[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 12, Chapter 29 (Sections 1-34), Volume 13, Chapter 29 (Sections 35-end, plus index)]
[Chapter 29. Consideration and Debate]
[F. Disorder in Debate]
[Â§ 50. Ruling by the Speaker]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 10725-10735]
 
                               CHAPTER 29
 
                        Consideration and Debate
 
                         E. RELEVANCY IN DEBATE
 
Sec. 50. --Ruling by the Speaker

    The Speaker or Speaker Pro Tempore has the sole power to rule 
whether words objected to violate the rules and precedents of the 
House.(3) The question is not open to debate.(4) 
Appeals may be taken from the Speaker's ruling on objectionable words 
but such appeals are rare.(5)
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 3. See Sec. 50.9, infra; 2 Hinds' Precedents Sec. 1249; 5 Hinds' 
        Precedents Sec. Sec. 5163, 5169, 5187.
            The Chairman of the Committee of the Whole does not rule on 
        objectionable words (see Rule XIV clause 4, House Rules and 
        Manual Sec. 760 (1995)).
 4. See Sec. 50.7, infra.
 5. See Sec. 50.8, infra. Under clause 4 of Rule XIV, appeals are in 
        order from the Speaker's ruling. The rule provides that: ``the 
        House shall, if appealed to, decide the case without debate.'' 
        On a past occasion where an appeal was not allowed (see 5 
        Hinds' Precedents Sec. 6944), the appeal was demanded on a 
        ruling on words taken down in debate on a pending appeal. In 
        that situation, appeals could be multiplied indefinitely.
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    In ruling on words, the Speaker considers not only past precedents

[[Page 10726]]

on exact or similar words,(6) but also weighs the importance 
of preserving free debate and expression of opinion in the 
House.(7) The Speaker has consulted a dictionary where he 
was in doubt as to the meaning of colloquial expressions.(8) 
The Speaker may seek further information than the exact words reported 
in order to deliver an informed ruling. For example, the Speaker has 
inquired of the Member called to order whether he was in fact referring 
to certain persons or proceedings,(9) and has directed the 
Clerk to report words uttered in the House in addition to those 
objected to in order to judge the words in context.(10)
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 6. See Sec. 50.1, infra.
 7. See Sec. 50.2, infra.
 8. See Sec. 50.4, infra.
 9. See Sec. 50.3, infra.
10. See Sec. 50.5, infra.
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                            Cross References
Courses of action if words ruled out of order, see Sec. Sec. 51, 52, 
    infra.
Necessity of ruling if words withdrawn, see Sec. 51, infra.
Speaker's rulings generally on points of order, see Ch. 31, 
    infra.                          -------------------

Factors Considered by the Speaker

Sec. 50.1 In ruling on words objected to in debate, the Speaker gives 
    weight to past precedent.

    On Feb. 5, 1940,(11) a Member referred to another Member 
in debate as ``President of the Demagogue Club.'' The words were 
demanded to be taken down and Speaker Pro Tempore Sam Rayburn, of 
Texas, ruled the language out of order.
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11. 86 Cong. Rec. 1529, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
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    On May 4, 1943,(12) when one Member called another 
Member in debate a demagogue, Speaker Rayburn ruled that he had passed 
upon identical language in the past and would conform to his prior 
ruling, holding that words accusing a Member of demagoguery was a 
breach of order.
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12. 89 Cong. Rec. 3915, 3916, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    On Dec. 13, 1973,(13) a Member termed an amendment 
offered by another as ``demagogic or racist because it is only 
demagoguery or racism which impels an amendment like this.''
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13. 119 Cong. Rec. 11289, 11290, 93d Cong. 1st Sess.
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    Speaker Carl Albert, of Oklahoma, cited Speaker Rayburn's ruling of 
May 4, 1943, ruling the use of the word ``demagogue'' or 
``demagoguery'' in reference to another Member out of order. In 
reliance on that ruling, Speaker Al

[[Page 10727]]

bert ruled that the language used was a breach of order in debate.

