

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Saturday, January 12, 1991

The House met at 9 a.m.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

On this day, O God, we express our thoughts and feelings in prayers for peace together with the multitudes of people from all across our land and from many lands. From every background and with different voices together we pray: O God of Life, protect all life, O God of peace, grant us peace.

We specially remember, O God, the men and women of the Armed Forces who serve so far from home and family. We remember too the diplomats on every side who seek ways to avoid the anguish of conflict and who search to know the foundation for justice.

May Your good spirit, O gracious and loving God, that transcends all the barriers that are placed between nations, encourage all people of good will, so Your gift of peace will be our heritage and our treasure.

Bless us, O God, this day and every day. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1, rule I, I demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the Chair's approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 286, nays 92, not voting 56, as follows:

[Roll No. 6]

YEAS—286

Abercrombie	Anthony	Barton
Ackerman	Applegate	Bateman
Alexander	Archer	Bennett
Anderson	Aspin	Bereuter
Andrews (ME)	Atkins	Berman
Andrews (NJ)	Bacchus	Bevill
Andrews (TX)	Barnard	Billirakis
Annunzio	Bartlett	Bliley

Boehner	Harris	Olin
Bonior	Hatcher	Orton
Borski	Hefner	Owens (UT)
Boucher	Henry	Oxley
Boxer	Hertel	Packard
Brewster	Hochbrueckner	Pallone
Brooks	Horn	Panetta
Broomfield	Horton	Parker
Browder	Houghton	Patterson
Brown	Hoyer	Payne (NJ)
Bruce	Hubbard	Payne (VA)
Bryant	Huckaby	Pelosi
Bustamante	Hughes	Perkins
Byron	Jacobs	Peterson (FL)
Callahan	Jefferson	Peterson (MN)
Campbell (CO)	Jenkins	Petri
Cardin	Johnson (CT)	Pickett
Carr	Johnson (SD)	Pickle
Chlinger	Johnston	Porter
Coleman (MO)	Jones (GA)	Poshard
Collins (IL)	Jontz	Price
Combest	Kanjorski	Purcell
Conte	Kaptur	Quillen
Cooper	Kasich	Rahall
Costello	Kennedy	Ramstad
Cox (IL)	Kennelly	Rangel
Cramer	Kildee	Ravenel
Cunningham	Kleczka	Reed
Darden	Klug	Richardson
Davis	Kolter	Rinaldo
de la Garza	Kopetski	Roe
DeFazio	Kostmayer	Roemer
DeLauro	LaFalce	Rose
DeLay	Lancaster	Roth
Dellums	Lantos	Rowland
Derrick	LaRocco	Roybal
Dingell	Laughlin	Russo
Dooley	Lehman (CA)	Sabo
Dorgan (ND)	Lehman (FL)	Sanders
Downey	Lent	Sangmeister
Dreier	Levin (MI)	Sarpalius
Duncan	Levine (CA)	Sawyer
Durbin	Lewis (GA)	Scheuer
Dwyer	Lipinski	Schiff
Early	Livingston	Schulze
Eckart	Long	Schumer
Edwards (CA)	Lowey (NY)	Serrano
Edwards (OK)	Lukens	Sharp
Edwards (TX)	Madigan	Shaw
Emerson	Markley	Shuster
Engel	Matsui	Sisisky
English	Mavroules	Skaggs
Erdreich	Mazzoli	Skeen
Espy	McCollum	Skelton
Evans	McCrery	Slaughter (NY)
Fascell	McCurdy	Slaughter (VA)
Fazio	McDade	Smith (FL)
Fields	McDermott	Smith (IA)
Fish	McEwen	Smith (NJ)
Foglietta	McMillan (NC)	Snowe
Frank (MA)	McMillen (MD)	Solarz
Franks (CT)	McNulty	Spence
Frost	Meyers	Staggers
Gallo	Mfume	Stallings
Gaydos	Michel	Stenholm
Gejdenson	Miller (CA)	Stokes
Gephardt	Mineta	Studds
Geren	Mink	Swett
Gibbons	Mollohan	Swift
Gillmor	Montgomery	Synar
Gilman	Moody	Tallion
Glickman	Moran	Tanner
Gonzalez	Morrison	Taylor (MS)
Gordon	Mrazek	Thomas (GA)
Gradison	Murtha	Torricelli
Grandy	Myers	Towns
Gray	Nagle	Trafficant
Green	Natcher	Traxler
Guarini	Neal (MA)	Unsold
Hall (OH)	Neal (NC)	Viscosky
Hall (TX)	Nichols	Volkmer
Hamilton	Nowak	Walsh
Hammerschmidt	Oakar	Wheat
Hansen	Oberstar	Whitten
	Obey	Williams

Wilson	Wyden	Yatron
Wise	Wyllie	
Wolpe	Yates	

NAYS—92

Allard	Holloway	Rogers
Armey	Hopkins	Rohrabacher
Baker	Hunter	Ros-Lehtinen
Ballenger	Hyde	Roukema
Barrett	Inhofe	Santorum
Bentley	Ireland	Saxton
Boehlert	James	Schaefer
Bunning	Kolbe	Schroeder
Burton	Kyl	Sensenbrenner
Camp	Lagomarsino	Shays
Campbell (CA)	Leach	Sikorski
Chandler	Lewis (CA)	Smith (OR)
Clay	Lewis (FL)	Smith (TX)
Coble	Lightfoot	Solomon
Coughlin	Lowery (CA)	Stearns
Dannemeyer	Machtley	Stump
Dickinson	Marlenee	Sundquist
Doolittle	Martin	Taylor (NC)
Dornan (CA)	McCandless	Thomas (CA)
Fawell	McGrath	Thomas (WY)
Galleghy	Miller (OH)	Upton
Gekas	Miller (WA)	Vucanovich
Gilchrest	Molinar	Walker
Gingrich	Moorhead	Weber
Goodling	Morella	Weldon
Goss	Murphy	Wolf
Hastert	Nussle	Young (AK)
Hayes (IL)	Paxon	Young (FL)
Hefley	Regula	Zeliff
Herger	Rhodes	Zimmer
Hobson	Riggs	

NOT VOTING—56

AuCoin	Ford (MI)	Ritter
Bellenson	Ford (TN)	Roberts
Billbray	Hancock	Rostenkowski
Carper	Hayes (LA)	Savage
Chapman	Hoagland	Slattery
Clement	Hutto	Spratt
Coleman (TX)	Jones (NC)	Stark
Collins (MI)	Lloyd	Tauzin
Condit	Manton	Thornton
Conyers	Martinez	Torres
Cox (CA)	McCloskey	Udall
Coyne	McHugh	Valentine
Crane	Moakley	Vander Jagt
Dicks	Ortiz	Vento
Dixon	Owens (NY)	Washington
Donnelly	Pease	Waters
Dymally	Penny	Waxman
Feighan	Ray	Weiss
Flake	Ridge	

□ 0933

Mr. PAXON changed his vote from "present" to "nay."

So the Journal was approved.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MAZZOLI). The Chair would ask the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA] to lead the House in the Pledge of Allegiance.

Mr. PANETTA led the Pledge of Allegiance as follows:

I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

EXPRESSING SENSE OF CONGRESS THAT CONGRESS MUST APPROVE ANY OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST IRAQ

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 27, it is now in order to consider the concurrent resolution printed in section 1 of House Report 102-1 by, and if offered by, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] or the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] or their designee.

For what purpose does the gentleman from Florida rise?

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, on my behalf and on behalf of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] and some 80 cosponsors, I offer House Concurrent Resolution No. 32.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the concurrent resolution.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 32

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring)

SECTION 1. URGENCY OF CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY FOR OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

The Congress finds that the Constitution of the United States vests all power to declare war in the Congress of the United States. Any offensive action taken against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the Congress of the United States before such action may be initiated.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] will be recognized for 30 minutes and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes. Is there a Member opposed to the resolution?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Therefore, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] will be recognized for 30 minutes in opposition.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT].

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 5 minutes, and the rest of the time I will leave in the hands of the cosponsor of the resolution, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN].

Mr. Speaker, this is a day for courage. There are all different kinds of courage. Courage is intertwined with one's responsibility. Those who have been in Saudi Arabia and talked to the soldiers there, on the precipice and on the eve of battle, have encountered people who experience the most travailing part of military life. That is, the expectancy that in the very near future they will go to combat.

They have been interviewed, and they have shown remarkable courage. We are glad of that. As an ex-infantry soldier man myself, I want to tell Members that they could not have told citizens anything else than what they said. They are "ready to go to war, and

we are hopeful that if the war comes forward, it gets over with if it is going to be." They could not really say, "Mr. Congressman, have you exercised your part of courage? You have a responsibility. You are elected by the American people to make a decision about war and peace. I was not elected. I am just a soldier, but you were elected."

Is not this your time for courage? Is not this your time, Mr. President and Mr. Secretary of State, instead of saying as the Secretary of State has said, "not one inch will we give in diplomacy, we will tell you what you will do, and you will give in to us." Is that diplomacy?

Are there things that could be done? Obviously there are things that could be done. There are things that are of interest to both sides, of interest to our side of this difficulty and on the other side of this difficulty. Among the things that could be done, and the ones that come to my mind immediately are that there are border disputes between Iraq, between Kuwait. Perhaps some arrangement could be made that they could be handled by the World Court.

I will tell Members what I think about it. I do not care whether I have the attention of Members or not. If Members like it, fine. If they do not, they do not have to like it.

The resolution before Members now is one all Members can vote for because it is just a resolution to say that Congress is going to stand up and uphold the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution says that the Congress is a warmaking power of the public, and we must do that. That is as important, almost, as this question of whether we are going to war or not. Members can vote for all of the resolutions, or Members can vote for the Bennett-Durbin resolution, and vote for either one or the other: the Republican one, or the bicameral one, is one which does not sustain that point of view, but it does not repudiate it.

□ 0940

But you can vote the Bennett-Durbin resolution and also vote for the other resolutions, so it is not inconsistent. I want to make that point clear to you, but I do want to say something else about what is before us, because I think the overall issue before us is the sort of thing that we should carry in our hearts.

We do not have to be reelected. When I first came to Congress, I wore a ribbon, the Silver Star. I did it partly as an apology for being crippled. I have not been wearing it recently. I am not quite sure why I am not wearing it, but I do know this, that when I was given that, I was given that with a citation that said "Gallantry in Action."

Friends, there is no such thing as gallantry in action. I do not want to run down anybody else's award, but action, military action, is a horrible ex-

perience. There is no gallantry in it. There is no beauty in it. It is a horrible experience.

It is up to us in Congress to bite the bullet ourselves and to do something about seeing to it that peace and security can be secured for the benefit of everybody, and it can be done.

There are things that are unmentionable, things that cannot be linked, for instance. It antagonizes a lot of people, but the world knows that if this war ends the way it is now going, we are going to have a worse war in the future, a much worse war which may last for thousands of years.

So this question of settling the Palestine problem, protecting Israel in its boundaries and things like that are things that can be met. That takes courage, because it can defeat us to do anything about it, but that is why we were elected. We were elected to make this kind of decision. We were not elected to stay here forever. We were not elected for our salaries. We were elected to take the responsible position of Government when the opportunity comes to take it. That is what we are not doing unless we have some way to see to it that this process of trying to find a solution to this, other than combat, takes place. That is our responsibility. That is the courage that we must show today and this is the place it has to be. It is not in Saudi Arabia. It is here in Washington, DC, in this Chamber today.

So you must decide in your life. This may be the most important point in my entire life. This is a decision which we must make.

I am 80 years of age. I have been in this Chamber 43 years. Out of the 17,000 votes I have cast, the only one I really regret is the one which I cast for the Bay of Tonkin resolution. I particularly regret it, because I knew it was a declaration of war, and just as is the Solarz measure before us today. It is a declaration of war, and if you pass it, you make compliance with the things I am now asking you to vote for.

I have not spoken very eloquently from the standpoint of using good words, but I have spoken courageously and I think that is what we have to do today. We have to speak courageously. That does not mean to say that if you take an opposite position from what I take, that you are not courageous, but it means that the vote ought to be cast on the basis of what you think is best for our country, not best for the Democratic or Republican Party, not best for the President, not best for you, but what is best for our country and what is best for the world.

So take that in your hearts. Hold it close to you and realize this is a tremendously important opportunity you have here today, and cast your vote on that basis.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OBEY). Before the debate resumes, the Chair will simply say that the Chair knows in the normal course of events we have at least a low murmur going on around the House. That is not especially harmful, but on an occasion like this the Chair is going to be more rigid than normal because of the seriousness of the occasion and because every Member feels this issue so deeply and feels that he or she has the right to be heard without the accompanying tension of wondering whether or not he or she is being heard. So the Chair asks for the cooperation of the House, and if you want to engage in the normal collegial conversation, the Chair will ask you to please leave.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, it is extremely difficult to disagree with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT]. He is one of the most beloved and respected people in the world, much less in this body, and it is extremely difficult to vote against something that is so important to him, and frankly, I do not think the world will stop spinning on its axis if this bill passes, because I think what it does is subsumed into the Solarz resolution, so its mandate is accomplished if the Solarz resolution passes.

But frankly, we are passing laws. We are not voting approval or affection or esteem for anybody. We are passing laws for the country. That is why I cannot vote for this bill.

What we do here today cannot change the Constitution, what it means, what it says, what it does. We can express our views on it, of course, but we cannot change it.

I suggest to you there are some distinctions that need to be made in the Bennett-Durbin bill that are not made.

It requires that any offensive action taken against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the Congress. The distinction between offensive action and defensive action is crucial.

I would suggest to you that a very good case, one that I believe and accept, can be made that our situation in the gulf is not offensive action, that the war was started when international law was flouted by Iraq when they occupied Kuwait. They broke the U.N. Charter. They have violated international law and therefore only in the most tactical sense can our response to that be offensive, but in a legal and strategic sense I suggest it is not offensive, but defense.

Now, as to declaring war and making war, there are distinctions of which history gives us many examples but I think that to vote for the Bennett resolution, however much one would like to, muddies the waters; but in any event, it does not achieve anything because the Solarz resolution is an explicit request from this Congress for

the authority that the Bennett resolution says the President must get.

Now, so much for that.

Mr. Speaker, this is a soul wrenching issue, the whole issue that we are dealing with today and yesterday. Despite the fact that it has been overwhelmed by speeches, it is nonetheless a soul wrenching issue.

I heard the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. JOHN LEWIS, recite the great spiritual, "Ain't gonna study war no more." No one can ever hear that without being gripped, being gripped in the soul, but you know, "if men were angels," Madison said, there would be no need for government. If men were angels, there would be no need for West Point or Annapolis and the Air Force Academy.

□ 0950

But our freedom has been won by men who did study war and who defended it and are still willing to defend it.

I do not think we should be less than proud of them.

William Bullitt, our first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, appointed by President Roosevelt, said:

To beat our swords into plowshares while the spiritual descendants of Genghis Khan stalk the Earth is to die and leave no descendants.

What he said then is true today. Important vote? Yes. This is a very important vote.

And I can remember in my 16 years in this Chamber some important votes. I remember my first year here, I sat in the back of the Chamber at 2 o'clock in the morning and we were debating cutting off all funds from the army of the Republic of Vietnam. We had gotten out and now the question was would we permit them to defend themselves against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese? We cut out every dime. We did not give them anything. And I remember that.

I thought that was an important vote, and I remember John Conlan, a Member from Arizona, standing here and saying, "My God, it is Dunkirk over there." But this body was unmoved. We cut out every nickel to defend South Vietnam after we had decided it was too costly—and it may well have been.

But when the issue was defending themselves, we were not there—we turned our back.

The result was boat people, reeducation camps, Pol Pot; not a heck of a lot of moral dividends from that.

And some of the same voices that have been arguing against supporting the President here, I remember them arguing against our deployment in 1983 of intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe, they were shaken when the Soviets walked out of the arms control talks, and they charged we were bringing our country to the brink of nuclear

war. They were adamantly opposed to it. But we hung tough, we followed through, and the result was an INF Treaty.

We have been told by people opposed to the President that war should be a last resort, not the first resort. I can agree with that. But this invasion was on August 2; since then there have been 12 United Nations resolutions. I do not think we need 24 United Nations resolutions. How many diplomatic initiatives are enough?

I wonder if ever there is a time for us to take a stand. I wonder if this is not our foreign policy Midgetman, always the next weapon, always something around the corner and down the street, but never here and never now.

Is this struggle about democracy? No.

Is this struggle about restoring the emir to the throne of Kuwait? No.

What is it about? It is about aggression, something we have seen quite enough of in this century. It is about the rule of law. It is about resisting brutal conquest, lawlessness, international banditry; it is about law and order in the world, the kind of a world we and our grandchildren want to inhabit and want to inherit now that the Communist house of cards has fallen.

It is about collective security. We have reached an historical breakthrough, an unprecedented standing together of 27 nations. It is about whether we as the last superpower left standing will step up to the terrible, awesome responsibilities of world leadership.

Something else I remember, and I know my friend Mr. BENNETT remembers it and so does Mr. GIBBONS, and that is the Great Depression of the 1930's. I remember that.

Boy, I remember when unemployment was not 4 or 5 percent, it was 24.9 percent. Hunger, joblessness, cold, frustration, despair; but they were orderly suffering people in those days. They waited in line for their bowl of soup then.

This next depression, if it hits this country, there will be broken glass. There will not be an orderly group of hungry Americans, cold Americans. It will be chaos.

So need we be embarrassed about worrying about a worldwide depression? Do we need to apologize about that? I do not think so. I do not think so.

Giving Saddam Hussein a stranglehold on the jugular vein of the world's economy is something I think we ought to think about, because a worldwide depression will inevitably result.

But there are other reasons, perhaps more salient, for supporting the President.

Nuclear proliferation: How many of us are terrorized by the thought that more and more countries are joining the nuclear club? Does anybody doubt

for a second that Saddam Hussein is working to get a nuclear weapon and that he will use it?

Biological warfare: You can carry in your hands enough anthrax to destroy a whole metropolitan area, and you can smuggle it in in diplomatic pouches.

Chemical warfare: He has destroyed over 5,000 of his own people, not to mention Iranians by using it on them.

That is what Saddam Hussein is. Those are reasons to stand tough.

So much in this century the American people have sacrificed their treasure, their blood, to beat down the dictators, tear down the walls, defend human dignity. But I will tell you there is no such thing as a risk-free foreign policy.

Do you think Perez de Cuellar can talk Saddam Hussein out of his weapons of mass destruction without the credible threat of military force?

The Solarz resolution provides credibility that the United States and the United Nations must have if we are going to avoid war.

This infusion of credibility is needed now, not 6 months from now. To abandon the U.N. resolution, to abandon the President now, erodes, undermines, subverts any credibility we might have.

It is backing down, it is retreat. It is like paying a blackmailer. When does it end? It never ends.

The heart of this argument really is not a denial that military force may be necessary; we all concede that. The argument is over when? Now or later should that authority be given?

What are the consequences of voting for Gephardt? Well, we will shatter into a thousand pieces our influence in the Middle East and in the world. But support of the United Nations and the President will put us in an unprecedented position to help share peaceful settlements in the whole region.

Think of the influence we will have in trying to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli issue, which is looming like a brooding omnipresence over this whole area.

Think of the leverage and the prestige that we will have if we succeed. If we fail, I am afraid all is lost. Backing down not only strengthens Saddam Hussein, it encourages all of the embryonic Saddam Hussein's throughout the world. It shatters the brittle coalition.

Let me tell you, a coalition made up of Iran and Syria, Jordan, not to say the Saudis and Egypt, is miraculous and brittle. We have to keep it together.

Please do not forget, Saddam Hussein does not care what happens to his civilian population.

But the tragedy and the irony of all this is that we do this at precisely the time when the world is looking to America for leadership, at a time when the newly freed people of central and

Eastern Europe are joyfully acknowledging the success of American policies, which regrettably many of the same opponents of the President's gulf policy once rejected, and at the precise time when the countries' representatives at the Security Council are more confident of America's ability to act for good, for peace, for freedom, for human dignity than ever before.

Now let me speak on the virtue of prudence. No one should blithely assume that anyone goes to war lightly. It is sheer demagoguery to suggest the President has mindlessly locked himself into a macho confrontation in which he is prepared to resolve at the cost of American lives.

The moral traditions of the West which emanate from the philosophy of the Greeks and Jewish and Christian theology has emphasized, for three millennia, that the supreme virtue in all policies is prudence, prudence. It is not a question of splitting the differences between opposed moral positions. It is the moral skill of applying our principles to messy human situations so that the maximum good is obtained in complicated circumstances.

Prudence ought to tell us something about our current choices, none of which are pleasant and few of which are satisfactory.

Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait is part of a larger strategy of intimidation and coercion that poses grave threats to peace in the Middle East and to the legitimate security interests of the United States; not Germany, not Japan, not Saudi Arabia, but the United States.

His arsenal is offensive, it grotesquely exceeds what he needs to defend Iraq, and it has one purpose: intimidation, coercion in the service of tyranny.

Should Saddam successfully intimidate and coerce the United States and the United Nations, and anything less than Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait will be a success for him, we may be sure that we will be faced with even more terrible choices in 2 years, 3 years, 5 years, or 10 more years.

May I say to my friends we have such limited time. If there is time at the end, I would be delighted to engage in a dialog, but I cannot now.

□ 1000

Using military force versus Iraq is not going to be easy or pleasant, but it will be far more dangerous, far more difficult and far more costly in lives in the future. Prudence should teach us that now is the time to check the aggression of this ruthless dictator whose troops have bayoneted pregnant women and have ripped babies from their incubators in Kuwait.

My friends, the spiritual descendants of Genghis Khan still stalk the Earth in Baghdad, in Vilnius, Lithuania, in

Afghanistan, in North Korea, in Cambodia, and they do not respond to plowshares.

St. Augustine, who died in the year 430, had a great prayer. He said, "O God, make me chaste, but not now." The Gephardt resolution says to Iraq, "Get out of Kuwait, but not now, not now."

It has been said that democracy is always 2 years behind the tyrant, and that was certainly true in World War II. The result: 50 million people, 50 million people around the world died as a result of World War II, the most avoidable war in history had we stood firm at that time.

We can today, here, make this democracy's finest hour by standing up to the awesome responsibility of world leadership. The consequences are immense. Today the debate will finish, and the decision is here.

Support Solarz-Michel.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I think the debate we are having here on this measure is terribly important. It goes right to our historical root and what a democracy is all about. Our forefathers and foremothers said,

There is nothing more sacred in the public trust than committing the young lives of your citizens and committing them to a war in which they may be killed.

Mr. Speaker, that is too much power for any person to have because indeed none of us are angels, and so what we are talking about here is reaffirming that very, very basic principle that we Americans should be so proud of that are in our Constitution.

We have heard so much about this debate, that this democratic debate must be giving Saddam Hussein comfort. No, it is not giving him comfort. He must be terrorized. His people see this kind of debate and say, "There's a country that's powerful enough to allow people to criticize some of the administration's policies and not get shot." His people may want a parliament. Imagine such a thing. That would not make him feel good at all.

We know that seeing our democracy operate in a constitutional manner, as it has in many other ways, allowed Eastern Europe, the people of Eastern Europe, to finally get the same dream and the same idea and have it.

I think this debate is so healthy, so important, and I think it is going to help all over the Middle East to see how a democracy really functions, and I certainly hope this body votes for the Bennett-Durbin resolution. Our forefathers and foremothers would be shocked to know that they fought for

200 years for this principle and to think that this body would waffle and walk away from it. This is the absolute root of our foundation. If we defer on this, we count for nothing.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURPHY].

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN].

Mr. Speaker, we have had 2 days and 2 nights of debate on the resolution, whether or not we should authorize the President to enter into a military conflict, and we will have more of that debate as the day progresses. I would like to, however, address my brief remarks in support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I think we have come to the floor this week because we believe that the Constitution of the United States stands above the President. It stands above Congress, it is the rule in which we all must live, and for several months now our President has acted as though he were not guided by that Constitution, that he could establish deadlines, that he could declare war, that he could move massive amounts of military might around the world without the consent of the people.

Mr. Speaker, we may not be all the people, but we are responsible to them every 2 years. The people send us here. The people are calling our offices, the people are seeing us as we return home on our streets and in our neighborhoods, and they are telling us what they want.

It is extremely important that today we establish the policy that the Bennett-Durbin resolution brings and that the President accepts that policy that no war should ever be entered into without the consent of the American people through their elected Congress.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Speaker, this is not a vote about whether we support the President in the Persian Gulf. It is a vote about what each of us thinks is our responsibility as Members of Congress.

The Constitution has been very clear over the warmaking authority of the Congress. Yes, Presidents in the past, both Republican and Democrat, have conveniently ignored it in Grenada, in Vietnam, and Panama. Had there not been overwhelming pressure from the American people, President Bush himself might have followed the same course in the Persian Gulf.

This resolution simply reaffirms first that the American people, through their elected Representatives, have the primary authority to declare war.

I ask my colleagues, "Can you imagine 400,000 Americans engaged in war without the American people having a say?"

Mr. Speaker, we have elected a President, not a monarch, not an emir. It is very clear the Constitution says that Congress has warmaking authority.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. COLLINS].

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, enough is enough.

The Constitution clearly, unequivocally gives Congress, and only Congress, the right to declare war. Once the war is declared, the President can wage the war. But only Congress can tell the President that the time has come when U.S. troops are to go into active combat.

Yet, President's are sometimes not satisfied with that division of power. In recent decades, time and time again, U.S. military force has been used without heed to the Constitution's distinctions. Although others have done so, none have violated the Constitution as flagrantly as Presidents Reagan and Bush. Does President Bush not remember the oath he took to uphold the Constitution?

On January 3, 1991, 535 Members of the House and Senate took the oath. I hold that oath sacred. I will do everything in my power to ensure that American citizens of the Chicago metropolitan area will not be short-changed in their representation in Congress. Among our most explicit and vital duties as Members of Congress is the power to be the sole arbiter in the question of whether to go to war. There is no chance that American blood should ever be spilled on foreign soil without our having decided that there was a good enough reason to do so or our having had the opportunity to prevent it.

No single man or woman should have such awesome power. To allow President Bush to dictate that we are to start war without being subject to Congress' determination on the question is to elevate him from President to monarch and, in many respects, to a god-like being. That is not only unconstitutional, but unconscionable as well.

The potential problems are showcased in the past. Vietnam was a morass of five presidents acting without authority from the Congress. In the early 1980's, President Reagan never asked us for permission to invade Grenada. He just did it. I still feel that it was one of the most unnecessary uses of power that could have been contrived. But try using that observation to console the families of those who died. What was done was done. Since Congress could do nothing about it after the fact, we must be on the case, to stop such frivolous military action before it occurs.

More recently, President Bush invaded Panama. Did he ask? Did he ever convince the Congress, the representatives of the people, that there was a strong enough need to march in and destroy? Of course not. Yet, such actions affect every American. They especially affected the dozens of American servicepeople who came back in body bags and the families of those people.

That must never happen again, and especially not now, in the Persian Gulf. The House must pass the Durbin-Bennett resolution today. To do otherwise would be to gift-wrap our powers and send them to the President. If we abandon this authority, will we next aban-

don our authority to appropriate Federal funds? What is the difference? In both cases, the Founding Fathers struck a sagacious balance of powers between our two branches of Government. To upset that balance would be to tamper with the fundamental fabric of our democracy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all my colleagues to support the Durbin-Bennett resolution for now and all times to come.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN].

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Speaker, let me repeat a verse that was given me by a rancher, that I used yesterday. His question was, "What's the hurry?"

The verse he gave me was: 10,000 men march off to fight when 40 statesmen call it right, but had the statesmen fought instead, their impatience would have cost but 40 dead."

What is the hurry? We are told today we must send a message to Saddam Hussein, and the message must in effect be a declaration of war, in order to demonstrate that this country in the middle of an economic crisis, is willing to borrow money to send our troops to shed American blood to protect what is largely our allies' oil supply.

Two points:

First of all, this country should never choose war until it has exhausted every effort for peace; and, second, Iraq has received a message. Saddam Hussein is now stopped. We have sent the message and it was received. Dealing with Iraq later, if we must, will not be dealing with a stronger Iraq. It will be dealing with a weaker Iraq because economic sanctions will and now are weakening Iraq.

So, what is the hurry? What is the rush, statesmen?

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLIETTA].

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

My colleagues, we make a lot of hard decisions in this Chamber.

Every day we make decisions that affect people, real people, flesh and blood. Decisions that affect poverty or prosperity, life or death.

But no decision is harder to make than that to authorize the President to send American men and women to fight a war.

It is our decision to make. That is what the Constitution says.

Little more than 200 years ago, a group of men sat in Independence Hall in Philadelphia—in my district—and wrote the foundation for this great land—the U.S. Constitution.

The administration speaks out of two sides of its mouth when it comes to interpreting the Constitution.

When it suits them, they are strict constitutionists. They say that you must look to the original intent. But

when it doesn't meet their purposes, they ignore the document and its original intent.

Here, the original intent is clear.

The Framers spoke loud and clear about this division of authority.

No single person should be saddled with the responsibility to send men and women to die.

All of us have been in our districts listening to our constituents. Their voices whisper in our ear as we make this decision this weekend.

Let the people be heard.

Vote to support the Bennett-Durbin Resolution.

□ 1010

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Speaker, this issue was not about nuclear and chemical and biological weapons; those weapons, the chemical and biological, as a reality, and the nuclear as a potential have been in Saddam Hussein's hands for a long time. They were in his hands when many of us in this House tried to impose sanctions against him and the Bush administration lobbied to kill them. And the Bush administration's stated policy now, as the gentleman from Illinois restated it, is that he should leave Kuwait, which would leave the nuclear and chemical weapons in his hands. They are the problems to be dealt with, but they are not the target of this administration's policy now, although they were in fact the beneficiaries of this administration's policy before.

Second, the gentleman said that democracy is certain to lag 2 years behind the tyrants. Not by my values. I celebrate democracy. I celebrate the fact that this Nation ought not to be able to make the most terrible decision that a society can make, to send its young people out to kill or be killed, which sometimes we have to do.

There is no pacifism here. This is not a case of Munich. Saudi Arabia is Czechoslovakia, if you want to use Munich, and we sent hundreds of thousands of troops with unanimity in this body to its defense. This is not Munich.

What we are talking about is, as the gentleman articulated it, should America take world leadership? That is what we take on ourselves, the burden of Americans dying, of Americans paying.

We have a multilateral force that consists of American soldiers and international cheerleaders. We have the Egyptians announcing that they will not go into Iraq. They will go into Kuwait, but if the Army goes the other way, they will not be there. We are being told by the President that America alone should take this burden on. Then the question is, who makes that decision?

We have heard it here, people saying, "Don't undermine America's policy."

What are we, the Canadian Consulate? This is part of America. This is where the elected Representatives of the American people sit, and that is why we need the Bennett-Durbin resolution, to do away with the notion that Presidential policy governs in the most terrible decision we can make on loss of life, destabilization of our economy, and commitment forever, apparently, to this "we will do it all" idea. That is why Congress has to vote, and that is why we owe the gentleman from Illinois and the gentleman from Florida thanks for letting us establish this important constitutional principle.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAZZOLI].

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I have just completed reading the book, "Miracle at Philadelphia," by Elizabeth Drinker Bowen. Anyone who would read that book about those fateful days in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787, would conclude that all the Members of this House really should support the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT] on this resolution. We should be the ones to declare offensive action.

Having said that, let me also suggest that I support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution because I do not know what the rush to war is all about. Why do we have to be bludgeoned into or rush into an affair that will clearly claim many American lives, the lives of men and women?

Is Saddam Hussein, for example, sailing up the Hudson River and about to lay siege to the World Trade Towers? Is he poised over in Clarksville, IN in LEE HAMILTON's district, about to come into Louisville, in my district? No, he is not. He has been stabilized.

This is not World War II. This is not Europe. This is not a situation where the world is silent and the world is asleep. The world is wide awake, and the world is vigilant. The world is poised to pounce upon this man if he fails to do the right thing and leave Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, let us give diplomacy a chance and let us give sanctions a chance. Then and only then, if we have to, should we move with military force.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished Marine general, BEN BLAZ, the gentleman from Guam, where America's day begins.

Mr. BLAZ. Mr. Speaker, it is difficult enough to speak on this issue today. It is tormenting to speak in apparent opposition to CHARLIE BENNETT and in support of Solarz-Michel, for there are very few people I admire more profoundly than I do my friend CHARLIE BENNETT.

If you are a foe of America, you would be distressed today, for it is ap-

parent that American resolve is being awakened. If you are a friend and a former critic of this House, you would be reassured, for the House has risen, with candor, without rancor, as it should rise, for the issue is overwhelmingly important. That message is enough.

Were we to stop today, we would be served and served well. But if we are speaking about messages, permit me, please, to sharpen the focus of the debate to a particular constituency of ours, the men and women in the Armed Forces of the United States. I yield to you and you and you on your messages to Saddam Hussein. I yield to you and you and you on your messages about politics and the economy. I give little ground to the kind of message that a soldier, sailor, Air Force man or Marine would like to hear.

In our history, World War II, because of American resolve, produced men of character such as CHARLIE BENNETT, because we were all one. In Korea we failed. We ended with a draw. I was there. I could not believe that I always had to seek permission to turn right or turn left. A draw for a soldier?

And in Vietnam we lost. That was worse. Not only did we have to seek permission, we could not shoot unless shot at. Good grief. That is committing the soldier to certain death.

In the interim years we had the All-Volunteer Force. We have devoted so much to giving them all that they need. And we applauded in this House, as they did everywhere else, when we sent them off in August. When we augmented them in September, we cheered, and when we sent reinforcements in October, we cheered.

Now we are saying, "Wait now." In effect, some of the messages are like saying, "Don't shoot unless you are shot at, and, by the way, before you shoot, call me collect."

Mr. Speaker, let me say this to my friends: I am as tormented as all of us, as all of you are. I had an opportunity to have a peaceful discussion with the President, one-on-one, on this issue.

□ 1020

He is a very tormented man as well.

But my friends, America did not seek to be the world's leader, it was thrust upon us. And it is the burden of leadership to lead.

We are not saying you must go to war. What we are saying is that if you have to fight, then you do not need to make that phone call.

Let me end by just reminding some of my friends of a story I told when I took the oath here 7 years ago. As I exited, a reporter came up to me and he said, "What was on your mind?" I indicated to him that in the 30 seconds that it took to take the oath that 30 years of my life as a marine flashed before me, and the most prominent images were those instances in which I

was asking my men to go off to war and saying it is for democracy, for our way of life, for freedom. And when the casualties came back I was burdened with so much guilt, but it was my lot as an officer to carry that burden. I was ready to carry it to death.

But in the 30 seconds during the oath, as the majesty, the nobility, and the dignity of the Chamber unfolded before me, I realized that I did give the right mission, because if this is the forum that we are trying to protect, then it was worth the sacrifice, and I am not as much burdened by a sense of guilt.

We must carry the burden of leadership. It is heavy, but the bigger burden is to send the message to the soldier, sailor, and marine that we are behind them, because in the final analysis he carries the heaviest burden of all.

I thank you, my friends, for listening to me, and I salute all of you.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the pending resolution and as a cosponsor of the Michel-Solarz resolution. I see absolutely nothing inconsistent. In fact, it is entirely compatible and I think it is essential for this Congress to go on record in support and affirmation of the constitutional provision.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution being offered by our distinguished colleagues, Representatives BENNETT and DURBIN, House Concurrent Resolution 1. This resolution expresses the sense of the Congress that Congress must approve any offensive military action against Iraq.

The resolution further reaffirms that Congress has the responsibility and authority to declare war as granted in the Constitution.

Both Representatives BENNETT and DURBIN presented excellent and persuasive testimony on their resolution to the Foreign Affairs Committee earlier this week.

As an original sponsor of the War Powers Resolutions enacted nearly 20 years ago, I fully support the principles expressed in House Concurrent Resolution 1 and would add that these principles are incorporated in House Joint Resolution 62, which has the support of a bipartisan membership of the Congress, led by Representatives SOLARZ and MICHEL.

House Joint Resolution 62 authorizes the conditional use of force to implement U.N. resolutions and as such is the implementation of the War Powers Resolution. In section 2(c)(1) of House Joint Resolution 62, the Congress declares that this conditional authorization of the use of force constitutes the specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

In other words, under House Joint Resolution 62, force is authorized by the Congress only after the President determines that the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions and that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

Only pursuant to the presentation of that determination to Congress and the American people, for which he will be held accountable, would the President then be authorized to use force to implement the U.N. resolutions. This procedure established by House Joint Resolution 62 is consistent with and fulfills the requirements of the War Powers Resolution and the U.S. Constitution.

In this way, the Congress is upholding the basic premise of our system of government as prescribed in the U.S. Constitution that responsibility for foreign policy and national security policy decisions, including and especially those involving war, is to be shared between the executive and legislative branches of government and not to be decided alone by any one branch or person.

For these reasons, I fully support House Concurrent Resolution 1, the Bennett-Durbin resolution and urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Montana, [Mr. WILLIAMS].

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution and also in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Rushing to war will be a mistake of historic proportions. The result of moving too quickly to war will be destructive divisions here at home and a dangerous jumbling of alliances and allegiances in the nations of the Middle East.

Moving to war quickly out of fear that the coalition of nations will not hold for the long pull indicates that the coalition may lack sturdiness and resilience because the cause itself is infirm.

This Nation must match our determination that Iraq's aggression will not stand with the restraint, caution and thoughtfulness required of a Nation that would lead the world. We urge President Bush to be both confident and wise. We hope he will rely on history for guidance, and not only the history of World War II, but other events, including Korea and Vietnam. Not all old soldiers learn the lesson.

Finally, I want to express my opposition to the Solarz-Michel proposal. War by voucher system breaks faith with the Founders and abrogates our constitutional responsibilities in this Congress.

Finally, we pray for the young men and women under arms in the Middle East. We pray for President Bush and we urge on him thoughtfulness, caution, and wisdom.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York, [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the resolution introduced by our colleagues Mr. BENNETT and Mr. DURBIN. This important resolution reasserts the clear constitutional prerogative of Congress to make the ultimate decision to commit the Nation to war.

There are two very distinct issues before the House today. One issue—about which there is deep and passionate division here in Congress—concerns the wisdom of various strategies to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait. For my own part, I am convinced that we have not yet exhausted all available economic and diplomatic avenues, and that our best option is to stay the course of sanctions and diplomatic pressure.

But there is another important issue before the House today—an issue of profound constitutional import. It boils down to one simple question—who has the authority to commit the United States to war?

On the one hand, this question hardly seems necessary to debate at all. The Constitution, in article 1, section 8, leaves absolutely no ambiguity on this issue. It is Congress—and only Congress—who has that authority. The necessity of this provision was clear to the members of the Constitution Convention. They were determined that no one person, be he a King or a President, should have the sole authority to send the Nation to war.

The Constitution is so clear, in fact, and the Founders' reasoning so wise, that it almost seems superfluous to reiterate the time-tested Constitutional provision in legislation.

But the recent statements of President Bush—and indeed the record of the last 10 years—indicate that the resolution offered by Mr. BENNETT and Mr. DURBIN is not only appropriate, but absolutely essential.

Mr. Bush—like Mr. Reagan before him—has made the bald assertion, the Constitution notwithstanding, that the President has the authority to send the Nation to war without the approval of Congress. This unadorned claim would not even have been conceivable just a decade ago. Yet now it is publicly asserted from the White House.

One of the great ironies of President Bush's position is the fact that he—like President Reagan before him—claims to be a strict interpreter of the "original intent" of the Framers of the Constitution. It is odd that President Bush supports the original intent of the Founders when the Constitution is vague, yet opposes the Framers' intent when it is crystal clear, as on the issue of congressional war powers.

The Bennett-Durbin resolution, for which I commend the gentlemen from Florida and Illinois, will put that new-found misinterpretation of the Constitution to rest.

Congress—and only Congress—has the authority to commit the United States to war. I urge my colleagues to support the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

Mr. Speaker, when we take those 30 seconds to take the oath of office, and we raise our right hands, and we puff our chests, that is not just a formula that we are going through. We swear to preserve and protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. When we do that, we do it in the particular and for the last 10 years at least there has been such a tremendous erosion of our commitment to protecting and defending and preserving the Constitution. And this institution has played a role in that erosion in that we

have abdicated our constitutional responsibilities.

When we permit a President to wage small wars, whether it is Grenada or Panama, without the prior approval of the Congress, we are eroding the Constitution. And when we try to defend against violations of international law having violated international law ourselves we erode the Constitution and we undermine our leadership role in the international community.

The Bennett-Durbin resolution should be adopted because it reasserts that which the Founders of this Nation intended, that the people through their representatives must make the fateful decision to go to war. That is the procedure that should be followed at this time. And it is being followed. But it would not have been followed if the Secretary of State or the President had been left to their own inclination. This body made that happen.

