Important Note: This declassified report summarizes many important
findings and judgments contained in the Select Committee's classified
Report, issued January 3, 1999. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
agencies within the Clinton administration have determined that other
significant findings and judgments contained in the Select Committee's
classified Report cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national
security or ongoing criminal investigations.
#### A. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen design
information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons.
The People's Republic of China (PRC) has stolen classified design
information on the United States' most advanced thermonuclear weapons.
These thefts of nuclear secrets from our national weapons laboratories
enabled the PRC to design, develop, and successfully test modern strategic
nuclear weapons sooner than would otherwise have been possible. The stolen
U.S. nuclear secrets give the PRC design information on thermonuclear
weapons on a par with our own.
The PRC thefts from our National Laboratories began at least as early
as the late 1970s. Significant secrets are known to have been stolen, from
the laboratories or elsewhere, as recently as the mid-1990s. Such thefts
almost certainly continue to the present.
**ï¿½ The stolen information includes classified information on seven
U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed
thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal. **
**ï¿½ The stolen information also includes classified design information
for an enhanced radiation weapon (commonly known as the "neutron bomb"),
which neither the United States, nor any other nation, has yet
deployed.**
**ï¿½ The PRC has obtained classified information on the following U.S.
thermonuclear warheads, as well as a number of associated reentry vehicles
(the hardened shell that protects the thermonuclear warhead during
reentry).**
In addition, in the mid-1990s the PRC stole from a U.S. national
weapons laboratory classified thermonuclear weapons information that
cannot be identified in this unclassified Report. Because this recent
espionage case is currently under investigation and involves sensitive
intelligence sources and methods, the Clinton administration has
determined that further information cannot be made public without
affecting national security or ongoing criminal investigations.
The W-88, a miniaturized, tapered warhead, is the most sophisticated
nuclear weapon the United States has ever built. In the U.S. arsenal, it
is mated to the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile carried aboard
the Trident nuclear submarine. The United States learned about the theft
of the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead information, as well as about the theft of
information regarding several other nuclear weapons, in 1995.
**The PRC has stolen U.S. design
information and other classified information for neutron bomb
warheads.** The PRC stole classified U.S. information about the neutron
bomb from a U.S. national weapons laboratory. The U.S. learned of the
theft of this classified information on the neutron bomb in 1996.
In the late 1970s, the PRC stole design information on the U.S. W-70
warhead from the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. The U.S. government first
learned of this theft several months after it took place. The W-70 warhead
contains elements that may be used either as a strategic thermonuclear
weapon, or as an enhanced radiation weapon ("neutron bomb"). The PRC
tested the neutron bomb in 1988.
The Select Committee is aware of other PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear
weapons-related secrets. The Clinton administration has determined that
further information about PRC thefts of U.S. thermonuclear weapons-related
secrets cannot be publicly disclosed without affecting national
security.
The PRC acquired this and other classified U.S. nuclear weapons
information as the result of a 20-year intelligence collection program to
develop modern thermonuclear weapons, continuing to this very day, that
includes espionage, review of unclassified publications, and extensive
interactions with scientists from the Department of Energy's national
weapons laboratories.
The Select Committee has found that the primary focus of this
long-term, ongoing PRC intelligence collection effort has been on the
following national weapons laboratories:
**ï¿½ Los Alamos**
**ï¿½ Lawrence Livermore**
**ï¿½ Oak Ridge**
**ï¿½ Sandia**
**The Select Committee judges that
the PRC will exploit elements of the stolen design information on the
PRC's next generation of thermonuclear weapons.** The PRC plans to
supplement its silo-based CSS-4 ICBMs targeted on U.S. cities with mobile
ICBMs, which are more survivable because they are more difficult to find
than silo-based missiles.
The PRC has three mobile ICBM programs currently underway - two
road-mobile and one submarine-launched program - all of which will be able
to strike the United States.
The first of these new People's Liberation Army (PLA) mobile ICBMs, the
DF-31, may be tested in 1999, and could be deployed as soon as 2002. These
mobile missiles require small warhead designs, of which the stolen U.S.
design information is the most advanced in the world.
In addition, the PRC could choose to use elements of the stolen nuclear
weapons design information - including the neutron bomb - on intermediate-
and short-range ballistic missiles, such as its CSS-6 missiles.
The PRC has the infrastructure and technical ability to use elements of
the stolen U.S. warhead design information in the PLA's next generation of
thermonuclear weapons. The Select Committee concludes that the production
tools and processes required by the PRC to produce small thermonuclear
warheads based on the stolen U.S. design information, including the stolen
W-88 information, would be similar to those developed or available in a
modern aerospace or precision-guided munitions industry. The Select
Committee judges that the PRC has such infrastructure and is capable of
such production.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC is likely to continue its work
on advanced thermonuclear weapons based on the stolen U.S. design
information. The PRC could begin serial production of such weapons during
the next decade in connection with the development of its next generation
of intercontinental ballistic missiles.
A series of PRC nuclear weapons test explosions from 1992 to 1996 began
a debate in the U.S. Government about whether the PRC's designs for its
new generation of nuclear warheads were in fact based on stolen U.S.
classified information. The apparent purpose of these PRC tests was to
develop smaller, lighter thermonuclear warheads, with an increased
yield-to-weight ratio.
The United States did not become fully aware of the magnitude of the
counterintelligence problem at the Department of Energy national weapons
laboratories until 1995. In 1995 the United States received a classified
PRC document that demonstrated that the PRC had obtained U.S. design
information on the W-88 warhead and technical information concerning
approximately half a dozen other U.S. thermonuclear warheads and
associated reentry vehicles.
The document was provided by a PRC national, unsolicited by the CIA - a
"walk in." This individual approached the CIA outside the PRC, and turned
over a number of documents. Among these was an official PRC document
classified "Secret" by the PRC.
This PRC document included, among other matters, stolen U.S. design
information on the W-88 thermonuclear warhead used on the Trident D-5
missile, as well as U.S. technical information on several other strategic
U.S. nuclear warheads. The document recognized that the U.S. weapons
represented the state-of-the-art against which PRC nuclear weapons should
be measured.
By mid-1996 the CIA had determined that the individual who provided the
information was secretly under the direction of the PRC intelligence
services. The CIA and other U.S. intelligence community analysts have
nevertheless concluded that the classified PRC document contained U.S.
thermonuclear warhead design information and other technical information
on U.S. nuclear weapons.