Sec. 50.2 In ruling on words objected to in debate, the Speaker gives 
    weight to the preservation of free debate in the House.

    On Mar. 7, 1942,(14) Mr. Vito Marcantonio, of New York, 
stated ``since the gentleman from Texas raised the question here of 
dereliction of duty, I say that dereliction in this matter rests at the 
doorstep of his committee.''
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14. 88 Cong. Rec. 2056, 77th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    A point of order was made and the words were taken down. Speaker 
Sam Rayburn, of Texas, ruled as follows:

        The Chair thinks that if he were to hold upon as fine a point 
    as that, at some time free debate in the House of Representatives 
    might cease. The Chair holds that the language does not violate the 
    rules of the House.

    On July 26, 1951,(15) Mr. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of 
Massachusetts, demanded that words used in debate by Mr. John J. 
Rooney, of New York, in reference to the Republican Conference be taken 
down. Speaker Rayburn ruled as follows:
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15. 97 Cong. Rec. 8969, 82d Cong. 1st Sess.
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        The Chair in every instance of this kind has been most liberal 
    with the Member who uttered the words objected to, because he has 
    always thought that great liberality must be indulged in so that we 
    may have free and full debate. On very few occasions has the 
    present occupant of the chair held that remarks were a violation of 
    the rules of the House.
        The Chair can hardly agree, however, that the words, applied to 
    the meeting of the Republicans in caucus yesterday were quite 
    proper. . . .(16)
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16. For the exact words demanded to be taken down, see Sec. 53.3, 
        infra.
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Explanation of Member Called to Order

Sec. 50.3 The Speaker has relied on the assurance of a Member called to 
    order that in using a word which was also the name of a Member he 
    was not referring to the other Member.

    On Oct. 9, 1940,(17) Mr. Sol Bloom, of New York, 
objected to the alleged use by Mr. John C. Schafer, of Wisconsin, of 
Mr. Bloom's name in debate rather than referring to him as the 
gentleman from New York. Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, ruled, on the 
assurance of Mr. Schafer that he was not referring to his colleague Mr. 
Bloom, that he was not speaking out of order.(18)
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17. 86 Cong. Rec. 13477, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
18. See also 113 Cong. Rec. 8411, 8412, 90th Cong. 1st Sess., Apr. 5, 
        1967 (Speaker inquired of Member called to order whether he was 
        in fact quoting executive proceedings of a House committee).
            Under normal practice, a Member whose words have been 
        objected to must take his seat and may not debate the demand 
        that his words be taken down or explain his words except on 
        motion pursuant to clause 4 of Rule XIV (see Sec. 52, infra).

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[[Page 10728]]

Dictionary Definitions

Sec. 50.4 The Speaker has consulted a dictionary in ruling on 
    colloquial expressions which have been objected to in debate.

    On July 16, 1935,(19) Mr. Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New 
York, referred to Mr. Wright Patman, of Texas, in debate as a 
``snooper.'' The words were taken down, and Speaker Joseph W. Byrns, of 
Tennessee, held that the use of the term violated the rules of the 
House, after consulting Webster's Dictionary and reading the following 
definition to the House: ``to look or pry about or into others' affairs 
in a sneaking way. One who snoops; a prying sneak.''
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19. 79 Cong. Rec. 11256, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    On June 16, 1934,(20) Speaker Henry T. Rainey, of 
Illinois, ruled that the word ``yapping'', used by Mr. George E. 
Foulkes, of Michigan, in debate to refer to addresses on the floor by 
Mr. John Taber, of New York, was not unparliamentary. The Speaker had 
consulted the dictionary and stated that the term meant ``to talk 
loudly; chatter; scold'' and was not objectionable.(1)
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20. 78 Cong. Rec. 12114, 73d Cong. 2d Sess.
 1. See also 79 Cong. Rec. 11256, 74th Cong. 1st Sess., July 16, 1935 
        (when ruling out of order in debate the term ``stool pigeon,'' 
        the Speaker stated it was not necessary to consult a dictionary 
        to ascertain the meaning of the expression).
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Speaker Rules on Propriety of Words Objected to

Sec. 50.5 When there is a demand that certain words used in debate be 
    taken down, the words objected to may be withdrawn by unanimous 
    consent by the Member using them, but where the words are not 
    withdrawn, the Speaker will rule on the propriety of the words.