Let us adopt this resolution so we make it absolutely clear that it is still Congress that has the sole power to declare war.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes and 15 seconds to the gentleman from California [Ms. PELOSI].

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding the time and thank him for his leadership, along with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], for his leadership in giving us this opportunity to vote on the constitutional right of Congress to declare war, because in restating that right for Congress we are restating it for the American people. And the people of my district want Congress to be aware of some consequences that perhaps have not been addressed in this debate as we consider when and if to use force in the Persian Gulf.

We all, of course, revere those who have gone before us and fought the wars that have made our country and the world free. But the stakes are so much higher in this potential battle that I want to call some of them to Members' attention.

Mr. Speaker, every Member of Congress, regardless of which gulf resolution they are supporting, is burdened with the image of human lives that could be lost in the tragedy of a Persian Gulf war.

While we are all concerned about this tragic image, there are other concerns which will also affect human life and all of life on Earth.

The war cloud that would result from exploding oil fields and large-scale bombing of Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the Middle East would doom the environment for many years to come. King Hussein of Jordan stated in his remarks before the global warming conference in Geneva last year: "If half of Kuwait's oil reserves were to go up in flames during a war, the environmental impact would be swift, severe and devastating—(it)

would blacken the skies over a radius of at least 750 kilometers." And last night the king stated that the war would be an ecological disaster of the first order.

Some of the world's leading scientists state that the environmental effects of a war in the Middle East would be staggering. While we discuss the many scenarios that might result from a gulf war, let us also focus on these images:

Fires raging for weeks, or perhaps months, sending tons of smoke and debris into the Earth's atmosphere.

Oil equal to a dozen *Exxon Valdez* spills coursing through gulf waters.

Millions of Dolphins, fish, sea birds and other marine life washed onto gulf shores.

Smoke and debris blocking sunlight, causing temperatures to drop and altering crop seasons which would result in widespread famine.

Toxic plumes ascending to the upper atmosphere and falling as acid rain.

Chemical contamination of air, water and vegetation.

The Persian Gulf as the Dead Sea.

All of the Persian Gulf's natural resources, recognized by the United Nations environmental program as "one of the most fragile and endangered ecosystems" in the world, would be affected—from drinking water to marine life—disrupting the chain of life and livelihood for generations to come.

We are all too familiar with the devastation that can be wrought by a large-scale oilspill. The *Valdez* tragedy, which we addressed with oilspill prevention and liability legislation in the last Congress, would be magnified many times over by war in the Middle East. It takes, on average, a minimum of 3 weeks to put out an oilwell fire. There are 1,000 oilwells in Kuwait. There are only a few firefighting teams in the world prepared for this type of emergency.

The Fertile Crescent, created by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers flowing into the gulf, habitat for rich marsh life and the center of agricultural irrigation, would be irrevocably changed. Imagine this: The gulf would become the Dead Sea in more ways than one.

The point has already been made how important it is for us to have an energy policy to avoid such conflicts in the future. And the point has already been made how we have to have a better policy toward nuclear disarmament. I hope the point is made that we take very seriously the environmental consequences of our action, and again I thank the gentlemen for their resolution.

□ 1030

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, in order to fully understand what we are doing today, I think it is important to understand the legal nature of the three measures we will vote on today. Two are concurrent resolutions and one is a joint resolution.

Concurrent resolutions do not rise to the level of a law. They are mere expressions of opinion. They do not go to the President for his signature or veto. They do not change or legally interpret any section of the Constitution or any law. Passing a concurrent resolution in either House is not binding on anyone and may be inconsistent with one passed in the Senate or passed previously or in the future. It makes no difference legally and to pretend the House is passing a historic law when it passes a mere concurrent resolution is a misrepresentation.

A joint resolution if passed in identical form by both the Senate and the House and signed by the President can have the force of law.

Both the Bennett resolution (H. Con. Res. 1) and the Hamilton resolution are concurrent resolutions and merely express opinions of Congress. The Solarz-Michel resolution (H.J. Res. 62) is a joint resolution which, if passed in identical form by both the House and Senate and signed by the President, will rise to the level of law.

If those who support the two concurrent resolutions were to pass something of substance, they would propose passing a law to repeal the War Powers Act, which is inconsistent with these two concurrent resolutions most of them support. The War Powers Act is a law which sets forth certain procedures the President should follow if he orders troops or the use of Armed Forces in situations like we have in the gulf. I did not vote for it and believe it was in effect an unconstitutional delegation of congressional authority and also an unenforceable infringement on Presidential power. It has not been recognized as constitutional by any of the five Presidents since it passed. If the War Powers Act is to be modified or repealed, it must be done by law and cannot be done by a mere concurrent resolution.

House Concurrent Resolution 1 states that it is the opinion of those voting for it that "any offensive action against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the Congress of the United States before such action can be initiated." Since there are no exceptions, it would even prohibit using the force we are using each day to enforce the embargo and it would prohibit offensive action taken in retaliation for suffering inflicted by Iraq under any condition. That means that if Iraq were to use biological or chemical weapons on our troops in the desert, all they could do is try to defend themselves against another attack. They could not take offensive action to prevent another attack. No Member of the House has been willing to say they believe the response should be that limited in that particular case but that is the plain unambiguous reading of the resolution; and one or even several Members of the 435 in the House saying they would like for exceptions to be read into it, does not change it. Even though it is a mere resolution expressing an opinion, and will not settle a question which has been debated for 200 years, any resolution stating the opinion of this House today should state any exceptions Members believe

appropriate. I will not vote for a resolution or opinion which as written in effect states that American soldiers should be limited in responding to a biological or chemical attack.

The Hamilton resolution is based upon the assumption that sanctions and an embargo will cause Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. I do not believe that and not very many do. It is merely an excuse. Those who want to wait, and they are many, should just say so. Since the Hamilton resolution cannot rise to the level of a law and will not have any legal effect on the President, to claim it is effective or an historic document is not right. While passing a mere opinion in and of itself does no legal harm, it does no real good either. On the other hand, I fear passing it might encourage Saddam to believe U.S. troops would not be permitted to retaliate and therefore, passing it might encourage him to continue to defy the U.N. edict to withdraw, encourage him to not agree to proposals being advanced this week-end by the U.N. Secretary General, and also encourage him to commit a reckless aggressive act endangering our military personnel. I see no positive gain flowing from passing this resolution but a possible downside. If the authors want to do something positive and substantive, they should instead be proposing repeal or amendment of the War Powers Act which in effect concedes authority of the President to use force in such situations for up to 90 days.

House Joint Resolution 62, which is supported by the administration, is a serious proposal rising to the level of a law, but it grants authority to be implemented at some indefinite time in the future. The circumstances at that future time are not known today. Indeed, circumstances may very well change substantially by next Tuesday and those changes may be so important that one voting yes today under today's circumstances may want to vote no on Tuesday. If the Secretary General of the United Nations can extract an agreement for a viable program for withdrawal, there would be a lot more support for action. I think House Joint Resolution 62, as written at this time, is too much of a blank check. We should deal with such important questions at a time when all the circumstances are known.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HASTERT].

Mr. HASTERT. Mr. Speaker, I stand in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution and oppose the Bennett resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution authorizing the President to use United States Armed Forces to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions concerning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The approval of this resolution by Congress will provide the President with a critically important tool to use in his continued efforts to avert war—Saddam Hussein will know beyond a shadow of a doubt that our Government and its citizens stand firmly behind the President's actions.

We cannot expect our Commander in Chief to lead our Nation through this crisis with one hand tied behind his back. The President must have the ability to choose among a variety of options, including military options, in negotiating this crisis. Sanctions alone do not provide

the needed threat to bring about the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In the more than 5 months since the Iraqi invasion, Saddam Hussein has increased, rather than decreased his hold on Kuwait. Sanctions have produced no hint of a response from Iraq.

The morale of our troops in Saudi Arabia is high. I returned from the gulf region earlier this week with the knowledge that our military forces are extremely well trained and ready for any eventuality. These brave men and women are professionals that know their jobs and strongly believe in their mission. But our troops must know that our Government stands squarely behind them and respects their ability. Just as we must speak with one voice to Saddam Hussein, we cannot send mixed messages to our own soldiers about our commitment in the gulf. In this instance, maintaining peace demands that we maintain a credible military threat, otherwise Iraq will not budge, and we will go to war.

I continue to maintain hope that we can yet avoid war, and pray for this outcome. The loss of young lives in the defense of our country would be a tragedy of overwhelming proportion. However, the threat of failing to act, of allowing a mad dictator to succeed in his vicious aggression against neighboring countries and the world community is simply not an option. In short order our Nation would face an even more aggressive and imposing force in the Middle East, one that could jeopardize many more lives.

As we approach the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the world is intently watching how the strongest nation on Earth responds to one of its greatest threats. I have faith, based on more than 200 years of proud history, in the strength and resolve of the American people to protect freedom and defend against aggression. We will persevere, and Congress has the opportunity to help.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER].

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Speaker, I understand the intentions of the gentlemen who offer this resolution, and they differ from my own. But I am unable to understand the relevancy of insisting in a concurrent resolution on what the Constitution says plainly—that only Congress has the right to declare war—when the concurrent resolution has no force of law and merely expresses a sense of the body, and especially when, on the same day, we will be voting to grant—or not—the express power to the President to take offensive military action.

I believe, as I expect most all Members of this body believe, that the Founding Fathers were correct in placing in the hands of the legislative branch the responsibility and power to commit our country to armed conflict. Plainly, there are and have been throughout our history times when the exercise of such power was not possible, consistent with our national interests. These included actions against pirates in the early days of our national existence, the invasions of Grenada and Panama, when covert action was necessary, and others, such as Vietnam, where we were fighting for an established government and against an insurrection and, at least in the very early stages of our involvement, there was no other

nation we might have wanted to declare war upon at that time.

In every such case, of course, the legislative branch retained the power and responsibility for providing the resources to conduct these military operations and thus, though no declaration of war may have been appropriate, the legislative branch was a full participant with the power to prevent continuation of our military participation at any moment.

The situation in Kuwait, however, does not fall into any of these categories. Military action has been threatened for some months and both sides have steadily built their confronting forces. An identifiable nation is the intended enemy and there is nothing covert about the confrontation. Ample legislative time is available to address the issue.

I have been urging the President publicly and privately that, in these circumstances, the Constitution requires a declaration of war, and he should ask for one. Note, however, that the Constitution nowhere requires the President to seek a declaration of war from the Congress. It is our power and our responsibility alone, and the President under the Constitution has no role to play in it.

In any case the Michel-Solarz joint resolution fulfills, in my judgment, the constitutional imperative completely and also satisfies the terms of the Bennett-Durbin concurrent resolution, which under the circumstances, it seems to me, is irrelevant and redundant.

A vote for or against the proposition, then, seems totally unnecessary and the current resolution, therefore, totally unnecessary as well. The statement reaffirming that the power and responsibility for declaring war lies in the Congress is obviously one I support. The need for such affirmation as a sense of the Congress and in the face of actual legislation which grants the President such power is difficult to discern.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. YOUNG].

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, what a terrible shame, 1990 was a year in which freedom broke out around the world and was the first time in more than 50 years that the entire world seemed to be at peace.

What a terrible shame, just as the people of the world were standing together breathing a collective sigh of relief that war was going away, super-power confrontation was going away, the dictator of Iraq stirred it all up again.

The long-anticipated clash between the Soviet Union and the United States ended instead with a historic chain of diplomatic events and treaties that lessened the threat of conflict, reduced the United States and Soviet nuclear threat, resulted in a build-down of Eastern and Western Military forces in Europe, and opened the doors to a clearer understanding between the leaders of our two nations. It was under the strong leadership of Presidents Reagan and Bush, and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev that a new decade ushered in a vision of peace for the first time in three generations.

Here at home, we reduced spending on national defense programs and this Congress eagerly anticipated a peace dividend that could be spent to provide for the education of our children and the health care of our aged.

In recent months we were amazed with the destruction of the Berlin Wall, the melting of the Iron Curtain, freedom was breaking out all over Europe, free elections in Poland, free elections in Czechoslovakia, countries withdrawing from conflicts where they were involved as surrogates and third parties. Peace was breaking out, and the dictator of Iraq changed all of that. There can be no question that the dictator of Iraq is a threat, not only to the people of Kuwait, not only to the people of Saudi Arabia, but to the people of the world, to the economy of the world. And he has denied us, he has denied us that peaceful world that we thought we had within our grasp. What a shame. What a shame. He is a threat, and something needs to be done.

Hope and optimism for a potential entire generation of peace were quickly dashed on August 2, when Saddam Hussein's armed forces brutally annexed Kuwait, taking thousands of Americans and other visitors of that nation hostage. Not only did he rob the Kuwaiti people of their freedom, pillage the nation of its assets and resources, and violently murder innocent men, women, and children—Saddam Hussein robbed the world of its only real hope for peace.

Our President, George Bush, did something, and everyone speaking on this floor in the last several days has complimented the President for moving out swiftly and strongly and organizing world opinion, preparing to stop the threat from the dictator of Iraq. Congress was in session at the time of the invasion of Kuwait. But Congress was silent as the United Nations adopted resolution after resolution condemning the dictator of Iraq. Congress applauded, the people of America applauded, even the press applauded.

As the troop movements began and commitments were made, thousands of Americans went to the desert with their tanks and guns and ships and airplanes and other types of equipment that we cannot even mention on the floor today. The commitment was being made, and Congress acquiesced in that commitment. Yes we were part of that commitment through our silence.

In August, September, October, November, and December, Congress did not stand to try to prevent that commitment, to try to stop what was happening, to tell the President, "You cannot move ahead." We applauded. We joined in that commitment by our silence, and now we have George Bush, who has done such an outstanding job in this regard out there on the end of the limb, and Congress can be silent no longer. Congress should speak out

strongly in favor of that commitment today since we made that commitment all along with George Bush with our silence.

As we close the debate on this critical resolution, we stand just hours away from a possible armed conflict, the magnitude of which the world has not seen for almost 20 years. There is no Member of this House who hopes and prays more than I that Saddam Hussein will withdraw from Kuwait and avert the use of force.

There is no questioning the resolve of the United States and the international coalition of more than 100 nations that have condemned Iraq's aggression in 12 strong and very clear U.N. resolutions. President Bush has rallied the international community, including a coalition of our allies and another coalition of nations who rarely if ever support the United States, in an unprecedented show of unity. Immediately following Iraq's incursion into Kuwait, the United Nations approved resolution 660, the first condemning Iraq's invasion and demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of forces.

The United Nations soon after, on August 6, approved resolution 661 imposing a trade embargo and financial sanctions against Iraq and Iraq-occupied Kuwait. On August 9, the United Nations declared Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void and demanded that Iraq rescind the annexation.

The United Nations on August 18 demanded that Iraq release the thousands of foreign nationals being held hostage and on August 25 reaffirmed its support for enforcement of the international trade embargo against Iraq. The U.N.-approved four additional resolutions in September including resolution 670 that indicated a greater resolve by the entire international community to tighten the trade embargo.

Despite Saddam Hussein's arrogance, the United Nations issued two resolutions in October and November before finally approving resolution 678 on November 29 authorizing member states to use all means necessary to uphold the terms of the first 11 U.N. resolutions and restore international peace and security in the region. It was this resolution which established the January 15 deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, President Bush, Secretary of State Baker, and U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar have taken every step possible to enable Saddam Hussein to settle this situation peacefully. Iraq's response was never clearer than this past Wednesday when its Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz refused to accept a letter from President Bush to Saddam Hussein that ought to make the Iraqi President fully understand the options available to him and the consequences of his decisions. As the world watched, the Iraqi

Foreign Minister, on behalf of Saddam Hussein, virtually closed the door to any peaceful settlement and all but challenged the world to forcibly remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

The United States clearly stands on the side of peace. For more than 5 months, President Bush has sought through every diplomatic channel possible to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, a nation Saddam Hussein openly acknowledges that he has liquidated and annexed. The Soviet Union, the United Nations, even the nations of the Arab community, have provided unwavering support to President Bush and his every move.

Mr. Speaker, those on both sides of the aisle commend President Bush for his leadership, his initiative and his restraint in dealing with Saddam Hussein these past 5 months. With this vote today, we can clearly signal the support of the U.S. Congress for his efforts and reaffirm our trust in the difficult decisions he must make in the weeks and months ahead. A vote for the Solarz-Michel resolution today is a signal to Saddam Hussein that the international community remains united in its condemnation of Iraq's brutal aggression and its attempt to take away the freedom of a sovereign nation and its people.

A vote against the Solarz-Michel resolution sends the wrong message to Saddam Hussein. It would strengthen his hand and lessen the chances for a peaceful resolution of this diplomatic stalemate. It also would seriously undermine the credibility of the President of the United States and leave our allies in turmoil.

A vote against President Bush today casts aside the 12 years of leadership by two American Heads of State to reestablish respect throughout the world for the United States and the American people. We are on the doorstep of a so-called new world order that offers the hope of peace to this generation and generations to come.

It is a hope that will not and cannot be fulfilled without strong leadership and that leadership must come from the United States which for more than 200 years has stood as the beacon of hope, the beacon of freedom, and the beacon of peace throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, when I was a child growing up during World War II, I was old enough to know that we were in a terrible war. But I knew that there was someone somewhere looking after this great Nation and I had every confidence that the decisions they were making would make everything all right. Ladies and gentlemen, today all over this great country there are young men and women who know that someone somewhere is looking out for them. That someone somewhere is us and we have got to be decisive in making the right decision.

In his first annual Address to the U.S. Congress, President George Washington said, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." I think that was a valid observation then, and I think it is a valid observation now. Today to be prepared for war and preserve the peace means adoption of the Solarz-Michel resolution to let the dictator of Iraq know beyond a doubt that we are serious, that he should withdraw and to let him know that we will keep our commitment to the world, to President Bush and to the young Americans who are in the desert today.

If we are going to err in making a decision, we must err on the side of strength and leadership. This is a world in which Saddam Hussein and those tyrants who will surely follow him only understand and respect strength and the willingness to use that strength to right the wrongs that have been thrust upon the world.

If we err on the side of procrastination and what appears to Saddam Hussein to be indecision and division we repeat the same mistakes that preceded World War II when we refused to deter the aggression of another despot from a far more civilized nation than we face today. It is this series of mistakes from which we have just emerged and which finally gave us the hope for world peace.

Mr. Speaker, the vote we cast today will not only go a long way toward resolving the situation in the Persian Gulf, but it will determine our future, the future of our children, and the future of our grandchildren. It is one which will determine if we are to begin a generation of world peace or a renewed generation of world conflict and tension.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OBEY). The Chair will announce that the time remaining is 9¼ minutes on this side and 7 minutes on this side. In the case of all three propositions today, the proponents will be allowed to close.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution explicitly states that the Congress alone has the power to declare war. The Constitution says, "The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war." The Constitution properly mandates that our elected representatives have an important check and balance against an errant Presidential decision on so grave an issue involving our national security. And the people have spoken: An Associated Press poll released Wednesday showed that only 44 percent of the Nation support military action by the United States against Iraq, while 50 percent want to give sanctions more time to work.

The President wants to sidestep this pivotal provision of the Constitution by simply asking this Congress to implement U.N. Resolution 678, authorizing "all means necessary" to enforce the will of that body. If we pass the administration's resolution, we play directly into not only the President's political gyrations, but the very peril the Constitution seeks to avoid: the loss of American life overseas without an explicit declaration of war by the Representatives of the people.

By taking this country to war without a national consensus, the President, and this Congress by its actions, threatens to break the spirit of this Nation, wreak violence on the Constitution, and illegally place U.S. troops in a lethal situation. We made a great mistake in giving unlimited authority to the President in the Vietnam war with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, and most Americans do not want to see this occur again.

Article 1, section 8, clause 11, means exactly what it meant 200 years ago: that only the American people, through their elected congressional representatives, can lead this Nation to war, and it must be done with a formal declaration. Our actions here today threaten to undo this vital measure. If we cannot preserve the foundation of democracy here at home, how can we encourage it abroad? We are talking about deliberately initiating a conflict of potentially uncontrollable dimensions. In this case the President is simply wrong. President Woodrow Wilson said, "The greatest mistake a President can make is to take a divided nation to war."

Our Nation is divided, Mr. Speaker, because the administration has failed to provide the American people with a compelling reason for our sons and daughters to die. I have not heard anyone assert that our basic survival or national identity are at risk. The commitment of our troops to a desert war without the consent of the people will only further divide the Nation and paralyze our future diplomatic role in that critical region.

Practical sense and the U.S. Constitution both require support for this resolution.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1¼ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Ms. KAPTUR].

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution, and also I rise as one Member who is not prepared to give the President a blank check in the situation in the Middle East.

We, as Members of Congress, hold a sacred trust with our troops in the field as well as our citizenry here at home.

There must be no doubt about why America goes to war. The reasons must be crystal clear, and the objectives honorable, and war must be the very last of resorts, not the first.

I appreciate our congressional leadership responding to the pleas inside this body to hold this debate and discussion. The American people have a right to a Congress that meets its constitutional responsibilities today and in the days to come.

This branch of government is not an extension of the executive branch nor

its handmaiden. Each of us is elected in our own right and is sworn to the very same oath of office as the President of the United States.

Events have conspired to make these votes today very tough calls. My own preference is to let the economic sanctions and the noose tighten around Saddam Hussein and Iraq.

But to assure a national consensus in this country, we know the American people must be assured by our actions that all diplomatic and peaceful means have been tried before the war option is triggered.

I support the Bennett-Durbin resolution, because it preserves this Congress' rightful responsibilities in the days to come.

And I just want to say that I commend this body for the high manner in which this debate has been conducted, nonpartisan on both sides. I am proud of all of you, this institution, and our country.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SANGMEISTER].

Mr. SANGMEISTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution and also the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Great Britain's Prime Minister Clement Attlee once said: Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that defenses of peace must be constructed." It is in this context that the Congress of the United States must work its will.

In the more than 16 years I have spent in a legislative capacity, I can think of no other vote that has been more difficult, or more important. It goes without saying that this is anything but a political decision. No party, or for that matter, no individual has the right to say whether we are to go to war. This can only be done as our forefathers declared in the Constitution—through the collective decision of the Congress by its elected representatives.

I originally supported the President's action in stopping Saddam Hussein's efforts to invade Saudi Arabia after his takeover of Kuwait. I believe that action was necessary; however, now we must face the question of whether we go from a defensive posture to one of an aggressor. Have we really given enough time for the sanctions to work? Shouldn't every avenue of diplomacy be explored first? Is the cost of American lives—which will surely occur—worth what we will gain? Where are the ground troops of all those countries represented in the United Nations that resolved that after January 15, force can be used? Where is the logic in setting an arbitrary date for the use of force? Will Israel be drawn into this conflict and perhaps break up the Arab coalition that supposedly now supports us? Will terrorism break out all around the world? How long will this war last? A week, a month, or years? How many American lives will be lost? When it is over, will the United States then become the landlord of Iraq, and perhaps the entire Middle East? Will we then bear the responsibility to monetarily and economically support them?

There are no easy answers to these questions. I have served in the military myself and realize that military force is sometimes necessary, but I fail to see that destroying one individual is worth the cost of countless human lives—not only American, but the innocent Iraqi citizens as well. History provides us with valuable insight. I believe it is imperative that the American people be behind the President if he chooses to wage war in the Persian Gulf but I sense that this vital support is not there. President Johnson found this out too late on Vietnam, and President Bush should look back on this hard-earned lesson before committing our troops to battle.

Surely before we proceed, every avenue to resolve this conflict must be explored and traveled to achieve a peaceful resolution of this crisis. Short of that, my conscience only allows me to vote no on going to war.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Michigan [Miss COLLINS].

Miss COLLINS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, a decision to go to war—once made and implemented—is irreversible.

It is a decision that weighs heavily on the minds and in the hearts of the families and friends in my congressional district whose sons and daughters are at risk on the front-line in Operation Desert Shield.

It is a decision that will directly impact on the lives and livelihood of every American and seriously strain our already strained national economy.

It is a decision that cannot and must not be taken lightly.

A decision to go to war should only be made when all other avenues for peaceful resolution have been exhausted and the American way of life is directly threatened or in eminent danger.

Mr. Speaker and my fellow colleagues, over the past few days the citizens in my district have reached out—first in prayer and then in concern.

Their prayers are to a power that is higher than you and I. A power that urges us, as representatives of the people's will, to think long and hard about the decisions we will be making over the next few days; to fully weigh the consequences that our decisions will have for both our Nation and the world.

Their concern is that those of us gathered in this Hall will not haphazardly make a decision that will cause the death or injury to their loved ones until we have: First, exhausted all peaceful remedies, and second, developed a better rationale for the loss of American lives.

My constituents are asking one question and one question only: Why?

Why are we in Saudi Arabia?

If it is not for oil, why?

Why are we risking the lives of our sons and daughters in a foreign land?

If not for democracy, why?

In a time of limited resources to rebuild our cities, feed and house our homeless, and educate our young, why is this administration so eager to spend billions of dollars in a far-off land that will have no meaningful impact on resolving the social and economic problems

confronting every American every day, right here at home?

Mr. Speaker, my constituents are asking why? And at this time, with the information currently available, I am hardpressed to find an answer. For this reason, I urge my colleagues to support: The continuing of current sanctions against Iraq; encouraging the administration to continue to explore other diplomatic avenues for reaching a peaceful solution to this crisis situation that looms over our Nation; and voting against any measure that would enable the President to go to war and place our sons and daughters at risk.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Speaker, the heart and soul of a democracy is the commitment to act on matters grave only with the consent of the governed. No action can be more grave than the action of going to war.

The levy of war will directly hit few of the Members in this body, but if we go to war, thousands of mothers will mourn the loss of their sons, their daughters, thousands of fathers likewise. Thousands of children will mourn the loss of their parents. And thousands of young people will spend the rest of their lives in wheelchairs or in hospital beds.

The economic cost of war, which is often forgotten during the rhetoric about pride and honor, is also enormous. No taxation without representation, the very foundation of our political origins, really means no enormous material levy can be exacted on the people without their consent.

For all of these reasons, Congress, the most direct representative of the people, must make the choice of war. This insistence on that role is the most conservative of all positions.

The Durbin-Bennett resolution asserts that responsibility.

Please support the Durbin-Bennett resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RHODES].

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Speaker, one of the catch phrases for those who are opposing the Solarz-Michel resolution appears to be, "What is the hurry? Iraq has been stopped. Our policy has worked."

Well, where was Iraq stopped? In Kuwait. Kuwait does not belong to Iraq. Kuwait is, or was, a sovereign nation. Yes, Iraq is stopped. It is stopped on somebody else's square.

□ 1040

Kuwait is dying. The Kuwaiti people are dying. Those who are not dying are suffering miserably. The people of Iraq are suffering. The old men and women and children of Iraq are suffering. The Iraqi Army is not suffering. The Iraqi Army sits in Kuwait. It is being fed. It is being clothed. It is being cared for.

Those who say, "Let's wait. Let's rely on sanctions." First of all, we all know we are depriving our President and the United Nations of their options, their legitimate options, to repeal aggression. But I would observe as well that if we rely solely on sanctions, if we say, "What's the hurry?" If we say "Let's wait and see if sanctions work," that the Iraqi Army would arguably be the safest organization in the world to belong to. While the people of Iraq will not be fed, the people of Iraq will not be clothed, and the people of Iraq will not be cared for, the army will be fed. The Iraqi Army will be fed, the Iraqi Army will be clothed, the Iraqi Army will be cared for, and the Iraqi Army will be a safe place to be because they will not be at risk.

It seems to me that with Kuwait dying, with the Kuwaiti people suffering, and with the Iraqi Army sitting on land that belongs to a sovereign nation, that we have just defined "the hurry." That is the hurry. The United Nations has stood up and said, "We will no longer tolerate aggression in this world, and we will authorize whatever means are necessary to repeal aggression." Is the Congress of the United States to say different?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from the State of Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Speaker, many of those who have stood in the well before me in this debate have reiterated that the votes we cast today will be momentous votes on the issue of peace and war in 1991. That is true. But these votes will have a tremendous effect on peace and war in the next century, as well. Sometime perhaps in the year 2003—a dictator will be considering invading his or her neighbor. That dictator will look back on 1991, and Saddam Hussein, and will ask him or herself, did the United Nations stand firm? Did the United States, the leader of the United Nations, stand firm? Or after 5 months of diplomatic and economic efforts, did we back off on the U.N. resolution and let Saddam Hussein carry the day?

Let Members stand firm with the United Nations and with the President. Let the Members vote to preserve peace in the next century. Let Members support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KANJORSKI].

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise today as a cosponsor and strong supporter of the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

Adoption of this resolution confirms our solemn obligation under article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution to act for the people of the United States, in the decision to go to war.

As I have stated on this floor a number of times in the last 3 days, the process we are

currently undertaking is vital to our country, and vital to the Constitution our Nation depends upon.

Today we are debating the powers of one man to commit American lives and resources to war when our country or our citizens are not directly threatened.

If we do not test our Constitution now, when we have the time and are not directly in harm's way, we allow the potential for future constitutional crises to rock this Nation.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today not only in favor of the Bennett-Durbin resolution, but also in support of our Constitution and our Founding Fathers.

I urge all of my colleagues to join me in supporting this critical resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OBEY). The Chair would say at this point that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] has 3 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN] has 7 minutes remaining.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ROTH].

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this resolution for two fundamental reasons. First, it goes to the heart of what is perhaps Congress' most solemn constitutional function. And second, because it addresses the failure by Congress to live up to its duty thus far in this world crisis. For both reasons, I urge my colleagues to vote for this reaffirmation that Congress will fulfill its responsibility to speak for and act for the people in determining when force will be used on behalf of our country. Article I, section 8, clause 11 of the Constitution is clear: only Congress can declare war. The Founding Fathers left no doubt about that, 204 years ago. Their intention was that the power to commit the nation to war must reside with the Congress, as the institution which most directly speaks for the people of this country. The question today is, how should this constitutional principle apply in today's world, where the use of armed force as an instrument of national policy is usually limited, both in scope and purpose, without any declaration that a state of war exists. Clearly, the President, acting as Commander in Chief, must have flexibility to act, but it is equally clear that Congress cannot abdicate its Constitutional duty or its responsibility to the people to serve as their voice.

In the 5 months since this crisis began, Congress has not fulfilled its duty. The President committed 200,000 troops to the Persian Gulf without any formal action by Congress. When we adjourned last October, we made a special provision to come back into session to act in this crisis. Yet when the President doubled our troop commitment to more than 400,000 Congress did not convene. Nor did we meet to consider the United States' role in seeking or implementing the United Nations resolution, which is cited as the basis

for threatening military action against Iraq. In short, Congress did nothing until now, a few days before the U.N. deadline, when this crisis has reached the precipice of war.

This resolution is important to remind the President that he must come to Congress for the authority to use force. As this crisis has demonstrated, when Congress leaves a vacuum, Presidents can step in and maneuver Congress into a position where a vote against military action is a vote to undercut our troops at their moment of maximum vulnerability.

For me, it is a bitter choice to be forced into the position we find ourselves today. It is the result of Congress' failure to be more involved in the preceding months, as this crisis has escalated. Now, we have no choice but to back up the President by voting for the use of force—a step that I fervently hope the President will not use, and should not use while there is the slightest hope for a diplomatic solution. In fact, it is because I am absolutely convinced that diplomacy can succeed only with a demonstration of unity in our Government that I can vote for the authority to use force. Five months ago, two months ago, one month ago, a full debate by Congress could have allowed other options for our action. Today, because of this institution's inaction, we have only one.

That is why this resolution is so vital.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Speaker, the Constitution has become an early American wall decoration. Everybody sees it. Nobody reads it. Nixon raped it. Reagan shredded it. The truth be known here, George Bush would disregard it.

Through all this, Congress turned their back. They turned their back that dealt with Vietnam. They turned their back that dealt with Korea. Congress cannot afford to turn their back as it deals with the Persian Gulf.

If Members think the gulf cannot turn into a Vietnam, let me tell Members something: Yitzhak Shamir and King Fahd are both singing "Onward Christian Soldiers." I assure Members that it can happen. I say this today. It should be quite clear that Congress' legislative history is simply this: Any President that disregards the Constitution on warmaking powers in the future will be subject to impeachment. If Congress has any courage at all, Congress will set that record straight.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. SHUSTER].

Mr. SHUSTER. Mr. Speaker, we are asked, what is the hurry? Well, after 5 months of rebuffed diplomacy, every day that this Congress procrastinates, Saddam's factories are producing more

chemical and biological weapons, more anthrax, more botulism, more sarin. This is a lethal nerve gas. And yes, more progress on nuclear weapons.

Make no mistake about it, if indeed we must resort to military force, those factories of death and destruction and terrorism will surely be targets.

So today, not next week, not next month, but today, we must give the President the authority to remove this scourge, or the face of history will pass judgment upon the Congress, as the Congress that failed to do their duty.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MCEWEN].

Mr. MCEWEN. Mr. Speaker, last night my daughter asked the question as postulated by her fourth grade teacher: Will your father vote for war or for peace?

As I looked into the face of that little life that I value more than my own, I thought how simple it is when a person knows no history, when they have no memory, when they see no consequences, when a person lives only for today.

Munich simply said, "You go no further." From now on we will have sanctions. When Chamberlain landed and held up the paper on which he had the few words that held peace in our time, the crowds lined the streets, blocked Downing Street, so much that he could not enter, as the House of Commons roared their approval. They asked the little stooped 65-year-old remnant of World War I, Lord Adm. Winston Churchill, "What do you think? He has brought us peace in our time."

□ 1050

Churchill said, "The Prime Minister faced the question between war and shame, and he has chosen both."

From that day until now the world has learned, all the civilized world, unanimous in the United Nations.

Mubarak has placed the future of Egypt on the line.

The tremendous economic sacrifices of Turkey, the Communist bloc have all said, "We will stop tyranny at its first step."

Hitler said, "I intend to go no further."

Hussein has said, "I intend to go all the way. I intend to unite the entire Arab world under my command."

And the civilized world has said, "We will stop you here."

The Congress of the United States of America in 1991 should do no less.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFazio].

Mr. DEFazio. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Bennett-Durbin constitutional War Powers Resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution offered by my colleagues, Mr. BENNETT of Florida and Mr. DURBIN of Illinois. I am encouraged that, at long last, Congress is

confirming its exclusive right to commit this Nation to war. In the present case, I strongly oppose granting the authority to the President to make war against Iraq.

Just over 3 years ago, when American servicemen were dying in the Persian Gulf to protect Kuwaiti oil shipments, I made the point that the United States was in the 37th year of a constitutional crisis. The crisis began when President Harry Truman introduced a large American military force into the Korean conflict without any congressional authorization whatsoever. His administration advanced the unheard-of theory that "the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, has full control over the use thereof."

For the first time in American history, a President claimed the full share of the warmaking powers granted to Congress by the U.S. Constitution. Today, Mr. Speaker, we are in the 40th year of that constitutional crisis, and Congress is still failing in its responsibility.

The Framers of the Constitution clearly intended that the power to initiate war, whether declared or undeclared, should reside in the legislative branch of Government. They gave Congress the power "to declare war [and] grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water"; Congress was given thereby sole authority over not only declared wars, but undeclared military actions sanctioned by the Government of the United States. The Framers also gave Congress the power to "make rules for the Government and regulation of the land and naval forces," the power to "define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations," and the power to "raise and support Armies * * * [and] a navy."

If that weren't enough, Congress is given perhaps the broadest grant of power in the Constitution, the power "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or office thereof."

The President's vaunted power as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, according to Alexander Hamilton, who among the Framers was the champion for a strong Presidency, was limited to "nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces," as opposed to the British King, whose power included "the declaring of war and * * * the raising and regulating of fleets and armies."

The Framers sought to create a chief executive, not another king. The power to lead the Nation into a costly overseas military adventure was a power they explicitly denied to the President of the United States. James Madison spoke for all of his colleagues when he wrote, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson:

The constitution supposes, what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the Executive is the branch of power most interested in war and most prone to it. It has accordingly, with studies care, vested the question of war in the Legislature.

Presidents up until Harry Truman by and large honored the constitutional scheme. But since that time, the President has increasingly

asserted the power to make war at the expense of the Constitution and the legitimate role of the U.S. Congress.

The constitutional crisis came to a head with the Vietnam war and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution was a loosely worded declaration supporting the President's actions to defend U.S. Armed Forces in Southeast Asia and deter aggression. Members of the Senate rose to make it clear that the resolution was not intended to authorize a wider war, but two U.S. Presidents read it differently.

Only two Members of Congress opposed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. One of them was Wayne Morse of Oregon. In opposing the Solarz-Michel resolution later today, I am proud to echo his words on the floor of the Senate in 1964:

I believe history will record that we have made a great mistake by subverting and circumventing the Constitution of the United States, by means of this resolution. As I argued earlier today, we are in effect giving the President war making powers in the absence of a declaration of war. I believe that to be a historic mistake.

History vindicated the Senator from Oregon.

The War Powers Resolution, passed in 1973 over President Nixon's veto, was a response not only to the excesses of the Executive during the Vietnam war, but also to the near-total abdication of responsibility during that period by Congress. The resolution was intended to:

Insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or in such situations.

The resolution requires the President to report to Congress under section 4(a)(1) whenever he introduces U.S. Armed Forces into hostile situations. Congress must act within 60 days to authorize their continued presence, or they must be withdrawn. Unfortunately, Presidential compliance with the reporting and consulting requirements of the resolution has been nearly nonexistent.

The CONGRESSIONAL RECORD is equally dismal. In 1987, when President Reagan used the U.S. Navy to escort reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, both the House and Senate repeatedly ducked the war powers issue. Despite a major military buildup in the gulf—despite the fact that 37 U.S. seamen aboard the U.S.S. *Stark* were killed by an Iraqi missile, the fact that a number of vessels were damaged by mines, and the exchange of hostile fire between United States and Iranian forces, the President did not submit a report pursuant to section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution and Congress did not demand one.

It was left to a number of my colleagues and I to seek relief in the Federal courts. The courts judged the matter to be a nonjusticiable political question. Today we have arrived at the final and complete unraveling of the War Powers Resolution. The President has once again failed to properly comply with the law, and Congress has offered him its congratulations.

The near war with Iraq in which we find ourselves is a classic case of bad policy choices coming home to haunt us. Iraq has a long history of aggression in the region, and an abysmal human rights record, and has violated international conventions against the use of chemical weapons, going so far as to use them against its own population. Despite that, the Reagan and Bush administrations have increasingly tilted United States policy toward Iraq. Their bad judgment was compounded, of course, by both administrations' failure to develop a national energy policy and their systematic cuts in Federal support for conservation and renewable energy development.

Today, a large American force sits uneasily in the Arabian desert. They don't have a clear idea why they are there, the American people don't have a clear idea why they are there, and Congress doesn't have a clear idea why they are there.

Mr. Speaker, if we should have learned anything from the military misadventures of the last 40 years, it is that U.S. military might should not be committed to battle without a clear statement of U.S. objectives and the broad support of the American people.

Will our citizens support an indefinite United States presence in the Arabian Peninsula? Will they support a war to put back in power the autocratic billionaire oil sheiks of Kuwait? Will they support the President if he decides to invade Kuwait and Iraq? Will they support the decades-long occupation of Iraq that would follow? These are the kinds of questions that we must answer with debate in Congress on granting the President authority for war with Iraq. The Constitution is clear. Congress must speak.

Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I hope my colleagues in this Chamber will allow me to digress at least partially from this debate for one moment. I feel it is the ultimate in hypocrisy for Soviet President Gorbachev to be counseling President Bush on the issue of peace while Soviet paratroopers and tank forces brutalize Lithuania and the Baltic Republics.

I only hope that America can save part of its outrage over the aggression of Saddam Hussein and reserve it for the most recent winner of the Nobel Peace Prize.

One of the saddest responsibilities of a Member of Congress is to stand at the funeral of a fallen soldier. Many of us have done it. After the crack of the rifles, the Honor Guard has folded Old Glory into the neat tricorn and handed it to the survivor, it is often our responsibility to walk up and strain to find some words to say.

I have listened closely to the debate over the last 2 days. I do not know that I could go up to a young woman I know in my home town, a black American, whose only son is on the front line and say, "I'm very sorry, but we just couldn't wait."

I do not know that I can go up to the father or to the mother of someone who has died in Operation Desert Shield and say, "I regret very much

the sorrow to your family, but we had to get it over with."

I certainly do not know that I could go up and tell someone who has lost a husband that it was more important for this Congress to show unity than patience.

These statements which we have heard repeatedly over the last 2 days may have the ring of truth and sincerity to some, but to this Congressman they are a hollow substitute for the principles and values which many Americans treasure as worthy of human sacrifice.

War and killing must be the last resort, and before we lose another American life in Operation Desert Shield, we must exhaust every reasonable possibility for peace, and that is why I am supporting Hamilton-Gephardt.

