[Survey Report on Background Investigations for Navajo Area Education Employees, Bureau of Indian Affairs]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
Report No. 99-i-146
Title: Survey Report on Background Investigations for Navajo Area
Education Employees, Bureau of Indian Affairs
Date: December 23, 1998
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U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
SURVEY REPORT
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS FOR
NAVAJO AREA EDUCATION EMPLOYEES,
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
REPORT NO. 99-I-146
DECEMBER 1998
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Secretary
FROM: Eljay B. Bowron
Inspector General
SUBJECT SUMMARY: Final Survey Report -
"Background Investigations for Navajo Area
Education Employees, Bureau of Indian
Affairs" (No. 99-i-146)
Attached for your information is a copy of the subject final
survey report. The objective of the survey was to determine
whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs performed, in accordance
with applicable laws, regulations, and policies, background
investigations and suitability determinations for Navajo Area
education employees who work in Bureau-operated schools. The
audit was conducted in response to a request from the Assistant
Secretary for Indian Affairs.
The Security Officer for the Navajo Area did not timely
initiate and properly complete all background investigations
for new and existing education employees. Also, three
employees who had criminal histories involving child-related
offenses and were determined to be unsuitable to have contact
with school-age children by the Area Security Office were
employed by the Bureau at two schools and an agency office.
These deficiencies occurred because the Bureau did not have
effective processes, including written procedures, to identify
all employees who needed background investigations, to obtain
the information needed for the proper and timely completion of
background investigations and suitability determinations, and
to ensure that nonsuitability determinations of the Security
Officer were adequately addressed. As a result, the Bureau
could not be assured that the 27 individuals who were employed
without the requisite completed and/or adjudicated background
investigations at one agency office and 22 Bureau-operated
schools, which had a total student enrollment of 7,753, were
suitable for employment at these education facilities. In
related matters, the Navajo Area Security Office generally
completed required preemployment reference checks and
fingerprint verifications and properly documented in the
personnel files finished background investigations as completed
and approved. However, the Central Office Security Officer
made certain employee suitability determinations based on
incomplete information for education employees.
In its response, the Bureau agreed with the report's four
recommendations to address these issues. Based on the response,
we considered three recommendations resolved and implemented
and one recommendation resolved but not implemented.
If you have any questions concerning this matter, please
contact me at (202) 208-5745 or Mr. Robert J. Williams,
Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 208-4252.
Attachment
December 23, 1998 C-IN-BIA-002-98(B)-R
SURVEY REPORT
Memorandum
To: Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs
From: Robert J. Williams
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
Subject: Survey Report on Background Investigations
for Navajo Area Education Employees,
Bureau of Indian Affairs (No. 99-i-146)
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the results of our survey of
background investigations for Navajo Area education
employees performed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The objective of the survey was to determine whether
the Bureau performed, in accordance with applicable
laws, regulations, and policies, background
investigations and suitability determinations[1] for
education employees who work in Bureau-operated
schools. The audit was conducted in response to a
request from you, as the Assistant Secretary for
Indian Affairs.
BACKGROUND
The legislative requirements for background
investigations for education employees are contained
in the Indian Child Protection and Family Violence
Prevention Act (Public Law 101-630, dated November 28,
1990) and the Crime Control Act of 1990 (Public
Law 101-647, dated November 29, 1990). In general,
the Acts require that all employees who have regular
contact with children receive background
investigations. The Code of Federal Regulations (25
CFR 63) establishes minimum standards of character "to
ensure that individuals having regular contact with or
control over Indian children have not been convicted
of certain types of crimes or acted in a manner that
placed others at risk or raised questions about their
trustworthiness." In addition, the Code of Federal
Regulations (5 CFR 736) requires that personnel
background investigations be initiated within 14 days
of placement (hire date) for all noncritical-sensitive
positions.[2] In that regard, the Bureau has
designated as noncritical sensitive positions all
education employee positions within the Office of
Indian Education Programs. Further, administrative
instructions for personnel officers to keep security
officers informed of all relevant personnel actions
are contained in the Department of the Interior Manual
(441 DM 3.3C), and instructions for employee selecting
officials to conduct and document reference checks and
obtain information on any previous background
investigations are contained in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs Manual (62 BIAM 11), dated April 6, 1990, and
updated on November 7, 1996.
