[Cannon's Precedents, Volume 6]
[Chapter 179 - Speaker's Power of Recognition]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
SPEAKER'S POWER OF RECOGNITION.
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1. The rule and practice. Sections 283-291.
2. No appeal from. Sections 292-294.
3. Member once recognized not to be deprived of floor. Section
295.
4. Recognition governed by Member's relation to the pending
question. Sections 296-306.
5. Conditions under which right to prior recognition passes to
opponents of a measure. Sections 307-313.
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283. A Member desiring recognition must first rise and address the
Speaker.
On December 10, 1913 \2\ after announcing the business in order for
the day, the Speaker \3\ said:
The Chair desires to suggest to the House that Members can not sit in
their seats and make any motion whatever; they can not sit in their
seats and interrupt a Member who has the floor. The Chair understands
that these things are done without due consideration and without any
desire on the part of a Member to disturb the order of the House, but
he does disturb it.
284. Women presiding in the House or in the Committee of the Whole
are properly addressed as ``Madam Speaker'' and ``Madam Chairman''
respectively.--On March 2, 1932,\4\ following, the approval of the
Journal, Mr. Claude V. Parsons, of Illinois, rising to correct the
Record, said:
Yesterday afternoon the distinguished Congresswoman from Florida
occupied the Chair and in addressing the Chair I addressed her as Madam
Chairman. I notice in the Record this morning, that it is printed as
Mr. Chairman. I wish to inquire which one of the titles is correct.
The Speaker \5\ replied:
In the opinion of the present occupant of the Chair, the gentleman
from Illinois in addressing the Chair as Madam Chairman used the
correct form.
285. The rules require Members to address themselves to ``Mr. Speaker
only, and it is a breach of parliamentary law for Members to preface
remarks by addressing themselves to Gentlemen of the House,'' ``Ladies
and gentlemen,'' etc.
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\1\ Supplemental to Chapter XLVI.
\2\ Second session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 634.
\3\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\4\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 5117.
\5\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 286
On January 12, 1932,\1\ Mr. Robert Luce, of Massachusetts, rising to
a question of privilege, said:
I find in the Record this morning that a few remarks I made yesterday
are printed as follows.
Mr. Speaker, ladies, and gentlemen.
Not since I have been a Member have I thus broken parliamentary law.
Of course, I desire not to go on record as supporting a practice which
is obnoxious to me.
When I came here 12 years ago, nobody, so far as I can recollect,
ever deviated from the parliamentary rule that salutation should be
confined to the occupant of the chair, either ``Mr. Speaker'' or ``Mr.
Chairman.'' Within a very few years the practice has grown up of
addressing the House en masse by some form of preliminary language.
This is contrary to the parliamentary precedent of several hundred
years.
I would read to you a statement by Sir Thomas Smith who described the
practice of the Parliament of Queen Elizabeth's time. He said:
``Though one do praise the law, the other dissuade it. For every man
speaketh as to the Speaker, not as one to another, for that is against
the order of the house.''
Jefferson's Manual, which is the law of the House when it has no rule
to the contrary, says that ``when any Member means to speak * * * he is
* * * to address himself not to the House, nor to any particular
Member, but to the Speaker,'' and so forth. Notice that he is to
address himself not to the House, but to the Speaker of the House.
I called this matter to the attention of Speaker Longworth, and he
was even more severe than I would be in criticizing the practice and in
expressing the hope that some means might be found to call it to the
attention of the House. I hope that I have not unduly taken the time of
the House in calling attention to this matter, and ask unanimous
consent that the words ``ladies and gentlemen'' be stricken from the
report of my speech.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The Chair is in entire sympathy with the remarks made by the
gentleman from Massachusetts. It is supposed to be a slight upon the
Chair, according to the expressions of former Speakers of the House,
when Members address the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole or the
Speaker and then address the Members on the floor en masse. The Speaker
represents the House of Representatives in its organization, and by
addressing the Chair gentlemen address the entire membership of the
House.
Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
286. Under the rules Members seeking recognition rise and address
themselves to the Speaker from their places in the House and the
Speaker declines to recognize Members preferring requests from the well
of the House.--On December 9, 1931,\3\ a number of Members came down
the aisles and stood in the well of the House asking recognition.
Mr. William B. Bankhead, of Alabama, raised a question of order
against the recognition of Members from the well of the House and asked
that the rule against the practice be enforced.
The Speaker \4\ sustained the point of order and said:
May the Chair make a few remarks concerning that? It is the opinion
of the Chair that the practice of coming down into the well of the
House in order to attract the attention of the Chair is improper. It
tends to confusion. It does not give the membership in the rear of the
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\1\ First session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 1815.
\2\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\3\ First session, Seventv-second Congress. Record, p. 236.
\4\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
Sec. 287
Hall opportunity to hear the requests. So the Chair thinks he will
adopt the practice of not recognizing gentlemen who seek recognition
from the well of the House. The Chair thinks this will finally stop the
practice.
287. A Member may not by reserving the right to object to a request
for unanimous consent secure the floor for debate.
On April 14, 1913,\1\ Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, asked
unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record on the subject of
woman suffrage.
Mr. A. W. Lafferty, of Oregon, reserved the right to object and was
engaging in debate, when Mr. Martin B. Madden, of Illinois, inquired
under what rule a reservation of the right to object entitled Members
to the floor.
The Speaker \2\ replied that while it was a custom which had
prevailed for many years and was the practice when he first entered the
House more than eighteen years before, it was not sanctioned by the
rules, and was frequently the cause of a waste of time, but that any
Member by demanding the regular order might prevent such reservations
and preclude debate.
288. On September 5, 1919,\3\ twhile the House, proceeding under a
special order, was in Committee of the Whole House for the
consideration of bills, on the Private Calendar unobjected to, Mr.
Thomas L. Blanton of Texas objected to the consideration of a certain
bill.
Mr. Charles C. Kearns, of Ohio, inquired of the Chair whether a
Member reserving the right to object to the consideration of a bill was
entitled to the floor, and if recognized, whether he could be deprived
of the floor by a demand for the regular order.
The Chairman, Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, replied that until
unanimous consent for the consideration of a bill was secured no Member
could be recognized, as there was nothing before the House for
discussion, and that no Member could occupy the floor in debate under
reservation of the right to object to a request for unanimous consent
if there was objection or demand for the regular order.
289. The Speaker may inquire for what purpose a Member rises and then
deny recognition.
On April 14, 1913,\1\ when the immediate business before the House
had been concluded, Mr. Richard W. Austin, of Tennessee, rose and
addressed the Chair.
The Speaker inquired:
For what purpose does the gentleman from Tennessee rise?
Upon ascertaining that the request was for the purpose of presenting
an unprivileged resolution, the Speaker refused recognition.
Mr. James R. Mann, of Illinois, submitted as a parliamentary inquiry,
that having recognized Mr. Austin to make the inquiry the Speaker could
not then withdraw recognition.
The Speaker \2\ said:
The gentleman from Tennessee arose, and the Chair asked him for what
purpose he rose.
Then the gentleman sent up the resolution, and the Chair obtained the
resolution from the Clerk and read enough of it to determine that it
was not a privileged resolution.
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\1\ First session Sixty-third Congress, Record, p. 173.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 4938.
Sec. 290
The Chair does not think that if the gentleman from Illinois would
rise, for instance, and the Chair would then ask for what purpose the
gentleman rose, that he would thereby recognize the gentleman from
Illinois until he found out whether he was entitled to be recognized.
At first to-day the Chair did not do that, and several gentlemen
obtained in that way recognition for matters which they had no right to
bring up; but afterwards the Chair adopted the old procedure of
propounding a question that was very unpopular here for awhile, namely,
for what purpose the gentleman rose. The Chair think that is the only
orderly way to proceed.
