[Cannon's Precedents, Volume 6]
[Chapter 175 - Punishment and Expulsion of Members]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
PUNISHMENT AND EXPULSION OF MEMBERS.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1. Punishment for abuse of leave to print in the Record.
Section 236.
2. Censure for conduct in debate. Section 237.
3. Punishment for crime. Section 238.
4. In the Senate. Section 239.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
236. For abuse of the leave to print, the House censured a Member
after a motion to expel him had failed.
In the absence of a Member against whom resolutions of expulsion were
offered, consideration of the resolutions was postponed with notice
that the Sergeant-at-Arms would be asked to deliver to the Member or
his secretary a copy of the resolution with notice of its pending
consideration.
A proposition to censure is not germane to a proposition to expel.
(Contra 5923.)
The question on agreeing to resolutions of expulsion having been
decided adversely, the Speaker recognized a Member of the opposition to
offer resolutions of censure.
Form of censure administered by the Speaker to a Member by order of
the House.
A Member having been subjected to censure, the Speaker, after
deliberation, laid before the House a letter of explanation and apology
from the Member.
A Member against whom a resolution of censure was pending was asked
by the Speaker if he desired to be heard.
The Speaker having censured a Member by order of the House, the
censure appears in full in the Journal.
Resolutions providing for the expulsion of a Member were presented as
privileged.
On October 24, 1921 \2\ the House agreed, yeas 314, nays 1, to a
motion by Mr. Frank W. Mondell, of Wyoming, to expunge from the Record
an extension of remarks inserted on the previous legislative day by Mr.
Thomas L. Blanton of Texas.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Supplementary to Chapter XLII.
\2\ First session Sixty-seventh Congress, Record, p. 6687; Journal,
p. 498.
Sec. 236
Subsequently,\1\ Mr. Mondell, as a question of privilege, submitted
the following:
Whereas Thomas L. Blanton, Representative from the seventeenth
district of the State of Texas, did on October 4, 1921, ask unanimous
consent to extend his remarks in the Congressional Record ``upon the
improvements in the Government Printing Office,'' which consent was
granted by the House; and
Whereas under such permission the said Thomas L. Blanton did insert
and cause to be printed in the Congressional Record for Saturday,
October 22, 1921, grossly indecent and obscene language, unworthy of a
Member of the House of Representatives, contrary to the rules of the
House, derogatory to its dignity, and in violation of its confidence:
Therefore be it
Resolved, That the said Thomas L. Blanton, by his conduct as
aforesaid, has forfeited all right to sit as a Representative in the
Sixty-seventh Congress, and is hereby expelled and declared to be no
longer a Member of this House.
Mr. Finis J. Garrett, of Tennessee, called attention to the fact that
Mr. Blanton was absent and asked that the resolution be withdrawn.
Mr. Mondell said:
I will not withdraw the resolution, but I shall not press it for
consideration at this time. While our rules do not require it, in order
that there may be no question as to the service of notice on the
gentleman from Texas of the resolution which I have just presented, I
shall ask the Sergeant-at-Arms to deliver him, or his secretary in his
absence, a copy of the resolution at the earliest possible moment, and
notice that it will be taken up Thursday.
On October 27,\2\ Mr. Mondell called up the resolution. At the
conclusion of Mr. Mondell's remarks, the Speaker said:
The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Blanton, if he
desires to be heard.
Thereupon Mr. Blanton addressed the House in his own behalf.
In the course of debate, Mr. Garrett proposed to offer the following
substitute for the pending resolution:
Whereas Thomas L. Blanton, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, did on the 4th day of October, 1921, ask unanimous
consent to extend his remarks in the Congressional Record ``upon the
improvements in the Government Printing Office,'' which consent was
granted by the House; and
Whereas under the permission thus obtained the said Thomas L. Blanton
did insert and cause to be printed in the Congressional Record for
Saturday, October 22, 1921, a certain letter or communication
purporting to have been written by one Millard French to George H.