The Bureau's background investigation process begins
after an applicant is conditionally selected for
employment. First, the employing school or related
agency office provides the applicants with the
background investigation forms[3] and instructs the
applicants to return the completed forms on or prior
to the date of hire. Prior to April 28, 1998, the
school or agency sent the forms to the Central Office
Security Officer for the Officer's determination that
the forms were complete. The Security Officer
reviewed and updated incomplete forms by contacting
the appropriate employing school and sent the forms to
the Office of Personnel Management. On April 28,
1998, the Bureau changed its process and made the
agency or school responsible for submitting the forms
to the Office of Personnel Management. The Office of
Personnel Management conducts the background
investigations and sends the results to the Central
Office Security Officer in Washington, D.C., for
review and adjudication. Prior to June 1996, the
adjudications were performed by an Area Security
Officer located at the Navajo Area Office.
To comply with the background investigation
requirements for Bureau employees, the Bureau has five
Security Officers (one Central Office Security Officer
in Washington, D.C., and an Area Security Officer in
Albuquerque, New Mexico; Aberdeen, South Dakota;
Billings, Montana; and Phoenix, Arizona). The four
Area Security Officers report to the Central Office
Security Officer. For positions requiring
investigations, the Area Security Officers are
responsible for initiating education employee
background investigations and adjudicating the
investigation results received from the Office of
Personnel Management.
During 1997, the Office of Indian Education Programs
employed approximately 5,165 employees in 82 Bureau-
operated elementary and secondary schools and 5
peripheral dormitories for students who attend public
schools. The Central Office Security Office is
responsible for providing oversight of and
coordination for Navajo Area background investigations
related to 2,960 education employees at 5 agency
offices and 47 Bureau-operated schools and dormitories
that have a total student enrollment of 13,648.
SCOPE OF SURVEY
Our survey was conducted in accordance with the
"Government Auditing Standards," issued by the
Comptroller General of the United States.
Accordingly, we included such tests of records and
other auditing procedures that were considered
necessary under the circumstances. To accomplish our
objective, we (1) obtained and reviewed applicable
criteria related to initiating, processing, and
adjudicating background investigations; (2) reviewed
and discussed Area Security Office background
investigation operating procedures with Bureau
officials; and (3) selected and reviewed a judgmental
sample of education employees' security and personnel
files.
We selected our sample from the 2,960 education
employees for the Navajo Area listed in the Bureau's
payroll system at March 16, 1998. The payroll system
indicated that for the 2,960 education employees,
investigations had been completed for 2,253 employees
and had not been completed for 707 employees. Of the
2,960 employees, we judgmentally selected 116
employees (4 percent) for review, of which 52
employees were recorded as having completed
investigations and 64 employees were recorded as not
having completed investigations.[4] The scope of our
review did not include the procedures used by the
Office of Personnel Management to perform background
investigations.
As part of our survey, we reviewed the Departmental
Report on Accountability for fiscal year 1996 and the
Bureau's annual assurance statement on management
controls for fiscal year 1997, both of which contain
information required by the Federal Managers'
Financial Integrity Act. We determined that neither
report disclosed any internal control weaknesses
related to the objective of this survey. We also
evaluated the system of internal controls related to
the Navajo Area education employee background
investigation process to the extent we considered
necessary to accomplish the objective. The internal
control weaknesses identified are discussed in the
Results of Survey section of this report. Our
recommendations, if implemented, should improve the
internal controls in the areas identified.
Our survey was performed from June 1-19, 1998, and
included visits to the Bureau's Navajo Area Personnel
Office in Gallup, New Mexico, the Office of Indian
Education Programs Personnel Office in Albuquerque,
New Mexico, and the Eastern Navajo Agency Education
Office in Crownpoint, New Mexico.
PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE
During the past 5 years, neither the Office of
Inspector General nor the General Accounting Office
has performed any audits that addressed Bureau of
Indian Affairs education employees' background
investigations and suitability determinations.
