[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 15, Chapter 31]
[Chapter 31. Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries]
[A. Points of Order]
[Â§ 1. In General; Effect]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 11939-12035]
 
                               CHAPTER 31
 
                Points of Order; Parliamentary Inquiries
 
                           A. POINTS OF ORDER
 
Sec. 1. In General; Effect


    A point of order is in effect an objection that the pending matter 
or proceeding is in violation of some rule or practice of the House. It 
may also constitute a demand for an immediate return to the regular 
order.(1) A point of order is not a vehicle for obtaining 
debate time or for injecting comments about a pending amendment or 
matter under consideration.(2)
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 1. For general discussion of the subject of points of order prior to 
        1936, see 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6863-6957; 8 Cannon's 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 3427-3458.
            Points of order consume less time today than formerly. Mr. 
        Clarence Cannon (Mo.), who was parliamentary clerk at the 
        Speaker's table before becoming a Member, once estimated that 
        discussion of points of order occupied a third of the time of 
        the House in the early 20th century. See 101 Cong. Rec. 10609, 
        84th Cong. 1st Sess., July 14, 1955.
 2. See Sec. 1.42, infra.
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    Rule I clause 4 (3) provides that it is the duty of the 
Speaker (4) to decide points of order, subject to a right of 
appeal by any Member. Apart from this rule, the disposition of points 
of order is largely governed by the discretion of the Chair and by 
precedent.(5) The Chair, without prompting from a Member, 
sometimes assumes an affirmative obligation to protect the rights of 
Members.(6) In the exercise of its discretion, the Chair 
may, for example, decide whether to entertain more than one point of 
order at the same time; (7) whether to decide one point or 
another first; (8) or whether to rule on points of order 
simultaneously.(9) On rare occasions,

[[Page 11940]]

the Chair will anticipate a parliamentary situation and--as with a 
question of privilege--rule without a point of order from the 
floor.(10)
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 3. House Rules and Manual Sec. 624 (1997).
 4. In the Committee of the Whole, the Chairman decides questions of 
        order and generally acts with the powers of the Speaker, as 
        provided by Rule XXIII clause 1, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. 861 (1997). See 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 6828, 6927.
 5. See Sec. 1.1, infra, as to the importance of precedents, generally.
 6. See Sec. 1.3, infra.
 7. See Sec. 1.8, infra.
 8. See Sec. 1.9, infra.
 9. See Sec. 1.13, infra.
            The Chair's discretion in this regard is guided by his 
        understanding of the relative effects resulting from the 
        sustaining of the various points of order.
10. See Sec. 1.51, infra.
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    At the beginning of a Congress, before rules are adopted, the Chair 
enforces ``order'' based on precedents and long-established customs--
principles of general parliamentary law--which constitute and define 
proper decorum in debate.(11)
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11. See Sec. 1.2, infra.
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    The Chair may refuse to rule on matters that are related to but not 
expressly raised in the point of order; (12) and points of 
order do not lie against the Chair's exercise of discretionary 
authority granted by the standing rules.(13) Moreover, the 
Chair does not rule on constitutional questions,(14) 
hypothetical questions,(15) or the effect of a bill's 
provisions.(16) Similarly, the Chair does not pass upon the 
consistency of proposed amendments (17) or resolve 
ambiguities in amendments.(18)
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12. See Sec. 1.28, infra.
13. See Sec. 1.29, infra.
14. See Sec. Sec. 1.37-1.39, infra.
15. See Sec. 1.40, infra.
16. See Sec. 1.36, infra.
17. See Sec. 1.36, infra
18. See Sec. 1.41, infra.
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    The effect of sustaining a point of order depends on the matter 
before the House. For example, a point of order against a portion of an 
amendment may cause the whole amendment to fall; (19) and a 
point of order against a conference report, if sustained, may vitiate 
the report and leave the House with the amendments in disagreement 
before it for disposition.(20)
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19. See Sec. 1.25, infra.
20. See Sec. 1.27, infra.
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    The enforcement of committee rules--those which are not explicit 
rules of the House but are internal to a committee--is the 
responsibility of the pertinent committees. Normally, the Speaker is 
not compelled to rule on a point of order relating to the 
interpretation of such a committee rule.(1)
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 1. See Sec. 1.47, infra.
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    However, violations of certain committee rules are cognizable in 
the House under Rule XI clause 2.(2)
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 2. See, e.g., Rule XI clause 2(g)(5), House Rules and Manual Sec. 708, 
        and clause 2(l), Sec. 713 (1997). See also Sec. Sec. 1.47, 
        1.48, 1.49, infra.
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    There are special procedures prescribed by standing rule 
(3) relating to words uttered in debate. The proper 
procedure is to demand that ``words be taken down.'' But such demands 
must be time

[[Page 11941]]

ly, before other debate intervenes.(4)
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 3. See Rule XIV, clauses 1, 4, and 5, House Rules and Manual 
        Sec. Sec. 749, 760 (1997).
 4. See Sec. 1.50, infra.

                          -------------------
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Importance of Precedents

Sec. 1.1 The Speaker follows the precedents of the House in deciding 
    points of order.

    On June 24, 1958,(5) Mr. Thomas B. Curtis, of Missouri, 
challenged a practice of the House with which he disagreed and sought 
to have Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, overrule certain precedents 
which prevented discussion on the floor of the House of matters 
occurring in committees, unless the committees in question took action. 
The following exchange, emphasizing the importance of precedent in the 
Speaker's rulings, took place:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 104 Cong. Rec. 12121, 12122, 85th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight

        The Speaker: Under previous order of the House, the gentleman 
    from Missouri [Mr. Curtis], is recognized for 60 minutes.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: . . . Mr. Speaker, I am very disturbed 
    about the manner in which one of our House subcommittees has been 
    conducting itself in the past few days. I refer to the subcommittee 
    of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on Legislative 
    Oversight. . . .
        . . . Not only is this subcommittee, in my judgment, not doing 
    the job that needs to be done, it has brought the institution 
    again, in my judgment, into disrepute by disregarding the rules of 
    the House and permitting a committee of the House to be used as a 
    forum in this fashion.
        Mr. [Oren] Harris [of Arkansas]: Mr. Speaker, I must object 
    again and ask that those words be deleted.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: I would like to ask the gentleman 
    before he does, just what language is he objecting to?
        Mr. Harris: To the charge that this committee is violating the 
    rules of the House.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Well, I certainly do charge that and I 
    think it is proper to charge such a thing if I have presented the 
    evidence. How else are we going to present the case to the House?
        The Speaker: There is a long line of decisions holding that 
    attention cannot be called on the floor of the House to proceedings 
    in committees without action by the committee. The Chair has just 
    been reading a decision by Mr. Speaker Gillett and the decision is 
    very positive on that point.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, in addressing myself to 
    that, may I say I am unaware of such a rule and I would argue, if I 
    may, in all propriety, that that rule, if it does exist, should be 
    changed because how else will the House ever go into the 
    functioning and actions of its committees?
        The Speaker: That is not a question for the Chair to determine. 
    That is a question for the House to change the rule.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: Mr. Speaker, is it a rule or is it a 
    ruling? If it is

[[Page 11942]]

    a ruling of the Chair, then it is appropriate for the Chair to 
    consider it.
        The Speaker: The precedents of the House are what the Chair 
    goes by in most instances. There are many precedents and this Chair 
    finds that the precedents of the House usually make mighty good 
    sense.
        Mr. Curtis of Missouri: But the Chair can change a precedent. 
    That is why I am trying to present this matter.
        The Speaker: If the Chair did not believe in the precedents of 
    the House, then the Chair might be ready to do that, but this Chair 
    is not disposed to overturn the precedents of the House which the 
    Chair thinks are very clear. . . .
        The Speaker: The Chair has made his ruling, and the Chair 
    thinks it is correct.

Sec. 1.2 At the beginning of a new Congress, before rules are adopted, 
    the Chair will entertain a point of order that proper decorum is 
    not being followed and will enforce those rules relating to the 
    Chair's power of recognition which embody long established custom.

    On Jan. 3, 1991,(6) during debate on House Resolution 5, 
establishing rules for the 102d Congress, Mrs. Nancy L. Johnson, of 
Connecticut, was yielded time under the hour taken to debate the 
resolution. At the conclusion of her time, she refused to relinquish 
the floor and persisted in debate despite repeated admonitions from the 
Chair and the use of the Speaker's gavel. The rather raucous 
proceedings were as follows:
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 6. 137 Cong. Rec. 58, 59, 102d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Solomon] has 1 minute remaining.
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 7. Steny H. Hoyer (Md.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I yield 
    such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Connecticut 
    [Mrs. Johnson].
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman 
    for yielding me this time.
        Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the substance of 
    this proposal, and with deep concern for the subversion of the 
    legislative process contained in this package.

        The substance strikes at the heart of the budget agreement. The 
    process strikes at the heart of democracy, and so I am going to use 
    such time as I may consume, and I am not going to recognize the 
    authority of the Speaker's gavel, because I want to make very clear 
    the implications of what is happening here.
        First of all, this House is operating under precedent, not 
    under rule. Precedent is something that we honor because we hold 
    ourselves to a standard of ethical conduct that requires honoring 
    our rules.
        If we do not hold ourselves to that standard of ethical 
    conduct, then the

[[Page 11943]]

    line between self-government and chaos disintegrates. If we cannot 
    operate ethically, we cannot govern ourselves as a free nation. So, 
    honor is everything; word is bond.
        I choose not to be governed by the gavel, because I want to 
    demonstrate that where word is not bond, democracy cannot survive.
        If we were doing that here today, democracy in its gut and at 
    the level of trust that it demands would not be at risk; but the 
    majority party is not proposing a statutory change for which they 
    could be held accountable.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The time of the gentlewoman has 
    expired.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: The majority party is proposing a 
    rules change.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would state to the 
    gentlewoman that whatever point she is trying to make that the 
    Chair is going to make a point.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: It does not change the law.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The House will operate under proper 
    decorum.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: . . . What is happening here is 
    that individual desire for spending programs is overriding the 
    public interest in deficit reduction.
        Mr. [Gerry] Sikorski [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, regular 
    order.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman is out of order. The 
    gentlewoman is making the point of not following the rules.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: Mr. Speaker, I am sorry. I know 
    this is unpleasant.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman will remove herself 
    from the well within 30 seconds.

                               point of order

        Mr. [Henry B.] Gonzalez [of Texas]:
        Mr. Speaker, I rise to a point of order. I rise to a point of 
    order, Mr. Speaker.
        Mrs. Johnson of Connecticut: As I said, I am not going to talk 
    at length but only for the very few minutes necessary to make clear 
    my concern with the substance and process violations in this rules 
    proposal.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Gonzalez: The gentlewoman is out of order and is defying 
    the Chair's ruling and, therefore, I am imploring the Chair to 
    exercise its authority to enforce the rules of the House by 
    summoning the Sergeant at Arms and presenting the mace.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair may do that.

Speaker Protects Parliamentary Rights of Members

Sec. 1.3 The Speaker may on his own initiative take action to protect 
    the right of Members to raise appropriate points of order.

        Until the 104th Congress adopted its rules on Jan. 4, 1995, 
    points of order had to be ``reserved'' on general appropriation 
    bills when they were reported. Failure to take this step deprived 
    the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole of the right to ``rule 
    out,'' in re

[[Page 11944]]

    sponse to a point of order, a portion of the bill as being 
    legislative or unauthorized in law as required by Rule XXI clause 
    2.(8) Rule XXI clause 8 (9) was added in 1995 
    and provides: ``At the time any appropriation bill is reported, all 
    points of order shall be considered as reserved.''. The following 
    incident, on May 23, 1994,(10) showed the willingness of 
    the Chair to protect the prerogatives of Members.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. House Rules and Manual Sec. 834 (1997).
 9. House Rules and Manual Sec. 848a (1997).
10. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ________, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
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      Permission for Committee on Appropriations To File a Privileged 
           Report on Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill, 1995

        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the Committee on Appropriations may have 
    until midnight tonight, May 23, 1994, to file a privileged report 
    to accompany a bill providing appropriations for Foreign Operations 
    for fiscal year 1995, and for other purposes.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (11) Is there objection to 
    the request of the gentleman from Wisconsin?
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11. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (Miss.).
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        Mr. [Gerald B. H.] Solomon [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, 
    reserving the right to object, we would like to know if the 
    minority has been informed. We are told that they have not been.
        Mr. Obey: If the gentleman will yield, I do not think that is 
    correct.
        Mr. Solomon: Mr. Speaker, I stand corrected. I understand that 
    the minority is aware of it, and we have no objection on this side 
    of the aisle.
        Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        There was no objection.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: All points of order are reserved.

Priority of Committee Members in Recognition for Point of Order

Sec. 1.4 Members of the committee reporting a bill have priority of 
    recognition to make points of order against proposed amendments to 
    bills.

        On Mar. 30, 1949,(12) in the Committee of the Whole, 
    Chairman Jere Cooper, of Tennessee, confronted with points of order 
    offered simultaneously by two Members, recognized the committee 
    member.
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12. 95 Cong. Rec. 3520, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 3838, the Interior Department general appropriation bill 
        for 1950.
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        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I offer my 
    amendment at this time and ask that it be read.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. [Henry M.] Jackson of Washington: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Carl T.] Curtis [of Nebraska]: Mr. Chairman, a point of 
    order.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Washington,

[[Page 11945]]

    a member of the committee, to state a point of order.
        Mr. Jackson of Washington: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of 
    order that this particular amendment is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill and imposes additional duties on the Bureau of 
    Reclamation.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from South Dakota desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman on the point of 
    order. . . .
        Does the gentleman from Nebraska desire to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        Mr. Curtis: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman briefly.
        Mr. Curtis: I rose to make the same point of order. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from South Dakota [Mr. Case] offers an amendment 
    which has been reported, against which the gentleman from 
    Washington [Mr. Jackson] makes a point of order on the ground it is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chair sustains the point of order.

Authority of the Chair To Reverse an Earlier Decision

Sec. 1.5 The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole has the authority 
    to reverse his ruling made earlier during the consideration of a 
    bill for amendment and on rare occasions does so when additional 
    information on the point of order is presented to him.

    The Committee on Appropriations has the burden of proving the 
authorization for projects carried in a general bill and has sometimes 
cited an ``organic law'' as the legal basis for a particular item of 
appropriation.
    While the Organic Act creating an agency can be cited to support an 
item of appropriation, on one occasion when such a law was cited and 
the Chair relied upon it to overrule a point of order, he later 
reversed his ruling when it was determined that the Organic Act had 
been amended to remove the portion thereof relied upon in the ruling.
    On June 8, 1983,(13) Chairman Gerry E. Studds, of 
Massachusetts, entertained argument against an appropriation for 
``Salaries and Expenses, Bureau of the Mint.'' The point of order was 
brought by a member of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, Frank Annunzio, of Illinois, who argued that the annual 
authorization for the Bureau had not been enacted into law.

[[Page 11946]]

The chairman of the Subcommittee on Treasury, Post Office 
Appropriations, Edward R. Roybal, of California, cited the provisions 
of law carried in title 31 of the United States Code, which established 
the Bureau of the Mint. The Chair relied upon these citations in 
holding that the appropriation was in fact authorized by law.
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13. 129 Cong. Rec. 14854, 14855, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                               Bureau of the Mint

                             Salaries and Expenses

            For necessary expenses of the Bureau of the Mint: 
        $49,558,000.

        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order that the 
    appropriations for the Bureau of the Mint, salaries and expenses, 
    contained in title I are not authorized by law.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Roybal) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Roybal: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I wish to be heard on the point 
    of order.
        The Bureau of the Mint has been operating under one form or 
    another since this country was first founded. The Mint has been 
    minting and issuing coins pursuant to authority found in title 31 
    of the United States Code. Section 251 of title 31 establishes the 
    Bureau and I would just like to read to the Chairman the first part 
    of section 251. It reads as follows:

            There shall be established in the Treasury Department a 
        Bureau of the Mint embracing as an organization and under its 
        control all mints for the manufacture of coin and all assay 
        offices for the stamping of bars which has been or which may be 
        authorized by law.

        Section 253 states:

            The Director of the Mint shall have the general supervision 
        of all mints and assay offices and shall make an annual report 
        to the Secretary of the Treasury of their operations at the 
        close of each fiscal year, and from time to time such 
        additional reports setting forth the operational conditions of 
        such institutions as the Secretary shall require, and shall lay 
        before him the annual estimates for their support; and the 
        Secretary of the Treasury shall appoint the number of clerks 
        classified according to law necessary to discharge the duties 
        of said Bureau.

        Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in addition to the 
    sections I have just read, sections 261 through 463 of title 31 set 
    forth in detail the duties of the Bureau of the Mint, and those 
    sections are replete with requirements that the mint must 
    accomplish certain acts.
        I would like to cite Deschler's and Brown's Procedure of the 
    House, chapter 25, section 5.7, which states in part, as follows. 
    Section 5.7 reads as follows:

            The failure of Congress to enact into law separate 
        legislation specifically authorizing appropriations for 
        existing programs does not necessarily render appropriations 
        for those programs subject to a point of order, where more 
        general existing law authorizes appropriations for such 
        programs. Thus, a paragraph in a general appropriation bill 
        purportedly containing some funds not yet specifically 
        authorized by separate legislation was held not to violate

[[Page 11947]]

        Rule XXI clause 2, where it was shown that all of the funds in 
        the paragraph were authorized by more general provisions of law 
        currently applicable to the programs in question.

        It is my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the general existing law 
    which I have just cited authorizes the appropriation. The United 
    States Code specifically establishes the Bureau of the Mint, and 
    because the Code requires the Mint to accomplish certain functions, 
    there is implicit in law the authority for the Congress to 
    appropriate funds to accomplish those objectives which Congress set 
    forth in law.

        Mr. Chairman, I ask that the point of order be overruled.
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard on the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio) but the Chair would ask him to address 
    himself to the necessity, as he claims in his point of order, for 
    an annual authorization for these funds.
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, I listened closely to the 
    explanation of the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee of 
    the Committee on Appropriations.
        If the Chair were to sustain the point of order, there would 
    not be any need for authorizing committees to present their 
    authorizations. The Appropriations Committee would be doing the 
    job.
        I would also like to cite that in clause 2, rule XXI of the 
    rules of the House, it states that funds cannot be appropriated 
    with an authorization.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Conte) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        MR. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I rise 
    in opposition to the point of order.
        The chairman of the subcommittee has cited a number of general 
    authorizations, which taken together constitute authorization 
    within the meaning and the application of rule XXI, clause 2.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Illinois makes the point of order that there 
    is no authorization for the expenses contained in the line in 
    question.
        The gentleman from California cites an organic statute creating 
    the office in question, namely, the Bureau of the Mint.
        The Chair is aware of the bill, H.R. 2628, passed by the House 
    earlier this year, but not yet law. That bill, if and when it 
    becomes law, will authorize some Bureau of Mint appropriations for 
    fiscal 1984 and provide other permanent authorizations for salaries 
    and expenses. Absent citation to such a statute requiring annual 
    authorization, however, the Chair believes that the gentleman from 
    California may rely on an organic act creating the office and 
    authorizing it as a standing authorization in law for the purposes 
    of the Bureau and, therefore, overrules the point of order.

    Later in the consideration of the bill,(14) more recent 
citations of law were called to the attention of the Chair which showed 
that the Organic Act had been supple

[[Page 11948]]

mented by a requirement in law for annual authorizations. The Chair 
then reversed his earlier decision. The proceedings were as follows: 
(15)
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14. H.R. 3132 (Treasury, Postal Service appropriation, 1984).
15. 129 Cong. Rec. 14876, 14877, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. Roybal: Mr. Chairman, I ask that the Chair return to page 
    5, lines 14 through 17, only for the purpose of hearing further 
    arguments on the point of order raised by the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio).
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. [Bill] Frenzel [of Minnesota]: Reserving the right to 
    object, Mr. Chairman--
        The Chairman: The gentleman did not propound a unanimous 
    consent request.
        Mr. Frenzel: A point of information, Mr. Chairman. Can the 
    Chair restate what the gentleman from California propounded?
        The Chairman: The gentleman from California requested the Chair 
    to entertain a return to a point of order earlier overruled.
        The Chair in rare circumstances may agree to such a request and 
    has recognized the gentleman to be heard.
        Mr. Frenzel: Can the Chair tell us what position in the bill 
    the point of order occurs?
        Mr. Chairman: will hear the gentleman from California and will 
    recognize him for that purpose, and the gentleman will point that 
    out.
        Mr. Roybal: Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Annunzio).
        Mr. Annunzio: Mr. Chairman, for the benefit of my distinguished 
    colleague, the gentleman from Minnesota, I am renewing my point of 
    order that the appropriation violates clause 2 of rule XXI, on page 
    5, line 14, of the rules of the House, in that they appropriate 
    funds without an authorization.
        A misunderstanding concerning the point of order has occurred 
    because of a change in the law that took place in 1981, the Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act. Prior to the passage of the act, the mint 
    operated under a permanent authorization and needed only to come 
    before the Appropriations Committee to obtain its funds.
        In 1981, however, the Congress changed that law so that the 
    mint had to first obtain a yearly authorization before obtaining an 
    appropriation.
        The report of the House Banking Committee on this legislation 
    makes that point very clear, that each year a new authorization is 
    needed. The report in part says:

            It is the intent of the Committee to repeal the permanent 
        authorization of the salaries and expenses of the Bureau of the 
        Mint.

        Further, the statement of the managers in the conference report 
    of the committee on the legislation makes the point even more 
    clear, that it is to be a yearly authorization. In part the report 
    states:

            The House bill terminated the permanent authorization for 
        appropriations for salaries and expenses for the Bureau of the 
        Mint. The Senate receded to the House.

        The Chairman: The Chair desires to make a statement. The Chair 
    apologizes in advance to the Members for the length of the 
    statement.

[[Page 11949]]

        Earlier, during consideration of the bill in the Committee of 
    the Whole, the Chair overruled a point of order against the 
    paragraph appropriating funds for the Bureau of the Mint, salaries 
    and expenses, on page 5, lines 14 through 17. In argument on the 
    point of order, the manager of the bill cited provisions of law 
    establishing and delegating functions to the Bureau of the Mint, as 
    sufficient authority to authorize appropriations for annual 
    expenses and salaries. The Chair has since become aware that those 
    provisions of law have been repealed, and that the statutes 
    relating to the mint have been amended, first by the Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act of 1981, then by the Omnibus Reconciliation Act 
    of 1982, and then by a complete recodification of title 31 of the 
    United States Code. No specific authorization of appropriations for 
    fiscal year 1984 has yet been enacted, but one has passed the House 
    (H.R. 2628).
        The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, Public Law 97-35, 
    provided in section 382 that the sentence in the Code (31 U.S.C. 
    369) which had been construed to provide a permanent authorization 
    of appropriations for the Bureau of the Mint be repealed, and 
    replaced that language with an authorization of appropriations for 
    fiscal year 1982 only. The report on that measure in the House 
    stated, on page 129, that by repealing the existing statutory 
    provision and by limiting the authorization to fiscal year 1982 
    only, it is the intent of the committee to repeal the permanent 
    authorization for the salaries and expenses of the Bureau of the 
    Mint. The joint explanatory statement of the conferees on the 
    Reconciliation Act reiterated that the House bill terminated the 
    permanent authorization for appropriations for salaries and 
    expenses of the Bureau of the Mint (page 717). The Omnibus 
    Reconciliation Act of 1982, Public Law 97-253, in section 202, 
    changed the 1982 authorization into a fiscal year 1983 
    authorization. Public Law 97-258 codified in its entirety title 31 
    of the United States Code, and carried the 1982 authorization in 
    section 5132 of title 31; all the old provisions of title 31 
    dealing with the mint, previously cited in argument on the point of 
    order, have been repealed. Public Law 97-452 modified the 
    codification to reflect the 1983 authorization carried in the 1982 
    Reconciliation Act. There remains no statutory language relating to 
    the mint which may be construed as a permanent authorization.
        The Chair recognizes that it is unusual for the Chair to 
    reverse a decision or ruling previously made, and it is the opinion 
    of the Chair that he should undertake such a course of action only 
    where new and substantial facts or circumstances, which were not 
    evident or stated in argument on a point of order, are subsequently 
    brought to his attention.
        In rare instances, the Chair has reversed a decision on his own 
    initiative; for example, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    in 1927, as cited in volume 8 of Cannon's Precedents section 3435, 
    held that a provision in a general appropriation bill constituted 
    legislation after reviewing a statute he was not previously aware 
    of when he had rendered a contrary decision.
        For the reasons stated, and in view of the unique and 
    compelling circumstances, the Chair holds that the language in the 
    bill on page 5, lines 14

[[Page 11950]]

    through 17, appropriating funds for the Bureau of the Mint, is 
    unauthorized and, therefore, rules the paragraph out of order.

Chair's Duty To Rule on Point of Order

Sec. 1.6 The Chair only rules on a point of order when required to do 
    so, and will permit withdrawal of an amendment (by unanimous 
    consent in Committee of the Whole) prior to ruling on a point of 
    order raised against the amendment.

    On June 7, 1983,(16) the energy and water development 
appropriation for fiscal 1984 (H.R. 3132), was under consideration in 
Committee of the Whole. An amendment, offered by Mr. Robert W. Edgar, 
of Pennsylvania, was subject to at least two possible points of order: 
it was ``legislation'' in violation of Rule XXI clause 2; and it 
affected the level of excise tax and was thus a violation of Rule XXI 
clause 5(b), which prohibits tax or tariff measures from being in order 
to a measure not reported by the Committee on Ways and Means. Points of 
order were reserved against the amendment, and, after discussion, the 
proponent of the amendment asked that it be withdrawn.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 129 Cong. Rec. 14656, 14657, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Edgar: On page 8, after line 2, 
        add the following new section:
            ``Sec. 104. Within funds available in the construction 
        general account, including but not limited to funds deferred, 
        the Corps of Engineers is directed to complete the navigation 
        and related features of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway at a 
        total additional Federal cost of $202,000,000. Section 206 of 
        the Inland Waterways Revenue Act of 1978 is amended by adding 
        at the end thereof the following: `(27) Tennessee-Tombigbee 
        Waterway: From the Pickwick Pool on the Tennessee River at RM 
        215 to Demopolis, Alabama, on the Tombigbee River at RM 215.4.' 
        ''.

        Mr. [Tom] Bevill [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point 
    of order on this amendment.
        The Chairman: (17) The gentleman from Alabama (Mr. 
    Bevill) reserves a point of order against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Donald J. Pease (Ohio).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ronnie G.] Flippo [of Alabama]: Mr. Chairman, I also make 
    a point of order against the gentleman's amendment on the grounds 
    that it violates paragraph (b), clause 5, rule XXI of the rules of 
    the House.
        The Chairman: Would the gentleman suspend.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman reserves a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Edgar: Mr. Chairman, with those assurances, I would like to 
    ask

[[Page 11951]]

    unanimous consent to withdraw my amendment at this time.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania?
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to object to the 
    unanimous-consent request.
        I wish to make a point of order against the amendment because 
    the amendment violates paragraph (b), clause 5, rule XXI of the 
    Rules of the House of Representatives.
        The Chairman: If the gentleman would suspend a moment, proper 
    procedure is for the gentleman to object to the unanimous-consent 
    request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, to withdraw his 
    amendment and then to make a point of order.
        Mr. Flippo: I do object to the unanimous-consent request.
        Mr. Edgar: Will the gentleman reserve the right to object?
        Mr. Flippo: I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Edgar: Before the gentleman makes his objection, the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania is attempting to remove the impediment 
    that the gentleman wants to call a point of order against, simply 
    because the gentleman has made the assurances.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I do not object to the gentleman's 
    request and I withdraw my reservation of objection.

