[House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House]
[Chapter 7. Budget Process]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office, www.gpo.gov]
CHAPTER 7
BUDGET PROCESS
HOUSE PRACTICE
Sec. 1. In General
Sec. 2. --Earlier Statutes
Sec. 3. --The Paygo/Cutgo Rule
Sec. 4. --The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Stat-Paygo)
Sec. 5. Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Sec. 6. The Budget Timetable
Sec. 7. Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Sec. 8. --Amendments to Budget Resolutions
Sec. 9. --Debate on Conference Reports
Sec. 10. --Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related
Legislation
Sec. 11. Reconciliation Procedures
Sec. 12. Adherence to Budget Resolution Spending and Revenue Levels
Sec. 13. Other Spending Controls
Sec. 14. --Sequestration
Sec. 15. --New Contract Authority; New Borrowing Authority
Sec. 16. --New Entitlement Authority
Sec. 17. Social Security Funds
Sec. 18. The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
Sec. 19. Impoundments Generally
Sec. 20. --Rescissions
Sec. 21. --Deferrals
Sec. 22. Unfunded Mandates
Sec. 23. Earmarks
Sec. 24. Recent Developments
Research References
Deschler Ch 41
Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21
Manual Sec. Sec. 169, 719, 748, 853, 990, 1068c, 1068f, 1129-
1130
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman)
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation
Act of 1987
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997
Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010
Budget Control Act of 2011
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
Sec. 1 . In General
There are three stages in the complex process by which the
Congress allocates the fiscal resources of the Federal government.
There is an authorization process, under which Federal programs are
created in response to national needs. There is an appropriations
process under which funding is provided for those programs. See
Appropriations. Finally, there is a congressional budget process that
annually establishes an overall fiscal policy of spending and revenues
and that institutes a complex web of procedures to enforce those
budgetary decisions. The overall fiscal policy is established by the
annual adoption of a concurrent resolution on the budget. The
congressional budget process sometimes includes the development and
consideration of reconciliation legislation to implement its most
significant budget policies. These three stages are not necessarily
considered or completed in chronological order.
The enforcement of budgetary decisions encompasses both
congressional and executive actions. Such enforcement is rooted
principally in three statutes--the Congressional Budget Act of 1974
(the Budget Act), the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 (Gramm-Rudman), and the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of
2010 (Stat-Paygo). Recent laws from 2011, 2013, and 2015, also provide
enforcement mechanisms for budgetary decisions. See Sec. 24, infra.
The Budget Act permits enforcement through parliamentary points of
order against legislation violating its requirements and procedures.
However, the enforcement mechanisms are not automatically applied and
timely points of order from the floor are required to bring them into
play. Gramm-Rudman made significant revisions to the Budget Act and
its budgetary control mechanisms. See Sec. 2, infra. Stat-Paygo
provides for a scorecard and a procedure that will result in
sequestration (automatic spending cuts) if the scorecard shows a
debit. The Budget Control Act of 2011 established a point of order if
discretionary spending caps are violated and provided sequestration
procedures.
Sec. 2 . --Earlier Statutes
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
Budget reform began with the passage of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921. That Act established a new budget system that permitted
all items relating to a department to be brought together in the same
bill; required the President to submit an annual national budget to
Congress in place of the previous uncoordinated agency submissions;
created the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to assist in this
respect; and established the General Accounting Office and made it the
principal auditing arm of the Federal government. 31 USC Sec. 1101.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Until 1974 Congress lacked a comprehensive, uniform mechanism for
establishing priorities among its budgetary goals and for determining
national economic policy regarding the Federal budget. Responsibility
for the budget remained fragmented throughout the Congress. The size
of the budget, and the size of the surplus or deficit, were not
subject to effective controls. To address these problems, the
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 was enacted.
Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21. The Act (2 USC Sec. 601) consisted of 10
titles that established:
New committees on the budget in both the House and the Senate,
and a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) designed to improve
Congress' informational and analytical resources with respect
to the budgetary process.
A timetable and controls for various phases of the
congressional budget process centered on a concurrent
resolution on the budget to be adopted before legislative
consideration of revenue or spending bills.
Various enforcement procedures and provided for program review
and evaluation.
Standardized budget terminology.
Procedures for congressional review of Presidential
impoundment actions.
Titles I through IX constitute the Congressional Budget Act of
1974 and title X constitutes the Impoundment Control Act. The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to title IV of the
Budget Act.
The central purpose of the process established by the Budget Act
is to coordinate the various revenue and spending decisions that are
made in separate tax, appropriations, and legislative measures.
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Gramm-Rudman) made further significant changes in the budget process,
and in the Budget Act procedures. 2 USC Sec. 900. Conceived as a
statutory response to the burgeoning Federal deficit, Gramm-Rudman
instituted a single binding concurrent resolution on the budget,
binding committee allocations, reconciliation (a process for
reconciling budgetary goals with current law), and enforcement of
spending through sequestration. Gramm-Rudman included provisions
amending the Budget Act to permit a new point of order against
legislation exceeding the appropriate committee allocation
(Sec. 302(f) of the Budget Act), exempting the title II Social
Security program from reconciliation (Sec. 310(g) of the Budget Act),
and precluding the breaching of budget authority or outlay ceilings or
revenue floors, with certain exceptions (Sec. 311 of the Budget Act).
Pursuant to section 275 of Gramm-Rudman, several provisions of Gramm-
Rudman expired on September 30, 2002, including two provisions
providing for sequestration to enforce discretionary spending
(Sec. 251) and deficit targets (Sec. 253). Some of these provisions
were revived by the Budget Control Act of 2011.
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990; Revisions and Extensions
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA of 1990) revised the
Gramm-Rudman deficit targets, made deficit targets adjustable, and
extended the sequestration process. It set limitations on distinct
categories of discretionary spending and created a paygo process that
would trigger a sequestration of funds should increases in direct
spending or decreases in revenues cause a net increase in the deficit
for a given year. Sec. Sec. 13-16, infra.
Budget Enforcement Act of 1997
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1997 (BEA of 1997) extended the
discretionary spending limits and paygo process through fiscal year
2002 and further changed the congressional budget process. For a more
detailed discussion of its revisions, see Budget Enforcement Act of
1997: Summary and Legislative History, CRS, Oct. 8, 1997.
Sec. 3 . --The Paygo/Cutgo Rule (clause 10 of rule XXI)
Generally
In the 112th Congress, the House created a procedure known as
``Cut-As-You-Go'' (cutgo) which permitted a point of order to be
raised against certain matters providing a net increase in mandatory
spending. The current rule was based on earlier procedures known as
``Pay-As-You-Go'' or paygo. At different times over the past three
decades, different procedures in the House have fallen under this
label. The term paygo was first used in law in section 252 of Gramm-
Rudman as part of a process that required that direct spending and
revenue legislation enacted into law be deficit neutral. The original
statutory paygo process, as noted above, was first instituted in 1990
and, while textually still in law, only applies to legislation enacted
prior to the end of the fiscal year 2002. Today the House operates
under another statutory paygo process (Stat-Paygo), enacted in 2010
(Pub. L. No. 111-139). See Sec. 4, infra. The House first adopted a
separate paygo rule providing a point of order against measures in the
110th Congress (clause 10 of rule XXI). That rule was converted in the
112th Congress to the current cutgo rule. For a more detailed
description of Stat-Paygo, see The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of
2010: Summary and Legislative History, CRS, Sept. 13, 2010. For more
on the former House paygo rule, see Manual Sec. 1068e for the 111th
Congress (H. Doc. 110-162).
The Cutgo Rule (clause 10 of rule XXI)
The House cutgo rule establishes a point of order against measures
that cause an increase in mandatory spending over a six- or eleven-
year time period. The effect of the measure is determined on the basis
of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget. 112-1, Jan. 26,
2011, pp 919, 920. The rule also provides special procedures when
evaluating measures that (1) are considered under a rule that directs
the Clerk to add the text of one measure to another after passage, or
(2) contain provisions designated as an emergency.