    The following proceedings occurred in the House on Mar. 19, 1985: 
(2)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 2. 131 Cong. Rec. 5532, 5533, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Harry] Reid [of Nevada]: Mr. Speaker, on February 26 of 
    this year one of my constituents traveled nearly 3,000 miles to 
    Washington specifically to see me about a critical issue, but he

[[Page 10729]]

    did not. . . . I was called away from something very important to 
    become captive, once again, to an abusive practice, an abuse 
    inflicted upon the entire House of Representatives and the 
    legislative process itself, voting on the Journal.

    Mr. Reid made further comments, indicated below, which were the 
subject of a demand that the words be taken down:

        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: Mr. Speaker, I demand that the 
    gentleman's words be taken down. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, would it be in order, in view of the gentleman's 
    statement a minute ago, for me to ask unanimous consent that he be 
    permitted to withdraw his words?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (3) Yes. The Chair would 
    entertain such a motion. . . .
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 3. Kenneth J. Gray (Ill.).
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        Mr. Reid: Mr. Speaker, I respectfully submit that I appreciate 
    the request of the gentleman from Minnesota, but I do not think I 
    said anything offensive, and I would ask for a ruling on that.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair will rule.
        The Clerk will report the words.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            One of the most important things to remember is that those 
        Members who call for these wasteful votes are led by my 
        distinguished colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. Walker, who 
        speaks constantly of the need to do away with government waste, 
        and he is literally speaking out of both sides of his mouth.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair would announce that it is 
    not proper to impugn the motive of another Member. We have 
    precedents here in the House. Mr. Knutson, of Minnesota: ``I cannot 
    believe that the gentleman from Mississippi is sincere in what he 
    has just said.'' And that was held not in order on November 2, 
    1942.
        The Chair must state that the words of the gentleman from 
    Nevada have, in his opinion, an unparliamentary connotation and 
    shall be stricken.
        Without objection, the gentleman from Nevada may proceed. Do I 
    hear an objection?
        Mr. Weber: Yes, Mr. Speaker. . . .
        Would the Chair clarify the parliamentary situation in which 
    the gentleman from Nevada finds himself?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: . . . The Chair has ruled that the 
    gentleman from Nevada misspoke on the words ``speaking out of both 
    sides of his mouth,'' and therefore those words shall be stricken.
        The Member only can proceed by permission of the House.

Context of Words Used

Sec. 50.6 The Speaker ordered the Clerk to report words uttered 
    previously to words to which objection was taken in order to 
    deliver an informed ruling.

    On July 23, 1935,(4) Mr. Hamilton Fish, Jr., of New 
York, demanded that certain words used in debate by Mr. John W. McCor

[[Page 10730]]

mack, of Massachusetts, be taken down. On the direction of Speaker Pro 
Tempore John J. O'Connor, of New York, the Clerk read the following 
words:
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 4. 79 Cong. Rec. 11699, 74th Cong. 1st Sess.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], whether he intended it 
    or not, is guilty of that crime; not only a few days ago, but is 
    again guilty of the same crime on this occasion.

    Mr. Edward E. Cox, of Georgia, then made a point of order to insist 
``in connection with those words, that the previous statement that he 
had made an unfair argument also be included.''
    The Speaker Pro Tempore responded:

        The Chair was about to make that suggestion. To properly inform 
    the Chair, the words previously uttered should be read in 
    connection with the words just reported.
        The Clerk will report the words uttered previously to the words 
    to which objection was taken.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            I respect men who fight hard. I respect men, members of the 
        Republican Party and the Democratic Party, who fight hard for 
        their party, but who fight clean. I respect men who make 
        constructive criticisms; but my general respect for men is 
        somewhat lost when they depart from what should be and what 
        ordinarily is their general conduct and enter into the field of 
        unnecessary, unfair, and unwarranted attacks and arguments.

