offered to a general appropriation bill, 
similar to one held in order in a previous Congress as a proper 
limitation, the Chair was convinced by the argument on the point of 
order that the language was intended to impose new du-ties and 
sustained a point of order that the amendment violated Rule XXI clause 
2. The proceedings of June 14, 1978,(5) relevant to the 
amendment and the Chair's ruling are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 124 Cong. Rec. 17650, 17651, 17667, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [R. Lawrence] Coughlin [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment, my amendment No. 2.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Coughlin: On page 6, after line 
        23, insert the following new section:
            Sec. 102. (a) None of the funds appropriated by any 
        provision described in subsection (b) shall be expended or 
        obligated for any purpose specified in such provision unless 
        such funds so expended or obligated are subject to audit by the 
        Comptroller General of the United States.
            (b) For purposes of subsection (a), any provision in Title 
        I of this Act following the provision relating to 
        ``COMPENSATION OF MEMBERS'' and preceding the heading ``JOINT 
        ITEMS'' is a provision described in this subsection. . . .

        (Mr. Coughlin asked and was given permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [George E.] Shipley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, may I make 
    an inquiry? I was unable to determine which amendment this is.
        Mr. Coughlin: The amendment No. 2, which I believe the 
    gentleman has.
        Mr. Shipley: I might want to reserve a point of order, but I am 
    not sure which amendment the gentleman is offering.

[[Page 12269]]

        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (6) The Clerk will again 
    report the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk rereported the amendment.
        Mr. Coughlin: I raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman. I thought 
    that we were on my 5 minutes.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania had 
    not proceeded to his debate.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, this is identical to an amendment 
    offered last year by the gentlewoman from Massachusetts (Mrs. 
    Heckler) and the gentlewoman from New York (Mrs. Chisholm) to 
    provide for a GAO audit of Members and committee accounts. It is 
    the identical amendment that was raised at that time. It was not 
    objected to on a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask exactly what 
    would take place in this type of audit.
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from 
    Massachusetts (Mrs. Heckler).
        Mrs. [Margaret M.] Heckler [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, 
    the operations of the Comptroller General under this amendment 
    would continue as under existing circumstances in that site at the 
    Capitol where the office is presently located. The authority would 
    provide an audit of Members' accounts and committee accounts. It 
    would provide that authority to be utilized by the GAO.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, 
    does it extend in any way the present audit system that we have now 
    in the House?
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentlewoman from 
    Massachusetts.
        Mrs. Heckler: Mr. Chairman, it extends the authority that now 
    exists in law but is not necessarily a change in existing law. It 
    affirms the authority of the GAO which presently exists in the 
    House; however, I do not believe that the GAO is able to examine 
    Members' accounts and this amendment clarifies that authority. 
    However, it does not mandate audits across the board of every 
    Member at any particular time.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, would the gentlewoman answer another 
    question for me again. I am not quite clear in my own mind what 
    exactly would this amendment require the Comptroller General to do 
    specifically?
        Mrs. Heckler: I believe that this amendment would provide an 
    expansion of the number of accounts which the GAO is presently 
    auditing including the tax-funded accounts of Members of Congress 
    and our legislative committees, as covered by the general 
    legislative appropriation bill. We are in this bill dealing with an 
    appropriation of $992 million. I believe that these public funds 
    should be subject to audit. This amendment merely affirms the legal 
    authority to the GAO to conduct such audits.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, I still reserve my point of order. . 
    . .
        Mr. Chairman, I would like to be heard on the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I insist on my point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I object to the amendment and make a point of 
    order

[[Page 12270]]

    against it on the grounds that it imposes additional duties on the 
    Comptroller General and, as such, is in violation of clause 2, rule 
    XXI of the House. The additional duties implied by the amendment 
    might involve the Comptroller General insisting that time and 
    attendance reporting systems be set up in Members and committee 
    offices and may require setting up annual and sick leave systems 
    and involve examination of Members' personal diaries, perhaps even 
    their personal financial records. These are duties and procedures 
    clearly beyond the offices of the Comptroller General's present 
    audit authority. Under paragraph 842 of clause 2, rule XXI:

            An amendment may not impose additional duties, not required 
        by law, or make the appropriation contingent upon the 
        performance of such duties . . . then it assumes the character 
        of legislation and is subject to a point of order.

        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further on the point 
    of order?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Coughlin) is recognized.
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, let me say that the amendment 
    imposes no additional duties on the General Accounting Office. It 
    proposes that these accounts be subject to audit by the GAO.
        Title 31, section 67, of the United States Code annotated says 
    as follows:

            . . . the financial transactions of each executive, 
        legislative, and judicial agency, including but not limited to 
        the accounts of accountable officers, shall be audited by the 
        General Accounting Office in accordance with such principles 
        and procedures and under such rules and regulations as may be 
        prescribed by the Comptroller General of the United States.

        In a memorandum to the Comptroller General from the general 
    counsel of the General Accounting Office, the following language 
    appeared:

            Our authority under the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, to 
        investigate all matters relating to the receipt, disbursement, 
        and application of public funds also extends to the Congress.

        I continue to quote from the memorandum, as follows:

            Similarly, our authority in the Accounting and Auditing Act 
        of 1950 to audit all financial transactions, not limited to 
        accountable officer transactions, extends to legislative 
        agencies . . .

        Mr. Chairman, it is very clear that the General Accounting 
    Office already has the authority and the duty to audit the accounts 
    of the legislative branch, and this amendment in no way expands or 
    extends that authority. The General Accounting Office has taken a 
    position that it is interested in having an expression of the will 
    of the legislative branch as to whether it wishes the General 
    Accounting Office to carry out that function. This amendment would 
    be an expression of that will.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment would in no way expand the 
    authority of the General Accounting Office or impose additional 
    duties on the General Accounting Office; it would only make these 
    accounts subject to audit.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further on my point 
    of order?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will hear the gentleman.

[[Page 12271]]

        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, in the colloquy with the gentlewoman 
    from Massachusetts (Mrs. Heckler), she stated that the amendment 
    would extend the present authority of the GAO.
        Again, Mr. Chairman, I press my point of order.
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard further on the 
    point of order, I will say in answer to the gentleman from Illinois 
    (Mr. Shipley) that I do not think the amendment would extend the 
    present authority of the GAO.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair certainly agrees that the language in the amendment 
    is ambiguous. The Chair takes into account, however, the debate, 
    and the debate as observed by the Chair indicates the amendment 
    certainly does extend the authority of the Comptroller General and 
    is subject to a point of order.
        The Chair does recognize that there are conflicting 
    interpretations of the amendment under discussion. However, the 
    Chair has a duty under the precedents to construe the rule against 
    legislation strictly where there is an ambiguity. The Chair feels 
    he must sustain the point of order based on the interpretations 
    given the amendment during the debate.
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire, is the debate 
    subject to a point of order?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that it has to 
    make a determination based on the debate, and the Chair sustains 
    the point of order.
        Mrs. Heckler: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair sustains the point of 
    order. . . .
        Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Coughlin: On page 6, after line 
        23, insert the following new section:
            Sec. 102. None of the funds appropriated on pages 2 through 
        6 of this Act shall be made available for obligation unless 
        such funds are subject to audit by the Comptroller General of 
        the United States in accordance with the provisions of title 
        31, section 67 of the U.S.C.A.

Burden of Proof Where Language Is Susceptible to More Than One 
    Interpretation

Sec. 8.10 The proponent of an amendment to a general appropriation bill 
    has the burden of proving that the amendment does not change 
    existing law and, if in the form of a ``limitation'' falls within 
    the categories of permissible limitations delineated in the 
    precedents arising under Rule XXI clause 2; and if the amendment is 
    susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is incumbent on the 
    proponent to show that it is not in violation of the rule.

    On July 28, 1980,(7) the Committee of the Whole had 
under

[[Page 12272]]

consideration the Housing and Urban Development-independent agencies 
appropriation bill, fiscal 1981. An amendment offered by Mr. Herbert E. 
Harris, II, of Virginia, to the bill was a restriction, not on the 
amount of funds in the bill, but on the timing of their obligation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 126 Cong. Rec. 19924, 19925, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Harris: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Harris: Page 45, after line 23, 
        insert the following:
            Sec. 413. No more than an amount equal to 20 percent of the 
        total funds appropriated under this Act for any agency for any 
        fiscal year and apportioned to such agency pursuant to section 
        3679 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (31 U.S.C. 
        665) may be obligated during the last two months of such fiscal 
        year.

    The point of order raised against the amendment by Mr. John T. 
Myers, of Indiana, the ranking member of the subcommittee bringing the 
bill to the floor, and the response to the point of order by the 
proponent of the amendment, as well as the Chair's ruling are carried 
below.

        The Chairman: (8) Does the gentleman from Indiana 
    (Mr. Myers) insist on his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Elliott H. Levitas (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Myers of Indiana: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has offered an amendment to limit 
    the appropriations to a specific time; but I respectfully suggest 
    that the fact the gentleman has added the words, ``No more than'' 
    is still not, in fact, a limitation.
        The House has long established and the Committee has long 
    established that Congress does have the right to limit how money 
    shall be spent for a specific purpose. I quote:

            The House's practice has established the principle that 
        certain ``limitations'' may be admitted. It being established 
        that the House under its rules may decline to appropriate for a 
        purpose authorized by law, so it may by limitation prohibit the 
        use of money for part of the purpose, while appropriating for 
        the remainder of it.

        The first precedent that I want to cite is Hinds' Precedents, 
    volume IV, section 3936, where on January 17, 1896, the Chairman of 
    the Committee of the Whole, Nelson Dingley, ruled:

            The House in Committee of the Whole has the right to refuse 
        to appropriate for any object which it may deem improper, 
        although that object may be authorized by law; and it has been 
        contended, and on various occasions sustained by the Committee 
        of the Whole, that if the Committee has the right to refuse to 
        appropriate anything for a particular purpose authorized by 
        law, it can appropriate for only a part of that purpose and 
        prohibit the use of the money for the rest of the purpose 
        authorized by law.

        Mr. Chairman, it has been firmly established a number of times, 
    I could go on and quote, on January 31, 1925, the Chairman of the 
    Committee of the Whole, John Tilson of Connecticut, ruled:

            Congress may appropriate for one subject authorized by law 
        and refuse

[[Page 12273]]

        to appropriate for another object authorized by law.

        This firmly establishes the principle that a limitation must 
    apply to a specific purpose or an object.
        Mr. Chairman, this does not do that.
        I further cite that on June 25, Chairman Sharp of Indiana 
    sustained a point of order that was asked by this gentleman on an 
    appropriation bill, that he limits the discretionary power of the 
    executive.
        Now, this particular amendment has been remedied somewhat, or 
    there has been an attempt to remedy, in citing section 3679 of the 
    revised statutes of United States Code 31 U.S. 665.
        Now, Mr. Chairman, the rules of the House of Representatives, 
    rule XXI, section 843, says this:

            In construing a proposed limitation, if the Chair finds the 
        purpose to be legislative, in that the intent is to restrict 
        executive discretion to a degree that it may be fairly termed a 
        change in policy rather than a matter of administrative detail 
        he should sustain the point of order.

        The key here, Mr. Chairman, is that if the intent is to 
    restrict executive discretion to agree that it may be fairly termed 
    a change in policy rather than a matter of administrative detail he 
    should sustain the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, the fact that you are limiting here, not 
    directing, but limiting the authority to the last 2 months how much 
    may be spent takes away the discretionary authority of the 
    Executive which might be needed in this case. It clearly is more 
    than an administrative detail when you limit and you take away the 
    right of the Executive to use the funds prudently, to take 
    advantage of saving money for the Executive, which we all should be 
    interested in, and I certainly am, too; but Mr. Chairman, rule 843 
    provides that you cannot take away that discretionary authority of 
    the Executive.
        This attempt in this amendment does take that discretionary 
    authority to save money, to wisely allocate money prudently and it 
    takes away, I think, authority that we rightfully should keep with 
    the Executive, that you can accumulate funds and spend them in the 
    last quarter if it is to the advantage of the taxpayer and the 
    Executive.
        Mr. Chairman, this clearly is in violation of the rules of the 
    House.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Virginia desire to be 
    heard?
        Mr. Harris: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, let me first address the last point, probably 
    because it is the weakest that the gentleman has made with respect 
    to his point of order.
        With respect to the discretion that we are in any way limiting 
    the President, we cannot limit the discretion which we have not 
    given the President directly through legislation. There is no 
    discretion with regard to legislation that we have overtly 
    legislated and given to the President.
        Mr. Chairman, section 665(c)(3) of title 31 of the United 
    States Code, which states the following:

            Any appropriation subject to appointment shall be 
        distributed as may be deemed appropriate by the officers 
        designated in subsection (d) of this section to make 
        apportionments and reapportionments.

        Clearly grants agency budget officers the discretionary 
    authority to appor

[[Page 12274]]

    tion the funds in a manner they deem appropriate. My amendment 
    would not interfere with this authority to apportion funds. On the 
    contrary, my amendment reaffirms this section of the United States 
    Code, as Deschler's Procedures, in the U.S. House of 
    Representatives, chapter 26, section 1.8, states:

            The provision of the rule forbidding in any general 
        appropriation bill a ``provision changing existing law'' is 
        construed to mean the enactment of law where none exists, or a 
        proposition for repeal of existing law. Existing law may be 
        repeated verbatim in an appropriation bill, but the slightest 
        change of the text causes it to be ruled out.

        My amendment, Mr. Chairman, as the Chair will note, 
    specifically restates by reference the existing law, which in no 
    way gives discretion as to spending, but gives discretion as to 
    apportionment.
        Mr. Chairman, as the Chair knows, the budget execution cycle 
    has many steps. Whereas the Chair's earlier ruling related to the 
    executive branch authority to apportion, my amendment addresses the 
    obligation rate of funds appropriated under the fact. As OMB 
    circular No. A-34 (July 15, 1976) titled ``Budget Execution'' 
    explains:

            Apportionment is a distribution made by OMB.
            Obligations are amounts of orders placed, contracts 
        awarded, services received, and similar transactions.

        Mr. Chairman, my amendment proposes some additional duties, but 
    only a very minimal additional duty upon the executive branch.
        Deschler's chapter 26, section 11.1 says:

            The application of any limitation on an appropriation bill 
        places some minimal extra duties on Federal officials, who, if 
        nothing else, must determine whether a particular use of funds 
        falls within that prohibited by the limitation.

        The fact of the matter, Mr. Chairman, is that this is a very 
    carefully drawn limitation on appropriations. It is consistent with 
    a number of previous rulings of the Chair.
        Mr. Chairman, I would urge my colleague to withdraw his point 
    of order, because even a narrow interpretation of the rules will 
    not satisfy the other body on this. The other body has made it 
    clear that this restriction will go into the appropriation bill.
        I think it is a shame, after this House has voted this past 
    week 350 to 52, that it not go ahead and enact this type of 
    provision on the HUD bill. I think the Members want to vote for it. 
    I think the Members should be permitted to vote for it. I think it 
    is a shame to just allow the other body to take the initiative on 
    what I think is an extraordinarily important reform in our 
    budgetary process.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Indiana desire to be 
    heard further?
        Mr. Myers of Indiana: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The citation cited by the gentleman from Virginia points to the 
    fact that this amendment, if adopted, would cause the Executive to 
    unwisely allocate and spend money in quarters earlier or in the 
    year earlier when it might not be wise to spend it. This amendment, 
    while the intent I do not disagree with, the spirit that would be 
    carried out would cause the Executive

[[Page 12275]]

    to allocate and spend money unwisely because it was forced by this 
    amendment to allocate a portion according to this. But the 
    amendment does not do what the gentleman aspires for it to do.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Texas desire to be heard?
        If not, the Chair is prepared to rule based upon the arguments 
    made with respect to the point of order.
        In the first instance, the Chair would observe that it is not 
    the duty of the Chair or the authority of the Chair to rule on the 
    wisdom or the legislative effect of amendments.
        Second, the Chair will observe that the gentleman from 
    Virginia, in the way in which his amendment has been drafted, 
    satisfies the requirements of the Apportionment Act, which was the 
    subject of a prior ruling of the Chair in connection with another 
    piece of legislation.
        The Chair agrees with the basic characterization made by the 
    gentleman from Indiana that the precedents of the House relating to 
    limitations on general appropriation bills stand for the 
    proposition that a limitation to be in order must apply to a 
    specific purpose, or object, or amount of appropriation. The 
    doctrine of limitations on a general appropriation bill has emerged 
    over the years from rulings of Chairmen of the Committee of the 
    Whole, and is not stated in clause 2, rule XXI itself as an 
    exception from the prohibition against inclusion of provisions 
    which ``change existing law.'' Thus the Chair must be guided by the 
    most persuasive body of precedent made known to him in determining 
    whether the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
    Harris) ``changes existing law.'' Under the precedents in 
    Deschler's Procedure, chapter 26, section 1.12, the proponent of an 
    amendment has the burden of proving that the amendment does not 
    change existing law.
        The Chair feels that the basic question addressed by the point 
    of order is as follows: Does the absence in the precedents of the 
    House of any ruling holding in order an amendment which attempts to 
    restrict not the purpose or object or amount of appropriation, but 
    to limit the timing of the availability of funds within the period 
    otherwise covered by the bill require the Chair to conclude that 
    such an amendment is not within the permissible class of amendments 
    held in order as limitations? The precedents require the Chair to 
    strictly interpret clause 2, rule XXI, and where language is 
    susceptible to more than one interpretation, it is incumbent upon 
    proponent of the language to show that it is not in violation of 
    the rule (Deschler's chapter 25, section 6.3).
        In essence, the Chair is reluctant, based upon arguments 
    submitted to him, to expand the doctrine of limitations on general 
    appropriation bills to permit negative restrictions on the use of 
    funds which go beyond the amount, purpose, or object of an 
    appropriation, and the Chair therefore and accordingly sustains the 
    point of order.

Burden of Proving Authorization for Appropriation

Sec. 8.11 The burden of proof to cite the authorization to sustain an 
    appropriation for a

[[Page 12276]]

    project is on the proponent of the amendment.

    On Oct. 29, 1991,(9) when an amendment dealing with an 
environmental study was offered to the dire emergency appropriation 
bill in 1991, a point of order against the amendment was sustained 
where no authorization was cited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 137 Cong. Rec. 28791, 28792, 28802, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     amendment offered by mr. gilchrest

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gilchrest: Page 10, after line 20, 
        insert the following new paragraph:

                        Environmental Protection Agency

                         study of wetlands delineation

            For necessary expenses for entering into an arrangement 
        with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to 
        examine the scientific basis for methods used in identifying 
        and delineating wetlands (including the Federal manual for 
        Identifying and Delineating Jurisdictional Wetlands, published 
        January 10, 1989, revisions to such manual proposed by the 
        Environmental Protection Agency on August 14, 1991, and 
        previous manuals and methodologies), $500,000.

        Mr. [Wayne T.] Gilchrest [of Maryland] (during the reading): 
    Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be 
    considered as read and printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: (10) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Maryland?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    reserve a point of order against the amendment.
        Mr. [James A.] Hayes of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order, as well, against the amendment.
        Mr. Gilchrest: . . . The point of order is not well taken.
        Mr. Chairman, just before I came to the House floor, someone 
    told me, and it was an interest group, that wetlands should not be 
    a science issue. It should be a political issue. Well, I take issue 
    with that statement. We need the science. We need wetlands 
    determination. We need a policy based on fact, not a policy based 
    on politics.

                               point of order

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. Hayes] 
    insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Hayes of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, yes, I do.
        I make a point of order against the amendment, because it 
    proposes to change existing law, constituting legislation in an 
    appropriation bill, therefore, violating clause 2 of rule XXI, the 
    rule which states in pertinent part that no amendment to a general 
    appropriation bill shall be in order if changing existing law.
        This amendment imposes additional duties. It, in fact, 
    instructs the EPA to make and enter into an arrangement with the 
    National Academy of Sciences all of this to include, by specific 
    ref

[[Page 12277]]

    erence of this amendment, the Federal manual for identifying and 
    delineating jurisdictional wetlands, all of which comes under 
    section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the appropriate jurisdiction of 
    which belongs with the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 
    and the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.
        There is no doubt but that this is, in fact, imposing 
    legislative intent upon an appropriation bill, and I ask for a 
    ruling from the Chair.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. Gilchrest] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order.
        Mr. Gilchrest: Mr. Chairman, we are not legislating an 
    appropriation.
        Mr. Hayes of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, I have a question for the 
    gentleman.
        The question would be: Is it not that the exact language says 
    that the Environmental Protection Agency will have the expenses for 
    entering into an arrangement with the National Academy of Sciences? 
    I am reading directly from the amendment. Therefore, this is an 
    appropriation of $500,000 for the express and sole purpose of 
    entering into an arrangement with the National Academy of Sciences 
    which is, in fact, legislating on an appropriation bill and 
    imposing the additional duties on the EPA, duties which are not in 
    existence now.
        Mr. Gilchrest: We are appropriating money for a study. We are 
    not legislating here.
        Mr. Hayes of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, I would just proceed to 
    ask the Chair for a ruling.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair is unaware of any current statutory authorization for 
    the activities called for in the amendment and, consequently, the 
    reasons stated by the gentleman from Louisiana constitute a 
    violation of clause 2, rule XXI.
        The Chair sustains the point of order. . . .

                     amendment offered by mr. gilchrest

        Mr. Gilchrest: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gilchrest: Page 15, after line 20, 
        insert the following new chapter:

                         study of wetlands delineation

            For necessary expenses for entering into an arrangement 
        with the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study to 
        examine the scientific basis for methods used in identifying 
        and delineating wetlands, for purposes of the conservation of 
        fish and wildlife resources and their habitat, as authorized by 
        16 U.S.C., 742f. $500,000.

        Mr. Gilchrest: Mr. Chairman, this is the same amendment that I 
    offered earlier. We have cleared up some of the problems with the 
    amendment. The purpose of the amendment is for a study, I am asking 
    for this study for the purposes of conservation, fish and wildlife 
    resources, and their habitat.

Chair's Ability To Look Behind Proponents Characterization of Motion

Sec. 8.12 Where a motion to concur in a Senate amendment with an 
    amendment was of

[[Page 12278]]

    fered as ``preferential,'' the Speaker Pro Tempore, without the 
    benefit of a point of order from the floor, on his own initiative 
    declared that the motion did not in fact qualify for that status 
    and recognized another Member to offer a motion to concur with an 
    amendment. On appeal, the Chair was sustained.

    On July 2, 1980,(11) the House had under consideration a 
series of amendments reported in disagreement from conference. A motion 
offered by Mr. Jamie L. Whitten, of Mississippi, to disagree with a 
particular Senate amendment was pending. The manager of the conference 
report, Mr. Clarence D. Long, of Maryland, then offered a preferential 
motion to concur in the Senate amendment with a further amendment. This 
motion was also rejected. At this point, Mr. Robert E. Bauman, of 
Maryland, offered a ``preferential'' motion to concur with an 
amendment. The proceedings following the rejection of Mr. Long's motion 
were then as indicated below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 126 Cong. Rec. 18357, 18359-61, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 preferential motion offered by mr. bauman

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I offer a preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Bauman moves to recede and concur in the amendment of 
        the Senate, (No. 95) with an amendment as follows: In lieu of 
        the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment insert the 
        following:

                                   CHAPTER VI

                               FOREIGN OPERATIONS

                      Funds Appropriated to the President

                       international disaster assistance

            For an additional amount to carry out the provisions of 
        Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
        $43,000,000 to remain available until expended.

         payment to the foreign service retirement and disability fund

            For an additional amount for ``Payment to the Foreign 
        Service Retirement and Disability Fund'', $1,020,000.

                               operating expenses

            For an additional amount for ``Operating Expenses of the 
        Agency for International Development'', $2,000,000, to remain 
        available until expended.

        Mr. Bauman (during the reading): Mr. Speaker, that happens to 
    be the end of the motion. I am not sure why the gentleman is 
    reading further. That is the end of the motion I sent to the desk.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Allen E.] Ertel [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12279]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (12) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Paul Simon (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Speaker, how is this particular amendment a 
    preferential motion?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman rose and was recognized 
    to offer a preferential motion. The Clerk has not completed the 
    reading of the motion.
        Mr. Bauman: The gentleman from Maryland would advise the 
    Speaker that the Clerk has completed reading the motion that I sent 
    to the desk. I am not sure what the Clerk is now reading.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Has the Clerk finished reading the 
    motion?
        The Clerk will rereport the motion.
        Mr. Ertel (during the reading): Mr. Speaker, I reserve a point 
    of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    reserves a point of order.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Speaker, inasmuch as the motion was partially 
    read before, how is this a preferential motion which the gentleman 
    has been recognized for; on what basis?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Long amendment having been to 
    concur with an amendment and being defeated, another motion to 
    concur with an amendment is a preferential motion.
        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Speaker, I have an additional parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania will 
    state his additional parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Speaker, did we not though vote to recede and 
    concur in the Senate amendment previously?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The House has, on reconsideration 
    refused to concur in the Senate amendment No. 95 with an amendment.
        The Clerk will continue to read the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Bauman moves to concur in the amendment of the Senate 
        (No. 95) with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter 
        stricken and inserted by said amendment insert the following:

                                   CHAPTER VI

                               FOREIGN OPERATIONS

                      Funds Appropriated to the President

                       international disaster assistance

            For an additional amount to carry out the provisions of 
        Section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
        $43,000,000 to remain available until expended.

         payment to the foreign service retirement and disability fund

            For an additional amount for ``Payment to the Foreign 
        Service Retirement and Disability Fund'', $1,020,000.

                               operating expenses

            For an additional amount for ``Operating Expenses of the 
        Agency for International Development'',

[[Page 12280]]

        $2,000,000, to remain available until expended. . . .

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland is 
    recognized.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, under the rules, does not the 
    gentleman from Mississippi have the time? I would like for him to 
    yield to me, but I believe he has the time.
        Mr. Long of Maryland: Mr. Speaker, I have a preferential 
    motion.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have been recognized, I believe.
        Mr. Long of Maryland: Mr. Speaker, I was on my feet.

                               point of order

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have the floor and I do not yield.
        Mr. Long of Maryland: Mr. Speaker, I was on my feet for a 
    preferential motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: On this motion the gentleman from 
    Maryland (Mr. Bauman) has the time.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I would like to take my time at this 
    point.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
    Bauman) is recognized.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I do not want to complicate an already 
    complicated situation. The motion which I have just offered, and 
    the Members should at least try and understand it because we are 
    apparently going to have to vote on it, in essence returns the 
    House to the position that we went to the conference with on the 
    foreign aid issue. It provides amounts of money for three funds 
    that the administration informed the House was necessary for 
    inclusion in the supplemental appropriation bill. It does not 
    include any of the funding which was added by the other body and, 
    therefore, amounts to roughly about $46 million. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only I yield to the 
    gentleman from New York (Mr. McEwen).
        Mr. [Robert C.] McEwen [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I thank the 
    gentleman for yielding.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: For what purpose does the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts rise?
        Mr. [Thomas P.] O'Neill [Jr., of Massachusetts]: Mr. Speaker, 
    in view of the fact that the gentleman from Maryland did not offer 
    a preferential motion, I offer a preferential motion that is at the 
    desk.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I did not yield to the gentleman to 
    offer a motion.
        Mr. O'Neill: I was recognized.
        Mr. Bauman: Well, I did not yield for that purpose, Mr. 
    Speaker. I control the time, do I not?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
    Bauman) has 30 minutes, the majority side has 30 minutes.
        Does the gentleman from Maryland wish to use more time?
        Mr. Bauman: I do and I was in the course of using the time when 
    I was interrupted. I do not believe I can be interrupted unless I 
    yield.

[[Page 12281]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland may 
    proceed.
        Mr. Bauman: I do not yield for that purpose. I yield for debate 
    only to the----
        Mr. O'Neill: I want the House to know that I reserve my right 
    and before the previous question is put, I will offer for a 
    preferential motion.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York 
    for the purpose of debate only. . . .
        My parliamentary inquiry is that the Chair stated a moment ago 
    that the time on a preferential motion to concur with an amendment 
    is divided between the majority and the minority. Is it not 
    controlled by the maker of the motion? Only amendments in 
    disagreement are divided.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The practice of the House is clearly 
    on a motion of this type after an initial motion has been rejected 
    on an amendment reported from conference in disagreement that the 
    time is divided between the majority and the minority parties.
        Mr. Bauman: The second question I have is, has not the 
    gentleman from Maryland made a preferential motion which is now 
    pending?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland made a 
    motion which was in form a preferential motion. Upon examination by 
    the Chair, it is in fact a motion to insist upon the original House 
    position rather than a motion to amend the Senate amendment.
        Mr. Bauman: A further parliamentary inquiry. The House's 
    previous action on this amendment was a vote to recede from the 
    position of the House. At that point----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the Chair could--the House has not 
    voted to reconsider the motion to recede----
        Mr. Bauman: Precisely. That is what the gentleman from Maryland 
    is observing, that the House has voted to recede from its position. 
    At that point a preferential motion to concur with an amendment is 
    in order. That is what the gentleman from Maryland has offered.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: What the House has done is to recede 
    from its initial disagreement, not from the House position.
        Mr. Bauman: Well, is not the gentleman from Maryland's motion a 
    preferential motion under the rule?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In form it is but upon examination it 
    is in fact a motion to insist upon the House position.
        Mr. Bauman: Well, does not the Chair have to be subjected to a 
    point of order at an appropriate time in order to make that ruling? 
    Does the Chair on its own inquire behind the form of motion?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is responding to a 
    parliamentary inquiry of the gentleman from Maryland.
        Mr. Bauman: Well, but the Chair made a statement a few moments 
    ago, unsolicited by anyone that my motion was not a preferential 
    motion. This gentleman would like to ask upon what authority the 
    Chair is able to rule a preferential motion offered in proper form 
    is nonpreferential when no one has raised the issue.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has not ruled out the motion 
    of

[[Page 12282]]

    the gentleman from Maryland. It is still pending. The parliamentary 
    inquiry was whether it was a preferential motion.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, further using my time on parliamentary 
    inquiry of the Chair, who controls the preferential motion on the 
    previous question under these circumstances?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is the gentleman asking if another 
    motion is made?
        Mr. Bauman: I am asking the Chair, under the parliamentary 
    inquiry, who controls the preferential motion of the previous 
    question? Who may move the previous question on this motion?

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If a motion is privileged it may be 
    offered by any Member of the House.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: For what purpose does the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts (Mr. O'Neill) seek recognition?

                 preferential motion offered by mr. o'neill

        Mr. O'Neill: Mr. Speaker, I offer a preferential motion.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order. I moved the previous 
    question on the pending motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The motion for the previous question 
    does not rule out a preferential motion, if moved while time is 
    remaining to the opposite party. The previous question is not yet 
    in order.
        The Clerk will read the preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. O'Neill moves that the House concur in the amendment of 
        Senate numbered 95 with an amendment as follows:
            In lieu of the matter deleted and inserted by said 
        amendment, insert the following:

                      Funds Appropriated to the President

                       international disaster assistance

            For an additional amount to carry out the provisions of 
        section 491 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 
        $43,000,000 to remain available until expended.

                                disability fund

            For an additional amount for ``Payment to the Foreign 
        Service Retirement and Disability Fund,'' $1,020,000.

                               operating expenses

            For an additional amount for ``Operating Expenses of the 
        Agency for International Development,'' $2,000,000, to remain 
        available until expended.

                             economic support fund

            For an additional amount of $80,000,000 for necessary 
        expenses to carry out the provisions of sections 531 through 
        535, provided that these funds shall not be available for 
        obligation or expenditure until October 1, 1980.

                               point of order

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that this 
    motion is not a preferential motion. It is, in fact, an amendment 
    to the pending motion of the gentleman from Maryland, which sought 
    to concur in the Senate amend

[[Page 12283]]

    ment with an amendment. This is simply another motion seeking to 
    concur in the Senate amendment with a slightly different amendment, 
    and therefore it has no preference over my pending motion.
        I make a point of order against it on that ground.

    The Chair, stating that the motion to concur with an amendment took 
precedence over a motion to insist on the House position, overruled the 
point of order. Mr. Bauman then made another point of order as 
indicated below:

        Mr. Bauman: A point of order, Mr. Speaker.
        The gentleman from Maryland has offered a motion to concur in 
    the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, and now another 
    motion to concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment 
    is being offered. That additional motion is not in order at this 
    point.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland has 
    offered an amendment which in form was a motion to concur with an 
    amendment. In fact, it is a motion to insist on the original House 
    language.
        Mr. Bauman: I make a point of order against the pending motion 
    by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'Neill) that it is not 
    preferential because it is, in form, simply a motion to insist on 
    the House position and is not, in fact, a preferential motion. If 
    my motion is not [in] order, his is not either.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland is not 
    correct. The point is not well taken.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        If that is the way you are going to play the game, let us fight 
    it to the end.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman appeals the ruling of 
    the Chair. The question is, shall the Chair's decision stand as the 
    judgment of the Committee.

                   motion to table offered by mr. bolling

        Mr. [Richard] Bolling [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, I move to lay 
    the appeal from the Chair on the table.
        Mr. Bauman: And that the motion be reduced to writing.
        Mr. Bolling: It is at the desk. It is at the desk.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Bolling moves to lay the appeal on the table.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to 
    table.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker Pro Tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays, so 
    that we can go on record on the fairness in this House.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    222, nays 140, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 70, as follows: . 
    . .
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.

[[Page 12284]]

    O'Neill) is recognized in support of his preferential motion.

Chair's Role in Clarifying Amendment

Sec. 8.13 In attempting to construe an ambiguous amendment, the Chair 
    may inquire of the author the meaning of certain language therein, 
    and then rely on those responses, and additional debate, in 
    rendering a decision on a point of order.

        On Oct. 29, 1991,(13) Chairman Gerry E. Studds, of 
    Massachusetts, presiding over the dire emergency appropriation 
    bill, 1991, was faced with an amendment and a point of order that 
    it was legislation in violation of Rule XXI clause 2. The Chair 
    elicited some debate on the matter to help clarify the meaning of 
    the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 137 Cong. Rec. 28818, 28819, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      amendment offered by mr. boehner

        Mr. [John A.] Boehner [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Boehner: At the appropriate place 
        in the bill, add the following new chapter:

                          Chapter--Legislative Branch

          house of representatives committee on house administration--
                           house information systems

            For an additional amount for ``Committee on House 
        Administration, House Information Systems'', $1.00 to cancel 
        the contract with Aristotle Industries for the CD-ROM Voter 
        Registration Lists project.

        Mr. [Vic] Fazio [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the gentleman's amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, I believe this language is legislation 
    on an appropriation bill. It seems to direct that the Committee on 
    House Administration should cancel a contract, and, if that is the 
    thrust of the amendment, and that is the Chairman's interpretation 
    of it, I would suggest that this is language that should be 
    removed.
        Mr. Chairman, I object and insist on my point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Ohio wish to be heard on 
    the point of order? . . .
        The Chair would inquire of the author of the amendment whether 
    it is his intention and understanding with respect to his amendment 
    that it directs the Committee on House Administration to cancel the 
    contract.
        Mr. Boehner: That is correct.
        The Chairman: This is his intention?
        Mr. Boehner: Yes. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, as I 
    read the amendment, the amendment reads that House Administration 
    is given $1 to cancel the contract of Aristotle Industries. This is 
    not an absolute mandate upon the committee. That $1 may be 
    sufficient to do that job, it may not

[[Page 12285]]

    be, so it seems to me the language of the amendment is such that 
    there is an optional nature to it. It is not a mandate under the 
    terms of the amendment and so, therefore, it should be in order in 
    the House for offering before the House.
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further on the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman from California 
    [Mr. Fazio].
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, I think the author of the amendment 
    has stated his purpose. He said it did direct the committee to 
    cancel the contract. Others who have attempted to intervene and 
    reinterpret this statement have no standing. The gentleman who 
    offered the amendment is accurate in his purpose. He stated it very 
    clearly, and I would further insist that this point of order be 
    upheld.
        The Chairman: The Chair will inquire of the author of the 
    amendment as to whether or not he intends to direct the committee 
    to cancel the contract.
        Mr. Boehner: My intent, Mr. Chairman, is that the contract be 
    canceled. That is my intent. We do not direct that, though, in the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        Under existing law and procedures the Committee on House 
    Administration is clearly authorized to cancel contracts into which 
    it has entered on behalf of the House. Thus the funds in the 
    amendment are authorized by law. Whether the amendment constitutes 
    legislation depend on whether the amendment directs the committee 
    to do that which it merely has discretion to do or not to do, the 
    amendment on its face does not state such a direction, and that is 
    why the Chair inquired twice of the author of the amendment as to 
    his intention.

        The Chair has no alternative other than to rely on the more 
    recent assurance of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Boehner] that it 
    is not his intention to direct the committee, but merely to 
    appropriate funds authorized by law, and, consequently, the point 
    of order is overruled.

Basis for Rulings on Points of Order Under Budget Act

Sec. 8.14 Under some provisions of the Congressional Budget Act, the 
    Chair must be guided in his rulings by estimates of costs provided 
    by the Committee on the Budget (see sections 302 and 311); in other 
    cases, particularly where a point of order is raised under section 
    303 of the Act, the Chair's judgment is shaped by the text of the 
    bill and not bound by Budget Committee estimates.

    Many factors help shape the Chair's decision on a point of order: 
the rule under which the point of order is brought, its legislative 
history, precedents, and prior interpretations of the rule in question. 
The Congressional Budget Act, adopted by the House as an exercise of 
its rulemaking

[[Page 12286]]

authority, specifies in several instances that estimates furnished by 
the Committee on the Budget are dispositive when a question is raised 
about the cost of legislation. Language of the following type is found 
in several sections of the Act: ``For purposes of this section, levels 
of new budget authority, spending authority . . . outlays . . . for a 
fiscal year shall be determined on the basis of estimates made by the 
Committee on the Budget. . .''.
    On Mar. 26, 1992,(14) during consideration of the Higher 
Education Amendments of 1992, an amendment was offered by Mr. Scott 
Klug, of Wisconsin, which had the effect of enlarging the class of 
borrowers under student loan provisions. The Committee on the Budget 
had told Mr. Klug that there were no costs associated with his 
amendment. The Chair held to the contrary and sustained a point of 
order raised under section 303 of the Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 138 Cong. Rec. 7185, 7186, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (15) The Clerk will report the 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Don J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Klug: Page 169, line 23, and page 
        170, line 16, strike ``and'' and on page 170 after line 5 and 
        after line 23, insert the following new clauses:

        ``(iii) not in excess of 3 years during which the borrower is 
    engaged as a full-time teacher in a public or nonprofit private 
    elementary or secondary school in a teacher shortage area 
    established by the Secretary pursuant to paragraph (4) of this 
    subsection;

            Page 177, strike lines 13 through 16 and redesignate the 
        succeeding subsections accordingly.
            Page 177, line 18, strike ``428(b)(4) of the Act as 
        redesignated)'' and insert ``428(b)(5) of the Act''.
            Page 178, line 4, and page 179, lines 14 and 23, 
        redesignate paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) as paragraphs (5), 
        (6), and (7), respectively.

        Mr. Klug (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
    Record.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Wisconsin?
        There was no objection.

                               point of order

        Mr. [William D.] Ford of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I am 
    constrained to and must make a point of order on this amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Ford of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I would have reserved a 
    point of order, but what just happened when we tried to do that is 
    an illustration that we will never get finished here if we use the 
    reservation of a point of order for unlimited debate. For that 
    reason I make the point of order without a reservation.
        Mr. Chairman, in section 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act 
    it is not in order to consider any measure

[[Page 12287]]

    which creates entitlement authority or directs spending authority 
    first effective in the fiscal year prior to the budget resolution 
    for that fiscal year.
        The amendment would require the Government to pay an interest 
    subsidy for an extended period of time for individuals not 
    otherwise subsidized by the bill.
        The amendment expands the class of individuals entitled to an 
    interest subsidy in repayment of their student loans. Consequently, 
    the amendment establishes a beneficiary and a right to the benefit 
    in the subsidy satisfying the definition of new entitlement 
    authority under the Budget Act.
        While the Congressional Budget Office did not credit the 
    committee with savings for changes in the deferment terms of the 
    student loan programs in the act, the present amendment expands the 
    class of individuals entitled to the economic benefit of loan 
    principal repayment deferments and interest subsidies. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Wisconsin wish to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Klug: Yes, very briefly, I might add, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Klug: First of all, Mr. Chairman, this amendment, like the 
    amendment offered by my colleague, the gentlewoman from Hawaii just 
    a few minutes ago, attempts to expand the higher education 
    authority to also allow deferments for teachers involved in teacher 
    shortage areas. In fact, right now, 34 States have made application 
    to the Federal Government because of shortages of teachers, much 
    like the shortage of physicians in rural areas across the United 
    States.
        I accept the gentleman's point of order, but let me tell you, 
    there is some frustration that I feel in that we in good faith went 
    to the Congressional Budget Office last week and asked for an 
    analysis, only to have now today an indication that the CBO 
    estimate no longer holds. They told us there would be no additional 
    expense. We come to the floor and suddenly find out that in this 
    case the Congressional Budget Office, which happens to support our 
    position, no longer holds.
        I think that is a very dangerous precedent. If we are going to 
    ask the CBO to do an analysis, then my sense is the CBO analysis 
    should be the rule of law on this floor.
        The Chairman: Does anyone else wish to be heard on the point of 
    order?
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania may proceed.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I am very troubled with what is 
    happening here. In previous iterations of this kind of challenge, 
    the Parliamentarians have ruled that the Congressional Budget 
    Office determinations with regard to the cost of an amendment would 
    in fact hold.
        Now under this particular challenge, we have the 
    Parliamentarians overruling the Congressional Budget Office in what 
    the Congressional Budget Office feels is the true nature of the 
    situation. As I understand it, the Congressional Budget Office has 
    said that the category of people that the gentleman from Wisconsin 
    [Mr. Klug] wishes to cover in his amendment were already

[[Page 12288]]

    assumed by them to be included, and so therefore there is no cost 
    involved in extending this particular benefit. . . .
        Mr. Ford of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, may I be heard further on 
    the point of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Michigan may proceed.
        Mr. Ford of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania apparently was not on the floor when the previous 
    ruling was made by the Chair on precisely the same point of order, 
    and the point of order was raised from that side of the aisle. . . 
    .
        The Chairman: Does anyone else desire to be heard on the point 
    of order? If not, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair would observe that the fact that CBO assumed the 
    inclusion of these borrowers in its estimating model is not 
    dispositive to the question of order under section 303. Moreover, 
    under section 303 the Chair must be guided by the text and, unlike 
    sections 302 and 311, is not required to accept Budget Committee 
    estimates as conclusive.
        Having said that, the Chair would point out that the issue here 
    is identical to what it was in the amendment raised by the 
    gentlewoman from Hawaii, and based on the same reasoning the Chair 
    sustains the point of order.

Burden of Proof on Points of Order

Sec. 8.15 In response to most points of order against provisions in an 
    appropriation bill or against amendments, the burden is on those 
    supporting the provision or amendment to prove that it does not 
    violate the pertinent rule; but where a limitation of funds 
    amendment is challenged as being a ``tax provision'' in violation 
    of Rule XXI clause 5(b), the person advocating the point of order 
    must show the inevitability of tax consequences in or- der to 
    successfully press the point of order.

    The proceedings of June 18, 1991,(16) show the 
difficulty of carrying the burden of proof where a point of order is 
raised under rule XXI clause 5(b), especially where the tax measure is 
a provision in or amendment to an appropriation bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 137 Cong. Rec. 15189-91, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Obey: Page 13, line 7, insert 
        before the period the following:
        : Provided further, That additional amounts above fiscal year 
        1991 levels for the information reporting program shall be used 
        instead for the examination of the tax returns of high-income 
        and high-asset taxpayers.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I make 
    a point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12289]]

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment of the gentleman from Wisconsin on grounds that it 
    violates clause 5(b) of House rule XXI and ask to be heard on my 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, clause 5(b) of rule XXI states at the 
    relevant part that, and I quote:
        No amendment in the House or proposed by the Senate carrying a 
    tax or tariff measure [shall] be in order during the consideration 
    of a bill or joint resolution reported by a committee not having 
    that jurisdiction.
        The proposed amendment would transfer the increased funds in 
    the bill over last year's appropriation for the Information 
    Reporting Program to be used instead for the examination of the tax 
    returns of high-income and high-asset taxpayers.
        It is my contention, Mr. Chairman, that under the precedents 
    surrounding clause 5(b) of rule XXI, this amendment constitutes a 
    tax measure to a bill not reported by the committee having 
    jurisdiction over tax measures-the House Ways and Means Committee.
        In this regard, I cite the footnote at section 846(b) of the 
    House Rules and Manual for the 101st Congress, and I quote:
        In determining whether a limitation in a general appropriation 
    bill constitutes a tax or tariff measure proscribed by this clause, 
    the Chair will consider argument as to the certainty of impact on 
    revenue collections and tax status or liability.
        That particular reference was to a point of order raised on 
    August 1, 1986, against a provision in a Treasury, Postal Service 
    appropriations bill to prohibit the use of funds in the bill to 
    implement certain specified Treasury regulations. Those regulations 
    required taxpayers to maintain detailed information to substantiate 
    the deductibility of certain expenses on their tax returns.
        . . . And while new regulations could be promulgated, there 
    would be a necessary delay in doing so, and this would, and I 
    quote, ``necessarily result in a direct loss of revenue to the 
    Federal Treasury.''
        The Chair concluded that the progression of decisions under 
    clause 5(b), rule XXI, support the proposition that a provision 
    constitutes a tax or tariff measure, and again I quote the Chair:

            Where it can be conclusively shown that the imposition of 
        the restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year will 
        effectively and inevitably either preclude the IRS from 
        collecting revenues otherwise due and owing under provisions of 
        the Internal Revenue Code or require collection of revenue not 
        legally due and owing. . . .

        But all we are concerned with in this point of order is whether 
    shifting funds from the information matching system to audits will 
    be a revenue gainer or loser in fiscal 1992. And the testimony of 
    the IRS commissioner is that keeping that money in the Information 
    Reporting System is more efficient and will yield a larger revenue 
    return.

        Finally, Mr. Chairman, while I think I have provided ample 
    proof that this amendment will deprive the IRS of net revenues it 
    would otherwise receive in the coming fiscal year, under 
    parliamentary practice, the burden of

[[Page 12290]]

    proof is on the proponent of the amendment to show that the 
    amendment does not violate the rule. In other words, it is up to 
    the gentleman from Missouri to prove that his amendment will not 
    ``inevitably preclude the IRS from collecting revenues otherwise 
    due and owing under the provision of the Internal Revenue Code.''
        I therefore urge that my point of order be sustained.
        The Chairman: The proponent of the amendment is entitled to be 
    recognized on the point of order.
        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: . . . There is no way to 
    ascertain whether an audit of a taxpayer will or will not result in 
    increased revenue or lowered revenue to the Treasury of the United 
    States. And to suggest otherwise, I think, would be to suggest that 
    this subcommittee could take virtually no action which would impact 
    the rules of the IRS or any other agency that either audits or 
    imposes fines.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California [Mr. Roybal] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Edward R.] Roybal [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I just 
    wanted to add that the rule protects this amendment. The rule 
    states as follows:

            It shall be in order to consider the amendment printed in 
        the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
        resolution, and all points of order against said amendment for 
        failure to comply with the provisions of clause 2 of rule XI 
        are hereby waived.

        I ask the Chair to rule on it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further on the point 
    of order?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Pennsylvania may be heard 
    further.
        Mr. Walker: I thank the Chair.
        First of all, my point of order does not relate to clause 2 of 
    rule XI. I am making my point of order based upon clause 5(b) of 
    rule XXI. . . .
        Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would quote from section 835 of the 
    House Rules and Manual relating to points of order on 
    appropriations bills:

            If the amendment is susceptible to more than one 
        interpretation, it is incumbent upon the proponent to show that 
        it is not in violation of the rule.

        Moreover, it might be advisable here to apply the principle 
    used for germaneness points of order, since clause 5(b) of rule XXI 
    is very similar. To quote from section 594 of the manual:

            The burden of proof is on the proponent of the amendment to 
        establish its germaneness, and where an amendment is equally 
        susceptible to more than one interpretation, one of which will 
        render it not germane, the Chair will rule it out of order.

        I would submit in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that even if the 
    proponent were able to claim that his amendment is a revenue gainer 
    rather than a net revenue loser, the existence of clear evidence to 
    the contrary should compel the Chair to rule against the amendment 
    on grounds that it is susceptible to more than one interpretation. 
    . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        Whether greater scrutiny of certain tax returns will, by the 
    use of funds contained in this bill will, in fact, lead to a loss 
    or a gain in tax liability and in tax collection is a matter of 
    conjecture as was pointed out by the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. 
    Obey].

[[Page 12291]]

        The amendment itself goes only to funding in the bill. It does 
    not necessarily result in a loss or gain of revenues, as was shown 
    to be the case in the arguments on the points of order cited by the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        The test here is certainty and inevitability of such a tax gain 
    or loss, and just to complete the record, the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania cited a ruling by Chairman Beilenson on August 1, 
    1986.
        Let the Chair read fully from that paragraph:

            A limitation on the availability of funds for the Internal 
        Revenue Service otherwise in order under clause 2(c), rule XXI 
        may still be construed as a tax measure in violation of clause 
        5(b), rule XXI where it can be shown that the imposition of the 
        restriction on IRS funding for the fiscal year will effectively 
        and inevitably--

        And I underline the words ``effectively and inevitably,''--
        preclude the IRS from collecting revenues otherwise due and 
        owing by law or require collection of revenue not legally due 
        or owing.

        Absent a showing of inevitable or absolutely inevitable certain 
    effects, the test is not met with respect to funding restrictions 
    on annual appropriation bills and the point of order is overruled.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: The Chair did not refer to the rulings, however, 
    where it is clear that the Chair is prepared to sustain points of 
    order where the amendment is equally susceptible to more than one 
    interpretation which clearly this particular amendment is. I did 
    not hear the Chair rule on the point of order that I raised in that 
    regard.
        The Chairman: The Chair will simply remind and repeat to the 
    gentleman that in this line of precedent on funding restrictions on 
    appropriation bills the test of inevitability of a tax increase or 
    decrease is consistent through all the precedents. For that reason, 
    again, the Chair rules the point of order out of order.
        Under the rule, debate on this amendment and all amendments 
    thereto shall not exceed 1 hour.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Obey] 
    for 5 minutes.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 9. Waiver

    The rules of the House are enforced by points of order, usually 
raised by a Member calling the attention of the Chair and his 
colleagues to what the Member perceives to be an infraction of a rule. 
On some occasions, the Speaker or Member presiding will move to bring a 
violation of a rule before the body. The Chair will, for example, on 
his own initiative, call a Member to order for remarks uttered in 
debate which violate proper decorum.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. See Sec. Sec. 9.17, 9.18, infra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12292]]

    Since the House is given ``rule-making'' authority by the 
Constitution (19) and creates its procedural and 
parliamentary code anew in each Congress, it can also use this same 
authority to change or waive a rule. A rule can be waived, mooted, or 
by-passed by unanimous consent,(20) by suspension of the 
rules, or by adoption of a special order reported from the Committee on 
Rules. Even a rule based on a provision of a statute can be waived 
under the House's ``rule-making'' authority.(1) A waiver can 
be put in place after consideration of a bill has 
commenced.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Art. 1, Sec. 5, House Rules and Manual Sec. 58 (1997).
20. See Sec. 9.4, infra.
 1. See Sec. 9.2, infra.
 2. See Sec. 9.7, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The requirement that points of order be made at the proper time 
also may be waived by agreement in the House or in the Committee of the 
Whole.(3) The requirement may also be waived by the adoption 
of a special rule from the Committee on Rules,(4) or by the 
granting of unanimous consent by the House.(5) On one 
occasion, the proceedings whereby a provision in a bill was stricken by 
a valid point of order was later vacated by unanimous consent and the 
provision was reinserted in the text.(6) Sometimes, too, the 
effect of earlier proceedings is such that a point of order is 
considered waived and cannot later be asserted against the proposition 
in question. Thus, if a motion that is susceptible to a point of order 
is agreed to by the House, no point of order being raised against it, 
the point is deemed waived.(7) Where the scope of a rule 
waiving points of order is questioned, the Chair may be called upon to 
interpret the language.(8) It should also be noted that a 
House Rule may

[[Page 12293]]

specify that a particular type of point of order may be in order at any 
time. For example, under the provisions of Rule XXI clause 5, a point 
of order against an amendment proposing an appropriation on a bill 
reported by a committee not having that jurisdiction is in order at any 
time.(9) However, even under this rule the precedents 
dictate that the point of order must be timely, i.e., during the five-
minute rule in Committee of the Whole or before the amendment is 
adopted.(10)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Ch. 19, supra; and Sec. 9.5, infra.
 4. See Sec. 9.1, infra.
            For more complete discussion of special rules from the 
        Committee on Rules waiving points of order, see Sec. 10 of this 
        chapter and Ch. 21, supra.
 5. See Sec. 9.3, infra. But where points of order againstconsideration 
        of a bill are not specifically waived as part of a unanimous-
        consent request for immediate consideration, a point of order 
        that a quorum of the committee was not present when the bill 
        was ordered reported will lie despite the unanimous-consent 
        request. See the proceedings at 114 Cong. Rec. 30751, 90th 
        Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 11, 1968, wherein such a point of order 
        was sustained against consideration of S. 1507 although 
        unanimous consent for immediate consideration of the bill had 
        been granted.
 6. See Sec. 9.19, infra.
 7. See Sec. Sec. 9.6, 9.16, infra.
 8. See Sec. 9.8, infra.
 9. Rule XXI clause 5, House Rules and Manual Sec. 846 (1997). For 
        further discussion, see Chs. 25, 26, supra.
10. See 92 Cong. Rec. 2365, 79th Cong. 2d Sess., Mar. 18, 
        1946.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In General

Sec. 9.1 Special ``rules'' or resolutions from the Committee on Rules 
    often contain provisions expressly waiving points of order against 
    certain language in the bill rather than against all provisions in 
    the bill.

    On May 8, 1968,(11) Mr. William M. Colmer, of 
Mississippi, called up House Resolution 1164, which provided:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 114 Cong. Rec. 12220, 12221, 90th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        17023) making appropriations for sundry independent executive 
        bureaus, boards, commissions, corporations, agencies, offices, 
        and the Department of Housing and Urban Development for the 
        fiscal year ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes, all 
        points of order against the provisions contained under the 
        heading ``National Aeronautics and Space Administration'' 
        beginning on page 19, line 17, through page 21, line 8, are 
        hereby waived.

    Mr. Colmer advised that the Committee on Rules in this instance had 
waived the points of order against certain specific items in the 
appropriations bill, rather than for all items in the bill.

        Mr. Colmer: . . . I might add also for the information of the 
    gentleman--and of the Members of the House--that the Committee on 
    Rules has recently adopted a course of procedure where these rules 
    waiving points of order will be limited to specific items, as has 
    been done in this instance.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Points of order were waived against the 
provisions of the bill pertaining to the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration since the annual authorization bill for that agency had 
not yet become law.

Motion To Suspend Application of a Statutory Rule

Sec. 9.2 A motion to suspend the rules and pass a bill suspends all 
    rules, including statutory provisions of law

[[Page 12294]]

    enacted under the rulemaking power of the House, and since under 
    article I, section 5 of the Constitution, each House may make and 
    change its rules, the House is not precluded from waiving a rule 
    enacted as a statute.

    On Nov. 1, 1977,(12) Mr. Stephen J. Solarz, of New York, 
moved to suspend the rules and pass the Congressional Salary Deferral 
Act, H.R. 9282. Mr. Robert E. Bauman, of Maryland, raised a point of 
order against the suspension motion on the ground that it infringed the 
jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget, in violation of section 
306 of the Budget Act. The arguments on the point of order and the 
ruling of Speaker Pro Tempore George E. Brown, Jr., of California, are 
shown in the Record of that date.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 123 Cong. Rec. 36309-11, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       Congressional Salary Deferral

        Mr. Solarz: Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass 
    the bill (H.R. 9282) to provide that adjustments in the rates of 
    pay for Members of Congress shall take effect at the beginning of 
    the Congress following the Congress in which they are approved, and 
    for other purposes.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                   H.R. 9282

            Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
        the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a)(1) 
        paragraph (2) of section 601(a) of the Legislative 
        Reorganization Act of 1946 (2 U.S.C. 31), relating to 
        congressional salary adjustment, is amended by striking out 
        ``Effective at the beginning of the first applicable pay period 
        commencing on or after the first day of the month in which'' 
        and inserting in lieu thereof ``Effective at the beginning of 
        the Congress following any Congress during which''. . . .
            Sec. 2. (a) It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any appropriation 
        bill, budget, resolution, or amendment thereto, which directly 
        or indirectly prevents the payment of increases in pay rates 
        resulting from a pay adjustment deferred under the amendments 
        made by the first section of this Act.
            (b) For purposes of subsection (a), the term ``budget 
        resolution'' means any concurrent resolution on the budget, as 
        such term is defined in section 3(a)(4) of the Congressional 
        Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.
            (c) The provisions of subsection (a) are enacted by the 
        Congress--
            (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and as such they 
        shall be considered as part of the rules of each House, 
        respectively, and such rules shall supersede other rules only 
        to the extent that they are inconsistent therewith; and
            (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
        either House to change such rules (so far as relating to such 
        House) at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent 
        as in the case of any other rule of such House.
            Sec. 3. The provisions of this Act shall take effect on the 
        date of the enactment of this Act.

[[Page 12295]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is a second demanded?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have a point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    present consideration of the bill under suspension on the ground 
    that the bill itself and the manner in which it was considered is 
    in violation of Public Law 93-344, the Congressional Budget Act, 
    specifically section 306.
        Section 306 of the Budget Act says as follows:

            No bill or resolution and no amendment to any bill or 
        resolution dealing with any matter which is within the 
        jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget of either House 
        shall be considered in that House unless it is a bill or 
        resolution which has been reported by the Committee of the 
        Budget of that House or from the consideration of which such 
        committee has been discharged, or unless it is an amendment to 
        such bill or resolution.

        Mr. Speaker, the bill before us specifically, in section 2, 
    seeks to repeal part of the jurisdiction of the Committee on the 
    Budget. Specifically it says the following:

            Sec. 2. (a) It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any appropriation 
        bill, budget resolution, or amendment thereto, which directly 
        or indirectly prevents the payment of increases in pay rates 
        resulting from a pay adjustment deferred under the amendments 
        made by the first section of this Act.

        Mr. Speaker, the Budget Act is very clear that so far as the 
    rules of procedure governing the Budget Act itself are concerned, 
    that is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Rules. This 
    bill was reported by the Committee on Post Office and Civil 
    Service, the committee of original jurisdiction, and I understand 
    the jurisdiction was waived by the Committee on Rules. 
    Nevertheless, section 306 makes it plain that since this bill, if 
    it becomes statutory law, repeals part of the jurisdiction of the 
    Committee on the Budget, it should have also been considered, in 
    the opinion of the gentleman from Maryland, by the Committee on the 
    Budget or their jurisdiction should have been waived. This was not 
    done.
        I would say further, Mr. Speaker, that if in fact any committee 
    of the House is able to report a bill which prevents the Committee 
    on the Budget from dealing with subject matters under that 
    reporting committee's jurisdiction, then the Committee on the 
    Budget in fact could be, over a period of time, destroyed as far as 
    its capability of dealing with the Budget Act.
        For all of those reasons, I make a point of order against 
    consideration of this bill. I would further point out that section 
    306 does not deal with reporting or with whether or not the House 
    can suspend the rules, but it forbids consideration by the House at 
    any time of any legislation that repeals or changes the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget without that 
    committee's acting upon it.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from New York 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Solarz: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        I have unbounded admiration for the parliamentary sagacity of 
    my good

[[Page 12296]]

    friend, the gentleman from Maryland. Who am I, after all, to 
    challenge the validity of this rather sophisticated parliamentary 
    analysis? But may I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that the substantive 
    merits of the gentleman's objection notwithstanding, the fact is 
    that from a procedural point of view I do believe it has to be 
    found wanting. The reason for that is that under the suspension of 
    the rules, which are the terms under which the legislation is being 
    considered, all existing rules of the House are waived, and to the 
    extent that the provision to which the gentleman from Maryland 
    referred is itself incorporated in the rules of the House, which 
    do, after all, provide for the consideration of these budget 
    resolutions, I would suggest that his objection is not relevant to 
    this resolution and, therefore, is not germane.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, may I be heard further?
        The gentleman makes the contention that by making a motion to 
    suspend the rules of the House, this wipes out a rule against 
    consideration in any form, including the suspension of the 
    requirements of the Budget Act. There is ample precedent in the 
    House for situations in which the Chair has ruled that a bill may 
    not even be brought up under suspension if it has not in fact been 
    considered by the committee of proper jurisdiction. I refer the 
    Chair to Hinds' Precedents, volume 5, section 6848, page 925, in 
    which it was ruled by the Chair that a committee, the Committee on 
    the Census, could not bring up for consideration under a motion to 
    suspend the rules a bill relating to the printing of a compendium 
    of a census, because it had not been brought before the Committee 
    on Printing.
        It is quite obvious that this is a question of consideration. 
    It is written into the statutory law that no such bill can be 
    considered, and I am not aware that that rule of consideration can 
    be suspended or repealed by a simple motion to suspend the rules. 
    If, in fact, that is the case, the Budget Act is meaningless.
        Mr. [Robert N.] Giaimo [of Connecticut]: Mr. Speaker, may I be 
    heard on the point of order?

