[Audit Report on Followup of Recommendations Relating to the Bureau of Corrections, Department of Justice, Government of the Virgin Islands]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]
Report No. 98-I-468
Title: Audit Report on Followup of Recommendations Relating to
the Bureau of Corrections, Department of Justice, Government
of the Virgin Islands
Date: May 29, 1998
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U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
AUDIT REPORT
FOLLOWUP OF RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
REPORT NO. 98-I-468
MAY 1998
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Secretary
FROM: Robert J. Williams
Acting Inspector General
SUBJECT SUMMARY: Final Audit Report for Your Information - "Followup of
Recommendations Relating to the Bureau of Corrections,
Department of Justice, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 98-I-468)
Attached for your information is a copy of the subject final audit report. The objective of
this review was to determine whether the Bureau of Corrections, Department of Justice,
Government of the Virgin Islands, had satisfactorily implemented the recommendations in
four prior reports and whether any new recommendations were warranted.
Based on our followup review of 45 recommendations made in the prior audit reports on the
Bureau, we found that 7 recommendations were fully implemented, 22 recommendations
were partially implemented, and 16 recommendations were not implemented. Specifically,
the Bureau took actions to (1) develop a plan to correct building deficiencies, (2)
develop
maintenance plans to meet the grant requirements of the Federal agencies which provided
funds for the repair of correctional facilities, (3) institute a formal system for classifying
inmates as to level of risk, (4) provide uniforms to corrections officers and
inmates,
(5) provide inmates with medical and dental care, (6) transfer the Youth Rehabilitation
Center to the Department of Human Services, (7) provide a training facility on St. Croix
for corrections officers, and (8) develop "post orders" (descriptions of required duties)
for
all corrections officer positions. However, we found that deficiencies disclosed in the prior
reports still existed, primarily because (1) the Bureau did not have a permanent management
team to ensure that corrective actions were initiated and completed, (2) prison facilities on
St. Thomas and St. Croix did not have standard operating procedures and only the
St. Thomas facilities had a comprehensive procedures manual, (3) corrections personnel
did not always follow established procedures, and (4) the recommendations were not always
implemented consistently on the two islands. As a result, physical security at the
correctional facilities continued to be compromised, repair and maintenance problems
existed,prison facilities were overcrowded, rehabilitative programs for inmates were not fully
effective, and deficiencies related to staffing and training existed within the Bureau.
Although we made six new recommendations to the Governor of the Virgin Islands to
address the deficiencies, we did not receive a response. Therefore, the six recommendations
are unresolved.
If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 208-5745.
Attachment
AUDIT REPORT V-IN-VIS-003-97
Honorable Roy L. Schneider
Governor of the Virgin Islands
No. 21 Kongens Gade
Charlotte Amalie, Virgin Islands 00802
Subject: Audit Report on Followup of Recommendations
Relating to the Bureau of Corrections, Department of Justice,
Government of the Virgin Islands (No. 98-I-468)
Dear Governor Schneider:
This report presents the results of our followup review of recommendations contained in four
prior audit reports on the Bureau of Corrections, Virgin Islands Department of Justice (see
Prior Audit Coverage). The objective of this review was to determine whether the Bureau
had satisfactorily implemented the recommendations in the prior reports and whether any
new recommendations were warranted.
BACKGROUND
The Bureau of Corrections was established within the Office of the Governor by Title 5,
Chapter 401, of the Virgin Islands Code. In fiscal year 1987, the Bureau was placed under
the administrative control of the Virgin Islands Department of Justice as a result of the
Government's Executive Branch reorganization. The mission of the Bureau includes
providing for the custody and care of inmates detained in correctional and detention facilities
for felonies and misdemeanors. The Bureau's operating budget totaled $12.7 million in
fiscal year 1996 and $13.8 million in fiscal year 1997.
The Director of Corrections is the chief administrator and fiscal officer of the Bureau and is
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Legislature. The Bureau
operates four correctional facilities within the Virgin Islands: the Golden Grove Adult
Correctional Facility and the Anna's Hope Adult Detention Center on St. Croix and the
Alexander Farrelly Criminal Justice Complex and the Criminal Justice Complex Annex on
St. Thomas. As of September 1997, these facilities housed more than 500 inmates, with
another 190 inmates (including 70 inmates who were transferred to Arizona in July 1997)
held in correctional facilities in the continental United States because of overcrowding
conditions.
SCOPE OF AUDIT
To accomplish our audit objective, we reviewed documents and records pertaining to the
Bureau's operations during fiscal years 1995 through 1997 and to policies and procedures
in effect at the time of the audit. We also inspected the four facilities administered by the
Bureau and interviewed Bureau and Virgin Islands Department of Justice personnel
regarding actions taken to implement the prior audit recommendations.
Our review was made, as applicable, in accordance with the "Government Auditing
Standards," issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. Accordingly, we
included such tests of records and other auditing procedures that were considered necessary
under the circumstances. Because of the limited scope and objective of our review, we
reviewed internal controls only to the extent that they related to corrective actions taken on
the prior recommendations.
PRIOR AUDIT COVERAGE
From 1991 to 1993, the Office of Inspector General issued four audit reports on the Bureau,
which disclosed deficiencies in the areas of security and maintenance; prison overcrowding;
inmate care, rehabilitation, and safety; and administrative functions. The four audit
reports
contained a total of 45 recommendations on the Bureau of Corrections as follows:
- The August 1991 report "Security and Maintenance of Correctional Facilities,
Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 91-I-1188) stated that the Bureau of Corrections had
not implemented adequate measures to ensure that correctional facilities in the Virgin Islands
were secure and properly maintained. Specifically, the report noted that (1) inmates were not
adequately monitored and supervised, (2) internal and perimeter security equipment and
systems were not fully operable, (3) inmates and visitors were not adequately screened to
prevent the introduction of contraband such as drugs and weapons, (4) a comprehensive
preventive maintenance and repair program had not been established, and (5) available
Federal funds for needed maintenance and repair were not used effectively. The report's
16 recommendations were classified as resolved but not implemented based on the
Government's response to the report.
- The October 1991 report "Prison Overcrowding, Bureau of Corrections,
Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 92-I-90) stated that correctional facilities in the
Virgin Islands housed 80 percent more inmates than their designed capacity. The report
further stated that (1) the Bureau of Corrections had not effectively analyzed and planned for
expansion of the prisons; (2) the Territorial and Federal Courts did not implement special
sentencing programs which could assist in relieving overcrowding conditions; and (3) the
Bureau improperly credited inmates with good conduct allowances that were not earned,
which reduced inmates' prison sentences to less than court-ordered sentences. The report's
five recommendations were classified as resolved but not implemented based on the
Government's response to the report.
- The December 1992 report "Inmate Care, Rehabilitation, and Safety, Bureau of
Corrections, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 93-I-363) stated that the Bureau of
Corrections and the Department of Human Services, which was responsible for programs at
the Youth Rehabilitation Center, had not adequately provided for the care, rehabilitation, and
safety of incarcerated individuals. Specifically, the report noted that (1) bathing and
drinking
water at correctional facilities was contaminated and unsafe for human use, (2) kitchen and
medical facilities at the Golden Grove prison were not clean and were unsanitary, (3) the
level of medical and dental services provided to inmates was inadequate, (4) existing
educational programs were only to the fifth-grade level, (5) vocational and prison industries
programs were not effective, (6) substance abuse treatment programs reached only a small
percentage of the target inmate population, (7) emergency alarm systems and emergency
exits were not functional, and (8) adequate fire fighting equipment was not available. The
report's 10 recommendations were classified as unresolved based on the Government's
response to the report.
- The March 1993 report "Personnel, Property Management, and Procurement
Functions, Bureau of Corrections, Government of the Virgin Islands" (No. 93-I-670) stated
that the Bureau of Corrections needed to make improvements in its personnel, property
management, and procurement practices. Specifically, the report noted that the Bureau
(1) did not adequately staff or properly utilize corrections officers, which resulted in
overtime
costs of about $1.3 million annually; (2) did not always hire the most qualified officer
candidates; (3) incurred excess salary costs of $138,000 by using corrections officers to
perform certain administrative duties; (4) did not develop a comprehensive, cost-effective
training program for new recruits and for in-service training; (5) did not maintain current and
accurate records of equipment and supplies; (6) did not comply with procurement regulations
concerning the use of over-the-counter purchases; and (7) lost about $37,000 in prompt
payment discounts because of delayed payments to vendors. The report's
14 recommendations were classified as unresolved based on the Government's response to
the report.