290. On July 5, 1918,\1\ during the consideration of Senate
amendments to the river and harbor appropriation bill, the Speaker
recognized Mr. Oscar L. Gray, of Alabama, to offer a motion to recede
and concur, but declined to recognize him for debate on the ground that
Mr. John H. Small, of North Carolina, the Member in charge of the bill,
was entitled to the floor.
In the course of his remarks the Speaker \2\ said:
A good many gentlemen have been under the impression that if a man is
recognized at all he is recognized for all purposes, which is not true.
The late Hon. Augustus P. Gardner always insisted that there were two
recognitions, and finally he convinced me of the truth of that; and
that is the reason that the Chair asks a gentleman for what purpose he
rises. There was a tremendous agitation here once about the Speaker
asking that question. When I became Speaker I started in with the
intention not to propound that inquiry, and the first thing I knew I
was in deep water and in a good deal of trouble. After seeing how it
worked out I concluded that Speaker Cannon had been right in demanding
``For what purpose does the gentleman rise?'' I have carried out that
practice ever since.
291. On August 5, 1919,\3\ William L. Igoe, of Missouri, rose to a
question of personal privilege and in the course of his remarks
referred to the fact that on a previous day the Speaker, after
recognizing him, had declined to permit him to proceed.
During the colloquy which ensued, Mr. John N. Garner, of Texas,
suggested:
Will the gentleman yield for a suggestion which occurs to me, that
this colloquy illustrates the advisability of one custom that Mr.
Speaker Cannon always insisted upon, for which we criticized him a good
deal, but that finally the ex-Speaker, Mr. Clark of Missouri, was
compelled to adopt, and that was to ask each Member when he rises,
``For what purpose does the gentleman rise?''
The Speaker \4\ agreed:
That strikes me as logical, and I think it is probably wise, as the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Garner suggests, to ask for what purpose a
gentleman rises, and the Chair does that very often; but when the
leader of the minority rises, the Chair generally recognizes him
without putting that question, because he knows that the leader of the
minority has a sense of responsibility and is familiar with the rules,
and the Chair knows that he would not intend to take advantage of his
recognition. So the Chair many times recognizes him when he would not
recognize other gentlemen without making the inquiry; but I agree that
perhaps it is wise that the Chair should always ask that question. Most
Members on both sides of the House who wish to make a motion out of the
regular order consult the Speaker in advance and then it is arranged
whether and when they can be recognized so as least to interfere with
the regular business of the House.
292. There is no appeal from a decision by the Speaker on a question
of recognition.
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\1\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 8710.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 3663.
\4\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
Sec. 293
On March 15, 1910,\1\ the legislative, executive, and judicial
appropriation bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time,
when Mr. William S. Bennett of New York, Mr. Martin D. Foster of
Illinois, and Mr. William A. Cullop of Indiana, arose simultaneously,
and demanded recognition to move to recommit the bill. The Speaker,
after ascertaining that all were opposed to the bill, recognized Mr.
Bennett. Mr. Foster appealed from the decision of the Chair.
The Speaker \2\ said:
It is a question of recognition, and the gentleman is quite aware
that upon a question of recognition an appeal from the Chair has never,
at least for a generation, been entertained.
293. An inquiry to ascertain for what purpose a Member arises does
not constitute recognition.
While an appeal or a motion to adjourn is always in order, a Member
must first secure recognition in order to present either.
On February 28, 1919,\3\ during the consideration of the bill (S.
1419) regulating the construction of dams across navigable waters, Mr.
William E. Mason, of Illinois, rose and demanded recognition.
The Speaker pro tempore, Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, inquired
for what purpose the Member arose, and, upon ascertaining that the
Member desired to move to adjourn, refused recognition.
Mr. Mason asked if a motion to adjourn was in order.
The Speaker pro tempore said:
The motion to adjourn is always in order when a gentleman gets
recognition to make it; but the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Sims, has
the floor and has an hour.
