[House Practice: A Guide to the Rules, Precedents and Procedures of the House]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

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              A. Generally

  Sec.  1. In General; House and Senate Functions
  Sec.  2. Who May Be Impeached
  Sec.  3. Grounds for Impeachment
  Sec.  4. -- Impeachable Misconduct
  Sec.  5. Effect of Adjournment

              B. Procedure in the House

  Sec.  6. In General; Initiation and Referral of Charges
  Sec.  7. Committee Investigations
  Sec.  8. Consideration in the House; Voting

              C. Procedure in the Senate

  Sec.  9. In General
  Sec. 10. Voting and Judgment
        Research References
          1 Hinds Secs. 63-79
          6 Cannon Secs. 193-202
          3 Deschler Ch 14
          Manual Secs. 173-176; 603-620
          U.S. Const. art. I Secs. 2, 3; art. II Sec. 4

                               A. Generally

  Sec. 1 . In General; House and Senate Functions

      Impeachment is a constitutional remedy addressed to serious 
  offenses against the system of government. It is the first step in a 
  remedial process--that of removal from public office and possible 
  disqualification from holding further office. The purpose of 
  impeachment is not personal punishment; rather, its function is 
  primarily to maintain constitutional government. Deschler Ch 14 App. 
  pp 726-728.
      Impeachment proceedings have been initiated more than 60 times 
  since the adoption of the Constitution. 3 Hinds Secs. 2294 et seq.; 6 
  Cannon Secs. 498 et seq.; Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 1. Fifteen of these 
  cases resulted in impeachment by the House--President Andrew Johnson 
  in 1868, Secretary of War Wil-

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  liam W. Belknap in 1876, Senator William Blount in 1799 and 12 federal 
  judges. Only seven impeachments have led to Senate convictions--all of 
  federal judges.
      An impeachment is instituted by a written accusation, called the 
  ``Articles of Impeachment,'' which states the offense charged; the 
  articles serve the same purpose as an indictment in an ordinary 
  criminal proceeding. See Manual Sec. 609.
      The impeachment power is delineated by the U.S. Constitution. The 
  House is given the ``sole Power of Impeachment'' (art. I Sec. 2); the 
  Senate is given ``the sole Power to try all Impeachments'' (art. I 
  Sec. 3). Impeachments may be brought against the ``President, Vice 
  President, and all civil Officers of the United States'' (art. II 
  Sec. 4). Conviction of ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
  Misdemeanors'' (art. II Sec. 4) is followed by ``removal from Office'' 
  and may include ``disqualification to hold'' further public office 
  (art. I Sec. 3).
      The term ``impeach'' is used in different ways at various stages 
  of the proceedings. A Member rises on the floor to ``impeach'' an 
  officer in presenting a resolution or memorial. 3 Hinds Sec. 2469. The 
  House votes to ``impeach'' in the constitutional sense when it adopts 
  an impeachment resolution and accompanying articles. Sec. 8, infra. 
  The Senate then conducts a trial on these articles and either convicts 
  by two-thirds vote or acquits the ``impeached'' accused federal 
  official. Sec. 9, infra.

  Sec. 2 . Who May Be Impeached

      The ``President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the 
  United States'' are subject to removal under the impeachment clause of 
  the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. II Sec. 4. A private citizen who 
  has held no public office may not be impeached. 3 Hinds Secs. 2007, 
      It has been said that the term ``civil Officers,'' as used in the 
  Constitution, is broad enough to include all officers of the United 
  States who hold their appointment from the federal government, whether 
  their duties be executive, administrative, or judicial, or whether 
  their position be high or low. Impeachment, Selected Materials, 
  Committee on the Judiciary, H. Doc. No. 93-7, p 691, Oct. 1973. On the 
  other hand, military officers are not subject to impeachment, since 
  they are subject to disciplinary measures according to military codes. 
  3 Willoughby, The Constitution (1929) Sec. 929; 9 Hughes, Federal 
  Practice (1931) Sec. 7228.
      A Member of Congress is not a ``civil Officer'' within the meaning 
  of the impeachment provisions of the Constitution. 3 Hinds Secs. 2310, 
  2316. The contention that a Senator was not a civil officer within the 
  meaning of the

