[House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House]
[Budget Process]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
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BUDGET PROCESS
Sec. 1. In General; Legislative Background
Sec. 2. Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Sec. 3. The Budget Timetable
Sec. 4. Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Sec. 5. -- Amendments to Resolutions
Sec. 6. -- Debate on Conference Reports
Sec. 7. Reconciliation Procedures
Sec. 8. Adherence to Spending and Revenue Levels
Sec. 9. Deficit Targets
Sec. 10. Sequestration
Sec. 11. Spending Controls
Sec. 12. New Spending Authority
Sec. 13. Social Security Funds
Sec. 14. The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
Sec. 15. Impoundments Generally
Sec. 16. -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto
Sec. 17. -- Deferrals
Sec. 18. Unfunded Mandates
Research References
3 Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21
Manual Secs. 169, 674, 695, 709, 726, 876b, 1007-1013
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (Pub. L. No. 67-13)
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub.
L. No. 93-344)
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(Pub. L. No. 99-177), also known as the Gramm-Rudman Act
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation
Act of 1987 (Pub. L. No. 100-119)
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-508)
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-66)
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-4)
Line Item Veto Act (Pub. L. No. 104-130)
Manual on the Federal Budget Process, CRS, Dec. 24, 1991
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Sec. 1 . In General; Legislative Background
Generally
There are three stages in the complex process by which the
Congress allocates the fiscal resources of the federal government.
There is, first, an authorization process under which federal programs
are created in response to national needs, and second, an
appropriations process under which funding is provided for those
programs. See Appropriations. The third stage is the congressional
budget process, under which Congress annually establishes an overall
fiscal policy on how much total spending and revenues ought to be and
how total spending should be divided among the major functions of
government such as defense, agriculture, and health. These three
stages are not necessarily considered or completed in chronological
order.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921
The modern era in budget reform began with the passage of the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which established a new
Presidential budget system, and which permitted all items relating to
a department to be brought together in the same bill. This Act (Pub.
L. No. 67-13) authorized the President to submit a national budget in
place of the previous uncoordinated agency submissions. This Act
required him to submit his budget recommendations to Congress each
year, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was created to
assist him in this respect. The 1921 Act also established the General
Accounting Office and made it the principal auditing arm of the
federal government. See 31 USC Secs. 1101 et seq.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974
Until 1974, the Congress lacked a comprehensive uniform mechanism
for establishing priorities among its budgetary goals and for
determining national economic policy regarding the federal budget.
Budget responsibility remained fragmented throughout the Congress.
Both taxing and spending actions were taken over a period of many
months and by way of many different legislative measures. The size of
the budget, and whether it should be in surplus or deficit, were not
subject to effective controls. To address these problems, both Houses
enacted over President Nixon's veto the Congressional Budget and
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Pub. L. No. 93-
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344). Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21. The Act (see 2 USC Secs. 601 et seq.)
consisted of 10 titles which:
Established new committees on the budget in both the House and
the Senate, and a Congressional Budget Office designed to
improve Congress' informational and analytical resources with
respect to the budgetary process.
Set forth a timetable and established controls for various
phases of the congressional budget process centered on a
concurrent resolution on the budget to be adopted prior to
legislative consideration of revenue or spending bills.
Spelled out various enforcement procedures and provided for
program review and evaluation.
Provided for standardization of budget terminology.
Established procedures for congressional review of
Presidential impoundment actions.
Titles I through IX are known as the ``Congressional Budget Act''
and title X is known as the ``Impoundment Control Act.'' The Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 added a new part B to title IV of the
Congressional Budget Act.
The central purpose of the process established by the Act is to
coordinate the various revenue and spending decisions that are made in
separate tax, appropriations, and legislative measures. (The Act
originally provided for the adoption of two budget resolutions each
year, but the Act was amended in 1985 to allow an entire fiscal-year
cycle to be addressed by a single resolution.)
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
(referred to herein as Gramm-Rudman) made further significant changes
in the budget process, and in the Congressional Budget Act procedures.
(Gramm-Rudman is codified in 2 USC Secs. 900 et seq.) Conceived as a
statutory response to the burgeoning federal deficit problem, Gramm-
Rudman instituted a single binding budget resolution, binding
committee allocations, and provided for reconciliation and enforcement
of fixed deficit targets through sequestration. The Congressional
Budget Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S.
House of Representatives, July 1986, p 7. The Act included provisions
amending the Congressional Budget Act to permit a new point of order
against legislation exceeding the appropriate committee allocation
(Sec. 302(f)), exempting the title II social security program from
reconciliation (Sec. 310(g)), and precluding the breaching of budget
authority or outlay ceilings or revenue floors, with certain
exceptions (Sec. 311).
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Budget Enforcement Act of 1990; Revisions and Extensions
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) revised the Gramm-Rudman
deficit targets and made them adjustable, and extended the
sequestration process. It set limitations on distinct categories of
discretionary spending, and created pay-as-you-go procedures to
require that increases in direct spending or decreases in revenues due
to legislative action be offset so that there is no net increase in
the deficit. Secs. 9, 10, infra. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 (OBRA) extended the discretionary spending limits and pay-as-
you-go requirements through fiscal 1998. Pub. L. No. 103-66.
Enforcement Procedures Generally
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 permits enforcement through
parliamentary points of order against legislation violating its
requirements and procedures. However, the enforcement mechanisms are
not automatically applied and timely points of order from the floor
are required to bring them into play. Budget Process Law Annotated,
1993 Edition, S. Prt 103-49, p 176. But the Congressional Budget Act
also is linked to certain automatic enforcement procedures under
Gramm-Rudman. The Congressional Budget Act sets forth discretionary
spending limits used for purposes of sequestration, the automatic-
formula reduction process that is required if triggered under Gramm-
Rudman. Sequestration, see Sec. 10, infra.
Enforcement through Budget Act points of order may be precluded
under Sec. 606(d)(2) if the pending measure is protected by one of the
emergency designations permitted under Gramm-Rudman when declared by
both the President and Congress (see Secs. 251(b)(2)(D) and 252(e)).