        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania to withdraw the amendment?
        There was no objection.

Preliminary Argument on Point of Order

Sec. 1.7 Arguments in support of a point of order may be submitted for 
    the information of the Speaker in advance of raising the point of 
    order.

    On July 12, 1935,(18) Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, 
informed the Speaker of arguments that he intended to use to support 
anticipated points of order, thus enabling Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, to research the applicable precedents and authorities ahead 
of time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 79 Cong. Rec. 11113, 11114, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. The discussion 
        pertained to the provisions of the Private Calendar rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Blanton: Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the Chair, I 
    should like to make a point of order with respect to certain bills 
    that will come up next Tuesday, and then let the point of order be 
    pending, so that the Speaker in the meantime may examine the 
    authorities which may be presented by myself or by the 
    Parliamentarian.
        The Speaker: The Chair will be glad to hear the gentleman.

    Parliamentarian's Note: The Speaker would have discretion whether 
to recognize for such anticipatory argument and could request its 
informal submission in writing, in lieu of using the time of the House.

Discretion of Chair

Sec. 1.8 It is within the discretion of the Chair whether to en

[[Page 11952]]

    tertain more than one point of order to a paragraph at the same 
    time.

    On Mar. 29, 1966,(19) in the Committee of the Whole, the 
Chair entertained and overruled two points of order made against 
separate language in the same paragraph of a general appropriation bill 
simultaneously.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 112 Cong. Rec. 7103, 7104, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 14012, the second supplemental appropriation for 
        fiscal 1966.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Melvin R.] Laird [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Chairman, I raise a 
    point of order against lines 6 through 22 on page 4 of the pending 
    legislation, and desire to be heard on the point of order.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. James G. O'Hara (Mich.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, the language contained in lines 15 
    through 22 [is] a clear violation of rule XXI of the Rules of the 
    House of Representatives, wherein clause 2 states: . . .
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I have a point of order on line 12, 
    which reads ``in any fiscal year.'' Is it in order to make that 
    point now, or should it be made at the conclusion of the Chair's 
    ruling?
        The Chairman: It can be made now. The Chair will rule on both 
    points of order.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    language appearing on line 12 . . . to the words ``any fiscal 
    year,'' on the grounds that it is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill which binds the appropriations for all future times. . . .
        Mr. Laird: Mr. Chairman, I accept the inclusion of the point of 
    order by the gentleman from Illinois, and under the terms of Hinds' 
    Precedents, my point of order is raised against the entire section 
    and I would include the point made by the gentleman from Illinois 
    against the entire section.
        The Chairman: The Chair will pass on both points of order at 
    this moment, and the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair finds that the decision of the Chair on H.R. 11588, a 
    bill providing for supplemental appropriations, on the 14th of 
    October 1965, did include language identical to that subject to the 
    point of order made by the gentleman from Wisconsin and identical 
    to that subject to the point of order made by the gentleman from 
    Illinois. At that time both points of order were ruled upon by the 
    Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House, Mr. Harris, of 
    Arkansas. He ruled that the proviso constituted a limitation 
    negative in nature that did not impose additional duties upon the 
    administration and overruled the point of order on both points.
        The Chair, on the basis of the ruling of the Chairman on the 
    14th of October 1965, referred to, overrules the point of order of 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin and the point of order of the 
    gentleman from Illinois.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Since Mr. Laird incorporated Mr. Yates'

[[Page 11953]]

point of order into his own as against the entire paragraph, it was 
proper for the Chair to rule simultaneously on both.

Sec. 1.9 It is within the discretion of the Chair as to which of 
    several points of order he will hear or decide first.

    On Dec. 15, 1937, in the Committee of the Whole, the following 
proceedings took place: (1)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 82 Cong. Rec. 1579, 75th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Bertrand H.] Snell [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield to me to make a parliamentary inquiry?
        Mr. [Jere] Cooper [of Tennessee]: Mr. Chairman, I yield.
        Mr. Snell: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that one point of order 
    ought to be disposed of before we start on another point of order, 
    that that would be the better procedure and more orderly than to 
    have all of these points of order made at one time, because they 
    are all entirely different. When the gentleman from Tennessee began 
    to state his point of order I thought it was along the same lines 
    as my own.
        Mr. Cooper: Of course, my point of order was raised at this 
    time at the invitation of the Chair.
        Mr. Snell: I think one point of order should be considered at a 
    time, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Cooper: From my viewpoint I think they should all be 
    presented.
        The Chairman: (2) The Chair feels it is within the 
    discretion of the Chair to hear all points of order at the same 
    time that relate to germaneness, and also in the discretion of the 
    Chair as to which one he will rule upon in the first instance. . . 
    .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. John W. McCormack (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair feels it would be in the best interest of orderly 
    conduct if the procedure indicated by the Chair is followed.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Although several points of order against a 
proposition may be pending at the same time, the Chair may choose any 
one of them as a basis for ruling out the proposition without citing 
the remaining points of order. The Chair would normally follow the 
principle that he should avoid making an unnecessary ruling, if 
possible, by ruling first on points of order which he would sustain, 
thereby rendering moot the remaining points of order.

Multiple Points of Order Against Paragraph, Chair May Be Selective in 
    Ruling

Sec. 1.10 Every argument raised against a paragraph in an appropriation 
    bill need not be addressed when the Chair responds to a point of 
    order; and if the language is subject to one point of order, since 
    it is unauthorized by law, he need not refute other assertions not 
    necessary to reach this decision.

[[Page 11954]]

    On Sept. 23, 1993,(3) the Department of Transportation 
appropriation bill for fiscal 1994 was being read for amendment. By 
unanimous consent, the Committee permitted a return to a paragraph 
already passed in the reading. A point of order was raised against the 
paragraph and the proceedings were as shown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 139 Cong. Rec. 22172, 22173, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (4) The Chair would advise the 
    gentleman that the Clerk was beginning to read the paragraph 
    beginning on line 16, page 21, but had not commenced the reading of 
    that paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. Rick Boucher (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Norman Y.] Mineta [of California]: Let me ask about page 
    21, lines 1 through 7.
        The Chairman: That section has been read.
        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I did not hear that portion being 
    read, and I have a point of order on that provision.
        The Chairman: The Chair would advise the gentleman that that 
    section of the bill has been passed in the reading and would ask 
    the gentleman if he desires to make a unanimous-consent request 
    that the Committee return to that section.
        Mr. Mineta: Since I did not, and I believe other Members have 
    not heard that portion read, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous 
    consent that that portion be read for consideration at this point.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California? . . .
        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: The Committee will return to line 1 on page 21.
        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            Kentucky Bridge Project

                              (highway trust fund)

            For up to 80 percent of the expenses necessary for 
        continuing construction to replace the Glover Cary Bridge in 
        Owensboro, Kentucky, $12,000,000, to be derived from the 
        Highway Trust Fund and to remain available until September 30, 
        1997. . . .

        The Chairman: Are there any points of order to be raised to 
    that language?

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against page 
    21, lines 1 through 7, on the basis that this provision violates 
    clause 2 of rule XXI. First of all, this project is unauthorized. 
    And while there have been previous appropriations, the project has 
    never been authorized by law.
        In addition, the period of funding availability until September 
    30, 1997, is not authorized.
        Also, this provision appropriates money out of the highway 
    trust fund, contrary to section 9503(C)(1) of the Internal Revenue 
    Code. That section provides that the highway trust fund may only be 
    used to fund programs authorized in the Highway Acts of 1956, 1982, 
    1987, and 1991. Thus, because this provision provides funding from

[[Page 11955]]

    the highway trust fund for a project not authorized by one of these 
    laws, it has the effect of changing existing law, and, therefore, 
    is in violation of rule XXI.
        Finally, this provision does not come within the exception to 
    rule XXI, clause 2(A), for continuation of appropriations for 
    public works and objects which are already in progress.
        It is clear from the precedents that the exception is narrowly 
    construed and has been applied only to Federal projects. As applied 
    specifically to highways, the precedents have required that the 
    United States actually hold title to the road. The project in this 
    paragraph does not meet this test. Thus, Mr. Chairman, for the 
    reasons enumerated above, lines 1 through 7 on page 21 are in 
    violation of rule XXI and subject to a point of order.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Carr] 
    desire to be heard?
        Mr. [Bob] Carr of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, I do. This falls 
    within the exceptions in rule XXI for works in progress, and we 
    would ask the Chair to rule.
        The Chairman: Do other Members desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from California [Mr. Mineta] makes the point of 
    order that the funds appropriated in the paragraph entitled 
    ``Kentucky Bridge Project'' are unauthorized and thus in violation 
    of clause 2 of rule XXI. The gentleman from Michigan has argued 
    that although the funds are indeed unauthorized they are in order 
    under the exception to clause 2 of rule XXI which allows 
    unauthorized appropriations to continue funding public works and 
    objects which are already in progress, referred to as the ``works-
    in-progress exception.'' The Chair need not rule on whether this 
    project is exclusively a federally-owned project.
        The legal authority for expending highway trust funds is 
    outlined in section 9503(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. That 
    section states in positive terms that highway trust fund moneys 
    shall be available where authorized by specific enumerated acts. 
    The paragraph in question circumvents that requirement. Deschler's 
    Precedents, volume 8, chapter 26, section 8.9, stands for the 
    proposition that the works-in-progress exception may not be invoked 
    to circumvent existing law. Therefore, the Chair sustains the point 
    of order.

Multiple Reasons for Sustaining a Point of Order

Sec. 1.11 Any number of reasons may be advanced at one time to 
    determine whether a matter is subject to a point of order.

    On Apr. 5, 1946,(5) Mr. Adam C. Powell, Jr., of New 
York, offered an amendment to a general appropriation bill prohibiting 
the use of the funds therein provided to any office, agency, or 
department of the District of Columbia which

[[Page 11956]]

segregated the citizens of the District on the basis of race, color, 
creed, or place of national origin. Several points of order based upon 
the germaneness rule [Rule XVI clause 7, House Rules and Manual Sec.  
794 (1997)] and upon the rule precluding legislation on a general 
appropriation bill [Rule XXI clause 2(b), House Rules and Manual Sec.  
834b (1997)] were immediately raised against the amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. 92 Cong. Rec. 3227, 79th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 5990, a District of Columbia appropriation bill for fiscal 
        1947.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: (6) The gentleman will state the point 
    of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. Aime J. Forand (R.I.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that the 
    amendment is not germane, and that it is legislation on an 
    appropriation bill, in that it attempts to change the fundamental 
    laws of the District of Columbia. . . .
        Mr. [John M.] Coffee [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order that the amendment proposes to incorporate a 
    legislative provision in an appropriation bill that does not come 
    within the purview of the Holman rule and that it sets up an 
    affirmative agency in the law.
        Mr. [Howard W.] Smith of Virginia: Mr. Chairman, I desire to 
    add further points of order upon which I should like to be heard at 
    a later time in the discussion.
        These points of order led to the following exchange, which is 
    illustrative of the rule:
        Mr. [Vito] Marcantonio [of New York]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Marcantonio: Then there will be two points of order pending 
    at the same time.
        The Chairman: Any number of reasons can be given for the point 
    of order.

Chair's Obligation in Case of Multiple Points of Order

Sec. 1.12 If several points of order are made against an amendment and 
    the Chair sustains one of them, it is not necessary that he rule on 
    the remainder as the amendment is no longer pending.

    When the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary appropriation bill 
for fiscal 1979 was under consideration in the Committee of the Whole 
on June 14, 1978,(7) an amendment, phrased as a restriction 
of all funds in the bill for certain types of advertising of unsafe 
products, was offered by Mr. Mark Andrews, of North Dakota. Mr. Bob 
Eckhardt, of Texas, raised two points of order against the amendment. 
The proceedings were as indicated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. 124 Cong. Rec. 17644, 17646, 17647, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.

[[Page 11957]]

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: on page 
        51 after line 16, insert the following:
            Sec. 605. Except for funds appropriated to the Judiciary in 
        title IV of this act, no part of any appropriation contained in 
        this act may be used to pay the salary or expenses of any 
        person to limit the advertising of: (1) any food product that 
        contains ingredients that have been determined to be safe for 
        human consumption by the Food and Drug Administration or are 
        considered to be ``Generally Recognized as Safe'' (GRAS) and 
        does not contain ingredients that have been determined to be 
        unsafe for human consumption by the FDA; (2) any toy which has 
        not been declared hazardous or unsafe by the Consumer Product 
        Safety Commission.

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order on the 
    amendment.
        The Chairman: (8) The gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
    Eckhardt) reserves a point of order. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. George E. Brown, Jr. (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Does the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) desire to press 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Eckhardt: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Eckhardt: The amendment is legislation on an appropriation 
    bill, and as such is subject to a point of order under rule XXI, 
    clause 2.
        Mr. Chairman, it is provided in the very first section of 
    Deschler on this particular point that:

            When an amendment, while curtailing certain uses of funds 
        carried in the bill, explicitly places new duties on officers 
        of the government or implicitly requires them to make new 
        investigations, compile evidence, or make judgments and 
        determinations not otherwise required of them by law, then it 
        assumes the character of legislation and is subject to a point 
        of order.

        That is the main thrust of my point of order but I also believe 
    that in the colloquy it becomes rather apparent that this amendment 
    was directed at the Federal Trade Commission section of the bill 
    which has come out. Therefore, I would also offer alternatively, or 
    additionally, the point of order that this is not germane to the 
    bill as it is now before us.
        On that latter objection, which I will speak to only very 
    briefly, the argument and the thrust of the amendment clearly goes 
    toward rulemaking authority. But I should primarily like to speak 
    on the point of order based on the proposition that I just read, 
    that is, that this constitutes legislation on an appropriations 
    bill and gives to officers of the Government very, very large 
    additional duties as the result of the passage of this amendment, 
    should it be passed.
        I point primarily to the case which I believe is directly in 
    point. On June 21, 1974, there was a point of order made by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Moss) to a provision in the 
    appropriations bill at that time, section 511. The gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Moss), asserted that the language would impose 
    additional duties on every agency subject to the bill and was 
    legislation on an appropriation. The language of the section was as 
    follows:

            Except as provided in existing law, funds provided in this 
        act shall be

[[Page 11958]]

        available only for the purposes for which they are 
        appropriated.

        Mr. Moss correctly pointed out that if that provision was 
    sustained, it would be necessary in the use of any funds by an 
    agency involved to go back and show that the Appropriations 
    Committee had addressed the specific object of the use of those 
    funds. The gentleman from California (Mr. Moss), pressed that point 
    very strongly. The gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. Whitten) then 
    contended that he considered this only as limiting the legislation 
    to existing law, and the present speaker joined in supporting the 
    Moss point of order.
        I said at that time that as I understood the gentleman from 
    Mississippi, Mr. Whitten's, position on the provision, it meant 
    that each of the specific appropriations would have to be 
    considered with respect to the process brought forth in that 
    committee's hearings.
        The Chair ruled as follows:

            The Chair is prepared to rule on the point of order. If the 
        language means what the gentleman from Mississippi now says it 
        does, then the language is a nullity because it just repeats 
        existing law. The Chair is of the opinion, though, that there 
        is a possibility, as earlier indicated during general debate 
        and as suggested by the gentleman from California, that the 
        amendment imposes an additional burden, and the Chair, 
        therefore, sustains the point of order.

        There are a number of cases, of course, in Deschler around this 
    area that I have cited that bear out the point that I have made, 
    but I know that the Chair is familiar with the general proposition 
    and I shall not recite them. But I do want to say and show on that 
    point of order if its facts should be sustained, then our 
    contention that there is an additional burden on administrators is 
    demonstrated in spades in this amendment. This amendment says that 
    none of the funds appropriated ``in this act may be used to pay the 
    salary or expenses of any person to limit the advertising of: 
    First, any food product that contains ingredients that have been 
    determined to be safe for human consumption by the Food and Drug 
    Administration or are considered to be `generally recognized as 
    safe.'.''
        The Food and Drug Administration does not list food products as 
    safe or unsafe. The Food and Drug Adminis-tration only determines 
    whether or not ingredients in food products are safe or unsafe. 
    Therefore, if this restriction were placed in law, it would be 
    necessary for an agency like the Federal Communications Commission, 
    when it is determining whether or not funds might be used in order 
    to take some action respecting unsafe foods, to look to see what 
    ingredients were included in the particular food involved. In other 
    words, the Federal Communications Commission would have to exercise 
    the same type of expertise, the same type of technical research 
    that the other agency has had to go through. In addition to this, 
    the amendment says that none of these funds can be used with regard 
    to any toy which has not been declared hazardous or unsafe by the 
    Consumer Product Safety Commission. The Consumer Product Safety 
    Commission does not list specific toys as unsafe.
        The Consumer Product Safety Commission determines what minimum 
    design or what minimum standards, per

[[Page 11959]]

    formance standards, are necessary in order for a toy to be 
    permitted to go on the market. For instance, a toy that melts lead 
    to make toy soldiers might be unsafe because of the method in which 
    it melts the lead and exposes persons to heat.
        The point, though, is that the Commission does not establish 
    that this particular toy is unsafe. If we pass this restriction, we 
    would place the burden on the FTC to go in and look at every toy 
    and then apply the standards of the Consumer Product Agency to 
    those toys to find out whether they could be advertised.
        So, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a classic example of placing 
    on every agency to whom this restriction would apply very extensive 
    duties beyond that which they are now called upon to exercise.
        In addition, it would place the same burden on other agencies, 
    like the Consumer Product Safety Commission, to change their rules 
    to make different modes of establishing and identifying unsafe 
    toys.
        Mr. Chairman, I urge that the point of order be sustained.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from North Dakota (Mr. 
    Andrews) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Andrews of North Dakota: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the House of Representatives has 
    accepted as ``in order'' amendments to appropriations bills which 
    are negative prohibitions, descriptive of employment not mandated 
    by law which may not be undertaken if those individuals are to be 
    compensated by funds in the bill.
        This type of amendment is clearly described in Deschler's 
    Procedure. The following are two examples of such an amendment:
        On June 21, 1974, the House held in order an amendment by 
    Representative Whitten of Mississippi to limit funds used by the 
    FTC to collect line of business data.
        On October 9, 1974, the House held in order an amendment to 
    prohibit EPA from using funds to tax, limit or regulate parking 
    facilities.
        Mr. Chairman, addressing the question of germaneness, the House 
    Manual, section 795, states that an amendment in the form of a new 
    paragraph must be germane to the bill as a whole.
        It certainly is, because the bill contains funding for the 
    Federal Communications Commission, which is the only agency which 
    has so far put in detail an investigation of this type of action.
        Second, addressing the issue of legislation on an appropriation 
    bill, to implement the limitation the agency only need examine 
    information which it now receives under existing laws; so there are 
    no additional substantive duties, judgments or determinations.
        Therefore, since this amendment is based on a clearly 
    discernible standard and since chapter 25, section 10.4 says:

            Where the manifest intent of a proposed amendment is to 
        impose a limitation on the use of funds appropriated in the 
        bill, the fact that the administration of the limitation will 
        impose certain incidental but additional burdens on executive 
        officers does not destroy the character of the limitation.

        Mr. Chairman, based on this, I feel that the amendment is in 
    order. I would hope the Chair would rule accordingly.

[[Page 11960]]

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Dicks) 
    desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Norman D.] Dicks [of Washington]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, just to reiterate on this point, this amendment 
    was aimed at limiting the Federal Trade Commission. Now that that 
    section has been stricken, the only way it can apply is to the FCC. 
    The FCC does not have to regulate itself for advertising. That 
    jurisdiction falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
    Commission.
        Therefore, it creates new legal duties for the FCC, which are 
    beyond the scope of an appropriation bill, which makes it 
    legislation within an appropriation bill and, therefore, subject to 
    rule XXI, clause 2.
        Also the ruling made by the Consumer Product Safety Commission 
    is accurate. The language does not go to unsafe toys, and they 
    would have additional duties created by this amendment.
        Mr. Chairman, I also believe that clause 2, rule XXI, applies 
    in this case.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt) makes the point of 
    order that the amendment offered by the gentleman from North Dakota 
    (Mr. Andrews) constitutes legislation on an appropriation bill. In 
    addition, he makes the point that because it was drafted originally 
    to be applicable to the Federal Trade Commission and that section 
    of the bill has been stricken, it is no longer germane to the bill.
        The Chair does not find it necessary to rule, however, on the 
    point of germaneness.
        The amendment would prohibit use of any funds in the bill to 
    limit advertising of food products and toys in relation to which 
    determinations have been made by the Food and Drug Administration 
    and the Consumer Product Safety Commission. As indicated by the 
    arguments made on the point of order, this bill now contains no 
    funds for the Federal Trade Commission but does contain funds for 
    the Federal Communications Commission. The Chair feels it is 
    necessary to lay that basis in order to determine whether the 
    amendment requires new duties or determinations of a particular 
    agency which are not now required by law.
        The Federal Communications Commission has the authority under 
    the law to regulate interstate and foreign communications and 
    transmissions in wire and radio, but existing law contains no 
    mandate that the Commission consider whether food and toy products 
    are safe or unsafe in regulating broadcasts within its 
    jurisdiction. The amendment would disallow funds for the Commission 
    to limit advertising of certain products, even if the purpose for 
    such regulatory limitations was totally unrelated to the safety of 
    the product in question. In considering any proposal to limit 
    advertising of food or toy products, the Commission would be 
    required to first determine the scope and extent of determinations 
    of other agencies on the safety of those products, and it is far 
    from clear whether such determinations are readily available or 
    sufficiently certain to determine whether the limitation would 
    apply in a particular case.
        Furthermore, in relation to food products, the Commission would 
    have to determine whether the finished food

[[Page 11961]]

    product contained ingredients which have been declared safe if the 
    Food and Drug Administration had made no determination on the 
    safety of such a finished product.

        The Chair would also note that the amendment would prohibit 
    advertising of food products containing ingredients considered to 
    be generally recognized as safe, without specifically indicating 
    whether that determination is to be made by the FDA or by the 
    Federal Communications Commission.
        For the reasons stated, the Chair finds that the amendment 
    would impose substantial new duties and requirements on the Federal 
    Communications Commission beyond its authorities under existing law 
    and, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Points of Order Against En Bloc Amendments

Sec. 1.13 Where amendments to the pending paragraph of an appropriation 
    bill and to the following section were, by unanimous consent, 
    considered en bloc, a point of order was lodged against both 
    amendments based on identical legislative language therein and was 
    sustained by the Chair.

    On July 31, 1969,(9) where amendments to a bill were 
considered en bloc in the Committee of the Whole, Chairman Chet 
Holifield, of California, ruled simultaneously on points of order 
against two amendments containing identical language.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 115 Cong. Rec. 21675, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 13111, the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and 
        Welfare appropriations for fiscal 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Silvio O.] Conte [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments and I ask unanimous consent that the amendments be 
    considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts?
        There was no objection. . . .
        Mr. [Robert L. F.] Sikes [of Florida]: Mr. Chairman, I wish to 
    make a point of order against the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will hear the gentleman.
        Mr. Sikes: Mr. Chairman, it appears to me that the rulings of 
    the Chair heretofore on this bill this afternoon show clearly that 
    this is legislation on an appropriation bill. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule. The Chair 
    recognizes that this is a very difficult matter. The proposed 
    amendment for section 408 is different from section 408 of the bill 
    in that it has added the words ``in order to overcome racial 
    imbalance.''. . .
        Mr. Conte: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard for a minute?
        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman, 
    regular order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will please desist until the Chair 
    has finished his ruling on the second amend

[[Page 11962]]

    ment because they are being considered en bloc.
        The additional words in the amendment to section 409 are ``in 
    order to overcome racial imbalance'' and this clearly requires 
    additional duties on the part of the officials. Therefore, it is 
    not negative in nature and is legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order.

Sec. 1.14 If a point of order is sustained against any portion of a 
    package of amendments being considered ``en bloc'' on a general 
    appropriation bill, all the amendments are ruled out and those not 
    subject to a point of order must be reoffered separately.

    On Sept. 16, 1981,(10) the House had under consideration 
the military construction appropriations for fiscal 1982. Amendments 
were offered, and by unanimous consent, were considered en bloc. The 
proceedings are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 127 Cong. Rec. 20735-38, 97th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Ronald B. (Bo)] Ginn [of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I ask 
    unanimous consent that the bill be considered as read and open to 
    amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: (11) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Georgia?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Philip R. Sharp (Ind.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.
        The Chairman: Are there any points of order against the bill? 
    The Chair hears none. . . .
        Mr. [M. Caldwell] Butler [of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments, and I ask unanimous consent that these amendments be 
    considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from Virginia?
        There was no objection. . . .

            Amendments offered by Mr. Butler: Page 2, line 11, strike 
        out ``$1,029,519,000'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$1,009,276,400''.
            Page 3, line 6, strike out ``$1,404,883,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$1,354,096,100'' . . .
            Page 6, line 16, strike out ``$36,000,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$34,345,000''.
            Page 6, line 22, strike out ``$37,400,000'' and insert in 
        lieu thereof ``$35,855,000''.
            Page 14, after line 13, insert the following new section:
            Sec. 123. The provisions of the Act of March 3, 1931 (40 
        U.S.C. 276a-276a-5; 46 Stat. 1494), commonly referred to as the 
        Davis-Bacon Act, shall not apply to the wages paid to laborers 
        and mechanics for any work or services performed under any 
        contract entered into on or after the date of enactment of this 
        Act for the construction of any project funds for which are 
        appropriated by this Act.

                               POINT OF ORDER

        Mr. Ginn: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendments.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Ginn: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendments because they constitute legislation in

[[Page 11963]]

    an appropriations bill, which is in violation of clause 2, rule 
    XXI.
        The amendments proposed constitute a change in existing law, 
    which under House rules is not allowed through an appropriations 
    bill.
        The amendments are legislative in nature and are in violation 
    of clause 2, rule XXI. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I ask for a ruling 
    from the Chair. . . .
        Mr. [Thomas F.] Hartnett [of South Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Hartnett: We do not have a whole lot of on-the-job training 
    for new Members who just arrived in the 97th Congress. In the event 
    I would want to raise a point of order, as did the distinguished 
    chairman from Georgia, that the amendment is what I would call 
    double or triple barreled, that I, as a Member, although I may want 
    to vote for some of the changes that are proposed by the gentleman 
    from Virginia (Mr. Butler) in his amendment to the bill, I may not 
    want to vote for others.
        My inquiry is: Is this amendment being offered as one 
    amendment, and if it is, would the point of order be in order that 
    the amendment was not properly drawn and that I was being precluded 
    from voting for--I would have to vote for or against all of them 
    where, in fact, I may want to vote for one or the other?
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the gentleman's inquiry 
    by stating that the gentleman from Virginia has already gotten 
    unanimous consent to offer his amendments en bloc. However, if a 
    point of order is sustained against those amendments or any portion 
    thereof, under the precedent the remaining amendments will have to 
    be reoffered, at which point the gentleman from Virginia will again 
    have to ask permission to have them offered en bloc. If that is 
    denied, then the amendments would have to be offered individually.
        Mr. Hartnett: Mr. Chairman, what you are telling me is, in 
    order for the gentleman from Virginia to offer a series of 
    amendments like that, the gentleman has to obtain unanimous consent 
    prior to doing that or, in fact, he would have to offer each one of 
    them individually?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. The very first action 
    the gentleman from Virginia engaged in was to ask for such 
    unanimous consent.
        Mr. Hartnett: I thank the Chair.

