[House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House]
[Budget Process]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]


[[Page 173]]

 
                              BUDGET PROCESS

  Sec.  1. In General; Legislative Background
  Sec.  2. Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
  Sec.  3. The Budget Timetable
  Sec.  4. Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
  Sec.  5. -- Amendments to Resolutions
  Sec.  6. -- Debate on Conference Reports
  Sec.  7. Reconciliation Procedures
  Sec.  8. Adherence to Spending and Revenue Levels
  Sec.  9. Deficit Targets
  Sec. 10. Sequestration
  Sec. 11. Spending Controls
  Sec. 12. New Spending Authority
  Sec. 13. Social Security Funds
  Sec. 14. The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
  Sec. 15. Impoundments Generally
  Sec. 16. -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto
  Sec. 17. -- Deferrals
  Sec. 18. Unfunded Mandates
        Research References
          3 Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21
          Manual Secs. 169, 674, 695, 709, 726, 876b, 1007-1013
          Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Pub. L. No. 67-13)
          Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub. 
            L. No. 93-344)
          Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
            (Pub. L. No. 99-177), also known as the Gramm-Rudman Act
          Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation 
            Act of 1987 (Pub. L. No. 100-119)
          Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-508)
          Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-66)
          Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-4)
          Line Item Veto Act (Pub. L. No. 104-130)
          Manual on the Federal Budget Process, CRS, Dec. 24, 1991

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  Sec. 1 . In General; Legislative Background

                                 Generally

      There are three stages in the complex process by which the 
  Congress allocates the fiscal resources of the federal government. 
  There is, first, an authorization process under which federal programs 
  are created in response to national needs, and second, an 
  appropriations process under which funding is provided for those 
  programs. See Appropriations. The third stage is the congressional 
  budget process, under which Congress annually establishes an overall 
  fiscal policy on how much total spending and revenues ought to be and 
  how total spending should be divided among the major functions of 
  government such as defense, agriculture, and health. These three 
  stages are not necessarily considered or completed in chronological 
  order.

                   The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921

      The modern era in budget reform began with the passage of the 
  Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which established a new 
  Presidential budget system, and which permitted all items relating to 
  a department to be brought together in the same bill. This Act (Pub. 
  L. No. 67-13) authorized the President to submit a national budget in 
  place of the previous uncoordinated agency submissions. This Act 
  required him to submit his budget recommendations to Congress each 
  year, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was created to 
  assist him in this respect. The 1921 Act also established the General 
  Accounting Office and made it the principal auditing arm of the 
  federal government. See 31 USC Secs. 1101 et seq.

                   The Congressional Budget Act of 1974

      Until 1974, the Congress lacked a comprehensive uniform mechanism 
  for establishing priorities among its budgetary goals and for 
  determining national economic policy regarding the federal budget. 
  Budget responsibility remained fragmented throughout the Congress. 
  Both taxing and spending actions were taken over a period of many 
  months and by way of many different legislative measures. The size of 
  the budget, and whether it should be in surplus or deficit, were not 
  subject to effective controls. To address these problems, both Houses 
  enacted over President Nixon's veto the Congressional Budget and 
  Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-

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  344). Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21. The Act (see 2 USC Secs. 601 et seq.) 
  consisted of 10 titles which:

     Established new committees on the budget in both the House and 
         the Senate, and a Congressional Budget Office designed to 
         improve Congress' informational and analytical resources with 
         respect to the budgetary process.
     Set forth a timetable and established controls for various 
         phases of the congressional budget process centered on a 
         concurrent resolution on the budget to be adopted prior to 
         legislative consideration of revenue or spending bills.
     Spelled out various enforcement procedures and provided for 
         program review and evaluation.
     Provided for standardization of budget terminology.
     Established procedures for congressional review of 
         Presidential impoundment actions.

      Titles I through IX are known as the ``Congressional Budget Act'' 
  and title X is known as the ``Impoundment Control Act.'' The Unfunded 
  Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to title IV of the 
  Congressional Budget Act.
      The central purpose of the process established by the Act is to 
  coordinate the various revenue and spending decisions that are made in 
  separate tax, appropriations, and legislative measures. (The Act 
  originally provided for the adoption of two budget resolutions each 
  year, but the Act was amended in 1985 to allow an entire fiscal-year 
  cycle to be addressed by a single resolution.)

       The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985

      The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
  (referred to herein as Gramm-Rudman) made further significant changes 
  in the budget process, and in the Congressional Budget Act procedures. 
  (Gramm-Rudman is codified in 2 USC Secs. 900 et seq.) Conceived as a 
  statutory response to the burgeoning federal deficit problem, Gramm-
  Rudman instituted a single binding budget resolution, binding 
  committee allocations, and provided for reconciliation and enforcement 
  of fixed deficit targets through sequestration. The Congressional 
  Budget Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S. 
  House of Representatives, July 1986, p 7. The Act included provisions 
  amending the Congressional Budget Act to permit a new point of order 
  against legislation exceeding the appropriate committee allocation 
  (Sec. 302(f)), exempting the title II social security program from 
  reconciliation (Sec. 310(g)), and precluding the breaching of budget 
  authority or outlay ceilings or revenue floors, with certain 
  exceptions (Sec. 311).

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         Budget Enforcement Act of 1990; Revisions and Extensions

      The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) revised the Gramm-Rudman 
  deficit targets and made them adjustable, and extended the 
  sequestration process. It set limitations on distinct categories of 
  discretionary spending, and created pay-as-you-go procedures to 
  require that increases in direct spending or decreases in revenues due 
  to legislative action be offset so that there is no net increase in 
  the deficit. Secs. 9, 10, infra. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
  of 1993 (OBRA) extended the discretionary spending limits and pay-as-
  you-go requirements through fiscal 1998. Pub. L. No. 103-66.

                     Enforcement Procedures Generally

      The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 permits enforcement through 
  parliamentary points of order against legislation violating its 
  requirements and procedures. However, the enforcement mechanisms are 
  not automatically applied and timely points of order from the floor 
  are required to bring them into play. Budget Process Law Annotated, 
  1993 Edition, S. Prt 103-49, p 176. But the Congressional Budget Act 
  also is linked to certain automatic enforcement procedures under 
  Gramm-Rudman. The Congressional Budget Act sets forth discretionary 
  spending limits used for purposes of sequestration, the automatic-
  formula reduction process that is required if triggered under Gramm-
  Rudman. Sequestration, see Sec. 10, infra.
      Enforcement through Budget Act points of order may be precluded 
  under Sec. 606(d)(2) if the pending measure is protected by one of the 
  emergency designations permitted under Gramm-Rudman when declared by 
  both the President and Congress (see Secs. 251(b)(2)(D) and 252(e)).