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Connecticut.
        Mr. Giaimo: Mr. Speaker, the charge has been made and the 
    objection has been raised that this legislation, particularly 
    section 2, invades the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee in that 
    it purports to prohibit the Budget Committee from exercising its 
    jurisdiction over budget resolutions insofar as they would apply to 
    pay raises and cost-of-living increases. I must submit that that is 
    a proper interpretation.
        However, I do believe that the argument of the gentleman from 
    New York that this matter is being brought up under suspension of 
    the rules is a very valid one and that the House of Representatives 
    can in its wisdom by a two-thirds vote suspend the rules and 
    deprive the Budget Committee and in fact the Appropriations 
    Committee of jurisdiction in effecting pay raises or cost-of-living 
    increases by a two-thirds vote.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Are there any other Members who desire 
    to be heard on the point of order? If not, the Chair is prepared to 
    rule.
        The gentleman from Maryland makes a point of order against the 
    con

[[Page 12297]]

    sideration of the bill H.R. 9282 under suspension of the rules on 
    the grounds that section 306 of the Congressional Budget Act states 
    that no bill or resolution nor amendment to any bill or resolution 
    dealing with any matter which is within the jurisdiction of the 
    Committee on the Budget of either House shall be considered in that 
    House unless it is a bill or resolution which has been reported by 
    the Committee on the Budget of that House or from consideration of 
    which such committee has been discharged or unless it is an 
    amendment to such a bill or resolution.
        The Chair need not rule on the jurisdictional issue raised by 
    the gentleman and points out to the gentleman from Maryland that 
    under the specific provisions of section 904 of the Budget Act, the 
    provisions of title III including section 306, which he cites, are 
    stipulated as being an exercise of the rulemaking power of the 
    House of Representatives with full recognition of the 
    constitutional right of either House to change such rules so far as 
    relating to such House at any time in the same manner and to the 
    same extent as in the case of any other rule of such House. It is 
    the opinion of the Chair therefore that it is within the discretion 
    of the Chair under rule XXVII to entertain a motion to suspend the 
    rules and to consider the bill at this time. Of course, the 
    precedent cited by the gentleman from Maryland applies only to a 
    provision which is no longer in rule XXVII relating to motions to 
    suspend the rules made by committees. Accordingly the point of 
    order is overruled.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, may I be heard further, at the 
    sufferance of the Chair?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Bauman: I thank the Speaker for permitting me to be heard 
    further.
        I would just point out that the Speaker has pointed out that it 
    is within the prerogatives of the House to change the rules of the 
    House, but this is not a rule of the House. It is a provision of a 
    statute which is being waived, and while I would not appeal the 
    ruling, I do not think that is a proper basis for the ruling.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The specific provision which the 
    gentleman states has the status of a rule of the House of 
    Representatives under the statute and under the Constitution.
        Is a second demanded?
        Mr. [Edward J.] Derwinski [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I demand 
    a second.

Interpreting What Waiver Covers

Sec. 9.3 Instance where a unanimous-consent waiver of all points of 
    order against a bill combined with a unanimous-consent agreement to 
    consider the bill on a day certain was held to waive all points of 
    order against the consideration of the bill for failure of the 
    accompanying report to be available or to be sufficient under the 
    rules.

    On July 19, 1947,(13) Speaker Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of 
Massa

[[Page 12298]]

chusetts, ruled on the effect of a waiver on several points of order 
raised against a bill. The points of order had been waived pursuant to 
a unanimous-consent request which had been agreed upon three days 
previously.(14) The unanimous-consent agreement provided as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 93 Cong. Rec. 9396, 80th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        the National Security Act of 1947.
14. 93 Cong. Rec. 9095, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., July 16, 1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Charles A.] Halleck [of Indiana]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that it may be in order on Friday next and 
    thereafter to consider the bill H.R. 4214, that all points of order 
    against the said bill be considered as waived, and that there be 
    not to exceed 5 hours of general debate, to be confined to the bill 
    and to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
    ranking minority member of the Committee on Expenditures in the 
    Executive Departments; and further, Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous 
    consent that after the passage of the bill H.R. 4214 the Committee 
    on Expenditures shall be discharged from the further consideration 
    of the bill S. 758, and it shall then be in order in the House to 
    move to strike out all after the enacting clause of the Senate bill 
    and insert in lieu thereof the provisions contained in H.R. 4214 as 
    passed.

    The proceedings on July 19 were as follows:

        Mr. [Clare E.] Hoffman [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    4214) to promote the national security by providing for a Secretary 
    of Defense; for a National Military Establishment; for a Department 
    of the Army, a Department of the Navy, and a Department of the Air 
    Force; and for the coordination of the activities of the National 
    Military Establishment with other departments and agencies of the 
    Government concerned with the national security; and pending that, 
    Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all those who may speak 
    on the bill may include in their remarks any relevant material, and 
    that all Members who so desire may have five legislative days in 
    which to extend their remarks in the Record on this subject.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [W. Sterling] Cole of New York: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Cole of New York: My parliamentary inquiry is whether it 
    would be in order at this time to make a point of order against the 
    motion upon the ground that at least 24 hours have not intervened 
    between the time the bill was available and the time the bill was 
    called up.
        The Speaker: In reply to the inquiry of the gentleman from New 
    York, the Chair would say that under the unanimous-consent 
    agreement which was reached on July 16, appearing in the 
    Congressional Record at page 9095, all points of order against the 
    bill were waived.

[[Page 12299]]

        Mr. Cole of New York: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary 
    inquiry. I am further advised that although the bill is available 
    this morning, the report accompanying the bill is not. Would it be 
    in order to raise a point of order against the motion of the 
    gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Hoffman] upon the ground that the 
    report is not now available?
        The Speaker: It would not be in order because the same ruling 
    would apply. All points of order were waived under the unanimous-
    consent agreement.
        Mr. Cole of New York: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary 
    inquiry. I am informed that the report does not comply with the 
    rules of the House in that it does not set forth the alterations 
    proposed by the bill to existing law. My inquiry is whether the 
    request of the gentleman from Indiana, the majority leader, that 
    points of order against the bill be waived also carried with it the 
    waiving of points of order against the report which is supposed to 
    accompany the bill.
        The Speaker: The Chair is compelled to make the same ruling in 
    this instance also. All points of order were waived under the 
    unanimous-consent agreement and, therefore, the raising of that 
    point of order at this time would not be in order.
        Mr. Cole of New York: Mr. Speaker, without undertaking to 
    dispute the decision, I call your attention to the fact that the 
    request for waiving points of order was directed to the bill 
    itself. Does the Speaker rule that the waiving of points of order 
    against the bill carried with it the waiving of points of order 
    against the report?
        The Speaker: Yes.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Under the modern practice, points of order 
based upon insufficiency or unavailability of the accompanying report 
or upon certain Budget Act violations go to the question of 
consideration and not to the bill itself and must be separately waived. 
If points of order against the consideration of a bill are waived by 
unanimous consent, such waiver applies to the committee report on the 
bill.

Unanimous Consent for Consideration of a Bill; What It Waives

Sec. 9.4 A unanimous-consent agreement ``to consider a bill in the 
    House on tomorrow or any day thereafter'' may waive the three-day 
    availability requirement but does not waive other points of order 
    against consideration when the bill is called up under the 
    agreement.

    Where a non-privileged appropriation bill (not a general bill) was 
reported from the Committee on Appropriations, the chairman of that 
committee made a unanimous-consent request so the bill could be called 
up without meeting the three-day layover requirement. In response to an 
inquiry,

[[Page 12300]]

the Speaker indicated that if the request were granted, points of order 
under the Budget Act could still be raised when the bill was called up. 
The proceedings of Feb. 4, 1982,(15) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 128 Cong. Rec. 844, 845, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that it may be in order on tomorrow or any day 
    thereafter to consider in the House the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 
    391) making an urgent supplemental appropriation for the Department 
    of Labor for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1982.
        The Speaker: (16) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Mississippi?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Trent] Lott [of Mississippi]: What about section 311(a) of 
    the Budget Act? Is there a budget problem of hitting the ceiling?
        Mr. Whitten: In the first place, I do not know how that 
    applies. It is my information that technically we are not in excess 
    of the budget right now. That might be open to question on this, 
    that, or the other thing. My purpose in offering this is so we 
    could move ahead regardless. What I had in mind was the 3-day rule.
        The Speaker: May I answer the gentleman? It does not waive all 
    points of order.
        Mr. Lott: Mr. Speaker, that is what I wanted to ask.
        The Speaker: I say to the gentleman from Mississippi that it 
    does not waive all points of order but makes it in order to call 
    the bill up under the conditions stated.
        Mr. Lott: If I could, Mr. Speaker, I would address the question 
    to the chairman, or perhaps the Chair could respond.
        The Speaker: The Chair understands the gentleman is speaking, 
    of course, with regard to the Budget Act, the budget authority. 
    This request, as stated, does not waive a point of order, if some 
    Member would get on the floor to offer a point of order under the 
    Budget Act.
        Mr. Lott: Mr. Speaker, is it my understanding a point of order 
    would lie on this point of the Budget Act when it comes to the 
    House?
        The Speaker: The Chair would state that a proper point of order 
    at that time would be entertained.

Unanimous Consent for Protection of a Specific Section

Sec. 9.5 The House may by unanimous consent agree to consider a section 
    of a general appropriation bill without the intervention of a point 
    of order.

    On May 4, 1948,(17) as an alternative to obtaining a 
rule waiving points of order from the Committee on Rules, the House 
granted unanimous consent to consider a section [containing legislation 
in

[[Page 12301]]

an appropriation bill] without that section being vulnerable to a point 
of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 94 Cong. Rec. 5264, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 6430, a District of Columbia appropriations bill for 
        fiscal 1949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Horan, from the Committee on Appropriations, reported the 
    bill (H.R. 6430) making appropriations for the government of the 
    District of Columbia. . . .
        Mr. Fogarty reserved all points of order on the bill.
        Mr. [Walter F.] Horan [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that in the consideration of the bill making 
    appropriations for the District of Columbia for the fiscal year 
    1949 it may be in order to consider without intervention of a point 
    of order a section which I send to the desk and ask to have read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Sec. 2. Except as otherwise provided herein, all vouchers 
        covering expenditures of appropriations contained in this act 
        shall be audited before payment by or under the jurisdiction 
        only of the Auditor for the District of Columbia and the 
        vouchers as approved shall be paid by checks issued by the 
        Disbursing Officer without countersignature.

        The Speaker: (18) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Washington?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

Where Valid Point of Order Is Not Pressed Against an Amendment

Sec. 9.6 An amendment which is not in order because it is not germane 
    to a pending amendment may, by unanimous consent, be offered and 
    considered notwithstanding this infirmity.

    On occasion, the Committee of the Whole may proceed to consider and 
debate an amendment notwithstanding a decision that it is not germane. 
For example, on Oct. 31, 1975,(19) the proponent of an 
amendment not otherwise in order was permitted to offer it although it 
was not germane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 121 Cong. Rec. 34563, 34564, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert G.] Stephens [Jr., of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Stephens: Section 306 of title III 
        of H.R. 10024 as reported is amended by striking the word 
        ``person'' on line 22, page 15 and substituting therefor the 
        phrase ``state chartered depository institution'' and by adding 
        the words ``state chartered'' before the words ``depository 
        institution'' on line 12, page 16. . . .

        Mr. [Albert W.] Johnson of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment to the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania to the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Stephens: Insert at the end of section 
        306(b) the following language: ``Notwithstanding any other 
        provision of this subsection, compliance with the requirements 
        imposed under this subsection shall be enforced under--

[[Page 12302]]

            ``(1) Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act in the 
        case of national banks, by the Comptroller of the Currency; and
            ``(2) Section 5(d) of the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 in 
        the case of any institution subject to that provision, by the 
        Federal Home Loan Bank Board.''

        The Chairman: (20) The Chair observes that this is 
    not a proper amendment to the pending amendment and should be 
    offered separately.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Spark M. Matsunaga (Ha.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair will recognize the gentleman after the amendment of 
    the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Stephens) has been disposed of.
        Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, would it be in order 
    to tack them together by unanimous consent at this point?
        The Chairman: By unanimous consent, yes. Is the gentleman 
    making that request?
        Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that my amendment be offered as an amendment to the pending 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania?
        There was no objection.

Time of Adoption of Resolution of Waiver

Sec. 9.7 A resolution waiving points of order against a certain 
    provision in a general appropriation bill has been considered and 
    agreed to by the House after the general debate on the bill has 
    been concluded and reading for amendment has begun in the Committee 
    of the Whole.

    On May 21, 1969,(1) a waiver of the points of order 
against a particular section of a bill was adopted after the first 
paragraph of the bill was read for amendment. The proceedings on the 
resolution waiving points of order were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 115 Cong. Rec. 13246, 13251, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H. Res. 414, waiving points of order against 
        title IV, H.R. 11400, supplemental appropriation bill of 1969.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William M.] Colmer [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, by 
    direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 414 
    and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 414

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        11400) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 
        ending June 30, 1969, and for other purposes, all points of 
        order against title IV of said bill are hereby waived.

        Mr. Colmer: Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary 30 minutes to 
    the minority, to the very able and distin

[[Page 12303]]

    guished gentleman from California (Mr. Smith). Pending that I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.
        Mr. Speaker, I shall not use all the time on this resolution. 
    This is a rather unusual situation that we find ourselves in, 
    parliamentarily speaking. We have debated the supplemental 
    appropriation bill at some length under the privileged status of 
    the Appropriations Committee. Now we come in with a resolution from 
    the Rules Committee for one purpose and one purpose alone; that is, 
    to waive points of order against a particular section of the bill. 
    . . .
        The language that the rule waives the point of order against is 
    found in title IV of the bill. Title IV of the bill places a 
    ceiling upon the amount of the expenditures that the Chief 
    Executive can make within the fiscal year. Now, that amount is, 
    roughly, $192 billion. . . .
        Mr. Colmer: Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (2) The question is on the 
    resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Edmond Edmondson (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.

Interpretation of Resolution Providing Waiver

Sec. 9.8 In construing a resolution waiving certain points of order, 
    the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may examine debate on 
    the resolution in the House in determining the scope of the waiver.

    On June 22, 1973,(3) Chairman James G. O'Hara, of 
Michigan, was called upon to interpret the intention of the Committee 
on Rules in the adoption of language waiving certain provisions of a 
House rule in the consideration of an appropriation bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 119 Cong. Rec. 20983, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 8825, the HUD-independent agencies appropriations for 
        fiscal 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair feels that it will be necessary first to speak on the 
    contention raised by the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Tiernan) 
    and amplified upon by the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Giaimo) 
    with respect to the provisions of the resolution under which the 
    bill is being considered, and whether or not the provisions of that 
    resolution have an effect on the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Boland).
        The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Giaimo) is correct in 
    asserting that if the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode 
    Island (Mr. Tiernan) is out of order at all it is out of order 
    because of the second sentence of clause 2 of Rule XXI, which 
    contains the provisions that ``nor shall any provision in any such 
    bill or amendment thereto changing existing law be in order,'' and 
    so forth setting forth exceptions. But the gentleman from Con

[[Page 12304]]

    necticut (Mr. Giaimo) contends, and the gentleman from Rhode Island 
    (Mr. Tiernan) concurs, that the resolution providing for the 
    consideration of the bill waives the provisions of that rule. The 
    Chair has again read the rule. It says:

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        8825) making appropriations for the Department of Housing and 
        Urban Development . . . the provisions of clause 2, rule XXI 
        are hereby waived.

        It does not say that points of order are waived only with 
    respect to matters contained in the bill. It says ``During the 
    consideration of the bill'' the provisions of clause 2 of Rule XXI 
    are waived.
        The Chair was troubled by that language and has examined the 
    statements made by the members of the Committee on Rules who 
    presented the rule to see if their statements in any way amplified 
    or explained or limited that language. The Chair has found that 
    both the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Long) and the gentleman from 
    Ohio (Mr. Latta) in their explanations of the resolution did, 
    indeed, indicate that it was their intention, and the intention of 
    the committee, that the waiver should apply only to matters 
    contained in the bill and that it was not a blanket waiver.
        Therefore whatever ambiguity there may have been in the rule as 
    reported, the Chair is going to hold, was cured by the remarks and 
    legislative history made during the presentation of the rule, which 
    were not disputed in any way by the gentleman from Connecticut or 
    anyone else. However, the Chair recognizes that it is a rather 
    imprecise way of achieving that result and would hope that in the 
    future such resolutions would be more precise in their application.

    The Chair then sustained the point of order raised against the 
amendments offered by Mr. Tiernan.

Waiver Against Bill Does Not Cover Amendments

Sec. 9.9 Where the House has adopted a resolution waiving points of 
    order against a bill, no immunity is granted to Members to offer 
    amendments which are not germane.

    On June 15, 1948,(4) Mr. Leo E. Allen, of Illinois, 
called up House Resolution 671, which provided as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 94 Cong. Rec. 8340, 80th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be 
    in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee 
    of the Whole House on the State of the Union for consideration of 
    the bill (H.R. 6401) to provide for the common defense by 
    increasing the strength of the armed forces of the United States 
    and for other purposes, and all points of order against said bill 
    are hereby waived. That after general debate, which shall be 
    confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 3 hours, to be 
    equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
    member of the Committee on Armed

[[Page 12305]]

    Services, the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute 
    rule. At the conclusion of the reading of the bill for amendment, 
    the Committee shall rise and report the same to the House with such 
    amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question 
    shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto 
    to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
    recommit. After the passage of the bill (H.R. 6401) it shall be in 
    order in the House to take from the Speaker's table the bill, S. 
    2655, and to move to strike out all after the enacting clause of 
    said Senate bill and to insert in lieu thereof the provisions 
    contained in H.R. 6401 as passed.
The resolution was agreed to.(5)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On June 17, 1948,(6) an amendment to the bill was 
offered by Mr. Edward H. Rees, of Kansas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 94 Cong. Rec. 8685, 8686, 80th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6401, Selective Service Act of 1948.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Rees: At the end of line 12, page 
        23, add the following and number the succeeding sections 
        accordingly:
            ``Sec. 8. (a) The training under this act shall be 
        administered and carried out on the highest possible moral, 
        religious, and spiritual plane.
            ``(b) It shall be unlawful within such reasonable distance 
        of any military camp, station, fort, post, cantonment, or 
        training or mobilization place, where training under this act 
        is being given, as the Secretary of National Defense may 
        determine to be necessary to the protection of the health, 
        morals, and welfare of such persons who are receiving training 
        under this act and shall designate and publish in general 
        orders or bulletins, to establish or keep houses of ill fame, 
        brothels, bawdy houses, or places of entertainment which are 
        public nuisances, or other like facilities detrimental to the 
        health and morals of persons who are being trained under this 
        act, or to receive or permit to be received for immoral 
        purposes any person in any vehicle, place, structure, or 
        building used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or 
        prostitution within said distance determined by the Secretary 
        of Defense or to knowingly rent, lease, or permit the use of 
        any property for such purposes. Any person, corporation, 
        partnership, or association violating any of the provisions of 
        this subsection shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and 
        upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine of not more 
        than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 12 months, or 
        both.
            ``(c) The sale of or dealing in, beer, wine, or any 
        intoxicating liquors by any person in any post exchange, 
        canteen, ship's store, or Army, Navy, or Marine transport or 
        upon any premises used for military or naval purposes by the 
        United States is hereby prohibited. The Secretary of Defense is 
        authorized and directed to take appropriate action to carry out 
        the provision of this subsection.''

        Mr. [Walter G.] Andrews of New York: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order against the amendment that the provisions thereof 
    are not germane to the provisions of this bill.
        The Chairman (Mr. Francis H. Case of South Dakota): The Chair 
    is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from New York [Mr. Andrews] has made the point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the

[[Page 12306]]

    gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Rees] is not germane to the bill. 
    Several of the Members who have spoken have called attention to 
    other provisions in the bill. The Chair must remind the committee 
    that the provisions in the bill as reported by the committee were 
    made in order by a special rule adopted by the House of 
    Representatives. There may be provisions in the bill which would 
    not be germane if offered as an amendment by individual Members, 
    but are in order in the bill because they were made in order by the 
    rule adopted by the House.
        So every amendment offered must stand on its own bottom as to 
    whether or not it is germane.

        The Chair invites attention to the fact that the amendment 
    includes such language as ``It shall be unlawful to maintain 
    certain institutions,'' and further on says, ``Any person, 
    corporation, partnership, or association violating any of the 
    provisions of this subsection shall be deemed guilty of a 
    misdemeanor'' and so forth. In that respect it seems to the Chair 
    that the amendment goes beyond the provisions of the bill, imposing 
    penalties and sanctions on persons outside the armed forces.
        Therefore, the Chair is constrained to sustain the point of 
    order.

Effect on Amendments

Sec. 9.10 Where a resolution providing for the consideration of a bill 
    specifies that ``all points of order against said bill are hereby 
    waived,'' the waiver is applicable only to the text of the bill and 
    not to amendments.

    On May 1, 1968,(7) Speaker Pro Tempore Carl Albert, of 
Oklahoma, advised Mr. Durward G. Hall, of Missouri, as to whether 
points of order would lie against amendments to a bill after the 
adoption of a House resolution waiving points of order against the 
bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 114 Cong. Rec. 11304-06, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Being discussed was H. 
        Res. 1150, providing for consideration of H.R. 16729, extending 
        the higher education student loan program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Claude D.] Pepper [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1150 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 1150

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into 
        the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for 
        the consideration of the bill (H.R. 16729) to extend for two 
        years certain programs providing assistance to students at 
        institutions of higher education, to modify such programs, and 
        to provide for planning, evaluation, and adequate leadtime in 
        such programs, and all points of order against said bill are 
        hereby waived. . . .

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
    Pepper] is recognized for 1 hour. . . .
        Mr. Hall: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12307]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Hall: Mr. Speaker, in view of our colloquy and our 
    understanding of House Resolution 1150, which says, on lines 8 and 
    9, that ``all points of order against such bill are hereby 
    waived,'' my parliamentary inquiry is whether or not amendments 
    submitted--inasmuch as on line 1, page 2, the resolution states 
    ``the bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule''--
    could not be subject to a point of order or a point of order made 
    and lie against such amendments if they were nongermane or 
    otherwise did not come under a rule of the House? A mirror image of 
    my question is, does a point of order lie against all amendments 
    that might be offered?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The resolution does not apply to 
    amendments that might be offered. . . .
        There is nothing in the resolution which would provide for a 
    waiver of points of order against any amendment which might be 
    offered to the bill, if such amendment were not germane under the 
    rules of the House.

Sec. 9.11 Where the House by adoption of a resolution waives all points 
    of order against any provisions in an appropriation bill, such 
    action does not waive points of order against amendments offered 
    from the floor.

    On Aug. 20, 1951,(8) the Chairman (9) held 
that points of order would lie against amendments offered from the 
floor, despite a rule waiving points of order against the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 97 Cong. Rec. 10408, 82d Cong. 1st Sess. [H.R. 5215, a supplemental 
        appropriation bill for fiscal 1952]; Id. at p. 11682 [H.R. 
        2982, to readjust postal rates]; 100 Cong. Rec. 9629, 83d Cong. 
        2d Sess., July 2, 1954 [H.R. 9680, Agricultural Act of 1954].
 9. Edward J. Hart (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John J.] Dempsey [of New Mexico]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Dempsey: The amendment is not germane to this section, and 
    in addition to that, it is purely legislation on an appropriation 
    bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan desire to 
    address himself to the point of order?
        Mr. [Gerald R.] Ford [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, in reply to 
    the point of order made by the gentleman from New Mexico, I would 
    like to say first that under the rule adopted at the time this 
    legislation came to the floor all points of order were waived. 
    Secondly, I think that the amendment is germane. . . .
        Mr. Dempsey: Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Rules waived points 
    of order to the bill, but they certainly cannot waive points of 
    order to an amendment which might be offered, which the gentleman 
    is proposing to do.

[[Page 12308]]

        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        With respect to the question of waiving all points of order, 
    that runs only to the provisions of the bill and not to amendments 
    offered to the bill. A proposition in an appropriation bill 
    proposing to change existing law but permitted to remain, may be 
    perfected by germane amendments, provided they do not add further 
    legislation. The Chair is of the opinion that this amendment does 
    add further legislation, and, therefore, sustains the point of 
    order.

Sec. 9.12 Where points of order have not been waived against committee 
    amendments in a bill, such committee amendments occupy the same 
    status as those offered from the floor with respect to points of 
    order.

    On Aug. 9, 1954,(10) absent a special rule waiving 
points of order, a committee amendment was ruled nongermane.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 100 Cong. Rec. 13807, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was S. 
        3506, amending the District of Columbia Alley Dwelling Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joseph P.] O'Hara of Minnesota: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment on the ground that it is not 
    germane to the bill as passed by the Senate. . . .
        Mr. [Arthur L.] Miller of Minnesota: Mr. Speaker, this 
    amendment was offered not here today in the House but . . . was 
    voted and written into the bill when a full quorum was present in a 
    regularly constituted meeting of the District of Columbia 
    Committee. I am not sure what the vote was, but it was a 
    substantial vote. Therefore it is not being offered here today as a 
    new amendment. . . .
        The Speaker: (11) The Chair is prepared to rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        In response to the parliamentary inquiry propounded by the 
    gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. Miller] the Chair may say that the 
    committee amendment assumes the same status in the House as any 
    other amendment that might be offered from the floor. That is why 
    the Committee on Rules is sometimes asked to report special rules 
    waiving points of order against committee amendments. Those points 
    of order usually involve questions of germaneness. . . .
        The Chair is of the opinion that the amendment is not germane 
    and, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Sec. 9.13 A resolution adopted by the House waiving points of order 
    against a committee substitute does not waive such points against 
    amendments to the substitute.

    On Aug. 31, 1944,(12) the Committee of the Whole 
considered S. 2051 pursuant to a House Resolution (H. Res. 627), 
adopted two days previously by the House. This resolution provided: 
(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 90 Cong. Rec. 7463, 7464, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.
13. 90 Cong. Rec. 7350, 78th Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 29, 1944.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12309]]

        Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be 
    in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee 
    of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration 
    of the bill S. 2051, an act to amend the Social Security Act, as 
    amended, to provide a national program for war mobilization and 
    reconversion, and for other purposes, and all points of order 
    against said bill are hereby waived. That after general debate, 
    which shall be confined to the bill and continue not to exceed 2 
    days to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
    ranking minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means, the 
    bill shall be read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. It shall 
    be in order to consider without the intervention of any point of 
    order the substitute amendment recommended by the Committee on Ways 
    and Means now in the bill, and such substitute for the purpose of 
    amendment shall be considered under the 5-minute rule as an 
    original bill. At the conclusion of such consideration, the 
    committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such 
    amendments as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a 
    separate vote in the House on any of the amendments adopted in the 
    Committee of the Whole to the bill or committee substitute. The 
    previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
    amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion 
    except one motion to recommit.

    In response to a point of order raised by Mr. John Taber, of New 
York, it was held that the waiver of points of order against a 
committee substitute was limited to these provisions only, and the 
waiver did not apply, according to Chairman Fritz G. Lanham, of Texas, 
to possible amendments to the committee substitute.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 90 Cong. Rec. 7463, 7464, 78th Cong. 2d Sess., Aug. 31, 1944.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Aime J.] Forand [of Rhode Island]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Forand: Page 39, after the period 
        in line 24, add a new section as follows:

               ``unemployment compensation for federal employees

            ``Sec. 403. (a) The Social Security Act, as amended, is 
        further amended by adding at the end thereof the following new 
        title: . . .

        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order against the 
    amendment that it is an appropriation of funds in violation of 
    clause 4 of rule XXI of the House. . . .
        The Chairman: . . . Can the gentleman from Rhode Island show 
    how that is not included in the prohibition in the rule cited by 
    the gentleman from New York?
        Mr. Forand: Mr. Chairman, I have not studied that point. I did 
    not expect it was going to be raised. It has been carried in the 
    Senate bill all the way through without a question, and I contend 
    that title 301(a), under title III, is in the same category. No 
    point of order has been raised against that. So if one is subject 
    to a point of order, I imagine both would be.

[[Page 12310]]

        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from Rhode 
    Island that the rule under which we are considering this measure, 
    waives points of order against the committee substitute, but not 
    against the amendments which would be offered to that substitute. . 
    . .

Waiver for Text of Bill Offered as Amendment May Not Cover Portions 
    Thereof Individually

Sec. 9.14 Where a resolution providing for the consideration of a bill 
    makes in order the text of a specific bill as an amendment, points 
    of order are considered as waived only against the complete text of 
    the proposed bill and not against portions thereof.

    On Dec. 10, 1969,(15) Speaker Pro Tempore Carl Albert, 
of Oklahoma, explained the effect of a waiver to Mr. Clark MacGregor, 
of Minnesota.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 115 Cong. Rec. 38123, 38130, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Being discussed 
        was H. Res. 714, which provided for the consideration of H.R. 
        4249, extending portions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ray J.] Madden [of Indiana]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 714, and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 714

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into 
        the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for 
        the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4249). . . . It shall be in 
        order to consider, without the intervention of any point of 
        order, the text of the bill H.R. 12695 as an amendment to the 
        bill. At the conclusion of the consideration of H.R. 4249 for 
        amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the 
        House with such amendments as may have [been] adopted. . . .

        Mr. MacGregor: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. MacGregor: Mr. Speaker, under the resolution (H. Res. 714), 
    if adopted, should the bill, H.R. 12695, be considered and 
    rejected, would it then be in order, following rejection of H.R. 
    12695, should that occur, to offer a portion or portions of H.R. 
    12695 as amendments to H.R. 4249?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that would be in 
    order subject to the rule of germaneness, if germane to the bill 
    H.R. 4249.

Constructive Waiver

Sec. 9.15 Parliamentarian's Note: Where a motion which might have been 
    subject to a point of order (if a point of order had been raised in 
    a timely fashion) is, in the absence of a point of order, agreed 
    to--it represents the will of the House and governs its proce

[[Page 12311]]

    dure until the House orders otherwise (or until a proper collateral 
    challenge to that procedure is made).

    On Oct. 9, 1968,(16) following the Chair's disclosure of 
the absence of a quorum, the House adopted the following motion made by 
Mr. Brock Adams, of Washington:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 114 Cong. Rec. 30212-14, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. At the time the Clerk 
        was reading the Journal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Carl] Albert [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Speaker, I move a call of 
    the House.
        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, as a part of the motion of a call of 
    the House, I further move under Rule II, under which a call of the 
    House is in order, that a motion be made for the majority here that 
    those who are not present be sent for wherever they are found and 
    returned here on the condition that they shall not be allowed to 
    leave the Chamber until such time as the pending business before 
    this Chamber on this legislative day shall have been completed.
        The Speaker: (17) The question is on the motion 
    offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Adams].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The motion was agreed to.
        The Clerk proceeded to call the roll.(18) . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 114 Cong. Rec. 30213, 30214, 90th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: On this rollcall 222 Members have answered to 
    their names, a quorum.

    There was discussion then concerning whether this motion would have 
been subject to a point of order, had one been made. The Speaker stated 
that the motion as adopted expressed the will of the majority of the 
Members present, and indicated that the question was moot.

        Mr. Brock: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Brock: Is it not so that the rules of the House provide for 
    the highly unusual procedure of calling in absent Members only in 
    the case of the establishment of a nonquorum? Is that not true? And 
    was the motion not illegal and improper on its face, having been 
    made prior to the establishment of no quorum?
        The Speaker: The Chair will observe that we can always attempt 
    to have Members attend who are not present at this time or actually 
    in the Chamber at some particular time. Further, the Chair might 
    also observe that every effort is being made on the Democratic side 
    in connection with notifying Members of the situation that has 
    existed for the past 12 or so hours.
        Mr. Brock: But the parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker, was to 
    the question of whether or not the motion was in fact outside the 
    normal rules of the House.
        Mr. Albert: Mr. Speaker, will the Chair yield?
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Oklahoma desire to be 
    heard on the parliamentary inquiry of the gentleman from Tennessee?

[[Page 12312]]

        Mr. Albert: The gentleman from Oklahoma would only suggest if a 
    point of order would have been eligible as against the motion made 
    by the distinguished gentleman from Washington, it certainly has 
    come too late in view of the action of the House.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state without passing on the 
    question as to whether or not a point of order would lie if made at 
    the proper time when the gentleman from Washington made his motion, 
    that after the motion had been adopted no point of order was made. 
    Therefore, the motion expressing the will of the majority of the 
    Members present will be adhered to.

    Parliamentarian's Note: As indicated in the Parliamentarian's note 
in Chapter 11, Sec. 3.2, supra, this instance does not establish a 
precedent that a ``constructive waiver of a point of order'' may be 
accomplished in the absence of a quorum. In such circumstances, a 
proper collateral challenge to an improper order of the House may be 
made, as the discussion in that chapter indicates.

Where No Point of Order Is Lodged, Proceedings May Continue

Sec. 9.16 Where an amendment is offered and no point of order is raised 
    against its consideration, although a valid point of order could 
    have been raised, the Chair may use his parliamentary discretion to 
    clarify the situation so that the amendment may be debated and 
    voted on.

    The proceedings of Mar. 21, 1975,(19) illustrate the 
discretion that the Chair may sometimes exercise to allow the Committee 
of the Whole to work its will in an ambiguous situation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 121 Cong. Rec. 7950, 7952, 7953, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, of New Jersey, had offered a perfecting 
amendment to the pending section of the Emergency Middle-Income Housing 
Act of 1975, which was being read for amendment under the five-minute 
rule. Her amendment struck out one paragraph of the section under 
consideration and inserted new language. After debate on the Fenwick 
amendment Mr. Les AuCoin, of Oregon, offered ``a perfecting amendment'' 
which was not in order, since only one perfecting amendment can be 
pending at a time. When no point of order was raised, the AuCoin 
amendment was debated. The Chair could have treated the second 
amendment as a substitute for the first but chose to entertain it as a 
perfecting amendment to the text which would be stricken if the Fenwick 
amendment were adopted.(20) The relevant pro

[[Page 12313]]

ceedings are carried in Sec. 15.21, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. See Sec. 469 of Jefferson's Manual, House Rules and Manual (1997), 
        for discussion of the doctrine of perfecting text proposed to 
        be stricken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Chair's Initiative in Enforcing Rules

Sec. 9.17 In certain instances, particularly with respect to questions 
    of propriety in debate, the Chair takes the initiative in enforcing 
    the rules and does not await a point of order.

    Jefferson's Manual provides that ``it is the duty of the House, and 
more particularly of the Speaker, to interfere immediately, and not to 
permit expressions to go unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint 
to the other House.'' (1) Because of this admonition from 
Jefferson, the Chair has customarily differentiated between debate 
which engages in personalities toward other House Members, where the 
Chair normally awaits a point of order from the floor, and debate which 
raises the issue of comity between the Houses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. House Rules and Manual Sec. 374 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Since the amendment to Rule XIV clause 1, in the 101st Congress, 
the standards of what is permissible debate with reference to the 
Senate has changed. But the duty of the Chair remains as stated by 
Jefferson.
    An example of the Chair tak- ing the initiative is shown in the 
following exchange of Apr. 17, 1975,(2) which predated the 
amendment to Rule XIV mentioned herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 121 Cong. Rec. 10458, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (Mr. Cleveland asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [James C.] Cleveland [of New Hampshire]: Mr. Speaker, I am 
    amazed that four Democratic members of the Rules Committee of the 
    other body, reviewing the challenge of Democrat John Durkin to the 
    seating of Senator-elect Louis Wyman, should have yesterday voted 
    to take away from Wyman 10 straight Republican ballots that had 
    been properly counted for him in New Hampshire. These critically 
    important votes belong to Mr. Wyman by settled New Hampshire law in 
    a contest with an existing margin of two votes.
        As even Durkin's counsel acknowledged before the committee, the 
    ballots were and would have consistently been counted for Wyman in 
    New Hampshire. On each the voter had voted a cross in the straight 
    Republican circle with no marks on the Democratic side of the 
    ballot. He had also voted a cross in every voting square except Mr. 
    Wyman's. By operation of statute and court decision in New 
    Hampshire for 60 years-as well as in other States

[[Page 12314]]

    having the straight ticket option-a vote in the straight ticket 
    circle is a vote for every candidate under the circle and a vote in 
    every box under the circle by operation of law.
        Worse yet, similar ballots for Durkin in the original New 
    Hampshire recount had not been challenged by Wyman because under 
    settled New Hampshire law they were recognized as valid votes. 
    These remain in the totals relied on by the Senate committee, 
    counted for Durkin.
        On April 9 in this Record I called for a new election in New 
    Hampshire and surely this has now become a compelling necessity, 
    unless we are to witness a legislative Watergate.
        The Speaker: (3) The Chair must ask the gentleman to 
    desist and must call to the attention of the gentleman from New 
    Hampshire that his remarks are in violation of the rules of the 
    House and rules of comity. The Chair has been very lenient, but 
    this goes far beyond the bounds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        It is not proper to criticize the actions of the other body, or 
    any committee of the other body, in any matter relating to official 
    duties.
        Mr. Cleveland: Mr. Speaker, would it be in order for me to 
    quote a Member of the other body who characterized this?
        The Speaker: No, it would not be. The Chair was very lenient by 
    letting the gentleman make his point, but the Chair is going to be 
    strict in observing the rules of comity between the two bodies. 
    Otherwise we cannot function as an independent, separate 
    legislative body under the Constitution of the United States.

Points of Order Against Improper Debate

Sec. 9.18 The Speaker reaffirmed his intention to enforce the provision 
    in Jefferson's Manual which prohibits improper references to the 
    Senate and to exercise his own initiative in calling Members to 
    order where infractions occur.

    On June 16, 1982,(4) Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, of 
Massachusetts, anticipating that the House would shortly be considering 
an amendment directed at activities of the Senate, cautioned Mem- bers 
against violating the provision of Jefferson's Manual. The announcement 
and subsequent inquiries are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 128 Cong. Rec. 13843, 13873, 97th Cong. 2d. Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The Chair appreciates the fact that there is an 
    amendment that will be offered very shortly concerning the Senate.
        The Chair deems it necessary to make a statement at this time 
    to firmly establish an understanding that improper references to 
    the other body or its Members during debate are contrary to the 
    rules and precedents of the House and will not be tolerated. The 
    Chair will quote from section 374 of Jefferson's Manual which is a 
    part of the rules of the House:

            It is the duty of the House, and more particularly of the 
        Speaker, to

[[Page 12315]]

        interfere immediately, and not to permit expressions to go 
        unnoticed which may give a ground of complaint to the other 
        House, and introduce proceedings and mutual accusations between 
        the two Houses, which can hardly be terminated without 
        difficulty and disorder.

        Traditionally when a Member inadvertently transgresses this 
    rule of the House, the Chair upon calling the Member to order 
    prevails upon that Member to remove the offending remarks from the 
    Record. With the advent of television, however, the Chair is not 
    certain that such a remedy is sufficient. Henceforth, where a 
    Member's references to the other body are contrary to the important 
    principle of comity stated in Jefferson's Manual, the Chair may 
    immediately deny further recognition to that Member at that point 
    in the debate subject to permission of the House to proceed in 
    order. The Chair requests all Members to abide by this rule in 
    order to avoid embarrassment to themselves and to the House.
        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Speaker, in order to abide by the rules, which 
    are very difficult, does the Senate have the same rule? Does the 
    other body?
        The Speaker: No; the Senate does not have the same rule, but it 
    is a rule of our House and we are going to abide by it as long as I 
    am Speaker.
        Mr. Conte: Is it permissible to refer to them as `the other 
    body'?
        The Speaker: That is permissible, the other body . . .
        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: If the gentleman will yield 
    on that point, I do not want to behave like the other body. I am 
    fed up with Members of the other body posing for holy pictures on 
    congressional pay and then running around, collecting $60,000 in 
    outside income.

                  announcement by the speaker pro tempore

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is constrained to admonish 
    the body, in accordance with the warning of the Speaker earlier, 
    that the Members should be careful in their references to the other 
    body.

Vacating Point of Order Proceedings

Sec. 9.19 Where several items in an appropriation bill had been 
    stricken on points of order, the Committee of the Whole 
    subsequently agreed to vacate the point of order proceedings, 
    thereby causing the stricken language to be reinserted in the bill.

    On June 7, 1991,(5) during the consideration of the 
Defense appropriation bill, fiscal 1992, Mr. James A. Traficant, Jr., 
of Ohio, successfully made several points of order against provisions 
in the Operation and Maintenance title of the bill. He announced his in

[[Page 12316]]

tention to challenge many provisions by raising points of order, but 
reversed his position when promised that an amendment he wished to 
offer, also legislative in concept, would not be opposed by the bill 
managers when offered. He then sought to rectify his actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 137 Cong. Rec. 13976, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John P.] Murtha [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, we have 
    an agreement with the gentleman from Ohio that he can offer his 
    amendment at the appropriate place, if he would ask unanimous 
    consent to put back the provisions that he has taken out.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I would be glad to do that if I 
    could feel that when we got to conference and got everybody in the 
    back room, that when the law is signed by the President the 
    Traficant amendment would be in there . . .
        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman knows, I will do the 
    best I can with every provision we have put in, including the 
    provisions that the gentleman has put in the bill. We will do the 
    best that we can to hold that provision.
        I agree with the gentleman on the provision. I think it is a 
    very important provision, and I agree with the gentleman completely 
    on it.
        The Chairman: (6) Are there any other points of 
    order against title II?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. James L. Oberstar (Minn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        If not, are there any amendments to title II?

     vacating proceedings on previous points of order by mr. traficant

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that any 
    provisions of title II stricken by my objections to such provisions 
    for having constituted legislation on an appropriation bill be 
    vacated and the bill stand as it is.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio asks unanimous consent to 
    va-cate proceedings under points of order raised by the gentleman 
    from Ohio only, not the gentleman from Indiana, under title II.
        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Those provisions, accordingly, are restored to 
    title II of the bill.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 10. Role of Committee on Rules in Waiving Points of Order

    In the ``modern House,'' at least since the 95th Congress, the 
Committee on Rules has been called upon to craft special orders 
governing the consideration of most major pieces of legislation to be 
brought before the House. Even bills otherwise given ``privilege'' by 
standing rules of the House, such as general appropriation bills, are 
often considered pursuant to or are protected by a special 
rule.(7) Special rules can insulate a bill or amendments 
from points of order; they often are designed to expedite 
consideration.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Sec. 10.16, infra.
 8. See Sec. Sec. 10.15, 10.19-10.22, infra.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12317]]

    In recent Congresses, these special orders have become more 
complex. Some waive the application of all rules which would inhibit 
consideration of a measure; (9) some waive specific 
rules.(10) Others protect vulnerable amendments 
(11) or provisions of the bill text, structure an amendment 
process,(12) or modify normal debate rules. Some special 
orders contain a variety of such provisions and more.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. See Sec. Sec. 10.6, 10.14, infra.
10. See Sec. Sec. 10.3, 10.13, infra.
11. See Sec. Sec. 10.5, 10.18, infra.
12. See Sec. 10.23, infra.
13. See Sec. 10.16, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A special order can be selective, protecting some provisions or 
amendments and leaving others vulnerable.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Sec. Sec. 10.7, 10.9, 10.11, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    A special order may recommend the waiver of any rule, even one 
created in a statute enacted pursuant to the rulemaking authority of 
the House.(15) Such an order, if adopted by the House, can 
even modify the normal application of a standing rule or 
order.(16)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. See Sec. Sec. 10.1, 10.2, infra.
16. See Sec. Sec. 10.8, 10.10, 
        infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Waiving Points of Order Against Violation of Rule Established by 
    Statute

Sec. 10.1 One House may, pursuant to its constitutional authority to 
    make its own rules, change or temporarily waive provisions of law 
    which have been enacted as rules of each House insofar as that law 
    applies to the procedure of that House.

    On Mar. 20, 1975,(17) the chairman of the Committee on 
Rules called up for consideration a resolution reported as privileged 
by that committee. A point of order was raised against the 
consideration of the report on the ground that it purported to waive 
certain statutory provisions of the Budget Act in order to permit 
consideration of H.R. 4485, the Emergency Middle-Income Housing Act of 
1975. The resolution contained a provision waiving the applicability of 
section 401 of the Budget Act which prohibits consideration of a bill 
containing ``new spending authority'' not limited by amounts specified 
in an appropriation act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 121 Cong. Rec. 7676, 7677, 7678, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In support of the point of order raised by Mr. John B. Anderson, of 
Illinois, Mr. Robert E. Bauman, of Maryland, also pointed out that the 
report on the resolution did not contain a ``Ramseyer'' showing the 
waiver of section 401 of the Budget Act, arguing that the resolution 
``changed existing law'' and therefore had to comply with Rule

[[Page 12318]]

IX clause 4(d), making the so-called ``Ramseyer rule'' applicable to 
reports from the Committee on Rules.
    Several collateral parliamentary issues were raised in the argument 
on the point of order and are carried herein.

        Mr. [Claude] Pepper [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 337, and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

                                  H. Res. 337

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move, clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI and 
        section 401 of Public Law 93-344 to the contrary 
        notwithstanding, that the House resolve itself into the 
        Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
        consideration of the bill (H.R. 4485) to provide for greater 
        homeownership opportunities for middle-income families and to 
        encourage more efficient use of land and energy resources. 
        After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and 
        shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided 
        and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of 
        the Committee on Banking, Currency, and Housing, the bill shall 
        be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. At the 
        conclusion of the consideration of the bill for amendment, the 
        Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such 
        amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous question 
        shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments 
        thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one 
        motion to recommit.

        Mr. Anderson of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order 
    against House Resolution 337 and I would like to be heard on the 
    point of order.
        The Speaker: (18) The gentleman will state his point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Anderson of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, I raise a point of order 
    against House Resolution 337 on the grounds that the Budget Act by 
    direct inference forbids any waiver of the section 401 ban on new 
    backdoor spending in the House of Representatives.
        Mr. Speaker, my point of order is grounded on two basic facts: 
    First, there is no specific provision in section 401 for an 
    emergency waiver of its provisions; and yet, in section 402, which 
    generally prohibits consideration of bills authorizing new budget 
    authority after May 15, there is specific provision for an 
    ``Emergency Waiver in the House'' if the Rules Committee determines 
    that emergency conditions require such a waiver. It is my 
    contention that if the authors of section 401 had intended to 
    permit a waiver of its provisions, they would have specifically 
    written into law as they did with section 402. Section 402 makes a 
    similar provision for waiving its provisions in the Senate.
        Second, section 904 of the Budget Act, in subsections (b) and 
    (c) states that ``any provision of title III or IV may be waived or 
    suspended in the Senate by a majority vote of the Members voting,'' 
    thus extending a waiver procedure in the Senate to section 401 as 
    well as 402. But section 904 contains no similar waiver provision 
    for the House of Representatives.

[[Page 12319]]

        It should be clear from these two facts that the House was 
    intentionally excluded from waiving the provisions of section 401 
    of the Budget Act.
        Mr. Speaker, the point may be made that the Budget Act's 
    provisions are part of the rules of the House, and, as such, are 
    subject to change at any time under the constitutional right of the 
    House to determine the rules of its proceedings. But I think a fine 
    distinction should be drawn here. This resolution is presented for 
    the purpose of making a bill in order for consideration, and is not 
    before us for the purpose of amending or changing the Budget Act. 
    Since section 401 of the Budget Act deals concurrently with the 
    House and the Senate and their integrated procedures for 
    prohibiting new backdoor spending, any attempt to alter this would 
    have to be dealt with in a concurrent resolution at the very 
    minimum, if not a joint resolution or amendment to the Budget Act. 
    It is one thing for the House to amend its rules; it is quite 
    another for it to attempt, by simple resolution, to waive a 
    provision of law relating to the joint rules of procedures of both 
    Houses.
        Mr. Speaker, on March 3, 1975, section 401 of the Budget Act, 
    as well as certain other provisions, was activated by the issuance 
    of House report 94-25 by the House Budget Committee. On page 4 of 
    that report, under the heading, ``Controls on New Backdoor 
    Authorities,'' it is written:

            The Budget Committees are implementing immediately those 
        portions of section 401 of the Act which (1) make new contract 
        and borrowing authority effective only to the extent and 
        amounts provided in appropriations acts (section 401(a)).

        The report goes on to state:

            With respect to new contract and borrowing authorities, it 
        is very much in the interest of the new budget process to 
        prohibit a last-minute rush of new backdoor authorities.

        Mr. Speaker, despite the fact that section 401 was activated on 
    March 3, the Committee on Banking and Currency did not see fit to 
    report a clean bill on March 14 which was in conformity with the 
    section 401 requirement. And on March 18, some 15 days after the 
    activation of 401, the Banking and Currency Committee asked the 
    Rules Committee to waive section 401 against its bill.
        Mr. Speaker, the relevance of all this to my point of order 
    should seem quite obvious. It is not relevant whether the committee 
    promises to offer the appropriate amendment at a later point. It 
    may or may not offer such an amendment, and it may or may not be 
    adopted. But it should be quite clear that there never was any 
    intention to permit the Rules Committee to waive the provisions of 
    section 401; for by so doing, we would in effect be repealing the 
    backdoor spending ban of the Budget Act by permitting side-door 
    spending through the Rules Committee. It is my contention that the 
    authors of the Budget Act never intended for side-door spending in 
    the Rules Committee and for that reason specifically excluded any 
    provision for emergency waivers in section 401 in the House. I 
    therefore urge that my point of order be sustained.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Missouri desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Richard] Bolling [of Missouri]: I do, Mr. Speaker.

[[Page 12320]]

        Mr. Speaker, there are a variety of grounds on which it would 
    be possible to address this point of order. It could be dismissed 
    very quickly on the grounds that the rules of the House provide 
    that it shall always be in order to call up for consideration a 
    report from the Committee on Rules on a rule, joint rule or the 
    order of business, and then it proceeds to give the very limited 
    number of exceptions. The one that the gentleman from Illinois 
    makes as his point of order, and all the different ones he makes as 
    his points of order, are not included in those specific exceptions.
        So, the rules of the House specifically make it clear that the 
    Rules Committee is in order when it reports a rule dealing with the 
    order of business, and it does not qualify that authority except in 
    a very limited degree.
        Furthermore, it is an established fact that the House can 
    always change its rules. It is protected by so doing.
        Mr. Speaker, the Chair will note I have not relied on the fact 
    that as a member of the committee that dealt finally with the 
    Budget and Impoundment Control Act, I might have an opinion as to 
    what the authors of that act, and consequently the House, felt. I 
    know, as a matter of fact, that the authors of that bill in its 
    final form were well aware of the points that I have just made. It 
    seems to me very clear that the point of order is not valid on 
    those grounds.

        I think, however, it is important to add the fact that the 
    Committee on the Budget is a new committee. Quite specifically, the 
    legislation gave it a year in which it could work its way into the 
    process, and that this rule aids that committee in working its way 
    into the process.
        It has been pointed out by the gentleman from Illinois that 
    when the amendment of the committee is adopted, or the amendments 
    of the committee are adopted to the bill reported by the committee, 
    that the bill then will be in compliance even with the Budget 
    Control Act. But, this exception is fully justified on the grounds 
    of the intent of the Congress in giving the Congress itself an 
    opportunity of 1 year in which to try out the process without 
    requiring that every specific provision of that process as provided 
    in law be followed.
        So, on the general grounds, the constitutional grounds and the 
    specific grounds, it seems to me very clear that the point of order 
    is not good.
        Mr. [Chalmers P.] Wylie [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I would like to 
    be heard on the point of order.
        Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a question of the gentleman 
    from Missouri on the point of order. On page 6 of the bill H.R. 
    4485, at line 14, it says:

            [The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed 
        to purchase any obligations of the Association issued under 
        this section, and for such purposes the Secretary of the 
        Treasury is authorized to use as a public debt transaction the 
        proceeds from the sale of any securities issued under the 
        Second Liberty Bond Act.]

        Would the gentleman please explain to me the meaning of the 
    language?
        Mr. Bolling: I think it would be more appropriate if the 
    gentleman will allow me to suggest that a member of the Committee 
    on Banking and Currency should explain it.
        Mr. Wylie: It relates to the point of order, and that is the 
    point I want to

[[Page 12321]]

    make. This provides for back-door spending and, indeed, suggests 
    that the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized under the act, 
    which was passed many years ago, to increase the public debt 
    without congressional action or approval of the Committee on 
    Appropriations. It seems to me as if it goes directly to section 
    401(a), as provided in the new Budget Procedures Act.
        Mr. Bolling: I am not prepared to disagree with the gentleman 
    on his interpretation of that particular point, but I do not see 
    where it is pertinent to the point of order. I think the discussion 
    we have had on the point of order makes it clear that, despite the 
    fact, this rule is in order.
        Mr. Wylie: Does not the Budget Control Act, section 401(a) 
    prohibit back-door spending?
        Mr. Bolling: It also is possible for that provision to be 
    waived. What I tried to do in my discussion in opposition to the 
    validity of the point of order made by the gentleman from Illinois 
    was to point out the very broad basis on which such a matter could 
    be waived, a constitutional basis and a specific provision of 
    clause 4 of rule XI granting the Committee on Rules a very broad 
    authority to report matters that relate to order of business. It is 
    a well-known fact that the Committee on Rules often reports waivers 
    of points of order, and this is, in effect, a waiver of a point of 
    order.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of order against 
    the consideration of House Resolution 337 reported from the 
    Committee on Rules, on the grounds that that Committee has no 
    authority to report as privileged a resolution waiving the 
    provisions of section 401 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. 
    Section 401 prohibits the consideration in the House of any bill 
    which provides new spending authority unless that bill also 
    provides that such new spending authority is to be available only 
    to the extent provided in appropriations acts.
        The Chair would point out that while section 401 has the force 
    and effect of law, section 904 of the Congressional Budget Act 
    clearly recites that all of the provisions of title IV, including 
    section 401, were enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking power of 
    the House, to be considered as part of the rules of the House, with 
    full recognition of the constitutional right of each House to 
    change such rules at any time to the same extent as in the case of 
    any other rule of the House. House Resolution 5, 94th Congress, 
    adopted all these provisions of the Budget Act as part of the rules 
    of the House for this Congress.
        Much of the argument of the gentleman from Illinois goes to the 
    merits or the propriety of the action recommended by Committee on 
    Rules and not to the authority of that committee to report this 
    resolution.
        The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: I make a further point of order against the 
    consideration of this rule based on the ruling just made by the 
    Chair.

[[Page 12322]]

        The Chair has just ruled section 904 of the Budget Control Act 
    permits the House to exercise its power to change the rules of the 
    House.
        Under the rules of the House, in rule IX, 4(d), it requires 
    that--

            Whenever the Committee on Rules reports a resolution 
        repealing or amending any of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives or part thereof it shall include in its report 
        or in an accompanying document--
            (1) the text of any part of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives which is proposed to be repealed; and
            (2) a comparative print. . . .

        The report of the Rules Committee, Report 94-80, contains no 
    such comparative print. It shows nothing as to the effect of this 
    rule as it applies to any waiver or change of the rules of the 
    House; and, therefore, is in direct contradiction, on the basis the 
    Chair just cited. I, therefore, make a point of order this is not 
    in order at this time.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Bolling) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Bolling: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        It seems to the gentleman from Missouri that the constraint 
    purported to be placed on the House by that particular language is 
    not equal to the specific, clear, constitutional provision which 
    states that the House will make its rules and change its rules.
        Mr. Speaker, it would seem to me that no subsidiary provision 
    would be prevailing when the House would be stopped from modifying 
    its rules repeatedly by technical arguments.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair agrees with the statement made by the gentleman from 
    Missouri (Mr. Bolling). The Chair would state further that the 
    objection raised by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) refers 
    to permanent changes--amendments or repeals--in the rules of the 
    House and not to temporary waivers.
        Mr. [John J.] Rhodes [of Arizona]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Rhodes: Mr. Speaker, in accordance with the ruling of the 
    Chair, I inquire as to whether or not the ruling of the Chair has 
    the effect of rescinding the rule which is the subject of the point 
    of order made by the gentleman from Illinois or whether it merely 
    suspends the application of that rule for the purposes of the 
    resolution which is now before the House.
        The Speaker: In answer to the parliamentary inquiry, the Chair 
    will state that all the ruling of the Chair does is make in order 
    the consideration of the resolution before the House. It does not 
    change the permanent rules of the House.
        Mr. Rhodes: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.

        Mr. Rhodes: Mr. Speaker, would it then be necessary for the 
    resolution which is before the House to be agreed to by a two-
    thirds vote?
        The Speaker: It would not.
        The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Pepper) is recognized for 1 
    hour.
        Mr. Pepper: Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to the able 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Anderson), pending which I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume.

[[Page 12323]]

Authority of Committee on Rules To Waive Rules Put in Place by Statute

Sec. 10.2 The Committee on Rules can call up as privileged a resolution 
    which provides for temporary waivers of House rules, even though 
    those rules may be part of a statutory scheme enacted into law as 
    an exercise of congressional rulemaking authority.

    House Resolution 352 which provided for the consideration of the 
National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Act of 1975, was reported on 
Mar. 23, 1975, and called up as privileged on the following 
day.(19) Mr. Robert E. Bauman, of Maryland, raised a point 
of order against consideration of the resolution, claiming that a 
special procedural resolution could not waive provisions of a statutory 
law, in this instance a section of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
which prohibits consideration of measures containing ``new spending 
authority'' not subject to limitation by an appropriation act. He also 
argued that the report of the Committee on Rules was defective insofar 
as it did not contain a ``Ramseyer'' showing the waiver of a provision 
of the Budget Act which would have prevented consideration of the 
measure had it been applicable. The arguments raised against the 
resolution were similar to those raised against another special order 
reported by the Committee on Rules on the preceding day. The 
proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 121 Cong. Rec. 8418, 94th Cong. 1st Sess., Mar. 24, 1975.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Richard] Bolling [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 352 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

                                  H. Res. 352

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move, section 401 of Public Law 93-344 to 
        the contrary notwithstanding, that the House resolve itself 
        into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union 
        for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4222) to amend the 
        National School Lunch and Child Nutrition Acts in order to 
        extend and revise the special food service program for children 
        and the school breakfast program, and for other purposes 
        related to strengthening the school lunch and child nutrition 
        programs. After general debate, which shall be confined to the 
        bill and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally 
        divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
        member of the Committee on Education and Labor, the bill shall 
        be read for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be 
        in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a 
        substitute recommended by

[[Page 12324]]

        the Committee on Education and Labor now printed in the bill as 
        an original bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-
        minute rule, and all points of order against sections 13 and 15 
        of said substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of 
        clause 5, rule XXI are hereby waived. At the conclusion of such 
        consideration, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to 
        the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and 
        any Member may demand a separate vote in the House on any 
        amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the bill or 
        to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The 
        previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill 
        and amendments thereto to final passage without intervening 
        motion except one motion to recommit with or without 
        instructions.

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have a point of order.
        The Speaker: (20) The gentleman will state his point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    consideration of House Resolution 352 on two grounds. The first 
    ground is that the rule itself attempts to permit a waiver of 
    section 401 of Public Law 93-344, the Budget Control Act.
        In support of this point of order, I cite the argument by the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Anderson), which appeared in the 
    Congressional Record on page H2074 of last Thursday, which I adopt 
    by reference, the argument being in essence that a procedural 
    resolution of the House cannot repeal, amend, or waive a section of 
    statutory law.
        Mr. Speaker, anticipating the Chair's ruling on my first point, 
    I cite the ruling of the Chair on last Thursday in which the Chair 
    said in part:

            ``. . . section 401'' and the provisions thereof ``were 
        enacted as an exercise of the rulemaking power of the House, to 
        be considered as part of the rules of the House, with full 
        recognition of the constitutional right of each House to change 
        such rules at any time to the same extent as in the case of any 
        other rule of the House.''

        This leads me to state my second point of order against the 
    report, House Report 94-107, accompanying House Resolution 352, on 
    the grounds that this report violates rule XI of clause 4(d), of 
    the Rules of the House which in essence requires that at any time a 
    rule of the House is amended or changed, there shall be printed in 
    the text of the report a comparative print showing such changes.
        Mr. Speaker, in support of this second point, I have researched 
    the records of the House; to the best extent one Member can. I 
    realize that rule XI 4(d) is a new provision, but it has a 
    comparative predecessor in the Ramseyer Rule. I have found, in 
    looking up the Ramseyer Rule, that there is no comparable case in 
    which the Chair has ever ruled that a waiver by a simple resolution 
    making in order a rule has extended to the right to change the 
    statutes of the United States, without at least attempting to 
    comply with the Ramseyer Rule. The only close case that I found was 
    a case on January 9, 1930, in which the Chair [Speaker Longworth of 
    Ohio] ruled that the Ramseyer Rule did not apply to an 
    appropriations statute being enacted by the Congress which 
    permitted a temporary waiver of another statute, but this did not 
    apply to a simple rule.

[[Page 12325]]

        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, on both of these points, I suggest that 
    the consideration of this resolution and its report is not in order 
    at this time.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Bolling) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Bolling: I do, Mr. Speaker, very briefly.
        Mr. Speaker, I would cite the case cited by the gentleman from 
    Maryland (Mr. Bauman), the arguments which I happen to have made on 
    that day, and the various rulings of the Chair in support of the 
    position that the rule is in order.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule if the gentlemen do not 
    desire to be heard further.
        For the reasons stated by the Chair last week on the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) and on the 
    point raised by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Anderson), the 
    Chair finds no reason to reverse the ruling he made last week and 
    therefore overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Is it the Chair's position that henceforth, rule 
    XI, clause 4(d) does not apply at all in any instance where a 
    waiver of a permanent rule of the House, or a statute which has the 
    status of a permanent rule of the House is involved; that in any of 
    those instances there is no need for the Committee on Rules to 
    inform the House of its impending action?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that, firstly, the rule if 
    adopted is a temporary waiver, and the Chair has previously stated 
    his position with respect to temporary waivers in the case of that 
    portion of the gentleman's argument which cites the Ramseyer rule. 
    That is only applicable with respect to amendments or repeals of 
    laws or rules. It is not applicable simply to a waiver of a rule.
        The Chair overrules the point of order.
        The gentleman from Missouri is recognized.

Waiver Policy of Committee on Rules

Sec. 10.3 In certain Congresses, the Committee on Rules has followed a 
    policy of not granting ``blanket waivers'' but only waivers of 
    specified House rules.

