[Deschler-Brown Precedents, Volume 12, Chapter 29 (Sections 1-34), Volume 13, Chapter 29 (Sections 35-end, plus index)]
[Chapter 29. Consideration and Debate]
[E. Relevancy in Debate]
[Â§ 36. On Question of Privilege]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[Page 10486-10494]
 
                               CHAPTER 29
 
                        Consideration and Debate
 
                         E. RELEVANCY IN DEBATE
 
Sec. 36. --On Question of Privilege

Question of Personal Privilege

Sec. 36.1 In addressing the House on a question of personal privilege a 
    Member must confine himself to that question.

    On May 6, 1932, Mr. John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, arose to state 
a question of personal privilege based on a newspaper editorial 
accusing the majority of the House of treason under the leadership of 
Mr. Rankin.(17)
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17. 75 Cong. Rec. 9715, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.

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[[Page 10487]]

    Speaker John N. Garner, of Texas, ruled that a question of personal 
privilege was stated, and Mr. Rankin delivered further remarks. Mr. 
Albert Johnson, of Washington, then arose to make a point of order that 
Mr. Rankin was not speaking to the question of privilege. Speaker 
Garner ruled that Mr. Rankin must confine himself to the 
question.(18)
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18. See also 90 Cong. Rec. 876, 877, 78th Cong. 2d Sess., Jan. 28, 
        1944; and 81 Cong. Rec. 6309, 6310, 75th Cong. 1st Sess., June 
        24, 1937.
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Sec. 36.2 In speaking to a question of personal privilege based on 
    criticism of a Member, he is required to confine his remarks to the 
    question involved, but is entitled to discuss related matters 
    necessary to challenge the charge against him.

    On Feb. 28, 1956,(19) Mr. Craig Hosmer, of California, 
arose to a point of personal privilege, based on an editorial from a 
newspaper accusing him of falsehoods in relation to a bill before the 
House.
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19. 102 Cong. Rec. 3477, 3479, 3480, 84th Cong. 2d Sess.
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    After Speaker Pro Tempore John W. McCormack, of Massachusetts, 
ruled that Mr. Hosmer had stated a question of personal privilege Mr. 
Hosmer obtained unanimous consent to revise and extend his remarks and 
to include extraneous matter, including tables, during his debate.
    Mr. Byron G. Rogers, of Colorado, subsequently rose to the point of 
order that Mr. Hosmer was not speaking on his question of personal 
privilege but was speaking as to the nature of the bill involved. The 
Speaker Pro Tempore ruled as follows:

        The Chair has previously stated that in laying the foundation 
    for answering the charge of falsehood in the editorial, the 
    gentleman from California would have rather a broad field to 
    discuss his reasons for defending himself. The Chair calls 
    attention to the gentleman from California, that there are limits 
    to the liberality extended in this connection and suggests that the 
    gentleman from California proceed in order.

    Mr. Hosmer proceeded further on his point of personal privilege, 
and Mr. Rogers rose to another point of order that Mr. Hosmer was again 
discussing a bill and placing before the Members of the House a chart, 
and not referring in any way to the truth or falsity of the charges 
involved in the question of personal privilege. The Speaker Pro Tempore 
ruled:

        The Chair might state that he feels that the gentleman from 
    California is very close to the line where the Chair may sustain a 
    point of order. As the Chair understands it, the gentleman

[[Page 10488]]

    has the right to discuss the facts involved in the pending bill 
    insofar as that is necessary in order for the gentleman to express 
    his views with reference to the charge of falsehood contained in 
    the editorial, and to answer that charge, and make his record in 
    that respect. The Chair again suggests to the gentleman from 
    California, having in mind the observations of the Chair, 
    particularly those just made, that he proceed in order and confine 
    his discussion of the bill at this time only to that which is 
    necessary to challenge the charge of falsehood contained in the 
    editorial.

References to Pending Legislation

Sec. 36.3 A Member who is recognized on a question of personal 
    privilege must limit himself to a discussion of the charges made 
    against him and may not discuss a measure which is to come before 
    the House for consideration.