In addition, in January 1997, the Government of the Virgin Islands was cited by the U.S.
District Court for failing to comply with a court order to reduce overcrowding, house
mentally ill patients separately, and fix the deteriorating physical plant at the Criminal
Justice
Complex on St. Thomas. Our current review disclosed that the Government had not fully
corrected these deficiencies.
RESULTS OF AUDIT
Of the 45 recommendations made in our four prior audit reports, we found that
7 recommendations were fully implemented, 22 recommendations were partially
implemented, and 16 recommendations were not implemented. (A summary of the status
of the recommendations is in Appendix 1, and the status of each recommendation and of the
corrective actions taken is in Appendices 2 through 5.) We found that the Bureau took
actions to (1) develop a plan to correct building deficiencies; (2) develop maintenance plans
to meet the grant requirements of the Federal agencies which provided funds for the repair
of correctional facilities; (3) institute a formal system for classifying inmates as to level
of
risk; (4) provide uniforms to corrections officers and inmates; (5) provide inmates with
medical and dental care, which included assigning a full-time registered nurse at the
Golden Grove prison; (6) transfer the Youth Rehabilitation Center to the Department
of Human Services; (7) provide a training facility on St. Croix for corrections officers; and
(8) develop "post orders" (descriptions of required duties) for all corrections officer
positions. However, we found that deficiencies disclosed in the prior reports still existed,
primarily because (1) the Bureau did not have a permanent management team (the positions
of Director, Assistant Director, Warden, and Assistant Warden were all vacant at the time
of our followup review) which ensured that corrective actions were initiated and completed,
(2) the prison facilities on St. Thomas and St. Croix did not have standard operating
procedures and only the St. Thomas facilities had a comprehensive procedures manual, (3)
corrections personnel did not always follow established procedures, and (4) the
recommendations were not always implemented consistently on the two islands. As a result,
physical security at the correctional facilities continued to be compromised, repair and
maintenance problems existed, prison facilities were overcrowded, rehabilitative programs
for inmates were not fully effective, and deficiencies related to staffing and training existed
within the Bureau.
Security and Maintenance of Correctional Facilities
Regarding our August 1991 audit report on the security and maintenance of correctional
facilities, our followup review determined that 3 of the 16 recommendations had been fully
implemented, 12 had been partially implemented, and 1 had not been implemented (see
Appendix 2). Although the Bureau had made improvements in the security and maintenance
of correctional facilities, further improvements were needed in the areas of physical security,
supervision of inmates, and inmate classification.
Physical Security. The Bureau did not have a comprehensive procedures manual for
its St. Croix facilities that included specific policies on maintaining an adequate level of
security within the facilities, disposing of contraband found in the facilities, and
controlling
the issuance of disposable razors to inmates. In addition, the Bureau allowed inmates at the
Golden Grove prison to cover their cell door windows and lock cell doors from the inside.
Further, corrections officers stationed in the perimeter guard towers at Golden Grove were
not provided with firearms that could serve as a deterrent to inmates attempting to escape
from the prison. At the Anna's Hope facility, a secure control room with monitoring
equipment was not available, and the plumbing needed to be repaired. On St. Thomas,
access to the main control center at the Criminal Justice Complex was not restricted to
authorized corrections officers, and there was no full-time maintenance unit. The emergency
generator, ventilation system, and roof at the Criminal Justice Complex needed to be
repaired.
We also found that the Bureau had not fully implemented the corrective action plan imposed
on the Bureau by the U.S. District Court for improvements at the Golden Grove facility on
St. Croix. Although improvements were made in the areas of emergency care, medication,
and sanitation, the Bureau had not fully complied with the order in the areas of improving
fire safety, screening windows, and controlling tools. For example, we found that the central
fire alarm system was inoperative, and the majority of dormitory windows were bent or
missing or had large holes in them. As a result, inmates got wet when it rained, and many
placed plastic bags or cardboard over the windows to prevent the rain from coming in. In
addition, the majority of window screens in the dormitories were missing or had large holes
in them.
Supervision of Inmates. The Bureau had formal procedures for the work detail
programs at the correctional facilities on both islands. However, the established procedures
were not always followed, particularly at the Golden Grove facility. For example, of the 108
inmates enrolled in the work detail program on St. Croix, 24 maximum security prisoners,
who had committed violent crimes such as first degree murder, were allowed to work in
areas such as the farm, the carpentry shop, and the kitchen, where they had access to tools
and other sharp objects that could be used in the conduct of violent acts against other inmates
or prison personnel. In addition, we found that 12 inmates had not served at least one-third
of their sentences, as required by established policies, before being considered for more
independent work detail assignments. We also found that, on both islands, inmates enrolled
in the work detail program were not always paid for their hours of work. Specifically, on
St. Croix, inmates had not been paid since 1995 because the money allotted for that purpose
was used for other Bureau expenses. Based on our review of records for the period of
December 1995 to August 1996, we found that 150 inmates at the Golden Grove facility
were owed about $69,000 for that 9-month period.
Although inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas were allowed to
participate in work release programs based on the courts' sentencing orders, the Bureau did
not have formal procedures for the work release program, and controls over inmates
participating in the work release program were not adequate. For example, the only
supervision of inmates in the work release program was in the form of occasional telephone
calls made to the inmates' places of employment to determine whether they were at work.
At the time of our followup review, the work release program was not active on St. Croix.
Inmate Classification. The Bureau did not ensure that emergency situations and
unusual incidents which occurred in the correctional facilities were recorded in the
facilities'
logbooks. The number and the type of unusual incidents in the prisons were factors used by
Bureau officials to reclassify inmates from maximum to medium security or from medium
to minimum security. In addition, good conduct allowances, through which inmates'
sentences were reduced for good behavior, were also based on the number and type of
unusual incidents that occurred. However, because emergency situations and unusual
incidents were not routinely recorded in the correctional facilities' logbooks for later
transcription to the individual inmates' prison files, the potential existed for inmates to be
given a less restrictive security classification or a greater level of good conduct allowances
than was appropriate.
On St. Croix, cell assignments were not always appropriate based on the classification of the
inmates. For example, we found that high-risk prisoners were housed in the same cells as
low-risk prisoners at the Golden Grove facility. In one instance, a maximum security inmate
who had been convicted of first degree murder and who was serving a mandatory life
sentence was housed in a medium security dormitory and shared a cell with an inmate who
had committed robbery and had only 4 years remaining on a 10-year sentence. Another
inmate convicted of first degree murder who was serving a mandatory life sentence shared
a cell with an inmate who was serving his sentence on weekends. Moreover, because the
Anna's Hope Detention Center did not have separate facilities for female detainees,
maximum security inmates and minimum security detainees, along with mentally ill females,
were housed together in the Golden Grove facility's female dormitory.
On St. Thomas, the Bureau made cell assignments without regard to inmate classifications.
Specifically, all types of inmates, minimum to maximum security, were housed in the same
cell clusters. We believe that this practice did not provide adequate physical security for
the
inmates, since the cell clusters at the Criminal Justice Complex were small. For example,
one convicted murderer who was serving a life sentence plus additional years shared a cell
with a minimum security inmate who was convicted for witness tampering. In addition,
because the Criminal Justice Complex was frequently understaffed, proper supervision was
not ensured. For example, one officer sometimes guarded two cell clusters simultaneously.
Prison Overcrowding
Regarding our October 1991 audit report on prison overcrowding, our followup review
determined that two of the five recommendations had been partially implemented and that
the remaining three had not been implemented (see Appendix 3). Specifically, although the
Bureau made efforts to alleviate prison overcrowding, it had not developed a comprehensive
plan to increase the overall capacity of prisons in the Virgin Islands. As a result,
overcrowding still existed.
Overcrowding. The Criminal Justice Complex remained the most overcrowded
correctional facility, with an occupancy of 151 inmates and detainees, which was 196 percent
over the facility's design capacity of 51 inmates and detainees. We observed as many as four
inmates occupying cells designed to hold an individual. As a result, inmates slept on
mattresses placed on the floor, some of which were directly adjacent to toilets or under bunk
beds. Although the Bureau had plans to complete renovation work on an annex to the
Criminal Justice Complex, which would have a capacity of 52 inmates, we found that the
renovation project was not progressing as intended because of insufficient funding.