Now, most of us come to this debate weary of all the statements made on the floor and praying that our collective decision is wise, whatever it is; but regardless of the outcome of these historic roles, everyone in this Chamber must concede this Congress has responded to a national crisis with an exhaustive debate which has engaged the opinions and interests of the American people. The men who wrote our Constitution over 200 years ago understood that. They understood the gravity of this decision and they knew how important it was that the American people we represent have a voice in this debate over the fate of the lives of their children.

A week ago this very debate was in question. The President argued that he would follow the Constitution, but he would give us no assurance that a vote would be taken before war began.

My colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] initiated a lawsuit to try to guarantee that constitutional voice, and today the Constitution has prevailed. The American people have prevailed, and a topic which has been debated far and wide in barbershops, sale barns, family rooms, and board rooms, has finally been debated on the floor of the people's House.

Even the Solarz-Michel resolution makes it clear that we are authorizing the President. We are giving him authority. We are not conceding the President had this authority without us.

Now, some argue they can conceive of a set of facts where some President in the future faced with extraordinary circumstances might not be able to seek congressional authorization. I will concede that point. History proves that point. It is not unusual or even unconstitutional for a President to use his power as Commander in Chief and ask for congressional approval after the fact, and certainly not all uses of force constitute war; but I would hope that this Congress will not squander its constitutional birthright over some am-

biguous possibility or partisan loyalty to any President, Democrat or Republican.

It is far more important that we assert clearly and directly that article I, section 8, clause 11, is alive and well. To do otherwise is to effectively amend this important power out of our Constitution.

It has been my honor to cosponsor this resolution with the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT]. I certainly hope that every Member in this Chamber, regardless of their feelings on the Persian Gulf, will take their oath of office seriously and vote yes on the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. CAMPBELL].

Mr. CAMPBELL of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Bennett-Durbin resolution.

The Bennett-Durbin resolution before us correctly states that only the Congress can declare war. This is a view I have long applied to the Persian Gulf crisis. However, the resolution goes further and states:

Any offensive action taken against Iraq must be explicitly approved by the Congress of the United States before such action may be initiated.

That is not the same thing as saying that Congress alone can declare war. Let me offer at least one concrete and realistic example.

After the *Achille Lauro* hijacking and murder of the American, Leon Klinghoffer, the United States intercepted an Egyptian plane carrying the hijackers and their leader, Abu Abbas, to freedom. We forced the plane down in Italy, where the hijackers were arrested and convicted. The forcing down of that plane was offensive action against the country under whose flag that plane flew—Egypt. Indeed, the United States fought the War of 1812 on just that issue, the principle of free navigation on the high seas. Yet President Reagan did not seek, nor was there time to seek, congressional approval in advance.

Abu Abbas was let go by the Italian authorities and is now reported to be living in Baghdad. Furthermore, Saddam Hussein has explicitly threatened terrorism within his arsenal in the present crisis. Suppose we learned in the next week that an Iraqi plane or ship was carrying Abu Abbas out of Iraq. If the President forced that plane or ship to stop, to take Abu Abbas prisoner for the murder of Leon Klinghoffer, it would be an offensive action against Iraq. There would not be time to seek explicit approval in advance from Congress for such an action. This is a realistic example, in the precise context of the present crisis.

The problem with the Bennett-Durbin resolution, evidently, is that it is drafted too broadly. It is simply impossible for the President to submit "any offensive action" to the prior consideration and approval of Congress. And the resolution says "explicitly;" its drafters intend it to sweep broadly.

Had the resolution said that the Congress alone can declare war under our Constitution, I would have supported it. But the drafters, either intentionally or through imprecision born

of the shortness of time, have drafted a resolution that incorrectly states this important principle of constitutional law. The President does have authority in certain occasions to use offensive action, and to say he doesn't goes against the Constitution as much as to say Congress is not the body empowered to declare war.

Let me also take this occasion to place before the public my reasons for voting in favor of the Solarz-Michel joint resolution, and against the Gephardt-Hamilton concurrent resolution. Nothing has consumed more of my time and energy since becoming a Congressman than this. It is a terrible thing to go to war. Nevertheless, war, or the use of force, has been justified from time to time in our history.

The use of force directed at Iraq's chemical, biological, and incipient nuclear weapons facilities is justified. The world would be a safer place if Saddam Hussein no longer possessed chemical and biological weapons, or the potential for nuclear weapons. I believe an air or missile attack on those facilities could be successful with little loss of life. And I do not believe this would necessarily cause Saddam Hussein to respond by invading Saudi Arabia.

Saddam Hussein is the only national leader on the world stage who has used chemical weapons—against both the Iranians and the Kurds. It is likely that he will threaten to use them again, possibly against the Turks, the Syrians, the Saudis, or the Israelis. To these may be added his biological weapons. Both of these kinds of weapons were created by Iraq in clear violation of international law.

It is true that the United States also has chemical weapons, though we have never used them and Saddam Hussein has. Furthermore, we are actively engaged in negotiations with the Soviets aimed toward mutual elimination of these weapons. And, in my own case, I have always voted against funding their creation or stockpiling.

Experts disagree on how soon Iraq will have a nuclear device, but the estimates range from less than 1 year to 5 years. Complex delivery systems may take longer, though we know Iraq does possess the SCUD surface-to-surface long-range missile. Without overemphasizing the point, I think we can conclude that Iraq's nuclear potential is also worthy of concern. Yes, several other countries possess nuclear arms; but what is unique about Saddam Hussein is his proven willingness to use chemical weapons, which could indicate a willingness to use at least a tactical nuclear weapon as well. At the very least, he could make a threat to do so that his neighbors would consider very credible.

The present crisis, therefore, as I see it, affords the opportunity to rid the world of horrible weapons held by a man who has used them before. Whereas eliminating these weapons was not the focus of the U.N. resolution, their destruction would be quite consistent with the resolution, which authorizes the use of force necessary to drive Iraq from Kuwait. For one point, destroying these weapons facilities might convince Saddam Hussein that he is in a position of military inferiority, so that he might voluntarily then withdraw from Kuwait, or, perhaps, be toppled from power in his own country. Also, destroying them is a logical

prelude to any war that might come—as a way of protecting our own troops from being attacked with them.

Additionally, I think it would be defensible to use force to seal off Kuwait—to intercept any attempt to resupply the Iraqi troops there. If we were successful in enforcing a complete blockade by land, sea, and air, the Iraqi troops in Kuwait could then be invited to lay down their arms and enter Saudi Arabia. I am hopeful they would do so—again, ending this crisis with relatively little loss of life. I do recognize that lives will be lost by shooting down Iraqi supply planes or bombing overland resupply convoys or ships. But this would still be far short of an all out war.

I am not in possession of all the information of which the President is aware, but I think it would be wiser for American troops not to be committed to a land invasion of Iraq or Kuwait. The potential for large-scale loss of life in such a contingency is high. After destroying the chemical and biological weapons, and interdicting the resupply of Kuwait, I would think the withdrawal from Kuwait or the defection of Iraqi troops from Kuwait would soon follow. But if it didn't, I would favor the replacement of United States troops in the Saudi desert. Waiting out the long term in a purely defensive posture can, I believe, be the mission of the troops from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria. An Arab nation force could defend Saudi Arabia from any threatened further invasion by Saddam Hussein, especially after he had been deprived of his weapons of mass destruction. U.S. forces could be limited to the air and sea power necessary to maintain air superiority in the event of a such an attack.

Nevertheless, the threat of such an invasion should be maintained; and this the President is doing in hopes that Saddam Hussein will withdraw completely.

Some critics have argued that our decisions have been driven by oil. While there is no doubt that oil is important to the present world economy, our access to oil was not a factor in my vote. I have long believed that our country needs to move away from fossil fuels, primarily for environmental reasons, but also for reasons of national security. The real issues for me are chemical weapons, daily human rights abuses by the Iraqis in Kuwait, and a chance to guarantee the long-term peace in the world through a newly invigorated United Nations.

One last point—the cost of this entire operation must be borne to a far greater degree by the Saudis, and by our other allies. The Saudis have benefited from the higher world price of oil—estimates are \$2 to \$3 billion a month of increased revenues. That entire sum should go to the multilateral force arrayed against Iraq. Americans are taking the risk of loss of life; that is the greatest contribution imaginable.

Our votes today are on authorizing the use of force or waiting for the economic sanctions to have more effect.

The latter course condemns the Kuwaiti people to human rights abuses throughout the time we continue to wait. The Amnesty International report on what the Iraqi soldiers have done to individual Kuwaitis makes horrifying reading—rape, gouging out of eyes, castra-

tion, beating individuals while suspended, summary execution.

The latter course allows Saddam Hussein more time to build more weapons, including chemical and biological weapons capable of killing thousands. It allows his troops to dig in deeper, his air defenses to be made more comprehensive. When the time comes to go to war, our troops will thus be under greater threat. I cannot do that.

Only the former course authorizes the destruction of horrible weapons created in contravention of international law, used in contravention of international law and all human decency. Only the former holds out the hope of replacing Saddam Hussein, the only leader on the world stage today to have used chemical weapons.

It is a sorry thing to conclude that the use of force is ever necessary to settle disputes in the affairs of nations. But we must use force from time to time, until the world is rid of those who invade their peaceful neighbors, to rape, torture, steal, and murder.

It is far more comfortable to seek peace at any price. Some would never use force; many of them are saints, too many of them are martyrs. But we Members of Congress cannot afford to take that posture. We are sworn to protect those whom we represent. We have, by taking public office, taken on the heavy responsibility of authorizing the use of force when it must be so. This is a time when it must be so.

Mr. MORRISON. Mr. Speaker, there are three votes to cast today that are of great significance. I choose to comment on them in their order of appearance on the calendar.

First, the Bennett-Durbin resolution calling for no offensive action against Iraq without congressional approval.

History shows that the Presidents of the United States have initiated military action on about 260 different occasions, while Congress has declared war five times.

As the clock ticks toward the January 15 U.N. deadline, this legislative option reopens a centuries old debate over who has what authority under the Constitution. This resolution simply ties the President's hands on any offensive action against Iraq unless Congress specifically approves, a process that could take months.

I would love to be part of an in-depth debate on this constitutional issue, but not under today's circumstances. As history reflects, the Commander in Chief has the authority to react instantly, and Congress has chosen to legally participate less than 2 percent of the time, in every case in support of the President.

This resolution, though nonbinding, would totally deny the Executive's emergency authority that currently does not necessarily lead to the start of war. That authority has been used, for instance, to force down the plane carrying the fleeing murderers of the *Achille Lauro* hijacking, and there are numerous other examples of a justified use of force.

In the name of separation of powers, this resolution is unduly restrictive and is unnecessary in light of the resolution offered in support of the United Nations.

Second, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution calling for the extension of economic sanc-

The sanctions have been somewhat effective but there has been universal agreement in congressional hearings that sanctions alone will not achieve Iraq's departure from Kuwait.

My conclusion is that Saddam Hussein wins if we merely attempt to extend economic sanctions. Under this legislative option, he has faced up to the United Nations and the United States, and we back away while he slaughters the people of Kuwait. His stature is enhanced, and we unravel the fabric of international cooperation that is the best hope for long-term world peace.

I believe that some Members will vote for both the U.N. Presidential authority resolution and extended sanctions. This has some appeal to me because I argued weeks ago that sanctions could play a greater role in weakening Iraq. Since then the United Nations has approved Resolution No. 678 with the January 15 deadline, and President Bush has increased our troop strength dramatically. Under today's circumstances, I believe that supporting both resolutions is contradictory.

Third, the Solarz-Michel resolution authorizing, upon certification by the President that all diplomatic and peaceful means have been exhausted, the use of armed forces under the provisions of U.N. Resolution 678.

This is not a declaration of war. It is authorization for the use of force if all else fails. It is a big stick.

I am increasingly convinced that positive action by Congress, backing up the United Nations and our President, will be the next logical step toward a peaceful solution and the most effective message that we can deliver to Saddam Hussein. He will probably be encouraged by the debate, as our system of government allows the full presentation of dissenting views. But a strong vote in support of this joint resolution is the enforceable bottom line that also characterizes our system.

The President does not need this authority to proceed under the U.N. resolution and its January 15 deadline. My visits to the White House during the past few days underscore the President's support for Perez de Cuellar's last-minute efforts at diplomacy, and his contempt for Iraq's continuing efforts to break up the international strength that has amassed against his brutality.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, well, I guess I don't really know what the point of this resolution is.

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution vests Congress with the power to declare war. The executive and legislative branches have disagreed ever since on how this power relates to the President's role as head of state and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.

I'm sure all the Members of this House agree that the President should consult Congress on planned military action, and seek congressional authorization whenever possible. This is because our political system works best when there is agreement between the branches of Government on this important question.

Perhaps there is no great harm in adopting this resolution, provided it is seen in connection with the other actions that will be taken by this House and the Congress. I hope and expect that Congress will adopt a resolution supporting action under U.N. Security Council

Resolution No. 678 which authorizes the use of all necessary means, including military force, to respond to Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

This resolution simply restates the constitutional provisions on the power to declare war. It does not and cannot add to the powers of the President and Congress on the use of U.S. military forces overseas.

Also, this resolution speaks only of offensive action against Iraq. I don't know what this is supposed to mean, but many experts believe that—under both international and domestic law—military actions taken as part of U.N. Security Council enforcement actions are defensive in nature. They believe that a state of war has existed in the Persian Gulf since Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait on August 2. So, once again, this resolution would not impose any new limitation on the President's authority.

But the bottom line is this—that the House is now preparing to adopt not only this resolution but a resolution to support the actions that the President will take, in accordance with the Security Council resolution, to turn back Iraq's aggression against Kuwait.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Durbin-Bennett resolution.

As chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, I have been deeply concerned by the President's continued denial of the Congress' constitutional prerogative with regard to the declaration of war.

With the Bennett-Durbin resolution, Congress does no more than reassert our constitutional prerogative—the sole power to declare war—which article I, section 8 of the U.S. Constitution gives to Congress alone.

In a better world, such a restatement of the Constitution would be unnecessary. But, today, we find ourselves in a climate where an American President has cast among the American people shadows of doubt on Congress' role in making war. This resolution removes those shadows, and reassures the American people that war will never be declared in this country by one person, acting alone.

The President is, of course, the Commander in Chief once war is begun, but he has absolutely no constitutional authority to start a war on his own. There can be no graver decision than a decision taking our country to war. It is Congress' constitutional prerogative and solemn responsibility to make this grave determination.

The resolution before us makes this point crystal clear. I strongly urge its passage.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. OBEY). Pursuant to the rule, the previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution.

The question is on the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 302, nays 131, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 7]

YEAS—302

Abercrombie
Ackerman
Alexander
Anderson
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Annunzio
Anthony
Applegate
Aspin
Atkins
AuCoin
Bacchus
Barnard
Barnes
Bellenson
Bennett
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Billbray
Boehrlert
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Boxer
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown
Bruce
Bryant
Bustamante
Byron
Campbell (CO)
Cardin
Carper
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Coble
Coleman (MO)
Coleman (TX)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conte
Conyers
Cooper
Costello
Cox (IL)
Coyne
Cramer
Darden
de la Garza
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dooley
Dorgan (ND)
Downey
Duncan
Durbin
Dwyer
Early
Eckart
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
Engel
English
Erdreich
Espy
Evans
Fascell
Fawell
Fazio
Feighan
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gaydos

Gedensson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Gray
Green
Guarini
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamilton
Hammerschmidt
Harris
Hayes (IL)
Hayes (LA)
Hefner
Henry
Hertel
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Horn
Hoyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hutto
Jacobs
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (SD)
Johnston
Jones (GA)
Jones (NC)
Jontz
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Klecza
Klug
Kolter
Kopetski
Kostmayer
LaFalce
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin
Leach
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Levin (MI)
Levine (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey (NY)
Luken
Machtley
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDade
McDermott
McGrath
McHugh
McMillen (MD)
McNulty
Meyers
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Miller (WA)
Mineta
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moody
Moran
Morella
Mrázek

Murphy
Murtha
Nagle
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Ortiz
Orton
Owens (NY)
Owens (UT)
Pallone
Panetta
Bilirakis
Parker
Patterson
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pease
Pelosi
Penny
Perkins
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Porter
Poshard
Price
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reed
Regula
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Roe
Roemer
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Savage
Sawyer
Scheuer
Schroeder
Schumer
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shays
Sikorski
Siskisky
Skaggs
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter (NY)
Smith (FL)
Snowe
Solarz
Spratt
Staggers
Stallings
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Studds
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tallon
Tanner
Tausin
Taylor (MS)
Thomas (GA)
Thornton
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traffant
Traxler

Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Walsh
Washington

Waters
Waxman
Weiss
Weldon
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson

Wise
Wolpe
Wyden
Yates
Yatron
Young (FL)
Zimmer

NAYS—131

Allard
Archer
Armey
Baker
Ballenger
Barrett
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bilirakis
Billey
Boehner
Broomfield
Bunning
Burton
Callahan
Camp
Campbell (CA)
Chandler
Clinger
Combust
Coughlin
Cox (CA)
Crane
Cunningham
Dannemeyer
Davis
DeLay
Dickinson
Doolittle
Dornan (CA)
Dreier
Edwards (OK)
Fields
Fish
Franks (CT)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goss
Gradison

Grandy
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hastert
Hatcher
Hefley
Herger
Holloway
Hopkins
Horton
Houghton
Hunter
Hyde
Inhofe
Ireland
James
Kasich
Kolbe
Kyl
Lagomarsino
Lent
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Livingston
Lowery (CA)
Madigan
Marlenee
Martin
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McEwen
McMillan (NC)
Michel
Miller (OH)
Mollinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morrison
Myers
Nichols
Nussle

Oxley
Packard
Paxon
Pickle
Pursell
Quillen
Ravenel
Ray
Rhodes
Riggs
Ritter
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Schulze
Shaw
Shuster
Skeen
Slaughter (VA)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sundquist
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Vander Jagt
Vucanovich
Walker
Weber
Wolf
Wylie
Young (AK)
Zeliff

NOT VOTING—2

Dymally

Udall

□ 1115

Mr. BUSTAMANTE changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REGARDING UNITED STATES POLICY TO REVERSE IRAQ'S OCCUPATION OF KUWAIT

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 3 of House Resolution 27, it is now in order to consider the concurrent resolution printed in section 2 of House Report 102-1 by, and if offered by, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] or the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], or their designee.

For what purpose does the gentleman from Missouri rise?

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the rule, I offer House Concurrent Resolution No. 33.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the concurrent resolution.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 33

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That (a) the Congress is firmly committed to reversing Iraq's brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait.

(b) The Congress authorizes continued use of American military force to enforce the United Nations economic embargo against Iraq; to defend Saudi Arabia from direct Iraqi attack; and to protect American forces in the region.

(c) The Congress believes that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time and should be sustained.

(d) The Congress pledges its full and continued support for sustaining the policy of increasing economic and diplomatic pressure against Iraq; for maintaining our military options; and for efforts to increase the military and financial contributions made by allied nations.

(e) The Constitution requires the President to obtain authorization from the Congress before initiating new offensive military action or waging war against Iraq or Iraqi forces. The Congress does not rule out the enactment by the Congress at a later time of a declaration of war or other Congressional authorization for the use of force should that become necessary to achieve the goal of forcing Iraqi troops from Kuwait. The Congress will consider any request from the President for such an authorization expeditiously in accordance with the priority procedures set forth in section 2.

SEC. 2. PRIORITY PROCEDURES.

(a) The House leadership commits to ensuring swift consideration of a Presidential request to authorize the use of force against Iraq. On the first legislative day on which the President submits such a request, the majority leader of the House of Representatives shall introduce (by request) a joint resolution to carry out that request. Notwithstanding clause 4(b) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, for the purpose of expediting the consideration and passage of any joint resolution introduced pursuant to this subsection, it shall be in order for the Committee on Rules of the House of Representatives to present for consideration a resolution of the House of Representatives providing procedures for the prompt consideration of that joint resolution under this subsection.

(b) Subsection (a) is adopted by the Congress with full recognition of the constitutional right of either House to determine the rules of its proceedings (so far as relating to such House).

□ 1120

Mr. GEPHARDT (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the concurrent resolution be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Missouri?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] will be recognized for 30 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.

For what purpose does the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] rise?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the

Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, and I ask unanimous consent that the debate in opposition be controlled, 20 minutes by the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI] and 10 minutes by myself.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], the majority leader.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I rise in support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution.

Congress and the President agree that Iraq must leave Kuwait. We differ today on means, not ends.

Supporters of Gephardt-Hamilton are as serious about reversing aggression as supporters of the President's resolution. Iraq will be forced out of Kuwait.

Our strategy is not sanctions alone. It includes tough sanctions, diplomatic isolation and the threat of force.

This strategy is working. It continues to ratchet up the pressure on Iraq. You simply cannot yet say this strategy has failed. We should not shift to a war strategy.

There are two issues before members.

First, who decides when we use force?

We have a constitutional responsibility to vote at the time when and if the President concludes force is necessary. That decision must be made jointly.

The President's resolution means Congress gives up the right to decide. It means we give the President unlimited discretion to start a war in circumstances that cannot be foreseen. He should not make that decision alone.

Second, should we stay the course?

I believe there are three arguments for staying the course.

First, the three-pronged U.S. strategy of tough sanctions, diplomatic isolation and the threat of force is working.

It has produced results. Iraq has been isolated; hostages have been released; Saudi Arabia is safe; and oil continues to flow.

Economic sanctions have begun to bite. They are seriously damaging the Iraqi economy. They will inflict further pain in all sectors. There is a reasonable expectation that this strategy will succeed.

Second, our current strategy is better than the alternative of war. There are no guarantees war will be quick or easy.

War will have risks for the United States and unintended consequences. War will: Split the coalition; estrange us from our closest allies; make us the object of Arab hostility; endanger friendly governments in the region; and not be easy to end, once started.

War will be largely a U.S. operation. We have three-quarters of the fighting forces. The coalition will be divided by war. Some partners: Will fight only in Kuwait, not in Iraq; some will rethink participation if Israel enters; some will not use ground forces; and still others have not sent ground forces. Coalition support for war is questionable. War promises no neat solution.

What does it mean to win a war, and what comes next? The region is volatile and prone to violent change; alliance shift. A few years ago, we helped Saddam Hussein against the ayatollah; some think Saddam's demise will solve all our problems; it will not. Who will rule in Baghdad? Who will police the region? What will be our role? Bringing stability to the Middle East after a war will be protracted and difficult.

Third, diplomatic options have not been exhausted.

Saddam Hussein is isolated. You do not get a message to him if you do not convey it directly. Six hours of talks after nearly six months of stalemate with a Foreign Minister who is not a key adviser do not exhaust diplomacy; several other diplomatic initiatives are underway; and to declare war ends diplomacy.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Speaker, some of the President's supporters call his resolution the last, best chance for peace. Two chief sponsors of the President's resolution call it the equivalent of a declaration of war. You cannot have it both ways.

The Gephardt-Hamilton resolution: Preserves the role of the Congress; guarantees our participation in any decision; and does not delegate that decision to the President.

Mr. Speaker, we must stay the course: Current policy is working; we are putting the screws on Iraq; the sanctions are biting; diplomatic options are opening; and events are moving in our direction. You simply cannot make the judgment today that current U.S. strategy has failed. This strategy stands a reasonable chance of success.

There are better alternatives to war: War will bring devastation, death, horror and havoc far beyond Iraq; we must exhaust all options before we resort to the use of force; and we must stay the course.

I urge adoption of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, the last two days have reflected the best of American tradition at a moment of crisis. We have listened to Members' opinions reflecting every conceivable point of view regarding the challenge we face in the Middle East.

This morning we have reached the moment of truth.

I urge my colleagues to be very restrained in their rhetoric during the debate today. It is one thing to make speeches for domestic consumption. It is quite another to realize that what we say here, right now, is being carefully measured by Saddam Hussein. America will not be hurt by what her politicians do not say today.

The President wants peace. He opposes the kind of violence that led to the absorption of Kuwait by Iraq. He needs the united strength of all of America as he extends his hand for a peaceful solution. Let us make certain that what we say and do here does not weaken his hand.

Every voice that does not support the world's opposition to Iraq's aggression weakens the President's voice. Every voice that does not support the logic of the United Nations muffles the world's cry for peace. My colleagues, to each of you personally I must say this, do not let your voice weaken the slim chance for peace.

Saddam Hussein has aggressive intent beyond Kuwait. If President Bush had not acted swiftly in August, Iraq would have moved on Saudi Arabia and we would already be at war. Since that time, a vast coalition of nations seeking a new world order has come together to condemn Iraq's occupation of Kuwait and demand its withdrawal.

The United States and the United Nations have exercised every possible avenue to bring about a diplomatic solution. In the meantime, Hussein continues to build his military capability. He is moving quickly to develop weapons of mass destruction, including missiles to accurately deliver poison gas. He is working frantically toward nuclear capability.

The time has come for us to squarely face that line in the sand. Yes, my colleagues, the time has come for us to set aside partisanship. The time has come for a united American voice to strengthen the President's effort for peace.

I am not unlike many of my constituents who have family serving in the gulf. My nephew Erich, who commands a Black Hawk helicopter crew, is among the thousands of young men and women on the front lines in the Saudi desert. Thoughts of him weigh heavily on my mind. Like most people, I do not want to see America go to war. But like Erich, I will continue to support my President.

Mr. Speaker, I support the civilized world's opposition to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. We must join the world of nations to see that Saddam Hussein's aggression does not prevail. I urge the Congress to give overwhelming support to the U.N. resolutions and the world effort toward a sensible and peaceful resolution.

□ 1130

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, after the brutal Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, President Bush reacted quickly. He sent in the 82d Airborne, he sent in the Marine Expeditionary Force, he deployed carriers, he sent in F-15 fighters, and he consulted with Congress.

I personally, in my job as chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, met with him 11 times on this crisis. I have talked with him on the phone, and we gave him advice. He did not talk to us; we talked to him.

We said to him get the allies involved; seek burden sharing; don't repeat Vietnam. We said, everything must be done under the auspices of the United Nations.

President Bush, with his background in diplomacy, as former Ambassador to the United Nations, did a brilliant job. I do not know if there is anybody else in history better prepared for this type of a crisis. He talked to his allies, and he sent Secretary of State Baker to encourage burden sharing. He took that advice, and he has done everything in that regard.

The United Nations then passed 12 resolutions, condemning Iraq, and allowing member states to use force if necessary to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

He has continued diplomatic efforts for a peaceful solution. As a matter of fact, a number of us were in a meeting with the President. He was interrupted. Secretary Baker had called from Geneva. He went out, and came back 10 minutes later and said, "We have been stiffed. This guy made no compromise, indicated no flexibility. He is not willing at all to agree to a diplomatic solution. All the flurry of activity and all the diplomacy we have been involved in has produced nothing."

I visited the 82d Airborne 1 month after the deployment. Let me tell you something: there is no harsher environment. I have been in the jungles of Vietnam, I have been in the jungles of Central America. There is no harsher environment than the deserts of the Middle East.

If you sit here in an air-conditioned office and you say, "Let our soldiers sit out there in the sand," you do not know what it is like. You put your hand on metal and you get a third-degree burn. It is so hot they have to train at nighttime and sleep in the daytime.

Many of them are getting just one hot meal a day and infrequent showers. It is easy for the Congress to sit back here and say, "We are going to allow these troops to sit out there in the sand for an unlimited period of time." We cannot do that, and they cannot sustain that physically.

I went down to Norfolk and Camp Lejeune to visit the families of the peo-

ple who have been deployed for the longest period of time. I listened to a lot of problems that they have.

I said to them, "What is the thing you want most? What is the problem I can resolve?"

They said, "We want our men home. We want our families together."

"What is the second most important problem?"

"We want them home soon."

I was out in the hallway the other day, and I hope this is not something we can say about a lot of Members, but I heard one Member say to another, "You know, this is just a concurrent resolution. It is only a sense of Congress resolution. It has no force of law. You can vote for this resolution. If it does not work out, you can always say, 'I didn't tie the hands of the President.'"

Let me tell you something: this is a concurrent resolution that has no force of law, but it sends an outrageous signal to Saddam Hussein if we were to pass it. It shows that this country is not united, and we have to be united if we are going to have a peaceful solution.

Let me read a quote to you:

America's strength is not great unless it is a united strength. Our power is not determining unless it is mobilized. America's will is not decisive unless it is one irresistible will.

That was made July 28, 1941, by the late great chairman Claude Pepper, trying to rally the American people to the cause and be prepared for World War II.

I was in the Marine Reserves during the Cuban crisis. I remember people saying when JFK was facing down Khrushchev, they said, "Let him put missiles in Cuba. We don't want a holocaust. We don't want to destroy the world. Let him put missiles there. We have missiles in Europe."

John Kennedy stood up to Khrushchev, and this is a better, more secure America, for what he did in those days.

The United States has to be united against Saddam Hussein and united in support of the international community arrayed against Saddam Hussein. We must be united in support of our troops deployed in Saudi Arabia.

The way to send the message of unity is simple: vote against the concurrent resolution, which has no force in law, and vote for the Michel-Solarz joint resolution, allowing the President to continue his good work.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON].

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution which embraces the current policy of sanctions, diplomacy, and

military deterrence to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait.

The policy of sanctions has the broad-based support of the American public. History has demonstrated time and time again that strong support at home for major action abroad has long been the formula for success in American foreign policy. It is in keeping with this democratic tradition that I support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. Speaker, this debate is not about whether Congress, by its actions, will either be opposing or supporting Saddam Hussein. No one wants to reward Saddam for his aggression in Kuwait. No one here wants to let him threaten the world with weapons of mass destruction and no one wants to allow Saddam to control the free flow of oil from the Persian Gulf.

The President's response to Hussein's piracy of Kuwait was supported by the Congress and the American people back in August. The issue before us now is whether the United States should continue to use sanctions to starve Saddam's army out of Kuwait over the long term or force his troops out militarily in the short term. That is the context in which this debate should be framed.

Mr. Speaker, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution rightly maintains our current policy. The underpinning of this resolution views military force as a last resort. We owe it to our troops in the gulf to exhaust every conceivable option before embarking on a military offensive in the gulf.

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, I recall when many of us here called for the imposition of sanctions against Saddam Hussein when he used chemical weapons to kill thousands of innocent Kurds back in 1988. Last year, many of us, once again, sought to impose economic sanctions to protest Saddam's butchery of his own people. In both cases, sanctions were derailed by the State Department which contended that such punitive measures were counterproductive and would send the wrong message to Baghdad.

Mr. Speaker, had we imposed those sanctions back then Saddam might not have grossly miscalculated the United States response to his invasion of Kuwait. Economic sanctions would have been the appropriate policy response then, just as maintaining our current policy of economic sanctions is the appropriate response now.

Our current policy will maintain the support of the American people and the world community. Force will not. Sanctions will eventually erode Iraq's war-making capacity and cause dissension within Saddam's military. That is a certainty. Force now, will result in a significant number of American casualties. That is a certainty.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution does not rule out the use of force, if it becomes necessary, in the future. But offensive military action, at this time, denies our American troops the benefit of allowing the sanctions time to work. We owe them that, and I would urge my colleagues to support Hamilton-Gephardt and oppose the use of force resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the

gentleman from Maryland [Mr. CARDIN].

Mr. CARDIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

First, let me compliment the leadership on both sides of this debate. It is clear that this Congress and our Nation are united in their commitment and their resolve to stop the aggression of Iraq and restore the lawful Government of Kuwait.

Where we differ is on the course we now should take to accomplish these goals. I favor the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

The current economic and political policies initiated by the United States and supported by our allies have worked. Iraq has been isolated. Our hostages have been released. Iraq has been denied the benefits of Kuwaiti oil. Saudi Arabia is secure, and we have established stability in the flow of oil from the Middle East. Now is the time to maintain this successful policy and accomplish our final objective of getting Iraq out of Kuwait.

By initiating offensive military action now we run the risk of unpredictable and unintended consequences. Can we keep our coalition together as other nations are drawn into active military engagement? What will be the continued U.S. obligation in the region after the cessation of hostilities? Are our allies willing to fairly share this burden?

There are those who say we cannot just stand by and do nothing. I agree. We have taken decisive action. We have enforced an economic blockade. We have sent hundreds of thousands of Americans to the Middle East. And this policy has brought world support.

Mr. Speaker, regardless of the vote on these resolutions, the message of this Congress is clear. We stand united in our support and will take any and all action necessary to support the brave men and women of this country who are in the Middle East, preserving the freedom for which this Nation was founded.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. STARK].

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution as a responsible alternative to the President's policy.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened very carefully to the debate for 2 days now.

I have not heard any of you say a single thing for which I would vote to send even one American to die. Not one of the many reasons given, such as Hussein being a modern-day Hitler, the need for oil, protecting the Saudis, the need to save Kuwait, or the safety of Israel have convinced me that war is justified. The only valid issue is whether to give President Bush authority to order thousands, even tens of thousands to their death.

Our allies have done almost nothing to help with this burden. The embargo is the only humane alternative.

I will not vote for the President's resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. COSTELLO].

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt

resolution. These are very difficult times for this country. These are very difficult times for every Member of the House of Representatives, and the other body. We are about to cast the most important vote of our careers. I cannot imagine a more difficult decision than the one that may result in putting thousands of American lives on the line.

As my colleagues know on both sides of the aisle, I have a very proud son who is a member of the 82d Airborne Division, an infantry paratrooper, who has been in Saudi Arabia since August. I spoke with him on the telephone this past Sunday. He is prepared both mentally and physically to go into combat if called upon. If we go to war, my son and thousands of young Americans will win this war, and we will be very proud of them.

This debate today is not about my son or any one soldier in the Middle East. This debate is about how we can best achieve our goals of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. It may take war. I have not ruled out war. The Gephardt resolution does not rule out war. It simply says that while we have the remaining option, economic sanctions, let us give economic sanctions time to work.

If I believed for 1 minute that by giving President Bush the authority to engage in combat and take this country to war we could achieve peace today, I would vote for the Solarz amendment. But I do not.

There is still evidence to indicate that economic sanctions and international diplomacy are in fact working. How long will they take? I do not know. There is no Member of this body that knows if it will take 3 months, 6 months, or a year.

But I do know this. The experts cannot agree as to how long it will take to be successful, but they do agree on one thing: That sanctions are effective, and they are working. If we go to war now or next week, we will never know if a peaceful resolution might have prevailed.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, in the last 48 hours I have been asked by the news media if President Bush had his son on the front line, and if each and every Member of this body and the other body had a son or daughter on the front line in Saudi Arabia today, would it affect their decision?

I truly believe that it would. But I do not believe that the outcome of the vote today would be any different. I believe that Members of this body would do as I have done. I have listened to the testimony, I have listened to the debate, I have gone to the Middle East, and now I will cast my vote to do what I think is right. Not for Pvt. Jerry F. Costello, but for this country.

If you believe that the path of peace is with the Solarz resolution, then I respect that, and I ask you to vote for

Solarz. But if you believe, as I believe, that economic sanctions may work, then I ask you to support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

□ 1140

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. REGULA].

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, I have listened carefully to the debate on the resolutions now before this body. It is clear that both the Gephardt and the Solarz-Michel resolutions, as well as Durbin, recognize the need to evict Iraq from Kuwait and to reverse the brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait.

The debate today is over the most effective means of achieving the goal of gaining freedom for the beleaguered nation of Kuwait.

I am convinced that sanctions alone will not result in the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait and will only result in erosion of the strength of the U.N. coalition. The tyrant Saddam Hussein will be emboldened by what he perceives as a lack of will on the part of the United States and its United Nations allies. Time will only make the problem facing the international military forces more difficult and potentially more costly in human life.

As the President continues working for a peaceful solution he needs to be armed with the option of using force. The record of brutality of Saddam Hussein shows clearly that he does not respond to rational options.

As President George Washington stated in his first annual address to the Congress, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace."

The Solarz-Michel resolution recognizes that as President Bush seeks peace he must have the support of this body and that the President must be armed with a credible threat of force.

The Solarz-Michel resolution mandates that the President must certify to Congress that "the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions * * *." In addition, the resolution approved by the House invokes the War Powers Resolution.

Passage of this resolution would allow the continuance of sanctions and diplomacy while providing the credible threat of force. This combination has the best chance of achieving a peaceful solution.

This decision is not easy. Having myself served in the U.S. Navy, I fervently resist the idea of war. I hope and pray that we can still avoid war. Our images of the post-cold-war era do not involve fighting. They involve economic prosperity, the free trade of both products and ideas, a renewed emphasis on qual-

ity of life for all people, and equality of opportunity.

And then one man, hungry for the power that oil would provide him, and seeing himself as the savior of the Arab world, clouded our view of the world we are trying to build.

All Americans would prefer that a peaceful and diplomatic solution could be found to resolve the crisis. I believe President Bush has taken every reasonable opportunity in pursuit of a non-violent resolution. To that end, the threat of force becomes another mechanism.

A decision by Congress and the American people to deny the President this option would seriously undermine his efforts to convince Saddam Hussein that the international force arrayed against him is serious. Authorizing the use of force may be the last means of conveying to Iraq that it would be in its best interests to pull out of Kuwait.

This is not a regional conflict. If it were, 32 nations would not have contributed either men or material, or both, to the military force stationed in the Persian Gulf. It is an international crisis, not because of oil, but because of the power that controlling 21 percent of the world's oil reserves would bestow upon one man who used naked aggression to obtain it.

Do we reward Saddam Hussein or do we stop him? Most people believe that if he is not stopped now, he will have to be stopped in the future. It is better to do it now than to wait for him to achieve his goal of a nuclear weapons capability.

Moreover, does waiting longer improve the chance of an Iraqi pullout or does it strengthen Saddam Hussein's position? There are many points of view on the effects of economic sanctions. CIA Director Webster reports that the strength of Iraqi ground forces will not be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months even if effective sanctions could be maintained. Two former hostages who visited my office this week reported that food in Iraq is plentiful, but that food shipments were not being made to Kuwaiti residents. Again, they are the victims of aggression.

Regardless of differences of opinion on what course should be taken, I hope that all Americans will support our 430,000 soldiers, sailors, and air force personnel who are proudly serving their country.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GREEN].

Mr. GREEN of New York. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me. I have reluctantly concluded that the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution would seriously undercut U.N. Resolution 678.

Mr. Speaker, the decision of the congressional leadership to wait until 4 days before

the January 15, 1991, deadline specified in U.N. Resolution 678 to have a vote on the Persian Gulf situation is troubling, and moreover, threatens to undercut the legitimate and well-thought out process that led to U.N. Resolution 678.

I do not want to be misunderstood—clearly, I do believe it is appropriate for the Congress to debate matters of this profound importance. However, the time to do that effectively has largely passed, and the opportunity to consider these issues was ignored. By inserting ourselves into the process at this late date, our ability to participate in a meaningful way is severely limited and could severely cripple the recently begun process of providing for collective security through the United Nations.

U.N. Resolution 678, with its predecessors, is the first major effort of the United Nations to function on behalf of collective security since the end of the cold war. This is our first effort to enable the Security Council to function as the drafters of the U.N. Charter envisaged, whereby the great powers—and particularly the United States and the U.S.S.R.—would work together through the Security Council to ensure the collective security of peoples around the world.

If the Congress now undercuts Resolution 678, it will likely destroy forever this initiative to reconstitute the United Nations as it was originally conceived as the vehicle by which the nations of the world work together for collective security.

The 101st Congress, in its waning days, did not lack opportunities to affect the process. By the time we had adjourned on October 28, 1990, we had approved a defense authorization and appropriations bill that provided funds for the stationing of troops in the Persian Gulf. Since that deployment had been in accordance with article 51 of the U.N. Charter and U.N. Resolution 665 concerning the naval and maritime blockade, our vote plainly endorsed that deployment.

I supported those efforts, joining over 400 of my colleagues in approving an additional \$978 million for Persian Gulf related operations on September 19, 1990.

When the House adjourned on October 28, 1990—well over 2 months ago—our adjournment motion contained a specific provision allowing the Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate to call the 101st Congress back into session on 2 days' notice. Thus we were not dependent on a Presidential call of a special session under article II, section 3 of the Constitution in order to reconvene to consider issues relating to the Persian Gulf; we could have been called back at any time by our leadership.

By mid-November, it was clear that President Bush was seeking international support for a U.N. Security Council resolution to authorize the use of force to enforce the previous resolution adopted by the Security Council regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The November 19, 1990, New York Times reported on Secretary Baker's trip to the U.S.S.R., specifying that he was there to secure the U.S.S.R.'s support of a U.N. resolution backing a use of force.

However, this effort by President Bush did not bear fruit until November 29, when the Security Council passed U.N. Resolution 678,

authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to withdraw from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

The administration effort to secure U.N. Resolution 678 represented a significant change in position from that which the Congress had approved in appropriating funds for the Persian Gulf effort. It was during that 10 day period between the reports of that new position and the enactment of Resolution 678 that the Congress should have been called back into session. This would have been the opportunity to consider the issues raised by this change of position, if there was any question of lack of congressional support, or if the Congress wished to impose any conditions.