However, on June 27, 1997, the Office of Personnel
Management issued the report "Appraisal of the
Personnel Security/Suitability Programs of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs Central Office East/West." The
report stated that personnel security and suitability
programs in the Bureau's Central Office needed to be
improved. Specifically, the report stated that 19
(22 percent) of 87 personnel files reviewed had no
indication that a background investigation had been
performed. The report made recommendations to improve
procedures for ensuring that background investigations
are initiated timely on all employees. In its October
23, 1997, response to the report, the Bureau stated
that (1) the individuals identified as not having had
a background investigation had been provided the
necessary forms and that background investigations
were being scheduled with the Office of Personnel
Management and (2) the Bureau had initiated "a 100
percent review" of the official personnel files for
the Central Office East/West to determine whether
additional corrective actions were warranted. In its
October 27, 1998, response (Appendix 1) to the draft
of this report, the Bureau stated that all 19 of the
individuals identified as not having had a background
investigation were Bureau employees but did not work
for the Office of Indian Education Programs. The
Bureau further stated that as of October 15, 1998, the
status of the background investigations for the 19
employees was as follows: nine employee investigations
had been completed, nine employee investigations were
ongoing pending correction of security forms, and one
investigation was no longer necessary because the
employee no longer worked for the Bureau.
In addition, on October 24, 1997, the Acting Personnel
Officer, Office of Indian Education Programs, provided
the Director with a report on the status of education
employees' background investigations as listed in the
payroll system. The report stated that background
investigations had not been completed for 1,495 (29
percent) of the Bureau's 5,165 school employees. The
Acting Personnel Officer recommended that background
investigation forms be included with the appointment
documents sent to the Office of Indian Education
Programs Personnel Office to ensure that the forms are
completed by the employee at the time the employee is
hired. The report did not require a response, and at
the time of our review, the Acting Personnel Officer
stated that no action had been taken on the report's
recommendation.
In its response to the draft of this report, the
Bureau stated:
More than half of the 1,495 employees,
however, had been investigated and
determined suitable under E.O. [Executive
Order]10450 standards which are the same
standards as in Pub. L. [Public Law]101-630.
Most of these background investigations were
conducted in the late 1970's or early
1980's. The OPM's [Office of Personnel
Management] SII [Security Investigative
Index] data base only maintains information
on investigations conducted within the past
15 years. Therefore, an SII check of the
OPM files will denote a "No Record" for
investigations completed prior to 1983.
The Bureau further stated:
To determine an accurate universe, the
Bureau security specialists conducted a
thorough review of all OIEP [Office of
Indian Education Programs] employees using a
July 20, 1998, payroll listing, the
employees' Official Personnel Folders, and
OPM's SII data base. Based on this review
the Bureau determined that 836 current OIEP
employees required investigations. Of that
number, 459 were employed at the Navajo
Area.
RESULTS OF SURVEY
We found that the Security Officer for the Navajo Area
did not timely initiate and properly complete all
background investigations for new and existing
education employees. Specifically, background
investigations had not been initiated for 11 (9
percent) of the 116 employees in our sample, and
background investigation forms had not been submitted
in a timely manner to the Office of Personnel
Management for 41 (39 percent) of the 105 remaining
employees. While background investigations had been
completed for 95 of the 105 employees, the Security
Officer had not reviewed and adjudicated completed
background investigations for 16 (17 percent) of the
95 employees. We also found that three employees in
our sample who had criminal histories involving
child-related offenses[5] and were determined to be
unsuitable to have contact with school-age children by
the Area Security Office were employed by the Bureau
at two schools and an agency office. The Indian Child
Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act, the
Crime Control Act, and the Code of Federal Regulations
contain the requirements for performing and completing
background investigations. However, the Bureau did
not have effective processes, including written
procedures, to identify all employees who needed
background investigations, to obtain the information
necessary for the proper and timely completion of
background investigations and suitability
determinations, and to ensure that nonsuitability
determinations of the Security Officer were adequately
addressed. In addition, the Bureau delayed replacing
the former Area Security Officer, which further slowed
the adjudication process. As a result, the Bureau
could not be assured that the 27 individuals who were
employed without the requisite completed and/or
adjudicated background investigations at one agency
office and 22 Bureau-operated schools with a total
student enrollment of 7,753 were suitable for
employment at these education facilities. In related
matters, we found that required preemployment
reference checks and fingerprint verifications were
generally completed and that finished background
investigations were properly documented in the
personnel files as having been completed and approved.