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  impeachment provisions of the Constitution was sustained by the Senate 
  in 1799. The Senate dismissed impeachment charges brought to its bar 
  by the House, finding that an impeachment of a Senator was beyond its 
  jurisdiction. 3 Hinds Sec. 2318.
      Federal judges are subject to removal under the impeachment 
  provisions of the Constitution. Of the 15 impeachments reaching the 
  Senate, 12 have been directed at federal judges, and in seven of these 
  cases the Senate voted to convict: Pickering in 1803 (3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2319-2341), Humphreys in 1863 (3 Hinds Secs. 2385-2397), 
  Archbald in 1912 (6 Cannon Secs. 498-512), Ritter in 1936 (S. Doc. No. 
  200, 74-2, 1936), Claiborne in 1986, and Nixon and Hastings in 1988 
  and 1989 (see Manual Sec. 176).
      Impeachment proceedings were initiated against a Member of the 
  President's Cabinet in 1876, when impeachment charges were filed 
  against William Belknap, who had been Secretary of War. The House and 
  Senate debated the power of impeachment at length and determined that 
  the former secretary was amenable to impeachment and trial. 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2007, 2467. In 1978, the House voted to table a privileged 
  resolution impeaching Andrew Young, the United States Ambassador to 
  the United Nations. 95-2, July 13, 1978, p 20606.
      A Commissioner of the District of Columbia has been held not to be 
  a civil officer subject to impeachment under the Constitution. 6 
  Cannon Sec. 548.

                           Effect of Resignation

      The House and Senate have the power to impeach and try an accused 
  who has resigned. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 2. It has been conceded (in the 
  Blount impeachment proceeding) that a person who has been impeached 
  cannot escape punishment simply by submitting his resignation. 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2317, 2318. As a practical matter, however, the resignation of 
  an official about to be impeached generally puts an end to impeachment 
  proceedings because the primary objective--removal from office--has 
  been accomplished. This was the case in the impeachment proceedings 
  begun against President Nixon in 1974 and federal judge George English 
  in 1926. Deschler Ch 14 Secs. 2.1, 2.2. President Nixon having 
  resigned following the decision of the Committee on the Judiciary to 
  report to the House recommending his impeachment, further proceedings 
  were discontinued. H. Rept. No. 93-1305, 93-2, Aug. 20, 1974, p 29361.

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  Sec. 3 . Grounds for Impeachment


      The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment and 
  conviction as ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
  Misdemeanors.'' U.S. Const. art. II Sec. 4. When the House determines 
  that grounds for impeachment exist, and they are adopted by the House, 
  they are presented to the Senate in articles of impeachment. Any one 
  of the articles may provide a sufficient basis or ground for 
  impeachment. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 3.
      The interpretation which has been placed on the words ``high 
  Crimes and Misdemeanors'' is a broad one. The framers of the 
  Constitution adopted the phrase from the English practice. At the time 
  of the Constitutional Convention, the phrase ``high crimes and 
  misdemeanors'' had been in use for over 400 years in impeachment 
  proceedings in Parliament. Some of these impeachments charged high 
  treason; others charged high crimes and misdemeanors. The latter 
  included both statutory offenses and nonstatutory offenses. Many of 
  the charges involved abuse of official power or trust. Deschler Ch 14 
  App. pp 706-708.
      An offense must be serious or substantial in nature to provide 
  grounds for impeachment. This requirement flows from the language of 
  the clause itself--``high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' While there is 
  some authority to the contrary, it is generally accepted that the 
  adjective ``high'' modifies ``Misdemeanors'' as well as ``Crimes.'' 
  Impeachment--Selected Materials, Committee on the Judiciary, 93-1, 
  Oct. 1973, p 682. As to what constitutes a serious, impeachable 
  offense, one commentator has said:

      To determine whether or not an act or a course of conduct is 
    sufficient in law to support an impeachment, resort must be had to 
    the eternal principles of right, applied to public propriety and 
    civil morality. The offense must be prejudicial to the public 
    interest and it must flow from a willful intent, or a reckless 
    disregard of duty. . . . It may constitute an intentional violation 
    of positive law, or it may be an official dereliction of commission 
    or omission, a serious breach of moral obligation, or other gross 
    impropriety of personal conduct which, in its natural consequences, 
    tends to bring an office into contempt and disrepute. Brown, The 
    Impeachment of the Federal Judiciary, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 684, 703, 

      The time when the offenses were committed is a factor to be taken 
  into consideration. In 1973, the House declined to take any action on 
  a request by Vice President Agnew for an investigation into 
  allegations of impeachable offenses, where the offenses were not 
  committed during his term of office as Vice President and where the 
  offenses were pending before the courts. 93-1, Sept. 25, 1973, p 

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      Exactly 100 years earlier, by coincidence in a case that also 
  involved the Vice President, the Judiciary Committee found that 
  Schuyler Colfax could not be impeached for an alleged offense 
  committed before his term of office as Speaker of the House. 3 Hinds 
  Sec. 2510.