The Chair recognized the gentleman from Tennessee. The gentleman from
Illinois rose and addressed the Chair, and the Chair asked him for what
purpose he rose. He said, ``I rise to make a motion to adjourn.'' That
does not constitute a recognition.
The gentleman from Tennessee has been recognized.
The Chair never recognized the gentleman, and can not recognize him
in the time of the gentleman from Tennessee. The gentleman from
Tennessee has this hour and the right to parcel it out as he chooses.
Mr. Mason proposed to appeal from the decision of the Chair, and the
Speaker pro tempore held that an appeal was not in order, as the Member
had not been recognized.
294. While circumscribed by the rules and practices of the House, the
exercise of the power of recognition is not subject to a point of
order.
On February 15, 1923,\4\ during the consideration of the naval
omnibus bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union, Mr. William J. Fields, of Kentucky, and Mr. Isaac V. McPherson,
of New York, rose and simultaneously addressed the chair.
The Chairman recognized Mr. Fields, when Mr. Frederick C. Hicks, New
York, made the point of order that Mr. McPherson, being a member of the
Committee on Naval Affairs, which had reported the bill, was entitled
to recognition in preference to Mr. Fields, who was not a member of
that committee.
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\1\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 3218.
\2\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\3\ Third session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 4639.
\4\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 3719.
Sec. 295
The Chairman \1\ held that recognition is within the discretion of
the Chair and is not subject to a point of order.
295. After a Member has proceeded with his remarks it is too late to
challenge his right to the floor.
On January 30, 1923,\2\ Mr. Philip P. Campbell, of Kansas, from the
Committee on Rules, submitted a privileged resolution providing for the
consideration of the joint resolution (S. J. Res. 12) to dispose of
sugars imported from Argentina.
The previous question having been ordered, debate proceeded for 40
minutes under the rule and Mr. Campbell was recognized and addressed
the House in behalf of the resolution.
Mr. Edward W. Pou, of North Carolina, was then recognized under the
impression that he was opposed to the resolution. After he had
proceeded for some time, in support of the resolution, Mr. Thomas L.
Blanton, of Texas, made the point of order that the previous
recognition was in favor of the resolution and therefore the opposition
was entitled to recognition.
The Speaker \3\ said:
The rules provide \4\ that one-half of such time shall be given in
favor of and one-half in opposition. As the House is aware, it is
always the custom in the House to recognize the ranking member of the
Committee on Rules in favor and the ranking member of the minority
against. When the gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Campbell, had finished and
reserved the balance of his time, the Chair recognized the gentleman
from North Carolina, Mr. Pou, for 20 minutes.
The Chair assumed that he was against the rule, which was confirmed
by his yielding to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Jones, who opposed the
rule. Then the first knowledge the Chair had that the gentleman from
North Carolina was in favor of the rule was when he took the floor and
occupied time for 10 minutes. The Chair thinks the point of order
should be made when recognition is had.
296. The Member in charge of the bill is entitled to prior
recognition to offer amendments.
On April 2, 1908,\5\ the House was in Committee of the Whole House on
the state of the Union for the consideration of the resolution (H. Res.
233) to dispose of a message from the President.
During the consideration of the resolution for amendments, Mr. John
Sharp Williams, of Mississippi, and Mr. Sereno E. Payne, of New York,
rose at the same time and addressed the chair. The Chairman recognized
Mr. Williams. Thereupon Mr. Payne made the point of order that being in
charge of the resolution, he was entitled to prior recognition.
Mr. Williams submitted.
Mr. Chairman, I submit it is too late for that now. If the gentleman
had been upon his feet at the same time I was offering an amendment and
striving himself to offer one undoubtedly he would have been entitled
to preference. But he was not upon his feet to offer any amendment, and
I leave it to him if his amendment is not an afterthought. It was never
his intention at the time that I offered this amendment to offer one.
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\1\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Chairman.