**The stolen U.S. nuclear secrets
give the PRC design information on thermonuclear weapons on a par with our
own.** Currently deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on U.S. cities are based on
1950s-era nuclear weapons designs. With the stolen U.S. technology, the
PRC has leaped, in a handful of years, from 1950s-era strategic nuclear
capabilities to the more modern thermonuclear weapons designs. These
modern thermonuclear weapons took the United States decades of effort,
hundreds of millions of dollars, and numerous nuclear tests to
achieve.
Such small, modern warheads are necessary for all of the elements of a
modern intercontinental nuclear force, including:
**ï¿½ Road-mobile ICBMs**
**ï¿½ Submarine-launched
ICBMs**
**ï¿½ ICBMs with multiple warheads
(MRVs or MIRVs)**
The PRC has an ongoing program to use these modern thermonuclear
warheads on its next generation of ICBMs, currently in development.
Without the nuclear secrets stolen from the United States, it would have
been virtually impossible for the PRC to fabricate and test successfully
small nuclear warheads prior to its 1996 pledge to adhere to the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
#### B. The Select Committee judges that elements of the stolen information
on U.S. thermonuclear warhead designswill assist the PRC in building its
next generation of mobile ICBMs, which may be tested this year.
The stolen U.S. design information will assist the PRC in building
smaller nuclear warheads - vital to the success of the PRC's ongoing
efforts to develop survivable, mobile missiles. Current PRC ICBMs, which
are silo-based, are more vulnerable to attack than mobile missiles.
The PRC has currently underway three intercontinental mobile missile
programs - two road-mobile, and one submarine-launched. All of these
missiles are capable of targeting the United States.
The first of these, the road-mobile solid-propellant DF-31, may be
tested in 1999. Given a successful flight-test program, the DF-31 could be
ready for deployment in 2002.
**The Select Committee judges that
the PRC will in fact use a small nuclear warhead on its new generation
ICBMs. **The small, mobile missiles that the PRC is developing require
smaller warheads than the large, heavy, 1950s-era warheads developed for
the PRC's silo-based missiles. The main purpose of a series of nuclear
tests conducted by the PRC between 1992 and 1996 was evidently to develop
new smaller, lighter warheads with an increased yield-to-weight ratio for
use with the PRC's new, mobile nuclear forces.
The Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit elements of the
stolen U.S. thermonuclear weapons designs on its new ICBMs currently under
development. The advanced U.S. thermonuclear warheads for which the PRC
has stolen U.S. design information are significantly smaller than those
for which the PRC's silo-based missiles were designed. The U.S. designs,
unlike those in the PRC's currently-deployed arsenal, can be used on
smaller mobile missiles.
The Select Committee judges that:
**ï¿½ The PRC is likely to continue
to work on small thermonuclear warheads based on stolen U.S. design
information**
**ï¿½ The PRC has the
infrastructure and ability to produce such warheads, including warheads
based on elements of the stolen U.S. W-88 Trident D5 design
information**
**ï¿½ The PRC could begin serial
production of small thermonuclear warheads during the next decade in
conjunction with its new generation of road-mobile missiles**
**ï¿½ The introduction of small
warheads into PLA service could coincide with the initial operational
capability of the DF-31, which could be ready for deployment in
2002**
These small warhead designs will make it possible for the PRC to
develop and deploy missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs or
independently targetable MIRVs).
Multiple reentry vehicles increase the effectiveness of a ballistic
missile force by multiplying the number of warheads a single missile can
carry as many as ten-fold.
Multiple reentry vehicles also can help to counter missile defenses.
For example, multiple reentry vehicles make it easier for the PRC to
deploy penetration aids with its ICBM warheads in order to defeat
anti-missile defenses.
The Select Committee is aware of reports that the PRC has in the past
undertaken efforts related to technology with MIRV applications. Experts
agree that the PRC now has the capability to develop and deploy silo-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs
or MRVs).
Experts also agree that the PRC could have this capability for its new
mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles within a reasonable period of
years that is consistent with its plans to deploy these new mobile
missiles. The PRC could pursue one or more penetration aids in connection
with its new nuclear missiles.
If the PRC violates the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by testing
surreptitiously, it could further accelerate its nuclear development.
**The Select Committee judges that,
if the PRC were successful in stealing nuclear test codes, computer
models, and data from the United States, it could further accelerate its
nuclear development.** By using such stolen codes and data in
conjunction with High Performance Computers (HPCs) already acquired by the
PRC, the PRC could diminish its need for further nuclear testing to
evaluate weapons and propose design changes.
The possession of the stolen U.S. test data could greatly reduce the
level of HPC performance required for such tasks. For these reasons, the
Select Committee judges that the PRC has and will continue to aggressively
target for theft our nuclear test codes, computer models, and data.
Although the United States has been the victim of systematic espionage
successfully targeted against our most advanced nuclear weapons designs -
and although the Select Committee judges that the PRC will exploit
elements of those designs for its new generation of ICBMs - the United
States retains an overwhelming qualitative and quantitative advantage in
deployed strategic nuclear forces. Nonetheless, in a crisis in which the
United States confronts the PRC's conventional and nuclear forces at the
regional level, a modernized PRC strategic nuclear ballistic missile force
would pose a credible direct threat against the United States.
Neither the United States nor the PRC has a national ballistic missile
defense system.
**In the near term, a PRC
deployment of mobile thermonuclear weapons, or neutron bombs, based on
stolen U.S. design information, could have a significant effect on the
regional balance of power,** particularly with respect to Taiwan. PRC
deployments of advanced nuclear weapons based on stolen U.S. design
information would pose greater risks to U.S. troops and interests in Asia
and the Pacific.
In addition, the PRC's theft of information on our most modern nuclear
weapons designs enables the PRC to deploy modern forces much sooner than
would otherwise be possible.
At the beginning of the l990s, the PRC had only one or two silo-based
ICBMs capable of attacking the United States. Since then, the PRC has
deployed up to two dozen additional silo-based ICBMs capable of attacking
the United States; has upgraded its silo-based missiles; and has continued
development of three mobile ICBM systems and associated modern
thermonuclear warheads.