Overcrowding was not as severe at the Golden Grove facility, where no more than two
inmates were assigned to each cell in the male section of the prison. However, the female
dormitory had one small room that contained seven bunk beds.
In an attempt to address the overcrowding, the Bureau, in July 1997, moved 70 inmates
(40 from Golden Grove and 30 from the Criminal Justice Complex) to a correctional
institution in Arizona. However, the Bureau's projected cost of incarceration for each inmate
in Arizona was $60 per day, or more than $1.5 million per year, for the 70 inmates. The
Bureau also transferred 24 inmates from the Criminal Justice Complex on St. Thomas to the
Golden Grove facility on St. Croix, thereby reducing some of the overcrowding observed at
the St. Thomas facility.
Alternative Sentencing. During our followup review, we did not find any
documentation that the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands had conducted a feasibility
study on alternative sentencing programs, as had been recommended in our October 1991
audit report. However, the Territorial Court did make attempts to alleviate prison
overcrowding by implementing an alternative sentencing program known as the Pre-trial
Intervention Program. The purpose of this program was to give first-time misdemeanor
offenders an opportunity to perform community service instead of going to prison.
According to Territorial Court officials, about 500 individuals have participated in the
Pre-trial Intervention Program since 1985.
Our followup review found that improvements were needed in the computation of good
conduct allowances earned by inmates. Based on our review of the records for 20 inmates
(10 on St. Thomas and 10 on St. Croix), we found that, for all of the inmates, the computed
release dates based on good conduct allowances were in error by amounts ranging from 1 day
to 6 1/2 months because of the mathematical formula used by the Bureau in computing good
conduct allowances. In addition, we found that the longer the inmates' original sentences,
the larger the discrepancies in the computation of good conduct release dates because of the
longer time periods during which a discrepancy could be carried forward. Further, the
Bureau had not developed written procedures that included minimum-to-maximum ranges
for the forfeiture of good conduct allowances for subsequent incidences of misconduct, and
there were no formal procedures for recording infractions, forfeited good time allowances,
or adjustments to inmate release dates for misconduct in Bureau logbooks. As a result, the
potential existed for inmates to be awarded good conduct allowances to which they were not
entitled.
Inmate Care, Rehabilitation, and Safety
Regarding our December 1992 audit report on inmate care, rehabilitation, and safety, our
followup review determined that 2 of the 10 recommendations had been fully implemented,
4 had been partially implemented, and 4 had not been implemented (see Appendix 4).
Specifically, we found that, although medical care had significantly improved, medications
were not adequately supplied; substance abuse and other rehabilitative programs were not
effective; and safety deficiencies existed, such as inoperative smoke detectors and emergency
lighting, which could adversely affect inmate safety in an emergency situation.
Inmate Care. The Bureau took actions to improve the level of medical and dental
care provided to inmates, including the assignment of a full-time registered nurse at the
Golden Grove facility. However, at the Golden Grove facility, 67 types of medicines were
completely or almost out of stock. Therefore, some inmates did not have the medications
they needed on a regular basis, such as those needed to control high blood pressure or mental
illness.
Regarding general cleanliness and sanitation, we found that the kitchen at the Criminal
Justice Complex had not passed its most recent (March 1997) inspection by the Department
of Health because food items in stock had expiration dates which had passed and also
because insects were found in the kitchen area. We also noted that kitchen equipment and
utensils were blackened from years of use and were in generally poor operating condition.
In addition, corrections officers were allowed to take home kitchen equipment, such as pots
and pans, for personal use. Further, the Bureau was not providing inmates with personal
hygiene items (such as toothpaste, toothbrushes, and deodorant) on a regular basis.
Rehabilitative Programs. We found that in fiscal year 1996, the Bureau received
two grants through the Virgin Islands Law Enforcement Planning Commission for vocational
education programs at the Golden Grove facility: $150,000 to purchase tools and video
training equipment and $137,000 to purchase supplies. Although $106,000 of the first grant
and $53,000 of the second grant had been expended through October 1996 to purchase such
items, the Bureau had not officially started a vocational education program. However,
classroom equipment had been purchased, and the classroom areas were being prepared.
During fiscal year 1996, the Bureau requested a grant budget adjustment whereby a 1-year
extension, through September 30, 1997, was approved by the Law Enforcement Planning
Commission to begin the vocational education program at the Criminal Justice Complex.
The Bureau identified a Government-owned building that could be used rent free for the
program and earmarked $21,000 of the grant to purchase equipment. However, at the time
of our followup review, the program had not been started. Although the grant director wrote
to the Acting Warden requesting required status reports on the rental of the building that
could accommodate the vocational education program so that grant funds could be released,
we found no documentation that the Bureau had responded to those requests.
Educational and substance abuse treatment programs were not effective. During fiscal years
1996 and 1997, the Law Enforcement Planning Commission also awarded Bureau grants
totaling about $400,000 to establish substance abuse treatment programs within the
correctional facilities. Of that amount, $175,000 was specifically earmarked for construction
of separate facilities within the prisons to accommodate substance abusers. However, we
found that the potential existed for the Bureau to lose the grant funds because it may not be
able to use the funds for the construction of separate facilities or other program requirements
by September 30, 1998. Law Enforcement Planning Commission personnel told us that if
the grant funds were not used, they would be reprogrammed for use by the Youth
Rehabilitation Center, which was operated by the Virgin Islands Department of Human
Services. The potential also existed for the Government to lose an additional $170,000 of
the grant funds if a program for controlled substance testing is not implemented by
September 1998. At the time of our followup review, the only substance abuse treatment
program within the prisons consisted of occasional visits by representatives of Alcoholics
Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. Bureau officials told us that those meetings
generally were not well attended by inmates.
On St. Thomas, improvements were also needed in the implementation of a comprehensive
educational program for inmates. At the time of our followup review, the Bureau had two
volunteers who taught basic education courses to seven inmates at the Criminal Justice
Complex. However, a program had not been developed, in coordination with the Department
of Education, to help inmates acquire functional literacy or obtain General Education
Development high school equivalency certificates. In contrast, educational programs were
fully operational on St. Croix.
We believe that, without effective substance abuse, vocational education, and basic education
programs, inmates may not have the skills necessary to be successfully integrated into the
community upon their release.
Inmate Safety. We found that the smoke detection system, emergency lighting, and
exit signs at the Golden Grove facility were not working effectively. In addition, doors of
the emergency exits at the Anna's Hope Detention Center could not be opened, and
emergency keys were not easily accessible to corrections officers. These deficiencies could
adversely affect inmate safety in an emergency situation such as a fire.
Personnel, Property Management, and Procurement Practices
Regarding our March 1993 report on personnel, property management, and procurement
practices, our followup review determined that 2 of the 14 recommendations had been fully
implemented, 4 had been partially implemented, and 8 had not been implemented (see
Appendix 5). Specifically, the Bureau (1) was not recruiting and retaining an adequate
number of qualified corrections officers, (2) did not have comprehensive pre-service and in-
service training programs, and (3) had not implemented effective procedures to control its
property management and procurement functions.
Recruitment and Retention. The Bureau continued to have a shortage of
corrections officers, which resulted in overtime costs of $1.4 million in fiscal year 1996 and
$446,000 in fiscal year 1997 (through April 1997). In addition, the Bureau hired individuals
whose background investigations disclosed irregularities or potential reasons for not being
hired. For example, we reviewed the personnel files for a sample of 21 officers and found
that 2 applicants' background investigations had disclosed that their social security numbers
and dates of birth were in conflict and that another 2 applicants had prior convictions or
prior
involvement with selling and using illegal drugs. The Bureau also hired three applicants
without waiting for their entrance test scores, drug test results, or background investigation
results. We found one instance in which a member of the Bureau's candidate selection
committee provided a personal recommendation for an applicant who was hired. We believe
that this personal recommendation may represent a conflict of interest on the part of the
selection committee member. These discrepancies occurred, in part, because the Bureau did
not have or follow formal policies and procedures for recruiting and hiring corrections
officers.