\2\ Fourth session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 2731.
\3\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\4\ Section 3 of Rule XXVII.
\5\ First Session Sixtieth Congress, Record, p. 4330.
Sec. 297
The Chairman \1\ said:
The Chair, under the procedure of the House, must recognize the
gentleman in charge of the bill if he rises for the purpose of offering
an amendment. The Chair can not question his motives. The gentleman
from New York, Mr. Payne, has offered an amendment to strike out the
last word, and he is entitled to the floor.
297. A Member may not by offering a motion of higher privilege than
the pending motion deprive the member of the committee in charge of the
bill of the floor.
On February 10, 1910,\2\ the House was considering the Senate
amendment to the urgent deficiency appropriation bill. Mr. James A.
Tawney, of Minnesota, chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, and
in charge of the bill, moved that the House further insist on Senate
amendments not concurred in and ask for a further conference.
Mr. Augustus P. Gardner, of Massachusetts, made a motion to recede
and concur and upon that motion claimed the floor.
The Speaker held that while the motion of the gentleman from
Massachusetts was entitled to precedence, the right to prior
recognition for debate belonged to the Member in charge of the bill.
298. On June 7, 1910 \3\ the House was considering the Senate
amendment to the bill (H. R. 17536) to create a commerce court. Mr.
James R. Mann, of Illinois, moved that the House disagree to the
amendment. Thereupon Mr. Irvine L. Lenroot, of Wisconsin, made a motion
to concur with an amendment, and took the floor, claiming the right
under clause 6 of Rule XIV, to open and close debate.
The Speaker \4\ recognized Mr. Mann, and said:
If the gentleman from Illinois had yielded, under the ordinary
practice of the House the gentleman would be entitled to the floor for
an hour. But the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Mann] while he is taken
off of the floor temporarily by the offering of a preferential motion,
is not deprived of the floor. It has been the uniform and well-
understood practice of the House that arises constantly every session.
The practice of the House, so far as the Chair recollects is
unbroken.
299. On May 13, 1912,\5\ the House was considering the Senate
amendments to the joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment
providing for election of Senators by direct vote. A motion to recede
and concur in a certain amendment had been made by Mr. William W.
Rucker, of Missouri, chairman of the committee in charge of the
resolution.
Mr. Charles L. Bartlett, of Georgia, made a motion to recede and
concur with an amendment, and upon that motion claimed the right to
debate for one hour.
The Speaker \6\ held that of the two motions that of Mr. Bartlett was
entitled to precedence and would be first voted upon, but that the
offering of the preferential motion could not deprive the Member in
charge of the floor, and Mr. Rucker was
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\1\ George P. Lawrence, of Massachusetts, Chairman.
\2\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 1703.
\3\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 7568.
\4\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speaker.
\5\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Journal, p. 1046; Record p.
6346.
\6\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 300
entitled to recognition for one hour during which time which he might
move the previous question.
300. The Member in charge of the bill is entitled at all stages to
prior recognition for allowable motions intended to expedite the bill.
On May 8, 1912,\1\ the House was considering the bill (H. R. 17756)
to provide civil government in the Philippine Islands, when Mr. Marlin
E. Olmsted, of Pennsylvania, was recognized, and offered an amendment
which was agreed to. Thereupon Mr. William A. Jones, the Member in
charge of the bill, moved the previous question on the bill and all
pending amendments.
Mr. Swagar Sherley, of Kentucky, made the point of order that the
Member in charge having yielded the floor was not again entitled to
recognition until other Members desiring to be heard had been
recognized.
The Speaker \2\ held that Mr. Olmsted, though recognized for an hour,
surrendered the floor in offering an amendment, and no one having the
floor, the Member in charge was entitled to prior recognition at any
stage of the bill to move the previous question.