    The Speaker Pro Tempore ruled that the word ``crime'' used by 
Mr. McCormack, when taken in context, was not unparliamentary 
language.(5)
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 5. Under normal practice, the Chair rules only on the language 
        specifically objected to and reported to the House (see 
        Sec. Sec. 49.2, 49.3, supra).
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Debate

Sec. 50.7 The question of whether words taken down violate the rules is 
    for the Speaker to decide and is not debatable.

    On Jan. 15, 1948,(6) Mr. Emanuel Celler, of New York, 
referred in debate to a statement by Mr. John E. Rankin, of 
Mississippi, as ``damnable.'' Mr. Rankin demanded that the words be 
taken down. After the words were read to the House, Speaker Joseph W. 
Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, inquired of Mr. Rankin whether the word 
``damnable'' was the word objected to. Mr. Rankin responded in the 
affirmative and Mr. Celler interjected the inquiry ``Mr. Speaker, may I 
be heard?''
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 6. 94 Cong. Rec. 205, 80th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    The Speaker ruled ``This is not debatable. The Chair will pass on 
the question.''
    On Mar. 9, 1948,(7) after Mr. Rankin had demanded that 
cer

[[Page 10731]]

tain words used in debate be taken down and Speaker Martin had ruled 
them not a breach of order, the following exchange occurred:
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 7. 94 Cong. Rec. 2408, 80th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. Rankin: Mr. Speaker, I would like to be heard.
        The Speaker: It is a matter for the Chair to determine.
        Mr. Rankin: I understand; but I would like to be heard on the 
    matter. We have a right to be heard.
        The Speaker: The Chair has held that the words are not 
    unparliamentary. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Celler] is merely 
    expressing his own opinion. The gentleman from New York will 
    proceed.

    Parliamentarian's Note: Clause 4 of Rule XIV specifies that this 
question of order is not debatable on appeal. On infrequent occasions, 
the Chair has declined to rule directly on the propriety of words but 
has implicitly ruled them out of order by entertaining a debatable 
motion to expunge the words from the Record. See 8 Cannon's Precedents 
Sec. 2539. See also 6 Cannon's Precedents Sec. 617.

Appealing the Chair's Ruling

Sec. 50.8 Appeals have been permitted from rulings of the Chair that 
    certain words spoken in debate were out of order or in order.

    On Dec. 20, 1943,(8) Speaker Pro Tempore John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, ruled that a statement in debate that 
remarks of another Member were ``false and slanderous'' was a breach of 
the rules of the House.
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 8. 89 Cong. Rec. 10922, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    Following the ruling, Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, who had 
uttered the objectionable words, entered an appeal from the ruling of 
the Chair on the ground the ruling was ``so one-sided I do not think 
the House will sustain it.'' The House voted to sustain the ruling of 
the Speaker Pro Tempore.
    On July 23, 1935,(9) Mr. John W. McCormack, of 
Massachusetts, was proceeding in House debate, and certain words were 
deemed offensive by Mr. Hamilton Fish, of New York. The challenge was 
to an allegation that a Member ``was guilty of that crime.'' The words 
which were taken down were as follows:
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 9. 79 Cong. Rec. 11699, 74th Cong. 1st Sess. See also 75 Cong. Rec. 
        10019, 72d Cong. 1st Sess., May 11, 1932, where the Chair 
        sustained a point of order and an appeal thereto was 
        subsequently withdrawn.
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            I respect men who fight hard. I respect men, members of the 
        Republican Party and the Democratic Party, who fight hard for 
        their party, but who fight clean. I respect men who make 
        constructive criticisms; but my general respect for men is 
        somewhat lost when they depart from what should be and what 
        ordinarily is their general conduct and

[[Page 10732]]

        enter into the field of unnecessary, unfair, and unwarranted 
        attacks and arguments.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Clerk will again report the words 
    to which objection was taken.
        The Clerk read as follows:

            The gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], whether he intended 
        it or not, is guilty of that crime; not only a few days ago, 
        but is again guilty of the same crime on this occasion.