However, certain employee suitability determinations
made by the Central Office Security Officer were made
based on incomplete information received from the
Office of Personnel Management.
Initiating Background Investigations
Section 408 of the Indian Child Protection and Family
Violence Prevention Act, dated November 28, 1990,
requires that background investigations be performed
for employees who have regular contact with or control
over Indian children. In addition, Section 231 of the
Crime Control Act of 1990, dated November 29, 1990,
requires that all existing employees involved in child
care services, including education employees, receive
background investigations no later than May 29, 1991.
Also, the Departmental Manual (441 DM 3.3C) states
that personnel officers are responsible for ensuring
that security officers are immediately notified of all
relevant personnel actions, including (1) changes in
program or position placement (sensitivity levels)
which require additional investigation and
(2) reassignments, details, transfers, or terminations
for all sensitive positions and for positions such as
education employee positions which require security
clearances. However, we found that the Bureau did not
have written procedures for transmitting the necessary
information, including relevant personnel actions, to
the Central Office Security Officer. Instead, the
Bureau relied on the employing school or agency to
inform the Security Officer of employees needing
background investigations. However, the schools and
agencies did not always identify employees who did not
have completed background investigations, obtain the
required background investigation forms from the
employees, or submit the background investigation
forms to the Area Personnel Office.
Based on our review of the security and personnel
files for the 116 employees, we found that background
investigations had not been initiated for 1 (11
percent) of 9 employees hired before the Crime Control
Act was enacted on November 29, 1990, and for 10 (9
percent) of 107 employees who were hired on or after
that date. Examples of the absence of initiation of
background investigations are as follows:
On October 23, 1995, the Bureau hired a speech
pathology teacher. However, we found that as of June
1, 1998, the background investigation forms on the
teacher had not been submitted to the Office of
Personnel Management. In addition, the personnel and
security files contained no evidence that a
preemployment reference check was completed.
On August 12, 1996, the Bureau hired a school
counselor. However, we found that as of June 1, 1998,
the background investigation forms on the counselor
had not been submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management. In addition, the personnel and security
files contained no evidence that a preemployment
reference check had been completed.
We believe that the Bureau needs to improve controls
over the initiation of background investigations to
ensure that all employees who have regular contact
with children receive background investigations.
Submitting Background Investigation Forms
The Crime Control Act, Section 231, requires that all
existing and newly hired employees involved in child
care services, including education employees, receive
a background investigation, with all existing
employees receiving background investigations no later
than May 29, 1991. In addition, the Code of Federal
Regulations (5 CFR 736) requires personnel background
investigations to be initiated within 14 days of
placement (hire date) for all noncritical sensitive
positions. However, we found that schools and
agencies did not always require employees to submit
the background investigation forms in a timely manner
and that the Area Personnel Office did not always
monitor and follow up on background investigation
forms which were returned to employees for completion.
Based on our review of security and personnel files
for the 105 employees whose background investigations
had been initiated or completed, we found that the
required background investigation forms for 41 (39
percent) of the 105 employees had not been submitted
timely by the Area Personnel Office to the Office of
Personnel Management. Specifically, background
investigation forms for 32 employees hired after the
November 29, 1990, enactment date of the Crime Control
Act were submitted an average of 259 days after the
date of hire rather than within the 14 days required
by the Code of Federal Regulations (5 CFR 736), and
background investigation forms for 9 employees hired
before November 29, 1990, were not submitted in
accordance with the Act's due date for submission of
May 29, 1991. For example:
On August 2, 1996, the Bureau hired a schoolteacher
who submitted the background investigation forms to
the employing school prior to the hire date. On
April 2, 1997, the Office of Personnel Management
determined that the forms were improperly completed
and returned them to the employee's agency office for
correction and return by April 23, 1997. However, the
forms were not returned by the agency office until 1
year later, and a background investigation was not
initiated until April 24, 1998, approximately 1 3/4
years after the teacher was hired.
On September 13, 1988, the Bureau hired a dormitory
assistant who did not submit the background
investigation forms until March 27, 1998. As a
result, the background investigation was not scheduled
with the Office of Personnel Management until April
29, 1998, approximately 7 years after the Act's May
29, 1991, due date for submission.