    In the 100th Congress, a member of the minority leadership included 
in the Record a list of special orders which contained blanket waivers, 
and a copy of his letter to the then chairman of the Committee of Rules 
requesting adherence to the policy of granting only specific waivers. 
The insertion of Nov. 20, 1987,(1) is carried, in part, 
below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 133 Cong. Rec. 33209, 33210, 100th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Trent] Lott [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, the House Rules 
    Committee is rapidly becoming the ruleless committee. This week 
    alone, of the four

[[Page 12326]]

    rules we granted for the consideration of bills and conference 
    reports, all four waived all points of order against consideration. 
    In other words, for all we know, each of those measures could have 
    violated every rule in the book, including the entire Budget Act, 
    but the Rules Committee was saying, ``It's okay.''
        Mr. Speaker, about 9 years ago, when Congressman Bolling became 
    chairman of the Rules Committee, a conscious policy was instituted 
    to avoid blanket waivers of the rules in favor of specified 
    waivers. This policy has proved extremely useful to Rules Committee 
    members, the rest of the House, and to committees.
        When our current chairman, Senator Pepper, took over in 1983, 
    he continued to observe this policy, and, according to my research, 
    during his first term as chairman in the 98th Congress, 1983-84, 
    not once did we have a blanket waiver for a bill, a substitute made 
    in order as original text, or a conference report. In the last 
    Congress, though, such blanket waivers comprised 17 percent of all 
    rules. And thus far in this Congress, they constitute 23 percent of 
    all rules.
        Mr. Speaker, I don't think committees have become all that more 
    flagrant in their violations of rules than before to warrant such a 
    heavy reliance on blanket waivers. It's just that such rules are 
    easier to draft and explain away. In short, we are becoming sloppy 
    and lazy, and, in so doing, we will eventually be encouraging 
    committees to become so as well when it comes to complying with 
    House rules.
        I have therefore today written to Chairman Pepper, urging that 
    we return to our policy of specifying waivers in the rules we 
    grant. This is the best way Members will know what's involved with 
    both the rules we report and the bills they make in order. And, it 
    is the best way to keep committees honest and ensure that our rules 
    are honored to the maximum extent possible.
        At this point in the Record, Mr. Speaker, I will insert my 
    letter to Chairman Pepper and two tables I have prepared on blanket 
    waivers. The materials follow:
        Congress of the United States,
            House of Representatives,
              Washington, DC, Nov. 20, 1987.
                                                 Hon. Claude Pepper,
                 Chairman, House Committee on Rules, Washington, DC.

            Dear Mr. Chairman: Several years ago, the Rules Committee 
        made a conscious decision to avoid waiving all points of order 
        against measures, and instead to specify in our rules just 
        which House rules and Budget Act provisions were being waived.
            As a result of this policy, our Committee Members were 
        better prepared to explain the potential rules violations that 
        were being protected; House Members were consequently better 
        informed about the necessity for the rule and problems with the 
        bills made in order; and, I think, committees were likely to be 
        more careful about not violating House rules in drafting their 
        bills and reports.
            In reviewing rules granted in the last three Congresses, I 
        was pleased to learn that none of the 190 rules granted in the 
        98th Congress waived all points of order against a bill or its 
        consideration, against a substitute as original text, or 
        against a conference report. However, in the 99th Congress, 
        such waivers comprised 17% of all rules, and, in this

[[Page 12327]]

        Congress, amount to 23% of the rules reported to date. In fact, 
        in this week alone, all four of the rules reported waived all 
        points of order against the measures involved. (See enclosed 
        tables.)
            I would like to strongly urge that our Committee return to 
        our former policy of specifying waivers for the benefit of our 
        Committee members, the rest of the House, and as a deterrent 
        against even more violations by committees. While waiving all 
        the rules may be easy and convenient on the surface, it only 
        glosses over deeper troubles that are bound to disrupt surface 
        appearances and conditions the more the practice is relied on.
            With warm personal regards, I am
              Sincerely yours,
                                                       Trent Lott.

            Enclosures.

    The following is a list of rules containing waivers of all points 
of order in the 98th Congress:

                  100th Congress (as of Nov. 19, 1987)
    H. Res.:
      38..................................  H.R. 2.
      124.................................  H.R. 2 (CR).
      116.................................  H.J. Res. 175.
      151.................................  H.R. 3.
      191.................................  H.R. 4.
      227.................................  H.R. 2470.
      233.................................  H.R. 3022.
      236.................................  H.R. 27.
      238.................................  H.J. Res. 132.
      247.................................  H.J. Res. 324 (CR).
      265.................................  H.R. 3030.
      296.................................  H.R. 3545.
      298.................................  H.R. 3545.
      308.................................  H.R. 1451 (CR).
      309.................................  H.R. 1748 (CR).
      310.................................  H.R. 1720 (CR).
      314.................................  H.R. 1346.
      316.................................  H.R. --.
                     (CR) denotes conference report.


Chairman of the Budget Committee Announced Policy Regarding Waivers of 
    Budget Act Provisions Preventing Consideration of Bills

Sec. 10.4 In the first year of the implementation of the Congressional 
    Budget Act of 1974, the chairman of the Committee on the Budget 
    stated to the House the policies to be followed by his committee 
    regarding waivers recommended by the Committee on Rules for bills 
    violating restrictions against ``back-door spending'' contained in 
    the Budget Act.

    After several resolutions providing special orders of business 
reported from the Committee on Rules had been challenged by points of 
order when called up for consideration, and the Speaker had held them 
to be in order as proper exercises of rulemaking authority, the 
chairman of the Committee on the Budget, Mr. Brock Adams, of 
Washington, explained the policies to be followed by the Committee on 
the Budget in enforcement of the restrictions in the Budget Act. He 
acknowledged the authority of the House to waive provisions of the 
Budget Act but stated a policy of monitoring such waivers, supporting 
or

[[Page 12328]]

opposing them as necessary to protect the integrity of the budget 
process. The statement by Mr. Adams on Mar. 24, 1975,(2) 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 121 Cong. Rec. 8419, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
    this time. I would like to have at this time the attention of the 
    House so that I might outline the procedure which will be followed 
    by the Budget Committee.
        As the gentleman from Missouri has explained, these rules came 
    up without an opportunity for us to debate this motion before the 
    Rules Committee. I blame no one for this, because we are in the 
    process of implementing a new statute, which, as was described in 
    the earlier colloquy, puts together a process to be used for 
    closing back-door spending.
        The Speaker has ruled, as the statute (Public Law 93-344) 
    provides in section 401 that it shall not be in order under the 
    rules of the House to engage in new backdoor spending--as provided 
    in the act--unless this provision is waived by rule. This can be 
    recommended by the Committee on Rules, and that is proposed in this 
    case. The Budget Committee intends to implement this procedure in 
    the following fashion:
        First, I have written to the chairman of the Committee on 
    Rules, and stated that it will be the position of the Budget 
    Committee that it wishes to be heard on any proposed waiver of the 
    rules of the Budget Committee Act with regard to backdoor spending. 
    Thus the Budget Committee will have the opportunity to appear 
    before the Committee on Rules and argue the matter of whether a 
    rule waiving points of order should be granted. It is not the 
    general intention of this Member, as chairman of the Budget 
    Committee, to expect any waiver of such rule.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my letter 
    of March 21, 1975, to the chairman of the Committee on Rules 
    setting forth this position be included in the Record at this 
    point.
        The Speaker: (3) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Washington?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The letter follows:
                                                   March 21, 1975.
    Hon. Ray J. Madden,
    Chairman, Committee on Rules, U.S. House of Representatives, 
        Washington, D.C.

            Dear Mr. Chairman: As you know, on March 3, 1975, the 
        Committee on the Budget filed a report with the House (H. Rept. 
        No. 94-25) implementing certain new budget procedures contained 
        in P.L. 93-344, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
        Control Act of 1974.
            Two of the important new procedures implemented (effective 
        March 3) are as follows: (1) section 401(a), which prohibits 
        floor consideration of any new contract or borrowing authority 
        legislation unless it contains a provision that such new 
        authority is to be effective only to the extent or in such 
        amounts as are provided in appropriations acts; and (2) section 
        401(b)(1), which prohibits floor consideration of entitlement 
        legislation having an effective date before the start of the 
        next fiscal year.

[[Page 12329]]

            In order to assure effective implementation of these 
        provisions, I would ask that any request to the Rules Committee 
        for a waiver of points of order relating to sections 401(a) or 
        401(b)(1) of P.L. 93-344 be called immediately to the attention 
        of the Budget Committee. In such cases, the Committee will make 
        known to you its views on the waiver request as promptly as 
        possible.
            With warmest regards,
                                                  Brock Adams,
                                                       Chairman.

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I have also contacted all of the seated 
    committee chairmen of the House again by a special letter of March 
    21, 1975, and have indicated to them the procedure which is 
    required to be followed if back-door spending is to be allowed, 
    indicating the alternatives, and indicating that if a committee 
    wishes to have a waiver of the rule, that we are available to 
    discuss this matter with them before the matter is presented to the 
    Rules Committee. This has just been done with the other two bills 
    that were involved before the Rules Committee last week. In those 
    bills the back-door spending has been removed. We now have made 
    clear the procedure to be followed so that when the Budget 
    Committee members appear before the Committee on Rules, any 
    chairman looking for a waiver of this rule will know the procedure 
    to be followed.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that a copy of my letter 
    of March 21, 1975, which was sent to each chairman of a standing 
    committee, be included in the Record at this point.
        The Speaker: Is there objection to the request of the gentleman 
    from Washington?
        There was no objection.
        (The letter follows:)

            Identical Letter to all Chairmen of Standing Committees
                                                   March 21, 1975.
    Hon. Ray Roberts,
    Chairman, Committee on Veterans' Affairs, U.S. House of 
        Representatives, Washington, D.C.

            Dear Mr. Chairman: On March 3, 1975, the Committee on the 
        Budget filed a report with the House (H. Rept. No. 94-25) 
        implementing certain new budget procedures contained in P.L. 
        93-344, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
        1974.
            Two of the important new procedures implemented (effective 
        March 3) are as follows: (1) section 401(a), which prohibits 
        floor consideration of any new contract or borrowing authority 
        legislation unless it contains a provision that such new 
        authority is to be effective only to the extent or in such 
        amounts as are provided in appropriations acts; and (2) section 
        401(b)(1), which prohibits floor consideration of entitlement 
        legislation having an effective date before the start of the 
        next fiscal year.
            In order to assure effective implementation of these 
        provisions, I have asked the Rules Committee to bring to the 
        attention of the Budget Committee any request for a waiver of 
        points of order relating to sections 401(a) or 401(b)(1) of 
        P.L. 93-344. In such cases, the Budget Committee plans to 
        inform the Rules Committee of its views on the waiver request 
        as promptly as possible.
            Similarly, I would like to ask you to bring to the 
        attention of the Budget Committee any request you plan to make 
        for such a waiver. I assure you that our Committee will do 
        everything possible to work out with you any problems relating 
        to these new provisions of the Budget Act.
            I have asked George Gross, the Budget Committee's General 
        Coun

[[Page 12330]]

        sel, to contact your staff concerning any questions you may 
        have on these new procedures.
            With warmest regards,
                                                  Brock Adams,
                                                       Chairman.

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I might state that the reason we have 
    had these problems is that the implementing report of the committee 
    was only filed on March 3, 1975. We were then required to wait for 
    the filing of the Senate committee report which was filed on March 
    5, 1975. It was this process which put into effect section 401 of 
    Public Law 93-344. If we had not filed this report the back-door 
    spending closure would not have gone into effect until next year. 
    So we were implementing this provision a year in advance, and it is 
    now in effect.

Where Special Order Waives Point of Order Against Specific Amendment, 
    Germane Amendments Thereto May Be Considered and the Amendment as 
    Modified Remain Protected

Sec. 10.5 Where a special rule waives points of order against the 
    consideration of a designated amendment which might otherwise be 
    ruled out as not germane, and does not specifically preclude the 
    offering of amendments thereto, germane amendments to the amendment 
    may be offered and adopted but it is then too late to challenge the 
    amendment as modified even though its text is no longer that 
    protected by the explicit description in the waiver.

    The special order providing for consideration of the Energy 
Conservation and Oil Policy Act of 1975 made an amendment offered by 
Mr. Robert Krueger, of Texas, in order, notwithstanding the fact that 
it was arguably not germane. The rule did not address amendments to the 
protected amendment, and it was this aspect of the special rule which 
presented the procedural questions that arose in the July 22, 
1975,(4) proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 121 Cong. Rec. 23990, 23991, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Patricia] Schroeder [of Colorado]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment to the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mrs. Schroeder to the amendment 
        offered by Mr. Krueger: In section 8(d)(2)(E) (ii)(a)(1) of the 
        Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 as amended by Mr. 
        Krueger's amendment) strike the words ``(including development 
        or production from oil shale,'' and insert a comma after 
        ``gas''.
            In section 8(d)(2)(E)(ii)(a)(2) of the Emergency Petroleum 
        Allocation Act of 1973 (as amended by Mr. Krueger's amendment) 
        strike the words ``oil shale,''.

        Mr. [Bob] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point 
    of order, and pending that I have a parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12331]]

        The Chairman: (5) The gentleman from Texas reserves 
    a point of order, and the gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Eckhardt: The parliamentary inquiry is what determines 
    germaneness of this amendment, if it is germane, to the Krueger 
    amendment? It would then be admissible at this time as germane, as 
    I understand it. In other words, the relation to the Krueger 
    amendment would determine germaneness in this instance, I would 
    assume.
        The Chairman: If the gentleman is asking whether the amendment 
    offered by the gentlewoman from Colorado has to be germane, the 
    answer, of course, is ``yes.'' Is the gentleman contending that it 
    is not germane?
        Mr. Eckhardt: No. The gentleman merely asks whether or not on 
    the question of germaneness with respect to this amendment, the 
    question is determined on whether or not this amendment is germane 
    to the Krueger amendment.
        The Chairman: That is correct.
        Mr. Eckhardt: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my reservation of a point of order.
        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. Schroeder) to the amendment offered 
    by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Krueger).
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Brown of Ohio) there were--ayes 39, noes 31.
        So the amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the Krueger amendment.

        The Chairman: The Chair will have to state he believes the 
    point of order comes too late.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I am not making one at this time if 
    I need not make one, but I would certainly make one at such time as 
    the Krueger amendment would be voted on.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman restate what he is doing? Is 
    he making a point of order against the Krueger amendment?
        Mr. Eckhardt: I am making a point of order against the Krueger 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: That comes too late.
        Mr. Eckhardt: If the Chairman would hear me on the point of 
    order I will be glad to explain.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the point of order. It comes too late.
        The Chairman: The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman from 
    Texas on the timeliness of his point of order.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, if the Chair would permit me, I 
    should make a point of order now if I must do so or I will at such 
    time as the vote arises on the Krueger amendment on the ground that 
    the Krueger amendment is now outside the rule.
        If the Chair will recall, I queried of the Chair whether or not 
    the question of germaneness on the amendment offered by the 
    gentlewoman from Colorado was based upon its germaneness to the 
    Krueger amendment or if that were the standard. The Chair answered 
    me that it was. Therefore, the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
    from Colorado was not subject to a point of order at that time and 
    I

[[Page 12332]]

    point out to the Chair that the question of germaneness rests upon 
    whether or not the amendment is germane to the amendment to which 
    it is applied.
        At that time it was not in order for me to urge that the 
    amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Colorado was not germane 
    because it was indeed germane to the Krueger amendment, but the 
    rule protects the Krueger amendment itself from a point of order on 
    the grounds of germaneness and specifically says that it shall be 
    in order to consider without the intervention of any point of order 
    the text of an amendment which is identical to the text of section 
    301 of H.R. 7014 as introduced and which was placed in the 
    Congressional Record on Monday and it is described.
        The Krueger amendment upon the adoption of the Schroeder 
    amendment becomes other than the identical amendment which was 
    covered by the rule. At this point the question of germaneness of 
    the Krueger amendment rests on the question of whether or not it is 
    at the present time germane to the main body before the House.
        It is not germane to the main body before the House because of 
    the--and I cite in this connection Deschler on 28, section 24 in 
    which there are several precedents given to the effect that an 
    amendment which purports to create a condition contingent upon an 
    event happening, as for instance the passage of a law, is not in 
    order. For instance 24.6 on page 396 says:

            To a bill authorizing funds for construction of atomic 
        energy facilities in various parts of the Nation, an amendment 
        making the initiation of any such project contingent upon the 
        enactment of federal or state fair housing measures was ruled 
        out as not germane.

        There are a number of other authorities in that connection, 
    that is, an amendment postponing the effectiveness of legislation 
    pending contingency.
        Now, with respect to the question of timeliness, the gentleman 
    from Texas could not have raised the point of order against the 
    Schroeder amendment because of the fact that the Schroeder 
    amendment was, in fact, germane to the Krueger amendment. It is 
    clearly stated that the test of germaneness must rest on the 
    question of the body upon which the amendment acts, and as I 
    queried the Chair at the time, I asked that specific question, 
    would the germaneness of the Schroeder amendment rest upon the 
    question whether it is germane to the Krueger amendment.
        The Chair answered, I think correctly, that it was germane. I 
    could not quarrel with that ruling and I could not at that point 
    raise a question whether it was effective to the main body involved 
    here; but at this time is the very first time I have had an 
    opportunity and I raise the point of order that the Krueger 
    amendment as now constituted is not protected by the rule.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member desire to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I only state 
    that it seems to me that the rule makes the Krueger amendment in 
    order by its text, but it does not prohibit it being amended by 
    subsequent action of this body and that if the text had been 
    changed by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Krueger) in its 
    introduction, the

[[Page 12333]]

    point of order might have been appropriate; but the point of order 
    that is attempted to prohibit this body from amending the text of 
    the Krueger amendment after it has been properly introduced and 
    been made germane by the rule would prohibit those others in the 
    majority of this body from acting on any perfection of the Krueger 
    amendment. I do not think that is the purpose of the rule.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule, unless another Member 
    desires to be heard.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Chairman, I am troubled by this point of 
    order. I think, first of all, it comes too late. I think the 
    amendment, Mr. Chairman, comes, first of all, too late.
        Second, it would make a nullity of the actions of the Committee 
    on Rules, which very specifically made in order the Krueger 
    amendment.
        As a matter of fact, it was at the request of this particular 
    Member and the gentleman from Texas that that was done and also it 
    was at the request of this particular Member of this body that the 
    Committee on Rules made appropriate amendments to the Krueger 
    amendment. If the point of order of the gentleman from Texas would 
    prevail, the gentleman would be able to ex post facto undo the work 
    of the Committee on Rules and convert a prior amendment, which may 
    or may not have been germane, into such a vehicle that it would 
    strike at the actions of the Committee on Rules.
        The time to raise this point of order was at the time of 
    offering the amendment by the gentlewoman from Colorado.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule, but the Chair would 
    be glad to hear from additional Members.
        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard only because of 
    the statement of the gentleman from Michigan, who is a very correct 
    man with respect to points of order, but the gentleman is now not 
    quite correct.
        The gentleman from Michigan did, in truth, ask that the rule 
    include the specific provision protecting the Krueger amendment, if 
    amended; but the Committee on Rules did not include the gentleman's 
    request, but rather very sharply and definitely prescribed that the 
    matter that would be relevant and nothing else was the body of that 
    amendment as printed in the Record.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The rule under which the matter is being considered did in fact 
    make in order the so-called Krueger amendment, and any amendment to 
    that amendment which is germane to that amendment was thus, at the 
    same time, made in order. There was no need for special provision 
    to make amendments germane to the Krueger amendment in order, and 
    the argument made by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) is very 
    much to the point.
        The Chair, therefore overrules the point of order.

Waiving Points of Order

Sec. 10.6 Rules of the House which are designed to prohibit 
    consideration of a bill can be waived if the House adopts a special 
    order which makes consideration in order

[[Page 12334]]

    notwithstanding violations of Budget Act provisions or inadequacies 
    in the committee report.

        House Resolution 601 of the 95th Congress, 1st Session, 
    providing for the consideration of the Victims of Crime Act (H.R. 
    7010), illustrates the type of special order which may be used to 
    allow a bill to be considered where, absent the adoption of such a 
    rule, points of order would prevent consideration.
        The content of the special order and the explanation of its 
    provisions are included below.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 123 Cong. Rec. 17965, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., June 8, 1977.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

                                  H. Res. 601

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move, section 401(b)(1) of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344), clause 
        2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI, and clause 7 of rule XIII to the 
        contrary notwithstanding, that the House resolve itself into 
        the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for 
        the consideration of the bill (H.R. 7010) to provide for grants 
        to States for the payment of compensation to persons injured by 
        certain criminal acts and omissions, and for other purposes. 
        After general debate, which shall be confined to the bill and 
        shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided 
        and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of 
        the Committee on the Judiciary, the bill shall be read for 
        amendment under the five-minute rule. At the conclusion of the 
        consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall 
        rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
        may have been adopted, and the previous question shall be 
        considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to 
        final passage without intervening motion except one motion to 
        recommit.

        The Speaker: (7) The Chair recognizes the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts (Mr. Moakley).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John Joseph] Moakley [of Massachusetts]: . . . .
        Section 401(b)(1) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 
    prohibits consideration of any bill containing new entitlement 
    authority which could take effect before the first day of the 
    fiscal year which begins during the calendar year in which the bill 
    is reported. H.R. 7010 is clearly an entitlement within the meaning 
    of the act.
        The Committee on Judiciary has agreed to offer an amendment on 
    the floor which will insure that the entitlement provision cannot 
    take effect before October 1, 1977. The amendment will bring the 
    bill into full compliance and, on the basis of this agreement, the 
    Committee on Budget has supported a waiver of the point of order 
    and the Committee on Rules has reported a resolution containing the 
    waiver.
        Clause 2(l)(3)(A) of rule XI provides that reports of 
    committees shall contain oversight findings and recommendations. Of 
    course, the Victims of Crime Act establishes an entirely new 
    program. Since the program does not yet exist, the Committee on 
    Judiciary could hardly exercise any oversight

[[Page 12335]]

    at this point. The committee intends to exercise vigorous oversight 
    and a simple statement like the one I am making contained in the 
    committee report would have satisfied the requirement of the rule. 
    It is a purely technical waiver and I am aware of no possible 
    controversy.
        Clause 7 of rule XIII requires any report to contain a cost 
    estimate. This was added to the rules of the House by the 
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and has been rendered 
    largely obsolete by enactment of the Congressional Budget Act 
    creating the Congressional Budget Office. The act added to the 
    rules of the House a rule (clause 2(l)(3)(B) of rule XI) which 
    requires all committee reports to contain a cost estimate prepared 
    by the Congressional Budget Office. Since CBO has greater 
    professional expertise in this area, the old rule is usually 
    complied with by a single sentence stating the committee reporting 
    the bill accepts the CBO estimate as accurate. The violation of the 
    rule occurs simply because the report does not contain a statement 
    conceding the CBO estimate. It should be noted that a detailed cost 
    estimated by CBO is included in the report (H. Rept. 95-337) on 
    pages 11 through 14 inclusive. While the Committee on Judiciary 
    neglected to include a statement that it accepts the estimate, it 
    does agree and notes that the departmental estimate is in the same 
    range. This waiver is quite technical and presents no controversy 
    at all. . . .
        Mr. [John B.] Anderson of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, House 
    Resolution 601 is a 1-hour, open rule providing for the 
    consideration of H.R. 7010, the Victims of Crime Act of 1977. Mr. 
    Speaker, this rule contains three waivers, two of which would have 
    been unnecessary if the committee had taken more care in preparing 
    its report. The first waiver, mentioned at line 2 of the rule, is 
    of section 401(b)(1) of the Budget Act which prohibits 
    consideration of any new spending authority which would take effect 
    prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. This waiver is necessary 
    because subsection 2(c) of the bill, beginning on line 22 of page 
    2, provides an automatic entitlement of travel, transportation and 
    per diem expenses to the members of the Advisory Committee on 
    Victims of Crime. Since this advisory committee presumably could be 
    in operation before October 1 of this year, the waiver became 
    necessary. I would hasten to add, though, that the waiver does not 
    apply to the grants made available to victims of crime. Under 
    section 9 of the bill, the compensation grants to victims of crime 
    does not begin until fiscal year 1978.

Resolutions Providing Partial Waivers, Leaving Certain Provisions 
    Unprotected From Points of Order

Sec. 10.7 A resolution may propose the waiver of points of order 
    against legislative provisions in a general appropriation bill 
    except for certain enumerated provisions which then remain 
    vulnerable to points of order.

    When the Committee on Rules has a hearing to consider a rule 
waiving points of order against

[[Page 12336]]

provisions in a general appropriation bill, Members may appear at that 
hearing to ask that certain language not receive the protection of a 
waiver.
    The special rule granting waiver protection to certain provisions 
in the Defense appropriation bill for fiscal 1978 was called up in the 
House on June 24, 1977.(8) In the debate on the rule, the 
necessity for certain explanatory language in the rule, limiting the 
effect of a point of order against an unprotected provision to the 
precise words targeted by the point of order, was explained by Mr. 
Delbert L. Latta, of Ohio, a minority member on the Committee on 
Rules.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 123 Cong. Rec. 20706, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
 9. Since the special rule identified the parts of the bill which were 
        to be protected by page and line numbers, the Parliamentarian 
        suggested to the Committee on Rules that a proviso be added to 
        the rule making it clear that the remainder of a paragraph 
        would not be ruled out if a portion thereof was unprotected. 
        The fact that the remainder of a paragraph was protected by a 
        waiver of a particular House rule would not of itself alter the 
        general principle that an entire paragraph of an appropriation 
        bill is subject to a point of order if any provision therein is 
        vulnerable to a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gillis W.] Long of Louisiana: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 655 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 655

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        7933) making appropriations for the Department of Defense for 
        the fiscal year ending September 30, 1978, and for other 
        purposes, all points of order against the following provisions 
        in said bill for failure to comply with the provisions of 
        clause 2, rule XXI are hereby waived: beginning on page 13, 
        line 14 through page 16, line 9; beginning on page 17, line 17 
        through page 20, line 19; beginning on page 21, line 15 through 
        page 23, line 21; beginning on page 25, line 8 through page 27, 
        line 25; and beginning on page 40, line 25 through page 42, 
        line 16; and all points of order against the following 
        provisions in said bill for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clause 6, rule XXI are hereby waived: beginning 
        on page 15, line 13 through page 24, line 15, except with 
        respect to the language on page 19 beginning with the word 
        ``and'' on line 17 and all that follows up to the semicolon on 
        line 21: Provided however, That a point of order if sustained 
        against the language falling within the exception in the 
        preceding sentence shall apply only to that language and not to 
        the entire paragraph in which it appears.

        The Speaker: (10) The gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. 
    Long) is recognized for 1 hour. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Latta: Mr. Speaker, I agree with the statements that were 
    just made by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. Long).

[[Page 12337]]

        I would like to point out that there is a proviso in this rule 
    which would seem to set a new precedent. I have reference to line 
    5, page 2 of the rule where the following proviso appears:

            Provided however, That a point of order if sustained 
        against the language falling within the exception in the 
        preceding sentence shall apply only to that language and not to 
        the entire paragraph in which it appears.

        Mr. Speaker, this unusual provision was included in the rule as 
    a result of an amendment offered in the Rules Committee. A member 
    objected to the waiver of clause 6, rule XXI as it applied to 
    language transferring funds for the hydrofoil missile ship program 
    to other purposes. He strongly favored the hydrofoil ship program 
    and did not favor transferring the funds from the hydrofoil ship 
    program to other purposes. Therefore, he moved to amend the rule so 
    that the waiver of clause 6, rule XXI would not apply to the 
    language transferring funds from the hydrofoil ship program to 
    other purposes.
        The Rules Committee adopted his amendment excepting from the 
    waiver of clause 6, rule XXI, the language in the bill on page 19, 
    beginning with the word ``and'' in line 17 and all that follows up 
    to the semicolon on line 21.
        Once part of the paragraph was exempted from the waiver, it was 
    then necessary to add the proviso clause, insuring that the rest of 
    the paragraph would still stand. This was necessary because the 
    House precedents state that an entire appropriating paragraph is 
    subject to a point of order when a part of that paragraph is 
    subject to a point of order.

Special Order Modifying Application of Germaneness Rule

Sec. 10.8 The Committee on Rules may report a special order altering 
    the ordinary test of germaneness, such as rendering only one 
    portion of an amendment subject to challenge by a point of order as 
    being not germane, while protecting the consideration of the 
    remainder of the amendment.

    The Defense Department authorization bill, 1979 was considered in 
the House on May 24, 1978. A special order, with the unique feature 
which permitted a point of order to lie against one provision in an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, had been adopted on May 23. 
The critical part of the special rule and the resulting proceedings in 
Committee of the Whole under this rather unique rule were as follows.
    The pertinent language in H. Res. 1188, adopted by the House on May 
23, 1978,(11) was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 124 Cong. Rec. 15094, 15095, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  H. Res. 1188

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into 
        the Committee of the Whole

[[Page 12338]]

        House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
        bill (H.R. 10929) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal 
        year 1979, for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval 
        vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, 
        and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed 
        Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for 
        each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each 
        Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel 
        of the Department of Defense, to authorize the military 
        training student loads, and to authorize appropriations for 
        civil defense, and for other purposes. . . . It shall be in 
        order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute 
        recommended by the Committee on Armed Services now printed in 
        the bill as an original bill for the purposes of amendment, 
        said substitute shall be read for amendment by titles instead 
        of by sections and all points of order against said substitute 
        for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 5, rule XXI 
        and clause 7, rule XVI, are hereby waived, except that it shall 
        be in order when consideration of said substitute begins to 
        make a point of order that section 805 of said substitute would 
        be in violation of clause 7, rule XVI if offered as a separate 
        amendment to H.R. 10929 as introduced. If such point of order 
        is sustained, it shall be in order to consider said substitute 
        without section 805 included therein as an original bill for 
        the purpose of amendment, said substitute shall be read for 
        amendment by titles instead of by sections and all points of 
        order against said substitute for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clause 7, rule XVI and clause 5, rule XXI are 
        hereby waived. . . .

    The proceedings of May 24,(12) when the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute was pending in the House were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Id. at pp. 15293-95.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (13) When the Committee rose on 
    Tuesday, May 23, 1978, all time for general debate on the bill had 
    expired. Pursuant to the rule, the Clerk will now read by titles 
    the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended 
    by the Committee on Armed Services now printed in the reported bill 
    as an original bill for the purpose of amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
        the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this 
        Act may be cited as the ``Department of Defense Appropriation 
        Authorization Act, 1979''.

        Mr. [Clement J.] Zablocki [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, in 
    accordance with the rule, House Resolution 1188, I make a point of 
    order that section 805 of the committee amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute, if offered as a separate amendment to H.R. 10929 as 
    introduced, would be in violation of clause 7 of House Rule XVI 
    regarding germaneness. This provision which deals with the 
    withdrawal of troops from Korea, and section 805 which deals with 
    the withdrawal of troops from Korea, is not germane to the 
    Department of Defense authorization bill. . . .
        Thus, by whatever test of germaneness one examines, section 805 
    is not germane to H.R. 10929.

[[Page 12339]]

        Mr. Chairman, without regard to the merits of the issue, H.R. 
    10929 is not the proper vehicle for House consideration of the 
    issue of U.S. troop withdrawal from Korea. Accordingly, I must 
    insist on the point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Samuel S.] Stration [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I desire 
    to be heard on the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Zablocki), 
    makes the point of order that section 805 is not germane on the 
    ground that it deals with a matter that is related to something 
    that has been before his committee. As he indicated before the 
    Committee on Rules, if this had been introduced as an original 
    bill, it would have been referred sequentially to the Committee on 
    International Relations as well as to the Committee on Armed 
    Services.
        I submit, Mr. Chairman, that, first of all, the question of 
    germaneness does not depend on what committee it might be referred 
    to sequentially. In fact, the whole idea of sequential referral is 
    a relatively new concept. I believe, in fact, that it has only been 
    practiced in this House during this present Congress, and perhaps a 
    few times previously. . . .
        So, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the point of order be overruled. 
    Section 805 is clearly within the authority of the committee. It is 
    clearly germane to the broad purposes of the bill and the House 
    should have the right to vote on this important question.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule. The gentleman from 
    Wisconsin makes a point of order against section 805 of the 
    committee amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by 
    the Committee on Armed Services, on the grounds that section 805 of 
    said amendment would not have been germane if offered to the bill 
    H.R. 10929, as introduced.
        As indicated by the gentleman from Wisconsin, the special order 
    providing for consideration of this measure, House Resolution 1188, 
    allows the Chair to entertain a point of order on the basis stated 
    by the gentleman, that section 805 of the committee amendment would 
    not have been germane as a separate amendment to H.R. 10929 in its 
    introduced form.
        The bill as introduced and referred to the Committee on Armed 
    Services contains authorizations of appropriations and personnel 
    strengths of the Armed Services for fiscal year 1979. It contains 
    no permanent changes in law or statements of policy except for mi-
    nor conforming changes to existing law relating to troop and 
    personnel strengths.
        Section 805 of the committee amendment in the nature of a 
    substitute prohibits: First the withdrawal of ground combat units 
    from the Republic of Korea until the enactment of legislation 
    allowing the retention in Korea of the equipment of such units, and 
    second, the reduction of combat units below a certain level in the 
    Republic of Korea until a peace settlement is reached between said 
    Republic and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea ending the 
    state of war on the Korean peninsula.
        The subject matter of section 805 of the committee amendment is 
    unrelated

[[Page 12340]]

    to H.R. 10929 as introduced. The strength levels prescribed in the 
    bill are for 1 fiscal year only and deal with the overall strength 
    of the Armed Forces, not with the location of Armed Forces 
    personnel. As indicated in the argument of the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin, the withdrawal of American Forces stationed abroad 
    pursuant to an international agreement, and the relationship of 
    that withdrawal to peace agreements between foreign nations and to 
    the transfer of American military equipment to foreign powers, are 
    issues not only beyond the scope of the bill but also within the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on International Relations. Although 
    committee jurisdiction over an amendment is not the sole test of 
    germaneness, the Chair feels that it is a convincing argument in a 
    case such as the present one where the test of germaneness is 
    between a limited 1-year authorization bill and a permanent 
    statement of policy contingent upon the administration of laws 
    within the jurisdiction of another committee.
        For the reasons stated, the Chair sustains the point of order.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, the Chair may have just stated a 
    novel concept which has never before been heard in a ruling. That 
    is that the sequential referral rule somehow serves as the basis 
    for jurisdiction, and thus can support a point of order dealing 
    with a section in a bill such as the one before us.
        The parliamentary inquiry I have is this: Simply because under 
    the new procedure adopted for the first time in this Congress the 
    rules allow sequential referral at the discretion of the Speaker, 
    does that mean that a committee that has primary jurisdiction, such 
    as the Committee on Armed Services, may be challenged on the floor 
    and have a point of order sustained removing a provision that might 
    be partially under the jurisdiction of another committee on a 
    sequential referral?
        The Chairman: The ruling of the Chair does not stand for that 
    proposition.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Maryland 
    understood the Chair to say that the argument of the gentleman from 
    Wisconsin was persuasive to the Chair regarding jurisdiction. If 
    that is the case, it seems to me every committee of this House is 
    somehow going to be challenged on the floor henceforth if its 
    jurisdiction is shared to the slightest degree by another 
    committee.
        The Chairman: All the Chair has stated is that section 805 is 
    not germane to the introduced bill, and the rule provides that the 
    point of order would lie on that ground.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Chairman, I have this further parliamentary 
    inquiry:
        Then the ruling of the Chair is based on germaneness of this 
    amendment to this bill and does not go to any effect the sequential 
    jurisdiction would have on the provision?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.

Special Order Waiving Points of Order and Refining Application of Rule 
    XXI Clause 2 to Particular Provision in Bill

Sec. 10.9 Form of a special order providing that during con

[[Page 12341]]

    sideration of a general appropriation bill, all points of order 
    under Rule XXI clause 2 are waived except with respect to a portion 
    of one paragraph, which is left unprotected.

    The form of the resolution waiving certain points of order against 
House Resolution 332, the supplemental appropriation bill for fiscal 
1984, is carried in full, below: (14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 129 Cong. Rec. 27329, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., Oct. 5, 1983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Martin] Frost [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of the 
    Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 332 and ask for its 
    immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 332

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        3959) making supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year 
        ending September 30, 1984, and for other purposes, all points 
        of order against the bill for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clause 2, rule XXI are hereby waived, except 
        against the language beginning with the word ``Provided'' on 
        page 2, line 21 through the colon on page 2, line 25: Provided 
        That a point of order against that provision may be made only 
        against that provision and not against the entire paragraph.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) The gentleman from 
    Texas (Mr. Frost) is recognized for 1 hour. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Dale E. Kildee (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Frost: . . . House Resolution 332 provides for the 
    consideration of these items by waiving all points of order against 
    consideration of the bill for failure to comply with the provisions 
    of clause 2, rule XXI. A number of provisions in the bill are not 
    authorized and there is also language in the bill which is 
    considered legislation, thus necessitating the waiver of clause 2 
    of rule XXI. There is, however, one exception to this blanket 
    waiver. In chapter I of the bill, the Committee on Appropriations 
    added legislative language to the provision of funds for the 
    Emergency Veterans' Job Training Act of 1983 which would have 
    changed the eligibility requirements for job training as provided 
    in the authorizing act. Consequently, the Committee on Rules did 
    not provide the waiver of clause 2, rule XXI for this language and 
    a point of order against this language, but not against the entire 
    paragraph, will stand if it is raised during consideration of the 
    bill.

Altering Application of Germaneness Rule by Special Order

Sec. 10.10 Example of a special order which alters the application of 
    the germaneness rule, making part of an amendment in the nature of 
    a substitute vulnerable to a separate challenge as ``not germane'' 
    to the bill as introduced, while protecting the remainder of the 
    amendment.

    The special rule providing for consideration of the Civil Service

[[Page 12342]]

Reform Act of 1979 permitted points of order to be lodged against two 
titles of the substitute. The text of the rule, as excerpted from the 
proceedings of Aug. 11, 1978,(16) is set forth herein:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 124 Cong. Rec. 25705, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Lloyd] Meeds [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 1307 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 1307

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to move, section 402(a) of the Congressional 
        Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) to the contrary 
        notwithstanding, that the House resolve itself into the 
        Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
        consideration of the bill (H.R. 11280) to reform the civil 
        service laws. After general debate, which shall be confined to 
        the bill and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be 
        equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
        minority member of the Committee on Post Office and Civil 
        Service, the bill shall be read for amendment under the five-
        minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in 
        the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Post 
        Office and Civil Service now printed in the bill as an original 
        bill for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, 
        said substitute shall be read for amendment by titles instead 
        of by sections, and all points of order against said substitute 
        for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 7, rule XVI 
        are hereby waived, except that it shall be in order when 
        consideration of said substitute begins to make one point of 
        order that titles IX and X would be in violation of clause 7, 
        rule XVI if offered as a separate amendment to H.R. 11280 as 
        introduced. If such point of order is sustained, it shall be in 
        order to consider said substitute without titles IX and X 
        included therein as an original bill for the purpose of 
        amendment, said substitute shall be read for amendment by 
        titles instead of by sections and all points of order against 
        said substitute for failure to comply with the provisions of 
        clause 7, rule XVI are hereby waived. At the conclusion of the 
        consideration of the bill for amendment, the Committee shall 
        rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as 
        may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate 
        vote in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of 
        the Whole to the bill or to the amendments in the nature of a 
        substitute made in order by this resolution. The previous 
        question shall be considered as ordered on the bill and 
        amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion 
        except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Washington (Mr. 
    Meeds) is recognized for 1 hour.

Rules Selectively Protecting Provisions Against Point of Order

Sec. 10.11 The Committee on Rules can protect portions of a general 
    appropriation bill from points of order under

[[Page 12343]]

    Rule XXI clause 2, and leave other portions unprotected and subject 
    to being ruled out on points of order.

    The special order reported from the Committee on Rules 
(17) to govern consideration of the State, Justice, 
Commerce, and the Judiciary appropriations bill, fiscal 1982, is a 
valid example of how special rules can be tailored to meet particular 
circumstances.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 127 Cong. Rec. 18799, 18800, 97th Cong. 1st Sess., July 30, 1981.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Leo C.] Zeferetti [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 188 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 188

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        4169) making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, 
        Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for 
        fiscal year ending September 30, 1982, and for other purposes, 
        all points of order against the following provisions in said 
        bill for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 2 of 
        rule XXI are hereby waived; beginning on page 3, lines 1 
        through 4; beginning on page 3, line 20 through page 6, line 
        12; beginning on page 8, line 4 through page 10, line 7; 
        beginning on page 13, lines 6 through 23; beginning on page 17, 
        line 3 through page 23, line 21; beginning on page 25, lines 1 
        through 14; beginning on page 25, lines 16 through 20; 
        beginning on page 26, lines 7 through 14; beginning on page 26, 
        line 19 through page 33, line 14; beginning on page 33, line 16 
        through page 34, line 6; beginning on page 34, line 15 through 
        page 36, line 11; beginning on page 39, lines 4 through 18; 
        beginning with the word ``to'' on page 7, line 19 through page 
        7, line 20; beginning with the word ``Provided'' on page 24, 
        line 13 through page 24, line 16; and all points of order 
        against the following provisions in said bill for failure to 
        comply with the provisions of clause 6, rule XXI are hereby 
        waived: beginning on page 6, lines 6 through 12: Provided, That 
        in any case where this resolution waives points of order 
        against only a portion of a paragraph, a point of order against 
        any other provision in such paragraph may be made only against 
        such provision and not against the entire paragraph. . . .

        Mr. Zeferetti: . . . Clause 2 of rule XXI prohibits 
    unauthorized appropriations and legislation in an appropriation 
    bill. H.R. 4169 includes various programs which have not yet 
    completed the authorization process and without this waiver would 
    be subject to a point of order.
        Clause 6 of rule XXI prohibits reappropriations in an 
    appropriations bill. This waiver is required due to one item in 
    title I permitting administrative costs for the coastal energy 
    impact fund to be derived from unobligated funds in the expired 
    account for environmental grants.
        As in House Resolution 171, HUD appropriations, House 
    Resolution 188 includes a provision that insures in any case where 
    this resolution waives points of order against only a portion of a 
    paragraph, a point of order against any other provision in such 
    paragraph

[[Page 12344]]

    may be made only against such provision and not against the entire 
    paragraph.

Points of Order Against Special Rules

Sec. 10.12 No point of order lies against a special order of business 
    reported from the Committee on Rules waiving points of order or 
    otherwise altering procedures governing consideration of a measure, 
    where no rule of the House or law enacted as rulemaking authority 
    prohibits such consideration.

    Public Law 96-389 amended Public Law 95-435 to reaffirm 
congressional commitment toward achieving a balanced budget. A fair 
summary of the law was that beginning with fiscal year 1981, the total 
budget outlays of the federal government shall not exceed its receipts. 
This statute did not constitute a rule of the House and did not prevent 
consideration of any budget resolution or other measure providing 
budget outlays in excess of revenues.
    The resolution and the budget resolution which it made in order are 
excerpted from the Record of June 10, 1982,(18) and carried 
herein:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 128 Cong. Rec. 13352, 13353, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        First Concurrent Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1983

        Mr. [Claude] Pepper [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 496 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                H. Res. 496

        Resolution providing for the consideration of the concurrent 
            resolution (H. Con. Res. 352) revising the congressional 
            budget for the United States Government for the fiscal year 
            1982 and setting forth the congressional budget for the 
            United States Government for the fiscal years 1983, 1984, 
            and 1985

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order, section 305(a)(1) of the Congressional 
        Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344) to the contrary 
        notwithstanding, to move that the House resolve itself into the 
        Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the 
        consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 352) 
        revising the congressional budget for the United States 
        Government for the fiscal year 1982 and setting forth the 
        congressional budget for the United States Government for the 
        fiscal years 1983, 1984, and 1985, and the first reading of the 
        resolution shall be dispensed with. General debate in the 
        Committee of the Whole on said resolution shall continue not to 
        exceed two hours, with not to exceed one hour equally divided 
        and controlled as provided in section 305(a)(2) of the 
        Congressional Budget Act and not to exceed one hour for debate 
        on economic goals and policies as provided in section 305(a)(3) 
        of the Congressional Budget Act. No amendment to the resolution 
        shall be in order ex

[[Page 12345]]

        cept the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the 
        Congressional Record of June 8, 1982, by Representative Latta 
        of Ohio, said amendment shall be in order any rule of the House 
        to the contrary notwithstanding and shall be considered as 
        having been read, and said amendment shall be debatable for not 
        to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the 
        chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the 
        Budget. Said amendment shall not be subject to amendment except 
        for a substitute consisting of the text of the amendment in the 
        nature of a substitute printed in the Congressional Record of 
        June 8, 1982, by Representative Jones of Oklahoma, said 
        amendment shall be in order any rule of the House to the 
        contrary notwithstanding and shall be considered as having been 
        read and said amendment shall not be subject to amendment but 
        shall be debatable for not to exceed one hour, to be equally 
        divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
        member of the Committee on the Budget. The resolution shall not 
        be subject to a demand for a division of the question in the 
        House pending final adoption. It shall also be in order to 
        consider the amendment or amendments provided in section 
        305(a)(6) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 necessary to 
        achieve mathematical consistency. Upon the adoption of H. Con. 
        Res. 352, the concurrent resolution S. Con. Res. 92 shall be 
        considered to have been taken from the Speaker's table, to have 
        been amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute 
        consisting of the text of H. Con. Res. 352 as adopted by the 
        House, to have been adopted by the House as so amended, and the 
        House shall be considered to have insisted on its amendment to 
        S. Con. Res. 92 and to have requested a conference with the 
        Senate thereon; the Speaker shall then appoint conferees 
        without intervening motion.

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    reserve a point of order against consideration of the rule.
        The Speaker: (19) The gentleman has to state his 
    point of order. There is no reserving a point of order against 
    consideration of a report from the Committee on Rules.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I request a point of order against the 
    legislation for the fact that it puts in order consideration of a 
    bill which, if passed, would violate the law of the land; namely, 
    Public Law 95-435; and that the rule provides no waiver for that 
    particular violation of law, nor does the resolution that we will 
    be taking up provide any waiver of that law.
        So, therefore, Mr. Speaker, we will be considering a rule and 
    legislation which would be in direct contravention of a law which 
    was reaffirmed by this House yesterday by a vote of 375 to 7.
        Mr. Speaker, I would demand a ruling on my point of order.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Pepper) wish 
    to speak on the point of order?
        Mr. Pepper: Mr. Speaker, I invite the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        Section 904 of the Budget Act makes it clear that that act was 
    adopted as an exercise of rulemaking powers. Those rules and laws 
    which do constitute rules of the House may be waived at any time by 
    either House of the Congress of the United States, and

[[Page 12346]]

    this power lies in the Rules Committee.
        However, the statute that the gentleman cites which has been 
    amended is not a rule of the House. It triggers no point of order, 
    it needs no waiver, so the gentleman's point of order is not well 
    taken.
        The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Pepper) is recognized for 1 
    hour.

Example of the Interaction of Two House Rules Governing Admissibility 
    of Amendments

Sec. 10.13 Where an amendment may be protected by a special order from 
    vulnerability to a point of order under one rule of the House, it 
    may still be susceptible to a point of order under another rule.

    On July 17, 1985,(20) the Committee of the Whole had 
under consideration the Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary 
appropriation bill for fiscal 1986. Points of order had been waived 
against unauthorized items in the bill by a special rule. An amendment 
was offered to a paragraph of the bill which increased the unauthorized 
figure therein. Two points of order were raised against the amendment: 
the Chair overruled one and sustained the second. The proceedings 
showing the interaction of two House rules are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 131 Cong. Rec. 19432, 19435, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [C. W. Bill] Young of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Young of Florida: On page 15, line 
        4 strike ``$1,194,132,000'' and insert ``$1,203,625,000''. . . 
        .

        Mr. [Neal] Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of 
    order on the amendment.
        Mr. [Don] Edwards of California: Mr. Chairman, I also reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: (1) Does the gentleman from California 
    [Mr. Edwards] insist on his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Edwards of California: Mr. Chairman, did the gentleman from 
    Florida [Mr. Young] withdraw his amendment?
        Mr. Young of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I did not withdraw the 
    amendment, no.
        Mr. Edwards of California: Mr. Chairman, it was my 
    understanding there was a commitment made to withdraw the 
    amendment. If that is not true, I insist on my point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California [Mr. Edwards] will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Edwards of California: Mr. Chairman, the amendment violates 
    clause 2 of House rule XXI, which provides no appropriation shall 
    be reported in any general appropriation bill for any expenditure 
    not previously authorized by law.

[[Page 12347]]

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Smith] desire 
    to press his point of order?
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: I do, Mr. Chairman. I have a different point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Smith of Iowa: I am very reluctant to make a point of 
    order, but I feel I have to in this case.
        It would add budget authority for fiscal year 1986. The waiver 
    of the points of order against the provisions in the bill did not 
    waive points of order against amendments. Therefore, an amendment 
    to add money to the bill would not be in order.
        I am very constrained to do that, but if I do not do that in 
    this case, I know there will be a lot of amendments all over the 
    place.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Florida [Mr. Young] wish 
    to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Young of Florida: Mr. Chairman, I do.
        Regarding the point made by our colleague, the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Edwards], that it is an unauthorized item, this 
    paragraph in question is not authorized but it is protected by the 
    rule. It is well established under the precedents of the House that 
    where an unauthorized appropriation is permitted to remain in the 
    bill by waiver of points of order, that appropriation may be 
    amended to increase the sum, provided the amendment does not add 
    unauthorized items.
        My amendment does exactly that, and I believe that that point 
    of order should be overruled.
        On the point of my friend and colleague from Iowa [Mr. Smith], 
    deal- ing with the Budget Act, again, Mr. Chairman, I suggest that 
    the point of order is not well taken. The purpose of House 
    Resolution 221, the rule covering points of order against the 
    Budget Act, is to allow an appropriations bill to be considered on 
    the House floor before the first concurrent budget resolution has 
    been approved by Congress. And since consideration of an 
    appropriations bill on the House floor general- ly does not require 
    a rule and does not limit amendments, interpretation of this 
    language should follow usual House procedures and allow amendments 
    to appropriations bills whether the amendment would increase or 
    decrease an uncertain budget ceiling.
        Therefore, the point of order I think should be overruled. I 
    make the point again that the first budget resolution is still 
    pending, it has still not been finalized by the Congress.
        Second, on the same point, Mr. Chairman, House Resolution 221, 
    the rule covering points of order against the Budget Act, provides 
    that all points of order for failure to comply with the provisions 
    of section 303(a) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Public 
    Law 93-344, are hereby waived. Section 303(a) of the Budget Act 
    states that ``it shall not be in order in either the House of 
    Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or resolution 
    (or amendment thereto) ***.'' Since House Resolution 221 does not 
    specifically limit amendments and since it is to be read in 
    conjunction with section 303(a), my amendment offered during 
    consideration of a general appropriations bill that was reported by 
    the Appropriations Committee prior to July 12, 1985, should be 
    allowed and the point of order overruled.

[[Page 12348]]

        The Chairman: If no one else wishes to be heard on the point of 
    order, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        With regard to the point of order raised by the gentleman from 
    California [Mr. Edwards], as to appropriation without 
    authorization, the Chair is constrained to overrule that point of 
    order on the grounds that a waiver has been provided in the rule 
    against the amount in the bill, and the amendment merely increases 
    that amount without an earmarking for an unauthorized purpose.
        With regard to the point of order made by the gentleman from 
    Iowa [Mr. Smith] as to whether it has not been waived by the rule, 
    the Chair is constrained to uphold that point of order on the 
    grounds that, while consideration of the bill itself has in House 
    Resolution 221 received a waiver from section 303(a) of the Budget 
    Act, that does not apply to amendments adding new budget authority 
    to the bill and the Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Rules Committee May Protect Various Types of Amendments

Sec. 10.14 On occasion, the Committee on Rules will report a resolution 
    which protects an amendment from all points of order if offered by 
    a specific Member.

    Rules which self-execute the adoption of amendments, or protect a 
stated amendment from points of order if offered by a particular 
proponent, are more commonplace. The following special order excerpted 
from the proceedings of Sept. 12, 1986,(2) is illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 132 Cong. Rec. 23154, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Waiving Certain Points of Order Against Consideration of H.R. 5313, 
     Departmant of Housing and Urban Development-Independent Agencies 
                          Appropriations Act, 1987

        Mr. [Anthony C.] Beilenson [of California]: Mr. Speaker, by 
    direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 532 
    and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 532

            Resolved, That during the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
        5313) making appropriations for the Department of Housing and 
        Urban Development, and for sundry independent agencies, boards, 
        commissions, corporations, and offices for the fiscal year 
        ending September 30, 1987, and for other purposes, all points 
        of order against the following provisions in the bill for 
        failure to comply with the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXI 
        are hereby waived: beginning on page 2, line 8 through page 7, 
        line 9; beginning on page 7, line 22 through page 9, line 11; 
        beginning on page 10, line 1 through page 13, line 21; 
        beginning on page 14, lines 13 through 16; beginning on page 
        15, line 21 through page 16, line 9; beginning on page 16, line 
        23 through page 18, line 4; beginning on page 18, line 10 
        through page 19, line 12; beginning on page 20, line 10 through 
        page 25, line 3; beginning on page 26, line 1

[[Page 12349]]

        through page 29, line 4; beginning on page 29, line 13 through 
        page 33, line 8; beginning on page 35, line 20 through page 36, 
        line 9; and beginning on page 39, line 7 through page 41, line 
        22. It shall be in order to consider an amendment to the bill 
        printed in section two of this resolution, if offered by 
        Representative Boland of Massachusetts, and all points of order 
        against said amendment for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clause 2 of rule XXI are hereby waived.
            Sec. 2. On page 26, line 14, insert at the end of the 
        sentence: ``: Provided further, That of the funds appropriated 
        under this heading, not to exceed $160,000,000 shall be 
        provided for space station phase C/D development and such funds 
        shall not be available for obligation until the enactment of a 
        subsequent appropriations Act authorizing the obligation of 
        such funds.''. . . .

        Mr. Beilenson: . . . Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 532 is the 
    rule waiving certain points of order against consideration of H.R. 
    5313, the Department of Housing and Urban Development and 
    independent agencies appropriations for fiscal year 1987.
        Since general appropriation bills are privileged under the 
    rules of the House, the rule does not provide for any special 
    guidelines for the consideration of the bill. Provisions related to 
    time for general debate are not included in the rule.
        Customarily, Mr. Speaker, general debate time is limited by a 
    unanimous-consent request by the chairman of the Appropriations 
    Subcommittee prior to the consideration of the bill.
        Mr. Speaker, the rule protects specified provisions of the bill 
    against points of order for failure to comply with the provisions 
    of clause 2 of rule XXI. Clause 2 of rule XXI prohibits 
    unauthorized appropriations and legislative provisions in an 
    appropriations bill. The specific provisions of the bill for which 
    the waiver is provided are detailed in the rule by page and line.
        Also, Mr. Speaker, the rule makes in order an amendment offered 
    by Representative Boland of Massachusetts. The amendment is printed 
    in section 2 of the rule. The rule waives points of order against 
    the amendment under clause 2 of rule XXI which, as I stated 
    earlier, prohibits the inclusion of unauthorized appropriations and 
    legislation in general appropriation bills.

Authority of Committee on Rules To Grant Waivers

Sec. 10.15 Where a special report from the Committee on Rules, filed on 
    a preceding day, specifies that only ``amendments printed in the 
    report accompanying this resolution'' are eligible for 
    consideration, and the report has not been printed at the time the 
    resolution is called up for consideration, no point of order lies 
    against consideration of the report on that ground.

    On Apr. 28, 1988,(3) a second rule was reported to 
govern the further consideration of the Defense authorization bill, 
fiscal

[[Page 12350]]

1989. This second rule limited the number of amendments which could be 
considered during the further consideration of the bill and specified 
the order of consideration and debate time allotted to amendments 
printed in a report accompanying the resolution. The report had not 
been returned from the Government Printing Office and was thus not 
available to Members when the rule was called up. Several parliamentary 
inquiries were raised as the debate on the rule commenced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 134 Cong Rec. 9194, 9196, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Providing for Further Cnsideration of H.R. 4264, National Defense 
                    Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989

        Mr. [Claude] Pepper [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 436 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 436

            Resolved, That during the further consideration of the bill 
        (H.R. 4264) to authorize appropriations for the fiscal year 
        1989 amended budget request for military functions of the 
        Department of Defense and to prescribe military personnel 
        levels for such Department for fiscal year 1989, to amend the 
        National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 
        1989, and for other purposes, no further amendment to the bill 
        or to the amendment in the nature of a substitute, as modified 
        and as amended, shall be in order except the amendments 
        designated in section 2 of this resolution, in the report of 
        the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, or by 
        paragraph (2) of section 2 of H. Res. 435. Said amendments 
        shall be considered only in the order and in the manner 
        specified. The amendments designated in this resolution shall 
        be printed in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying 
        this resolution and shall be considered as having been read 
        when offered. Each amendment may only be offered by the Member 
        designated for such amendment in the report of the Committee on 
        Rules, or this resolution, or their designee. Debate on each of 
        said amendments shall not exceed the time designated in said 
        report, to be equally divided and controlled between the 
        proponent and an opponent. All points of order are waived 
        against the amendments contained in sections 1 and 2, and 
        against amendments numbered 5, 6, 7, 11, 19, 20, 28, 35, 47, 
        and 50 in section 3 of the report of the Committee on Rules. No 
        amendment, except for amendments printed in section 3 of the 
        report of the Committee on Rules, shall be subject to amendment 
        except as specified in this resolution or in the report of the 
        Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, or to a demand 
        for a division of the question in the House or in the Committee 
        of the Whole. Debate on any amendment offered to an amendment 
        printed in section 3 of the report of the Committee on Rules 
        shall be limited to ten minutes, equally divided and controlled 
        by the proponent of the amendment and a member opposed thereto. 
        Any particular amendment under consideration when the Committee 
        of the Whole rises on a legislative day shall be completed when 
        the Committee of the Whole next resumes its sitting on H.R. 
        4264. During the consideration of the bill, pro forma 
        amendments for the purpose of debate shall

[[Page 12351]]

        be in order only if offered by the chairman or ranking minority 
        member of the Committee on Armed Services. Any period of 
        general debate specified in this resolution shall be equally 
        divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
        member of the Committee on Armed Services.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (4) The gentleman from 
    Florida (Mr. Pepper) is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Marvin Leath (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Newt] Gingrich [of Georgia]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gingrich: Mr. Speaker, this refers to a report which I 
    believe will contain the various amendments and explain precisely 
    what the Clerk so lengthily just read.
        Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that that report is not 
    available, that that report has not been printed.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: There is a copy at the minority table.
        Mr. Gingrich: Mr. Speaker, I would suggest, under the rules of 
    the House in terms of the individual Members' access to 
    information, they should be given a document which has been marked 
    up, edited. This has various handwriting and is not available to 
    Members. This is a loose collection of papers. This is not a 
    published report at this time, and would it not be better, I would 
    ask the Speaker, for the House to delay considering this rule until 
    we have the report of the Committee on Rules so Members could see 
    what they are voting on?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is not stating a point 
    of order. He is perhaps stating a reason to vote against the rule.
        Mr. Gingrich: I believe it was a parliamentary inquiry whether 
    or not Members are protected and have any recourse in the rules of 
    the House against having a report printed.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question of consideration cannot 
    be raised against a rule filed on a prior day. The Chair would 
    suggest that Members could vote against the rule.
        Mr. Gingrich: So, Mr. Speaker, Members who want a printed 
    report should vote ``no,'' is the Chair's recommendation.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the gentleman is dissatisfied with 
    the report he has, that would be a recommendation.
        Mr. Gingrich: I thank the Chair.

Sec. 10.16 Special order providing for consideration of a general 
    appropriation bill, waiving points of order against legislation in 
    violation of Rule XXI clause 2, reappropriations in violation of 
    Rule XXI clause 6, where the authorizing committees had consented 
    to the waivers; permitting consideration of specified amendments 
    which were not germane and specifying the order of amendments to be 
    considered under a ``king of the mountain'' procedure.

    The rule providing for consideration of the dire emergency sup

[[Page 12352]]

plemental appropriation bill for fiscal 1989, H.R. 2072, on Apr. 26, 
1989,(5) provides an example of the complexities often 
required to permit the timely consideration of appropriation measures 
which precede the authorization process and interact with the 
constraints of the Congressional Budget Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 135 Cong. Rec. 7489, 7490, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Waiving Certain Points of Order Against Consideration of H.R. 2072, 
     Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Transfers, Urgent 
        Supplementals, and Correcting Enrollment Errors Act of 1989

        Mr. [Joe] Moakley [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 135 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 135

            Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this 
        resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule 
        XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the 
        Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of 
        bill (H.R. 2072) making dire emergency supplemental 
        appropriations and transfers, urgent supplementals, and 
        correcting enrollment errors for the fiscal year ending 
        September 30, 1989, and for other purposes, and the first 
        reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points of 
        order against consideration of the bill for failure to comply 
        with the provisions of sections 302(f) and 311(a) of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-344, as amended 
        by Public Law 99-177) are hereby waived. After general debate, 
        which shall be confined to the bill and which shall not exceed 
        one hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman 
        and ranking minority member of the Committee on Appropriations, 
        the bill shall be considered for amendment under the five-
        minute rule. During the consideration of the bill, all points 
        of order against the bill for failure to comply with the 
        provisions of clause 2 and 6 of rule XXI are hereby waived, 
        except against the provisions beginning on page 20, line 19 
        through page 21, line 6; beginning on page 31, lines 5 through 
        12; and beginning on page 34, lines 19 through 25. It shall be 
        in order to consider the amendments printed in the report of 
        the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, said 
        amendments shall be considered in the order specified in the 
        report, may be offered only by the Member specified or his 
        designee, shall be considered as having been read, shall be 
        debatable for not to exceed one hour each, equally divided and 
        controlled by the offeror and a Member opposed thereto, and 
        shall not be subject to amendment or to a demand for a division 
        of the question in the House or in the Committee of the Whole. 
        All points of order against said amendments are hereby waived, 
        except for points of order under clause 2 of rule XXI against 
        provisions identical to those provisions in the bill against 
        which points of order were not waived by this resolution. Any 
        such point of order may lie only against those specified 
        portions of an amendment, and not against an entire amendment. 
        If both of said amendments are adopted, only the latter 
        amendment which is adopted shall be considered to have been 
        finally adopted and reported back to the House.