It would have been appropriate, for example, to consider the issue of burden sharing, since I am not satisfied that all of our allies are carrying their share of the burden in this effort. Frankly, I had expected a larger commitment in dollars and manpower from many of our allies.

By means of a debate and enactment of a resolution between November 19 and November 29, the position of the Congress could have been made clear before Resolution 678 was considered and before the governments of other countries had acted to support us by voting for Resolution 678 or by maintaining troops or financing operations in the gulf area impacted by decisions on Resolution 678.

However, the fact we face today is that Congress did not meet during that period of time to consider those very serious issues, and all of the governments involved acted in reliance on Resolution 678.

Make no mistake about it—a vote of congressional support of or opposition to Resolution 678 is dramatically different on January 11 or 12 from what it would have been on November 23. Our choices now are very limited. If we repudiate the resolution, we hand Saddam Hussein a powerful weapon and cast serious doubt over the United Nations effort to act effectively as an arbiter of international disputes. In fact, by waiting until this later hour, we have rendered ourselves extraneous to any positive policy role, unless we are prepared to try to force a change in the position taken by the United Nations.

I know that the leadership of the Congress does not wish either to help Saddam Hussein or to damage the United Nations; yet, by failing to act at the appropriate time, we face this Hobson's choice.

Supporters of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution describe it as a "stay the course" resolution. In fact, I heard one of its sponsors, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] so describe it on ABC's Nightline, and he so described it a few minutes ago. I think that description would have been true prior to November 29; it is plainly untrue today. Since November 29, the course on which we have been placed is that set forth in U.N. Resolution 678, under which January 15 is the deadline for Iraq's compliance and use of force is authorized to achieve compliance.

I have other problems with the Gephardt-Hamilton approach. Though I am very skeptical of the efficacy of sanctions, let us assume that they can work in a year or two. That still leaves the question: Can President Bush hold together the fragile and diverse coalition arrayed against Iraq for as long as it will take

sanctions to work? I am very doubtful that he can. But even if he can, can we afford to pay the price that will be necessary to do so? How long do we remain silent about the Baltic States? What if European nations that were only too happy to sell Iraq the makings of its chemical and nuclear weapons industries start using the Persian Gulf situation as a lever in our trade talks with them?

When one considers questions like those, the superficial attractiveness of the Gephardt-Hamilton proposal rapidly fades. I urge a vote against it.

As I have stated, if the Congress did not wish to embark on the course called for by U.N. Resolution 678, then Speaker FOLEY and Senator MITCHELL should have reconvened us prior to November 29. To change course now can only persuade Saddam Hussein of our irresolution and increase the probability that force will ultimately have to be used if we truly insist that Iraq get out of Kuwait. For that reason, I shall cast my vote in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution and the positions contained in Resolution 678, and oppose efforts to undercut the United Nations, the President, and those nations who have, in good faith, acted to support us.

I do so most solemnly. I understand that any war in the Persian Gulf will involve casualties. I do not view those casualties with equanimity. But let us hope that, at the very least, this unhappy situation can be the start of a process by which we develop a workable system for collective security backed by the world's major powers.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, at issue today is whether this Congress favors a policy of peacekeeping or keeping an unprincipled peace.

Sanctifying the status quo in the gulf, as the Hamilton-Gephardt approach so flaccidly does, grants time and solace for a tyrannical satrap to fortify his sand redoubt in Kuwait, to perfect with hideous science his biochemical and nuclear weapons capacity, and to continue to exhort, without compunction or conscience, murderous miscreants around the world to replicable acts of terrorism.

Sanctifying the status quo drives a stake into the heart of international law, for it renders hapless the collective security system that Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt worked so assiduously to create, and American soldiers in the great wars of this century fought so courageously to make possible.

When human beings are allowed to be raped as an instrument of state policy, when innocent citizens are executed at an epidemic rate, when a country is not only being systematically pillaged, but a culture eviscerated, moral people have an obligation to do more than simply wring their hands and suggest that resolve be diluted by the sands of time.

The Hamilton-Gephardt approach is a nonbinding copout. It leaves a fragile

world order increasingly vulnerable to aggression and thus war.

The President's collective security approach, on the other hand, gives hope that an international order will be established based on the precept that aggression will not be rewarded, that peacekeeping is peacemaking, that potentates, whether petty or mighty, who through naked aggression attempt to take the world hostage will be held accountable to the rule of law.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington, [Mr. CHANDLER].

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, I think we need to keep clear in mind the choice we face today. Under Michel-Solarz we authorize the President of the United States to use force in the Persian Gulf to enforce the U.N. resolutions and bring about a withdrawal from Kuwait by Iraq. Or we adopt the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution and deny the use of force, require extension of sanctions with no time limit, and add to the end of that a congressional approval requirement for any future use of force.

Unfortunately, Michel-Solarz has been characterized today as a declaration of war, one which gives up on diplomacy. Let me point out within the language itself of Michel-Solarz there is a requirement for every last single effort to bring about a final-hour diplomatic solution. The President would be required to report to this Speaker and to the majority leader of the Senate that he has, and I quote from the resolution,

*** used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council's resolutions (cited in the subsection above), and that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

The U.N. Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar, is advancing a peace plan today. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker have made it clear that they are open to any reasonable, peaceful diplomatic solution. President Mikhail Gorbachev has offered his assistance, and the President, by the language of the Michel-Solarz resolution, is required to use diplomacy.

I do not know about you, but I have had a lot of trouble sleeping the last couple of nights. I think that is the case with all of us. But what I would suggest you do is look at the face of the President of the United States. That face is drawn, it is lined, it is the face of a man under tremendous strain, a man carrying an agonizing burden.

President Bush is not a gunslinger. He is not a Rambo, and he does not want war. But regrettably, I have concluded that he needs the authority to wage war in order to make diplomacy work.

If there are no consequences for the failure of diplomacy, diplomacy has no chance to succeed with a man like Saddam Hussein. I urge the defeat of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. RANGEL].

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of Hamilton-Gephardt that will give the opportunity for sanctions to work in the Persian Gulf, and against a declaration of war that has been expressed in the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

As I've talked to my constituents over the last few weeks about what to do in the Persian Gulf, I think a lot about my boyhood friend John Waden.

John Waden grew up five doors down the block from my home in Malden. In 1966, he came back from Vietnam in a body bag. I had looked up to John Waden, but at his wake I looked down at his closed casket and wondered why he had died. As I went from adult to adult, I searched for an answer. No one could explain to me what the war in Vietnam was all about. I swore then that if I were ever in any position of power, I would do everything I could to assure that before any young persons were asked to lay down his or her life for our country, we would be able to explain to that young person's friends and family the reasons why.

So far, I haven't heard any explanations that would satisfy the loved ones of the new generation of John Wadens who now stand poised to fight in the Persian Gulf. Some say that Saddam Hussein is a Hitler who must be stopped; that if we don't use force to drive Iraq from Kuwait, we will only whet Saddam's appetite for further aggression, much as Neville Chamberlain's appeasement at Munich encouraged further Nazi aggression.

As my mother often says, if you don't start out working smarter, you'll end up working harder. If one drop of American blood is spilled in the sands of Saudi Arabia this winter, it will be because for the last decade America has not worked smarter. This failure can be directly traced to four public policy failures by the Reagan and Bush administrations that, taken together, have established the conditions for U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf crisis.

First, energy policy. In 1980, the Reagan-Bush campaign called for the elimination of the Department of Energy. To make good on this campaign promise, President Reagan appointed a dentist named James Edwards as Secretary of Energy. Edwards testified before Congress that he intended to shut down the Department so he could "be back in South Carolina for hunting or fishing in April or May." When questioned on how he could possibly be serious about such a timetable—let alone the

wisdom of such a move—Edwards joked "the fishing is good in June or July as well."

A "Gone Fishin'" sign has hung on the door of the Reagan-Bush energy policy ever since—automobile fuel economy standards rolled back, appliance and building efficiency standards gutted, energy conservation research slashed, alternative energy research cut. The Department of Energy, which, in 1980, had earmarked more than two-thirds of its total budget for civilian energy programs and one-third for nuclear weapons, was by the end of the decade spending two-thirds of its funds on nuclear weapons and only one-third on civilian energy programs. Ten years later the United States still has no long-term energy independence strategy, and U.S. oil imports have soared from 34 to over 50 percent of total consumption, thereby immersing us ever deeper in the insanity of Middle Eastern politics.

Second, nuclear proliferation. During the 1980 campaign Ronald Reagan claimed that nuclear proliferation was not "any of our business." Once in office the Reagan-Bush administration cut back on enforcement of United States nuclear nonproliferation laws, allowing Iraq to obtain access to sensitive technologies used in its nuclear weapons program. Moreover, the administration sat on the sidelines as Iraq manipulated oil exports to blackmail European countries into supplying it with nuclear technology and assistance that it could use to build the bomb. Ironically, the Bush administration now warns of Saddam Hussein's nuclear ambitions, but when Israel launched an air strike against Iraq's Osirak nuclear powerplant in 1981, to halt Saddam's drive to acquire nuclear explosives, the Reagan-Bush administration sharply criticized Israel's courageous action. During the several months following the raid, the United States actually worked with Iraq on various U.N. resolutions condemning Israel.

Third, chemical weapons. In 1983, Saddam Hussein began using chemical weapons against Iranian troops and in 1988, he used nerve gas against the Kurdish minority in Iraq. The Reagan-Bush administration turned a blind eye toward Iraqi use of chemical weapons and in 1988 it successfully opposed congressional efforts to impose sanctions against Iraq for its use of such weapons. During this same period, America's moral stance against the use of chemical weapons was undercut by the Reagan administration's efforts to break a longstanding U.S. moratorium on production of lethal nerve gas—including then Vice President George Bush's three tie-breaking votes in the U.S. Senate in favor of new chemical weapons production.

Fourth, the tilt toward Iraq. In 1980, Saddam Hussein invaded Iran. Instead of condemning this act of "naked Iraqi aggression," the Reagan-Bush administration tilted toward Baghdad, and in 1982, it removed Iraq from the list of terrorist nations—thereby clearing the way for providing Iraq with agricultural credits. By 1984, the United States restored full diplomatic relations with Iraq and shortly thereafter it reportedly began providing Saddam with covert intelligence support, including satellite photographs of Iranian military formations.

By July 1990, Congress was pressing to end the pro-Iraqi tilt of United States foreign policy, adopting measures that would cut off agricultural credits to Iraq until it complied with international agreements on human rights and weapons nonproliferation. In response, the State Department issued a statement opposing this legislation, saying that "measures now under consideration would not help us achieve United States goals with Iraq."

Incredibly, when Iraq escalated its war of words with Kuwait over oil production increases last July and began threatening war, State Department officials testified before Congress that the United States was unlikely to respond sharply to an Iraqi military action, noting that the United States had "no defense treaty relationship with any gulf country" and that "we have historically avoided taking a position on border disputes or internal OPEC deliberations." The State Department also instructed the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to tell Saddam Hussein that "we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

Given this sorry record, is it any wonder that we are today facing a Saddam Hussein armed with chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and on the verge of acquiring nuclear explosives within the next decade? Will we now compound these previous blunders by plunging America head long into a costly military confrontation with Iraq?

There is an alternative to war. It has four parts.

First, instead of launching a bloody offensive war, we should maintain a multinational military force in Saudi Arabia to contain Saddam Hussein and deter any further Iraqi aggression. A policy of containment and deterrence won the cold war against the Soviet Union; it can certainly lead to a successful resolution of the gulf crisis. Remarkably, with the end of the cold war, both the United States and the Soviet Union stand united in opposition to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, making it possible for the entire world community to join in demanding an Iraqi withdrawal. Now we need to give this unprecedented exercise in international cooperation more time to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.

But we must also demand that all participants in the coalition arrayed against Iraq bear their fair share of the burden on containment and deterrence. Our European and Japanese allies, who are heavily dependent on imported gulf oil, should increase their contributions to the multinational military force in the gulf. At the same time, we should expect greater Arab support for the joint effort. The Saudis, for example, are realizing a windfall profit of up to \$150 million a day from increases in the price of oil since the onset of the gulf crisis. They should be asked to use all of their windfall profits to help defray the costs of Operation Desert Shield.

Second, we should give the economic sanctions time to work. Those who argue that sanctions alone will not force Saddam from Kuwait are mistaken. Iraq invaded Kuwait for economic reasons, desiring access to Kuwait's rich oil reserves and wanting to shed the burden of the huge war debt it owed Kuwait for financing Saddam's war against Iran. The Iraqi

economy is already thirsting from the loss of \$1.5 billion in foreign exchange earnings every month—the equivalent by itself to more than a third of Iraq's total national product—and the sanctions are expected to lead to a 48-percent decline in Iraq's gross national product over the next 1 to 2 years, effectively choking Saddam's economy to death. Sanctions will also weaken Iraq's military capabilities by denying Saddam access to military equipment and spare parts for the Mig fighters, tanks, and other military hardware Iraq purchased from the Soviets before the invasion.

Third, America must take steps to reduce our overdependence on gulf oil. This overdependence threatens to interfere with our ability to advance other important American interests in this region, such as promoting a Middle East peace agreement which assures the security of Israel. It's time to take the "gone fishing" sign off the Department of Energy and forge a national energy policy capable of achieving energy independence. Such a policy must focus on improving energy efficiency and conservation, expanding Federal incentives for renewable energy production, expanding weatherization assistance, and promoting reliable and environmentally responsible energy sources.

Fourth, we must reverse the legacy of the past decade and become a principled world leader in opposing the spread of nuclear weapons. We should press for a more effective multilateral nuclear nonproliferation regime that serves as a technological stranglehold on the spread of nuclear explosives to countries such as Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Libya, and North Korea. This regime should include tougher international safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials and technologies, stricter inspection and verification procedures, bars on all nuclear-related exports to nonweapons states that refuse to accept international safeguards, a phase-out of all exports of highly enriched uranium, and harsh penalties for those countries which continue to engage in reckless proliferation policies.

Two weeks ago, at a town meeting I held in Billerica, a woman stood up before the microphone and told me how she lived each day in fear that America would soon be in a war and her son might come home in pieces. Cradling in her arms a picture of her boy as she choked back her emotions, she said:

"If my son had to go to war with people coming after us in our country, I'd be right there * * *. I'm a very American person, I'd be right there along with all my family. But this I don't understand. I'd like to have it explained why exactly they're over there."

We owe it to the soldiers and their families to pursue alternatives to war. If we do so, we will not need to search for explanations to make to the mother in Billerica, or to any of the families and friends of this generation of John Wadens. No caskets will be filled that cannot be justified. America will have worked smarter, our Nation and its economy will be stronger, and as a result, the young men and women now deployed in the deserts of Saudi Arabia will not have to fight and die harder.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. JENKINS].

Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Speaker, I come here today with the full understanding of how grave this situation is for our Nation. I have withheld statements to the press and avoided discussions of my positions based on hypothetical circumstances because I believe in the principle of pursuing diplomatic solutions as long as peace is within our grasp. I felt that more rhetoric, while our Secretary of State and our President worked within the framework of diplomacy to achieve a solution without war, did not serve our Nation well; and I have supported our President in his management of this political aggression in the Persian Gulf.

But I will not transfer my responsibility as a member of the U.S. Congress to the President in making the decision on whether or not this Nation engages in war against another nation. When the time comes to declare war, I will not hide behind some resolution absolving me of my constitutional responsibility.

But in my mind, that time—the time to declare war—has not yet come. When the time does come, a straight declaration of war resolution should be brought to this Congress for debate, not some resolution delegating to the President that sole responsibility.

There is no legislation, nor any proposition, that should be more closely examined and debated than one which authorizes war. It may be a difficult political vote when we decide to impose a new or higher tax on our people. But if we are wrong, life, nevertheless, goes on. In is not the end of the world. Where, however, the issue is war, life will not go on for many young men and women; and it will be the end of the world for them. Therefore, it is critical that we debate this with the full knowledge and understanding of what we are doing.

Liberty and freedom are worth fighting for. They are worth dying for. But war must be the very last resort.

Yes, Iraq has invaded and conquered Kuwait. Yes, the Iraqi military threatens Saudi Arabia, and only holds back because of the counterthreat of United States forces standing guard. Yes, the Iraqi leader is irrational and ruthless. But have we exhausted all means to turn away this aggression short of war?

For all of recorded history, the Middle East and the Persian Gulf have been the site of conflict and turmoil. It is not easy for us to fully understand the thinking of these people whose lives and history have been forever plagued with violence. We never fully understand the alliances which crisscross the boundaries of the various nations of this part of the world. We grope for understanding.

In total frustration, we are now ready to involve hundreds of thousands of our finest young men and women in a ground war in this troubled part of the world. But beyond that, we are now

committing billions of dollars in the future into the Middle East. There will be no end to this dollar drain.

Henry Clay, who served in the House, the Senate, and as our Secretary of State, addressed the House of Representatives on the issue of war on March 24, 1818. The words of Henry Clay 173 years ago apply here today. In his speech, Clay said:

It is not every cause of war that should lead to war. War is one of those dreadful scourges, that so shakes the foundation of society, interrupts or destroys the pursuits of private happiness, brings, in short, misery and wretchedness in so many forms, and at last is, in its issue, so doubtful and hazardous that nothing but dire necessity can justify an appeal to arms.

Are we and the American people ready for the misery and wretchedness of war?

I do not believe that time has yet come for the misery and wretchedness of war. I do not believe that the time has come to lay the lives of American men and women on the desert sands nor plunge them into the Persian Gulf waters.

For now, I favor continuing the sanctions for a time. But then in the event no avenue is left us but war, I will be here to cast my vote and to bear the burdens of the consequences of it. I am not quick to war, but I will be committed to it when it is a necessity.

In the heat of this debate, we should remember the words of former President Herbert Hoover:

Older men declare war. But it is youth that must fight and die. And it is youth who must inherit the tribulation, the sorrow and the triumphs that are the aftermath of war.

Now is not the time to rush into abdicating our constitutional responsibility for a few fleeting moments of political popularity. The effect of our decision here on this issue will last much longer than the 30 second sound bite and will be remembered far longer than what the political expedience of the moment was.

I am not yet convinced that war is the only avenue. I am not yet convinced, if war should be the only answer, that our allies are ready to fully participate with us in this endeavor. Surely we want that answer before we declare war.

I have heard your arguments that sanctions and diplomacy will not work. You may be right. But let us not yet give up on that possibility.

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Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HUBBARD].

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution. If adopted, this measure will severely undermine America's credibility with its allies.

Now is the time for those of us in Congress to support President George

Bush, a man who was elected Chief Executive by carrying 49 out of the 50 States in 1988.

Finally, I urge my colleagues to support the brave men and women who are presently or who soon will be serving in the Persian Gulf region. Support the Solarz-Michel resolution and vote no on Gephardt-Hamilton.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON].

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Speaker, my remarks are for the support of the American men and women we have called on to defend this Nation's principles in the Gulf. We have no alternative but to support the Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, today marks a unique day not only in American history but in world history. Today the eyes of the world are focussed on Congress, the capital of the free world and the beacon of hope for oppressed people worldwide. Today, my colleagues and I must make a very personal decision: a decision which will set the course for American foreign policy. In making this decision, I am compelled to consider four factors: the nature of our adversary, the best course of action for America to take today, public opinion, and the message Congress will send to the world.

I do not know how many Americans truly understand Saddam Hussein's background, his character, his goals, or his logic. He is single-minded in his purpose, ruthless in his actions, and shrewd in determining what course of action will best further his goals. His ultimate goal, gaining power by which he can unite the Arab world, is all that matters. He does not recognize people as Americans, Egyptians, Iranians: only friends to his cause or enemies to his cause, Arabs or infidels. He has 1 million men under arms. After 8 years of war and an economy unable to support them, where do we expect them to go? Saddam Hussein's nature can lead me to only one conclusion: he will continue to use force in the future when he sees an opportunity to further his goals. He must be stopped.

The question then becomes "when do we stop him?" Now or later? Which option must I, today, make to ensure that Saddam Hussein leaves Kuwait and does not further threaten America's and the world's interests. My decision is not about whether I believe we should be there to the extent that we are; the President as Commander in Chief has chosen a course of action and the time for that debate has passed. My options are clear: stay the course with sanctions and wait a little longer before authorizing force, or authorize the use of force in conjunction with the U.N. resolutions. Experts can argue about the effectiveness of sanctions, but I cannot find any indication that staying the course and delaying military options will achieve our goals. A vote to stay the course is a vote of hope: hope that a dictator who continues to threaten the entire world will back down. Had I any assurances that this would occur, I would not hesitate to vote accordingly. Unfortunately, I have no such assurances that Saddam Hussein will back down if we delay military options. My colleagues who urge further patience do so

nobly, with the understanding that war should only be a last resort. I, too, agree that war should only be a last resort. A vote to authorize force is also a vote of hope, though; hope that Saddam Hussein will back down when he sees our resolve and willingness to forcefully deny him what he truly treasures. By voting for an authorization of force, I believe I will be best advancing the cause of peace.

In making this decision, I have listened carefully to my constituents. By a 2-to-1 margin they say they oppose war. No one wants war. I am struck by Secretary of State Baker's comments following his talks with Iraq's Foreign Minister. He stated:

Don't miscalculate the resolve of the American people, who are very slow to anger, but who believe strongly in principle and who believe that we should not reward aggression * * *.

In support of this statement, I am compelled to look back in this Nation's history only 50 years. In February 1941, Hitler had conquered the European continent and was looking toward Britain. FDR looked for Congress to pass the Lend Lease Act and thereby end America's declared neutrality. Congress hotly debated lend lease for 2 months; interventionists arguing for action and isolationists urging inaction. Congress and the people were divided on our intervention abroad yet united in our principle against tyranny. When my father-in-law, only 19 days before his death in a plane crash, voted in favor of the Lend Lease Act, passing by 260 to 165 on February 8, 1941, this Nation set itself on a course toward war. The fait accompli came on December 8, 1941 when my mother-in-law, then a new Member of this body, voted with 387 of her colleagues to declare war on Japan. Americans know what we can accomplish when we are united, and Americans know what our limits are when we are divided. I cannot help but believe that while Americans want peace in the Persian Gulf today, we are willing to confront Saddam Hussein with all available resources in the end. At this point in time, with over 400,000 American troops in the Persian Gulf, I cannot vote for buying time. War is not inevitable yet, but our moment of decision has come. We must make our principles known today, before war begins, or we will be forced to defend our principles by force at a later date and a greater cost.

Today, with the world watching, Congress, as the voice of the American people, will send a message. This message should be one of support for our President and strength in our resolve. This message will reach the entire world, but is really meant for two entities. The first is for Saddam Hussein: you will not be able to string out this crisis in hopes of dividing American public opinion. If you are really interested in peace, if you want to survive, you will obey the 12 United Nations resolutions. The second entity Congress will reach with our message is the American people in the gulf. Our sons and daughters, husbands and wives, mothers and fathers serving in the gulf are looking to the Congress for support and assurance: assurance that Americans will support their efforts, and assurance that if they enter combat, they will be given all means at their disposal to accomplish the Commander in Chief's military and political objectives as

quickly as possible and with as few casualties as possible.

History will be the ultimate judge of today's decision. My colleagues and I are making the monumental judgement of our lives. There is none among us who can predict the future. My vote is a vote to give the President and the world community the support they need to resolve this situation peacefully, and only as a last resort, the power they need to resolve this crisis decisively by force. I hope and pray that congressional action today, whichever message we send, will result in peace tomorrow.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HUGHES].

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution. This is a time to support the President, to support U.N. Resolution 678, not repudiate it. Leadership requires us to stand firm. We do not do that by supporting Gephardt-Hamilton.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. MCCURDY].

Mr. MCCURDY. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, the goal in the Persian Gulf should be, and must be, a political solution. Economic sanctions and military force are only tools to get there.

There are those who choose to wait to see if a clearer political solution in the conflict arises. I can respect that position. There are those who argue against the establishment of a January 15 deadline, but, my colleagues, on two different occasions when I was in the gulf, I saw that a deadline gave hope to our men and women in uniform that this conflict, this stalemate will not go on indefinitely.

What institution better understands the need for deadlines to break gridlock and to force concessions than the Congress of the United States?

Some have complained that the sanctions in the United Nations were engineered by President Bush. That may be. But we Democrats should rejoice that a President, a Republican President, heeded our advice and used the United Nations and formed an international coalition instead of unilaterally rushing to force.

My good friend and respected colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON], and my dear friend, the majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], urge that we adopt the stay-the-course resolution and give sanctions a chance, to give peace a chance. I want to see a successful, peaceful outcome in the gulf that addresses the long-term threat in the region.

The goal of sanctions is political. It is political; it is not economic. The key is what influences Saddam Hussein, because he is the only one who counts in making decisions in Iraq. Look at his inner circle. In the intelligence committee we have had briefings. The ques-

tion is not of objective advice. The question is simply loyalty.

Of the five key people in his inner circle, his ministers, they include his son-in-law, two half brothers, and his cousin.

There is no evidence that sanctions—although they are biting deeply into the economy, whether it is imports, exports, or his cash flow—have had an effect or impact on Iraq's military or the psychology of Saddam Hussein.

Judge Webster said that the marginal military decline would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of his defensive fortifications. Most ammunition and the ability to wage war with his ground forces, which is his strength, can be produced domestically and will be taxed only in time of military action.

But more importantly, I was taken by the testimony in the Committee on Armed Services of a psychiatrist who helped form a psychological profile of Saddam the person. I wish I now had the time to detail and quote it, but I cannot, but let me quote just a few provisions.

It said, "It is this political personality, this constellation of messianic ambition for unlimited power, the absence of conscience, the unconstrained aggression and a paranoid outlook which makes Saddam so dangerous. However, he is not impulsive. He only acts after judicious consideration and can be extremely patient." And for those who argue sanctions, "Indeed he uses time as a weapon."

Mr. Speaker, "He is willing to reverse course, but only if his power and reputation are threatened." And I further quote, "The only language Saddam understands is the language of power. Without this demonstrable, and this is a quote, 'Without this demonstrable willingness to use force even if the sanctions are biting deeply, Saddam is quite capable of putting his population through a sustained period of hardship as he has in the past.' And, lastly, 'It is a certainty that he will return at a later date stronger than ever unless firm measures are taken to contain him.'"

My colleagues, I pray for a successful, peaceful outcome in this region. I believe that war should be undertaken only as a last resort, but I also believe that because of the complex and dangerous personality that we are confronting that only by authorizing the President, the executive, the President of the United States to employ force, if necessary, with our allies will this outcome occur.

I urge the support of the Solarz resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE].

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution and in opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Both resolutions have the same goal—to achieve the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

But there is an essential difference between the two resolutions. The Gephardt-Hamilton resolution seeks to achieve the goal through continued reliance on economic sanctions against Iraq, not on war. The Solarz-Michel resolution assumes that economic sanctions won't work and would rely on force to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

The basic choice we make today is between economic sanctions and war.

Mr. Speaker, I choose sanctions.

I choose sanctions because American lives are at stake. War with Iraq will mean the loss of life for thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of young American men and women. It will mean not only body bags but thousands of other young people coming home on stretchers. Such carnage may ultimately be unavoidable, but we ought first to give economic sanctions every opportunity to work.

I choose sanctions because a United States attack on Iraq risks opening a veritable Pandora's box of uncertain consequences. Certainly there is the risk of death and destruction in Israel, which Iraq says it will attack if the United States initiates offensive action against Iraq. There is the risk that a United States-Iraq conflict would be transformed into a war pitting Israel and its ally the United States against the Arab world. Such a division would put the current leadership of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan into an impossible position and would risk radical revolutions and dangerous long-term instability in the Middle East. If United States forces destroy Saddam Hussein's regime, the resulting power vacuum will likely be filled by Syria and/or Iran, both of them outlaw nations. Ultimately, Mr. Speaker, it may be necessary to run those risks, but it should not be until we have given economic sanctions a real chance.

I choose sanctions because the cost of war against Iraq will be borne overwhelmingly by American taxpayers; only a fraction of the cost will be borne by others who have far more at stake. The cost will be \$30 billion this year even if there is no war; if war starts, the cost to American taxpayers will be from \$1 to \$2 billion for each and every day of the war—this at a time when the U.S. fiscal deficit for next year is already estimated at \$350 billion or more. Serious, critical social needs will go unmet. To 37 million Americans who have no health insurance whatsoever, we will be saying that their government can find tens of billions of dollars to wage war but not a dime for a new health insurance initiative.

I choose sanctions, Mr. Speaker, because of the political turmoil which war will cause in the United States. President Bush has not made a convincing case to the American people that armed force against Iraq is justified. Americans will not support war and its concomitant loss of life in order to preserve oil flows or to restore the undemocratic Government of Kuwait. In particular, college students across the land—those at risk from the resumption of the military draft which a prolonged conflict would require—will turn their campuses into boiling cauldrons of dissent.

Mr. Speaker, I choose sanctions because their successful implementation would establish a realistic, believable precedent for future

situations in which nations try to forcibly annex the territory of their neighbors. To few other places around the world is the United States likely to dispatch 400,000 troops. There is no credible precedent here. On the other hand, the United States and the United Nations can impose economic sanctions if future acts of aggression occur. The community of nations can—as it currently is doing in the Persian Gulf—deny to an aggressor the fruits of his aggression. Economic sanctions are a precedent worth establishing.

Mr. Speaker, I choose sanctions because that course has the greatest chance for success at the lowest cost.

Those who support the Solarz-Michel resolution are taking a high stakes gamble. They gamble that congressional support for President Bush will help convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait, thus avoiding war.

But if that gamble fails, war will ensure with tragic loss of human life, costs in the tens of billions of dollars, and great political instability in the Middle East and within the United States.

Those of us who support the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution are gambling too. We are gambling that sanctions, over time, will force Iraq out of Kuwait.

If our gamble fails, we will be, a year from now, essentially where we are today, with no loss of life for thousands of American young people; no huge escalation of cost to the American taxpayers; no political turmoil in the Middle East or the United States; and no benefit to Iraq of its aggression.

And we will still have, at that time, the military option.

Mr. Speaker, to me, the right choice of action is absolutely clear. I urge support for the sanctions option and opposition to the war option.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MFUME].

Mr. MFUME. Mr. Speaker, I rise this morning in total support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution and in total opposition to the declaration of war implicit and inherent in the intent of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to express my open and absolute opposition to war in the Persian Gulf. My fear against going to war in the Persian Gulf is not due to the fact that America and our allies can not win in battle, but because our objectives and policies in this region have been inconsistent.

I am not comfortable with the stated objectives of why we are so ready to use force to dislodge Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. In August—when it appeared that Iraq was poised to attack Saudi Arabia's oil fields and hold foreign hostages at strategic locations—I concurred with the President's action to create an international force to defend the Saudi's oil fields and impose economic sanctions against Iraq.

Later, President Bush upped the ante with his steadfast promotion of the military option before we could determine whether sanctions and other international initiatives had a chance to take root. Additionally, President Bush began to talk about the need to stop Hussein's

naked aggression and that he must leave Kuwait. For me, this is one of the most profound and bewildering turn of events of the entire crisis.

Why are we going to authorize the use of force and the death of thousands of American soldiers to dislodge Hussein from Kuwait and reinstall the Kuwaiti emir. Kuwait by no means represented Jeffersonian democracy. Many of the administration's past objectives and policy positions defended democracy and freedom. Where were these governing principles in Kuwait prior to August?

Equally, the Iraqi's informed Ambassador April Glaspie that they intended to invade Kuwait in July and Ambassador Glaspie's response was that we don't get involved in such Arab affairs and that we do not have a defense treaty with Kuwait. Mr. Speaker, in part, we are responsible for creating the Leviathan that challenges us now. Were we as concerned about Iraq's buildup when they were keeping Iran at bay? Of course not. Were we as concerned when Hussein and other Middle Eastern countries escalated their acquisition of arms? Of course not.

The international stance against Saddam Hussein is not truly as united as the President would like us to believe. The major league participants in this conflict are plainly the United States and Iraq. Unfortunately, the first and the last soldiers to die will probably be wearing American uniforms.

Now we are considering whether to give the President the authority to use force to dislodge Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, or to work for a peaceful negotiated resolution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. I favor exploring our diplomatic options prior to playing our military option.

I fear that the Michel-Solarz resolution will give President Bush tacit approval to launch a military offensive against Saddam Hussein's forces in Kuwait and set off a very bloody desert war. Mr. Speaker, make no doubt about it, a vote for the resolution before us is a vote for war. Anyone who attempts to argue the opposite is lying to themselves and to the American people.

I have heard many of our colleagues on the floor and in the media discuss the fact that we need to send a message to Saddam Hussein that his naked aggression will not be tolerated. I take this opportunity to send a message to the parents and loved ones of those soldiers participating in Operation Desert Shield. My message is that my conscience cannot rest knowing that your family members are being placed into a conflict that has yet to be clearly defined by the President to anyone.

Mr. Speaker, let us not rush head first into chaos and uncertainty. Let us instead seek ways to leverage Iraq from Kuwait and further tighten the screws via international sanctions and continued isolation against Baghdad.

The Gephardt-Hamilton resolution is the most progressive and promising chance we have to avert war in the Persian Gulf. Gephardt-Hamilton advocates continued sanctions and enforcement of the U.N. economic embargo. CIA Director William Webster said that sanctions are working and can further hurt Iraq. The administration knows that economic sanctions can work.

America stands to suffer great economic consequences if war in the Middle East reaches the anticipated levels. How are we going to pay for such a military offensive? Will those within this august body who have adamantly opposed taxes now vote to increase taxes to support a foreign war effort? War offers many paradoxes, but the ones emanating from our current crisis will be devastating.

Thus, I urge those who want to go to war with Iraq to remember, that although the Middle East is strategic because of its oil, I for one, do not wish to see the Saudi desert become the symbol of misguided policy and the massive loss of American lives.

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Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. MORAN].

Mr. MORAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. Speaker, today we are called upon to be the conscience of America.

When our forefathers gathered to write the Constitution that would define and direct these United States, never did they realize that their successors would one day be able to bring into their homes debate on the true meaning and consequence of article 1, section 8, that states that only the Congress of the United States is vested with the responsibility and authority to commit this country to wage war.

And Mr. Speaker, never before in our Nation's history has the U.S. Congress been watched more closely nor depended upon more greatly, to exercise its collective conscience.

People stayed home yesterday and stayed up last night to hear us express our judgment.

And Mr. Speaker, they have expressed their judgment—and that is that government has not exhausted every alternative to war.

Mr. Speaker, it is their sons and daughters who must pay the ultimate cost of war.

Mr. Speaker, we are not a nation of peace-niks nor of warmongers. We are a nation of patriots.

Adm. William Crowe is a neighbor, Mr. Speaker. His life embodies what patriotism is all about. He has spent his life in our military, capping his career as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. Speaker, he knows what he is talking about and yet what he told me that was most compelling is what I want to share with you. He said,

I have a son over there. He's a company commander. He's on the front line.

He's a good kid. He grew up in this house. He went to school with your kids. He loves his country. Enough to lay down his life for it. And if we go to war with Iraq I will lose him.

And it doesn't have to happen.

Not yet, Mr. Speaker. Do we need to risk the lives of our loved ones?

And should we not pose to ourselves that same compelling question: How would we vote if our son or daughter were on the front lines?

Mr. Speaker, I have immersed myself in this issue day and night and consulted every expert available.

And Mr. Speaker, I must conclude that this will not be a quick and clean war. Surgical air strikes may be an effective strategy, but it will not be the final resolution. The best analogy to the ground attack that will be necessary to overcome Iraq's ground troops that are dug in along Kuwait's perimeter, dug into ditches reinforced by wire behind pools of oil that will be lit upon attack—Mr. Speaker, is Normandy.

Mr. Speaker, I have stood on the beaches of Normandy where in the month of June 1944, 100,000 Allied troops met their death.

Perhaps this is why, Mr. Speaker, that so many of my constituents including countless numbers of military officers and retired veterans have urged me to vote for the Hamilton-Gephardt amendment.

Mr. Speaker, last night I held a town meeting and heard from several hundred of my constituents who had come out in the freezing rain to share their views with me.

That constituency was of the same opinion that 95 percent of the people who have written and phoned—that it is not time to move to the final alternative of war. The vast majority of the people of the Eighth District of Virginia are not convinced that it is past time for negotiations nor for sanctions.

And while the perception of support that a vote for the Solarz-Michel amendment might give the President in strengthening his hand in the negotiation process, the awesome responsibility of declaring war should not be relinquished prematurely.

But if Saddam Hussein interprets support for the Gephardt-Hamilton amendment as a vote against the use of force at any time, he will have made yet another miscalculation.

We are a people of principle. We are prepared to pay the ultimate cost for the preservation of those principles. And if, Mr. Speaker, negotiations clearly have failed and sanctions clearly have not worked, then, Mr. Speaker, this Congress and this Congressman will declare war and will lead the nations of the world in the conclusion of that war and in the restoration of a lasting peace.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER].

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Speaker, this country is about to be sucked into a war in the area of the world known for violence, known for terrorism, known for blood baths, known for atrocities. I will tell Members, we will never be the same.

The Gephardt-Hamilton alternative points to a wiser path. It keeps the line drawn in the sands of Saudi Arabia. It keeps the sanctions, and it calls on our allies to do more.

Make no mistake about it, unless we pass Gephardt, this will be an American war. The measly contributions of Japan, Germany, France, and Italy will not dry the tears of our war widows.

The two ships provided by the Netherlands which gets 100 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf will not heal the broken hearts of our grieving mothers and fathers.

A robbery is taking place right here, right now. Billions of dollars out the door to pay for an operation called The

World Versus Saddam Hussein. But the world does not pay. We do—Uncle Sugar Daddy.

We have spent more on Desert Shield so far than we spend in 1 year on Head Start, cancer research, AIDS research, Alzheimer's, heart research, and childhood immunization, all combined. That is what we have spent so far on Desert Shield.

My friends, a 22-year-old constituent of mine, and it could have been any constituent of yours, as he was sent off to the Persian Gulf was told to write his will. What will he leave his mother? What will he leave his father? His love? His hopes? His dreams? His ambitions?

With all due respect, this is not about looking at the President's face. I know his face looks worried. Our faces look worried. It is not about looking at the President's face, and it is not about saving face. It is about saving lives. Peace through war makes about as much sense as health through sickness.

It took 8 years into the Vietnam war to get 150 votes against it. Today, we will have more negative votes than that for this war yet to come. That is because there is a better way. It is called Gephardt-Hamilton. We have learned from Vietnam. It is good that we have, and we should not be ashamed that we have learned from Vietnam. We have totally isolated Iraq without a shot being fired. So stay the course and spare the United States the body bags, the tears, the terrorism, and the anguish. Support Gephardt-Hamilton.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. PACKARD].

Mr. PACKARD. Mr. Speaker, I have determined that this debate comes down to one simple fact, that is, that Saddam Hussein will withdraw his troops from Kuwait faster with a loaded and cocked gun at his head, than he will if we extend the sanctions. Let Members load and cock the gun, and then pray to God that we do not have to pull the trigger.

I rise in strong support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mrs. ROUKEMA].

Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution and in opposition to Gephardt-Hamilton.

I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution, endorsing the U.N. Resolution No. 678, giving President Bush authority in conjunction with our allies to use "all means necessary" to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore regional stability.

And I do so with graver misgivings than most, having lost a son; not to war but to illness. I know the everlasting anguish of the loss of a child.

I have concluded that if we truly believe that we should walk the last mile for peace we

should defeat the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution and approve the Michel-Solarz resolution and possibly spare the anguish of loved ones having died because we lost our resolve.

Choosing this last mile is not a clear choice, because fundamentally I believe that the sanctions are working and that a number of avenues remain open for dialog and diplomatic maneuver, while remaining true to our commitment to the international coalition and our principles. I do not see war as inevitable.

I do see war as bringing about numerous consequences as yet unforeseen. Representative HAMILTON spoke cogently on this subject yesterday.

These include an even more incendiary Middle East.

In other words, the tactics are debatable.

But in this vote today, we must take the facts as they are where we are today. And the bold facts are:

There was a failure last Wednesday in Geneva.

The deadline adopted by the United Nations is looming.

Secretary General de Cuellar is preparing to talk to Saddam again.

Whether by design, by cynical calculation or by default, we have been maneuvered to this vote at the precise time when a negative vote will be viewed by the world community as ineptitude.

The United States will have lost credibility and we will have provoked a prolonged stalemate and all-out war could be the only recourse.

So we must endorse the U.S. action and when—in their collective judgment—the President and the coalition attest to the need for force.

Any miscalculation, on the President's part, will result in thousands of lives lost and profound economic and political consequences.