                           Use of Special Rules

      A concurrent resolution on the budget or a budget reconciliation 
  bill that has been reported as privileged pursuant to clause 4(a) of 
  Rule XI is privileged for consideration under the provisions of 
  Sec. 305 of the Act and clause 8 of Rule XXIII or the provisions of 
  Sec. 310 of the Act, as the case may be. In either case, however, the 
  House may vary the parameters of consideration established in statute 
  or standing rule by unanimous consent, by suspension of the rules, or 
  by adoption of a special rule.
      This is true because the statutory provisions concerned were 
  enacted as exercises of the rulemaking powers of the House and the 
  Senate, respectively, under the Constitution. See, for example, 
  Sec. 904(a). It is customary for the House to vary the parameters for 
  consideration of a particular budget resolution or reconciliation bill 
  by adopting a special order of business resolution recommended by the 
  Committee on Rules.

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      Similarly, the various parliamentary enforcement mechanisms 
  established in the Act--those sections establishing points of order 
  against consideration of certain propositions--likewise constitute 
  rules of the House and, as such, are liable to waiver by unanimous 
  consent, by suspension of the rules, or by adoption of a special rule. 
  It is not unusual for the House to waive such a point of order by 
  adopting a special order of business resolution recommended by the 
  Committee on Rules.
      Under the Budget Act the Speaker must refer a concurrent 
  resolution on the budget reported from the Budget Committee 
  sequentially to the Rules Committee for not more than five legislative 
  days if it includes any procedure or matter having the effect of 
  changing a rule of the House. See Sec. 301(c). After such a referral, 
  an additional one-day layover follows the report of the Committee on 
  Rules. See Sec. 305(a)(1).


  Sec. 2 . Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates

                                 Generally

      To implement the congressional budget process, the Congressional 
  Budget Act created the Senate and House Budget Committees (and the 
  Congressional Budget Office). 2 USC Secs. 601 et seq. The Budget 
  Committees were given the authority to draft Congress' annual budget 
  plan for the federal government for consideration by the full Senate 
  and House. Unlike the authorizing and appropriating committees, which 
  focus on individual federal programs, the Budget Committees focus on 
  the federal budget as a whole and how it affects the national economy.
      The House rules give the House Budget Committee jurisdiction over 
  matters relating to the congressional budget, including concurrent 
  resolutions on the budget. Rule X clause 1(d)(2). Manual Sec. 673a. 
  The Committee on Rules has the special oversight function of review of 
  the budget process. Rule X clause 3(i). Manual Sec. 693. In the 104th 
  Congress, the limited jurisdiction of the Budget Committee was 
  expanded to consolidate the budget process and the enforcement of 
  budget controls. See Manual Sec. 673b.
      The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 310) provides conditions for 
  the reporting by the Budget Committees of reconciliation measures. The 
  Act (Sec. 306) prohibits the consideration in either House of any 
  measure dealing with a matter within the jurisdiction of its Budget 
  Committee if not reported from the Budget Committee or discharged 
  therefrom.

            Committee Reports; Cost Estimates and Scorekeeping

      The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides economic and 
  program analyses and cost information on most reported public bills 
  and resolu-

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  tions. Under the Budget Act, five-year cost estimates are prepared and 
  published in the reports accompanying these bills. Sec. 403(a).
      Committee reports on legislation providing new budget authority, 
  new spending or credit authority, or a change in revenues or tax 
  expenditures, are required to contain the estimates and other detailed 
  information mandated by Sec. 308(a). The information mandated by 
  Sec. 308(a) is also required under House Rule XI clause 2(l)(3) except 
  that, under an amendment adopted in 1995, the estimates with respect 
  to new budget authority must include, when practicable, a comparison 
  of the total estimated funding level for the relevant program (or 
  programs) to the appropriate levels under current law.
      If a bill is introduced in a form providing new budget or 
  entitlement authority and is reported without curative amendment and 
  without an estimate of its cost, then a Sec. 308 point of order may be 
  made against consideration of the bill. However, a special order for 
  the consideration of a bill that ``self-executes'' the adoption of an 
  amendment providing new budget authority into a bill to be 
  subsequently considered does not, itself, provide new budget authority 
  within the meaning of Sec.  308 of the Budget Act. 103-1, Feb. 24, 
  1993, p ____.
      The Director of the Congressional Budget Office is required to 
  issue to the committees of the House and the Senate monthly reports 
  detailing and tabulating the progress of congressional action on 
  specified bills and resolutions. Sec. 308(b)(1). The Budget Committees 
  of each House are required to prepare budget ``scorekeeping'' reports 
  and to make them available frequently enough to provide Members of 
  each House with an accurate representation of the current status of 
  congressional consideration of the budget. Sec. 308(b)(2).
      Committee allocations, see Sec. 8, infra.


  Sec. 3 . The Budget Timetable

      The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 300) includes a timetable for 
  various stages of the congressional budget process:

     On or before first Monday in February--President submits his 
         budget to Congress

      Note: Additional time for submission of the President's budget can 
  be provided for by law. Shortly after its submission, the two Budget 
  Committees begin hearings on the budget, the economic assumptions upon 
  which it is based, the economy in general, and national budget 
  priorities.

     On or before February 15--Congressional Budget Office submits 
         annual report

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      Note: The CBO is required to submit its annual report to the 
  Budget Committees. This report deals primarily with overall economic 
  and fiscal policy and alternative budget levels and national budget 
  priorities.

     On or before February 25--Committees submit views and 
         estimates to Budget Committees

      Note: This step involves the submission of the views and estimates 
  of all standing committees of the House and Senate. These reports 
  provide the Budget Committees with an early and comprehensive 
  indication of committee legislative planning. These reports include 
  estimates of new budget authority and outlays.

     On or before April 1--Senate Budget Committee reports 
         concurrent resolution
     On or before April 15--Congress completes action on concurrent 
         resolution on the budget

      Note: Congress may revise its budget resolution before the end of 
  the appropriate fiscal year (see Sec. 304 of the Budget Act); while 
  this may be done at any point, the Congress in some years has followed 
  the practice of revising the budget plan for the current fiscal year 
  as part of the budget resolution for the upcoming fiscal year.

     May 15--Annual appropriation bills considered in the House

      Note: General appropriation bills may be considered in the House 
  after May 15 even if a budget resolution for the ensuing fiscal year 
  has yet to be agreed to. Sec. 303(b)(1).

     On or before June 10--House Appropriations Committee reports 
         last annual appropriation bill
     June 15--Congress completes action on reconciliation 
         legislation

      Note: The mandatory June 15 deadline was repealed by BEA. However, 
  the Congress may not adjourn for more than three calendar days during 
  the month of July until the House has completed action on the 
  reconciliation legislation (Sec. 310(f)) and the 13 general 
  appropriation bills (Sec. 309).