Definitions and Time Periods
The cutgo rule only addresses measures that affect mandatory
spending. The rule equates ``mandatory spending'' with ``direct
spending'' and uses the definition of direct spending found in section
250 of Gramm-Rudman with an exception for certain provisions in
appropriation Acts. The rule also uses the definitions of ``budget
year'' and ``current year'' found in section 250 of Gramm-Rudman (the
``budget year'' is the fiscal year that begins on October 1 of the
calendar year in which that session of Congress begins; the ``current
year'' is the fiscal year immediately preceding the budget year).
The rule provides both a six- and eleven-year time period in which
a measure may not increase mandatory spending. Specifically, the
measure may not increase mandatory spending for the period comprising
either: (1) the current year, the budget year, and the four years
following that budget year; or (2) the current year, the budget year,
and the nine years following that budget year.
Estimates
The effect of the measure on mandatory spending is based on
estimates provided by the Committee on the Budget. This is similar to
the authority vested in the Committee on the Budget by section 312 of
the Budget Act over estimates of levels of new budget authority,
outlays, direct spending, new entitlement authority, and revenues for
purposes of titles III and IV of the Budget Act. The Chair is
authoritatively guided by estimates from the Committee on the Budget
as to the net effect of a measure as compared to the proposition to
which it was offered. 112-1, Jan. 26, 2011, pp 919, 920. Pursuant to
clause 4 of rule XXIX, the Chair may obtain authoritative guidance
with respect to budgetary levels from the chair of the Committee on
the Budget.
Linking Measures
The rule provides for a special evaluation when a measure is being
considered under a special order of business that directs the Clerk to
add the text of one measure to another measure following passage.
Specifically, the rule provides that if a bill, joint resolution, or
amendment is considered pursuant to a special order of the House
directing the Clerk to add as new matter at the end of such measure
the entire text of a separate measure or measures as passed by the
House, the new matter shall be included in the evaluation of the bill,
joint resolution, or amendment. Clause 10(b) of rule XXI. See Special
Orders of Business.
Emergency Designations
The rule excludes provisions designated as emergencies in certain
measures from the cutgo evaluation. The rule specifically excludes a
provision designated as an emergency under Stat-Paygo in the case of a
point of order against: (1) a bill or joint resolution; (2) an
amendment made in order as original text by a special order of
business; (3) a conference report; or (4) an amendment between the
Houses. Clause 10(c)(1) of rule XXI. The rule also provides that in
the case of an amendment (other than an amendment made in order as
original text or an amendment between the Houses) the evaluation of
the Committee on the Budget shall give no cognizance to any
designation of emergency. Clause 10(c)(2) of rule XXI. This provision
creates a level playing field for amendments by requiring the
Committee on the Budget to evaluate amendments offered from the floor
(including those proposed in a motion to recommit) to the underlying
text as if both the amendment and the underlying text did not include
such emergency designations. For a discussion of the treatment of
emergency designations under the Budget Control Act of 2011, see
Sec. 24, infra.
Reconciliation Directives
Clause 7 of rule XXI provides that it is not in order to consider
a concurrent resolution on the budget, or an amendment thereto, or a
conference report thereon, that contains reconciliation directives
under section 310 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 that specify
changes in law that would cause an increase in net direct spending for
the period of the concurrent resolution on the budget.
Sec. 4 . --The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Stat-Paygo)
Generally
The Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010 (Pub. L. No. 111-139) was
enacted in 2010. That Act established a new budget enforcement
mechanism to require that new direct spending and revenue legislation
enacted into law not increase the deficit. Under this procedure, the
budgetary effects of direct spending and revenue legislation are
carried on paygo scorecards covering five- and ten-year periods. If at
the end of a congressional session a scorecard shows a net debit, the
President issues an order known as a ``sequestration order'' that
results in a largely across-the-board cut in certain programs equal to
the amount of the debit.
Section 4 of the Act establishes a procedure whereby budgetary
effects of certain measures for purposes of maintaining a paygo
scorecard are determined by Congress. This procedure permits the House
and Senate to include language in bill text to direct that the scoring
of a measure be determined by reference to an estimate submitted in
the Congressional Record by the chair of either the House or Senate
Committee on the Budget or both acting together in the case of a
conference report. If such language is not included, the budgetary
effects are determined by the Office of Management and Budget.
Section 4 of the Act provides that the provisions that are
designated as emergency requirements under the Act are not counted as
budgetary effects. The Act further provides that the Chair must put
the question of consideration with regard to each measure carrying an
emergency designation. See Question of Consideration. The question of
consideration is obviated when the House considers legislation
pursuant to a motion to suspend the rules. 113-2, July 30, 2014, p__.
Budgetary Effects Procedure
Stat-Paygo establishes a procedure where the budgetary effects of
legislation are determined by either the Congress or by the Office of
Management and Budget. The Act provides for congressional scoring to
be used if (1) specified legislative language is contained in the
measure and (2) a statement issued by the relevant chair of the
Committee on the Budget (or jointly by both chairs in the case of
amendments between the Houses and conference reports) has been printed
in the Congressional Record prior to the final vote on the measure.
The language required to be included in the measure is as follows:
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying
with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined by
reference to the latest statement titled `Budgetary Effects of paygo
Legislation' for this Act, submitted for printing in the
Congressional Record by the chair of the (House and/or Senate)
Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted
prior to the vote on passage (or in the House acting first on this
conference report or amendments between the Houses).
For examples of Congressional Record submissions to accompany the
textual reference, see 111-2, Feb. 25, 2010, pp 1952, 1953 (submission
with respect to a bill) and 111-2, May 28, 2010, p 9969 (submission
with respect to a House amendment to a Senate amendment). Any
deviation from the statutory formula in terms of content or timing
could result in the budgetary effects being measured by the Office of
Management and Budget rather than Congress.
Emergency Designations
Section 4 of the Act provides that a provision of direct spending
or revenue legislation may be designated as an emergency for purposes
of the Act. The budgetary effects of such a provision are not included
in the estimate provided under the Act by CBO or OMB, as applicable.
Sec. 4(g). The Act also provides that if an emergency designation
under the Act is included in a measure in the House, the Chair must
put the question of consideration on such measure. Sec. 4(g)(2).
Emergency designations are not counted as matter within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget for purposes of section
306 of the Budget Act. Sec. 4(a)(4). The Budget Control Act of 2011
provides a separate treatment for emergency designations and motions
to strike such designations. See Sec. 24, infra.
Sec. 5 . Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Committee on the Budget Jurisdiction
To implement the congressional budget process, the Budget Act
created the Senate and House Budget Committees and CBO. 2 USC
Sec. 601. The Budget Committees were authorized to draft the
concurrent resolution on the budget. Unlike the authorizing and
appropriating committees, which focus on individual Federal programs,
the Budget Committees focus on the Federal budget as a whole and on
how it affects the national economy.
Clause 1(d) of rule X gives the Committee on the Budget
jurisdiction over matters relating to the congressional budget,
including concurrent resolutions on the budget and measures on budget
process and on the enforcement of budget controls. Manual Sec. 719.
Section 310 of the Budget Act provides conditions for the reporting by
the Budget Committees of reconciliation measures.
Section 306 of the Budget Act prohibits the consideration in
either House of a bill or resolution dealing with a matter within the
jurisdiction of its Committee on the Budget if not reported from that
committee or discharged therefrom. The following were held to violate
this section:
An amendment directing that certain lease-purchase agreements
be scored on an annual basis for budget purposes. Deschler-
Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 16.2.
An amendment designating an appropriation as ``emergency
spending'' within the meaning of the budget-enforcement laws.
Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 16.1.
An emergency designation under Stat-Paygo does not constitute
matter within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Budget for
purposes of section 306 enforcement. The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013
amended section 306 of the Budget Act to clarify that its prohibition
with regard to resolutions applied to joint resolutions only (as well
as amendments thereto and conference reports thereon). Pub. L. No.
113-67. This amendment to the Budget Act codified an implementation of
section 306 that had been carried as a separate order of the House
since the 107th Congress. See, e.g., 107-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2001, p
26.