If the PRC is successful in developing modern nuclear forces, as seems
likely, and chooses to deploy them in sufficient numbers, then the
long-term balance of nuclear forces with the United States could be
adversely affected.
#### C. Despite repeated PRC thefts of the most sophisticated U.S. nuclear
weapons technology, security at our national nuclear weapons laboratories
does not meet even minimal standards.
The PRC stole design information on the United States' most advanced
thermonuclear weapons as a result of a sustained espionage effort targeted
at the United States' nuclear weapons facilities, including our national
weapons laboratories. The successful penetration by the PRC of our nuclear
weapons laboratories has taken place over the last several decades, and
almost certainly continues to the present.
More specifically, the Select Committee has concluded that the
successful penetration of our National Laboratories by the PRC began as
early as the late 1970s; the PRC had penetrated the Laboratories
throughout the 1980s and 1990s; and our Laboratories almost certainly
remain penetrated by the PRC today.
Our national weapons laboratories are responsible for, among other
things, the design of thermonuclear warheads for our ballistic missiles.
The information at our national weapons laboratories about our
thermonuclear warheads is supposed to be among our nation's most closely
guarded secrets.
**Counterintelligence programs at
the national weapons laboratories today fail to meet even minimal
standards.** Repeated efforts since the early 1980s have failed to solve
the counterintelligence deficiencies at the National Laboratories. While
one of the Laboratories has adopted better counterintelligence practices
than the others, all remain inadequate.
Even though the United States discovered in 1995 that the PRC had
stolen design information on the W-88 Trident D-5 warhead and technical
information on a number of other U.S. thermonuclear warheads, the White
House has informed the Select Committee, in response to specific
interrogatories propounded by the Committee, that the President was not
briefed about the counterintelligence failures until early 1998.
Moreover, given the great significance of the PRC thefts, the Select
Committee is concerned that the appropriate committees of the Congress
were not adequately briefed on the extent of the PRC's espionage
efforts.
A counterintelligence and security plan adopted by the Department of
Energy in late 1998 in response to Presidential Decision Directive 61 is a
step toward establishing sound counterintelligence practices. However,
according to the head of these efforts, significant time will be required
to implement improved security procedures pursuant to the directive.
Security at the national weapons laboratories will not be satisfactory
until at least sometime in the year 2000.
See the chapters PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology, PRC Theft of U.S.
Thermonuclear Warhead Design Information, and PRC Missile and Space Forces
for more detailed discussions of the Select Committee's investigation of
these matters.
#### A. The PRC has stolen U.S. missile technology and exploited itfor the
PRC's own ballistic missile applications.
The PRC has proliferated
such military technology to a number of other countries, including regimes
hostile to the United States.
The Select Committee has found that the PRC has stolen a specific U.S.
guidance technology used on current and past generations of U.S. weapons
systems. The stolen guidance technology is currently used on a variety of
U.S. missiles and military aircraft, including:
**ï¿½ The U.S. Army Tactical
Missile System (ATACMS)**
**ï¿½ The U.S. Navy Stand-off Land
Attack Missile-Extended Range (SLAM-ER)**
**ï¿½ The U.S. Navy F-14**
**ï¿½ The U.S. Air Force F-15,
F-16, and F-117 fighter jets**
The stolen guidance technology has direct applicability to the PRC's
intercontinental, medium- and short-range ballistic missiles, and its
spacelift rockets.
The theft of U.S. ballistic missile-related technology is of great
value to the PRC. In addition to ICBMs and military spacelift rockets,
such technology is directly applicable to the medium- and short-range PLA
missiles, such as the CSS-6 (also known as the M-9), the CSS-X-7 (also
known as the M-11), and the CSS-8 that have been developed for, among
other purposes, striking Taiwan.
CSS-6 missiles were, for example, fired in the Taiwan Strait and over
Taiwan's main ports in the 1996 crisis and confrontation with the United
States.
The Select Committee has uncovered instances of the PRC's use of this
specific stolen U.S. technology that:
**ï¿½ Enhance the PRC's military
capabilities**
**ï¿½ Jeopardize U.S. national
security interests**
**ï¿½ Pose a direct threat to the
United States, our friends and allies, or our forces**
The Clinton administration has determined that particular uses by the
PRC of this stolen U.S. technology cannot be disclosed publicly without
affecting national security.
The PRC has proliferated weapons systems and components to other
countries including Iran, Pakistan, Libya, Syria, and North Korea.
#### B. In the late 1990s, the PRC stole or illegally obtained
U.S.developmental and research technology that, if taken to successful
conclusion, could be used to attack U.S. satellites and
submarines.
During the late l990s, U.S. research and development work on
electromagnetic weapons technology has been illegally obtained by the PRC
as a result of successful espionage directed against the United States.
Such technology, once developed, can be used for space-based weapons to
attack satellites and missiles.
In 1997, the PRC stole classified U.S. developmental research
concerning very sensitive detection techniques that, if successfully
concluded, could be used to threaten U.S. submarines.
#### C. Currently-deployed PRC ICBMs targeted on the United States are
based in significant part on U.S. technologiesillegally obtained by
the PRC in the 1950s.
#### This illustrates the potential long-term effects of technology
loss.
Even in today's rapidly changing technological environment, technology
losses can have long-term adverse effects. Currently-deployed PRC ICBMs
targeted on the United States are based on U.S. and Russian technologies
from the 1950s and 1960s.
In the 1950s, a U.S. military officer and associated members of the
design team for a U.S. ICBM program (the "Titan" missile program)
emigrated to the PRC and illegally gave U.S. missile and missile-related
technology to the PRC.
This information formed the basis for the up to two dozen PRC CSS-4
ICBMs that are currently targeted on the United States.
All but two of these missiles have been deployed by the PRC for the
first time in this decade.
#### D. In the aftermath of three failed satellite launches since 1992,U.S.
satellite manufacturers transferred missile design information and
know-how to the PRC without obtaining the legally required licenses.
#### This information has improved the reliability of PRC rockets useful
for civilian and military purposes.
#### The illegally transmitted information is useful for the design and
improved reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles, as well.
U.S. satellite manufacturers analyzed the causes of three PRC launch
failures and recommended improvements to the reliability of the PRC
rockets. These launch failure reviews were conducted without required
Department of State export licenses, and communicated technical
information to the PRC in violation of the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations.