     On or before June 30--House completes action on annual 
         appropriation bills
     October 1--Fiscal year begins

      Note: The fiscal year begins on October 1, and ends on September 
  30. In the past, action on appropriation bills has not always been 
  completed by October 1, necessitating the passage of a ``continuing 
  resolution'' to provide appropriations on a temporary basis until the 
  regular appropriation bills are enacted.

      Deadlines for other stages in the budget process, such as 
  notification of adjustment in maximum deficit amounts, the President's 
  mid-session

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  budget review, and various CBO and OMB sequestration reports, were 
  provided for in Gramm-Rudman Sec. 254(a).
      Under rules adopted in 1995, each standing committee has the 
  deadline of February 15 of the first session for the submission of its 
  oversight plans for the Congress to the Committees on Government 
  Reform and Oversight and House Oversight. These plans must be reported 
  to the House by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight by 
  March 31 of the session. Rule X clause 2(d).


  Sec. 4 . Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate

                                 Generally

      The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution; as such it is 
  not a law, but serves as an internal framework for Congress in its 
  action on separate revenue, spending, and other budget-related 
  measures. The content of budget resolutions is governed by the 
  Congressional Budget Act (see particularly Secs. 301, 606). Budget 
  resolutions set forth budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year 
  and for the four succeeding fiscal years. The budget totals set forth 
  what the Congress considers to be the appropriate amounts, including 
  amounts for total spending and total revenues. The budget resolution 
  gives the Congress a mechanism for establishing federal spending 
  priorities. The budget resolution accomplishes this by dividing up 
  federal spending among various classifications such as national 
  defense, agriculture, and health. These classifications, known as 
  ``budget functions,'' provide the Congress with a means of allocating 
  federal resources among broad categories of spending. The 
  Congressional Budget Process, An Explanation, Committee on the Budget, 
  U.S. Senate, Mar. 1988, p 4.
      Section 301(b)(4) of the Budget Act permits a concurrent 
  resolution on the budget to ``set forth such other matters, and 
  require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may be 
  appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'' (This provision 
  is sometimes referred to as the ``elastic clause.'') Textually, the 
  ``other matters'' and ``procedures'' admitted by this section must: 
  (1) relate to the budget; and (2) be appropriate to carry out the 
  purposes of the Budget Act.

      Note: They must not include matter that would destroy the 
  privilege of the concurrent resolution on the budget, such as by 
  effecting a special order of business. The only matter in the nature 
  of a special order of business that may be included in a privileged 
  concurrent resolution on the budget is a reconciliation directive. 
  Reconciliation, see Sec. 7, infra.

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                            Floor Consideration

      The Congressional Budget Act provides special procedures for House 
  consideration of a concurrent resolution on the budget reported by the 
  Committee on the Budget. Floor consideration may begin after a five-
  day layover period that starts when the report on the resolution first 
  becomes available to the Members. See Sec. 305(a)(1).
      The Act provides for consideration in the Committee of the Whole. 
  Ten hours are allowed for general debate, with an additional four 
  hours permitted on economic goals and policies. Amendments are 
  considered under the five-minute rule (Sec. 5, infra). After the 
  Committee rises and reports the resolution back to the House, the 
  previous question is considered as ordered on the resolution and any 
  amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion. A 
  motion to recommit the resolution is not in order, nor is a motion to 
  reconsider. Sec. 305(a)(2)-(5). The question having been put on final 
  passage, the yeas and nays are considered as ordered. Rule XV clause 
  7.
      A budget resolution being considered in Committee of the Whole has 
  been held subject to a motion to rise and report the resolution back 
  to the House with the recommendation that the resolving clause be 
  stricken. 103-1, Mar. 18, 1993, p ____.
      The Budget Act procedures for floor consideration of a budget 
  resolution are applicable only to privileged budget resolutions which 
  have been reported from committee, and not to unreported budget 
  resolutions. 98-2, Apr. 5, 1984, pp 7992, 7993.
      The Rules Committee may report a special rule to be applied during 
  the consideration of a particular budget resolution or conference 
  report. The committee may report a special rule permitting only 
  certain designated amendments to be offered to the resolution. See 
  Sec. 1, supra. In recent Congresses, only designated amendments in the 
  nature of substitutes have been permitted, and perfecting amendments 
  have been precluded. H. Res. 384, 103-2, Mar. 10, 1994, p ____.
      A budget resolution may under some circumstances be divided so as 
  to permit a separate vote on particular sections therein. 102-2, Mar. 
  5, 1992, p ____. In one instance, where a pending budget resolution 
  contained one section revising the congressional budget for the fiscal 
  year, preceded by sections setting forth budget targets for ensuing 
  fiscal years as well as reconciliation instructions, and followed by a 
  final section on reporting of certain fiscal information, the question 
  of its adoption was divided on the demand of a Member for two separate 
  votes (1) on the first and final portions of the resolution and then 
  (2) on the separable section in between. 96-2, May 7, 1980, pp 10185-
  87.

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     Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related Legislation

      The Congressional Budget Act precludes certain budget-related 
  legislation for a fiscal year until the budget resolution for that 
  year has been adopted by both Houses. Sec. 303(a). The essence of 
  section 303(a) of the Budget Act is timing. It reflects a judgment 
  that legislative decisions on expenditures and revenues for the coming 
  fiscal year should await the adoption of the budget resolution for 
  that year. 101-2, July 25, 1990, p ____. Legislation ruled out under 
  this provision has included:

     A conference report containing new spending authority in the 
         form of entitlements to become effective in fiscal years 1978 
         through 1980, where the concurrent resolution on the budget for 
         those fiscal years had not yet been adopted. 94-2, Sept. 30, 
         1976, pp 34074, 34075.
     An amendment providing new entitlement authority to become 
         effective in a fiscal year before adoption of the budget 
         resolution for that year. 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-57; 102-
         2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____ (six rulings).
     An amendment providing new budget authority for a fiscal year, 
         before adoption of a budget resolution for that year. 99-1, 
         July 17, 1985, pp 19435, 19436.

      Under Sec. 303 of the Act, the Chair is guided by his own judgment 
  of the text and of the arguments presented from the floor as to 
  whether an amendment involves spending or revenues. The statutory 
  requirements that the Chair determine certain levels of spending or 
  revenues on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget 
  apply only to questions arising under Sec. 302 (allocation breaches) 
  or Sec. 311 (breaches of totals). Nevertheless, the Chair may treat 
  Budget Committee estimates as persuasive on questions arising under 
  Sec. 303 (timing breaches), whether to maintain consistency in 
  determinations under title III of the Act or simply for their 
  analytical merit. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____.
      Waivers of Sec. 303(a) have been provided pursuant to a special 
  rule from the Committee on Rules. See Sec. 1, supra.