Committee on Rules Jurisdiction
The Committee on Rules has the special oversight function of
review of the budget process. Clause 3(j) of rule X. Under section
301(c) of the Budget Act, the Speaker must refer a concurrent
resolution on the budget reported from the Committee on the Budget
sequentially to the Committee on Rules for not more than five
legislative days if it includes any procedure or matter having the
effect of changing a rule of the House. After such a referral, an
additional one-day layover follows the report of the Committee on
Rules. Sec. 305(a)(1) of the Budget Act. In modern practice, this
sequential referral is obviated in favor of the review by the
Committee on Rules when reporting a special order of business
governing consideration of the budget resolution. This process allows
the Committee on Rules to review suggested rules changes. In the 108th
Congress, composition of the Committee on the Budget was changed to
include one member of the Committee on Rules. Clause 5(a)(2) of rule
X.
Committee Reports; Cost Estimates and Scorekeeping
CBO provides economic and programmatic analyses and cost
information on most reported public bills and resolutions. Under the
Budget Act, five-year cost estimates are prepared and published in the
reports accompanying these bills. Sec. Sec. 308(a)(1)(B), 402 of the
Budget Act. Committees are separately required to include an estimate
of the costs incurred in carrying out the bill or joint resolution in
the fiscal year it is reported and in each of the five following
fiscal years (which may be satisfied by including a section 402
estimate). A committee cost estimate identifying certain spending
authority as recurring annually and indefinitely was held necessarily
to address the five-year period required by this section. Deschler-
Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 7.1.
Committee reports on legislation providing new budget authority or
a change in revenues or tax expenditures are required to contain the
estimates and other detailed information mandated by section 308(a) of
the Budget Act. The information mandated by section 308(a) also is
required under clause 3(c)(2) of rule XIII, except that the estimates
with respect to new budget authority must include, when practicable, a
comparison of the total estimated funding level for the relevant
program (or programs) to the appropriate levels under current law.
Manual Sec. 840.
If a measure is reported without an estimate of its cost, a point
of order under clauses 3(c)(2) (requiring that an estimate under
section 308 of the Budget Act be included in the report) and 3(d)(1)
of rule XIII may be made against consideration of the measure. If the
report fails to include an estimate under section 402 of the Budget
Act timely submitted by CBO, a point of order under clause 3(c)(3) of
rule XIII may be made against consideration of the measure. However, a
special order of business for the consideration of a bill that ``self-
executes'' the adoption of an amendment providing new budget authority
into a bill to be subsequently considered does not, itself, provide
new budget authority within the meaning of section 308 of the Budget
Act (so as to require a report by the Committee on Rules to include
such a cost estimate). Manual Sec. 1127. The Committee on the Budget
has certain scorekeeping responsibilities under section 312 of the
Budget Act, the House cutgo rule, and Stat-Paygo.
The Director of CBO is required to issue to all committees of the
House and the Senate monthly reports detailing and tabulating the
progress of congressional action on specified bills and resolutions.
Sec. 308(b)(1) of the Budget Act. The Budget Committees of each House
are required to prepare budget ``scorekeeping'' reports and to make
them available frequently enough to provide Members of each House with
an accurate representation of the current status of congressional
consideration of the budget. Sec. 308(b)(2) of the Budget Act.
In the 114th Congress, clause 8 was added to rule XIII to provide
that cost estimates for major legislation prepared by the
Congressional Budget Office and the Joint Committee on Taxation shall,
to the extent practicable, incorporate the budgetary effects of
macroeconomic variables resulting from such legislation. Manual
Sec. 868a. This requirement replaced a former requirement that
macroeconomic impact analyses be included in certain committee reports
from the Committee on Ways and Means. Manual Sec. 849a.
For a discussion of committee allocations, see Sec. 12, infra.
Sec. 6 . The Budget Timetable
Section 300 of the Budget Act includes a nonmandatory timetable
for various stages of the congressional budget process:
On or before first Monday in February--President submits a
budget to Congress
Note: Additional time for submission of the President's budget can
be provided by law. Shortly after its submission, the two Budget
Committees begin hearings on the budget, the economic assumptions upon
which it is based, the economy in general, and national budget
priorities.
On or before February 15--CBO submits annual report to the
Budget Committees
Note: This report deals primarily with overall economic and fiscal
policy and alternative budget levels and national budget priorities.
Not later than six weeks after President submits a budget--
committees submit views and estimates to Budget Committees
Note: These reports provide the Budget Committees with an early
and comprehensive indication of committee legislative planning. These
reports include estimates of new budget authority and outlays.
On or before April 1--Senate Budget Committee reports
concurrent resolution
On or before April 15--Congress completes action on concurrent
resolution on the budget
Note: Congress may revise its budget resolution before the end of
the appropriate fiscal year (Sec. 304 of the Budget Act); although
this may be done at any point, the Congress in some years has followed
the practice of revising the budget plan for the current fiscal year
as part of the budget resolution for the ensuing fiscal year.
May 15--Annual appropriation bills may be considered in the
House
Note: General appropriation bills, and amendments thereto, may be
considered in the House after May 15 even if a budget resolution for
the ensuing fiscal year has yet to be agreed to. Sec. 303(b)(2) of the
Budget Act.
On or before June 10--House Committee on Appropriations
reports last annual appropriation bill
June 15--Congress completes action on reconciliation
legislation
Note: The mandatory June 15 deadline was repealed by the BEA of
1990. However, the Congress may not adjourn for more than three
calendar days during the month of July until the House has completed
action on reconciliation legislation (Sec. 310(f) of the Budget Act)
and the annual appropriation bills (Sec. 309 of the Budget Act).
On or before June 30--House completes action on annual
appropriation bills
October 1--Fiscal year begins
Note: The fiscal year begins on October 1 and ends on September
30. If action on appropriation bills has not been completed by October
1, a ``continuing resolution'' may be enacted to provide
appropriations on a temporary basis until the regular appropriation
bills are enacted.
Deadlines for other stages in the budget process, such as
notification of adjustment in maximum deficit amounts, the President's
mid-session budget review, and various CBO and OMB sequestration
reports, were provided for in section 254(a) of Gramm-Rudman. Other
than October 1 (beginning of new fiscal year), the dates established
in section 300 are targets to be met each year. Failure to meet the
targets does not inhibit consideration of measures beyond those dates.
Under clause 2(d) of rule X, each standing committee (other than
the Committees on Appropriations, Ethics, and Rules) must submit its
authorization and oversight plan for the Congress to the Committees on
Oversight and Government Reform, House Administration, and
Appropriations by February 15 of the first session. These plans must
be reported to the House by the Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform by March 31 of the session. Clause 2(d) of rule X.
Sec. 7 . Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Generally
The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution; as such it is
not a law. It serves as an internal framework for Congress in its
action on separate revenue, spending, and other budget-related
measures. The content of budget resolutions and accompanying reports
is governed by section 301 of the Budget Act. Budget resolutions set
forth budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year and for at least
the four succeeding fiscal years, including amounts for total spending
and total revenues. The budget resolution gives the Congress a
mechanism for establishing Federal spending priorities. The budget
resolution accomplishes this by dividing up Federal spending among
various ``major functional categories,'' such as national defense,
agriculture, and health. Manual Sec. 1127.
Section 301(b)(4) of the Budget Act permits a concurrent
resolution on the budget to ``set forth such other matters, and
require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may be
appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'' This provision
is sometimes referred to as the ``elastic clause.'' Textually, the
``other matters'' and ``procedures'' admitted by this section must:
(1) relate to the budget; and (2) be appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the Budget Act.
Consideration of Budget Resolutions
A concurrent resolution on the budget that has been reported as
privileged pursuant to clause 5(a) of rule XIII is privileged for
consideration under procedures set forth in section 305 of the Budget
Act, but those procedures do not apply to unreported budget
resolutions. 98-2, Apr. 5, 1984, pp 7992, 7993. The House may vary the
parameters of consideration by unanimous consent, by suspension of the
rules, or by adoption of a special order of business, because the
statutory provisions concerned were enacted as exercises of the
rulemaking powers of the House under the Constitution. Sec. 904(a) of
the Budget Act. It is customary for the House to vary the parameters
for consideration of a budget resolution by adopting a special order
of business recommended by the Committee on Rules. Such rules have
permitted only designated amendments in the nature of substitutes, and
perfecting amendments have been precluded. See, e.g., 103-2, H. Res.