                         Presidential Impeachments

      The grounds for invoking the impeachment power against the 
  President were illustrated in 1974 when the House initiated an inquiry 
  into President Nixon's conduct as a result of charges arising out of a 
  1972 break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate 
  Office Building in Washington, D.C. The House Judiciary Committee 
  adopted three articles of impeachment against Nixon late in July 1974. 
  The articles charged him with abuse of his Presidential powers, 
  obstruction of justice, and contempt of Congress. Deschler Ch 14 
  Sec. 3.7. Before the full House voted on these articles, Nixon 
  resigned, after having been assured that his impeachment was a virtual 
  certainty. His resignation terminated further action on the issue, 
  although the articles were submitted to and accepted by the House. 93-
  2, Aug. 20, 1974, pp 29219-29362.
      This was but the second time in the history of the United States 
  that the House resolved to investigate the possibility of impeaching a 
  President. Some 107 years earlier the House had investigated whether 
  President Andrew Johnson should be impeached. Johnson was impeached by 
  the House on the ground that he had violated the Tenure of Office Act 
  by dismissing a Cabinet chief. The theory of the proponents of 
  impeachment was succinctly put by one of the managers in the Senate 

      An impeachable high crime or misdemeanor is one in its nature or 
    consequences subversive of some fundamental or essential principle 
    of government or highly prejudicial to the public interest, and this 
    may consist of a violation of the Constitution, of law, of an 
    official oath, or of duty, by an act committed or omitted, or, 
    without violating a positive law, by the abuse of discretionary 
    powers from improper motives or for an improper purpose. The 
    Constitution of the United States of America--Analysis and 
    Interpretation, p 607, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982.

                           Judicial Impeachments

      Since federal judges hold office ``during good Behaviour'' (U.S. 
  Const. art. III Sec. 1), it has been suggested that misbehavior 
  properly defines the bounds of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' or 
  even that lack of good behavior constitutes an independent standard 
  for impeachment. 6 Cannon Sec. 464. The more modern view, however, is 
  that the ``good Behaviour'' clause is more aptly descriptive of 
  judicial tenure; that is, that it does not constitute a standard for 
  impeachability, but merely means that federal

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  judges hold office for life unless removed under some other provision 
  of the Constitution. Under this view, the power of removal, together 
  with the appropriate standard, are contained solely in the impeachment 
  clause. Impeachment--Selected Materials, Committee on the Judiciary, 
  93-1, Oct. 1973, p 666.
      The grounds for impeachment of federal judges were scrutinized in 
  1970, in the inquiry into the conduct of Associate Justice Douglas of 
  the Supreme Court. The report concluded that a federal judge could be 
  impeached for judicial conduct which is either criminal or a serious 
  abuse of public duty, or for nonjudicial conduct which is criminal. 
  Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 3.13 (proceedings discontinued for lack of 

  Sec. 4 . -- Impeachable Misconduct

      Impeachments have commonly involved charges of misconduct 
  incompatible with the official position of the office holder. This 
  conduct falls into three broad categories: (1) abusing or exceeding 
  the lawful powers of the office; (2) behaving in a manner grossly 
  incompatible with the office; and (3) using the power of the office 
  for an improper purpose or for personal gain. See Deschler Ch 14 App. 
  p 719.

               Abusing or Exceeding the Powers of the Office

      The impeachment by the House of Senator William Blount in 1797 was 
  based on allegations that he attempted to incite an Indian attack in 
  order to capture certain territory for the British. He was charged 
  with engaging in a conspiracy to compromise U.S. neutrality, and with 
  attempting to oust the President's lawful appointee as principle agent 
  for Indian affairs. 3 Hinds Secs. 2294-2318. Although the Senate found 
  that it had no jurisdiction over the trial of an impeached Senator, it 
  expelled him for having been guilty of a ``high misdemeanor, entirely 
  inconsistent with his public trust and duty as a Senator.'' Deschler 
  Ch 14 App. p 720.
      The impeachment of President Andrew Johnson in 1868 was likewise 
  based on allegations that he had exceeded the power of his office. 
  Johnson was charged with violation of the Tenure of Office Act, which 
  purported to limit the President's authority to remove members of his 
  own Cabinet. Johnson, believing the act unconstitutional, removed 
  Secretary of War Stanton and was impeached by the House three days 
  later. Johnson was acquitted in the Senate by a single vote. 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2399.
      A serious abuse of the powers of the office was a charge included 
  among the recommended articles impeaching President Nixon in 1974. The 
  Judiciary Committee found that his conduct ``constituted a repeated 
  and continuing abuse of the powers of the Presidency in disregard of 
  the fun-

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  damental principle of the rule of law in our system of government.'' 
  Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 3.7.