301. On August 3, 1917,\3\ Mr. Asbury F. Lever, of South Carolina,
called up the conference report on the bill (H. R. 4188), the food-
survey bill. At the conclusion of the reading of the report and
statement, Mr. Frank D. Scott, of Michigan, proposed to move the
previous question.
The Speaker \2\ declined to recognize the gentleman from Michigan for
that purpose, on the ground that the chairman of the committee, in
charge of the bill, was entitled to the floor.
302. The Member on whose motion a subject is brought before the House
is first entitled to the recognition.
On January 3, 1917,\4\ Mr. William R. Wood, of Indiana, rose to a
question of privilege and presented a resolution providing for an
investigation of certain charges affecting the dignity of the House.
Mr. Robert L. Henry, of Texas, asked recognition for the purpose of
making a motion to refer the resolution, and Mr. James R. Mann, of
Illinois, made the point of order that Mr. Wood, as the proponent of
the resolution, was entitled to recognition.
The Speaker \2\ sustained the point of order and recognized Mr. Wood.
303. On July 5, 1918,\5\ while the House was considering the Senate
amendments to the river and harbor appropriation bill, Mr. Oscar L.
Gray, of Alabama, made a motion that the House recede and concur in the
pending amendment.
Mr. John H. Small, of North Carolina, chairman of the committee, and
in charge of the bill demanded recognition to offer a motion to further
insist.
The Speaker \2\ read the decision \6\ of Mr. Speaker Carlisle on a
similar question, holding that a member may not by offering a
preferential motion deprive the mem-
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\1\ Second session Sixty-second Congress, Journal, p. 1044; Record,
p. 6075.
\2\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
\3\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 5770.
\4\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 897.
\5\ Second session Sixty-fifth Congress, Record, p. 8710.
\6\ Vol. II, see. 1460 of this work.
Sec. 304
ber in charge of the bill of the floor, and in conformity with that
decision recognized Mr. Small for one hour.
304. On December 22, 1920,\1\ the House was considering the emergency
tariff bill in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the
Union.
Mr. Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, offered an amendment striking out
the pending paragraph, when Mr. Carl Hayden, of Arizona offered an
amendment perfecting the paragraph.
A question of precedence being raised, the Chairman \2\ held that the
perfecting amendment took precedence over the motion to strike out the
paragraph and was first voted on, but Mr. Walsh having been first
recognized was entitled to the floor in debate.
305. On June 15, 1921,\3\ during consideration by the House of the
bill (H.R. 6754) to promote the welfare of American seamen in the
merchant marine, Mr. Frank D. Scott, of Michigan, offered an amendment
and after the expiration of the five minutes allowed for debate under
the rule moved the previous question on the amendment.
Mr. Meyer London, of New York, made the point of order that Mr.
Scott's time having expired, he was not entitled to recognition for
that purpose.
The Speaker pro tempore \4\ stated that the gentleman from Michigan,
in moving the previous question, was within his rights as the Member in
charge of the bill.
306. The members of the committee reporting the bill have precedence
in the discussion.--On January 12, 1933,\5\ the Committee of the Whole
House on the state of the Union was considering the bill (H. R. 13991),
the farm relief bill, when Mr. Donald F. Snow, of Maine, a member of
the Committee on Agriculture, reporting the bill, and Mr. William J.
Granfield, of Massachusetts, who was not a member of the committee,
rose simultaneously and asked recognition to offer amendments.
The Chairman \6\ recognized Mr. Granfield, whereupon Mr. Bertrand H.
Snell, of New York, made the point of order that Mr. Snow as a member
of the committee reporting the bill was entitled to precedence.
The Chairman sustained the point of order and said:
The Chair understands the precedents of the House. The Chair has
uniformly given preference to members of the committee on each occasion
when he has presided. The Chair agreed to recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts. The gentleman was on his feet and asking for recognition
before any member of the committee. However, the Chair will follow the
precedents and recognize the gentleman from Maine to offer an amendment
which the Clerk will report.