Our followup review also disclosed that the Bureau did not have a sufficient number of
administrative staff. As a result, corrections officers were assigned to administrative
positions, such as payroll clerk, purchasing officer, property manager, and cook.
Although the Bureau issued policy memoranda regarding the use of overtime, we found that
because of inadequate control, there was little assurance that time and attendance records
were reconciled with the overtime approval records.
Training. The Bureau continued to operate without a territorial training coordinator,
who would be responsible for providing overall supervision and coordination of staff training
programs at all facilities operated by the Bureau. Although the Bureau included a training
plan as part of its procedural manual for the St. Thomas facilities, the training plan was not
implemented. In addition, we found that the training provided was not standardized in that
newly hired corrections officers on St. Thomas received 7 weeks of pre-service training but
newly hired corrections officers on St. Croix received 12 weeks of pre-service training.
Further, we found that the personnel files for 14 corrections officers who had been on the
job over 1 year did not contain any documentation that they had received the 40 hours of
annual in-service training required by the corrections officers' union contract.
Property Management and Procurement. The Bureau did not have formal
property management procedures to ensure that Government identification numbers were
affixed to all equipment. In addition, inventory control procedures for materials and supplies
were inadequate. For example, although Bureau personnel on St. Croix maintained perpetual
inventory cards and performed weekly physical inventories, the inventory results were not
reconciled with the inventory cards; therefore, the cards did not accurately reflect the
results
of the physical inventories. Additionally, the property officer was responsible for procuring,
receiving, and distributing supplies, which resulted in a lack of segregation of duties.
Further, access to the supply storeroom was not restricted during the weekend, when the
property officer was off duty. On St. Thomas, the acting property officer did not maintain
perpetual inventory cards or perform periodic physical inventories. We also found that the
Bureau had not established policies and procedures to ensure that purchases were not split
on over-the-counter purchases.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Governor of the Virgin Islands require the Bureau of Corrections to:
1. Reconsider the 38 recommendations in the prior audit reports that have not been
fully implemented (see Appendices 1-5) and develop a plan which identifies the specific
corrective actions to be taken and includes titles of responsible officials and target dates to
achieve full implementation of these recommendations.
2. Take necessary actions to expeditiously fill the Bureau positions of Director,
Assistant Director, Warden, and Assistant Warden.
3. Ensure that Bureau personnel at the St. Croix facilities adopt the procedures
manual used by personnel at the St. Thomas facilities to provide consistent policies and
procedures for operations at all of the Bureau's correctional facilities.
4. Establish procedures which ensure that adequate supervision is provided to
inmates who are allowed to leave the correctional facilities on work release assignments and
that inmates are promptly paid for work performed under the work release and work detail
programs. In addition, the recently developed procedures for operating the work detail
program should be implemented.
5. Evaluate the level of staff resources and take actions to ensure that the
correctional facilities are adequately staffed to maintain a reasonable level of security at
all
times and to minimize the need for overtime work by existing staff.
6. Revise the existing recruitment and retention policies to ensure that all applicants
for corrections officer positions are properly qualified and pass all pre-hiring tests and
background investigations before they are hired. In addition, the Bureau should adopt
procedures to ensure that candidate selection committee members do not compromise their
independence by giving personal recommendations for applicants.
Governor of the Virgin Islands Response and Office of Inspector General
Reply
On March 19, 1998, we transmitted a draft of this report to you requesting a response by
May 8, 1998. At the request of your Special Assistant for Audit and Policy Evaluation, we
granted an extension until May 15, 1998. However, a response to the draft report has not
been provided. Therefore, since this final report is being issued without benefit of your
response, all of the recommendations are considered unresolved (see Appendix 6).
The Inspector General Act, Public Law 95-452, Section 5(a)(3), as amended, requires
semiannual reporting to the U.S. Congress on all audit reports issued, actions taken to
implement audit recommendations, and identification of each significant recommendation
on which corrective action has not been taken.
In view of the above, please provide a response, as required by Public Law 97-357, to this
report by June 30, 1998. The response should be addressed to our Caribbean Regional
Office, Federal Building - Room 207, St. Thomas, Virgin Islands 00802. The response
should provide the information requested in Appendix 6.
We appreciate the assistance of Bureau personnel in the conduct of our audit.
Sincerely,
Robert J. Williams
Acting Inspector General
APPENDIX 1
SUMMARY OF THE STATUS OF
PRIOR RECOMMENDATIONS
Audit Report Fully Partially Not
Subject Total Implemented Implemented Implemented
Security and
Maintenance
(Appendix 2) 16 3 12 1
Prison Overcrowding
(Appendix 3) 5 0 2 3
Inmate Care,
Rehabilitation,
and Safety
(Appendix 4) 10 2 4 4
Personnel, Property
Management, and
Procurement Practices
(Appendix 5) 14 2 4 8
Total 45 7 22 16
STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
"SECURITY AND MAINTENANCE OF
CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS"
(No. 91-I-1188)
Recommendations
A.1. Develop and implement a
comprehensive procedures manual for the
Bureau of Corrections which includes
specific policies with regard to the
maintenance of an adequate level of
security and control at all correctional
facilities.
A.2. Institute and enforce procedures to
ensure (a) that accurate and complete
inmate counts are conducted in
accordance with established time frames
and that the results of such counts are
recorded in a logbook; (b) that routine
information, emergency situations, and
unusual incidents are recorded in the
logbook; and (c) that the practice of
Recommendations
allowing prisoners to cover their cell door
windows and lock their cell doors from
the inside is discontinued.
A.3. Develop and enforce formal
procedures for the work detail and work
release programs. These procedures
should (a) clearly define the eligibility
requirements for each program, (b)
specify types of crimes which would
prohibit an inmate from participating in
the programs, and (c) ensure adequate
controls over inmates while they are
participating in the programs.
Recommendations
A.4. Develop post orders for all
correction officer positions and ensure
that these orders are available to and
understood by the respective officers.
A.5. Develop and enforce formal
procedures for controlling contraband
within the correctional facilities. These
procedures should include provisions for
(a) screening visitors and items brought
to the facilities by visitors, (b) limiting
physical contact between visitors and
inmates, (c) requiring periodic
unannounced shakedowns of inmates and
cell areas, (d) disposing of contraband
that is discovered in the facilities, and (e)
taking actions against inmates and others
who bring contraband into the facilities or
are found possessing contraband.
Recommendations
A.6. Develop a plan to correct building
deficiencies which result in inadequate
security and control for all facilities. This
plan should address, at a minimum,
(a) reconstruction of guard towers,
(b) installation of perimeter and other
security alarm systems, (c) repair of
surveillance equipment, and (d) repair of
locking mechanisms in all cells and other
secured areas.
A.7. Acquire sufficient communication
equipment and firearms for correction
officers assigned to inmate and perimeter
areas of the facilities.
Recommendations
A.8. Institute procedures and physical
layout changes to ensure that access to
control centers at all facilities are
restricted to authorized officers and that
alarm, communication, surveillance, and
other systems are controlled from within
the control centers.
A.9. Develop formal procedures for the
control of firearms, security equipment,
and tools and culinary equipment. These
procedures should (a) limit access to
storage areas to authorized personnel, (b)
include actions to ensure that corrections
officers are strictly accountable for
weapons assigned to them, and (c) provide
for monthly physical inventories of the
weapons.
Recommendations
A.10. Provide uniforms to all correction
officers and inmates that distinguish
officers from prisoners. Correction
officers and inmates should be required to
wear the uniforms.
Recommendations
A.11. Institute a formal system for
classifying inmates as to level of risk and
make cell assignments so that low-risk
inmates are separated from violent high-
risk prisoners.
B.1. Develop a comprehensive
preventive maintenance plan for the
Bureau of Corrections. The preventive
maintenance plan should (a) identify
specific plant and equipment items which
require regular maintenance, (b) specify
the minimum inspection interval for such
items, (c) provide standards and
procedures for completing regular
maintenance, (d) provide procedures for
documenting the completion of regular
inspections and actual maintenance
provided, and (e) provide procedures for
handling special repair and maintenance
needs in a timely manner.
B.2. Take the actions necessary to
implement the corrective action plan
developed in response to the 1986
consent decree concerning the Golden
Grove Adult Correctional Facility.