               Behavior Grossly Incompatible With the Office

      Judge John Pickering was impeached by the House in 1803 for errors 
  in a trial in violation of his trust and duty as a judge, and for 
  appearing on the bench during the trial in a state of intoxication and 
  using profane language. Pickering was convicted in the Senate and 
  removed from office. 3 Hinds Secs. 2319-2341.
      Associate Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase was impeached by the 
  House in 1804. The House charged Chase with permitting his partisan 
  views to influence his conduct in certain trials. His conduct was 
  alleged to be a serious breach of his duty to judge impartially and to 
  reflect on his competence to continue to exercise the power of the 
  office. Chase was acquitted in the Senate. 3 Hinds Secs. 2342-2363.
      Judge West Humphreys was impeached by the House and convicted in 
  the Senate in 1862 on charges that he joined the Confederacy without 
  resigning his federal judgeship. Judicial prejudice against Union 
  supporters was also alleged. 3 Hinds Secs. 2385-2397.
      Judge George W. English was impeached by the House in 1926 for 
  showing judicial favoritism and for failure to give impartial 
  consideration to cases before him. It was alleged that his favortism 
  had created distrust of his official actions and destroyed public 
  confidence in his court. 6 Cannon Secs. 544-547. Judge English 
  resigned prior to commencement of trial by the Senate and the 
  proceedings were discontinued at that point.

         Using the Office for an Improper Purpose or Personal Gain

      In 1826, Judge James Peck was impeached by the House for taking 
  action against a lawyer who had publicly criticized one of his 
  decisions, imprisoning him, and ordering his disbarment. The House 
  charged that such conduct was unjust, arbitrary, and beyond the scope 
  of his judicial duties. Peck was acquitted in the Senate. 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2364-2366. Vindictive use of power also constituted an element 
  of the charges in the articles of impeachment voted against Judge 
  Charles Swayne in 1903. It was alleged that he maliciously and 
  unlawfully imprisoned two lawyers and a litigant for contempt. 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2469-2485.
      Several impeachments have alleged the use of office for personal 
  gain or the appearance of financial impropriety while in office. 
  Secretary of War William Belknap was impeached by the House in 1876 
  for receiving substantial payments in return for his making of an 
  appointment. He was acquitted in the Senate. 3 Hinds Secs. 2444-2468.

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      The use of the office for direct or indirect personal monetary 
  gain was also involved in the impeachments of Judges Charles Swayne 
  (1903), Robert Archbald (1912), George English (1926), Harold 
  Louderback (1932), and Halsted Ritter (1936). Judge Swayne was charged 
  with falsifying expense accounts. Judge Archbald was charged with 
  using his office to secure business favors from litigants and 
  potential litigants before his court. Judges English, Louderback, and 
  Ritter were charged with misusing their power to appoint and set the 
  fees of bankruptcy receivers for personal profit. See 3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2469-2485 (Swayne); 6 Cannon Secs. 498-512 (Archbald); 
  Secs. 544-547 (English); Secs. 513-524 (Louderback); 74-2, Jan. 14, 
  1936, p 5602 (Ritter).
      In 1986, the House agreed to a resolution impeaching federal 
  district judge Harry Claiborne, who had been convicted of falsifying 
  federal income tax returns. His final appeal was denied by the Supreme 
  Court, and he began serving his prison sentence. Because he declined 
  to resign, however, Judge Claiborne was still receiving his judicial 
  salary and, absent impeachment, would resume the bench on his release 
  from prison. Consequently, a resolution of impeachment was introduced 
  on June 3, and on July 16, the Committee on the Judiciary reported to 
  the House four articles of impeachment against Judge Claiborne. On 
  July 22, the resolution was called up as a question of privilege and 
  agreed to by a recorded vote of 406 yeas, 0 nays. After trial in the 
  Senate, Judge Claiborne was convicted on three of the four articles of 
  impeachment and removed from office on Oct. 9, 1986. Manual Sec. 176.
      In 1988, the House agreed to a resolution reported from the 
  Committee on the Judiciary impeaching federal district judge Alcee L. 
  Hastings. The resolution specified 17 articles of impeachment, some of 
  them addressing allegations on which the judge had been acquitted in a 
  federal criminal trial (H. Res. 499, 100-2, Aug. 3, 1988, pp 20206 et 
  seq.). The judge was convicted in a trial before the Senate in the One 
  Hundred First Congress. 101-1, Oct. 20, 1989, p ____.
      In 1989, the House voted 417 to 0 to impeach U.S. District Court 
  Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. after he had been convicted on two counts 
  of perjury before a grand jury about his relationship to a man whose 
  son was being prosecuted for drug-smuggling. The impeachment 
  resolution charged that Nixon had given false information about 
  whether he had discussed the case with the local district attorney and 
  attempted to influence its outcome. 101-1, May 10, 1989, p 8814.