Use of Special Rules
A concurrent resolution on the budget or a budget reconciliation
bill that has been reported as privileged pursuant to clause 4(a) of
Rule XI is privileged for consideration under the provisions of
Sec. 305 of the Act and clause 8 of Rule XXIII or the provisions of
Sec. 310 of the Act, as the case may be. In either case, however, the
House may vary the parameters of consideration established in statute
or standing rule by unanimous consent, by suspension of the rules, or
by adoption of a special rule.
This is true because the statutory provisions concerned were
enacted as exercises of the rulemaking powers of the House and the
Senate, respectively, under the Constitution. See, for example,
Sec. 904(a). It is customary for the House to vary the parameters for
consideration of a particular budget resolution or reconciliation bill
by adopting a special order of business resolution recommended by the
Committee on Rules.
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Similarly, the various parliamentary enforcement mechanisms
established in the Act--those sections establishing points of order
against consideration of certain propositions--likewise constitute
rules of the House and, as such, are liable to waiver by unanimous
consent, by suspension of the rules, or by adoption of a special rule.
It is not unusual for the House to waive such a point of order by
adopting a special order of business resolution recommended by the
Committee on Rules.
Under the Budget Act the Speaker must refer a concurrent
resolution on the budget reported from the Budget Committee
sequentially to the Rules Committee for not more than five legislative
days if it includes any procedure or matter having the effect of
changing a rule of the House. See Sec. 301(c). After such a referral,
an additional one-day layover follows the report of the Committee on
Rules. See Sec. 305(a)(1).
Sec. 2 . Committee Jurisdiction; Reports and Estimates
Generally
To implement the congressional budget process, the Congressional
Budget Act created the Senate and House Budget Committees (and the
Congressional Budget Office). 2 USC Secs. 601 et seq. The Budget
Committees were given the authority to draft Congress' annual budget
plan for the federal government for consideration by the full Senate
and House. Unlike the authorizing and appropriating committees, which
focus on individual federal programs, the Budget Committees focus on
the federal budget as a whole and how it affects the national economy.
The House rules give the House Budget Committee jurisdiction over
matters relating to the congressional budget, including concurrent
resolutions on the budget. Rule X clause 1(d)(2). Manual Sec. 673a.
The Committee on Rules has the special oversight function of review of
the budget process. Rule X clause 3(i). Manual Sec. 693. In the 104th
Congress, the limited jurisdiction of the Budget Committee was
expanded to consolidate the budget process and the enforcement of
budget controls. See Manual Sec. 673b.
The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 310) provides conditions for
the reporting by the Budget Committees of reconciliation measures. The
Act (Sec. 306) prohibits the consideration in either House of any
measure dealing with a matter within the jurisdiction of its Budget
Committee if not reported from the Budget Committee or discharged
therefrom.
Committee Reports; Cost Estimates and Scorekeeping
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) provides economic and
program analyses and cost information on most reported public bills
and resolu-
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tions. Under the Budget Act, five-year cost estimates are prepared and
published in the reports accompanying these bills. Sec. 403(a).
Committee reports on legislation providing new budget authority,
new spending or credit authority, or a change in revenues or tax
expenditures, are required to contain the estimates and other detailed
information mandated by Sec. 308(a). The information mandated by
Sec. 308(a) is also required under House Rule XI clause 2(l)(3) except
that, under an amendment adopted in 1995, the estimates with respect
to new budget authority must include, when practicable, a comparison
of the total estimated funding level for the relevant program (or
programs) to the appropriate levels under current law.
If a bill is introduced in a form providing new budget or
entitlement authority and is reported without curative amendment and
without an estimate of its cost, then a Sec. 308 point of order may be
made against consideration of the bill. However, a special order for
the consideration of a bill that ``self-executes'' the adoption of an
amendment providing new budget authority into a bill to be
subsequently considered does not, itself, provide new budget authority
within the meaning of Sec. 308 of the Budget Act. 103-1, Feb. 24,
1993, p ____.
The Director of the Congressional Budget Office is required to
issue to the committees of the House and the Senate monthly reports
detailing and tabulating the progress of congressional action on
specified bills and resolutions. Sec. 308(b)(1). The Budget Committees
of each House are required to prepare budget ``scorekeeping'' reports
and to make them available frequently enough to provide Members of
each House with an accurate representation of the current status of
congressional consideration of the budget. Sec. 308(b)(2).
Committee allocations, see Sec. 8, infra.
Sec. 3 . The Budget Timetable
The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 300) includes a timetable for
various stages of the congressional budget process:
On or before first Monday in February--President submits his
budget to Congress
Note: Additional time for submission of the President's budget can
be provided for by law. Shortly after its submission, the two Budget
Committees begin hearings on the budget, the economic assumptions upon
which it is based, the economy in general, and national budget
priorities.
On or before February 15--Congressional Budget Office submits
annual report
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Note: The CBO is required to submit its annual report to the
Budget Committees. This report deals primarily with overall economic
and fiscal policy and alternative budget levels and national budget
priorities.
On or before February 25--Committees submit views and
estimates to Budget Committees
Note: This step involves the submission of the views and estimates
of all standing committees of the House and Senate. These reports
provide the Budget Committees with an early and comprehensive
indication of committee legislative planning. These reports include
estimates of new budget authority and outlays.
On or before April 1--Senate Budget Committee reports
concurrent resolution
On or before April 15--Congress completes action on concurrent
resolution on the budget
Note: Congress may revise its budget resolution before the end of
the appropriate fiscal year (see Sec. 304 of the Budget Act); while
this may be done at any point, the Congress in some years has followed
the practice of revising the budget plan for the current fiscal year
as part of the budget resolution for the upcoming fiscal year.
May 15--Annual appropriation bills considered in the House
Note: General appropriation bills may be considered in the House
after May 15 even if a budget resolution for the ensuing fiscal year
has yet to be agreed to. Sec. 303(b)(1).
On or before June 10--House Appropriations Committee reports
last annual appropriation bill
June 15--Congress completes action on reconciliation
legislation
Note: The mandatory June 15 deadline was repealed by BEA. However,
the Congress may not adjourn for more than three calendar days during
the month of July until the House has completed action on the
reconciliation legislation (Sec. 310(f)) and the 13 general
appropriation bills (Sec. 309).