Recommendations
B.3. Provide the Bureau with the
resources necessary to staff a full-time
maintenance unit consisting of a
sufficient number of qualified
maintenance personnel at each
correctional facility.
B.4. Take immediate action to correct
the repair and maintenance deficiencies
noted by our audit and other studies
performed for the Government of the
Virgin Islands by Federal Bureau of
Prisons and National Association of
Corrections experts.
Recommendations
B.5. Take immediate action to develop
maintenance plans required to meet the
requirements of the U.S. Department of
Interior, the U.S. Marshals Service, and
the Federal Emergency Management
Agency grants for prison renovation and
expansion to correct noted deficiencies.
Status of Corrective Actions
Partially implemented. The Bureau
developed and implemented a
comprehensive procedures manual, which
was being used at the two correctional
facilities on St. Thomas. The manual
addressed issues such as security and
maintenance, control of inmates, and
health services. We found copies of the
manual at all corrections officer posts in
the St. Thomas facilities. However, a
comprehensive procedures manual had
not been implemented at the correctional
facilities on St. Croix. Although the
Bureau's St. Croix branch had written
procedures for certain areas, such as
inmate work assignments and inmate
classification, written guidance was
lacking for most operational areas.
Partially implemented. We found, by
reviewing all logbooks located in the cell
clusters at the facilities on St. Thomas,
that inmate counts were conducted by the
corrections officers every hour on the
hour. In addition, the Criminal Justice
Complex had a "15-minute log book" in
which corrections officers logged a quick
walk-through inspection of the clusters
Status of Corrective Actions
every 15 minutes. We found, by
reviewing all logbooks located in the
prison dormitories at the facilities on St.
Croix, that inmate counts were conducted
by the corrections officers four times
daily. However, there were no written
procedures specifying the frequency or
the manner in which inmate counts
should be made.
We also found that the Bureau was not
recording emergency situations and
unusual incidents in logbooks. In
addition, the practice of allowing
prisoners to cover their cell door
windows and lock cell doors from the
inside existed at the Golden Grove
facility on St. Croix.
Partially implemented. The Bureau had
formal procedures for the work detail
programs at the facilities on both islands.
Those procedures clearly defined the
eligibility requirements for each work
detail program, specified the types of
crimes that would prohibit an inmate
from participating in the programs, and
ensured that adequate controls existed
over inmates while they were
participating in the programs. However,
we found that the established procedures
were not always followed at the Golden
Grove facility on St. Croix.
The Bureau did not have an active work
release program on St. Croix, and the
work release program on St. Thomas was
based on specific court orders. However,
formal procedures were not developed for
the work release program, and no specific
controls were in place for inmates
participating in the program.
Status of Corrective Actions
Partially implemented. Post orders were
developed for all corrections officer
positions on both islands and were made
available to all respective officers.
However, on St. Croix, some of the
orders were dated as long ago as 1977
and were probably obsolete. On that
island, post orders were also issued in the
form of program statements issued by the
former warden. We found that at least
three senior corrections officers were not
aware of the existence of these program
statements.
Partially implemented. Procedures for
controlling contraband within the
correctional facilities were included in
the procedures manual developed
on St. Thomas. However, these
procedures were not always followed,
especially regarding shakedowns and
disposal of contraband. We found that
virtually no records were kept on
shakedowns or the disposal of
contraband. In addition, our review of
prison logbooks for a 6-month period
found that only one shakedown was
conducted and that this was only a partial
search conducted in two of the seven cell
clusters.
St. Croix had unwritten policies regarding
shakedowns, with the chief or acting
chief corrections officer determining the
disposition of confiscated items, such as
drugs or weapons, and determining when
senior-level authorities should be called
in. During our review, we noticed that
disposable razors were issued to prisoners
by the Bureau's procurement officer but
that the razors were not picked up by
Status of Corrective Actions
corrections officers when inmates were
finished shaving. We also found that
disposable razors could be bought by any
prisoner from the prison commissary. A
review of incident reports in inmate files
disclosed that razors had been used as
weapons during prison disturbances.
Implemented. A plan was developed and
implemented. We found that guard
towers at the Golden Grove facility on St.
Croix were reconstructed and a new
guard tower was positioned on the
western side of the prison's perimeter. In
addition, a new perimeter fence was
constructed and linked to the control
room to notify corrections officers if
anything pressed against the fence.
Locking mechanisms in all cells and
perimeter areas were repaired at the time
that cell doors were replaced in 1995.
On St. Thomas, the surveillance
equipment was repaired and was in good
working condition. In addition, all
electronic locking mechanisms for the
doors and cells in the facility were in
good working condition. These repairs
were also completed in 1995.
Partially implemented. The Bureau
provided corrections officers with
sufficient communication equipment. All
officers in inmate areas had both a hand
held radio and a telephone, which were
used to contact the control areas of the
prisons. However, continued
improvements for perimeter security are
needed at the Golden Grove facility.
Status of Corrective Actions
Partially implemented. The Bureau did
implement physical layout changes to
ensure that alarms, communication,
surveillance, and locking mechanisms
were controlled from the center.
However, procedures to ensure that
access to the control center was restricted
to authorized corrections officers had not
been implemented at the Criminal Justice
Complex on St. Thomas. All corrections
officers and civilian employees at the
facility had access to the control center.
At the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix,
access to the control center was restricted
to authorized corrections officers, and all
prison systems, including fire and
perimeter alarm systems, were monitored
from the control room. The Anna's Hope
Detention Center on St. Croix did not
have perimeter alarms or a formal control
room. However, the control area was
moved away from the visitor's desk,
where it was located at the time of the
prior audit.
Partially implemented. Formal
procedures for the control of firearms,
security equipment, and tools and
culinary equipment were developed and
implemented as part of the procedures
manual for St. Thomas. However, the
established procedures were not always
followed. Specifically, weapons were not
stored away from the facility, monthly
inventories of weapons were not
conducted, officers were not required to
sign out for weapons assigned to them,
and unauthorized Bureau employees had
access to the weapons.
Status of Corrective Actions
Written policies and procedures had not
been developed for St. Croix for the
control of firearms, security equipment,
tools, and culinary equipment.
Additionally, regular inventories of
firearms were not conducted. In
September 1996, several weapons were
found to be missing from the armory at
the Golden Grove facility, and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation was
called by Bureau of Corrections officials
to investigate the disappearances.
Subsequently, the locks at the armory
were changed, and only the acting
assistant chief had the keys.
Implemented. We observed that all
corrections officers at the Criminal
Justice Complex on St. Thomas were in
full uniform. In addition, all inmates
were in full inmate uniforms when they
were outside of their cell clusters. On St.
Croix, the corrections officers' uniforms
were generally faded and in short supply.
However, despite this factor, we observed
that corrections officers were easily
distinguished from the inmates, who were
in full inmate uniforms or in grey and
white clothing while on laundry duty or
in recreational status.
Status of Corrective Actions
Partially implemented. The Bureau had
standard policies on both islands for
classifying inmates as to level of risk.
However, our reviews of cell assignments
disclosed that the policies were not always
complied with at the Golden Grove facility
on St. Croix. We noted instances in which
high-risk prisoners were housed in the
same cells as low-risk prisoners,
including the dormitory housing female
prisoners at Golden Grove.
On St. Thomas, cell assignments were not
made with regard to inmate
classifications. All types of inmates,
from low- to high-risk, were housed in
the same cell clusters.
Not implemented. The Bureau did not
implement a comprehensive maintenance
plan for any of its correctional facilities.
Although monthly preventive
maintenance checklists were prepared for
the Golden Grove facility and the Anna's
Hope Detention Center on St. Croix, such
checklists were not available on St.
Thomas.
Partially implemented. Although some
progress was made on implementing the
corrective action plan for the Golden
Grove facility on St. Croix, some
deficiencies still existed. We found that,
although improvements were made in the
Status of Corrective Actions
areas of emergency care, medication, and
some sanitation issues, the Bureau was
not in full compliance in the areas of
providing fire safety, screening windows,
and controlling tools.
Partially implemented. On St. Croix, the
Bureau created a full-time maintenance
unit at the Golden Grove facility in
March 1997.