Carter, Public Printer, which said communication contained language
that was so indecent, obscene, vulgar, and vile as to render it
unmailable had it been contained in any other than an official
publication; and
Whereas the said Thomas L. Blanton by taking the responsibility of
inserting such matter in the Congressional Record has offered an
indignity to the House of which he is a member and to the people
represented by the membership of the Congress whose official organ the
publication is, for which he deserves the severe rebuke and censure of
the House: Therefore be it
Resolved, That the said Thomas L. Blanton be, and he is hereby, voted
the censure of this body, and the Speaker of the House is hereby
directed to summon him to the bar of the House and deliver to him its
reprimand and censure.
Mr. Mondell made the point of order that the substitute proposed was
not germane to the original proposition.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Record, p. 6755; Journal, p. 501.
\2\ Record, p. 6880; Journal, p. 508.
Sec. 236
The Speaker \1\ said: \2\
The Chair has given considerable attention to this point of order. It
seems to the Chair very clear. It does not seem that a motion of
censure, if this were a new question, would be germane to a motion to
expel. The two are very different intrinsically. Then, the motion to
expel requires a two-thirds majority; a motion to censure requires
simply a majority. Suppose the amendment was adopted and the motion to
expel was amended by a motion to censure; would that still be a motion
to expel amended and require a two-thirds vote for its adoption or
would it be a motion to censure? But probably that is not final,
because it might be interpreted as a substitute. The decision which the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Luce, cited from section 5923 of
Hinds' precedents appears to be strictly on the point, but the Chair
examined it in the Record, and he finds in the decision of the Chair
that this point was not at all alluded to. It went over for two days,
and when the decision was made this point of order was not even
referred to. And the Chair does not think, consequently, that that is a
precedent. There is a precedent, although the Chair does not think this
either is final, in which Speaker Henderson said in the Roberts case:
``Does anyone contend that changing a resolution from a condition
where a mere majority can carry it through to a resolution which will
require a two-thirds vote to carry it through--that such an amendment
is germane to the original proposition?
``The Chair does not entertain a single doubt but that this is not
germane to the original resolution.''
Of course, that case was different from this, and therefore the Chair
does not think it is a direct precedent. But it seems to the Chair that
in the nature of things, and looking at it as a new question, a motion
to censure is not germane to a case to expel. And the Chair is
confirmed by the conditions that exist on this resolution. Both motions
are privileged, and therefore if the motion to expel should not prevail
the motion to censure would still be in order, and therefore the remedy
would still exist. And as to the objections made by the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Black, that this motion is necessary in order that the House
may express itself, it must be remembered that men who are opposed to
doing anything might well vote, and often do vote, for a milder
amendment, and if they carry that then vote against the whole
proposition. So it would not follow on this amendment that a man who
voted for the amendment would necessarily, if that amendment carried,
vote for the resolution as amended. So the vote on the amendment would
not really produce the result which the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Black, referred to, of allowing the House to express its judgment. The
Chair thinks that, inasmuch as both motions are privileged, the House
will have the right to express itself if two-thirds do not vote for a
motion to expel. The Chair sustains the point of order.
The vote recurring on the original resolution, there appeared yeas
204, nays 113; and so, two-thirds not concurring, the resolution was
not agreed to.
Thereupon, the Speaker recognized Mr. Garrett, who submitted as a
question of privilege the resolution previously offered as a
substitute.
The vote being taken, the resolution was agreed to, yeas 293, nays 0.
Thereupon, by direction of the Speaker, the Sergeant at Arms appeared
at the bar with Mr. Blanton, when the Speaker said:
Mr. Blanton, by a unanimous vote of the House--yeas, 293; nays,
none--I have been directed to censure you because, when you had been
allowed by the courtesy of the House to print a speech which you did
not deliver, you inserted in it foul and obscene matter, which you knew
you could not have spoken on this floor; and that disgusting matter,
which could not have been circulated through the mail in any other
publication without violating the law, was transmitted as part of the
proceedings of this House to thousands of homes and libraries
throughout the country, to be read by men and women, and, worst of all,
by children, whose prurient curiosity it would excite
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Frederick H. Gillett, of Massachusetts, Speaker.
\3\ Expressly overruling decision at section 5923 of this work.
Sec. 237
and corrupt. In accordance with the instructions of the House and as
its representative, I pronounce upon you its censure.
This censure by the Speaker appears in full in the Journal.