On or before June 30--House completes action on annual
appropriation bills
October 1--Fiscal year begins
Note: The fiscal year begins on October 1, and ends on September
30. In the past, action on appropriation bills has not always been
completed by October 1, necessitating the passage of a ``continuing
resolution'' to provide appropriations on a temporary basis until the
regular appropriation bills are enacted.
Deadlines for other stages in the budget process, such as
notification of adjustment in maximum deficit amounts, the President's
mid-session
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budget review, and various CBO and OMB sequestration reports, were
provided for in Gramm-Rudman Sec. 254(a).
Under rules adopted in 1995, each standing committee has the
deadline of February 15 of the first session for the submission of its
oversight plans for the Congress to the Committees on Government
Reform and Oversight and House Oversight. These plans must be reported
to the House by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight by
March 31 of the session. Rule X clause 2(d).
Sec. 4 . Budget Resolutions; Consideration and Debate
Generally
The budget resolution is a concurrent resolution; as such it is
not a law, but serves as an internal framework for Congress in its
action on separate revenue, spending, and other budget-related
measures. The content of budget resolutions is governed by the
Congressional Budget Act (see particularly Secs. 301, 606). Budget
resolutions set forth budgetary levels for the upcoming fiscal year
and for the four succeeding fiscal years. The budget totals set forth
what the Congress considers to be the appropriate amounts, including
amounts for total spending and total revenues. The budget resolution
gives the Congress a mechanism for establishing federal spending
priorities. The budget resolution accomplishes this by dividing up
federal spending among various classifications such as national
defense, agriculture, and health. These classifications, known as
``budget functions,'' provide the Congress with a means of allocating
federal resources among broad categories of spending. The
Congressional Budget Process, An Explanation, Committee on the Budget,
U.S. Senate, Mar. 1988, p 4.
Section 301(b)(4) of the Budget Act permits a concurrent
resolution on the budget to ``set forth such other matters, and
require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may be
appropriate to carry out the purposes of [the] Act.'' (This provision
is sometimes referred to as the ``elastic clause.'') Textually, the
``other matters'' and ``procedures'' admitted by this section must:
(1) relate to the budget; and (2) be appropriate to carry out the
purposes of the Budget Act.
Note: They must not include matter that would destroy the
privilege of the concurrent resolution on the budget, such as by
effecting a special order of business. The only matter in the nature
of a special order of business that may be included in a privileged
concurrent resolution on the budget is a reconciliation directive.
Reconciliation, see Sec. 7, infra.
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Floor Consideration
The Congressional Budget Act provides special procedures for House
consideration of a concurrent resolution on the budget reported by the
Committee on the Budget. Floor consideration may begin after a five-
day layover period that starts when the report on the resolution first
becomes available to the Members. See Sec. 305(a)(1).
The Act provides for consideration in the Committee of the Whole.
Ten hours are allowed for general debate, with an additional four
hours permitted on economic goals and policies. Amendments are
considered under the five-minute rule (Sec. 5, infra). After the
Committee rises and reports the resolution back to the House, the
previous question is considered as ordered on the resolution and any
amendments thereto to final passage without intervening motion. A
motion to recommit the resolution is not in order, nor is a motion to
reconsider. Sec. 305(a)(2)-(5). The question having been put on final
passage, the yeas and nays are considered as ordered. Rule XV clause
7.
A budget resolution being considered in Committee of the Whole has
been held subject to a motion to rise and report the resolution back
to the House with the recommendation that the resolving clause be
stricken. 103-1, Mar. 18, 1993, p ____.
The Budget Act procedures for floor consideration of a budget
resolution are applicable only to privileged budget resolutions which
have been reported from committee, and not to unreported budget
resolutions. 98-2, Apr. 5, 1984, pp 7992, 7993.
The Rules Committee may report a special rule to be applied during
the consideration of a particular budget resolution or conference
report. The committee may report a special rule permitting only
certain designated amendments to be offered to the resolution. See
Sec. 1, supra. In recent Congresses, only designated amendments in the
nature of substitutes have been permitted, and perfecting amendments
have been precluded. H. Res. 384, 103-2, Mar. 10, 1994, p ____.
A budget resolution may under some circumstances be divided so as
to permit a separate vote on particular sections therein. 102-2, Mar.
5, 1992, p ____. In one instance, where a pending budget resolution
contained one section revising the congressional budget for the fiscal
year, preceded by sections setting forth budget targets for ensuing
fiscal years as well as reconciliation instructions, and followed by a
final section on reporting of certain fiscal information, the question
of its adoption was divided on the demand of a Member for two separate
votes (1) on the first and final portions of the resolution and then
(2) on the separable section in between. 96-2, May 7, 1980, pp 10185-
87.
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Budget Resolution to Precede Consideration of Related Legislation
The Congressional Budget Act precludes certain budget-related
legislation for a fiscal year until the budget resolution for that
year has been adopted by both Houses. Sec. 303(a). The essence of
section 303(a) of the Budget Act is timing. It reflects a judgment
that legislative decisions on expenditures and revenues for the coming
fiscal year should await the adoption of the budget resolution for
that year. 101-2, July 25, 1990, p ____. Legislation ruled out under
this provision has included:
A conference report containing new spending authority in the
form of entitlements to become effective in fiscal years 1978
through 1980, where the concurrent resolution on the budget for
those fiscal years had not yet been adopted. 94-2, Sept. 30,
1976, pp 34074, 34075.
An amendment providing new entitlement authority to become
effective in a fiscal year before adoption of the budget
resolution for that year. 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-57; 102-
2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____ (six rulings).
An amendment providing new budget authority for a fiscal year,
before adoption of a budget resolution for that year. 99-1,
July 17, 1985, pp 19435, 19436.
Under Sec. 303 of the Act, the Chair is guided by his own judgment
of the text and of the arguments presented from the floor as to
whether an amendment involves spending or revenues. The statutory
requirements that the Chair determine certain levels of spending or
revenues on the basis of estimates made by the Committee on the Budget
apply only to questions arising under Sec. 302 (allocation breaches)
or Sec. 311 (breaches of totals). Nevertheless, the Chair may treat
Budget Committee estimates as persuasive on questions arising under
Sec. 303 (timing breaches), whether to maintain consistency in
determinations under title III of the Act or simply for their
analytical merit. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____.