Multiple Points of Order Against Paragraph in General Appropriation 
    Bill

Sec. 1.15 Where two points of order are made against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill which has just been read, one against a 
    proviso in the paragraph and the other against the totality of the 
    paragraph, it is the broader point of order which the Chair must 
    address and upon which he must rule.

    During the reading for amendment of the supplemental appropriation 
bill, fiscal 1978, on Oct. 19, 1977,(12) a paragraph dealing

[[Page 11964]]

with the Federal Energy Administration was read by the Clerk. Mr. Frank 
Horton, of New York, made a point of order against a proviso in the 
paragraph which contained a waiver of existing law. Mr. Robert L. 
Ottinger, of New York, then raised a point of order against the entire 
paragraph, addressing not only the change in law highlighted by Mr. 
Horton, but the unauthorized items funded in the paragraph. Chairman 
Sam Gibbons, of Florida, ultimately ruled out the entire paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 123 Cong. Rec. 34245, 34246, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                RELATED AGENCIES

                         Federal Energy Administration

                             Salaries and Expenses

            For an additional amount for ``Salaries and expenses'', 
        $293,611,000, of which $266,145,000 shall become available only 
        upon enactment of authorizing legislation as follows: (1) for 
        conservation grants for schools and health care facilities, 
        $200,000,000; for conservation grants for local government 
        buildings, $25,000,000; for grants for financial assistance to 
        utility regulatory commissions, $11,250,000; for solar heating 
        and cooling installations in federal buildings, $25,000,000; to 
        remain available for obligation until September 30, 1979; and 
        (2) for administration of grants for schools and health care 
        facilities, local government buildings, and utility rate 
        reform, $1,480,000; and for a federal vanpooling program, 
        $3,415,000: Provided That of the total amount of this 
        appropriation, not to exceed $6,000,000, shall remain available 
        until expended for a reserve to cover any defaults from loan 
        guarantees issued to develop underground coal mines as 
        authorized by Public Law 94-163: Provided further, That the 
        indebtedness guaranteed or committed to be guaranteed under 
        said law shall not exceed the aggregate of $62,000,000: 
        Provided further, That notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) 
        government-owned vehicles may be used to initiate vanpool 
        demonstration projects.

        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    portion of this chapter which appropriates funds for a Federal 
    vanpooling program. The appropriation is contained in lines 15 and 
    16 of page 8--in the words ``; and for a Federal vanpooling 
    program, $3,415,000''. Related language, to which my point of order 
    should also apply since these words have no meaning in the bill 
    except as they pertain to the vanpooling appropriation, is 
    contained in lines 23 and 24 of page 8 and lines 1 and 2 of page 9:

            Provided further, That notwithstanding 31 U.S.C. 638a(c)(2) 
        government-owned vehicles may be used to initiate vanpool 
        demonstration projects.

        Mr. Chairman, these provisions violate rule XXI, clause 2, of 
    the Rules of the House. This rule states, in pertinent part:

            No appropriation shall be reported in any general 
        appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for 
        any expenditure not previously authorized by law, unless in

[[Page 11965]]

        continuation of appropriations for such public works and 
        objects as are already in progress.

        A Federal vanpooling program has never been authorized and is 
    not now in progress. In fact, the House has rejected such a program 
    twice, the second time by an even larger margin than the first. We 
    considered vanpooling as section 701 of H.R. 8444, the National 
    Energy Act, in August of this year. I moved to strike that section 
    from the bill, and my amendment carried with strong bipartisan 
    support, 232 to 184. When the bill was reported back to the House 
    by the Committee of the Whole, a separate vote was demanded on my 
    amendment. In the separate vote, the amendment was agreed to by a 
    vote of 239 to 180.
        Mr. Chairman, I am opposed to the House creating by a few words 
    in an appropriation bill a program which it has twice explicitly 
    rejected in the past. That is why I have raised this point of order 
    against H.R. 9375's appropriation of funds for a Federal vanpooling 
    program.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Ottinger: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    portion of the bill H.R. 9375 appropriating salaries and expenses 
    for the Federal Energy Administration.

        The particular provision appropriates $266,145,000 for several 
    purposes all of which are prefaced by the phrase that such 
    appropriation is subject to ``enactment of authorizing 
    legislation.''
The purposes are:

        Conservation grants for schools and health care facilities, 
    $200 million;
        Conservation grants for local government buildings, $25 
    million;
        Grants for financial assistance to utility regulatory 
    commissions, $11,250,000;
        Solar heating and cooling installations in Federal buildings, 
    $25 million;
        Administration of grants for schools and health care 
    facilities, local government buildings, and utility rate reform, 
    $1,480,000; and
        Federal vanpooling programs, $3,415,000.
        Mr. Chairman, rule XXI, clause 2, provides that no 
    appropriations shall be reported in any general appropriation bill 
    for any expenditure not previously authorized by law. All of the 
    above provisions are unauthorized. They are now a part of the 
    versions of the National Energy Act legislation pending in the 
    House and the Senate. The vanpooling provision was soundly rejected 
    by the House last August in connection with H.R. 8444. The 
    precedents show that an authorization must be enacted before the 
    appropriation may be included in an appropriation bill. Thus, 
    delaying the availability of an appropriation pending enactment of 
    the authorization, as is done in H.R. 9375, does not protect the 
    item of appropriation against the point of order under rule XXI, 
    clause 2. See, Congressional Record, April 26, 1972, page 14455. 
    See also, 114 Congressional Record, 15354, 90th Congress, second 
    session, May 28, 1968, where it was ruled that an appropriation for 
    a maritime ship construction operation and research not yet 
    authorized by law for the fiscal year of the appropriation was

[[Page 11966]]

    conceded to be unauthorized and was ruled in violation of rule XXI, 
    clause 2. . . .
        The Chairman: Does any other Member desire to be heard?
        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I think I 
    should respond to the point of order. The gentleman is correct 
    insofar as the point of order is concerned. The purpose of the 
    subcommittee in placing these appropriations in this bill was in 
    order to expedite the activities of the Federal Energy 
    Administration at a critical time. It is my understanding that the 
    conferees for both the House and the Senate have very nearly 
    reached agreement on the bill.
        The action of the gentleman in offering the point of order, in 
    my judgment, will slow down the activities of the Federal Energy 
    Administration. However, let me say that as far as the point of 
    order itself is concerned, we are constrained to concede it. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Exactly what lines were stricken by the point of 
    order?
        The Chairman: The point of order requests the striking of the 
    language on page 8, line 2, through page 9, line 2; the entire 
    section.
        Mr. Yates: Up to the line, ``strategic petroleum reserve.''
        The Chairman: Does anyone else desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I did not understand what the Chair 
    said as to the language that is to be stricken.
        The Chairman: The language the gentleman from New York (Mr. 
    Ottinger) wishes to be stricken on the point of order is the 
    language beginning on page 8, line 2, going through page 9, line 2. 
    All of that language, which includes the part the gentleman from 
    New York (Mr. Horton) has raised his point of order against.
        Mr. Horton: Mr. Chairman, I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The point of order has been conceded, and the point of order is 
    sustained. The language on page 8, line 2, through page 9, line 2, 
    is stricken.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Part of Paragraph in 
    Appropriation Bill

Sec. 1.16 When part of a pending paragraph in a general appropriation 
    bill is subject to be stricken on a point of order as being 
    legislation, the entire paragraph is also subject to a point of 
    order.

    On Apr. 15, 1957,(13) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, found it necessary to sustain a 
point of order against an entire paragraph after sustaining one against 
language in part of it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 103 Cong. Rec. 5684-86, 85th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 6870, the Second Urgent Deficiency Appropriations Act 
        of 1957.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Robert E.] Jones [Jr.] of Alabama: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order.

[[Page 11967]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Jones of Alabama: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order 
    against the language commencing on page 2, line 23, after the 
    words, ``as amended'' and reading: ``And to be made available from 
    the loan authorization contained in section 606(a) of the act of 
    August 7, 1956 (Public Law 1020).''. . .
        I submit that this is legislation on an appropriation bill and 
    is subject to a point of order. . . .
        Mr. [Frank T.] Bow [of Ohio]: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of 
    order against the entire paragraph on loan authorizations. . . .
        Mr. Jones of Alabama: I insist on the point of order, Mr. 
    Chairman.
        Mr. [Clarence] Cannon [of Missouri]: Mr. Chairman, we concede 
    the point of order.
        Mr. Bow: I insist on my point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The point of order made by the gentleman from Alabama on line 
    23, page 2, is against the three lines beginning with the word 
    ``and'' as being legislation upon an appropriation bill, which it 
    obviously is.
        Now, the gentleman from Ohio, however, offers a point of order 
    against the entire paragraph. As the language which is sought to be 
    stricken by the gentleman from Alabama is subject to a point of 
    order and is part of the paragraph, then the whole paragraph is 
    subject to a point of order, and the Chair is constrained to 
    sustain both points of order.

Sec. 1.17 If any part of a paragraph of an appropriation bill is 
    subject to a point of order, it is sufficient for the rejection of 
    the entire paragraph.

    On Mar. 15, 1945,(14) after it was conceded, in the 
Committee of the Whole, that certain lines in a paragraph were subject 
to a point of order, the Chair sustained a point of order against the 
entire paragraph.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 91 Cong. Rec. 2305, 79th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 2603, a State, Justice, Commerce, Judiciary, and Federal 
        Loan Agency appropriation for 1946.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (15) Does the gentleman from Michigan 
    [Mr. Rabaut] desire to be heard?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Wilbur D. Mills (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Louis C.] Rabaut: Mr. Chairman, I think the point of order 
    might apply to the language appearing in lines 20 and 21. That is 
    because of the excesses.
        The Chairman: Permit the Chair to understand the gentleman. The 
    gentleman concedes that the language in lines 20 and 21 is bad and 
    subject to a point of order?
        Mr. Rabaut: Yes.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. Rees] insist 
    on his point of order against the entire paragraph? . . .
        Mr. [Edward H.] Rees of Kansas: I insist on the point of order 
    to the entire paragraph, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: In view of the fact that certain language in the 
    paragraph is conceded to be subject to a point of

[[Page 11968]]

    order, the entire paragraph is subject to a point of order.
        The Chair sustains the point of order.

Sec. 1.18 A point of order may be made against a part of a paragraph in 
    a general appropriation bill and, if sustained, will not affect the 
    remainder of such paragraph if no point of order is made against 
    it.

    On Mar. 30, 1954,(16) in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. 
Jacob K. Javits, of New York, raised a point of order against only part 
of a paragraph, but declined to make his point of order against the 
remainder of the paragraph. Chairman Louis E. Graham, of Pennsylvania, 
then ruled that only the affected language was out of order and the 
balance of the paragraph would remain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 100 Cong. Rec. 4108, 4109, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 8583, the independent offices appropriations bill of 
        1955.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows: . . .
        Mr. Javits: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    proviso appearing on page 28, lines 13 to 18, on the ground it is 
    legislation on an appropriation bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California desire to be 
    heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [John] Phillips [of California]: No, Mr. Chairman. I think 
    we are compelled to concede the point of order and I submit an 
    amendment to replace it. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair sustains the point of order.
        Mr. [Jamie L.] Whitten [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Whitten: Mr. Chairman, is it possible to make a point of 
    order to one part of a paragraph and have it limited to that 
    particular part?
        The Chairman: A Member may make a point of order to any 
    objectionable language in the paragraph.
        Mr. Whitten: Separating it from the remainder of the paragraph?
        The Chairman: Yes.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Portion of Amendment

Sec. 1.19 A point of order against a portion of an amendment to a 
    general appropriation bill is sufficient, if sustained, to rule out 
    the entire amendment.

    On June 25, 1976,(17) during consideration of the 
Interior appropriation bill, fiscal 1977, an amendment of two parts was 
offered to the pending paragraph and one following. The amendments 
were, by general consent, considered en bloc. A point of

[[Page 11969]]

order was directed specifically against one portion of the amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 122 Cong. Rec. 20551, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Gilbert] Gude [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    amendments.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendments offered by Mr. Gude: Amendment No. 1: Page 10, 
        line 2, strike out ``$272,635,000.'' and insert in lieu thereof 
        ``$284,399,871, except that $856,000 of this appropriation 
        shall be available for obligation only upon the enactment into 
        law of authorizing legislation providing for the establishment 
        of the Valley Forge National Historical Park in the 
        Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.''
            Amendment No. 2: Page 10, beginning on line 19, strike out 
        ``$37,228,000'' and insert in lieu thereof ``$44,228,000''.

        Mr. Gude (during the reading): Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous 
    consent that the amendments be considered as read and printed in 
    the Record, and that they be considered en bloc.
        The Chairman: (18) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Maryland?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. Walter Flowers (Ala.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Sidney R.] Yates [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, reserving 
    the right to object, I want to make a point of order against the 
    amendments, and I do not know whether my rights are protected if I 
    consent to the unanimous-consent request. So I object.
        The Chairman: Objection is heard. The Chair will protect the 
    gentleman on his point of order.
        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk concluded reading the amendments.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gude), as it 
    violates clause 2, rule XXI, which states in part that:

            No appropriation shall be reported in any general 
        appropriation bill, or be in order as an amendment thereto, for 
        any expenditure not previously authorized by law.

        Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from 
    Maryland (Mr. Gude) specifically provides for the allocation of 
    funds for the Valley Forge National Historical Park. There is no 
    authorization for the Valley Forge National Historical Park.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Maryland wish to be 
    recognized on the point of order?
        Mr. Gude: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, the amendment reads that the money will be 
    allocated to the Park Service. The fact that a part of it would be 
    available for the Valley Forge Park I do not feel works to the 
    entire amendment being out of order.
        Mr. [Roy A.] Taylor of North Carolina: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Gude: I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. 
    Taylor).
        Mr. Taylor of North Carolina: I thank the gentleman for 
    yielding.
        Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman is correct in stating that 
    the authorization for Valley Forge National Historical Park has not 
    yet become law. It has passed the House. In all probability, it 
    shall become law. The act provides for the transfer to take place 
    as of the beginning of the fiscal year 1977. We wanted the State

[[Page 11970]]

    of Pennsylvania to operate it under this law. The fact is that we 
    are going to have to have more personnel in order to have this 
    park. Are we just going to have to take them away from other parks 
    and spread the existing personnel more thin? They are too thin now.
        Mr. Yates: Mr. Chairman, I insist upon my point of order.
        I cite, additionally, the following language:

            Delaying the availability of an appropriation pending 
        enactment of an authorization does not protect the item of 
        appropriation against a point of order under this clause.

        The Chairman: A point of order has been interposed against the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Gude).
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from Maryland 
    contemplates in its own language that there has been no 
    authorization which has become law and, inasmuch as the point of 
    order must be sustained to that part of it, under Deschler's 
    chapter 26, section 8.1, it would apply to the entire amendment. 
    The Chair must sustain the point of order raised by the gentleman 
    from Illinois (Mr. Yates).

If Part of Amendment Is Legislative, the Whole Can Be Ruled Out

Sec. 1.20 If any portion of an amendment on a general appropriation 
    bill constitutes legislation, the entire amendment is out of order.

    On Aug. 7, 1978,(19) Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, of 
Illinois, ruled out an amendment, the first part of which might have 
qualified as a proper limitation but which was tainted by language in 
the amendment restricting discretion on the part of federal officials. 
The amendment, the point of order, and the ruling are set forth herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 124 Cong. Rec. 24707, 24708, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. John T. Myers [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. John T. Myers: On page 8, after 
        line 10, add the following new section:
            None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available 
        in this Act shall be obligated or expended for salaries or 
        expenses during the current fiscal year in connection with the 
        demilitarization of any arms as advertised by the Department of 
        Defense, Defense Logistics Agency sale number 31-8118 issued 
        January 24, 1978, and listed as ``no longer needed by the 
        Federal Government'' and that such arms shall not be withheld 
        from distribution to purchasers who qualify for purchase of 
        said arms pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 
        4308. . . .

        Mr. [Abner J.] Mikva [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I make a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Mikva: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order on the 
    amendment on the ground that I believe that it is leg

[[Page 11971]]

    islation within a general appropriation bill and, therefore, 
    violates the rules of the House.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. John T. 
    Myers) wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. John T. Myers: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana.
        Mr. John T. Myers: Mr. Chairman, this is a simple limitation 
    amendment. It merely limits the Secretary of the Treasury to 
    continue to carry out existing law. It does not provide any new 
    law. It simply says that the Secretary of the Treasury shall carry 
    out the prevailing, existing law.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Ashbrook) wish 
    to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [John M.] Ashbrook [of Ohio]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
        Mr. Ashbrook: Mr. Chairman, rule 21, clause 2, of the Rules of 
    the House (House Rules and Manual pages 426-427) specifies that an 
    amendment to an appropriation bill is in order if it meets certain 
    tests, such as:
        First. It must be germane;
        Second. It must be negative in nature;
        Third. It must show retrenchment on its face;
        Fourth. It must impose no additional or affirmative duties or 
    amend existing law.

                  Why the Amendment Complies with Rule 21

        First. It is germane. As the amendment applies to the 
    distribution of arms by the Defense Logistics Agency, it is not 
    exclusively an Army of civilian marksmanship amendment, so should 
    not be placed elsewhere in the bill. The overall Defense Department 
    allocates sale and distribution to various military components 
    (foreign sales, Navy, ROTC, Air Force, Division of Civilian 
    Marksmanship, et cetera). It is therefore proper to place the 
    amendment in the general Defense Department section of the bill: 
    ``Operation and maintenance, Defense Agencies.''

        Second. It is negative in nature. It limits expenditure of 
    funds by the Defense Department by prohibiting the destruction and 
    scrapping of arms which qualify for sale through the civilian 
    marksmanship program, which is a division of the executive created 
    by statute.
        Third. It shows retrenchment on its face. Retrenchment is 
    demonstrated in that the Department of Defense if prohibited from 
    expending funds to destroy surplus military arms, and that the arms 
    previously earmarked for destruction will be made available in 
    accordance with existing statute. Actual cost savings is not a 
    necessary element in satisfying the retrenchment test under rule 
    21. However, the Defense Department has attempted destruction of 
    290,000 M-1 rifles, leading to the waste by scrapping of a valuable 
    stock of arms. The House, in adding this amendment, will secure 
    additional funds for the Treasury which the General Accounting 
    Office has determined is adequate to pay costs of handling the 
    arms. For example, the M-1 rifles are to be sold at a cost of $110 
    each. These are the arms most utilized by the civilian marksmanship 
    program. The Defense Department will not be

[[Page 11972]]

    required to spend additional funds to process the sale of 
    additional arms.
        Fourth. Does not impose additional or affirmative duties or 
    amend existing law. Title 10, United States Code, section 4308 
    provides in part:

            (a) The secretary of the Army, under regulations approved 
        by him upon the recommendation of the National Board for the 
        Promotion of Rifle Practice, shall provide for . . .
            (5) the sale to members of the National Rifle Association, 
        at cost, and the issue to clubs organized for practice with 
        rifled arms, ammunition, targets, and other supplies and 
        appliances necessary for target practice . . .

        In fact, the Army regulations relating to issuance of these 
    arms contain no caveat that distribution shall be limited to any 
    quantity. (AR 725-1 and AR 920-20.) By passing this amendment, we 
    will see that additional funds are placed in the Treasury--
    certainly more than by scrapping the arms. Thus, by statute and 
    regulation, such arms must be sold to qualified civilians. This 
    amendment specifies that 290,800 of an available pool of 760,000 
    arms shall not be destroyed, and shall be available for use by this 
    program. If my amendment prevails, the test as to whether these 
    arms will be distributed will be:
        First. Does the applicant qualify under the law?
        Second. Are sufficient arms in this pool of 290,800 available 
    for distribution?
        Regulations issued (see tab M) AR 725-1 and AR 920-20 provide 
    for the issuance of arms by application and qualification through 
    the Director of Civilian Marksmanship. The DCM shall then submit 
    sale orders for the Armament Readiness Military Command (ARMCOM) to 
    fill the requests of these qualified civilians. Thus, the amendment 
    simply requires the performance of duties already imposed by the 
    Army's own regulation.
        Minor administrative ministerial duties required by this 
    amendment will not mandate such affirmative action, so as to exceed 
    the responsibilities already imposed by statute. Assessing needs 
    and communicating the needs by the Board would not cross the 
    threshold so as to raise to the level of a newly created positive 
    duty.

    precedents supporting the overruling of point of order to my motion

        There is ample precedent for language of this nature. A similar 
    motion was offered by Mr. Myers of Indiana in connection with the 
    curtailment of funds for implementation of an executive order 
    pardoning draft evaders. Mr. Myers' amendment provided that the 
    executive could not expend funds to pardon the evaders. This was an 
    after-the-fact amendment following President Carter's Executive 
    order. My amendment does nothing more than to track the same form 
    of executive limitation as did the Myers amendment of March 16, 
    1977, when the parliamentarian ruled that amendment in order. This 
    precedent will be found in the Congressional Record, pages 7706-
    7754, on H.R. 4877, a supplemental appropriations bill.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Mikva) wish 
    to be heard further on the point of order?
        Mr. Mikva: I do, Mr. Chairman.

[[Page 11973]]

        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Mikva: Mr. Chairman, I particularly call attention of the 
    Chair to the second half of the amendment, which imposes an 
    affirmative duty on the Secretary, saying that such arms shall not 
    be withheld from distribution to purchasers who qualify for 
    purchase of said arms pursuant to title 10, United States Code, 
    section 4308.
        Under the general existing law, there are all kinds of 
    discretions that are allowed to the Secretary to decide whether or 
    not such arms shall be distributed. Under this amendment, the 
    existing law is to be changed and those arms may not be withheld. 
    The practical purpose is to turn lose 400,000 to 500,000 rifles 
    into the body politic.
        But the parliamentary effect is clearly to change the existing 
    law under which the Secretary can exercise all kinds of discretion 
    in deciding whether or not those arms will be distributed. Under 
    this amendment it not only limits the fact that the funds may be 
    obligated but it specifically goes on to affirmatively direct the 
    Secretary to distribute such arms under title X, which is an 
    affirmative obligation, which is exactly the kind of obligation the 
    rules prohibit, and I renew my point of order.
        Mr. John T. Myers: Mr. Chairman, section 4307 provides for the 
    sale of these surplus weapons. This amendment does nothing more 
    than provide that, in this title of section X.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair has read the section to which the gentleman refers, 
    title 10, United States Code, section 4308, and is of the opinion 
    that it does not require that all firearms be distributed to 
    qualified purchasers. The Chair further feels that while the first 
    part of the amendment is a limitation, the last part of the 
    amendment is a curtailment of Executive discretion, and the Chair 
    sustains the point of order.
        The Clerk will read.

Effect of Point of Order Sustained Against a Portion of a Paragraph in 
    a General Appropriation Bill

Sec. 1.21 A point of order, if sustained against a proviso containing 
    legislation in a paragraph in a general appropriation bill, is 
    sufficient to cause the whole paragraph to be stricken, even if the 
    remainder of the paragraph is authorized.

    On June 8, 1977,(20) while a general appropriation bill 
was being read for amendment under the five-minute rule in Committee of 
the Whole, a paragraph was read pertaining to the care and maintenance 
of the official residence of the Vice President. A point of order was 
directed at the proviso carried in the paragraph. Proceedings were as 
indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 123 Cong. Rec. 17922, 17923, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 11974]]

                    Official Residence of the Vice President

                               Operating Expenses

            For the care, maintenance, repair and alteration, 
        furnishing, improvement, heating and lighting, including 
        electric power and fixtures, of the official residence of the 
        Vice President, $61,000: Provided That advances or repayments 
        or transfers from this appropriation may be made to any 
        department or agency for expenses of carrying out such 
        activities.

        Mr. [Herbert E.] Harris [II, of Virginia]: Mr. Chairman, I make 
    a point of order against this portion of the bill on the basis 
    previously stated.
        The Chairman: (1) Does the gentleman from Oklahoma 
    (Mr. Steed) desire to be heard on the point of order?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. B. F. Sisk (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Tom] Steed [of Oklahoma]: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chairman, in this case there is authorization for the item. 
    In the 93d Congress, Senate Joint Resolution 202, passed July 12, 
    1974, provides for the inclusion of this item in the bill. It is 
    Public Law 93-346.
        The Chairman: Let the Chair direct a question to the gentleman 
    from Virginia (Mr. Harris) so that the gentleman may clarify his 
    point.
        Against what portion of this paragraph does the gentleman make 
    his point of order?
        Mr. Harris: Mr. Chairman, we are dealing with official 
    entertaining expenses in this item, and that is not authorized 
    under law.
        The Chairman: To what line is the gentleman referring? Will the 
    gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Harris) explain it so we will know to 
    what specific lines of the paragraph he directs his point of order?
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard, I believe the 
    gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Harris) made the point of order 
    against the entire item.
        Mr. Harris: Mr. Chairman, this is the item on the Official 
    Executive Residence of the Vice President, Operating Expenses.
        The Chairman: Let the Chair state to the gentleman from 
    Virginia (Mr. Harris) that there is authorization for 
    appropriations for the official residence of the Vice President, if 
    that is the point the gentleman is attempting to address in this 
    matter. Therefore, that portion of the paragraph would not be 
    subject to a point of order.
        Mr. Harris: I thank the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair, therefore, overrules the point of 
    order.
        Mr. [Edward J.] Derwinski [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I rise 
    to make a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Derwinski) will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Derwinski: Mr. Chairman, let me read this to be sure we are 
    speaking of the same item.
        I make a point of order against the language of the bill on 
    page 8, lines 20 through 25, and on page 9, lines 1 and 2. That 
    item is entitled ``Official Residence of the Vice President--
    Operating Expenses,'' and this language violates rule XXI, clause 
    2, of the Rules of the House. That is the basis for the point of 
    order.
        Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard further, we have had previous 
    points of order sustained against this item, and, in fact, in last 
    year's appropriation bill a similar point of order was sustained.

[[Page 11975]]

        The Chairman: Let the Chair state that the present occupant of 
    the chair was the occupant of the chair last year and considered 
    the proviso starting on line 25 of page 8 and continuing through 
    line 26 and lines 1 and 2 on page 9. On that basis the point of 
    order was sustained. However, the earlier designation, as the Chair 
    understood the statement of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. 
    Harris), would not follow, because basically there is authority for 
    the Vice President's residence.
        That is the reason the Chair is giving ample opportunity to the 
    Members to clarify the point of order. A point of order was in fact 
    sustained on the proviso mentioned last year. I understand the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Derwinski) is making a point of order 
    based on that proviso.
        Mr. Steed: Mr. Chairman, if I may be heard on the point of 
    order, if we read section 3 of this act, it says that the Secretary 
    of the Navy shall, subject to the supervision and control of the 
    Vice President, provide for the staffing, upkeep, alteration, and 
    furnishing of an official residence and grounds for the Vice 
    President.
        Mr. Chairman, I do not know what more authority we need.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that in line with the like 
    ruling last year, a paragraph in a general appropriation bill 
    containing funds for the official residence of the President and of 
    the Vice President and providing for advances repayments or 
    transfers of those funds to other departments or agencies--not just 
    to General Services Administration--was conceded to change existing 
    law and was ruled out as being in violation of clause 2, rule XXI.