On the following days \1\ the Speaker pro tempore \2\ laid before the
House a communication with the following explanation:
The Chair is in receipt of a communication addressed to the Speaker
of the House and which the writer of the communication has requested
should be laid before the House to-day. The Chair after conference with
the majority leader, the gentleman from Wyoming, Mr. Mondell, and the
minority leader, the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Garrett, feels that
the request of the writer of the communication is entitled to be
recognized, and therefore directs the Clerk to read the letter.
The Clerk read as follows:
October 28, 1921.
Hon. Frederick H. Gillett,
Speaker House of Representatives.
My Dear Mr. Speaker: I am involved in no issue now before the House,
hence what I now say is not a sacrifice of any principle.
When I expressed a wish of being able to place before the country the
record expunged, I was misunderstood by my colleagues, who believed
that I would circulate the objectionable language. My intention was not
to do this, but to circulate the expunged record with all the
objectionable words and abbreviations contained in the employee's
affidavit eliminated, and circulated only to show to the country the
honest bona fide purpose of my remarks.
I realize that the judgment of no human is infallible. I bow to the
collective judgment of my colleagues, against none of whom I harbor
malice, and offer this my apology to the House for what my colleagues
in their decision determined was an error.
Very sincerely,
Thomas L. Blanton.
237. The Speaker may not pronounce censure except by order of the
House. On June 8, 1933,\3\ Mr. Thomas L. Blanton, of Texas, rising to a
question of personal privilege, called attention to an article in the
current issue of a newspaper in which it was charged that on the
preceding day he had been censured by the Speaker.
The Speaker said: \4\
The Chair will state to the gentleman from Texas that the Speaker has
no authority whatever to censure any Member of Congress unless ordered
to do so by the House itself.
The Speaker did not violate the rules. Neither did the House censure
the gentleman from Texas, because the House permitted the gentleman's
remarks to remain in the Record.
238. A Member convicted in the courts resigned after the House had
ordered an inquiry.
A Member convicted by the courts refrained from participation in the
proceedings of the House pending action on his appeal.
It is the custom of the House to defer final action against Members
under criminal charges pending disposition in the court of last resort.
The House will not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior to
his election, even when convicted for an offense.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Record, p. 6968.
\2\ Joseph Walsh, of Massachusetts, Speaker pro tempore.
\3\ First session Seventy-third Congress, Record, p. 5335.
\4\ Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois, Speaker.
Sec. 238
A committee announced as a fundamental principle that the House could
not permit in its membership a person serving a sentence for crime.
A Member whose qualifications; were being investigated by a special
committee having resigned, the committee was discharged.
On December 9, 1925,\1\ Mr. Theodore E. Burton, of Ohio, offered the
following resolution:
Resolved, That the credentials presented to the House of
Representatives by John W. Langley, Representative elect from the tenth
district of the State of Kentucky, be referred to a select committee of
five members, to be appointed by the Speaker, to inquire into the
election returns and qualifications of mid Representative elect. Said
committee shall report to the House the result of its inquiries,
together with such recommendations as it may deem advisable.
In debating the resolution, Mr. Burton explained:
The facts may be briefly stated. A committee was appointed in the
first session of the last Congress to investigate certain charges
against Members. It appeared that during their investigations an
indictment had been found against Mr. Langley in the District of
Columbia, and, further, that an indictment had also been found against
him in the United States Court for the Eastern District of the State of
Kentucky. Mr. Langley was convicted before that district court early in
May of last year and sentenced to a term of two years. The committee
reported that as the courts had taken jurisdiction and proceedings were
to be instituted before an appellate court it seemed the proper and
best thing to suspend further proceedings in the House. An appeal or
writ of error was taken to the appellate court, the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which very recently affirmed the
conviction in the district court. In the meantime Mr. Langley was
elected a Member of this Congress. A motion for a rehearing was made
very recently. That has been heard and the motion denied, though
execution of the sentence has been suspended. But there is now a
further opportunity which the attorneys for the defendant intend to
utilize, and that is to apply for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The time for that is comparatively brief.
It must be within 90 days after the decision of the circuit court.