[[Page 12353]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. 
    Moakley) is recognized for 1 hour.
        Mr. Moakley: . . . Mr. Speaker, the rule waives points of order 
    under two specified sections of the Congressional Budget Act 
    against consideration of the bill, section 302(f) and section 
    311(a).
        Section 302(f) of the Congressional Budget Act prohibits 
    consideration of measures that would exceed the subcommittee 
    allocations of new discretionary budget authority made pursuant to 
    section 302(b) of the Budget Act. Since the bill provides new 
    budget authority in excess of the Appropriations Committees 302(b) 
    allocations the bill would violate section 302(f) of the Budget 
    Act.
        Mr. Speaker, the second budget act waiver against consideration 
    of the bill is section 311(a). Section 311(a) of the Budget Act 
    prohibits consideration of any measure which would cause the budget 
    authority or outlay ceilings established by the concurrent 
    resolution on the budget for such fiscal year to be breached. Since 
    the budget authority and outlays set forth in House Concurrent 
    Resolution 268, the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal 
    year 1989, have already been exceeded, the bill would violate 
    section 311(a) by causing the spending ceilings to be further 
    exceeded. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, the rule also waives clause 2 and 6 of rule 21, 
    against the bill, except for certain provisions. Clause 2, of rule 
    21, prohibits the inclusion of legislation and unauthorized 
    appropriations in any appropriation bill.
        There are three provisions that are subject to points of order. 
    The first two provisions deal with adjusting pay rates for certain 
    health care occupations within the Defense and Veterans 
    Departments, and a provision that directs the Federal Aviation 
    Administration to initiate rulemaking procedures to require 
    airlines to use a particular type of explosive detection equipment.
        These sections Mr. Speaker, were left unprotected at the 
    request of the committees that have legislative jurisdiction on 
    these matters.
        Clause 6 of rule 21 prohibits reappropriations in a general 
    appropriations bill, because the bill contains transfers of 
    previously appropriated funds the waiver is necessary.
        Finally, Mr. Speaker, the rule makes in order two amendments 
    that are printed in the report accompanying this resolution. The 
    amendments are to be offered by the member named or his designee, 
    and only in the order specified in the report.

Sec. 10.17 The Chair will not render an advisory opinion as to whether 
    a particular amendment against which points of order are waived by 
    a special rule would in fact be subject to a point of order.

    The Committee on Rules, in reporting a special order waiving points 
of order against a specified amendment, sometimes does so out of an 
abundance of caution. The fact that a waiver is included does not 
necessarily mean that a valid point of order would in fact lie if the 
amendment were unpro

[[Page 12354]]

tected. The inquiry raised by Mr. Coleman on June 28, 
1989,(6) is illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 135 Cong. Rec. 13688, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                amendment offered by mrs. martin of illinois

        Mrs. [Lynn] Martin of Illinois: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mrs. Martin of Illinois: Page 13, line 
        24, strike the period and insert the following: ``: Provided 
        further, That the Secretary of the Army, acting through the 
        Chief of Engineers, shall use $600,000 of the funds 
        appropriated under this heading for a flood control project on 
        Loves Park Creek, Loves Park and vicinity, Illinois, as 
        authorized by Public Law 99-662, sec. 401.''.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        The Chairman: (7) For what purpose does the 
    gentleman from Texas (Mr. Coleman) rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Don J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ronald D.] Coleman of Texas: I have parliamentary inquiry, 
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his inquiry.
        Mr. Coleman of Texas: I understand, am I correct, that this 
    amendment is in violation of clause 2 of rule XXIII, that it was 
    granted a waiver, is that correct, under the rule?
        The Chairman: The rule waives that point of order against the 
    amendment.
        Mr. Coleman of Texas: And those Members on the other side of 
    the aisle that object to rules that waive points of order would not 
    do so in this particular instance, is that correct?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is not stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Coleman of Texas: I thank the Chairman.

Waiver of Points of Order by Special Order

Sec. 10.18 Where a special order adopted by the House waived points of 
    order against certain of the amendments carried in the committee 
    report, those amendments not protected by the waiver remain subject 
    to points of order when offered, despite certain debate to the 
    effect that ``all specified amendments'' (those in the report) 
    could be considered.

    Where the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole is faced with a 
point of order against an amendment enumerated in the report of the 
Committee on Rules accompanying the special order setting the terms for 
the consideration of the bill, he is guided by the language in the 
special order, not on interpretations of the debate accompanying its 
adoption. Where the rule is clear, it must be followed literally.
    On June 24, 1992,(8) disagreement over the protection 
afforded

[[Page 12355]]

a particular amendment manifested itself during the five-minute rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 138 Cong. Rec. 16106, 16107, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (9) The Clerk will designate the 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Brian J. Donnelly (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The text of the amendment is as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: Page 36, after line 5, 
        insert the following new section:
            Sec. 312. Section 313 of the Federal Election Campaign Act 
        of 1971 (2 U.S.C. 439a) is amended by striking out ``may be'' 
        the first place it appears and all that follows through the end 
        of the section and inserting in lieu thereof ``shall, when the 
        individual ceases to hold Federal office, as determined by the 
        individual--
            ``(1) be submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for 
        deposit in the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts;
            ``(2) be contributed to any organization described in 
        section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
            ``(3) be returned to the persons who made the 
        contributions;
            ``(4) be transferred without limitation to any national, 
        State, or local committee of any political party; or
            ``(5) be contributed to an authorized committee of a 
        candidate for Federal, State, or local office, within the 
        limits provided for by law.''.

        Mr. [Vic] Fazio [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the gentleman's amendment and wish that he would 
    explain it to the Members.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California reserves a point of 
    order on the amendment.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is recognized for 
    10 minutes.
        Mr. [George] Gekas [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I yield 
    myself such time as I may consume. . . .

                               point of order

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] 
    wish to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, I would simply say that the Committee 
    on Rules has made distinctions between those which they protected 
    and which they did not. This clearly is not in the protected 
    category, and I would indicate to the chairman that while many, 
    many Members of this body are not at all affected by the 
    grandfather clause and while many who are covered by it have made 
    public their decision not to exercise it or have, by their decision 
    to seek reelection, made themselves ineligible to utilize it, it is 
    important that we keep faith with the Ethics Reform Act which was 
    passed overwhelmingly in this body several years ago.
        Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment 
    because it proposes to change existing law and constitutes 
    legislation in an appropriations bill and, therefore, violates 
    clause 2 of rule XXI.
        Mr. Gekas: Mr. Chairman, a point of parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Gekas: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I do. Is there time available to 
    debate the point of order undertaken by the gentleman?
        The Chairman: Within the Chair's discretion, the gentleman is 
    recognized to debate the point of order.
        Mr. Gekas: Mr. Chairman, the point of order that has been 
    exercised is the

[[Page 12356]]

    one to which I made my previous remarks, that it is legislating, if 
    I am correct, that it is legislating in an appropriations bill. If 
    that is the stem of the point of order, then I submit, again, for 
    the record, that standing alone, any one of a dozen provisions in 
    this legislative appropriations bill that is before us, had it 
    exchanged places with me and with this amendment, would be subject 
    to the same point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond that the rule waived 
    certain points of order against provisions in the bill, but not 
    against all amendments, and the rule was adopted by the House. The 
    Chair is prepared to rule.
        Mr. Gekas: I understand. I made a point of parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The Chair will continue that the rule did not 
    exempt this amendment from a point of order.
        Does any other Member wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I wish 
    to be heard on the point of order. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, if I understand correctly, the rule did in fact 
    allow certain amendments to be brought forward on the floor. . . .
        On the other hand, the committee did say, I think the language 
    was ``amendments 1 and 9.'' Some could put an interpretation on 
    that, that that meant the entire scope of the amendments that were 
    listed in the bill, of amendments 1 through 9. I think that of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is one of those amendments, 
    and therefore does deserve the protection that was accorded by the 
    rule, and it should be allowed to be made in order. . . .
        As I say, there are two interpretations. One interpretation is 
    that it means only amendment 1 and amendment 9. However, when the 
    staff of the Committee on Rules on our side originally read that 
    rule, they believed, based upon what they had heard in the 
    Committee on Rules, that it meant all nine of the amendments. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond. The Chair is constrained 
    by the language of the resolution adopted by the House, line 25, 
    ``All points of order under clause 2 of rule XXI against amendments 
    in the report numbered 1 and 9 are waived.''
        The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order of the 
    gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio]. . . .
        The Chair would again respond that the Chair is constrained by 
    the adoption of the rule earlier today by the House on which only 
    certain points of order against amendments 1 and 9 were waived.
        Mr. Gekas: As a point of parliamentary inquiry, is the Chair 
    saying to me that the rule as fashioned overrules any further 
    consideration of the content of the rule?
        The Chairman: The Chair has earlier ruled twice during 
    consideration of amendments in the Committee of the Whole that two 
    other amendments which were offered by a different gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania were in fact legislation on an appropriation bill in 
    violation of the rules of the House, and were not given waivers by 
    the rule that was adopted by the House.
        The Chair is restrained by the rule that was adopted by the 
    House.

[[Page 12357]]

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California [Mr. Fazio] 
    insist on his point of order?
        Mr. Fazio: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I certainly do.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California makes the point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    violates clause 2 of rule XXI by proposing legislation on a general 
    appropriation bill.
        The gentleman's amendment simply and directly amends the 
    Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971. As such it proposes 
    legislation and does not merely perfect provisions in the bill.
        The point of order is sustained.

``Hereby'' Resolutions and Points of Order

Sec. 10.19 The Committee on Rules may recommend a special order of 
    business providing that a Senate amendment pending at the Speaker's 
    table is ``hereby'' adopted, and a point of order does not lie 
    against the resolution on the basis that the Senate amendment 
    requires consideration in the Committee of the Whole.

    The proceedings on Feb. 4, 1993,(10) when H. Res. 71, 
reported from the Committee on Rules, was called up for consideration 
were not unique. So-called ``hereby'' resolutions have been challenged 
by points of order on other occasions.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 139 Cong. Rec. 2499, 2500, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
11. A clear precedent for this ruling can be found in 6 Deschler's 
        Precedents, Ch. 21, Sec. 16.11. It should be noted that the 
        Committee on Rules could have recommended a resolution 
        providing for the consideration of the Senate amendment but 
        waiving the applicability of Rule XX clause 1. See also House 
        Rules and Manual Sec. 728 (1997) for related parliamentary 
        situations where specific rules were indirectly waived by the 
        use of ``hereby'' resolutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    While assuming that the Senate amendment to the bill H.R. 1, the 
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, would indeed by subject to 
consideration in Committee of the Whole if called up for consideration, 
the Chair in this instance ruled that vulnerable amendment was not in 
fact before the House. Proceedings were as follows:

        Mr. [Bart] Gordon [of Tennessee]: Mr. Speaker, by direction of 
    the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 71 and ask for 
    its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                   H. Res. 71

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution the 
        bill (H.R. 1) to grant family and temporary medical leave under 
        certain circumstances be, and the same is hereby, taken from 
        the Speaker's table to the end that the Senate amendment 
        thereto

[[Page 12358]]

        be, and the same is hereby, agreed to.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (12) The gentleman from 
    Tennessee [Mr. Gordon] is recognized for 1 hour.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. David E. Skaggs (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                               point of order

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House rule XX, I make the 
    point of order that House Resolution 71, the rule that we are 
    taking up, should be considered in the Committee of the Whole, and 
    I ask to be heard on my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, House rule XX provides that, and I 
    quote:

            Any amendment of the Senate to any House bill--

        And I repeat:

            An amendment of the Senate * * * shall be subject to a 
        point of order that it shall first be considered in the 
        Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union, if, 
        originating in the House, it would be subject to that point.

        And the rule goes on to provide just one exception to this 
    requirement is possible, and that is if a motion to disagree to the 
    Senate amendment and request a conference is made.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Again, rule XX which the gentleman has 
    cited applies only if the Senate amendment itself is before the 
    House, which is not the parliamentary status that we are now in.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, where is the Senate amendment if it is 
    not in this language? It has to be before the House as a part of 
    this language because once this language is adopted, and the Chair 
    has ruled that the Senate amendment will not come up separately, 
    and so therefore, it has to be contained in this resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: What will be adopted will be the rule.
        Mr. Walker: But the rule enacts the bill, so the bill is a part 
    of the rule.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Again, the bill is not before the 
    House. The Senate amendment is not before the House. The resolution 
    of the Rules Committee is before the House. The Chair has ruled on 
    the point of order.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. Gordon].

Sec. 10.20 A special order reported from the Committee on Rules may 
    provide for the ``self-execution'' of a Senate amendment, providing 
    that it be agreed to, even though if the amendment were before the 
    House it might be challenged by a variety of points of order (under 
    Rule XVI cl. 7, (germaneness); Rule XXI cl. 5(a) (an appropriation 
    in a legislative bill), or certain Budget Act infractions).

[[Page 12359]]

    By the use of ``hereby'' or ``self- executing'' resolutions the 
House can sometimes reduce the parliamentary steps required to achieve 
a legislative goal.
    On Feb. 24, 1993,(13) a rule was called up which 
provided for consideration of the Emergency Unemployment Compensation 
Act, 1993. Because the rule provided that certain amendments be 
``considered as adopted,'' the number of votes necessary to perfect the 
text of the bill in the desired manner were consolidated in the vote on 
the rule. The points of order against the rule and the various 
responses of the Chair are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 139 Cong. Rec. 3542, 3543, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

           Emergency Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993

        Mr. [David E.] Bonior [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, by direction 
    of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 103 and ask 
    for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 103

            Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
        shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 920) 
        to extend the emergency unemployment compensation program, and 
        for other purposes. The amendment recommended by the Committee 
        on Ways and Means printed in the bill and the amendment printed 
        in the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this 
        resolution shall be considered as adopted. All points of order 
        against the bill, as amended, and against its consideration are 
        waived. Debate on the bill shall not exceed two hours equally 
        divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
        member of the Committee on Ways and Means. The previous 
        question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as 
        amended, to final passage without intervening motion except one 
        motion to recommit.

                              points of order

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    point of order against the resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (14) The gentleman will 
    state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Romano L. Mazzoli (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against House 
    Resolution 103 on the ground that two amendments self-executed by 
    the resolution are in violation of two different House rules, and I 
    ask to be heard on my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania wishes 
    to be heard, and the gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, first, House Resolution 103 is in 
    violation of clause 5(a) of rule XXI because it proposes to adopt 
    the Ways and Means Committee amendment printed as section 4 in H.R. 
    920 as reported. That section deals with financing provisions and 
    in effect reappropriates advance account funds to make payments to 
    the States to provide these additional benefits. Clause 5(a) of 
    rule XXI prohibits appropriations provisions in a bill not

[[Page 12360]]

    reported by the appropriations committee.
        Second, Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 103 attempts to adopt an 
    amendment contained in the report to accompany the resolution 
    extending coverage of the bill to railroad employees. That 
    amendment is in violation of clause 7 of rule XVI which prohibits 
    the consideration of germane amendments. The amendment contained in 
    the Rules Committee report is under the jurisdiction of the Energy 
    and Commerce Committee and is therefore not germane to this bill 
    from the Ways and Means Committee.
        Mr. Speaker, since both of those amendments will be considered 
    to be adopted when this rule is adopted, they are currently before 
    us and must be subject to points of order. It is clear from the 
    rule that once the rule is adopted, the bill as amended by them is 
    not subject to points of order. But, prior to the adoption of this 
    resolution, those two amendments are obviously a part of this 
    resolution and subject to the two points of order I have raised.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does any Member wish to be heard on 
    the point of order?
        If not, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The fact that amendments which if offered separately would be 
    violative of the rules does not prevent the Rules Committee from 
    self-executing the adoption of those amendments together in the 
    rule itself, by providing for their adoption upon the adoption of 
    the rule. The amendments are thus not separately before the House 
    at this time.

``Hereby'' Resolutions and Budget Act Relationships

Sec. 10.21 The requirement of section 308(a) of the Budget Act--that 
    any reported bill or resolution or committee amendment thereto 
    providing new budget authority shall contain in the accompanying 
    report a statement of the estimated costs--does not apply to a 
    resolution reported from the Committee on Rules which ``self-
    executes'' into a bill an amendment providing new budget authority, 
    since the resolution itself does not finally enact new budget 
    authority.

    Neither the consideration nor the adoption of a resolution reported 
from the Committee on Rules which self-executes an amendment carrying 
new budget authority is susceptible to a point of order under section 
308(a) of the Budget Act.(15) On Feb. 24, 
1993,(16) the Chair pointed out that the amendment was not 
before the House during consideration of the resolution and the 
resolution itself did not enact new budget authority. The point of 
order and the debate thereon are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. See also Sec. 10.20, supra.
16. 139 Cong. Rec. 3542, 3543, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (17) . . . Does the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania have another point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Romano L. Mazzoli (Ky.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12361]]

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I make 
    another point of order against House Resolution 103 on the ground 
    that it is in violation of section 308(a) of the Congressional 
    Budget Act of 1974, and I ask to be heard on my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman may proceed.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, section 308(a) of the Congressional 
    Budget Act provides that, and I quote, ``Whenever a committee of 
    either House reports to its House a bill or resolution, or 
    committee amendment thereto, providing new budget authority * * * 
    new spending authority described in section 401(c)(2), or new 
    credit authority * * * the report accompanying that bill or 
    resolution shall contain a statement, the report accompanying that 
    bill or resolution shall contain a statement, or the committee 
    shall make available such a statement * * * prepared after 
    consultation with the Director of the Congressional Budget Office'' 
    detailing the costs of that provision.
        Mr. Speaker, the amendment contained in the Rules Committee 
    report, which would be adopted upon the adoption of this 
    resolution, extends coverage of this bill to railroad workers. It 
    is my understanding that this may entail a cost of $20 million, but 
    the Rules Committee has not provided a cost estimate from CBO in 
    its report on this amendment as required by section 308 of the 
    Budget Act. This is an amendment reported by the Rules Committee 
    and therefore is subject to the CBO cost estimate requirements. I 
    therefore urge that my point of order be sustained.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does any Member wish to be heard on 
    the point of order?
        If not, the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania raises an objection based on 
    section 308(a) of the Budget Act on the basis that the report 
    accompanying this resolution coming from the Rules Committee would 
    have to have a CBO estimate of the potential cost involved by 
    virtue of adoption of the amendment. However, the Chair, after 
    consulting precedents and the rules of the House, rules that the 
    cost estimate does not have to be made a part of the report 
    accompanying the rule being brought from the Rules Committee, but 
    rather the point of order might lie against the underlying bill. 
    The resolution itself does not enact budget authority and, 
    therefore, the resolution coming from the Rules Committee does not 
    itself have to have the cost estimate in the accompanying report.
        Therefore, the Chair now would overrule the gentleman's point 
    of order. . . .
        The Chair would state that the Budget Act, section 308(a) of 
    the Budget Act, does not require budget estimates to be included in 
    the report since the amendments are not adopted until such time as 
    the rule is adopted. At that time, then, the amendments which are 
    contained and which would be self-actuated under the rule would 
    then be subject to section 308(a) of the Budget Act.
        Prior to the adoption by the House of Representatives of this 
    resolution, that underlying budget estimate is not required to be a 
    part of the report on the resolution itself.

Sec. 10.22 The adoption of a special order for the consider

[[Page 12362]]

    ation of a bill that ``self-executes'' the adoption of an amendment 
    providing new budget authority to a bill to be subsequently called 
    up does not, itself, provide new budget authority within the 
    meaning and application of section 308 of the Budget Act.

    House Resolution 103, called up in the House on Feb. 24, 
1993,(18) attracted several points of order at various times 
during its consideration. As indicated in Sec. 10.20, supra, points of 
order when the resolution was first called up by the Rules Committee 
were overruled. The point of order carried in this section was raised 
after the ordering of the previous question on the special order. Mr. 
Robert S. Walker, of Pennsylvania, was trying to show that the Budget 
Act requirement that a report contain a Congressional Budget Office 
estimate of the budget authority was being completely obliterated by 
the type of special order being utilized here. A point of order was not 
entertained by the Chair at any stage of the proceeding. The waivers 
were all-encompassing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 139 Cong. Rec. 3554, 3555, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Jim] Slattery [of Kansas] changed his vote from ``nay'' to 
    ``yea.''
        So the previous question was ordered.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                               point of order

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment printed in the Rules Committee report, which I understand 
    is now before us, based upon the Chair's previous ruling.
        I make my point of order on the ground that the report in this 
    resolution violates section 308(a) of the Budget Act requiring a 
    cost estimate.
        Section 308(a) of the Budget Act, which requires the CBO cost 
    estimate in the report on any committee bill, resolution or 
    amendment, contains no exemption for the report of the Committee on 
    Rules.
        I quote from the section 308(a) of the Congressional Budget 
    Act:

            Whenever a committee of either house reports to its house a 
        bill or resolution or committee amendment thereto providing new 
        budget authority, new spending authority described in section 
        402(c)(2) or new credit authority, the report accompanying that 
        bill or resolution shall contain a statement or the committee 
        shall make available such a statement prepared after 
        consultation with the director of the Congressional Budget 
        Office. . . .

        Section 308(a) clearly applies to the committee amendment, and 
    the amendment contained in the Rules Committee or report is a Rules 
    Committee amendment. It was not reported by the Ways and Means 
    Committee, it was not reported by the Energy and Commerce Committee 
    and so therefore is exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Rules 
    Committee.

[[Page 12363]]

        The amendment contained in the Rules Committee report on this 
    resolution will be considered to have been adopted when this 
    resolution is adopted. So there is no question who should provide 
    the CBO cost estimate. It is the Rules Committee. They are not 
    above the rules.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask that my point of order be sustained. . . .
        Yes, Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard further on the point of 
    order. . . .
        When it comes to a question in the bill itself, the point of 
    order with regard to the Budget Act will not be in order because 
    that point of order has been waived. The only time we can get at 
    this particular item is in the self-enacting amendment which is a 
    part of the rule.
        The gentleman has not referred to the self-enacting amendment. 
    That is the question to which this particular point of order 
    pertains and it is up to the Chair, I think, to sustain the point 
    of order based upon the fact that the self-enacting amendment 
    within this rule does in fact add costs. It is new budget authority 
    and is therefore in violation of the Congressional Budget Act. . . 
    .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (19) The Chair is prepared 
    to rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Romano L. Mazzoli (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The amendment printed in the bill and the amendment printed in 
    House Report 103-18 will be considered as adopted by the operation 
    of House Resolution 103, which is the special order now pending 
    before the House. . . .

        As the Chair indicated previously, the new budget authority at 
    issue would be provided not by the resolution reported by the 
    Committee on Rules, but rather by the bill as amended.
        At this point, the point of order does not lie. That all points 
    of order against the bill as amended will be waived by House 
    Resolution 103, if adopted, does not cause such points of order to 
    lie at some earlier stage.
        The rules of the House authorize the Committee on Rules to 
    report a resolution providing a special order of business, and a 
    point of order under Section 308 of the Budget Act does not lie 
    against such a resolution on the ground that its adoption would 
    have the effect of abrogating clause 2(l)(3) of rule XI, which 
    incorporates the requirement of section 308 in the standing rules.
        Accordingly, the point of order is overruled.

Use of Special Order To Avoid Budget Act Points of Order

Sec. 10.23 Where the Congressional Budget Act provides for points of 
    order against reported measures which do not meet certain Budget 
    Act criteria, the Committee on Rules can recommend, in a special 
    order for consideration of a bill, that the text of an unreported 
    measure be considered in lieu of that reported. The Chair has in-
    dicated in response to a parliamentary inquiry, that points of 
    order under sections 302, 303, 311, 401, and

[[Page 12364]]

    402 apply only to reported measures.

    Following the adoption of a special order which made in order the 
text of an unreported bill in lieu of the reported version of a bill 
providing for welfare reform, the Chair entertained a parliamentary 
inquiry which explored the relationship of the Congressional Budget Act 
to the bill which would be considered under the provisions of the 
special order. While the Chair does not normally give anticipatory 
rulings, he did in this instance clarify the parliamentary situation. 
The proceedings of Mar. 21, 1995,  follow:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ____x-8 3/81/81/162/62/3 
        5/322/51/51/3x-0 3/81/62/6 
        77/21/61/6x-0
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Jim] McDermott [of Washington]: I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (1) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. John T. Doolittle (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. McDermott: Mr. Speaker, does the rule we have just adopted 
    make in order general debate on H.R. 4 or H.R. 1214?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The rule makes in order debate on H.R. 
    4.
        Mr. McDermott: As I understand it, Mr. Speaker, the committees 
    of jurisdiction reported out three other bills, none of which is 
    before the House today. Am I correct that H.R. 4 has not been 
    reported out by any committee of jurisdiction?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. McDermott: Mr. Speaker, continuing that inquiry, is it true 
    that the Budget Act points of order which are designed to assure 
    that the budget rules we established for ourselves are adhered to 
    apply only to measures that have been reported by the committee of 
    jurisdiction?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair observes that sections 302, 
    303, 311, 401, and 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 all 
    establish points of order against the consideration of bills or 
    joint resolutions as reported. That is, in each case the point of 
    order against consideration operates with respect to the bill or 
    joint resolution in its reported state. Thus, in the case of an 
    unreported bill or joint resolution, such a point of order against 
    consideration is inoperative.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 11. As Related to Other Business

    Certain points of order may interrupt business or 
debate.(2) A timely point of order may be made while another 
Member has the floor, and his consent is not required.(3) A 
point of order may even interrupt a Member stating a question of 
privilege.(4) A timely

[[Page 12365]]

point of order takes precedence of a parliamentary 
inquiry.(5) There are motions which supersede a point of 
order, however. One such motion is a motion that the Committee of the 
Whole rise(6) or that the House adjourn. It may be 
entertained by the Chair pending a decision on a point of 
order.(7) The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may 
entertain a unanimous-consent request to withdraw or modify an 
amendment even though a point of order is pending against 
it.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. The special case of the point of order that a quorum is not present 
        is discussed in detail in Ch. 20, Calls of the House; Quorums.
 3. See Sec.  11.1, infra.
 4. See Sec.  11.2, infra.
 5. See Sec.  11.4, infra.
 6. See Sec.  11.3, infra.
 7. See Sec.  11.3, infra.
 8. See Sec.  11.5, infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interrupting Members in Debate

Sec. 11.1 Points of order may be made while a Member has the floor, and 
    the consent of such Member is not required.

    On Mar. 13, 1942,(9) a Member was permitted to interrupt 
another to make a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 88 Cong. Rec. 2439, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 6709, an agricultural appropriation bill for 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        [Mr. May, of Kentucky, was proceeding to debate a motion that 
    the Committee rise and report the bill under consideration back to 
    the House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be 
    stricken out.]
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: (10) The gentleman from Missouri will 
    state the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Robert Ramspeck (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Andrew J.] May [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, I have not 
    yielded for a point of order.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order 
    that under the unanimous-consent agreement all time for debate has 
    expired and the gentleman cannot be recognized on a motion to 
    strike out the enacting clause offered to secure time for debate, 
    and not offered merely to secure time for debate.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Kentucky desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. May: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman briefly.
        Mr. May: In the first place, Mr. Chairman, I did not yield to 
    the gentleman from Missouri for the purpose of his making a point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Missouri did not have to ask 
    the gentleman from Kentucky to yield in order to submit a point of 
    order.

Sec. 11.2 A point of order may interrupt a Member stating a question of 
    privilege.

        On June 30, 1939,(11) Speaker William B. Bankhead, 
    of Alabama, per

[[Page 12366]]

    mitted several Members to raise points of order while Mr. Clare E. 
    Hoffman, of Michigan, stated a question of personal privilege.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 84 Cong. Rec. 8468, 8469, 76th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Hoffman] will 
    state his question of personal privilege.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker . . . .
        Mr. [Jack] Nichols [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Speaker, I make the point 
    of order that the gentleman is not stating a question of personal 
    privilege.
        The Speaker: The Chair will allow the gentleman some latitude 
    in stating his question, but the gentleman must state a question of 
    privilege.
        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: I insist that the 
    gentleman be allowed only a small amount of latitude.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, I did not hear the remarks made by 
    the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell].
        The Speaker: The Chair is interested in hearing the gentleman 
    state his question of personal privilege.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, I am interested in the right of free 
    speech, and when the gentleman interrupts to make a remark I am 
    entitled to hear it. . . .
        Mr. Nichols: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Nichols: I make the point of order, Mr. Speaker, that the 
    gentleman is not stating a question of personal privilege.
        Mr. Hoffman: I do not yield for that, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Nichols: In order to state a question of privilege the 
    gentleman must state something that somebody said about him. The 
    gentleman is quoting statements he himself made.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, have I the floor or not?
        The Speaker: The gentleman has the floor, but unless the 
    gentleman proceeds to state his point of privilege he will not 
    occupy the floor very much longer.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, I am endeavoring to state the point 
    as concisely as I may, and I trust that the Speaker will bear with 
    me in my ignorance and my inexperience and let me state it. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, may I be free from such interruptions as occurred 
    then when a Member of the House [Mr. Hook] said, ``I agree''? 
    Otherwise, I will have to demand that the words be taken down.
        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.

        Mr. Hoffman: I do not yield for a point of order, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Mississippi will state his 
    point of order.
        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the 
    statement that the gentleman from Michigan is making does not in 
    any way constitute a question of high constitutional privilege. . . 
    .
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, it is a strange situation when I 
    cannot state a question of personal privilege without interruption.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Mississippi had a perfect right 
    to make the point of order. The Chair is entitled to hear the point 
    of order made by the gentleman from Mississippi.

Motions Interrupting Point of Order

Sec. 11.3 In the Committee of the Whole, a motion that the

[[Page 12367]]

    Committee rise may be entertained pending a decision of the Chair 
    or further argument on a point of order.

    On June 4, 1957,(12) a proponent of a bill, Mr. Harold 
D. Cooley, of North Carolina, forestalled a ruling by Chairman Brooks 
Hays, of Arkansas, on a point of order, by moving that the Committee of 
the Whole rise.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 103 Cong. Rec. 8318, 8319, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6974, to extend the Agricultural Trade Development and 
        Assistance Act of 1954.
13. Parliamentarian's Note: In this case the language of the bill was 
        in violation of the provisions of Rule XXI clause 4, and the 
        Member in charge of the bill moved that the Committee rise so 
        application could be made to the Committee on Rules for a 
        resolution waiving points of order against the bill. See H. 
        Res. 274, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. (1957).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John J.] Rooney [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a 
    point of order against the entire bill, H.R. 6974, on the ground 
    that it is a bill from a committee not having authority to report 
    an appropriation. . . .
        Mr. Cooley: . . . I am a little bit apprehensive that the point 
    of order may be sustained, if the Chair is called upon to rule on 
    it. But, I think it would be very unfortunate for us to delay final 
    action on the bill, and in the circumstances we have no other 
    alternative other than to move that the Committee do now rise, and 
    so, Mr. Chairman, I make that motion.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order, but the motion offered by the gentleman from North Carolina 
    that the Committee do now rise is in order, and the Chair will put 
    the question.

Precedence of Point of Order Over Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 11.4 A timely point of order takes precedence over a parliamentary 
    inquiry, and the reservation of a parliamentary inquiry gives no 
    priority for that purpose, since recognition is in the discretion 
    of the Chair.

    On June 7, 1977,(14) the Committee of the Whole, chaired 
by Mr. James R. Mann, of South Carolina, was operating under the five-
minute rule. The following proceedings are related to the topic of this 
section:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 123 Cong. Rec. 17713, 17714, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas N.] Kindness [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments, and I wish to make a parliamentary inquiry with respect 
    thereto.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, may I reserve my parliamentary 
    inquiry and make it after the reading of the amendments?
        The Chairman: Certainly, the gentleman may do that.

[[Page 12368]]

        The Clerk will report the amendments.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Mr. Kindness: Page 28, line 12, 
        strike out ``but does not include a member of the uniformed 
        services'' and insert ``including any member of the uniformed 
        services''.
            Page 30, line 12, strike out ``and''.
            Page 32, line 3, strike out the period and insert ``; 
        and''.
            Page 32, after line 3, insert:
            ``(10) `Secretary concerned' has the same meaning as given 
        such term in section 101(5) of title 37.
            Page 35, line 2, strike out ``or a member of a uniformed 
        service.''.
            Page 38, line 14, immediately before the period insert ``or 
        by reason of being a member of the uniformed services''.
            Page 45, before line 8, insert the following:
            ``(j) The preceding provisions of this section shall not 
        apply in the case of a violation by a member of a uniformed 
        service. Procedures with respect to any such violation shall, 
        under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, be the 
        same as those applicable with respect to violations of section 
        892 of title 10.''. . .

        Mr. [William] Clay [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Missouri will state his point 
    of order.
        Mr. Clay: Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order on the 
    grounds that the matter contained in the amendment is in violation 
    of the germaneness rule stated in clause 7 of House rule XVI.
        The instant amendment proposes to make the bill applicable to 
    an entirely new class of individuals other than what is covered 
    under the bill.
        The reported bill applies only to civilian employees in 
    executive branch agencies, including the Postal Service and the 
    District of Columbia government, who are presently under the Hatch 
    Act.
        The amendment seeks to add a totally different class of 
    individuals to the bill; namely, military personnel who are not now 
    covered by the Hatch Act. Accordingly the amendment is not germane 
    to the bill.
        Mr. Chairman, I insist on my point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kindness) wish 
    to speak to the point of order?
        Mr. Kindness: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I understood that I was recognized prior to the 
    reading of the amendment for the purpose of stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman chose to 
    defer his inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the gentleman's 
    point of order is out of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that a point of order is now 
    in order and has preference.

Sec. 11.5 Although a point of order is pending against a substitute for 
    an amendment, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may en-
    tertain a unanimous-consent request to withdraw or modify the 
    substitute.

    On June 18, 1958,(15) it was ruled in order in the 
Committee of

[[Page 12369]]

the Whole to make a unanimous-consent request although a point of order 
was pending at the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 104 Cong. Rec. 11641-43, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 12858, making appropriations for civil functions 
        administered by the Departments of the Army, Interior, etc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [Robert] Hale [of Maine]: Mr. Chairman, I offer a 
    substitute amendment.
        The Chairman: (16) The Clerk will read the 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Hale Boggs (La.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [John] Taber [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order against the amendment because it provides for items that are 
    not authorized by law. . . .
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa]: Mr. Chairman, can a unanimous-
    consent request be propounded while a point of order is pending 
    before the committee?
        The Chairman: The Chair would entertain such a unanimous-
    consent request. Any Member can object if he so desires. Does the 
    gentleman from Maine care to make such a request?
        Mr. Hale: Mr. Chairman, I want to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman can be heard and he is recognized. 
    The Chair is interested in disposing of the point he raised a 
    moment ago.
        Mr. Hale: I will be happy to have any solution of the 
    parliamentary situation.
        The Chairman: The gentleman can ask unanimous consent to 
    withdraw the substitute and offer an amendment.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 12. Relationship of Quorum Requirements to Points of Order

    Since 1974, the House has altered the rules regarding enforcement 
of the constitutional requirement that a quorum--a majority of the 
House-must be present to do business.(17) The first, and 
most notable, change is that a quorum is not required for mere debate; 
and the Chair is not permitted to recognize for a point of no quorum 
unless the pending question has been put.(18) Both the 
Speaker and the Chairman of a Committee of the Whole have a limited 
discretion, under the new procedures, to entertain a proper motion to 
obtain a quorum by recognizing for a motion for a call of the House or, 
in Committee, to recognize for a point of no quorum and invoke a call 
of the Committee.(19) Once a quorum of the Committee has 
been established on a day, the Chair is restricted in

[[Page 12370]]

recognizing for another point of no quorum unless the Committee is 
operating under the five-minute rule and the question has been put on a 
pending question or motion. When a question is put, and is 
pending,(20) the lack of a quorum, if the point is raised, 
takes precedence over a demand for a record vote.(1) The 
concept of when there is a ``pending motion or proposition'' (the 
condition specified in Rule XXIII clause 2(a)) has been the focus of 
several decisions.(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. See U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 5, House Rules and Manual Sec. 52; see 
        also, Rule XV cl. 6, Sec. 774c (1997).
18. See Ch. 20, supra; see also Sec. 12.16, infra.
19. See Rule XXIII cl. 2(a), House Rules and Manual Sec. 863 (1997).
20. See Sec.  12.6, infra.
 1. See Sec. Sec.  12.1, 12.8, 12.11, 12.13, infra.
 2. See Sec. Sec.  12.7, 12.8, 12.10, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    When the lack of a quorum has been declared by the Speaker or 
Chairman, no business can be conducted (other than a motion to adjourn 
or to rise) until a quorum is reestablished.(3) If a 
recorded vote is refused, the requisite second not having risen to be 
counted, the demand for a recorded vote cannot then be renewed, 
although a division can still be requested.(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. See Sec. Sec.  12.4, 12.5, 12.17, infra.
 4. See Sec.  12.9, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The current practice has been challenged on several occasions by 
points of order.(5) An appeal has been unsuccessfully taken 
from the Chair's decision that the new rules were consistent with the 
House's constitutional authority to make its own rules.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. See Sec. 12.2, infra.
 6. See Sec. 12.3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Precedence of Point of No Quorum

Sec. 12.1 In Committee of the Whole, where there is a demand for a 
    recorded vote and a point of order that a quorum is not present, 
    the point of order must be disposed of first, and once a quorum is 
    ascertained, the pending business is then the demand for a recorded 
    vote.

    On Mar. 14, 1975,(7) where the Committee of the Whole 
had under consideration the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, the 
Chair announced that the ayes appeared to prevail on a voice vote on 
the pending amendment. The proceedings and inquiries which eventually 
led to a record vote on the amendment were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 121 Cong. Rec. 6707, 6708, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (8) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Seiberling).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Neal Smith (Iowa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Sam] Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, on that I demand a 
    re

[[Page 12371]]

    corded vote and make the point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
        The Chairman: The Chair will count.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: I am told, Mr. Chairman, that you are 
    not honoring my point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: The Chair has counted 21 Members to this point.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman----
        The Chairman: The Members will be seated. The Chair is counting 
    for a quorum.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, another point of order. I 
    do not want to confuse anyone here. I would ask the Chair this: Is 
    it true that if 21 Members are standing, that is a sufficient 
    number on which to base a rollcall vote and we would then avoid the 
    necessity of demanding a quorum? It obviously is not here anyway.
        The Chairman: Is the gentleman from Arizona withdrawing his 
    point of no quorum?
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: No. I am just asking, if there are 21 
    Members who responded to my demand for a rollcall, which I coupled 
    very cleverly with a point of order that a quorum was not present, 
    that is sufficient if 20 were standing, but the Chair announced 
    that 21 were standing.
        The Chairman: The point of no quorum must be disposed of first.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Even though the demand preceded the 
    point of order?

        The Chairman: Yes.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: This is very interesting. I want all 
    the Members to remember that.
        Mr. [Morris K.] Udall [of Arizona]: Mr. Chairman, if the 
    gentleman will yield, I ask him to withdraw it and I will support 
    his request for a vote and we will thereby save time.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: All right. I think it is going to work 
    out.
        The Chairman: Sixty-eight Members are present, evidently not a 
    quorum.
        The Chair announces that he will vacate proceedings under the 
    call when a quorum of the committee appears.
        Members will record their presence by electronic device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.

Points of No Quorum Under New Rule

Sec. 12.2 Pending consideration of motions to suspend the rules, the 
    Speaker ruled: (1) that clause 6(e) prohibits a Member from making 
    or the Chair from entertaining a point of no quorum in the House 
    when a pending question has not been put to a vote; (2) that a 
    point of order of no quorum during debate in the House would not 
    lie independently under the Constitution (article I, section 5) 
    since clause 6(e), Rule XV, is a proper exercise of the House's 
    rulemaking authority and can be construed consistently with the 
    constitutional requirement that a quorum be present to con

[[Page 12372]]

    duct business; (3) and that under the same clause, the Speaker is 
    authorized, at his discretion, to recognize a Member for a call of 
    the House.

    On Sept. 12, 1977,(9) Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., of 
Massachusetts, faced a somewhat similar situation, on a day when 
suspension motions were in order. The Speaker had announced his 
intention to postpone suspension votes, and in response to a point of 
order and a parliamentary inquiry, he clarified the application of 
clause 6(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 123 Cong. Rec. 28800, 28801, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The Chair desires to make an announcement.
        Pursuant to the provisions of clause 3(b) of rule XXVII, the 
    Chair announces that he will postpone further proceedings today on 
    each motion to suspend the rules on which a recorded vote or the 
    yeas and nays are ordered, or on which the vote is objected to 
    under clause 4 of rule XV.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.
        Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House, since there is not a 
    quorum present and not even close to a quorum present.
        The Speaker: The gentleman is aware of the rule of the House 
    that the Chair cannot recognize the gentleman for a point of no 
    quorum unless there is a pending question being put to a vote. . . 
    .
        There is no question or business being put to a vote at the 
    moment, so under clause 6 of rule XV the gentleman's point is not 
    well taken. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) 
    has just pointed out the fact that there are possibly less than 50 
    Members present on the floor at this point. He made the further 
    point that the Constitution, article I, section 5, requires that 
    the House have a quorum at all times to do business. We are in the 
    full House. We are not in the Committee of the Whole. I raise again 
    the question whether or not the House can conduct its business for 
    4 or 5 hours today on 13 separate bills under suspension without 
    having a majority of the membership here and recorded present.
        I think any legislation we act upon could be challenged in 
    court as not having been considered by a quorum, and a quorum is 
    not here.
        Also I am under the impression that rule XV requires or permits 
    at least one quorum call to establish a quorum at the opening of 
    each day's session.
        The Speaker: With regard to the gentleman's statement, the 
    Constitution does require what the gentleman says--a quorum to do 
    business. The rules of the House reflect this requirement. But 
    under the circumstances, the Chair will recognize a Member to move 
    a call of the House.
        Mr. [Morris K.] Udall [of Arizona]: Mr. Speaker, I move a call 
    of the House.

[[Page 12373]]

        A call of the House was ordered.
        The call was taken by electronic device . . . .

Sec. 12.3 The Speaker's refusal to entertain a point of order of no 
    quorum when there is no pending question being put to a vote is not 
    subject to an appeal, since Rule XV clause 6(e) states an absolute 
    prohibition against the Chair's entertaining such a point of order 
    and to allow an appeal would permit a direct change in that rule.

    The Speaker Pro Tempore, Ms. Barbara Jordan, of Texas, refused to 
entertain an appeal in this case since the rule involved leaves no 
discretionary interpretation to the Chair. The proceedings of Sept. 16, 
1977,(10) are shown below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 123 Cong. Rec. 29594, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [J. William] Stanton [of Ohio]: Madam Speaker, I yield 2 
    minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Wylie), a very 
    distinguished and important member of our committee.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Madam Speaker, I make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will inform the gentleman 
    from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) that the point of order is not in order at 
    this time under rule XV, clause 6(e).
        Mr. Ashbrook: Madam Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will inform the gentleman 
    that is not an appealable ruling. The rule contains an absolute 
    prohibition against a Member making or the Chair entertaining such 
    a point of order at this time, leaving no interpretive authority in 
    the Chair and no authority to recognize for such a point of order. 
    The rule itself, and not the ruling of the Chair, governs in this 
    situation. To permit an appeal would be tantamount to permitting a 
    direct change in the rule itself.

Withdrawal of Point of Order After Absence of Quorum Is Announced

Sec. 12.4 A point of order that a quorum is not present may not be 
    withdrawn, even by unanimous consent, after the Chair has announced 
    the absence of a quorum.

    Once the absence of a quorum has been ascertained and announced, no 
business, even by unanimous consent, can be conducted. Only two options 
remain: to adjourn or to secure a quorum. An instance where the latter 
option was exercised is excerpted from the Sept. 21, 
1977,(11) proceedings as shown below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 123 Cong. Rec. 30083, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (12) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gen

[[Page 12374]]

    tleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Coughlin).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Barbara Jordan (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Coughlin) there were--ayes 13, noes 19.
        Mr. [R. Lawrence] Coughlin [of Pennsylvania]: Madam Chairman, I 
    demand a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        Mr. Coughlin: Madam Chairman, if I can get a recorded vote, I 
    will withdraw my point of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair had announced that a quorum is not 
    present and the gentleman may not withdraw his request at this 
    time.
        Mr. Coughlin: Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to 
    withdraw my request.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that he 
    cannot withdraw his request even by unanimous consent.
        The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, she 
    will vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the 
    Committee appears. Members will record their presence by electronic 
    device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.
        The Chairman: One hundred Members have appeared. A quorum of 
    the Committee of the Whole is present. Pursuant to rule XXIII, 
    clause 2, further proceedings under the call shall be considered as 
    vacated.
        The Committee will resume its business.

                               recorded vote

        The Chairman: The pending business is the demand of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Coughlin) for a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.

Motion To Rise in Absence of Quorum

Sec. 12.5 The motion that the Committee of the Whole rise is in order 
    pending a point of no quorum and a request for a recorded vote, 
    since the motion to rise does not require the presence of a quorum.

    Where the Committee of the Whole rose after a point of no quorum 
had been made on Jan. 28, 1980,(13) the Chair announced that 
the pending request for a recorded vote would be before the Committee 
when it resumed its sitting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 126 Cong. Rec. 898, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (14) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Michel).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Matthew F. McHugh (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Robert W.] Edgar [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I demand 
    a recorded vote, and pending that, I make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        Mr. [Ray] Roberts [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I move that the 
    Committee do now rise.

[[Page 12375]]

        The motion was agreed to.
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, does that make in order at the opening 
    of tomorrow morning's session the vote, lacking a quorum at this 
    time?
        The Chairman: The Chair will put the question for a recorded 
    vote when the Committee of the Whole reconvenes.
        Mr. Edgar: I thank the Chair.

Right of Member To Make a Point of No Quorum

Sec. 12.6 A point of no quorum can be made only when a question is 
    pending; and where the vote on a suspension motion is objected to 
    on the ground that a quorum is not present and is then postponed, 
    there is no longer a question before the House and the point of no 
    quorum ``is considered as withdrawn.''

    On Sept. 24, 1979,(15) the Speaker Pro Tempore stated 
the pending business as shown and the proceedings that follow indicate 
one more skirmish in the battle over Rule XV clause 6(e).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 125 Cong. Rec. 25876, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) The question is on the 
    motion offered by the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Nichols) that the 
    House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 5168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. John J. Cavanaugh (Nebr.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand 
    the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Pursuant to clause 3 of rule XXVII and 
    the Chair's prior announcement, further proceedings on this motion 
    will be postponed.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I insist on my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The point of order is considered 
    withdrawn.
        The question is no longer pending.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair did not recognize the 
    gentleman for that purpose.

What Is a ``Pending Question'' Which Permits Point of No Quorum

Sec. 12.7 The Chair may not entertain a point of no quorum pending a 
    request that a committee be permitted to sit during the five-minute 
    rule, since the requirement of Rule XV clause 6(e) that a question 
    be pending before a point of no quorum can be made has not been 
    met.

[[Page 12376]]

    On June 18, 1980,(17) the Speaker Pro Tempore did not 
entertain a point of no quorum in circumstances where no question was 
being put to a vote. The circumstances are set forth herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 126 Cong. Rec. 15316, 15317, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas N.] Kindness [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary be permitted 
    to sit today and tomorrow during the 5-minute rule for 
    consideration of the criminal code.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (18) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Ohio?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Marty Russo (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, reserving the 
    right to object, the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) 
    has requested that I object. I am bound to object, and I indeed 
    will object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Those Members objecting please 
    rise.(19)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. The prohibition against committees sitting during the five-minute 
        rule if ten or more Members rendered objections was dropped 
        from Rule XI in the 105th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Messrs. Ashbrook, Bauman, Devine, Myers of Indiana, Rousselot, 
    and Hansen rose.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: An insufficient number of Members have 
    arisen.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I object to 
    the Chair's ruling on the ground that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The request is not a motion or 
    proposition put by the Chair to a vote.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that under the 
    Constitution the requirement is that a quorum be present to do any 
    business of the House. A quorum is not present at this time, and 
    the request for permission to sit for a committee is business being 
    conducted in the absence of a quorum.

                             Call of the House

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.
        A call of the House was ordered.
        The call was taken by electronic device, and the following 
    Members responded to their names: . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: On this rollcall, 362 Members have 
    recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum.
        Under the rule, further proceedings under the call are 
    dispensed with.

    request for permission for committee on the judiciary to sit today 
                 and thursday, june 19, under 5-minute rule

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I renew my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I renew my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: There is no point of order. The Chair 
    will state that under the rules of the House, the request that was 
    made was not subject to a point of order of a quorum not being 
    present because such a request in the House does not require the 
    presence of a quorum, as nothing is being put to a vote.
        The gentleman then moved a call of the House. The Chair was not 
    given an

[[Page 12377]]

    opportunity to count the House at that time, so we can presume a 
    quorum present. A quorum now being present, there is no point of 
    order that lies at this time.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that the 
    request was not in order and could not be granted unless a quorum 
    was present at that time. I made the point of order at the time the 
    request was ruled upon by the Chair, that the ruling was not 
    correct, that a quorum had to be here because the Constitution 
    requires a quorum at all times to do business, and a request for 
    the committee to sit is business.
        If I may be heard further, if it is the Chair's position that a 
    quorum is not required, requests for committees to sit can be made 
    at any time, after special orders, at any time of the day, to the 
    disadvantage of Members, and, therefore, preclude the right of 
    Members to exercise their power to prevent a committee from 
    sitting.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the gentleman, under 
    the rules of the House, the Chair is not permitted to entertain a 
    point of order, because such a request is not a motion or 
    proposition being put to a vote and the rule does not provide that 
    the Chair can entertain such a request.
        The request was made. The Chair asked whether or not any Member 
    objected. Ten Members did not stand, permission was granted. The 
    gentleman then made a point of order. The Chair, under the rules, 
    cannot entertain such a point of order at the particular time. The 
    Chair in the past has used its discretion in not accepting requests 
    for committees to sit when such requests are made during special 
    orders. The Chair will continue to exercise that discretion.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Is it the Chair's position that a quorum of the 
    House is not required at any time when a request for a committee to 
    sit is made?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The rules do not permit a point of no 
    quorum at that particular point. The Chair has so stated.
        Mr. Bauman: I renew my parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: The question is not whether the rules of the House 
    permit a point of no quorum. I am inquiring of the Chair whether or 
    not a quorum is required to be present when a request for a 
    committee to sit is made.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state again that the 
    Chair does not interpret the Constitution when there is an explicit 
    House rule on point. The Chair has already twice given the 
    gentleman his interpretation of the rules of the House.

When Question Is ``Pending'' To Permit Point of No Quorum

Sec. 12.8 As long as the Chair has put the question on the pending 
    proposition but has not announced the final re

[[Page 12378]]

    sult there on, any Member can make a point of order that a quorum 
    is not present, and a Member is not required to have been on his 
    feet when another Member made the point of order and then withdrew 
    it.

    Mr. Richardson Preyer, of North Carolina, was presiding as Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole on Aug. 20, 1980,(20) when he 
announced that on a division vote, an amendment was agreed to. The 
division showed that a quorum of the Committee did not vote and the 
proceedings were as indicated herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 126 Cong. Rec. 22149, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. McDade).
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    McDade) there were--ayes 36, noes 22.
        Mr. [Allen E.] Ertel [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I demand 
    a recorded vote, and pending that I make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: The gentleman asks for a recorded vote.
        Mr. Ertel: Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my request for a recorded 
    vote.
        Mr. [Robert] Garcia [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, just a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Am I in a position to make mention that a quorum is not 
    present?
        Mr. Chairman, I withdraw the request.
        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I demand a 
    recorded vote, and I make the point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
        Mr. [Richard L.] Ottinger [of New York]: A point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman, if he wishes to demand a vote, may 
    do so.
        Mr. Gonzalez: A point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has the right to ask for a recorded 
    vote or make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New York (Mr. Ottinger) will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Ottinger: The point of order, Mr. Chairman, is that the 
    gentleman was not on his feet to make such a request at the 
    appropriate time.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman was 
    relying on another gentleman being on his feet and making the point 
    of order, and he would have the right under these circumstances to 
    renew the point of order, since the Chair has not finally announced 
    the result of the vote.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and 
    pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
        The Chairman: Evidently a quorum is not present.

Once Refused, Request for Recorded Vote Not Renewable

Sec. 12.9 A recorded vote having been refused in Committee of

[[Page 12379]]

    the Whole, a point of no quorum may still lie under Rule XXIII 
    clause 2, if the pending question has not been disposed of by a 
    division vote, but a demand for a recorded vote cannot be renewed.

    During consideration of the first concurrent resolution on the 
budget for fiscal 1983, Chairman Pro Tempore Leo C. Zeferetti, of New 
York, had to vote to break a tie where a recorded vote was denied when 
requested on the adoption of an amendment. The proceedings of May 27, 
1982,(1) are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 128 Cong. Rec. 12470, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Whitten) to the 
    amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by the gentleman 
    from Wisconsin (Mr. Aspin).
        The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Ralph] Regula [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded 
    vote.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: A recorded vote is demanded.
        All those in favor of taking this vote by a recorded vote will 
    rise and be counted.
        Twenty-four Members, an insufficient number.
        So a recorded vote was refused.
        Mr. Regula: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present, and pending that, I demand a recorded vote.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair has already announced an 
    insufficient number.

        The gentleman can make a point of order but he cannot ask for a 
    recorded vote.
        Mr. Regula: Mr. Chairman, I demand a division.
        On a division (demanded by Mr. Regula) there were--ayes 42, 
    noes 43.
        Mr. [James J.] Howard [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I demand 
    tellers.
        Tellers were ordered and the Chairman pro tempore appointed as 
    tellers Mr. Whitten and Mr. Jones of Oklahoma.
        The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that 
    there were--ayes 72, noes 72.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair votes ``aye.''

``Permission To Sit'' Not Such Business as Requires Quorum

Sec. 12.10 The pendency of a request under the then applicable rule 
    (Rule XI clause 2(i)) for a committee to sit during the five-minute 
    rule, which would be granted unless 10 Members objected to the 
    request, was not considered equivalent to the Chair's putting the 
    question and did not set the stage for a point of no quorum under 
    Rule XV clause 6(e).

[[Page 12380]]

    Monday, Aug. 16, 1982,(2) was a ``suspension day'' and 
the leadership had announced that votes on such motions would be 
postponed until a following day. When Chairman John D. Dingell, of 
Michigan, then came to the floor to ask for permission for the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce to sit during the five-minute rule for 
the balance of the week, there were not sufficient Members on the floor 
or in their offices to object, ten objections being required by the 
rule then in effect to prevent a committee from sitting.(3) 
The following colloquy shows the difficulty of allowing such requests 
to be made on a day when no votes are scheduled.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 128 Cong. Rec. 21219, 21315, 21316, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
 3. The prohibition against committees sitting during the five-minute 
        rule if ten or more Members rendered objections was dropped 
        from Rule XI in the 105th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Request for Permission for Committee on Energy and Commerce To Sit 
            Today and the Rest of the Week During 5-Minute Rule

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (4) For what purpose does 
    the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    Committee on Energy and Commerce have the permission of the House 
    to sit today and for the rest of the week for the purposes of the 
    consideration of legislation while the House is sitting under the 
    5-minute rule.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
        Mr. [William E.] Dannemeyer [of California]: Mr. Speaker, 
    reserving the right to object, I wonder if the gentleman from 
    Michigan can enumerate what legislation this request relates to.
        Mr. Dingell: It is my expectation to consider the Clean Air Act 
    amendments.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Reserving the right to object, the request 
    relates only to the legislation dealing with the Clean Air Act?
        Mr. Dingell: That is correct.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
        Mr. [Henry A.] Waxman [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I move a 
    call of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is not recognizing the 
    gentleman for that purpose at this time.
        Mr. Waxman: Reserving the right to object, and pending that, 
    Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: That is not in order at this point. I 
    wonder if we could ask the gentleman from Michigan to temporarily 
    withhold his request.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I believe that this is proper 
    business of the House. The Chair has just considered a request of 
    this kind. If it is the wish of

[[Page 12381]]

    the gentleman from California to obfuscate and delay the business 
    of the Committee on Energy and Commerce, the business of the House, 
    then it is his right to do so, and I think it is my right to have 
    him take that step.


                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Speaker, a point of parliamentary procedure.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Waxman: I would like to know how the rules would protect 
    Members who have been informed that a controversial unanimous-
    consent request would not be brought up on a day when there are no 
    votes, except to allow a Member to ask for a quorum call so the 
    Members can participate in a decision that is made.
        Mr. Dingell: I call for the regular order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has indicated that a motion 
    at this time or objection at this time that a quorum is not present 
    is not in order. The gentleman from Michigan insists on his 
    unanimous-consent request.
        Mr. Dingell: That is correct.
        Mr. Waxman: A point of parliamentary procedure.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Waxman: I renew my inquiry to the Speaker on how the rules 
    are permitted to protect Members when there are no indications of 
    any controversy being brought up on a day when the House is not 
    required to have votes.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I demand the regular order. I make 
    the point of order that is not a proper parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Speaker, I demand the regular order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman insists on the regular 
    order. The gentleman from California insists on his right to make 
    an objection, pending which he makes the point of order a quorum is 
    not present.
        Mr. [John F.] Seiberling [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman withhold for a minute his point of order?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman yield to the 
    gentleman from Ohio?
        Mr. Waxman: I will be pleased to yield.
        Mr. Seiberling: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    Committee on the Judiciary be permitted to sit while the House is 
    reading for amendment under the 5-minute rule on Tuesday, 
    Wednesday, and Thursday, August 17, 18, and 19, 1982.
        Mr. Dingell: I have a similar request pending, and I object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is within his rights to 
    object to yield for that purpose. The gentleman did not recognize 
    the gentleman for that purpose at this time.
        The Chair at this time will withhold recognition for any 
    further purpose for a period. The Chair will protect the gentleman 
    from Michigan's rights in this matter.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I am entitled to have a ruling on my 
    unanimous-consent request.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will reserve a ruling. The 
    Chair will protect the gentleman's rights.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I believe I am entitled to be 
    protected at this time.

[[Page 12382]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: It is a matter of recognition, and the 
    Chair is going to exercise his rights of recognition at this time. 
    The Chair assures the gentleman that his rights will be protected.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I would observe that if I am denied 
    recognition at this time, I may very well be denied my rights. I 
    have a unanimous-consent request for which I was properly 
    recognized. I would point out another request was recognized for a 
    similar unanimous consent just previous to me. That request was 
    granted.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: It was not granted.
        Mr. Dingell: Perhaps the Speaker can explain to me why I am 
    being denied my rights.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Ohio withdrew his 
    request.
        Mr. Dingell: The gentleman previous to that.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Ohio withdrew his 
    request.
        Mr. Dingell: Are you forgetting that another Member had just 
    made a request on behalf of the Armed Services Committee?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from the Armed Services 
    Committee, Mr. White of Texas, asked to file a report, and that 
    unanimous-consent request was granted.
        Mr. Dingell: Unanimous-consent request that the Armed Services 
    Committee be permitted to sit.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: I am sorry to disagree with the 
    gentleman. The Chair did not grant permission to sit or entertain 
    that motion from the gentleman from Texas.
        The Chair will take 1 minute speeches at this time. . . .

    Request for Permission for Committee on Energy and Commerce To Sit 
           During 5-Minute Rule on Today and Balance of the Week

        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    Committee on Energy and Commerce be permitted to sit for the 
    purposes of considering legislation during the time that the House 
    is sitting under the 5-minute rule today and for the balance of the 
    week.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Michigan?
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object.

                             call of the house

        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.
        A call of the House was ordered.
        The call was taken by electronic device, and the following 
    Members responded to their names: . . .
        Mr. Phillip Burton [of California]: Mr. Speaker, regular order.
        Mr. Speaker, regular order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is observing the regular 
    order.
        Mr. Phillip Burton: Mr. Speaker, regular order as to the time 
    to note the presence of Members has expired.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Are there any Members who have not yet 
    recorded their presence?
        The Chair will advise the gentleman from California that 15 
    minutes is a minimum, not a maximum.

                                adjournment

        Mr. [E (Kika)] de la Garza [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House do now adjourn.

[[Page 12383]]

        The motion was agreed to: accordingly (at 1 o'clock and 17 
    minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until 
    Tuesday, August 17, 1982, at 10 a.m.

Relative Precedence, Point of No Quorum and Objection to Vote Because 
    of No Quorum

Sec. 12.11 When a question is pending, any Member can make a point of 
    order that a quorum is not present and get a quorum call before the 
    vote is taken; but another Member can preempt the quorum call by 
    objecting to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present, 
    thereby producing an automatic call under Rule XV clause 4.

    On Aug. 18, 1982,(5) Mr. Silvio O. Conte, of 
Massachusetts, intended to provoke a call of the House before the 
question was put on disposing of a Senate amendment in disagreement. 
His intention was thwarted by the more privileged point of order and 
objection to the vote raised by Mr. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., of 
Wisconsin.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 128 Cong. Rec. 22037, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (6) The question is on the 
    motion offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Long).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Abraham Kazen, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum 
    is not present.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
    ground that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is the gentleman from Massachusetts 
    (Mr. Conte) objecting to the vote?
        Mr. Conte: No, Mr. Speaker, I am just making the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
    Sensenbrenner) has a right to object to the vote.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the 
    ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

Point of No Quorum During General Debate

Sec. 12.12 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may, in his 
    discretion, entertain a point of no quorum during general debate.