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                          Noncriminal Misconduct

      In the history of impeachments under the U.S. Constitution, the 
  most closely debated issue has been whether impeachment is limited to 
  offenses indictable under the criminal law--or at least to offenses 
  which constitute crimes--or whether the word ``Misdemeanors'' in the 
  impeachment clause extends to noncriminal misconduct as well. While 
  the precedents are not entirely uniform, the majority clearly favors 
  the broader definition. As stated in the Ritter impeachment, the 
  modern view is that the provision for impeachment in the Constitution 
  applies not only to high crimes and misdemeanors as those words were 
  understood at common law, but also to acts which, though not defined 
  as criminal, adversely affect the public interest. H. Rept. No. 93-
  653, pp 9, 10 (1926).
      The historical evidence establishes that the phrase ``high crimes 
  and misdemeanors''--which over a period of centuries evolved into the 
  English standard of impeachable conduct--had a special and distinctive 
  meaning, and referred to a category of offenses that subverted the 
  system of government. Deschler Ch 14 App. p 724. The American 
  experience with impeachment likewise reflects the view that 
  impeachable conduct need not be criminal. Of the 15 impeachments voted 
  by the House since 1789, at least 10 involved one or more allegations 
  that did not charge a violation of criminal law. Deschler Ch 14 App. p 
  725. The impeachment of Judge Pickering in 1803 was the first such 
  proceeding to result in conviction and was based, at least in part, on 
  noncriminal misconduct. The first three articles involved a series of 
  flagrant errors on the part of the judge in his conduct of a case. 3 
  Hinds Secs. 2319 et seq. Similarly, in 1974, in recommending articles 
  impeaching President Nixon, the House Committee on the Judiciary 
  concluded that the President could be impeached not only for 
  violations of federal criminal statutes, but also for abuse of the 
  power of his office and for refusal to comply with proper subpenas of 
  the committee. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 3.7.
      In drawing up articles of impeachment, the House has placed little 
  emphasis on criminal conduct. Less than one-third of all the articles 
  the House has adopted have explicitly charged the violation of a 
  criminal statute or used the word ``criminal'' or ``crime'' to 
  describe the conduct alleged. Much more common in the articles are 
  allegations that the officer has violated his duties or his oath or 
  seriously undermined public confidence in his ability to perform his 
  official functions. Deschler Ch 14 App. p 723.

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  Sec. 5 . Effect of Adjournment

      An impeachment may proceed only when Congress is in session. 3 
  Hinds Secs. 2006, 2462. But an impeachment proceeding does not die 
  with adjournment. An impeachment proceeding begun in the House in one 
  Congress may be resumed by the House in the next Congress. 3 Hinds 
  Sec. 2321. And an official impeached by the House in one Congress may 
  be tried by the Senate in the next. 3 Hinds Secs. 2319, 2320.
      Managers on the part of the House who were appointed in the prior 
  Congress to conduct the trial in the Senate may be reappointed in the 
  following Congress by resolution. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 4.2. Thus, the 
  resolution and articles of impeachment against Judge Alcee Hastings 
  were presented in the Senate during the second session of the 100th 
  Congress (100-2, Aug. 3, 1988, p 20223) but were still pending trial 
  by the Senate in the 101st Congress, when the House reappointed 
  managers (101-1, Jan. 3, 1989, p 84).