    On Apr. 9, 1943,(20) Mr. Clare 
E. Hoffman, of Michigan, rose to 
a question of personal privilege based on a newspaper article charging 
him with being one 
of ``Hitler's American stooges.'' Speaker Sam Rayburn, of Texas, ruled 
that a question of personal privilege was stated.
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20. 89 Cong. Rec. 3195, 78th Cong. 1st Sess.
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    While discussing his question of personal privilege, Mr. Hoffman 
digressed to discuss a tax bill which had been introduced in the House 
and which was to come before the House for consideration. Mr. Herman P. 
Eberharter, of Pennsylvania, arose to state a point of order:

        . . . I submit the gentleman is not speaking on a question of 
    personal privilege when he is discussing a measure which is to come 
    before the House for consideration.
        Mr. Hoffman: I would like to be heard on that, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: The Chair will ask the gentleman from Michigan to 
    proceed in order, and under the rule he must limit himself to a 
    discussion of the charges made in his question for personal 
    privilege. The gentleman will proceed in order.(1)
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 1. Id. at p. 3197.
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    On Aug. 4, 1970,(2) Mr. Silvio O. Conte, of 
Massachusetts, rose to a question of personal privilege to challenge 
words spoken in debate in the House, although the ordinary procedure 
requires a timely demand that the objectionable words be taken down. 
Mr. Conte based his question of personal privilege on the fact that Mr. 
Page H. Belcher, of Oklahoma, had referred to Mr. Conte as ``another 
guy'' who had ``horned in'' on the act in relation to a certain bill. 
Mr. Conte then began discussing

[[Page 10489]]

the bill in question, the Agricultural Act of 1970.
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 2. 116 Cong. Rec. 27130, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
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    Mr. Delbert L. Latta, of Ohio, made the point of order that Mr. 
Conte was not directing his remarks to the words he challenged but to a 
legislative proposition which would be fully discussed when general 
debate commenced on the bill. Speaker Pro Tempore Edward P. Boland, of 
Massachusetts, directed Mr. Conte to confine his remarks to the point 
of personal privilege.
    Parliamentarian's Note: A point of order was subsequently made that 
the raising of a point of personal privilege was not the proper 
procedure to challenge words spoken in debate but that the words should 
be demanded to be taken down. The Speaker Pro Tempore ruled that the 
point of order came too late, and unanimous consent was granted that 
the objectionable words be stricken from the Record.

References to Grounds for Impeachment

Sec. 36.4 Where a question of personal privilege is based up-on 
    newspaper editorials impugning a Member's motives in offering a 
    resolution seeking to impeach the President, the Member in 
    addressing the House may discuss the several charges contained in 
    his resolution in order to justify his resolution.

    On Jan. 23, 1933, Mr. Louis T. McFadden, of Pennsylvania, rose to a 
question of personal privilege based on newspaper criticism of his 
having moved for the impeachment of President Roosevelt.(3) 
When Mr. McFadden proceeded to read additional newspaper editorials, 
Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, rose to make the point of order that 
Mr. McFadden was not confining himself to the question. Mr. Bertrand H. 
Snell, of New York, stated the rule that a Member proposing a question 
of personal privilege must confine his remarks to the matter contained 
in items on which he bases his question of privilege. Speaker John N. 
Garner, of Texas, stated that the newspaper articles read by Mr. 
McFadden raised questions as to his right to move for impeachment and 
that they were relevant to the question.
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 3. 76 Cong. Rec. 2294, 72d Cong. 2d Sess.
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    In response to a further point of order by Mr. Snell, Speaker Pro 
Tempore Blanton ruled that although Mr. McFadden could not refer to the 
experience and law of Great Britain in relation to impeachment, he 
could discuss the charges contained in his resolu

[[Page 10490]]

tion of impeachment in order to justify his moving for impeachment:

        Mr. Snell: Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that the 
    gentleman is not confining himself to the question before the House 
    or the matter of personal privilege, referring in particular to his 
    actions in his representative capacity. He is quoting the King of 
    England and stating matters that happened over in England which 
    have nothing to do with the charge against the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania in his representative capacity. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair sustains the point of order 
    in so far as it relates to any reference to England, unless there 
    was some reference to England in the resolution. The gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania knows the rules. He is confined absolutely to the 
    matters that were embraced within his resolution, and must not go 
    beyond that.
        Mr. Snell: Just a moment, Mr. Speaker. Has he the right to go 
    into every single phase of the charges he made in the resolution 
    that he presented here a week or two ago?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair thinks he is entitled to 
    explain any matter that is contained within his resolution because 
    for the filing of it he was called by certain newspapers 
    contemptible, unpatriotic, and the author of an indecent act.
        Mr. Snell: I maintain that he may not discuss what other men in 
    England have said.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair has sustained the point of 
    order to that limit, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania 
    understands the rule and must proceed in order.

Question of Privilege of the House

Sec. 36.5 A Member having been recognized on a question of the 
    privileges of the House must confine himself to such question.

    On Aug. 28, 1940,(4) Speaker William B. Bankhead, of 
Alabama, recognized Mr. Jacob Thorkelson, of Montana, on a matter of 
privilege of the House raised on the preceding day and pending at 
adjournment. Mr. Thorkelson's question of privilege was based on the 
alleged extension of remarks in the Record by Mr. Adolph J. Sabath, of 
Illinois, without first obtaining permission of the House. The Speaker 
ruled that such an extension of remarks gave grounds for a question of 
privilege of the House. Mr. Thorkelson proceeded in debate on his 
question of privilege and on a resolution which he had offered to 
expunge from the Record the remarks inserted by Mr. Sabath without 
permission to revise and extend. When Mr. Thorkelson began discussing 
British history,

[[Page 10491]]

the Speaker interjected to inquire what relation the discussion had to 
the question of privilege of the House:
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 4. 86 Cong. Rec. 11150-58, 76th Cong. 3d Sess.
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        The Speaker: Would the gentleman from Montana allow a question 
    from the Chair?
        Mr. Thorkelson: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
        The Speaker: On what phase is the gentleman addressing himself 
    so far as the question of privilege is concerned?
        Mr. Thorkelson: I did not want 
    to read this, Mr. Speaker. I asked unanimous consent to have it 
    inserted in the Record. This is a history of the secret service I 
    am now reading.
        The Speaker: Conceding that, to what phase does it have 
    reference so far as the question of privilege is concerned?
        Mr. Thorkelson: With regard to whether I have uttered truths or 
    falsehoods. I believe that is part of my resolution.
        The Speaker: The Chair does not find any language in the 
    gentleman's resolution where he is charged with an untruth or 
    falsity.
        Mr. Thorkelson: There is the question of whether I have stated 
    facts or not.
        The Speaker: The only question of privilege involved is whether 
    or not the matter was put in without permission of the House.
        Mr. Thorkelson: The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Sabath] asked 
    me to read it. Now, then, if he does not want me to read it, I will 
    put it in the Record.
        The Speaker: The gentleman from Illinois objected to the 
    gentleman's request to incorporate the statement in the Record. He 
    did not request the gentleman to read it. The Chair does not desire 
    to interrupt the continuity of the gentleman's argument, but the 
    Chair is under some obligation to see that the gentleman conforms 
    with the rules and discusses the matter of privilege about which he 
    complains.

    Mr. Thorkelson then made a point of order that under the 
Constitution he had a right to present his case before the House and 
not to be deprived of that right by the Chair. The Speaker overruled 
the point of order.

Question of Personal Privilege

Sec. 36.6 Debate on a question of personal privilege must be confined 
    to the statements or issue which gave rise to the question of 
    privilege.