    On Dec. 1, 1982,(7) the Chairman of the Committee of the

[[Page 12384]]

Whole entertained a point of order that a quorum was not present while 
general debate was underway. Members who were expected to participate 
in the debate were not on the floor and the quorum call allowed them to 
be notified about the proceedings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 128 Cong. Rec. 28205, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James T.] Broyhill [of North Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    make the point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: (8) Under clause 2, rule XXIII, as 
    adopted by the House of Representatives on January 5, 1981, the 
    Chair, in his discretion, may entertain a point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair will entertain the point of no quorum and announces 
    that pursuant to the provisions of clause 2, rule XXIII, he will 
    vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the Committee 
    appears.
        Members will record their presence by electronic device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.

Where Quorum Present, Objection to Vote Does Not Lie

Sec. 12.13 It is not in order to object to a vote on the ground that a 
    quorum is not present under Rule XV clause 4, if the Chair has 
    counted the House and announced that a quorum is in fact present 
    and no business has intervened since his count.

    On Dec. 17, 1982,(9) the House was considering 
amendments in disagreement to the District of Columbia appropriation 
bill, fiscal 1983. A motion that the House recede and concur in Senate 
amendment number 40 had been divided, and the Speaker Pro Tempore 
proceeded to put the question on receding from disagreement. The 
exchanges between Mr. Robert S. Walker, of Pennsylvania, and the 
Speaker Pro Tempore, Mr. John P. Murtha, of Pennsylvania, follow:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 128 Cong. Rec. 31951, 97th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is whether the House 
    shall recede from disagreement to Senate amendment 40.
        The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will count. Two hundred 
    nineteen Members are present, a quorum.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, that was an interesting count. I thank 
    the Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.

[[Page 12385]]

        So the motion was agreed to.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I might say we are going to have more 
    votes, then, this evening.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is now on concurring in 
    the Senate amendment with an amendment.
        The question was taken and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will count for a quorum. Two 
    hundred nineteen Members are present, a quorum.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will advise the gentleman 
    that he just counted a quorum.

Point of No Quorum During General Debate in House

Sec. 12.14 Pursuant to Rule XV clause 6(e)(1), a point of order of no 
    quorum cannot be made during general debate in the House; and while 
    the Speaker has discretion to entertain a motion for a call of the 
    House he does not recognize for a point of no quorum unless he has 
    put the pending question to a vote.

    During debate in the House on H.R. 3706, a bill making the birthday 
of Martin Luther King, Jr., a national holiday, the Speaker Pro Tempore 
(10) declined on two occasions to recognize Ms. Mary Rose 
Oakar, of Ohio, for a point of no quorum. Proceedings were as follows: 
(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Dale E. Kildee (Mich.).
11. 129 Cong. Rec. 22233, 22234, 98th Cong. 1st Sess., Aug. 2, 1983.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Dannemeyer) has 1 minute remaining.
        Mr. [William E.] Dannemeyer [of California]: I reserve the 
    balance of my time.
        Ms. Oakar: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that a quorum 
    is not present.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: I yield to the gentleman from Kansas such time 
    as he may consume.
        Ms. Oakar: Regular order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will not entertain the point 
    of order at this time.
        The gentleman from California yielded to whom? . . .
        The gentlewoman from Indiana.
        Mrs. [Katie] Hall of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I ask that the 
    gentleman from California yield back the balance of his time.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: The gentleman from California reserves the 
    balance of his time.

[[Page 12386]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman from Indiana.
        Ms. Oakar: Will the gentlewoman yield to me?
        Mrs. Hall of Indiana: I yield to the gentlewoman.
        Ms. Oakar: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order that a quorum 
    is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair does not have to entertain a 
    motion for a call of the House at this time and chooses not to.
        Ms. Oakar: I am sorry, I did not hear the Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The point of order cannot be made when 
    the Chair has not put the pending question, and the Chair has 
    discretion whether to entertain a motion for a call of the House at 
    this time and now recognizes the gentlewoman from Indiana.
        Mrs. Hall of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the 
    distinguished majority leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, 
    the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright).

Points of No Quorum During Five-minute Rule

Sec. 12.15 Once a quorum has been established by a recorded vote during 
    the five-minute debate in Committee of the Whole, a subsequent 
    quorum call during debate may be accomplished only by unanimous 
    consent.

    On May 10, 1984,(12) Chairman Les AuCoin, of Oregon, 
during five-minute debate on an amendment in Committee of the Whole, 
stated that since a quorum had been established on an earlier recorded 
vote, another quorum call would not be in order until the question was 
put on the pending amendment. Since Members on both sides of the aisle 
wanted to have a quorum present to hear the final speeches, a call of 
the committee was conducted by unanimous consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 130 Cong. Rec. 11836, 11837, 11869, 11870, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Rule XXIII clause 2(a) (13) provides that ``[a]fter the 
roll has been once called to establish a quorum during such day, the 
Chairman may not entertain a point of order that a quorum is not 
present unless the . . . Chairman has put the pending motion or 
proposition to a vote''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. House Rules and Manual Sec. 863 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The proceedings were as follows:

        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Studds).
        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [William S.] Broomfield [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    demand a recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    128, noes 287, not voting 18. . . .

[[Page 12387]]

        So the amendment was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. . . .
        Mr. Broomfield: Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point of 
    order that a quorum is not present for the final few speakers.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the Chair cannot 
    entertain that point of order unless the question has been put on a 
    pending proposition.
        Mr. Broomfield: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order----
        The Chairman: The Chair will state again that he cannot 
    entertain a point of order at this point unless the question has 
    been put on a pending matter, a quorum having been established on a 
    prior recorded vote today in this Committee of the Whole.
        Does the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Fascell) reserve the 
    balance of his time?

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Dante B.] Fascell [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Fascell: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry, but I did not hear the 
    Chair. I have no objection to a rollcall if that is what the 
    gentleman from Michigan asks for. But I did not hear what the Chair 
    said.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    Florida and to the gentleman from Michigan that by unanimous 
    consent, if a quorum is sought, a quorum can be sought by unanimous 
    consent.
        Mr. Fascell: Mr. Chairman, I am saying I have no objection.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan ask unanimous 
    consent for a quorum to be called.
        Mr. Broomfield: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Michigan?
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: A quorum call is ordered.
        Members will record their presence by electronic device.

Improper Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 12.16 During debate in the House, when a point of no quorum cannot 
    be entertained by the Speaker, he has declined to respond to a 
    parliamentary inquiry asking ``how many Members are in the 
    Chamber?'' since it would be improper under the guise of such an 
    inquiry to attempt to show the absence of a quorum.

    The brief parliamentary inquiry described above occurred on Oct. 
28, 1987,(14) and was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 133 Cong. Rec. 29682, 100th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [F. James] Sensenbrenner [Jr., of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, 
    I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. W. J. (Billy) Tauzin (La.).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12388]]

        Mr. sensenbrenner: Mr. Speaker, how many Members are present 
    now?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot respond to that as a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

When Chair Must Entertain Point of No Quorum

Sec. 12.17 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole must entertain a 
    point of order that a quorum is not present during the five-minute 
    rule over other requests for recognition, since Rule XXIII clause 2 
    gives the point of no quorum the highest pri-ority where a quorum 
    has not been established in the Committee on that day.

    The proceedings of June 30, 1993,(16) in Committee of 
the Whole, demonstrate the mandatory nature of a point of order of no 
quorum under certain conditions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 139 Cong. Rec. 14882, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Nita M.] Lowey [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I point out 
    the absence of a quorum.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentlewoman from New York 
    [Mrs. Lowey] makes this point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Philip R. Sharp (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Henry J.] Hyde [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [Robert K.] Dornan [of California]: Mr. Chairman, the 
    gentleman from Illinois was on his feet first, clearly.
        The Chairman: A point of no quorum takes precedence over other 
    motions and other requests for recognition.
        The gentlewoman has made a point of order of no quorum.
        The Chair will need to count for a quorum.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Dornan: Could I please have a parliamentary reading on 
    whether the Chairman sitting in the chair clearly ignored the 
    gentleman from Illinois for minutes before he recognized the 
    gentlewoman?
        The Chairman: The Chair may not ignore a point of no quorum, 
    under rule XXIII where a quorum has not been previously established 
    during the amendment stage.
        Previously, the Chair recognized the distinguished gentleman 
    from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], and the Chair will be pleased to do so 
    again at the appropriate moment.
        A Member has made the point that a quorum is not present. 
    Therefore, the Chair must count for a quorum of 100 Members in the 
    Committee of the Whole House.
        Evidently a quorum is not present.
        Members will record their presence by electronic device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 13. Appeals

    The right of appeal from decisions of the Speaker on questions

[[Page 12389]]

of order is provided for by the House rules. In Rule I clause 4, it is 
provided:

        He [the Speaker] shall . . . decide all questions of order, 
    subject to an appeal by any Member, on which appeal no Member shall 
    speak more than once, unless by permission of the House.

    Although amended in 1811, the portion of the rule pertaining to 
appeals of points of order dates from 1789.(18)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Rule I clause 4, House Rules and Manual Sec. 624 (1997).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Although appeals from rulings of the Chair on points of order are 
permissible, such appeals have been infrequent. The only issue 
presented by an appeal is the propriety of the Chair's ruling under the 
rules and precedents, and not the merits of the proposition to which 
the ruling applies.(19) Certain determinations by the Chair 
are not subject to appeal, such as his discretion in exercising the 
power of recognition,(20) his count to determine whether a 
quorum is present,(1) or his count on whether a sufficient 
number of Members have risen to order the yeas and nays.(2) 
Members are not recognized to appeal from the Chair's response to a 
parliamentary inquiry.(3)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. See Sec. Sec. 13.1, 13.2, infra.
20. See Sec. 13.11, infra.
 1. See Sec. 3.12, infra.
 2. See Sec. Sec. 13.13, 13.14, infra.
 3. See Sec. 14.4, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Decisions of the Chair on points of order raised in the Committee 
of the Whole may be appealed, although such are also rare. In such 
cases the decision of the Chairman is appealed to the 
Committee.(4) In the House an appeal is not voted on 
directly if the House agrees to a motion to table the 
appeal,(5) but the motion to table is not available in the 
Committee of the Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. See Sec. Sec. 13.3, 13.6-13.9, infra.
 5. See Sec. Sec. 13.15, 13.16, 
        infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In General

Sec. 13.1 The Chair suggested, in response to a parliamentary inquiry, 
    that the question of the constitutionality of a provision in a 
    pending bill was a matter for the House to determine by its vote on 
    the merits of that language, rather than by voting on a possible 
    appeal from the Chair's decision declining to rule upon that 
    constitutional issue.

    May 10, 1973,(6) in the Committee of the Whole, Chairman 
Jack Brooks, of Texas, declined to

[[Page 12390]]

rule upon the constitutionality of certain language that Mr. Sidney R. 
Yates, of Illinois, found objectionable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 119 Cong. Rec. 15290, 15291, 93d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 7447, supplemental appropriations for 
        fiscal 1973.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order against the 
    language beginning at page 6, line 10 through line 12.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    language set forth in lines 10, 11, and 12, on page 6.
        Article I, section 8, of the Constitution of the United States 
    says:

            The Congress shall have the power to declare war. . . .

        Congress has not declared war against Cambodia or Laos or 
    against any other country in Southeast Asia for that matter. 
    Congress has not given the President any authority to use the 
    American Armed Forces in Cambodia and Laos. Nevertheless, on order 
    of President Nixon, American military planes are bombing in both 
    those countries. The appropriation contained in the transfer 
    authority includes funds to continue the bombing of Cambodia and 
    Laos. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, under that rule it is not enough that there be 
    ordinary legislative authority which is required for other 
    appropriations. It is not enough that there be ordinary legislative 
    authority upon which to base an appropriation for American Armed 
    Forces to engage in war.
        There must be constitutional authority for that appropriation 
    as well, namely, there must be congressional approval for American 
    forces to engage in a war. Both authorizations are essential for 
    that kind of appropriation. . . .
        I am asking the Chair for its ruling on two points. One, I ask 
    the Chair to rule with respect to military appropriations which 
    provide funds for American Armed Forces to engage in war under rule 
    XXI, section 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the House of 
    Representatives, which states there must be, as well as any other 
    legislation authorizing such action, compliance with article I, 
    section 8, of the U.S. Constitution, which requires the approval of 
    the Congress for American Armed Forces to engage in that war; and, 
    secondly, I am asking the Chair to rule that the requirements in 
    article XI, section 8, cannot be waived by any rule of the 
    Committee on Rules. . . .
        The Chairman: . . . The Chair is not in a position, nor is it 
    proper for the Chair to rule on the constitutionality of the 
    language, or on the constitutionality or other effect of the action 
    of the House in adopting the resolution of the Committee on Rules. 
    In the headnotes in the precedents of the House it very clearly 
    states that it is not the duty of a chairman to construe the 
    Constitution as it may affect proposed legislation, or to interpret 
    the legality or effect of language; and the Chair therefore 
    overrules the point of order raised by the gentleman from Illinois 
    (Mr. Yates).
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I want to make some comments on the 
    ruling of the Chair with the thought that I may appeal from the 
    ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair has ruled. The gentleman is perfectly 
    within his right to move to strike the last word, and he may 
    proceed.

[[Page 12391]]

        Mr. Yates: The point I make, Mr. Chairman, is that in the 
    ruling that the Chair made on precedents, as I recall that ruling, 
    it also says that while the Chair does not interpret the 
    constitutionality of the provision, it leaves that for the House to 
    decide. Is my memory correct on that?
        The Chairman: The Chair believes that is correct in that the 
    committee may later vote on the provision.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, while I believe the ruling to be not 
    on the points I made I accept the ruling of the Chair. Let the 
    House vote on the amendment which will be offered.

Purpose of Appeal; Validity of Chair's Ruling

Sec. 13.2 An appeal from a ruling of the Chair goes only to the 
    propriety of the Chair's ruling--whether he has correctly applied 
    the precedents and rules in making the decision--and the vote 
    thereon should not be interpreted as reflecting the sentiments of 
    the Members as to the merits of the underlying issue.

    A decision of the Chair in response to a point of order may impact 
on an emotional or politically volatile issue, and may determine 
whether the issue can be debated or voted upon. Some Members have 
suggested, even attempted, to generate an appeal as a way of putting 
Members on record. One such occurrence almost surfaced during 
consideration of the Labor-HHS appropriation bill, fiscal 1992, on June 
26, 1991.(7)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 137 Cong. Rec. 16436, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [William E.] Dannemeyer [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (8) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Alan Wheat (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dannemeyer: Mr. Chairman, if a point of order is raised 
    against the Weber language on parental notification in this bill, 
    and if the Chairman would sustain the point of order, would I be in 
    order at that time to ask for a rollcall vote on that sustaining of 
    that point of order, making parental notification not in order of 
    this bill?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: Any such ruling of the Chair is 
    subject to an appeal, as the gentleman is aware.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: The only way to get the rollcall vote is to 
    appeal the ruling of the Chair?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: That might depend on the effect of 
    the Chair's ruling.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: A further parliamentary inquiry: Is the appeal 
    of a ruling of a Chair interpreted by some in this body as a 
    procedural matter, as distinguished from a substantive matter?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: An appeal of the Chair's ruling goes 
    only to the propriety of the Chair's ruling under the rules.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Mr. Chairman, I interpret the Chair's remarks 
    to mean

[[Page 12392]]

    it is procedural in nature rather than substantive.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: It should not be interpreted as a 
    vote on the merits of the issue at hand.

Sec. 13.3 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair stated that 
    an appeal was a proper mechanism to contest the Chair's decision on 
    a point of order.

    On May 16, 1979,(9) an appeal was taken in the Committee 
of the Whole from a decision on the germaneness of an amendment made by 
Chairman E de la Garza, of Texas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 125 Cong. Rec. 11470-72, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     amendment offered by mr. kindness

        Mr. [Thomas N.] Kindness [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment and ask unanimous consent for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            On page 2, following line 2, add the following new sections 
        to the bill:
            ``Sec. 2. Subsection (c) of section 207 of title 18, United 
        States Code, is hereby repealed.
            ``Sec. 3. Section 207 of title 18, United States Code is 
        further amended--
            (1) in subsection (d) by striking out ``(c)'' and inserting 
        in lieu thereof ``(b)(ii)'';
            (2) in subsection (e) by striking out ``(c)'' and inserting 
        in lieu thereof ``(b)(ii)'';
            (3) in subsection (f) by striking out ``(a), (b), and (c)'' 
        and inserting in lieu thereof ``(a) and (b)'';
            (4) in subsection (i) by striking out ``(c)'' and inserting 
        in lieu thereof ``(b)(ii)'';
            (5) in subsection (j) by striking out ``(a), (b), or (c)'' 
        and by inserting in lieu thereof ``(a) or (b)''; and
            (6) by redesignating subsection (d) through (j) as 
        subsections (c) through (i), respectively. . . .

        Mr. [George E.] Danielson [of California]: I make a point of 
    order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California makes a point of 
    order?
        Mr. Danielson: Yes, I do.
        The Chairman: Will the gentleman state his point of order. . . 
    .
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman from California 
    on his point of order.
        Mr. Danielson: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's amendment would 
    repeal subsection (c) of title 207 of the United States Code. I 
    respectfully submit that it is not germane inasmuch as the bill 
    pending before the committee at this time refers only to subsection 
    (b) of section 207 of the United States Code. It has nothing to do 
    with subsection (c). Therefore, it is beyond the scope of the bill 
    and is not germane.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman is recognized for that purpose.
        Mr. Kindness: This railroad is running pretty fast. The 
    chairman of the subcommittee has just shown a lack of confidence in 
    this bill. So much so that all we can consider under a very 
    narrowly drawn committee amendment is just a little bit of the 
    section that is in

[[Page 12393]]

    volved. The real controversy lies outside of subsection (b). . . .
        The previous ruling of the Chair related to the establishment 
    of some other section of law; but this is right in the same section 
    and it is inappropriate to limit the application of this bill to 
    just a portion of the section which is, indeed, a sentence. To 
    limit it to only subsection (b) would not be to even consider the 
    complete sentence.
        Mr. [Carlos J.] Moorhead of California: Mr. Chairman, I wanted 
    to speak to that point of order. The title of this bill is an act 
    to amend section 207 of title 18, United States Code. That is 
    exactly what this amendment does. It amends section 207 of title 18 
    of the United States Code. It should be relevant.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, on that point, in connection with 
    the point raised by the gentleman from California (Mr. Moorhead), 
    we must relate the ruling of the Chair on the point of order that 
    has been raised to section 501 of title 18 of the United States 
    Code. There can be no way to relate the ruling to section 501 of 
    title 18 without it being in order and germane to consider 
    everything within that section 501.
        The Chairman: Is there any other Member who wishes to be heard 
    on the point of order?
        The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) is recognized.

        Mr. [Robert C.] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I speak in 
    opposition to the point of order. As has been said before, both the 
    matter before the House and the amendment relate to section 207. 
    Both address the same question, the precise question, that was 
    addressed by the original bill. This amendment is both germane to 
    the original bill and germane to the committee amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Volkmer) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: Briefly, Mr. Chairman, 
    in support of the point of order.
        I would just like to note that even though the title itself 
    refers to the full section, the body of the bill relates only to 
    subsection (b) and subsection (d) as originally passed by the 
    Senate and sent over to this body. It does not relate in any way to 
    subsection (c), which is the subject of the amendment and, 
    therefore, I believe the germaneness rule, which I will acknowledge 
    is a narrow interpretation, should be followed here, and that only 
    amendments to those two parts of section 207 would be in order.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on the 
    point of order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Ohio 
    (Mr. Kindness).
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman tell me where 
    the sentence ends?
        In fact, subsections (a), (b), and (c) are not subsections; 
    they are part of one sentence.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair can only rule with respect to the legislation which 
    appears before the Committee of the Whole in its present form, and 
    that is S. 869.
        By a previous amendment adopted in the committee, the reference 
    to sub

[[Page 12394]]

    section (d)(3) has been stricken from the bill. The only other 
    subsection that remains in the bill is subsection (b) of section 
    207 of title 18 addressing one category of employees. Any mention 
    made of the title to the bill is not considered as a substantive 
    part of the legislation and does not determine the germaneness of 
    an amendment to the test.
        Therefore, under the precedents as studied by the Chair, the 
    Chair will sustain the point of order.

                           Parliamentary Inquiry

        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kindness) will state 
    his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, in order to appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair to the Committee of the Whole, is it in order at this 
    point to move that the question be presented by way of a direct 
    appeal of the ruling of the Chair?
        The Chairman: The gentleman has the right to appeal.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    be sustained?
        The question was taken; and the Chairman being in doubt, the 
    Committee divided, and there were, ayes 15, noes 6.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and 
    pending that, I make the point of order that quorum is not present.
        The Chairman: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Chair announces that pursuant to clause 2, rule XXIII, he 
    will vacate proceedings under the call when a quorum of the 
    Committee appears.
        Members will record their presence by electronic device. . . .
        The Chairman: Three hundred and forty-nine Members have 
    answered to their name, a quorum is present, and the Committee will 
    resume its business.
        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kindness) insist upon his 
    request for a recorded vote?
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw 
    the request for a recorded vote on appealing the ruling of the 
    Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman can withdraw his request without 
    unanimous consent.

The Chair Does Not Rule on Questions of Constitutionality

Sec. 13.4 The Chair does not rule on the constitutionality of the rules 
    adopted by the House of Representatives.

    Rule XV clause 6(e), which prohibits the Speaker from entertaining 
a point of no quorum unless the pending motion or proposition has been 
put to a vote, was included as part of H. Res. 5, which was considered 
and adopted on Jan. 4, 1977.(10) On several occasions during 
the first session of the 95th Congress, Members sought to challenge 
that new rule by various parliamentary means.

[[Page 12395]]

Two such challenges are shown in this and the following section. The 
first example is from the proceedings of Sept. 8, 1977.(11)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 123 Cong. Rec. 53-70, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
11. 123 Cong. Rec. 28114, 28122-24, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (12) The gentleman from 
    Texas (Mr. Mahon) is recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman 
    from Alabama (Mr. Edwards) is recognized for 30 minutes. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will report the next amendment in disagreement.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Senate amendment No. 41: Page 25, line 12, strike out 
        ``$7,417,705,-000'' and insert ``$6,111,600,000''.

        Mr. [George H.] Mahon [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Mahon moves that the House recede from its disagreement 
        to the amendment of the Senate numbered 41 and concur therein 
        with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum proposed by 
        said amendment insert: ``$7,693,400,000''. . . .

        Mr. [Jack] Edwards of Alabama: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such 
    time as I may consume.
        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: That point of order is not in order in 
    the House at this time.
        The gentleman from Alabama is recognized.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, a point of 
    order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States 
    requires that a quorum be present at all times to conduct business 
    in the House of Representatives. We are sitting in the House and at 
    this time there is a pending motion on an appropriations conference 
    report being debated, and I can count. Obviously there are not 218 
    Members present. We have no quorum. I make a point of order that 
    under the Constitution, article I, section 5, the House cannot 
    continue to conduct its business in this way without a quorum and I 
    move a call of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has discretion to entertain 
    a motion for a call of the House but he cannot entertain a point of 
    order at this time.
        Mr. Bauman: A parliamentary inquiry. Under what authority does 
    the Chair not entertain a point of no quorum when a quorum is not 
    present?
        Mr. [John] Brademas [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I move a call 
    of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Indiana moves a 
    call of the House.
        Under rule XV clause 6(e) the Chair cannot entertain a point of 
    no quorum at this time.
        Mr. Bauman: A parliamentary inquiry. Does rule XV allow 
    discretion in the Chair whether or not a point of no quorum will be 
    permitted? There is not a quorum present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The only discretion the Chair would 
    have under clause 6(e)(2) of rule XV is whether to entertain a 
    motion for a

[[Page 12396]]

    call of the House. The Chair has entertained such a motion.
        Without objection, a call of the House is ordered.
        There was no objection.
        The call was taken by electronic device, and the following 
    Members failed to respond: . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: On this rollcall 353 Members have 
    recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum.
        By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were 
    dispensed with.
        The Chair wishes to clarify the point which was raised by the 
    gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) prior to the quorum call, and 
    since the gentleman is perhaps much more familiar with the rules 
    than is the Chair, the Chair wishes to quote clause 6 of rule XV 
    which deals with quorum calls in the House. The provision of the 
    rules which the Chair wishes to cite is specifically clause 
    6(e)(1), which reads as follows:

            Except as provided by subparagraph (2), it shall not be in 
        order to make or entertain a point of order that a quorum is 
        not present unless the Speaker has put the pending motion or 
        proposition to a vote.

        In this instance the Speaker pro tempore had not put the 
    pending motion or proposition to a vote to make it possible for a 
    quorum call to qualify under the rules. It is, of course, 
    imperative that the Chair follow the rules in a matter of this 
    sort.
        This point has been further stressed by Speaker O'Neill when 
    the matter has been brought up on previous occasions.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, not that I wish to belabor the point, 
    but the Constitution of the United States, article I, section 5, 
    requires that at all times a majority of the House be present for 
    the conduct of business. The point that I made prior to the quorum 
    call was that there was not a majority of the House present, and in 
    the absence of a majority, any business that would be conducted 
    would not be legally or constitutionally conducted, the rules of 
    the House notwithstanding.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. 
    Bauman) is perhaps more familiar with the Constitution than is the 
    Chair, who is not in a position to rule upon the constitutionality 
    of the rule, but the new rule does not anticipate, according to the 
    understanding of the Chair, that the mere conduct of debate would 
    constitute business in the sense as contemplated by the 
    Constitution, and the rule does provide that a point of order is in 
    order if a question has been put to a vote.

Appeal Does Not Lie

Sec. 13.5 The Speaker's refusal to entertain a point of order of no 
    quorum when there is no pending question being put to a vote is not 
    subject to an appeal, since Rule XV clause 6(e) states an absolute 
    prohi

[[Page 12397]]

    bition against the Chair's entertaining such a point of order and 
    to allow an appeal would permit a direct change in that rule.

    The Speaker Pro Tempore, Ms. Barbara Jordan, of Texas, refused to 
entertain an appeal in this case since the rule involved leaves no 
discretionary interpretation to the Chair. The proceedings of Sept. 16, 
1977,(13) are shown below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 123 Cong. Rec.  29594, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [J. William] Stanton [of Ohio]: Madam Speaker, I yield 2 
    minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Wylie), a very 
    distinguished and important member of our committee.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Madam Speaker, I make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will inform the gentleman 
    from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) that the point of order is not in order at 
    this time under rule XV, clause 6(e).
        Mr. Ashbrook: Madam Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will inform the gentleman 
    that is not an appealable ruling. The rule contains an absolute 
    prohibition against a Member making or the Chair entertaining such 
    a point of order at this time, leaving no interpretive authority in 
    the Chair and no authority to recognize for such a point of order. 
    The rule itself, and not the ruling of the Chair, governs in this 
    situation. To permit an appeal would be tantamount to permitting a 
    direct change in the rule itself.

Appeal in Committee of the Whole--Chair Sustained

Sec. 13.6 The Chair's ruling on a point of order in the Committee of 
    the Whole was sustained on appeal by division vote of the 
    Committee.

    On Mar. 31, 1937,(14) arguing that a point of order 
against his amendment had been raised too late, Mr. Ross A. Collins, of 
Mississippi, appealed a ruling of Chairman Scott W. Lucas, of Illinois. 
To Mr. Collins' proposed amendment, Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, of North 
Carolina, had raised a point of order that it was legislation in an 
appropriation bill and, hence, out of order. To this Mr. Collins 
responded that it was too late because he had already been recognized 
in debate, although it was disputed as whether he had actually said 
anything or not. Chairman Lucas ruled that Mr. Warren could raise his 
point of order because he had shown due diligence in seeking 
recognition. Further, the Chairman upheld the point of order against

[[Page 12398]]

the amendment. Thereupon, Mr. Collins made the following unsuccessful 
appeal of the Chairman's ruling:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 81 Cong. Rec. 2980, 2981, 75th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 5966, an appropriation bill for the legislative branch 
        for fiscal 1938.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule on the point of order 
    made by the gentleman from North Carolina. In the opinion of the 
    Chair, there is no authorization under the law for the additional 
    clerks as is proposed by the amendment offered by the gentleman 
    from Mississippi [Mr. Collins]. Obviously, it is an attempt to pass 
    legislation upon an appropriation bill. The Chair sustains the 
    point of order made by the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. 
    Warren].
        Mr. Collins: Mr. Chairman, I appeal from the ruling of the 
    Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    stand as the judgment of the Committee?

        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Snell) there were ayes 72 and noes 23.
        So the decision of the Chair stood as the judgment of the 
    Committee.

Sec. 13.7 On appeal, the Chair's ruling on a question of germaneness 
    was upheld on a voice vote.

    During consideration of the Justice System Improvement Act, 1979, 
an appeal was taken by Mr. John M. Ashbrook, of Ohio, from a decision 
by the Chair that Mr. Ashbrook's second degree amendment was not 
germane. The proceedings of Oct. 12, 1979,(15) were as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 125 Cong. Rec. 28123, 28124, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Volkmer: Page 164, lines 24 and 
        25, amend the bill by adding the following after the word 
        ``project,'' ``including photographic equipment, and 
        fingerprint equipment, for law enforcement purposes.''.

        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Ashbrook to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Volkmer: Insert after the word ``including'' 
        ``bulletproof vests.''.

        The Chairman: (16) Does the gentleman from New York 
    insist on his point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Mike McCormack (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Peter A.] Peyser [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I do.
        Mr. Chairman, I do this to my friend from Ohio because my 
    concern is exactly the same as his, which is to guarantee that we 
    do include in this bill the availability of bulletproof vests, 
    because it is a whole different subject. I raise the point that it 
    is not germane to this particular equipment that is being discussed 
    at this time. When we previously discussed this with the 
    Parliamentarian the point was made that it could not be amended on 
    the other side by having the bulletproof vest amendment amended by 
    adding cameras and other equipment. It is not a germane fact to 
    this issue and the type of equipment we are dealing with and 
    discussing, and for that reason it should be ruled out of order.

[[Page 12399]]

        I will say that it is my intention, to the gentleman from Ohio, 
    to offer this amendment as I did the other day, offer the exact 
    same amendment. I intend to offer it today as soon as this 
    discussion is finished.
        Does the gentleman from Ohio wish to be heard on the point of 
    order?
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, I would merely say in response that 
    I do not believe my colleague from New York has stated adequate 
    grounds on the point of order. I think the proposition he 
    propounded, the question placed to the Parliamentarian was on the 
    Volkmer amendment when we were in an entirely different position 
    the other day and we have already opened up two categories. It 
    seems to me this comes within the general description of the type 
    of police gear, type of police paraphernalia, electronic devices 
    that could be used, and I would think the point of order should be 
    overruled.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Missouri wish to speak on 
    the point of order?
        Mr. Volkmer: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak on the 
    point of order. As to the question of germaneness, as I understand 
    it my amendment says, ``including photographic equipment, 
    fingerprint equipment,'' and then the words ``for law enforcement 
    purposes.''
        Therefore, in my opinion anything that would be in there for 
    law enforcement purposes would be germane. In other words, if 
    somebody would offer an amendment for pistols, or offer an 
    amendment for bullets, or offer an amendment for police caps or 
    cars or anything else for law enforcement purposes, it is germane. 
    This is not restricted just to a certain type of equipment. We have 
    photographic equipment and fingerprint equipment. They are not 
    related at all. Bulletproof vests are for law enforcement purposes.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The question really comes down to how to define and segregate 
    categories of law enforcement equipment. The Chair is persuaded 
    that the term, ``photographic equipment and fingerprint equipment'' 
    is a generic category that deals with information rather than 
    protection of law enforcement officers.
        Bulletproof vests are within the different category of 
    equipment for the protection of law enforcement officers. The Chair 
    recognizes that this is a fine line, but rules that under the 
    precedents the amendment is not germane to the pending amendment 
    and the point of order is sustained.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, is the point of order upheld?
        The Chairman: Yes.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the Chair's ruling stand 
    as the judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote, and 
    pending that, I make the point of order that a quorum is not 
    present.
        The Chairman: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        Pursuant to the provisions of clause 2 of rule XXIII, the Chair 
    announces

[[Page 12400]]

    that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time 
    within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken 
    on the pending question following the quorum call. Members will 
    record their presence by electronic device.
        The call was taken by electronic device.
        The Chairman: Three hundred and twelve Members have answered to 
    their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its 
    business.
        The pending business is the demand of the gentleman from Ohio 
    (Mr. Ashbrook) for a recorded vote appealing the decision of the 
    Chair.
        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) insist upon his 
    demand for a recorded vote?
        Mr. Ashbrook: I do not, Mr. Chairman.

Appeal in Committee of the Whole--Chair Overruled

Sec. 13.8 Where a ruling on a point of order by the Chairman of the 
    Committee of the Whole was appealed and voted upon, the Chair's 
    ruling was overturned.

    In a rare instance in which a ruling by the Chairman was appealed, 
on Feb. 1, 1938,(17) the Committee of the Whole voted to 
overrule the decision of the Chairman, William J. Driver, of Arkansas. 
The situation occurred following the offering of an amendment by Mr. 
Ross A. Collins, of Mississippi, to which Mr. Jack Nichols, of 
Oklahoma, raised a point of order after Mr. Collins had spoken only a 
few words on the amendment. Mr. Collins then made the point of order, 
which the Chair sustained, that the point of order raised by Mr. 
Nichols came too late, as Mr. Collins had already begun his remarks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 83 Cong. Rec. 1372, 1373, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 9181, a District of Columbia appropriation bill for 
        1939.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Collins: Mr. Chairman, the language that is incorporated in 
    the amendment--
        Mr. Nichols: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment.
        Mr. Collins: Eliminates the language against which the 
    gentleman made the point of order.
        Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the gentleman's 
    point of order comes too late.

    It was disputed whether Mr. Collins had been recognized at the time 
he commenced his remarks, although the Chair maintained that he had 
been recognized. In any event, those supporting Mr. Nichols' position 
argued that he had had no opportunity to make his point of order. The 
following then took place:

        Mr. Nichols: If the Chair has made a final ruling, I would, in 
    the most re

[[Page 12401]]

    spectful manner I know, request an appeal from the decision of the 
    Chair.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Oklahoma appeals from the 
    decision of the Chair on the ruling of the Chair on the point of 
    order, as stated.
        The question before the Committee is, Shall the ruling of the 
    Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee?
        The question was taken, and the Chair announced that the noes 
    had it.
        So the decision of the Chair does not stand as the judgment of 
    the Committee.

Form of Question When Decision Is Appealed

Sec. 13.9 Where a decision of the Chair ruling an amendment out of 
    order is appealed, the question is put: ``Shall the decision of the 
    Chair stand as the judgment of the Committee'' and if the Chair's 
    ruling is not sustained, the amendment would be debated under the 
    five-minute rule.

    On Aug. 1, 1989,(18) when an appeal was taken from a 
ruling of the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole, Mr. George E. 
Brown, Jr., of California, the Majority Leader directed several 
inquiries to the Chair to inform Members of the consequences of such an 
appeal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 135 Cong. Rec. 17154-56, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                       amendment offered by mr. ridge

        Mr. [Thomas J.] Ridge [of Penn-sylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Ridge: Page 20, after line 3, 
        insert the following:
            Sec. 604. No part of any appropriation contained in title I 
        shall knowingly be used to enumerate any undocumented alien in 
        the 1990 decennial census.

        Mr. [Neal] Smith of Iowa: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    on the amendment. . . .
        The Chairman: . . . The gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Smith) makes a 
    point of order that the amendment violates clause 2 of rule XXI by 
    legislating on a general appropriations bill. The amendment offered 
    by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ridge) is in the form of a 
    limitation on funds in the bill and, by its use of the modifier, 
    ``knowingly,'' refrains from requiring any affirmative 
    investigation or determination on the part of government officials.
        However, the amendment requires the exclusion from the census 
    of population persons having a certain known status who under 
    current law are not required to be excluded. Article I, section 2 
    of the Constitution and the 14th amendment require a decennial 
    census of the whole number of persons in each State, excluding 
    Indians not taxed.
        To fulfill the constitutional mandate, section 141(a) of title 
    13 of the United States Code directs the Secretary of

[[Page 12402]]

    Commerce to make a census of the population. The statute authorizes 
    the Secretary to determine the form and content of the census. 
    Although subject to judicial review, the Secretary's sole 
    discretion under the statute has been described by the court as 
    broad.
        The amendment would impinge upon the discretion of the 
    Secretary of Commerce by requiring him to exclude from the census 
    of population persons having a certain status should he know that 
    status. Under the statute, however, the Secretary's discretion is 
    not so bounded. He is not required to exclude persons having that 
    status. An amendment to a general appropriation bill that subjects 
    the discretion of a government official to a limit not contained in 
    existing law is legislation in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI.
        In volume 8 of Deschler's precedents, at section 64, the 
    following test is set forth as one of the fundamental tests of the 
    propriety of a proposed limitation; and I quote:

            Does the limitation curtail or extend, modify or alter, 
        existing powers or duties, or terminate old or confirm new 
        ones? If it does, then it must be conceded that legislation is 
        involved, for without legislation these results could not be 
        accomplished.

        It is the opinion of the Chair that the amendment in this case 
    must involve legislation, and, accordingly, the Chair sustains the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Ridge: Mr. Chairman, I respectfully appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair and ask for a recorded vote.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Richard A.] Gephardt [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gephardt: Would the Chair state for us the effect of the 
    appealing and ruling of the Chair?
        The Chairman: The Chair was about to state the question.
        The question is: Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the 
    judgment of the Committee? An aye vote would support the Chair's 
    ruling. A no vote would not.
        Mr. [William H.] Gray [III, of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Gray: The question that I have, Mr. Chairman, is, if the 
    Chair's ruling is not sustained, what would be the parliamentary 
    situation at that time?
        The Chairman: At that point, if the decision of the Chair is 
    not sustained, the amendment would be debatable on the merits under 
    the 5-minute rule in the normal course of procedure.

    The Chair then put the question and, on a recorded vote, the 
decision of the Chair was sustained.

Withdrawal of an Appeal

Sec. 13.10 An appeal was taken from a decision of the Speaker and then 
    withdrawn, before the question was put on a motion to lay the 
    appeal on the table.

    In recent years appeals from rulings of the Chair on points of 
order have been tabled in the House more often than they have

[[Page 12403]]

been voted upon. Thus, Nov. 28, 1967,(19) Mr. Paul C. Jones, 
of Missouri, opposed a Senate amendment to a House bill, stating:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 113 Cong. Rec. 34032, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H. Res. 985, providing for concurring in Senate amendments to 
        H.R. 2275, an act to provide for the relief of Dr. R. V. 
        Samala, with Senate amendments relating to congressional 
        redistricting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        As the other body has done so many times in the past, they have 
    taken a bill of no great merit and of interest probably to only one 
    Member of Congress, and have attached to that bill an amendment 
    which would affect practically every Member of Congress and each 
    one of the 200 million inhabitants of the United States. They have 
    tried by subterfuge to obtain the passage of a bill in the form of 
    an amendment which they cannot pass directly.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Id. at p. 34033.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Mr. Jones raised a point of order against the amendment ``to 
restore comity and equality'' between the Houses:

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (1) The Chair will 
    recognize the gentleman to make his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Charles M. Price (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Jones of Missouri: I will make the point of order now.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    or- der. . . .
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: I am making the point of order on the 
    basis of the rule of equity. I am making the point of order on the 
    basis of what the distinguished Speaker of the House of 
    Representatives has said on many occasions, that these two bodies 
    are equal. I am making the point of order to restore comity and 
    equality. As everyone in the House knows, if I were a lawyer, I 
    would not be up here trying to make this point today.

    After Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, overruled the 
point of order, Mr. Jones appealed the ruling, but when Mr. Price moved 
to table the appeal, Mr. Jones withdrew it:

        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule. The Chair has given 
    serious consideration to the point of order raised by the gentleman 
    from Missouri. The Committee on Rules has reported out a special 
    rule. It is within the authority of the rules, and a reporting out 
    by the Rules Committee is consistent with the rules of the House. 
    Therefore, the Chair overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, I know this has never been 
    done, but I am going to appeal from the rule of the Chair and ask 
    for a rollcall.
        Mr. Price of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, I move to lay on the table 
    the appeal of the gentleman.
        Mr. Jones of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my request, but 
    it is still within my heart.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Missouri withdraws his request.

Where Appeal Is Not Entertained

Sec. 13.11 Under clause 2 of Rule XIV, recognition is wholly

[[Page 12404]]

    within the discretion of the Chair, who may decline to recognize a 
    Member to propound a unanimous-consent request relating to an order 
    of business, and such a decision of the Chair on recognition is not 
    subject to appeal.

    On Feb. 27, 1992,(2) Speaker Pro Tempore Michael R. 
McNulty, of New York, had recognized the chairman of the Committee on 
Rules to discuss the agenda of that committee and the floor schedule 
which might result from actions taken by the committee. Mr. James A. 
Traficant, Jr., of Ohio, attempted to propound a unanimous-consent 
request to alter the House schedule. The proceedings which followed are 
carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 138 Cong. Rec. 3655, 3656, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joe] Moakley [of Massachusetts]: I rise to notify members 
    about the Rules Committee's plans for two measures: The budget 
    resolution for fiscal year 1993 and H.R. 3732, the Budget Process 
    Reform Act of 1991. . . .
        I take this opportunity to advise Members who wish to offer an 
    amendment to either the budget resolution or to H.R. 3732, the 
    Budget Process Reform Act. . . .
        I have just been informed that the budget will be available at 
    the committee offices tomorrow.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Speaker, will the chairman yield to me?
        Mr. Moakley: I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Speaker, I want to rise in support of what 
    was just stated on the floor. I think that every Member of this 
    body should have at least 7 days to read thoroughly and to 
    understand the budget of our country.
        I think this. I do not know if it is in order, but I would like 
    to ask unanimous consent that there be at least 1 week's 
    availability for all Members of this House to read the budget 
    before action for amendments or pending rules be considered.
        Mr. Speaker, I put that in the form of a unanimous-consent 
    request.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman's request is not in 
    order. . . .

        Request That Members Be Given 1 Week To Read Budget Proposal

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: For what reason does the gentleman 
    from Ohio rise?
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Speaker, I rise for the purpose of offering 
    a unanimous-consent request to the Congress.
        Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members be given 
    1 week to read next year's budget proposal from the Budget 
    Committee and that no rule be recommended or considered until that 
    1-week reading opportunity is granted to all Members of the House.
        Mr. [James H.] Bilbray [of Nevada]: Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has the power of recognition 
    and the Chair declines to recognize the

[[Page 12405]]

    gentleman for that purpose and the gentleman cannot challenge that 
    denial.

                               point of order

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Speaker, I would like to know under what 
    rule of the House such action by the Chair is taken.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Clause 2, rule XIV.

Sec. 13.12 An appeal does not lie to the Chair's count determining that 
    a quorum is present.

    Where a vote first taken by a division is objected to on the ground 
that a quorum is not present, and the Chair counts the House and 
announces that a quorum is in fact present, that count is not subject 
to challenge by appeal. A demand for the yeas and nays, if supported by 
one-fifth of those present, would produce an accurate vote and count of 
those present. The events of Aug. 3, 1977,(3) preceding and 
during consideration in the House of a conference report on the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act of 1978, where the Chair was faced with a 
parliamentary inquiry, illustrate the point of the headnote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 123 Cong. Rec. 26528, 26532, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William A.] Steiger [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Steiger moves, pursuant to section 152(d)(3) of the 
        Trade Act of 1974, to postpone indefinitely the motion that the 
        House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
        the State of the Union for the consideration of House 
        Resolution 653.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (4) The question is on the 
    preferential motion offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. 
    Steiger).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Ashbrook) there were--ayes 149, noes 33.
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I object to the 
    vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point 
    of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will count.
        Two hundred and twenty-four Members are present, a quorum.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        So the preferential motion was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. . . .

      Conference Report on H.R. 6689, Foreign Relations Authorization 
                           Act, Fiscal Year 1978

        Mr. [Dante B.] Fascell [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, I call up the 
    conference

[[Page 12406]]

    report on the bill (H.R. 6689) to authorize fiscal year 1978 
    appropriations for the Department of State, the U.S. Information 
    Agency, and the Board for International Broadcasting, to make 
    certain changes in the Foreign Service personnel system, and for 
    other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the 
    managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Florida?
        Mr. Ashbrook: Reserving the right to object, I believe the 224 
    Members who are present want to hear this.
        Mr. Speaker, I object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Objection is heard.
        The Clerk will read the conference report.
        (The Clerk commenced reading the conference report).
        Mr. [John] Buchanan [of Alabama] (during the reading): Mr. 
    Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the 
    conference report be dispensed with.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Alabama?
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I 
    would like to propound a parliamentary inquiry of the Chair. It is 
    my understanding under the rules there is no appealing a ruling of 
    the Chair that can be made as to those present. Am I correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is asking about an 
    appeal to the count of the Chair?
        Mr. Ashbrook: An appeal to the count of the Chair cannot be 
    taken?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: That is correct.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Further reserving the right, then, to object, all 
    that the Members can rely on for the count of the Chair is the 
    integrity of the Chair and the capacity of the Chair to make a 
    correct count.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman can ask for the yeas and 
    nays.
        Mr. Ashbrook: I would like to do that later if I could be 
    assured we probably could get that count.
        But having made that point, I withdraw my reservation of 
    objection.
        Mr. Buchanan: I thank the gentleman.

Sec. 13.13 The Speaker's count of the House to determine whether one-
    fifth of those present have seconded a demand for the yeas and nays 
    is not subject to appeal.

    On Sept. 12, 1978,(5) the Speaker Pro Tempore put the 
question on a motion to suspend the rules and pass the Miscellaneous 
Revenue Act of 1978 (H.R. 12578). On a voice vote, the Chair announced 
that two-thirds had voted in favor of the motion. The yeas and nays 
were then requested. Proceedings were as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 124 Cong. Rec. 28949, 28950, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (6) The question is on the 
    motion offered by

[[Page 12407]]

    the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Ullman) that the House suspend the 
    rules and pass the bill H.R. 12578, as amended.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. B. F. Sisk (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, two-
    thirds have voted in the affirmative.
        Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, on that I 
    demand the yeas and nays.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. 
    Volkmer) demands the yeas and nays. All those in favor of taking 
    this vote by the yeas and nays will rise and remain standing until 
    counted.
        Not a sufficient number have risen.
        Mr. Volkmer: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        Is the requirement one-fifth of the Members present?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Yes. The Chair will state that the 
    requirement is that one-fifth of the Members present be standing 
    for the yeas and nays, and there is not one-fifth of the Members 
    standing.
        Mr. Volkmer: Mr. Speaker, I count four Members standing.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, an 
    insufficient number have arisen.
        The Chair will be glad to count, if the gentleman desires.
        Mr. Volkmer: Would the Chair count, please? I believe there are 
    only 25 Members here.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will count. Thirty Members 
    are present.
        Two-thirds having voted in the affirmative, the rules are 
    suspended and the bill, as amended, is passed, and without 
    objection, a motion to reconsider is laid on the table.
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [John F.] Seiberling [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, is it in order 
    to appeal the ruling of the Chair on the last vote?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state to the gentleman 
    that no appeal lies on the count of the Chair.

Sec. 13.14 No appeal lies against the count of the Chair of the number 
    of Members supporting or seconding a procedural request.

    During the 95th through the 102d Congresses, standing committees of 
the House were not permitted to sit when the House was reading a bill 
under the five-minute rule unless they were granted permission to do so 
by the House. Such permission was considered granted when the 
permission was sought on the floor unless ten or more Members indicated 
objection. The Chair would state the permission sought and ask ``Is 
there objection?''. If ten or more Members then stood, permission of 
the House was denied.
    The following proceedings of Sept. 12, 1978,(7) 
demonstrate the practice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 124 Cong. Rec. 28983, 28984, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 12408]]

      Permission for Committee on the Judiciary To Meet Tomorrow and 
                      Thursday During Five-Minute Rule

        Mr. George E.] Danielson [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Committee on the Judiciary may meet 
    tomorrow and Thursday, September 13 and 14, 1978, notwithstanding 
    the 5-minute rule.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from California? . . .
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, further 
    reserving the right to object, it is my understanding that the 
    civil service reform bill will be up tomorrow morning. That was the 
    order of the business as I understood it at about midnight last 
    night when we left here on Monday. I have the greatest admiration 
    for my hardworking friend and colleague, the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. McClory), but if that bill is going to come up 
    tomorrow, I am constrained to object and I do object.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that it takes 10 
    Members to object, and the objectors will have to remain standing 
    until counted.
        An insufficient number have arisen.
        Therefore, the request is granted.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that no appeal is 
    in order in a matter of this kind.

Appeal Tabled

Sec. 13.15 An appeal was taken from the decision of the Chair and that 
    appeal, on motion, was laid on the table.

    On July 7, 1971,(8) Ms. Bella Abzug, of New York, moved 
to discharge a resolution of inquiry from the Committee on Armed 
Services. A point of order was raised against the motion on the ground 
that the resolution of inquiry called for opinions, not factual 
information, relative to the Vietnam war and was therefore not 
privileged under Rule XXII clause 5. The Speaker's ruling that the 
motion was not in order was appealed by Ms. Abzug.(9)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 117 Cong. Rec. 23810, 23811, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H. Res. 491, directing the Secretaries of 
        State and Defense and the Director of the CIA to furnish a 
        report on U.S. military involvement in Southeast Asia.
 9. For further discussion of resolutions of inquiry, see Ch. 13, 
        supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [F. Edward] HeBERT [of Louisiana]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order that the resolution is not privileged under the 
    rules.
        The Speaker: (10) Does the gentleman insist on his 
    point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Carl Albert (Okla.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hebert: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the point of order in order 
    to give the gentlewoman from New York an opportunity to speak to 
    the point of order.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Louisiana reserves the point of 
    order.
        Does the gentlewoman from New York desire to be heard?
        Ms. Abzug: Yes, Mr. Speaker. . . .

    After hearing arguments on the points of order in support of the

[[Page 12409]]

respective positions, Speaker Albert ruled.

        The Speaker: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentlewoman from New York has moved to discharge the 
    Committee on Armed Services from further consideration of the 
    resolution, House Resolution 491. The gentlewoman has furnished the 
    Chair a copy of the resolution, and the Chair appreciates that 
    fact, since it gives an opportunity to the Chair to examine the 
    resolution prior to ruling on the point of order.
        The resolution under consideration has not been reported by the 
    committee to which it has been referred.
        Clause 5 of Rule XXII provides that:

            All resolutions of inquiry addressed to the heads of 
        executive departments shall be reported to the House within one 
        week after presentation.

        The gentleman from Louisiana makes a point of order against the 
    motion to discharge on the ground that the resolution is not 
    privileged under the rule because it calls for opinions in addition 
    to factual information.
        It has been consistently held that to retain the privilege 
    under the rule, resolutions of inquiry must call for facts rather 
    than opinions--Cannon's Precedents, volume VI page 413 and pages 
    418 to 432. Speaker Longworth, on February 11, 1926, held that a 
    resolution inquiring for such facts as would inevitably require the 
    statement of an opinion to answer such inquiry was not privileged--
    Record, page 3805.
        Among other requests, House Resolution 491 calls for the 
    furnishing of one, the ``rationale'' for U.S. involvement in South 
    Vietnam since the completion of the study; two, the nature and 
    ``capacity'' of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, 
    including ``analyses'' of their military ``capabilities''; their 
    capacity for self-sufficiency which would include analyses of the 
    Government's political base, the scope of malfunction and 
    corruption, the depth of popular support; and three, analyses of 
    U.S. involvement in 1971 elections in South Vietnam.
        In at least these particulars, executive officials are called 
    upon--not for facts--but to furnish conclusions, which must be, 
    essentially, statements of opinion.
        The Chair therefore holds that House Resolution 491 is not a 
    privileged resolution within the meaning of clause 5, rule XXII, 
    and that the motion to discharge the Committee on Armed Services 
    from its further consideration is not in order.
        Ms. Abzug: Mr. Speaker, I appeal from the ruling of the Chair.
        Mr. [Hale] Boggs [of Louisiana]: Mr. Speaker, I move to lay 
    that appeal on the table.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from Louisiana.

        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    had it.
        So the decision of the Chair stands.

Motion To Reconsider Tabling of Appeal

Sec. 13.16 The House has tabled a motion to reconsider the vote whereby 
    an appeal from a decision of the Chair was laid on the table.

[[Page 12410]]

    On Oct. 8, 1968, (11) the reading of the Journal was 
interrupted by numerous points of order of no quorum. A motion was made 
by Mr. Brock Adams, of Washington, and adopted by the House, that 
absent Members be sent for and thereafter detained until the 
disposition of the pending business of the day. This motion provoked 
some Members to express concern about their personal liberty and 
rights. In this context, Mr. Robert Taft, Jr., of Ohio, attempted to 
interrupt the reading of the Journal with what he contended was a 
question of privilege, but which Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, determined not to properly raise a question of privilege 
of the House in the form and manner argued, and consequently not in 
order at that time. From this ruling, Mr. Taft appealed. Mr. Carl 
Albert, of Oklahoma, moved the appeal be laid on the table which motion 
was successful. Mr. Craig Hosmer, of California, then moved to 
reconsider the vote on the motion to table.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 114 Cong. Rec. 30214-16, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. [Calendar Day of Oct. 
        9, 1968].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hosmer: Mr. Speaker, I move to reconsider the vote on the 
    motion to lay the appeal from the Chair on the table.
        Mr. Albert: Mr. Speaker, I move that the motion be laid on the 
    table.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from California moves to reconsider 
    the vote on the motion to lay the appeal from the decision of the 
    Chair on the table, and the gentleman from Oklahoma moves that that 
    motion be laid on the table.
        Mr. Hosmer: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order against the 
    motion of the gentleman from Oklahoma to lay my motion on the table 
    because that motion does not lie.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that a motion to lay on the 
    table, on a motion to reconsider, is a recognized motion.
        The question is on the motion to lay on the table.
        Mr. Hosmer: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered. . . .
        So the motion to lay on the table was agreed to.



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                 B. PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES
 
Sec. 14. In General

    Parliamentary inquiries are in the nature of procedural questions 
of the Chair, relating to the pending order of business. Compared to 
points of order, the raising of a parliamentary inquiry is a relatively 
informal procedure. In contrast to points of order, no appeal will lie 
from the Chair's response to a parliamentary inquiry.(1) It 
is

[[Page 12411]]

within the discretion of the Chair whether to recognize Members for the 
purpose of propounding parliamentary inquiries.(2) Like 
points of order, however, parliamentary inquiries are properly 
submitted only to the Chair.(3) And where an inquiry is 
directed to House procedure, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
may suggest that the inquiry be addressed to the Speaker when he is 
presiding.(4) Similarly, the Speaker may defer an inquiry 
properly within the cognizance of the Member presiding over the 
Committee of the Whole.(5) Where both an inquiry and a point 
of order are directed to the Chair, the point of order, if timely, 
takes precedence.(6)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. See Sec. 14.4, infra. See also 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6955, 
        8 Cannon's Precdents Sec. Sec. 3457.
 2. See Sec. Sec. 14.1, 14.2, 14.5, infra. See also 6 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 541.
 3. See Sec. 14.14, infra.
 4. See Sec. Sec. 14.39, 14.43, infra.
 5. See Sec. Sec. 14.40, 14.41, infra.
 6. See Sec. 14.3, infra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Examples of subjects deemed suitable for parliamentary inquiries 
include the anticipated order of business,(7) the status of 
the Clerk's progress in reading a document which is before the 
House,(8) the proper or accepted interpretation of a 
rule,(9) the order in which amendments should be 
offered,(10) and the like. Subjects that may not be raised 
by way of a parliamentary inquiry include hypothetical 
questions,(11) a request for an advisory 
opinion,(12) the effect of a vote about to be 
taken,(13) the future exercise of the Chair's power of 
recognition,(14) and the construction or meaning of language 
in a bill (15) or in an amendment.(16) The Chair 
may defer his response to a parliamentary inquiry until he has time to 
research the applicable precedents.(17) It is an improper 
use of a parliamentary inquiry to secure recognition for the limited 
purpose of making an inquiry, and then attempting to offer an 
amendment,(18) or to debate the merits of a pending 
proposition.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. See Sec. 14.7, infra.
 8. See Sec. 14.12, infra.
 9. See Sec. Sec. 14.6, 14.8, 14.44, infra.
10. See Sec. 14.10, infra.
11. See Sec. Sec. 14.16, 14.17, infra. See also Ch. 5, supra.
12. See Sec. Sec. 14.19, 14.33, infra.
13. See Sec. 14.20, infra.
14. See Sec. 14.42, infra.
15. See Sec. 14.18, infra.
16. See Sec. Sec. 14.18, 14.22, 14.35, infra, and 6 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 254.
17. See Sec. Sec. 14.24-14.28, infra.
18. See Sec. 14.38, infra.                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Discretion of Chair

Sec. 14.1 Recognition of Members for the purpose of propounding 
    parliamentary in

[[Page 12412]]

    quiries is within the discretion of the Chair.

    On Sept. 11, 1968,(19) numerous parliamentary inquiries 
were posed to Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, who 
responded as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 114 Cong. Rec. 26453-56, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. See also 114 Cong. 
        Rec. 30214-16, 90th Cong. 2d Sess., Oct. 9, 1968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [L. Mendel] Rivers [of South Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Rivers: Mr. Speaker, as long as these delaying tactics are 
    observed, is this preventing the military appropriation bill from 
    being considered--to take care of our fighting men?
        Mr. [Durward G.] Hall [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, a further 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Missouri will state the 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Hall: Mr. Speaker, is the conference report agreed to on 
    the Speaker's desk, as agreed to by the other body?
        The Speaker: The Chair, in reply, will say that it has been 
    returned from the Senate and is available. . . .
        Mr. [Thomas G.] Abernethy [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Abernethy: I thank the Speaker.
        Is there any parliamentary procedure whereby these 
    parliamentary inquiries may be brought to a parliamentary 
    conclusion?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that a parliamentary inquiry 
    is a matter of discretion with the Chair. The Chair knows that the 
    gentleman from Mississippi would want to preserve the right of any 
    occupant of the Chair in that respect.

Sec. 14.2 Recognition for parliamentary inquiries is within the 
    discretion of the Chair, who may decline to entertain an inquiry 
    not relevant to the immediately pending question.

    On June 8, 1972,(20) Speaker Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, 
refused to entertain a parliamentary inquiry which did not relate to a 
pending motion for the previous question on a conference report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 118 Cong. Rec. 20339, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        the conference report on S. 659, the higher education 
        amendments of 1972.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Carl D.] Perkins [of Kentucky]: Mr. Speaker, I do want to 
    point out that we have most important provisions affecting the 
    Vocational Educational Act of 1963. Certain of those programs will 
    expire unless the conference report is adopted.
        Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question.
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12413]]

        The Speaker: Does the gentleman's parliamentary inquiry relate 
    to the previous question?
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Speaker, it does not relate to the vote on 
    the previous question.
        The Speaker: The question is on ordering the previous question.
        The previous question was ordered.

Relative Precedence of Point of Order and Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 14.3 A timely point of order takes precedence over a parliamentary 
    inquiry, and the reservation of a parliamentary inquiry gives no 
    priority to that purpose, since recognition is within the 
    discretion of the Chair.

    While the Federal Employees' Political Activities Act of 1977 was 
being read for amendment under the five-minute rule in Committee of the 
Whole, on June 7, 1977,(1) an amendment was challenged as 
being not germane. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 123 Cong. Rec. 17713, 17714, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas N.] Kindness [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments, and I wish to make a parliamentary inquiry with respect 
    thereto.
        The Chairman: (2) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. James R. Mann (S.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, may I reserve my parliamentary 
    inquiry and make it after the reading of the amendments?
        The Chairman: Certainly, the gentleman may do that.
        The Clerk will report the amendments.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Mr. Kindness: Page 28, line 12, 
        strike out ``but does not include a member of the uniformed 
        services'' and insert ``including any member of the uniformed 
        services''.
            Page 30, line 12, strike out ``and''.
            Page 32, line 3, strike out the period and insert ``; 
        and''.
            Page 32, after line 3, insert: ``(10) `Secretary concerned' 
        has the same meaning as given such term in section 101(5) of 
        title 37.
            Page 35, line 2, strike out ``or a member of a uniformed 
        service,''.
            Page 38, line 14, immediately before the period insert ``or 
        by reason of being a member of the uniformed services''.
            Page 45, before line 8, insert the following:
            ``(j) The preceding provisions of this section shall not 
        apply in the case of a violation by a member of a uniformed 
        service. Procedures with respect to any such violation shall, 
        under regulations prescribed by the Secretary concerned, be the 
        same as those applicable with respect to violations of section 
        892 of title 10.
            Page 46, after line 12, insert the following:
            ``(c) The preceding provisions of this section shall not 
        apply in the case of a violation by a member of the uniformed 
        services. Any such violation shall, under regulations 
        prescribed by the Secretary concerned, be subject to the same 
        penalties as apply in the case of a violation of section 892 of 
        title 10.''.

[[Page 12414]]

            Page 47, after line 21, insert the following:
            ``(d) In the case of members of the uniformed services, the 
        Secretary concerned shall carry out the responsibilities 
        imposed on the Commission under the preceding provisions of 
        this section.''.
            Page 48, line 17, strike out the close quotation mark and 
        the period.
            Page 48, after line 17, insert:
            ``(c) In the case of members of the uniformed services, the 
        Secretary concerned shall prescribe the regulations the 
        Commission is required to prescribe under this section, section 
        7322(9), and section 7324(c)(2) and (3) of this title.''.

