[Assessment of Security at the National Park Service's Icon Parks]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office, www.gpo.gov]

Report No.  2003-I-0063

Title: Assessment of Security at the National Park Service's Icon
       Parks



Date:  August 28, 2003

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Subject:  Assessment of Security at the National Park Service's Icon Parks (No. 
2003-I-0063)

Introduction

This assessment is the third in a series of reports concerning the efforts of 
the Department of the Interior (DOI or Department) to address homeland security 
issues.  This report contains the results of our assessment of the national 
monuments that have been designated as ï¿½iconsï¿½ due to their prominent historical 
attraction.  The sites that make up the icon category typically draw large 
numbers of tourists and frequent media attentionï¿½factors that make them 
particularly attractive terrorist targets.  The Department has been designated 
the Lead Federal Agency1, with primary jurisdiction over national icons and 
monuments.

This assessment was conducted by the Office of Inspector Generalï¿½s Program 
Integrity Division.  The focus of the assessment included security management, 
staffing, and the use of funding.  Information was obtained through site visits 
to all the designated icon parks, scrutiny of completed security reviews, and by 
conducting over 50 interviews with Department personnel at all levels.  

We conducted our evaluation in accordance with the Presidentï¿½s Council on 
Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspections.  Accordingly, we 
included such tests or reviews of records that we considered necessary under the 
circumstances.  In the interest of security, the specific names of the icon 
parks exhibiting security deficiencies have been withheld.

The teamï¿½s observations were shared with park management personnel and other 
Department employees at the conclusion of each site visit.  Many changes were 
made to security countermeasures as a result of our discussions, while other 
changes, which were pending at the time of our visits, have since been 
implemented.  In general, this report attempts to represent the current status 
of security measures at these icon parks, although we recognize that changes and 
enhancements are occurring daily.  At the conclusion of the report, we offer ten 
suggestions for action that we believe will improve the continuity and 
efficiency of protection for our icon parks.

We appreciate the assistance and candor of the members of the National Park 
Service and the Department during this assessment.  We found there was a common 
thread between assessor and assessee: the desire to improve security.  


Results in Brief
 
The National Park Service (NPS) has failed to successfully adapt its mission and 
priorities to reflect its new security responsibilities and commitment to the 
enhanced protection of our nationï¿½s most treasured monuments and memorials from 
terrorism.  Our assessment revealed a lack of continuity, consistency, and 
creativity in the planning and execution of protection practices for the 
national icon parks.  Necessary security enhancements have been delayed, 
postponed, or wholly disregarded while management attempts to equally balance 
security needs with other park programs and projects.  More than once, we were 
told by park superintendents that they continue to do everything they did prior 
to September 11, in addition to their new security responsibilities.  While it 
is commendable that NPS wishes to continue providing pre-9/11 services and 
improvements throughout its parks, this approach fails to recognize and accept 
the need to discard the status quo and place a higher priority on the timely 
implementation of new security measures.  Unfortunately, we believe that current 
funding and staffing will not permit the desired ï¿½equalï¿½ balancing of all 
programs and projects.  In short, it is imperative that icon park protection 
take precedence over all other park concerns.

Throughout our assessment, we encountered management officials lacking 
situational awareness and acceptance of the fact that their parks were 
susceptible to terrorist attacks, and they appeared unconvinced that security 
enhancements were necessary.  Other officials lacked the expertise and resources 
to effectively assess, determine, and prioritize what actions and 
implementations were necessary.  Although we found the superintendents to be 
dedicated to the concept of protection and preservation of their parks and 
visitors, many were lacking coherent and qualified direction and support from 
the region, bureau, and the Department regarding security augmentation.  

During our review, we observed security measures that appeared to have been 
haphazardly determined and hastily implemented.  At one park, for example, we 
learned that security countermeasures were installed at a certain distance based 
on aesthetics rather than a scientific blast analysis or recognized security 
standards.  At two other parks, we discovered an entrance gate unmanned, 
unprotected, and unmonitored just a short distance from what the park management 
advised was one of their top three vulnerable areas.  Other security 
deficiencies included improperly-distanced vehicle barriers, inoperable security 
equipment, cameras without nighttime capabilities, ineffective alarm systems, 
exposed security wiring, and negligent security personnel.  

Security cameras at some icon parks were located at such a lengthy distance from 
the monuments, for reasons having primarily to do with aesthetics and/or 
historic integrity, that veils of trees, along with various other impediments, 
actually obscured critical areas of vulnerability.  While we recognize the 
significance of maintaining the historic nature of these parks, there has to be 
some room for accommodating adequate security measures, such as the 
aforementioned cameras. Moreover, we discovered many of these cameras remain 
unmonitored throughout the day and go dormant at night, relying then on motion-
detection devices.  