The resolution was agreed to, and the Speaker immediately appointed
the committee, which reported on December 22, 1925.\2\
The report briefly summarizes the history of the case:
While a Member of the Sixty-eighth Congress, on May 13, 1924, Mr.
Langley was convicted of conspiracy in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky under section 37 of the Penal
Code, and was sentenced to serve a term of two years in the Atlanta
Penitentiary. From this conviction a writ of error was taken to the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court, on November
13, 1925, affirmed the conviction in the district court. A motion for
rehearing was filed and decided against the accused on December 4 last.
On December 8 a stay of execution of the sentence was ordered by the
circuit court, to continue until five days after the first motionday in
the United States Supreme Court for the year 1926--January 4--with the
further provision that if prior to that date a petition for certiorari
should be presented in that court the execution of the sentence should
be deferred until a decision should be rendered upon the petition.
At the November election for 1924, Mr. Langley was reelected as a
Representative from the tenth Kentucky district.
The committee unanimously agree that under the long-established
custom of the House the circumstances do not warrant expulsion and the
report states:
Without an expression of the individual opinions of the members of
the committee, it must be said that with practical uniformity the
precedents in such cases are to the effect that the House will
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 567.
\2\ House Report No. 30.
Sec. 238
not expel a Member for reprehensible action prior to his election as a
Member, not even for conviction for an offense. On May 23, 1884,
Speaker Carlisle decided that the House had no right to punish a Member
for any offense alleged to have been committed previous to the time
when he was elected a Member, and added, ``That has been so frequently
decided in the House that it is no longer a matter of dispute.''
The committee, however, are just as strongly of the opinion that the
circumstances require action on the part of the House at the
appropriate time and agree that:
A more serious question arises, however, in the ease of Mr. Langley,
in that the House could not permit in its membership a person serving a
sentence for crime.
Such action, according to the report, is delayed only because of the
further custom of the House to defer final disposition of such cases
until passed upon by the court of last resort:
It is, however, again in accordance with precedent that final action
shall not be taken until a criminal charge has been disposed of in the
court of last resort.
The committee are informed that a petition for certiorari on behalf
of Mr. Langley has already been filed in the Supreme Court, seeking a
reversal of the conviction. There is every prospect of an early
disposition of this petition, and the committee recommend that no
action be taken at present. It is well known that Mr. Langley is not
participating in the proceedings of the House, and it is understood
that his resignation will be immediately presented in case of the
refusal of the petition for certiorari.
And the committee reserve the right to submit a further report if
occasion requires:
The committee do not ask at this time to be discharged from the
duties imposed upon them. If there should be unusual delay in action on
the petition for certiorari, or other circumstances arise which would
seem to require action, the committee desire leave to make a further
report to the House.
However, on January 11, 1926,\1\ Mr. Langley addressed to the Speaker
the following resignation:
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives.
My Dear Mr. Speaker: I hereby tender my resignation as a
Representative elect to the Sixty-ninth Congress from the tenth
Kentucky district, to take effect immediately. I would appear on the
floor and do this myself but for the state of my health and other
conditions. I am taking this action for two reasons:
First. The action of the Supreme Court in denying my application for
a writ of certiorari.
Second. I do not wish to cause my colleagues in the House any
embarrassment. Most of them have been my associates and warm, personal
friends, having served with many of them for nearly 20 years, and I am
glad to believe that, notwithstanding the unfortunate circumstances
which have recently surrounded me, they will have faith in the
reiteration which I now make of my absolute innocence of the charges
upon which my prosecution has been based, and that the day will yet
come when my complete vindication will follow.
Very respectfully.
John W. Langley.
A copy of the resignation was transmitted by the Speaker to the
Governor of the State of Kentucky, and on motion of Mr. Burton, by
unanimous consent, the committee was discharged.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Sixty-ninth Congress, Record, p. 1861.
Sec. 239
239. A proposition for the censure of a Senator was entertained as
priviledged.
A Senator who had employed an official of a manufacturing association
as a clerk in the formulation of a tariff bill was censured by the
Senate.
The introduction in official capacity to confidential committee
conferences of a representative of business organizations interested in
legislation under consideration was declared by resolution to be
contrary to senatorial ethics.
A Senator against whom a resolution of censure was pending addressed
the Senate without permission being asked or given.