  Sec. 5 . -- Amendments to Resolutions

                                 Generally

      Under the Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 305(a)(5)), amendments to 
  budget resolutions are considered in the Committee of the Whole under 
  the five-minute rule in accordance with House Rule XXIII. Under clause 
  8 of that rule, the resolution is open to amendment at any point, so 
  that the Committee of the Whole may amend the functional categories 
  section prior to consideration of the total budget allocations. 95-2, 
  May 2, 1978, p 12094.

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              Amendments to Achieve Mathematical Consistency

      The 96th Congress adopted provisions amending Rule XXIII clause 8 
  to require, with certain exceptions, that amendments to concurrent 
  resolutions on the budget be mathematically consistent. 96-1, Jan. 15, 
  1979, p 8. Under this rule, amendments making changes in budget 
  authority and outlay aggregate totals must be accompanied by 
  comparable changes in functional categories. A point of order will lie 
  against an amendment to the resolution increasing the aggregates and a 
  functional category for budget authority and outlays but not changing 
  the amount of the deficit. However, an amendment which only transfers 
  an amount of budget authority from one functional category to 
  another--that is, reduces one category by a certain amount and adds 
  the same amount to another category--need make no changes in the 
  aggregates to achieve mathematical consistency. 96-1, May 8, 1979, p 
  10271.
      An amendment to achieve mathematical consistency throughout the 
  resolution may either change the functional categories to conform with 
  the aggregates, or vice versa, and if such an amendment is offered and 
  rejected, another amendment in different form to achieve mathematical 
  consistency may be offered. 96-1, May 14, 1979, pp 10967-75. Under 
  Sec. 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, an amendment or amendments to 
  achieve mathematic consistency can be offered at any time up to final 
  passage.
      A change in the public debt limit from that figure reported by the 
  Committee on the Budget is not in order, except as part of an 
  amendment offered at the direction of the Budget Committee to achieve 
  mathematical consistency. Rule XXIII clause 3. Public debt limit, see 
  Sec. 14, infra.

                                Germaneness

      Unless protected by special rule, an amendment to a concurrent 
  resolution on the budget must be germane to the text of the 
  resolution. An amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the 
  Impoundment Control Act be repealed for a fiscal year and calling for 
  a review of the Budget Act and the budget process, has been conceded 
  to be not germane. 96-2, Nov. 18, 1980, p 30026.


  Sec. 6 . -- Debate on Conference Reports

      Under Sec. 305(a)(6) of the Congressional Budget Act there can be 
  up to five hours of debate in the House on a conference report on a 
  concurrent resolution on the budget, such debate to be equally divided 
  between the majority and minority parties. Where the conferees report 
  in total disagreement, debate on the motion to dispose of the 
  amendment in disagreement is not

[[Page 184]]

  governed by the statute and is instead considered under the general 
  ``hour'' rule in the House. 94-2, May 13, 1976, p 13756; 95-1, May 17, 
  1977, p 15126; and 95-2, May 17, 1978, p 14117.


  Sec. 7 . Reconciliation Procedures

      The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 301(b)(2)) provides for the 
  inclusion of reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution and 
  for the reporting and consideration of reconciliation legislation. The 
  purpose of the reconciliation process is to require committees to 
  implement the spending and tax policy decisions agreed to in the 
  budget resolution. If the reconciliation directive involves more than 
  one committee in each House, then all committees affected by the 
  directive are to submit their recommendations to their respective 
  Budget Committees. The Budget Committees then assemble, without 
  substantive revision, all the recommendations into one package for 
  action by the House or Senate. (Sec. 310). The Congressional Budget 
  Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of 
  Representatives, July 1986, p 15. In the 104th Congress, the Senate 
  took the position that reconciliation instructions might contemplate 
  several reconciliation bills. 104-2, May 21, 1996, p ____ (decision of 
  Chair sustained on appeal); 104-2, May 23, 1996, p ____.
      Reconciliation instructions are directives to committees to 
  recommend changes in existing law to achieve the goals in spending or 
  revenues contemplated by the budget resolution. Reconciliation 
  provides Congress with a mechanism to achieve reduced spending by 
  changing the law applicable to certain entitlement programs as part of 
  its budget plan. Merely lowering entitlement spending levels in the 
  budget resolution may not suffice, because entitlement laws require 
  the government to pay specified benefits to qualifying individuals 
  unless Congress changes those entitlement laws.
      The Congressional Budget Act (see Sec. 310(d)) requires that 
  amendments offered to reconciliation legislation in either the House 
  or the Senate must not increase the level of deficit (if any) in the 
  resolution. In order to meet this requirement, an amendment reducing 
  revenues or increasing spending must offset deficit increases by 
  equivalent revenue increases or spending cuts. Manual on the Federal 
  Budget Process, CRS, Dec. 24, 1991, p 55. Section 313 of the Budget 
  Act addresses the subject of ``extraneous'' material in a 
  reconciliation bill--the so-called ``Byrd Rule.'' The enforcement of 
  this section applies only in the Senate, but can be directed against 
  matter originating with the House.

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  Sec. 8 . Adherence to Spending and Revenue Levels

                                 Generally

      With certain exceptions, the Congressional Budget Act 
  (Sec. 311(a)) precludes specified measures--including amendments and 
  conference reports--that would cause total budget authority or total 
  outlays to exceed, or total revenues to be below, the level set forth 
  in the budget resolution after the Congress has completed action 
  thereon. The provision is enforced by raising points of order against 
  the consideration of measures which would breach the ``appropriate 
  levels'' of total new budget authority or total outlays or total 
  revenues in the budget resolution. The revenue and spending estimates 
  of the Budget Committees are used to determine revenue and spending 
  levels. Sec. 311(c). These budget levels represent a congressional 
  determination of appropriate fiscal policy and national budget 
  priorities. The Congressional Budget Process: A General Explanation, 
  Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, July 1986, p 
  12. Section 311 of the Act has been interpreted to prohibit 
  consideration of an amendment striking out a rescission of existing 
  budget authority where its effect would be to increase the net new 
  budget authority in the bill in breach of the applicable total. 97-1, 
  May 12, 1981, p 9314. A point of order will lie against an amendment 
  that has the effect of reducing revenues for the fiscal year below the 
  total level of revenues contained in the concurrent resolution on the 
  budget for that year. See 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-57.