On St. Thomas, the Bureau hired a
civilian in 1995 to be its maintenance
engineer, but there was no full-time
maintenance unit. Additionally, despite
the presence of the maintenance engineer,
we noted numerous maintenance
problems at the Criminal Justice
Complex, including needed repairs of the
emergency generator, the ventilation
system, and the roof.
Partially implemented. Most of the repair
and maintenance problems disclosed by
our prior audit and studies conducted by
the corrections experts have been
corrected. Light fixtures, cameras,
monitors, and plumbing were all found to
be in working condition at the Criminal
Justice Complex on St. Thomas. In
addition, all doors and locks in the cell
areas, which were previously operated by
draw bolt, had electrical buttons or dead
bolts.
At the Golden Grove facility on St. Croix,
most of the repair and maintenance
deficiencies have been corrected by the
Bureau. However, most windows in the
dormitories were in disrepair and were
bent, could not be opened and
Status of Corrective Actions
closed (which caused inmates to get wet
when it rained), or were completely
missing. In addition, the majority of the
window screens in the dormitories were
missing or had large holes in them.
Conditions at the Anna's Hope Detention
Center were essentially unchanged from
the time of the prior audit. We found that
most of the urinals and toilets were
inoperative and that the ones which were
working were in an unsanitary condition.
Implemented. We reviewed
correspondence which showed that the
Bureau developed maintenance plans
required to meet the requirements of two
of the three grantor agencies.
Additionally, although Bureau officials
could not locate documentation
concerning the submission of the
maintenance plans to the U.S. Marshals
Service, we found that the Bureau
received the grant from the Marshals
Service, which we believe indicates that
the Service was satisfied with the
Bureau's maintenance plans.
STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
"PRISON OVERCROWDING,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS"
(No. 92-I-90)
Recommendations
A.1. Develop and implement a
comprehensive plan to increase the
available prison capacity in the Virgin
Islands. This plan should consider (a)
realistic projections of future needs,
considering the high level of crime, and
longer mandatory sentences; (b) the return
of inmates currently housed in Federal
prisons to the Virgin Islands; (c) the level
to which existing prison facilities can meet
capacity needs; (d) special facilities and
programs to provide inmates with medical,
substance abuse, and mental health
treatment and a variety of rehabilitative
services; (e) physical layout, including
security and isolation measures to protect
the general community; and (f) detailed
cost estimates and potential funding
sources, including the possibility of
Federal funding and the issuance of bonds.
A.2. Encourage the Territorial Court to
conduct a feasibility study of
implementing alternative sentencing
programs in the Virgin Islands. If such
programs are found to be feasible,
legislation should be submitted to allow
the Territorial Court to consider
alternative sentencing programs when
sentencing non-violent convicted
criminals. Thereafter, the Territorial Court
Recommendations
should establish policies and procedures
for the operation of such programs.
B.1. Recompute good conduct
allowances earned for all inmates serving
sentences to ensure that good conduct
allowances are credited in accordance with
the Virgin Islands Code. This
recomputation should include crediting
good conduct allowances to inmates only
for the full months they served and
excluding months in which infractions
were committed or forfeitures were
ordered.
B.2. Establish written procedures for the
forfeiture of accumulated good time for
misconduct. These procedures should
include minimum-to-maximum ranges for
the forfeiture of good time for each type of
infraction and should be included in the
penalties listed in the Bureau's Rules for
Inmate Conduct.
B.3. Establish written procedures to
ensure that inmates' official records
document the infractions committed and
the forfeitures of good conduct
allowances ordered and that inmate release
dates are adjusted to reflect the amount of
good conduct time disallowed or forfeited
for infractions of Bureau rules.
Status of Corrective Actions
Not implemented. The Bureau of
Corrections did not develop a
comprehensive plan to increase the prison
capacity in the Virgin Islands. As a result,
the Criminal Justice Complex on St.
Thomas was filled to 196 percent of its
design capacity. Cells at the Complex
that were designed to hold one inmate
housed as many as four inmates.
In an attempt to address the problem of
overcrowding, in July 1997, Bureau
officials moved 70 inmates to an
institution in Arizona. They also
transferred 24 inmates from the Criminal
Justice Complex to the Golden Grove
facility on St. Croix. However, the total
projected cost of incarceration for the
inmates in Arizona will be $1.5 million
per year.
Partially implemented. The Territorial
Court implemented an alternative
sentencing program known as the Pre-
trial Intervention Program. This program
allowed first time offenders who
committed misdemeanor crimes to
participate in a community-based
program rather than to serve time in
prison. However, neither a feasibility
study nor legislation concerning
Status of Corrective Actions
alternative sentencing was developed.
Partially implemented. Good conduct
allowances were recomputed, but we
found that the allowances were not
accurate. As a result, we did not find any
instances in which an inmate was released
on the correct release date.
Not implemented. Although penalties for
committing infractions were included in
written procedures for St. Thomas, the
procedures did not contain any ranges for
the forfeiture of good time allowances for
each infraction. The facilities on St.
Croix did not have written procedures for
the forfeiture of good time for
misconduct.
Not implemented. Although the
procedures manual for St. Thomas
contained a section on inmate
classification, it did not include any
procedures for recording infractions, good
time forfeited, or the adjustment of
inmate release dates. There were no
written procedures at the facilities on St.
Croix to ensure that inmates' official
records documented the infractions
committed, the forfeiture of good conduct
allowances ordered, and the adjustment of
inmate release dates.
STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
"INMATE CARE, REHABILITATION, AND SAFETY,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS"
(No. 93-I-363)
Recommendations
A.1. Develop and implement a
comprehensive system, including formal
written policies and procedures, to correct
deficiencies in sanitation and personal
hygiene conditions. The system should
(a) require at least monthly sanitation
inspections by Bureau sanitation
specialists and annual inspections by the
Virgin Islands Department of Health; (b)
provide inmates with clean and safe water
for drinking and bathing; and (c) provide
inmates with personal hygiene items such
as soap, toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs,
and toilet paper.
A.2. Develop and implement a
comprehensive system, including formal
written policies and procedures, to correct
deficiencies in food service operations.
The system should (a) provide for routine
cleaning of the kitchen facilities and
equipment and (b) ensure that kitchen
Recommendations
equipment and fixtures are in good
operating condition.
A.3. Develop and implement a
comprehensive system, including formal
written policies and procedures, to correct
deficiencies in medical and dental
services. The system should (a) provide a
full-time registered nurse for the Golden
Grove Correctional Facility and (b)
provide inmates and juvenile offenders
with preventive and general dental care.
B.1. Introduce legislation to amend
Title 5, Chapter 401, of the Virgin Islands
Code to allow the Bureau of Corrections
to require inmates to participate in prison
Recommendations
work programs unless they are
participating in an approved educational
or vocational training program.
B.2. Ensure that a comprehensive
educational program for incarcerated
individuals with courses leading to
functional literacy and achievement of a
General Education Development (GED)
high school equivalency certificate is
established and implemented in
coordination with the Department of
Education. Incentives should be
implemented to encourage inmates who
have not achieved the level of education
commensurate with their age to
participate in the educational program.
B.3. Establish and implement a
comprehensive program of vocational and
prison industries activities to afford
inmates the opportunity to learn skills to
Recommendations
help them obtain employment when
released from prison. Incentives should
be provided to encourage inmates to
participate in at least one such vocational
or prison industries activity. Inmates who
choose not to participate should be
required to perform other work within the
correctional facilities.
B.4. Establish and implement a
comprehensive substance abuse program
and actively encourage inmates with
substance abuse problems to participate in
the program.
B.5. Provide the Department of Human
Services with the funding necessary to
accomplish the planned transfer of the
Youth Rehabilitation Center from the
Bureau of Corrections and establish
comprehensive educational, vocational,
substance abuse, and other rehabilitative
programs for juvenile offenders.
Recommendations
C.1. Improve the emergency capabilities
of all correctional facilities by (a)
installing centralized smoke detection and
alarm systems, (b) ensuring that all
emergency exits are operational, and (c)
providing those correction officers on
duty in inmate living areas with
emergency keys.
C.2. Obtain new or repair existing fire
fighting equipment to ensure that all
correctional facilities meet minimum
standards necessary to pass fire
inspections by the Virgin Islands Fire
Service. This equipment should include
an adequate number of fire extinguishers,
Recommendations
emergency lighting, continuously
illuminated exit signs, and operational fire
hydrants or water standpipes.