On September 30, 1929,\1\ in the Senate, a subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, instructed by resolution,\2\ ``to inquire
into the activities of lobbying associations and lobbyists,'' reported:
Your committee, having had under consideration the matter of the
association of one Charles L. Eyanson, assistant to the president of
the Manufacturers Association of Connecticut (Inc.), with Hon. Hiram
Bingham, a Senator from that State, during the consideration by the
Finance Committee of the Senate and the majority members thereof of the
pending tariff bill and having completed that phase of its work, beg
leave to report as follows:
The Manufacturers Association of Connecticut (Inc.) is an
organization in the nature of a trade association, the purpose of which
is to promote the general interests of its members in their business,
manufacturing establishments of the State of Connecticut, including the
New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Co. Its business at Hartford,
Conn., is under the immediate supervision and direction of the said
Charles L. Eyanson under the president thereof, E. Kent Hubbard.
Eyanson is paid a salary of $10,000 per annum, by the association. He
came to Washington while the tariff bill referred to was under
consideration by the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives in the early part of the present year, and aided
members of the association in preparing arguments and data for
submission by them to the committee referred to.
Eyanson came to Washington to take position, in effect, as a clerk in
the office of Senator Bingham, in which he had a desk where he received
callers who came to consult with him or Senator Bingham or both. He
assembled material for the use of Senator Bingham in connection with
the hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance and attended the
hearings, occupying a seat from which he could communicate at any time
with Senator Bingham and aided him with suggestions while the hearings
were in progress. After the hearings were completed the majority
members went into secret session for the purpose of considering the
bill. At that time, at the direction of Senator Bingham, Eyanson was
sworn in as clerk of the Committee on Territories and Insular
Possessions, of which Senator Bingham was then and is now the chairman,
displacing one Henry M. Barry, who was told by Senator Bingham that his
salary would nevertheless continue. This course was purused, the
committee was told by Senator Bingham, that Eyanson might be ``subject
to the discipline of the Senate,'' the significance of the phrase being
left unexplained.
After Eyanson had thus been introduced into the secret meetings of
the majority members and had sat with them for some two or three days,
Senator Smoot, chairman of the committee, inquired of Senator Bingham
whether, Eyanson, was an officer or employee of the Manufacturers
Association of Connecticut, and being advised that he was, Senator
Bingham was told by Senator Smoot that objection had been made to
Eyanson's presence in the committee and intimated it would be better if
he did not longer attend. Senator Bingham then inquired as to the
attitude of other members of the committee and from the view thus
elicited reached the conclusion that
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ First session Seventy-first Congress, Senate Report No. 43.
\2\ Senate Resolution 20.
Sec. 239
Eyanson ought not longer to attend the meetings and he did not. Eyanson
drew his salary as clerk of the Committee on Territories and Insular
Possessions. At the end of his first months service as such he turned
the amount so received over in cash to Senator Bingham. The remainder
of his salary while he continued on the rolls he drew and turned over
to Mr. Barry, the whole amounting to $357.50.
After the departure of Eyanson from Washington on the completion of
his work here with Senator Bingham, the latter transmitted to him a
check for $1,000, which has never been cashed, the recipient having
determined tentatively on its receipt to return it personally rather
than by letter to Senator Bingham, but now remains undecided as to what
disposition he should make of the check.
On November 4, 1929,\1\ Mr. George W. Norris, of Nebraska, referred
to this report and offered the following resolution:
Resolved, That the action of the Senator from Connecticut, Mr.
Bingham, in placing Mr. Charles L. Eyanson upon the official rolls of
the Senate at the time and in the manner set forth in the report of the
subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary is contrary to good
morals and senatorial ethics and tends to bring the Senate into
dishonor and disrepute, and such conduct is hereby condemned.
A request that consideration of the resolution be delayed having been
submitted by Mr. Simeon D. Fess, of Ohio, the President pro tempore \2\
said:
The Chair is of the opinion that the resolution is privileged.
Request then being preferred by Mr. Fess that consideration of the
resolution be postponed until the following day, the President pro
tempore continued.
Although privileged, with the assent of the mover of the resolution,
it will go over one day.