Moreover, security equipment is not utilized in the most efficient manner.  
Physical security measures at these parks are assembled in an almost makeshift 
fashion; security countermeasures (barriers, bollards, cameras, alarms, etc.) 
are arranged in disorder and without the supervision of a trained professional, 
and therefore do not function to the highest potential level in order to deter 
attackers.  	

Overall, we found the majority of the parksï¿½ screening sites competent and 
professionally operated.  Most of these sites made good use of contract 
personnel who participated in the screening process.  Unfortunately, however, 
this professionalism was not found across the board: we discovered that a few 
icon parks were not performing any checkpoint screening at all, and in some 
parks that did screen visitors, it was being done rather poorly.  On both 
occasions where it was attempted, the assessment team was able to breach 
security screening checkpoints with pocket knives.  On one occasion, this was 
due to intentionally-lowered magnetometer sensitivity.  On another occasion, 
this was due to dead batteries in the screenerï¿½s wand.  

In short, the parks have not felt the pressure to perform, nor have they been 
held accountable for their noncompliance.  The NPS and the Department must 
address these serious deficiencies within the security and law enforcement 
programs in order to adequately protect our national icons.  Greater effort and 
guidance are needed in order to properly meet current security demands.  
Coordination and communicationï¿½two key characteristics of any well-functioning 
organizationï¿½are lacking.  Specifically, we uncovered an over-reliance on small 
numbers of protection rangers and Park Police officers.  Reliance on overworked 
and understaffed protection rangers and Park Police officers to provide 
satisfactory protection at icon parks is unwise.  The park security workforce 
requires augmentation, and both current and incoming rangers and officers should 
receive more intense training in order to strengthen their skills and to enhance 
their ability to execute protection duties.  Furthermore, technological 
solutions should be pursued, as well as the use of contract security personnel, 
where appropriate.  

Despite these shortcomings, however, we have been encouraged by some creative 
and concentrated efforts toward improving the security program within the NPS 
recently.  We are finally seeing sincere and serious dialogue in regard to 
examining the effectiveness of the current program, and a willingness to 
consider actions that transcend the status quo.  The necessary infrastructure to 
provide the required oversight is finally being put into place with the Visitor 
and Resource Protection Directorate, and is rapidly acquiring the desired 
impact.  Notably, both NPS and certain specific icon parks made a number of 
significant changes throughout the course of this assessment.  This is a 
positive sign.  We anticipate many more problems to be addressed and solutions 
implemented in the near future, and remain hopeful that this effort will 
continue to flourish.

Although protection of resources has always been the hallmark of the NPS 
mission, the need to protect national icons and monuments from terrorist attack 
is new and requires the development and coordination of comprehensive policies, 
practices, and protective measures.  Prior to September 11, 2001, the Department 
and NPS security programs were woefully deficient, if not completely 
nonexistent.  In addition, the law enforcement entities whose function it was to 
provide security for these parks were imprudently ignored and allowed to erode.  
Security and law enforcement programs were not viewed as a priority at the time 
by senior management, and staffing, funding, and technology throughout the parks 
suffered as a result of this neglect.  After 9/11, however, security and law 
enforcement factions received considerable and sudden attention; nevertheless, 
the pre-9/11 funding and staffing deficit has greatly impacted the parksï¿½ 
capability to respond swiftly to todayï¿½s call for enhanced security measures.  
With limited resources, the Department and NPS have been challenged in their 
efforts to carry out their protective mission. 

In addition to limited resources, the protective mission has been hindered by 
park managementsï¿½ and some field law enforcement officialsï¿½ inability to 
recognizeï¿½or acceptï¿½the actual threat of terrorism.  This finding is troubling, 
since senior management for both the Department and the NPS have acknowledged 
and accepted the threat potential of terrorist acts and the need to prepare 
countermeasures.  