                         B. Procedure in the House

  Sec. 6 . In General; Initiation and Referral of Charges


      Under the modern practice, an impeachment is normally instituted 
  by the House by the adoption of a resolution calling for a committee 
  investigation of charges against the officer in question. This 
  committee may, after investigation, recommend the dismissal of charges 
  or it may recommend impeachment. Impeachment--Selected Materials, 
  Committee on the Judiciary, H. Doc. No. 93-7, Oct. 1973, p 699. A 
  resolution recommending impeachment is reported to the House 
  simultaneously with the articles of impeachment setting forth the 
  grounds for the proposed action. Sec. 8, infra. Following the adoption 
  of a resolution to impeach, the House appoints managers to conduct the 
  impeachment trial in the Senate. The Senate is then informed of these 
  facts by resolution. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 9. When this resolution 
  reaches the Senate, the Senate advises the House as to when the Senate 
  will receive the managers appointed by the House. The managers then 
  present themselves and the impeachment articles to the Senate, the 
  House reserving the right to file additional articles later. Deschler 
  Ch 14 Secs. 10, 11.

                           Initiation of Charges

      In most cases, impeachment proceedings in the House have been 
  initiated either by introducing resolutions of impeachment by placing 
  them in

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  the hopper, or by offering charges in a resolution on the floor of the 
  House under a question of constitutional privilege. Deschler Ch 14 
  Sec. 5.
      Other methods of setting an impeachment in motion in the House 

     Charges initiatd by a memorial from one or more citizens and 
         referred to committee. 3 Hinds Secs. 2364, 2491, 2494.
     A message from the President. 3 Hinds Secs. 2294, 2319; 6 
         Cannon Sec. 498.
     Charges transmitted from the legislature of a state. 3 Hinds 
         Sec. 2469.
     Charges arising from a grand jury investigation. 3 Hinds 
         Sec. 2488.

      In the 93d Congress, Vice President Agnew used a letter to the 
  Speaker to attempt to initiate an investigation by the House of 
  charges against him of possible impeachable offenses; the House took 
  no action on the request. 93-1, Sept. 25, 1973, p 31368.

                           Referral to Committee

      Resolutions introduced through the hopper which directly call for 
  an impeachment are referred to the Committee on the Judiciary, whereas 
  resolutions merely calling for a committee investigation with a view 
  toward impeachment are referred to the Committee on Rules. See 93-1, 
  Oct. 23, 1973, p 34873. Thus, a resolution authorizing an 
  investigation in the 89th Congress into the conduct of three federal 
  judges was referred to the Committee on Rules. 89-2, Feb. 22, 1966, p 
  3665. But where a Member announces on the floor that he is introducing 
  a resolution of impeachment, the resolution is referred to the 
  Committee on the Judiciary if it is a direct proposition to impeach. 
  91-2, Apr. 15, 1970, pp 11912, 11920, 11941 (Douglas).
      All impeachments to reach the Senate since 1900 have been based on 
  Judiciary Committee resolutions. Prior to that committee's creation in 
  1813, impeachments were referred to a special committee for 
  investigation. 6 Cannon Sec. 657; Manual Secs. 603 et seq.

  Sec. 7 . Committee Investigations

      Committee impeachment investigations are governed by those 
  portions of Rule XI relating to committee investigatory and hearing 
  procedures, and by any rules and special procedures adopted by the 
  committee for the inquiry. See Deschler Ch 14 Secs. 6.3 et seq. The 
  House may by resolution waive a requirement of these rules in a 
  particular case. In one recent instance, the House agreed to a 
  resolution authorizing the counsel to the Committee on the Judiciary 
  to take depositions of witnesses in an impeachment investigation and 
  waiving the provisions of Rule XI which requires at least

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  two committee members to be present during the taking of such 
  testimony. 93-2, Feb. 6, 1974, pp 2349 et seq.
      Under the earlier practice, the committee sometimes made its 
  inquiry ex parte (3 Hinds Secs. 2319, 2343, 2385), but the modern 
  trend is to permit the accused to testify, present witnesses, cross-
  examine witnesses (3 Hinds Secs. 2445, 2471, 2518), and be represented 
  by counsel (3 Hinds Secs. 2470, 2501; 93-2, Aug. 20, 1974, p 29219). 
  Constitutionality, see Sec. 9, infra.