        Mr. [William] Clay [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point 
    of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Missouri will state his point 
    of order.
        Mr. Clay: Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order on the 
    grounds that the matter contained in the amendment is in violation 
    of the germaneness rule stated in clause 7 of House rule XVI.
        The instant amendment proposes to make the bill applicable to 
    an entirely new class of individuals other than what is covered 
    under the bill.
        The reported bill applies only to civilian employees in 
    executive branch agencies, including the Postal Service and the 
    District of Columbia government, who are presently under the Hatch 
    Act.
        The amendment seeks to add a totally different class of 
    individuals to the bill; namely, military personnel who are not now 
    covered by the Hatch Act. Accordingly the amendment is not germane 
    to the bill.
        Mr. Chairman, I insist on my point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kindness) wish 
    to speak to the point of order?
        Mr. Kindness: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I understood that I was recognized prior to the 
    reading of the amendment for the purpose of stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman chose to 
    defer his inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I suggest that the gentleman's 
    point of order is out of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that a point of order is now 
    in order and has preference.
        Mr. Kindness: Responding, then, to the point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman, the bill, as before us at this time, has been expanded in 
    considerable degree by the Clay amendment and by other amendments 
    that have been adopted during the course of the consideration of 
    the bill in the Committee of the Whole.
        However, I would point out that the amendment is germane, and I 
    particularly direct the attention of the Chairman and the Members 
    to line 12 of page 28 where, in the definition of the word 
    ``employee'' the words appear, on line 12, ``but does not include a 
    member of the uniformed services.''
        Mr. Chairman, that is the very crux of this whole point. The 
    committee has given consideration, apparently, to the inclusion or 
    exclusion of members of uniformed services under the provisions of 
    this bill. A conscious decision was apparently made; and as 
    reported to the House, this bill has that conscious decision 
    reflected in it not to include members of the uniformed services.

[[Page 12415]]

        Mr. Chairman, the issue is directly before the House in that 
    form, so that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio is 
    in order, is pertinent, and is germane. It could not be nongermane.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of 
    order.
        The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Clay) makes a point of order 
    that the striking of the language, ``but does not include a member 
    of the uniformed services,'' and the remainder of the amendment 
    broadens the scope of the bill in violation of rule XVI, clause 7.
        The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kindness) argues that because the 
    exclusion from coverage for the military is in the bill and has 
    received consideration, that the germaneness rule should be more 
    liberally interpreted.
        An annotation to clause 7, rule XVI, says that, in general, an 
    amendment simply striking out words already in a bill may not be 
    attacked as not germane unless such action would change the scope 
    and meaning of the text. Cannons VIII, section 2921; Deschler's 
    chapter 28, sec. 15.3.
        On October 28, 1975, Chairman Jordan of Texas ruled, during the 
    consideration of a bill H.R. 2667, giving the right of 
    representation to Federal employees during questioning as follows:

            In a bill amending a section of title 5, United States 
        Code, granting certain rights to employees of executive 
        agencies of the Federal Government, an amendment extending 
        those rights to, in that case, legislative branch employees, as 
        defined in a different section of that title, was held to go 
        beyond the scope of the bill and was ruled out as not germane.

        The class of employees included in this legislation is confined 
    to civilian employees of the Government, and those specifically so 
    stated and described as being civilian employees of the executive 
    agencies, of the Postal Service and of the District of Columbia 
    government, and a reference to the Hatch Act as currently in force 
    indicates that military personnel are not included in that act.
        It is obvious that the purpose and the scope of the act before 
    us as referred to in its entirety as amended by this bill, is, ``to 
    restore to Federal civilian and Postal Service employees their 
    rights to participate voluntarily, as private citizens, in the 
    political processes of the Nation, to protect such employees from 
    improper political solicitations, and for other purposes.''
        The Chair finds that the striking of the language excluding 
    military employees and inserting language covering the military 
    broadens the class of the persons covered by this bill to an extent 
    that it substantially changes the text and substantially changes 
    the purpose of the bill. The fact that the exclusion of military 
    personnel was stated in the bill does not necessarily bring into 
    question the converse of that proposition. The Chair therefore 
    finds that the amendment is not germane and sustains the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, has the Chairman ruled on that part 
    of the position stated by the gentleman from Ohio that the bill has 
    already been expanded in scope by reason of the inclusion of 
    provisions with respect to gov

[[Page 12416]]

    ernment employees very similar in category to those who are in the 
    uniformed services and indeed include some in the uniformed 
    services, I believe?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the Chair finds that 
    the general language of the uniformed services is capable of clear 
    interpretation as meaning the military forces of this country.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, I have another parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Kindness: Mr. Chairman, my parliamentary inquiry is this: 
    Is there a way to appeal the ruling of the Chair within the rules 
    of the House?
        The Chairman: Yes, there is.
        Mr. Kindness: So that I may respectfully appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair at this point?
        The Chairman: If the gentleman from Ohio desires to do so.
        Does the gentleman desire to appeal the ruling of the Chair?
        Mr. Kindness: No, Mr. Chairman, I do not so desire at this 
    point.

Appeals

Sec. 14.4 Appeals from responses by the Chair to parliamentary 
    inquiries are not recognized and collateral challenges to 
    proceedings not immediately subjected to points of order cannot be 
    made by appeals from responses to parliamentary inquiries 
    pertaining thereto.

    On Sept. 4, 1940,(3) there was particularly acrimonious 
debate on the floor of the House between supporters of peacetime 
conscription and those opposed to it. Apparently, there was even a 
scuffle between two Members. Not satisfied that the words of Mr. 
Beverly M. Vincent, of Kentucky, had been taken down properly, Mr. 
Clare E. Hoffman, of Michigan, disputed the handling of the matter by 
Speaker Pro Tempore Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, and attempted to appeal 
the response to a parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 86 Cong. Rec. 11516, 11517, 76th Cong. 3d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 10132, providing for compulsory military training and 
        service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order and a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Hoffman: Mr. Speaker, a moment ago certain words were 
    uttered by the gentleman on the floor of the House which I demanded 
    be taken down. No report was made of those words. I demand the 
    regular order-the taking down of the words, the report of the 
    words, and the reading by the Clerk.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Sub-sequently, unanimous consent was 
    granted for the words to be withdrawn.
        Mr. Hoffman: Oh, no, Mr. Speaker; three Members were on their 
    feet. I was one of them, and objecting to that.

[[Page 12417]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: That was the ruling of the Chair.
        Mr. Hoffman: I appeal from the ruling of the Chair then.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: This is not a ruling, it is just an 
    answer to a parliamentary inquiry.

Chair Controls Recognition for Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 14.5 Recognition for a parliamentary inquiry is within the 
    discretion and control of the Chair, and a Member so recognized may 
    not yield to other Members.

    On Mar. 16, 1988,(4) a Member who had been recognized 
for a one- minute speech refused to end his remarks at the end of that 
time, despite repeated admonitions from the Chair. Eventually, the 
Speaker Pro Tempore ordered the Sergeant at Arms to turn off the 
microphone on the floor so that the Member would desist. Inadvertently, 
the persons regulating the House coverage by television turned off the 
sound on the broadcast of the House proceedings. Several Members then 
came to the floor to protest this action. Various parliamentary 
inquiries were entertained by the Chair and eventually he felt it 
necessary to reiterate that Members may not carry on a dialogue with 
each other under the guise of a parliamentary inquiry. A portion of 
these hectic proceedings is carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 134 Cong. Rec. 4081, 4084-87, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Let Us Have Another Vote on Contra Aid

        (Mr. Dornan of California asked and was given permission to 
    address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his 
    remarks.)
        Mr. [Robert K.] Dornan of California: Mr. Speaker, and I 
    address a different Member of this Chamber from New York, because 
    you have left your chair, and Mr. Majority Whip from California, 
    you have also fled the floor. In 10 years Jim and Tony--I am not 
    using any traditional titles like ``distinguished gentleman''--Jim 
    and Tony, in 10 years I have never heard on this floor so obnoxious 
    a statement as I heard. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (5) The time of the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) has expired.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Gary L. Ackerman (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dornan of California: Wait a minute. On Honduran soil and 
    on Nicaraguan soil.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. Dornan of California: And it was set up in this House as 
    you set up the betrayal of the Bay of Pigs.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentleman has expired.
        Mr. Dornan of California: I ask--wait a minute--I ask unanimous 
    consent for 30 seconds. People are dying.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentleman has expired.

[[Page 12418]]

        Mr. Dornan of California: People are dying.
        Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, regular 
    order, regular order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentleman has expired. 
    Will the Sergeant at Arms please turn off the microphone?
        Mr. Dornan of California: You get your regular order, people 
    are dying. You get your regular order now. People are dying because 
    of this Chamber. I demand a Contra vote on aid to the Democratic 
    Resistance and the freedom fighters in Central America. In the name 
    of God and liberty and decency I demand another vote in this 
    Chamber next week.
        Don't get a hernia and break your gavel. Don't get a hernia.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Jud] Gregg [of New Hampshire]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Gregg: Mr. Speaker, I was just in my office viewing the 
    proceedings here, and during one of the proceedings, when the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) was addressing the House, it 
    was drawn to my attention that the Speaker requested that Mr. 
    Dornan's microphone be turned off, upon which Mr. Dornan's 
    microphone was turned off.

        Mr. Speaker, my inquiry of the Chair is: Under what rule does 
    the Speaker decide to gag opposite Members of the House? Under what 
    rule does the Speaker decide to close down the debate and pursue a 
    policy of shutting up the opposition by not allowing us access to 
    the public and to the media and to our own microphones, the 
    microphones of this House? Under what rule of this House or of our 
    country or our Constitution is freedom of the speech so grossly 
    violated in this institution?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman asked to proceed for 1 
    minute----
        Mr. Gregg: No, I am asking that of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is referring to Mr. Dornan. 
    He requested permission of the Chair to proceed for 1 minute, and 
    that permission was granted by the House. Mr. Dornan grossly 
    exceeded the limits and abused the privilege far in excess of 1 
    minute, and the Chair proceeded to restore order and decorum to the 
    House. . . .
        Mr. Gregg: I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker. 
    Is it the Chair's intention to turn off my microphone?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: What is the gentleman's parliamentary 
    inquiry?
        Mr. Gregg: My parliamentary inquiry is that I want to know how 
    the Chair can specifically turn off the microphone and what rule 
    the Chair does it under, because the Chair has not answered that 
    question.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has responded to the 
    parliamentary inquiry of the gentleman from New Hampshire.
        Mr. Gregg: Mr. Speaker, I reserve my time, and yield to the 
    gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Martin).

[[Page 12419]]

        Mr. [Daniel E.] Lungren [of California]: Mr. Speaker, 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mrs. [Lynn] Martin of Illinois: Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair advises that a Member may 
    not yield time to another Member under a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mrs. Martin of Illinois: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry. . . .
        Mr. [Paul B.] Henry [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, I rise for a 
    point of parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Speaker, I was among those who were on the floor during the 
    exchange which we have been debating and would like to indicate it 
    was the consensus of many of us that when the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Dornan) was addressing the House the floor 
    microphones were not turned off but the difficulty arose in part 
    that the television broadcast, the C-SPAN microphones were cut off. 
    Mr. Speaker, the rules of the House clearly stipulate that 
    electronic broadcast of the proceedings of the House shall be a 
    fair and accurate proceedings, recording and rendering of 
    proceedings of the House.
        I am wondering if the Speaker would respond as to the 
    appropriateness in this instance when apparently the C-SPAN 
    electronic broadcast of the proceedings of the House were cut off 
    while the House microphones were not.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Let the Chair assure the gentleman 
    that the Chair was directing his remarks to the in-house 
    microphones and certainly not to the coverage of the proceedings of 
    the House by electronic media or the press. . . .
        Mr. Henry: Mr. Speaker, I have a point of parliamentary inquiry 
    and to respond. I had been recognized on this issue and I would 
    like to be very clear for the Record because of the serious 
    importance of this issue: As I understand the Chair's response we 
    are told that your instructions were in fact to turn off the House 
    floor microphones--whether that is appropriate or not is another 
    question--but that was mistakenly acted upon by the internal 
    broadcast mechanism so in fact the House floor's inadvertently 
    remained on and the electronic microphones for internal broadcast 
    system which the other electronic relays rely on was cut off. Am I 
    correct in that, Mr. Speaker? I want to clarify very clearly that 
    the Chair does not have the power to turn off----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct for coverage 
    of proceedings of the House. It was the intent of the Chair to turn 
    off the House microphones.
        Mr. Henry: Thank you very much, Mr. Speaker.

Parliamentary Inquiries at Chair's Discretion

Sec. 14.6 Parliamentary inquiries are entertained at the discretion of 
    the Chair, and on occasion, the Chair will respond to inquiries, 
    following a ruling on a point of order, as to the basis for or 
    consequence of that ruling.

    On Feb. 5, 1992,(6) a resolution creating a task force 
of members

[[Page 12420]]

of the Foreign Affairs Committee to investigate certain allegations 
concerning the holding of Americans as hostages by Iran in 1980 was 
called up for consideration. The resolution had been reported from both 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on House 
Administration, since it both created the task force and funded its 
operations. A point of order was lodged against the consideration of 
the resolution based on the contention that a primary expense 
resolution had not been reported to fund the task force, as required by 
Rule XI clause 5, or, if the resolution was itself a primary expense 
resolution, it failed to meet the standards set for such a resolution 
by the rule. After argument, the Chair overruled the point of order and 
his decision was sustained on appeal. After the ruling, Mr. Robert S. 
Walker, of Pennsylvania, directed a series of inquiries to the Chair. 
The point of order, the Chair's ruling, and the subsequent 
``interrogatories'' are set forth here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 138 Cong. Rec. 1621-23, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Creating a Task Force To Investigate Certain Allegations Concerning 
            the Holding of Americans as Hostages by Iran in 1980

        Mr. [Butler C.] Derrick [Jr., of South Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, 
    pursuant to House Resolution 303, I call up the resolution (H. Res. 
    258) creating a task force of members of the Foreign Affairs 
    Committee to investigate certain allegations concerning the holding 
    of Americans as hostages by Iran in 1980, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the title of the resolution.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Bob] McEwen [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of 
    order against House Resolution 258 on grounds that it is in 
    violation of clause 5(a) of House rule XI, and I ask to be heard on 
    my point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman will 
    state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. David R. Obey (Wis.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. McEwen: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Speaker, House rule XI, clause 5(a) provides that whenever 
    a committee, commission or other entity is to be granted 
    authorization for the payment from the contingent fund of the House 
    of its expenses in any year, ``such authorization initially shall 
    be procured by one primary expense resolution for the committee, 
    commission or other entity.''
        The rule goes on to require that ``any such primary expense 
    resolution reported to the House shall not be considered in the 
    House unless a printed report on that resolution'' shall ``state 
    the total amount of the funds to be provided to the committee, 
    commission or other entity under the primary expense resolution for 
    all anticipated activities and programs * * *.''
        Mr. Speaker, it is my assumption that this resolution, which 
    was reported by the House Administration and authorizes the payment 
    of ex

[[Page 12421]]

    penses from the contingent fund, is the primary expense resolution 
    for the task force. And yet the committee report on this 
    resolution, House Report 102-296, part II, does not ``state the 
    total amount of funds to be provided'' as required by rule XI, 
    clause 5(a).
        If, on the other hand, it is argued that House Resolution 258 
    is not a primary expense resolution, then it is not in order since 
    House rule XI, clause 5(a) requires that whenever any entity such 
    as this task force is to be granted authorization for the payment 
    of expenses from the contingent fund, and I quote, ``such 
    authorization initially shall be procured by one primary expense 
    resolution for the committee, commission or other entity.'' In 
    other words, this resolution is not in order until after a primary 
    expense resolution has been adopted by this House.
        I urge that my point of order be sustained.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from South Carolina 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, under clause 5(c), the funds will be 
    provided to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and they will, in 
    turn, provide the funds to the subcommittee, I mean to the 
    committee that we are establishing.
        Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, does Chairman Whitten share that view?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman wish to be heard 
    further on the point of order?
        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, I would be glad to read clause 5(c) 
    on page 482 of the House Rules Manual. I would be glad to read that 
    for you.
        Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, do I understand the gentleman to say 
    that the money is coming from the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
    funds; is that what he is saying?
        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, the House Administration Committee, 
    in its forthcoming resolution, will provide funds to the Committee 
    on Foreign Affairs and they will provide it to the committee that 
    is being established. And this authority is provided under 5(c).
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman desire to be heard 
    further on the point of order?
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I wish to be heard.
        Mr. Speaker, it sounds to me as though the gentleman from South 
    Carolina is contending that the money is previously authorized 
    under the House Administration's budget and so therefore the money 
    is allocated there. When the House Administration Committee's 
    budget was put into place, there was absolutely nothing in the 
    House Administration budget which indicated that this task force 
    was going to be formed. The new entity being created under the 
    rules is the entity of the task force. It is that entity to which 
    the gentleman from Ohio has referred, it is that entity to which 
    the House rules speak. Either the House rules are going to apply to 
    this or we are going to completely abandon any pretense that the 
    House rules have meaning with regard to spending. This is very much 
    of a spending issue because if in fact we do not obey House rules 
    there, we have open ended the fund for this task force for as far 
    out into the future as we can see.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule unless 
    the

[[Page 12422]]

    gentleman from Ohio wishes to be heard further on his point of 
    order.
        Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, I would only say as a member of the 
    Committee on Rules, reading the rules, it says that if we are going 
    to spend money, it has to be authorized under a resolution. It is 
    not before us. There is no rule that permits us to proceed at this 
    time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Ohio, in a point of 
    order, suggests to the House that under rule XI, clause 5(a), there 
    needs to be a total amount stated in the report of the Committee on 
    House Administration for funding of the task force, and the Chair 
    would simply point out that the primary expense resolution for the 
    Committee on Foreign Affairs and all other committees will be 
    reported to the House later this year.
        As the gentleman from South Carolina has attempted to point out 
    to the House, clause 5(c) of rule XI reads as follows:

            The preceding provisions of this clause do not apply to--
            (1) any resolution providing for the payment from the 
        contingent fund of the House of sums necessary to pay 
        compensation for staff services performed for, or to pay other 
        expenses of, any committee, commission or other entity at any 
        time from and after the beginning of any year and before the 
        date of adoption by the House of the primary expense resolution 
        providing funds to pay the expenses of that committee, 
        commission or other entity for that year.

        It is the ruling of the Chair at this time that the task force 
    comes under that exception. The task force is a subunit of the 
    Committee on Foreign Affairs and not a separate entity.
        The point of order is, therefore, overruled.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I respectfully appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
    Walker] appeals the ruling of the Chair.
        The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair stand as the 
    judgment of the House?

                   motion to table offered by mr. derrick

        Mr. Derrick: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Derrick moves to lay on the table the appeal by the 
        gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] on the ruling of the 
        Chair.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to table 
    offered by the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Derrick].
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Walker) there were--ayes 19, noes 29. . . .
        So the motion to table the appeal of the ruling of the Chair 
    was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12423]]

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, the parliamentary inquiry is that the 
    Chair in its ruling on the previous point of order indicated, and I 
    think the video record of the House will confirm this, that the 
    reason for the ruling was that the entity being created is a 
    subunit of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Is that not what the 
    Chair ruled?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has ruled on the basis that 
    clause 5(c) of rule XI simply provides an applicable exception, and 
    the Chair has ruled on that basis.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a further parliamentary 
    inquiry. My understanding of the Chair was that 5(c) applied 
    because this was a subunit of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The 
    Chair specifically mentioned the Foreign Affairs Committee in his 
    ruling. It is now my understanding, after further consultation, 
    that that is not the case, and so, therefore, the Chair's ruling 
    was based upon an understanding which does not exist under section 
    5(c).

        Would the Chair clarify for the House the entity we are about 
    to create?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Under the resolution, the task force 
    consists of members of and reports to the Committee on Foreign 
    Affairs. But in any event, the Chair has ruled that the clause (c) 
    exception applies to the task force. This is the first example, 
    since the rule cited the creation of an entity and its funding at 
    the same time. That is why the resolution was sequentially referred 
    to the House Administration Committee. In any event, the clause 
    5(c) exception applies to any entity, not to any preexisting 
    entity. . . .
        Mr. Walker: I have a further parliamentary inquiry. If that was 
    the impression of the Chair at the time, is that what the Chair 
    ruled?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair ruled as the Chair stated.
        Mr. Walker: The Chair ruled on section (c).
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: On any entity being excepted under 
    (c).
        Mr. Walker: I have a further parliamentary inquiry. The Chair 
    ruled on section 5(c) based upon his contention that it was a 
    subunit of the Foreign Affairs Committee. What I am seeking to find 
    out is whether or not the Chair is now withdrawing that contention.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair's ruling was based on the 
    literal ruling of 5(c).
        Mr. Walker: I thank the Chair for pointing out it was based 
    upon a literal ruling of 5(c). However, the specific ruling of the 
    Chair, and again, I point out the video record of the House will 
    certainly confirm this, that he ruled on 5(c) based upon----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has already commented on 
    that and does not care to repeat himself. . . .
        Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. McEwen: Mr. Speaker, under my point of order under clause 
    5(a) of House rule XI, I stated that the new entity being created 
    by the resolution currently before us had to meet the requirements 
    of that. You have stated now that this new entity is a subunit.
        Can the Chair rule for me the circumstances under which my rule 
    cited here, clause 5(a) of rule XI, would apply ever?

[[Page 12424]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair read the exception as it 
    applies in this instance and has ruled accordingly.
        Mr. McEwen: So can the Chair state for me of an instance or 
    example in which the rule that I cited under the belief that it 
    applied to the House would be applicable to anything stated?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot speculate about other 
    situations, and the Chair has provided the ruling, and the House 
    has spoken.

Scope of Permissible Inquiries

Sec. 14.7 Parliamentary inquiries concerning the anticipated order of 
    business may be entertained by the Chair.

        On Sept. 11, 1968,(8) Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
    Massachusetts, answered a question concerning what item would next 
    be taken up by the House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 114 Cong. Rec. 26455, 90th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [George H.] Mahon [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Texas will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Mahon: Mr. Speaker, will the Chair advise whether or not 
    the conference report has been sent over by message from the 
    Senate, indicating that the authorization bill has now cleared both 
    Houses--that is, for the Defense Department bill--and, if that is 
    correct, would it be in order for the Committee on Appropriations 
    to call up the $72 billion Defense appropriation bill?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Senate has approved 
    the conference report. The Department of Defense appropriation bill 
    is programmed for today. All Members recognize the importance, I am 
    sure, of having this bill acted upon as quickly as possible, and, 
    after the Journal is read and approved, the Defense appropriation 
    bill will be the next order of business to be brought up.

Use of a Parliamentary Inquiry--the Proper Interpretation of a New Rule

Sec. 14.8 A parliamentary inquiry may address the proper interpretation 
    of a new rule.

    In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole indicated that a new rule (Rule XXIII clause 5), 
requiring distribution of offered amendments by the Clerk, was not a 
mandatory requirement and that the Clerk's distribution was a matter of 
courtesy and not a mandatory prerequisite for consideration of an 
amendment. The inquiry and the Chair's response made on Mar. 14, 
1975,(9) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 121 Cong. Rec. 6708, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Sam] Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12425]]

        The Chairman: (10) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Neal Smith (Iowa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, without a copy of the 
    amendment, we cannot understand the purpose of the amendment.
        I thought that under the new rules we are under some obligation 
    to provide some sort of amendment in written form so that those 
    Members who wish to go to the extra effort might read and 
    understand what is going on.
        Am I correct or incorrect, Mr. Chairman?
        The Chairman: It does not stop the consideration of an 
    amendment, although that is supposed to be the custom.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: Mr. Chairman, the rule is simply a 
    matter of courtesy rather than one of mandate?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Steiger of Arizona: I thank the Chair.

Proper Uses of Parliamentary Inquiries

Sec. 14.9 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair stated that 
    committee reports that erroneously reflect the information required 
    under clause 2(l)(2)(B) of Rule XI (that committee reports reflect 
    the total number of votes cast for and against any public measure 
    or matter and any amendment thereto and the names of those voting 
    for and against) would be subject to a point of order against its 
    consideration; however, a point of order would not lie if the error 
    was introduced by the Government Printing Office.

    On Jan. 15, 1995,(11) an inquiry was directed to the 
Presiding Officer regarding a rule adopted at the commencement of the 
104th Congress.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Paul E.] Kanjorski [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (12) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Steve Gunderson (Wis.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as I understand the new rule in 
    clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI, adopted on January 4 of this year as 
    the new rules of the House, each committee report must accurately 
    reflect all rollcall votes on amendments in committee; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as a further parliamentary inquiry, 
    the report accompanying H.R. 5, as reported from the Committee on 
    Government Reform and Oversight, House Report 104-1, part 2, lists 
    many rollcall votes on amendments. On amendment 6, the

[[Page 12426]]

    report states that the committee defeated the amendment by a 
    rollcall vote of 14 yes and 22 no. However, the tally sheet shows 
    35 members voting ``aye'' and 1 member voting ``nay''.
        Mr. Speaker, would a point of order under clause 2(l)(2)(B) of 
    rule XI apply?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, the 
    gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, if that were the case, it is clear 
    that this bill could not proceed under its present rule; is that 
    correct?

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct, if it is an 
    error on behalf of the committee. If it is a printing error. That 
    would be a technical problem which would not be sustained in the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Kanjorski: . . . I would urge that the majority, in 
    consideration of the fact that we are not going to use this tactic 
    to delay this debate, take into consideration that their rules must 
    be applied on a day-to-day basis, because the majority is 
    responsible for having passed this rule.

Sec. 14.10 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair indicated 
    that the adoption of an amendment adding a new section would 
    preclude further amendment to the pending section.

    During consideration of a bill setting emergency price support 
levels for the 1975 crop year, an amendment was offered which would add 
a new section following the one then open for amendment. Following a 
reservation of a germaneness point of order against the amendment, a 
parliamentary inquiry was made by another Member who wished to offer a 
perfecting amendment to the section which had been read by the Clerk. 
The proceedings were as shown in the Record of Mar. 20, 
1975.(13)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 121 Cong. Rec. 7666, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Peter A.] Peyser [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Peyser: Page 3, immediately after 
        line 16, insert the following new section:
            ``Sec. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there 
        shall be no acreage allotment, marketing quota or price support 
        for rice effective with the 1975 crop of such commodity.''

        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington] reserved a point of order 
    on the amendment.
        Mr. [Steven D.] Symms [of Idaho]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (14) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. John Brademas (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Symms: Mr. Chairman, I have another amendment to section 2 
    of the bill. Will this amendment preclude the offering of the next 
    amendment?
        The Chairman: It will if the amendment is agreed to.
        Does the gentleman from Washington insist on his point of 
    order?

[[Page 12427]]

        Mr. Foley: I do, Mr. Chairman. I insist on the point of order 
    against this amendment.
        The amendment is not germane to the bill, and violates rule 
    XVI, clause 7.
        H.R. 4296 deals with price supports, established prices, and 
    loan rates for wheat, feed grains, cotton, and milk under sections 
    103, 105, 107, and 201 of the Agricultural Act of 1949.
        The bill does not relate to acreage allotments, or marketing 
    quotas on any commodity. The amendment offered would affect the 
    provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938.
        Accordingly, the amendment is not germane to the bill, and I 
    therefore press my point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Peyser: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The reason I offered the amendment was because of the ruling of 
    the Chair dealing with the Conte amendment some hour or so ago, 
    where we were discussing it, and the Chair ruled in favor of nuts 
    and fruits, and some other items, and I therefore felt that 
    introducing the question of rice would be substantially within the 
    germaneness of this bill as the other items that have been offered, 
    and that the Chair had ruled in favor of.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair has heard the point of order made by the gentleman 
    from Washington (Mr. Foley), and has listened to the response made 
    by the gentleman from New York (Mr. Peyser).
        The Chair would observe in respect of its earlier ruling on the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts that the 
    earlier amendment was a price support amendment. The purpose of the 
    bill under consideration, as the gentleman from Washington has 
    already pointed out, runs to price supports. Acreage and allotments 
    and marketing quotas are not within the scope of the bill, and the 
    Chair rules, therefore, that the amendment is not germane, and 
    sustains the point of order.

Sec. 14.11 A parliamentary inquiry is an appropriate vehicle to 
    ascertain the proper time for making a point of order against the 
    content of an unprivileged committee report.

    On May 16, 1989,(15) a bill which had been ordered 
reported by the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs was 
filed in the House. Not having a privileged status, the report was 
filed through the hopper. Mr. Robert S. Walker, of Pennsylvania, was 
under the impression that certain changes had been made in the report 
after the committee action. His inquiries were directed toward the 
appropriate time to make a point of order if his allegations were well 
founded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 135 Cong. Rec. 9329, 9355, 9356, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, it is bad enough that this House is up 
    to its eyeballs in creating the problem that

[[Page 12428]]

    led to the savings and loans crisis. Now as we are about to 
    consider legislation to deal with the S&L crisis that this House 
    helped create, we hear a rumor that the process and the procedures 
    of the House are about to be abandoned as we bring that legislation 
    to the floor.
        Evidently the chairman of the Committee on Banking, Finance and 
    Urban Affairs has unilaterally changed the legislation and intends 
    to file a report later today which is his personal version of the 
    bill rather than that reported from his committee.
        Mr. Speaker, when is someone going to stop this kind of abuse? 
    We cannot have chairmen of committees overruling the work of their 
    committees.
        There is a lot of controversy about this particular legislation 
    for FSLIC. It should be resolved unilaterally by one chairman. The 
    Chair should refuse to let the report be filed until the House is 
    assured that it is the committee's report and not the chairman's 
    personal report.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Thomas A. Luken (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that in the 
    course of the day today, or perhaps later on today, there will be a 
    report filed from the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
    Affairs with regard to the FSLIC bill. Can the Chair, first of all, 
    tell me whether that report has been filed?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The report has just been filed.
        Mr. Walker: The report has been filed.
        Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that the language in that 
    report differs markedly from the language as reported from the 
    Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, that in fact 
    substantive sections of the bill have been changed unilaterally by 
    the chairman, and that is reflected in the report before the House 
    in the new language as defined by the chairman rather than the 
    language as reported from the committee.
        Mr. Speaker, can the Chair tell me whether or not a point of 
    order rests against the filing of that report under those kinds of 
    circumstances?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Under these circumstances, the normal 
    time to question the validity of a committee report is when the 
    bill comes up for consideration in the House or at a hearing before 
    the Committee on Rules.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, if I understand correctly then, this 
    question could be raised about the change of the language before 
    the Committee on Rules, or should a rule be adopted with regard to 
    consideration of the bill, a point of order would rest against 
    consideration of the bill on the House floor given the fact that 
    language was changed subsequent to committee action; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the bill was improperly reported, 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Walker) is correct.

Sec. 14.12 The status of the Clerk's progress in reading a

[[Page 12429]]

    document which is before the House is a proper subject for a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

    On Oct. 8, 1968,(17) before the transaction of 
legislative business, the roll was taken numerous times to ascertain 
the presence of a quorum. After unanimous consent was sought to 
dispense with the reading of the Journal, the following exchange 
occurred:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 114 Cong. Rec. 30100, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. At the time the Clerk was 
        reading the Journal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [George W.] Andrews of Alabama: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: (18) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Andrews of Alabama: I would like to know how many pages 
    have been read and how many remain.
        The Speaker: That is a very proper inquiry.
        Mr. Andrews of Alabama: I am most interested in the reading.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that there are 68 pages and 
    the Clerk has already read 38.

Chair's Comments on Matters Pending at Desk

Sec. 14.13 In response to a parliamentary inquiry, the Speaker may 
    examine a report at the desk and render an advisory opinion about 
    its validity.

    On Oct. 8, 1986,(19) when the Chairman of the Committee 
on Rules filed a hastily assembled report from that committee, a series 
of inquiries sought assurances that the report was complete. The 
Chair's response is carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 132 Cong. Rec. 29803, 29804, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Claude] Pepper [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. [Louis] Stokes [of Ohio]: I am delighted to yield to the 
    gentleman from Florida.

      report on resolution providing for consideration of h.r. 3810, 
        immigration control and legalization amendments act of 1985

        Mr. Pepper, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged 
    report (Rept. No. 99-980) on the resolution (H. Res. 580) providing 
    for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 3810) to amend the 
    Immigration and Nationality Act to revise and reform the 
    immigration laws, and for other purposes, which was referred to the 
    House Calendar and ordered to be printed.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [F. James] Sensenbrenner [Jr., of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, 
    I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (20) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Tim Valentine (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Sensenbrenner: Mr. Speaker, the rule just filed by the 
    distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules, the gentleman 
    from Florida (Mr. Pep

[[Page 12430]]

    per) references 14 amendments which are made in order that are not 
    contained in the rule but are contained in the report of the 
    Committee on Rules. May I ask if the texts of those amendments are 
    contained in the report of the Committee on Rules that has just 
    been filed by the chairman of the committee as a privileged report?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would say to the gentleman 
    that the Chair presumes that that is the case.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker. The gentleman from Wisconsin wishes to know if the text of 
    the one substitute and the 14 amendments to the substitute that are 
    referenced are in the report and thus available to the Members as 
    of this legislative day?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would state to the gentleman 
    that there are 14 numbered amendments in the report.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker. The resolution that was just filed by the chairman of the 
    Committee on Rules also makes reference to an amendment in the 
    nature of a substitute. Is the text of that amendment in the nature 
    of a substitute contained in the report that has just been filed?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would state to the gentleman 
    that it is not, but it has been introduced separately and it will 
    be printed and available to the Members in the morning.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: I thank the Chair.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I have a point 
    of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Speaker, is it not necessary that at the time 
    the motion is made to file a report that that report be in hand, 
    completed as approved by the committee submitting the report?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: That is the rule as the Chair 
    understands it, and that is the case.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Speaker, my understanding is that the rule as 
    approved by the Rules Committee less than an hour ago is not 
    complete and, therefore, cannot be presented in a complete form at 
    this time, and I challenge the validity of that procedure.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would say to the gentleman 
    that the Chair believes that it is complete, and of course it has 
    been filed.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Speaker, will the Chair point to the report 
    as filed?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would state to the gentleman 
    from Texas that the report is here at the desk and available for 
    examination by the gentleman from Texas.
        Mr. Gonzalez: Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair and I withdraw my 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stokes) 
    still has the time and may proceed.

Inquiries Properly Submitted to Speaker

Sec. 14.14 Inquiries concerning the parliamentary situation on the 
    floor are properly directed to the Chair, and it is not customary 
    for a Member

[[Page 12431]]

    to request that the notes of the official reporters be read to 
    ascertain what motions have been put by the Chair.

    On May 22, 1968,(1) in a confusing parliamentary 
situation involving the consideration of a conference report, Minority 
Leader Gerald R. Ford, of Michigan, requested that the reporter's notes 
be read back to clarify the legislative situation. Speaker John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, rejected the request, and, a few moments 
later, the Speaker went on to remind the Members of their duty to 
address questions of order to the Chair, not to other Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 114 Cong. Rec. 14403-05, 90th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H. Rept. No. 1397 on S. 5, the Consumer Credit Protection 
        Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gerald R. Ford: Mr. Speaker, so that the record is crystal 
    clear, I request that the notes of the reporter be reread to the 
    Members.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that this has never been done 
    before so far as the knowledge of the Chair is concerned. . . .
        The Chair will suggest that the Members can carry on their 
    colloquy but the position of the Chair is clear--the gentleman from 
    Texas called up the conference report and had asked that the 
    statement of the managers on the part of the House be read and 
    after the Clerk had proceeded to read the statement, the gentleman 
    from Texas asked unanimous consent that the further reading of the 
    statement of the managers on the part of [the] House be dispensed 
    with and that it be placed in the Record.
        The gentleman from Texas was standing and the Chair rose and 
    said--`The question is on agreeing to the conference report.'' The 
    Chair did it deliberately--and the report was agreed to. The Chair 
    acted most deliberately. . . .
        The gentleman from Virginia reserves the right to object.
        Mr. [Richard H.] Poff [of Virginia]: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the 
    right to object in order to propound a question to the 
    distinguished majority leader. In the event the House agrees to the 
    request of the gentleman, would the minority maintain the right 
    under the rules of the House to offer motions to recommit if it 
    were so disposed?
        The Speaker: The gentleman ought to address his question to the 
    Chair. That question should be addressed to the Chair, and, 
    assuming that the gentleman did address the Chair, the Chair will 
    state that point has gone by, and a motion to recommit under those 
    circumstances would not be in order.

Not Cognizable by Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 14.15 The Chair responds to parliamentary inquiries relating to 
    the pending proceedings but is not required to verify allegations 
    placing current events in historical context.

        On June 25, 1992,(2) during discussion regarding the 
    adoption of a re

[[Page 12432]]

    strictive rule on a general appropriation bill, Mr. Robert S. 
    Walker, of Pennsylvania, posed an inquiry to the Speaker Pro 
    Tempore, Mr. Michael R. McNulty, of New York.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 138 Cong. Rec. 16174, 16175, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, in this morning's newspaper, the 
    Speaker of the House is quoted as saying the process under which we 
    are operating on this rule, or on this bill, is a common practice; 
    namely, the practice of having closed rules on appropriation bills 
    of a general character. My research tells me that we have only had 
    such rules five times in the history of the Congress. My research 
    indicates that only five times in the history of the Congress have 
    we had a situation where general appropriation bills have been 
    considered under a closed rule. Three of those have been during 
    this speakership.
        I am asking the Chair whether or not the Chair can confirm that 
    that is, indeed, the situation that this is only the sixth time in 
    history that we will be considering this bill under such a process.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman must state a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

Inquiries Which Chair Does Not Entertain

Sec. 14.16 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole does not respond 
    to hypothetical questions raised under the guise of a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

    On Mar. 26, 1965,(3) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Richard Bolling, of Missouri, declined to answer a 
hypothetical question raised in the guise of a parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 111 Cong. Rec. 6114, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 2362, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Albert H.] Quie [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Quie: Mr. Chairman, if I had risen to move to strike out 
    the last word, rather than offering an amendment which would be 
    voted on, then would the extra 5 minutes have been divided equally?
        The Chairman: The Chair is not in position to answer that kind 
    of question.
        Mr. Quie: It may happen in the future as we go along with the 
    debate.
        The Chairman: The Chair will meet the situation as it arises.

Sec. 14.17 The Speaker does not entertain hypothetical questions.

    On Sept. 14, 1944,(4) at a time when there was no bill 
or resolu

[[Page 12433]]

tion before the House, a Member asked about the status of certain 
funds.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 90 Cong. Rec. 7772, 78th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clare E.] Hoffman [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (5) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Orville Zimmerman (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hoffman: I gathered from statements which were made on the 
    floor today that a statement going back as far as 1920 and 
    containing information as to the amounts of money requested by the 
    military establishments of the Government, as to the amounts that 
    had been recommended by the executive department, and as to the 
    amounts finally appropriated by Congress, had been sent to the 
    Committee on Appropriations, but for some 2 years it had been in 
    the safe over there, inaccessible to Members of the House. By what 
    authority or what rule of Congress or what rule governing 
    committees was that suppressed?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The present occupant of the chair has 
    no knowledge of any such facts, and therefore is not in a position 
    to answer the gentleman's inquiry.
        Mr. Hoffman: Does the Chair mean he does not have any knowledge 
    that that is true?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has no knowledge of that, 
    except that somebody has said it is true, according to the 
    gentleman's statement.
        Mr. Hoffman: Submitting that then as a hypothetical question.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair does not entertain a 
    hypothetical question, and does not think that the parliamentary 
    inquiry is pertinent at this stage of the proceedings and at this 
    particular time in the absence of the Speaker.

What Is Not a Proper Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 14.18 It is not a proper parliamentary inquiry to inquire of the 
    Chair whether his ruling striking a portion of a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill leaves a certain program without 
    sufficient funds.

    On Oct. 26, 1983,(6) during the reading of the Defense 
appropriations bill of 1984, certain language was conceded to be a 
reappropriation of funds, in violation of Rule XXI clause 6, and was 
stricken from the bill. The proceedings and the resulting inquiry are 
carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 129 Cong. Rec. 29416, 29417, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                           Missile Procurement, Army

                         (including transfer of funds)

            For construction, procurement, production, modification, 
        and modernization of missiles, equipment, including ordnance, 
        ground handling equipment, spare parts, and accessories 
        therefor; specialized equipment and training devices; expansion 
        of public and private plants, including the land necessary 
        therefor,

[[Page 12434]]

        without regard to section 4774, title 10, United States Code, 
        for the foregoing purposes, and such lands and interests 
        therein, may be acquired, and construction prosecuted thereon 
        prior to approval of title as required by section 355, Revised 
        Statutes, as amended; and procurement and installation of 
        equipment, appliances, and machine tools in public and private 
        plants; reserve plant and Government and contractor-owned 
        equipment layaway; and other expenses necessary for the 
        foregoing purposes, as follows: For Other Missile Support, 
        $9,200,000; for the Patriot program, $885,000,000; for the 
        Stinger program, $100,500,000, and in addition, $37,300,000 to 
        be derived by transfer from ``Missile Procurement, Army, 1983/
        1985''; for the Laser Hellfire program, $218,800,000; for the 
        TOW program, $189,200,000; for the Pershing II program, 
        $407,700,000; for the MLRS program, $532,100,000; for 
        modification of missiles, $123,300,000; for spares and repair 
        parts, $261,702,000; for support equipment and facilities, 
        $108,200,000; in all: $2,807,702,000, and in addition 
        $37,300,000 to be derived by transfer, to remain available 
        until September 30, 1986: Provided That within the total amount 
        appropriated, the subdivisions within this account shall be 
        reduced by $28,000,000 for revised economic assumptions.

        Mr. [Richard] Ray [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order that the language on page 19, line 5, after ``$100,500,000'' 
    through ``1983/85'' on line 6 constitutes a reappropriation of 
    unexpended balances of appropriations and thus is not in order 
    under rule XXI, clause 6.
        The $37,300,000 that would be transferred from the Army missile 
    funds, 1983-1985, would be extended in availability to September 
    30, 1986.
        Such an extension of these funds through appropriation is 
    prohibited by the rules.
        The Chairman: (7) Does the gentleman from New York 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joseph P.] Addabbo [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I concede 
    the point of order.
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained.
        Mr. [David] Dreier of California: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Dreier of California: Does the ruling of the Chair on the 
    gentleman's point of order mean that title IV is underfunded by 
    $37.3 million for Stinger missile procurement in fiscal year 1984?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman is not 
    making a parliamentary inquiry.

Chair Does Not Signal His Ruling on Future Amendment

Sec. 14.19 The Chair can respond to a parliamentary inquiry about the 
    effect of voting down the previous question on a special order--``a 
    germane amendment would be in order''--but will not render an 
    advisory opinion as to whether a particular described amendment 
    would be in order.

[[Page 12435]]

    On June 16, 1994,(8) where the previous question had 
been moved on a special order reported from the Committee on Rules, the 
Speaker Pro Tempore responded to parliamentary inquiries as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 140 Cong. Rec. 13155, 13156, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Bart] Gordon [of Tennessee]: Mr. Speaker, I move the 
    previous question on the resolution.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Porter J.] Goss [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (9) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Robert E. Wise, Jr. (W. Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Goss: Mr. Speaker, if the previous question is rejected, 
    would it be in order for me to offer an amendment to the rule to 
    strike the exception that leaves the Wolf provision subject to a 
    point of order?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: While the Chair cannot give a specific 
    anticipatory ruling, in the opinion of the Chair, should the 
    previous question be rejected, any germane amendment to the rule 
    may be offered.
        Mr. Goss: Mr. Speaker, the Chair's answer is ``yes'' and that 
    would be my intention.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair stands by his statement. Any 
    germane amendment can be offered.
        Mr. Goss: I was not asking a parliamentary inquiry about 
    germaneness. I wish to know whether or not that would be in order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has responded.
        The question is on ordering the previous question.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.

Chair Does Not Interpret Whether Votes Are Consistent

Sec. 14.20 A request that the Chair announce the effect on an earlier 
    House political position of a vote about to be taken is not a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

    On June 26, 1942,(10) Speaker Pro Tempore Jere Cooper, 
of Tennessee, sustained a point of order against Mr. Clarence Cannon, 
of Missouri, when he made an inquiry as to the effect of a vote on a 
pending motion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 88 Cong. Rec. 5646, 77th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 6709, an agriculture appropriation for 1943.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: A vote against the motion is a vote to 
    sustain the position of the House?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: A vote against the pending motion is a 
    vote for the defeat of the pending motion.
        Mr. Cannon of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that 
    the chair

[[Page 12436]]

    man of the subcommittee has made this motion without authorization 
    by a majority of the managers on the part of the House, it is only 
    fair that the House understand the effect of this vote. 
    Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I desire to know if a vote against the 
    pending motion is not a vote to sustain the position which the 
    House took when it sent the bill to conference.
        Mr. [Herman P.] Eberharter [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    point of order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Eberharter: The question raised by the gentleman from 
    Missouri is not a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The point of order is sustained.

Sec. 14.21 The Chair will not comment on the consistency of amendments 
    under the guise of responding to a parliamentary inquiry.

    On May 15, 1991,(11) the House was considering 
amendments to a measure under consideration in the Committee of the 
Whole. One amendment had been agreed to when an inquiry was directed to 
the Chair.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 137 Cong. Rec. 11116, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Marty] Russo [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (12) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Jim McDermott (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Russo: Mr. Chairman, as I understand the parliamentary 
    situation, we are now voting on the Upton amendment which, if you 
    voted for Berman, you would vote no to Upton.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Illinois is not 
    stating a parliamentary inquiry.
        The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Michigan (Mr. Upton) as a substitute for the amendment en bloc 
    offered by the gentlewoman from Maine (Ms. Snowe) as amended.

Sec. 14.22 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole responds to 
    parliamentary inquiries as to whether an amendment changing a lump-
    sum figure in a general appropriation bill is in order; but he does 
    not interpret the effect of the adoption of such an amendment on a 
    particular project which might be funded by the lump-sum figure.

    On Oct. 21, 1990,(13) during consideration of the 
legislative branch appropriation bill for fiscal 1991 in Committee of 
the Whole, there was pending an amendment reducing a lump-sum figure in 
the bill. The announced goal of the proponent of the amendment was to 
eliminate funding for certain garage attendants. Another Mem

[[Page 12437]]

ber wished to eliminate yet another service, and attempted to get a 
ruling from the Chair whether by an amendment to the pending amendment 
he could accomplish that goal. The discussion was as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 136 Cong. Rec. 31673, 31674, 31689-91, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                   H.R. 5399

            Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
        the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the 
        following sums are appropriated, out of any money in the 
        Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the Legislative Branch 
        for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1991, and for other 
        purposes, namely:

                       TITLE I--CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS

                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                               Mileage of Members

            For mileage of Members, as authorized by law, $210,000.

                             Salaries and Expenses

            For salaries and expenses of the House of Representatives, 
        $667,-010,000, to remain available until expended, as follows:

        Mr. [Vic] Fazio [of California]: Mr. Chairman, as provided in 
    the rule, at this time I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma Mr. 
    [Synar] and the gentleman from California Mr. [McCandless], who are 
    cosponsoring this amendment, for the purpose of offering the en 
    bloc amendments numbered one and printed in the report of the 
    Committee on Rules.

                  amendments en bloc offered by mr. synar

        Mr. [Mike] Synar [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the 
    gentleman from California Mr. [McCandless] and myself, I offer 
    amendments en bloc under the rule.
        The Chairman: (14) The Clerk will report the 
    amendments en bloc.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Dale E. Kildee (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments en bloc offered by Mr. Synar:
            Page 2, line 8, strike ``$677,010,-000'' and insert 
        ``$663,510,000''.
            Page 14, line 4, strike ``$27,238,-000'' and insert 
        ``$22,721,000''. . . .
            Page 14, line 18, strike ``$32,285,-000'' and insert 
        ``$30,950,000''. . . .

        The Chairman: Pursuant to House Resolution 510, the amendments 
    en bloc are not subject to amendment or to a demand for a division 
    of the question, may amend portions of the bill not yet read for 
    amendment and if adopted, shall become original text for the 
    purpose of further amendment. . . .
        So the amendments en bloc were agreed to. . . .

                       amendment offered by mr. conte

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Conte: Page 14, line 18, strike 
        ``$30,950,000'' and insert ``$30,800,000''. . . .

        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, I spoke before on this situation. It 
    has simply gotten out of hand: I'm talking about the garage 
    attendant problem. . . .

[[Page 12438]]

        Mr. [Harris W.] Fawell [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his inquiry.
        Mr. Fawell: Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment to the Conte 
    amendment, and I am desirous, of course, of presenting that. I do 
    not want to be foreclosed from so doing.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman wish to offer his amendment?
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. I have 
    agreed with the chairman of the committee that I would go along 
    with this compromise. Can we not put that to a vote and get rid of 
    that?
        The Chairman: The Chair has to recognize that the gentleman 
    from Illinois [Mr. Fawell] rose, saying that he has an amendment to 
    the amendment. The Chair has to protect the right of the gentleman 
    from Illinois [Mr. Fawell].
        Mr. Fawell: Mr. Chairman, in furtherance of my parliamentary 
    inquiry, as long as I am not foreclosed from presenting my 
    amendment to the amendment, I simply wanted to make sure that the 
    section does not close, and that I do have the right to present my 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: Once the figure in the bill is agreed to by the 
    adoption of the Conte amendment, the gentleman cannot then at that 
    time make another amendment to that figure. . . .

      amendment offered by mr. fawell to the amendment offered by mr. 
                                   conte

        Mr. Fawell: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Fawell to the amendment offered by 
        Mr. Conte: Page 14, line 18, strike ``$30,950,000'' and insert 
        ``$30,550,-000''.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, may I make a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman: The gentleman may state his inquiry. . . .
        The Fawell amendment strikes $30,950,000 and inserts 
    $30,550,000.
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, if the Fawell amendment is adopted, 
    therefore, my amendment is wiped out, because the gentleman does 
    not make the savings.
        The Chairman: The figure inserted by the Conte amendment would 
    be reduced by an additional $250,000.
        Mr. Conte: Well, Mr. Chairman, the gentleman's amendment is for 
    $400,000 for the beauty shop and gym study.
        Mr. Fazio: Mr. Chairman, may I state further in this 
    parliamentary inquiry, we cannot do the Fawell and the Conte 
    amendments in their entirety simultaneously. One or the other is 
    out of order.
        Mr. Conte: That is right.
        The Chairman: The Chair can only read the figures in each 
    amendment.
        Mr. Conte: Well, Mr. Chairman, let us go over this again.
        The Chairman: The Chair cannot interpret those figures which 
    are to be a lump sum amount for the House Office Building. The 
    Chair can only read them in response to the gentleman's inquiry.
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, may I further inquire, the gentleman 
    from Il

[[Page 12439]]

    linois is trying to cut $400,000, is that right?
        The Chairman: The amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Fawell] would cut an additional $250,000 from the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Conte].
        Mr. Conte: Which would leave no cut for the garage attendants.
        The Chairman: The Chair cannot interpret the effect of that. 
    The Chair can give the gentleman the arithmetic only.

Chair's Power of Recognition

Sec. 14.23 The Chair will not render an anticipatory decision on whom 
    he will recognize to offer a motion if the previous question on a 
    pending question is defeated but reserves the option of making that 
    determination after hearing debate and ascertaining to his 
    satisfaction who has ``led the opposition'' to ordering the 
    previous question.

    Where there was an effort to defeat the previous question on a 
pending motion to instruct conferees, the proponent of the pending 
motion asked who would have the right to offer an amendment if the 
previous question were defeated. The Chair's response, excerpted from 
the proceedings of Sept. 22, 1988,(15) is carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 134 Cong. Rec. 24868, 24869, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Julian C.] Dixon [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the bill (H.R. 
    4776) making appropriations for the government of the District of 
    Columbia and other activities chargeable in whole or in part 
    against the revenues of said District for the fiscal year ending 
    September 30, 1989, and for other purposes, with Senate amendments 
    thereto, disagree to the Senate amendments, and agree to the 
    conference asked by the Senate.
        The Speaker: (16) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from California?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

                        motion offered by mr. green

        Mr. [Bill] Green [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Green moves that the managers on the part of the House 
        at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on 
        the bill, H.R. 4776, be instructed to agree to the amendment of 
        the Senate numbered 25.

        The Speaker: The gentleman from New York (Mr. Green) is 
    recognized for 1 hour. . . .

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Green: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.

[[Page 12440]]

        Mr. Green: Mr. Speaker, if the motion on the previous question 
    loses, may I inquire whether it is the motion of this gentleman 
    from California (Mr. Dannemeyer) or the more recent gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Dornan) that gets offered?
        The Speaker: The Chair will determine recognition priorities at 
    the appropriate time, ascertaining at such time who is entitled to 
    recognition.
        Does the gentleman have further comments on his motion?

Taking Parliamentary Inquiry Under Advisement

Sec. 14.24 The Chair may delay his response to a parliamentary inquiry 
    pending an examination of the precedents.

    A privileged disciplinary resolution, reported from the Committee 
on Standards of Official Conduct, was called up in the House on Oct. 
13, 1978.(17) Immediately after the reading of the 
resolution, a Member asked, as a parliamentary inquiry, whether the one 
paragraph resolution was divisible. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 124 Cong. Rec. 37009, 37016, 37017, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

              in the matter of representative edward r. roybal

        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged resolution (H. Res. 1416) and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 1416

            Resolved, That Representative Edward R. Roybal be censured 
        and that the House of Representatives adopt the Report of the 
        Committee on Standards of Official Conduct dated October 6, 
        1978, In the matter of Representative Edward R. Roybal.

        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: (18) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, my parliamentary inquiry is directed 
    toward the rules and the precedents of the House. I would propound 
    a question to the Chair in my parliamentary inquiry as to whether 
    the resolution is divisible when it comes to a vote.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the gentleman will have 
    to indicate how he wanted to divide the vote.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, the resolution says, ``That 
    Representative Edward R. Roybal be censured,'' which would seem to 
    be divisible under the precedents of the House. The resolution 
    calls upon the House of Representatives to adopt the report and to 
    censure Mr. Roybal. I wonder whether or not the resolution can, 
    therefore, be divided into two questions, one being censure and the 
    second being the adoption of the report, which could be by separate 
    votes.
        The Speaker: The gentleman's rights will be protected. The 
    Chair will examine the precedents with regard to the gentleman's 
    point.

[[Page 12441]]

        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair for that 
    consideration.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Flynt) is 
    recognized for 60 minutes. . . .
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Speaker, earlier I propounded a parliamentary 
    inquiry to the Speaker as to whether or not, under the rules and 
    precedents of the House, House Resolution 1416, as it stands, would 
    be divisible.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to respond to the gentleman.
        Mr. Ashbrook: I appreciate that, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) has 
    requested an opinion as to whether the question on House Resolution 
    1416 may be divided.
        To be the subject of a division of the question under the 
    precedents of the House, a proposition must constitute two or more 
    separate substantive propositions so that if one of the 
    propositions is removed, the remaining proposition constitutes a 
    separate and distinct question, and that test must work both ways.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the questions are substantially 
    equivalent questions. For that reason, the Chair holds that House 
    Resolution 1416 is not subject to a demand for a division of the 
    question.
        Mr. Ashbrook: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Flynt: Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the 
    resolution.
        The previous question was ordered.
        Mr. Bob Wilson: [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion 
    to recommit.
        The Speaker: Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?
        Mr. Bob Wilson: I am.
        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Bob Wilson moves to recommit the resolution, House 
        Resolution 1416, to the Committee on Standards of Official 
        Conduct with instructions to report the same back forthwith 
        with the following amendment. Strike all after the resolving 
        clause and insert:
        That Edward R. Roybal be and he is hereby reprimanded.

        The Speaker: Without objection, the previous question is 
    ordered on the motion to recommit.
        There was no objection.
        Mr. [Bruce F.] Caputo [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Caputo: Is time allowed for debate?
        The Speaker: The motion is not debatable.
        The question is on the motion to recommit with instructions.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.
        Mr. Flynt: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were refused.
        Mrs. [Millicent] Fenwick [of New Jersey]: Mr. Speaker, I object 
    to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the 
    point of order that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

[[Page 12442]]

        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    219, nays 170, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 40, as follows: . 
    . .
        So the motion to recommit was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        Mr. Flynt: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the 
    House, I report the resolution back to the House with an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Flynt: Strike all after the 
        resolving clause and insert: That Edward R. Roybal be and he is 
        hereby reprimanded.

        The amendment was agreed to.
        The resolution, as amended, was agreed to.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Sec. 14.25 Where a parliamentary inquiry does not relate to the 
    immediate proceedings of the House, the Chair may take the matter 
    under advisement, particularly where research is required into the 
    origins of a rule.

    On Apr. 7, 1992,(19) during a special order concerning 
the so-called ``banking scandal'' that preoccupied many Members of the 
House, a discussion involved the meaning of the admonition in Rule II 
that the officers of the House ``shall keep the secrets of the House.'' 
The Speaker took the matter under advisement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 138 Cong Rec. 8271-74, 102d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    Thoughts on the Scandal-ridden House

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (20) Under a previous order 
    of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DeLay] is recognized 
    for 60 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Richard Ray (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tom] DeLay [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I take this time in 
    the well and before the House to express my opinions about what has 
    been going on in this House or the lack of what has been going on 
    in this House over the last few years, particularly during the 
    scandal-ridden period of the last year or so. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman giving us that little 
    bit of history. I think it is very beneficial to the overall theme 
    of this special order. That is that this has been going on, this 
    lack of leadership, the mismanagement of the House, has been going 
    on for many years. It just points up that when someone is in power 
    for an inordinate amount of time, then this kind of oversight, this 
    kind of corruption, if you will, continues and builds upon itself 
    and sort of feeds on itself. . . .
        Mr. [Richard K.] Armey [of Texas]: . . . There is another 
    question I would have about the secrets of the House.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. DeLay: Would the gentleman hold right there?
        Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12443]]

        Mr. DeLay: Mr. Speaker, I make an inquiry of what does it mean 
    when it says in the rules of the House that the House must keep the 
    secrets of the House, the officers must keep the secrets of the 
    House?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is not prepared to respond 
    to that, and will be consulting with the gentleman. . . .
        The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Do I understand the 
    Chair correctly that the Chair is not prepared to rule at this time 
    on what the phrase ``secrets of the House'' means?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In reference to that question, the 
    Chair says to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the word ``secrets'' 
    has appeared in the rule for a great number of years. The Chair 
    will endeavor to try to find out for the gentleman what the word 
    ``secrets'' means.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Rule II provides for the election of 
officers of the House (other than the Speaker) by viva voce vote, 
``each of whom shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the 
United States . . . and to keep the secrets of the House.''
    In section 635 of the House Rules and Manual it is recited that the 
``requirement that the officers be sworn to keep the secrets of the 
House is obsolete'' (citing 1 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 187). In that 
precedent the origin of the oath of secrecy requirement in the rule is 
discussed only in relationship to secret sessions of the House, ``but 
inasmuch as no secret session has been held for about seventy years, 
the observance of this portion of the rule is naturally neglected.'' 
Thus, according to Asher Hinds, the oath of secrecy requirement had 
become obsolete at that time.
    As indicated in section 914 of the House Rules and Manual, the 
House conducted its first secret session since 1830 on June 20, 1979, 
and then conducted three subsequent secret sessions on July 17, 1979, 
Feb. 25, 1980, and July 19, 1983. On all of those occasions, the Manual 
and Record indicate that ``those officers and employees specified by 
the Speaker whose attendance was essential to the functioning of the 
secret session. . . would be required to sign an oath of secrecy.''

Sec. 14.26 The Chair may in his discretion defer a response to a 
    parliamentary inquiry pending his examination of the rule and the 
    amendments in question.
On Oct. 4, 1990,(1) the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 
1990 was being considered under the provisions of a complex special 
order which permitted consider

[[Page 12444]]

ation only of those amendments spelled out in the report of the 
Committee on Rules. The order of amendments was specified in the rule. 
When asked about the juxtaposition of two amendments to the same 
portion of the bill, the Chair needed to evaluate both the rule and the 
text of the amendments in order to respond to the parliamentary inquiry 
made by Mr. George W. Gekas, of Pennsylvania.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 136 Cong Rec. 27511, 27512, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gekas: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (2) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. Douglas H. Bosco (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Gekas: There is a bit of confusion reigning in my mind, if 
    nowhere else, as to whether or not under previous instructions and 
    rules of this type as to whether or not the Hughes-Gekas amendment 
    is in the posture of king of the hill. Specifically, I would ask 
    the Chair to let me know, at this juncture, is it so that if both 
    pass, that the latter one, the Gekas amendment, would prevail?
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman momentarily, 
    as the Chair must now be advised on this and review both 
    amendments.
        The Chair would advise the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
    Gekas] as soon as the Chair has examined the two amendments.
        Mr. Gekas: I thank the Chair. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the parliamentary 
    inquiry just posed.
        The Hughes amendments offered en bloc, if adopted, would insert 
    several new sections, sections 212 through 218, into title II, and 
    would make a minor change in title XXII. The Gekas amendment would 
    rewrite all of title II as amended by Hughes and insert a new 
    title.
        In effect, the Gekas amendment, if adopted, would replace most 
    of the Hughes amendment en bloc.
        Mr. Gekas: I thank the Chair. That was our suspicion, and we 
    wanted to have it confirmed from the summit itself.

Sec. 14.27 The Chair may take a certain parliamentary inquiry under 
    advisement, especially where the inquiry does not relate to the 
    immediate procedures of the House.

        On May 26, 1993,(3) a new Member-elect arrived at 
    the Capitol. A sitting Member inquired of the Chair whether the new 
    Member-elect would be permitted to take the oath, although his 
    credentials were not before the body. The Speaker Pro Tempore, Mr. 
    Jim McDermott, of Washington, suggested that the question should be 
    presented to the Speaker for his consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 139 Cong Rec. 11251, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [F. James] Sensenbrenner: [Jr., of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, 
    I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Sensenbrenner: Mr. Speaker, would it be in order for me to 
    ask

[[Page 12445]]

    unanimous consent that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. Barca] who 
    has been elected to fill the vacant First District seat, be allowed 
    to take the oath of office, notwithstanding the fact that a 
    certificate of election for him has not arrived? The Republican 
    candidate has conceded and, to my knowledge, there is no objection 
    to Mr. Barca taking the oath of office from this side of the aisle.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would have to take that 
    under advisement with the Speaker of the House.