    The Speaker Pro Tempore, Mr. John J. O'Connor, of New York, ruled 
as follows:

        The Chair may state, even though it may be gratuitous, that 
    from his personal standpoint there has grown up in this House a 
    ridiculous habit of causing the words of a Member to be taken down, 
    which course often consumes a great deal of time; and, as the Chair 
    said on the floor the other day, it appears to have come to pass 
    recently that a Member cannot even say ``boo'' to another Member 
    without some Member demanding that the words be taken down. This 
    practice has become reductio ad absurdum.
        The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. McCormack] has just 
    uttered the words reported. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] 
    thereupon demanded that the words be taken down.
        For the gentleman from Massachusetts to state that what the 
    gentleman from New York did or said was a ``crime'', in the opinion 
    of the present occupant of the chair, is but a loose expression--a 
    word commonly used as a mere figure of speech. The word ``wrong'' 
    in the dictionary is a synonym for ``crime'', and the Chair holds 
    that the use of the word ``crime'', under the particular 
    circumstances, is not unparliamentary language; and the gentleman 
    from Massachusetts may proceed.

    Mr. John Taber, of New York, appealed the ruling and, on a division 
vote of 165-35, the Chair's ruling was upheld.

Speaker's Ruling, Challenges to

Sec. 50.9 The Speaker, and not the Chairman of the Committee of the 
    Whole, rules on whether words spoken and objected to in the 
    Committee of the Whole are in order; and the House may by proper 
    motion dictate the consequences of the Chair's ruling the words out 
    of order, such as whether the words should be expunged from the 
    Record and whether the Member called to order may proceed in 
    debate.

    The following proceedings occurred in the Committee of the Whole on 
May 26, 1983,(10) during consideration of H.R. 2969 
(Department of Defense authorization for fiscal year 1984):
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10. 129 Cong. Rec. 14048, 14049, 98th Cong. 1st Sess.
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        Mr. [Thomas F.] Hartnett [of South Carolina]: . . . The 
    gentleman

[[Page 10733]]

    from California, for whom I have a great deal of respect, is, 
    through his proposals, through his amendment, advocating unilateral 
    disarmament on behalf of the United States. . . .
        I would say to my colleague from Indiana that when we are told 
    by the gentleman from California that we go beyond a deterrence to 
    a war-fighting capability, that when your deterrence is no longer a 
    deterrence it is probably time that you build that deterrence at 
    least to a war-fighting capability.
        I do not want my colleague from Indiana to be ashamed 
    whatsoever or to let this element over here who advocates 
    unilateral disarmament to browbeat you into thinking they know more 
    than you do.
        Mr. [Ronald V.] Dellums [of California]: . . . Mr. Chairman, I 
    object and I move that the gentleman's words be taken down. . . .
        Mr. [Kenneth B.] Kramer [of Colorado]: The parliamentary 
    inquiry is: Can the Chair tell us the procedure that relates to 
    taking down words and what will follow?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: (11) The procedure is as 
    follows: After the Clerk reports the words, the Speaker will review 
    the words of the gentleman from South Carolina, making a ruling 
    thereon; unless, of course, the gentleman from South Carolina 
    wishes, by unanimous consent, to withdraw his words. . . .
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11. Thomas J. Downey (N.Y.).
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        Mr. Kramer: Mr. Chairman, is the ruling of the Speaker the 
    final word on that or is there an appeal process or how does that 
    work exactly?
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: The Chair would inform the gentleman 
    that the Speaker would rule on that but that after the Speaker has 
    ruled it would be in order to dictate the consequences of the 
    ruling of the Chair by proper motions in the House. . . .
        Mr. Hartnett: Mr. Chairman, I am not certain as to which of my 
    remarks struck such a sensitive chord among my colleagues here this 
    afternoon. My words that have been now requested to have been taken 
    down were to the point that there is an element here in the House 
    that would advocate unilateral disarmament. Now it is my 
    understanding, Mr. Chairman, and I would like a ruling on this, 
    that the element means a section, a portion, a fraction or a part 
    or less than the whole and my statement was that there was an 
    element or a less than the whole membership of this House who would 
    advocate a unilateral disarmament and I would like the Chair to 
    rule.
        The Chairman Pro Tempore: It is neither the intention nor the 
    privilege of the current presiding officer of the Committee of the 
    Whole to make such a ruling. That is the prerogative of the Speaker 
    and when the gentleman's words are read to the House, the Speaker 
    will so rule.