        Therefore, on the basis of the proviso, the point of order is 
    sustained against the entire paragraph.

Reinserting Language Stricken by Point of Order

Sec. 1.22 Where a point of order is sustained against a paragraph in a 
    general appropriation bill because a portion thereof is 
    unauthorized and contains legislation, and the entire paragraph is 
    therefore stricken, the authorized portion may then be reinserted 
    by amendment.

    When the legislative branch appropriations bill for fiscal 1978 was 
read for amendment in Committee of the Whole on June 29, 
1977,(2) a point of order was made against the paragraph 
carrying appropriations for ``Capitol Grounds''. The paragraph 
contained a proviso amendment a prior appropriation law,(3) 
was conceded to be legislative. After

[[Page 11976]]

the paragraph was stricken by the Chair, the chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Legislative Branch Appropriations offered an amendment, 
deleting not only the legislative provision but with a lump sum 
appropriation figure which deleted funding for a Capitol parking 
facility which was not authorized by law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 123 Cong. Rec. 21402, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
 3. The proviso in existing law amended by the paragraph was a 
        provision in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1973, 
        authorizing the Architect to use certain lands as a park area 
        pending development of a contemplated Residential Page School, 
        project which never materialized.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chairman: (4) The Clerk will read.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. John M. Murphy (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read as follows:

                                capitol grounds

            For care and improvement of grounds surrounding the 
        Capitol, the Senate and House Office Buildings, and the Capitol 
        Power Plant; personal and other services; care of trees; 
        planting; fertilizer; repairs to pavements, walks, and 
        roadways; waterproof wearing apparel; maintenance of signal 
        lights; and for snow removal by hire of men and equipment or 
        under contract without regard to section 3709 of the Revised 
        Statutes, as amended, $2,402,500, including $483,000 to develop 
        Square 764 into a temporary parking facility for the House of 
        Representatives: Provided That chapter V of the Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act, 1973 (Public Law 92-607, approved October 
        31, 1972, 86 Stat. 1513), is hereby amended by striking the 
        words ``green park area'' in the third further proviso of the 
        paragraph entitled ``Acquisition of Property as an Addition to 
        the Capitol Grounds'', and inserting in lieu thereof, the 
        following: ``temporary parking facility''.

        Mr. [R. Lawrence] Coughlin [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    make a point of order against the entire paragraph starting on page 
    19, line 16, through line 7 on page 20, on the ground that in two 
    respects it violates rule XXI, clause 2.
        Mr. Chairman, this is a provision for the creation of a parking 
    lot at the old Providence Hospital site about which the Chairman of 
    the Committee on House Administration, the gentleman from New 
    Jersey (Mr. Thompson) and I have had colloquy. There is no 
    authorization in law for the development of this parking lot 
    provided for in lines 23 to 25 on page 19.
        Mr. [George E.] Shipley [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, will the 
    gentleman yield?
        Mr. Coughlin: I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Shipley: I thank the gentleman for yielding.
        The committee understands that this is subject to a point of 
    order, as the Chairman of the Committee on House Administration, 
    Mr. Thompson, mentioned earlier. The committee will concede the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Coughlin: I thank the gentleman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and sustained 
    against the entire paragraph.
        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Shipley: On page 19, after line 
        15, insert the following:
            For care and improvement of grounds surrounding the 
        Capitol, the Senate and House Office Buildings, and the Capitol 
        Power Plant; personal and other services; care of trees; 
        planting; fertilizer; repairs to pavements, walks, and 
        roadways;

[[Page 11977]]

        waterproof wearing apparel; maintenance of signal lights; and 
        for snow removal by hire of men and equipment or under contract 
        without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as 
        amended, $1,919,500.

        Mr. Shipley: Mr. Chairman, this amendment simply restores the 
    appropriation language for the Capitol grounds at the lower figure, 
    reflecting the reduction of the $483,000 for the temporary parking 
    facility, which was eliminated by the point of order.

Special Rule Creating Jurisdictional Point of Order Against Portion of 
    Text

Sec. 1.23 Pursuant to a special rule (5) permitting points 
    of order against any ``title, part or section'' of a committee 
    substitute within the jurisdiction of another committee, the Chair 
    sustained a point of order against a section which contained a 
    subsection outside that committee's jurisdiction (although the 
    section as a whole was within that jurisdiction) under the 
    principle that if a point of order is sustained against a portion 
    of a pending section the entire section may be ruled out of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. H. Res. 661, agreed to Oct. 27, 1971. 117 Cong. Rec. 37765-69, 92d 
        Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    On Nov. 4, 1971,(6) in the Committee of the Whole, Mr. 
David N. Henderson, of North Carolina, raised a point of order relating 
to the jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service 
with respect to legislation prepared by the Committee on Education and 
Labor.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 117 Cong. Rec. 39287, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7248, amending and extending the Higher Education Act of 
        1965.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Henderson: Mr. Chairman, I was on my feet seeking 
    recognition. I raise a point of order against section 1085 of this 
    title.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (7) The Chair will hear 
    the gentleman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Edward P. Boland (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Henderson: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against 
    section 1805 of title XVIII.
        Section 1805 authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and 
    Welfare to establish a Council on Higher Education Relief 
    Assistance, and includes provisions that the Secretary may appoint 
    not more than 10 individuals, without regard to the civil service 
    or classification laws, as members of the staff of the Council.
        An exemption to the civil service or classification laws is a 
    matter clearly within the Federal civil service generally. Under 
    clause 15 of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, 
    a matter relating to the Federal civil service generally is a 
    matter clearly within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Post 
    Office and Civil Service.

[[Page 11978]]

        Mr. Chairman, I urge that the point of order be sustained on 
    the basis that section 1805 includes matters that are within the 
    jurisdiction of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee. . . .
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair is ready to rule. . . .
        Clause 15(f), rule XI, gives the Committee on Post Office and 
    Civil Service jurisdiction over the status of officers and 
    employees of the United States, including their compensation, 
    classification, and retirement. Section 1805 includes a portion 
    which, if considered separately, contains subject matter within the 
    jurisdiction of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service. 
    Under the precedents of the House, if a point of order is sustained 
    against a portion of a pending section or paragraph, the entire 
    section or paragraph may be ruled out of order.
        The Chair, therefore, sustains the point of order against 
    section 1805, and the language of the section is stricken from the 
    committee amendment.

Effect of Sustaining Point of Order Against Part of Amendment in 
    Legislative Bill

Sec. 1.24 If a point of order is made against an amendment, the entire 
    amendment is ruled out, although only a portion of such amendment 
    is objectionable.

    On June 30, 1955,(8) in the Committee of the Whole, the 
Chairman invoked the general principle that a point of order against a 
part of an amendment renders the whole amendment subject to a point of 
order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 101 Cong. Rec. 9662, 84th Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        S. 2090, amending the Mutual Security Act of 1954.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Wilbur D.] Mills [of Arkansas]: Mr. Chairman, I make the 
    point of order against the amendment, of course, that it is not 
    germane to the bill.
        The Chairman: (9) Does the gentleman from South 
    Carolina desire to be heard?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Jere Cooper (Tenn.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James P.] Richards [of South Carolina]: Mr. Chairman, may 
    I ask if the gentleman raises the point of order in both instances?
        Mr. Mills: I base the point of order on the language of the 
    amendment on page 19, lines 1 through 6. I am not advised as to the 
    remainder of the amendment, but I do know that the language 
    referred to is not germane to this bill. . . .
        Mr. Richards: I concede the point of order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The point of order is conceded and the point of 
    order is sustained. A point of order to a part of an amendment 
    makes the whole amendment subject to a point of order, so the whole 
    amendment goes out on the point of order.

Sec. 1.25 A point of order against any part of an amendment, if 
    sustained, has the effect of invalidating the entire amendment.

[[Page 11979]]

    On June 15, 1970,(10) Speaker Pro Tempore Carl Albert, 
of Oklahoma, answered a parliamentary inquiry, as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 116 Cong. Rec. 19841, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. Being discussed was H. 
        Res. 1077, providing for consideration of H.R. 17070, the 
        Postal Reform Act of 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [H. Allen] Smith of California: Mr. Speaker . . . I make a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Smith of California: Mr. Speaker, on H.R. 17966, the so-
    called Udall substitute, that is in my understanding one amendment 
    in the nature of a substitute. If any part of that bill is not 
    germane or subject to a point of order, would not the entire H.R. 
    17966 be subject to a point of order if points of order are not 
    waived against it? That was my understanding of the situation.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman has correctly stated the 
    rule. Should points of order not be waived, then if any part of the 
    amendment is not in order, the entire amendment is not in order.

Reinserting Remainder of Section Where Part Is Subject to Point of 
    Order

Sec. 1.26 Where a portion of a section of a legislative bill is out of 
    order, the entire section is rejected, but it is in order to offer 
    an amendment reinserting that part of the section which would 
    otherwise have been in order.

    On July 13, 1939,(11) Mr. John Taber, of New York, made 
a point of order against part of a bill as being an appropriation of 
funds by a committee not having such jurisdiction, which point of order 
Chairman John W. Boehne, Jr., of Indiana, sustained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 84 Cong. Rec. 9060, 9061, 76th Cong. 1st Sess. S.J. Res. 118, to 
        provide for the establishment and maintenance of the Franklin 
        D. Roosevelt Library.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Sec. 205. (a) A Board to be known as the Trustees of the 
    Franklin D. Roosevelt Library is hereby established. . . .
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the 
    section on the ground that it contains an appropriation of public 
    funds and that it is reported by a committee not having 
    jurisdiction to bring into the House an appropriation bill.

    Mr. Taber called attention to specific language that he deemed 
improper.

        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from New York limit his point 
    of order to the sentence which he read?
        Mr. Taber: Mr. Chairman, I made the point of order against the 
    section. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The Chair is of the opinion that the point of order made by the 
    gentleman from New York against the section is

[[Page 11980]]

    well taken, and therefore sustains the point of order.

    Subsequently, Mr. Sam Rayburn, of Texas, offered an amendment, 
whose purpose he explained as follows:

 0      The amendment I offer leaves out the language objected to by 
    the gentleman from New York in lines 7, 8, 9, and 10 on page 6. . . 
    .

    The amendment was agreed to.

Where Point of Order Sustained Against Conference Report

Sec. 1.27 A conference report containing new spending authority not 
    subject to advance appropriations having been ruled out as in 
    violation of the Congressional Budget Act, the manager of the bill 
    moved to recede and concur in the Senate amendment containing the 
    offending language with an amendment rendering the new spending 
    authority subject to amounts specified in advance in appropriation 
    acts.

    When the conference report on the Health Professional Education 
Assistance Act of 1976 was called up by the chairman of the Committee 
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, a point of order was lodged against 
the report by Mr. Brock Adams, of Washington, chairman of the House 
Committee on the Budget. The proceedings of Sept. 27, 
1976,(12) were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 122 Cong. Rec. 32655, 32656, 32679, 32685, 32703, 94th Cong. 2d 
        Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Conference Report on H.R. 5546, Health Professions Educational 
                           Assistance Act of 1976

        Mr. [Harley O.] Staggers [of West Virginia]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    call up the conference report on the bill (H.R. 5546), to amend the 
    Public Health Service Act to revise and extend the programs of 
    assistance under title VII for training in the health and allied 
    health professions, to revise the National Health Service Corps 
    program, and the National Health Service Corps scholarship training 
    program, and for other purposes, and ask unanimous consent that the 
    statement of the managers be read in lieu of the report.
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, I make a point of order on the 
    conference report.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (13) The gentleman from 
    Washington will state his point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. John J. McFall (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Adams: Mr. Speaker, the conference agreement on H.R. 5546, 
    the Health Professions Assistance Act of 1976, contains a provision 
    which appears to provide borrowing authority which is not subject 
    to advance appropriations. Consequently, it would be subject to a 
    point of order under section 401(a) of the Congressional Budget 
    Act.
        Section 401(a) provides:

[[Page 11981]]

            It shall not be in order in either the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider any bill or resolu- 
        tion which provides new spending authority described in 
        subsection (c)(2)(A) or (B) (or any amendment which provides 
        such new spending authority), unless that bill, resolution, or 
        amendment also provides that such new spending authority is to 
        be effective for any fiscal year only to such extent or in such 
        amounts as are provided in appropriation acts.

        Section 401(c)(2)(B) of the Budget Act defines spending 
    authority as authority ``to incur indebtedness-other than 
    indebtedness incurred under the second Liberty Bond Act-for the 
    repayment of which the United States is liable, the budget 
    authority for which is not provided in advance by appropriation 
    acts.'' This form of spending authority is commonly known as 
    borrowing authority.
        The conference report accompanying H.R. 5546 contains a 
    provision creating a student loan insurance fund under section 734 
    of the Public Health Service Act.
        Clearly, the requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury 
    purchase these obligations constitutes borrowing authority.
        And since the provision contains no requirement that the 
    authority be limited to amounts provided in advance in 
    appropriation acts, it appears to give rise to a section 401(A) 
    point of order.
        The fact that the provision relates to default payments which 
    might arise pursuant to a loan guarantee program does not bring the 
    provision within the ``loan guarantee'' exception to section 401 of 
    the Budget Act. Although the loan guarantee itself may not be 
    subject to advance appropriation, the default payment made pursuant 
    to the provision in question does not constitute a loan guarantee 
    and it is fully subject to the requirements of section 401.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Adams: I yield to the gentleman from West Virginia, the 
    chairman of the committee.
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I concede the point of order.
        Mr. Speaker, I have a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. 
    Staggers) concedes the point of order.
        Therefore, the point of order is sustained.
        The Clerk will report the Senate amendment in disagreement.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, it was my understanding that the 
    gentleman from West Virginia (Mr. Staggers) called up a conference 
    report, and a point of order was made against that conference 
    report, which was sustained.
        Is the conference report still before the House, Mr. Speaker?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The conference report is not, but the 
    Senate amendment in disagreement is; and a motion will be offered, 
    the Chair will state to the gentleman from Maryland, that could 
    cure the point of order. Therefore, if the gentleman will bear with 
    us for the sake of orderly proce

[[Page 11982]]

    dure, we will have this matter properly before the House. . . .
        [Reading of the amendment in disagreement was dispensed with.]
        Mr. Staggers: Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Staggers moves that the House recede from its 
        disagreement to the amendment of the Senate to the bill H.R. 
        5546, and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
            In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate 
        amendment insert the following:

                         short title: reference to act

            Section 1. (a) This Act may be cited as the ``Health 
        Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976''. . . .

                         ``student loan insurance fund

            ``Sec. 734. (a) There is hereby established a student loan 
        insurance fund (hereinafter in this section referred to as the 
        `fund') which shall be available without fiscal year limitation 
        to the Secretary for making payments in connection with the 
        default of loans insured by him under this subpart. . . .
            . . . but only in such amounts as may be specified from 
        time to time in appropriations Acts. . . .

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Is there objection to the request of 
    the gentleman from West Virginia?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I reserve the right to object to the 
    unanimous consent request made by the gentleman from West Virginia 
    (Mr. Staggers).
        My inquiry of the Chair is the same as I made before, and that 
    is that in view of the fact that a point of order has been made to 
    any consideration of the conference report, is the motion that is 
    being made to agree with the Senate amendment to the amendment of 
    the House deleting the offending phrase?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: When a conference report is ruled out 
    of order, as this one was, then the Senate amendment in 
    disagreement is before the House. This motion, if passed, would 
    remedy the point of order that was made.

Rulings on Matters Not Raised in Point of Order

Sec. 1.28 The Chair does not rule on statutory interpretations not 
    presented in a point of order or comment upon le-gal questions 
    which might collaterally result from an interpretation of the 
    challenged language.

    On June 28, 1949,(14) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Hale Boggs, of Louisiana, declined to rule on more than was 
necessary to resolve a point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 95 Cong. Rec. 8536-38, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4009, the Housing Act of 1949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Francis H.] Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, the point 
    of order I make is that subparagraphs (e) and (f) of section 102 in 
    title I constitute the appropriation of funds from the Federal 
    Treasury, and that the Committee on Banking and Currency is without 
    jurisdiction to report a bill car

[[Page 11983]]

    rying appropriations under clause 4, rule 21, which says that no 
    bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations shall be reported 
    by any committee not having jurisdiction to report appropriations. 
    . . .
        . . . I make this point of order because this proposes to 
    expand and develop a device or mechanism for getting funds out of 
    the Federal Treasury in an unprecedented degree.
        The Constitution has said that no money shall be drawn from the 
    Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. It must 
    follow that the mechanism which gets the money out of the Treasury 
    is an appropriation.
        I invite the attention of the Chairman to the fact that 
    subparagraph (e) states:

            To obtain funds for loans under this title, the 
        Administrator may issue and have outstanding at any one time 
        notes and obligations for purchase by the Secretary of the 
        Treasury in an amount not to exceed $25,000,000, which limit on 
        such outstanding amount shall be increased by $225,000,000 on 
        July 1, 1950, and by further amounts of $250,000,000 on July 1 
        in each of the years 1951, 1952, and 1953, respectively--

        Within the total authorization of $1,000,000,000.
        Further that subparagraph (f) provides that--

            The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed--

        And I call particular attention to the use of the words ``and 
    directed''--

            to purchase any notes and other obligations of the 
        Administrator issued under this title and for such purpose is 
        authorized to use as a public debt transaction the proceeds 
        from the sale of any securities issued under the Second Liberty 
        Bond Act, as amended--

        And so forth. The way in which this particular language extends 
    this device of giving the Secretary authority to subscribe for 
    notes by some authority is this: It includes the words ``and 
    directed.''
        In other words, the Secretary of the Treasury has no 
    alternative when the Administrator presents to him some of these 
    securities for purchase but to purchase them. The Secretary of the 
    Treasury is not limited to purchasing them by proceeds from the 
    sale of bonds or securities. He is directed to purchase these notes 
    and obligations issued by the Administrator. That means he might 
    use funds obtained from taxes, that he might use funds obtained 
    through the assignment of miscellaneous receipts to the Treasury, 
    that he might use funds obtained through the proceeds of bonds.
        This proposal will give to the Committee on Banking and 
    Currency, if it should be permitted, authority which the Committee 
    on Appropriations does not have, for in the reporting of an 
    appropriation bill for a fiscal year, any appropriation beyond the 
    fiscal year would be held out of order. Here this committee is 
    reporting a bill which proposes to make mandatory extractions from 
    the Treasury during a period of 4 years. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, this is not, as I said earlier, a casual point of 
    order; we are here dealing with the fundamental power of the 
    Congress to control appropriations. No such device has ever before, 
    so far as I can find out, been pre

[[Page 11984]]

    sented to the Congress for getting money in the guise of a 
    legislative bill without its having been considered by the 
    Committee on Appropriations. It is a mandatory extraction of funds 
    from the Public Treasury, and, consequently, constitutes an 
    appropriation and is beyond the authority or the jurisdiction of 
    the Committee on Banking and Currency to report in this bill. . . .
        Mr. [Brent] Spence [of Kentucky]: Mr. Chairman, the raising of 
    funds by public debt transaction has been frequently authorized by 
    the Congress: The Export-Import Bank raises funds by that method; 
    the Bretton Woods Agreement, in my recollection, is carried out by 
    that method; the British loan was financed by that method, and the 
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was also financed by that 
    method. It does not seem to me that this is a seasonable objection. 
    This has been the policy of the Congress for years.
        Mr. Chairman, this is not raising money to be appropriated for 
    the purposes that ordinary appropriation bills carry. All of this 
    money is to be used as loans.
        The gentleman says that in other acts the Secretary of the 
    Treasury is ``authorized'' but not ``directed.'' I contend that the 
    meaning of ``authorized'' and ``directed'' in this act is 
    absolutely the same.
        Do you think when you authorize the Secretary of the Treasury 
    to raise funds to carry out a great public purpose it is in his 
    discretion whether he shall raise those funds and that that shall 
    depend on the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury? I say 
    ``authorized'' in this sense means ``directed.'' It could not mean 
    anything else, otherwise you would be delegating to an officer of 
    the Government entire discretion as to whether or not great 
    national acts should be carried out and the purposes of Congress 
    should be subserved.

        Mr. Case of South Dakota. Mr. Chairman, in most of the acts 
    which the gentleman has suggested, points of order were waived, and 
    I refer to Bretton Woods and some of the other bills. But as to the 
    particular point here in issue, the question whether the words 
    ``and directed'' have any meaning, if they do not have any meaning 
    why are they there? The present housing act merely authorizes the 
    Secretary of the Treasury to purchase. It does not say ``and 
    directed.'' The very inclusion of the words ``and directed'' is 
    evidence of the fact they have a special meaning. They create a 
    mandatory extraction of funds from the Public Treasury. . . .
        Mr. [John W.] McCormack [of Massachusetts]: . . . The gentleman 
    from South Dakota has referred to the Constitution. The 
    Constitution says:

            No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in 
        consequence of appropriations made by law.

        The word ``appropriations'' is used.
        The rule referred to, clause 4, rule 21, says:

            No bill or resolution carrying appropriations shall be 
        reported by any committee not having jurisdiction to report 
        appropriations.

        You will note the word ``appropriations'' is used. Now, let us 
    see what ``appropriations'' means.
        I have before me Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary and 
    ``appropriations'' is defined as follows:

[[Page 11985]]

            To set apart for a particular use. To take for one's own 
        use.

        The provisions of this bill are not taking for one's own use, 
    because this is a loan designed purely for loan purposes. It is not 
    a definite appropriation. It is giving authority to utilize for 
    loan purposes and the money comes back into the Treasury of the 
    United States with interest. . . .
        The provision in paragraph (f) that my friend has raised a 
    point of order against relates entirely to loans. As we read 
    section 102 of title I it starts out with loans. Throughout the 
    bill, a number of times, there is reference to loans. . . .
        . . . Certainly, the word ``appropriations'' is used in the 
    Constitution. And, I think it is the rule of the House that must 
    govern, and that is what the Chair has to pass upon, because the 
    Congress could determine by proper legislation what the word 
    ``appropriation'' means as contained in the Constitution itself. . 
    . . Now, if the House intended that it should apply to provisions 
    of this kind, instead of saying, ``No bill or joint resolution 
    carrying appropriations shall be reported'' the House might have 
    said, ``No bill or joint resolution carrying appropriations or 
    having directly or indirectly the effect.'' There is a difference 
    between cause and effect. Certainly, it applies to this case. The 
    House, in its wisdom, in adopting this rule, confined it to 
    appropriations made to an agency of Government for use by that 
    agency in carrying out what the Congress considered to be 
    essentially the function of the Government during the coming fiscal 
    year or during the period for which the appropriation has been 
    made.
        I respectfully submit that it must call for an appropriation 
    out of the general funds of the Treasury in order to violate the 
    rules of the House. This permits the use of money raised by the 
    sale of bonds under the Second Liberty Bond Act for loans to these 
    public agencies, such loans to be repaid with interest. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair agrees with the gentleman from South Dakota that the 
    point which has been raised is not a casual point of order. As a 
    matter of fact, as far as the Chair has been able to ascertain, 
    this is the first time a point of order has been raised on this 
    issue as violative of clause 4 of rule XXI.
        As the Chair sees the point of order, the issue involved turns 
    on the meaning of the word ``appropriation.'' ``Appropriation,'' in 
    its usual and customary interpretation, means taking money out of 
    the Treasury by appropriate legislative language for the support of 
    the general functions of Government. The language before us does 
    not do that. This language authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury 
    to use proceeds of public-debt issues for the purpose of making 
    loans. Under the language, the Treasury of the United States makes 
    advances which will be repaid in full with interest over a period 
    of years without cost to the taxpayers.
        Therefore, the Chair rules that this language does not 
    constitute an appropriation, and overrules the point of order.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.

[[Page 11986]]

        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: Would the Chair hold then that that 
    language restricts the Secretary of the Treasury to using the 
    proceeds of the securities issued under the second Liberty Bond Act 
    and prevents him from using the proceeds from miscellaneous 
    receipts or tax revenues?
        The Chairman: The Chair does not have authority to draw that 
    distinction. The Chair is passing on the particular point which has 
    been raised.
        Mr. Case of South Dakota: However, Mr. Chairman, it would seem 
    implicit in the ruling of the Chair and I thought perhaps it could 
    be decided as a part of the parliamentary history. It might help 
    some courts later on.
        The Chairman: The Chair can make a distinction between the 
    general funds of the Treasury and money raised for a specific 
    purpose by the issuance of securities. That is the point involved 
    here.

Point of Order Against Speaker's Appointment of Conferees

Sec. 1.29 A point of order does not lie against the Speaker's exercise 
    of his discretionary authority under Rule X clause 6(e) in 
    appointing conferees who ``generally supported the House position, 
    as determined by the Speaker.''

    The portion of Rule X clause 6(f) involved in the following point 
of order raised by Mr. Erlenborn explicitly gives the Speaker 
discretion to make the determination in appointing conferees who 
generally supported the House position. Other provisions of the clause 
are mandatory on the Speaker: he must name Members who are primarily 
responsible for the legislation, for example. Speaker O'Neill's 
response to the Erlenborn point of order as excerpted from the 
proceedings of Oct. 12, 1977,(15) is carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 123 Cong. Rec. 33434, 33435, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: (16) The Chair appoints the following 
    conferees: Messrs. Perkins, Dent, Phillip Burton, Gaydos, Clay, 
    Biaggi, Zeferetti, Quie, Erlenborn, and Ashbrook; and an additional 
    Member, Mr. Pickle, solely for the consideration of section 12 of 
    the House bill and modifications thereof committed to conference.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Thomas P. O'Neill (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John N.] Erlenborn [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I make a 
    point of order against the naming of the conferees as not being in 
    compliance with the provisions of section 701(e), rule X of the 
    Rules of the House.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) 
    wish to be heard on his point of order?
        Mr. Erlenborn: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, rule X, section 701(e) provides in part:

            In appointing members to conference committees the Speaker 
        shall appoint no less than a majority of members who generally 
        supported the House position as determined by the Speaker.