384, Mar. 10, 1994, p 4346; 107-1, H. Res. 100, Mar. 28, 2001, p 4758;
111-1, H. Res. 305, Apr. 1, 2009, p 9515.
Section 305(a)(1) of the Budget Act requires a three-day layover
period that starts when the report on the resolution first becomes
available. Clause 4(a) of rule XIII. Section 305(a) of the Budget Act
also provides for consideration in the Committee of the Whole; limits
general debate to not more than ten hours, with up to an additional
four hours permitted on economic goals and policies; and provides for
consideration of amendments under the five-minute rule. Sec. 8, infra.
After the Committee of the Whole rises and reports the resolution back
to the House, the previous question is considered as ordered on the
resolution and any amendments thereto to adoption without intervening
motion. Neither a motion to recommit the resolution nor a motion to
reconsider is in order. Sec. 305(a)(2)-(5) of the Budget Act. The yeas
and nays are required to be put on the question of adoption of a
concurrent resolution on the budget. Clause 10 of rule XX.
A budget resolution being considered in Committee of the Whole has
been held subject to a motion to rise and report the resolution back
to the House with the recommendation that the resolving clause be
stricken. 103-1, Mar. 18, 1993, p 5658.
The question of adoption of a budget resolution may under some
circumstances be divided so as to permit a separate vote on particular
sections therein. Manual Sec. 921. The question of adoption of a
budget resolution containing one section revising the congressional
budget for the fiscal year, preceded by sections setting forth budget
targets for ensuing fiscal years as well as reconciliation
instructions, and followed by a final section on reporting of certain
fiscal information, was divided on the demand of a Member for two
separate votes (1) on the first and final portions of the resolution
and then (2) on the separable section in between. Deschler-Brown-
Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 5.18. The rule providing for the
consideration of a budget resolution normally precludes a demand for a
division on the question of its adoption. See, e.g., 107-1, H. Res.
100, Mar. 28, 2001, p 4758.
In the 113th and 114th Congresses, the House adopted a separate
order (contained in the resolution adopting the standing rules) that
created a point of order against any budget resolution, amendment
thereto, or conference report thereon, that did not contain certain
information regarding ``means-tested'' and ``nonmeans-tested'' direct
spending programs. 113-1, Jan. 3, 2013, p__; 114-1, Jan. 6, 2015, p__.
Sec. 8 . --Amendments to Budget Resolutions
Generally
Under section 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, amendments to budget
resolutions are considered in the Committee of the Whole under the
five-minute rule in accordance with rule XVIII. Under clause 10 of
rule XVIII, the resolution is open to amendment at any point, so that
the Committee of the Whole may amend the functional categories section
before consideration of the total budget allocations. Manual
Sec. 1127. As stated above, a special order of business resolution
from the Committee on Rules typically structures the amendment
process.
Amendments to Achieve Mathematical Consistency
Clause 10 of rule XVIII requires, with certain exceptions, that
amendments to concurrent resolutions on the budget be mathematically
consistent. Under this rule, amendments making changes in budget
authority and outlay aggregate totals must be accompanied by
comparable changes in functional categories. A point of order will lie
against an amendment to the resolution increasing the aggregates and a
functional category for budget authority and outlays but not changing
the amount of the deficit. However, an amendment that only transfers
an amount of budget authority from one functional category to
another--that is, reduces one category by a certain amount and adds
the same amount to another category--need make no changes in the
aggregates to achieve mathematical consistency. 96-1, May 8, 1979, p
10271.
An amendment to achieve mathematical consistency throughout the
resolution may either change the functional categories to conform with
the aggregates, or vice versa, and if such an amendment is offered and
rejected, another amendment in different form to achieve mathematical
consistency may be offered. 96-1, May 14, 1979, pp 10967-75. Under
section 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, an amendment or amendments to
achieve mathematical consistency can be offered at any time up to
adoption.
A change in the public debt limit from that figure reported by the
Committee on the Budget is not in order, except as part of an
amendment offered at the direction of the Committee on the Budget to
achieve mathematical consistency. Clause 10 of rule XVIII. For more on
the public debt limit, see Sec. 18, infra.
Germaneness
Unless protected by a special order of business, an amendment to a
concurrent resolution on the budget must be germane to the text of the
resolution. An amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the
Impoundment Control Act be repealed for a fiscal year and calling for
a review of the Budget Act and the budget process was conceded to be
not germane to a particular budget resolution. 96-2, Nov. 18, 1980, p
30026. However, in recent years, budget resolutions have tended to
include more statements of policy, thus expanding the range of policy
amendments that may be germane.
Sec. 9 . --Debate on Conference Reports
Unless limited by a special order of business, there can be up to
five hours of debate in the House on a conference report on a
concurrent resolution on the budget under section 305(a)(6) of the
Budget Act, to be equally divided between the majority and minority
parties. Where the conferees report in total disagreement, debate on
the motion to dispose of the amendment in disagreement is not governed
by the statute and is instead considered under the general ``hour''
rule in the House. See, e.g., 95-2, May 17, 1978, p 14117. Under
section 305(a)(6) of the Budget Act, neither a motion to recommit nor
a motion to reconsider is available on a conference report.
Sec. 10 . --Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related
Legislation
Section 303 of the Budget Act precludes consideration of certain
budget-related legislation for a fiscal year until the budget
resolution for that year has been adopted by both Houses. The essence
of this section is timing. It reflects a judgment that legislative
decisions on expenditures and revenues for the coming fiscal year
should await the adoption of the budget resolution for that year. 101-
2, July 25, 1990, p 19161. Legislation ruled out under section 303 has
included:
A conference report containing new spending authority in the
form of entitlements to become effective in fiscal years 1978
through 1980, where the concurrent resolution on the budget for
those fiscal years had not yet been adopted. Manual Sec. 1127.
An amendment providing new entitlement authority to become
effective in a fiscal year before adoption of the budget
resolution for that year. Manual Sec. 1127.
An amendment providing new budget authority for a fiscal year,
before adoption of a budget resolution for that year. Manual
Sec. 1127.
A motion to recommit proposing an amendment providing an
increase in revenues for a fiscal year before adoption of a
budget resolution for that year. Deschler-Brown-Johnson-
Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 9.6.
While section 303 provides that a point of order lies only against
a bill or joint resolution that has been reported (Sec. 303(b)(3) of
the Budget Act), clause 8 of rule XXI provides that title III of the
Budget Act operates without regard to whether the measure concerned
has been reported.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 amended section 315 of the
Budget Act to provide that section 303 points of order would be
enforced against a reported bill or joint resolution considered under
a special order of business on the basis of the text made in order as
an original bill or joint resolution (or the text on which the
previous question is ordered directly to final passage). Pub. L. No.
113-67. This amendment to the Budget Act codified an application of
section 303 that had been carried as a separate order of the House
since the 106th Congress. See, e.g., 106-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p
47.
Waivers of section 303 have been provided pursuant to a special
order of business from the Committee on Rules. See Sec. 4, supra.
Section 303 does not apply after April 15 if the measure would not
increase the deficit or lower revenues below the aggregate level of
Federal revenues set forth in the concurrent resolution on the budget.
Sec. 302(g) of the Budget Act.
Sec. 11 . Reconciliation Procedures
Sections 301(b)(2) and 310 of the Budget Act provide for the
inclusion of reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution and
for the reporting and consideration of reconciliation legislation.
Reconciliation instructions direct committees to recommend changes in
existing law to achieve the goals in spending or revenues contemplated
by the budget resolution. If reconciliation instructs more than one
committee in each House, then all committees instructed are to submit
their recommendations to their respective Budget Committees. The
Budget Committees then assemble, without substantive revision, all the
recommendations into one bill for action by the House or Senate.