On April 28, 1998, the Bureau took action to improve
its controls over the security program by issuing new
operating procedures that primarily addressed employee
position sensitivity designations and the appointment
of employees to positions requiring background
investigations. We believe that if these procedures
are implemented, the designation of position
sensitivity levels will be improved. The procedures
also made the employing agency or the school rather
than the Area Personnel Office responsible for
submitting background investigation forms to the
Office of Personnel Management. While this change
should improve the timeliness of the submissions, the
procedures do not provide assurance that all forms
will be obtained and independently verified before
they are submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management. The Area Personnel Office was previously
responsible for these functions. In addition, the
procedures do not address the completion of background
investigations for individuals who are employed.
**FOOTNOTES**
[1]:An employee suitability determination (adjudication)
consists of determining whether an employee has met
the required background investigation standards.
[2]:The Federal Personnel Manual, Subchapter 2,
identifies four sensitivity levels for designating
positions for security-related positions: nonsensitive,
noncritical-sensitive, critical-sensitive, and special
-sensitive. The subchapter states that noncritical
-sensitive includes positions that involve one of the following:
"access to Secret or Confidential national security materials,
information, etc.; - Duties that may directly or indirectly
adversely affect the overall operations of the agency; -
Duties that demand a high degree of confidence and trust."
[3]:All education employees are required by the Office of
Personnel Management to complete a "Questionnaire for Public
Trust Position" (SF-85P), a "Supplemental Questionnaire for
Selected Positions" (SF-85P-S), and a "Fingerprint Chart"
(SF-87).
[4]:Our review disclosed that the status of background
investigations as recorded in the payroll system was not
accurate. Of the 116 employees selected for review, background
investigations had not been initiated for 11employees, and of
the 105 that had been initiated, 95 had been completed.
[5]:The Personnel Office for the Office of Indian Education
Programs indicated, on June 19, 1998, that for these three
individuals, there were no reported incidents of child abuse
or molestation.
Adjudicating Background Investigations
The Code of Federal Regulations (25 CFR 63) requires
that the Bureau of Indian Affairs designate qualified
security personnel to adjudicate the results of
background investigations performed by the Office of
Personnel Management. The Code further requires that
the adjudicating official review the background
investigations to determine the character, reputation,
and trustworthiness of the individuals. In addition,
the Departmental Manual (441 DM 3.3B) requires
security officers to ensure the review and
adjudication of background investigations. However,
we found that background investigation results
received from the Office of Personnel Management were
not adjudicated timely principally because the Bureau
delayed replacing the former Area Security Officer,
who left the Bureau on June 21, 1996, by 22 months.
Our review disclosed that adjudications had not been
performed for 16 (17 percent) of the 95 employees
reviewed for whom background investigations had been
completed. For example:
- On August 19, 1996, the Bureau hired a dormitory
assistant. A background investigation was initiated
with the Office of Personnel Management on May 6,
1997. However, we found that the investigation
results received on June 13, 1997, had not been
adjudicated as of June 1, 1998, almost 2 years after
the assistant was hired.
- On November 8, 1996, the Bureau hired a school
teacher. A background investigation was initiated
with the Office of Personnel Management on May 29,
1997. However, we found that the investigation
results received on June 30, 1997, had not been
adjudicated as of June 1, 1998, approximately 1 1/2
years after the teacher was hired.
On April 28, 1998, the Bureau assigned background
investigation reviews and suitability determinations
for the Navajo Area to the Albuquerque Area Security
Officer. We believe that this action will improve the
adjudication of background investigations for the
Navajo Area.
Implementing Suitability Determinations
The Departmental Manual (441 DM 6.1) establishes
standards for employee suitability determinations for
all education employee positions within the
Department. The Manual states that suitability
determinations should be based on considerations of
but not be limited to (1) delinquency or misconduct in
prior employment; (2) criminal, dishonest, infamous,
or notoriously disgraceful conduct; and (3)
intentional false statement or deception or fraud in
examination or appointment. In addition, the Code of
Federal Regulations (25 CFR 63) states that an
employer may deny employment to or dismiss an employee
when an individual has been convicted of an offense
involving a child victim, a sex crime, or a drug
felony.