[[Page 11987]]

        Mr. Speaker, as I pointed out in debate earlier today, the 
    three items in contention between this body and the other body are 
    the rate structure, the tip credit, and the small business 
    amendment. Every one of the majority Members, with the exception of 
    the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Gaydos), did not support the 
    House position during the consideration of the bill on the floor.
        I will admit, Mr. Speaker, that all of the Members who were 
    present did vote for the passage of the bill. The passage of the 
    bill is not in contention. Those items that are in contention 
    between this body and the other body are the three items that I 
    have mentioned, and the majority of the conferees named by the 
    Speaker are not among those Members who supported the majority 
    position in the House.
        The Speaker: Does the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Perkins) 
    wish to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. [Carl D.] Perkins [of Kentucky]: I do, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, there were numerous amendments offered to the 
    minimum wage bill. Perhaps the major amendment that was adopted was 
    the one increasing the exceptions from $250,000 to $500,000 for 
    small businesses. The Speaker has taken care of that situation by 
    appointing the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Pickle).
        If we were to follow the argument of the gentleman from 
    Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn), as it might apply to a situation in which 
    some 30 or 40 Members outside the committee had offered amendments, 
    I would think that it would set a precedent that this House could 
    not live with.
        But notwithstanding that, the Members who have been suggested 
    to the Speaker by myself as chairman of the Committee on Education 
    and Labor, the seven ranking members of the Subcommittee on Labor 
    Standards, headed by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Dent), 
    voted for the majority of the amendments that were offered to the 
    bill on the floor of the House. By and large, all the conferees 
    suggested to the Speaker generally supported the legislation, and 
    that is the rule.
        We must look at this picture as a whole and not pick out one or 
    two select amendments that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. 
    Erlenborn) is primarily interested in and overlook all the other 
    amendments that the other members supported and that the suggested 
    conferees supported.
        Therefore, Mr. Speaker, it is my contention that the point of 
    order raised by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) is 
    without merit and should be overruled.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule.
        This is the judgment of the Chair concerning the following 
    language: ``The Speaker shall appoint no less than a majority of 
    Members who generally supported the House position as determined by 
    the Speaker, and the Speaker shall name Members who are primarily 
    responsible for the legislation and shall, to the fullest extent 
    feasible, include the principal proponents of the major provisions 
    of the bill as it passed the House.''
        That language is found in clause 6(e) of rule X of the Rules of 
    the House.

        In the opinion of the Chair, after looking over the list of 
    conferees, and

[[Page 11988]]

    in view of the fact that the Chair has only had one additional 
    request to name a conferee--and that is the gentleman from Texas 
    (Mr. Pickle), whom the Chair has named as a limited conferee--the 
    Members that the Chair has named as conferees meet the 
    qualification of being ``primarily responsible for the 
    legislation.''
        The Chair's appointment under the remaining provisions of the 
    rule is ultimately a matter within his discretion, which the Chair 
    feels he has properly exercised, and there is nothing in the rule 
    requiring the Chair to consider the conferees' positions solely on 
    the matter in dispute.
        The Chair overruled the point of order.

Chair's Recognition Not Subject to Point of Order

Sec. 1.30 Recognition for unanimous-consent requests to address the 
    House for one minute before legislative business is within the 
    discretion of the Chair, and the Chair's refusal to entertain such 
    requests is not subject to a point of order.

    When the House convened on July 25, 1980,(17) Speaker 
Pro Tempore James C. Wright, Jr., of Texas, announced that the conduct 
of legislative business should precede recognition for one-minute 
speeches. Several Members sought recognition to challenge this exercise 
of the Speaker's power of recognition. Attempts to state opposition to 
this policy by raising questions of the privilege of the House were 
unsuccessful. The Chair's announcement and the events which followed 
are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 126 Cong. Rec. 19762-64, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                  announcement by the speaker pro tempore

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair desires to make an 
    announcement.
        As the Chair announced yesterday, requests to address the House 
    for 1 minute will be entertained at the conclusion of the 
    legislative business today, rather than at the beginning. This 
    should not deprive any Member of the privilege of being heard on 
    any subject of his choice, so long as the Member is willing to 
    await the conclusion of the business of the House.
        The Chair believes there is genuine value in the 1-minute rule 
    in the exercise of free expression on subjects, the variety of 
    which is limited only by the individual imaginations of the 
    Members. The Chair would not desire to deny any Member this 
    privilege. For all its value, however, the Chair does not believe 
    that the 1-minute rule must necessarily precede, nor be permitted 
    to postpone, the business of the House. On several occasions this 
    year, the exercise of the 1-minute rule has delayed a beginning on 
    the business of the day by periods extending from 45 minutes to 1 
    hour.
        Only 38 legislative days remain, including Mondays and Fridays, 
    between now and October 4, the date of our re

[[Page 11989]]

    cess or adjournment sine die. Nine major appropriations bills 
    remain to be acted upon by the House. No major appropriations bill 
    at this time has completed the legislative process.
        In addition to those very basic and indispensable legislative 
    priorities, there are other bills, including the budget 
    reconciliation legislation, the second budget resolution for fiscal 
    year 1981, and a considerable number of important legislative 
    initiatives, which, in the public interest, must be completed 
    before the Congress can adjourn.
        Under those circumstances, the Chair requests the understanding 
    and cooperation of all the Members in expediting the necessary 
    legislative business of the House, which is of course our first 
    duty to the American people. The Chair assures all Members, to the 
    extent that any such reassurance may be desired, that their rights 
    under the rules will be fully respected and assiduously protected.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland asks a 
    parliamentary inquiry. The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the gentleman from Maryland 
    heard the Chair answer a question regarding 1-minute speeches. The 
    gentleman from Maryland asked the Chair whether or not limits on 
    such speeches is to be a policy to be followed for the remainder of 
    the session, and the Chair, as recorded on page H6404, said that 
    the Chair was not announcing a policy for the remainder of the 
    session, but only for Thursday and Friday.
        Do I take the Chair's announcement this morning to mean that 
    this will be the policy for the remainder of this session?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: No; as the Chair stated yesterday in 
    response to a question from the gentleman from Maryland, the 
    present occupant of the chair is not in a position to announce a 
    policy for the remainder of the session, and so stated.
        The policy for the remainder of the session would be more 
    appropriately determined and stated by Speaker O'Neill. At this 
    present time, that is all the Chair has to say, or all that he 
    properly should or could say.

                     question of privilege of the house

        Mr. [E. G. (Bud)] Shuster [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I 
    rise to a point of privilege.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his 
    privilege.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Whereas the custom of allowing one-minute speeches is a 
        longstanding tradition of the House, begun by Speaker Sam 
        Rayburn in the 1940's;
            Whereas the ability of the Minority to be heard rests to a 
        large degree on the one-minute speeches; permitted in a timely 
        fashion; and
            Whereas the integrity of the proceedings of the House is 
        impugned where all Members are not accorded a full opportunity 
        to speak; Now, therefore, be it

[[Page 11990]]

            Resolved, That the Speaker exercise his prerogative and 
        reinstitute the custom of allowing one-minute speeches at the 
        beginning of the session.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair must declare that a question 
    of the privileges of the House under rule IX cannot impinge upon 
    the Speaker's right of recognition. The gentleman's proposal is 
    not, under rule IX, a privileged resolution, and the Chair will so 
    rule. The Chair does not entertain the resolution at this time.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a point of privilege.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state his point of 
    privilege.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly send a second 
    privileged resolution to the desk.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the second 
    resolution.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                                  H. Res. 753

            Whereas the structural deficiencies of the West Front of 
        the Capitol include walls that are ``cracked, the stones are 
        misaligned, the ties have rusted away, and the walls are held 
        in place by a system of shores and braces;'' and
            Whereas the portico ceiling at the West Capitol Front is 
        composed of ``stone joints that have failed;'' and
            Whereas ``the exterior walls of the west central portion of 
        the Capitol are distorted and cracked, and require corrective 
        action for safety and durability;'' now, therefore, be it
            Resolved, That an independent investigation be immediately 
        initiated into the safety of the Members of the House.

                  motion to table offered by mr. brademas

        Mr. [John] Brademas [of Indiana]: Mr. Speaker, I move to table 
    the resolution.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to table 
    offered by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Shuster: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The Chair will state that the vote is on the motion offered by 
    the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas) to table the resolution 
    offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Shuster).
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    222, nays 137, not voting 74, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

                               point of order

        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, a point of order. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, prior to the privileged or nonprivileged motions 
    just offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the Chair 
    unilaterally issued a ruling regarding the 1-minute speeches and 
    stated in essence, if I recall, that these speeches would not be 
    permitted today

[[Page 11991]]

    or during his tenure as Speaker pro tempore because of the press of 
    legislative business in the remainder of the session. I believe 
    that was the import of his remarks.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would correct the gentleman, 
    if the gentleman would permit.
        The Chair did not exactly say that, but the gentleman will 
    state his point of order.
        Mr. Bauman: I make a point of order against the ruling of the 
    Chair. I make a point of order that the Chair cannot in fact deny 
    the 1-minute speeches on the ground which he stated, and as 
    authority for that, I cite chapter 21, section 7 of Deschler's, 
    wherein there are several instances, including those referring to 
    July 22, 1968; June 17, 1970; and October 19, 1966, where the Chair 
    declined to recognize Members for 1-minute speeches because of the 
    press of business, a heavy legislative schedule, which is 
    Deschler's phrase, and proceeding to unfinished business.
        Mr. Speaker, my point of order is that the traditions of the 
    House, as evidenced in these precedents, indicate the Chair has the 
    discretion to deny 1-minute speeches on those grounds, but that the 
    ruling of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright), the Speaker pro 
    tempore, has, in fact, allowed an arbitrary ground to be used at a 
    time when there is no press of heavy legislative business 
    manifested by the fact that the Speaker and others have announced 
    that we will adjourn today at 3 o'clock when we can easily stay 
    here and deal with any pressing legislative business if that 
    exists.
        Further my point of order is that the Speaker has departed from 
    past traditions and, therefore, has exceeded his discretion in 
    regard to 1-minutes as supported by the traditions of the House.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule on the 
    point of order, unless other Members insist on being heard. The 
    Chair is prepared to rule.
        The gentleman's point of order in the first place comes too 
    late. But the Chair is prepared to state that in any event it is 
    not a sustainable point of order.
        The gentleman from Maryland is aware, because he is a scholar 
    of the rules of the House, and he is aware of the great thrust of 
    the very section to which he made reference, paragraph 7 of chapter 
    21 of Deschler's Procedure.
        The Chair would simply recite one or two of the precedents 
    therein reported. Recognition for 1-minute speeches is within the 
    discretion of the Speaker, and his evaluation of the time consumed 
    is a matter for the Chair and is not subject to challenge or 
    question by parliamentary inquiry.
        Now that was May 9, 1972.
        On December 16, 1971, the Speaker pro tempore announced that he 
    would recognize Members to address the House for longer than 1 
    minute for reasons that he felt desirable. On a number of 
    occasions, July 22, 1968; June 17, 1970; October 19, 1966, the same 
    rule was applied. Recognition for 1-minute speeches is within the 
    discretion of the Speaker, and when the House has a heavy 
    legislative schedule, he sometimes refuses to recognize Members for 
    that purpose.
        So the traditions of the House are clear, and the customs have 
    not been

[[Page 11992]]

    broken; and the Chair has tried to state to the gentleman his 
    intention and his firm determination assiduously to protect the 
    rights of all Members, minority as well as majority.
        The Chair has had a conversation with the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania, and with the Chairman who will preside in the 
    Committee of the Whole House and has asked that Chairman as a favor 
    to the Chair and as an exercise in abundant fairness to be 
    extremely tolerant of the rules of relevance so as to permit the 
    gentleman from Pennsylvania to speak his mind on an amendment that 
    he will be offering.
        Now, the Chair has bent over backward in an effort to be fair 
    with the minority, and the Chair believes the gentleman from 
    Maryland is aware of that fact; and so the point of order is 
    overruled.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Maryland appeals 
    from the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        Mr. Brademas: Mr. Speaker, I move to lay the appeal on the 
    table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion offered 
    by the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Brademas).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    233, nays 139, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 60, as follows: . 
    . .

Chair's Recognition Not Subject to Appeal

Sec. 1.31 The decision of the Chair on a matter of recognition is not 
    subject to a point of order, since recognition is largely within 
    the discretion of the Chair.

        On July 7, 1980,(18) there was a contest for 
    recognition in the Committee of the Whole when it had under 
    consideration H.R. 7235, the Rail Act of 1980. The proceedings were 
    as indicated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 126 Cong. Rec. 18285, 18290-92, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [James J.] Florio [of New Jersey]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Florio: Page 103, line 14, insert 
        ``or (c)'' immediately after ``subsection (b)''.
            Page 104, line 20, strike out the closing quotation marks 
        and the following period.
            Page 104, after line 20, insert the following new 
        subsection: . . .

        Mr. [Edward R.] Madigan [of Il-linois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment as a substitute for the amendment.

        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Madigan as a substitute for the 
        amendment offered by Mr. Florio:
            Page 103, line 14, insert ``or (c)'' immediately after 
        ``subsection (b)''.

[[Page 11993]]

            Page 104, line 20, strike out the closing quotation marks 
        and the following period.
            Page 104, after line 20, insert the following new 
        subsection: . . .

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, this amendment includes a number of 
    provisions designed to resolve problems which had been expressed by 
    agricultural groups since the bill was reported from committee. . . 
    .
        Mr. [Robert C.] Eckhardt [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman will state his 
    inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Les AuCoin (Oreg.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I was not aware at the time that 
    this amendment was offered that it would purport to deal with a 
    number of very different subjects. I assume that it would not be in 
    order to raise a point of order concerning germaneness at this late 
    time, not having reserved it, but I would like to ask if the 
    question may be divided. There are several subjects that are quite 
    divisible in the amendment offered here, and that deal with 
    different matters.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from Texas 
    that he is correct, it is too late to raise a point of order on the 
    question of germaneness.
        The Chair will further advise the gentleman from Texas that a 
    substitute is not divisible.

     amendment offered by mr. eckhardt to the amendment offered by mr. 
      madigan as a substitute for the amendment offered by mr. florio

        Mr. Eckhardt: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the 
    amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will re-port the amendment to the 
    substitute amendment.

                               point of order

        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Madigan: Mr. Chairman, I understand that the procedure is 
    that the members of the subcommittee would be recognized for 
    amendments first, and that the gentleman from Texas sought 
    recognition for the purpose of making a parliamentary inquiry and 
    was recognized for that purpose, and was not recognized for the 
    purpose of offering an amendment.
        I further understand that the gentlewoman from Maryland, a 
    member of the subcommittee, was on her feet seeking recognition for 
    the purpose of offering an amendment, as well as the gentleman from 
    North Carolina (Mr. Broyhill).
        Ms. [Barbara A.] Mikulski [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, that is 
    correct.
        The Chairman: The Chair will respond to the gentleman by saying 
    to him that the normal procedure is to recognize members of the 
    full committee by seniority, alternating from side to side, which 
    the Chair has been doing. The gentleman was recognized under that 
    procedure, and the Chair's recognition is not in any event subject 
    to challenge.
        Therefore, the gentleman is recognized, and any point of order 
    that the gentleman from Illinois would make on that point would not 
    be sustained.

[[Page 11994]]

        Mr. Madigan: Further pursuing my point of order, and with all 
    due respect to the Chair, am I incorrect in assuming that the 
    gentleman from Texas was recognized for the point of raising a 
    parliamentary inquiry?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is correct. He was recognized for 
    that purpose; then separately for the purpose of the amendment that 
    he is offering, which the Clerk will now report.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Eckhardt to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Madigan as a substitute for the amendment offered by Mr. 
        Florio: page 3, strike out lines 14 through 20.
            Page 3, line 5, strike out ``(i)''.
            Page 3, line 13, strike out ``; or'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof a period.
            Pages 4 and 5, strike out ``20,000'' and insert in lieu 
        thereof ``5,000''.

        Mr. Florio: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from New Jersey reserves a point of 
    order.
        Mr. Florio: We have not got a copy of the amendment, and what 
    was just shown does not comply with what was just read.
        The Chairman: The Chair will advise the gentleman from New 
    Jersey that the amendment that has been read is the amendment that 
    is pending. The fact that the gentleman does not have a copy of the 
    amendment does not give rise to a point of order.
        Mr. Florio: I would like to reserve a point of order until we 
    have an opportunity to see the amendment.
        The Chairman: The gentleman reserves a point of order.

Order of Amendments, Chair's Discretion

Sec. 1.32 Recognition to offer amendments in the Committee of the Whole 
    is within the discretion of the Chair, and no point of order lies 
    against the Chair's recognition of one Member over another, absent 
    a special rule which gives one amendment a special priority.

    During consideration of the Panama Canal Act of 1979, which had 
been considered by several committees of the House and was being 
debated under the provisions of a rather complicated special order, a 
dispute arose about the order of recognition to offer the next 
amendment. The pertinent proceedings of June 21, 1979,(20) 
were as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 125 Cong. Rec. 15999, 16000, 96th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John M.] Murphy of New York: Mr. Chairman, I move to 
    strike the last word.
        Mr. Chairman, I rise at this time with so many Members in the 
    well and on the floor to ask as many Members as possible to try to 
    stay on the floor throughout the next hour and 50 minutes. . . .
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 11995]]

            Amendment offered by Mr. Bauman: Page 187, strike out line 
        19 and all that follows through line 20 on page 189 and insert 
        in lieu thereof the following:

                             Chapter 2--IMMIGRATION

            Sec. 1611. Special Immigrants.--(a) Section 101(a)(27) of 
        the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)), 
        relating to the def-inition of special immigrants, is amended-- 
        . . .

        Ms. [Elizabeth] Holtzman [of New York] (during the reading): 
    Mr. Chairman, I want to raise a point of order. My point of order 
    is that under the rule the Committee on the Judiciary was given the 
    right to offer an amendment to strike section 1611, and I believe 
    that is the import of the amendment offered. The gentleman's 
    amendment goes to that section, and I was on my feet.
        The Chairman: (1) First the amendment should be 
    read, and then the Chair will recognize the gentlewoman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Thomas S. Foley (Wash.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk will read.
        The Clerk continued the reading of the amendment.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, I renew the point of order that I 
    tried to state at an earlier time.
        The Chairman: The gentlewoman will state the point of order.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, at the time that the last amendment 
    was voted on, I was on my feet seeking to offer an amendment on 
    behalf of the Committee on the Judiciary with respect to striking 
    in its entirety section 1611 of the bill. The right to offer that 
    amendment is granted under the rule, in fact on page 3 of House 
    Resolution 274. I want to ask the Chair whether I am entitled to be 
    recognized or was entitled to be recognized to make first a motion, 
    which was a motion to strike the entire section before amendments 
    were made to the text of the bill.
        The Chairman: Unless an amendment having priority of 
    consideration under the rule is offered, it is the Chair's practice 
    to alternate recognition of members of the several committees that 
    are listed in the rule, taking amendments from the majority and 
    minority side in general turn, while giving priority of recognition 
    to those committees that are mentioned in the rule.
        The gentlewoman from New York (Ms. Holtzman) is a member of 
    such a committee, but following the adoption of the last amendment 
    the gentleman from New York (Mr. Murphy), the chairman of the 
    Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, sought recognition to 
    strike the last word. Accordingly, the Chair then recognized the 
    gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Bauman) to offer a floor amendment, 
    which is a perfecting amendment to section 1611 of the bill.
        The rule mentions that it shall be in order to consider an 
    amendment as recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary, to 
    strike out section 1611, if offered, but the rule does not give any 
    special priority to the Committee on the Judiciary to offer such 
    amendments, over perfecting amendments to that section.
        Ms. Holtzman: Mr. Chairman, may I be heard further? The 
    gentleman said that he was going to recognize members of the 
    committees that had a right to offer amendments under the rule al

[[Page 11996]]

    ternately. I would suggest to the Chair that no member of the 
    Committee on the Judiciary has been recognized thus far in the 
    debate with respect to offering such an amendment and, therefore, 
    the Chair's principle, as I understood he stated it, was not being 
    observed in connection with recognition.
        The Chairman: The Chair would observe that the Chair is 
    attempting to be fair in recognizing Members alternately when they 
    are members of committees with priority and that the rule permits 
    but does not give the Committee on the Judiciary special priority 
    of recognition over other floor amendments, which under the 
    precedents would take priority over a motion to strike.
        Second, the Chair would like to advise the gentlewoman from New 
    York that recognition is discretionary with the Chair and is not 
    subject to a point of order. Does the gentlewoman have any further 
    comment to make on the point of order?
        The Chair overrules the point of order and recognizes the 
    gentleman in the well.

Addressing Rules of Procedure Through Question of Privilege of House

Sec. 1.33 While ordinary questions of procedure or interpretations of 
    the House rules cannot be raised by a question of privilege under 
    Rule IX, since it is the duty of the Speaker under Rule I clause 4 
    to rule on all questions of order, a question of privilege was once 
    based upon the assertion that integrity of House proceedings would 
    be violated if the House could not determine as a question of 
    privilege the vote required to extend the time for ratification of 
    a constitutional amendment already submitted to the states.

    The Equal Rights Amendment was proposed to the states for 
ratification in the 92d Congress. In the text of that joint resolution, 
there was a provision stating that ratification should be completed 
within seven years of its submission to the states. In the 95th 
Congress, the House Committee on the Judiciary reported another joint 
resolution (H.J. Res. 638) proposing to extend the time for 
ratification. The difficult question presented was the vote needed to 
pass this joint resolution.
    After the House had adopted a special rule making consideration of 
H.J. Res. 638 in order, Mr. Quillen, of the Committee on Rules, offered 
H. Res. 1315 as a question of privilege under Rule IX. This resolution 
declared that a two-thirds vote was required to pass the joint 
resolution extending the ratification period. The proceedings of Aug. 
15, 1978,(2) are carried in full.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 124 Cong. Rec. 26203, 26204, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

[[Page 11997]]

     Providing for a Two-Thirds Vote of Members Present and Voting on 
                Final Passage of House Joint Resolution 638

        (Mr. Quillen asked and was given permission to address the 
    House for 1 minute.)
        Mr. [James H.] Quillen [of Tennessee]: Mr. Speaker, at the 
    conclusion of my remarks I shall offer a resolution involving a 
    question of the privileges of the House and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        Mr. Speaker, the ``Resolved'' clause of my resolution demands a 
    two-thirds vote on final passage of the constitutional resolution 
    extending the ERA. At the appropriate time I will offer my 
    privileged resolution.
        The Speaker: (3) The Chair will state to the 
    gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Quillen) that now is the time for the 
    gentleman to offer his resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Privileges of the House--Providing for a Two-Thirds Vote of Members 
     Present and Voting on Final Passage of House Joint Resolution 638

        Mr. Quillen: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of the 
    privileges of the House and offer a privileged resolution (H. Res. 
    1315) involving a question of the privileges of the House, and I 
    ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the resolution.
        First, the Chair will state that he has had an opportunity to 
    examine the resolution as offered by the gentleman from Tennessee 
    (Mr. Quillen), and in the opinion of the Chair the resolution 
    presents a question of the privileges of the House and may be 
    considered under rule IX of the rules of the House.
        The Clerk will report the resolution.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 1315

            Whereas H.J. Res. 638 of this Congress amends H.J. Res. 208 
        of the 92nd Congress, proposing an amendment to the 
        Constitution;

            Whereas H.J. Res. 208 of the 92nd Congress was passed by an 
        affirmative vote of two-thirds of the Members present and 
        voting, as required by Article V of the Constitution, and 
        submitted for ratification on March 22, 1972;
            Whereas the integrity of the process by which the House 
        considers changes to H.J. Res. 208 of the 92nd Congress would 
        be violated if H.J. Res. 638 were passed by a simple majority 
        of the Members present and voting; and
            Whereas the constitutional prerogatives of the House to 
        propose amendments to the Constitution and to impose necessary 
        conditions thereto in accordance with Article V of the 
        Constitution would be abrogated if H.J. Res. 638 were passed by 
        a simple majority of the Members present and voting;
            Resolved, That an affirmative vote of two-thirds of the 
        Members present and voting, a quorum being present, shall be 
        required on final passage of H.J. Res. 638.

        Mr. [Don] Edwards of California: Mr. Speaker, I move to table 
    the resolution.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Edwards).
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes 
    appeared to have it.

[[Page 11998]]

        Mr. Quillen: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    230, nays 183, not voting 19, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to table was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Edwards) to offer a motion. . . .
        Mr. [Charles E.] Wiggins [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state his parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. Wiggins: Mr. Speaker, upon the conclusion of our 
    consideration of House Joint Resolution 638, including the adoption 
    of any amendments to it, when the question is put on the final 
    passage of that resolution, must the vote of the House to adopt the 
    joint resolution be by a simple majority of those present and 
    voting or by two-thirds of those present and voting?
        The Speaker: In response to the parliamentary inquiry raised by 
    the gentleman from California, the Chair feels that the action of 
    the House in laying on the table House Resolution 315 was an 
    indication by the House that a majority of the Members feel a 
    majority vote is required for the final passage of House Joint 
    Resolution 638. The Chair would cite the precedent contained in 
    Cannon's VIII, section 2660, that affirmative action on a motion to 
    lay on the table, while not a technical rejection, is in effect an 
    adverse disposition equivalent to rejection.
        The Chair, by ruling that House Resolution 1315 properly raised 
    a question of the privileges of the House under rule IX, believed 
    it essential that the question of the vote required to pass House 
    Joint Resolution 638 be decided by the House itself. The House now 
    having laid that resolution on the table, the Chair feels that the 
    result of such a vote, combined with the guidance on this question 
    furnished by the Committee on the Judiciary on page 6 of its 
    report, justifies the Chair in responding that, following the 
    expression of the House, House Joint Resolution 638 will be 
    messaged to the Senate if a majority of those present and voting, a 
    quorum being present, vote for passage.
        Mr. Wiggins: I have a further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Wiggins: Do I understand the ruling of the Chair correctly 
    to be that a vote not to consider a privileged resolution is 
    equivalent to a rejection of the text of the resolution itself?
        The Speaker: The vote was not on the question of consideration. 
    The Chair will state that he believes he has answered the question 
    raised in the gentleman's original inquiry. The Chair has stated 
    that a motion to table is an adverse disposition.
        Mr. Wiggins: Mr. Speaker, I understood the answer, then, to be 
    ``Yes?''
        The Speaker: The answer is ``Yes.''

    Parliamentarian's Note: The question of the vote required, a 
majority or two-thirds, was unique. Section 508, Jefferson's Manual, 
states that ``The voice of the majority decides; for the lex majoris 
partis is the law of all

[[Page 11999]]

councils, elections, etc. where not otherwise expressly provided.''
    A supermajority is required in the Constitution, Article V: ``The 
Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, 
shall propose Amendments to this Constitution. . . .''
    Since 1917, Congress has, when proposing a constitutional amendment 
for ratification, provided in the joint resolution a time limit within 
which the requisite number of states must ratify; in four cases since 
that date the time limit has appeared in the text of the constitutional 
amendment, but since the 23d amendment the time limit has appeared 
independently in the proposing clause.

Chair Does Not Rule on Consistency of Pending Bill

Sec. 1.34 The Speaker does not rule on a point of order alleging that a 
    pending bill is not consistent with existing law.

    On May 3, 1949,(4) Mr. Adam C. Powell, Jr., of New York, 
pointed out the apparent incongruity of language in proposed 
legislation that referred to federal courts under nomenclature that was 
obsolete because of court reorganization.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 95 Cong. Rec. 5543, 5544, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration 
        was H.R. 2032, the National Labor Relations Act of 1949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Powell: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker: (5) The gentleman will state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Sam Rayburn (Tex.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Powell: If this bill uses language which is no longer in 
    keeping with our laws, I raise the point of order that it is 
    incorrectly drawn. On page 53, line 13, this bill uses the 
    language, ``to review by the appropriate circuit court of 
    appeals.'' I make the point of order that there is no longer any 
    circuit court of appeals.
        The Speaker: There might be 203 Members take the same position 
    that the gentleman from New York does, but that does not alter the 
    situation.
        The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the 
    bill.