Sec. 310 of the Budget Act. Reconciliation instructions may
contemplate several reconciliation bills, including a bill that
reduces revenues. See, e.g., 104-2, May 21, 1996, p 11939-41 (decision
of Chair sustained on appeal in the Senate); 106-1, H. Con. Res. 68,
Mar. 25, 1999, pp 5754, 5755 (House adoption of budget resolution).
Section 310 provides expedited consideration in both Houses of
reconciliation legislation, provided the reconciliation bill has been
reported as privileged pursuant to clause 5(a) of rule XIII. However,
it is customary for the House to vary the parameters for consideration
of a reconciliation bill by adopting a special order of business
resolution recommended by the Committee on Rules. See, e.g., 107-1, H.
Res. 142, May 16, 2001, p 8191. Clause 7 of rule XXI provides a point
of order against reconciliation instructions that cause a net increase
in direct spending.
Section 310(c)(1)(A) of the Budget Act permits committees, in
meeting their reconciliation targets, to alternatively substitute
revenue and spending changes by up to 20 percent of the sum of the
absolute value of reconciled changes as long as the result does not
increase the deficit relative to the reconciliation instructions.
Section 310(d) of the Budget Act requires that amendments offered to
reconciliation legislation in either the House or the Senate must not
increase the level of deficit (if any) in the resolution. Section 313
of the Budget Act addresses the subject of ``extraneous'' material in
a reconciliation bill--the so-called ``Byrd Rule.'' The enforcement of
this section applies only in the Senate but can be directed against
matter originating in the House.
Sec. 12 . Adherence to Budget Resolution Spending and Revenue Levels
The various parliamentary enforcement mechanisms established in
the Budget Act--those sections establishing points of order against
consideration of certain propositions--constitute rules of the House
and, as such, are liable to waiver by unanimous consent, by suspension
of the rules, or by adoption of a special order of business. It is not
unusual for the House to waive such a point of order by adopting a
special order of business resolution recommended by the Committee on
Rules.
Adherence to Total Spending and Revenue Levels (Sec. 311(a) of the
Budget Act)
With certain exceptions, section 311(a) of the Budget Act
precludes specified measures--including amendments and conference
reports--that would cause total budget authority or total outlays to
exceed, or total revenues to be below, the level set forth in the
budget resolution. The provision is enforced by points of order
against the consideration of reported measures that would breach the
``appropriate levels'' of total new budget authority or total outlays
or total revenues in the budget resolution. The point of order must be
timely raised and is not in order after debate on a measure has begun.
113-2, July 11, 2014, p__.
The Chair has sustained points of order under section 311(a) of
the Budget Act in the following instances:
An amendment striking a rescission of existing budget
authority where its effect would be to increase the net new
budget authority in the bill in breach of the applicable total.
97-1, May 12, 1981, p 9314.
An amendment reducing revenues for the fiscal year below the
total level of revenues contained in the concurrent resolution
on the budget for that year. See 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-
57.
A motion to amend a Senate amendment providing new budget
authority for official mail costs to be available immediately
where the applicable total of new budget authority contained in
the budget resolution had already been exceeded and where the
Committee on Appropriations had exceeded its section 302(a)
allocation (thereby rendering the section 311(c) exception
inapplicable). 101-1, Sept. 28, 1989, p 22267.
``Deemers''
The House has adopted resolutions to ``deem'' budget parameters to
be in place for temporary enforcement. These ``deemers'' have
typically been carried in either a special order of business reported
from the Committee on Rules or as a separate order in an opening-day
resolution adopting the standing rules for a Congress. See Deschler-
Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 17; 111-2, H. Res. 1493, July 1,
2010, pp 12571, 12572, 12587; 113-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2013, p__;
113-1, H. Res. 243, June 4, 2013, p__; 113-2, H. Res. 557, Apr. 30,
2014, p__; 114-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 2015, p__; 114-1, H. Res. 223,
Apr. 29, 2015, p__. These resolutions often empower the chair of the
Committee on the Budget to place allocations in the Congressional
Record that are ``deemed'' in place for purposes of enforcing the
Budget Act. See, e.g., 106-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 6, 1999, p 47; 112-1, H.
Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p 80; 112-1, H. Res. 38, Jan. 25, 2011, p 627.
Committee Allocations (Sec. 302 of the Budget Act)
Section 302(a) of the Budget Act provides for an allocation to
each committee of ``appropriate levels'' of new budget authority and
outlays, which are published in the joint statement of managers
accompanying a conference report on the budget resolution.
Each committee is allocated an overall level for discretionary
spending that is consistent with the congressional budget plan. Under
section 302(b) of the Budget Act, the Committee on Appropriations of
each House then subdivides its allocations among its subcommittees.
After the Committee on Appropriations has received a 302(a)
allocation, section 302(c) of the Budget Act precludes consideration
of an appropriation measure until that committee has made its
suballocation under section 302(b). Points of order under section
302(c) apply separately to the consideration of bills and amendments.
Thus, a waiver of points of order against consideration of an
appropriation bill before filing of a report from the Committee on
Appropriations allocating new budget authority among its subcommittees
does not extend to an amendment providing new budget authority in
addition to the amounts contained in the bill. Deschler-Brown-Johnson-
Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. Sec. 11.25, 11.26.
Any Member may raise a point of order under section 302(f) of the
Budget Act against a bill, amendment, or conference report that would
exceed the relevant committee allocation. An amendment that provides
no new budget authority or outlays but instead results in outlay
savings is not subject to a point of order under these provisions.
100-1, June 30, 1987, p 18308. The Chair has sustained points of order
under section 302(f) of the Budget Act in the following instances:
An amendment to a general appropriation bill increasing the
level of new discretionary budget authority in excess of the
relevant allocation under 302(b) of the Budget Act. 108-1, July
25, 2003, p 19722-24; 109-2, June 27, 2006, p 12802.
An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to
strike a provision scored as negative budget authority and thus
providing new budget authority in excess of the relevant
allocation under section 302(b) of the Budget Act. Deschler-
Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 11.12.
An amendment to a general appropriation bill offsetting an
increase in the level of discretionary budget authority with a
decrease in an account designated as ``emergency spending,''
such designation rendering that account invisible under the
Budget Act and thus unavailable for an offsetting transfer.
Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 11.7.
An amendment to a general appropriation bill proposing to
strike a provision stating that a specified increment of new
discretionary budget authority provided by the bill would
``become available for obligation only upon the enactment of
future appropriations legislation,'' thus causing the bill to
provide additional new discretionary budget authority in that
incremental amount in excess of the relevant 302(b) allocation.
Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 11.10.
A motion to commit a bill with instructions proposing to
provide new budget authority in excess of the relevant 302(a)
allocation. Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41 Sec. 11.17.
A motion to recommit a bill with instructions proposing to
provide new budget authority in excess of the relevant 302(a)
allocation. Deschler-Brown-Johnson-Sullivan Ch 41
Sec. Sec. 11.16, 11.18.
An amendment to a general appropriation bill transferring
amounts between two separate 302(b) allocations of the same
subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, thus causing a
breach of one of the allocations. 112-2, July 18, 2012, p__.
In the 109th Congress, the House adopted a resolution creating a
point of order against a motion to rise and report an appropriation
bill that exceeded an applicable allocation of new budget authority
under section 302(b) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Such a
point of order has been carried forward in subsequent Congresses by
separate order contained in the opening-day rules package. Manual
Sec. 1044b.
The Section 311(c) Exception
As noted above, section 311(a) of the Budget Act precludes
Congress from considering legislation that would cause total revenues
to fall below, or total new budget authority or total outlays to
exceed, the appropriate level set forth in the budget resolution.
However, section 311(a) does not apply in the House to legislation
that provides new budget authority if the committee reporting the
measure has stayed within its section 302(a) allocation of new budget
authority. See Sec. 311(c) of the Budget Act. Accordingly, for the
purposes of section 311, the House may take up any measure providing
new budget authority that is within the appropriate committee
allocations, even if it would cause total spending to be exceeded.