    On May 31, 1984,(5) the following proceedings occurred 
in the House:
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 5. 130 Cong. Rec. 14620, 14622, 14623, 98th Cong. 2d Sess.
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        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I rise 
    to a question of personal privilege.
        The Speaker: (6) The gentleman will state it.
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 6. Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (Mass.).
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        Mr. Walker: Mr. Speaker, in this morning's Washington Times 
    newspaper, an article appears which, if accurate, constitutes a 
    personalized attack, calls into question possible asso

[[Page 10492]]

    ciations this Member may have and, therefore, it seems to me is 
    subject to a point of personal privilege.
        I quote from the newspaper article:

            Mr. O'Neill, meanwhile, shrugged off the ads but launched 
        his own attack on the conservative Republicans with whom he has 
        become increasingly irritated.
            ``I understand the young fellows, the regressives, the John 
        Bircher types, absolutely insisted they run the ads on me,'' 
        the speaker said.
            In making the statement, Mr. O'Neill specifically names 
        Reps. Newt Gingrich, R-Ga., and Robert S. Walker, R-Pa., and 
        said ``they want to turn back the clock to the days when there 
        were only the rich and the poor in America.''
            He said the conservatives oppose him because he is 
        ``fighting for the middle man and the poor man.''

        The Speaker: May the Chair say I may have compared the 
    gentleman's philosophy with those who belong to the Birch Society. 
    I never said that the gentleman belonged to the Birch Society.
        But nevertheless there is a point of personal privilege because 
    of the fact that the newspaper printed an article. The point of 
    personal privilege is against the newspaper.
        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. 
    Walker) for 1 hour. . . .
        Mr. [Thomas S.] Foley [of Washington]: . . . Mr. Speaker, the 
    gentleman said he thought the American people viewed the 
    responsibility of the Speaker as being fair and impartial as the 
    presiding officer. I think that is right, and I think this Speaker 
    has been fair and impartial as a presiding officer.
        As a matter of fact, going back over the last decade it is 
    absolutely rare, probably to the point of being able to count the 
    times on one hand, where we have had an appeal from a ruling of the 
    Chair, whether it is being occupied by the Speaker personally, or 
    by someone acting in his behalf. This cannot be said of the other 
    body or of most State legislatures. . . .
        [I]t is one thing for the gentleman to suggest that some action 
    of the Speaker off the floor and not presiding over the floor is 
    something he wants to criticize; it is another thing to imply that 
    there is unfairness, partiality or partisanship in the way this 
    Speaker has conducted himself in this Chamber.
        Mr. Walker: I would say to the gentleman that the Speaker of 
    the House is the Speaker of the House full time. He is the symbol 
    of this body when he is on the floor and when he is off the floor. 
    What he says and does as Speaker of the House reflects on us all, 
    all of the time. . . .
        Mr. [Vin] Weber [of Minnesota]: . . . What we have just heard 
    from our colleague from Washington is a definition of fairness of 
    the chair being that that Speaker's rulings are not appealed. Well, 
    I will say to you on this side of the aisle we do not think that 
    this Speaker has been fair. We do not think it is fair that 
    legislation is bottled up in committee and not brought to the floor 
    for votes, we do not think it is fair that constitutional 
    amendments are scheduled for action on the Suspension Calendar, we 
    do not think it is fair that we are not given proportional 
    representation on any committees of the House of Representatives, 
    and I could go on and on and on. . . .
        Ms. [Mary Rose] Oakar [of Ohio]: . . . You three gentlemen have 
    been,

[[Page 10493]]