The Select Committee has concluded that the PRC implemented a number of
the recommended improvements to rocket guidance and to the fairing (or
nose cone), which protects a satellite during launch. These improvements
increased the reliability of the PRC Long March rockets. It is almost
certain that the U.S. satellite manufacturers' recommendations led to
improvements in the PRC's rockets and that the improvements would not have
been considered or implemented so soon without the U.S. assistance.
It is possible or even likely that, absent the U.S. satellite
manufacturers' interventions on the problems associated with the defective
fairing on the PRC's Long March 2E rocket and the defective guidance
system on the PRC's Long March 3B rocket, one or more other PRC launches
would have failed.
**The PRC Long March rockets
improved by the U.S. technology assistance are useful for both commercial
and military purposes.** The military uses include launching:
**ï¿½ Military communications and
reconnaissance satellites**
**ï¿½ Space-based sensors**
**ï¿½ Space-based weapons, if
successfully developed**
**ï¿½ Satellites for modern command
and control and sophisticated intelligence collection**
The Select Committee judges that the PRC military has important needs
in these areas, including notably space-based communications and
reconnaissance capabilities.
In addition, design and testing know-how and procedures communicated
during the launch failure reviews could be applied to the reliability of
missiles or rockets generally. U.S. participants' comments during the
failure investigations related to such matters as:
**ï¿½ Missile design**
**ï¿½ Design analysis**
**ï¿½ Testing procedures**
**ï¿½ The application of technical
know-how to particular failure analyses**
To the extent any valuable information was transferred to the PRC's
space program, such information would likely find its way into the PRC's
ballistic missile program. The ballistic missile and space launch programs
have long been intertwined and subordinate to the same ministry and
state-owned corporation in the PRC.
For example, the PRC's Long March 2 rockets and their derivatives
(including the Long March 2E, on which Hughes advised the PRC) were
derived directly from the PRC's silo-based CSS-4 intercontinental
ballistic missiles that are currently targeted on the United States.
The various institutes and academies in the PRC involved in ballistic
missile and rocket design also share design and production
responsibilities. Many of the PRC personnel in these organizations have
responsibilities for both commercial rocket and military missile programs.
Attendees at important failure review meetings included PRC personnel from
such organizations.
**In fact, information passed
during each of the failure analyses has the potential to benefit the PRC's
ballistic missile program.** The independent experts retained by the
Select Committee judge that information valuable to the PRC's ballistic
missile and space programs was transferred to the PRC in the failure
investigations.
The rocket guidance system on which Loral and Hughes provided advice in
1996 is judged by the Select Committee to be among the systems capable of
being adapted for use as the guidance system for future PRC road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missiles, although if a better system is
available, it is more likely to be chosen for that mission.
The Select Committee judges that information on rocket fairings (that
is, nose cones) provided to the PRC by Hughes may assist the design and
improved reliability of future PRC MIRVed missiles, if the PRC decides to
develop them, and of future submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
When Loral and Hughes assisted the PRC, they could not know whether the
PRC would in fact use such information in their military programs.
#### i. In 1993 and 1995, Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design
and reliability of PRC rockets.
#### Hughes' advice may also be useful for design and improved reliability
of future PRC ballistic missiles.
#### Hughes deliberately acted without seeking to obtain the legally
required licenses.
In 1993 and 1995, Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design and
reliability of PRC Long March rockets with important military
applications. The information provided by Hughes also may be useful for
improving the reliability of future PRC ballistic missiles. Hughes
deliberately acted without the legally required licenses.
**In 1993 and 1995 Hughes analyzed
the causes of PRC launch failures and, for both failures, illegally
recommended to the PRC improvements** to the fairing, a part of the
rocket that protects the payload. The PRC changed the fairing of its Long
March rocket to incorporate the Hughes recommendations.
Hughes also corrected deficiencies in the PRC's coupled loads analysis,
a critical rocket design technology.
Hughes also identified changes needed in PRC launch operations.
The State Department's Office of Defense Trade Controls has concluded
that Hughes significantly improved the PRC space launch program and
contributed to the PRC goal of assured access to space. The State
Department further concluded that the lessons learned by the PRC are
inherently applicable to their missile program.
The State Department administers arms export licensing, and would have
been the proper authority to license the Hughes failure
investigations.
The State Department found that the PRC and Hughes personnel engaged in
an extensive exchange of data and analyses, which, among other things,
identified and corrected for the PRC deficiencies in a number of technical
areas, including:
**ï¿½ Anomaly analysis**
**ï¿½ Accident investigation
techniques**
**ï¿½ Telemetry analysis**
**ï¿½ Coupled loads
analysis**
**ï¿½ Hardware design and
manufacture**
**ï¿½ Testing**
**ï¿½ Modeling**
**ï¿½ Simulation**
**ï¿½ Weather
analysis**
The illegally transmitted information improved the PRC's military
rockets and operations. The illegally transmitted information may assist
the PRC in the design and improved reliability of future silo-based or
mobile PRC ballistic missiles, including particularly missiles that
require fairings (or nose cones). These would include missiles with
advanced payloads (that is, multiple warheads, or certain penetration aids
designed to defeat missile defenses), and submarine launched ballistic
missiles.
The PRC has the capability to develop and deploy silo-based missiles
with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRVs or MRVs). Within a reasonable period
of years that is consistent with the PRC's possible deployment of new
mobile missiles, the PRC could deploy multiple warheads on those mobile
missiles, as well. The PRC also appears to have gained practical insight
into U.S. coupled loads analysis, and insight into diagnostic and failure
analysis techniques for identifying the causes of a launch failure. Such
lessons could be applied to both rockets and missiles.
In both 1993 and 1995, Hughes failed to apply for or obtain the
required Department of State licenses for its activities, because Hughes
knew that the Department of State would be unlikely to grant the license
and that the licensing process would in any case be lengthy.
Hughes also engaged in deliberate efforts to circumvent the Department
of State licensing requirement. To this end, Hughes sought the approval of
a Department of Commerce official for its 1995 activities and claims to
have sought the approval of a Department of Defense monitor for some of
its 1993 activities, although Hughes knew that neither official was
legally authorized to issue the required license.
Hughes had important commercial interests in the PRC at the time it
engaged in the failure investigations. These interests included future
sales of satellites to the PRC or to parties serving the PRC market, and
reducing the cost and improving the safety of launching satellites in the
PRC.