Emergency Spending
In prior years, Congress used a variety of mechanisms to exempt
spending designated as emergency spending from constraints imposed by
the Budget Act. For example, an amount designated as an emergency
might be rendered ``invisible'' and not taken into account for certain
Budget Act purposes, as under section 606(d) (now repealed). Under
other procedures, automatic adjustments in budget levels and committee
allocations would be triggered to account for amounts designated as
emergencies, as under section 314 (now revised).
The Budget Control Act of 2011 provided for new treatment in the
House for provisions containing amounts designated as an emergency and
made substantial changes to the operation of section 314 of the Budget
Act. See Sec. 24, infra. In addition, emergency spending is sometimes
governed by provisions in the concurrent resolution on the budget.
Finally, emergency designations are also accorded special treatment
under clause 10 of rule XXI and Stat-Paygo. See Sec. Sec. 3, 4, supra.
For restrictions on ``commingling'' emergency designations, see
clause 2(e) of rule XXI.
Chair Guided by Committee on the Budget Estimates
When the Chair decides questions of order under titles III and IV
of the Budget Act, section 312(a) of the Budget Act requires the
reliance on estimates provided by the Committee on the Budget in
determining levels of new budget authority, outlays, direct spending,
new entitlement authority, and revenues for a fiscal year. See, e.g.,
106-2, June 8, 2000, pp 9940-3. Under clause 4 of rule XXIX, such
estimates may be provided to the Chair by the chair of the Committee
on the Budget. Manual Sec. 1105b.
Sec. 13 . Other Spending Controls
Generally
The House has frequently made use of separate orders, applicable
for the instant Congress only, that provide mechanisms for budgetary
enforcement. Such separate orders may be contained in a simple
resolution of the House, in a separate section of the resolution
adopting the standing rules at the beginning of a Congress, or in a
separate section of the concurrent resolution on the budget. For
example, the House has established a point of order against a measure
that provides advance appropriations or would cause discretionary
advance appropriations to exceed a certain level. See, e.g., 106-1, H.
Con. Res. 83, May 8, 2001, p 7364; 112-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p
80; 115-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p__. The House has also
established points of order against measures that would increase
mandatory or direct spending above a certain level. 112-1, H. Res. 5,
Jan. 5, 2011, p 82; 115-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p__.
For a detailed explanation of deficit targets, discretionary
spending limits, and paygo processes, see Introduction to the Federal
Budget Process, CRS, Dec. 3, 2012.
Land Conveyances
In the 115th Congress, the House (by separate order) provided that
any measure requiring or authorizing a conveyance of Federal land
shall not be considered as providing new budget authority, decreasing
revenues, increasing mandatory spending, or increasing outlays. 115-1,
H. Res. 5, Jan. 3, 2017, p__.
Sec. 14 . --Sequestration
Sequestration (an automatic spending reduction process) involves
the issuance of a Presidential order that permanently cancels
budgetary authority (except for special funds and trust funds) for the
purpose of achieving a required amount of outlay savings. Currently,
sequestration authority is provided by Stat-Paygo and the Budget
Control Act of 2011. Pursuant to Stat-Paygo, the budgetary effects of
direct spending and revenue legislation are carried on scorecards
covering five- and ten-year periods. The President is required to
issue a sequestration order (prepared by OMB) if, at the end of a
congressional session, either scorecard shows a net debit. The
sequestration order results in a largely across-the-board cut equal to
the amount of the debit, the specifics of which can be found in
section 6 of Stat-Paygo.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 established annual discretionary
spending limits for security and non-security spending for a ten-year
period. The Act also mandated sequestration procedures to eliminate a
breach in either category. The Act also established a point of order
in section 314 of the Congressional Budget Act against any bill, joint
resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report that would cause
the discretionary spending caps to be exceeded.
Direct Spending
A conventional authorization establishes or continues a government
agency or program. Although it may limit the amount of budget
authority that may be appropriated for that purpose, the authorized
funds are available only to the extent provided for in appropriation
Acts originated by the Committee on Appropriations. Deschler Ch 25
Sec. 2.13; see Appropriations. Spending legislation that circumvents
the appropriations process is called ``direct spending'' (sometimes
referred to as ``mandatory spending''). Under clause 10 of rule XXI,
direct spending includes spending described in section 250(c)(8) of
Gramm-Rudman (budget authority provided by law other than
appropriation Acts, entitlement authority, and the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program) and, additionally, provisions in
appropriation Acts that make outyear modifications to substantive law
as described in section 3(4)(C) of Stat-Paygo.
Sec. 15 . --New Contract Authority; New Borrowing Authority
New budget authority provided by law other than appropriation Acts
may take the form of new contract authority or new authority to incur
indebtedness (often referred to as ``borrowing authority'').
With certain exceptions, section 401(a) of the Budget Act requires
new contract authority and new authority to incur indebtedness to be
effective only as provided in appropriation Acts. The various
authorities referred to in section 401(a) of the Budget Act do not
apply to bills that provide legislative authorizations that are
subject to the appropriations process. Whether or not an amendment to
a pending measure violates section 401(a) of the Budget Act is
determined by its marginal effect on the pending measure (rather than
current law). See 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p 7183.
Sec. 16 . --Entitlement Authority
Section 401(b) of the Budget Act precludes ``new entitlement
authority'' that becomes effective during the current fiscal year.
Entitlement authority is the authority to make payments to a person or
government under a provision of law that obligates the United States
to make such payments to those who meet the requirements established
by that law, including the food stamp program. Sec. 3(9) of the Budget
Act; Manual Sec. 1127. The Chair contemplates immediate enactment to
determine when an entitlement takes effect. Manual Sec. 1127.
The following examples have been held to provide new entitlement
authority within the meaning of the Budget Act:
A conference report requiring the Secretary of Agriculture to
pay a cost of transporting agricultural commodities to major
disaster areas.
A Senate amendment requiring the Secretary of Labor to certify
a new group of workers as eligible for adjustment assistance
under the Trade Act of 1974.
An amendment enlarging the class of persons eligible for a
government subsidy.
Manual Sec. 1127.
The following examples have been held not to provide new
entitlement authority within the meaning of the Budget Act:
A provision requiring payments to individuals meeting certain
qualifications but also requiring such payments to be ratably
reduced to the amounts of appropriations actually made if sums
appropriated pursuant thereto are insufficient.
An amendment establishing a new executive position at a
specified compensation level but subjecting its salary to the
appropriation process.
Manual Sec. 1127.
In recent Congresses, the House has adopted an order of the House
excluding Federal compensation from the definition of entitlement
authority. See, e.g., 112-1, H. Res. 5, Jan. 5, 2011, p 80. The
Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 amended section 401 of the Budget Act to
codify this exclusion. Pub. L. No. 113-67.
Points of Order under Section 401 of the Budget Act
A point of order under section 401 lies against a reported bill or
joint resolution and not against an unreported measure. Manual
Sec. 1127. The spending authorities subject to constraints under
section 401, as forms of direct spending, are also subject to the
spending constraints on new budget authority under sections 302(f),
303, and 311(a) of the Budget Act.
Sec. 17 . Social Security Funds
Under section 13301 of the BEA of 1990, receipts and disbursements
of the Social Security trust funds are not to be counted as new budget
authority, outlays, receipts, or as deficit or surplus. The off-budget
status of these programs applies for purposes of the President's
budget, the congressional budget, and under Gramm-Rudman. Manual
Sec. 1129. In the 112th Congress, this section was effectively waived
by a separate order requiring discretionary administrative expenses of
the Social Security Administration be included in a section 302(a)
allocation. 112-1, Jan. 5, 2011, p 80. Section 13302 of the BEA of
1990 creates a ``fire wall'' point of order in the House to prohibit
the consideration of legislation that would change certain balances of
the Social Security trust funds over specified periods. Manual
Sec. 1129.
Section 310(g) of the Budget Act prohibits the consideration of
reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations with respect
to the title II program under the Social Security Act (OASDI). In the
114th and 115th Congresses, the House adopted a separate order
prohibiting the consideration of measures that would reduce the
actuarial balance of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust
Fund by a certain percentage. 115-1, Jan. 3, 2017, p__; 114-1, Jan. 6,
2015, p__.