Status of Corrective Actions
Not implemented. The Bureau did not
develop a comprehensive system,
including written policies and procedures,
to correct the identified deficiencies.
Although the Bureau provided clean and
safe water for drinking and bathing
purposes for inmates at all facilities by
installing ultraviolet water purifiers at
both facilities on St. Croix and by
receiving monthly water safety tests by an
outside contractor on St. Thomas,
monthly sanitation inspections were not
conducted at any facility. In March 1997,
the Criminal Justice Complex on St.
Thomas did not pass an inspection
conducted by the Department of Health.
In addition, on both St. Thomas and St.
Croix, the Bureau did not provide
personal hygiene items such as soap,
toothbrushes, toothpaste, combs, and
toilet paper to inmates on a consistent
basis. These items were regularly in short
supply at all facilities.
Partially implemented. The Bureau
established standard operating procedures
that included procedures to correct the
identified deficiencies for St. Thomas.
However, we found that many of the
sanitation deficiencies continued to exist.
For example, during its inspection of
Status of Corrective Actions
the Criminal Justice Complex, the
Department of Health found that some
food items were past their expiration dates
and toxic materials were stored on the
same shelves as food items. We also
found that kitchen equipment and fixtures
were blackened and in poor operating
condition from years of use without repair
or replacement.
Sanitation procedures had not been
developed for the facilities on St. Croix,
and the kitchen at Golden Grove had been
operating without a health permit for 3
years. Despite these deficiencies, we
noted that the kitchen equipment and
fixtures were clean and in good operating
condition.
Implemented. A comprehensive plan was
established to provide medical and dental
care to inmates at the Criminal Justice
Complex on St. Thomas. Preventive and
general dental care was provided by a
contracted dentist. We did note, however,
that the nurse's station was frequently
manned by a licensed practical nurse
without the supervision of a registered
nurse, who would have been trained to
deal with emergency situations.
The Bureau provided a full-time
registered nurse for the Golden Grove
facility on St. Croix and also provided
preventive and general dental care to
inmates in a medical and dental facility
constructed within the prison complex.
Not implemented. Legislation was never
introduced, and participation in the work
programs continues to be voluntary.
Status of Corrective Actions
Partially implemented. The Bureau
established and implemented an
educational program with courses leading
to literacy and achievement of a GED
diploma for inmates at the Golden Grove
facility on St. Croix. Classrooms were set
up in the facility, and 52 inmates were
enrolled, with 30 inmates in either the
advanced GED or pre-GED groups. Five
inmates have already graduated from the
GED program. In addition, the Bureau
established literacy programs for inmates
who could not read or write. Inmates were
recruited, and incentives for participation
were provided, including contact visits
and graduation exercises to which the
inmates' families were invited.
Although Federal funds were available,
the Bureau did not provide classes on St.
Thomas that would prepare inmates for
the achievement of a GED diploma or that
would lead to their achievement of
functional literacy. We found that St.
Thomas inmates had the opportunity to
attend only adult basic education classes
which were taught by two volunteer
teachers. These classes were held 3 days
a week in a small room at the Criminal
Justice Complex that also serves as a
library, and only seven inmates
participated.
Not implemented. The Bureau had not
established and implemented a
comprehensive vocational program at any
of the correctional facilities. The Golden
Status of Corrective Actions
Grove facility on St. Croix had limited
vocational programs in the fields of
carpentry, automotive repair, and
agriculture, but these programs were used
primarily for work detail purposes.
However, we found that the Bureau was
in the final stages of developing a
comprehensive vocational and prison
industries program and had received two
grants for this purpose through the Virgin
Islands Law Enforcement Planning
Commission.
There were no vocational programs for
inmates at the Criminal Justice Complex
on St. Thomas. The Criminal Justice
Complex Annex had a carpentry shop in
which two inmates who were skilled in
carpentry made mahogany clocks and
other items for sale at the island's annual
agricultural fairs. However, the program
was not designed to provide vocational
education to unskilled inmates.
Not implemented. Although the Virgin
Islands Law Enforcement Planning
Commission made about $400,000
available to the Bureau for the
establishment of substance abuse
programs, such programs had not been
established at any of the correctional
facilities.
Implemented. The Youth Rehabilitation
Center was transferred to the Department
of Human Services from the Bureau of
Corrections in 1993. Comprehensive
educational programs presented by the
Department of Education were established
at the Center, along with programs in
horticulture, air conditioning and
refrigeration repair, and electronics.
Status of Corrective Actions
Counselors were also provided for
substance abusers.
Partially implemented. Although
emergency capabilities were improved at
all correctional facilities, several
deficiencies existed. On St. Croix, we
found that centralized smoke detectors
and alarm systems were installed at both
facilities. However, the system at the
Golden Grove facility was inoperative at
the time of our review. Golden Grove
also had a working centralized alarm
system to notify corrections officers of
any activity at the perimeter fences. All
emergency exits were working at Golden
Grove, and all officers had access to
emergency keys.
However, we found that the Anna's Hope
facility on St. Croix still did not have a
perimeter alarm system and that several
emergency doors could not be opened. In
addition, keys were not easily accessible
and identifiable during an emergency
because they were kept on rings with a
large number of other keys.
On St. Thomas, the smoke detection and
monitoring systems were in good
operating condition, all emergency exits
were in an operative condition, and keys
were accessible to the corrections officers
on duty in inmate living areas.
Partially implemented. On St. Croix, the
Fire Service had not conducted a fire
safety inspection at the Golden Grove
facility in 1 and 1/2 years. At that time,
although most sections of the prison
passed the inspection, the Fire Service
found problems with the smoke detection
Status of Corrective Actions
and electrical systems. We found that a
major deficiency at the facility was a lack
of maintenance of fire extinguishers in the
dormitory areas. More than one-half of
the extinguishers needed recharging and
therefore were inoperative. Bureau
officials had the extinguishers recharged
when we brought this problem to their
attention. We also found that, although
emergency lighting was sufficient, there
were no lighted exit signs in any of the
dormitory areas. We also found that none
of the fire hydrants at or around the
Golden Grove facility were working.
We could not locate a Fire Service
inspection report for the Anna's Hope
Detention Center. We found that fire
extinguishers were available in all areas of
the Center, but several smoke detectors
were inoperative. To repel mosquitoes,
detainees were allowed to use fire-lighted
pieces of rolled up toilet paper, which
constituted a fire hazard. Also, there were
no lighted exit signs or emergency
lighting at the Center.
On St. Thomas, Fire Service inspections
were conducted at the Criminal Justice
Complex on a regular basis. We also
found that all fire extinguishers were in
working condition, there were illuminated
exit signs over all doors, and an adequate
number of water standpipes were
available. However, according to the Fire
Service inspection reports, the Bureau
needed to make improvements in the
facility's ventilation system and manual
fire alarms. We also noted that
emergency lighting at the Complex was
inoperative.
STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS
AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
FOR AUDIT REPORT
"PERSONNEL, PROPERTY MANAGEMENT,
AND PROCUREMENT PRACTICES,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS"
(No. 93-I-670)
Recommendations
A.1. Establish a comprehensive
correction officer recruitment and
retention program, similar to the one
recommended in September 1991 by the
Bureau's training supervisor, to ensure that
the Bureau has a sufficient number of
correction officers to provide adequate
security at correctional facilities and to
reduce the amount of overtime work
necessary to maintain such security.
A.2. Establish written payroll policies
and procedures to ensure that time and
attendance records are reconciled to
approved overtime slips and that officers
are prohibited from accumulating
approved overtime slips.
A.3. Reconcile the time and attendance
records for the 66 correction officers
identified in our sample who were either
overpaid or underpaid for overtime work
and make the necessary payroll
adjustments to correct these errors.
Recommendations
A.4. Provide the Bureau with sufficient
administrative staff so that the practice of
assigning noncorrection duties to
correction officers can be discontinued.
A.5. Establish policies and procedures to
ensure that recommendations by the
Bureau's Selection Committee and
background investigation reports are
considered and that Bureau actions
contrary to those recommendations are
fully documented and justified.
B.1. Establish and fill a position for a
territorial training coordinator, who would
be responsible for overall supervision and
coordination of staff training programs at
all facilities operated by the Bureau of
Corrections.