And to President Bush, I say, God give you the wisdom and compassion to bring about the New World order for which all Americans pray.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to Gephardt-Hamilton, and strong support for Solarz-Michel.

Mr. Speaker, while I strongly support continued, tough international sanctions against Iraq, I do not believe that sanctions alone will force Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions. I rise in opposition to the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution. Let us not deceive ourselves, this resolution removes the threat of force, which apparently is the only action which will influence Saddam Hussein. This resolution does not strengthen sanctions or diplomacy, it weakens them. It is very clear that if Saddam Hussein believes we will not use force, or if there is not a credible threat of force, he will never withdraw from Kuwait and will continue to directly threaten vital American national security interests.

I agree that if nothing else in the world changes, over time, sanctions could provide enough pressure on Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions. But, all the other

key factors that make sanctions effective will not remain the same. The realities of the world, which some are ignoring to make their case, clearly indicate that over time our coalition and our ability to enforce a tough embargo will weaken whereas Iraq's position will not. Without the credible threat of force, time is on Saddam Hussein's side, not ours. That's reality.

First, Iraq can hold out for a long time. Saddam has no problems denying resources to his people in order to maintain his aggressive, offensive military machine. His gestapo-style secret police will make sure that anyone who complains won't be around to ever complain again. The Iraqi people went without for 8 years during a war with Iran. They are hardened. Further, Iraq has quite a self-sufficient agricultural sector, particularly in basic foodstuffs, meaning the Iraqi people are in no danger of starving therefore removing a pressure on Saddam to change his ways. They are willing to go without some of life's conveniences rather than be shot. Remember, Iraq is not all desert like Kuwait, it is Mesopotamia, the cradle of many ancient and modern civilizations—the fertile crescent.

While the embargo is denying Iraq spare parts for its weapons, without the very real, credible threat of force, Saddam doesn't need spares because he won't be using his weapons. Besides, Iraq has billions of dollars in hard currency and gold looted from Kuwait to sustain illegal sanctions-busting, black-market trade for key goods. And, if thousands of years of history have taught us anything, the people of this region are extremely capable merchants able to overcome any obstacle.

As I noted during yesterday's debate, the fact that many Soviet and Bulgarian technicians in Iraq have opted, despite the security threats, not to leave because they note there are more consumer goods and food in Baghdad than in Moscow or Sofia, indicates that sanctions are not totally effective. So too, is the fact that fresh kiwifruit, a perishable item not grown in Iraq, are available in Iraq and occupied Kuwait. Hostages held in Kuwait affirmed this to me.

While I believe Iraq can hold out for some time, especially without the credible threat of the use of force which the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution removes, I believe the multiple pressures on our coalition mean we cannot.

Today's sanctions are hurting the poorest countries and Eastern Europe's newest democracies the most—more than they are hurting Iraq. As I explained yesterday, the gulf situation is an economic, and therefore becomes a political and social, disaster for the Third World and Eastern Europe's new, very fragile democracies. Do we want to see and can we afford failure in Eastern Europe coupled with revolutions, civil wars and new dictators in Asia, Africa, and Latin America—in other words a collapse of much of what we've recently achieved?

In his chilling resignation speech before the Congress of People's Deputies, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze specifically noted the increasing opposition from powerful Soviet institutions like the Red army to Soviet support for our gulf policy. Iraq was a key source of trade and hard currency for the Soviets. With all the other serious problems they are facing,

how long can the reformists in the Soviet Union continue to be cooperative with us and the United Nations?

Similarly, over time, vulnerable countries like Syria and Jordan which cannot sustain the embargo may become lax in enforcing it or abandon it altogether, making sanctions even far less effective.

While the coalition against Iraq is a multinational one, because we are a superpower that is looked up to by most, we naturally play a leadership role. But, if we are unwilling to back the U.N. resolutions and our own national security interests, we signal that we are a weak leader and the coalition, therefore also the effectiveness of sanctions and diplomacy, crumble.

As we wait for sanctions to work, Saddam can rest and better prepare his armies. Like all tyrants, he will deny his people resources to ensure his armies remain strong. And, when sanctions don't force him to leave by some later deadline, we'll face an even stronger Iraqi army with, perhaps, less international support. The expense of waiting through higher American casualties is ours.

For example, in overrunning Kuwait, Iraq was able to seize advanced American-made Hawk antiaircraft missiles. These are just like some of the missiles we have deployed in Saudi Arabia to protect our forces. We believe that at this time, Iraq has not had the time to learn how to operate the Hawk system effectively. But, Iraqi technicians are not stupid. In time they will master the system and correct Iraq's weakness in medium-range and high-altitude air defense. We know how good the Hawk system is and our pilots don't want to have to fly against it. As we wait for sanctions to bite, the chances of confronting the deadly Hawks only increase. Those who say we should engage in an air war if there are hostilities by voting for Gephardt may well mean more pilots will be lost.

Further, by waiting without threatening force, we still have to keep sufficient forces in the area. That means we must rotate troops. The only way to accomplish this is to either call up hundreds of thousands of reserves or reinstitute the draft. Both of these are very unpopular actions that will hurt our economy, increase our budget deficit, and reduce domestic programs like education, housing, and drug control while, once again, increasing defense spending.

The only chances for peace that the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution increases are for a bad one. History has proven that a bad peace always results in a war, often a far bloodier and costly one. I wish we didn't have to threaten to use force, no one wants a military option, particularly me. I wish we could just sit back and let sanctions and diplomacy alone work. But, they will not and the costs of not providing a very real and credible threat of force are too high. The choice before us today is not war or peace. War is not inevitable. With the resolutions before us both alternatives are possible. However, I continue to strongly believe that House Joint Resolution 62, the bipartisan Solarz-Michel-Broomfield-Fascell resolution has the best chance of fostering a peaceful solution whereas the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution lessens the chances that Saddam will seek peace and increases

the chances that we will pay a much higher price for war.

The final decision as to whether there shall be war or peace lies with Saddam Hussein. To paraphrase Winston Churchill's comments about the aggressive actions of Hitler, "If (he) does not want war, then there will be no war. Therefore, if war should come, there can be no doubt upon whose head the blood guiltiness will fall." While Churchill's comments refer to Hitler and events earlier this century, they are very applicable to Saddam Hussein and his actions today.

The decisions before us today are very hard and very trying. Yet, I urge my colleagues to seriously consider all of the factors and all of the real costs today and into the future. The best chance for achieving our goals peacefully is not the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, but the Solarz-Michel-Broomfield-Fascell resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HENRY].

Mr. HENRY. Mr. Speaker, I oppose the Gephardt resolution because it undermines, rather than enhances, prospects for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the Persian Gulf. To adopt the Gephardt resolution sends Saddam Hussein the wrong message. The world community of nations has been waiting 5 months for Saddam Hussein to demonstrate the slightest inclination of being willing to withdraw from Kuwait. Any lack of resolve by this House to stand by the U.N. Resolution 678 can only be interpreted by him as capitulation and retreat on the terms of the resolution itself.

Look at the consequences, Mr. Speaker: Saddam Hussein will claim it as a victory, and he will only believe that our having postponed once, we will postpone yet again. Be it 30 days or 60 days or half a year from now, we will be faced with the same decision. But meanwhile, the moral resolve of the community of nations, its diplomatic unity, and its military position will have been put at risk while we wait.

We will present to the world the picture of a nation divided, divided in its support of the President's policy and divided in support of the U.N. resolution.

The morale of our troops in the gulf will potentially be undermined as they seek to interpret the meaning of this resolution. Prospects of extended tours of duty in the gulf are forced on themselves and their families at home.

The safety of our troops in the gulf will have been put at risk.

Forthcoming changes in the climatic patterns in the gulf are adverse to the military situation in the alliance. They will be straddled in an announced defensive posture while subject to offensive attack.

This resolution puts the United States at odds with the community of nations itself. The Senate has rejected the resolution just shortly sometime

ago. Now history looks at the House of Representatives. Will it point to this House in this moment as the place and time where the attempt of the world community of nations to order its affairs in a post-cold-war era was cast into the abyss?

Mr. Speaker, I do not seek war. I do not even want to resort to military action in the gulf. This resolution not only undermines the judgment of the world community as to just how such a conflict can be avoided, but it also undermines the means by which such a resort to force can be hopeful of success should it be required.

Oppose the Gephardt resolution, my colleagues. Stand firm with our President. Stand firm with the alliance. Stand firm for the principle of the rule of law between nations, and stand firm on behalf of steps which history has taught us to be the best means of keeping the peace.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Speaker, is it in order under the rules of the House to refer to statements of Members of the other body, or to actions taken within the other body?

The SPEAKER. It is possible under the rules of the House to refer to a vote taken in the other body, but not to characterize the vote by statements of approval or disapproval.

Mr. AUCOIN. I thank the chair.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, was the gentleman referring to the fact that the Senate has just defeated the Gephardt amendment?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution and in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I believe our economic alternatives have expired in the Persian Gulf Region. I recently met with several former hostages, including Miles Hoffman from Columbus, GA, the only American wounded by Iraqi soldiers. The hostages described to me the failure in a policy of economic sanctions. They talked of food and other supplies entering Iraq unrestricted from Jordan and Iran. We also discussed the fact that other sympathetic countries like Libya are sending hard currency to Saddam enabling him to buy needed goods. One hostage described Iraq's growing agricultural capability—complete with irrigation facilities. Finally, they told me of their luscious Thanksgiving Dinner—turkey with all the trimmings.

Mr. Speaker, does that sound like a country suffering at the hands of serious economic sanctions that are stripping it bare of basic necessities?

Saddam Hussein and his army are not suffering from these sanctions, nor will they because they will continue to plunder, rape, and

pilfer all that they must from Kuwait to maintain themselves. In addition, as fellow Arabs grow ever more sympathetic to Saddam, they will continue to help Saddam get what he needs.

Mr. Speaker, we gave Iraq an ultimatum—their time has come due.

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Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL].

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in the midst of the most important debate in my 10 years in Congress. We have already heard many excellent arguments on both sides of this vital issue, and I appreciate the honest views of my colleagues. As for me, I intend to support the President and the U.N. resolutions, not because I want war, but because I want a genuine peace.

I'm sure we can all agree that President Bush and Secretary of State Jim Baker have done an excellent job in bringing the international community together in joint condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. As a matter of fact, I feel that Secretary of State James Baker will always be remembered as one who went the last mile, always cool and courteous, always professional, and always there. Who could have dreamed that he could pull the U.N. members together—even Syria and Egypt? This Secretary of State brings to mind the Cordell Hull image of the 1930's and early 1940's.

As I agonized over this historic vote, I keep coming back to where we are now. Not last August or September—but now. Our troops are in the desert now. They were there when I arrived on the scene. They were there when the entire Congress came on the scene. If I were President, I probably would not have sent ground forces to Saudi Arabia. Instead, I would have used air and sea power and our technological advantages to protect the Persian Gulf from further unprovoked aggression. As Gen. Douglas MacArthur put it, "The object of war is victory." If hostilities begin, let's learn from Korea and Vietnam, and allow the military to fight the war. The shortest war spawns the fewest casualties. These would be my actions based on what I know. Granted, I am not in command of the information that our Chief Executive has.

Therefore, I don't know all of the relevant factors involved in the President's decision to send a large contingent of ground forces. If I trust in the judgment of the President, if I believe he is sound of mind, that he is a patriot, and I do, then I must accept that he has made the right decision. I would ask my colleagues, how would you feel if you were a young soldier sitting in a pup tent in that remote desert, and you picked up a copy of the "Stars and Stripes" newspaper, only to read that the Congress did not support your Commander in Chief?

I honestly believe that the policy of appeasement and delay is, in fact, a policy which in the end leads to even greater suffering and death. As a veteran of World War II, I cannot help but remember the words of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain upon his return from his ill-fated peace negotiations with Adolf Hitler, and I quote Mr. Chamberlain, who said,

"For the second time in our history a British Prime Minister has returned from Germany bringing peace with honor. I believe it is peace for our time. Go home and get a nice quiet sleep." Mr. Speaker, I and many others did get a nice sleep that night. Yes Mr. Chamberlain delayed the war—but he magnified the loss. In looking the other way then, the world allowed a madman to consume Europe, and before it was over, millions paid for this tragic mistake with their lives.

Mr. Speaker, it is indeed appropriate for Congress to meet here today to debate this issue. The Constitution empowers this body with the responsibility to decide when this Nation goes to war, and we shouldn't shrink from our constitutional duty. Let us decide today—not 6 months or 1 year from now—to put a stop to Saddam Hussein's ambitions before he descends on more of his neighbors, before his neighbors—little countries who have supported the U.N. resolutions condemning Iraq—have the sinking feeling that we are not going to call Iraq's hand. Then they will have no alternative but to fall in line behind Saddam, and we will have created a monster on that desert that will have the financial resources to buy the world—and the thirst to consume it.

I cannot do less than support our troops over in the desert, by supporting their Commander in Chief here at home.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE].

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, what justifies the threat of force against Saddam Hussein? It is Saddam Hussein's record of brutal aggression, combined with his nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons capability and the threat that poses to the United States and to the entire world.

American force is not justified by the need to liberate Kuwait. That is a valid objective and it is one that can and should be an integral part of any resolution of this crisis.

The threat to oil does not justify the use of force. That is precisely the type of threat best effected by an embargo.

The new world order which we want to achieve is a result which should be achieved by diplomacy, not force; but what cannot be achieved by diplomacy or sanctions alone, is our ability to defeat Saddam's increased ability to utilize chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, which weapons he could, and undoubtedly would, use to blackmail the United States and any other country in the world.

We must be willing to act now or face the grave risk of Saddam's nuclear weapons to the Nation and to the world.

Unfortunately, many have followed a policy of wishful thinking toward Saddam Hussein. Many never believed that Saddam would invade Iran, and he did. Many never believed that Saddam would use chemical weapons for the

first time since World War I, and he did.

Many never believed that Saddam would use chemical weapons against his own people, and he did.

Many never believed that Saddam would be able to extend the range of Soviet-made missiles to hit Tehran, and he did.

Many never believed he would invade and annex and rape Kuwait, and he did.

Some now say he will not have nuclear weapons for 5 to 10 years, despite strong and credible evidence of a much shorter timeframe. We have dangerously deluded ourselves about his capacity, and as much as we would like sanctions to force Saddam out of Kuwait, that is wishful thinking, too. Sanctions alone to date have accomplished nothing.

Sanctions did not convince Saddam Hussein to halt his drive to the Kuwaiti border.

Sanctions have not kept oil flowing.

Sanctions did not convince Saddam Hussein's emissary to negotiate in good faith with Secretary of State Baker earlier this week, and sanctions did not tell Saddam Hussein to release his hostages. Saddam released foreign hostages not because of sanctions, but because of his cynical attempt to undermine the entire Arab coalition.

I ask my colleagues, my friends who would argue we should give sanctions more time, when will we have given them enough time? Will we have given sanctions enough time when the Iraqi chemical stockpile has tripled in size? Will sanctions have run their course once Baghdad has a nuclear bomb?

I deeply regret this conclusion, but saying we need more time for sanctions is an excuse for doing nothing. We can engage in wishful thinking that shortages of imported goods will bring Saddam to his knees, but in a dictatorship where opponents to Saddam are shot for expressing a divergent view and whose agricultural bounty extends from the Tigris to the Euphrates, sanctions will discomfort the civilian population, but they will not bring Saddam Hussein to his knees and they will not force Saddam out of Kuwait.

We must not pull the rug out from under the international coalition at one minute before midnight.

Whatever has been accomplished to date has been accomplished precisely because Saddam began to believe that the United States and the international community were prepared to use force to respond to his aggression.

Philosopher Michael Walzer writing in *The New Republic* states, and I ask you to listen to this quote:

The embargo is aimed *** at Iraq's military-industrial capacity. But Saddam can let his capacity run down indefinitely so long as he is sure he will not be attacked. Hence the effectiveness of an embargo depends on a credible threat to fight. At some point Saddam must yield or we must fight. If he

doesn't yield and we don't fight, the victory will be his.

A vote, my friends, today for Hamilton-Gephardt will strip the President of the ability to credibly threaten the use of force in support of sanctions. It will send a clear message that the Congress does not stand behind the U.N. resolution and that our policy is one of sanctions alone. It will convince Saddam that he can remain in Kuwait as long as he wants.

Based upon my conversations with our soldiers in the field, we know it will have a devastating impact on the morale of our forces.

At this point, this vote will determine whether our Nation has the will to resist the dictator's aggression, or whether we will continue to engage in a policy of wishful thinking.

If we really want sanctions to work, if we want a real chance to avoid conflict, Congress must reject this amendment and instead pass the Solarz-Michel amendment.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DE LA GARZA].

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, my colleagues, arriving at this point in the discussion of this issue has been very difficult and painful. I would like to respectfully share with you my views at this time. I support the President, I support the troops in Operation Desert Shield, but I am deeply disturbed at the events and the persons who have led us to this point in our history. I have and will continue to support our troops and will support all efforts to give them the necessary tools to fulfill their mission. Having said that, the most important support we can give them is to do our utmost to keep them from having to use those tools.

I am not prepared at this time to accept the fact that all of the resources of the free world through the United Nations have failed in this instance and the only recourse is war—what a shame, how sad if this is true, that in 1991 the world admits failure for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the Kuwait affair. I support the United Nations resolutions, that's no problem, but do you know what they say? Get the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait, that's all they say. I now ask, is the Emir of Kuwait worth dying for? No. Is the Emir of Kuwait worth one American life? No. I condemn the actions of Mr. Saddam Hussein, and I agree he is a menace to that area of the world and possibly beyond. I think that what he has done should not be the order of the day, but under the U.N. resolutions we drive him out of Kuwait, that's all they say, what then, what have we gained? They do not speak of chemical weapons or nuclear weapons, all they say is he's a bad guy and should be driven out of Kuwait. Having done that, what have we gained, I respectfully ask?

The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution does not prohibit the President from acting. All it says is, should all fail, then Mr. President, you tell us that's the case and we will act together, that's all it says, let us do it together. Mr. President, as the elected representatives of the people, is that too much to ask? I support you, Mr. President, but my conscience and my district demand that we give peace a chance first, should that not be humanly possible and war is the ultimate need, I will be with you, and pray that it be achieved with the least loss of life possible, for it will be our young people in great part that will bear the burden. God bless and protect them. With all my mind, body and soul, I pray that what we do here today be worthy of our service as representatives of the people of the United States, our troops abroad and our own conscience. Thank you.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time and commend him for what he has done on this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, we all support the President. We support his goals. We want Iraq out of Kuwait and we want, frankly, most of us, if not all of us, to get rid of Saddam Hussein one way or the other; but the Solarz resolution is not right. It does not meet the constitutional test for which we swore an oath of office to uphold that Constitution.

It is not a declaration of war. If we are going to go to war, make the President do exactly what the Constitution calls for, not a back door open-ended blank check to do it at his decision, at his time, but the people's time, the time when it is right, not the time he decides.

Second of all, we, none of us, have enough information. Do we know how long this war might be anybody's guesstimate in the Defense Department?

Do we know how many bodies may come back, how much of a casualty count there will be by the Defense Department estimate?

Do we know what the cost will be? The gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA] says they will not even tell us. Is that fair for you to make the most important decision of your careers, your lives, affecting your neighbor's children, husbands, and wives, based on no information?

Third of all, it is premature. Diplomacy has not been given its final chance. We have to go every extra mile, as the President has said, in the quest of peace. Walk another extra mile, I say to the President, before he commits young Americans to death, because that is what war is. They are not disconnected.

War is death. People will die, our young sons and daughters and husbands and wives.

The sanctions are working. This nonsense that they are not working is not true at all.

□ 1220

He is weaker. Testimony from our own Defense Department has said he is weaker. His airplanes, his aircraft are less capable of flying today than they were 4 and 5 months ago.

Would you rather face an enemy who is weaker, and more capable of being won over rapidly than doing it now when he is more capable?

War will bring terrorism. Mark my words, the surge of terrorism will be on the battlefield of the world, not just in Iraq.

Anybody who thinks that the battle is going to be in Kuwait or Iraq is deluding themselves.

This man is a lunatic, and he will blow up any object that he wants to get at Americans. That means we are all at risk.

The last thing we want to do is to prematurely go to war.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we have an obligation to others, our allies in the region, our friends; but we have an obligation to ourselves and to our servicemen and women.

I would rather that they sweated in the desert than be buried in that desert.

Mr. Speaker, would it not be ironic if the new world order touted by this President has as its first act the act of war? How sad, how wrong for America, and its moral leadership.

If the time comes to go to war, then we will go to war, but we should all be assured that everything short of war has been done. The Gephardt-Hamilton resolution allows us to do that with the resolve for the President to continue to have the military option.

You should vote for it and vote against the Solarz resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished majority whip, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GRAY].

Mr. GRAY. Mr. Speaker, in August, when the first American troops were sent to the Persian Gulf, Americans opposed the brutal invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein.

They knew we had to halt Iraq's imperialism, free our hostages, safeguard the world's vital oil reserves, and protect our allies in the region from further naked aggression.

Americans also knew what a threat Saddam Hussein was to world peace. He used chemical weapons on his people, practiced genocide on the Kurds, and in Iraq political opposition can be found only in the cemeteries.

That is why I—and practically all Members of Congress—supported the President's decision to send troops to

Saudi Arabia, and then to use sanctions. In August, we voted to impose sanctions 416-0. In October, we voted 380-29 to support the policy of Desert Shield.

Today, however, this successful policy is on the brink of major change.

The administration now wants to change "Desert Shield" into "Desert Spear."

They want our approval to launch offensive military action of an unspecified nature—at an unspecified time.

In short: A Presidential declaration of war.

Why change policy now?

Is it to stop aggression?

We have stopped Iraq, protected Saudi Arabia and our other allies in the region, and protected world oil supplies.

Is it to defend democracy?

Hardly, since Kuwait is no democracy. Neither is Saudi Arabia, or Syria.

Forget lofty ideals. Let's be practical.

Is it to protect oil and our way of life?

Iraq and Kuwait combined have only 20 percent of the world's oil reserves; 80 percent are located elsewhere. And it we developed an alternate energy policy and eliminated gas guzzling cars and boats we wouldn't need dipstick diplomacy.

Let's do that, and let Saddam Hussein drown in his own oil.

Is it to send a diplomatic signal of resolve and strength?

But sending a signal implies somebody's there to receive it. He hasn't gotten the signal yet—not from 400,000 troops and two U.N. resolutions. What makes us think he will get it from this vote today?

Let us not fool ourselves. The vote today is not to send a signal. It's on whether we want a declaration of war.

What about the new coalition?

We'll have partners, right?

Only if we mistake words for deeds.

Japan draws 70 percent of its oil from the Middle East. It has contributed about \$400 million to Desert Shield. All our allies combined have paid about \$4.3 billion of the \$30 billion Desert Shield will cost.

One foreign official talked to us about the strength of our allies' commitment.

He said:

The Syrians, Saudis, and Egyptians want Saddam Hussein defeated swiftly, decisively, elegantly. But if it doesn't come quickly, they're willing to fight—to the last American.

Will the coalition hold together for another year while we allow sanctions to take effect?

Our allies have kept their troops home, and their money in the bank. Are we now to believe they will even cut off the words?

If we can coalesce for war, why not peace?

At some time we may well have to use force in Kuwait. But we haven't exhausted our diplomatic options. Not yet. One meeting—even 6 hours long—is not enough.

My colleagues, here is the central issue. Should we change from Desert Shield to Desert Spear?

Is that the national—and international—consensus?

Let us stick with the current policy.

It prevented Saddam Hussein from going into Saudi Arabia.

It is weakening his arsenal.

It is draining his treasury.

Let us stay the course.

"Genius," a French philosopher once wrote, "is nothing but a greater aptitude for patience."

Nations of great genius exhibit great patience.

Let's not sacrifice lives on the altar of impatience.

Let's not lose lives because we didn't want to lose time.

Vote for Hamilton-Gephhardt.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Speaker, there are four reasons today to vote for Hamilton-Gephhardt. First is that the Michel resolution itself is a declaration of war without actually admitting it. It puts the trigger in the President's fingers and it says, "You decide."

Do not vote to ask American troops to make the ultimate sacrifice unless you are willing to go home and admit that squarely.

Second, the problem is that the Michel proposal authorizes war before we have to. Do not ask our soldiers to put their lives at risk until there is absolutely no other possibility left.

Surely we are not yet at that point. We have time.

The President's supporters say this is not Vietnam, and they are absolutely right; but neither is it Munich. Iraq is not Germany, and if war occurs, Saddam will learn that in days whether we attack now or later. George Bush has already prevented another Munich. Saddam has already been stopped. We have time.

Third, if we attack, the Middle East would become what we have always feared it would be: A radicalized, polarized cauldron in both the Palestinian and Moslem worlds, seething with hatred, and that hatred will be directed at us and it will not just be confined to the region.

The costs will be enormous abroad and at home. You had better be prepared to pay them.

And that is my last point: Do not vote to strike up the band today unless you are willing to face the music afterward. Do not vote to create a new generation of veterans of foreign wars unless you are willing to pick up the full cost of caring for their health needs, caring for their family support needs,

and all the other attendant needs that they will experience.

Last, let me simply say that a lot of you do not like to vote for foreign aid. Well, if you vote for the Michel resolution today, you had better be prepared to vote for a lot of it.

□ 1230

You had better be prepared to support the billions and billions in new Presidential requests which you will see over the next decade. You had also better be prepared to vote for the taxes to pay for the war upon which we are about to embark.

Mr. Speaker, I beg you to not just add the cost to the deficit because a bookkeeping gimmick allows us to. Our economy cannot afford it, and our self-respect should not allow it.

I would ask my colleagues last of all to remember not just the President's face, but to remember the faces of all of the people we know who are now on the front lines who may be asked to make the ultimate sacrifice.

When I was in the chair last night, I made a list of the people who I knew personally or who I have met from my own area in the last 6 months who are now in Saudi Arabia. I thought of the vice president of the central labor body in my own hometown of Wausau. I thought of kids I met from Sheboygan, Milwaukee, Stevens Point, Superior, and literally a dozen other places in my own State. I thought of the classmate of my own son here at Yorktown High School in Arlington. That is who I think of before I vote.

Mr. Speaker, I ask my colleagues today, for God's sake, remember: The choice is not whether we have to go to war. It is whether we have to go to war now. Give us more time.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PETERSON].

Mr. PETERSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I come to the well today for the first time in my career. I do it at a time most grave for this Nation, and I rise in support of the only resolution that makes any sense, the Hamilton-Gephhardt resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I do this with a special perspective, a 26-year military veteran, 7 of which were in sustained combat. So, I know what these troops are doing over there, and I have great respect for their perseverance, for their capabilities, for their professionalism, because if we go to war, our troops will win a decisive battle. No doubt.

But the Gephhardt-Hamilton resolution is not a lollipop. It is a tough resolution. It supports our President regardless of what has been said. It supports the constitutional way this government works. It supports our troops in the gulf, too, because we say, "Hey, one single attack, and you've been had, Mr. Saddam Hussein." It secures the Saudi borders for the same reason. But

it encourages, it insists, that the President continue diplomatic efforts and that he does exhaust every effort to find a way to find a peaceful solution to this conflict.

It does not give war-making powers to the President, and the reason we are not doing that is because the President can only commit forces. The President cannot commit the Nation. Only this body, by this Constitution, can commit this Nation to war.

The Tonkin Gulf resolution is experience enough. The reasons for that resolution were great. It fell apart because we committed troops. We did not commit our Nation to that exercise, and it destroyed this Nation. It split it apart. Let us not do that again.

I vowed when I sat in Hanoi that I would never allow anyone to persuade me to send troops into battle without the backing of the American people, and I am not going to do it today. I will never do it, and I ask my colleagues today to vote for the only resolution that stays on the line of the Constitution, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2½ minutes.

Mr. Speaker and colleagues, each time that I step on this floor to cast a vote for a half million Missourians, I feel somewhat inadequate to the responsibility of being their voice and their vote. I never feel informed enough, I never feel prepared enough, and I never feel wise enough.

Today, for obvious reasons, I especially feel that way.

The Saturday after Thanksgiving I was eating lunch in a McDonald's with my 20-year-old son, Matt, not too far from this Chamber. A woman, a stranger, approached us as we were eating, and she said, "You're a Senator or something; aren't you?"

I said, "Yes."

I let it pass.

She said, "I want to talk to you." she said, "You see, my son and his wife are in the Army in the Persian Gulf," and then she began to cry, and then her tears turned to sobs. I tried to console her, but she could not get control of herself, and finally she just had to turn and leave.

We cannot and we should not decide the policy of our country in the gulf standing just in her shoes, but I believe we have got to be able to look that woman and all like her, and husbands as well, in the eye and say that before we send their children to war that we have done everything in our power to reach our goals without war. In my heart and mind we cannot say that yet today.

When we started sanctions, we knew that it would take longer, rather than sooner, for them to achieve their goal. But I say to my colleagues that these are the most powerful and effective sanctions in the history of the world.

With more than 50 of our warships in the region, three of our aircraft carriers, we have made over 6,000 interceptions of questionable vessels; 800 times our sailors have boarded and stopped questionable ships. Thirty-five times we have diverted ships from their destination and sent them somewhere else, and many, many times we have sent shots over the top of the ships that we have wanted to stop.

Only we have begun to lose patience with the policy of sanctions that is clearly having its intended effect. Opponents say that they will never work alone. They say they will never work fast enough, they will never keep enough pressure on Saddam Hussein politically to leave. Opponents say that if we do not use force now, then we have told the world that we have cut and run.

Mr. Speaker, that is what they said about the sanctions applied to Idi Amin, to Trujillo, to Somoza, and to Daniel Ortega.

□ 1240

But history shows that even brutal dictators have been toppled and defeated by sanctions. Sanctions are force. Sanctions are effective. Sanctions require rightful contributions from our allies, and, yes, sanctions succeed, as these are succeeding, and sanctions will leave us better able in the end to resume the wars we must fight here at home, wars against drugs and crime, wars against poverty and disease, and the war to rebuild our economic strength.

Now, the debate of words and ideas is about to end, and we are about to have the chance to decide. Whatever our decision, we will leave this room today one again and whole again. If we vote for war today—and I hope that we will not—this Congress and this country must close ranks, not because that makes war inevitable but because diplomacy and sanctions and international pressure thankfully still have time to work. But if that fateful decision is made, let us also be united in our prayers.

I pray for the President, for his judgment, for his wisdom, and for whatever decision and whatever course he will decide. Most of all, all of us pray for our young people, for our soldiers scanning the lonely sand-blown horizons. We pray for the pilots flying their fighters above the Arabian Sea. We pray for the sailors and the ground forces, and we pray, all of us, with all our hearts, for their safe return to America, the country that loves them and deeply appreciates the sacrifice they are prepared to make.

The SPEAKER. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may

consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel amendment. And I do so with a great sense of responsibility, as we all must feel here today. This is indeed one of those historic occasions when we are called upon to perform our ultimate duty, to our constituents, and to our Nation. The responsibility weighs heavy on our shoulders, but we cannot shrink from it.

This debate, and the votes we will cast, are momentous indeed. But the resolution I support is not a declaration of war. Let us be very clear about that. It is rather a vote to stand firm, stand tall, and stand together, as one nation. It is a vote to give our President the support he has asked for, the support he deserves, the support he needs. At this critical moment for our country, and for the world, we have been called upon to give the President of the United States the authority he requires to meet this great challenge. Yes, Congress does have a constitutional prerogative. But we must exercise that prerogative soberly and responsibly.

If anything, a yes vote on Solarz-Michel is the best chance to avoid war. For only if Saddam Hussein sees unity and resolve on our side, will he finally understand that he has no choice. Only a credible threat will force him to yield. If we fail to send that unequivocal message, Iraq might miscalculate once again. Saddam may conclude that we lack the will to use force, and that if he stays put, his illegal occupation will stand. If you don't believe that, ask President Ozal of Turkey. He knows the Iraqis very well. He shares a border with them. His forces have 10 Iraqi divisions pinned down on that border. He is quoted in this morning's Washington Times as saying that it is crucial that we "send the right message * * * only * * * Congress can convince (Hussein) that the Bush administration is now authorized to use force to evict him." Mr. Speaker, that realization on the part of Saddam Hussein may be our best chance to avoid war. That's why it is so crucial that we do the right thing here, and give the President the support he asked us for.

During the past few months, we have heard much discussion centering on one small question: Why are we in the gulf?

The answer to this question is crucial in terms of this debate. What indeed is this conflict all about? Well, first let's determine what it is not about. Oil is certainly a consideration, but it is not the primary consideration. We have other sources of energy. And it is high time that we developed a real independence of Arab oil.

It is not even about Kuwait, and it is certainly not about democracy. Kuwait was a benevolent dictatorship, but it was a dictatorship. So is Saudi Arabia. It is not about human rights. Unfortunately, human rights abuses are rampant throughout the Arab world, and in so many other countries, like Cuba, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

The fact remains however, that we do have a vital stake in this confrontation. Our national interests really are at stake. For Kuwait is only the beginning. If Saddam Hussein is allowed to prevail, what kind of world will we live in?

If Saddam stays in Kuwait, he will undoubtedly become the leader of the Arab world. His appetite for conquest and intimidation will grow. Other dictators will be encouraged. Instability in the world will be rampant.

We and our allies will be affected. Saddam Hussein will increase his arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons, and he will use them, make no mistake about it. The threat lies not necessarily in what will happen tomorrow, but what will happen the day after tomorrow, if we do not act now. Winston Churchill put it best:

Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.

Mr. Speaker, this is the history that we must avoid, because our children will pay the price.

I would just like to interject one note of caution into his debate—for those, whether in Europe, in the Arab world, or anywhere else, who think we should "give" something to Saddam, who think we should press Israel to make concessions. We must continue to categorically reject linkage. It is unconscionable that Israel be made a victim of this crisis. Of course we want to solve the Palestinian problem. So do the Israelis.

All the Arabs have to do is accept Israel's existence. Egypt recognized the state of Israel. In return, they got every inch of the Sinai Desert, although Israel won that territory in a war of self defense. All problems in the Middle East can be addressed, but the solutions must be based on rationality and goodwill.

To those who oppose this bipartisan approach, I say this: I respect your view. I know we all want the same thing. But please, please, ask yourselves this question: What is the cost of waiting?

Ask yourselves these questions:

Can we afford to wait?

Can our men and women continue to sit in the desert, away from their loved ones, and in many cases away from their jobs and studies here at home?

Can our coalition stand the erosion of support that may come in the interim?

Can the Kuwaiti people continue to suffer from the horrible atrocities they have been subjected to?

Can our allies—Egypt, Israel, Turkey—continue to suffer the damage to their economies caused by the protraction of this crisis?

Can we wait around while a vicious, blood-thirsty dictator holds the world at bay?

Can we wait around while Saddam makes a mockery of civilized norms of behavior?

Please ask yourselves these questions. Please be honest. Please vote your conscience.

Let's stand shoulder to shoulder with the President during this trying crisis.

With God's help, we may just be able to avoid a greater catastrophe later on.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. UPTON].

Mr. UPTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Gephardt-Hamilton

resolution because it would undermine U.N. Resolution 678.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bipartisan resolution which authorizes the President to use all means necessary to enforce the UN resolutions regarding Iraq's invasion of Kuwait provided he certifies to Congress the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic means to obtain Iraqi compliance with the U.N. resolutions and determines those diplomatic efforts have been unsuccessful.

The United Nations is finally acting in its true sense as an international peacekeeping coalition. Many in the international coalition have sent troops and invested money in order to repeal Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. A vote against the bipartisan resolution is a vote against the United Nations and will seriously undermine the United Nations as it is finally acting as a peace-keeping international organization. This is not a vote for war. It is a vote to support the United Nations, not repudiate it. It is a vote to stand united behind the President and the international community. This is a vote to ensure diplomatic initiatives have a chance to work. Diplomacy will work only if Hussein knows that his rejection of diplomacy has severe consequences.

I believe the objectives of the United States and United Nations are clear. They have been stated in 12 U.N. resolutions. These goals call for Iraq's total and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of the Government of Kuwait, compensation to the victims of Saddam Hussein's aggression, and stopping any further aggression from Iraq to its neighboring countries.

Iraq mobilized its armies, lied to their neighbors about their intentions, invaded and annexed Kuwait, took foreign hostages to use them as human shields, and raped and tortured Kuwaiti citizens.

It has been said that for evil to thrive, good only needs to remain neutral. The United States has not remained neutral and neither has the world community. For the first time in my life, the United Nations has truly worked as it was originally intended. The founders of the United Nations were determined, in the words of the charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war . . . and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."

In American diplomacy, this principle was stated by President Truman, when he declared the fundamentals of American foreign policy would rest in part on the proposition "that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations organization comprised of all peace-loving nations of the world who are willing to use force if necessary to ensure peace." Unfortunately, the threat of force is sometimes needed to ensure peace, and this is one of those times. It is my sincere hope that adoption of this resolution will lead our Nation down the path of peace and not war.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MCDADE].

Mr. MCDADE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. Speaker, this has been a most difficult and sobering debate for all of us. The stakes are high. Emotions are running strong. And I think all of us—reflecting the feelings and belief of those we are privileged to represent—find ourselves torn and conflicted by the situation that confronts us today and the choices before us.

None of us wants war. No one. All of us want to see this crisis resolved peacefully. I can understand and I respect the views of those who want to defer conflict and avoid a recourse to arms.

But today, we find ourselves at what without question is a defining moment, a moment of truth.

It is a critical moment for the world community in its quest for a peaceful settlement. The world is watching whether the Congress will stand together, unified, with the President and the United Nations in rejecting the aggression of Saddam Hussein.

And it is a moment of truth for Saddam Hussein because this is perhaps the very moment he has been waiting for and gambling on all these many months.

Even though the international community, in unprecedented unity, has rejected his immoral occupation and destruction of Kuwait—even though Iraq has been subjected to sanctions and a trade embargo—even though a 28-nation coalition has arrayed against him a military force of unquestionable power—Saddam Hussein has refused to budge.

Even confronted with the explicit threat of force by the United Nations, he has spurned each and every effort to reach a peaceful solution to this crisis.

For the past 5 months Iraq has not sought peace. Instead, it has sought simply to divide and conquer; divide the international community while conquering Kuwait.

We've been forced to endure a seemingly endless charade from Baghdad, not diplomacy but rhetoric and threats, intended to fracture the coalition.

Baghdad says the issue is not Kuwait, it is the Arab-Israeli dispute. Iraq takes, then releases, hostages trying to cynically manipulate world opinion. It threatens "seas of blood" trying to sap our will.

And when finally given the chance this week to broach a peaceful solution, Iraq insults our President and matter-of-factly states it will attack Israel.

Iraqi diplomacy—if one would stoop to call it that—has been a waiting game, an effort to confuse; to delay; and ultimately to divide.

This is Saddam Hussein's gamble—will the international community, the coalition, stay together over the long haul? Or will the coalition begin to come apart while Iraq has the pressure taken off and is given more time to stall and delay?

Mr. Speaker, like it or not—we find ourselves confronted with choices that go to the heart of Saddam's gamble. This is perhaps the ultimate roll of the dice in his game and the stakes are immense.

At this critical moment—what are the chances for any peaceful resolution of this cri-

sis if the dictator sees that his gamble may pay off?

Can anyone doubt what will occur if we send a mixed signal at this critical juncture? What will happen to the coalition if the carefully forged position of the United Nations and President Bush is not endorsed by this body?

What hope is there, really, for any peaceful settlement that denies Saddam Hussein the fruits of his aggression if he receives a signal from this body that his gamble, his delaying game, is working?

There is only one vote before us, Mr. Speaker, which will clearly and unequivocally strengthen, not weaken, the President's ability to achieve a peaceful resolution to this crisis.

At this critical juncture, the chances for long-term peace—a peace that does not reward aggression—are best served by supporting the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Let's endorse the position of the President and the United Nations. Let's keep the world unified against the dictator, let us speak with one strong voice and send a signal to Saddam Hussein that his gamble will not pay off.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. GRANDY].

Mr. GRANDY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Let me begin by concurring with a portion of what the distinguished majority leader has just said.

Mr. Speaker, it is terribly important that in the last moment of this debate we do not reduce this magnificent exercise in free speech to some kind of inarticulate, indecisive mumble which sends no clear message of American resolve. However, if we reject Solarz-Michel and pass Gephardt-Hamilton, or, worse, if we pass them both, we may preach diplomacy but we will practice delay and we will give Saddam Hussein the one commodity he needs to prevail. That is time.

A 2-month delay will allow him to manipulate the Islamic holy month of Ramadan against our Arab allies in the international coalition. A 6-month delay will force our U.S. commanders to decide between combat readiness and troop rotation. A delay of 1 year might force this body back into session to decide whether we need to reinstitute a military draft to maintain our own commitment. And while we labor under these decisions, Saddam, confident that he will not be struck at massively and decisively at a point uncertain, will no doubt refresh and rest his troops, stockpile his spare parts, deprive his citizens to feed his soldiers, and probably work out the kinks in his chemical weapons. And I cannot even begin to speculate at what the luxury of time will do to his ability to export terrorism around the region, which he has vowed to do.