During our assessment, we found that several parks were deficient in respect to 
actual situational awareness, and were observed subscribing to lackadaisical 
security procedures and nonchalance when dealing with the implementation of 
security measures.  There was an overall imbalance between security and 
accommodation.  At one park, convenience for local merchants and employees was 
given priority over closing a recently-purchased security gate meant to secure a 
specified area of vulnerability.  Gates were left open and unattended at another 
park for the convenience of local residents.  At yet another park, the 
designated minimum staffing of security posts was ignored and, when challenged, 
a United States Park Police official quipped: ï¿½You can go under minimum staffing 
as long as nothing bad happens.ï¿½  A chief ranger at another icon park asked, ï¿½If 
you canï¿½t protect against everything, why protect against anything?ï¿½  During 
unannounced inspections, we often found that the reported number of officers on 
duty or standing guard at these parks was not in accordance with the individual 
parkï¿½s own reported minimums.  Similarly, we frequently observed ineffective 
patrol procedures, poor law enforcement visibility, staff fatigue, and the 
capricious redeployment of security personnel.  
 	
Many of the park officials responsible for making security decisions do not 
understand the basic objective: a terrorist attack is less likely to occur the 
more difficult it is for the terrorist to accomplish the deed.  Terrorists also 
seek targets that will provide them with maximum impact and may be aimed at 
destroying property, killing individuals, or both.  Experience has shown that 
terrorists are interested in attacking symbols of America, and intelligence 
information suggests that no attack will take place without first scrutinizing a 
target for its weaknesses and vulnerabilities.  If proper security measures are 
in place when this scrutiny occurs, there is a good chance that the terrorists 
will seek some other, less protected target.  Simply stated, a well-protected, 
adequately staffed facility will help deter terrorists from attacking it.  

The goal, however, is not to develop a foolproof security plan.  Recognizing 
that an asset cannot be protected completely without absorbing much higher costs 
and without inhibiting some business operations, a balance between cost-
effective security and visitor accommodation must be maintained in order for 
each park to both function and protect itself to the highest possible extent.  
Therefore, the goal in instituting icon park security measures should be to make 
it more difficult for an adversary to breach security and effectively execute an 
attack.  

Many of the efforts to date fall short of reaching a deterrence level for ï¿½pre-
screeningï¿½ by terrorists.  Many of the parks have failed to provide adequate 
training to their respective non-law enforcement staff concerning the 
identification and reporting of suspicious persons and activities.  At several 
parks, during the unannounced period of our assessments, the team went 
unchallenged when taking photographs of security-sensitive areas or while 
accessing controlled areas without identification.  At another location, team 
members strolled through a restricted area past several employees, who did not 
make any attempt to stop or report the incident to security personnel.  The team 
was challenged at a few of the parks, but the parksï¿½ follow-through proved 
inadequate: park security personnel did not always perform the appropriate steps 
to assure a proper negation of the prospective threat.  

A standard protection plan needs to be developed for icon parks.  Currently, 
each park has separate operational policies and staffing methodologies that not 
only fail to coincide but, in some instances, actually negate each other.  For 
instance, visitor screening is not done at every park, the ratio of law 
enforcement officers on duty per area or per visitor varies, and the use of 
closed-circuit television cameras is different at each location.  Some security 
personnel often appear confused about the specifics of their mission, which 
results in complacency and a sense of frustration and disinterest among law 
enforcement personnel.  Also, some NPS officials exhibit an air of insolence 
while others feel unappreciated in the face of what they view as an overwhelming 
task not fully under their control.  	

There is also significant confusion in respect to the national alert levels.  
Each park has developed its own response plans for heightened threat levels.  
When inspected, a number of parks were discovered to be implementing their own 
interpretations of national threat levelsï¿½which some characterized as the 
ï¿½flavors of orange.ï¿½  The reasons varied, but most were founded on a lack of 
clear direction from the regional offices as well as the Department.  At one 
park, the chief ranger admitted that he was told the park could not afford the 
transition to an orange alert, and that he was not to implement the increased 
security.  At other parks, staff believed they only had to increase security 
based on park-specific threat levels and that the national threat levels did not 
mandate an official reaction.  One Park Police official wanted to know when he 
would again be able to ï¿½bring officers back down to normal shifts.ï¿½  A number of 
icon park officials also seemed to be under the impression that orange alert was 
not intended to last longer than a few days.  

However, Regional NPS offices and the Department have failed on occasion to 
provide the necessary preparedness and guidance to the parks during increased 
levels of threat.  Confusion also has been generated by the Office of Law 
Enforcement and Security (OLES) modifying or enhancing threat levels and 
security measures in response to special initiatives, such as Operation Liberty 
Shield2, which became known as ï¿½enhanced orangeï¿½ by some NPS officials.  At 
other times, icon parks have been inundated with multiple calls and governances 
from Headquarters, Regional offices, and OLES, confusing the matter even more.  