Sec. 14.28 The Chair may take a parliamentary inquiry under advisement, 
    particularly in a situation where a delay in responding to the 
    inquiry does not interfere with the pending business of the House.

    An inquiry of the Chair about the composition of the Congressional 
Record, and extensions of remarks therein, was taken under advisement, 
where the Chair did not have time to consult with the Official 
Reporters of Debates and the Government Printing Office during the 
proceedings. The pertinent excerpts from the Record of Feb. 11, 
1994,(4) are set out below:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 140 Cong. Rec. 2244, 2245, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (5) Under a previous order 
    of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] is 
    recognized for 5 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Jolene Unsoeld (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Madam Speaker, I 
    would like to use my 5 minutes to begin with to propound a 
    parliamentary inquiry relating to the matter of extensions of 
    remarks in the Congressional Record.
        In yesterday's Congressional Record, that would be February 10, 
    on pages H 460 to H 476, material was submitted to the 
    Congressional Record costing the taxpayers $6,132, where there was 
    not an announcement of that cost prior to the material being 
    submitted.
        My parliamentary inquiry is this, does the Chair have a 
    responsibility to ascertain the amount of taxpayer expense in 
    Extensions of Remarks.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the inquiry of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania, the Chair understands the situation to 
    be as follows: the gentlewoman from Colorado requested permission 
    to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend her remarks 
    and to include extraneous material. Due to the length of the matter 
    submitted, the material was moved by the official reporters from 
    the beginning of the day to appear following legislative business. 
    This normally is a signal to the Government Printing Office to 
    return the material to the Member should a printing estimate be 
    required, submissions in excess of two Congressional Record pages. 
    That apparently did not occur in this situation, so the submission 
    was printed. . . .
        Mr. Walker: So the Member has the responsibility, if they have 
    a large amount of material, to present that to the House prior to 
    asking the permission; is that correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: To ask permission with the estimate of 
    the cost in hand.

[[Page 12446]]

        Mr. Walker: And in this particular case, as I understand it, 
    that procedure was not followed; is that correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman did not have an 
    estimate and, for that reason, the matter was held over until the 
    end of the Record.
        Mr. Walker: Is there a procedure for recovering the amount of 
    money spent that was spent and not properly agreed to.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would have to take that 
    under advisement.

Improper Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 14.29 The Chair will not respond to a parliamentary inquiry 
    whether a floor request conforms to ``committee policy'' where that 
    policy is not a rule of the House.

    On Apr. 29, 1988,(6) the House was considering a Defense 
authorization bill (fiscal 1989) under a series of complicated special 
orders. The rule under which the bill was being considered specified 
which amendments were to be in order, the order of their consideration, 
and their debate time. In the House, before resolving into the 
Committee of the Whole for further consideration of the measure, 
Chairman Les Aspin, of Wisconsin, asked unanimous consent to change the 
order of amendments. Several parliamentary inquiries were directed to 
the Speaker, in an attempt to determine whether certain amendments had 
been submitted in a timely fashion, pursuant to the announced policy of 
the Committee on Rules. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 134 Cong. Rec. 9551, 9552, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Permission To Consider Amendment No. 20 Printed in Section 3 of 
     House Report 100-590 as Amendment No. 6 of Section 2 of Report on 
      H.R. 4264, National Defense Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989

        Mr. Aspin: Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that amendment 
    No. 20, printed in section 3 of House Report 100-590 be considered 
    as if it were amendment No. 6 of section 2 of the report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin? . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. James H. Bilbray (Nev.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [John R.] Kasich [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Kasich: What I do not quite understand, Mr. Speaker, is if 
    we are operating under a certain rule, somebody has got to know 
    what the rule is to find out whether the amendment being offered 
    should be accepted under the rule.

[[Page 12447]]

        I have no objection to the amendment from how I understand it. 
    I am just trying to understand if the rule is being followed here, 
    and if there is an ability to get unanimous consent to offer 
    something that did not follow within that deadline, then I would 
    like to reserve the ability to be able to ask for that unanimous 
    consent.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The amendment is in order. It is on 
    page 55 of House Report 100-590, an amendment offered by 
    Representative Pepper of Florida or Representative Lowry of 
    Washington or his designee, debatable for not to exceed 40 minutes, 
    to be equally divided between the proponent and opponent.
        Mr. Kasich: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary inquiry. I am 
    not interested--if it is printed in there, I want to know if the 
    amendment was filed by the time that we were supposed to have had 
    these amendments filed. That is what I am inquiring.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: It is presumed that that is correct. 
    But again, it is something that has to be answered by the Rules 
    Committee.
        Mr. Kasich: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker. I do 
    not want us to presume anything. I want to know. I do not want to 
    presume.
        I do not have any objection, Mr. Speaker, to that amendment. It 
    is just that if we are not going to abide by those rules, there are 
    additional amendments that we would like to offer. I do not object, 
    necessarily to the substance of the amendment.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Ohio will have to 
    accept that the Chair does not know the answer to the gentleman's 
    question, nor does the chairman of the Armed Services Committee.
        Mr. [William L.] Dickinson [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Kasich: Then I will object, Mr. Speaker, until we get an 
    answer as to what the rule is, how it was filed.
        Mr. Dickinson: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman withhold his 
    objection for a moment?
        Mr. Kasich: Yes; I will withhold, and simply reserve the right 
    to object.
        Mr. Aspin: Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, we will 
    deal with this amendment today, because we have to get the 
    unanimous consent in the House.
        Mr. Kasich: Then I will withdraw my objection so we can get 
    those questions answered.
        Mr. Aspin: The gentleman deserves an answer to his question, 
    but I do not think we can answer it today.

Sec. 14.30 The Chairman of Committee of the Whole does not respond to 
    inquiries about future legislative programs in the House.

    On Feb. 3, 1995,(8) Mr. John A. Boehner, of Ohio, was 
presiding in Committee of the Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Neil] Abercrombie [of Hawaii]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.

[[Page 12448]]

        Mr. Abercrombie: Mr. Chairman, is it the Chair's understanding 
    that a ruling was arrived at or an understanding was arrived at 
    with respect to the votes on Monday and the 2 o'clock versus 5 
    o'clock time? Because that is not clear to me.
        The Chairman: The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole is not 
    in a position to rule on that question.
        Mr. Abercrombie: Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry. 
    How might I go about making that inquiry? My understanding is that 
    issue was not settled.
        The Chairman: The gentleman should inquire of the leadership 
    who makes those decisions.

Sec. 14.31 Questions concerning informal guidelines of the Committee on 
    Rules for submission of amendments may not be raised as 
    parliamentary inquiries, since the Chair is not being called upon 
    to interpret any rule of the House.

    While the Chair responds to parliamentary inquiries concerning the 
application of House rules and precedents relating to pending business, 
he does not interpret committee policies or factual questions about 
matters not within his cognizance. The proceedings of May 5, 
1988,(9) are illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 134 Cong. Rec. 9938, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Duncan] Hunter [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 
    the Chair's admonition, and my only remarks with regard to the 
    point of order is I hope the Chairman would allow us to cure the 
    defect that he has pointed out in this particular package.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (10) Does the gentleman 
    from Arkansas (Mr. Robinson) desire to be heard on the point of 
    order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Kenneth J. Gray (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tommy F.] Robinson [of Arkansas]: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Arkansas is 
    recognized.
        Mr. Robinson: Mr. Chairman, we had a date certain deadline for 
    all amendments to the DOD bill to be submitted to the Rules 
    Committee.
        Parliamentary inquiry, was the Aspin amendment submitted to 
    meet the deadline initially when we all had to abide by the rules 
    to bring any amendment to this floor?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot answer that inquiry. 
    That is not a parliamentary inquiry. . . .
        Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Badham) desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Robert E.] Badham [of California]: No, Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Badham: Mr. Chairman, my parliamentary inquiry is that 
    allusion was made to the fact that we had a deadline for submitting 
    amendments.

[[Page 12449]]

    Is it not true that there was no deadline for submitting 
    amendments?

        The Chairman Pro Tempore: That would be a question the 
    gentleman would have to ask the Rules Committee.
        Mr. Badham: I tried, Mr. Chairman, Lord knows I tried.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair is not prepared to rule on 
    that question.

Sec. 14.32 A Member may not use the guise of a parliamentary inquiry to 
    register opposition to a unanimous-consent agreement already 
    entered into.

    On occasion, the Chair may feel an obligation to ``indulge'' a 
Member in stretching the use of a parliamentary inquiry to clarify a 
misunderstanding that has arisen in floor procedure. Such was the 
situation on Dec. 20, 1987,(11) when Mr. Dan Burton, of 
Indiana, felt his rights had been violated because of a scheduling 
agreement entered into by his leadership during special orders, a 
period when unanimous-consent requests relating to the business of the 
House are normally not entertained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 133 Cong. Rec. 36699, 36700, 100th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: I hope all Members 
    realize that in attempts to reach a conclusion on the continuing 
    resolution and on the reconciliation bill, the joint leadership is 
    trying to accommodate Members as much as possible. We had hoped 
    that these bills might be ready today. . . .
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Foley: I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        Mr. Speaker, we are going to be asked this evening at 5 p.m. to 
    vote on a 1-day CR so that the Government would not have to shut 
    down. What I would like to advise the leadership now is that this 
    gentleman intends to object unless we have some idea at that time 
    whether or not agreement has been reached between not only the 
    Republican and Democratic sides of both Houses, but also the White 
    House.
        If there is no agreement on that, I think we are----
        Mr. Foley: We have been advised by the representatives of the 
    President that if he receives before tomorrow morning an action of 
    the Congress extending for 24 hours until midnight tomorrow night 
    the temporary continuing resolution, the President will sign it.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: I am not talking about that, if the 
    gentleman will yield further.
        I am talking about the big CR and the budget reconciliation 
    act. If agreement has not been reached between both Houses and the 
    White House and we have some pretty concrete evidence that the 
    President is going to sign it, I intend to object this evening.

[[Page 12450]]

        Mr. Foley: I do not think we intend to bring the matter by 
    unanimous consent. The gentleman may vote against the bill if he 
    wishes to.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Unanimous consent is not required?
        Mr. Foley: No.
        The Speaker: (12) The Chair will advise the 
    gentleman that unanimous consent would not be required.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair wishes to express along with the majority leader and 
    the minority leader a regret for any inconvenience that has been 
    caused to Members and their schedules, but as the majority leader 
    has explained, and the minority leader as well, the leadership has 
    been attempting to try to create a situation in which we can work 
    the will of the House and conclude the session of the Congress at a 
    minimum of inconvenience to the membership.
        In that regard, the Chair wants to thank the membership for 
    their understanding.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I would like to know when 
    this rule was requested and granted. The Members when we left on 
    Friday were not aware, to my knowledge, that there was going to be 
    a rule requested for a 1-day CR. It seems like that is kind of 
    something that was sneaked in on us, at least as far as I am 
    concerned.
        The Speaker: The Chair will advise the gentleman that the Rules 
    Committee was granted permission by this House, by unanimous 
    consent, a request offered by the majority leader and understood by 
    the minority leadership, they being present, that the Rules 
    Committee should have--until noon today, to file privileged 
    reports. And the Rules Committee has done so with respect to the 
    short-term continuing resolution.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: If I might further inquire of the Chair, 
    when did this take place, when did the leadership of both the 
    majority and minority, or when were they informed about this 
    requested rule?
        The Speaker: If the gentleman will be patient, the Chair will 
    examine the notes in the Journal and try to give the gentleman a 
    response as to when. It was sometime yesterday, approximately 5 
    p.m. yesterday afternoon.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Five p.m. on Saturday after everybody 
    had gone home?
        The Speaker: Well, the Chair will advise the gentleman that it 
    is the responsibility of the majority and the minority leadership 
    to try as best they can to accommodate the schedule of the 
    membership.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, where a unanimous consent 
    is required or requested, it is my understanding that it is the 
    entire body, not just the leadership that is supposed to be 
    involved. And to go ahead----
        The Speaker: If the gentleman will permit the Chair to respond, 
    it is a long--standing rule that unanimous consent requests-not by 
    the rules of the House, but by the comity and the courtesy that 
    exists between both sides--are cleared in advance of their

[[Page 12451]]

    being requested, usually, with the minority leadership, and that 
    they are not propounded unless someone representing the minority is 
    present in the Chamber. That is a matter of precedent.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: I have a further parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: Permit the Chair, please, to respond and the 
    gentleman will be recognized.
        There is no requirement that all Members be present. If there 
    were, the House might never achieve a unanimous consent request, 
    and I think the gentleman recognizes, as will all Members that the 
    minority and majority have tried very earnestly to work together in 
    a harmonious fashion. . . .
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: I have a further parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Speaker, there was some discussion privately of a 1-day CR 
    on Friday, and, Mr. Speaker, when we left, it was the understanding 
    of this gentleman, and, I think, most Members on our side of the 
    aisle that no legislative action was going to take place that would 
    preclude our right to object to a unanimous consent request to go 
    to the Rules Committee or to pass a 1-day CR. Now, it did take 
    place in our absence, and I submit, Mr. Speaker, that at least as 
    far as I was concerned, I was misled. I do not know whether it was 
    inadvertent or not, but I feel like I was misled because had I 
    known that you were going to ask unanimous consent to go to the 
    Rules Committee to get a special rule for a 1-day CR, a 1-day 
    extension, I would have been here to object.
        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]: A point of order, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentleman's point of order is well taken. The 
    gentleman was not stating a parliamentary inquiry, but the Chair 
    indulged him to make such statement as he desired to make.

Sec. 14.33 Although the Chair responds to parliamentary inquiries 
    concerning the amendment process, he does not: (1) rule on 
    hypothetical questions; (2) rule retrospectively on questions not 
    raised in a timely fashion; and (3) rule anticipatorily on 
    questions not yet presented.

    On June 6, 1990,(13) the Committee of the Whole had 
under consideration the Export Facilitation Act of 1990. An amendment 
dealing with Soviet Union-Lithuanian relationships was pending when a 
parliamentary inquiry was raised about the possibility of considering 
additional amendments, involving other international relationships. The 
proceedings were as shown herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 136 Cong. Rec. 13189, 13193, 13194, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Amendment offered by Mr. Durbin: Page 48, insert the following 
    after line 11:
    sec. 124. exports to the soviet union.

            No exports to the Soviet Union otherwise permitted by 
        virtue of the amendments made by this title may be made until 
        the President certifies

[[Page 12452]]

        to the Congress that the Soviet Union is not imposing any 
        economic sanctions on Lithuania and has entered into 
        negotiations with the elected government of Lithuania for the 
        purpose of restoring the independence of Lithuania.

              modification of amendment offered by Mr. durbin

      amendment offered by Mr. levine of california to the amendment 
                     offered by Mr. durbin, as modified

        Mr. [Mel] Levine of California: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the amendment as modified.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Levine of California to the 
        amendment as modified offered by Mr. Durbin:
            Insert ``(a) Exports.--'' before the first sentence.
            Add the following at the end of the amendment.
            (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
        that no reports to the Soviet Union otherwise permitted by 
        virtue of the amendments made by this title should be made if 
        the Soviet Union takes action to restrict the emigration of 
        Jews from the Soviet Union. . . .

        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (14) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Al Swift (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, I wholeheartedly support the 
    statement of the gentleman from California, and I support his 
    amendment to the amendment.
        My parliamentary inquiry is that we have a Member, the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ritter), who would like to have 
    the opportunity to offer an amendment to the amendment to be 
    offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Burton) on Cuba, and the 
    Ritter amendment would deal with Afghanistan along the same basis 
    that the gentleman from California has been speaking.
        I just question: what is the parliamentary procedure for the 
    recognition of the amendment of the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Levine) and whether or not it would be in order at the appropriate 
    time for the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Ritter) to offer his 
    amendment to the amendment based on the same scenario?
        The Chairman: The pending situation has no bearing on what 
    might be the situation to what the Chair cannot anticipate, that 
    could develop subsequently on another amendment.
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Chairman, I have a further parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Chairman, on what basis is the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Levine) allowed to offer his amendment to the amendment? And, 
    again, I do not question the basis of his amendment, because I 
    support it. But I do not see it in the rule. That is why I was 
    asking.

        The Chairman: The rule does not prevent amendments to the 
    amendment, and no point of order with regard to its germaneness was 
    raised in a timely fashion. . . .
        Mr. [Doug] Bereuter [of Nebraska]: Mr. Chairman, I would 
    address my parliamentary inquiry to the Chair in this fashion: is 
    it still timely to object or to raise reservations under

[[Page 12453]]

    the point of nongermaneness to the amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair would respond in this fashion: it is 
    too late. That point of order would have to have come prior to the 
    time the gentleman from California (Mr. Levine) was recognized to 
    debate his amendment.

Chair Does Not Give Advisory Rulings

Sec. 14.34 The Chair may decline to indicate in advance whether a 
    suggested resolution would be privileged, since the Chair does not 
    give advisory opinions regarding parliamentary questions not 
    related to pending business.

    During the one-minute period at the beginning of the legislative 
day of Sept. 29, 1993,(15) two Members sought to suggest 
that an investigation into conduct by an executive branch official 
might be undertaken by a House committee. They pressed the Chair to say 
how such a resolution might be brought to the floor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 139 Cong. Rec. 22988-90, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                    Ly Binh To Be in My Office Tomorrow

        (Mr. Burton of Indiana asked and was given permission to 
    address the House for 1 minute.)
        Mr. [Dan] Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, the Clinton 
    administration has taken two giant steps toward normalizing 
    relations with Vietnam. . . .
        Now we find out that a Cabinet official, Mr. Ron Brown, the 
    Secretary of the Department of Commerce, is accused of taking 
    $700,000 to influence these decisions. . . .
        We have demanded an investigation into this, not unlike the 
    Watergate or the Iran-Contra investigations, because it involves 
    our foreign policy and a Cabinet official who may have influenced 
    these decisions even though there are 2,200 POW/MIA's still 
    unaccounted for in Vietnam. . . .

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I rise 
    to propound a parliamentary inquiry. . . .
        By what process can the House of Representatives begin an 
    investigation of this very serious matter where we can be assured 
    that the investigation will take place?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) The Chair advises the 
    gentleman that committees of jurisdiction can initiate 
    investigations on matters such as this.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Bill Richardson (N. Mex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Well, Mr. Speaker, the problem is that the 
    gentleman from Indiana has already written the committees of 
    jurisdiction and is being stonewalled. My question is:
        By what means can we ensure that, if the chairmen of those 
    committees refuse to hold hearings on this matter of major 
    significance, the House of Representatives can order such an 
    investigation to take place?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot respond more fully to 
    the

[[Page 12454]]

    gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] at this time. . . .
        Mr. Walker: . . . and I am seeking to know whether or not there 
    is a resolution of some sort that can be brought to the floor that 
    would force this investigation to take place.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot respond beyond the 
    fact that a resolution can be introduced and referred to the 
    appropriate committee of jurisdiction.
        Mr. Walker: But there is no privileged resolution that can be 
    brought to the floor that would force the investigation to take 
    place, Mr. Speaker?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot comment on such an 
    issue until seeing such a resolution.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] for his question.
        I sent a letter to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign 
    Affairs asking for an investigation. That appeared to me to be the 
    committee of jurisdiction. He has indicated that he did not think 
    he should do that, and he named a litany of other committees that 
    ought to be notified, and that is what prompted the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania to ask these questions, and so we just want to know, 
    if this merits an investigation, how do we do it?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the gentleman wants to introduce a 
    resolution, the Chair will refer it to the appropriate committee.
        Mr. Burton of Indiana: Mr. Speaker, we will do that.

Parliamentary Inquiry as to Legal Effect of Proposal

Sec. 14.35 Questions about the legal effect of a pending legislative 
    proposal are not entertained as parliamentary inquiries.

    On Jan. 25, 1995,(17) where the House had under 
consideration a resolution directing certain committees to take action 
to report legislation to achieve a balanced budget, the Chair declined 
to respond to parliamentary inquiries regarding the legal or binding 
effect of the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ____, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Michael P.] Flanagan [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, pursuant 
    to House Resolution 44, as designee of the majority leader, I call 
    up the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 17) relating to the 
    treatment of Social Security under any constitutional amendment 
    requiring a balanced budget, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration in the House.
        The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.
        The text of House Concurrent Resolution 17 is as follows:

                                H. Con. Res. 17

            Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate 
        concurring), That, for the purposes of any constitutional 
        amendment requiring a balanced budget, the appropriate 
        committees of the House and the Senate shall report to their 
        respec

[[Page 12455]]

        tive Houses implementing legislation to achieve a balanced 
        budget without increasing the receipts or reducing the 
        disbursements of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance 
        Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund to 
        achieve that goal.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (18) Pursuant to the rule, 
    the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Flanagan] will be recognized for 
    30 minutes and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Bonior] will be 
    recognized for 30 minutes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Jim Kolbe (Ariz.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. 
    Flanagan].

                           PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

        Mr. [Chaka] Fattah [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Fattah: Mr. Speaker, I would like to know the legal effect 
    of the resolution in front of us. Is it binding?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is not stating a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

Not a Proper Inquiry-Meaning of an Amendment

Sec. 14.36 The construction or meaning of an amendment is not a proper 
    subject for a parliamentary inquiry as such matters are for the 
    House and not the presiding officer to determine.

    On Oct. 12, 1966,(19) Chairman John J. McFall, of 
California, pointed out that it was the duty of the proponent of an 
amendment to explain it to other Members, not the duty of the Chair.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 112 Cong. Rec. 26205, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 51, the Indiana Dunes Lakeshore bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [J. Edward] Roush [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment to the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Arizona [Mr. Udall].
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana 
    [Mr. Roush].
        Mr. [Charles A.] Halleck [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield for the purpose of propounding a parliamentary 
    inquiry?
        Mr. Roush: I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Indiana will state the 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Halleck: Mr. Chairman, in view of the fact that all of the 
    units of this proposed national park are fixed by reference to a 
    map, is it in order to offer language in indefinite terms that 
    would undertake to alter that?
        The gentleman from Arizona offered an amendment which referred 
    to another map, which is a matter of record.
        I do not know and I do not know whether anybody else knows just 
    what is meant when reference is made to Ogden Dunes or Burns Bog 
    units.
        The Chairman: The Chair would reply that the Chair is not in a 
    position to construe the amendment. The amendment technically is in 
    order and it is up to the Member offering an

[[Page 12456]]

    amendment to construe the amendment for the benefit of the Members.

Anticipatory Rulings by Chair

Sec. 14.37 The Chair declines to anticipate whether an amendment not 
    yet offered might be precluded by adoption of a pending amendment.

    On June 26, 1979,(20) during consideration of the 
Defense Production Act amendments of 1979, a lengthy amendment was 
offered by Morris K. Udall, of Arizona, Chairman of the Committee on 
Interior and Insular Affairs. When he asked that the reading of the 
amendment be waived, there was a reservation of objection and the 
following proceedings occurred.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 125 Cong. Rec. 16681-83, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Amendment offered by Mr. Udall: Page 8, after line 13 add 
        the following new subsection and renumber the subsequent 
        sections accordingly:
            (g)(1) The Secretary of Energy is hereby authorized to 
        designate a proposed synthetic fuel or feedstock facility as a 
        priority synthetic project pursuant to the procedures and 
        criteria provided in this section.
            (2) For the purposes of this section the term--
            (A) ``Synthetic fuel or feedstock facility'' means any 
        physical structure, including any equipment, building, mine 
        processing facility or other facility or installation used. . . 
        .
            (4) The Secretary shall keep apprised of the processing of 
        applications for priority synthetic projects by State and local 
        governments. If the Secretary determines that a priority 
        synthetic project is being delayed or threatened with delay by 
        the inability or unwillingness of any State or local government 
        to implement a schedule for timely review and decision, the 
        Secretary shall notify the Governor of such State and transmit 
        to the Congress a statement describing the delay and 
        recommending action to alleviate or prevent the delay.

        Mr. Udall (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the 
    Record.
        The Chairman: (1) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Arizona?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, reserving the 
    right to object, I wish to make a point of order. Mr. Chairman, the 
    amendment which I had offered and had printed in the Record would 
    be an appropriate substitute amendment for the amendment offered by 
    the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Udall). Under the time limitation, 
    if I understand correctly, I have 5 minutes to offer that 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: That is correct if offered in the proper form.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: But if this amendment is not amended by my 
    amendment and succeeds, then I may be precluded from offering that 
    amendment; is that correct?
        The Chairman: It would be difficult for the Chair to rule on 
    that without having seen the gentleman's amendment.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: The question I would put to the Chair as a 
    parliamen

[[Page 12457]]

    tary inquiry is: Does, then, my amendment become appropriate to 
    this amendment and give me the right to 5 minutes to discuss my 
    amendment?
        The Chairman: If the gentleman were to offer his amendment as a 
    substitute for this amendment in the form printed in the Record, he 
    would, indeed, have the 5 minutes guaranteed to him under the rule.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Then, Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to 
    the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Udall).
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that it is 
    not yet in order.
        Is there objection to the unanimous-consent request of the 
    gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Udall)?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object 
    in order to make an inquiry of the Chair.
        The amendment of the gentleman from Arizona now pending and in 
    the process of being read, I think the Chair advised me, was 
    amendable by the gentleman from Ohio who has an amendment printed 
    in the Record.
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman that any 
    proper substitute for the amendment of the gentleman from Arizona 
    would be in order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: And the order of recognition for that 
    purpose, may I inquire of the Chair, does not relate to the 
    establishment of the fact that there was an amendment that is 
    appropriate?
        The Chairman: The order of recognition, the Chair will say to 
    the gentleman, depends on the discretion of the Chair, given which 
    Members are seeking recognition at the time.

Chair Does Not Rule on Hypothetical Questions on Scope of Conference

Sec. 14.38 The Chair does not advise, in response to a parliamentary 
    inquiry, whether the failure of conferees to abide by the terms of 
    a motion to instruct would go beyond the scope of their authority.

    While the Chair must rule under Rule XXLVIII clause 3, on a point 
of order that a specific motion to instruct goes beyond the scope of 
conference, he does not speculate about whether modification of the 
language to which the motion is directed would cause a violation of 
clause 3. The proceedings of Oct. 29, 1981,(2) illustrate 
the Chair's reluctance to get involved in such speculation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 127 Cong. Rec. 26046, 26049, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. [Patricia] Schroeder [of Colorado]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (3) The Clerk will report 
    the motion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mrs. Schroeder moves that the managers on the part of the 
        House at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two 
        Houses on the House amendments to the bill S. 815 be instructed 
        to agree to the provisions contained in section 922 of the 
        Senate bill.

[[Page 12458]]

                  motion to table offered by mr. dickinson

        Mr. [William L.] Dickinson [of Alabama]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    motion to table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Dickinson moves to lay on the table the motion of the 
        gentlewoman from Colorado.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The motion is not debatable.
        The question is on the motion to table offered by the gentleman 
    from Alabama (Mr. Dickinson).
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Dickinson) there were--yeas 28, nays 18.
        Mrs. Schroeder: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present. . . 
    .
        So the motion to table was rejected.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman from Colorado (Mrs. 
    Schroeder) is recognized for 1 hour.
        Mrs. Schroeder: Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may 
    consume.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Dickinson: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Dickinson: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask if my 
    understanding of the parliamentary procedure is correct.
        The gentlewoman from Colorado has succeeded against the motion 
    to table, in which case she has a privileged motion now pending. It 
    is my understanding she will have 1 hour to debate the motion now 
    pending, and is in control of that entire time. Is this correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman stated the issue 
    correctly. . . .
        Mr. [Samuel S.] Stratton [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, the motion 
    offered by Mrs. Schroeder was that the managers on the part of the 
    House at the conference of the disagreeing votes of the two Houses 
    to the bill S. 815 be instructed to agree to the provisions 
    contained in section 922 of the Senate bill.
        My inquiry is to what extent does that motion allow the House 
    conferees to deviate in any way from the specific provisions of 
    section 922 of the Senate bill?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair advises the gentleman that 
    no point of order would lie against the conference report if the 
    House conferees do not follow the instructions of the House, should 
    the House agree to the motion of the gentlewoman from Colorado.
        Mr. Stratton: In other words, we could accept a provision on 
    limiting cost growth that does not follow the precise wording of 
    section 922 of the Senate bill?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is not going to rule on what 
    will be in the scope of the conference. The Chair is advising only 
    as to the effect of the motion.

[[Page 12459]]

        Mr. Stratton: Does this mean, Mr. Speaker, that if the 
    gentleman from Alabama and I, who have been working on a substitute 
    for the Nunn amendment, come up with something that does not have 
    one or two of the provisions of the Nunn amendment in it, we are 
    not in violation of the motion offered by the gentlewoman from 
    Colorado?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would restate the 
    parliamentary situation; that no point of order would lie for the 
    reason that the conferees have not followed the instructions should 
    the House adopt the motion of the gentlewoman from Colorado.
        The motion to instruct is advisory.

Offering Amendment With Inquiry

Sec. 14.39 A Member recognized to propound a parliamentary inquiry may 
    not, having secured the floor for such limited purpose, offer an 
    amendment.

    On Mar. 12, 1964,(4) Chairman Chet Holifield, of 
California, recognized Mr. August E. Johansen, of Michigan, to pose a 
parliamentary inquiry, not to offer an amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 110 Cong. Rec. 5140, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 8986 dealing with salary increases for federal officers 
        and employees.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Johansen: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Johansen: I direct this inquiry to the Chair as to whether 
    it will be in order if I secure recognition to offer an amendment 
    to the amendment in the nature of a substitute for the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Ohio.
        The Chairman: Of course, the gentleman, if he is recognized, 
    may offer an amendment.
        Mr. [James H.] Morrison [of Louisiana]: A parliamentary 
    inquiry, Mr. Chairman. The gentleman secured recognition first and 
    asked the parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has not been recognized, except for 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Morrison: The gentleman has a substitute amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman made the parliamentary inquiry as 
    to whether he could offer an amendment and the Chair responded that 
    the gentleman could offer an amendment if he was recognized.

Proper Forum for Inquiry

Sec. 14.40 The question of the vote required to adopt a special rule in 
    the House is not properly addressed to the Chairman of the 
    Committee of the Whole as a parliamentary inquiry but should be 
    addressed to the Speaker in the House.

    On June 13, 1946,(5) Chairman William M. Whittington, of 
Mis

[[Page 12460]]

sissippi, declined to answer an inquiry concerning matters that were 
the responsibility of the Speaker of the House to determine:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 92 Cong. Rec. 6877, 6878, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6777, the Government Corporations appropriation bill 
        for 1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Would it be possible to get a rule 
    making in order a paragraph which had previously been stricken from 
    the bill on a point of order, unless that rule was adopted by a 
    two-thirds vote?
        The Chairman: The Chair may say to the gentleman that that 
    inquiry is not one that can be answered in the Committee of the 
    Whole. It is a matter that would have to be determined by the 
    Speaker of the House.

Inquiries Properly Submitted to Chairman of Committee of the Whole 
    House

Sec. 14.41 The Speaker in reply to a parliamentary inquiry will not 
    anticipate a ruling by a Chairman of the Committee of the Whole.

    On Apr. 11, 1935,(6) Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, declined to anticipate a ruling by a Chairman of the 
Committee of the Whole.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 79 Cong. Rec. 5457, 5458, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H. Res. 197, providing for the consideration of H.R. 7260, 
        social security legislation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joseph P.] Monaghan [of Montana]: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker: For what purpose does the gentleman from Montana 
    rise?

        Mr. Monaghan: For the purpose of submitting a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Monaghan: Is not the statement that was made by the 
    gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Mott] correct, that if this rule passes, 
    then only one particular plan, the plan that we now have under 
    discussion, may be passed upon by the Congress?
        The Speaker: The Chair is not in position to answer that 
    parliamentary inquiry. That is a matter which will come up 
    subsequently under the rules of the House. The Chair would not seek 
    to anticipate what the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole may 
    rule or what the Committee itself may do. The Chair feels very 
    certain that the Chairman of the Committee will be governed, as all 
    chairmen of committees are, by the rules and precedents of the 
    House. Certainly the Chair would not anticipate his ruling; and in 
    addition to this, the Chair cannot pass upon any particular 
    amendment until it has been presented in all its phases.

Sec. 14.42 It is the responsibility of the Chairman of the Committee of 
    the Whole to preserve decorum in that forum; and the Speaker will 
    not render an anticipatory rul

[[Page 12461]]

    ing on what exhibits might be in violation of proper decorum after 
    the House resolves itself into the Committee.

    Pending consideration of the National Foundation on Arts and 
Humanities Amendments of 1990, the Speaker was asked a series of 
parliamentary inquiries concerning what exhibits might be used in the 
debate. The Speaker elaborated on the concept of ``freedom of speech,'' 
the constitutional right of the House to make its own rules, and the 
duty of the Presiding Officer to maintain decorum in debate. The 
Speaker outlined the authority and responsibility of the Chairman of 
the Committee of the Whole but refused to anticipate his ruling. The 
proceedings of Oct. 11, 1990,(7) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 136 Cong. Rec. 28629, 28630, 28650, 28651, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (8) The gentleman will 
    state his parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. Dennis M. Hertel (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, my parliamentary inquiry is with 
    regard to the debate on the bill that is about to come up. Under 
    the Rules of the House of Representatives, is the right to free 
    speech protected as defined in the first amendment?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Yes, clearly it is, consistent with 
    the rules of the House.
        Mr. Walker: Consistent with the rules of the House. Some of the 
    artwork that we are about to discuss has been ruled by the courts 
    as being perfectly appropriate for public display. My parliamentary 
    inquiry is, will that artwork be permitted under the rules of the 
    House and under the provisions of free speech to be brought to the 
    floor for display to the membership during the upcoming debate?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will make a determination 
    based on the decorum of the House.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I have a further parliamentary 
    inquiry. Does the decorum of the House override the provisions of 
    free speech?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Order has to be maintained in the 
    House to conduct the business of the House.
        Mr. Walker: But that is my question, Mr. Speaker. When it comes 
    to the question of artwork, which has been declared by the courts 
    as being appropriate artwork, and while being so referred to by 
    proponents in this debate, will it be violative of the decorum of 
    the House for such artwork to be brought to the House floor?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Under the rules of the House, the 
    Chair makes the determination as to whether decorum is proper in 
    the House, and the Chair will make that determination at the proper 
    time.
        Mr. Walker: I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker. So the Speaker is saying that the right to free speech on 
    the House floor can in fact be limited by the Chair, at the

[[Page 12462]]

    Chair's discretion, despite the fact that there are court rulings 
    that indicate that the artwork is perfectly appropriate for public 
    display?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman knows that the Chair has 
    the responsibility for the House to be in order, and that includes 
    the decorum in the House. The gentleman from Pennsylvania knows 
    that. The Chair will enforce that. . . .
        Mr. Walker: I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: Since a jury has interpreted that this artwork is 
    appropriate for public display, is the Chair going to permit such 
    artwork to be displayed on the floor during the course of the 
    debate?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has already ruled and 
    explained to the gentleman. The Chair will make sure that there is 
    decorum in the House. The Chair will rule at any appropriated time 
    that there will be decorum in the House. That is the Chair's 
    ruling.
        Pursuant to House Resolution 494 and rule XXIII, the Chair 
    declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State 
    of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 4825.
        [In Committee.]
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (9) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. John P. Murtha (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, am I permitted to show such 
    photographs on the House floor?
        The Chairman: The first amendment to the Constitution provides 
    that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. 
    The Chair notes, however, the Constitution also provides that the 
    House may determine the rules of its proceedings, and in clause 2 
    of rule I, the House has assigned to the Speaker the sole 
    responsibility to preserve order and decorum.
        In similar circumstances on September 13, 1989, the Chair 
    advised he would prevent the display of exhibits that in his 
    judgment might disrupt order or impair decorum in the Chamber. The 
    current occupation of the Chair would intend to apply that 
    standard.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, I have a further parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, how are we going to make that 
    determination about what interferes with the decorum of the House?
        The Chairman: The Chair would not entertain any exhibits in 
    this debate.

Chair Does Not Speculate on Future Recognition

Sec. 14.43 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole does not 
    speculate, in response to a parliamentary inquiry, as to whom the 
    Speaker might recognize to offer a motion in the House.

    Pending a preferential motion that the Committee of the Whole rise 
and report the bill back to the

[[Page 12463]]

House with the recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken, the 
Chair refused to advise what Member might be given recognition back in 
the House to offer a motion to refer before the question would be put 
on the recommendation to strike the enacting clause. The pertinent 
proceedings of Apr. 14, 1994,(10) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 140 Cong. Rec. 7453, 7454, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Bill] McCollum [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. McCollum of Florida moves that the Committee do now 
        rise and report the bill back to the House with the 
        recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out. . . .

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. McCollum: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry. If 
    I would yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Volkmer] for the 
    purposes of one, am I using my time up on the debate we are 
    involved with here for purposes of this privileged motion?
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman would be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Robert G. Torricelli (N.J.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. McCollum: Mr. Chairman, another parliamentary inquiry:
        Mr. Chairman, do I have the right to reserve time or on this 
    motion do I have to consume all my 5 minutes?
        The Chairman: Under the rules of this House, the gentleman does 
    not have the right to reserve time.
        Mr. McCollum: I do not?
        The Chairman: The gentleman does not.
        Mr. McCollum: Then I do not wish to yield at this point, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, I would inquire how much time I have remaining.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] has 5 
    minutes remaining.
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, would 
    the gentleman yield for a parliamentary inquiry?
        Mr. McCollum: I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, am I correct that should the motion 
    carry, and this is not a motion to kill the bill, this is simply a 
    motion for the Committee to rise, and it can at that point decide 
    that another amendment can be made in order, is that right?
        The Chairman: The motion is to report to the House with a 
    recommendation that the enacting clause be stricken out, an action 
    that would reject the bill if carried in the House.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry:
        Mr. Chairman, as we established in the previous colloquy, I 
    think that there is also an action available to the House at that 
    point to further amend the bill, is that correct?
        The Chairman: A motion to refer would be in order.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, it would be in order, and it could be 
    a motion to refer and report back forth

[[Page 12464]]

    with, which would in effect at that point allow an amendment on the 
    floor?
        The Chairman: The Chair would say that a motion to refer could 
    include that instruction.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Chairman, that has precedence over the motion 
    to strike the enacting clause, is that correct?
        The Chairman: A motion to refer would be in order pending the 
    question of the House's concurrence in the recommendation to strike 
    out the enacting clause.
        Mr. Walker: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
    McCollum] has expired.
        Mr. [Harold L.] Volkmer [of Missouri]: I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Volkmer: Mr. Chairman, in the event that the motion 
    presently pending by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCollum] 
    would prevail, would any Member then be eligible for recognition to 
    make a motion to refer, or is the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
    McCollum] the only one that can make that?
        The Chairman: At that point we would be proceeding in the House 
    and it would be for the Speaker to recognize.
        Mr. Volkmer: I would ask the Chair, the Speaker could recognize 
    any Member?
        The Chairman: The Speaker would have his usual power of 
    recognition under the precedents.

Parliamentary Inquiries Regarding Budget Act Scorekeeping and Points of 
    Order

Sec. 14.44 The Speaker has responded to parliamentary inquiries 
    concerning the application of section 311 (the mechanism for 
    enforcement of budget aggregates) of the Congressional Budget Act 
    and the most recent concurrent resolution on the budget to upcoming 
    appropriation measures prior to their actual consideration in the 
    House.

    On Mar. 6, 1984,(12) the Speaker,(13) in 
response to a parliamentary inquiry, informed the House the sources of 
information on which he would rely in deciding points of order raised 
against a bill on the ground that it would cause the budget ceilings 
detailed in Section 311 of the Congressional Budget Act to be exceeded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 1130 Cong. Rec. 4620-22, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
13. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under Section 312(a), the Chair must rely on estimates and 
information provided by the Committee on the Budget in determining the 
current levels of new budget authority or outlays. In the instance 
shown below it was

[[Page 12465]]

the interrelationship between those estimates and the mandates of the 
latest concurrent resolution on the budget that created the need for an 
explanation by the Chair.

        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, pursuant 
    to the order of the House of Wednesday, February 29, 1984, I call 
    up for consideration in the House as in the Committee of the Whole 
    the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 492) making an urgent supplemental 
    appropriation for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1984, for 
    the Department of Agriculture.
        The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Tom] Loeffler [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Loeffler: Mr. Speaker, I make this parliamentary inquiry 
    because the bills under consideration today--House Joint Resolution 
    492 and House Joint Resolution 493, which provide for urgent 
    supplementals for the Public Law 480 program and low income energy 
    assistance--are the first appropriations bills to come before the 
    House this year. It is my purpose to be certain that I and other 
    Members fully understood the procedures that will be used in 
    scorekeeping for these and future appropriations bills.
        In particular, my inquiry relates to the enforcement of section 
    311 of the Congressional Budget Act. I have several questions, so 
    if the Chair will bear with me, I will proceed as expeditiously as 
    possible.
        Mr. Speaker, I note that the Parliamentarian's status report on 
    the current level of total Federal spending, printed in the 
    Congressional Record of February 22, indicates that there are 
    $3,079 million in budget authority and only $16 million in outlays 
    remaining under the aggregate spending ceilings set forth in the 
    concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 1984.
        Under section 311 of the Budget Act, once Congress has 
    completed a second budget resolution, bills, resolutions or 
    amendments providing new budget authority or new spending authority 
    as described in section 401(c)(2)(C) of the Budget Act, would be 
    subject to a point of order against their consideration in the 
    House if their adoption would cause the aggregate budget authority 
    or outlay ceilings in the most recently agreed to budget resolution 
    to be exceeded.
        For fiscal year 1984, as was the case in fiscal year 1983, the 
    first budget resolution included language which allows enforcement 
    of section 311 after October 1 of the fiscal year, if Congress does 
    not adopt a second budget resolution by that date.
        As reported by the Appropriations Committee, both bills under 
    consideration would cause the aggregate outlay ceilings under the 
    first budget resolution to be breached--although not the aggregate 
    budget authority ceiling--which, under enforcement provisions in 
    effect for fiscal year 1983, would have resulted in these bills 
    being subject to a point of order under section 311.
        Is my understanding correct that this year the operation of 
    section 311 has been further modified by a provision, section 5(B), 
    contained in House

[[Page 12466]]

    Concurrent Resolution 91, the first concurrent resolution on the 
    budget for fiscal year 1984--the so-called Fazio language?
        Further, could the Chair explain how section 5(B) of House 
    Concurrent Resolution 91 affects the applicability of section 311 
    points of order to spending bills, including those before us today, 
    and to any amendments that may be offered to such bills?
        Is it correct that neither the total level of outlays nor a 
    committee's outlay allocation under section 302(A) of the Budget 
    Act would be considered in determining whether a section 311 point 
    of order would apply to spending bills or amendments thereto?
        Could the Chair explain the basis upon which it makes a 
    determination regarding the discretionary budget authority 
    remaining available to committees of the House?
        Further, is it not the case that once the Congress adopts a 
    second budget resolution for fiscal year 1984, updating and 
    revising the first budget resolution, that the provisions of 
    section 5(B) in House Concurrent Resolution 91 would no longer be 
    in effect, and section 311 would operate as set forth in the Budget 
    Act, based on the newly established aggregate ceilings and 
    provisions in the second budget resolution? Finally, can one assume 
    that the Appropriations Committee's discretionary budget authority 
    allocation will be reduced by the amounts in these bills plus any 
    amendments adopted that increase spending, once they are enacted? . 
    . .
        The Speaker: The Chair will respond to the inquiry of the 
    gentleman from Texas.
        The gentleman from Texas has requested the Chair to interpret 
    the relationship between bills providing new spending for fiscal 
    year 1984 and the provisions of the most recently agreed to budget 
    resolution for that fiscal year.
        As the gentleman has pointed out in his inquiry. The first 
    concurrent resolution the budget for fiscal year 1984 (H. Con. Res. 
    91), adopted by the House and Senate on June 23, 1983, provided, in 
    section 5, that it would become the second concurrent resolution on 
    the budget for the purpose of section 311 of the Budget Act. 
    Failing actual adoption of a second budget resolution by October 1, 
    1983. However, section 5(b) of the budget resolution provided for a 
    more limited application of section 311 than would apply if a 
    second budget resolution had actually been adopted. The Speaker 
    received today from the chairman of the Committee on the Budget a 
    revised status report on the current level of spending under the 
    budget resolution. The status report indicates that any measure 
    providing budget in excess of $6 million would cause the total 
    level of outlays under the budget resolution to be exceeded. The 
    chairman of the Committee on the Budget included in that letter a 
    summary and explanation of the operation of section 5 of the budget 
    resolution once outlays are exceeded, and the Chair will now read 
    that statement, which is responsive to much of the gentleman's 
    inquiry: ``The procedural situation with regard to the spending 
    ceiling will be affected this year by section 5(b) of House 
    Concurrent Resolution 91. As I explained during debate on the 
    conference report on that resolution, enforcement against

[[Page 12467]]

    breaches of the spending ceiling under section 311(a) of the Budget 
    Act will not apply where a measure would not cause a committee to 
    exceed its appropriate allocation pursuant to section 302(a) of the 
    Budget Act. In the House, the appropriate 302(a) allocation 
    includes ``new discretionary budget authority'' and ``new 
    entitlement authority'' only. It should be noted that under this 
    procedure neither the total level of outlays nor a committee's 
    outlay allocation is considered. This exception is only provided 
    because an automatic budget resolution is in effect and would cease 
    to apply if Congress were to revise the budget resolution for 
    fiscal year 1984.
        The intent of the section 302(a) discretionary budget authority 
    and new entitlement authority subceiling provided by section 5(b) 
    of the resolution is to protect a committee that has stayed within 
    its spending allocation--discretionary budget authority and new 
    entitlement authority--from points of order if the total spending 
    ceiling has been breached for reasons outside of its control. The 
    302(a) allocations to House committees made pursuant to the 
    conference report on House Concurrent Resolution 91 were printed in 
    the Congressional Record, June 22, 1983, H4326.
        The Chair has been advised that each of the supplemental 
    appropriation joint resolutions scheduled for today, House Joint 
    Resolution 492 and House Joint Resolution 493, provides more than 
    $6 million in budget outlays for fiscal year 1984 and would thus 
    cause the total level of outlays to be exceeded. The Committee on 
    Appropriations has, however, a remaining allocation of $2 billion, 
    $351 million in discretionary budget authority, according to tables 
    prepared by the Budget Committee, inserted in the Congressional 
    Record of March 1, 1984, and included in today's status report. The 
    amount of budget authority contained in the joint resolutions 
    scheduled for today is well within that allocation. As to 
    amendments to those joint resolutions, or to other spending 
    measures for fiscal year 1984, germane amendments which increase 
    budget authority are in order as long as they do not cause the 
    measure, as amended, to exceed the total remaining allocation of 
    discretionary budget authority to the committee with jurisdiction 
    over the measure or amendment.
        The Chair's determination, whether a measure or amendment 
    thereto, violates section 311 as made applicable by the budget 
    resolution, is based upon estimates made by the Committee on the 
    Budget, pursuant to section 311(b) of the Budget Act, of the 
    remaining allocation to each committee. Once a bill providing new 
    budget authority or entitlement authority is enacted, the remaining 
    allocation of the committee with subject matter jurisdiction will 
    be changed by the net amount of new budget authority contained in 
    the measure, and the Chair is confident that the Committee on the 
    Budget will keep the Chair currently informed as to the status of 
    each committee.
        The Chair would finally point out that the provisions of 
    section 5 of the current budget resolution would cease to apply if 
    Congress does adopt a second concurrent resolution on the budget 
    for fiscal year 1984. In that event, the actual prohibition 
    contained in section 311 of the Budget Act would take effect, 
    unless modified by any special procedures contained in a second 
    budget resolution.

[[Page 12468]]



 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                 B. PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRIES
 
Sec. 15. When in Order

    Parliamentary inquiries are generally in order at any time, subject 
to the Chair's discretionary power of recognition. However, a Member 
who has the floor may not be interrupted by a parliamentary inquiry 
without his consent.(14)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. See Sec. Sec. 15.1-15.3, infra, and 8 Cannon's Precedents 
        Sec. 2455.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    If a Member does yield for a parliamentary inquiry while he has the 
floor, the time consumed by the inquiry and reply is taken out of his 
time.(15) And there are times when the Chair will not 
entertain an inquiry because of the occasion, as during the reading of 
the President's message on the state of the Union.(16) The 
Chair has also declined to accept parliamentary inquiries when a point 
of no quorum is pending,(17) during a roll 
call,(18) or during a teller (19) or division 
vote,(20) although there are exceptions permitting the 
asking of a parliamentary inquiry at such times as, for example, when 
the roll has been called but no Member has as yet responded to his 
name,(1) or inquiries relating to the conduct of the vote 
itself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. See Sec. Sec. 15.4, 15.5, infra, and Ch. 29, supra.
16. See Sec. 15.10, infra.
17. See Sec. 15.12, infra.
18. See Sec. 15.13, infra, and 8 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 3132.
19. See Sec. 15.17, infra.
20. See Sec. 15.19, infra.
 1. See Sec. 15.16, infra.

                          -------------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Interruption of Members in Debate

Sec. 15.1 A Member may not be taken from the floor by a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

    On July 22, 1965,(2) Chairman John J. Rooney, of New 
York, advised Mr. John H. Dent, of Pennsylvania, that he could not ask 
a parliamentary inquiry while another Member had the floor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 111 Cong. Rec. 17931, 89th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 8283, amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965. 
        See also106 Cong. Rec. 11267, 86th Cong. 2d Sess., May 26, 
        1960.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dent: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. [William H.] Ayres [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I do not yield 
    for that purpose.
        Mr. Dent: Mr. Chairman, under the rules I demand recognition 
    for a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman [Mr. Ayres, of Ohio] declines to 
    yield.
        The gentleman will proceed.

Sec. 15.2 One Member may not submit a parliamentary inquiry while 
    another Member

[[Page 12469]]

    has the floor without his consent.

    On July 25, 1935,(3) Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, during an acrimonious exchange between Mr. Thomas L. 
Blanton, of Texas, and Mr. Samuel Dickstein, of New York, found it 
necessary to remind the Members that a parliamentary inquiry may not 
interrupt a Member without his consent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 79 Cong. Rec. 11864, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Blanton: . . . Oh, there is plenty for the gentleman to do 
    if the gentleman would only do it. There is plenty here at home for 
    him to look after, if he would protect our home folks and would 
    attend to his own business, and let foreign governments attend to 
    their own business.
        Mr. Dickstein (from his seat): Why do you not attend to your 
    own business?

        Mr. Blanton: I am attending to mine and am performing a good 
    job.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Texas will suspend. It is 
    distinctly against the rules for a gentleman in his seat to 
    interrupt a Member who is speaking. . . .
        The rules provide that a Member must rise and address the 
    Chair. . . .
        Mr. Dickstein: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Blanton: Mr. Speaker, I do not yield for a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from New York cannot take the 
    gentleman from Texas off his feet by a parliamentary inquiry 
    without his consent.

    Similarly on Mar. 13, 1936,(4) Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, 
of Tennessee, reiterated the right of a Member to speak without 
interruption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 80 Cong. Rec. 3720, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was H. 
        Res. 447, entitled investigation of old age pension schemes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    Washington that the Chair is now entertaining a point of order made 
    by the gentleman from Montana, and cannot recognize the gentleman 
    from Washington to submit another point of order.
        Mr. [Marion A.] Zioncheck [of Washington]: I rise to a question 
    of personal privilege then.
        The Speaker: The Chair declines to recognize the gentleman for 
    that purpose while the gentleman from Montana has the floor.
        The gentleman from Montana will proceed.
        Mr. [Thomas] O'Malley [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Wisconsin cannot take the 
    gentleman from Montana off the floor by a parliamentary inquiry. If 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin will permit the gentleman from Montana 
    to proceed in order, perhaps this matter can be disposed of in a 
    very few minutes.

Sec. 15.3 A Member recognized by the Chair may be interrupted by a 
    demand that his words be taken down, but he may decline to yield 
    for a par

[[Page 12470]]

    liamentary inquiry about his words.

    Chairman Barney Frank, of Massachusetts, clarified the rights of a 
Member holding the floor in debate when another Member attempted to be 
recognized for a parliamentary inquiry. The proceedings of July 13, 
1989,(5) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 135 Cong. Rec. 14633, 14634, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Don] Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman 
    yield?
        Mr. [Robert J.] Mrazek [of New York]: No, I will not yield. I 
    only have an additional minute.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Mrazek: I will not yield.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, the gentleman used my name.
        The Chairman: The gentleman says that he will not yield.
        Mr. Mrazek: I will not yield, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has stated he will not yield, and 
    the gentleman does not yield for that purpose.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: But I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has not yielded to the gentleman 
    from Alaska for the purpose of making a parliamentary inquiry. The 
    gentleman from New York will proceed.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, do I understand that I have 
    to have permission from a Member on the floor before I can make a 
    parliamentary inquiry of the Chairman?
        The Chairman: Yes, if that Member has the floor.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: That is a new rule, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: For the information of the Members of the House, 
    the Chair will point out that one Member cannot make a 
    parliamentary inquiry when another Member is speaking without that 
    Member's yielding. When the floor is not occupied, one may make a 
    parliamentary inquiry of the Chair's discretion. The Chair wishes 
    to point that out for the benefit of the gentleman from Alaska.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: Mr. Chairman, when the gentleman refers to 
    another gentleman, is it not true that he can ask the Chair for a 
    point of order or a parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman: No. The Chair will state that at that point, if 
    the gentleman wishes to have the gentleman's words taken down, he 
    does not need the gentleman's permission.
        Mr. Young of Alaska: I would not do that, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has confused two points. A 
    parliamentary inquiry requires the permission of the Member 
    occupying the floor. An objection to his words and a request that 
    they be taken down does not require his permission.

Time Used in Making Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 15.4 Although a Member may not be interrupted by an

[[Page 12471]]

    other for a parliamentary inquiry without his consent, if he does 
    yield for a parliamentary inquiry, the time consumed by the inquiry 
    and reply is taken out of his time.

    On May 26, 1960,(6) Mr. Donald R. Matthews, of Florida, 
declined to yield for a parliamentary inquiry while he had the floor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 106 Cong. Rec. 11267, 11268, 86th Cong. 2d Sess. See also 110 Cong. 
        Rec. 1998, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., Feb. 5, 1964 [under 
        consideration was H.R. 7152, the Civil Rights Act of 1963]; 81 
        Cong. Rec. 3283-90, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 8, 1937 [under 
        consideration was H. Res. 83, involving an investigation of un-
        American activities].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Matthews: Mr. Chairman, the poet, Robert Frost, in his 
    poem, ``Road Not Taken,'' starts out with these lines----
        Mr. [Cleveland M.] Bailey [of West Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (7) Does the gentleman from Florida 
    yield for a parliamentary inquiry?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Aime J. Forand (R.I.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Matthews: Will it be taken out of my time?
        The Chairman: It will be taken out of the gentleman's time.
        Mr. Matthews: I regret I cannot yield to my beloved 
    colleague.(8)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. For further discussion of charging time in debate, see Ch. 29, 
        supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Sec. 15.5 Where a Member to whom time has been yielded for a portion of 
    general debate yields for a parliamentary inquiry, the time 
    consumed in answering the inquiry comes out of the time for debate.

    On Sept. 25, 1975,(9) Mr. Edward J. Derwinski, of 
Illinois, who was controlling part of the time allotted for general 
debate on a measure under consideration in Committee of the Whole, 
yielded time for debate. The following inquiry then was directed to the 
Chair:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 121 Cong. Rec. 30196, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Derwinski: Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman 
    from Alabama (Mr. Buchanan).
        (Mr. Buchanan asked and was given permission to revise and 
    extend his remarks.)
        Mr. [John] Buchanan [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (10) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. J. Edward Roush (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Buchanan: May I ask whether the making of this 
    parliamentary inquiry is taken out of my time?
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that it will be taken out of 
    the gentleman's time.

Time Used in Parliamentary Inquiry

Sec. 15.6 Time consumed on a parliamentary inquiry is

[[Page 12472]]

    counted against that of the Member controlling the floor who yields 
    for that purpose.

    On May 5, 1988,(11) during consideration of an amendment 
to the Defense authorization bill, fiscal 1988, the ranking minority 
member of the Committee on Armed Services was controlling time on a 
pending amendment. Another Member asked that he yield for a 
parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 134 Cong. Rec. 9935, 100th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Les] Aucoin [of Oregon]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (12) Does the gentleman 
    from Alabama yield for the purpose of a parliamentary inquiry?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Kenneth J. Gray (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William L.] Dickinson [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, if it 
    does not come out of my time.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: It does come out of the time of the 
    gentleman from Alabama.
        Mr. Dickinson: Mr. Chairman, then I will not yield.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Alabama declines 
    to yield.

Sec. 15.7 The time used by a Member in posing a rhetorical question and 
    waiting for an answer comes out of the time he has been allotted 
    for debate.

    A rhetorical question addressed to those present in the Chamber, 
like a parliamentary inquiry addressed to the Chair, comes out of the 
time of the Member holding the floor. The proceedings of June 27, 
1990,(13) are illustrative:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 136 Cong. Rec. 15821, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James A.] Traficant [of Ohio]: . . . Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the House agree that my question be posed to 
    anyone who can answer it, and I have 10 calendar days to receive 
    such an answer.
        The Chairman: (14) That is not a proper question to 
    be made in the Committee of the Whole at this time. The gentleman 
    is still recognized under the rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Dennis E. Eckart (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Traficant: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
    because no one would answer my question that that time not be 
    subtracted from my 10 minutes.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from Ohio, in 
    propounding the question it is a procedure that he is entitled to 
    make, and therefore is, in fact, deducted from his time. The 
    gentleman is still recognized in support of his amendment under the 
    rule.

Time Consumed by Parliamentary Inquiry Prior to Recognition

Sec. 15.8 When the Chair entertains a parliamentary in

[[Page 12473]]

    quiry before a Member who has called up a measure in the House has 
    been recognized for debate, the time consumed by the inquiry is not 
    deducted from the time to be allocated to the manager of the 
    measure.

    On Oct. 8, 1986,(15) it was demonstrated that where both 
the majority and minority managers of a conference report are in favor 
of the report, a Member opposed to the report may claim one-third of 
the time. An inquiry concerning the application of Rule XXVIII clause 
2, intervened between the calling up of the report and the beginning of 
debate. The proceedings were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 132 Cong. Rec. 29714, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

         Conference Report on H.R. 2005, Superfund Amendments and 
                        Reauthorization Act of 1986

        Mr. [John D.] Dingell [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to 
    the provisions of House Joint Resolution 577, I call up the 
    conference report on the bill (H.R. 2005) to amend title II of the 
    Social Security Act and related provisions of law to make minor 
    improvements and necessary technical changes.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) Pursuant to the rule, 
    the conference report is considered as having been read. (For 
    conference report, see proceedings of the House of Friday, October 
    3, 1986.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Leon E. Panetta (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Pursuant to House Resolution 577, the 
    gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Dingell) will be recognized for 1 hour 
    and 45 minutes and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Lent) will be 
    recognized for 1 hour and 45 minutes.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Philip M.] Crane [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, may I be 
    recognized?
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, is the time that is now being used 
    being taken out of the time that is fixed under the rule?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman has not been recognized 
    yet, so this time is not being taken out of the gentleman's time.
        Mr. Crane: Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to whether the 
    majority or minority managers of this conference report are opposed 
    to it?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
    Lent) opposed?
        Mr. [Norman F.] Lent [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman 
    from New York is supportive of the conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
    Crane) would be entitled to one-third of the time if he opposes.
        Mr. Crane: Mr. Speaker, I do oppose, and under clause 2, rule 
    XXVIII, as leader of the opposition, I will be reserved 1 hour and 
    10 minutes?

[[Page 12474]]

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Illinois will be 
    entitled to that time.
        Mr. Crane: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Dingell: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Dingell: I understand, under the ruling of the Chair, that 
    the time is apportioned, one-third to the gentleman from Illinois 
    (Mr. Crane), or some Member in opposition to the legislation; one-
    third to the gentleman from New York (Mr. Lent); and one-third to 
    myself for subsequent apportionment.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.

Before Approval of Journal

Sec. 15.9 The Speaker has entertained a parliamentary inquiry relating 
    to the order of business before the approval of the Journal.

    On Feb. 28, 1979,(17) Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., of 
Massachusetts, was about to announce his approval of the Journal when 
the following inquiry intervened:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 125 Cong. Rec. 3465, 3466, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Maryland will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, before the gentleman from Maryland 
    decides whether, under clause 1, rule I, he would like to ask for a 
    vote on the approval of the Journal, as that rule provides, could 
    the Chair tell us whether or not he will entertain a motion for a 
    call of the House and at what point he might entertain such a 
    motion today?
        Mr. [John] Brademas [of Indiana]: Mr. Speaker, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state it is his understanding the 
    gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas) intends to move a call of the 
    House.
        Mr. Bauman: So, Mr. Speaker, there will be a call after the 1-
    minute speeches?
        The Speaker: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Bauman: I thank the Chair.

                                The Journal

        The Speaker: The Chair has examined the Journal of the last 
    day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.
        Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

During Reading of Presidential Message

Sec. 15.10 Parliamentary inquiries are not necessarily entertained 
    during the reading of the President's message on the state of the 
    Union.