Perhaps since I have just returned from the gulf, I do not, as many of my colleagues do, feel as they do that the conflict is avoidable, but I will oppose Gephardt-Hamilton because I still want

to extend diplomacy and not extinguish it. But what chance does Perez de Cuellar or the European foreign ministers or even those Arab ministers who are proposing diplomatic solutions have to realize their goal if force is not a constant alternative to Saddam's intransigence?

We naively presume in this body that somehow this man is impressed by our tightly reasoned diplomatically appropriate Western civilization arguments. But what model does he have for democracy? Egypt? A country he has already betrayed by going into Kuwait? Israel? A country he has vowed to obliterate? And what is his model for Arab moderation and peaceful coexistence? Anwar Sadat, now deceased.

Mr. Speaker, from his narrow frame of reference we can only teach Saddam Hussein two lessons: We can teach him the lesson of Lebanon, in which American resolve collapsed under Third World terrorism, or we can teach him the lesson of Libya, in which the terrorist Qadhafi himself finally paid the price for his brutality. I know which lesson this gentleman will prefer to teach.

Yes, I have been with the congressional delegation most recently and heard the reports that the Arabs will not fight. I have heard that report. For what it is worth, I have also heard our distinguished majority whip report he was told conflict is inevitable and that sanctions will take 2 or 3 years. But I respect his decision.

But I ask the Members to respect this: I ask them to reject the Gephardt solution and rally instead behind the resolve and the clearheaded determination of a young soldier who said to us when we were in Saudi Arabia last week, "Congressman, I really want to go home, but I want to go home through Kuwait."

Support the Solarz resolution.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. DINGELL].

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution and in opposition to the resolution offered by my dear friends, Mr. GEPHARDT and Mr. HAMILTON. I urge my colleagues to vote likewise.

Mr. Speaker, I have spent much time following the debate here in the House and also in the other body.

I would like to note first that I served my country in time of war, as an infantryman in World War II, and through the most extraordinary kindness of the Almighty I survived that war.

I detest war. War is death and killing, pain and suffering, the bereavement of families, the loss of husbands, parents, and wives and children. Its costs in human terms are awful, its costs in economic terms unbelievable.

I have listened, read, thought, agonized and prayed for wisdom and guidance over the hard choices before us. They are not easy for any

of us here, nor are the choices clear. It is impossible to say who is right or to predict what is the best course. History will reveal that to us when we look back on this day, and I pray our judgment is wise and good for our great country and for all Americans—above all, for those who are especially at risk standing under arms in the Persian Gulf.

We have voted on House Continuing Resolution 1, the Bennett-Durbin resolution. I voted in favor of it, as did most of my colleagues. That was the right vote, a correct and proper institutional vote. It said the Constitution vests in the Congress the power to declare war, and that military action by the United States must be explicitly approved before military action may be initiated.

I have heard it said that this country should not resort to war until it has exhausted every method of achieving peace. I agree with that. There is no difference of opinion here in the House, or in the Senate on the substantive questions. We all agree:

We oppose war.

We want to avoid the terrible human and economic consequences of war.

Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait.

The Persian Gulf area must be restored to a state of peace and tranquility.

We all want the sanctions to be used and to establish that they cannot bring success before any military force is used.

We all want every effort to achieve a peaceful settlement to be exhausted before this country resorts to war and violence.

The question is not what are our substantive goals. Our differences are over how they are to be achieved. We differ on methods, and it is to these differences that we must address our attention.

I did everything I could, honorably and properly, to prevent the election of George Bush to the Presidency in one of the most partisan elections in history. Mr. Bush carried my district, and was elected in a landslide of awesome proportions. I say this not to explain my vote but simply to make clear his constitutional legitimacy.

George Bush in his capacity as President has clear constitutional primacy in two areas: In the conduct of foreign relations, which is reserved exclusively to the President; and as Commander in Chief, where the Constitution also gives the President exclusive power.

We in the Congress, on the other hand, have the power to declare war. In some 200 instances in the history of this Nation, Presidents have committed Armed Forces of the United States to military action. In only five of those instances was there a declaration of war by the Congress. That establishes clearly the power of the President to act as Commander in Chief.

The Congress should consider the important questions of policy here, and has done so now for 2 days. We are now preparing to vote, and I am satisfied that all Members are voting their conscience and convictions after a worthy debate, characterized by civility and intelligence.

As I have observed, the question before us is tactical: How to accomplish the substantive goals, upon which we all agree, and to do so with least risk to our servicemen and women, and with the least chance of war and the smallest loss of life.

The first point to be noted is that the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution does not have the force and effect of law. It is solely a House concurrent resolution. Indeed, the first two resolutions we vote on today lack, if adopted, the force and effect of law. The President will not be called upon to sign either of them, and cannot refuse to sign them because of the form in which they are submitted.

Those resolutions are, in effect, a statement of congressional policy. They are, if you wish, a message to the President. They are also a message to the world, and to Saddam Hussein, and it is he who will be mostly moved by that action.

Politics stops at the water's edge. We are all Americans, sharing the same goals of peace, freedom, self-determination, human dignity and a decent life for all. But the President was elected to be our principal negotiator, and we are sending our President to deal with some of the most important and sensitive questions affecting our national security. If the Nation, if this House, if this Congress expects the President to succeed, we cannot send him into the process without all the tools his office and the Constitution give him.

No principal, no negotiator, acting on an important matter can expect success if that negotiator is functioning with only limited authority.

If this Congress wants to protect our troops in the Persian Gulf, it is absolutely necessary that we give the President the authority to assert all his powers. It is also urgent that the President have the power to speak, clothed with the full backing of the Nation he serves.

To do less, to reduce the real or apparent power of the President to conduct the delicate, difficult, and dangerous task is to increase, not reduce, the risk of war and all its attendant horrors.

Will the President use these powers well? I don't know. I hope so. I pray so. I pray that God give him wisdom and grace to do what is right and best for all: for the United States, for the world, and for the people of the Persian Gulf, including, yes, the people of Iraq.

I do not rejoice at having to decide the issues before us. Nor do I rejoice at the way they are presented. I have many reservations about the way the matter has been conducted by the administration, and I have expressed those concerns to the President, and to officers of the administration. I have sent a lengthy letter to the President urging him in the strongest way to let the sanctions work. I still hope he will do so. That was clearly a sound policy before this debate and will continue to be so.

I hope that armed action can be avoided. I hope that the President can and will handle this matter without failure or fault. I cannot assure you that he will, or that I will agree with him as he continues one of the most difficult tasks ever to befall a President.

I cannot assure you I can or will agree with George Bush's conduct of our Persian Gulf policy. It may be that I will come to disagree with him on these matters, either personally or institutionally. If so, I, like the others of my colleagues, will do what I must do.

For now, I believe that history will confirm that our best chance of saving precious lives is to afford the President adequate authority to

negotiate the issues of concern to us in the Persian Gulf from a position of the greatest strength. He cannot serve us well with lesser powers.

The choices, as I have said, are not good. Had I crafted this debate and this process, I would have done it far differently. But the choices I would have crafted are not before us.

Diplomacy works, and we want it to work here. We want there to be sufficient time for it to work. We cannot expect it to work unaccompanied by a full expectation by our adversaries that failure to allow it to work will have far worse consequences for them.

Without that expectation, Saddam Hussein has no incentive to negotiate. The efforts of everyone now engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis will face the real probability of failure if we do not afford the President the necessary support for real negotiations in the availability of the military option.

Saddam Hussein will be watching this debate, and he will gauge whether or not the pressure will be sufficient to make him negotiate or not. The debate here will affect, adversely or favorably, the efforts of others to achieve diplomatic settlements.

Do not think that adoption of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution absolves this body of responsibility or closes the matter. If negotiations fail, our Armed Forces may well face Saddam on the field of battle and, God forbid, it may come soon.

We are all agreed that our national purposes will be carried out. Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait; peace, order, and tranquility in the gulf—those are our goals. This issue may be back here for another vote if the President is not successful in negotiating a diplomatic end to this matter. I hope, if and when that time comes, that we can say we gave the President the power he needed to resolve the issues diplomatically, on the best terms and with the least loss of life.

I also hope that our Nation, our forces, and our situation will be better and stronger at that time. I cannot be sure, nor can I assure my colleagues, that it will be so.

This will be the most difficult vote I have cast in 35 years of service here. For all of that I vote as I do firmly convinced that it affords us the best chance of avoiding the horrors of war, and the suffering and loss of life that accompany such an awful event.

I will vote for the Solarz-Michel resolution. I intend to vote against the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution. I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

God bless the United States, God bless our fine young men and women in the Persian Gulf. May He, in his infinite wisdom and power, guide us safely through this difficult time. May He give us peace.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. GLICKMAN].

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

I believe, with a great deal of reluctance, that diplomacy is best served by the threat of imminent military power. For that reason, I reluctantly oppose

the resolution of my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution and in opposition to the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution. I have listened to my constituents, for as their representative, it is my role to do my best to reflect their concerns. They are, though, divided in their assessment of what vote I should cast in these next few hours. But I must perform as our Constitution requires and the ultimate decision on how I vote is mine alone. I share with all my colleagues the gravity of the charge. It has been a difficult struggle.

I wonder if this Nation can actually insure we are setting the course for a tyrant's retreat from tyranny. I doubt the world's need for oil is dearer than the blood that will be shed for it. As the original House sponsor of the U.S. Institute of Peace, I believe in conflict resolution but I fear each day is yet another step away from all peaceful means of ending this crisis. I question the years of confusing and mistaken administration foreign policy which has led us to this time and place. I anguish over the fate of our brave troops. I am haunted by words read long ago, the author since forgotten, that said, "War would end if the dead could return."

Yet with all my doubts and all the ramifications of those doubts, I choose to vote to give the President the authority he has requested. I believe the chances for peace, as we approach the U.N. deadline, are indeed more likely if Saddam Hussein believes this great country of ours is united. God help me that I have made the correct decision, the decision that will lead to a speedy resolution, the decision which will, as history is written of this moment, be said to have been the best and most honorable decision.

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI] is recognized for 5 minutes.

□ 1250

Mr. TORRICELLI. Now, my friends, a great choice. Not only a question of war. In truth, that judgment remains with Saddam Hussein. He shall withdraw from Kuwait and the peace shall be preserved, or he shall remain. And at some point, on some battlefield, with some unspoken weapons, war will be fought.

The issue for us is also how to preserve the peace, even at this late moment. The Hamilton resolution asks you to believe that an adolescent assassin, who rose to power assassinating his closest friends and allies, who sent 1 million men to their deaths in the war with Iran, who visited upon his people 8 years of unspoken deprivation, that this man will respond to your patience, because of his deep and abiding concern for his people.

It is, my friends, a triumph of hope over reason. Four hundred thousand young Americans are on station in Saudi Arabia. The most powerful army

in history. And still Saddam defies the world's demand for justice.

He does not doubt our power. He does not question our weapons. He doubts our will. He challenges the proposition that our generation possesses the strength of purpose, the basic resolve of our fathers.

My friends, send Saddam a message that will shake the foundations of Baghdad, that the American people are filled with a terrible resolve, angered, that at this moment in history, still in the dawn of our triumph over communism, believing that the peace was secured for our generation, that he has brought the world to war again. Resolved that international law in our time will have meaning, the ambitions of Wilson and Roosevelt for order among nations, a time when the weak would be protected, that there would be order among the strong, would be known.

America, I know you are tired. We are so few, and we have borne the burdens of this world for so long. But history calls us again. George Bush has assembled what is arguably the greatest coalition of nations of all time, united not for the conquest of anyone, with designs on nothing, but for justice, and more, a lasting peace in a new time. That coalition is tested in a defining moment of the post-cold-war period, that will tell much about the role of our Nation for the rest of our lives, and the kind of peace that may endure.

This is the issue. I have lived through my life, my 39 years, with 200 wars. My greatest hope for our time is that the future be made different from the past. That is what we ask.

One hundred sixty nations have spoken. The Security Council has voted. The Senate of the United States has decided. Now the world watches this House. Is our resolve less, our vision any different?

Give an answer that will be heard not simply throughout the world, but throughout the years; a message that every despot and dictator in every corner of this globe will hear. It is a new time of international law, with real international sanctions for those who violate the peace.

Mr. Speaker, we are a patient people, but we shall not visit this moment in our history again. This international coalition will not endure if the wrong judgment is made here today.

The gift of time that you would give Saddam shall not be used for peace, God, I wish that it were so, but to prepare for war; to build the trenches, to provide the traps, to refine the weapons that would consume the lives of our sons and daughters.

An hour ago we declared that we would use our constitutional prerogative. Now is that time. Stand with your President, without divisions.

God bless you as you make your fateful choice. And to those young Ameri-

cans in foxholes and tents spread across the broad peninsula of Arabia, as you listen to our words here today, know that we are proud of you, we are grateful to you, and Godspeed in your mission for America and for a lasting peace.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. ABERCROMBIE].

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Mr. Speaker, speaking for 19 members of the class of 1990 in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, we believe that the alternatives to war have not been exhausted. We will not vote for a declaration of war in the Persian Gulf. We call on our colleagues to exhaust all efforts to secure peace in the area by voting for the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Less than 2 weeks after taking the oath of office we face a decision graver than any confronted by some of our most senior colleagues.

Because we believe that alternatives to war have not yet been exhausted, we will not vote for a declaration of war in the Persian Gulf.

Toward that end, we support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution. Hamilton-Gephardt strongly endorses the President's authority to enforce sanctions vigorously, to secure an Iraqi evacuation of Kuwait, to support our fighting men and women in the field, and to defend the Saudi borders.

Hamilton-Gephardt also affirms the constitutional requirement for congressional authorization before the commencement of war and calls for our coalition partners to bear a fuller share of the costs.

We call on our colleagues to exhaust all efforts to secure peace in the area by voting for the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Members of the class of 1990 supporting the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution are: PETE PETERSON, THOMAS H. ANDREWS, BERNIE SANDERS, WM. J. JEFFERSON, NEIL ABERCROMBIE, JOHN W. COX, JR., TIM ROEMER, COLLIN C. PETERSON, ROSA L. DELAUNO, CALVIN DOOLEY, MAXINE WATERS, PATSY T. MINK, JOHN F. REED, MIKE KOPETSKI, JOAN KELLY HORN, LARRY LA ROCCO, BARBARA-ROSE COLLINS, ELLENOR HOLMES NORTON, and JAMES MORAN.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Speaker, I endorse prayerfully the course which the resolution of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] would put us on.

Mr. Speaker, late last night—or, to be more precise, early this morning—I addressed this House with my concerns about the President's proposed military course of action in the gulf. I spoke in support of an alternative that would not take us into war until all other reasonable, practical options were exhausted.

Today as we continue to debate this grave issue, I would like to make two additional points that I believe are important.

First, a number of speakers have continued to make what I consider to be a forced and terribly mistaken analogy between the decision

we face today, and the decision that certain European governments made in Munich in 1938.

At that time Hitler threatened war if Europe did not acquiesce in his demand for Germany to annex the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia. In Munich in 1938, representatives of the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany met on this issue and, without the participation of the Government of Czechoslovakia, reached an agreement, known as the Munich Pact, that conceded the Sudetenland to Hitler.

British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain returned to London and announced that he had achieved peace in our time. A year later, far from satisfied with the acquisition of the Sudetenland, but instead strengthened economically and militarily by that acquisition, Hitler invaded Poland, and World War II was underway.

It's always tempting, but often dangerous, to try to use historical lessons to guide our present decisions. And those who suggest that a continuation of the policy of sanctions against Iraq and the policy of appeasement at Munich are comparable are most egregiously distorting history.

In 1938, the leaders of the European community gave their assent to the invasion, occupation, and absorption of the Sudetenland by Germany. In 1990 and 1991, the leaders of the world community have united to insist that Iraq must withdraw completely and unconditionally from Kuwait. And every member of this body who has participated in this debate agrees with and supports that demand.

In 1938, the leaders of the European community hoped that their gift of part of the territory of Czechoslovakia would satiate Nazi Germany, and did nothing to prepare to stop further German aggression. In 1990 and 1991, the leaders of the international community have mobilized and deployed overwhelming armed forces at the borders of Iraq and Kuwait to ensure that Iraq can undertake no further aggression. And this body is united in support of that policy.

In 1938, the leaders of the European community let Nazi Germany use the resources of the Sudetenland to increase its ability to wage what became World War II. In 1990 and 1991, the leaders of the world community have instituted against the Iraqi invader the most far-reaching and effective economic embargo and sanctions in the history of the world, to force it to withdraw from Kuwait and to keep it from enjoying any advantage from its aggression. And every Member of this body, so far as I am aware, supports that embargo and those sanctions; our disagreement is over how long we let them operate before we resort to force.

In 1938, the leaders of the European community were weak and irresolute, and allowed Hitler to embroil the world in war. In 1990 and 1991, the leaders of the world community are strong and resolute, and will, one way or another, compel Saddam Hussein to yield. Our only difference is over the means by which we will force him to yield, and the timing in adopting those means.

In short, we don't have similarities between this situation and Munich; we have fundamental differences. To suggest otherwise is to imply that the only power we have to bring to

bear is the full military power of an all-out offensive; that the force being used to enforce sanctions is not significant and powerful; that the economic power of this, the greatest Nation on Earth, in conjunction with that of our allies and the United Nations, is of no consequence; and that all diplomatic efforts are now worthless. I do not believe this. Our sanctions are being enforced with military power and they are working. And worthwhile diplomatic efforts can still continue.

To suggest that a continued reliance on economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts is akin to the justly infamous decision of Munich is to misrepresent in a very insidious fashion the truth and relevance of history.

In his testimony last month before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Gen. David C. Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that, instead of looking to Munich, that we look to the beginning of the First World War for wisdom:

One often looks for historical precedents to lend context to dramatic events and the press has been full of comparisons between Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and Hitler's annexation of Czechoslovakia prior to World War II. No analogy is perfect, but the current course of events strikes me as more reminiscent of World War I than World War II. In 1914, the contending powers set in motion a mobilization and deployment juggernaut that soon achieved a momentum of its own. Each side's reaction to the other's growing force levels and troop movements became, in itself, the rationale for war and the terrible slaughter that followed.

The second thing I believe all of us should consider in this decision is why our European and Japanese allies continue to balk at supporting the military endeavor the President is considering. These allies say they are behind us.

If they agree that vital interests are at stake, they should be standing with us shoulder to shoulder, with their fair share of troops, materiel, and funds. They should fully share the military, economic, and political prices and risks. But they aren't. We should ask ourselves—why not?

This is a fundamental question. After all, we have committed over 400,000 troops, and our financial costs will likely exceed \$35 billion, even if no shot is ever fired. War would almost certainly cost us thousands of casualties and scores of billions of dollars more.

Europe has committed perhaps one-tenth that number of troops, Japan none; and combined they have made pledges of perhaps \$10 billion in loans, equipment donations, economic aid to front-line states, and some cash.

This is predominantly an overwhelmingly American effort. And as a result, any political damage that accrues in the region, any burden of terrorism, from Arab States and Muslim populations, will also likely be placed on American shoulders.

We should ask ourselves why this is the case, given that our country is less dependent on Persian Gulf oil than Japan or any other European country.

Sixty-three percent of Japan's oil comes from the Persian Gulf. Yet it has committed no troops, its volunteer medical force of 19 doctors left the region last month, and its miserly \$4 billion donation turns out to be mostly

loans. The Netherlands, Spain, and Italy get 100 percent, 59 percent and 36 percent of their oil, respectively, from the gulf. Yet none of these nations have sent troops, and none have made financial contributions to the Desert Shield effort—although they may be participating in a European Community economic aid program for front-line states. France obtains 38 percent of its oil from the gulf, and England 16 percent; these nations have at least sent some troops—as of late December, about 33,000, with several thousand more pledged—and materiel.

We should ask ourselves why this is the case, given that European and Asian countries cannot count on the geographic distance we have from Iraq—and its rapidly developing war machine—missiles, chemical, and biological weapons, and in the future, possibly nuclear weapons.

Part of the answer may be that our European and Japanese allies do not believe war is yet an acceptable or necessary action. If that is the case, perhaps our country should listen more carefully to their concerns.

But just as plausibly, these countries may simply be letting America pay the costs that eventually the world would otherwise have to pay to reign in the aggressive dictatorship in Iraq. That is both shameful and unacceptable. And it threatens the ultimate successful resolution of this conflict.

Whether this is eventually resolved through sanctions or through military force, it will be terribly unwise for us to allow the effort to be labeled "American," rather than global. Our regional interests and relationships, and our ability to play a constructive role in working toward a more stable, peaceful, and democratic Middle East, would suffer greatly if Iraq and its allies—including extremist and religious groups throughout the region—succeed in putting an American label on these efforts.

The failure of Europe and Japan to meet their responsibilities hurts our efforts in the gulf and hurts our country. It will be the greatest and most outrageous irony for this country to have to borrow tens of billions of dollars from the Europeans and Japanese to finance a war to protect their interests, and, while paying it back, further cede to them critical economic advantage. We deserve better cooperation from them.

To their credit, and to the President's credit, many of our Arab allies have contributed significant levels of both financial and military—including troop—support. However, many of these Arab troops are not front-line troops and are not committed to the mission we are about to embrace. This must also be addressed.

Finally, I would simply like to insert into this debate the words of the commander of our troops in the gulf, General Schwarzkopf, who spoke about sanctions and war in late October of last year. He said:

Golly, the sanctions have only been in effect about a couple of months * * *. And now we are starting to see evidence that the sanctions are pinching. So why should we say, "OK, gave them two months, didn't work. Let's get on with it and kill a whole bunch of people?" That's crazy. That's crazy. You don't go out there and say, OK, let's have a nice war today. God Almighty, that war could last a long time, and kill an awful

lot of people. And so we've just got to be patient.

As the President continues to work toward a resolution of this conflict, I pray that he heeds General Schwarzkopf's wise advice.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES].

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Speaker, I rise to express the overwhelming sentiments of the American people, of my congressional district, who have implored upon me on behalf of their sons and daughters to support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. Speaker, during Vietnam, I stood by as a witness to the national anguish, the peoples' frustration, and the unintended consequences which we continue to pay for today.

Eight years ago, I came to Congress fully prepared that I would probably have to cast a vote in a war between two great superpowers. That never happened and the cold war is behind us.

With the dawning of a new age in the post-cold-war, with the promise of a better world, I find it incredulous we are now engaged in a momentous vote that could usher in a war that would pale Vietnam. Have we not learned from the lessons of history? Must we once again give to the President a blank check to carry out a war under doubtful circumstances?

Is this another Tonkin Gulf resolution? I believe it is. And I can well remember, as I'm sure you do the consequences and price that this Nation has had to pay for that ill-conceived resolution.

With all due respect for the talents of President Bush—he has employed his considerable skills to ally the world against Iraq—he has not articulated to my satisfaction why an invasion of Kuwait and Iraq is in our best interest.

Why should the United States risk thousands of American lives and spend billions of dollars to protect Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in order to provide Japan and Europe with cheap oil?

Why should American men and women die in Kuwait and Iraq so that the multinational oil corporations continue to reap huge profits for Kuwaitis who have not supplied soldiers in their own defense, while Americans may die to perpetuate a monarchy that has no commitment to democratic values.

Mr. Speaker, the first service casualty without us having fired a shot in the gulf was a constituent of mine. Sgt. Campisi of West Covina. That number of noncombat deaths has grown to 98. Indeed, 98 deaths too many for us to bear and if the Michel-Solarz resolution is adopted these numbers will be multiplied a thousand fold.

The many Latino veterans of my district have called upon me to not repeat the horrible lessons of Vietnam. Latinos, as American servicemen were over represented in combat units and

in the front lines and while they represent 5 percent of the U.S. population, they suffered 20 percent of the casualties. The war in Vietnam as one in the Persian Gulf will again bring disproportionate higher casualties of minority troops.

Mr. Carlos Munoz, Jr., a distinguished professor of politics and history at USC, Berkeley has recently written that 36 to 40 percent of combat troops in the Persian Gulf are Hispanic Americans.

Make no mistake, having lived through the Korean conflict as a serviceman, and having been witness to the Vietnam war, I know the high cost of war, both when we win, and when we lose. In the case of Korea, our victory cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars to station United States troops there in perpetuity.

In the case of Vietnam, our loss cost us thousands of lives and billions of dollars, much of it squandered, in a military buildup unparalleled in history. Either way, win or lose, war is costly.

This Nation, under the wraps of a recession already in place, with taxpayers bearing the cost of billions of dollars in failed savings and loans; with the expectation of serious problems in our banking system; with unemployment beginning to escalate, we can little afford to engage in a war with a national deficit of \$330 billion for 1991.

Mr. Speaker, today on this, my first substantive vote in the 102d Congress, I cannot vote for war. War should be our last resort after all diplomatic and economic efforts have failed. War should be our defensive strategy, not our offensive posture.

I will vote against the Michel-Solarz resolution which is a declaration of war.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Idaho [Mr. STALLINGS].

Mr. STALLINGS. Mr. Speaker, I have decided to support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution. I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. Speaker, I have supported the President to this point because I believe it is imperative that Saddam Hussein be forced to reverse his occupation of Kuwait and understand that his actions are unacceptable to us and to the other civilized nations of the world. But I also believe that in this effort, war, with all its attendant human and strategic costs, should be a course of last resort.

Our President initially told us that above all, we needed to have patience and resolve. I agreed then, and I still do. I am not persuaded that we have exhausted the options of sanctions and of diplomacy. We owe the effort to ourselves and to the mothers and fathers, and the sons and daughters of our troops.

Mr. Speaker, I also want to address this body from my perspective as a professor of history. I am concerned about a misuse of history in this debate. The notion that this is a new Munich, an appeasement, simply doesn't stand up to scrutiny.

We are not withdrawing from the field. We intend to pursue sanctions aggressively—I hope even more aggressively than we have to this point. We are not telling Saddam Hussein, as Chamberlain told Hitler, that we will leave him alone with Kuwait in his hands as long as he assures us he wants nothing more. Instead we are resolved that he will be an increasingly debilitated outcast from the community of nations until he leaves Kuwait.

Nor are we facing an action by a world-class industrialized power with a growing military machine capable of overwhelming those just across the borders. The Armed Forces assembled in the gulf make it impossible for Saddam Hussein to continue his aggressive actions.

So I ask my colleagues to be careful with history. There may well come a time when we must resort to war. But when we talk, for now, about sanctions, we are not talking about appeasement, we are talking about tactics, and about the most constructive way of bringing pressure on Hussein to get him out of Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, we have heard much over the last months and days about the notion that we are establishing a new world order. I agree that we are doing so. It is a new day. That makes it all the more important that we think very carefully about the nuances of our reaction.

I can think of no other war in this century that we entered for the reasons, or under the circumstances, that face us now. In all our other wars, both popular and unpopular, our physical integrity or our fundamental political system has been under direct attack. In World War I, our shipping was being attacked and sunk. In World War II, Pearl Harbor had been devastated by bombers and fighters. Korea involved an invasion by Communists openly hopeful of destroying democracy as an ideology. In Vietnam we faced similar Communist subversion.

The present situation does not equate to any of these.

If we accept that we are setting the ground rules for a new era, for a new emerging global order, we must carefully ask and consider a question I have not yet heard posed:

Do we really want to set ourselves up as the enforcer of this new world order. Why not choose to be a partner? And is it not through uncompromising patience, and firm sanctions and skillful diplomacy, that we will emerge as a partner and leader, instead of merely the chief enforcer?

It is easy, in this instance, to identify Kuwait as a nation deserving of our protection and efforts. There are, however, smoldering conflicts all around the globe. Are we to have responsibilities as an armed enforcer in each of those as well? As we speak, for example, the Soviet Union is using military force to suppress fledgling democracies in the Baltics. Do we send our young men and women to protect the integrity of Latvia or Lithuania? They are certainly as deserving of our protection as Kuwait.

We are launching into uncharted and perilous waters, and while we must never fear to do so, we must never do so blindly either. Before we rush headlong into this rule as the armed enforcer of the new world order, I would like to have a firm sense of the param-

eters of that role. We are making history here, and the historical precedent we are setting may pull us in directions and into conflicts we deeply regret. So let us not shy away from our responsibilities, but let us set the precedent carefully and deliberately.

Mr. Speaker, before I conclude I must also express our thanks and gratitude to the young men and women of our Armed Forces who are serving in the Persian Gulf. Sanctions and diplomacy do not betray them. Instead, continued sanctions would validate the actions of our men and women in the gulf, and the enormous accomplishment their presence has already made possible. They have drawn a line and placed themselves on the line, selflessly and loyally, as Americas soldiers have always done. The willingness of our young men and women to answer their country's call is precisely the reason the final call must not be given before we have exhausted our other options.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAZZOLI].

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in proud support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, and in opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. ESPY].

Mr. ESPY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the majority leader for yielding. I do not believe in death by deadline. I believe there are other alternatives which are viable left to us before we turn this great country to war. Therefore, after a lot of soul searching, I announce my support in favor of Hamilton-Gephardt.

Mr. Speaker, I rise before this body in an hour of grave deliberation, to speak in support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution. I have come to this decision after much soul searching. I support Gephardt-Hamilton, and oppose the resolution offered by Mr. SOLARZ and the distinguished minority leader because I do not believe in death by deadline.

The time has come when I, along with all of my colleagues, have to make the most serious and far-reaching decision of my tenure as a Member of this Congress. From my State of Mississippi, 7,270 courageous and committed men and women have been called to active duty for the Persian Gulf. While Mississippi has only 1 percent of the Nation's population, its Guard and Reserve units make up 2 percent of the total forces called into active duty.

I have listened to the debates. I have read all salient materials I could obtain. I have attended relevant hearings. I have communicated with my constituents. I have traveled to the Persian Gulf and I have talked to our courageous men and women in the desert. They are committed, and I have no doubt that if called upon they will be victorious.

I have searched my heart, my soul, and my conscience. My conclusion is that the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution offers the wisest course for the United States and the world at this time. We cannot render a sentence of death by deadline to our sons and daughters, wives and husbands, fathers and mothers in the Persian Gulf.

In my travels to the Persian Gulf I visited with President Mubarak of Egypt, talked with our military leaders, and met with our Israeli friends. I am convinced that at this time there are better alternatives than war.

We need to demonstrate patience at a time when it is very tempting to become impatient. The economic sanctions appear to be working, though they are working slowly. The international embargo has effectively eliminated virtually all of Iraq's exports, blocked over 90 percent of their imports, and cut its GNP in half. Continued sanctions should reduce Iraq's GNP to approximately 30 percent of its pre-invasion level. William Webster, Director of the CIA, has testified that continued sanctions will increasingly diminish Iraq's military power as Saddam Hussein is unable to obtain the materials necessary to maintain and replenish his stock of armaments.

Additionally, this embargo appears to be our most effective means for deterring Saddam Hussein's ability to add destructive nuclear weapons to his arsenal. A country as great as ours can afford to be patient while sanctions weaken Saddam. Even in this situation, patience is a virtue.

Further, I am not convinced that we have adequately exhausted all channels for negotiating a peaceful settlement in the Persian Gulf. This crisis began because Saddam Hussein refused to consider negotiation as a means of resolving his differences with Kuwait. How ironic and tragic it would be if this crisis ends, with the cost of thousands of innocent lives, because the greatest military power on Earth, the United States of America, was too impatient to allow sanctions and negotiations to work. As President John F. Kennedy once said, "let us never negotiate out of fear, but let us never fear to negotiate."

We should negotiate, not to reward aggression, but to address the legitimate issues that have precipitated this crisis. We should negotiate because the new world order we all seek will be no different from the old if international disputes are resolved by force, before all other options have been exhausted.

Six hours of talking at one another rather than to one another in Geneva by Secretary of State Baker and Minister Aziz does not constitute a reasonable attempt at negotiation. I believe we owe it to our brave men and women who are prepared to sacrifice their lives to give diplomacy and sanctions time to work. I believe we need to be patient, and give the diplomatic efforts which the United Nations, Algeria, and France and the rest of the international community have initiated a chance to work.

While I was in the gulf, I also became convinced that the multinational alliance is not "us," but mostly the United States. We have committed 375,000 men and women to the region. We will have spent in excess of \$31 billion in incremental costs by the end of this fiscal year if we do not engage in war. If we go to war, the financial costs alone will likely exceed \$1 billion a day.

Other countries such as Japan and Germany have pledged financial help, but most of it has yet to arrive. Of \$4 billion pledged by the Japanese, only \$450 million has been received. That is a paltry sum from a country which receives 63 percent of its oil from the

Persian Gulf. Of \$2 billion pledged by the Germans, only \$100 million has been received. Our allies are willing to hold our coats while we go fight.

In the gulf, I saw over 400 Mitsubishi four by four jeeps donated by the Government of Japan. But they were being driven by American soldiers. The Japanese are prepared to contribute their cars, and some of their cash, but not their children. Where are the sons and daughters of those who receive more oil from the Persian Gulf than we do? Before we fight, the alliance must be truly multinational, and it must be only after we have exhausted every other option.

Mr. Speaker, my family has a history of association with death. I was raised in the funeral home business, and I cannot count the times I have been called upon to comfort mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, husbands and wives after the death of a loved one. I know that Mississippi would likely have more casualties per capita in a war than any other State. Mr. Speaker, I will attend those funerals. But before it comes to that, I want to know in my heart that I can look those loved ones in the eye and tell them that I did everything possible, that I exhausted every reasonable opportunity, that I went the last mile for peace.

Before we go to war to pursue what some see as our vital interests, we need to exhaust every opportunity for peace. And before we go to war, we must be absolutely certain that our vital interests are at stake. After Iraq invaded Kuwait, President Bush swiftly ordered American troops to the gulf in a defensive posture to prevent an invasion of Saudi Arabia. I support that action because clearly we could not risk Saddam's controlling the entire Persian Gulf. But the world has adjusted to the situation in Kuwait. Eighty percent of the world's oil has not been affected.

Also, Kuwait is not a democracy, it is a monarchy. We need to repel the invasion of Kuwait, because Saddam must not keep the fruits of his aggression. But I do not believe at this time that we need to do so at a cost of thousands of American lives. We need to give sanctions and diplomacy a chance. And no matter how we do it, we don't need to do it alone.

Mr. Speaker I am convinced that if we do go to war, our troops will be victorious. America and the Congress will stand behind our President and our troops. We will give them everything they need for a decisive victory. But if we can do the job without war, we must. Let us be patient. Death by deadline is not a reasonable alternative.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. SLAUGHTER].

Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York. Mr. Speaker, because I believe with all my heart that it is the best course for the United States of America, I support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

For the first time since Vietnam, America is poised to fight a major war. Never before in history have we committed so many young men and women so quickly against a nation that did not directly threaten our borders. Soon our troop strength will total more than 400,000 troops in the Persian Gulf. Vietnam took us 5

years to build up such a huge military presence. In the Persian Gulf, it has taken less than 6 months.

President Bush has promised that he will not repeat the mistakes of Vietnam and that any offensive military action against Iraq will be quick and decisive. While I have great confidence in our military, I know that life is not a Rambo movie and that any major offensive against a brutal regime like Iraq involves great risks and great costs. We must consider fully the cost of war in terms of the loss of human lives and human suffering.

How many Americans will die if we go to war? It is a question my constituents raise back home every day in their letters and their phone calls to me. The estimates are appalling. Consider these: 5,000 Americans dead and 15,000 wounded in the first 10 days said Newsweek; 10,000 dead and 35,000 wounded in a successful 90-day campaign to take Baghdad said the Center for Defense Information; as many as 30,000 dead in 20 days, said Jack Anderson quoting from "top secret Pentagon estimates" Whatever the figure, the prospect of casualties by the tens of thousands is something we can't ignore.

There are other costs as well.

What will be the cost, for example, of caring for a new generation of disabled veterans, who will require a lifetime of medical care as a result of a Persian Gulf war? Today, our country is hard pressed to humanely care for those American heroes traumatized by past wars. Every week, my office helps veterans searching desperately for adequate health care, only to find that the Veterans' Administration cannot meet their needs.

What, will be the cost of war to our entire economy? Will our peace dividend evaporate forever in the sands of Saudi Arabia and with it our hopes for new domestic investments in deficit reduction, in education, in health care?

Will the burden of shouldering the costs of this war, without the promised help of our allies, cause our economy to collapse?

And what will be the costs of war for the United States in the new world order? Will attacking Iraq simply increase a sense of world disorder? Will our new extensions of friendship to Syria and China—countries known for terrorism and suppressing freedom of expression—help lessen tensions? Or will these gestures encourage other regimes to adopt similar tactics within their own countries.

In raising these questions, I want no one to conclude that I condone Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. I abhor the atrocities perpetrated on Kuwait and its people. Just as I abhor the atrocities committed on Tibet by China and on Lebanon by our new friend Assad. But I know of no Member in Congress who believes that Iraq can be allowed to remain in Kuwait.

The key question we are considering today is whether we have given diplomacy and economic sanctions enough time to work. The potential costs of waging war is so great that we should postpone military action until we are absolutely convinced that diplomacy and economic sanctions will not work.

Even the President's own CIA Director William Webster agrees. The sanctions, he testified, have a dramatic impact on Iraq's economy.

And two former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have seen no reason to rush into war. I was particularly impressed by Adm. William Crowe's statement: "I cannot understand, he said, why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution."

Paul Nitze, former President Reagan's special adviser on arms control, argued that a stable world order was more likely to result through successful sanctions than through all-out war. Success through sanctions would lower the risk of violence and disruption in the region; it would likely maintain our access to Middle East oil, and it could halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nitze concludes, sanctions are worth pursuing.

This Chamber is no stranger to Saddam Hussein and the threats he poses in the Middle East. And I recall only last July 24, to be exact, 6 days prior to the invasion of Kuwait, when we voted to impose tough sanctions against Iraq. And I dare say that numbers of persons here tonight, who have characterized him as the new Hitler, voted against those sanctions.

But nonetheless, the House voted to cut off new financial credits and export guarantees to Iraq until President Bush certified that Iraq was in compliance with the international agreements on human rights and weapons of nonproliferation. And the State Department fought us every step of the way.

Ironically, while we were reacting to Iraq's buildup of troops along the border of Kuwait, our Ambassador in Baghdad, April Glaspie, was telling Saddam Hussein in a face-to-face meeting that—and I quote, "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait."

And colleagues, I submit to you that future debates on this issue will revolve around the face-to-face meeting.

In preparing for this debate today, and for this vote that is obviously going to be the most crucial of any of our lives; I reread the Gulf of Tonkin debate and couldn't help but be struck by the similarities of almost everything said on the floor then has been said on the floor again today.

It seems that the very least we could have learned from that debate is that patience will not hurt. That peace is better than war. That life is better than death. And that we can support the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution tomorrow with a good conscience and a good heart and know that we have done our best for our country and for its future.

[From the Nation, Dec. 24, 1990]

CHOOSE PEACE

The choice in the Persian Gulf conflict has never been between sanctions and force. It is between peace and war, between life and death. The party of death, which prefers self-descriptions that cover its thirst for conquest with appeals to the great tradition of just wars and lesser evils, has since August 2 seen sanctions as a kind of ritualistic foreplay to the violent penetration of an entire region of the globe. President Bush manipulated the various United Nations sanctions votes as he sent Secretary of State Baker to bribe and buy a favorable "use of force" resolution, putting a specious international gloss on his deadly designs for war and, not incon-

sequentially, buying time for the Pentagon to amass the most destructive invasion force since D-Day. The issue is not how soon, or how effectively, sanctions would work. It is how soon Bush believes he can get away with abandoning them. The polls, the pressures of a self-aggrandizing war coalition and the uncertain formations of a nascent antiwar movement will set the time frame—rather than any true test of sanctions themselves. (For an assessment of the costs of war, see the special report beginning on page 791.)

Of course sanctions can work. They do all the time, whether imposed by one or two nations or an entire world organization. What needs to be decided in every instance is what constitutes "working" and how long a period is deemed acceptable. In South Africa international sanctions provided necessary context and specific impetus for historic concessions by the white rulers. But as Brian Urquhart, U.N. political under secretary for eighteen years, points out: "There have never been sanctions of this complexity or this comprehensive. And Iraq is uniquely vulnerable to sanctions. It has a single economic base and a poor industrial infrastructure."

Sanctions rarely, if ever, bring unconditional surrender. That requires overwhelming military devastation, the extermination of civilian populations and the reduction of a nation's economic life to rubble. To bring Iraq to its knees, the United States will have to exceed by several degrees the level of annihilation reached in three years of war in Korea and a dozen years in Indochina. A nuclear bomb or two or three would do the trick nicely.