In conducting our assessment, we visited each of the designated icon parks under 
the management of the NPS.  While there, we met with the management teams and 
inquired as to how the icon list was generated.  Collectively, no one could 
state how certain parks, monuments, and memorials were included and what 
criterion was used.  Most agreed that the list was produced shortly after 
September 11, when a ï¿½budget callï¿½ was made for parks that needed increased 
security funding.  The parks that received funds from the supplemental funding 
became known and referred to as icon parks.  In discussions with OLES, we later 
learned that NPS senior management subsequently endorsed the original list of 
icon parks at least two times, and then submitted them to the Department to be 
included in a broader list of DOI key assets3.  

This icon list includes several parks and monuments with international 
recognition and indisputable threat potential4, such as the Statue of Liberty, 
the Liberty Bell, Independence Hall, and the Washington Monument.  Others on the 
list do not possess the same degree of recognition and threat potential.  When 
questioned, OLES advised us that the list of icon parks submitted to OLES was 
not ï¿½second-guessed,ï¿½ despite some disagreement with several of the parks on the 
list.  Key NPS officials have also questioned the legitimacy of several of the 
parks being included on the key asset and icon lists.  

No official priority listing or other designated category for the icon parks 
exists.  Theoretically, while each park was placed on the list due to an 
increased likelihood of attack, specified vulnerability (significant loss of 
life and/or symbolic value), or a need for increased security measures, we found 
that the icon parks were not equally treated by the NPS or by OLES.  We also 
could not detect any across-the-board minimum standards for security.  

In addition, several of these parks encompass icons that are not the property of 
DOI, or are they under the management of the National Park Service or Department 
of the Interior.  The USS Constitution and USS Arizona, for example, remain 
commissioned ships of the United States Navy, while Fort Point National Historic 
Site houses the east footing of the Golden Gate Bridge.  The NPS and the 
Department certainly have some security responsibilities at these locations; 
however, we believe the property owners should retain greater, if not primary, 
responsibility for these assets.  

We believe that the designation of an icon park should ensure that the park is 
recognized within an exclusive category for budget, staffing, and matters of 
policy.  With the exception of receiving supplemental funding, many 
superintendents claimed there were no other benefits to being recognized as an 
icon park.  Moreover, only a few superintendents believed their requests were 
viewed and acted upon differently than their non-icon park contemporaries.  We 
were provided anecdotal accounts of security-related projects awaiting State 
Historical Prevention Office (SHIPO) approval, and being held up by non-
security/lower-priority requests.  Other examples included the regional offices 
changing priorities of park security projects and giving them a lower priority 
than non-icon security projects.

Icon status has also not reduced the expectation of continuing to support all 
other park functions, programs, and projects.  Several of the icon 
superintendents reported that, whereas security was a significant concern, it 
was only one of many of the competing programs at their parks.  

In conducting our assessment, we found all icon parks to be lacking access to a 
certified, full-time security professional.  Individually, most parks have done 
as well as could be expected given the limited guidance and technical support 
received from the Department or NPS.  For years, superintendents and their 
staffs have been placed in position to determine what security measures to 
implement, with little or no guidance from qualified security professionals.  

The NPS is well aware of the importance of retaining a full-time security 
professional, and is currently in the final stages of bringing a qualified 
candidate onboard.  This individual, they maintain, will facilitate dialogue 
among the parks, NPS, and the Department, conduct specific assessments of each 
icon park, and will ultimately provide a much clearer direction to the field.  
Currently, at the time of this report, this position is held by a temporary 
security officer who has illustrated to NPS the importance of attaining a full-
time security specialist.  OLES has only recently filled its permanent security 
manager position.

Several of the icon parks, including the Statue of Liberty, did possess 
individuals assigned to the position of security officer; however, those 
individuals also maintained a number of collateral duties.  In the case of the 
Statue of Liberty, a Park Police sergeant was designated as the security 
specialist, but also performed the duties of primary squad supervisor, training 
officer, firearms instructor, and fitness instructor.  Interestingly, we were 
notified one week following our assessment visit to Ellis and Liberty islands 
that Park Police senior management had abruptly designated the sergeant as the 
full-time security specialist and had relieved him of all other duties.  We 
fully support the expediency of this action; however, we recommend that this 
security specialist, and all other security specialists, complete an adequate 
training course and obtain appropriate certifications.  

Many of the icon park superintendents we interviewed acknowledged that access to 
an in-house security professional would be beneficial to their programs.  Most 
stated that they felt inadequate making serious security decisions based on 
their own limited training and lack of expertise in this field.  The majority of 
parks relied on their chief law enforcement officer or ranger to make security-
related decisions.  During our interviews, we learned that few of these law 
enforcement officials had ever received any physical security training and were 
similarly ill-suited to manage such responsibilities. 