Waivers of Sec. 303(a) have been provided pursuant to a special
rule from the Committee on Rules. See Sec. 1, supra.
Sec. 5 . -- Amendments to Resolutions
Generally
Under the Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 305(a)(5)), amendments to
budget resolutions are considered in the Committee of the Whole under
the five-minute rule in accordance with House Rule XXIII. Under clause
8 of that rule, the resolution is open to amendment at any point, so
that the Committee of the Whole may amend the functional categories
section prior to consideration of the total budget allocations. 95-2,
May 2, 1978, p 12094.
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Amendments to Achieve Mathematical Consistency
The 96th Congress adopted provisions amending Rule XXIII clause 8
to require, with certain exceptions, that amendments to concurrent
resolutions on the budget be mathematically consistent. 96-1, Jan. 15,
1979, p 8. Under this rule, amendments making changes in budget
authority and outlay aggregate totals must be accompanied by
comparable changes in functional categories. A point of order will lie
against an amendment to the resolution increasing the aggregates and a
functional category for budget authority and outlays but not changing
the amount of the deficit. However, an amendment which only transfers
an amount of budget authority from one functional category to
another--that is, reduces one category by a certain amount and adds
the same amount to another category--need make no changes in the
aggregates to achieve mathematical consistency. 96-1, May 8, 1979, p
10271.
An amendment to achieve mathematical consistency throughout the
resolution may either change the functional categories to conform with
the aggregates, or vice versa, and if such an amendment is offered and
rejected, another amendment in different form to achieve mathematical
consistency may be offered. 96-1, May 14, 1979, pp 10967-75. Under
Sec. 305(a)(5) of the Budget Act, an amendment or amendments to
achieve mathematic consistency can be offered at any time up to final
passage.
A change in the public debt limit from that figure reported by the
Committee on the Budget is not in order, except as part of an
amendment offered at the direction of the Budget Committee to achieve
mathematical consistency. Rule XXIII clause 3. Public debt limit, see
Sec. 14, infra.
Germaneness
Unless protected by special rule, an amendment to a concurrent
resolution on the budget must be germane to the text of the
resolution. An amendment expressing the sense of Congress that the
Impoundment Control Act be repealed for a fiscal year and calling for
a review of the Budget Act and the budget process, has been conceded
to be not germane. 96-2, Nov. 18, 1980, p 30026.
Sec. 6 . -- Debate on Conference Reports
Under Sec. 305(a)(6) of the Congressional Budget Act there can be
up to five hours of debate in the House on a conference report on a
concurrent resolution on the budget, such debate to be equally divided
between the majority and minority parties. Where the conferees report
in total disagreement, debate on the motion to dispose of the
amendment in disagreement is not
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governed by the statute and is instead considered under the general
``hour'' rule in the House. 94-2, May 13, 1976, p 13756; 95-1, May 17,
1977, p 15126; and 95-2, May 17, 1978, p 14117.
Sec. 7 . Reconciliation Procedures
The Congressional Budget Act (Sec. 301(b)(2)) provides for the
inclusion of reconciliation instructions in a budget resolution and
for the reporting and consideration of reconciliation legislation. The
purpose of the reconciliation process is to require committees to
implement the spending and tax policy decisions agreed to in the
budget resolution. If the reconciliation directive involves more than
one committee in each House, then all committees affected by the
directive are to submit their recommendations to their respective
Budget Committees. The Budget Committees then assemble, without
substantive revision, all the recommendations into one package for
action by the House or Senate. (Sec. 310). The Congressional Budget
Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of
Representatives, July 1986, p 15. In the 104th Congress, the Senate
took the position that reconciliation instructions might contemplate
several reconciliation bills. 104-2, May 21, 1996, p ____ (decision of
Chair sustained on appeal); 104-2, May 23, 1996, p ____.
Reconciliation instructions are directives to committees to
recommend changes in existing law to achieve the goals in spending or
revenues contemplated by the budget resolution. Reconciliation
provides Congress with a mechanism to achieve reduced spending by
changing the law applicable to certain entitlement programs as part of
its budget plan. Merely lowering entitlement spending levels in the
budget resolution may not suffice, because entitlement laws require
the government to pay specified benefits to qualifying individuals
unless Congress changes those entitlement laws.
The Congressional Budget Act (see Sec. 310(d)) requires that
amendments offered to reconciliation legislation in either the House
or the Senate must not increase the level of deficit (if any) in the
resolution. In order to meet this requirement, an amendment reducing
revenues or increasing spending must offset deficit increases by
equivalent revenue increases or spending cuts. Manual on the Federal
Budget Process, CRS, Dec. 24, 1991, p 55. Section 313 of the Budget
Act addresses the subject of ``extraneous'' material in a
reconciliation bill--the so-called ``Byrd Rule.'' The enforcement of
this section applies only in the Senate, but can be directed against
matter originating with the House.
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Sec. 8 . Adherence to Spending and Revenue Levels
Generally
With certain exceptions, the Congressional Budget Act
(Sec. 311(a)) precludes specified measures--including amendments and
conference reports--that would cause total budget authority or total
outlays to exceed, or total revenues to be below, the level set forth
in the budget resolution after the Congress has completed action
thereon. The provision is enforced by raising points of order against
the consideration of measures which would breach the ``appropriate
levels'' of total new budget authority or total outlays or total
revenues in the budget resolution. The revenue and spending estimates
of the Budget Committees are used to determine revenue and spending
levels. Sec. 311(c). These budget levels represent a congressional
determination of appropriate fiscal policy and national budget
priorities. The Congressional Budget Process: A General Explanation,
Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of Representatives, July 1986, p
12. Section 311 of the Act has been interpreted to prohibit
consideration of an amendment striking out a rescission of existing
budget authority where its effect would be to increase the net new
budget authority in the bill in breach of the applicable total. 97-1,
May 12, 1981, p 9314. A point of order will lie against an amendment
that has the effect of reducing revenues for the fiscal year below the
total level of revenues contained in the concurrent resolution on the
budget for that year. See 94-2, Oct. 1, 1976, pp 34554-57.
Waivers
The House may agree to a special rule reported from the Committee
on Rules waiving points of order against consideration of a bill or
resolution in violation of Sec. 311 of the Congressional Budget Act.