We found that 3 (3 percent) of the 105 sampled
employees for whom background investigations had been
initiated and/or completed had been determined by the
former Area Security Officer to be unsuitable for
having contact with or control over school-age
children. However, we determined that as of June 1,
1998, the three individuals were still employed at two
Bureau-operated schools and one agency office. This
occurred because the former Navajo Area Director and
Personnel Officer did not ensure compliance with the
education employee suitability standards. For
example:
- On August 8, 1994, the Bureau hired a substitute
teacher. An employee background investigation
completed by the Office of Personnel Management on
November 18, 1994, disclosed that the employee had
been (1) charged with child neglect in May 1994 and
(2) terminated from recent employment for obscene
behavior. In a February 27, 1995, memorandum to the
Navajo Area Personnel Officer, the former Area
Security Officer stated that the employee had
falsified the employment application and security
forms and recommended that the employee be terminated.
However, the Area Personnel Officer, in a February 27
response to the former Area Security Officer, stated
that the Merit Systems Protection Board would not
uphold a termination action against the employee. On
June 1, 1998, the Central Office Security Officer
stated that she had also reviewed the adverse
suitability determination made by the former Area
Security Officer and recommended to the former Area
Director that the employee be terminated. We found
that the employee was still employed as a substitute
teacher as of June 1, 1998.
- On May 23, 1984, the Bureau hired an elementary
schoolteacher. However, a background investigation
was not initiated for the employee until September 7,
1994. The background investigation was completed by
the Office of Personnel Management on October 31,
1994, and disclosed that the employee, in 1993, (1)
had been dismissed from his job for child abuse from a
Bureau-operated school and (2) had been arrested and
charged with assault and battery. In addition, a
followup questionnaire completed by the employee on
April 3, 1995, disclosed that the employee admitted to
falsifying the employment application and background
investigation forms. The former Area Security Officer
had denied a security clearance for the employee. The
Bureau's Central Office Security Officer stated that
in 1996 she had reviewed the adverse suitability
determination performed by the former Area Security
Officer and recommended to the former Area Director
that the employee be terminated. We found that the
employee was still employed as an elementary school
teacher as of June 1, 1998.
- On April 10, 1995, the Bureau hired a janitor for an
agency office. A preemployment reference check of two
previous employers was performed but did not include
any verification of personal references. A background
investigation for the employee was completed by the
Office of Personnel Management on July 7, 1995. The
investigation disclosed that the employee had (1) a
criminal history which included providing alcohol to a
minor in 1991 and a burglary in 1986 and (2) serious
absenteeism problems with two previous employers who
had not been contacted as part of the preemployment
reference check. As a result of the investigation,
the former Area Security Officer did not approve a
security clearance for the employee and recommended
that the employee be terminated. We found that the
employee was still employed as a janitor as of June 1,
1998.
We believe that a system to ensure that the
recommendations of Security Officers are adequately
addressed will help preclude those individuals who
have criminal histories involving child-related
offenses from being hired by Bureau schools.
Determining Suitability
We found that the Central Office Security Officer did
not have procedures for determining whether the
results of a background investigation provided
sufficient information on which to base a suitability
determination. Although we identified only 1
determination in our review of 79 suitability
determinations that we believe was based on
insufficient responses from the Office of Personnel
Management, we are reporting this matter because of
the sensitivity of the issue. We found that the
Security Officer, because no procedures were
established, made employee suitability determinations
based on the information provided by the Office of
Personnel Management, even if the information was
incomplete. For example, in the instance we noted,
the Case Closing Transmittal concerning the background
investigation for an education aide indicated that the
Office of Personnel Management was unable to verify 10
of 11 prior employer references and one of the three
personal references and that two local law enforcement
agencies either had not been contacted or had not
responded to the Office of Personnel Management's
request for a check of criminal history. Although the
information provided in the Office of Personnel
Management's Case Closing Transmittal was not
complete, the Central Office Security Officer, on
January 8, 1997, made a favorable suitability
determination for the employee. However, there was no
written justification for the determination because
there are no standards requiring Security Officers to
document the basis for favorable suitability
determinations.