Lacking qualified security professionals and staff within both the Department 
and Bureaus, the Department has learned to rely primarily on private security 
contractors to complete security risk and vulnerability reviews.  The various 
assessments and reviews have employed a variety of evaluative formulas and tools 
to produce specific recommendations.  This has led to the NPS being provided 
with individual assessments for each icon park with no methodology to use the 
information globally or compare results.  We found some of these assessments to 
be of questionable value, and we doubt the effectiveness of many of the measures 
that these particular assessments recommended for implementation.  Hence, there 
remains no single individual or group responsible, or capable, of professionally 
reviewing the security needs of the NPS icon parks, and to effectively recommend 
a specified, unified course of action to senior NPS management.  

In addition, we became aware that some individual assessments were manipulated 
or otherwise influenced by park management in order to find a balance between 
park accommodations as opposed to real security concerns.  Thus, we are 
concerned with the integrity of these recommendations having been impaired by 
management intervention. 

The NPS also lacks a comprehensive protection plan for its icon parks.  As a 
result of operating without a service-wide plan, the NPSï¿½s efforts remain 
dependent upon each individual superintendentï¿½s willingness to adhere to and 
interpret the security program.  This is a poor implementation of security 
measures, since the program itself lacks standards for NPS visitor screening, 
surveillance cameras, contract security guards, and vulnerability assessments.  
Until just recently, little evidence existed that icon park managers even 
communicated outside their respective boundaries in order to seek advice or to 
identify best practices.  Recently, we were pleased to discover that the 
Northeast Region instituted regular icon park conference calls.  This practice 
should be replicated in other Regions.  

We were also recently advised that Sandia National Laboratories5 is developing a 
much needed methodology to aid in the ranking of DOIï¿½s assets and setting 
priorities for security actions.  Sandiaï¿½s project team has visited several of 
the icon parks in order to incorporate the issues unique to those specific 
locations.  The project is being jointly funded by the Bureau of Reclamation and 
the NPS.  The use of a risk matrix would greatly assist the Department and NPS 
with evaluating its key assets and can then serve as a consistent, universal 
measuring tool.    	

When questioned, most park officials indicated that support received from the 
Departmentï¿½s Office of Law Enforcement and Security varied from park to park.  
At two locations, the park superintendent and chief ranger had never even heard 
of OLES.  A third park official admitted to very little direct involvement with 
OLES, although the communication and assistance received was said to be 
constructive and a ï¿½breath of fresh air.ï¿½  Several park officials reported 
receiving valuable assistance from OLES: for instance, the superintendents at 
the Statue of Liberty and Independence Hall welcomed OLES to their parks and 
found their support to be both necessary and advantageous.  

OLES not only has been able to increase advocacy for the icon parks, but has 
also been instrumental in getting results in a timely fashion.  At one location, 
we encountered the perimeter security to be grossly ineffective.  We briefed the 
superintendent, detailing our concerns and recommendations, but received no 
assurance of a timely resolution.  After briefing OLES on the situation they, 
too, visited the park, made the same observations and conclusions, and directed 
that the perimeter be reinforced.  Soon after, the perimeter was properly 
secured, negating the observed vulnerability.  

Overall, there remain conflicting impressions of OLES.  Confusion arises from 
the multiple instructions received by each individual icon park from OLES, 
particularly when OLES bypasses the NPS chain-of-command and often provides 
direction to parks which conflicts with more formal NPS instruction.  The NPS 
feels it cannot hold the icon park superintendents accountable for what they 
fail to do if their direction comes from another source, such as OLES.  
Likewise, a similar problem occurs when, for example, the region decides parks 
should not advance to higher threat levels when OLES says they should.  On a few 
occasions, we were told that parks were directed by OLES to take actions that 
were especially costly, despite the absence of a specified funding source.  

During a visit to one of the most vulnerable of the icon parks, we were told, 
ï¿½We know what is best.  We do not need anyone coming here to tell us what to 
do.ï¿½  This same official made the following remark concerning terrorist threats: 
ï¿½Iï¿½m not concerned about al-Qaeda.  I am more concerned with individuals.  Al-
Qaeda has never been around here before.ï¿½  These remarks were alarming, telling, 
and unfortunate.  In addition, we found several other officials discounting the 
terrorist threat notwithstanding repeated national alerts.  ï¿½This is my house,ï¿½ 
remarked one Park Police official, ï¿½and I know whatï¿½s wrong in my house.  I 
donï¿½t need everyone telling us what we need to do different and what we are 
doing wrong.ï¿½  

Protection rangers and Park Police officers are the foundation of icon park 
security.  The events of September 11 and the resultant augmentation of security 
have had an incredible impact on both parks and law enforcement officers 
service-wide: rangers have been detailed from their permanent parks to 
supplement the icon park forces, leaving many other parks with an atrophied and 
weakened protection staff.  Several non-icon park superintendents have voiced 
concerns that their rangers have been detailed to the parks with designated icon 
status.   