                                  Waivers

      The House may agree to a special rule reported from the Committee 
  on Rules waiving points of order against consideration of a bill or 
  resolution in violation of Sec. 311 of the Congressional Budget Act. 
  96-2, Jan. 24, 1980, p 581. Thus, in 1980, a special rule waived 
  points of order against consideration of a bill containing new budget 
  authority for the current fiscal year in excess of the ceiling on 
  total budget authority established in the concurrent resolution on the 
  budget. 96-2, May 13, 1980, p 10999. See Sec. 1, supra.

                  Committee Allocations; ``Crosswalking''

      Under the Congressional Budget Act, provision is made for the 
  allocation--to each committee with jurisdiction--of ``appropriate 
  levels'' of spending authority. See Secs. 302(a); 602(a). The joint 
  statement accompanying a conference report on the budget resolution 
  makes an allocation of total budget authority, outlays, and 
  entitlement authority contained in the resolution among the 
  appropriate committees of the House and Senate. For example, if the 
  conference report allocates $7 billion in budget authority and $6

[[Page 186]]

  billion in outlays for the functional category ``Community and 
  Regional Development,'' the statement of managers must divide those 
  amounts among the appropriate committees of the House and Senate with 
  jurisdiction over programs and authorities covered by that functional 
  category. See Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21. The Congressional Budget 
  Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of 
  Representatives, July 1986, p 13.
      The allocation of the budget plan's spending levels among the 
  spending committees is known informally as ``crosswalking.'' Committee 
  crosswalks for both the House and Senate are set out initially in the 
  report of each House accompanying the budget resolution, and finally 
  in the joint explanatory statement of the conference committee on the 
  budget resolution. Each committee is allocated an overall level for 
  discretionary spending within its jurisdiction that is consistent with 
  the congressional budget plan. Under Sec. 602(b) Appropriation 
  Committees then subdivide their allocations among their subcommittees 
  for programs within their jurisdiction.
      Any Member may raise a timely point of order against a reported 
  bill, amendment or conference report that would exceed the relevant 
  committee allocation. See Sec. 302(f). Thus, where a general 
  appropriation bill provided new budget authority to the limit of the 
  pertinent allocation pursuant to Sec. 602 of the Budget Act, an 
  amendment scored by the Budget Committee as providing further new 
  budget authority was ruled out as violating Sec. 302(f) of the Budget 
  Act by causing that allocation to be exceeded. 102-1, June 26, 1991, p 
  ____. Even an amendment delaying the imposition of a certain monetary 
  penalty has been held to violate Sec. 302(f), the rationale being 
  that, by foregoing offsetting receipts, it provided new budget 
  authority in excess of the pertinent committee allocation. 102-1, July 
  18, 1991, p ____. On the other hand, an amendment that provides no new 
  budget authority or outlays but instead results in outlay savings is 
  not subject to a point of order under these provisions. 100-1, June 
  30, 1987, p 18308.
      Pursuant to section 302(g) of the Budget Act, the Chair relies on 
  estimates provided by the Committee on the Budget in determining 
  levels of spending authority for purposes of deciding questions of 
  order under section 302(f) of the Budget Act. 102-1, June 26, 1991, p 
  ____.

                         The Sec. 311(b) Exception

      As noted above, Sec. 311(a) precludes Congress from considering 
  legislation that would cause total revenues to fall below, or total 
  new budget authority or total outlays to exceed, the appropriate level 
  set forth in the budget resolution. But Sec. 311(a) does not apply in 
  the House to spending legislation if the committee reporting the 
  measure has stayed within its allocation of new discretionary budget 
  authority and new entitlement authority. See

[[Page 187]]

  Sec. 311(b). Accordingly, the House may take up any spending measure 
  that is within the appropriate committee allocations, even if (solely 
  due to excessive spending within another committee's jurisdiction) it 
  would cause total spending to be exceeded.

                            Emergency Spending

      Budget Act points of order against a bill under either Sec. 311 
  (breach of the appropriate total) or under Sec. 302 (breach of 
  appropriate allocation) do not lie if the spending is protected by an 
  emergency designation authorized by Gramm-Rudman. Such exemptions are 
  specifically permitted by new Sec. 606(d)(2) of the Budget Act. Under 
  Gramm-Rudman, the emergency designation must be identified as such by 
  both the President and Congress. See Secs. 251(b)(2)(D) and 252(e).


  Sec. 9 . Deficit Targets

      Section 601(a)(1) of the Budget Act specified maximum deficit 
  amounts (MDA) for fiscal years through 1995. Congressional budget 
  resolutions had to be within the maximum deficit amount for the 
  applicable fiscal year, a requirement that was enforced by MDA points 
  of order under the Congressional Budget Act. See Sec. 606(b). While 
  these statutory deficit amounts were not in effect beyond fiscal year 
  1995, deficit limits were specified in the budget resolution for 
  fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1998. See H. Con. Res. 64 
  (conference report agreed to Mar. 31, 1993, p ____).
      Under current Gramm-Rudman provisions, the Office of Management 
  and Budget (OMB) provides certain estimates as to fiscal year 
  deficits. Sec. 252(b). Under the original Gramm-Rudman law, the 
  Comptroller General was a participant in the deficit amelioration 
  process. However, in July 1986, the Supreme Court declared the 
  sequestration procedure set forth in Gramm-Rudman to be 
  unconstitutional because it delegated executive powers to the 
  Comptroller General, an officer subject to removal by the Congress. 
  The Supreme Court in upholding the ruling of the District Court 
  invoked the separation of powers doctrine. The court concluded that 
  ``Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an 
  officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment. 
  To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer 
  answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in 
  Congress control over the execution of the laws.'' See Synar v U.S., 
  106 S.Ct. 3181, 478 US 714.

[[Page 188]]

  Sec. 10 . Sequestration

      Sequestration involves the issuance of a Presidential order that 
  permanently cancels budgetary resources (except for special funds and 
  trust funds) for the purpose of achieving a required amount of outlay 
  savings. Sequestration orders are automatically triggered by OMB 
  reports mandated under Gramm-Rudman. Gramm-Rudman, as amended, 
  provides multiple sequestration procedures. The sequestration process 
  is used to enforce the deficit targets (Sec. 253), to enforce the 
  discretionary spending limits (Sec. 251), and to enforce the pay-as-
  you-go requirements (Sec. 252). These provisions require that such 
  sequesters occur on the same day--15 calendar days after Congress 
  adjourns to end a session. Additional sequesters may occur 
  subsequently in the fiscal year to eliminate any breach in the 
  discretionary spending limits; this is referred to as ``within-
  session'' sequestration. Sec. 251(a)(6).