#### ii. In 1996, Loral and Hughes showed the PRC how to improve the design
and reliability of the guidance system used in the PRC's newest Long March
rocket.
#### Loral's and Hughes' advice may also be useful for design and improved
reliability of elements of future PRC ballistic missiles.
#### Loral and Hughes acted without the legally required license, although
both corporations knew that a license was required.
Loral and Hughes analyzed for the PRC the potential causes of a 1996
PRC launch failure, identified for the PRC the true cause of the failure
as a particular element within the Long March rocket's guidance unit, and
provided the PRC with technical assistance that may be useful not only for
the PRC's commercial and military space launch programs, but for ballistic
missiles as well.
In so doing, Loral and Hughes deliberately acted without the legally
required license, and violated U.S. export control laws.
Although Loral and Hughes were well aware that a State Department
license was required to provide assistance related to the guidance system
of a PRC rocket, neither company applied for or obtained the required
license. Loral was warned of the need for a license at the time it agreed
to participate in the investigation, but took no action.
Loral and Hughes also failed to properly brief participants in the
failure investigation of U.S. export requirements, failed to monitor the
investigation as it progressed, and failed to take adequate steps to
ensure that no prohibited information was passed to the PRC.
Loral and Hughes submitted lengthy written materials analyzing the
cause of the guidance system failure to the PRC and to other foreign
nationals. In addition, Loral and Hughes engaged in technical discussions,
including discussions about the details and causes of the guidance system
failure, that were almost certainly recorded by the PRC.
While some aspects of these discussions have been identified by the
Select Committee and reviewed by independent experts retained by the
Select Committee, the full range and content of these discussions remains
unknown. The Select Committee was unable to talk to several important
participants in the failure investigation, and the PRC refused to agree to
the Select Committee's request for interviews. Additional controlled
information may have been received by the PRC.
The information and assistance conveyed by Loral and Hughes led to
improvements to the guidance system of the PRC's Long March 3B rocket.
While the launch that failed was commercial, the information transmitted
by Loral and Hughes was useful, as well, for military space launch
purposes.
**Loral and Hughes provided
valuable additional information that exposed the PRC to Western diagnostic
processes that could lead to improvements in the reliability of all PRC
ballistic missiles.** Loral's and Hughes' advice could help reinforce or
add vigor to the PRC's adherence to good design and test practices, which
could be transferred to the ballistic missile program. The exposure to
U.S. diagnostic and test processes outlined by Loral and Hughes has the
potential to improve PRC pre- and post-flight failure analysis for the
ballistic missile program.
The technology transferred by Loral and Hughes thus has the potential,
if used by the PRC, to increase the reliability of future PRC ballistic
missiles.
The independent experts retained by the Select Committee had access not
just to the written report prepared by Loral with input from Hughes, but
also to the comments of participants about meetings in Beijing. The
independent experts conclude that information valuable to the PRC's space
and ballistic missile programs was transferred.
Neither Loral nor Hughes disclosed to export control officers of the
U.S. Government their unlicensed activities until after they were
contacted by U.S. Government licensing officials demanding an explanation
for their conduct. The U.S. Government officials became aware of the
improper activities through an article in a widely-read industry
publication. This article also came to Loral's attention prior to Loral's
disclosure to the U.S. Government.
Loral and Hughes had important commercial interests in the PRC when
they engaged in the 1996 failure investigation. These interests included
future sales of satellites to the PRC or to parties serving the PRC
market, and reducing the cost and improving the safety of launching
satellites in the PRC.
#### E. In light of the PRC's aggressive espionage campaign against U.S.
technology, it would be surprising if the PRC has not exploited security
lapses that have occurred in connection with launches of U.S. satellites
in the PRC.
The original policy permitting U.S. manufactured satellites to be
launched in the PRC envisioned strict compliance with requirements to
prevent unauthorized technology transfers.
These requirements are encompassed in U.S. regulations and licenses.
Pursuant to a bilateral agreement between the United States and the PRC,
the requirements include U.S. control over access to the satellite while
it is in the PRC. Many of these requirements imposed on exporters are to
be closely monitored by U.S. Government officials provided by the Defense
Department.
**The Select Committee has found
numerous lapses in the intended pre-launch technology safeguards.
**Defense Department monitors have reported numerous security
infractions by exporters. Exporters often hire private security guards to
assist in the performance of their duties to prevent technology transfers,
and these private guards have also reported security lapses.
In addition, it is likely that other security lapses have gone
unreported. In the mid-1990s, three launches and associated pre-launch
activities were not monitored by the Defense Department. Launches that
were monitored have lacked proper staffing.
Because of the PRC's aggressive efforts to acquire U.S. technology, it
would be surprising if the PRC has not exploited security lapses while
U.S.-built satellites and associated equipment and documents were in the
PRC. Prior to launch, the satellite, associated test equipment, and
controlled documents are transported to the PRC and may remain in the PRC
for periods as short as a couple of weeks or as long as two months. The
PRC would likely exploit opportunities to gain information while the U.S.
satellite and associated equipment are in the PRC before launch.
Unrestricted access to a satellite for as little as two hours could
provide the PRC with valuable, non-public information about major
satellite subsystems, as well as the design and manufacture of such
subsystems.
There are numerous reasons for security infractions, some of which may
be addressed through changes in procedures:
**ï¿½ Defense Department monitors
on occasion have found poor attitudes toward security among both company
management and private guards**
**ï¿½ Private security guards hired
by satellite exporters may have an inherent conflict of interest when
reporting on their current and prospective employers**
**ï¿½ Both Defense Department
monitors and private security guards may lack sufficient
training**
**ï¿½ Defense Department monitors
sometimes lack continuity with a given launch**
**ï¿½ Often, only one Defense
Department monitor may have been present on a project**
#### F. Foreign brokers and underwriters of satellite and space launch
insurance have obtained controlled U.S. space and missile-related
technology outside of the system of export controls that applies to U.S.
satellite manufacturers.
#### While existing laws address such exports, U.S. export control
authorities may not be adequately enforcing these laws in the space
insurance industry context, nor paying sufficient attention to these
practices.
Satellite and space insurance is underwritten by overseas and
multinational organizations to which U.S. technical information is always
passed to assess insurance risks. This is particularly true where the
insurers have particular reasons to be concerned about launch
failures.