Early on in our assessment, we found the NPSï¿½s process of detailing rangers 
somewhat confusing.  Rangers were traveling from icon park to icon park, 
seemingly without discretion, and the entire process proved unorganized and 
ineffectual.  On a few occasions, rangers assigned to icon parks were detailed 
to other parks, necessitating other rangers being detailed to cover their 
absence.  Quite often, detailed rangers reported to their assignments late, and 
would leave early.  There appeared to be very little coordination.  Recently, 
however, NPS has implemented a more thoughtful response to this problem: the 
development of two teams of rangers, with one designated as a ï¿½quick responseï¿½ 
unit and another as a ï¿½rapid deployment force.ï¿½  NPS is now able to quickly 
detail a designated group of rangers assigned to nearby national parks within 
six to eight hours of notice.  This immediate response group is then relieved by 
a group of rangers that are on standby deployment within 24 hours, in most 
cases.  NPS law enforcement management has scheduled the standby duties on what 
they refer to as the ï¿½fair share concept,ï¿½ and they have exempted icon park and 
border rangers.  

In addition to the detailing of rangers, most protection rangers and Park Police 
officers assigned to icon parks have been forced to work 12-hour shifts for 
extended periods of time, with little time off since September 11, 2001.  It was 
reported that officers were working 12-hour shifts seven days a week for several 
months and with no days off.  These officers only recently began receiving one 
day off per week.  We have a concern about the long-term effectiveness of the 
protection staff and the officers who operate under these intense conditions.  
Fatigue and waning morale often impede an officerï¿½s perspicacity.  A 
representative of one ranger group characterized the exhausted state of the 
protective ranger workforce as ï¿½setting up to fail.ï¿½  He also provided examples 
of some rangers being ï¿½constantly on the moveï¿½ between homeland security 
assignments and wildfire duties.  At one of the most prominent of the icon 
parks, a single officer working a 12-hour shift was responsible for monitoring 
101 different security cameras on eight different security monitors.  Despite 
occasional breaks, this is an arduous and taxing assignment for any officer, let 
alone for an officer required to put in so many unassisted hours.    

The impact of the additional security responsibilities has affected all NPS 
programs across the board.  The protection workforce has been the most 
dramatically impacted, and the role of the protection ranger has made a 
significant exemplary shift.  Recently, there has been increased discussion 
throughout the NPS concerning the use of Park Police officers and protection 
rangers for sentry-like functions at icon parks.  Some NPS managers and 
employees question whether current position descriptions allow the use of 
protection rangers for guard duties.  Others recommend replacing protection 
rangers with US Park Police Officers at all urban parks.  We do not believe the 
Park Police would be able to absorb these extra duties nor would they find 
themselves equipped to perform such tasks.  In fact, the two locations that the 
Park Police maintain primary security responsibilities for are wrought with 
deficiencies, which suggest they would not be the best choice.

We believe the NPS must examine the practicality of utilizing private (contract) 
security guards, or perhaps NPS security guards in conjunction with protection 
rangers, to relieve the current workforce.  We also believe the NPS and the 
Department would benefit greatly from increased exploitation of technical 
solutions in lieu of the more traditional, personnel-intensive solutions.	

Requiring police officers and protection rangers to perform sentry duties for 
extended periods of time is not in the best interest of the officers nor, for 
that matter, the Department itself.  Few officers and rangers have received 
training as sentries and are more accustomed to random police patrol.  Most 
officers do not want to perform sentry-like duties, particularly for long 
periods of time, and become discontented and unmotivated.  On one occasion, we 
witnessed a Park Police officer leave his assigned postï¿½without reliefï¿½to 
purchase lunch.  This officerï¿½s negligence left a national monument and its 
contract screeners without an immediate law enforcement presence.  When this 
situation was brought to the attention of a Park Police supervisor, the 
supervisorï¿½s reply was, ï¿½Nothing I can do about that.  The guy has to eat.ï¿½   

Another staffing issue concerns the disparate staffing levels at icon parks.  
There exists no specific staffing model or methodology for designated icon 
parks.  Because of this lack of methodology, we found one urban icon park to 
have as few as two protection rangers on duty during daytime hours.  Worse, it 
was not uncommon to find examples of no law enforcement presence on duty at some 
other parks.  The ï¿½iconï¿½ status does not automatically incorporate additional 
staffing for the mandatory increases in protection.  With the exception of the 
Boston Navy Yard, no icon park has received a significant amplification of 
permanent rangers since September 11.  Even more remarkable, many of the parks 
are currently operating with protection forces below pre-9/11 levels.