                Modification or Suspension of Sequestration

      The OMB having issued a final sequestration report for a fiscal 
  year, the Majority Leader of either House of Congress may under Gramm-
  Rudman introduce a timely joint resolution directing the President to 
  modify his most recent sequestration order or to provide an 
  alternative to reduce the deficit for such fiscal year. Sec. 258A(a). 
  The issuance of a ``low growth'' report by the CBO may also trigger a 
  joint resolution suspending the relevant enforcement provisions of 
  titles III and IV of the Budget Act. Sec. 258(a). For an example of 
  such a resolution, see S.J. Res. 44, 102-1, Jan. 23, 1991, p ____.
      A sequestration ordered by the President for fiscal year 1990 was 
  rescinded by the Congress when it adopted a deficit-reducing 
  reconciliation bill for that year. In this instance, initial 
  sequestration reports for fiscal year 1990 were issued by the 
  Directors of both CBO and OMB. Accordingly, the President issued an 
  initial sequestration order directing that the reductions specified in 
  the OMB report be made on a provisional basis; a final sequestration 
  order was then issued by the President. The reconciliation bill 
  included provisions to rescind the orders and restore the sequestered 
  funds, and reduced the deficit by achieving certain other savings. 
  Pub. L. No. 101-239.


  Sec. 11 . Spending Controls

                          Discretionary Spending

      The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) established discretionary 
  spending limits for fiscal years 1991 through 1995 in Sec. 601 of the 
  Congressional Budget Act. The limits on discretionary budget authority 
  and discre-

[[Page 189]]

  tionary outlays are enforceable by the sequestration process under 
  Sec. 251 of Gramm-Rudman. For fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the limits 
  applied to total discretionary budget authority and total 
  discretionary outlays (rather than being distributed among defense, 
  domestic, and international categories). See Sec. 601(a)(2).
      The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), Pub. L. No. 
  103-66, Sec. 14002, further extended the discretionary spending limits 
  of Sec. 601. OBRA continues the use of adjustable discretionary 
  spending limits through fiscal year 1998. As was the case for fiscal 
  years 1994 and 1995, OBRA established separate limits each year for 
  total discretionary budget authority and total discretionary outlays. 
  See H. Conf. Rept. No. 103-213, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. See also 103-1, 
  Aug. 4, 1993, p ____.
      Gramm-Rudman sets forth a detailed procedure for the periodic, 
  automatic adjustment of the discretionary spending limits. Adjustments 
  are made for various factors, including changes in accounting concepts 
  and inflation. See Sec. 251(b)(1).

                              Direct Spending

      Direct spending is spending controlled outside of the annual 
  appropriations process. It is composed of entitlement and other 
  mandatory spending programs, including, under Gramm-Rudman, the food 
  stamp program. Sec. 250(c)(8). Such programs are generally funded by 
  provisions of the permanent laws that created them. For these reasons 
  Congress relies on reconciliation procedures to enforce budget 
  policies with respect to existing spending laws. Reconciliation, see 
  Sec. 7, supra.
      Direct spending is not capped, but operates under Gramm-Rudman's 
  so-called paygo process, which requires that direct spending and 
  revenue legislation enacted for a fiscal year be deficit neutral. See 
  Sec. 252.


  Sec. 12 . New Spending Authority

      A conventional authorization establishes or continues a government 
  agency or program, and while it may place a limit on the amount of 
  budget authority that may be appropriated for that purpose (Deschler 
  Ch 25 Sec. 2.13), the authorized funds are available only to the 
  extent provided for in appropriation acts originated by the 
  Appropriations Committee (see Appropriations). Spending legislation 
  which circumvents the appropriations process is called ``backdoor 
  spending.'' Restrictions against such legislation are found in the 
  Congressional Budget Act. With certain exceptions, new ``spending 
  authority'' is to be ``effective'' only as provided in appropriation 
  acts. Sec. 401(a). ``Spending authority'' is defined by the Act to 
  include contract authority and borrowing authority. Sec. 401(c)(2). 
  The Act has been con-

[[Page 190]]

  strued to prohibit the consideration of a measure containing new 
  spending authority to incur indebtedness, if the budget authority 
  therefor is not provided in advance by appropriation acts. See 94-2, 
  Sept. 27, 1976, p 32655.
      The ``spending authority'' referred to in Sec. 401(a) does not 
  apply to bills that provide legislative authorizations that are 
  subject to the appropriations process. For example, a point of order 
  that a section of a bill providing that certain loan receipts were 
  ``authorized to be made available'' was in violation of the Budget Act 
  was overruled on the ground that the funds were subject to the 
  appropriation process and thus no new spending authority was involved. 
  94-1, Sept. 10, 1975, pp 28270, 28271. On the other hand a conference 
  report authorizing the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to 
  borrow funds by issuing government notes as a public debt transaction, 
  not subject to amounts specified in advance in appropriation acts, was 
  conceded to violate Sec. 401(a) of the Budget Act and was ruled out on 
  a point of order. 94-2, Sept. 27, 1976, p 32655.
      Whether or not an amendment to a pending measure provides new 
  spending authority for a program is determined by its marginal effect 
  on the pending measure (rather than current law). See 102-2, Mar. 26, 
  1992, p ____.
      The House may adopt a resolution reported from the Committee on 
  Rules waiving points of order against the consideration of a 
  conference report containing an amendment providing new spending 
  authority not subject to amounts provided in advance by appropriation 
  acts in violation of Sec. 401(a) of the Budget Act. 95-1, Dec. 15, 
  1977, pp 38949, 38950 [H. Res. 935, providing for consideration of the 
  Clean Water Act of 1977]. In this instance, the Budget Committee 
  supported the waiver for the Clean Water Act with the understanding 
  that a concurrent resolution would be offered after adoption of the 
  report to correct the enrollment of the bill to make the contract 
  authority subject to the appropriation process. A similar procedure 
  was followed with respect to a waiver of points of order against a 
  reclamation projects bill in 1976. 94-2, Aug. 25, 1976, p 27747.

                           New Credit Authority

      The Congressional Budget Act contains restrictions against the 
  consideration of new credit authority in reported measures unless such 
  authority is limited to the extent or in amounts provided in 
  appropriation acts. Sec. 402(a). Legislation carrying new credit 
  authority is also subject to Sec. 504(b) of the Budget Act. Section 
  504(b) constitutes a standing requirement, notwithstanding any other 
  provision of law, that new credit authority be effective only to the 
  extent that subsidy costs are capped and appropriated in advance.