Why should unconditional surrender be the goal of U.S. policy in the gulf? Sanctions have a much better chance of forcing Iraqi concessions in a shorter time and with much less misery than war. But Bush is running out of "patience" after four months. What that means is that he is finished with the foreplay and wants to get on with the action. If his talk-show surrogates Defense Secretary Cheney and Vice President Quayle are to be believed, Bush has already decided that Saddam Hussein and independent Iraqi power have to be stopped sooner or later, and it had better be sooner. If that's true, Baker's mission to Baghdad is intended solely to deliver an ultimatum for surrender, not to open a dialogue for peace.

No conceivable interest of the United States would be served by aborting the sanctions process and sending an invasion in its place. Saddam has shown every intention of modulating his most offensive policies—holding hostages, starving the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, pillaging his conquered territory—while there is the possibility of discussion with the United States. There's every reason to believe that with sanctions in force and talks in progress, most if not all of the U.N.'s August demands can be met without the catastrophe of war. In the meantime, U.S. ground forces can be steadily reduced. Enough firepower would remain in naval and air units to keep the sanctions "working." That's all that's needed, if the revocation of Iraq's claim to Kuwait and containment of further aggression are really the aims of the military presence in the gulf. The rest is overkill.

If there were a way to substitute a true U.N. command for what no one doubts is a unilateral U.S. effort in the gulf, it would be so much the better. But the demise of the cold war and the decline of much of the Third World's economy have made the U.N. a sitting duck for U.S. manipulation. We

should do all we can to strengthen the U.N. as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of world disputes, but let us not delude ourselves: The old socialist bloc is irrevocably broken, and the ever-promising nonaligned group is practically non-functional now that there's only one world power. France and Britain are toothless has-beens, and Germany and Japan are effectively removed from power in U.N. circles because of their exclusion from permanent membership on the Security Council.

Gorbachev probably exercised a restraining influence, but when it came to a vote Baker bought the Russians for an estimated \$4 billion in aid from the sheiks. He bribed Egypt's Mubarak with \$14 million in forgiven debts. Syria's Assad, whose own brand of Baathist fascism is no second to Saddam's, got \$1 billion in arms aid and a go-ahead to wipe out all opposition to its puppet control of Beirut—by massacre, Assad's favorite tactic, where necessary. Turkey was promised 8 or 9 billion dollars' worth more in U.S. weapons, support for its application to join the European Community, and a big increase in its quota for textile exports to the United States. And for abstaining on the war resolution, China got a \$114.3 million loan from the World Bank and a trip around official Washington for its Foreign Minister—the first break in a promised reintegration of the Dengist fascists of Beijing into the free-world comity.

In the middle run and the real world, the key to peace lies in Washington. Those opposed to war—both inside official circles and outside in the streets, campuses and conference halls—have more power than they may think to keep Bush from acting the war party animal. The party of peace must demand that he stick to sanctions, start talking about settlements and moderate the military buildup. Such a course might take six months, a year or longer to "work." But if peace is not worth waiting for, nothing is.

THE COSTS OF WAR

"This will not be another Vietnam," says George Bush. Agreed: The Iraqi Syndrome from which we will one day suffer, if war comes, will be different from the Vietnam Syndrome—and perhaps much worse. For the Pentagon the main lesson of Vietnam was to avoid gradual escalation. This time, the military will use maximum firepower from day one. "The lethality of the battlefield in a single day will overshadow the whole Vietnam War," says Marine Col. Carl Fulford. Second, Vietnam was the engine that drove the economy for more than a decade of sustained growth, but war with Iraq is more likely to deepen the present recession. Third, while Vietnam defied the predictions of the domino theorists, war with Iraq will trigger incalculable repercussions in the Middle East. This time we will not be able to retire and sulk over distant wreckage; it may pursue us into every corner of our lives.

Those who have planned the Bush Administration's war-fighting strategy assume that it was the incremental conduct of the war in Vietnam that bred public alienation. But that has led to a central fallacy: that there is only one way—the Vietnam way—that war will traumatize and divide the American people. Already, public anxiety is at a pitch that it did not reach for years over Vietnam. If the likely costs of a gulf war were spelled out, it would only grow more acute.

But Bush, like Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon before him, prefers not to be encumbered by informed public debate. Here, for all the differences, is the continuity be-

tween Vietnam and Iraq. Twenty years ago, thanks to the Pentagon Papers, we learned some of what had been suppressed. Today, we cannot know for certain what the Administration is keeping from us about the costs of war. But here are some informed guesses.

THE BATTLEFIELD

For weeks all the talk was of air superiority. There was the optimists' Top Gun scenario, in which Saddam Hussein would be driven out by a two- or three-day aerial blitzkrieg, and the longer-range bombing campaign proposed by analysts such as Edward Luttwak, who believe that even a successful ground war would be so devastating that it would cost George Bush his presidency. But air power "alone didn't work on the Ho Chi Minh trail, and it won't work on the battlefield of the future," says Gen. Ed Scholes, chief of staff for most of the Army troops in Saudi Arabia. Gen. Colin Powell, during Senate hearings on December 3, appeared to agree, deriding the reliance on air power as an "alleged low-cost, incremental, may-work" strategy. He too would start with airstrikes, but in order to create the best conditions for an inevitable ground war. This in turn could take a number of courses, depending on whether the goal was to force Iraq out of Kuwait or whether, as many defense analysts believe, it would necessarily involve an assault on Baghdad.

The combined air-sea ground operation that Powell foresees would kill more Iraqis than Americans—perhaps three times as many. Countless civilians would also be killed or wounded—100,000 or more if Baghdad is attacked, according to the Center for Defense Information (C.D.I.), a Washington think tank staffed by retired military officers. Many more will be at risk if chemical warfare installations are bombed.

But the debate in the United States will necessarily turn on U.S. casualties. "The American people will support this operation until body bags come home," said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Dugan in the infamous interview that led to his dismissal. The body bags, unfortunately, will be coming home in great numbers. (For comparison, bear in mind U.S. death on the battlefield in other conflicts since World War II: Vietnam 47,244; Korea 33,629; Panama 23; Grenada 19.)

5,000 dead and 15,000 wounded in the first ten days (Newsweek)—as many as in an average year in Vietnam.

10,000 dead and 35,000 wounded in a successful ninety-day campaign to take Baghdad (C.D.I.).

As many as 30,000 dead in twenty days, says columnist Jack Anderson, citing "top-secret Pentagon estimates."

The Pentagon has in place blood supplies to treat 4,000 casualties per day—a heavier casualty rate than at Iwo Jima.

It may also be helpful to consider the only direct recent precedent for a short, intense desert war—the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict, which produced 20,000 casualties in two weeks. Let's also be clear that "casualties" means the wounded as well as the dead. Because of new battlefield technology developed since 1973, "things are going to happen to people that we have never seen before," in the words of one U.S. weapons designer. Military surgeons and the V.A. hospitals are unprepared, for example, to handle "blast lung" and "metal fume fever" and the other arcane and nightmarish injuries that will afflict tank and armored vehicle crews. Weapons expert Donald Kennedy, writing in the military journal *Armor*, says this is "a subject that most governments do not wish to

publicize for fear of its effect on their armed forces."

The lower of the body counts we have cited depend on everything going right on the battlefield. But it never does. Murphy's Law was invented by the military. The death toll could rise to Korean War levels, or higher, in any of a number of circumstances. (1) How effective will the Iraqi defense of Kuwait City be? Iraq's strategy, rather like the Viet Cong's, will be to inflict casualty levels that are politically unacceptable in the United States. (2) U.S. air superiority is not a given, especially if the Iraqis have mastered the U.S.-made Hawk missile systems they are believed to have seized in Kuwait. (3) High technology often disappoints those infatuated with it. The F-117 Stealth fighter, which was a flop in Panama, will be an essential element of the air war. The M-1 tank is untested in desert conditions, and the Israelis believe it may prove a major disappointment. The Apache "tank-killer" helicopter develops a maintenance problem every fifty-four minutes of flying time. Night-vision equipment is untested. (4) Multinational command and control might well break down in combat. There is also a high risk of casualties from "friendly fire." Syrian and Iraqi equipment is identical. (5) All of the above assumes that Israel will be kept out of the war. (6) What does "winning" this war mean, anyway?—It may become necessary, in the immortal phrase, to destroy Kuwait City in order to save it. And what if the infidels capture the ancient Islamic metropolis of Baghdad, or "make its rubble bounce" with aerial bombing? In this war, military "success" may be directly proportional to political disaster.

THE REGION

President Bush says his goal is the security and stability for the Middle East, and he holds out the promise of a "new world order" once Saddam Hussein's aggression is punished and Kuwait is freed. But Middle East experts agree that the more likely outcome would be greater chaos.

Consider the existing unstable balance of forces, starting with the historic rivalry of the city-states of Baghdad, Damascus and Cairo for hegemony. Add the oil wealth, the way the Western powers have directed and defended its exploitation, and the class and nationalistic resentments generated among the have-nots; factor in the Muslim movement for purification and rejection of the West, led primarily by Iran; and then overlay Israel's saber rattling and de facto annexation of the occupied territories (paid for by the United States). Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent responses of the American-Saudi-Syrian-Egyptian-Israeli axis are already generating tremendous and contradictory pressures in the Middle East. War would transform the region.

If the war leaves Iraq intact, it will by definition be a weak Iraq. The occupiers of the pro-Western government they install will be hard pressed to ignore Kurdish demands for freedom. Then, according to former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Syria, Iran and even Turkey . . . might all be tempted to pursue their own territorial interests." Syria, emboldened by its U.S.-approved takeover of Lebanon, "might begin to make some moves against Jordan," says Raymond Tanter, a senior N.S.C. staff specialist on the Middle East in the early 1980's. The Iranians have a special interest in Shiite holy sites in oil-rich southern Iraq. An Iranian move on that region, says former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia James Akins, would create "a super oil power with three

times the population of Iraq and a far greater potential for causing trouble in the gulf." And the Turks no doubt would want to reclaim the Iraqi province of Mosul.

As for the future of "our friends in the region," ponder the C.D.I.'s prediction of 100,000 or more civilian casualties from air attacks in a battle for Baghdad. The prospect of being held responsible for such a toll terrifies Egypt's Hosni Mubarak and Syria's Hafez al-Assad, both of whom have insisted that their troops will not be used offensively. Akins warns that "every Arab country that backed us—even if their troops were not directly involved in offensive actions—would have revolutions. . . . Only the Saudis, backed by U.S. troops, would maintain control. The ruling family couldn't afford to let us leave. There would be a long-term U.S. occupation, the people would turn against us, the army would turn against us."

And what if, as is likely, Saddam deliberately attacks Israel, or the Israelis decide to "pre-empt" what they claim or believe to be an imminent attack? Most observers agree that Israeli-Iraqi fighting on Jordanian territory is likely, an event that would probably spell the end of the Hashemite kingdom. There are reports that the United States has asked Israel to "absorb" an Iraqi blow without retaliating; in exchange such a blow would be treated as a *casus belli*, akin to an Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia. But if an offensive from Saudi soil had already begun, the Iraqis would have little to lose by attacking Israel and a lot to gain. "Much as we want to coordinate our steps with our friends," writes Ze'ev Schiff, military correspondent for Ha'aretz, "we may happen to be forced to act unilaterally." The actual extent of U.S.-Israeli coordination remains a mystery, although the remarks of the recently dismissed General Dugan to the effect that the Air Force was getting targeting advice from Israel are somewhat enlightening. Former C.I.A. Middle East Analyst Graham Fuller, now at the Rand Corporation, says, "If Israel is involved in any way . . . it will transform the character of the conflict overnight."

THE ECONOMY

If the shooting starts, the only given is that oil prices will soar far beyond the point they've been driven to by the threat of war and the greed of the oil companies. According to a U.N. simulation, oil at \$40 a barrel would cost poor oil-importing countries \$64 billion on their trade balances and developed market economies \$177 billion.

And the United States itself?

The Defense Department's original estimate for keeping 200,000 troops in the gulf for a year without a war was \$15 billion.

Congressional Budget Office sources say the buildup could bring that figure to \$20 billion or \$30 billion.

The C.D.I. places noncombat costs at \$74 million a day; combat would absorb several times that amount.

Extrapolating from the experience of Vietnam, whose cost military planners had underestimated, anticipating a quick, "clean" war, it is reasonable to assume that military costs could be at \$50 billion to \$60 billion after a year. Assuming that sanctions were to take a maximum two years to work and assuming too—against all principle and common sense—that the original deployment was maintained over that period, the direct cost of sanctions would be half as much as a year of war (four months actual fighting) with all its imponderables.

Yet a fuller sense of the cost of fighting needs to include indirect expenditures, such

as military and economic assistance to other countries, increases in veterans' benefits, lost income from deaths and injuries and interest on the national debt. Back in 1973 Tom Riddell, now an economist at Smith College, calculated that the \$141 billion military outlay for Vietnam between 1965 and 1974 came to \$676 billion when those costs were added in. It would be crude simply to slot expectations about one war into the niche molded by the discrete circumstances of another—and therefore to conclude that the military estimate of \$50 billion for a gulf war translates neatly into \$240 billion with indirect expenditures—but the comparison is useful for suggesting the direction the costs of a shooting war might take.

All this will clearly add to the deficit. Interest rates will rise, exacerbating the recession at home. The housing industry, already on its knees, would be hard hit, maybe flattened. All industries that use large amounts of energy and aren't involved in war production would be troubled. Business investment, particularly for the long term, would drop, and the economy would fall further behind in developing technologies and producing goods that people need or want. Meanwhile, every percentage point added to U.S. interest lays a murderous \$10 billion onto Third World indebtedness.

There has been much talk of foreign, particularly gulf state, assistance offsetting the costs of the U.S. military deployment—a kind of Vietnamization in reverse. And in fact, if Saudi Arabia were to bail out all the costs and were to pump enough oil to hold prices down, recessionary effects of a war might be minimal or nonexistent, according to economics Nobel laureate Lawrence Klein. As it is, the United States has received about \$4 billion from other countries; a couple billion from Kuwait and \$987 million (out of a promised \$12 billion) from the Saudis.

Cost-benefit assessments never provide sufficient reason for opposing war—what if we could afford it?—although they have been used for promoting it. The rapid injection of vast sums into the economy does act as a stimulus, at least in the short term, but because of oil prices and the size of the deficit, a gulf war would be very tricky here. And as the United States "invests" in war to protect oil, it forgoes the prospect of applying resources for building alternative energy systems—one of many bitter ironies.

[From The Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1990]

TRANSCRIPT SHOWS MUTED U.S. RESPONSE TO THREAT BY SADDAM

(By Jim Hoagland)

One week before he ordered his troops into Kuwait, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein warned the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad that America should not oppose his aims in the Middle East because "yours is a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle" and is vulnerable to terrorist attack, according to the Iraqi minutes of the July 25 conversation.

U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie did not respond directly to Saddam's menacing comments, concentrating instead on praising Saddam's "extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country." She also gently probed the Iraqi leader's intentions in massing troops on Kuwait's border, but did not criticize the Iraqi troop movements, according to the Iraqi transcript.

The State Department did not challenge the authenticity of the transcript yesterday. Spokesman Richard Boucher declined to comment on specific remarks it contains. He said Glaspie was not available for comment.

Iraq's version of the meeting shows Saddam giving Glaspie explicit warnings that he would take whatever action he deemed necessary to stop Kuwait from continuing an "economic war" against Iraq. Her response, as recorded by the Iraqis, was to reassure Saddam that the United States takes no official position on Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait.

In response to Saddam's comments about Iraq's need for higher oil prices, the ambassador said: "I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait . . . James Baker has directed our official spokesman to emphasize this instruction."

The disclosure of the transcript to Western news media, which originated with Iraqi officials, appears intended to emphasize that Saddam had reasons to believe that the Bush administration would not offer any serious opposition to his move against Kuwait.

The administration has acknowledged that it was caught by surprise by Iraq's Aug. 2 invasion of Kuwait. But the tone and content of the transcript of the July 25 meeting called by Saddam strongly suggest that the official American misreading of Saddam's intentions and capabilities may have emboldened him to commit an act of aggression that has brought the United States to the brink of war in the Persian Gulf.

ABC television on Tuesday night quoted briefly from the Iraqi transcript, which was also the subject of an article in the British newspaper The Guardian yesterday. The Washington Post has obtained a 17-page English translation of the full transcript.

While the Iraqi transcript is disjointed in places, the substance of Glaspie's recorded remarks closely parallels official U.S. positions stated in Washington at the same time, in which other State Department officials publicly disavowed any American security commitments to Kuwait.

A career foreign service officer, Glaspie made a point of telling Saddam that she was acting under instructions from Washington responding to him.

Greeting her, Saddam said that he wanted his part of their conversation to be "a message to President Bush." Reviewing U.S.-Iraqi differences, he singled out the secret shipments of U.S. arms to Iran in 1985 and 1986 and recalled that he magnanimously accepted President Reagan's "apology" to him "and we wiped the slate clean."

Saddam turned next to the devastated condition of the Iraqi economy because of eight years of war with Iran. He suggested that the United States was supporting an effort by Kuwait to wage "another war against Iraq," an "economic war" that deprives Iraqis of "their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living."

The United States should be grateful to Iraq for having stopped Iran militarily because the United States could not fight such a war in the Persian Gulf, Saddam said. "I hold his view by looking at the geography and nature of American society . . . Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle."

Denouncing Kuwaiti efforts to "deprive us of our rights" he demanded that the United States "declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are . . . If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force . . . We cannot come all the way to you in the United States but individual Arabs may reach you."

The remainder of his opening monologue was filled with attacks on U.S. support for Israel, for the United Arab Emirates and for Kuwait. Saddam made a point of telling Glaspie that he had clearly warned the Kurdish tribesmen of Iraq and Iran's leaders before he went to war against them.

In the transcript, Glaspie did not respond to this rhetoric. She began her response by speaking of Bush's desire for friendship with Iraq: "As you know, he directed the United States administration to reject the suggestion of implementing trade sanctions" against Iraq. "I have a direct instruction from the president to seek better relations with Iraq . . . President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq."

Saying that the American media's treatment of Saddam resembles its treatment of American politicians, Glaspie is quoted as calling an ABC Television interview with him "cheap and unjust . . . I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media."

She then said she has been instructed "to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not in the spirit of confrontation—regarding your intentions" about Kuwait in light of his massing troops on the border. Saddam's response was that he hoped to settle his dispute with Kuwait peacefully, but the transcript shows him adding:

"We regard [Kuwait's economic campaign] as a military action against us . . . If we are not able to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else."

Glaspie took no notice of this implied threat in her concluding remarks. Instead, she told Saddam that she had worried that she would have to postpone here scheduled July 30 departure from Baghdad for consultations in Washington "because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly" on July 30.

Thirty-six hours after her departure, Saddam launched his invasion. Glaspie has remained in Washington since then to underscore official U.S. displeasure with Saddam's action, according to the State Department.

[From the New York Times, Sept. 23, 1990]

UNITED STATES GAVE IRAQ LITTLE REASON NOT TO MOUNT KUWAIT ASSAULT

(By Elaine Sciolino with Michael R. Gordon)

WASHINGTON, September 22.—In two weeks before Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, the Bush Administration on the advice of Arab leaders gave President Saddam Hussein little reason to fear a forceful American response if his troops invaded the country.

The Administration's message, articulated in public statements in Washington by senior policy makers and delivered directly to Mr. Hussein by the United States Ambassador, April C. Glaspie, was this: The United States was concerned about Iraq's military buildup on its border with Kuwait, but did not intend to take sides in what it perceived as a no-win border dispute between Arab neighbors.

In a meeting with Mr. Hussein in Baghdad on July 25, eight days before the invasion, Ms. Glaspie urged the Iraqi leader to settle his differences with Kuwait peacefully but added, "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait," according to an Iraqi document described as a transcript of their conversation.

Portions of the document, prepared in Arabic by the Iraqi Government, were translated and broadcast by ABC News on Sept. 11 and

were the basis of accounts by The Washington Post and The Guardian of London. The State Department declined to confirm the accuracy of the document, but officials did not dispute Ms. Glaspie's essential message.

As those and other details of the Administration's diplomacy have unfolded in recent weeks, its handling of Iraq before the invasion has begun to draw strong criticism in Congress, even among those who generally support the Administration's military action in the Persian Gulf. Some lawmakers have asserted that the Administration conveyed a sense of indifference to Baghdad's threats.

Interviews with dozens of Administration officials, lawmakers and independent experts and a review of public statements and the Iraqi document show that instead of sending Mr. Hussein blunt messages through public and private statements that an invasion would be unacceptable, the State Department prepared equivocal statements for the Administration about American commitments to Kuwait.

ARAB ASSURANCES ON INVASION

The American strategy, carried out primarily by the State Department but approved by the White House, was based on the assumption that Iraq would not invade and occupy Kuwait. President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who assured the Bush Administration that Mr. Hussein would not invade, argued that the best way to resolve an inter-Arab squabble was for the United States to avoid inflammatory words and actions.

Some senior Administration officials said the strategy was also rooted in the view that Washington—and most of the Arab world—probably could live with a limited invasion of Kuwait, in which Iraqi forces seized bits of Kuwaiti territory to gain concessions.

"We were reluctant to draw a line in the sand," said a senior Administration official. "I can't see the American public supporting the deployment of troops over a dispute over 20 miles of desert territory and it is not clear that the local countries would have supported that kind of commitment. The basic principle is not to make threats you can't deliver on. That was one reason there was a certain degree of hedging on what was said."

EFFECT OF A HARDER LINE

Even in the days before the invasion, there was a consensus inside the Administration and among outside experts that Mr. Hussein would not invade despite largely correct intelligence assessments of the military buildup on the ground.

"There would have been a lot of fluttering if there had been a partial invasion," said an Administration official. "The crucial factor in determining the American response was not the reality but the extent of the invasion."

It is not clear that taking a harder line would have made a difference in Baghdad's decision to take Kuwait, and some Administration officials argue that if they had they would now be accused of pushing Mr. Hussein toward extreme actions.

As the Administration's policy toward Iraq before the invasion has come under criticism in Congress, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, a group of experts who report to President Bush on intelligence issues, has also begun a post-mortem on the handling of the crisis.

The Administration was following what President Bush acknowledged last week was a flawed policy toward Iraq, a policy built on the premise that the best way to handle Mr. Hussein and moderate his behavior was

through improving relations with Baghdad. That assessment presumed that Iran and Iraq, both exhausted by their eight-year border war, would focus on domestic reconstruction, not foreign adventurism.

As a result, the Bush Administration failed to calibrate its policy to take into account a string of belligerent statements and actions by Mr. Hussein in recent months, including the execution of a British journalist and a threat to use chemical weapons against Israel.

"We were essentially operating without a policy," said a senior Administration official. "The crisis came in a bit of a vacuum, at a time when everyone was focusing on German reunification."

In the days before the invasion, Administration officials sent mixed signals about the American commitment to Kuwait's defense.

Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, for example, was quoted as telling journalists at a press breakfast on July 19 that the American commitment made during the Iran-Iraq War to come to Kuwait's defense if it were attacked was still valid. The same point was also made by Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, at a private luncheon with Arab ambassadors. But Pete Williams, Mr. Cheney's chief spokesman, later tried to steer journalists away from the Secretary's remarks, adding that Mr. Cheney had been quoted with "some degree of liberty."

From that moment on, there was an orchestrated Administration campaign to speak with one voice, and speak quietly.

On July 24, when Margaret D. Tutwiler, the State Department spokesman, was asked whether the United States had any commitment to defend Kuwait, she said, "We do not have any defense treaties with Kuwait, and there are no special defense or security commitments to Kuwait."

Asked whether the United States would help Kuwait if it were attacked, she replied, "We also remain strongly committed to supporting the individual and collective self-defense of our friends in the gulf with whom we have a deep and longstanding ties," a statement that some Kuwaiti officials said privately was too weak.

BUSH'S FORCEFUL TONE

Two days before the invasion, John H. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, essentially repeated the same message in Congressional testimony.

Even after the invasion, there was unease in some quarters in the State Department over Mr. Bush's tough public stance. On Aug. 6, when President Bush clearly committed the United States to roll back Iraq's conquest of Kuwait, Secretary of State James A. Baker 3d expressed reservations about the wisdom of the forceful tone of Mr. Bush remarks, according to Administration officials.

Last Tuesday, at a hearing before a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Representative Lee Hamilton sharply chided Mr. Kelly for not taking a tougher stance against Iraq in his testimony before the invasion.

"You left the impression that it was the policy of the United States not to come to the defense of Kuwait," said Mr. Hamilton, an Indiana Democrat. "I asked you if there was a U.S. commitment to come to Kuwait's defense if it was attacked. Your response over and over again was we have no defense-treaty relationship with any gulf country."

POLICY GUIDELINES FOLLOWED

Bush Administration officials assert that Kuwait never asked for American troops or

sought to join in joint military exercises with American forces.

Mr. Cheney told a breakfast group on Capitol Hill on Thursday that "the fact was, there was literally nothing we could do until we could get access to that part of the world, and the attitude of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states has been consistently that they didn't want U.S. forces on the ground over there."

On July 25, a week before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Ms. Glaspie was quickly summoned into Mr. Hussein's office in Baghdad, and she faithfully followed conciliatory policy guidelines sent to her from the State Department.

In their conversation, Mr. Hussein described an American conspiracy against him since the end of his war with Iran, and warned the United States not to oppose his goal of getting economic concessions from Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, according to the document described as the official Iraqi transcript which ABC News made available to the New York Times. Miss Tutwiler said Friday that the State Department would not reveal the contents of a diplomatic exchange.

WE TOO CAN HARM YOU

Mr. Hussein told the American Ambassador that the United States should thank Iraq for stopping Iran's aggression during the war, because the United States could never fight such a war to defend its friends in the region. According to the Iraqi document, he also suggested that he would use terrorism to curb and effort by the United States to try to stop him from achieving his goals.

"We too can harm you," he said, according to the document, adding, "We cannot come all the way to the United States but individual Arabs may reach you."

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EXCERPTS FROM IRAQI TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING WITH U.S. ENVOY

WASHINGTON, Sept. 22—On July 25, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2. Here are excerpts from a document described by Iraqi Government officials as a transcript of the meeting, which also included in the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. A copy was provided to The New York Times by ABC News, which translated it from the Arabic. The State Department has declined to comment on its accuracy.

Saddam Hussein: I have summoned you today to hold comprehensive political discussions with you. This is a message to President Bush.

You know that we did not have relations with the U.S. until 1984 and you know the circumstances and reasons which caused them to be severed. The decision to establish relations with the U.S. were taken in 1980 during the two months prior to the war between us and Iran.

When the war started, and to avoid misinterpretation, we postponed the establishment of relations hoping that the war would end soon.

But because the war lasted for a long time, and to emphasize the fact that we are a non-aligned country, it was important to re-establish relations with the U.S. And we choose to do this in 1984.

It is natural to say that the U.S. is not like Britain, for example, with the latter's his-

toric relations with Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq. In addition, there were no relations between Iraq and the U.S. between 1967 and 1984. One can conclude it would be difficult for the U.S. to have a full understanding of many matters in Iraq. When relations were re-established we hoped for a better understanding and for better cooperation because we too do not understand the background of many American decisions.

We dealt with each other during the war and we had dealings on various levels. The most important of those levels were with the foreign ministers.

U.S.-IRAQ RIFTS

We had hoped for a better common understanding and a better chance of cooperation to benefit both our peoples and the rest of the Arab nations.

But these better relations have suffered from various rifts. The worst of these was in 1986, only two years after establishing relations, with what was known as Irangate, which happened during the year that Iran occupied the Fao peninsula.

It was natural then to say that old relations and complexity of interests could absorb many mistakes. But when interests are limited and relations are not that old, then there isn't a deep understanding and mistakes could leave a negative effect. Sometimes the effect of an error can be larger than the error itself.

Despite all of that, we accepted the apology, via his envoy, of the American President regarding Irangate, and we wiped the slate clean. And we shouldn't unearth the past except when new events remind us that old mistakes were not just a matter of coincidence.

Our suspicions increased after we liberated the Fao peninsula. The media began to involve itself in our politics. And our suspicions began to surface anew, because we began to question whether the U.S. felt uneasy with the outcome of the war when we liberated our land.

It was clear to us that certain parties in the United States—and I don't say the President himself—but certain parties who had links with the intelligence community and with the State Department—and I don't say the Secretary of State himself—I say that these parties did not like the fact that we liberated our land. Some parties began to prepare studies entitled, "Who will succeed Saddam Hussein?" They began to contact gulf states to make them fear Iraq, to persuade them not to give Iraq economic aid. And we have evidence of these activities.

IRAQ POLICY ON OIL

Iraq came out of the war burdened with \$40 billion debts, excluding the aid given by Arab states, some of whom consider that too to be a debt although they knew—and you knew too—that without Iraq they would not have had these sums and the future of the region would have been entirely different.

We began to face the policy of the drop in the price of oil. Then we saw the United States, which always talks of democracy but which has no time for the other point of view. Then the media campaign against Saddam Hussein was started by the official American media. The United States thought that the situation in Iraq was like Poland, Romania or Czechoslovakia. We were disturbed by this campaign but we were not disturbed too much because we had hoped that, in a few months, those who are decision makers in America would have a chance to find the facts and see whether this media campaign had had any effect on the lives of

Iraqis. We had hoped that soon the American authorities would make the correct decision regarding their relations with Iraq. Those with good relations can sometimes afford to disagree.

But when planned and deliberate policy forces the price of oil down without good commercial reasons, then that means another war against Iraq. Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic war kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good standard of living. As you know, we gave rivers of blood in a war that lasted eight years, but we did not lose our humanity. Iraqis have a right to live proudly. We do not accept that anyone could injure Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have high standards of living.

Kuwait and the U.A.E. were at the front of this policy aimed at lowering Iraq's position and depriving its people of higher economic standards. And you know that our relations with the Emirates and Kuwait had been good. On top of all that, while we were busy at war, the state of Kuwait began to expand at the expense of our territory.

You may say this is propaganda, but I would direct you to one document, the Military Patrol Line, which is the borderline endorsed by the Arab League in 1961 for military patrols not to cross the Iraq-Kuwait border.

But go and look for yourselves. You will see the Kuwait border patrols, the Kuwait farms, the Kuwait oil installations—all built as closely as possible to this line to establish that land as Kuwaiti territory.

CONFLICTING INTERESTS

Since then, the Kuwaiti Government has been stable while the Iraqi Government has undergone many changes. Even after 1968 and for 10 years afterwards, we were too busy with our own problems. First in the north then the 1973 war, and other problems. Then came the war with Iran which started 10 years ago.

We believe that the United States must understand that people who live in luxury and economic security can reach an understanding with the United States on what are legitimate joint interests. But the starved and the economically deprived cannot reach the same understanding.

We do not accept threats from anyone because we do not threaten anyone. But we say clearly that we hope that the U.S. will not entertain too many illusions and will seek new friends rather than increase the number of its enemies.

I have read the American statements speaking of friends in the area. Of course, if it is the right of everyone to choose their friends. We can have no objections. But you know you are not the ones who protected your friends during the war with Iran. I assure you, had the Iranians overrun the region, the American troops would not have stopped them, except by the use of nuclear weapons.

I do not belittle you. But I hold this view by looking at the geography and nature of American society into account. Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle.

You know that Iran agreed to the ceasefire not because the United States had bombed one of the oil platforms after the liberation of the Fao. Is this Iraq's reward for its role in securing the stability of the region and for protecting it from an unknown flood?

PROTECTING THE OIL FLOW

So what can it mean when America says it will now protect its friends? It can only

mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the U.A.E. and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights.

I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are mentioned in the memorandum, we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a month or after one year, but we will take it all. We are not the kind of people who will relinquish their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need, for the U.A.E. and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy, we too are needy.

The United States must have a better understanding of the situation and declare who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But it should not make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We clearly understand America's statement that it wants an easy flow of oil. We understand America saying that it seeks friendship with the states in the region, and to encourage their joint interests. But we cannot understand the attempt to encourage some parties to harm Iraq's interests.

The United States wants to secure the flow of oil. This is understandable and known. But it must not deploy methods which the United States says it disapproves of—flexing muscles and pressure.

If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you.

WAR AND FRIENDSHIP

You can come to Iraq with aircraft and missiles but do not push us to the point where we cease to care. And when we feel that you want to injure our pride and take away the Iraqis' chance of a high standard of living, then we will cease to care and death will be the choice for us. Then we would not care if you fired 100 missiles for each missile we fired. Because without pride life would have no value.

It is not reasonable to ask our people to bleed rivers of blood for eight years then to tell them, "Now you have to accept aggression from Kuwait, the U.A.E. or from the U.S. or from Israel."

We do not put all these countries in the same boat. First, we are hurt and upset that such disagreement is taking place between us and Kuwait and the U.A.E. The solution must be found within an Arab framework and through direct bilateral relations. We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want our friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated American statements last year made it apparent that America did not regard us as friends. Well the Americans are free.

When we seek friendship we want pride, liberty and our right to choose.

We want to deal according to our status as we deal with the others according to their status.

We consider the others' interests while we look after our own. And we expect the others to consider our interests while they are dealing with their own. What does it mean when the Zionist war minister is summoned to the United States now? What do they mean, these fiery statements coming out of Israel during the past few days and the talk of war being expected now more than at any other time?

I do not believe that anyone would lose by making friends with Iraq. In my opinion, the American President has not made mistakes regarding the Arabs, although his decision to freeze dialogue with the P.L.O. was wrong. But it appears that this decision was made to appease the Zionist lobby or as a piece of strategy to cool the Zionist anger, before trying again. I hope that our latter conclusion is the correct one. But we will carry on saying it was the wrong decision.

You are appeasing the usurper in so many ways—economically, politically and militarily as well as in the media. When will the time come when, for every three appeasements to the usurper, you praise the Arabs just once?

April Glaspie: I thank you, Mr. President, and it is a great pleasure for a diplomat to meet and talk directly with the President. I clearly understand your message. We studied history at school. They taught us to say freedom or death. I think you know well that we as a people have our experience with the colonialists.

Mr. President, you mentioned many things during this meeting which I cannot comment on on behalf of my Government. But with your permission, I will comment on two points. You spoke of friendship and I believe it was clear from the letters sent by our President to you on the occasion of your National Day that he emphasizes—

Hussein: He was kind and his expressions met with our regard and respect.

DIRECTIVE ON RELATIONS

Glaspie: As you know, he directed the United States Administration to reject the suggestion of implementing trade sanctions.

Hussein: There is nothing left for us to buy from America. Only wheat. Because every time we want to buy something, they say it is forbidden. I am afraid that one day you will say, "You are going to make gunpowder out of wheat."

Glaspie: I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.

Hussein: But how? We too have this desire. But matters are running contrary to this desire.

Glaspie: This is less likely to happen the more we talk. For example, you mentioned the issue of the article published by the American Information Agency and that was sad. And a formal apology was presented.

Hussein: Your stance is generous. We are Arabs. It is enough for us that someone says, "I am sorry, I made a mistake." Then we carry on. But the media campaign continued. And it is full of stories. If the stories were true, no one would get upset. But we understand from its continuation that there is a determination.

Glaspie: I saw the Diane Sawyer program on ABC. And what happened in that program was cheap and unjust. And this is a real picture of what happens in the American media—even to American politicians themselves. These are the methods the Western media employs. I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media. Because your appearance in the media, even for five minutes, would help us to make the American people understand Iraq. This would increase mutual understanding. If the American President had control of the media, his job would be much easier.

Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intel-

ligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.

You are right. It is true what you say that we do not want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging too high a price for oil.

Hussein: We do not want too high prices for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article which expressed this view.

SHIFTING PRICE OF OIL

Tariq Aziz: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.

Hussein: Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price.

Glaspie: We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above \$25 because they come from oil-producing states.

Hussein: The price at one stage had dropped to \$12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of \$6 billion to \$7 billion is a disaster.

Glaspie: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?

My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not in the spirit of confrontation—regarding your intentions.

I simply describe the concern of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.

Hussein: We do not ask people not to be concerned when peace is at issue. This is a noble human feeling which we all feel. It is natural for you as a superpower to be concerned. But what we ask is not to express your concern in a way that would make an aggressor believe that he is getting support for his aggression.

We want to find a just solution which will give us our rights but not deprive others of their rights. But at the same time, we want the others to know that our patience is running out regarding their action, which is harming even the milk our children drink, and the pensions of the widow who lost her

husband during the war, and the pensions of the orphans who lost their parents.

As a country, we have the right to prosper. We lost so many opportunities, and the others should value the Iraqi role in their protection. Even this Iraqi [the President points to the interpreter] feels bitter like all other Iraqis. We are not aggressors but we do not accept aggression either. We sent them envoys and handwritten letters. We tried everything. We asked the Servant of the Two Shrines—King Fahd—to hold a four-member summit, but he suggested a meeting between the Oil Ministers. We agreed. And as you know, the meeting took place in Jidda. They reached an agreement which did not express what we wanted, but we agreed.

Only two days after the meeting, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister made a statement that contradicted the agreement. We also discussed the issue during the Baghdad summit. I told the Arab Kings and Presidents that some brothers are fighting an economic war against us. And that not all wars use weapons and we regard this kind of war as a military action against us. Because if the capability of our army is lowered then, if Iran renewed the war, it could achieve goals which it could not achieve before. And if we lowered the standard of our defenses, then this could encourage Israel to attack us. I said that before the Arab Kings and Presidents. Only I did not mention Kuwait and U.A.E. by name, because they were my guests.

Before this, I had sent them envoys reminding them that our war had included their defense. Therefore the aid they gave us should not be regarded as a debt. We did no more than the United States would have done against someone who attacked its interests.

I talked about the same thing with a number of other Arab states. I explained the situation to brother King Fahd a few times, by sending envoys and on the telephone. I talked with brother King Hussein and with Sheik Zaid after the conclusion of the summit. I walked with the Sheik to the plane when he was leaving Mosul. He told me, "Just wait until I get home." But after he had reached his destination, the statements that came from there were very bad—not from him, but from his Minister of Oil.

Also after the Jidda agreement, we received some intelligence that they were talking of sticking to the agreement for two months only. Then they would change their policy. Now tell us, if the American President found himself in this situation, what would he do? I said it was very difficult for me to talk about these issues in public. But we must tell the Iraqi people who face economic difficulties who was responsible for that.

TALKS WITH MUBARAK

Glaspie: I spent four beautiful years in Egypt.

Hussein: The Egyptian people are kind and good and ancient. The oil people are supposed to help the Egyptian people, but they are mean beyond belief. It is painful to admit it, but some of them are disliked by Arabs because of their greed.

Glaspie: Mr. President, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of the effort made by your Arab brothers and whether they have achieved anything.

Hussein: On this subject, we agreed with President Mubarak that the Prime Minister of Kuwait would meet with the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council in Saudi Arabia, because the Saudis initiated contact with us, aided by President Mubarak's efforts. He just telephoned me a

short while ago to say the Kuwaitis have agreed to that suggestion.

Glaspie: Congratulations.

Hussein: A protocol meeting will be held in Saudi Arabia. Then the meeting will be transferred to Baghdad for deeper discussion directly between Kuwait and Iraq. We hope we will reach some result. We hope that the long-term view and the real interests will overcome Kuwaiti greed.

Glaspie: May I ask you when you expect Sheik Saad to come to Baghdad?

Hussein: I suppose it would be on Saturday or Monday at the latest. I told brother Mubarak that the agreement should be in Baghdad Saturday or Sunday. You know that brother Mubarak's visits have always been a good omen.

Glaspie: This is good news. Congratulations.

Brother President Mubarak told me they were scared. They said troops were only 20 kilometers north of the Arab League line. I said to him that regardless of what is there, whether they are police, border guards or army, and regardless of how many are there, and what they are doing, assure the Kuwaitis and give them our word that we are not going to do anything until we meet with them. When we meet and when we see that there is hope, then nothing will happen. But if we are unable to find a solution, then it will be natural that Iraq will not accept death, even though wisdom is above everything else. There you have good news.

Aziz: This is a journalistic exclusive.

Glaspie: I am planning to go to the United States next Monday.

I hope I will meet with President Bush in Washington next week. I thought to postpone my trip because of the difficulties we are facing. But now I will fly on Monday.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FLAKE].

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, on behalf of the physically and emotionally scarred Vietnam veterans who have contacted me, and the potential physically and emotionally scarred casualties of Desert Shield, I rise in support of the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise on behalf of the many physical and emotional casualties who were fortunate enough to return from Vietnam alive, and not in body bags like many of their fellow soldiers. Many of them are casualties, however, because they are so physically impaired, or emotionally scarred that they are dysfunctional in our society. They cannot in many instances hold jobs and thus are unable to maintain constant employment. For many, the pains have been so great that they have turned to drugs for escape. All too many of the veterans are found among the homeless.