Chair Does Not Rule on Consistency of Amendments

Sec. 1.35 The Chair does not rule on the consistency of a proposed 
    amendment with another amendment already adopted to a different 
    portion of the bill.

    When the Committee of the Whole had under consideration the bill 
H.R. 3744, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1977, an amendment was 
offered and agreed to which established the minimum wage levels for 
three years. Later during the consideration of the

[[Page 12000]]

measure, another amendment relating to minimum wage levels was offered 
by Mr. Burton. The proceedings of Sept. 15, 1977,(6) were as 
follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 123 Cong. Rec. 29431, 29436, 29440, 95th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John N.] Erlenborn [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Erlenborn: Page 4, strike out 
        lines 16 and 17 and insert in lieu thereof ``INCREASE IN 
        MINIMUM WAGE''.
            Page 4, line 18, redesignate ``SEC. 2.(a)(1)'' as ``SEC. 
        2.(a)'', and beginning with line 20 strike out everything 
        through line 21 on page 5 and insert in lieu thereof:
            ``(1) not less than $2.65 an hour during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1978, not less than $2.85 an hour during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1979, and not less than $3.05 an hour 
        after December 31, 1979, except as otherwise provided in this 
        section;''. . . .

        The Chairman: (7) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. William H. Natcher (Ky.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the 
    noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Erlenborn: Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote. . . .
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 
    223, noes 193, not voting 18, as follows: . . .
        Mr. Phillip Burton [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I offer an 
    amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Phillip Burton: Page 9, insert 
        after line 5 of the following:
            (b) Section 6 (29 U.S.C. 206) is amended by adding at the 
        end the following:
            ``(9)(1) Every employer shall pay to each of his employees 
        who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or in the production 
        of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged 
        in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, wages 
        at the following rates: during the period ending December 31, 
        1977, not less [than] $2.30 an hour, during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1978, not less than $2.65 an hour, during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1979, not less than 52 per centum of the 
        average hourly earnings excluding overtime, during the twelve-
        month period ending in June 1978, of production and related 
        workers on manufacturing payrolls, during the year beginning 
        January 1, 1980, and during each of the next three years, not 
        less than 53 per centum of the average hourly earnings 
        excluding overtime, during the twelve-month period ending in 
        June of the year preceding such year, or production and related 
        workers on manufacturing payrolls, and during the year 
        beginning January 1, 1984, and during each succeeding year, not 
        less than the minimum wage rate in effect under this paragraph 
        for the year beginning January 1, 1983. For purposes of 
        computing the minimum wage prescribed by this paragraph, the 
        Secretary shall, not later than August 1, 1979, and August 1 of 
        each of the next five years, publish in the Federal Register an 
        estimate of the average hourly earnings (excluding overtime), 
        during the twelve-month period ending in June of such year, of 
        production and related workers on manufacturing payrolls, and 
        shall, not later than November 1, 1978, and November 1 of each 
        of the next five years, publish in the Fed

[[Page 12001]]

        eral Register such earnings for such period.''.
            ``(2) the minimum wage rate prescribed by paragraph (1) 
        shall apply in any year, in lieu of the wage rate prescribed by 
        subsection (a)(1), in which the wage rate prescribed by 
        paragraph (1) is higher than that prescribed by subsection 
        (a)(1).''.

        Mr. Erlenborn: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order against 
    the amendment. . . .
        Mr. [Clifford R.] Allen [of Tennessee]: Mr. Chairman, a point 
    of order. I can find no copy of this amendment. I would like to be 
    able to read the amendment and I believe under the rules a certain 
    number of copies are supposed to be available.
        The Chairman: The gentleman does not state a point of order.
        Mr. Phillip Burton: Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of 
    my time.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) 
    insist upon his point of order?
        Mr. Erlenborn: Yes, Mr. Chairman.
        I must first say I have had only a few minutes to look at the 
    amendment which is thrown together rather hastily in an attempt, as 
    the gentleman said, to get a recount on the issue of indexing, but, 
    Mr. Chairman, I make a point of order against the amendment on the 
    ground that the Committee has voted on the issue of indexing, has 
    expressed its will, and this is an amendment which merely would 
    have the House again vote on the same issue already disposed of.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from California (Mr. Phillip 
    Burton) desire to be heard on the point of order?
        Mr. Phillip Burton: No, other than to say that we have 
    developed this amendment so that a point of order does not lie.
        The Chairman: The Chair is ready to rule.
        The amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. 
    Phillip Burton) simply adds a new subsection to the end of the 
    section. In the opinion of the Chair the amendment is germane. As 
    to whether or not it is inconsistent with the amendment of the 
    gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Erlenborn) adopted a few moments ago, 
    the Chair cannot rule upon that. The Chair holds the amendment to 
    be germane and not to directly change the amendment already 
    adopted. The point of order is overruled. . . .
        So the amendment was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Sec. 1.36 The Chair does not pass upon the consistency of proposed 
    amendments or on their legal effect, if adopted.

    On Aug. 22, 1949,(8) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Walter A. Lynch, of New York, refused to rule on the 
consistency of an amendment to an authorization bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 95 Cong. Rec. 11994, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 5472, dealing with public works on rivers and harbors for 
        navigation and flood control.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Usher L.] Burdick [of North Dakota]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

[[Page 12002]]

            Amendment offered by Mr. Burdick: On page 19, line 10, 
        strike out lines 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 and insert 
        ``$250,000,000.''

        Mr. [William M.] Whittington [of Mississippi]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    make a point of order against the amendment, that the amendment is 
    really without meaning or significance, because it authorizes no 
    appropriation. The Congress cannot make an appropriation unless it 
    is authorized by law. There is no authorization. The gentleman from 
    North Dakota wants to strike out the entire paragraph and merely 
    insert $250,000,000. He wants to strike out on page 19 this 
    language:

            In addition to previous authorizations there is hereby 
        authorized to be appropriated the sum of $250,000,000 for the 
        prosecution of the comprehensive plan for the Missouri River 
        Basin to be undertaken by the Corps of Engineers, approved by 
        the act of June 28, 1938, as amended and supplemented by 
        subsequent acts of Congress.

        He wants to insert ``$250,000,000'', without saying it is an 
    authorization or what it is. The amendment is without meaning. It 
    is frivolous--meaningless. . . .
        The Chairman: The Chair will address himself to the point of 
    order and say that, in the opinion of the Chair, the point of order 
    is not well taken, for the reason that whether or not this is 
    consistent is not within the province of the Chair.

The Chair Does Not Rule on Questions of Constitutionality

Sec. 1.37 The Speaker does not rule on the question of whether a bill 
    is constitutional or unconstitutional.

    On July 21, 1947,(9) it was demonstrated that the Chair 
does not rule on the constitutionality of proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. 93 Cong. Rec. 9522, 9523, 80th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [John E.] Rankin [of Mississippi]: Mr. Speaker, I make the 
    point of order against the bill that it violates the Constitution 
    of the United States and that the Congress has no right to pass 
    such legislation, and I should like to be heard on the point of 
    order.
        The Speaker: (10) The Chair will hear the gentleman 
    from Mississippi briefly on the point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. Joseph W. Martin, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Rankin: . . . I submit, Mr. Speaker, that this bill is not 
    legally before the House, and that my point of order should be 
    sustained.
        The Speaker: The Chair is ready to rule. The bill is properly 
    before the House. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Chair to 
    determine what is constitutional and what is not constitutional. 
    The point of order is overruled.

Sec. 1.38 It is for the House and not the Chair to determine on the 
    constitutionality of a bill; and the Chair has declined to respond 
    to a parliamentary inquiry about whether a bill contravenes the 
    Constitution.

    On Feb. 7, 1995,(11) during debate on H.R. 729, a bill 
dealing

[[Page 12003]]

with the imposition of the death penalty under federal sentencing 
procedures, an inquiry was raised about the vote required on passage of 
the bill. The question and the Chair's response are carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Cleo] Fields of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (12) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. Frank D. Riggs (Calif.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: Mr. Chairman, since we are about to 
    vote on this measure, I have a question: Since this bill that is 
    before us modifies the Constitution to some degree, would this not 
    call for a two-thirds vote of the House?
        The Chairman: The simple answer is no. The amendment before us 
    is not a constitutional amendment.
        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman:
        My inquiry was on the bill and not the amendment.
        The Chairman: The Chair will issue the same ruling:
        This is a bill and not a constitutional amendment.

        Mr. Fields of Louisiana: A further parliamentary inquiry, Mr. 
    Chairman:
        The bill precisely says that evidence which is obtained as a 
    result of a search or seizure shall not be excluded in a proceeding 
    in a court of the United States on the grounds that the search or 
    seizure was in violation of the fourth amendment.
        How is that not, Mr. Chairman, making the fourth amendment of 
    the Constitution moot or at least revising it?
        The Chairman: The gentleman is not stating a parliamentary 
    inquiry. He is raising a question of constitutional law.
        That is a matter for the House to decide.

Sec. 1.39 The constitutional requirement that ``All Bills for raising 
    Revenue shall originate in the House . . .'' may be raised when a 
    measure is before the House for consideration, and the issue is 
    determined by the House, voting on a question of privilege which 
    may provide for returning the offending measure to the Senate. But 
    the challenge is in order only when the House is in possession of 
    the papers and cannot be raised collaterally or after the fact when 
    the bill has passed and is no longer in possession of the House.

    On Apr. 6, 1995,(13) a resolution was offered from the 
floor as a question of privilege under Rule IX. The resolution provided 
as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
13. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Peter] Deutsch [of Florida]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of

[[Page 12004]]

    privilege under rule IX of the House rules and I offer a House 
    Resolution No. 131.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (14) The Clerk will report 
    the resolution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. Scott McInnis (Colo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 131

            Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives provides that questions of privilege shall 
        arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are 
        affected;
            Whereas, under the precedents, customs, and traditions of 
        the House pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has 
        arisen in cases involving the constitutional prerogatives of 
        the House;
            Whereas section 7 of Article I of the Constitution requires 
        that revenue measures originate in the House of 
        Representatives; and
            Whereas the conference report on the bill H.R. 831 
        contained a targeted tax benefit which was not contained in the 
        bill as passed the House of Representatives and which was not 
        contained in the amendment of the Senate: Now, therefore, be it
            Resolved, That the Comptroller General of the United States 
        shall prepare and transmit, within 7 days after the date of the 
        adoption of this resolution, a report to the House of 
        Representatives containing the opinion of the Comptroller 
        General on whether the addition of a targeted tax benefit by 
        the conferees to the conference report on the bill H.R. 831 (A 
        bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to permanently 
        extend the deduction for the health insurance costs of self-
        employed individuals, to repeal the provision permitting 
        nonrecognition of gain on sales and exchanges effectuating 
        policies of the Federal Communications Commission, and for 
        other purposes) violates the requirement of the United States 
        Constitution that all revenue measures originate in the House 
        of Representatives.

    The Chair ruled that the resolution did not qualify as a proper 
question of Rule IX privilege. After debate, the Chair's decision was 
sustained on appeal.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentleman from Florida [Mr. 
    Deutsch] wish to be heard on whether the question is one of 
    privilege? . . .
        Mr. Deutsch: I thank the Chair.
        Mr. Speaker, article I, section 7 of the Constitution 
    specifically states that revenue measures must originate in this 
    Chamber, in the House of Representatives. It is an infringement of 
    the House prerogatives when that is not done, and in fact this 
    House has consistently ruled that as a question of privilege when 
    that occurs. It consistently occurs when the other body does a 
    revenue provision.
        What occurred in this case, as most Members at this point are 
    well aware, is that this revenue measure which did originate in the 
    House, then went to the other body, went to a conference committee. 
    . . .
        The House has consistently held that that type of instance is a 
    violation of our prerogatives.
        Furthermore, the Chair has consistently ruled that on issues of 
    this nature the House has the right, and the appropriate action is 
    for the House to decide itself what is a prerogative and what is a 
    violation in terms of the privileges of the House. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule.

[[Page 12005]]

        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        The Chair rules that the resolution does not constitute a 
    question of privilege under rule IX.
        The resolution offered by the gentleman from Florida 
    collaterally questions actions taken by a committee of conference 
    on a House-originated revenue bill by challenging the inclusion in 
    the conference report of additional revenue matter not contained in 
    either the House bill nor the Senate amendment committed to 
    conference. The resolution calls for a report by the Comptroller 
    General on the propriety under section 7 of article I of the 
    Constitution of those proceedings and conference actions on a bill 
    that has already moved through the legislative process.
        In the opinion of the Chair, such a resolution does not raise a 
    question of the privileges of the House. As recorded in Deschler's 
    Precedents, volume 3, chapter 13, section 14.2, a question of 
    privilege under section 7 of article I of the Constitution may be 
    raised only when the House is ``in possession of the papers.'' In 
    other words, any allegation of infringement on the prerogatives of 
    the House to originate a revenue measure must be made 
    contemporaneous with the consideration of the measure by the House 
    and may not be raised after the fact.
        The Chair rules that the resolution does not constitute a 
    question of the privileges of the House. . . .
        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker, I respectfully appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Florida has 
    appealed the ruling of the Chair. The gentleman is recognized.
        Mr. Deutsch: Mr. Speaker, I believe I am recognized for an 
    hour.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will suspend.

                   motion to table offered by mr. walker

        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I offer 
    a motion.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will report the motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Walker moves to lay the appeal on the table.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to 
    table.

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Gene] Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from the State of 
    Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] is recognized.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, since the rules of the 
    House clearly state that when the question of the integrity of the 
    proceedings of this House have been violated, that is indeed a 
    privileged resolution. Now, I realize that the Chair responded to 
    the written request of my colleague, but I have also asked the 
    Chair to respond to whether or not it is prima facie evidence that 
    a question relating to the integrity of the proceedings of this 
    body are called into question when one individual who earlier this 
    session offered the Speaker of the House an over $4 million book 
    deal which the Speaker

[[Page 12006]]

    turned down, but he still offered it and with--that is a 
    parliamentary inquiry. I have just as much right as the Members.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Regular order. This is a parliamentary 
    inquiry. The gentleman will suspend. The Chair has ruled previously 
    on all points on this issue as textually raised by the resolution. 
    We now have the motion before the House.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The motion is not debatable.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Mr. [Kweisi] Mfume [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. 
    Taylor] may state a legitimate parliamentary inquiry. . . .
        Mr. Mfume: Mr. Speaker, yesterday evening when there was an 
    appeal of the ruling of the Chair; then there was from the other 
    side of the aisle a request to table. Following that, there were 
    questions raised on this side of the aisle about why is it so 
    difficult to get a vote on an appeal of the ruling of the Chair? . 
    . .
        The gentleman has legitimately appealed it and ought to, at 
    least at some point in time, have a vote, so I would say to my 
    distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that, 
    while we will vote on the motion to table the appeal, that there 
    may in fact be another motion to appeal the Chair, and another one 
    after that, and, if that is what it is going to take to get one 
    vote on the appeal of the Chair, then this side is prepared to do 
    that. I would rather not do it. They will win in either case, but 
    this side is just asking for a clean vote on the appeal of the 
    Chair.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: It is the Chair's ruling that the 
    motion that is currently pending is, in fact, a proper motion under 
    the rules of the House.
        Mr. Mfume: I do not dispute that, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question before the House is the 
    motion to table.
        Are there further parliamentary inquiries?
        The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] to lay on the table the appeal of the 
    ruling of the Chair.
        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the noes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground 
    that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a 
    quorum is not present.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    230, nays 192, not voting 12, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of 
    the Chair was agreed to.
        The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
        A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

[[Page 12007]]

Chair Does Not Rule on Hypothetical Questions

Sec. 1.40 Although the Chair responds to parliamentary inquiries 
    concerning the rules of order and decorum in debate, he does not 
    rule on hypothetical questions; rule retrospectively on questions 
    not timely raised; or rule anticipatorily on questions not yet 
    presented.

    On Nov. 20, 1989,(15) the House had under debate House 
Resolution 295 providing for consideration of a measure relating to 
appropriations for foreign operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. 135 Cong. Rec. 30225, 30226, 101st Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    During the hour, the debate became somewhat intemperate.

        Mr. [Bob] McEwen [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, it is a difficult time 
    to represent the interest of the left when around the world from 
    Managua to Moscow it is being exposed that communism is a violation 
    of human rights and human dignity. Indeed, those who have supported 
    the Marxist guerrillas in Central America this week, having killed 
    hundreds of innocent civilians throughout El Salvador, have not 
    taken the floor to make any protestation of that death. . . .
        Mr. [David R.] Obey [of Wisconsin]: Mr. Speaker----
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (16) For what purpose does 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin rise?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. Pat Williams (Mont.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Obey: Mr. Speaker, I am about to ask that the gentleman's 
    words be taken down.
        Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman yield for a possible 
    correction? I do not want to make a motion to embarrass the 
    gentleman. Would the gentleman yield?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Would the gentleman from Ohio yield to 
    the gentleman from Wisconsin?
        Mr. McEwen: I yield to the gentleman. . . .
        Mr. Obey: Mr. Speaker, I would simply suggest--I would be happy 
    to give him another minute because I will not take more than a 
    minute.
        I think I heard the gentleman say that those who support 
    Marxist revolutions around the world have not taken specific action 
    on this floor. I hope that the gentleman is not suggesting that 
    anyone on this floor is in support of Marxist revolutions. We are 
    going to have an acrimonious enough debate today without leaving 
    mistaken impressions like that. . . .

                  announcement by the speaker pro tempore

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Before the Chair recognizes the 
    gentleman from Massachusetts, the Chair would like to say to 
    Members on both sides of the aisle that the Chair may intervene to 
    prevent the arraignment of the motives of other Members. The Chair 
    would, therefore, echo the sentiments expressed by the honorable 
    minority leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Michel], this 
    morning when he asked the Members to debate the issue and the 
    policy and not to become involved in attacking or laying for 
    question the motives of other Members.

[[Page 12008]]

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, I just would like to clarify on the 
    ruling of the Chair right now.
        Does the Chair believe, if someone did suggest that Members, 
    not by name, but that Members of this body supported Marxist 
    revolution, that would be unparliamentary language?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is not called upon to rule 
    on possible prior violation of the rules of the House or 
    Jefferson's Manual.

Ambiguities in Legislative Language

Sec. 1.41 The Chair does not rule on points of order as to whether an 
    amendment is ambiguous.

    On July 5, 1956,(17) in the Committee of the Whole, 
Chairman Francis E. Walter, of Pennsylvania, pointed out that the Chair 
does not rule on the ambiguity of proposed amendments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. 102 Cong. Rec. 11875, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 7537, dealing with federal assistance to states for school 
        construction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

            Amendment offered by Mr. [James] Roosevelt [of California] 
        to the Powell amendment: Strike the word ``provisions'' and 
        insert the word ``decisions.''

        Mr. [Ross] Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I make the point of order that the 
    amendment is not germane to the bill.
        The Chairman: It is certainly germane to the amendment offered 
    by the gentleman from New York to substitute the word ``decisions'' 
    for the word ``provisions.'' The Chair so rules.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: Mr. Chairman, a further point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. Bass of Tennessee: I make the point of order that the word 
    ``provisions'' is ambiguous and has no meaning whatever and would 
    make the amendment not germane.
        The Chairman: The Chair does not rule on the question of 
    ambiguity. It is a question of germaneness solely, and the Chair 
    has ruled that the amendment is germane.

Legal Effect of Bill Not Subject of Point of Order

Sec. 1.42 It is not a proper point of order to inquire as to the legal 
    effect of the adoption of an amendment.

    On Aug. 7, 1986,(18) during consideration of the Surface 
Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1986 (H.R. 
3129) in the Committee of the Whole,

[[Page 12009]]

Chairman Bob Traxler, of Michigan, declined to respond to a point of 
order seeking information concerning the effect of an amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 132 Cong. Rec. 19675, 99th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Rod] Chandler [of Washington]: Mr. Chairman, I demand a 
    recorded vote.
        A recorded vote was ordered.
        Ms. [Bobbi] Fiedler [of California]: I have a point of order, 
    Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The gentlewoman will state her point 
    of order.
        Ms. Fiedler: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask whether or not a 
    vote in favor of this particular amendment would require the 
    elimination of such signs along a route for hospitals or other 
    urgent or emergency care.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair would like to state to the 
    gentlewoman that that is not a point of order.
        A recorded vote has been ordered.

Point of Order Does Not Lie Against Competency of Drafting of Amendment

Sec. 1.43 The issue of whether an amendment is properly and competently 
    drafted to accomplish its legislative purpose is not questioned by 
    a point of order but is a matter to be disposed of by debate on the 
    merits.

    The purpose of raising a point of order is to determine whether a 
motion or action is in compliance with the rules. It is not properly 
used to question whether an amendment is properly drafted to achieve 
its stated purpose. The proceedings of Feb. 4, 1976,(19) 
illustrate this distinction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. 122 Cong. Rec. 2371, 94th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [William M.] Brodhead [of Michigan]: Mr. Chairman, I offer 
    an amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Brodhead to the amendment in the 
        na-ture of a substitute offered by Mr. Krueger: Strike out 
        section 105 and designate the succeeding sections of title I 
        accordingly.

        Mr. [Clarence J.] Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a 
    point of order on the amendment.
        The Chairman: (20) The gentleman from Ohio reserves 
    a point of order on the amendment. . . .
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Richard Bolling (Mo.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Does the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Brown) insist on his point of 
    order?
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: I do, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman from Ohio will state his point of 
    order.
        Mr. Brown of Ohio: Mr. Chairman, my point of order against the 
    amendment mentioned is that while it has a purpose with which I am 
    not totally unsympathetic, it does not make the conforming 
    amendments necessary to accomplish that purpose without leaving a 
    lot of loose ends hanging in the legislation. For example, it 
    strikes section 105, which is entitled, ``Prohibition

[[Page 12010]]

    of the Use of Natural Gas as Boiler Fuel.''
        In section 102, the ``purpose'' section of the amendment, it 
    says:

            . . . to grant the Federal Energy Administration authority 
        to prohibit the use of natural gas as boiler fuel; . . .
    That would be left in the legislation without any language under 
    this section 105 which provides for that.

        I think there are other references in the language that I have 
    not had a chance to dig out.
        I would suggest that if the gentle-man from Michigan would like 
    to withdraw his amendment, I think that we can provide the 
    gentleman with an amendment that would have all the necessary 
    conforming language.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state that the gentleman from Ohio 
    (Mr. Brown) is no longer speaking on his point of order. The Chair 
    will state that the question the gentleman from Ohio raises is not 
    a valid point of order, it is rather a question of draftsmanship 
    and the Chair overrules the point of order.
        If the gentleman from Ohio desires to be heard in opposition to 
    the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Brodhead) 
    then the Chair would be glad to recognize the gentleman for 5 
    minutes.

Points of Order Against Relevancy of Debate

Sec. 1.44 Where a special rule provides that general debate in the 
    Committee of the Whole shall be confined to the bill, a Member must 
    confine his remarks to the bill, and if he continues to talk of 
    other matters after repeated points of order, the Chairman will 
    request that he take his seat.

    On Mar. 29, 1944,(1) Chairman James Domengeaux, of 
Louisiana, sustained a point of order against Emanuel Celler, of New 
York, after the Member repeatedly strayed from the subject before the 
House.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. 90 Cong. Rec. 3263, 78th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 4257, dealing with the expatriation of persons evading 
        military service.
            Absent language in the special rule (H. Res. 482, 78th 
        Cong.) confining general debate to the subject of the bill, 
        debate would have been permitted in the Committee of the Whole 
        on any subject. See 5 Hinds' Precedents Sec. Sec. 5233-38; 8 
        Cannon's Precedents Sec. 2590; 120 Cong. Rec. 21743, 93d Cong. 
        2d Sess., June 28, 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Adolph J.] Sabath [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, I rise to a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the point of order.
        Mr. Sabath: The gentleman is not speaking to the bill. He has 
    been admonished several times, he has refused, and I am obliged to 
    make the point of order myself, though I regret it.
        The Chairman: The point of order is sustained and the gentleman 
    is again requested to confine himself to the bill.

[[Page 12011]]

        Mr. [Noah M.] Mason [of Illinois]: Mr. Chairman, a 
    parliamentary inquiry. How many times do we have to call the 
    gentleman to order and try to get him to confine his remarks to the 
    bill before the privilege of the House is withdrawn?
        The Chairman: This will be the last time. If the gentleman does 
    not proceed in order, he will be requested to take his seat.

Point of Order Based on Violation of Ramseyer Rule Lies Only in House

Sec. 1.45 A point of order that a committee report fails to comply with 
    the Ramseyer rule will not lie in the Committee of the Whole.

        On July 25, 1966,(2) Chairman Richard Bolling, of 
    Missouri, ruled that a point of order raised by Mr. John Bell 
    Williams, of Mississippi, against consideration of the bill on the 
    ground that the report of the Committee on the Judiciary 
    accompanying the bill did not comply with requirements of the 
    Ramseyer rule, would not lie in the Committee of the Whole. Mr. 
    Williams had attempted to raise the point of order prior to the 
    House's resolving itself into the Committee of the Whole, but, as 
    Speaker John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, later acknowledged, 
    the Chair did not hear Mr. Williams make his point of order. After 
    initial debate in the Committee of the Whole, the Committee voted 
    to rise; and the Speaker resumed the Chair. The Speaker then stated 
    that under the circumstances Mr. Williams could make his point of 
    order at that time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 112 Cong. Rec. 16840, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. Under consideration was 
        H.R. 14765, the Civil Rights Act of 1966. For more on the 
        Ramseyer rule, see Ch. 17, supra.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The dialogue was as follows:
        Mr. [Emanuel] Celler [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, I move that 
    the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 
    14765) to assure nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury 
    selection and service, to facilitate the desegregation of public 
    education and other public facilities, to provide judicial relief 
    against discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties 
    for certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other 
    purposes.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: The question is on the motion offered by the 
    gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler].
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, a point of order.
        The Speaker: All those in favor of the motion will let it be 
    known by saying ``aye.'' All those opposed by saying ``no.'' The 
    motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of 
    the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of 
    the bill, H.R. 14765, with Mr. Bolling in the chair.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order. Mr. Chairman, I 
    have a point of order. I was on my feet--
        The Clerk read the title of the bill.
        By unanimous consent, the first reading of the bill was 
    dispensed with.