At one park, prior to 9/11, we found that money for six additional protection 
rangers was supplied, but after deductions for assessments and an overall park 
deficit, one ranger had been hired and only three new positions had certificates 
issued.  When questioned about this, the chief ranger advised us she ï¿½had to 
wait,ï¿½ and that the money was ï¿½needed elsewhere.ï¿½  Soon after our visit, she was 
told she could advertise a noncompetitive reassignment she had requested.  But 
three months after our visit, only one position had been filled in addition to 
the one previously noted.

Shortly after the attacks on September 11, the Department received $92 million 
in supplemental funding from Congress, $63,248,000 of which was allocated to the 
NPS.  This funding was to provide relief for the costs associated with increased 
security and emergency construction relating to security at icon parks.  In June 
2002, we conducted a review to determine whether the bureaus had implemented 
strategies and controls to ensure that the funding was used for the desired 
purpose.  During this review, we examined the expenditures and uses of the 
supplemental funding received by the NPS and were satisfied that NPS had closely 
monitored and properly disbursed the funding.  

The only significant misuse of funding did not involve this supplemental 
funding, but previous yearsï¿½ funding earmarked for physical security.  For 
example, we found that one park had received $40,000 in 1999 to install closed-
circuit cameras at the park, but that the superintendent redirected the money to 
other non-security activities.  The funding was also included in the parkï¿½s base 
funding and has been appropriated for the past four years.  Shamefully, no 
camera system exists today despite the significant need for one.  To make 
matters worse, the park has actually submitted a new funding request to install 
a camera system throughout the park.  Incidents like this highlight the need for 
continuous OLES review of the use of security funding. 

A portion of the supplemental funding received was used to pay for increased 
temporary staffing at parks and dams.  Due to monetary restrictions, however, no 
new permanent positions were gained and, once the money was spent, no permanent 
increase in security was realized.  We learned that estimates of security needs 
and costs were typically drawn up in unreasonably short timeframesï¿½some as quick 
as three hoursï¿½then submitted to the regions and, later, to Congress for 
approval.  By all accounts, the early projections on costs and needs proved 
inaccurate and insufficient.   

In the days immediately following September 11, the icon parks found themselves 
in a rush to implement additional security, to determine what security measures 
were insufficient, and request funding adequate enough to bring park security up 
to new minimum levels.  Without comprehensive security analyses and with little 
to no understanding of the equipment, procedures, and personnel necessary to 
successfully enact such change, icon parks submitted timely but ill-conceived 
funding requests for each icon park.  

Finally, when a park uses detailed rangers, expenses are incurred not only for 
that officerï¿½s per diem and travel but, many times, for a replacement for the 
detaileeï¿½s home park as well.  Regardless of whether or not a backfill (often in 
the form of overtime) is necessary, the use of detailees is significantly more 
expensive than the cost of hiring a permanent ranger.  At one park, for example, 
the daily cost of the cheapest detailee equaled 1 ï¿½ times the cost of the 
average daily payroll of a GS 7/4 permanent ranger on overtime.  It is our 
opinion that the use of detailees is not an adequate long-term solution to the 
problem.  

For many years, NPS has attempted to treat all parks equally: we were repeatedly 
told funding requests from the Statue of Liberty, for example, were given the 
same consideration as funding requests from Badlands National Park in South 
Dakota.  There was no distinction.  Conversely, the events of September 11, 
2001, should have demonstrated to NPS the need to prioritize security measures 
at certain high-profile parks, but the organization has been slow in shifting 
its funding philosophy to effectively meet these needs.  Simply stated, while 
the NPS recognizes the importance of awarding special parks with high-profile 
status, they have failed to apply a similar status when it comes to prioritizing 
funding.  Though icon parks received base increases in recognition of their 
distinctive security needs, some of the money received by these parks has been 
redistributed to non-icon parks.  