Sec. 18 . The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
A limit on the public debt is fixed by law. 31 USC Sec. 3101. The
public debt limit may be changed by enactment of a bill or joint
resolution. See, e.g., 101-2, H.R. 5350, Aug. 4, 1990; the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993. A former rule of the House (known
as the ``Gephardt rule'') generated and deemed passed a joint
resolution automatically upon adoption by Congress of a concurrent
resolution on the budget that set forth a level of the public debt
that is different from the statutory limit. Rule XXVIII was first
adopted in the 96th Congress. It was rendered inoperative on occasion.
See, e.g., 104-1, H. Res. 149, May 17, 1995, pp 13275, 13276; 105-1,
H. Res. 152, May 20, 1997, p 8904. It was repealed in the 107th
Congress, reinstated in the 108th Congress, and repealed again in the
112th Congress. Manual Sec. 1104.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 provided for incremental increases
in the debt limit by the President and expedited procedures for the
Congress to disapprove of those increases. For a description of the
procedures for increasing the debt limit under the Budget Control Act
of 2011, see Sec. 24, infra.
Section 301(a)(5) of the Budget Act requires the budget resolution
to set forth the appropriate level for the public debt. Under clause
10(c)(1) of rule XVIII, it is not in order to consider an amendment to
the budget resolution that proposes to change the appropriate level
for the public debt. Reconciliation directives relative to changes in
the public debt may be included in the concurrent resolution on the
budget under section 310(a)(3) of the Budget Act.
Sec. 19 . Impoundments Generally
Executive Branch Authority; Types of Impoundments
The executive branch has no inherent power to impound appropriated
funds. In the absence of express congressional authorization to
withhold funds appropriated for implementation of a legislative
program, the executive branch must spend all the funds. Kennedy v.
Mathews, 413 F. Supp. 1240 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Train v. City of
New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975). Accordingly, if the controlling statute
gives the officials in question no discretion to withhold the funds, a
court may grant injunctive relief directing that they be made
available. Kennedy, 413 F. Supp. 1245.
The impoundment of appropriated funds may be proposed by the
President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Manual
Sec. 1130(6A). Two types of impoundments are referred to by this
statute: (1) rescissions, which are the permanent cancellation of
spending, and (2) deferrals, which impose a temporary delay in
spending. Sec. Sec. 1012, 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act; 2 USC
Sec. 681.
The Impoundment Control Act was enacted by Congress in an effort
to control the budgetary impoundment powers asserted by the President.
As the court noted in City of New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp.
1449 (D.D.C. 1986), in the early 1970s the President began to use
impoundments as a means of shaping domestic policy, withholding funds
from various programs he did not favor. The legality of these
impoundments was repeatedly litigated, and by 1974, impoundments had
been vitiated in many cases. See, e.g., National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897 (D.D.C.
1973) (public health funds).
Sec. 20 . --Rescissions
Under the Impoundment Control Act, the President may propose to
rescind all or part of the budget authority Congress has appropriated
for a particular program. To propose a rescission, the President must
send a special message to Congress detailing the amount of the
proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and a summary of the effects
the rescission would have on the programs involved. Sec. 1012(a) of
the Impoundment Control Act. Under the Act, Congress then has 45 days
within which to approve the proposed rescission by a ``rescission
bill'' that must be passed by both Houses. Sec. 1012(b) of the
Impoundment Control Act. If the rescission bill is not approved, the
President must allow the full amount appropriated to be spent. City of
New Haven v. United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449, 1452 (D.D.C. 1986).
The 45-day period prescribed by the Act applies only to the
initial consideration of the bill; the consideration of a conference
report on such a bill is subject only to the general rules of the
House relating to conference reports and is not prevented by the
expiration of the 45-day period following the initial consideration of
the bill. Manual Sec. 1130(6A).
The Impoundment Control Act sets forth detailed procedures
expediting and governing the consideration of a rescission bill
introduced under its provisions. Sec. 1017(a)-(c) of the Impoundment
Control Act. These procedures are rarely invoked in the modern
practice, and the ``rescission bill'' referred to in the Act is not
the only means by which the House may take action on such a matter.
The House may address the question through other legislation without
following the procedures set forth in section 1017 of the Impoundment
Control Act. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, p 8484.
Rescissions of prior appropriations are more often reported in
general appropriation bills, and the inclusion of rescission language
by the Committee on Appropriations is excepted from the prohibition
against provisions ``changing existing law'' under clause 2(b) of rule
XXI. See Manual Sec. Sec. 1038, 1043, 1052. However, this exception
does not extend to amendments or to the rescission of contract
authority provided by a law other than an appropriation Act. Manual
Sec. 1052.
Sec. 21 . --Deferrals
Under section 1013(a) of the Impoundment Control Act, the
President must notify Congress of the proposed deferral of any budget
authority, the reasons for the deferral, the impact the deferral will
have on the programs involved, and ``any legal authority invoked to
justify the proposed deferral.'' 2 USC Sec. 684(a).
Until 1986 the Impoundment Control Act was used frequently as the
basis for Presidential deferral proposals and for their consideration
by the Congress. Section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act allowed a
deferral to be overridden by a resolution of disapproval passed by
either House. Congress could reject the proposal by one-House veto or
in subsequent legislation. Today, the Congress may disapprove a
deferral only through the enactment of a law (often an appropriation
Act). It may not do so through a resolution of disapproval only by one
House under court rulings. Manual Sec. 1130.
In 1986 a suit was brought to contest the validity of certain
deferrals proposed by the President under section 1013 of the
Impoundment Control Act. In November 1985, the President had signed
the fiscal year 1986 appropriations bill for the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, which appropriated funds for certain community
development programs. In February 1986, the President sent impoundment
notices to Congress pursuant to the Act announcing his deferrals of
the expenditure of funds for the programs at issue. The plaintiffs in
the suit included various cities, community groups, and Members of
Congress. The plaintiffs challenged as unconstitutional the provision
allowing a so-called one-House legislative veto of impoundments
proposed by the President, such vetoes having been declared
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court decision in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). The plaintiffs
argued that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision contained
in section 1013 rendered the entire section invalid, leaving the
President without statutory authority on which to base the deferrals
in question. After analyzing the intent of Congress in enacting
section 1013, the District Court for the District of Columbia held
that the section's unconstitutional legislative veto provision was
inseverable from the remainder of the section. City of New Haven v.
United States, 634 F. Supp. 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). Accordingly, the court
declared section 1013 void in its entirety and ordered the defendants
to make the deferred funds available for obligation. City of New
Haven, 634 F. Supp. 1460. The judgment of the District Court in
striking down section 1013 in its entirety was affirmed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals. City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
In 1987, after section 1013 of the Impoundment Control Act was
declared unconstitutional, the Act was amended to exclude the one-
House legislative veto procedure, and limitations were placed on the
purposes for which deferrals could be made. Section 1013 of the
Impoundment Control Act now permits deferrals only in three specified
situations: ``to provide for contingencies,'' ``to achieve savings
made possible by or through changes in requirements or greater
efficiency of operations,'' or ``as specifically provided by law.''
The same language is used in the Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 USC
Sec. 1512(c)(1). The purpose of such language was to preclude the
President from invoking section 1013 as authority for implementing
``policy'' impoundments, while preserving the President's authority to
implement routine ``programmatic'' impoundments. City of New Haven,
809 F.2d 906 (note).
Unreported Deferrals
Section 1015(a) of the Impoundment Control Act (2 USC Sec. 686(a))
requires the Comptroller General to report to the Congress whenever it
is found that any officer or employee of the United States has
ordered, permitted, or approved a reserve or deferral of budget
authority, and the President has not transmitted a special impoundment
message with respect to such reserve or deferral.