    in my judgment, engaging in [McCarthyism] every evening. You take 
    the liberty of not only engaging in that kind of rhetoric, but 
    mentioning names. . . . I was one of them, and you are so ignorant 
    of the truth that you got me mixed up, I think, with Congresswoman 
    Schroeder. . . .
        You indicated that I had an 18-year-old son who did not want to 
    be drafted, or something like that. I do not have an 18-year-old 
    son. . . .
        Mr. Walker: The gentlewoman, of course, does make a point. 
    There was an inaccurate reference to her, not to the statement that 
    she made, but to the fact that she referred--but that she 
    referred----
        Mr. [John T.] Myers [of Indiana]: Regular order, Mr. Speaker.
        Mr. Walker: I was just about to apologize to the gentlewoman, 
    which is more than the Speaker has given me. I would say to the 
    gentlewoman she is owed an apology. . . .
        Ms. Oakar: Will you yield?
        Mr. Walker: I was trying to apologize to you. If you want me to 
    stop, I will be very glad to yield to the gentlewoman.
        Ms. Oakar: I gave a 1-minute speech about 3 weeks ago in which 
    I mentioned that, and it is a little belated, your apology, and I 
    am really surprised that you had not done so before this. But then 
    I do not think you fellows are very interested in the truth. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (7) The Chair would like to 
    have order.
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 7. John P. Murtha (Pa.).
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        Let the Chair remind the Members to confine their remarks to 
    the issue of personal privilege which is the newspaper article 
    which was brought up in the first place. . . .
        Mr. [Newt] Gingrich [of Georgia]: You know, it does not 
    surprise me that some Democrats get up and tell us how fair the 
    Speaker is. I expect if we were all Democrats we might think he is 
    fair, too. . . .
        We have been through a cycle in which the President has been 
    called heartless. It has been said he has ice water in his veins. . 
    . .
        The distinguished majority leader managed to describe the 
    President as a liar 10 times in a 1-minute speech.
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: Let the Chair remind the participants 
    in this debate to stick to the issue of the gentleman from 
    Pennsylvania's personal privilege, which is not what the gentleman 
    from Georgia was just debating.

Seating of Member

Sec. 36.7 It is in order during debate on a motion to refer a 
    resolution directing the temporary seating of a Member-elect to 
    discuss court decisions relating to the constitutional authority of 
    the House to judge its elections.

    During consideration of House Resolution 97 (to seat Richard D. 
McIntyre as a Member from Indiana) in the House on Mar. 4, 
1985,(8) the following proceedings occurred:
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 8. 131 Cong. Rec. 4277, 4278, 4280, 99th Cong. 1st Sess.

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[[Page 10494]]

        Mr. [Robert H.] Michel [of Illinois]: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a 
    question of privilege.
        Mr. Speaker, I send to the desk a privileged resolution (H. 
    Res. 97) and ask for its immediate consideration.
        The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                                   H. Res. 97

            Whereas a certificate of election to the House of 
        Representatives always carries with it the presumption that the 
        State election procedures have been timely, regular, and fairly 
        implemented; and . . .
            Whereas the presumption of the validity and regularity of 
        the certificate of election held by Richard D. McIntyre has not 
        been overcome by any substantial evidence or claim of 
        irregularity: Now, therefore be it
            Resolved, That the Speaker is hereby authorized and 
        directed to administer the oath of office to the gentleman from 
        Indiana, Mr. Richard D. McIntyre.
            Resolved, That the question of the final right of Mr. 
        McIntyre to a seat in the 99th Congress is referred to the 
        Committee on House Administration.

        The Speaker Pro Tempore: (9) The gentleman states a 
    valid question of privilege.
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 9. James C. Wright, Jr. (Tex.).
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        The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. 
    Alexander).
        Mr. [William V.] Alexander [of Arkansas]: Mr. Speaker, I move 
    that the resolution be referred to the Committee on House 
    Administration. . . .
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The gentleman is entitled to 1 hour 
    under that motion, during which time the gentleman from Arkansas 
    controls the time. . . .
        Mr. Alexander: . . . [A] certificate of election from the 
    appropriate State officer is considered only as prima facie 
    evidence of election and may be rendered ineffective by the House 
    under its power to judge elections. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, the matter before us today was . . . resolved in a 
    memorandum opinion on March 1 by the U.S. district court for the 
    District of Columbia in the case of McIntyre versus O'Neill, 
    whereupon the court found as follows. . . .
        Mr. [Robert S.] Walker [of Pennsylvania]: Mr. Speaker, I have a 
    parliamentary inquiry. . . .
        Mr. Speaker, am I correct that the gentleman must address 
    himself to the resolution that is before the House, and addressing 
    district court matters that are outside the ability of this House 
    to make decisions would not be addressing itself specifically to 
    the resolution at hand?
        The Speaker Pro Tempore: The Chair must rule that if a court 
    proceeding relates to a matter under discussion in the Chamber, 
    then it is not out of order to make reference to the court's 
    findings and related matter during debate on the motion to refer.