    On Jan. 21, 1946,(18) the Chair declined to entertain a 
parliamen

[[Page 12475]]

tary inquiry during the reading of the message of the President on the 
state of the Union and the budget.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 92 Cong. Rec. 164, 79th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert F.] Rich [of Pennsylvania] (interrupting the 
    reading of the message): Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (19) The Clerk read a 
    message from the President of the United States, and the Chair 
    feels that an inquiry at this time should not be 
    entertained.(20)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
20. Parliamentarian's Note: The President's message contained 
        approximately 25,000 words and took about three hours to read. 
        Under the modern practice, the reading of a Presidential 
        message of such length would be done ``scientifically''--in 
        abbreviated form-to shorten the time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Time for Inquiries on Amendments

Sec. 15.11 The Chair does not respond to a parliamentary inquiry 
    concerning the propriety of an amendment until the amendment is 
    offered.

    On June 28, 1967,(1) Chairman John J. Flynt, Jr., of 
Georgia, declined to pass upon the propriety of an amendment to an 
appropriation bill until the amendment was offered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 113 Cong. Rec. 17754, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 10340, authorizing appropriations for the National 
        Aeronautics and Space Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Joseph E.] Karth [of Minnesota]: Mr. Chairman, a further 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Karth: Mr. Chairman, if that figure cannot be further 
    amended, and the gentleman chooses to pursue his amendment, and 
    change the figure on page 2, would it then be a proper amendment?
        The Chairman: The Chair does not pass on that until an 
    amendment described by the gentleman from Minnesota is offered.

Inquiries Following Point of No Quorum

Sec. 15.12 The Chair need not recognize a Member to propound a 
    parliamentary inquiry while a point of no quorum is pending.

    On July 23, 1942,(2) it was indicated that the Chair 
should decline to hear a parliamentary inquiry when a point of order of 
no quorum is pending.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 88 Cong. Rec. 6540, 77th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Wright] Patman [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I make the point 
    of order that a quorum is not present.
        Mr. [Adolph J.] Sabath [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, may I ask 
    unanimous consent that we call up a resolution?
        Mr. Patman: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.

[[Page 12476]]

        Mr. [Earl C.] Michener [of Michigan]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: (3) The Chair doubts the authority of 
    the Chair to recognize the gentleman to propound a parliamentary 
    inquiry when a point of order is made unless the gentleman from 
    Texas withholds it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Sam Rayburn (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Inquiries During Roll Calls and Votes

Sec. 15.13 The Speaker may in his discretion decline to permit a 
    parliamentary inquiry during a roll call.

    On Sept. 6, 1961,(4) Speaker Pro Tempore John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, refused to recognize for a parliamentary 
inquiry during a roll call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 107 Cong. Rec. 18256, 87th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 9000, the extension of Public Laws 815 and 875 and the 
        National Defense Education Act.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Peter F.] Mack [Jr., of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair cannot recognize the 
    gentleman for a parliamentary inquiry during a rollcall.

Sec. 15.14 A roll call may be interrupted for a parliamentary inquiry 
    under the proper circumstances and at the discretion of the Chair.

    On Oct. 12, 1962,(5) there were repeated instances in 
which the Speaker, John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, permitted 
parliamentary inquiries to interrupt the roll call.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 108 Cong. Rec. 23433, 23434, 87th Cong. 2d Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 12900, the public works appropriations 
        for fiscal 1963.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (After completion of first call of the roll:)
        Mr. [William H.] Avery [of Kansas]: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker: For what purpose does the gentleman from Kansas 
    rise?
        Mr. Avery: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Avery: What motion is the House presently voting on?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the parliamentary 
    inquiry is very pertinent. The Chair will state in response that 
    the House is voting on a motion which was made by the gentleman 
    from Missouri [Mr. Cannon] to recede and concur in a Senate 
    amendment, with an amendment.
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon [of Missouri]: Mr. Speaker, my motion was 
    for the previous question.
        The Speaker: The House is voting on a motion made by the 
    gentleman from Missouri to recede and concur in the Senate 
    amendment, with an amendment.
        That is the motion pending at the present time.
        The Clerk will proceed to call the roll of those Members who 
    failed to answer on the first rollcall.

[[Page 12477]]

        (The Clerk resumed calling the roll.)
        Mr. [William C.] Cramer [of Florida] (interrupting call of the 
    roll): Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Cramer: Mr. Speaker, do I understand the parliamentary 
    situation to be that the motion now being voted upon is a motion to 
    recede and concur in a Senate amendment with an amendment, and a 
    vote ``no'' is a vote for $205,000 for the Florida Cross-State 
    Barge Canal planning, and a vote of ``aye'' is against it?
        The Speaker: The Chair has already stated that the 
    parliamentary inquiry is correct in response to the inquiry of the 
    gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Avery]. The Chair is confident that the 
    Members know what they are voting upon.
        (The Clerk resumed calling the roll.)
        Mr. Hardy, Mr. Abbitt, Mr. Gathings, Mr. Ashbrook, Mr. Byrnes 
    of Wisconsin, and Mr. Gary changed their vote from ``nay'' to 
    ``yea.''Mr. Blatnik, Mr. Bow, and Mr. Avery changed their vote from 
    ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        Mr. [H. R.] Gross [of Iowa] (interrupting the rollcall): Mr. 
    Speaker, I demand the regular order.
        The Speaker: The regular order is proceeding.
        Mr. Gross (interrupting the rollcall): Mr. Speaker, I demand 
    the well be cleared.
        The Speaker: Members will take their places out of the well. . 
    . .
        Mr. [Edmond] Edmondson [of Oklahoma] (interrupting the 
    rollcall): Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Edmondson: Mr. Speaker, is it possible to have a 
    recapitulation of the votes that have been cast in advance of the 
    announced vote?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that there has been no vote 
    announced as yet. Therefore, at this point it is not possible to 
    request a recapitulation.
        (The Clerk resumed calling the roll.)
        Mr. [William M.] Colmer [of Mississippi] (interrupting the 
    rollcall): Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Colmer: Mr. Speaker, in the event that a quorum is shown 
    not to be present, what procedure is then left to the House?
        The Speaker: The House can wait until a quorum arrives, or a 
    motion to adjourn would be in order.
        Mr. Cannon: Mr. Speaker, is a quorum present?
        The Speaker: The rollcall has not as yet been completed.
        Mr. Cannon: Mr. Speaker, in the absence of a quorum only one 
    motion is in order, and that is to adjourn. I move that the House 
    now adjourn.
        The Speaker: The Chair has not announced the fact that a quorum 
    is not present as yet. At this point that motion is not in order.
        (The Clerk resumed calling the roll.)
        Mr. Edmondson (interrupting the rollcall): Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Edmondson: May a recess be declared in advance of the 
    completion of the vote?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that [in] the present 
    situation the

[[Page 12478]]

    Chair may not declare a recess with a rollcall in process.
        Mr. [Carl] Albert [of Oklahoma]: Mr. Speaker, I ask that the 
    Chair announce the vote.
        The Speaker: On this vote there were 84 yeas and 120 nays.
        So a quorum is not present.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The leadership had kept the House in 
session on this date, hoping that the two Houses might reach agreement 
on certain outstanding issues and adjourn sine die. The roll call on 
Mr. Cannon's motion was taken very slowly in order that all available 
Members, and hopefully a quorum of the House, might reach the Chamber. 
When the call had proceeded for over 50 minutes the Majority Leader 
asked the Speaker to announce the vote. When it appeared that a quorum 
was not present, the Majority Leader moved to adjourn.

Parliamentary Inquiry During a Roll Call

Sec. 15.15 Although the Chair ordinarily refuses to recognize for a 
    parliamentary inquiry during a roll call vote, the Chair may, in 
    his discretion, entertain an inquiry relating to the conduct of the 
    call.

    On Mar. 14, 1978,(6) a roll call vote was being taken by 
electronic device in the House on the approval of the Journal. Members 
were late in reaching the Chamber to record their votes, and the 
Speaker determined to allow voting stations to remain open a bit longer 
than was customary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 124 Cong. Rec. 6840, 6841, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) Are there Members in 
    the Chamber who have failed to cast their votes?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Lloyd Meeds (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair will advise Members that the electronic voting 
    stations are still open, and they will remain open for 5 minutes.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Badham [of California]: My card did not work, 
    Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If there are Members who do not have 
    cards, the Chair will certainly take the word of those Members and 
    they may vote in the well.

        Mr. [Garry] Brown of Michigan: Mr. Speaker, I do not recall 
    that the rules provide for qualification.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Members who desire to vote may do so. 
    The voting stations will remain open for 5 minutes.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will take the parliamentary 
    inquiry, although he is not required to do so during the vote.
        Mr. Bauman: The gentleman from Maryland thanks the Chair for 
    his indulgence.
        The gentleman from Maryland was aware that the Speaker of the 
    House of

[[Page 12479]]

    Representatives had previously announced rules governing the 
    operation of the electronic voting device. Is the Chair now 
    announcing that those rules have been permanently changed, and that 
    there will be no 5-minute closed period at the end of all 15-minute 
    rollcalls?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will state that he is not 
    making a change. He is just adapting the procedure to fit the 
    situation.
        Mr. Bauman: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. [James G.] Martin [of North Carolina]: Mr. Speaker, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Martin: Mr. Speaker, the Speaker has announced that the 
    electronic recording devices are open. They are, but they have 
    neglected to throw the switch which will allow us to change our 
    vote, which is what I have been trying unsuccessfully to do.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would advise the gentleman 
    that the voting stations remain open for those Members who have not 
    yet recorded their votes. Pursuant to the announcement of the 
    Speaker on March 22, 1976, changes in votes already recorded may 
    not be made from the voting stations during the last 5 minutes of a 
    vote taken by electronic device, but must be made by card from the 
    well.
        Mr. Martin: That is right, Mr. Speaker, because I have not been 
    able to change my vote.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Will the gentleman from North Carolina 
    (Mr. Martin) bring his card to the well?
        The gentleman will not be able to change his vote at this time; 
    he will be able to vote for the first time. If the gentleman 
    desires to change his vote, he should come to the well when we take 
    changes at the end of the 5 minutes.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Five minutes has expired. The Chair 
    will accept changes for an additional 5 minutes.
        Messrs. Johnson of Colorado, Schulze, Hagedorn, Ketchum, 
    Wampler, Coughlin, O'Brien, Walker, Collins of Texas, Crane, Del 
    Clawson and Treen changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
        Messrs. Kindness, Dickinson, Livingston, Martin, and Steers 
    changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
        So the motion was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        Mr. [Mickey] Edwards of Oklahoma: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Edwards of Oklahoma moves to reconsider the vote 
        whereby the Journal was approved.

        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I move to 
    lay the motion to reconsider on the table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to table 
    the motion to reconsider.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Edwards of Oklahoma: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas 
    and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.

[[Page 12480]]

        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    308, nays 91, not voting 35, as follows: . . . 
        Mr. McEwen changed his vote from ``present'' to ``yea.''
        Mr. Beard of Tennessee changed his vote from ``yea'' to 
    ``nay.''
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Sec. 15.16 Where no Member has as yet responded to his name during the 
    roll call, an interruption of the call for a parliamentary inquiry 
    may be permitted.

    On June 27, 1935,(8) Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, allowed a parliamentary inquiry after the Clerk had 
commenced calling the names on a roll call, although no Member had as 
yet responded.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 79 Cong. Rec. 10288, 10289, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. Under 
        consideration was H.R. 8555, the Merchant Marine bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The question is on the passage of the bill.
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    McFarlane and Mr. O'Malley) there were--ayes 145, noes 131.
        Mr. [William D.] McFarlane [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I demand 
    the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The Clerk proceeded to call the roll.
        Mr. [Ralph O.] Brewster [of Maine]: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker: For what purpose does the gentleman from Maine 
    rise?
        Mr. Brewster: To propound a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Brewster: Mr. Speaker, it was my intention to offer a 
    motion to recommit.
        Mr. [Thomas L.] Blanton [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    point of order. The Clerk had already begun the calling of the roll 
    and had called the first name, ``Allen.'' I make the point of order 
    the gentleman from Maine cannot interrupt the roll call.
        The Speaker: The Chair overrules the point of order. The 
    gentleman from Maine is entitled to propound a legitimate 
    parliamentary inquiry, and the Chair presumes that the inquiry 
    propounded is a proper one. The gentleman from Maine will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Brewster: Mr. Speaker, do I understand that a motion to 
    recommit cannot be submitted at this stage?
        The Speaker: Such a motion is not in order at this time.

Sec. 15.17 The Chair has refused to entertain a parliamentary inquiry 
    during a teller vote.

    On June 28, 1967,(9) Chairman John J. Flynt, Jr., of 
Georgia, informed Mr. Joe D. Waggonner, of Louisiana, that a 
parliamentary

[[Page 12481]]

inquiry would not be heard during a teller vote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 113 Cong. Rec. 17748, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 10340, authorizing appropriations for the National 
        Aeronautics and Space Administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [George P.] Miller of California: Mr. Chairman, I demand 
    tellers.
        Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. 
    Roudebush and Mr. Miller of California.
        The Chairman: Those in favor of the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Roudebush] to the amendment offered by 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Fulton] will pass through the 
    tellers.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The Committee is in the process of voting, and no 
    parliamentary inquiry can be made at this time.

Sec. 15.18 The Speaker may entertain a parliamentary inquiry after the 
    yeas and nays are ordered, but debate on the pending question is 
    not in order.

    On Oct. 25, 1967,(10) Speaker John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, entertained an inquiry after the yeas and nays were 
ordered, but he did not allow Mr. Robert N. Giaimo, of Connecticut, to 
debate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 113 Cong. Rec. 29943, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 11641, a public works appropriation for fiscal 1968.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Kirwan] that the House recede from its 
    disagreement to Senate amendment No. 2 and concur therein with an 
    amendment.
        Mr. [John J.] Rhodes of Arizona: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand 
    the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        Mr. Giaimo: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Giaimo: Mr. Speaker, is it the parliamentary situation at 
    the present time in regard to the amendment No. 2 such that it 
    would provide almost $1 billion for construction by the Corps of 
    Engineers, and that we are voting on these funds without the 
    $875,000 for Dickey-Lincoln?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the House has before it 
    the motion by the gentleman from Ohio that the House recede from 
    its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 2, and 
    concur therein with an amendment, as follows: In lieu of the sum 
    proposed, insert ``$967,599,000''.
        Mr. Giaimo: In other words, Mr. Speaker, this takes out the 
    $875,000 for Dickey-Lincoln?
        The Speaker: That is not within the prerogative of the Chair to 
    state.
        Mr. Giaimo: Mr. Speaker, can we get an explanation from the 
    committee?
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that it is too late for that. 
    However, it is the understanding of the Chair that would be the 
    result.

Sec. 15.19 A Member may not interrupt a division vote with a 
    parliamentary inquiry.

[[Page 12482]]

    On Feb. 13, 1946,(11) Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, 
offered a resolution raising a question of privilege of the House to 
correct the Congressional Record after another Member, Charles R. 
Savage, of Washington, had allegedly inserted something unauthorized 
therein. During the division vote demanded by Mr. Smith, Mr. Hugh De 
Lacy, of Washington, attempted to interpose a parliamentary inquiry, 
which Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, held out of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 92 Cong. Rec. 1274, 1275, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H. Res. 523.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Smith of Virginia: Mr. Speaker, I demand a division.
        The House proceeded to divide.
        Mr. De Lacy (interrupting the division): Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The House is dividing now. Nothing else is in 
    order now.

Sec. 15.20 A parliamentary inquiry may not interrupt a division; but 
    such inquiries are entertained until the Chair asks those in favor 
    of the proposition to rise.

    On Sept. 29, 1966,(12) after the request of Mr. John N. 
Erlenborn, of Illinois, for a division vote, but before the Chair 
called for the Members to rise, Mr. William D. Ford, of Michigan, 
interposed a parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 112 Cong. Rec. 24457, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 15111, economic opportunity amendments of 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (13) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Erlenborn] to the 
    amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Oregon [Mrs. Green].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. Daniel J. Flood (Pa.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken and the Chairman announced the Chair was 
    in doubt.
        Mr. Erlenborn: Mr. Chairman, I ask for a division.
        Mr. William D. Ford: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. William D. Ford: In the event that the amendment offered by 
    the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Erlenborn] which is offered to the 
    amendment offered by the gentlewoman from Oregon [Mrs. Green] is 
    defeated at this time and the amendment offered by the gentlewoman 
    from Oregon [Mrs. Green] is also defeated, would the Erlenborn 
    amendment then be in order if offered separately?
        Mr. [Harold R.] Collier [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order. Is a parliamentary inquiry in order at this time during the 
    vote?
        The Chairman: The parliamentary inquiry was made before the 
    Chair put the question pursuant to the demand of the gentleman from 
    Illinois [Mr. Erlenborn] for a division.
        In response to the parliamentary inquiry by the gentleman from 
    Michigan,

[[Page 12483]]

    the Chair will state that the amendment may be offered later as a 
    separate amendment.

Parliamentary Inquiry Is Not ``Intervening Business'' Precluding Demand 
    for a Division Vote on a Pending Amendment

Sec. 15.21 A parliamentary inquiry as to the status of the Chair's 
    announcement of the result of a voice vote and the effect of the 
    adoption of an amendment on subsequent amendments which might be 
    offered is not such ``intervening business'' as to prevent a demand 
    for a division vote.

    During consideration of a bill for amendment under the five-minute 
rule in Committee of the Whole on Mar. 21, 1975,(14) some 
confusion was apparent about the status of pending amendments and the 
order of voting. A motion to strike out a paragraph in the section 
which was open for amendment and insert new language had been first 
offered, followed by a ``perfecting amendment'' which could have been 
construed as a substitute or as a perfecting amendment to the 
underlying text. The Chair treated the latter amendment as perfecting 
and it was adopted by a voice vote. The Chair then announced that the 
pending question was on the underlying motion to strike out and insert 
which had been offered by Mrs. Millicent Fenwick, of New Jersey. The 
Chair declared that the ayes had prevailed on a voice vote when a 
parliamentary inquiry intervened.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 121 Cong. Rec. 7950, 7952, 7953, 94th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mrs. Fenwick: Mr. Chairman, I am not sure but that I have let 
    the time go by, but I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mrs. Fenwick: Page 11, strike out 
        lines 1 through 12 and insert in lieu thereof:
            ``(d) Not more than 50 per centum of the aggregate mortgage 
        amounts approved in appropriation Acts may be allocated (1) for 
        use with respect to existing previously occupied dwellings 
        which have not been substantially rehabilitated and (2) for use 
        with respect to new, unsold dwelling units the construction of 
        which commenced prior to the enactment of this Act. Not more 
        than 10 per centum of the aggregate mortgage amounts approved 
        in appropriation Acts may be allocated with respect to dwelling 
        units with appraised values in excess of $38,000.'' . . . 

        Mr. [Les] AuCoin [of Oregon]: Mr. Chairman, I offer a 
    perfecting amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Perfecting amendment offered by Mr. AuCoin: On page 11, 
        line 1, strike out ``25'' and insert in lieu thereof ``30''.
            On page 11, line 3, insert ``with respect to existing units 
        and'' immediately after ``use''.

[[Page 12484]]

        The Chairman: (15) The Chair will treat this 
    amendment as a perfecting amendment to the paragraph of the bill 
    and it will be voted on first. . . . 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 15. Robert N. Giaimo (Conn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The question is on the perfecting amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AuCoin).
        The perfecting amendment was agreed to.
        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentlewoman from New Jersey.
        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. [Thomas L.] Ashley [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Does the Chairman mean the amendment, as amended?
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman that the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. AuCoin) was a 
    perfecting amendment to section 9(d) on page 11, line 1 through 
    line 8. The amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New Jersey 
    (Mrs. Fenwick) is an amendment which would strike all of the 
    language in the paragraph of the bill and substitute her language.
        The Chair will now preserve the rights of Members who were 
    standing at the time of the vote when the Chair put the question 
    and stated that the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New 
    Jersey (Mrs. Fenwick) had carried.
        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashley) seek recognition?
        Mr. Ashley: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, a further parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Ashley: It is on this basis, Mr. Chairman, that I 
    misunderstood the parliamentary situation. I had thought that the 
    gentleman's amendment was in the nature of a substitute. Inas-much 
    as the gentleman's amendment was adopted, is it also the fact that 
    the amendment of the gentlewoman from New Jersey (Mrs. Fenwick) was 
    adopted?
        The Chairman: Yes, thereby deleting the language which 
    contained the perfecting amendment of the gentleman from Oregon.
        Mr. Ashley: In that case, Mr. Chairman, I would ask for a 
    division on the vote.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Maryland will state his point 
    of order.
        Mr. Bauman: It is too late. Other business had intervened.
        The Chairman: The Chair will rule that no further business had 
    intervened, that at the instant when the Chair was ready to declare 
    the vote on the amendment of the gentlewoman from New Jersey, the 
    gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashley) was on his feet seeking 
    recognition with respect to whether to ask for a division vote on 
    that amendment. The Chair has stated that he would protect the 
    rights of the gentleman from Ohio.
        The question is on the amendment of the gentlewoman from New 
    Jersey (Mrs. Fenwick).
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Ashley) there were--ayes 34, noes 60.

[[Page 12485]]


 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                       DESCHLER-BROWN PRECEDENTS
 
                          INDEX TO PRECEDENTS


Affecting, point of order as
    amendments offered en bloc, Sec. Sec.  1.13, 1.14
    amendments to appropriations bills, Sec. Sec. 1.19-1.21
    amendments to legislative bills, Sec. Sec. 1.24-1.26
    appointment of conferees does not lie, Sec. 1.29
    appropriations bills, Sec. Sec. 1.15-1.18
    committee reports failing to comply with the Ramseyer rule, 
        Sec. 1.45
    conferee appointments not affected, Sec. 1.29
    conference reports, Sec. 1.27
    debate, relevancy in, Sec. 1.44
    recognition by Chair not subject to point of order, Sec. Sec. 1.30-
        1.32
    section of bill where only a portion of the section subject to a 
        point of order, Sec. 1.23
    unfunded mandates, Sec. 1.57
Amendments (see also Appropriations bills, points of order against 
    amendments to)
    Chair may rule out on his own initiative, Sec. 6.11
    Clerk's failure to transmit copies to majority and minority not 
        subject to point of order, Sec. Sec. 6.12, 6.13
    committee members receive priority in recognition to make a point 
        of order against an amendment, Sec. 1.4
    copies, failure of Clerk to transmit to majority and minority, not 
        subject to point of order, Sec. Sec. 6.12, 6.13
    debate not in order, a point of order must be made and not 
        reserved, Sec. 3.30
    not usually admitted while reservation of point of order pending, 
        Sec. Sec. 3.5, 5.2
    parliamentary inquiry regarding effect of adopting amendment on 
        further amendments, Sec. 14.10
    points of order against a paragraph considered before amendments to 
        the paragraph, Sec. Sec. 5.1, 6.14, 6.15
    portion subject to point of order subjects entire amendment to 
        point of order, Sec. Sec. 1.24, 1.25
    recognition to offer not subject to point of order, Sec. 1.32
    reinserting text stricken by a point of order, Sec. Sec. 1.22, 1.26
    reservation of point of order to be resolved before amendments are 
        admitted, Sec. Sec. 3.5, 5.2
    withdrawal by unanimous consent, allowed by Chair while point of 
        order pending, Sec. Sec. 1.6, 11.5
    where bill open for amendment at any point, points of order against 
        any provision to be resolved before amendments offered, 
        Sec. Sec. 5.3, 5.5-5.8
Amendments, timing of points of order against
    generally, Sec. 6
    considered as read, where amendment is, by unanimous consent, point 
        of order must follow disposition of unanimous-consent request, 
        Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6
    debate, if Chair does not recognize for, point of order still 
        viable, Sec. 6.30
    debate, point of order must come before, Sec. Sec. 6.7, 6.8, 6.16, 
        6.31-6.37
    debate, recognition for, does not preclude point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 6.23, 6.24
    diligence in seeking recognition, Member showing, may make point of 
        order, Sec. Sec. 6.38-6.42
    intervening business, as affecting, Sec. Sec. 6.17-6.22, 6.25-6.29, 
        6.36, 6.37

[[Page 12486]]

    parliamentary inquiry, in relation to, Sec. Sec. 6.3, 6.4, 6.20, 
        6.21
    point of order, earlier, having already been resolved, Sec. 6.22
    previous question, as affecting, Sec. 6.37
    reading, interrupting with point of order, Sec. 6.10
    reading, point of order not to be made before Clerk's, Sec. 6.2
    reading, point of order to follow immediately after, Sec. Sec. 6.1, 
        6.16, 6.31-6.37
    reading, where dispensed with by unanimous consent, point of order 
        must follow disposition, Sec. Sec. 6.5, 6.6
    reading, where not completed, Chair may require re-reading, 
        Sec. 6.9
    reading, where point of order interrupts, Chair may decline to rule 
        until reading completed, Sec. 6.10
    recognition, point of order not too late after recognition for 
        debate, but before debate begins, Sec. Sec. 6.7, 6.23, 6.24
    recognition for debate not having been granted, point of order may 
        be made even if debate has begun, Sec. 6.30
    recognition for point of order, Member seeking, on his feet at the 
        proper time, point of order in order, Sec. Sec. 6.38-6.42
    seeking recognition at the appropriate time protects right to 
        offer, Sec. Sec. 6.38-6.42
    unanimous-consent request, as affecting, Sec. Sec. 6.17-6.19, 6.25, 
        6.26, 6.36
Appealing from Chair's decision on a point of order
    generally, Sec. Sec. 13.1, 13.3
    Chair sustained on appeal, Sec. Sec. 13.6, 13.7
    Chair sustained on appeal by division vote, Sec. 13.6
    Chair sustained on appeal by voice vote, Sec. 13.7
    demand for yeas and nays, Chair's count for second, not subject to 
        appeal, Sec. 13.13
    form of question on appeal, Sec. 13.9
    merits not considered, only validity of Chair's ruling on the point 
        of order, Sec. 13.2
    procedural request, Chair's count of Members supporting, not 
        subject to appeal, Sec. 13.14
    quorum, appeal does not lie against Chair's refusal to entertain 
        point of no, Sec. 13.5
    quorum, Chair's count to determine not subject to appeal, 
        Sec. 13.12
    recognition, within Chair's discretion, not subject to appeal, 
        Sec. 13.11
    reconsider, motion to, vote on which appeal was tabled, itself 
        tabled, Sec. 13.16
    second to support a demand for the yeas and nays, Chair's count to 
        determine not subject to appeal, Sec. 13.13
    subject of vote on appeal is ruling, not merits of proposition 
        giving rise to the point of order, Sec. 13.2
    tabled, appeal, on motion, Sec. 13.15
    withdrawal of appeal, Sec. 13.10
    yeas and nays, Chair's count to determine second on demand for, not 
        subject to appeal, Sec. 13.13
Appropriations bills, points of order against amendments to
    authorization for appropriation, burden of proof on amendment's 
        proponent, Sec. 8.11
    legislation, burden of proof that an amendment does not constitute, 
        falls on amendment's proponent, Sec. Sec. 8.7-8.10

[[Page 12487]]

    legislation, where point of order alleges amendment to general 
        appropriation bill constitutes, if subject to two 
        interpretations, the Chair will sustain the point of order, 
        pending additional showing by proponent as to the better view, 
        Sec. Sec. 8.9, 8.10
    portion of amendment, when subject to a point of order, subjects 
        entire amendment to the point of order, Sec. Sec. 1.19, 1.20
    ``tax provision'' under Rule XXI clause 5(b), points of order 
        against, burden on Member making point of order, Sec. 8.15
Appropriations bills, points of order against portions of
    amendments, points of order not admitted once consideration of 
        amendments has begun, Sec. Sec. 5.10, 5.11
    authorization, lack of, points of order for, must be made to 
        specific text, not generally, Sec. 8.6
    authorization, lack of, burden of proof on Appropriations Committee 
        to show specific authorization, Sec. 8.5
    exception to requirements regarding the time to offer points of 
        order made where Member seeking recognition at the appropriate 
        time, Sec. Sec. 5.23, 5.24
    made before any amendments to the paragraph are considered, 
        Sec. Sec. 5.1, 6.15
    made during general debate, Sec. 5.9
    made only after paragraph is read, Sec. Sec. 5.14-5.22, 5.26
    modification of portion by unanimous consent has been allowed to 
        resolve point of order, Sec. 3.28
    parliamentary inquiry regarding sufficiency of funds after point of 
        order sustained, not admitted, Sec. 14.18
    proviso, point of order against having been considered, a point of 
        order against the paragraph in which it appears is not too 
        late, Sec. 5.13
    proviso, point of order if made against only, does not require the 
        Chair to strike the entire paragraph, Sec. 1.18
    proviso, when subject to point of order, subjects entire paragraph 
        to point of order, Sec. Sec. 1.16, 1.17, 1.21
    reinserting portions of a paragraph not subject to a point of order 
        by amendment, Sec. 1.22
    reservation not allowed, point of order must be pressed immediately 
        after reading, Sec. Sec. 3.27, 3.29
    resolved before debate under pro forma amendments, Sec. 1.56
    rule protecting some provisions, leaving others vulnerable, 
        Sec. 10.7
    rule waiving prohibition on legislation and unauthorized 
        appropriations, Sec. Sec. 10.9, 10.11
    sections, where paragraphs contained in a section, point of order 
        must still be made immediately after paragraph to be 
        challenged, Sec. 5.26
    ``tax provision'' under Rule XXI clause 5(b), burden on Member 
        making point of order to show tax consequences, Sec. 8.15
    vacating proceedings where language stricken from bill after point 
        of order sustained, Sec. 9.19
    waiving points of order against a specific section by unanimous 
        consent, Sec. 9.5
    where bill open to amendment at any time, Sec. Sec. 5.5-5.8
    where two points of order are raised, one against a paragraph, the 
        second against a proviso within the paragraph, the Chair must 
        rule on the first, Sec. 1.15

[[Page 12488]]

Budget Act (see Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising 
    under)
Burden of proof on points of order
    appropriations bills and amendments, point of order against as 
        being a ``tax provision'' under rule XXI clause 5(b), unlike 
        other points of order against such bills and amendments, burden 
        on Member making point of order to show tax consequences, 
        Sec. 8.15
    authorization for appropriations, burden to show specific authority 
        on Appropriations Committee, Sec. 8.5
    authorization for appropriations, point of order must be made 
        against precise text, Sec. 8.6
    authorization for appropriations made in amendment, burden to show 
        specific authority on amendment's proponent, Sec. 8.11
    Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under some 
        sections of, governed by Budget Committee estimates, Sec. 8.14
    germaneness of amendment, burden on amendment's proponent, 
        Sec. Sec. 8.1-8.3
    germaneness of amendment, where proponent concedes point of order, 
        Sec. 8.3
    legislation in an amendment to an appropriations bill, burden on 
        amendment's proponent, Sec. Sec. 8.7-8.10
    legislation in an appropriations bill, burden on reporting 
        committee, Sec. 8.4
    ``tax provision'' in violation of Rule XXI clause 5(b), unlike 
        other points of order against appropriations bills, burden on 
        Member making point of order to show tax consequences, 
        Sec. 8.15
Chair (see also Appealing from Chair's decision on a point of order; 
    Deciding points of order; Resolving points of order before decision 
    by the Chair)
    admits multiple points of order at his discretion, Sec. 1.8
    amendments, Chair may rule out on his own initiative, Sec. 6.11
    clarification of ruling in the Record, Sec. Sec. 7.23, 7.24
    conference report, points of order arising under a single rule, 
        Chair may require all to be stated at once, Sec. 4.18
    constitutional questions, not decided by, Sec. Sec. 1.37-1.39, 13.4
    debate, rules concerning propriety in debate, Chair takes 
        initiative in enforcing, Sec. Sec. 9.17, 9.18
    decides only question raised by point of order, not collateral 
        questions raised by interpretation of ruling, Sec. 1.28
    drafting of legislative language, Chair does not rule on adequacy, 
        Sec. 1.43
    effect of legislative language, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.42
    enforces on own initiative at his discretion, Sec. Sec. 9.17, 9.18
    House proceedings, point of order arising under, while in Committee 
        of the Whole to be decided by Speaker, Sec. 1.46
    hypothetical questions, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.40
    parliamentary inquiry, Chair has discretion to recognize Member 
        for, Sec. Sec. 14.1, 14.2, 14.6
    preferential status, Chair may determine qualification of a motion 
        for, on own initiative, Sec. 8.12
    protects Members' rights on own initiative, Sec. 1.3
    recognition of Member by, not subject to point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 1.30-1.32
    reservation of points of order allowed at Chair's discretion, 
        Sec. Sec. 3.15-3.18

[[Page 12489]]

    reverse early decision, has authority to, Sec. 1.5
    where points of order waived, Chair will not rule on whether point 
        of order would have applied absent the waiver, Sec. 10.17
Clerk
    amendments, failure of Clerk to transmit copies of amendments to 
        majority and minority not subject to point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 6.12, 6.13
Committee
    jurisdiction, as basis for point of order under special rule, 
        Sec. 1.23
    procedure, point of order against, in the House or Committee of the 
        Whole, Sec. 1.47, 1.48
    Ramseyer rule, point of order arising under, Sec. 1.45
Committee of the Whole, point of order during proceedings in
    House proceedings, point of order arising under, not decided by 
        Chair in Committee of the Whole, Sec. 1.46
Committee on Rules, see Rules Committee
Conferees
    Speaker's appointment not subject to point of order, Sec. 1.29
Conference reports
    against entire report, points of order, considered before points of 
        order against portions of the conference report, Sec. 4.14
    appropriations contained in, point of order does not lie if the 
        version of the bill passed by the House contained the same 
        provision, Sec. 4.23
    appropriations contained in, points of order lie only against if 
        arising from a Senate amendment, not the Senate legislative 
        bill before the conferees, Sec. 4.19
    Chair may require all points of order against a report arising 
        under a single rule, to be stated before rendering a decision, 
        Sec. 4.18
    debate on points of order against motion to recommit a conference 
        report limited to point of order, not to extend to merits, 
        Sec. 7.18
    nongermane provisions, points of order against, Sec. Sec. 4.21, 
        4.22
    open conference, point of order against failure to conduct, 
        Sec. 4.17
    point of order lies after reading and before reading of managers' 
        statement, Sec. Sec. 4.10-4.13
    ruled out of order under Budget Act, Sec. Sec. 1.27, 4.14
    scope of conference, Chair does not admit parliamentary inquiry 
        regarding the effect of a motion to instruct on, Sec. 14.38
    signatures, point of order against improper, must be made prior to 
        consideration, Sec. 4.20
    where proceedings are postponed, Sec. Sec. 4.15, 4.16
    where ruled out of order, acting on amendment in disagreement, 
        Sec. 1.27
Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under
    avoided by special rule making in order an unreported measure, 
        Sec. 10.23
    Budget Committee, policy of, concerning, Sec. 10.4
    conference reports, against entire, considered before other points 
        of order against portions of the conference report, Sec. 4.14
    conference reports, against new spending contained in, Sec. 1.27
    consideration of a measure, where point of order arising under the 
        Act applies to, must be raised when measure called up, 
        Sec. Sec. 4.2, 4.3

[[Page 12490]]

    criteria for decisions on points of order arising under, Sec. 8.14
    parliamentary inquiries regarding, Sec. 14.44
    Rules Committee, requirement regarding statement of estimated costs 
        does not apply to resolution which ``self-executes'' new budget 
        authority, Sec. Sec. 10.21, 10.22
    waived, notwithstanding violations of, by special rule, Sec. 10.6
Consideration, voting on, as way of determining certain points of 
    order, Sec. 1.57
Consistency, Chair does not rule on
    amendment to amendment previously adopted, Sec. 1.35
    amendment to authorization-appropriations process, Sec. 1.36
    bill, to law it amends, Sec. 1.34
Constitution (see also Constitutional amendments, amending resolutions 
    proposing to the states)
    Revenue bill origination requirement presents question of 
        privilege, not point of order, Sec. 1.39
Constitutional amendments, amending resolutions proposing to the 
    states, Sec. 1.33
Debate
    call of the House, Chair may allow motion for in his discretion, 
        but a point of no quorum cannot lie, Sec. 12.14
    irrelevant remarks in, point of order lies against, Sec. 1.44
    merits of provision allowed under reservation, not allowed once 
        point of order made, Sec. 3.2
    parliamentary inquiry does not give control over time, Member 
        making may not yield, Sec. 14.5
    point of no quorum in Committee of the Whole, Chair may entertain 
        during, Sec. 12.12
    point of no quorum in House, Chair may not entertain during, 
        Sec. 12.14
    point of order may interrupt, Sec. 11.1
    reservation of point of order does not grant Member reserving 
        control of any time, Sec. 3.4
    time for parliamentary inquiry, as affecting allocations of time 
        for debate, Sec. Sec. 7.8, 7.16
    time for point of order, as affecting allocation of time for 
        debate, Sec. Sec. 7.13-7.15
Debating points of order
    Chair's discretion to allow, Sec. Sec. 7.1, 7.2, 7.4-7.7, 7.17
    clarification of Chair's ruling in the Record, Sec. Sec. 7.23, 7.24
    ``colloquies'' not permitted, Sec. 7.17
    concession of point during debate, Chair rules unless another 
        Member desires to be heard against the point of order, 
        Sec. 7.20
    debate time on measure or amendment, debate on point of order as 
        affecting, Sec. Sec. 7.13-7.15
    extension of remarks not allowed under, Sec. Sec. 7.21, 7.22
    House rule may be read during, if it relates to the point of order, 
        Sec. 7.19
    limited to point of order, may not go to merits, Sec. Sec. 7.9-
        7.12, 7.18
    prior to Member making point of order, Chair may admit Members' 
        arguments either orally or in writing, Sec. 1.7
    revision and extension not allowed in debate on point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 7.21, 7.22
    revision of Chair's ruling in Record, Sec. Sec. 7.23, 7.24

[[Page 12491]]

    scope of debate limited to point of order, not to extend to merits 
        of language against which point of order made, Sec. Sec. 7.9-
        7.12, 7.18
    Senate rule may be read during, if it relates to the point of 
        order, Sec. 7.19
    time not to be reserved or yielded, Sec. Sec. 7.2, 7.4-7.7
    time, to be secured by seeking recognition from the Chair, 
        Sec. Sec. 7.3, 7.17
Deciding points of order (see also Burden of proof on points of order; 
    Resolving points of order before decision by the Chair)
    ambiguities, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.41
    by voting on consideration, rather than ruling by Chair, Sec. 1.57
    Chair decides only when required to do so, Sec. 1.6
    clarification of Chair's decision in Record, Sec. Sec. 7.23, 7.24
    collateral questions raised by interpretation of ruling not 
        decided, only question raised by point of order, Sec. 1.28
    committee procedure, Chair does not usually decide, Sec. Sec. 1.47, 
        1.48
    committee reports, sufficiency of, Sec. Sec. 1.45, 1.49
    concession of point, Chair rules unless another Member wishes to 
        argue against the point, Sec. 7.20
    Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under some 
        sections of, Budget Committee estimates provide basis for 
        ruling, Sec. 8.14
    consistency of bill with existing law, Sec. 1.34
    consistency of text to text it amends, Chair does not decide, 
        Sec. Sec. 1.35, 1.36
    constitutional questions, not decided by Chair, Sec. Sec. 1.37-1.39
    drafting of legislative language, Chair does not rule on adequacy 
        of, Sec. 1.43
    effect of legislative language, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.42
    germaneness, analysis limited to text, not possible effects, 
        Sec. 8.2
    hypothetical questions, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.40
    precedents, Chair follows, Sec. 1.1
    proponent's intentions in offering an amendment as a basis for 
        ruling, Sec. 8.13
    revision of Chair's decision in Record, Sec. Sec. 7.23, 7.24
    Unfunded Mandates Act, resolved by vote on consideration, Sec. 1.57
Effect of enactment, not subject to point of order, Sec. 1.42
En bloc amendments, Sec. Sec. 1.13, 1.14
Federal income tax rate increase, see Tax rate increase
Germaneness
    anticipatory ruling on, Sec. 6.4
    burden of proof in showing, Sec. Sec. 8.1-8.3
    nongermane provisions, points of order against, Sec. Sec. 4.21, 
        4.22
    parliamentary inquiry regarding, not sufficient to rule out of 
        order absent a point of order, Sec. 6.3
    rule altering ordinary test for, Sec. Sec. 10.8, 10.10
    ruling based on text of amendment only, Sec. 8.2
House Rule I clause 4 governing points of order, Sec. 1 introduction
Hypothetical questions, Chair does not rule on, Sec. 1.40
Income tax rate increase, see Tax rate increase

[[Page 12492]]

Jurisdiction, point of order based on Committee's, created by special 
    rule, Sec. 1.23
Making parliamentary inquiries
    amendment, regarding, not admitted until amendment is pending, 
        Sec. 15.11
    demand for division vote, parliamentary inquiry does not constitute 
        intervening business for purpose of precluding, Sec. 15.21
    interrupting another Member who controls the time, not allowed 
        without Member's consent, Sec. Sec. 15.1-15.3
    Journal, admitted before the Journal has been approved, Sec. 15.9
    point of no quorum, not necessarily admitted while pending, 
        Sec. 15.12
    presidential message, not necessarily admitted during reading of, 
        Sec. 15.10
    time used in, taken from the allocation of the Member yielding for 
        that purpose, Sec. Sec. 15.4-15.7
    time used in, where no one has been recognized for debate, time not 
        subtracted from allocation for debate, Sec. 15.8
    vote, making a parliamentary inquiry during a, Sec. Sec. 15.13-
        15.21
Making points of order (see also Reserving points of order)
    Committee members have priority of recognition in, against proposed 
        amendments, Sec. 1.4
    distinguish from parliamentary inquiry, Member should, Sec. 2.3
    interrupting debate, Member may be recognized by Chair while 
        another Member controls time, Sec. 4.24
    manager may make against own bill, Sec. Sec. 1.54, 1.55
    priority recognition in, to Committee members against amendments, 
        Sec. 1.4
    recognition by Chair required before, Sec. 2.1
    reservation by one Member does not prohibit another Member from 
        making the same point of order, Sec. 3.10
    specific, Member should be, as to language against which he is, 
        Sec. 2.2
    while one point of order already pending, Chair may admit another 
        at his discretion, Sec. 1.8
    words in debate, point of order not to be made against, proper 
        remedy is demand that words be taken down, Sec. 1.50
Multiple points of order pending at one time
    Chair's discretion to allow, Sec. Sec. 1.8, 1.11
    Chair need only sustain one to dispense with consideration of all 
        others, Sec. Sec. 1.10, 1.12
    order of consideration and decision at Chair's discretion, Sec. 1.9
    where one made against a proviso and another made against the 
        paragraph containing the proviso, the Chair must strike the 
        entire paragraph if he sustains the point of order, Sec. 1.15
``One-minute'' speeches, refusal of recognition by Speaker for, not 
    subject to point of order, Sec. 1.30
Parliamentary inquiry (see also Parliamentary inquiry, topics admitted 
    or not admitted by way of; Making parliamentary inquiries)
    answer, Chair may delay in providing in order to review the 
        precedents, Sec. Sec. 14.24-14.28
    anticipatory ruling in response to, Sec. 6.4
    appeals to Chair's response not admitted, Sec. 14.4
    Chair, inquiry properly submitted to, Sec. 14.14
    Chair answers, official reporters do not read back proceedings, 
        Sec. 14.14

[[Page 12493]]

    Committee of the Whole, procedure and actions, inquiries regarding, 
        properly addressed to the Chair, not the Speaker, 
        Sec. Sec. 14.41, 14.42
    Congressional Budget Act, inquiries regarding, Sec. 14.44
    debate time, as affected by, Sec. Sec. 7.8, 7.16
    delay, Chair may, response to, Sec. Sec. 14.24-14.28
    desk, Speaker may examine matter at the, in answering an inquiry, 
        Sec. 14.13
    House procedure and actions, inquiries regarding properly addressed 
        to the Speaker, not the Chair of the Committee of the Whole, 
        Sec. Sec. 14.40, 14.43
    point of order, Chair explains effect of ruling on prior, in 
        response to parliamentary inquiry, Sec. 14.6
    point of order takes precedence over, Sec. 14.3
    recognition for, in Chair's discretion, Sec. Sec. 14.1, 14.2, 14.6
    recognition for, limited to parliamentary inquiry, does not allow 
        Member recognized to offer amendment, Sec. 14.39
    reporters, inquiries do not request that, read back portions of the 
        Record, Sec. 14.14
    response by Chair insufficient to rule nongermane amendment out of 
        order absent a point of order, Sec. 6.3
    yielding time under a parliamentary inquiry not allowed, Sec. 14.5
Parliamentary inquiry, topics admitted or not admitted by way of
    admitted, generally, Sec. Sec. 14.7-14.13
    admitted, generally not, Sec. Sec. 14.15-14.23, 14.29-14.38
    advisory opinion on future ruling, not admitted, Sec. Sec. 14.19, 
        14.33, 14.34, 14.37
    amendment, effect of adoption on further amendment, 
        Sec. Sec. 14.10, 14.37
    amendment process, Sec. 14.33
    Clerk's progress in reading a document, Sec. 14.12
    committee policy, not admitted, Sec. 14.29
    committee report, sufficiency of, Sec. Sec. 14.9, 14.13
    conference committee, scope of, not admitted, Sec. 14.38
    Congressional Budget Act, Sec. 14.44
    consistency of House actions, not admitted, Sec. Sec. 14.20, 14.21
    construction of proposition, Sec. 14.36
    desk, status of matters at the, Sec. 14.13
    effect of adopting an amendment, not admitted, Sec. 14.22
    effect of striking material from a general appropriations bill on a 
        point of order as to sufficiency of funds, not admitted, 
        Sec. 14.18
    historical context of pending matter, not admitted, Sec. 14.15
    House legislative program, not admitted by Chair in Committee of 
        the Whole, Sec. 14.30
    hypothetical questions, not admitted, Sec. Sec. 14.16, 14.17, 14.33
    legal effect of proposed measure, not admitted, Sec. 14.35
    meaning of proposition, not admitted, Sec. 14.36
    order of business, Sec. 14.7
    parliamentary situation, Sec. 14.14
    point of order, as to timing of, Sec. 14.11
    privileged status, advisory opinion on, of resolution not yet 
        pending, Sec. 14.34

[[Page 12494]]

    recognition, inquiry regarding Chair's intent for future, not 
        admitted, Sec. 14.23
    rule, interpretation of, Sec. Sec. 14.8, 14.9
    Rules Committee guidelines for submission of amendments, not 
        admitted, Sec. 14.31
    sufficiency of funds in a general appropriations bill, not 
        admitted, Sec. 14.18
    unanimous-consent request, inquiry to register objection to, when 
        previously granted, not admitted, Sec. 14.32
Point of no quorum
    admitted after Chair has put the question and before the result has 
        been announced, Sec. 12.8
    appeal does not lie against Chair's refusal to entertain point of 
        no quorum, Sec. 12.3
    call of the House, Speaker has discretion to recognize Member to 
        move for a, Sec. 12.2
    Constitution does not create separate basis for point of order, 
        Sec. 12.2
    debate in Committee of the Whole, Chair may entertain during, 
        Sec. 12.12
    debate in the House, Chair may entertain motion for a call of the 
        House, but not a point of no quorum during, at his discretion, 
        Sec. Sec. 12.12, 12.14
    debate under the five-minute rule, once a quorum has been 
        established, a call of the House may only be made by unanimous 
        consent, Sec. 12.15
    demand for a recorded vote, point of no quorum takes precedence 
        over, Sec. 12.1
    objection to vote for lack of a quorum takes precedence over a 
        point of no quorum, Sec. 12.11
    parliamentary inquiry not necessarily admitted while point of no 
        quorum pending, Sec. 15.12
    parliamentary inquiry regarding number of Members in the Chamber 
        not in order when a point of no quorum would not lie, 
        Sec. 12.16
    pending question, what constitutes for purposes of permitting point 
        of no quorum, Sec. Sec. 12.7, 12.8, 12.10
    pending question, where question has not been put to a vote, point 
        of no quorum does not lie, Sec. 12.2
    privileged over other request for recognition where a quorum has 
        not previously been established, Sec. 12.17
    quorum, once established, no business having intervened, a point of 
        no quorum does not lie, Sec. 12.13
    recorded vote having been refused, a point of no quorum may still 
        lie, Sec. 12.9
    request for leave for a committee to sit during consideration of 
        amendments under the five-minute rule, does not constitute a 
        pending question put to a vote, Sec. Sec. 12.7, 12.10
    rise, motion that the Committee of the Whole, in order while point 
        of no quorum pending, Sec. 12.5
    suspension motion, where vote postponed, point of no quorum 
        considered as withdrawn, Sec. 12.6
    withdrawal not allowed after Chair's announcement that a quorum is 
        not present, Sec. 12.4
Point of order, topics admitted by way of
    appropriations bill, legislation in, Sec. Sec. 8.7-8.10
    appropriations bill, unauthorized appropriations, Sec. Sec. 8.5, 
        8.6, 8.11, 10.9, 10.11
    Budget Act violations, Sec. Sec. 1.27, 4.14, 8.14
    committee procedure and reports, deficiencies in, Sec. Sec. 1.23, 
        1.45, 1.47-1.49

[[Page 12495]]

    conference reports, Sec. Sec. 1.27, 4.14, 4.17, 4.19-4.23
    debate, relevancy in, Sec. 1.44
    germaneness, Sec. Sec. 4.21, 4.22
    tax rate increase, Sec. 5.27
    unfunded mandates, Sec. 1.57
Preferential status, Chair may determine qualification of motion for, 
    on own initiative, Sec. 8.12
Privileged questions
    parliamentary inquiry regarding status of resolution as, not 
        admitted before resolution pending, Sec. 14.34
Questions of privilege
    establishing procedure for unique parliamentary question, Sec. 1.33
    pre-empting point of order, Sec. 1.33
    revenue bill constitutional origination requirement presents, not 
        subject to point of order, Sec. 1.39
    Speaker rules on status of resolution as presenting, 
        Sec. Sec. 1.51-1.53
    statement of, may be interrupted by point of order, Sec. 11.2
Quorum, see Point of no quorum
Ramseyer rule
    point of order arising under, Sec. 1.45
    raised when bill called up, not after the House resolves into the 
        Committee of the Whole, Sec. Sec. 4.7-4.9
Recognition
    amendments, Chair's recognition of Member to offer not subject to 
        point of order, Sec. 1.32
    Committee members receive priority in, to make a point of order 
        against an amendment, Sec. 1.4
    decision of Chair on, not subject to appeal, Sec. 13.11
    decision of Chair regarding, not subject to point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 1.30, 1.31
    parliamentary inquiry, Chair has discretion to recognize Member 
        for, Sec. Sec. 14.1, 14.2, 14.6
    parliamentary inquiry, recognition limited to, Member so recognized 
        may not offer amendment, Sec. 14.39
    point of order, recognition by Chair required before making, 
        Sec. 2.1
    point of order, recognition for, may be granted without waiting for 
        time to be yielded, Sec. 4.24
Recommit, motion to
    debate on point of order against motion to recommit a conference 
        report confined to point of order, not to extend to merits, 
        Sec. 7.18
    point of order lies after reading and before debate, Sec. 4.25
Reserving points of order
    generally, Sec. 3.1
    amendments not admitted while reservation pending, Sec. 5.2
    appropriations bills, points of order reserved upon reporting of 
        the bill, Sec. Sec. 3.25, 3.26
    appropriations bills, portions of, points of order against must be 
        made, not reserved, Sec. Sec. 3.7, 3.27, 3.29
    Chair can reserve to protect Members' rights on own initiative, 
        Sec. 1.3
    Chair's discretion to allow, Sec. Sec. 3.15-3.18
    debate not allowed on an amendment, a point of order must be made, 
        and cannot be reserved, Sec. 3.30
    debate on merits allowed under reservation, Sec. 3.2
    debate time not allocated to Member reserving, Sec. 3.4
    distinguished from making points of order, Sec. 3.2
    further amendments not usually admitted while reservation pending, 
        Sec. Sec. 3.3, 3.5

[[Page 12496]]

    inquiry to sponsor acceptable under reservation, Sec. 3.31
    making point of order, one Member's reservation does not prohibit 
        another Member from, Sec. 3.10
    once a point of order reserved, all points of order against the 
        same text are reserved, Sec. Sec. 3.8-3.14
    regular order, demand for, not to interrupt proponent's initial 
        five-minute debate time, Sec. 3.20
    regular order, demand for, requires resolution of point of order, 
        Sec. Sec. 3.18, 3.19
    withdrawing a reservation, Sec. Sec. 3.21-3.24
Resolving points of order before decision by the Chair (see also 
    Deciding points of order)
    modification of portion of appropriations bill allowed by unanimous 
        consent while reservation of point of order pending, Sec. 3.28
    ruling may be forestalled by a motion to rise from the Committee of 
        the Whole, Sec. 11.3
    withdrawal of amendment while point of order pending, Chair allows 
        unanimous-consent request for, Sec. 1.6
    withdrawal of motion against which point of order lodged, obviates 
        the need for the Chair to rule, Sec. 4.6
Revenue bills, constitutional origination requirement presents question 
    of privilege, not point of order, Sec. 1.39
Reversing decided points of order (see also Appealing from Chair's 
    decision on a point of order)
    Chair has authority to reverse previous decision, Sec. 1.5
Rules Committee (see also Waiving points of order in a special rule)
    budget authority created by special order ``self-executing'' an 
        amendment, Congressional Budget Act requirement for statement 
        of estimated cost inapplicable to Rules Committee report, 
        Sec. Sec. 10.21, 10.22
    creating point of order based on committee jurisdiction, Sec. 1.23
    parliamentary inquiry regarding guidelines of, on submission of 
        amendments, not admitted, Sec. 14.31
    points of order not to lie against reports by, Sec. 10.12
    privileged resolution reported by, point of order against in order 
        after resolution called up and before Clerk has read, Sec. 4.1
    waiver policy, Sec. 10.3
    waiving points of order under a special rule, Sec. 9.1
Rules of the House
    order enforced before adoption of, Sec. 1.2
    parliamentary inquiry regarding interpretation of, Sec. Sec. 14.8, 
        14.9
    points of order governed by Rule I clause 4, Sec. 1 introduction
    Ramseyer rule, point of order arising under, Sec. 1.45
    Rule I clause 4 governing points of order, Sec. 1 introduction
Senate amendments
    rule providing amendment ``hereby'' adopted precludes points of 
        order under rule requiring consideration in Committee of the 
        Whole, Sec. 10.19
    ``self-executing'' rule agreeing to Senate amendment precludes 
        points of order that would ordinarily lie against the 
        amendment, Sec. 10.20
Speaker
    generally, see Chair

[[Page 12497]]

    House proceedings, points of order arising from, decided by 
        Speaker, not to be decided in Committee of the Whole, Sec. 1.46
    question of privilege, Speaker rules on status of resolution as 
        presenting, Sec. Sec. 1.51-1.53
Special rule, see Rules Committee; Waiving points of order in a special 
    rule
Supermajority vote requirement
    tax rate increase, point of order based on three-fifths vote 
        requirement in order when question put on final passage, 
        Sec. 5.27
Tax rate increase
    point of order regarding applicability of requirement of three-
        fifths vote for, in order when question put on final passage, 
        Sec. 5.27
Three-fifths vote
    point of order regarding applicability of requirement for, in order 
        when question put on final passage, Sec. 5.27
Timing of points of order (see also Amendments, timing of points of 
    order against)
    amendments, points of order against a portion of bill are 
        considered before amendments to it, Sec. 5.10
    amendments not in order to bill open at any point until all points 
        of order against any provision are resolved, Sec. 5.3
    appropriations bills, Sec. Sec. 5.13-5.22, 5.26
    ``at any time,'' points of order which rules allow, Sec. Sec. 5.28, 
        5.29
    conference reports, points of order against, Sec. Sec. 4.10-4.23
    consideration of a measure, point of order against in order when 
        measure called up, Sec. Sec. 4.2-4.4
    exceptions made for Members seeking recognition at appropriate 
        time, but not recognized in time, Sec. Sec. 5.23, 5.24
    failure to make a timely point of order against a motion, leaves 
        the motion as the will of the House until it orders otherwise, 
        Sec. 9.15
    general debate, points of order not to be raised during, Sec. 5.9
    paragraphs not yet read, points of order where allowed against by 
        unanimous consent, are entertained in order, Sec. 5.4
    parliamentary inquiry, timing of point of order appropriate subject 
        for, Sec. 14.11
    privileged resolution, point of order against in order after 
        resolution called up and before Clerk has read, Sec. Sec. 4.1, 
        4.4
    privileges of the House, point of order against report concerning, 
        in order after reading of report, Sec. 4.5
    proposition, against, considered before amendments to the 
        proposition are considered, Sec. Sec. 5.1, 6.14, 6.15
    Ramseyer rule, point of order alleging failure to comply with, in 
        order when measure called up, not after resolving into the 
        Committee of the Whole for consideration, Sec. Sec. 4.7-4.9
    recognition for point of order may be granted without waiting for 
        time to be yielded, Sec. 4.24
    recommit, motion to, point of order against must be made 
        immediately after the motion is read and before debate, 
        Sec. 4.25
    supermajority voting, point of order relating to requirement for, 
        in order when question put on final passage, Sec. 5.27
    voting by supermajority, point of order based on, in order when the 
        question is put on final passage, Sec. 5.27

[[Page 12498]]

    where bill open to amendment at any point, points of order to be 
        resolved before amendments admitted, Sec. Sec. 5.3, 5.5-5.8
    yielding of time not required for recognition to make a point of 
        order, Sec. 4.24
Unfunded Mandates Act, point of order arising under, resolved by voting 
    on consideration, Sec. 1.57
Vacating point of order proceedings, Sec. 9.19
Waiving points of order (see also Waiving points of order in a special 
    rule)
    amendments not covered by waiver for bill, Sec. 9.9-9.13
    appropriations bill, section of protected by unanimous-consent 
        request, Sec. 9.5
    appropriations bill, waiver of points of order against, not 
        protecting amendments to, Sec. 9.11
    bills, where points of order waived, protection for amendments, not 
        provided, Sec. Sec. 9.9-9.11
    bills protected as amendment to another bill, where points of order 
        waived against, no protection to individual portions of the 
        bill if offered separately, Sec. 9.14
    committee amendments, where points of order not waived against, 
        committee amendments treated as other amendments, Sec. 9.12
    committee substitute, where points of order against are waived, 
        protection does not apply to amendments to substitute, 
        Sec. 9.13
    construing scope, Chair may look to debate in Committee of the 
        Whole in, Sec. 9.8
    failure to raise a timely point of order against a motion, the 
        motion represents the will of the House until it orders 
        otherwise, Sec. 9.15
    germaneness of a perfecting amendment, by unanimous consent, 
        Sec. 9.6
    Rules Committee may waive in special rule, against portion of bill 
        language, Sec. 9.1
    scope of waiver, Sec. Sec. 9.3, 9.4
    statutory rule, waived by motion to suspend the rules, Sec. 9.2
    suspension of the rules waives statutory rules, Sec. 9.2
    timing of resolution, after consideration and reading for amendment 
        has begun, not too late, Sec. 9.7
    unanimous-consent requests, Sec. Sec. 9.3-9.6
    where waiver by failure to raise point of order leaves uncertain 
        situation, the Chair may use his discretion to clarify the 
        situation and let proceedings continue, Sec. 9.16
    where waiver not issued and point of order made, House may vacate 
        proceeding under point of order, Sec. 9.19
Waiving points of order in a special rule
    amendment, where protected by rule, the rule protects that 
        amendment as modified by a subsequent amendment, Sec. 10.5
    amendments if offered by a particular Member protected, Sec. 10.14
    appropriations, legislative provisions, some protected, some left 
        vulnerable, Sec. 10.7
    appropriations bill, rule waiving multiple points of order and 
        providing for altered procedure for consideration of 
        amendments, Sec. 10.16

[[Page 12499]]

    appropriations provision, portions of protected from prohibition on 
        legislation and unauthorized appropriations, Sec. Sec. 10.9, 
        10.11
    Budget Act provisions, violations of waived notwithstanding, 
        Sec. 10.6
    Budget Committee policy on waivers of Congressional Budget Act 
        points of order, Sec. 10.4
    Chair does not rule on whether a point of order would lie against a 
        provision where it has been waived, Sec. 10.17
    classes of amendments protected, Sec. 10.14
    Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under, avoided by 
        special rule making in order an unreported measure, Sec. 10.23
    Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under, Budget 
        Committee policy regarding, Sec. 10.4
    Congressional Budget Act, points of order arising under, regarding 
        statement of estimated costs, not applicable to special rule 
        ``self-executing'' new budget authority, Sec. Sec. 10.21, 10.22
    consideration, rules designed to govern, waived by rule providing 
        that something be considered to pass by virtue of the adoption 
        of the rule, Sec. 10.19
    consideration, rules designed to prohibit, waived by making 
        consideration in order notwithstanding such rules, Sec. 10.6
    debate, mischaracterization of rule not to affect actual 
        implementation of waivers, Sec. 10.18
    germaneness, rule altering ordinary test of germaneness, 
        Sec. Sec. 10.8, 10.10
    ``hereby'' resolutions waiving point of order, Sec. 10.19
    Member, amendments offered by particular, protected, Sec. 10.14
    points of order against the rule, not to lie unless prohibited 
        under rulemaking authority, Sec. 10.12
    Rules Committee, waivers against certain language but not all 
        provisions in bill, Sec. 9.1
    Rules Committee policy on waivers, Sec. 10.3
    ``self-executing'' agreement to a Senate amendment precludes points 
        of order against the amendment, Sec. 10.20
    Senate amendments, rules affecting points of order relating to, 
        Sec. Sec. 10.19, 10.20
    statutory rules providing points of order, Sec. Sec. 10.1, 10.2
    where point of order under one rule waived, point of order may 
        still lie under another rule, Sec. 10.13
    where waivers based on report accompanying rule, report not 
        required to be printed before consideration of resolution, 
        Sec. 10.15
Words used in debate, not subject to point of order, demand that words 
    be taken down proper remedy, Sec. 1.50
Yielding
    point of order may be made without, by Member controlling time, 
        Sec. 11.1