These insurers have, on occasion, received controlled U.S. technical
information. It is not clear that manufacturers and purchasers of
satellites are transmitting satellite information to such foreign brokers
and underwriters in compliance with U.S. export control rules and
regulations.
As insurance is critical to commercial space launches, the insurance
role cannot be eliminated. Existing laws address exports to brokers and
insurers. The administration of these laws must be applied to exports of
sensitive U.S. technology to the space launch and satellite insurance
industry.
#### G. The Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act took
important steps to correct deficiencies in the administration of U.S.
export controls on commercial space launches in the PRC.
#### But the aggressive implementation of this law is vital, and other
problems with launches in the PRC that the Act does not address require
immediate attention.
The Fiscal 1999 Department of Defense Authorization Act sought to
increase safeguards on technology transfer during foreign launches of U.S.
satellites.
The measures set forth in the Act include transferring licensing
jurisdiction to the Department of State, and increased support for the
Defense Department's efforts to prevent technology loss.
However, additional measures - including better training for Defense
Department monitors and improved procedures for hiring professional
security personnel - will be needed.
#### H. It is in the national security interest of the United States to
increase U.S. domestic launch capacity.
While U.S. policy since 1988 has permitted launching satellites in the
PRC, U.S. national security interests would be advanced by avoiding the
need for foreign launches through increased domestic launch
capability.
The Reagan administration's decision to permit launches in the PRC was
affected by two factors: insufficient domestic launch options in the
aftermath of the Challenger disaster, and the perception of the PRC as a
strategic balance against the Soviet Union in the context of the Cold War.
These factors are no longer applicable today.
Launching Western satellites has provided the PRC with additional
experience that has improved its space launch capabilities. Even in the
absence of any loss of U.S. technology, such experience benefits a
potential long-run competitor of the United States.
See the chapters *PRC Missile and Space Forces, Satellite Launches
in the PRC: Hughes*, and *Satellite Launches in the PRC: Loral*
for more detailed discussion of the Select Committee's investigation of
these matters.
#### A. Recent changes in international and domestic export control regimes
have reduced the ability to control transfers of militarily useful
technology.
#### i. The dissolution of COCOM in 1994 left the United States without an
effective, multilateral means to control exports of militarily useful
goods and technology.
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar) leaves international controls
over the transfer of military technologies to national discretion.
The dissolution of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM) in March 1994 left the United States without an effective
international mechanism to control the transfer of important military
technologies. Other multilateral control regimes set guidelines for
particular kinds of transfers (for example, certain transfers related to
missiles or weapons of mass destruction).
In the post-COCOM period, the United States dramatically liberalized
export controls.
A new COCOM-like agreement, under which national exports of certain
militarily useful goods and technologies are subject to international
agreement, would enhance efforts to restrict technology transfers. The
United States should seek to negotiate such a new arrangement.
#### ii. The expiration of the Export Administration Act in 1994 has left
export controls under different legislative authority that, among other
things, carries lesser penalties for export violations than those that can
be imposed under the Act.
Following the expiration of the Export Administration Act in 1994,
export controls on dual-use items have been continued under the provisions
of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. This law carries
significantly lesser penalties for criminal and civil violations of export
controls than those that applied under the Export Administration Act.
While the general criminal penalties of Title 18 of the U.S. Code may
be imposed under either scheme, administration of export controls would be
enhanced by a reauthorization of the Export Administration Act that would
restore more significant penalties for export control violations.
#### iii. U.S. policy changes announced in 1995 that reduced the time
available for national security agencies to consider export licenses need
to be reexamined in light of the volume and complexity of licensing
activities.
New procedures and deadlines for processing Commerce Department export
license applications instituted in late 1995 placed national security
agencies under significant time pressures.
Commerce officials alone are less likely to have the expertise for
identifying national security implications of exports of militarily useful
technologies. While national security agencies may be informed of
applications, due time is needed for their consideration.
However, the time frame for consideration is not always sufficient for
the Department of Defense to determine whether a license should be
granted, or if conditions should be imposed.
In addition, the Intelligence Community has sought a role earlier in
the licensing process in order to evaluate the technology and end
user.
#### B. Dividing the licensing responsibilities for satellites between the
Departments of Commerce and State permitted the loss of U.S. technology to
the PRC.
#### The 1996 decision to give Commerce the lead role in satellite
exporting was properly reversed by the Congress.
Divided jurisdiction between Commerce and State over satellite export
licensing has facilitated the loss of U.S. technology to the PRC.
While licensing authority regarding rockets has always remained with
the State Department, in 1992 certain aspects of satellite licensing were
transferred to Commerce.
For nearly a three-year period thereafter, Commerce licenses did not
require Department of Defense monitors for launch campaigns. Accordingly,
U.S. Government officials did not monitor several launches and launch
campaigns. Given the PRC's efforts at technology acquisition, it would be
surprising if the PRC did not attempt to exploit this situation.
In 1995, a Commerce Department official improperly authorized the
transfer, in the context of a launch failure investigation, of information
regarding rocket design that would almost certainly have been prevented
had the Department of State been consulted.
In October 1996, all remaining authority for commercial satellite
licensing was transferred to Commerce.
Legislation passed by Congress in 1998 eliminated the split
jurisdiction and assigned all licensing of satellite exports to the
Department of State.
#### C. U.S. policies relying on corporate self-policing to prevent
technology loss have not worked.
#### Corporate self-policing does not sufficiently account for the risks
posed by inherent conflicts of interest, and the lack of priority placed
on security in comparison to other corporate objectives.
To protect the national security interests of the United States, the
U.S. Government imposes substantial requirements on U.S. businesses
exporting technology to the PRC. These can include obtaining a license,
satisfying additional conditions imposed in the license, paying for U.S.
Government monitors, and providing security guards.
Under current policies, whether U.S. national security is in fact
protected from the loss of export-controlled information thus depends in
large part on the vigilance, good will, and efforts dedicated by business
to comply with lawful requirements.
Corporations may often face inherent conflicts of interest in complying
with U.S. export laws. Corporate interests that may conflict with
restricting exports as required by U.S. law include:
**ï¿½ Corporate goals to expand
overseas markets and to satisfy current or prospective customers**
**ï¿½ Urgent business priorities
that compete for the attention of corporate management**
**ï¿½ An unwillingness to devote
the financial resources necessary for effective
security**
Protecting the national security interest simply may not be related to
improving a corporation's "bottom line."