307. The member of the committee reporting a bill is entitled to
precedence in recognition for its discussion when it is taken up for
consideration in the House.--On February 24, 1933,\7\ Mr. Hatton W.
Sumners, of Texas,
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\1\ Third session Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 661.
\2\ Sidney Anderson, of Minnesota, Chairman.
\3\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 2643.
\4\ Wm. H. Stafford, of Wisconsin, Speaker pro tempore.
\5\ Second session Seventy-second Congress, Record, p. 1679.
\6\ Lindsay C. Warren, of North Carolina, Chairman.
\7\ Second session Seventy-second Congress, Record, P. 4912.
Sec. 308
having been recognized to submit a parliamentary inquiry, asked whether
he as chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary reporting a resolution
relating to the proposed impeachment of Judge Harold Louderback, but
having signed the minority report, or Mr. Tom D. McKeown, of Oklahoma,
who had filed the majority report from the committee, was entitled to
recognition when the resolution was called up for consideration in the
House.
The Speaker \1\ held:
The usual custom is that the Member who reports the legislation
coming before the House is the one the Chair recognizes, and the
Speaker would recognize the gentleman who has been directed by the
committee to report the bill.
Thereupon, Mr. McKeown called up the resolution, and the Speaker
said:
Under the rules of the House the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
McKeown, has one hour in which to discuss this resolution.
308. A motion to direct or control the consideration of the subject
before the House being made by the Member in charge and decided
adversely, right to recognition passes to the opposition.
On March 15, 1909,\2\ at the organization of the House, Mr. John
Dalzell, of Pennsylvania, offered resolutions providing for the
adoption of rules.
The question being taken, the House disagreed to the resolutions--
yeas 189, nays 193.
Thereupon the Speaker recognized Mr. Champ Clark, of Missouri, a
member of the opposition, who offered other resolutions providing for
the adoption of rules.
Mr. John J. Fitzgerald, of New York, proposed to offer an amendment
when Mr. Clark demanded the previous question on the resolutions.
The House refused the previous question, and Mr. Clark, rising to a
parliamentary inquiry, asked who was entitled to recognition.
The Speaker \3\ said:
The previous question having been refused, the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to yield to him for
an amendment, is entitled to the first recognition.
309. On October 5, 1917,\4\ Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, from
the Committee on Rules, submitted a resolution to take from the
Speaker's table the war-risk insurance bill with Senate amendments,
disagree to the amendments and agree to the conference asked by the
Senate.
Mr. Garrett demanded the previous question on the resolution, which
was refused, yeas 112, nays 144.
Thereupon, on motion of Mr. William C. Adamson, of Georgia, by
unanimous consent, all proceedings touching the resolution were
vacated.
The Speaker \5\ recognized Mr. Frederick H. Gillett, a member of the
minority, who moved to concur in amendment No. 100.
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\1\ John N. Garner, of Texas, Speaker.
\2\ First session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 22; Journal, p. 9.
\3\ Joseph G. Cannon, of Illinois, Speakers.
\4\ First session Sixty-fifth Congress, Journal, p. 428; Record, p.
7851.
\5\ Champ Clark, of Missouri, Speaker.
Sec. 310
Mr. Sam Rayburn, of Texas, raised a question of order against the
recognition of Mr. Gillett, and the Speaker explained that when the
vote on ordering the previous question was decided adversely, the right
to recognition passed to those opposed to the resolution.
310. On January 13, 1920,\1\ Mr. James A. Gallivan, of Massachusetts,
moved to discharge the Committee on Military Affairs from the further
consideration of a resolution of inquiry, and upon that motion demanded
the previous question.
The previous question was refused, yeas 155, nays 174, and Mr. Edward
W. Saunders, of Virginia, rising to a parliamentary inquiry, asked if
the refusal of the House to sustain the demand for the previous
question passed the control of the resolution to the opposition.
The Speaker pro tempore \2\ answered in the affirmative, and
recognized Mr. Arthur G. Dewalt, of Pennsylvania, the only Member who
had spoken in opposition to the resolution.