[[Page 191]]

                           Entitlement Authority

      New spending in the form of an entitlement may be subject to 
  points of order under the Congressional Budget Act. A measure 
  containing a new entitlement is subject to a point of order (see 
  Sec. 401(b)(1)) unless the entitlement (as defined by the Act) is to 
  take effect after the start of the appropriate fiscal year. See, for 
  example 99-2, June 26, 1986, p 15729. In addition, a point of order 
  lies under Sec. 303(a) against an amendment providing new entitlement 
  authority for a coming fiscal year before the adoption of a concurrent 
  resolution on the budget for that fiscal year. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p 
  ____.
      An amendment enlarging the class of persons eligible for a 
  government subsidy has been held to provide new entitlement authority 
  within the meaning of the Budget Act. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____.


  Sec. 13 . Social Security Funds

      Receipts and disbursements of the Social Security trust funds are 
  not to be counted as new budget authority, outlays, receipts, or as 
  deficit or surplus. Under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA), 
  the off-budget status of these programs applies for purposes of the 
  President's budget, the congressional budget, and under Gramm-Rudman. 
  See Sec. 13301.
      Transactions of the Social Security trust funds--the Federal Old-
  Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability 
  Insurance Trust Fund (OASDI)--are excluded from the spending and 
  revenue totals under the BEA. The trust funds were included in the 
  deficit calculations made under Gramm-Rudman for deficit reduction 
  purposes, but were exempt from sequestration. The BEA (in Secs. 13301-
  13306) reaffirms the off-budget status of Social Security trust funds, 
  excludes them from the deficit and paygo calculations made under 
  Gramm-Rudman, and continues their exemption from sequestration. The 
  BEA creates a ``fire wall'' point of order in the House to prohibit 
  the consideration of legislation that would change certain balances of 
  the Social Security trust funds over specified periods under 
  Sec. 13302. H. Conf. Rept. No. 101-964, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
      The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 prohibits the consideration 
  of certain reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations 
  with respect to the title II program under the Social Security Act. 
  Sec. 310(g).


  Sec. 14 . The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit

      A limit on the public debt is fixed by law. 31 USC Sec. 3101. 
  Increases in the debt limit are frequently needed because of increases 
  in federal debt. Changes in the public debt limit may be effected 
  through procedures set

[[Page 192]]

  forth in House Rule XLIX. Manual Sec. 945. The budget resolution plays 
  a key role in this process. Reconciliation directives relative to 
  changes in the public debt may be included in the concurrent 
  resolution on the budget under Sec. 310(a)(3) of the Budget Act. 
  Reconciliation, see Sec. 7, supra.
      If the budget resolution as adopted sets forth an amount for the 
  public debt which is different from the amount of the statutory limit, 
  the procedure specified by Rule XLIX operates. Manual Sec. 945. After 
  the budget resolution is adopted by the Congress, a joint resolution 
  changing the debt limit is prepared by the Clerk and sent to the 
  Senate for its approval. This resolution is ``deemed,'' under the 
  conditions of House Rule XLIX, to have passed the House. The date of 
  final House action in adopting the conference report on the concurrent 
  resolution on the budget, rather than the date of final Senate action 
  (when the Senate acts later) or the date of receipt of a message from 
  the Senate informing the House of final Senate action, is the 
  appropriate date under Rule XLIX for deeming the House to have 
  engrossed and passed a joint resolution increasing the statutory limit 
  on the public debt. 103-1, Apr. 1, 1993, p ____.
      In some years, instead of a joint resolution, Congress has enacted 
  a separate bill raising the debt limit. See, for example, H.R. 5350, 
  Aug. 4, 1990. The debt limit may also be increased by a provision 
  attached to other legislation, such as a reconciliation bill. See the 
  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-66). By 
  adoption of a special order, Rule XLIX may be made inapplicable to a 
  specific budget resolution. See H. Res. 149, May 17, 1995, p ____.


  Sec. 15 . Impoundments Generally

             Executive Branch Authority; Types of Impoundments

      The executive branch has no inherent power to impound appropriated 
  funds. In the absence of express congressional authorization to 
  withhold funds appropriated for implementation of a legislative 
  program, the executive branch must spend all the funds. Kennedy v 
  Mathews, 413 F Supp 1240 (1976). See also Train v City of New York, 
  420 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). Accordingly, if the 
  controlling statute gives the officials in question no discretion to 
  withhold the funds, a court may grant injunctive relief directing that 
  they be made available. Kennedy, at p 1245.
      The impoundment of appropriated funds may be proposed by the 
  President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Two types 
  of impoundments are referred to by this statute: (1) rescissions, 
  which are the permanent cancellation of spending (Sec. 1012), and (2) 
  deferrals, which impose a temporary delay in spending (Sec. 1013), 
  codified at 2 USC Secs. 681 et seq.

[[Page 193]]

      The Impoundment Control Act was enacted by Congress in 1974 in an 
  effort to control the budgetary impoundment powers asserted by the 
  President. As the court noted in City of New Haven, Conn. v U.S., 634 
  F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), in the early 1970's the President began to 
  use impoundments as a means of shaping domestic policy, withholding 
  funds from various programs he did not favor. The legality of these 
  impoundments was repeatedly litigated, and by 1974, impoundments had 
  been vitiated in many cases. See, e.g., National Council of Community 
  Mental Health Centers, Inc. v Weinberger, 361 F Supp 897 (D.D.C. 1973) 
  (public health funds).


  Sec. 16 . -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto

                       Under Impoundment Control Act

      Under the Impoundment Control Act, the President may propose to 
  rescind all or part of the budget authority Congress has appropriated 
  for a particular program. To propose a rescission the President must 
  send a special message to Congress detailing the amount of the 
  proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and a summary of the effects 
  the rescission would have on the programs involved. Sec. 1012(a). 
  Under the Act, Congress then has 45 days within which to approve the 
  proposed rescission by a ``rescission bill'' that must be passed by 
  both Houses. Sec. 1012(b). If it fails of approval, the President must 
  allow the full amount appropriated to be spent. City of New Haven, 
  Conn. v U.S., 634 F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), 1452.
      The 45-day period prescribed by the Act applies only to the 
  initial consideration of the bill in the House; the consideration of a 
  conference report on such a bill is subject only to the general rules 
  of the House relating to conference reports and is not prevented by 
  the expiration of the 45-day period following the initial 
  consideration of the bill. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, pp 8484, 8485.
      The Impoundment Control Act sets forth detailed procedures 
  expediting and governing the consideration of a rescission bill 
  introduced under its provisions. Secs. 1017(a)-(c). These procedures 
  are rarely invoked in the modern practice and the ``rescission bill'' 
  referred to in the Act is not the only means by which the House may 
  take action on such a matter. The House may address the question 
  through other legislation without following the procedures set forth 
  in Sec. 1017. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, p 8484.
      Rescissions of prior appropriations can be reported in a general 
  appropriation bill and the inclusion of rescission language by the 
  Committee on Appropriations is excepted from the prohibition against 
  provisions ``changing existing law'' under Rule XXI clause 2(b). See 
  Manual Secs. 834b, 834f.