96-2, Jan. 24, 1980, p 581. Thus, in 1980, a special rule waived
points of order against consideration of a bill containing new budget
authority for the current fiscal year in excess of the ceiling on
total budget authority established in the concurrent resolution on the
budget. 96-2, May 13, 1980, p 10999. See Sec. 1, supra.
Committee Allocations; ``Crosswalking''
Under the Congressional Budget Act, provision is made for the
allocation--to each committee with jurisdiction--of ``appropriate
levels'' of spending authority. See Secs. 302(a); 602(a). The joint
statement accompanying a conference report on the budget resolution
makes an allocation of total budget authority, outlays, and
entitlement authority contained in the resolution among the
appropriate committees of the House and Senate. For example, if the
conference report allocates $7 billion in budget authority and $6
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billion in outlays for the functional category ``Community and
Regional Development,'' the statement of managers must divide those
amounts among the appropriate committees of the House and Senate with
jurisdiction over programs and authorities covered by that functional
category. See Deschler Ch 13 Sec. 21. The Congressional Budget
Process: A General Explanation, Committee on the Budget, U.S. House of
Representatives, July 1986, p 13.
The allocation of the budget plan's spending levels among the
spending committees is known informally as ``crosswalking.'' Committee
crosswalks for both the House and Senate are set out initially in the
report of each House accompanying the budget resolution, and finally
in the joint explanatory statement of the conference committee on the
budget resolution. Each committee is allocated an overall level for
discretionary spending within its jurisdiction that is consistent with
the congressional budget plan. Under Sec. 602(b) Appropriation
Committees then subdivide their allocations among their subcommittees
for programs within their jurisdiction.
Any Member may raise a timely point of order against a reported
bill, amendment or conference report that would exceed the relevant
committee allocation. See Sec. 302(f). Thus, where a general
appropriation bill provided new budget authority to the limit of the
pertinent allocation pursuant to Sec. 602 of the Budget Act, an
amendment scored by the Budget Committee as providing further new
budget authority was ruled out as violating Sec. 302(f) of the Budget
Act by causing that allocation to be exceeded. 102-1, June 26, 1991, p
____. Even an amendment delaying the imposition of a certain monetary
penalty has been held to violate Sec. 302(f), the rationale being
that, by foregoing offsetting receipts, it provided new budget
authority in excess of the pertinent committee allocation. 102-1, July
18, 1991, p ____. On the other hand, an amendment that provides no new
budget authority or outlays but instead results in outlay savings is
not subject to a point of order under these provisions. 100-1, June
30, 1987, p 18308.
Pursuant to section 302(g) of the Budget Act, the Chair relies on
estimates provided by the Committee on the Budget in determining
levels of spending authority for purposes of deciding questions of
order under section 302(f) of the Budget Act. 102-1, June 26, 1991, p
____.
The Sec. 311(b) Exception
As noted above, Sec. 311(a) precludes Congress from considering
legislation that would cause total revenues to fall below, or total
new budget authority or total outlays to exceed, the appropriate level
set forth in the budget resolution. But Sec. 311(a) does not apply in
the House to spending legislation if the committee reporting the
measure has stayed within its allocation of new discretionary budget
authority and new entitlement authority. See
[[Page 187]]
Sec. 311(b). Accordingly, the House may take up any spending measure
that is within the appropriate committee allocations, even if (solely
due to excessive spending within another committee's jurisdiction) it
would cause total spending to be exceeded.
Emergency Spending
Budget Act points of order against a bill under either Sec. 311
(breach of the appropriate total) or under Sec. 302 (breach of
appropriate allocation) do not lie if the spending is protected by an
emergency designation authorized by Gramm-Rudman. Such exemptions are
specifically permitted by new Sec. 606(d)(2) of the Budget Act. Under
Gramm-Rudman, the emergency designation must be identified as such by
both the President and Congress. See Secs. 251(b)(2)(D) and 252(e).
Sec. 9 . Deficit Targets
Section 601(a)(1) of the Budget Act specified maximum deficit
amounts (MDA) for fiscal years through 1995. Congressional budget
resolutions had to be within the maximum deficit amount for the
applicable fiscal year, a requirement that was enforced by MDA points
of order under the Congressional Budget Act. See Sec. 606(b). While
these statutory deficit amounts were not in effect beyond fiscal year
1995, deficit limits were specified in the budget resolution for
fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1998. See H. Con. Res. 64
(conference report agreed to Mar. 31, 1993, p ____).
Under current Gramm-Rudman provisions, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB) provides certain estimates as to fiscal year
deficits. Sec. 252(b). Under the original Gramm-Rudman law, the
Comptroller General was a participant in the deficit amelioration
process. However, in July 1986, the Supreme Court declared the
sequestration procedure set forth in Gramm-Rudman to be
unconstitutional because it delegated executive powers to the
Comptroller General, an officer subject to removal by the Congress.
The Supreme Court in upholding the ruling of the District Court
invoked the separation of powers doctrine. The court concluded that
``Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an
officer charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.
To permit the execution of the laws to be vested in an officer
answerable only to Congress would, in practical terms, reserve in
Congress control over the execution of the laws.'' See Synar v U.S.,
106 S.Ct. 3181, 478 US 714.
[[Page 188]]
Sec. 10 . Sequestration
Sequestration involves the issuance of a Presidential order that
permanently cancels budgetary resources (except for special funds and
trust funds) for the purpose of achieving a required amount of outlay
savings. Sequestration orders are automatically triggered by OMB
reports mandated under Gramm-Rudman. Gramm-Rudman, as amended,
provides multiple sequestration procedures. The sequestration process
is used to enforce the deficit targets (Sec. 253), to enforce the
discretionary spending limits (Sec. 251), and to enforce the pay-as-
you-go requirements (Sec. 252). These provisions require that such
sequesters occur on the same day--15 calendar days after Congress
adjourns to end a session. Additional sequesters may occur
subsequently in the fiscal year to eliminate any breach in the
discretionary spending limits; this is referred to as ``within-
session'' sequestration. Sec. 251(a)(6).
Modification or Suspension of Sequestration
The OMB having issued a final sequestration report for a fiscal
year, the Majority Leader of either House of Congress may under Gramm-
Rudman introduce a timely joint resolution directing the President to
modify his most recent sequestration order or to provide an
alternative to reduce the deficit for such fiscal year. Sec. 258A(a).