In cases discussed later in this Report, two U.S. satellite
manufacturers, Hughes and Loral, failed to live by the requirements of
U.S. law. The failure of Hughes to obtain legally required licenses, for
example, reflects a deliberate decision to assist the PRC immediately,
rather than risk the possibility that a license application would be
delayed or rejected.
Such pressures may be great where important commercial opportunities or
relationships may seem to a corporation to be at stake.
U.S. policies relying on corporate self-policing to prevent technology
loss have not sufficiently accounted for the risks posed by inherent
conflicts of interest, and by the lack of priority placed on dedicating
resources to security in comparison to other corporate objectives.
#### D. The PRC requires high performance computers (HPCs) for the design,
modeling, testing, and maintenance of advanced nuclear weapons based on
the nuclear weapons design information stolen from the United States.
#### The United States relaxed restrictions on HPC sales in 1996; and the
United States has no effective way to verify that HPC purchases
reportedly made for commercial purposes are not diverted to military
uses.
#### The Select Committee judges that the PRC has in fact used HPCs to
perform nuclear weapons applications.
PRC research institutes with connections to PLA military industries
have access to numerous U.S.-built HPCs that could be used for unlawful
military applications. HPCs are important for many military applications,
and essential for some.
One key concern is diversion of U.S. HPCs to the PRC's nuclear weapons
program. If the PRC complies with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, then
its need for HPCs to design, weaponize, deploy, and maintain nuclear
weapons will be greater than that of any other nation possessing nuclear
weapons, according to the Department of Energy.
HPCs are useful for two-dimensional and critical to three-dimensional
computer modeling that would be necessary for the PRC to develop, modify,
and maintain its nuclear weapons in the absence of physical testing.
The utility of nuclear weapons computer modeling depends on the amount
of data available from actual nuclear weapons tests, the computing
capacity that is available, and programmer expertise. For this reason, in
the judgment of the Select Committee, the PRC has targeted U.S. nuclear
test data for espionage collection, which, if successful, would reduce its
HPC performance requirements.
Complete three-dimensional models, critical to stockpile maintenance
and assessment of the effect of major warhead modifications in the absence
of physical testing, require HPCs of one million MTOPS (millions of
theoretical operations-per-second, a measure of computer performance and
speed) or more. Assessing the effects of a new warhead without testing
would require three-dimensional modeling.
Although the precise utility of HPCs in the 2,000 to 10,000 MTOPS range
for two-dimensional modeling is unclear, these HPCs may be powerful enough
to help the PRC incorporate nuclear weapons design information that it
stole from the U.S. into delivery systems without further testing.
**In fact, the Select Committee
judges that the PRC has been using HPCs for nuclear weapons applications.
**The illegal diversion of HPCs for the benefit of the PRC military is
facilitated by the lack of effective post-sale verifications of the
locations and purposes for which the computers are being used. HPC
diversion for PRC military use is also facilitated by the steady
relaxation of U.S. export controls over sales of HPCs.
Until 1998, there was no verification of the end uses of HPCs in the
PRC. Modest verification procedures were announced in June 1998, but even
if these are implemented fully, they will be insufficient.
Over the past several years, U.S. export controls on the sale of HPCs
to the PRC have been steadily relaxed. As a result, while the PRC had
virtually no HPCs in 1996, the PRC had over 600 U.S.-origin HPCs at the
end of 1998.
The PRC has demonstrated the capability to assemble an HPC using
U.S.-origin microprocessors. The Select Committee has concluded, however,
that the PRC has virtually no indigenous high-end computer production
capability. Moreover, while the PRC might attempt to perform some HPC
functions by other means, these computer work-arounds remain difficult and
imperfect.
Data from the Commerce Department and Defense Department indicate that
HPCs from the United States have been obtained by PRC organizations
involved in the research and development of:
**ï¿½ Missiles**
**ï¿½ Satellites**
**ï¿½ Spacecraft**
**ï¿½ Submarines**
**ï¿½ Aircraft**
**ï¿½ Military systems
components**
**ï¿½ Command and control**
**ï¿½ Communications**
**ï¿½ Microwave and laser
sensors**
Given the lack of an effective verification regime, it is possible that
these HPCs have been diverted for military uses, which could include the
following:
**ï¿½ Incorporating or adapting
nuclear weapons designs**
**ï¿½ Upgrading and maintaining
nuclear and chemical weapons**
**ï¿½ Equipping mobile forces with
high-technology weapons**
**ï¿½ Building a modern fleet of
combat and combat support aircraft and submarines**
**ï¿½ Conducting anti-submarine
warfare**
**ï¿½ Developing a reliable,
accurate ballistic and cruise missile force**
**ï¿½ Equalizing a battlefield with
electronic or information warfare**
**ï¿½ Improving command, control,
communications, and intelligence capabilities**
Finally, the Select Committee judges that nuclear testing data and
related computer codes are a target of PRC espionage, and that the PRC's
nuclear weapons programs would benefit from the illegal acquisition of
such information.
In conjunction with such data and codes, HPCs can be used to improve
nuclear weapons designs, performance, modeling, and nuclear stockpile
maintenance that would otherwise be extremely difficult or impossible
given the restrictions imposed by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
#### E. The PRC has attempted to obtain U.S. machine tools and jet engine
technologies through fraud and diversions fromcommercial end uses.
#### In one 1991 case studied by the Select Committee, the Department of
Commerce decontrolled jet engines without consulting either the Defense
Department or the State Department.
**i. In 1994 and 1995 the PRC attempted to divert an export of machine
tools by McDonnell Douglas to military uses.**
The Select Committee's classified Report includes significantly more
detail on this subject than this unclassified version. The Justice
Department has requested that the Select Committee not disclose the
details of much of its investigation into these matters to protect the
Justice Department's prosecution of the China National Aero-Technology
Import/Export Corporation (CATIC) and McDonnell Douglas.
**ii. In 1991 the Commerce Department decontrolled Garrett jet engines
without consulting either the Defense Department or the State
Department.**
**This led to a PRC effort to acquire related jet engine production
technology. The Commerce Department was prepared to approve this transfer,
which was only thwarted when the Defense Department was alerted by the
U.S. Embassy in Beijing.**
See the chapters *High Performance Computers, U.S. Export Policy
Toward the PRC, and Manufacturing Processes* for a more detailed
discussion of the Select Committee's investigation of these matters.