[[Page 194]]

                         Under Line Item Veto Act

      Enhanced rescission authority was given to the President on Apr. 
  9, 1996, with the adoption of the Line Item Veto Act (Pub. L. No. 104-
  130). This new authority first becomes effective in the 105th 
  Congress. This Act added new part C to title X of the Congressional 
  Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 USC Secs. 631 et seq.). 
  If he acts within a limited time frame after the enactment, and if 
  certain presidential determinations are made, the President is 
  authorized to cancel:

     Any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority.
     Any item of new direct spending.
     Any limited tax benefit.

      The President must determine that such cancellation will reduce 
  the federal budget deficit, not impair any essential government 
  functions, and not harm the national interest. He must notify the 
  Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message within 
  five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law. 
  Sec. 1021(a).
      Provision is made for a 30-day congressional review period, and 
  for expedited consideration of disapproval bills. A disapproval bill 
  must be reported not later than seven calendar days after introduction 
  or be subject to a highly privileged motion to discharge. After being 
  reported or discharged, a disapproval bill may be considered in the 
  Committee of the Whole with consideration of the bill not to exceed 
  one hour and with no amendment in order except that any Member, if 
  supported by 49 other Members, may offer an amendment striking a 
  cancellation or cancellations from the bill. Any conference with the 
  Senate would also be expedited. Sec. 1025(f).
      The cancellation takes effect upon receipt in the House and the 
  Senate of the special message notifying the congress of the 
  cancellation. If a disapproval bill for such special message is 
  enacted into law, then all cancellations disapproved in that law 
  become null and void. Sec. 1023.


  Sec. 17 . -- Deferrals

      Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President must 
  notify Congress of the proposed deferral of any budget authority, the 
  reasons for the deferral, the impact the deferral will have on the 
  programs involved, and ``any legal authority invoked to justify the 
  proposed deferral.'' Sec. 1013(a). See codification at 2 USC 
  Sec. 684(a).
      Until 1986, the Act was used frequently as the basis for 
  Presidential deferral proposals and for their consideration by the 
  Congress. The statute as originally written allowed a deferral to be 
  overridden by a resolution of

[[Page 195]]

  disapproval passed by either House. Pub. L. No. 93-344, title X, 
  Sec. 1013. Congress could reject the proposal by one-House veto or in 
  subsequent legislation. Today, the Congress may disapprove a deferral 
  through the enactment of ordinary legislation or through appropriation 
  acts; but it may not do so through a resolution of disapproval by one 
  House only under recent court rulings. See Congressional Disapproval 
  Actions.
      In 1986, a suit was brought to contest the validity of certain 
  deferrals proposed by the President under Sec. 1013 of the Act. In 
  November 1985, the President had signed the fiscal year 1986 
  appropriations bill for the Department of Housing and Urban 
  Development (Pub. L. No. 99-160, 99 Stat. 909), which appropriated 
  funds for certain community development programs. In February 1986, 
  the President sent impoundment notices to Congress pursuant to the Act 
  announcing his deferrals of the expenditure of funds for the programs 
  at issue. The plaintiffs in the suit included various cities, 
  community groups, and Members of Congress. The plaintiffs challenged 
  as unconstitutional the provision allowing a so-called one-House 
  legislative veto of impoundments proposed by the President, such 
  vetoes having been declared unconstitutional under the Supreme Court 
  decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 U.S. 
  919, 103, S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). The plaintiffs argued 
  that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision contained in 
  Sec. 1013 rendered the entire section invalid, leaving the President 
  without statutory authority on which to base the deferrals in 
  question. After analyzing the intent of Congress in enacting 
  Sec. 1013, the District Court of the District of Columbia held that 
  the section's unconstitutional legislative veto provision was 
  inseverable from the remainder of the section. City of New Haven, 
  Conn. v U.S., 634 F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). Accordingly, it declared 
  Sec. 1013 void in its entirety and ordered the defendants to make the 
  deferred funds available for obligation. City of New Haven, at 1460. 
  The judgment of the District Court in striking down Sec. 1013 in its 
  entirety was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals. City of New Haven, 
  Conn. v U.S., 809 F2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
      In 1987, after Sec. 1013 of the Act was declared unconstitutional, 
  the Act was amended to exclude the one-House legislative veto 
  procedure, and limitations were placed on the purposes for which 
  deferrals could be made. See Pub. L. No. 100-119. The Act now permits 
  deferrals only in three specified situations: ``to provide for 
  contingencies,'' ``to achieve savings made possible by or through 
  changes in requirements or greater efficiency of operations,'' or ``as 
  specifically provided by law.'' Sec. 1013. The same language is used 
  in the Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 USC Sec. 1512(c)(1). The purpose of 
  such language was to preclude the President from invoking Sec. 1013 as 
  authority for implementing ``policy'' impoundments, while preserving 
  the

[[Page 196]]

  President's authority to implement routine ``programmatic'' 
  impoundments. City of New Haven, Conn. v U.S., 809 F2d 900 at p 906 
  (note).

                           Unreported Deferrals

      Section 1015(a) of the Impoundment Control Act (2 USC Sec. 686(a)) 
  requires the Comptroller General to report to the Congress whenever he 
  finds that any officer or employee of the United States has ordered, 
  permitted, or approved a reserve or deferral of budget authority, and 
  the President has not transmitted a special impoundment message with 
  respect to such reserve or deferral.


  Sec. 18 . Unfunded Mandates

      The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-4; 109 
  Stat. 48 et seq.) added a new part B to title IV of the Congressional 
  Budget Act of 1974 (2 USC Secs. 658-658g) that imposes several 
  requirements on committees with respect to ``federal mandates,'' 
  establishes points of order to enforce those requirements, and 
  precludes the consideration of a rule or order waiving such points of 
  order in the House. Section 425 of the Congressional Budget Act 
  establishes a point of order against consideration of a bill, joint 
  resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report containing 
  unfunded mandates. Section 426(a) of the Act establishes a point of 
  order against consideration of any rule or order that waives the 
  application of Sec. 425. Points of order under Secs. 425 and 426(a) of 
  the Budget Act are disposed of via the question of consideration. 
  Section 426(b)(2) establishes as a threshold premise for cognizability 
  of a point of order under Secs. 425 or 426(a) the specification of 
  precise legislative language that is alleged to constitute a federal 
  mandate. On May 23, 1996, the House voted to consider an amendment 
  notwithstanding a point of order raised under Sec. 425. 104-2, p ____.