[[Page 12012]]

        Mr. [Joe D.] Waggonner [Jr., of Louisiana]: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: Under the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
    Celler] will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Ohio 
    [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. [William M.] McCulloch: Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Ohio 
    rise?
        Mr. McCulloch: Mr. Chairman, I rise for a parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state it.
        Mr. McCulloch: I would like to know if the resolution 
    unqualifiedly guarantees the minority one-half of the time during 
    general debate and nothing untoward will happen so that it will be 
    diminished or denied contrary to gentlemen's agreements.
        The Chairman: The Chairman will reply by rereading that portion 
    of his opening statement. Under the rule, the gentleman from New 
    York [Mr. Celler] will be recognized for 5 hours, the gentleman 
    from Ohio [Mr. McCulloch] will be recognized for 5 hours. The Chair 
    will follow the rules.
        Mr. McCulloch: I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may 
    care to use.
        Mr. Chairman, Negroes propose to be free. Many rights have been 
    denied and withheld from them. The right to be equally educated 
    with whites. The right to equal housing with whites. The right to 
    equal recreation with whites.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, a point of order.
        Mr. Celler: Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, immediately before the House 
    resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House I was on my 
    feet on the floor seeking recognition for the purpose of making a 
    point of order against consideration of H.R. 14765 on the ground 
    that the report of the Judiciary Committee accompanying the bill 
    does not comply with all the requirements of clause 3 of rule XIII 
    of the rules of the House known as the Ramseyer rule and intended 
    to request I be heard in support of that point of order. I was not 
    recognized by the Chair. I realize technically under the rules of 
    the House at this point, my point of order may come too late, after 
    the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on 
    the State of the Union.
        Mr. Celler: Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Williams: But I may say, Mr. Chairman, that I sought to 
    raise the point of order before the House went into session. May I 
    ask this question? Is there any way that this point of order can 
    lie at this time?
        The Chairman: Not at this time. It lies only in the House, the 
    Chair must inform the gentleman from Mississippi.

        Mr. Williams: May I say that the Parliamentarian and the 
    Speaker were notified in advance and given copies of the point of 
    order that I desired to raise, and I was refused recognition 
    although I was on my feet seeking recognition at the time.

[[Page 12013]]

        Mr. [John J.] Flynt [Jr., of Georgia]: Mr. Chairman, I appeal 
    the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The Chair will have to repeat that the gentleman 
    from Mississippi is well aware that this present occupant of the 
    chair is powerless to do other than he has stated.
        Mr. Waggonner: Mr. Chairman, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        The Chairman: The question is, Shall the decision of the Chair 
    stand as rendered?
        The question was taken; and on a division (demanded by Mr. 
    Williams) there were--ayes 139, noes 101.
        The decision of the Chair was sustained.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now 
    rise, and on that I demand tellers.
        Tellers were ordered, and the Chairman appointed as tellers Mr. 
    Celler and Mr. Williams.
        The Committee again divided, and the tellers reported that 
    there were--ayes 168, noes 144.
        So the motion was agreed to.
        Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed 
    the chair, Mr. Bolling, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole 
    House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, 
    having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14765) to assure 
    nondiscrimination in Federal and State jury selection and service, 
    to facilitate the desegregation of public education and other 
    public facilities, to provide judicial relief against 
    discriminatory housing practices, to prescribe penalties for 
    certain acts of violence or intimidation, and for other purposes, 
    had come to no resolution thereon.
        The Speaker: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
    Mississippi.
        Mr. Williams: Mr. Speaker, the House resolved itself into the 
    Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union a moment 
    ago. When the question was put by the Chair, I was on my feet 
    seeking recognition for the purpose of offering a point of order 
    against consideration of the legislation. Although I shouted rather 
    loudly, apparently the Chair did not hear me. Since the Committee 
    proceeded to go into the Committee of the Whole, I would like to 
    know, Mr. Speaker, if the point of order which I had intended to 
    offer can be offered now in the House against the consideration of 
    the bill; and, Mr. Speaker, I make such a point of order and ask 
    that I be heard on the point of order.
        The Speaker: The Chair will state that the Chair did not hear 
    the gentleman make his point of order. There was too much noise. 
    Under the circumstances the Chair will entertain the point of 
    order.

Chairman of Committee of the Whole Does Not Rule on House Procedure

Sec. 1.46 The Speaker, and not the Chairman of the Committee of the 
    Whole, rules on the propriety of amendments included in a motion to 
    recommit with instructions.

    On July 28, 1983,(3) during consideration of H.R. 2760, 
a bill pro

[[Page 12014]]

hibiting covert assistance to Nicaragua in 1983, Chairman William H. 
Natcher, of Kentucky, responding to a parliamentary inquiry, stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. 129 Cong. Rec. 21471, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Chair would advise the gentleman that the rule does not 
    protect such a motion to recommit, but that would be up to the 
    Speaker when we go back into the House to answer that question 
    specifically.
        Points of Order Against Committee Procedure

Sec. 1.47 A point of order that a measure was reported from a committee 
    in violation of a committee rule requiring advance notice of the 
    committee meeting will not lie in the House--the interpretation of 
    committee rules being with the cognizance of the committee.

    On Oct. 12, 1978,(4) Mr. Bolling filed a privileged 
report emanating from the Committee on Rules. Mr. Bauman, a member of 
that committee, complained about the procedure used in the Committee on 
Rules in ordering the resolution reported.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 124 Cong. Rec. 36382, 95th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bolling, from the Committee on Rules, submitted a 
    privileged report (Rept. No. 95-1769) on the resolution (H. Res. 
    1426) providing for the consideration of reports from the Committee 
    on Rules, which was referred to the House Calendar and ordered to 
    be printed.
        Mr. [Robert E.] Bauman [of Maryland]: Mr. Speaker, I do not 
    think the gentleman from Missouri has properly filed his report. 
    The resolution was considered this morning in the Rules Committee 
    with no agenda, no notice. It was the intention of the gentleman 
    from Maryland to move to reconsider this resolution. Now, it is 
    jammed through here when we have been in session in the Rules 
    Committee for only 15 minutes.
        I think the members of the Rules Committee deserve something 
    better than that. I question whether a quorum was even present.
        The Speaker: (5) The report has been filed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Bauman: I make a point of order that a quorum was not 
    present in the Rules Committee at the time the action was taken.
        Mr. [Richard] Bolling [of Missouri]: If the gentleman will 
    yield----
        Mr. Bauman: I do not have the floor.
        The Speaker: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from 
    Missouri.
        Mr. Bolling: Mr. Speaker, there was a quorum present. The vote 
    was perfectly proper. No objection was heard, and I filed the 
    report.
        Mr. Bauman: And there was no notice given, as the rules of the 
    Rules Committee require, of that proposed action.
        The Speaker: Is the gentleman addressing the Chair?
        Mr. Bauman: Mr. Speaker, the gentleman is addressing the 
    gentleman

[[Page 12015]]

    from Missouri, who filed this; through the Chair.
        The Speaker: Well, as far as notice is concerned, that is a 
    matter of the interpretation of the rules of the Rules Committee, 
    to be raised within the committee and not in the House.

--May Be Raised in House Only if Improperly Disposed of in Committee

Sec. 1.48 Certain points of order based on procedures in committees 
    retain viability in the House only if first raised and improperly 
    disposed of in committee; and the Speaker Pro Tempore has advised 
    that a point of order that a bill was reported to the House without 
    a majority of the committee actually being present does not lie in 
    the House unless made in committee in a timely manner and 
    improperly disposed of therein.

    On Aug. 10, 1994,(6) the Speaker was about to declare 
the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole for the 
consideration of a pending measure. A Member pressed a parliamentary 
inquiry, pointing out that the report accompanying the bill stated that 
a quorum was present when the bill was ordered reported from the 
committee. The Member then averred that the facts were to the contrary 
and that committee records disputed the assertion in the report. The 
proceedings are carried here in full (after a special order providing 
for consideration of the bill had been adopted).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 6. 140 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 103d Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                           Parliamentary Inquiry

        Mr. [David] Dreier [of California]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 7. Jose E. Serrano (N.Y.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, House rule XI, in clause (l)(2)(A) 
    reads: ``No measure or recommendation shall be reported from any 
    committee unless a majority of the committee was actually present, 
    which shall be deemed the case if the records of the committee 
    establish that a majority of the committee responded on a rollcall 
    vote on that question.''
        Mr. Speaker, I realize that the rule goes on to say a point of 
    order will lie in the House that a quorum was not present unless it 
    was first made in the committee.
        But my question is this: If the records of the committee show a 
    quorum was not present on a rollcall vote to report a measure, can 
    a committee still claim in its report that a quorum was present?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman has correctly stated the 
    rule.
        Mr. Dreier: I know I have correctly stated the rule. I wonder 
    if the com

[[Page 12016]]

    mittee can still claim in its report that a quorum was present?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair is giving the gentleman 
    credit for stating the rule properly. In response to the 
    gentleman's first inquiry, the Chair would state that, while it may 
    not be accurate or proper for a committee to state in its report 
    that a quorum was present if its records show a quorum was not 
    actually present, that is an issue which must first be raised and 
    preserved in the committee by a committee member for a point of 
    order to survive in the House.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, continuing my parliamentary inquiry, 
    can a committee report a measure without a quorum being present, 
    even when there is a rollcall vote, or must the committee then 
    utilize a rolling quorum until an actual majority of the members 
    respond to their names?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the gentleman's second 
    inquiry, the Chair would state that if a point of no quorum is 
    raised by a committee member when the measure is ordered reported, 
    then the chairman of the committee must either await the appearance 
    of a quorum if there is not to be a rollcall vote, or a rollcall 
    vote must reveal a majority of the committee having responded at 
    some point in time before the measure is ordered reported.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, if I could pose one final question on 
    my parliamentary inquiry, if a committee can order a measure 
    reported with less than a majority being present, can the committee 
    report a bill with just the chairman present as long as he does not 
    make a point of order against himself?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In response to the third inquiry, the 
    Chair would state that it would be the responsibility of any and 
    all committee members, at a properly convened meeting of the 
    committee, to remain available to assure that at the time the 
    measure is ordered reported a point of order is made that a quorum 
    is not present in order to preserve that point of order in the 
    House.
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Speaker, I thank the Chair for that very cogent 
    explanation.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Pursuant to House Resolution 514 and 
    rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the 
    Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
    bill, H.R. 4822.

Timing of Point of Order Against Sufficiency of Committee Report

Sec. 1.49 Responding to a parliamentary inquiry, the Chair indicated 
    that the proper time to raise a point of order against deficiencies 
    in a committee report would be pending the Speaker's declaration 
    that the House resolve itself into Committee of the Whole for 
    consideration of the measure reported.

    The rules of the House prescribe that certain information relating 
to the committee process leading up to the filing of a committee re

[[Page 12017]]

port be set out in the report. Failure to include such information may 
subject the report to a point of order.
    Inquiries relating to the proper time to make a point of order of 
deficiencies in a committee report were directed to the Speaker on Jan. 
19, 1995,(8) pending the consideration of H.R. 5, the 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 8. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          parliamentary inquiries

        Mr. [Paul E.] Kanjorski [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have 
    a parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (9) The gentleman will 
    state it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 9. Steve Gunderson (Wis.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as I understand the new rule in 
    clause 2(l)(2)(B) of rule XI, adopted on January 4 of this year as 
    the new rules of the House, each committee report must accurately 
    reflect all rollcall votes on amendments in committee; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, as a further parliamentary inquiry, 
    the report accompanying H.R. 5, as reported from the Committee on 
    Government Reform and Oversight, House Report 104-1, part 2, lists 
    many rollcall votes on amendments. On amendment 6, the report 
    states that the committee defeated the amendment by a rollcall vote 
    of 14 yes and 22 no. However, the tally sheet shows 35 members 
    voting ``aye'' and 1 member voting ``nay.''
        Mr. Speaker, would a point of order under clause 2(l)(2)(B) of 
    rule XI apply?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: In the opinion of the Chair, the 
    gentleman is correct.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, if that were the case, it is clear 
    that this bill could not proceed under its present rule; is that 
    correct?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is correct, if it is an 
    error on behalf of the committee. If it is a printing error. That 
    would be a technical problem which would not be sustained in the 
    point of order.
        Mr. Kanjorski: Mr. Speaker, I am not going to insist or raise a 
    point of order. However, I bring this to the attention of the Chair 
    and to my colleagues on the other side. Some of the hesitancy to 
    proceed as quickly as we are proceeding on this bill and others 
    that are part of the Contract With America is the fear on the 
    minority side that this haste may bring waste, that speed may bring 
    poor legislation. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman from Pennsylvania has 
    been recognized for the purpose of a parliamentary inquiry. The 
    gentleman may continue regarding the inquiry. . . .
        Mrs. [Carolyn B.] Maloney [of New York]: Mr. Speaker, this was 
    my amendment, and it is a printing record error. The Republicans 
    voted against exempting the most vulnerable citizens in our 
    society, children, that cannot vote, cannot speak for themselves in 
    the unfunded mandates bill. But it is a

[[Page 12018]]

    printing error. They did not vote for it. . . .
        Mrs. [Cardiss] Collins of Illinois: A parliamentary inquiry, 
    Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, under clause 2(j)(1) of rule XI it states 
    ``Whenever any hearing is conducted by any committee upon any 
    measure or matter, the minority party members on the committee 
    shall be entitled, upon request to the chairman by a majority of 
    them before completion of the hearing, to call witnesses selected 
    by the minority to testify with respect to that measure or matter 
    during at least 1 day of hearing thereon.''
        Mr. Speaker, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight 
    is the committee of original jurisdiction on this bill. On January 
    10, the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight began its 
    markup on H.R. 5.
        Mr. [David] Dreier [of California]: Mr. Speaker, a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: There is a parliamentary inquiry 
    before the House at the present time. . . .
        Mrs. Collins of Illinois: After two opening statements, the 
    chairman of the committee invited a member of the majority party 
    who was not a member of the committee to testify before the 
    committee. At the conclusion of his testimony, the witness thanked 
    the chairman of the committee for holding the hearing.
        Mr. Speaker, minority members of the committee protested in a 
    timely fashion. No opportunity was given to Members on our side of 
    the aisle to question the witness. Democrats requested that an 
    additional formal hearing be conducted on this measure so that 
    their witnesses could be called. That request was denied and the 
    minority was told that the only procedure allowed would be to 
    continue the full committee markup of the bill. Efforts on the part 
    of the minority members to raise questions over possible violations 
    of House rules were dismissed by the chairman.
        Mr. Speaker, in my view, allowing a Member not on the committee 
    to testify changed the meeting from a straight markup to a hearing.
        It is true that in many committee markups the majority requests 
    the presence of certain experts, usually administration officials 
    or committee staff, to answer questions about the interpretation or 
    effect of different proposals.
        The Member's appearance before the committee, the Member who is 
    not a member of the committee, was not like that. Questions were 
    not put to him. He provided a statement and read his testimony in 
    the way any witness testifies at any hearing.
        Mr. Speaker, we do not protest the presence of Members not on 
    the committee at the markup and hearing. Our complaint is that we 
    were denied the opportunity to ask questions and to call our own 
    witnesses, as we were entitled to do under the rules.
        The only remedy, Mr. Speaker, is a point of order at this stage 
    of deliberation.
        Is it correct that I would be required to raise a point of 
    order, Mr. Speaker, when the committee resolves itself into the 
    Committee of the Whole?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: If the gentlewoman insists on her 
    point of order, that point of order would be timely at this point 
    in the process.

[[Page 12019]]

        Mrs. Collins of Illinois: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. However, 
    because, Mr. Speaker, I do not want to engage in any kind of 
    dilatory tactics, such as I have heard before in the 103d Congress 
    and previous Congresses, I will not insist upon a point of order at 
    this time.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Does the gentlewoman seek a response 
    from the Chair regarding the inquiry?
        Mrs. Collins of Illinois. Not at this time, Mr. Speaker. I 
    think I have made my point.

Point of Order Against Words Used in Debate

Sec. 1.50 A point of order may not be made or reserved against remarks 
    delivered in debate after subsequent debate has intervened, the 
    proper remedy being a demand that words be taken down as soon as 
    they are uttered.

    On Aug. 20, 1980,(10) a brief exchange relating to the 
procedure for ``taking down words'' occurred during the five-minute 
debate on the Treasury, Postal Service, and general government 
appropriations, 1981. The exchange between Mr. Robert K. Dornan, of 
California, and Mr. Henry A. Waxman, of California, followed a 
contentious amendment offered and then withdrawn by Mr. Dornan. Both 
the prior statement by Mr. Dornan, the Chair's admonition about 
referring, even indirectly, to a member of the Senate, and the exchange 
at issue are carried below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. 126 Cong. Rec. 22151-54, 96th Cong. 2d Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan was allowed to proceed for 3 
    additional minutes.)
        Mr. Dornan: I want to repeat that line, listen to it well, 
    every Member of this body. . . .
        He tells me there is a criminal investigation of the elected 
    Federal official and that I cannot question this prisoner about 
    this particular elected official. Then lo and behold, 2 days after 
    I confront this elected Federal official in his office, he is on an 
    airplane with Justice Department help, and he gets to see the 
    felon. . . .
        . . . The FEC never asked for the proof. It was all on 
    supposition, on the word of this felon, sitting in the former 
    General Counsel's office, the office of William Oldaker, and ``the 
    elected Federal official.'' . . .
        (By unanimous consent, Mr. Dornan was allowed to proceed for 1 
    additional minute.)
        The Chairman: (11) The gentleman from California 
    (Mr. Dornan) has also asked unanimous consent to withdraw his 
    amendment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
11. Richardson Preyer (N.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from 
    California?
        Mr. [Ronnie G.] Flippo [of Alabama]: Reserving the right to 
    object, if I might reserve the right to object and I shall not 
    object, the gentleman is making some statements in regard to

[[Page 12020]]

    his opinion of the Federal court's action on the matter regarding 
    Alabama, and he is speaking with great conviction. I wonder if the 
    gentleman has been following the trials taking place in Alabama in 
    regard to this matter. I wish the gentleman would refrain from 
    referring to the Senator from Alabama, and give the Senator an 
    opportunity to do what he needs to do to explain the situations. He 
    does not need to be tried by the Jack Andersons of this world. We 
    have a proper court procedure and a way to proceed in that regard.
        I would hope that the gentleman would refrain from bringing up 
    the name of any official from Alabama, or any other State 
    official's name up, in a manner that would tend to encourage people 
    to believe that they had done something wrong, when no such thing 
    exists or it has not been proven in a court of law. I know the 
    gentleman's high regard for court proceedings.
        Mr. Dornan: If the gentleman will yield, I believe I have 
    discovered a major coverup; a terribly inept, if not illegal 
    obstruction of justice by Justice Department people assigned to the 
    fair State of Alabama. I gave the Senator mentioned before a face-
    to-face opportunity, alone in his office, to explain his 
    involvement but he would not do so.
        Mr. Flippo. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the gentleman's words be 
    taken down.
        The Chairman: The gentleman may not refer to Members of the 
    other body.
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the gentleman's 
    words be taken down.
        I will yield to what the gentleman wants, then.
        The Chairman: The Chair will state to the gentleman from 
    California (Mr. Dornan) that under the rules of the House it is not 
    in order to refer to Members of the other body and in the light of 
    that the Chair would ask the gentleman from California if he wishes 
    to withdraw his remarks concerning the Member of the other body.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, as of about a year-and-a-half ago, 
    video tape records of House proceedings have been made. Taking that 
    into consideration I will accede to the Chair's suggestion and 
    remove all statements in the written Record pertaining to Members 
    of the other body.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will proceed. The gentleman has 
    agreed to remove all the statements in question from the Record. . 
    . .
        Does the gentleman from Alabama still reserve his point of 
    order?
        Mr. Flippo: Mr. Chairman, I no longer reserve the right to 
    object. . . .
        Mr. Waxman: Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, I am not familiar 
    with the allegations being made. This amendment has been offered 
    for the purpose of our colleague using the time of the House of 
    Representatives to engage in a good number of accusations attacking 
    the integrity of men in public office and those who would seek to 
    be in public office and those who have assisted them. The gentleman 
    may be absolutely correct; I just do not know. It does, however, 
    seem to me quite curious to have an amendment offered for the sole 
    purpose of using the time of the House to air all these 
    accusations. If there are accusations of serious moment they ought 
    to be brought to the proper authorities: the law en

[[Page 12021]]

    forcement authorities, if a crime is committed; the Federal 
    Election Commission which has jurisdiction over the questions of 
    violations of the law should that be involved.
        Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to take this opportunity to say 
    this strikes me as curious and gives me a great deal of hesitancy 
    to see that an amendment would be offered solely for the purpose of 
    discussing other matters than what is proposed in the amendment and 
    that relates to the gentleman's campaign for reelection. . . .
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his 
    additions.
        The Chairman: Is there objection to the request of the 
    gentleman from California (Mr. Dornan) to withdraw his amendment? 
    If not, the amendment is withdrawn.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state his point of order.
        Mr. Dornan: Mr. Chairman, I reserve a point of order in 
    opposition to the Member's words against me.
        To suggest that someone's remarks are demagogic is impugning 
    the motives of that Member. I could have had my good colleague's 
    words taken down. I reserve the point of order, but add that I am 
    emotionally concerned about a 1-year coverup by the Federal 
    officials who are charged with investigating these matters here. 
    Please have some sympathy, if not empathy, for my position. That is 
    why I do not mind your initial and quick analysis of my motives 
    here. It is understandable, but wrong.
        Mr. Waxman: Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Dornan: I will be glad to yield.
        The Chairman: The gentleman has no standing to raise the point 
    of order at this point. Debate has intervened. There is no other 
    amendment before the Committee, and the Chair will ask the Clerk to 
    read.
        The Clerk read as follows: . . .

Speaker's Responsibility To Rule on Questions of Privilege of the House 
    Under Rule IX

Sec. 1.51 It is the duty of the Speaker to decide whether a resolution 
    offered as privileged qualifies for the special privileged status 
    bestowed by Rule IX on questions of ``privilege of the House'' and 
    he may rule on this question without awaiting a point of order from 
    the floor.

    On Jan. 23, 1984,(12) Mr. William E. Dannemeyer, of 
California, rose to a question of privilege of the House and offered a 
resolution. The Speaker (13) asked the gentleman why he 
thought the resolution qualified for that special status under Rule IX, 
listened to the presentation, and then ruled that the resolution, since 
it was in effect a change in House rules, did not qualify. The resolu

[[Page 12022]]

tion, the arguments, and the ruling are carried herein.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
12. 130 Cong. Rec. 78, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
13. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The Speaker: The Chair had intended to recognize Members for 1-
    minute speeches at this time, unless the gentleman has a question 
    of privilege.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: Mr. Speaker, I raise a question of the 
    privileges of the House, and I offer a privileged resolution (H. 
    Res. 390) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                  H. Res. 390

            Resolved, That effective 30 days after the adoption of this 
        resolution, each Standing and Select Committee of the House, 
        except for the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, 
        shall be constituted in a ratio which is proportionate to the 
        membership of the two political parties in the House as a 
        whole; and each subcommittee thereof shall also be so 
        constituted; and insofar as practicable, the staffs of each 
        Committee shall also reflect these same ratios.

        The Speaker: The gentleman from California has been kind enough 
    to advise the Chair that he was going to offer this resolution as a 
    question of privilege at the appropriate time, and now is the 
    appropriate time.
        Would the gentleman state why he feels the resolution 
    constitutes a question of privilege?
        Mr. Dannemeyer: I would be happy to, Mr. Speaker. It has long 
    been recognized that the integrity of the proceedings by which 
    bills are considered is a matter of privilege. (Hinds' Precedents 
    III, 2597-2601, 2614; and IV, 3383, 3388, 3478).
        I especially draw the Chair's attention to III, 2602 and III, 
    2603 which show that error or obstruction of minority views are 
    matters of privilege. In the first instance, in the year 1880, it 
    was held that the matter of correcting the reference of a public 
    bill presented a question of privilege at a time when there was not 
    any other means of correction provided for in the rules. The point 
    was made on the floor that this matter was one involving the 
    integrity of the proceedings of the House and as such was 
    privileged.
        In the next reference, a charge investigated in 1863 as a 
    question of privilege was ``the charge that the minority views of a 
    committee had been abstracted from the Clerk's office by a Member * 
    * *.'' Both of these precedents indicate that it is a longstanding 
    matter that the minority is granted its ``day in court'' on 
    questions such as these which are questions impacting on the 
    integrity of the proceedings of the House. And further, these 
    questions indicate that it is the process by which legislation is 
    developed which affects the integrity of the proceedings of the 
    House. I submit that the disproportional ratio of committee 
    membership and staffing even more profoundly impacts on the process 
    by which legislation is developed and that there is no question 
    that my resolution involves a question of privilege.
        Some might argue that my resolution does not fall within the 
    ambit of privilege because they would say it is a motion to amend 
    the rules of the House or would ``effect a change in the rules of 
    the House of their interpretation.'' (Ruling by Speaker O'Neill, 
    Dec. 7, 1977, pp. 38470-73.) However, upon close examination the 
    Chair will find

[[Page 12023]]

    that my resolution is indeed a question of privilege and that the 
    December 7, 1977, ruling does not apply here.
        My resolution does not amend the rules of the House because the 
    practice we are attempting to change is not a rule. It is a 
    custom--a longstanding custom of the majority party that suppresses 
    the legitimate representation of the rights of the minority. I have 
    been unable to find--and I challenge any Member of the House to 
    show me where in the House rules it says the ratio in the Rules 
    Committee, for example, shall be nine majority and four minority. 
    It is certainly not in rules X and XI which set forth the 
    establishment and conduct of committees.
        The first and only mention of this ratio appears in official 
    records of the House when the committee assignments are made by the 
    Democratic Caucus or the Republican Conference after the Speaker 
    has notified the Republican leader of the number of party vacancies 
    on each of the several committees.
        Mr. Speaker, my resolution is not effecting a change in the 
    rules. I am simply attempting to change the arbitrary political 
    policy of the House--an arbitrary custom which indeed adversely 
    affects the integrity of the proceedings of the House.
        The Speaker: The Chair knows it is the duty of the Chair to 
    preside and to determine questions of privilege.
        Under the precedents of the House cited on page 329 of the 
    House Rules and Manual, a question of the privileges of the House 
    may not be invoked to effect a change in the rules of the House or 
    their interpretation. The gentleman from California contends that 
    the resolution which he has presented addresses not a specific 
    standing rule of the House, but the customs and traditions of the 
    House, and is thus not to be governed by the precedents in the 
    manual.
        In the opinion of the Chair, the resolution does constitute a 
    change in the rules of the House, by imposing a direction that the 
    composition of all standing committees be changed within 30 days. 
    The rules of the House do address the question of the procedure by 
    which full committee membership and staff selections are to be 
    accomplished. As indicated on page 399 of the manual, rule X, 
    clause 6, the respective party caucus and conference perform an 
    essential role in presenting privileged resolutions to the House, 
    both at the commencement of a Congress and subsequently to fill 
    vacancies. Because the issue of committee ratios can be properly 
    presented to the House in a privileged manner by direction of the 
    party conference or caucus, and because rule XI, clause 6, 
    establishes a procedure for selection of permanent committee 
    professional and clerical staff, the Chair rules that the 
    resolution constitutes an attempt to change procedures established 
    under the rules of the House and does not therefore present a 
    question of the privileges of the House.
        Mr. Dannemeyer: I thank the Speaker.

Sec. 1.52 On his own volition, without a question from the floor, the 
    Speaker ruled that a motion offered in the House to correct the 
    Record, no allegation being made

[[Page 12024]]

    that the integrity of the proceedings of the House were involved, 
    failed to qualify as a question of privilege under Rule IX. An 
    appeal from his decision was tabled.