The PRC has vigorously pursued over the last two decades the
acquisition of foreign military technologies. These efforts represent the
official policy of the PRC and its Chinese Communist Party leadership. The
PRC seeks foreign military technology as part of its efforts to place the
PRC at the forefront of nations and to enable the PRC to fulfill its
international agenda. The PRC's long-run geopolitical goals include
incorporating Taiwan into the PRC and becoming the primary power in
Asia.
The PRC has not ruled out using force against Taiwan, and its thefts of
U.S. technology have enhanced its military capabilities for any such use
of force.
The PRC has also asserted territorial claims against other Southeast
Asian nations and Japan, and has used its military forces as leverage in
asserting these claims.
These PRC goals conflict with current U.S. interests in Asia and the
Pacific, and the possibility of a U.S.-PRC confrontation cannot be
dismissed.
#### A. The PRC has mounted a widespread effort to obtain U.S. military
technologies by any means - legal or illegal.
#### These pervasive efforts pose a particularly significant threat to U.S.
export control and counterintelligence efforts.
The PRC seeks military-related technology through a broad range of
activities that complicate U.S. counterintelligence efforts.
Many of these efforts are less centralized than was the case with those
of the Soviet Union. The number of PRC nationals who seek access to U.S.
technology is much greater than the number of persons who sought similar
kinds of information for the Soviet Union.
**The Select Committee has
determined that the Intelligence Community is insufficiently focused on
the threat posed by PRC intelligence and the targeted effort to obtain
militarily useful technology from the United States.** Due to our
sustained focus on the Soviet Union during the Cold War, intelligence
collection against the PRC was not a top priority for our intelligence
agencies in those years.
For the last several years, the U.S. Intelligence Community has begun
to place a greater priority on the PRC. Nonetheless, the Intelligence
Community lacks sufficient Chinese linguists and needs increased resources
to address the challenge posed by the PRC's intelligence collection
efforts.
The FBI has inadequate resources in light of the extensive numbers of
PRC visitors, students, diplomats, business representatives, and others
who may be involved in intelligence and military-related technology
transfer operations in the United States.
#### B. Efforts to deny the PRC access to U.S. military technology are
complicated by the broad range of items in which the PRC is interested,
and by transfers to the PRC of Russian military and dual-use technologies,
which may make the consequences of the PRC's thefts of U.S. technology
more severe.
The PRC seeks and has acquired from the United States and elsewhere a
broad range of military and related technologies.
Russia, for example, has provided the PRC with extensive military
assistance and related technologies, including a number of complete
military systems. The Select Committee has been advised that the sheer
number of transfers of military equipment and technology to the PRC from
Russia, most of which have been a product of dramatically increased
PRC-Russian military cooperation since 1992, is vastly greater than the
number of transfers from the United States, most of which are the result
of PRC espionage.
Together, the added capabilities that the PRC has gained and continues
to gain from foreign sources makes it difficult to assess how quickly the
PRC will be able to make full use of any systems or technologies stolen
from the United States. For example, the PRC's reported acquisition of
solid-fuel and mobile missile launcher technologies, if successfully
combined with stolen U.S. nuclear design information, will enable the PRC
to field a robust road-mobile, intercontinental ballistic missile threat
to the United States sooner than would otherwise have been possible.
#### C. The PRC uses commercial and political contacts to advance its
efforts to obtain U.S. military, as well as commercial,
technology.
The PRC has adopted policies in recent years aimed at increasing its
influence within the United States in order to increase access to U.S.
military, as well as commercial, technology.
To this end, the PRC has used access to its markets to induce U.S.
business interests to provide military-related technology.
The PRC also uses access to its markets to induce U.S. businesses to
lobby in behalf of common goals, such as liberalized export standards and
practices.
Agents tied to the PRC's military industries who have illegally
provided political contributions may have used these contributions to gain
access to U.S. military and commercial technology.
#### D. The PRC has proliferated nuclear, missile, and space-related
technologies to a number of countries.
The PRC is one of the leading proliferators of complete ballistic
missile systems and missile components in the world.
The PRC has sold complete ballistic missile systems, for example, to
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, and missile components to a number of countries
including Iran and Pakistan. The PRC has proliferated military technology
to Iran, Pakistan, and North Korea.
In 1991, the PRC agreed to adhere to the April 1987 Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines, but the PRC has not accepted the
revisions to those guidelines issued in 1993. The 1993 MTCR guidelines
increase the kinds of missile systems subject to controls and call for a
"strong presumption to deny" both sales of complete missile systems and
components that could be used in ballistic missiles.
The PRC has provided, or is providing, assistance to the missile and
space programs of a number of countries according to the Congressional
Research Service. These countries include, but are not limited to:
**ï¿½ Iran. **The PRC has
provided Iran with ballistic missile technology, including guidance
components and the recent transfer of telemetry equipment. The PRC
reportedly is providing Iran with solid-propellant missile technology.
Additionally, the PRC provided Iran with the 95-mile range CSS-8
ballistic missile. Since the mid-1980s, the PRC has transferred C-802
anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran. The PRC has also provided assistance
to Iran's nuclear programs.
**ï¿½ Pakistan.** The PRC has
provided Pakistan with a wide range of assistance. The PRC reportedly
supplied Pakistan with CSS-X-7/M-11 mobile missile launchers and
reportedly has provided Pakistan with the facilities necessary to
produce M-11 missiles. The PRC provides Pakistan with assistance on
uranium enrichment, ring magnets, and other technologies that could be
used in Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
**ï¿½ Saudi Arabia.** The PRC
provided a complete CSS-2 missile system to Saudi Arabia in 1987. The
conventionally-armed missile has a range of 1,200 to 1,900 miles.
**ï¿½ North Korea. **The Select
Committee judges that the PRC has assisted weapons and military-related
programs in North Korea.
The Select Committee is aware of information of further PRC
proliferation of missile and space technology that the Clinton
administration has determined cannot be publicly disclosed without
affecting national security.
See the chapter *PRC Acquisition of U.S. Technology* for more
detailed discussion of the Select Committee's investigation of these
matters.
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