The issuance of a ``low growth'' report by the CBO may also trigger a
joint resolution suspending the relevant enforcement provisions of
titles III and IV of the Budget Act. Sec. 258(a). For an example of
such a resolution, see S.J. Res. 44, 102-1, Jan. 23, 1991, p ____.
A sequestration ordered by the President for fiscal year 1990 was
rescinded by the Congress when it adopted a deficit-reducing
reconciliation bill for that year. In this instance, initial
sequestration reports for fiscal year 1990 were issued by the
Directors of both CBO and OMB. Accordingly, the President issued an
initial sequestration order directing that the reductions specified in
the OMB report be made on a provisional basis; a final sequestration
order was then issued by the President. The reconciliation bill
included provisions to rescind the orders and restore the sequestered
funds, and reduced the deficit by achieving certain other savings.
Pub. L. No. 101-239.
Sec. 11 . Spending Controls
Discretionary Spending
The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA) established discretionary
spending limits for fiscal years 1991 through 1995 in Sec. 601 of the
Congressional Budget Act. The limits on discretionary budget authority
and discre-
[[Page 189]]
tionary outlays are enforceable by the sequestration process under
Sec. 251 of Gramm-Rudman. For fiscal years 1994 and 1995, the limits
applied to total discretionary budget authority and total
discretionary outlays (rather than being distributed among defense,
domestic, and international categories). See Sec. 601(a)(2).
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA), Pub. L. No.
103-66, Sec. 14002, further extended the discretionary spending limits
of Sec. 601. OBRA continues the use of adjustable discretionary
spending limits through fiscal year 1998. As was the case for fiscal
years 1994 and 1995, OBRA established separate limits each year for
total discretionary budget authority and total discretionary outlays.
See H. Conf. Rept. No. 103-213, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. See also 103-1,
Aug. 4, 1993, p ____.
Gramm-Rudman sets forth a detailed procedure for the periodic,
automatic adjustment of the discretionary spending limits. Adjustments
are made for various factors, including changes in accounting concepts
and inflation. See Sec. 251(b)(1).
Direct Spending
Direct spending is spending controlled outside of the annual
appropriations process. It is composed of entitlement and other
mandatory spending programs, including, under Gramm-Rudman, the food
stamp program. Sec. 250(c)(8). Such programs are generally funded by
provisions of the permanent laws that created them. For these reasons
Congress relies on reconciliation procedures to enforce budget
policies with respect to existing spending laws. Reconciliation, see
Sec. 7, supra.
Direct spending is not capped, but operates under Gramm-Rudman's
so-called paygo process, which requires that direct spending and
revenue legislation enacted for a fiscal year be deficit neutral. See
Sec. 252.
Sec. 12 . New Spending Authority
A conventional authorization establishes or continues a government
agency or program, and while it may place a limit on the amount of
budget authority that may be appropriated for that purpose (Deschler
Ch 25 Sec. 2.13), the authorized funds are available only to the
extent provided for in appropriation acts originated by the
Appropriations Committee (see Appropriations). Spending legislation
which circumvents the appropriations process is called ``backdoor
spending.'' Restrictions against such legislation are found in the
Congressional Budget Act. With certain exceptions, new ``spending
authority'' is to be ``effective'' only as provided in appropriation
acts. Sec. 401(a). ``Spending authority'' is defined by the Act to
include contract authority and borrowing authority. Sec. 401(c)(2).
The Act has been con-
[[Page 190]]
strued to prohibit the consideration of a measure containing new
spending authority to incur indebtedness, if the budget authority
therefor is not provided in advance by appropriation acts. See 94-2,
Sept. 27, 1976, p 32655.
The ``spending authority'' referred to in Sec. 401(a) does not
apply to bills that provide legislative authorizations that are
subject to the appropriations process. For example, a point of order
that a section of a bill providing that certain loan receipts were
``authorized to be made available'' was in violation of the Budget Act
was overruled on the ground that the funds were subject to the
appropriation process and thus no new spending authority was involved.
94-1, Sept. 10, 1975, pp 28270, 28271. On the other hand a conference
report authorizing the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to
borrow funds by issuing government notes as a public debt transaction,
not subject to amounts specified in advance in appropriation acts, was
conceded to violate Sec. 401(a) of the Budget Act and was ruled out on
a point of order. 94-2, Sept. 27, 1976, p 32655.
Whether or not an amendment to a pending measure provides new
spending authority for a program is determined by its marginal effect
on the pending measure (rather than current law). See 102-2, Mar. 26,
1992, p ____.
The House may adopt a resolution reported from the Committee on
Rules waiving points of order against the consideration of a
conference report containing an amendment providing new spending
authority not subject to amounts provided in advance by appropriation
acts in violation of Sec. 401(a) of the Budget Act. 95-1, Dec. 15,
1977, pp 38949, 38950 [H. Res. 935, providing for consideration of the
Clean Water Act of 1977]. In this instance, the Budget Committee
supported the waiver for the Clean Water Act with the understanding
that a concurrent resolution would be offered after adoption of the
report to correct the enrollment of the bill to make the contract
authority subject to the appropriation process. A similar procedure
was followed with respect to a waiver of points of order against a
reclamation projects bill in 1976. 94-2, Aug. 25, 1976, p 27747.
New Credit Authority
The Congressional Budget Act contains restrictions against the
consideration of new credit authority in reported measures unless such
authority is limited to the extent or in amounts provided in
appropriation acts. Sec. 402(a). Legislation carrying new credit
authority is also subject to Sec. 504(b) of the Budget Act. Section
504(b) constitutes a standing requirement, notwithstanding any other
provision of law, that new credit authority be effective only to the
extent that subsidy costs are capped and appropriated in advance.
[[Page 191]]
Entitlement Authority
New spending in the form of an entitlement may be subject to
points of order under the Congressional Budget Act. A measure
containing a new entitlement is subject to a point of order (see
Sec. 401(b)(1)) unless the entitlement (as defined by the Act) is to
take effect after the start of the appropriate fiscal year. See, for
example 99-2, June 26, 1986, p 15729. In addition, a point of order
lies under Sec. 303(a) against an amendment providing new entitlement
authority for a coming fiscal year before the adoption of a concurrent
resolution on the budget for that fiscal year. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p
____.
An amendment enlarging the class of persons eligible for a
government subsidy has been held to provide new entitlement authority
within the meaning of the Budget Act. 102-2, Mar. 26, 1992, p ____.