    The proceedings of Apr. 25, 1985,(14) offer another 
illustration of the Chair's responsibility under Rule IX to qualify 
motions or resolutions as questions of ``privilege of the House.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. 131 Cong. Rec. 9419, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    privileged motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Motion offered by Mr. Weber: Mr. Weber moves to correct the 
        Congressional Record by striking out on page 2281 the remarks 
        beginning with the words ``We'' down to and including the word 
        ``confederation'' and inserting the word ``are'' before ``a''.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (15) The Chair does not 
    believe the motion as offered by the gentleman states a question of 
    privilege.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. Tommy Robinson (Ark.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of the Chair.
        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: Mr. Speaker, I move to 
    lay the appeal on the table.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The question is on the motion to lay 
    on the table offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley].

        The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced 
    that the ayes appeared to have it.
        Mr. Weber: Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
        The yeas and nays were ordered.
        The vote was taken by electronic device and there were--yeas 
    200, nays 156, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 76. . . .

The Chair Rules Whether a Resolution States a Question of Privilege 
    Under Rule IX and No Longer Submits the Question to the House

Sec. 1.53 Although an earlier practice in the House was for the Speaker 
    to submit the question of whether a resolution raised a question of 
    privilege, the Speaker now rules directly on such matters without 
    waiting for a point of order from the floor.

    On Feb. 7, 1995,(16) Mr. Gene Taylor, of Mississippi, 
offered a resolution alleging unconstitutional actions on the part of 
the President. House Resolution 57 was directed to the Comptroller 
General and demanded an accounting of certain public funds. The 
resolution, the Chair's ruling, and a portion of the colloquy which 
followed are carried here.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I would like to use 
    this 1 minute to inform my colleagues that

[[Page 12025]]

    within a matter of minutes this House will be given the privilege 
    that the President of the United States did not give us; and that 
    is, to decide for ourselves whether or not we thought the Mexican 
    bailout was a good idea.
        The privileged motion that will be before the House in just a 
    few minutes is to require the comptroller general to tell us if the 
    law was obeyed when the President used $20 billion from the 
    stabilization fund to bail out Mexico. . . .

         Ensuring Executive Branch Accountability to the House in 
                        Expenditure of Public Money

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged 
    resolution (H. Res. 57) to preserve the constitutional role of the 
    House of Representatives to provide for the expenditure of public 
    money and ensure that the executive branch of the U.S. Government 
    remains accountable to the House of Representatives for each 
    expenditure of public money, and ask for its immediate 
    consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                   H. Res. 57

            Whereas rule IX of the Rules of the House of 
        Representatives provides that questions of privilege shall 
        arise whenever the rights of the House collectively are 
        affected;
            Whereas, under the precedents, customs, and traditions of 
        the House pursuant to rule IX, a question of privilege has 
        arisen in cases involving the constitutional prerogatives of 
        the House;
            Whereas section 8 of Article I of the Constitution vests in 
        Congress the power to ``coin money, regulate the value thereof, 
        and of foreign coins''; Whereas section 9 of Article I of the 
        Constitution provides that ``no money shall be drawn from the 
        Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law''; . 
        . .
            Whereas the obligation or expenditure of funds by the 
        President without consideration by the House of Representatives 
        of legislation to make appropriated funds available for 
        obligation or expenditure in the manner proposed by the 
        President raises grave questions concerning the prerogatives of 
        the House and the integrity of the proceedings of the House; . 
        . .
            Whereas the commitment of $20,000,000,000 of the resources 
        of the exchange stabilization fund to Mexico by the President 
        without congressional approval may jeopardize the ability of 
        the fund to fulfill its statutory purposes: Now, therefore, be 
        it
            Resolved, That the Comptroller General of the United States 
        shall prepare and transmit, within 7 days after the adoption of 
        this resolution, a report to the House of Representatives 
        containing the following:
            (1) The opinion of the Comptroller General on whether any 
        of the proposed actions of the President, as announced on 
        January 31, 1995, to strengthen the Mexican peso and support 
        economic stability in Mexico requires congressional 
        authorization or appropriation. . . .

        The Speaker: (17) Does the gentleman from 
    Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] wish to be heard briefly on whether the 
    resolution constitutes a question of privilege?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
17. Newt Gingrich (Ga.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Speaker, in the past few days a dozen Members of Congress, 
    ranking

[[Page 12026]]

    from people on the ideological right, like the gentleman from 
    Kentucky [Mr. Bunning] and the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Hunter], all the way to people on the ideological left, like the 
    gentleman from Vermont [Mr. Sanders], have asked the question of 
    whether or not the role of Congress has been shortchanged in the 
    decision by the President to use this fund to guarantee the loans 
    to Mexico. . . .
        One provision of our Nation's Constitution that is most clearly 
    mandatory in nature is article I, section 9, clause 7. It states, 
    ``No money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of 
    appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of 
    the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be 
    published from time to time.''
        Mr. Speaker, this Congress cannot stand idly by and avoid our 
    constitutional duty, a duty mandatory in nature.
        I request that the Chair rule immediately on this resolution, 
    and in making that ruling abide by section 664 of rule IX, General 
    Principles, as to precedents of question and privilege.
        Once again, it states that ``Certain matters of business 
    arising under the provisions of the Constitution mandatory in 
    nature have been held to have a privilege which has superseded the 
    rules establishing the order of business.'' . . .
        Mr. Speaker, since there were a dozen cosponsors of this 
    resolution, each of us with an equal input, I would like the Chair 
    to oblige those other Members who would like to speak on the 
    matter.
        The Speaker: The Chair is willing to hear other Members. The 
    Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. Kaptur].
        Ms. [Marcy] Kaptur [of Ohio]: Mr. Speaker, I rise as an 
    original sponsor of this legislation and in full support of our 
    bipartisan efforts to get a vote on this very serious matter. Our 
    resolution is very straightforward in attempting to reassert our 
    rightful authority under the Constitution of the United States. . . 
    .
        We believe that this is a question of privilege of the House 
    because of the constitutional role of the House of Representatives 
    to provide for the expenditure of public money and ensure that the 
    executive branch of the U.S. Government remains accountable to the 
    House for each such expenditure of public money. . . .
        The Speaker: Having heard now from five Members, the Chair is 
    prepared to rule on this. The Chair would first of all point out 
    that the question before the House right now is not a matter of the 
    wisdom of assistance to Mexico, nor is the question before the 
    House right now a question of whether or not the Congress should 
    act, nor is what is before the House a question of whether or not 
    this would be an appropriate topic for committee hearings, for 
    legislative markup, and bills to be reported.
        What is before the House at the moment is a very narrow 
    question of whether or not the resolution offered by the gentleman 
    from Mississippi [Mr. Taylor] is a question of privilege. On that 
    the Chair is prepared to rule.
        The privileges of the House have been held to include questions 
    relating to the constitutional prerogatives of the House with 
    respect to revenue leg

[[Page 12027]]

    islation, clause 1, section 1, article I of the Constitution, with 
    respect to impeachment and matters incidental, and with respect to 
    matters relating to the return of a bill to the House under a 
    Presidential veto.
        Questions of the privileges of the House must meet the 
    standards of rule IX. Those standards address privileges of the 
    House as a House, not those of Congress as a legislative branch.
        As to whether a question of the privileges of the House may be 
    raised simply by invoking one of the legislative powers enumerated 
    in section 8 of article I of the Constitution or the general 
    legislative ``power of the purse'' in the seventh original clause 
    of section 9 of that article, the Chair finds helpful guidance in 
    the landmark precedent of May 6, 1921, which is recorded in 
    Cannon's Precedents at volume 6, section 48. On that occasion, the 
    Speaker was required to decide whether a resolution purportedly 
    submitted in compliance with a mandatory provision of the 
    Constitution, section 2 of the 14th amendment, relating to 
    apportionment, constituted a question of the privileges of the 
    House.
        Speaker Gillett held that the resolution did not involve a 
    question of privilege. . . .
        The House Rules and Manual notes that under an earlier practice 
    of the House, certain measures responding to mandatory provisions 
    of the Constitution were held privileged and allowed to supersede 
    the rules establishing the order of business. Examples included the 
    census and apportionment measures mentioned by Speaker Gillett. But 
    under later decisions, exemplified by Speaker Gillett's in 1921, 
    matters that have no other basis in the Constitution or in the 
    rules on which to qualify as questions of the privileges of the 
    House have been held not to constitute the same. The effect of 
    those decisions has been to require that all questions of privilege 
    qualify within the meaning of rule IX.
        The ordinary rights and functions of the House under the 
    Constitution are exercised in accordance with the rules of the 
    House, without necessarily being accorded precedence as questions 
    of the privileges of the House. . . .
        The Chair will continue today to adhere to the same principles 
    enunciated by Speaker Gillett. The Chair holds that neither the 
    enumeration in the fifth clause of section 8 of article I of the 
    Constitution of Congressional Powers ``to coin money, regulate the 
    value thereof, and of foreign coins,'' nor the prohibition in the 
    seventh original clause of section 9 of that article of any 
    withdrawal from the Treasury except by enactment of an 
    appropriation, renders a measure purporting to exercise or limit 
    the exercise of those powers a question of the privileges of the 
    House. . . .
        It bears repeating that questions of privileges of the House 
    are governed by rule IX and that rule IX is not concerned with the 
    privileges of the Congress, as a legislative branch, but only with 
    the privileges of the House, as a House.
        The Chair holds that the resolution offered by the gentleman 
    from Mississippi does not affect ``the rights of the House 
    collectively, its safety, dignity, or the integrity of its 
    proceedings'' within the meaning of clause 1 of rule IX. Although 
    it may address the aspect

[[Page 12028]]

    of legislative power under the Constitution, it does not involve a 
    constitutional privilege of the House. Were the Chair to rule 
    otherwise, then any alleged infringement by the executive branch, 
    even, for example, through the regulatory process, on a legislative 
    power conferred on Congress by the Constitution would give rise to 
    a question of the privileges of the House. In the words of Speaker 
    Gillett, ``no one Member ought to have the right to determine when 
    it should come in in preference to the regular rules of the 
    House.'' . . .
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I would also like to 
    point out that the original custom of this body was to present any 
    question of a privilege of the House to the Members and let the 
    Members decide whether they felt it was a privilege of the House 
    that was being violated. Is the Speaker willing to grant the 
    Members of this House that same privilege?
        The Speaker: The Chair would simply note that the Chair is 
    following precedent as has been established over the last 70 years 
    and that that precedent seems to be more than adequate. And in that 
    context, the Chair has ruled this does not meet the test for a 
    question of privilege.

        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, a further parliamentary 
    inquiry: What is the procedure for----
        The Speaker: The only appropriate procedure, if the gentleman 
    feels that the precedents are wrong, would be to appeal the ruling 
    of the Chair and allow the House to decide whether or not to set a 
    new precedent by overruling the Speaker.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I appeal the ruling of 
    the Chair, and I would like Members of Congress to be granted the 1 
    hour that the House rules allow for to speak on this matter.

                  preferential motion offered by mr. armey

        Mr. [Richard K.] Armey [of Texas]: Mr. Speaker, I offer a 
    preferential motion.
        The Speaker: The Clerk will report the preferential motion.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Mr. Armey moves to lay on the table the appeal of the 
        ruling of the Chair.

                           parliamentary inquiry

        Ms. Kaptur: I have a parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The gentlewoman will state the parliamentary 
    inquiry.
        Ms. Kaptur: Mr. Speaker, am I correct in understanding that the 
    motion to table this appeal is not debatable?
        The Speaker: The gentlewoman is correct.
        Ms. Kaptur: And thus, Mr. Speaker, Members of Congress will be 
    deprived by this vote without any type of a debate on the authority 
    vested in our constitutional rights to vote on this issue?
        The Speaker: The Chair would say to the gentlewoman that the 
    motion is not debatable.
        The question is on the preferential motion offered by the 
    gentleman from Texas [Mr. Armey].
        The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the 
    ``ayes'' appeared to have it.
        Mr. Taylor of Mississippi: Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on 
    the

[[Page 12029]]

    ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order 
    that a quorum is not present.
        The Speaker: Evidently a quorum is not present.
        The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
        This vote will be 17 minutes total.
        The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 
    288, nays 143, not voting 3, as follows: . . .
        So the motion to lay on the table the appeal of the ruling of 
    the Chair was agreed to.

Floor Manager of Bill May Press Point of Order Against His Own Bill

Sec. 1.54 Instance where the manager of a general appropriation bill 
    made (on behalf of another) and then conceded a point of order 
    against a paragraph of his own bill.

    On June 18, 1993,(18) during consideration of the 
Treasury-Postal appropriation bill, fiscal 1994, the bill manager made 
a point of order against a provision therein, honoring a commitment he 
had made to an absent colleague.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
18. 139 Cong. Rec. 13364, 13365, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Steny H.] Hoyer [of Maryland]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    point of order.
        The Chairman: (19) The gentleman will state his 
    point of order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
19. Gerry E. Studds (Mass.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Hoyer: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the 
    language beginning with the words, ``Provided further,'' on page 
    17, line 2, through the word ``Code,'' on line 5.
        Mr. Chairman, I raise the point of order on behalf of the 
    gentleman from Missouri [Mr. Clay], the chairman of the Committee 
    on Post Office and Civil Service, pursuant to the colloquy that 
    just occurred with the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf] who is 
    the sponsor of this amendment and which is included in our bill.
        The language in fact constitutes legislation on an 
    appropriation bill and we, therefore, concede the point that would 
    be made by the chairman that it violates clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    point of order?
        If not, for the reasons stated, and because the point of order 
    was not waived by the rule, the point of order is sustained and the 
    language is stricken.

Bill Manager's Motivation in Making Points of Order

Sec. 1.55 Motivation for raising points of order against pro-visions in 
    a bill are varied; and the manager of a bill has pressed points of 
    order against his own bill to expedite its consideration.

    On Sept. 30, 1993,(20) Mr. John P. Murtha, of 
Pennsylvania,

[[Page 12030]]

Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, raised points of order against vulnerable provisions in 
his own bill where their inclusion was opposed by the Chairman of the 
committee having jurisdiction over the ``legislative provisions'' in 
the bill.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. 139 Cong. Rec. 23110, 23123, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        [The following paragraph was reached in the reading.]

                  Global Cooperative Initiatives, Defense-wide

                         (including transfer of funds)

            For support of Department of Defense responses to national 
        and international natural disasters and the expenses of other 
        global disaster relief activities of the Department of Defense; 
        . . . Provided further, That none of the funds appropriated 
        under this heading shall be obligated or expended for costs 
        incurred by United States Armed Forces in carrying out any 
        international humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, 
        peacemaking or peace-enforcing operation unless, at least 
        fifteen days before approving such operation, the President 
        notifies the Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of 
        each House of Congress in accordance with established 
        reprogramming procedures: Provided further, That any such 
        notification shall specify--
            (1) the estimated cost of the operation;
            (2) whether the method by which the President proposes to 
        pay for the operation will require supplemental appropriations, 
        or payments from international organizations, foreign 
        countries, or other donors;
            (3) the anticipated duration and scope of the operation;
            (4) the goals of the operation; and . . .

        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the 
    bill, through page 125, line 19, be considered as read, printed in 
    the Record, and open to amendment at any point.
        The Chairman: (1) Is there objection to the request 
    of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 1. Dan Rostenkowski (Ill.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        There was no objection.

                              points of order

        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I have four points of order.
        The Chairman: The gentleman will state the points of order.
        Mr. Murtha: Mr. Chairman, I make points of order against the 
    following language in the bill. Beginning on page 27, line 23, 
    through line 25;
        Beginning with ``Provided'' on page 20, line 17, through 
    ``operations'' on page 21, line 21, of the bill;
        Against section 8099, beginning on page 198, line 20, through 
    page 109, line 5; and
        Against section 8113, beginning on page 114, line 3, through 
    page 115, line 10.
        These provisions give affirmative direction, impose additional 
    duties, set aside existing law, go beyond the funding in this bill 
    and appropriate for an unauthorized project.
        This constitutes legislation in an appropriations bill and is 
    in violation of clause 2 of rule XXI.
        The Chairman: Does the gentleman from Florida wish to be heard 
    on the points of order?
        Mr. [C. W. Bill] Young of Florida: Mr. Chairman, we reluctantly 
    concede the points of order.

[[Page 12031]]

        The Chairman: The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana 
    [Mr. Hamilton].
        Mr. [Lee H.] Hamilton [of Indiana]: Mr. Chairman, let me just 
    express my appreciation for the consideration by the chairman in 
    accepting these points of order. As chairman of the Committee on 
    Foreign Affairs, I appreciate that very much.
        The Chairman: Does any other Member wish to be heard on the 
    points of order?
        If not, the points of order are conceded.

    Following disposition of the points of order, Mr. Murtha asked 
unanimous consent to curtail debate on the remainder of the bill and 
amendments thereto.

Priority of Points of Order Over Debate

Sec. 1.56 Points of order against a paragraph in a general 
    appropriation bill are entertained and disposed of before 
    recognizing Members to debate the provision under pro forma 
    amendments.

    On Sept. 23, 1993,(2) during the reading of a general 
appropriation bill under the five-minute rule, a Member sought 
recognition to strike out the last word to debate the pending portion 
of the bill. Another Member wished to make a point of order. The Chair 
indicated that the point of order should be disposed of first.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 139 Cong. Rec. 22177, 103d Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. [Norman Y.] Mineta [of California]: Mr. Chairman, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry.
        The Chairman: (3) The gentleman will state his 
    parliamentary inquiry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 3. Rick Boucher (Va.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, the fact that the Clerk has now read 
    page 23, line 14, does this preclude me from raising a point of 
    order if the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Traficant] is recognized?
        The Chairman: The point of order will have to be made first.

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order on page 23, 
    line 14.
        The Chairman: The Clerk will read the paragraph beginning on 
    line 14.
        The Clerk read as follows:

                            Highway Project Studies

                              (highway trust fund)

            For up to 80 percent of the expenses necessary for 
        feasibility and environmental studies for certain highway and 
        surface transportation projects and parking facilities that 
        improve safety, reduce congestion, or otherwise improve surface 
        transportation, $7,150,000, to be derived from the Highway 
        Trust Fund and to remain available until September 30, 1996.

        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from 
    California rise?

                               point of order

        Mr. Mineta: Mr. Chairman, I raise a point of order against the 
    provision on page 23, lines 14 through 22.

[[Page 12032]]

        This provision violates clause 2 of rule XXI because it would 
    appropriate $7.150 million out of the highway trust fund for 
    general feasibility and environmental studies. These studies are 
    not authorized.
        In addition, the period of funding availability until September 
    30, 1996, is not authorized. Thus this provision constitutes an 
    unauthorized appropriation and is subject to a point of order.

        The Chairman: Do other Members desire to be heard on the point 
    of order?
        Mr. [Bob] Carr of Michigan: Mr. Chairman, we concede the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas 
    rise?
        Mr. [Tom] DeLay [of Texas]: Mr. Chairman, I would like to be 
    heard on the point of order. . . .
        One could argue that the request for $250,000 for this highway 
    study is authorized. Under section 1105 of the ISTEA legislation 
    titled ``High Priority Corridors on National Highway System'' U.S. 
    Highway 59, including the portion of the highway I propose to 
    study, has been designated a high priority corridor. Under this 
    designation there are several interesting factual points the ISTEA 
    legislation makes. . . .
        Mr. Chairman, in my opinion, this is an authorized project, it 
    is authorized money, and I urge the Chair to rule against the point 
    of order.
        The Chairman: The Chair is prepared to rule.
        For those reasons stated by the gentleman from California [Mr. 
    Mineta] in making the point of order, and sustained in prior points 
    of order, the point of order is sustained.

Where Point of Order Is Determined by Voting on Consideration; Unfunded 
    Mandate Legislation

Sec. 1.57 Under the Unfunded Mandates Act, where a point of order is 
    raised against a provision in a bill or amendment which contains 
    such a mandate, the decision on the point of order is made by the 
    House, by voting on a motion to consider the provision, rather than 
    by a ruling of the Chair.

        On Jan. 31, 1995,(4) the House was continuing its 
    consideration of H.R. 5, the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995. 
    During the consideration of title III for amendment, Mr. David 
    Dreier, of California, offered an amendment which provided in 
    essence that points of order under Sections 425 and 426 of the 
    Budget Act would be disposed of by a vote, and not be dependent on 
    a ruling by the Chair. The amendment is carried herein, along with 
    the explanation of its proponent, Mr. Dreier.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 4. 141 Cong. Rec. p. ______, 104th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          ``sec. 425. point of order.

            ``(a) In General.--It shall not be in order in the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate to consider--
            ``(1) any bill or joint resolution that is reported by a 
        committee unless the committee has published the statement of 
        the Director pursuant to section 424(a) prior to such 
        consideration, except that this para

[[Page 12033]]

        graph shall not apply to any supplemental statement prepared by 
        the Director under section 424(a)(4); or
            ``(2) any bill, joint resolution, amendment, motion, or 
        conference report that contains a Federal intergovernmental 
        mandate having direct costs that exceed the threshold specified 
        in section 424(a)(1)(A), or that would cause the direct costs 
        of any other Federal intergovernmental mandate to exceed the 
        threshold specified in section 424(a)(1)(A), unless--. . .

           ``sec. 426. 5enforcement in the house of representatives.

            ``It shall not be in order in the House of Representatives 
        to consider a rule or order that waives the application of 
        section 425(a): Provided however, That pending a point of order 
        under section 425(a) or under this section a Member may move to 
        waive the point of order. Such a motion shall be debatable for 
        10 minutes equally divided and controlled by the proponent and 
        an opponent but, if offered in the House, shall otherwise be 
        decided without intervening motion except a motion that the 
        House adjourn. The adoption of a motion to waive such a point 
        of order against consideration of a bill or joint resolution 
        shall be considered also to waive a like point of order against 
        an amendment made in order as original text.''. . . .

                    sec. 303. exercise of rulemaking powers.

            The provisions of this title (except section 305) are 
        enacted by Congress--
            (1) as an exercise of the rulemaking powers of the House of 
        Representatives and the Senate, and as such they shall be 
        considered as part of the rules of the House of Representatives 
        and the Senate, respectively, and such rules shall supersede 
        other rules only to the extent that they are inconsistent 
        therewith; and
            (2) with full recognition of the constitutional right of 
        the House of Representatives and the Senate to change such 
        rules at any time, in the same manner, and to the same extent 
        as in the case of any other rule of the House of 
        Representatives or the Senate, respectively. . . .

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Dreier: In section 301, in the 
        proposed section 425 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, 
        strike subsection (d) and redesignate subsection (e) as 
        subsection (d).
            In section 301, in the proposed section 426 of the 
        Congressional Budget Act of 1974, strike: ``Provided however,'' 
        and all that follows through the close quotation marks.
            In section 301, after such proposed section 426, add the 
        following:

                  ``sec. 427. disposition of points of order.

            ``(a) In General.--As disposition of points of order under 
        section 425(a) or 426, the Chair shall put the question of 
        consideration with respect to the proposition that is the 
        subject of the points of order.
            ``(b) Debate and Intervening Motions.--A question of 
        consideration under this section shall be debatable for 10 
        minutes by each Member initiating a point of order and for 10 
        minutes by an opponent on each point of order, but shall 
        otherwise be decided without intervening motion except one that 
        the House adjourn or that the Committee of the Whole rise, as 
        the case may be.
            ``(c) Effect on Amendment in Order as Original Text.--The 
        disposition of the question of consideration under this section 
        with respect

[[Page 12034]]

        to a bill or joint resolution shall be considered also to 
        determine the question of consideration under this section with 
        respect to an amendment made in order as original text.''. . . 
        .

        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, during consideration of H.R. 5 in the 
    Committee on Rules, an amendment to section 426 was adopted that 
    creates a mechanism to allow any Member to make a motion to waive 
    points of order against a mandate in any bill, joint resolution, 
    amendment or conference report that does not include a CBO cost 
    estimate or a means for paying for the mandate.
        The language currently in section 426 is preferable to the 
    language in H.R. 5 as introduced for several reasons.
        First, it more directly achieves the goal of the authors of 
    H.R. 5 to guarantee votes in the House specifically on unfunded 
    mandates. Second, it does not place undue constraints on the 
    legislative schedule by requiring our Committee on Rules to report 
    two rules every time a decision is made to waive the application of 
    section 425.
        Third, it relieves some of the burden on the presiding officer 
    when making a determination with respect to a point of order.
        Since H.R. 5 was reported to the House, I have been working 
    with the Parliamentarian and a lot of other Members have been 
    working with the Parliamentarian on language to address two 
    additional concerns raised by section 426. The language is 
    contained in the amendment that I am now offering, Mr. Chairman.
        First, the amendment further reduces the burden on the 
    presiding officer to rule on points of order with respect to not 
    only the existence of a mandate but whether the cost of the mandate 
    exceeds the threshold of $50 million. This will be particularly 
    troublesome in situations where a motion to waive such a point of 
    order is not made.
        Second, the amendment addresses a concern raised by a number of 
    my colleagues on the other side of the aisle with respect to the 
    role of the chairman of the Committee on Government Reform and 
    Oversight in advising the Chair about the question of unfunded 
    mandates. Under my amendment, that advice would no longer be 
    necessary.
        Essentially, Mr. Chairman, the amendment provides that whenever 
    points of order are raised pursuant to section 425(a) or 426, the 
    points of order shall be disposed of by a vote of the Committee of 
    the Whole.
        The question would be debatable for 20 minutes, 10 minutes by 
    the Member initiating the point of order and 10 minutes by an 
    opponent of the point of order. . . .

     amendment offered by mr. moakley to the amendment offered by mr. 
                                   dreier

        Mr. [John Joseph] Moakley [of Massachusetts]: Mr. Chairman, I 
    offer an amendment to the amendment.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            Amendment offered by Mr. Moakley to the amendment offered 
        by Mr. Dreier:
            In the proposed new section 427, insert the following new 
        subsection (a) (and redesignate the existing subsections 
        accordingly):
            ``(a) In order to be cognizable by the Chair, a point of 
        order under sec

[[Page 12035]]

        tion 425(a) or 426 must specify the precise language on which 
        it is premised.''. . .

        Mr. Moakley: Mr. Chairman, the Dreier amendment is a major 
    improvement over the text of the bill. I would, however, make one 
    suggestion. . . .
        My amendment makes the Member who is raising the point of order 
    show exactly where the unfunded mandate exists and explain how that 
    language constitutes a violation. . . .
        Mr. Dreier: Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. . 
    . .
        It seems to me that on this issue the burden of proof should in 
    fact lie with the Member raising the point of order. This is a very 
    effective way to address that concern. I strongly support the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley] 
    to the amendment I have offered. The gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    [Mr. Clinger] will be let off the hook with this amendment. . . .
        Mr. [William F.] Clinger [Jr., of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Chairman, 
    that is precisely what I wanted to say. In the legislation 
    presently drafted, the task of determining what was or was not an 
    unfunded mandate would have fallen on the shoulders of the chairman 
    of the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, and/or perhaps 
    the ranking member of that committee, so I certainly appreciate the 
    fact that this is now going to ensure that this matter will be 
    decided by the House itself. That is the appropriate place for this 
    decision to be made. I am pleased to support the amendment.
        The Chairman: (5) The question is on the amendment 
    offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Moakley] to the 
    amendment offered by the gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 5. Bill Emerson (Mo.).
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        The amendment to the amendment was agreed to.
        The Chairman: The question is on the amendment offered by the 
    gentleman from California [Mr. Dreier] as amended.
        The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.