On November 4,\3\ during consideration of the resolution in the
Senate, Mr. Bingham participated in the debate and thus analyzed the
issues raised by the pending resolution:
The resolution asks for the condemnation of my having placed Mr.
Eyanson, secretary to the president of the Connecticut Manufacturers'
Association, on the Senate rolls on three grounds: First, that it is
contrary to good morals; second, that is contrary to senatorial ethics;
and third, that it tends to damage the honor and reputation of the
Senate.
In the first place, it is claimed that the employment of Mr. Eyanson
was contrary to good morals. It is difficult, Mr. President, to know
exactly what is meant by this expression ``contrary to good morals``;
but if it means anything at all it must mean that there was something
in this employment which was immoral in the sense of being dishonorable
or corrupt. To this charge, Mr. President, I plead not guilty. There
was nothing in his employment which was dishonorable or corrupt. Not
one dollar of the public money was wasted. Not a single taxpayer's
dollar was employed for any sinister purpose. I did not profit to the
extent of one dollar by any part of this transaction. There was nothing
contrary to good morals.
Now, let us take the second point: It is claimed that his being
placed on the rolls of the Senate was contrary to senatorial ethics. It
is fair to assume, Mr. President, that the expression ``senatorial
ethics'' relates to what is considered by senatorial practice to be
right or wrong. Again, Mr. President, I plead not guilty.
Everyone in the Senate knows that to each Senator there are assigned
four clerkships. It may not be generally known to the public, but it is
known to every Senator that the Senator himself is considered the sole
judge as to the nature of the employment to which these clerks
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Record, p. 5131.
\2\ George H. Moses, of New Hampshire, President pro tempore.
\3\ Record p. 5063.
Sec. 239
should be put and the character of the persons appointed to those
positions. There is no restriction on who should be appointed or how he
or the shall be employed. That is the custom of the Senate. That is the
nature of senatorial ethics so far as these positions are concerned.
So far as I have been able to learn, according to senatorial ethics,
no official of the Government, no official of the Senate, no committee
of the Senate has ever held that a Senator was answerable as to whom he
appointed or as to how the clerk was used. In view of this fact, Mr.
President, I do not see how my placing of Mr. Eyanson on the rolls as
one of my four clerks can possibly be held to be contrary to senatorial
ethics.
The third charge, Mr. President, is that my action tends to bring the
Senate into dishonor and disrepute. In order for this action to bring
the Senate into dishonor and disrepute it must have had some sinister
motive and must have been directed against the interest of the people
of the United States.
Mr. President, I do not believe that those who have done me the honor
of listening to or of reading my previous statements will accuse me of
having had dishonorable or unpatriotic motives. My sole desire was to
secure the beat possible information on a difficult and intricate
subject, particularly as it related to the people who elected me to the
United States Senate.
My sole object, my sole purpose in placing Mr. Eyanson on the
official rolls of the Senate was so that I might be the better prepared
to present the case of my constituents in Connecticut, both employers
and employees, both producers and consumers; that I might be the better
prepared to meet in committee and on the floor of the Senate the
arguments of those who are opposed to a high protective tariff.
Mr. President, this was my motive. This was my sole object. In
carrying it out not a dollar of the public funds was misused. Nothing
dishonorable or disreputable was attempted. Nothing was done contrary
to good morals or to senatorial ethics.
Mr. Norris replied:
This is not a question of the vindication of the Senator from
Connecticut or of his condemnation. It is a question of the honor of
this body. No one has disputed the evidence; no one has contradicted
the facts which were brought out.
After extended debate an amendment disavowing any imputation of
corrupt motives was incorporated and the resolution was agreed to, yeas
54, nays 22, in the following form:
Resolved, That the action of the Senator from Connecticut, Mr.
Bingham, in placing Mr. Charles L. Eyanson upon the official rolls of
the Senate and his use by Senator Bingham at the time and in the manner
set forth in the report of the subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary (Rept. No. 43, 71st Cong., 1st sess.), while not the result
of corrupt motives on the part of the Senator from Connecticut, is
contrary to good morals and senatorial ethics and tends to bring the
Senate into dishonor and disrepute, and such conduct is hereby
condemned.