                    Confidentiality of Material; Access

      The Committee on the Judiciary may adopt procedures which insure 
  the confidentiality of impeachment inquiry materials and which limit 
  access to such materials. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 15.3. Where a federal 
  court subpenas certain evidence gathered by the committee in an 
  impeachment inquiry, the House may adopt a resolution granting such 
  limited access to the evidence as will not violate the privileges of 
  the House or its sole power of impeachment under the Constitution. 93-
  2, Aug. 22, 1974, p 30047.

                        Subcommittee Investigations

      An investigatory subcommittee charged with an impeachment inquiry 
  is limited to the powers expressly authorized by the full committee. 
  See Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 6.11. After completing its investigation, the 
  subcommittee ordinarily submits recommendations to the full committee 
  as to whether impeachment is warranted. See, for example, Final Report 
  of the Special Subcommittee on H. Res. 920 of the Committee on the 
  Judiciary, 91-2, Sept. 17, 1970 (Douglas).


      For forms of resolutions authorizing an investigation of the 
  sufficiency of grounds for impeachment and conferring subpena power 
  and authority to take testimony, see Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 6.

  Sec. 8 . Consideration in the House; Voting


      The target of an impeachment proceeding is impeached by the House 
  if it adopts a resolution with articles of impeachment. Only a 
  majority vote is necessary (whereas a two-thirds vote is required in 
  the Senate for conviction). Impeachments--Selected Materials, 
  Committee on the Judiciary, H. Doc. No. 93-7, Oct. 1973, p 700. In 
  this regard, as is the usual practice, the committee's recommendations 
  as reported in the resolution are in no way binding on the House. In 
  1933, the House voted to impeach Judge Har-

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  old Louderback even though the House Judiciary Committee found 
  insufficient grounds to recommend impeachment. 6 Cannon Sec. 514.

                  Impeachment Propositions as Privileged

      A resolution impeaching an officer is highly privileged under the 
  Constitution, and therefore supersedes other pending business (3 Hinds 
  Secs. 2045-2048; 6 Cannon Sec. 468), including an election contest (3 
  Hinds Sec. 2581). Such a resolution may be immediately considered in 
  the House as a question of high privilege [and is therefore not 
  subject to the three-day layover requirement of Rule XI]. 95-2, July 
  13, 1978, p 20606 (Andrew Young). It does not lose its privilege from 
  the fact that a similar proposition has been made at a previous time 
  during the same session. 3 Hinds Sec. 2408. However, a resolution 
  simply proposing an investigation is not privileged, even though 
  impeachment may be a possible consequence. 3 Hinds Secs. 2050, 2546; 6 
  Cannon Sec. 463.
      A committee to which resolutions of impeachment have been referred 
  may report and call up as privileged resolutions incidental to the 
  consideration of the impeachment question. If, however, such a 
  resolution is offered on the floor by a Member on his own initiative 
  and not reported from the committee to which the impeachment has been 
  referred, it is not privileged for immediate consideration, since not 
  directly calling for impeachment. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 5.8.
      Propositions incidental to an ongoing impeachment proceeding taken 
  up as privileged (3 Hinds Sec. 2400), have included:

     Reports relating to the investigation (3 Hinds Sec. 2402; 
         Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 8.2).
     Resolutions providing for the selection of managers (6 Cannon 
         Sec. 517).
     Propositions to abate an impeachment proceeding (6 Cannon 
         Sec. 514).
     Proposals to confer subpena authority or to provide funding 
         for the investigation (6 Cannon Sec. 549; 93-2, Feb. 6, 1974, p 

      Resolutions incidental to the consideration of the impeachment 
  question may be called up as privileged by the committee considering 
  the matter. 93-2, Feb. 6, 1974, p 2349.
      Although charges or resolutions of impeachment are privileged, 
  they cannot be presented while another Member has the floor unless he 
  yields for that purpose. 91-2, Apr. 15, 1970, p 11920.

                              Debate; Motions

      Propositions of impeachment are considered under the general rules 
  of the House applicable to other simple House resolutions, unless the 
  House otherwise provides by special order. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 8. 
  Since 1912, the

[[Page 544]]

  House has considered the resolution together with the articles of 
  impeachment. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 8.2. The House may consider the 
  resolution and articles under a unanimous-consent agreement fixing and 
  controlling the time for debate. Deschler Ch 14 Secs. 8.1, 8.4. The 
  motion for the previous question and the motion to recommit are 
  applicable, and a separate vote may be demanded on substantive 
  propositions contained in the resolution. Deschler Ch 14 Secs. 8.8-
  8.10. The resolution is also subject to a motion to lay on the table 
  before debate thereon. 95-2, July 13, 1978, p 20606.
      A wide range of debate is permitted on impeachment proposals, and 
  a Member may refer to the political, social, and even the family 
  background of the accused. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 8.5.