B.2. Develop and implement a
comprehensive, formal training plan for
use in administering the Bureau of
Corrections staff training program. This
plan should include the establishment of
written training policies and procedures
and a requirement that the training plan
should be evaluated and updated annually.
Implementation of the training plan should
ensure that (a) training courses are
Recommendations
conducted in a cost effective manner, with
consideration to minimum class sizes and
efficient scheduling of classes; (b) the
annual training budget is sufficient to meet
the training needs of all correction
officers; (c) the type and length of pre-
service, in-service, and specialized training
courses offered on St. Thomas and St.
Croix are standardized; (d) policies and
procedures are established to evaluate
pre-service, in-service, and specialized
training programs on an ongoing basis;
and (e) accurate and complete training
information is maintained for each
correction officer to identify the type and
number of hours of training received.
B.3. Discontinue the practice of allowing
new employees to function as correction
officers before they have successfully
completed pre-service training
requirements.
B.4. Ensure that the training supervisor
is allowed to perform the full duties and
responsibilities of the position.
B.5. Require that all correction officers
meet annual requirements for pre-service,
in-service, and specialized training. To
ensure that these requirements are met,
officers who do not attend scheduled
courses should be rescheduled; officers
should successfully complete and achieve
Recommendations
passing grades in each course; and officers
should receive required training in the use
of firearms, emergency first aid, and riot
control.
B.6. Provide a suitable training facility
on St. Croix to conduct classes in a safe
and controlled environment.
C.1. Require that Bureau of Corrections
officials comply with the provisions of
Title 31, Section 242, of the Virgin Islands
Code and the Government's Property
Manual regarding the control of equipment
and supplies. To ensure compliance, the
Bureau should (a) implement standardized
property control procedures, (b) maintain
accurate and complete property records,
(c) establish procedures to ensure that
property numbers are assigned and affixed
to items, (d) perform physical inventories
and reconcile inventory results to property
records, (e) segregate accounting and
physical control duties at each storeroom
location, and (f) limit storeroom access to
authorized personnel.
Recommendations
C.2. Appoint a property management
officer at the St. Thomas Criminal Justice
Complex.
C.3. Require that the Bureau of
Corrections establish policies and
procedures to stop the practice of splitting
purchases to circumvent the established
limit on over-the-counter purchases and to
ensure that vendors are paid within the
prompt discount periods offered by the
vendors.
Status of Corrective Actions
Not implemented. The Bureau did not
establish a comprehensive officer
recruitment and retention program for any
of its facilities. As a result, the Bureau
continued to experience shortages of
corrections officers, resulting in overtime
costs of $1.4 million in fiscal year 1996
and $445,952 in fiscal year 1997 (through
April 30, 1997).
Not implemented. Although the Bureau
issued memoranda outlining overtime
procedures, the Bureau did not establish
detailed written payroll policies and
procedures to ensure that time and
attendance records were reconciled to
approved overtime records.
Not implemented. We found that payroll
transactions were not consistently
recorded, resulting in overpayments and
underpayments to corrections officers.
Status of Corrective Actions
Not implemented. The Bureau continued
to have a shortage of administrative staff
that resulted in the assignment of
corrections officers to perform
administrative duties. On St. Croix,
corrections officers were assigned to
positions of classification officer,
purchasing officer, and cashier. On
St. Thomas, corrections officers held
administrative positions of payroll clerk,
property management officer, and cook.
Not implemented. Policies and procedures
were not established to ensure that the
Committee's recommendations and
background investigations were
considered in the selection of corrections
officer candidates. In addition, minutes of
Committee meetings were not maintained.
We found that, as a result, discrepancies
identified by background investigations
were sometimes ignored and there was
little assurance that the Committee's
recommendations were taken into
consideration.
Not implemented. A territorial training
coordinator was not hired, and the Bureau
was without the services of an official
responsible for the overall supervision and
coordination of staff training programs.
Partially implemented. A comprehensive,
formal training plan was included in the
St. Thomas procedures manual. However,
the manual did not contain the specific
items recommended in the prior audit,
such as the type and length of required
training, and the manual's training
procedures were not complied with. In
addition, a comprehensive training plan
had not been developed for St. Croix.
Status of Corrective Actions
Because the two islands were not using
the same training policies and procedures,
training courses were not standardized.
Further, complete records were not
maintained on the training received by
corrections officers.
We also found that because the Bureau
did not budget or receive funds for a
training program, corrections officers who
conducted training classes were not
provided with the equipment necessary to
conduct the training and that they
purchased classroom supplies with
personal funds.
Partially implemented. Although the
practice of assigning new employees to
function as corrections officers before
they completed pre-service training was
discontinued on St. Croix, this practice
continued on St. Thomas. We also noted
that new employees did not receive
firearms training until periods of up to 4
months after they completed other pre-
service training.
Not implemented. Training supervisors
were not able to perform the full duties
and responsibilities of their positions
because of the lack of a training budget.
Partially implemented. Corrections
officers met annual requirements for pre-
service training, but the amount of
training received by officers on St.
Thomas and St. Croix differed because of
the lack of a standardized training plan.
Officers on St. Thomas received about 7
Status of Corrective Actions
weeks of training as compared with the 3
months of training received by corrections
officers on St. Croix.
Annual training and specialized training
requirements were not met by the Bureau.
None of the officers reviewed received the
mandatory 40 hours of in-service training
required by union contracts, and
specialized training courses were not
provided for all corrections officers.
Specifically, 10 officers did not receive
firearms training, 9 officers did not
receive self-defense training, and 1 officer
did not receive cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR) training.
Implemented. A facility with a safe and
controlled environment suitable for
training was provided at the Department
of Justice's Toro Building location on St.
Croix.
Partially implemented. The Bureau did
not comply with property control
requirements, and standardized property
control procedures were not implemented
to ensure that property numbers were
assigned and affixed on all equipment.
Regarding supplies, on St. Croix, the
Bureau prepared property cards for each
item and performed weekly physical
inventories. However, the inventory
results were not reconciled to the
property cards, resulting in inaccurate
balances on the cards. In addition, there
was an inadequate level of separation of
duties because the property officer was
responsible for procuring, purchasing,
receiving, and distributing equipment and
supplies. Also, access to the storeroom
was not limited during the weekend, when
the property officer was off duty.
Status of Corrective Actions
On St. Thomas, the acting property officer
did not maintain supply inventory cards
and property cards or perform periodic
inventory counts. In addition, the
property officer was the only person who
had access to the storeroom and the only
person authorized to accept deliveries of
equipment and supplies, which did not
provide an adequate level of segregation
of duties.
Implemented. A property management
officer was appointed at the Criminal
Justice Complex. That individual
resigned in May 1997, but a corrections
officer was subsequently assigned the
responsibilities of that position.
Not implemented. Policies and
procedures were not implemented to stop
the practice of splitting purchases and to
ensure that vendors are paid within the
prompt discount periods offered by the
vendors. Therefore, the procurement-
related problems identified in the prior
audit report still existed.
APPENDIX 6
STATUS OF AUDIT REPORT RECOMMENDATIONS
Finding/Recommendation
Reference
1-6
Status
Unresolved.
Action Required
Provide a response to each recommendation
indicating concurrence or nonconcurrence. If
concurrence is indicated, provide an action
plan that includes a target date and title of the
official responsible for implementation. If
nonconcurrence is indicated, provide specific
reasons for the nonconcurrence.
ILLEGAL OR WASTEFUL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE REPORTED TO THE OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL BY:
Sending written documents to:
Within the Continental United States
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
1849 C Street,N.W.
Mail Stop 5341
Washington, D.C. 20240
Calling:
Our 24 hour
Telephone HOTLINE
1-800-424-5081 or
(202) 208-5300
TDD for hearing impaired
(202) 208-2420 or
1-800-354-0996
Outside the Continental United States
Caribbean Region
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
Eastern Division- Investigations
1550 Wilson Boulevard
Suite 410
Arlington, Virginia 22209
Calling:
(703) 235-9221
North Pacific Region
U.S. Department of the Interior
Office of Inspector General
North Pacific Region
238 Archbishop F.C. F'lores Street
Suite 807, PDN Building
Agana, Guam 96910
Calling:
(700) 550-7428 or
COMM 9-011-671-472-7279