Sec. 13 . Social Security Funds
Receipts and disbursements of the Social Security trust funds are
not to be counted as new budget authority, outlays, receipts, or as
deficit or surplus. Under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA),
the off-budget status of these programs applies for purposes of the
President's budget, the congressional budget, and under Gramm-Rudman.
See Sec. 13301.
Transactions of the Social Security trust funds--the Federal Old-
Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability
Insurance Trust Fund (OASDI)--are excluded from the spending and
revenue totals under the BEA. The trust funds were included in the
deficit calculations made under Gramm-Rudman for deficit reduction
purposes, but were exempt from sequestration. The BEA (in Secs. 13301-
13306) reaffirms the off-budget status of Social Security trust funds,
excludes them from the deficit and paygo calculations made under
Gramm-Rudman, and continues their exemption from sequestration. The
BEA creates a ``fire wall'' point of order in the House to prohibit
the consideration of legislation that would change certain balances of
the Social Security trust funds over specified periods under
Sec. 13302. H. Conf. Rept. No. 101-964, 101st Cong. 2d Sess.
The Congressional Budget Act of 1974 prohibits the consideration
of certain reconciliation legislation that contains recommendations
with respect to the title II program under the Social Security Act.
Sec. 310(g).
Sec. 14 . The Budget Process and the Public Debt Limit
A limit on the public debt is fixed by law. 31 USC Sec. 3101.
Increases in the debt limit are frequently needed because of increases
in federal debt. Changes in the public debt limit may be effected
through procedures set
[[Page 192]]
forth in House Rule XLIX. Manual Sec. 945. The budget resolution plays
a key role in this process. Reconciliation directives relative to
changes in the public debt may be included in the concurrent
resolution on the budget under Sec. 310(a)(3) of the Budget Act.
Reconciliation, see Sec. 7, supra.
If the budget resolution as adopted sets forth an amount for the
public debt which is different from the amount of the statutory limit,
the procedure specified by Rule XLIX operates. Manual Sec. 945. After
the budget resolution is adopted by the Congress, a joint resolution
changing the debt limit is prepared by the Clerk and sent to the
Senate for its approval. This resolution is ``deemed,'' under the
conditions of House Rule XLIX, to have passed the House. The date of
final House action in adopting the conference report on the concurrent
resolution on the budget, rather than the date of final Senate action
(when the Senate acts later) or the date of receipt of a message from
the Senate informing the House of final Senate action, is the
appropriate date under Rule XLIX for deeming the House to have
engrossed and passed a joint resolution increasing the statutory limit
on the public debt. 103-1, Apr. 1, 1993, p ____.
In some years, instead of a joint resolution, Congress has enacted
a separate bill raising the debt limit. See, for example, H.R. 5350,
Aug. 4, 1990. The debt limit may also be increased by a provision
attached to other legislation, such as a reconciliation bill. See the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Pub. L. No. 103-66). By
adoption of a special order, Rule XLIX may be made inapplicable to a
specific budget resolution. See H. Res. 149, May 17, 1995, p ____.
Sec. 15 . Impoundments Generally
Executive Branch Authority; Types of Impoundments
The executive branch has no inherent power to impound appropriated
funds. In the absence of express congressional authorization to
withhold funds appropriated for implementation of a legislative
program, the executive branch must spend all the funds. Kennedy v
Mathews, 413 F Supp 1240 (1976). See also Train v City of New York,
420 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 839, 43 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975). Accordingly, if the
controlling statute gives the officials in question no discretion to
withhold the funds, a court may grant injunctive relief directing that
they be made available. Kennedy, at p 1245.
The impoundment of appropriated funds may be proposed by the
President pursuant to the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Two types
of impoundments are referred to by this statute: (1) rescissions,
which are the permanent cancellation of spending (Sec. 1012), and (2)
deferrals, which impose a temporary delay in spending (Sec. 1013),
codified at 2 USC Secs. 681 et seq.
[[Page 193]]
The Impoundment Control Act was enacted by Congress in 1974 in an
effort to control the budgetary impoundment powers asserted by the
President. As the court noted in City of New Haven, Conn. v U.S., 634
F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), in the early 1970's the President began to
use impoundments as a means of shaping domestic policy, withholding
funds from various programs he did not favor. The legality of these
impoundments was repeatedly litigated, and by 1974, impoundments had
been vitiated in many cases. See, e.g., National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers, Inc. v Weinberger, 361 F Supp 897 (D.D.C. 1973)
(public health funds).
Sec. 16 . -- Rescissions; Line Item Veto
Under Impoundment Control Act
Under the Impoundment Control Act, the President may propose to
rescind all or part of the budget authority Congress has appropriated
for a particular program. To propose a rescission the President must
send a special message to Congress detailing the amount of the
proposed rescission, the reasons for it, and a summary of the effects
the rescission would have on the programs involved. Sec. 1012(a).
Under the Act, Congress then has 45 days within which to approve the
proposed rescission by a ``rescission bill'' that must be passed by
both Houses. Sec. 1012(b). If it fails of approval, the President must
allow the full amount appropriated to be spent. City of New Haven,
Conn. v U.S., 634 F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986), 1452.
The 45-day period prescribed by the Act applies only to the
initial consideration of the bill in the House; the consideration of a
conference report on such a bill is subject only to the general rules
of the House relating to conference reports and is not prevented by
the expiration of the 45-day period following the initial
consideration of the bill. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, pp 8484, 8485.
The Impoundment Control Act sets forth detailed procedures
expediting and governing the consideration of a rescission bill
introduced under its provisions. Secs. 1017(a)-(c). These procedures
are rarely invoked in the modern practice and the ``rescission bill''
referred to in the Act is not the only means by which the House may
take action on such a matter. The House may address the question
through other legislation without following the procedures set forth
in Sec. 1017. 94-1, Mar. 25, 1975, p 8484.