Rulings on Words Reported From Committee of the Whole

Sec. 50.10 Where words uttered in the Committee of the Whole are taken 
    down and reported to the House, the Speaker will not rule on other 
    words that may have been used in the Committee.

    On July 27, 1965,(12) Mr. Howard W. Smith, of Virginia, 
de

[[Page 10734]]

manded that certain words used in debate in the Committee of the Whole 
by Mr. Charles E. Goodell, of New York, be taken down. Speaker John W. 
McCormack, of Massachusetts, directed the Clerk to read the words that 
had been objected to, and the Clerk read two sentences that were 
reported from the Committee of the Whole.
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12. 111 Cong. Rec. 18441, 89th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    Mr. Smith rose and objected that the Clerk had failed to read all 
of the language used. Speaker McCormack ruled that the Chair could pass 
only on the words that had been reported. After the Speaker delivered a 
ruling on the words, Mr. Smith arose to demand that the sentence 
following the words ruled out be taken down. Speaker McCormack 
responded ``The Chair will state that the Chair can only pass upon the 
words presented to the Chair and which were taken down in the Committee 
of the Whole.''

Senate Practice

Sec. 50.11 Where a Senator is called to order for words spoken in 
    debate, the Presiding Officer makes a determination as to whether 
    the words transgress the rules; an appeal from his decision is in 
    order and is debatable within any time limitations adopted by the 
    Senate.

    On May 14, 1964,(13) Senator Spessard L. Holland, of 
Florida, asked unanimous consent to interrupt pending business for the 
consideration of Senate Resolution 330, such consideration not to 
exceed 40 minutes (the resolution extended the time and scope of a 
committee investigation). Senator Michael J. Mansfield, of Montana, 
made some remarks on the resolution and was called to order by Senator 
Clifford P. Case, of New Jersey, for stating: ``The intemperate 
inference, the thinly veiled implication in which some have indulged.''
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13. 110 Cong. Rec. 10926-31, 88th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Presiding Officer Edward M. Kennedy, of Massachusetts, ruled that 
the words indicated did not violate the rules of debate, and Senator 
Case appealed that ruling and suggested the appeal was debatable. The 
Presiding Officer responded:

        Under paragraph 4 of rule XIX, the appeal from the ruling of 
    the Chair is debatable. The rule provides that if any Senator, in 
    speaking or otherwise, in the opinion of the Presiding Officer 
    transgress the rule, such Senator may appeal from the ruling of the 
    Chair, which appeal shall be open to debate.

    The Presiding Officer then stated that the time limitation had 
expired, and that the question

[[Page 10735]]

was on the consideration of the resolution. Senator Case asked for 
recognition on his appeal, but the Presiding Officer ruled that the 
expiration of the time limitation, and the intervening motion of 
Senator Mansfield to lay the resolution on the table, precluded further 
debate.(14)
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14. For a memorandum, prepared by the Senate Parliamentarian and 
        inserted in the Record by the Senate Majority Leader, 
        explaining the parliamentary situation on S. Res. 330, see 110 
        Cong. Rec. 11087, 88th Cong. 2d Sess., May 16, 1964.
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