Sec. 22 . Unfunded Mandates
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to
title IV of the Budget Act that imposes several requirements on
committees with respect to ``Federal mandates,'' establishes points of
order to enforce those requirements, and precludes the consideration
of a rule or order waiving such points of order in the House. 2 USC
Sec. Sec. 658-658g. Section 425 of the Budget Act establishes a point
of order against consideration of a bill, joint resolution, amendment,
motion, or conference report containing unfunded intergovernmental
mandates. Section 426(a) of the Budget Act establishes a point of
order against consideration of any rule or order that waives the
application of section 425. Points of order under sections 425 and
426(a) of the Budget Act are disposed of by the House voting on the
question of consideration. Manual Sec. 1127. For more on unfunded
mandates, see Unfunded Mandates.
Sec. 23 . Earmarks
While only indirectly related to the congressional budget process,
the subject of earmarks is addressed by the rules of the House. The
House rules define a congressional earmark as ``a provision or report
language included primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate,
Resident Commissioner, or Senator providing, authorizing, or
recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority,
credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan,
loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to
an entity, or targeted to a specific state, locality or Congressional
district, other than through a statutory or administrative formula-
driven or competitive award process.'' Clause 9(e) of rule XXI. This
clause also defines ``limited tax benefit'' and ``limited tariff
benefit,'' which are treated in the same fashion as earmarks.
The House attempts to limit or restrict the use of earmarks
through the mechanism of a disclosure requirement. Clause 9(a) of rule
XXI provides for a point of order against consideration of bills and
joint resolutions (whether or not reported from committee),
``manager's'' amendments to bills or joint resolutions (offered at the
outset of consideration), or conference reports that do not comply
with the disclosure requirement. Clause 9(b) provides a similar point
of order for conference reports accompanying general appropriation
bills.
In each case, the disclosure required to be made is a list of all
congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, and limited tariff
benefits contained in the measure, or, alternatively, a statement that
the measure contains no such earmarks, or tax or tariff benefits.
Depending on the measure at issue, such disclosure is required to be
made in the committee report (for reported bills or resolutions),
printed in the Congressional Record prior to consideration (for
unreported bills or joint resolutions), or contained in the joint
explanatory statement of managers (for conference reports). A
committee may cure a defective earmark statement contained in a
committee report by filing a supplemental report under clause 3(a)(2)
of rule XIII. 111-2, July 30, 2010, p 14834.
Clause 9(c) of rule XXI provides a point of order against a
special order of business reported from the Committee on Rules that
waives the application of either clause 9(a) or 9(b) of rule XXI.
Disposition of this point of order is decided by the question of
consideration, which the Chair puts to the House when the point of
order is made. Such question of consideration is debatable for 20
minutes, with 10 minutes controlled by the Member raising the point of
order and 10 minutes controlled by a Member opposed. The manager of
the measure has the right to close debate on the question of
consideration. 111-2, Mar. 21, 2010, p 4105. The question of
consideration is decided without intervening motion, except for one
motion that the House adjourn. This same procedure is followed with
respect to points of order made under clause 9(b) regarding conference
reports accompanying regular general appropriation bills. For a
further discussion of questions of consideration, see Question of
Consideration.
It is important to note that the disclosure requirement is
fulfilled by the mere presence of the disclosure statement in the
required document, whether that be a committee report, the
Congressional Record, or a joint statement accompanying a conference
report. When ascertaining the validity of a point of order under
clause 9(a), the Chair consults the pertinent document and notes the
presence or absence of the required statement. The Chair does not
assess the accuracy or sufficiency of the required earmark statement.
See 110-1, May 10, 2007, pp 12190, 12191.
For additional precedents regarding the timing and application of
this rule, see Manual Sec. 1068d.
In the 114th Congress, Congress enacted a tariff law that, inter
alia, created a new requirement for the chair of the Committee on Ways
and Means to submit a list of limited tariff benefits to accompany
certain tariff legislation. Pub. L. No. 114-159.
Sec. 24 . Recent Developments
The Budget Control Act of 2011
The Budget Control Act of 2011 was enacted on August 2, 2011. The
Act combined a series of budget control mechanisms with a proposal to
increase the limit of the public debt. The procedural aspects of the
Act included (1) the establishment of annual discretionary spending
caps over a ten-year period enforceable by a point of order and
sequestration; (2) altering the treatment for funding designated as
emergencies including protections for a motion to strike such a
designation; (3) requiring a vote in each body on a joint resolution
proposing a balanced budget amendment to the Constitution by a time
certain and providing expedited treatment of such a joint resolution
in the other body; (4) allowing for staged increases in the limit of
the public debt by the President with expedited procedures for joint
resolutions disapproving each increase; and (5) creation of a joint
select committee directed to produce a measure by a date certain that
would achieve a specified amount of deficit reduction and which would
then be considered by each House on an expedited basis (with failure
to enact such legislation by such date resulting in automatic
sequestration).
The Budget Control Act of 2011 established annual discretionary
spending limits for security and non-security spending for a ten-year
period. The Act also mandated sequestration procedures to eliminate a
breach in either category. The Act also established a point of order
in section 314 of the Budget Act against any bill, joint resolution,
amendment, motion, or conference report that would cause the
discretionary spending caps to be exceeded.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 amended section 314 of the Budget
Act to provide for new treatment in the House for provisions
containing amounts designated as an emergency. Under the law, a
provision contained in a reported bill or joint resolution, or
amendment thereto, or conference report thereon providing new budget
authority or outlays or reducing revenue and designated as an
emergency under Gramm-Rudman would be entitled to special scoring by
the chair of the House Committee on the Budget. Specifically, the
chair of the Committee on the Budget does not count the budgetary
effects of the provision under titles III and IV of the Congressional
Budget Act and the rules of the House. The Act also removes procedural
hurdles for a motion to strike an emergency designation under Gramm-
Rudman and attach thereto an accompanying across-the-board cut to
achieve budget neutrality. Specifically, a motion to strike an
emergency designation under Gramm-Rudman is not counted by the chair
of the Committee of the Budget for purposes of titles III and IV of
the Congressional Budget Act and the rules of the House. Such a
proposal to strike an emergency designation may also contain an
across-the-board cut that may be offered at any point in the reading
of a measure. These two steps obviate a point of order that striking
an emergency designation would increase the budget authority or reduce
revenues above or below enforceable levels and allow for an across-
the-board cut to address each account in the pending measure
regardless of how far the reading has progressed.
The Budget Control Act of 2011 provided for a vote in each body on
a joint resolution proposing a balanced budget amendment to the
Constitution by a date certain. However, no such joint resolution was
able to pass either body. The Act also provided for incremental
increases in the debt limit by the President and expedited procedures
for the Congress to disapprove of those increases. However, no such
joint resolution of disapproval was ever enacted. Finally, the Act
established a Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction composed of
six Senators and six Members of the House equally divided by party.
The goal of the joint select committee was ``to reduce the deficit by
at least $1.5 trillion over the period of fiscal years 2012 to 2021.''
However, the joint select committee failed to reach this goal, and the
expedited procedures for the consideration of its recommendations were
never utilized. The joint committee was terminated in 2012.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 was enacted on December 26,
2013. Pub. L. No. 113-67. It revised the Budget Control Act of 2011 by
adjusting the caps on discretionary spending and extending the
sequestration enforcement period through fiscal year 2023. It further
deemed in place a prior budget resolution for the remainder of the
113th Congress. It also required the chair of the Committee on the
Budget to publish budget aggregates and allocations in the
Congressional Record at levels set by reference to the revised
discretionary spending caps, and prospectively deemed such aggregates
and allocations to be enforceable under the Budget Act as though part
of a budget resolution. The Act did not make any changes to the public
debt limit, which had been statutorily suspended earlier in the year
(in the context of a continuing resolution). Pub. L. No. 113-46.
Finally, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013 amended the Congressional
Budget Act to codify certain orders of the House regarding the
definition of entitlement authority and the application of section 303
and section 306 points of order. See Sec. Sec. 5, 10, and 16, supra.
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015
The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 was enacted on November 2, 2015.
Pub. L. No. 114-74. It made fewer substantive changes to the budget
process compared to the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013, but it did
further revise the discretionary spending caps put in place by the
Budget Control Act of 2011. The sequestration enforcement mechanism
was also extended through fiscal year 2025. The Act also suspended the
public debt limit until March 15, 2017.