Rescissions of prior appropriations can be reported in a general
appropriation bill and the inclusion of rescission language by the
Committee on Appropriations is excepted from the prohibition against
provisions ``changing existing law'' under Rule XXI clause 2(b). See
Manual Secs. 834b, 834f.
[[Page 194]]
Under Line Item Veto Act
Enhanced rescission authority was given to the President on Apr.
9, 1996, with the adoption of the Line Item Veto Act (Pub. L. No. 104-
130). This new authority first becomes effective in the 105th
Congress. This Act added new part C to title X of the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (2 USC Secs. 631 et seq.).
If he acts within a limited time frame after the enactment, and if
certain presidential determinations are made, the President is
authorized to cancel:
Any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority.
Any item of new direct spending.
Any limited tax benefit.
The President must determine that such cancellation will reduce
the federal budget deficit, not impair any essential government
functions, and not harm the national interest. He must notify the
Congress of such cancellation by transmitting a special message within
five calendar days (excluding Sundays) after the enactment of the law.
Sec. 1021(a).
Provision is made for a 30-day congressional review period, and
for expedited consideration of disapproval bills. A disapproval bill
must be reported not later than seven calendar days after introduction
or be subject to a highly privileged motion to discharge. After being
reported or discharged, a disapproval bill may be considered in the
Committee of the Whole with consideration of the bill not to exceed
one hour and with no amendment in order except that any Member, if
supported by 49 other Members, may offer an amendment striking a
cancellation or cancellations from the bill. Any conference with the
Senate would also be expedited. Sec. 1025(f).
The cancellation takes effect upon receipt in the House and the
Senate of the special message notifying the congress of the
cancellation. If a disapproval bill for such special message is
enacted into law, then all cancellations disapproved in that law
become null and void. Sec. 1023.
Sec. 17 . -- Deferrals
Under the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, the President must
notify Congress of the proposed deferral of any budget authority, the
reasons for the deferral, the impact the deferral will have on the
programs involved, and ``any legal authority invoked to justify the
proposed deferral.'' Sec. 1013(a). See codification at 2 USC
Sec. 684(a).
Until 1986, the Act was used frequently as the basis for
Presidential deferral proposals and for their consideration by the
Congress. The statute as originally written allowed a deferral to be
overridden by a resolution of
[[Page 195]]
disapproval passed by either House. Pub. L. No. 93-344, title X,
Sec. 1013. Congress could reject the proposal by one-House veto or in
subsequent legislation. Today, the Congress may disapprove a deferral
through the enactment of ordinary legislation or through appropriation
acts; but it may not do so through a resolution of disapproval by one
House only under recent court rulings. See Congressional Disapproval
Actions.
In 1986, a suit was brought to contest the validity of certain
deferrals proposed by the President under Sec. 1013 of the Act. In
November 1985, the President had signed the fiscal year 1986
appropriations bill for the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Pub. L. No. 99-160, 99 Stat. 909), which appropriated
funds for certain community development programs. In February 1986,
the President sent impoundment notices to Congress pursuant to the Act
announcing his deferrals of the expenditure of funds for the programs
at issue. The plaintiffs in the suit included various cities,
community groups, and Members of Congress. The plaintiffs challenged
as unconstitutional the provision allowing a so-called one-House
legislative veto of impoundments proposed by the President, such
vetoes having been declared unconstitutional under the Supreme Court
decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 103, S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). The plaintiffs argued
that the unconstitutional legislative veto provision contained in
Sec. 1013 rendered the entire section invalid, leaving the President
without statutory authority on which to base the deferrals in
question. After analyzing the intent of Congress in enacting
Sec. 1013, the District Court of the District of Columbia held that
the section's unconstitutional legislative veto provision was
inseverable from the remainder of the section. City of New Haven,
Conn. v U.S., 634 F Supp 1449 (D.D.C. 1986). Accordingly, it declared
Sec. 1013 void in its entirety and ordered the defendants to make the
deferred funds available for obligation. City of New Haven, at 1460.
The judgment of the District Court in striking down Sec. 1013 in its
entirety was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals. City of New Haven,
Conn. v U.S., 809 F2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
In 1987, after Sec. 1013 of the Act was declared unconstitutional,
the Act was amended to exclude the one-House legislative veto
procedure, and limitations were placed on the purposes for which
deferrals could be made. See Pub. L. No. 100-119. The Act now permits
deferrals only in three specified situations: ``to provide for
contingencies,'' ``to achieve savings made possible by or through
changes in requirements or greater efficiency of operations,'' or ``as
specifically provided by law.'' Sec. 1013. The same language is used
in the Anti-Deficiency Act. 31 USC Sec. 1512(c)(1). The purpose of
such language was to preclude the President from invoking Sec. 1013 as
authority for implementing ``policy'' impoundments, while preserving
the
[[Page 196]]
President's authority to implement routine ``programmatic''
impoundments. City of New Haven, Conn. v U.S., 809 F2d 900 at p 906
(note).
Unreported Deferrals
Section 1015(a) of the Impoundment Control Act (2 USC Sec. 686(a))
requires the Comptroller General to report to the Congress whenever he
finds that any officer or employee of the United States has ordered,
permitted, or approved a reserve or deferral of budget authority, and
the President has not transmitted a special impoundment message with
respect to such reserve or deferral.
Sec. 18 . Unfunded Mandates
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. No. 104-4; 109
Stat. 48 et seq.) added a new part B to title IV of the Congressional
Budget Act of 1974 (2 USC Secs. 658-658g) that imposes several
requirements on committees with respect to ``federal mandates,''
establishes points of order to enforce those requirements, and
precludes the consideration of a rule or order waiving such points of
order in the House. Section 425 of the Congressional Budget Act
establishes a point of order against consideration of a bill, joint
resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report containing
unfunded mandates. Section 426(a) of the Act establishes a point of
order against consideration of any rule or order that waives the
application of Sec. 425. Points of order under Secs. 425 and 426(a) of
the Budget Act are disposed of via the question of consideration.
Section 426(b)(2) establishes as a threshold premise for cognizability
of a point of order under Secs. 425 or 426(a) the specification of
precise legislative language that is alleged to constitute a federal
mandate. On May 23, 1996, the House voted to consider an amendment
notwithstanding a point of order raised under Sec. 425. 104-2, p ____.