                        C. Procedure in the Senate

  Sec. 9 . In General

      The sole power to try impeachments is vested in the Senate under 
  the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 3 clause 6. On the day of 
  the trial, the Senate resolves itself into a court for the trial of 
  the impeachment. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 11.5. The President of the Senate 
  presides over the trial, except in the case of the impeachment of the 
  President of the United States or the Vice President, in which case 
  the Chief Justice presides. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 11. Upon organization 
  of the court, the managers appear and the trial of the case proceeds. 
  In the later practice, the resolution and articles of impeachment have 
  been considered together and exhibited simultaneously in the Senate by 
  the House managers. 6 Cannon Secs. 501, 515; 74-2, Mar. 10, 1936, pp 
  3485-88. Objections to the articles of impeachment, on the ground that 
  they duplicate and accumulate separate offenses, have been overruled. 
  74-2, Apr. 3, 1936, p 4898; 74-2, Apr. 17, 1936, p 5606.
      The presentation of the evidence follows a traditional sequence. 
  The evidence against the accused is first presented, then evidence in 
  defense and concluding evidence by the managers. The accused is 
  permitted to testify in answer to the charges contained in the 
  articles. 6 Cannon Secs. 511, 524; Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 12.11. Counsel 
  are permitted to appear, to be heard, to argue on preliminary and 
  interlocutory questions, to deliver opening and final arguments, to 
  submit motions, and to present evidence and examine and cross-examine 
  witnesses. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 12.
      The use of a Senate committee in judicial impeachment proceedings 
  does not violate any constitutional rights or offend fundamental 
  notions of justice. Hastings v U.S. Senate, Impeachment Trial 
  Committee, D.D.C. 1989, 716 F Supp 38. In one recent case, the court 
  denied the claim of a former

[[Page 545]]

  federal judge that conviction voted by the Senate on two articles of 
  impeachment adopted by the House was void because the judge was not 
  afforded trial before the ``full'' Senate, rather than before a Senate 
  committee. The court ruled that the Senate's denial of the former 
  judge's motion for hearing before the full Senate, while according him 
  the opportunity to present and cross-examine witnesses before the 12-
  member committee, and an opportunity to argue both personally and by 
  counsel before the full Senate, did not make the controversy 
  justiciable and the claim meritorious. Nixon v US, D.D.C. 1990, 744 F 
  Supp 9, affirmed 938 F2d 239, 290 U.S. App. D.C. 420, affirmed 113 
  S.Ct. 732, 122 L.Ed.2d 1.
      At the conclusion of the evidence, there is argument, followed by 
  deliberation by the Senate in executive session and a vote in open 
  session. Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 13. Prior to the vote, the proceedings 
  may be dismissed in the Senate on the advice of the House managers. 
  Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 2.2.

  Sec. 10 . Voting and Judgment

      Under the Constitution, a two-thirds vote is required to convict 
  the accused on an article of impeachment (U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 3 
  clause 6), the articles being voted on separately under the Senate 
  rules (Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 13). The yeas and nays are taken on each 
  article separately. 3 Hinds Secs. 2098, 2339. In some instances, the 
  Senate has adopted an order to provide a method of voting and putting 
  the question separately and successively on each article. 6 Cannon 
  Sec. 524; 74-2, Apr. 16, 1936, p 5558.
      The Constitution provides for removal from office on conviction 
  and also allows the further judgment of disqualification from holding 
  further office. U.S. Const. art. I Sec. 3 clause 7. No vote is 
  required on removal following conviction, since removal follows 
  automatically from conviction under this constitutional provision. 
  Deschler Ch 14 Sec. 13.9. But the further judgment of disqualification 
  from holding future office requires a majority vote. Deschler Ch 14 
  Sec. 13.10. The question on removal and disqualification is divisible. 
  3 Hinds Sec. 2397; 6 Cannon Sec. 512.
      The impeachment and removal from office of a United States 
  District Judge did not necessarily disqualify him from holding office 
  as a Member of the House, absent any specific action taken by the 
  Senate to disqualify him from future federal office. Waggoner v 
  Hastings, S.D.Fla. 1993, 816 F. Sup. 716.