Other Issues
The Departmental Manual (441 DM 3.3B) requires that
Security Officers ensure that all Departmental
employees are appropriately briefed concerning the
sensitivity level of their positions. To comply with
the Manual, the Bureau developed a briefing document
(Certification of Briefing Memorandum) that is
required to be issued to all education employees who
have completed background investigations. However, we
found that after June 1996, the Central Office
Security Officer had not issued any briefing documents
to Navajo Area education employees. The Security
Officer stated that briefing documents were not issued
because of the large case load of employees in the
Navajo Area. In addition, the Security Officer stated
that briefing documents would be delivered to the
Navajo Area employing schools and/or agencies during
the 1998 school semester.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs:
1. Direct the Central Office Security Officer to
establish policies and procedures to ensure that
education employees who have not received completed
background investigations are identified; that
employee suitability determinations are completed for
all completed background investigations; and that all
background investigation forms are obtained, properly
completed, and submitted to the Office of Personnel
Management.
2. Direct the Central Office Security Officer to
establish polices and procedures to ensure that the
Navajo Area Security Office is notified by the Area
Personnel Office of all relevant personnel actions and
that a clear definition has been developed as to the
quantity and type of information needed to determine
an employee's suitability for employment.
3. Direct the Director, Office of Indian Education
Programs, to review the adverse suitability
determinations for the three individuals cited and
take the appropriate personnel action.
4. Establish a process for the Navajo Area to ensure
that suitability determinations are adequately
reviewed and implemented.
Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs Response and
Office of Inspector General Reply
In the October 27, 1998, response (Appendix 1) to the
draft report, the Assistant Secretary for Indian
Affairs concurred with Recommendations 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Based on the response, we consider Recommendation 1
resolved but not implemented and Recommendations 2, 3,
and 4 resolved and implemented. Accordingly,
Recommendation 1 will be referred to the Assistant
Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget for
tracking of implementation (see Appendix 2).
Additional Comments on Audit Report
In its response, the Bureau provided additional
information on the Prior Audit Coverage section of the
draft report regarding the June 27, 1997, Office of
Personnel Management report "Appraisal of the
Personnel Security/Suitability Programs of the Bureau
of Indian Affairs Central Office East/West" and the
October 24, 1997, report from the Office of Indian
Education Programs' Acting Personnel Officer to the
Director pertaining to the status of education
employees' background investigations as listed in the
payroll system. Accordingly, we have revised the
Prior Audit Coverage section of this report to
incorporate the Bureau's comments as appropriate. The
Bureau also provided comments on actions taken to
improve the adjudication of background investigations.
The legislation, as amended, creating the Office of
Inspector requires semiannual reporting to the
Congress on all audit reports issued, the monetary
impact of audit findings, actions taken to implement
audit recommendations, and identification of each
significant recommendation on which corrective action
has not been taken.
Since the report's recommendations are considered
resolved, no further response to the Office of
Inspector General is required (see Appendix 2).
We appreciate the assistance of Bureau personnel in
the conduct of our survey.
APPENDIX 1
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APPENDIX 1
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APPENDIX 1
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APPENDIX 1
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APPENDIX 1
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APPENDIX 2
STATUS OF SURVEY REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------
Finding/
Recommendation
Reference Status Action Required
--------------------------------------------------------
1 Resolved; No further response to the
not Office of Inspector General is
implemented. required. The recommendation
will be referred to the
Assistant Secretary for
Policy, Management and Budget
for tracking of
implementation.
--------------------------------------------------------
2, 3, and Implemented. No further action is required.
4
--------------------------------------------------------
ILLEGAL OR WASTEFUL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE REPORTED
TO THE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL BY:
Sending written documents to:
Within the Continental United States
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
1849 C Street,N.W.
Mail Stop 5341
Washington, D.C. 20240
Calling:
Our 24 hour
Telephone HOTLINE
1-800-424-5081 or
(202) 208-5300
TDD for hearing impaired
(202) 208-2420 or
1-800-354-0996
Outside the Continental United States
Caribbean Region
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
Eastern Division- Investigations
1550 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 410
Arlington, Virginia 22209
Calling:
(703) 235-9221
North Pacific Region
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
North Pacific Region
238 Archbishop F.C. F'lores Street
Suite 807, PDN Building
Agana, Guam 96910
Calling:
(700) 550-7428 or
COMM 9-011-671-472-7279