Conclusion
Progress has been realized in the Departmentï¿½s efforts to develop and enhance 
security at our national icon parks.  The most significant advancements have 
been made within the last three months and, in all likelihood, improvements will 
continue to be made in the foreseeable future.  The Department and NPS were slow 
to react to the newly required security mission and spent precious months 
entangled in bureaucratic dialogue and inaction while security enhancements were 
addressed solely by the temporary deployment of rangers and Park Police 
officers.  Now that OLES staffing levels are adequate and serious planning and 
direction are underway, the newly created office is finally fulfilling its 
envisioned role.  The NPS law enforcement and security program has also 
progressed, albeit at a much slower pace, and will eventually reach its 
potentialï¿½if supported by senior NPS management in regard to staffing and 
funding.

The assessment revealed some serious deficiencies with the overall security 
program of the Department and NPS.  Some are a result of the infancy of the 
program and the initial lack of organizational infrastructure, but others are 
more serious flawsï¿½a failure of Departmental managers to embrace and support the 
security mission, for example.  The most disturbing discoveries were the 
misrepresentation of security implementation and the failure of key personnel to 
accept the actual threat potential present at their parks.

At a time when our countryï¿½s susceptibility to attack is at the forefront of 
concern, every reasonable course of preventative action must be taken.  After 
conducting this assessment, we believe that, as of now, this is not the case.  





Suggested Actions

1. The Department should revisit the definitions of key assets and critical 
infrastructures provided by the Homeland Security Department with a view toward 
refining NPSï¿½s icon park list.  Once an updated list is established, the NPS 
should maintain universal security standards at all icon parks, which include a 
minimum of countermeasures and staffing.

2. The Department must clarify the role of OLES in the planning, management, and 
oversight of its key assets.  The responsibility for planning and implementing 
security countermeasures at icon parks and other key assets should be a 
collaborative effort between OLES and the respective bureaus.  Bureaus must 
recognize and accept OLESï¿½s continuous involvement with key asset security.  
OLES must develop, in collaboration with the NPS, policies and procedures 
concerning resolution of operational concerns involving icon security.  

3. The Secretary should firmly establish the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Law 
Enforcement as the individual with final authority to decide the outcome of any 
internal conflict relative to key asset protection.

4. The Department and NPS should ensure, through senior management discussions, 
directives, and in-service training, that organizational commitments and 
responsibilities for key asset security are widely known and supported 
throughout the Department and NPS.

5. The Department and NPS must increase the accountability of all officials 
responsible for providing or overseeing security at key asset locations.  
Modifications to operational plans and security countermeasures should not occur 
without proper notification and approval.  OLES security audits should continue 
in order to determine compliance with established policies and procedures.  

6. Recognizing the importance of protecting national icon parks, and the 
responsibilities attendant to Homeland Security in general, NPS should consider 
grouping the icon parks in a separate category, outside of the traditional 
regional grouping for all security-related matters, including funding.  This 
would allow for more specific oversight of the icon parks, streamline the 
notification and reporting process during increased national threat levels, and 
enhance communications with external entities, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security.  

7. Icon parks with the most significant threat potential should have trained and 
certified security managers on-site.

8. Security assessments of icon parks should be conducted and completed every 
three years by a single source, coordinated through the NPS security manager, 
utilizing a standard risk assessment methodology.  Additionally, the Department 
of Homeland Securityï¿½s threat levels need to be strictly adhered to by all icon 
parks.  OLES should ensure that random testing of these security procedures 
takes place and that all approved plans have been fully implemented.  

9. NPS should explore the use of contract security guardsï¿½both armed and 
unarmedï¿½to complement protection now provided by existing NPS rangers and police 
officers.  It should be noted that a pilot project at one icon park is currently 
underway.  If this pilot is successful, the NPS and the Department should 
seriously consider the benefits of establishing a DOI security guard force with 
a limited scope of authority for the purpose of providing physical security 
protection for all key assets throughout the Department.  


10. Security awareness training should be provided for all employees at each 
icon park.  At the minimum, this training should consist of identification of 
suspicious persons, packages, and occurrences, with special attention on 
identifying and reporting individuals conducting surveillance.  



1 The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures 
and Key Assets
2 Concentrated security enhancement coinciding with the commencement of the 
Iraqi war
3 ï¿½Key assetsï¿½ have been identified as locations warranting additional security 
measures due to their mission, value, or symbolic status
4 ï¿½Threat potentialï¿½ estimates an assetï¿½s attractiveness as a target in respect 
to potential attacks
5 Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed 
Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energyï¿½s National Nuclear 
Security Administration



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