311. On October 11, 1921,\3\ while the bill (H. R. 8520) to regulate
certain public service corporations in the District of Columbia, was
under consideration in the Committee of the Whole House on the state of
the Union, Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, moved to strike out the
enacting clause.
The question was decided in the affirmative, yeas 58, nays 60, and
the Chairman recognized Mr. Blanton.
Mr. Nicholas Longworth, of Ohio, made the point of order that under
the accepted procedure of the House it was the duty of the Chair to
recognize the Member in charge of the bill and not the gentleman from
Texas.
The Chairman \4\ held that when a preferential or other decisive
motion is agreed to, the Member in charge loses control of the bill and
the proponent of the motion is entitled to recognition.
312. A material motion by the Member in charge being rejected through
absence of the majority acting under representations of the minority,
the minority declined to take advantage of the situation and yielded
for a motion to adjourn.
On January 20, 1910,\5\ late in the afternoon, Mr. James T. Lloyd, of
Missouri, proposed to tender his resignation from a special committee,
when Mr. James A. Tawney, of Minnesota, moved to adjourn.
The motion was rejected, and the Speaker \6\ recognized Mr. John J.
Fitzgerald, of New York, a member of the minority, to move a call of
the House.
Whereupon, Mr. Oscar W. Underwood, of Alabama, said:
Mr. Speaker, I desire to make a statement. We called a Democratic
caucus to meet here at this time to pass on matters of interest to the
Democratic party. It was supposed we were going into caucus at once,
and I know that Republican Members went home in good faith under those
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\1\ Sixty-sixth Congress, Record, p. 1504.
\2\ John Q. Tilson, of Connecticut, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6244.
\4\ Mr. Nicholas J. Sinnott, of Oregon, Chairman.
\5\ Second session Sixty-first Congress, Record, p. 857.
\6\ Joseph G. Cannon of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 313
circumstances. I did not know that the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Lloyd, was going to present his resignation at the desk at that time. I
do not think it was known to the membership on this side of the House.
When Mr. Lloyd's resignation was sent to the desk I did not at once
realize the position we were placed in, when we refused to adjourn by
Democratic votes, having the temporary control of the House, due to the
absence of Republican Members who did not expect further business to be
transacted. I rose to make a parliamentary statement in reference to
the question presented by Mr. Lloyd's resignation. I am sure this side
of the House did not realize that possibly we were taking advantage of
the absence of the majority Members. Now, the intention of the
gentleman from Missouri to submit his resignation at that time was not
a deliberate move on this side of the House. It came up unexpectedly on
our part. It came without my knowledge, and, I think, without the
knowledge of most Members on this side of the House. Under those
circumstances, I think there is nothing for us to do but to make a
motion to adjourn at once.
I yield to the gentleman from New York to make the usual motion to
adjourn.
The Speaker accordingly recognized Mr. Payne, who moved to adjourn.
313. While the rejection of a conference report transfers the control
of the measure to the opponents, the sustaining of a point of order
against a conference report is not adverse action on the part of the
House and exerts no effect on the right of recognition.
On January 12, 1917,\1\ the Speaker sustained a point of order made
by Mr. William S. Bennett, of New York, against a conference report on
the immigration bill.
Thereupon Mr. Bennett demanded recognition upon the ground that the
sustaining of a point of order against the report was equivalent to the
rejection of the report by the House and the right of recognition
passed to the opponents of the measure.
The Speaker \2\ held that while an adverse vote on a material motion
transferred the right of recognition to those in opposition, the
approval of a point of order by the Chair gave no indication of the
attitude of the House upon the proposition, and therefore could not
affect the right of recognition.
The Speaker then recognized Mr. John L. Burnett, of Alabama, the
Member in charge, who moved to disagree to the amendments of the Senate
and ask for further conference.
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\1\ Second session Sixty-fourth Congress, Record, p. 1294.