Further, Mr. Speaker, I rise on behalf of the potential unquantifiable physically and emotionally scarred survivors, if we chose to go to war in the Middle East. Thus far debates have focused on potential casualties measured by the number of anticipated body bags. Unless we are prepared to provide larger allocations for Veterans' benefits for counseling, housing, education, medical, and spousal and dependent support, we will exacerbate the current crisis that exists for Veterans who deserve many more benefits than they currently receive.

Since women will be included in this military offensive, in an unprecedented historical man-

ner, children will become casualties without the benefit of the love, guidance and nurture which mothers provide. Many of the problems of urban America, particularly drugs and violence, can be traced to the hostility that many of our children have experienced, having lost their father or other relatives in Vietnam, or having to see them maligned because they fought in an unpopular war for democracy abroad, only to return home and find conditions prohibiting full participation in American democracy.

This is not the time for war. American blood should not be spilled for one drop of oil. The new world order must be built on a foundation of peace. Mr. Speaker, let us use the resources that we will allocate for war in the Middle East to fight the war against drugs, homelessness, illiteracy, crime, and the myriad of economic problems which are eroding the power and strength of our Nation.

I support the Hamilton-Gephardt amendment because it does not deny our willingness to go to war if provoked. However, it does allow diplomacy and economic sanctions to work until the point of exhaustion, with war as the last option rather than the first choice.

Let us give peace a chance.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CARR].

Mr. CARR. Mr. Speaker, President George Bush has my prayers; Mr. HAMILTON and Mr. GEPHARDT have my vote.

Mr. Speaker, for the first time in almost 50 years, the Members of the House and Senate are debating whether our Nation should commit itself to war.

It has been a difficult debate, more difficult than when this body last confronted the issue of war. Perhaps this is because our interests are not as clear, the violation of our sovereignty not as blatant as in the case of Pearl Harbor. And perhaps, given the much advanced "new world order" this is a case of first impression. For that reason it is not like either World War II or the Vietnam war. But if we do have a new world order, we must have a new procedure for deciding the use of war as a remedy. To his credit President Bush has helped forge that new world order by seeking and obtaining the cooperation with the United Nations. Now, Congress must act. For if we don't then the power to declare war vested in us by the Constitution is meaningless.

Unlike some, I do believe that vital United States interests are at stake in the Middle East. Regardless of new or old world order, the principle that one sovereign nation must not invade another sovereign nation must remain inviolate. International trespass, burglary, and murder should not ever be legitimate means to settling disputes. We must stand against this aggression with military force, if necessary. There isn't any question that the American people, and that the nations of the world, are united in their resolve that Saddam must be driven out of Kuwait. All civilized nations have a duty to defend this interest and to protect friendly non-belligerent nations.

The question before us is: Who should take what steps, and when, to achieve this.

This debate would lead you to believe that sanctions and offensive military action are mutually exclusive. They need not be. There is a

middle road that is not expressed in either resolution. The President could come to us for permission to use offensive air superiority to give teeth to the sanctions, to speed their effectiveness and to make clear to Saddam and the Iraqi people, that they cannot succeed.

Frankly, Mr. Speaker, neither resolution before us does this. As a result, I'm not happy with either resolution.

Solarz-Michel asks us to give the President carte blanche to use force without further meaningful review by the Congress. The President's power over the situation is already awesome. But, to paraphrase Clemenceau: "War is much too serious a matter to be entrusted to—a President." Indeed not only our Constitution requires this but our entire economy requires it as well.

As hard as we might try in this debate today we cannot elevate this interest above other important interests in conflict. For example, it is also in our interest to be a first rate economic power. What with recession, a staggering deficit and financial collapse all around, we cannot ignore that a long protracted conflict or post-conflict responsibility abroad could seriously undermine our standing as a world economic power. I doubt that the members of the United Nations Security Council had the economic well-being of the United States on their minds when they gave the United States permission to use military force.

The problem with Solarz-Michel is that it not only gives the President a blank check on military options, but also an unlimited credit card, and it doesn't require him to tell us how he proposes to pay the bill. These are problems that the diplomats at the United Nations didn't examine. Nor is it their job to juggle those interests. It is ours and that is why we must have a continuing role throughout this crisis.

But in my view, Hamilton-Gephardt is also lacking. It gives the impression that international sanctions are sufficient to cripple the Iraq regime and eventually lead to the overthrow of Saddam.

The problem with this view is that while the sanctions imposed on Iraq are the most comprehensive, and the most successful ever imposed to date, they are not in all likelihood sufficient to get a remedy in a short enough time to really mean anything and to deter other nations in the future.

But after only 5½ months it is clear that sanctions are having some effect. In this respect for the near term time is on our side and we should use it. Saddam simply cannot maintain his army of 1 million men at the ready, in the field, indefinitely, without spare parts and supplies. And likewise, I think it would be foolish for the President in the short term to wage a land war to liberate Kuwait while the Iraqis—firmly entrenched and still well supplied—are capable of putting up a bloody resistance.

The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution should, but does not give the President present authority to use offensive air power to exacerbate the effects of the sanctions. I firmly believe that such a use of force is consistent with a commitment to the use of sanctions while avoiding an escalating general war.

In summary both resolutions are lacking. Solarz-Michel is too open ended and Hamilton-Gephardt is too restrictive.

I am convinced that it is possible to drive Saddam from Kuwait, and from Baghdad, by a combination of sanctions and limited offensive military strikes.

I hope that if the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution passes, the President will not disregard the rule of law and launch an unconstitutional offense. Such action would deeply divide the American people at a time when we should be united in our resolve.

If Solarz-Michel passes, I hope the President exercises careful restraint and pursues a course of gradual escalation, putting primary emphasis on sanctions, but speeding their effectiveness with surgical military operations. If we do this, while working for equitable burden sharing with our international partners, we will be able to teach the international community that we have the confidence and respect of them, and of ourselves. In addition we may learn that determined patience, the kind of patience that paid off in NATO, is more the character of America than the characterization of America as some kind of world-class "Rambo".

One last final thought: The pressure on Saddam and the Revolutionary Council doesn't really begin to build until the passage of the deadline next Monday evening. We owe it to ourselves, the people of America, and our international partners to see how he reacts. If he doesn't withdraw from Kuwait soon after the passage of the deadline, the use of an increasing military offensive capability should be used.

I could vote for the Solarz-Michel resolution in the hopes that the President will do just that. Or I could vote for Hamilton-Gephardt which supports sanctions and asks the President to come back to us and ask for approval to do that.

Though not happy with either resolution, on balance I believe it is in the country's best interest that we should support Hamilton-Gephardt because I believe that we should wait for 2 to 3 more weeks, and the President should formulate a specific proposal for the use of force. Were we to do so, by then, a few short days from now, the President should give us his specific—in secret session if necessary—request for greater authority. By that time, Saddam having failed to quit Kuwait, would receive an overwhelming mandate of support for the extreme military option. At that point the President would have my total support.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, a proud moment for the House; debate excellent on both sides, Mr. Leader.

With each passing day, Saddam Hussein grows stronger in the field of terrorism, and prepositions more weapons of horror worldwide.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. MORELLA].

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in favor of the resolution so we can have a continuation of sanctions, diplomacy, and against force at this time.

Mr. Speaker, we in Congress today face as difficult a decision as any of us have ever, or will ever, make. It is, quite frankly, a decision which none of us welcomes, but which we are responsible for making, and which we were elected to make. Let there be no doubt that the final decision about going to war properly rests with the representatives of the people here assembled.

I believe most strongly that the decisions which will be made today should not, and will not, be made on the basis of partisan considerations. In addressing the most critical issues which we are debating—how best to avoid war and the loss of lives, how best to serve the interests of the brave and courageous men and women serving in our Nation's armed forces, and how best to protect and to serve our Nation's national security—Members of Congress must probe deeply their individual consciences, and weigh that which we feel in our hearts as well as our heads. I hold the deepest respect for all of my colleagues who with me today are making these crucial decisions, regardless of their vote.

There are few, if indeed there are any, of us who believe that the use of force is not a justifiable response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The question which we each face is whether the Nation's interest is best served by the use of force at this time.

There are few words which could express how strongly I condemn Iraq's illegal, immoral, and entirely unjustified invasion of Kuwait and Iraq's brutal aggression against the Kuwaiti people. We are all familiar with the reports of human rights groups which have compiled absolutely horrific accounts of war crimes committed against Kuwaiti civilians and aliens resident in Kuwait. The world community of civilized nations holds Saddam Hussein and his henchmen responsible for their actions, and must see that justice is done.

Mr. Speaker, I supported the President's policy at the beginning. I believe that the deployment of troops to the gulf region was necessary to prevent further aggression by Iraq. I have been most impressed by the success which the President has had in rallying global support for his policies and have lauded his determination to work through the United Nations to achieve a just resolution of this crisis.

At the same time, I have grave concerns about authorizing the use of force at this time. I believe that the global community has unfairly placed on the United States, and that we have too easily accepted, the principal cost, in terms of both American lives and American dollars, of expelling Iraq from Kuwait. Why have those countries which are even more dependent on gulf oil, or which are more directly at risk from Iraqi aggression, not contributing more to our efforts in the gulf? Why are only 20,000 of Saudi Arabia's 65,000 army soldiers deployed on the Iraqi border? Why haven't our NATO allies pledged more military support? Why have we not secured from Japan and Germany, which are rightly precluded from the use of their military forces beyond their borders, greater financial support? I strongly believe that this crisis requires that all members of the global community assume a fair share of the responsibility, and I am not convinced that they have done so to date.

Most importantly, Mr. Speaker, I am not convinced that we have made every possible effort to resolve this situation without resorting to force. As a mother of nine children, who has had family members who have served this country in combat, and who has a former staffer serving today in Saudi Arabia, I believe that we must explore every possible alternative to war before asking our brave men and women in the Armed Forces of the United States to make the ultimate sacrifice. We owe them no less.

Mr. Speaker, I will yield to no one in my love of our country or in my respect for President Bush and his office. And while I believe that the use of force is justifiable and will likely support it in the future should all other alternatives fail to achieve the goals set forth by our President and the United Nations, I cannot in good conscience vote in support of the use of force at this time.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. BROWN].

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, listening to the debate and speeches of many of my colleagues over the past few days has, quite frankly, often appalled me.

True, today's votes are some of the most difficult ones we could ever be asked to cast. Also true is the fact that there are at least good arguments on each side. But from the flurry of factors there emerges one clincher. After giving each point its due and letting them cancel each other out, there is one point that remains standing.

To my colleagues who suggest that that one point is the administration's view that we must send a message to the world's oppressors and fight Saddam Hussein because it is morally imperative to do so, I say, "Hogwash!" Where was the State Department during the 1980's when the same Saddam Hussein was waging war against Iran for 8 years, complete with liberal usage of chemical weapons? If President Bush is sincere in his message now, he would have stated it then. Furthermore, this aim is in conflict with the President's stated objectives, to only liberate Kuwait, not to hunt Hussein or level Iraq.

To my colleagues who suggest that the one main point that necessitates war is that the flow of oil must be secured, I say, "Misinformation!" Prior to August, only a very small percentage of Kuwait's petroleum came to the United States and since August we have been doing just fine without that, too. It is grotesque to assert that we should bear the costs of war for the oil that is used by Japan and other industrial giants.

To my colleagues who suggest that the salient point in this debate is that we cannot leave the region and allow Israel to stand alone against Iraq, I say, "Speculation!" While standing firm with our allies in the region is very important, defending Israel has never been one of the President's stated objectives in deploying troops to the gulf. Furthermore, the suggestion that, after we leave the gulf peacefully, Iraq will attack Israel is just one among a sea of plausible scenarios. Who knows what other events and intervening factors will come to pass in the near future? One

could just as easily argue that Iraq will once again turn against its neighbor, Iran.

To my colleagues who suggest that the most weighty point is that we must stabilize the region, I say, "Illusory!" If they really support stability then they should be calling for an international peace conference on the Middle East to resolve the disputes through negotiation toward a long-term solution that all parties can live with. Furthermore, if our military's purpose was to stabilize regions, then we should also deploy troops to the Soviet Union, Indochina, Africa, Central America, and elsewhere.

To my colleagues who say that the one main point that necessitates war is that we must uphold our international credibility and stature, I say, "Aggression!" Recklessly jumping into war without exhausting alternatives will only make the United States look like a limping, aging giant who must thrash about to remind himself of what he was or could be. We will lose friends, not gain or retain them.

To my colleagues who say that the key point is that we must simply restore Kuwait's Government, I say, "Why?" Since when are we willing to go to war to uphold a regressive monarchy? If we do so in Kuwait, then we should have gone to war to reverse innumerable injustices worldwide in recent years.

As I see it, in the minds of the people there is only one point that remains standing after all others have canceled each other out: There is not yet any reason good enough to die for. America should not be in the business of wasting our young lives for the sake of some oblique geopolitical strategy contrived on some chalkboard. Just ask your constituents who have a son or daughter, mother or father in uniform in the gulf. They overwhelmingly do not see the situation as one that is bad enough to risk their loved one's lives. I strongly urge our colleagues who support the Solarz resolution to reconsider their position in light of the devastating consequences that their vote could have on those families. I believe that the question of war should be viewed strictly as representatives of the people, not as military or academic theorists.

Mr. Speaker, I am putting forth a call for humanness. I ask all my colleagues to put aside all the geopolitical analysis and ask themselves simply, "What is right?" I believe that the overwhelming answer will be to support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution and oppose the Solarz-administration resolution.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution. When this crisis began, I had hopes that a long-term policy of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions was likely to succeed. I still have those hopes, and I continue to support that strategy.

After the invasion of Kuwait on August 2, President Bush and the international community acted quickly and effectively to halt Iraq's Army, impose a comprehensive embargo, and ensure that Iraq got no financial gain from its capture of Kuwait's oil fields.

We have had some successes. Iraq's armies have been halted. Iraq can no longer buy weapons abroad. Before the crisis, Iraq exported about 3 million barrels of oil per day. The sanctions have cut that to zero. Iraq's other imports and exports are almost entirely cut off, and Iraq's GNP has fallen by 40 to 50

percent. That is an economic blow greater than any our country has ever suffered. I know there have been leaks, and I know the risks of erosion over time, but I still believe the sanctions need more time to work.

I think the case for continued sanctions remains valid. The Desert Shield force has blocked his aggression and is now large enough to defeat any attempt he could make against it. Iraq is blockaded by sea. The international community has branded Saddam Hussein the aggressor, and is resolute in its determination to stop him and reverse his annexation of Kuwait. His neighbors, Syria and Turkey, have joined the international coalition and show no inclination to leave. Egypt, the most populous of the Arab nations, shows no signs of wavering in its support.

If Iraq refuses to leave Kuwait, the policy of sanctions, containment, and prolonged pressure will do permanent damage to Iraq's economy, make it much more difficult for Saddam Hussein to sustain his bloated military, and set a precedent for future international cooperation against aggression by Iraq or anyone else.

I believe that the policy outlined by the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution is a sound strategy. I know that some say we have made no progress up to this point. The Iraqi Foreign Minister's performance in Geneva strengthened their argument. But I believe that the most successful resolution we can ask for is that Iraq leaves Kuwait without a shot fired. And with that in mind, regardless of what the Congress does today, I urge the President to use sanctions as our preferred policy in this crisis.

Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland. Mr. Speaker, now that we have provided the President of the United States the authority to use force to carry out U.S. and U.N. policy in the Persian Gulf, I believe that all possible avenues must be pursued. With that in mind, I have written President George Bush on this day imploring him to give diplomacy one last chance to resolve this crisis peacefully. While I support the Presidential authority to use force in this crisis, I feel it must be used only as a last resort. I would like to include that letter in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I realize that this letter reaches you on the eve of momentous events in the world, however, I implore you to consider it.

As you know, the Congress of the United States has now provided you the authority to use force to carry out American policy in the Persian Gulf if and when you deem it necessary. I supported this authority for a variety of reasons which I outlined during the debate in the House of Representatives. But most of all, I believe that our Commander in Chief should have every available option during this time of tension.

Nevertheless, I believe that all other options should be exhausted before this Nation employs force. I have discussed this crisis with many of my constituents and some of them are concerned that we are rushing into a war without using all means necessary to avoid violent conflict. Therefore, I respectfully request that diplomacy be given one last attempt to resolve this crisis peacefully. Even though the congressional resolution authorizing force requires you to report to the Congress that all diplomatic efforts have failed, the American people must be certain

that force is being used only as a last resort. We must be confident that if American men and women are being sent into battle, it is being done because all other means of peaceful resolution have failed.

I believe you now have the flexibility to convince the leader of Iraq that the United States is committed to use force and you can use this tool in a last effort of diplomacy. I urge you to seriously consider this option when weighing the consequences of your decision.

TOM McMILLEN.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I am voting against a declaration of war today.

Supporters of the President have raised three points to which I would like to respond: the issues of stopping territorial aggression, of protecting human rights, and preserving oil supplies.

How does each of these issues affect the United States?

On aggression, the aggression has stopped. Saddam Hussein has been contained. Yes, the aggression is yet to be reversed. But it took us 45 years to do that after World War II. What is the hurry? What is the rush to war after just 6 months?

As for human rights, they do not exist in the Persian Gulf as we know and revere them in our country. I wish they did, but the monarchies of the Middle East have never extended what we consider basic rights to their residents. War will not change their moral and ethical traditions which have evolved over centuries.

The issue of protecting an oil supply—large for Europe and Japan—is too crass a disregard of human life to warrant serious debate. For those who persist, it should suffice to point out that the United States is insolvent. We are in a deep recession. To increase our deficit and debt by over \$50 billion should turn the most aggressive warriors away from combat.

President Bush is anxious to go to war. Let's review the options foregone. President Bush has been an ally of Hussein. President Bush has funded the abuse of human rights in El Salvador and refused to act against the murderers of priests, women, and children in El Salvador—yet he now rushes to express concern about Kuwait. Upset about territorial invasions? What about Nicaragua?

I listened to serious debate for almost 3 days. Despite all of the flag waving, energy saving, Presidential loyalty, and saving our prestige arguments, there was nothing said to justify the deaths of tens of thousands of American service men and women—not to mention the civilian population that would inevitably be slaughtered.

As I listened, I could find no reason, no issue, not one scintilla of patriotic calling to convince me to vote, on behalf of my constituents, to risk the life of one U.S. citizen at this time.

Mr. FUSTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to address perhaps the most difficult question this body will face; significantly, it is the very first issue—and rightly so—on the agenda of this 102d Congress.

For me, it is particularly important, since I, the only Member of Congress from Puerto Rico, have just returned from the Middle East as a member of the official House delegation

sent there to assess the explosive and complicated situation in the Persian Gulf. Mr. Speaker, there are no easy answers to the long-standing problems in the Middle East, but we are all resolved that Saddam Hussein's brutal and naked aggression against Kuwait cannot be allowed to stand.

Nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, there are choices, different approaches to the problem. It is a very difficult choice we must make today, but I must support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution that would authorize the use of force now to defend Saudi Arabia and United States troops to enforce the embargo against Iraq—but, and most significantly, does not authorize offensive action against Iraq at this time.

Mr. Speaker, war has terrible, irrevocable consequences. There will be thousands of casualties, both ours and innocent Arabs. Moreover, war in Iraq will provoke resentment in the Arab world for a very long time. Most importantly, war would seriously jeopardize the emerging New World order. That new order must be one where peace is the ruling consideration, one based on law and justice and diplomacy. It cannot be built on the basis of a terrible war. We simply must not let this happen. This New World order is simply too vital, too far reaching, to slip between the cracks of a relatively minor confrontation between Middle East neighbors.

Let us seize the moment, Mr. Speaker, let us make this the finest moment of this 102d Congress. Let us support the President, Mr. Speaker, but let us put the interests of all the citizens of the United States first. Let us put Saddam Hussein on notice—firmly and unequivocally—but first let us give sanctions a chance to work. That is the prudent thing to do, and to that extent I support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Speaker, the question of whether to go to war is a most serious matter. The decision we are faced with today and tomorrow is a decision to commit U.S. forces to a war that the U.S. people are divided over. We have a very solemn constitutional obligation here to debate this matter—as Congress appropriately must—and to decide for ourselves and on behalf of our constituents what the best course of action for our Nation should be. The Congress must listen to the President, but it also has the constitutional responsibility to make an independent judgment.

To begin with, I share the repulsion that all Members have to the unprovoked invasion of Kuwait and to the atrocities that have been committed against that nation since August 2. I am also sensitive to the dangers that the Iraqi military machine poses to the region. The international community and certainly all of us in Congress agree that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait. Our debate here is over how best to accomplish that goal, and whether it can be accomplished without resorting to war. Because after all, war is—and should—a last resort. But let Saddam Hussein make no mistake, he is going to leave Kuwait.

After considering the excellent arguments raised on both sides of this critical question, and after listening to the outstanding debate here in the House I have decided to support the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution to urge continuation of the policy of economic and diplo-

matic pressure that was originally presented by the President last August. The policy of deploying troops to stop Saddam's aggression, to contain him and to apply economic sanctions against Iraq were overwhelmingly supported by the American people.

It is important to realize that the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution explicitly authorizes the use of American military force to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, to defend Saudi Arabia from direct Iraqi attack and to protect American forces in the region. It does not rule out authorizing the use of force, if necessary, at a later date to force Iraqi troops from Kuwait. This resolution simply states that continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq out of Kuwait is the wisest course at this time for our Nation and for the Middle East region.

Congress strongly supported President Bush immediately after August 2, in his initial decision to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf in order to deter further Iraqi aggression. And we were united in support of economic sanctions, which the President said would take time to be effective. We were willing to demonstrate the patience necessary to convince Saddam Hussein to understand that he had made a serious error. Both the House and Senate adopted resolutions by overwhelming margins affirming this support. And this policy of imposing economic sanctions while providing American and Allied Forces to deter further aggression against Saudi Arabia had the support of the vast majority of the American people.

In watching events unfold however, I believe that the President made a serious error in announcing a fundamental shift in our strategy on November 8. Without prior consultation with either the Congress or our allies in the international coalition, the President announced a doubling of the size of our deployed military forces in order to provide a credible option to launch a military offensive against Kuwait. I believe President Bush was also misguided in his judgment to impose an arbitrary deadline for exercising this military option.

The result is that the burden for this additional deployment has fallen disproportionately on the United States. Questions have been raised about the willingness of some deployed allied forces to participate in offensive operations. And the united front in the Congress and in the country disappeared.

This debate, and the communications we are receiving from our constituents, clearly demonstrate that the Nation is divided in its determination that a war at this time is either justified or required. We are divided on this issue. And if there is one lesson we should have learned from the tragedy of Vietnam it is—as Ross Perot has stated—do not commit this Nation to war if the country is not united. Until November 8 the American people and the Congress met this test, now they do not. It would be far better to continue the President's original policy, at least in the near term.

The Congress has heard from a wide array of "experts" on all aspects of the situation in which we find ourselves. While their opinions are instructive, they are all inherently speculation. No one can say with any degree of certainty whether economic sanctions will force

Iraq out of Kuwait, and if so when. We can, however, say with certainty, that they are working with unprecedented effectiveness. In past circumstances, economic sanctions have been judged effective when they resulted in a 2.5-percent reduction in gross national product. In this case the GNP decline in Iraq is on the order of 50 percent, and Senator NUNN has estimated they could reach 70 percent. Iraq has lost 98 percent of its foreign earnings, and 90 percent of its imports have been halted. There has been a 40-percent drop in civilian production. Iraq's hard currency is nearly exhausted. Multibillions of dollars in oil revenues have been lost. Spare parts for his foreign-built military machine have been terminated. Saddam Hussein certainly can not be enjoying economic sanctions.

At the same time, no one can say with certainty what would happen if there is war. There is no shortage of arm chair strategists here in Washington, DC. You can find someone with an impressive title to speculate on virtually any conceivable military strategy and outcome. I don't know if air power alone could prevail. I don't know whether the Iraqi Army will give up when confronted with our forces. I certainly do not pretend to be able to predict the length of the casualty lists. But I do know that the toll could be high, involving many thousand lives on both sides. The long range potential for post war instability is huge. And the economic cost would include not just the estimated \$1 billion a day during the fighting, but the devastation that war would produce in energy markets that could take the current recession and plunge us toward depression. One clear message that the conflicting public opinion polls send is that the American people are not prepared to accept heavy casualties to restore the Emirate in Kuwait.

The risks of war should not be borne unless we have, in fact, exhausted every reasonable avenue to achieve our goals without bloodshed. I am not convinced that we have exhausted all those avenues. I am not convinced that time is on the side of Saddam Hussein. The United Nations, the European Community, and the Arab League are all exploring a diplomatic settlement to this issue.

I also want to make it clear that should Iraq see the error of its ways and agree to honor the requirements of U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 that we will not immediately forget the problems faced in the region. In particular, the Iraqi military machine will have to be contained and dealt with by the international community. But there are economic and diplomatic options other than war, including a continuing arms embargo, more aggressive restrictions on technology transfer, as well as negotiated arms reductions on all sides in the region that can be pursued. An agreement of the coalition arrayed against Iraq to achieve a stable security agreement for the region, perhaps including a permanent international peacekeeping force, is essential.

It is with disappointment that I cannot support the President in his request for immediate authorization to use military force in the Persian Gulf. I am sensitive to the impact this will have on his efforts. But I am not convinced that failure to attack on January 16 will fatally undermine our efforts. In fact, it could provide the opportunity that is needed to initiate a new

world order demonstrating that the goals of the international community can be accomplished without resorting to war. Can anyone honestly state that we have exhausted every peaceful option? I do not think so.

I also strongly support the Durbin-Bennett resolution, clearly expressing the constitutional powers and responsibilities that belong to the Congress on issues of war and peace. I would fervently urge the President to honor the will of the Congress, if we do not vote for immediate authorization of military force in this instance. To ignore such an action would trigger a constitutional crisis that would seriously undermine any military effort. The President must realize that without the support of Congress and the American people, no policy can be sustained.

At the same time, if the Congress votes to authorize the use of military force, I hope that the Members of this body and the Nation as a whole will honor the outcome as well and unite in support of that decision. If this fateful decision is made, the President and our troops in the field will have my complete support. But I would hope that in any event that the President would seriously heed the language of the Solarz-Michel resolution requiring a certification that all peaceful options have been exhausted before any military action is begun.

So at this time, we all hope and pray that war can be averted. My vote today is based on my conviction that the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution is truly the last best hope for peace.

Mr. BEILENSEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

I want to say at the outset that I have the greatest respect and personal affection for the President—as well as for those closest to him in the White House who have been the shapers of our policy in the gulf since this crisis arose. I know that is not relevant to the policy matters at hand, but I wanted to say it anyway. These are decent and thoughtful men, and they are clearly trying to do the very best job they can.

I think all of us feel that way, but as one of the couple of dozen or so Members who have had the opportunity to meet with the President in the White House on a number of occasions during the past 3 months, I did want to say that we all appreciate that opportunity to have had his ear, and to have had that chance to exchange views with him. He has reached out more than past Presidents to stay in touch with the Congress, and to share his concerns and his feelings and his intentions with us, and I think every one of us appreciates his openness and his willingness to do so very much.

Having said that, I must also say that although virtually every one of us strongly supported the President's initial response to Saddam Hussein's outrageous and brutal aggression in Kuwait, some of us have strongly disagreed with his handling of this matter since he changed our policy last fall.

Back on August 8, President Bush said, "The mission of our troops is wholly defensive. Hopefully, they will not be needed long. They will not initiate hostilities, but they will defend themselves, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other friends in the Persian Gulf."

Virtually every one of us supported that original policy of the President. And, most of us thought that policy was working.

I believe that Mr. Bush succeeded months ago in protecting our vital interests in the gulf. We have successfully defended Saudi Arabia and the rest of the gulf states, deterred any further aggression by Iraq, ensured an adequate supply of oil at reasonable prices to the entire world, and brought about the release of all foreigners who wished to leave Kuwait and Iraq.

Our initial modest deployment of troops, and our continuing strict enforcement of U.N. economic sanctions against Iraq were proper and proportionate responses to Iraq's aggression. They were adequate to protect our interests in the gulf, and were likely to have a completely successful result if applied with patience and with perseverance.

We accomplished these objectives with the concerted help of virtually every other nation in the world and, during the first few weeks, at least, it looked as though only a fraction of the troops deployed in the region to achieve our objectives there would be U.S. personnel.

Some time in late October and early November, the administration changed its original policy. The President announced that we would double and then redouble the number of U.S. personnel in the region to about 430,000 in order to ensure, as the President himself put it, "an adequate offensive military option" to carry out our goals there.

That critical shift in policy brought about a number of changes that were detrimental, rather than helpful, to the eventual satisfactory outcome of our involvement there.

It meant that a high proportion of all troops would be American—and it remains likely that, in the event of hostilities, probably 75 or 80 percent or more of casualties will be American.

It meant that the world would increasingly see this as an argument between the United States and Iraq, and not as one between the entire world and Iraq which is, of course, what it is in fact—and should be seen as.

By unilaterally ratcheting up the level of rhetoric and U.S. response, we sent absolutely the wrong signal to the rest of the world: That we would be happy to do the job for them, that we would take care of the problem for them.

And by our scurrying around to get the United Nations to set a January 15 deadline, and by personalizing the confrontation between Mr. Bush and Saddam Hussein, and by making it more and more evident to the world that we were becoming impatient, the United States transformed the nature of the confrontation and made it more difficult to end it. We were no longer giving sanctions a chance. And we were ensuring that the sheer number of troops we had sent and the deadline we had set would themselves dictate our policy—rather than the other way around, as it should be.

Thus, there was, I believe, a better way of handling this—at a lower level of bombast and bellicosity, with a proportionately lower level of American involvement, and in a way that would have led us to a solution that did not involve offensive military action. That better way was President Bush's original policy.

I had the privilege last month of leading a bipartisan group of 19 Members of this House to the Persian Gulf. All of us came away with a renewed sense of pride and feelings of support for our men and women who are there on our behalf.

But as I saw the thousands of troops we had sent there and the tens of thousands of tons of materiel of all kinds—tanks, planes, and supplies of every sort—I had the recurring thought that if we can do what we are doing in the Persian Gulf, we can do anything. When you see what the United States can do in such a short period of time if we only put our minds, our hearts, and our resources together, it reminds you of what we could be doing here at home as well where problems are crying out for help.

It's heartbreaking to realize how much we could accomplish here at home if we would only try; and it's infuriating that we find it so easy to act overseas and so difficult to act to solve domestic problems. No one denies that we have major national interests to tend to in the gulf. But from the moment they were identified, we have spent whatever sum of money is necessary and called up however many troops and reservists we need; we acted immediately, and we have stopped at nothing.

Grave as this threat by Iraq may be to our vital interests as Americans, I can think of a dozen other vital interests that matter more in the everyday lives of most Americans and are more important to the long-term strength and security of our Nation—including improving an education system that is failing our children; reforming a health care system that costs too much and helps too few; halting the scourge of crime that makes personal security the No. 1 concern of most of our citizens; and rebuilding an infrastructure of roads; bridges, and other economic supports that has fallen into almost total disrepair over the past generation.

What is it about our interests overseas that inspire our President to commit any and every thing imaginable to protect them—and to give to the many problems we have here at home so little interest, money, and leadership? Why are we continuing the self-destructive work of the 1980's, taking care of everyone else's problems in the world, but not our own?

One additional, ironic, and sad legacy of our involvement in the Persian Gulf in a manner that was uncalled for, and at a higher cost than was necessary, is that the additional billions of dollars that this effort will add to our national deficit will effectively make it absolutely impossible for us to even begin to try to solve our problems here at home in the immediate future.

And, finally, however events unfold in the Persian Gulf, two policies must come of this. The first must be an effective international undertaking, most especially with our Western European friends and allies, to ensure a strict regimen of arms control and limitation of technology transfers to the Middle East region—and other regions—of the world. Iraq's nonconventional arsenal is worrisome and threatening not only to its neighbors in the Persian Gulf, but also to the entire world. And it's not only Iraq whose weapons capabilities should be of concern to us. Syria, too, has sophisticated weapons and a leader who will not

hesitate to use them, and there are other potential trouble spots in the world as well.

And the second must be the establishment and undertaking of a truly serious and substantive national energy program for the United States. The first two oil crises, in 1973 and 1979, led to higher prices, long gas lines, double-digit inflation here at home, and recession around much of the world.

This crisis may be leading us to war—and the loss of American lives, as well as \$30 billion or more in direct costs, higher oil prices, and the worldwide havoc it has already brought.

We have got to care about American lives, and the well-being of our people enough to ensure that our national interests can never again be so seriously threatened by turmoil in the Persian Gulf. If we do not tend to these problems, if we do not lead international efforts to stem the flow of sophisticated arms and technology to the Middle East, and lessen our reliance on overseas supplies of oil, then all of the money, the hard work, and the lives that may be lost—we pray that none are—will all have been in vain.

The question before us now is this: Are we bound to support our President, should we support our President, when he has moved us unwisely to the brink of war—when pursuit of his original policy, which had already achieved almost all of our important goals, would have continued to serve our interests well at a much lower cost in dollars and a very much lower risk of loss of lives?

As one of the small group of Members who sat in meetings with the President over the last 3 months, as a Member who has no doubts about the strength and the sincerity of the President's convictions about the policy he is pursuing, this gentleman finds himself wanting very much to be supportive of Mr. Bush.

But I feel much more strongly that we should not—we must not—let our desire to support our President in a time of crisis overrule our judgment about the wisdom of authorizing the President to go to war.

Is war really necessary?

The answer is clearly, no.

We have already stopped Iraqi aggression; we are punishing Iraq; we have already established the lesson that aggression does not pay.

And we have done all this—and have every prospect of achieving our final goal of evicting Iraq from Kuwait, without resorting to war.

Sanctions are working, and will succeed in weakening Saddam considerably if we are patient. We have succeeded in cutting off Iraq's oil exports, almost its entire source of income; that has reduced Iraq's GNP by 50 percent, and will reduce it by 70 percent in the near future. Sanctions will weaken Iraq's military capability as shortages of spare parts and needed materiel develop.

As someone who has had regular briefings on the Persian Gulf crisis from the intelligence community, I must tell you that I am perplexed about the administration's eagerness to abandon a good policy that was working. I am absolutely convinced that continued application of international economic sanctions will force Iraq out of Kuwait. We must give this policy a chance to work.

The case for war in the gulf is very weak indeed, and is driven mainly by our own mistaken policy of forcing the issue unnecessarily by our huge and uncalled-for military buildup, and our setting of a deadline that makes successful diplomacy very, very difficult.

Since we have achieved most of our original objectives, and since our remaining major goal is achievable with patience and by continuing to enforce the sanctions, we have no right, in my opinion, to put American lives at risk.

We are now voting on whether to send American men and women to war.

My own personal criterion for making such a decision is this: Is this a cause for which I believe my own sons and daughter should be sent to war? And my answer to that question is clearly no—for the reasons I have just given.

And if I would not want my own children to be sent to this war, then I shall not vote to send other parents' children to this war—because I believe that our Nation's vital interests have already been protected, and will ultimately be far better protected if we do not go to war.

Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, and against the Michel-Solarz resolution. With patient, steady application of sanctions, and with continued diplomacy, we will succeed in achieving the last of our objectives—the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait—and we will avoid the completely unnecessary loss of American lives.

Mr. JONTZ. Mr. Speaker, let me make five points with which I believe most Americans agree:

First, we should avoid a war in the Middle East if we can;

Second, if we have to go to war to achieve our objectives in the Middle East, we must;

Third, if we go to war, we must and will fight to win and win decisively and quickly;

Fourth, our Nation should stand together and if we end up sending troops into combat to resolve the Middle East conflict, we must support them in every way possible; and

Fifth, we are assuming these burdens because of our position of world leadership, but our allies who stand as much to gain or more than we do from successful resolution of the gulf crisis ought to be paying their fair share—and they aren't.

That being said, let me share what I believe are the disagreements in the current debate. I heard these disagreements when I traveled through the Fifth District earlier this week to solicit my constituents' views on what course of action our Nation ought to take; I have heard these same disagreements these past 2 days as the issue has been debated on the floor of the House and Senate.

First, there are different opinions about whether sanctions, diplomacy, and international pressure have been successful or can be successful. Some say these methods have failed, and will fail, or will be successful only with the immediate threat of war. This group says attack now; give the President the blessings of the Congress to proceed with force on January 15. Others say that sanctions have worked—we isolated Iraq, we won release of the hostages—and if they are continued, they might bring enough pressure to bear on Sad-

dam Hussein that means can be found to resolve the crisis without war. This group says be patient; that 5 months of embargo and 6 hours of dialog are not enough to accomplish resolution of the Middle East issues through peaceful means; that we should exhaust all options before risking American lives.

There is also disagreement about what steps will allow us to maintain and strengthen the international coalition now opposing Iraq, and lead to the long-term stability of the Middle East which is the most important of our objectives.

Some say that we cannot hold the coalition together if we do not attack; that there is no way the issue can be settled peacefully which will lead to long-term stability in the Middle East. Others say that the surest way to splinter the alliance of nations aligned against Iraq is for us to use force prematurely, and that efforts to resolve the issues by force if not necessary will lead to increased instability and more bloody conflict in the future.

We may need to go to war. If we fight, we must support our troops 100 percent and be united in our determination to finish the war quickly and with complete victory. But I will vote for the Hamilton resolution and against the Solarz resolution because I believe that there is still a possibility that diplomacy and sanctions can work. I don't want to risk American lives and drain the American treasury if our allies aren't willing to do their share in shouldering the burden.

The Netherlands, which receives 100 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf, has not contributed any military or financial support to our mission in the Persian Gulf. Japan, which receives 63 percent of its oil from the region, has sent no troops to the gulf, and offered just \$4 billion to an engagement that will cost an estimated \$30 billion before one shot is fired. France, Spain, and Italy, all rely extensively on the Persian Gulf for their energy needs, but have yet to give a cent to what is supposed to be an international effort.

Finally, Saudi Arabia, the nation which has the most at stake in the conflict, has profited to the tune of \$9 billion as a result of the sharp increase in oil prices that we Americans have been paying at the pump for 6 months. They're continuing to line their pockets at the rate of \$143 million a day, yet they have turned over just \$1 billion of their windfall—much of which has come from American wallets—to the military effort.

As long as there is some hope that continued sanctions and negotiations can bring about a peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf conflict, and until our allies back up their words with action, we should not risk the lives of the young men and women who are serving their country in the Middle East.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Speaker, the American people and the vast majority of the world community share a single, unequivocal goal in resolving the crisis confronting us today in the Middle East. We seek the withdrawal of the armies of Iraq from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait to its previous condition. However, in deciding how to achieve this goal, the citizens of our Nation, and of the world, are not speaking with one voice. The great

question facing Congress is how to achieve our goal without needlessly sacrificing the lives of the men and women in our Armed Forces and without sacrificing the values that make our country strong.

There are causes for which fighting and dying are worthwhile and necessary. Wisdom lies in knowing when to fight, when to ask young men and women to die. Today, I believe wisdom lies in patience and in resolve. We must resolve as a nation and as a global community to not respond to brute force with further violence until every avenue for a peaceful solution has been explored. We must be patient, and allow sanctions to have their full effect.

I believe our President is willing to risk too much too soon. The costs of an armed conflict with Iraq are great. Thousands of our own men and women face death and serious injury, while tens of thousands of civilians could be killed. Already in a recession, our economy will be devastated not only by skyrocketing oil prices but by the additional taxes which our citizens would have to pay in order to finance a war with Iraq. The entire Middle East would be destabilized, particularly if Iraq follows through with its promise to attack Israel. Few have even considered the long-term environmental problems associated with fires from ignited oil fields, which could burn for years and darken the skies across the region.

The situation we currently face in the Middle East—with all its potential risks and costs—calls out for strong efforts for a nonviolent solution. Such a solution is possible. World opinion is strong and unified and economic sanctions against Iraq are clearly working. With such great risks associated with violence in this situation, does not the sane, moral choice lie in patience and diplomacy?

There may come a time when military force clearly becomes our only option. At that time I have no doubt that the Congress and the American people would approve of our Armed Forces joining a truly multinational military force to remove Iraqi troops from Kuwait. However, until that day arrives, I favor President Bush's original strategy: economic sanctions, patience, the development of a multinational military force for deterrence, and diplomacy.

The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, which I will support, authorizes the President to use military force to defend our soldiers and to sustain the U.N. embargo against Iraq. This resolution tells the President that sanctions and diplomatic efforts to make Iraq leave Kuwait are the wisest choices at this time. This resolution also states that at any time the Congress will reconsider a new request from the Presi-

dent for a declaration of war or authorization to use military force.

Let Saddam Hussein make no mistake: We in this country are of one mind. He must withdraw his armies from Kuwait. Regardless of whether that end will be achieved peacefully or at tremendous cost to Iraq and the rest of the world community, it will be achieved.

My hope is that we in this body will exercise the resolve and wisdom which this situation demands. We have the strength to be patient. We have the responsibility to respect the lives of the men and women we sent to the Middle East. And we have the chance, still, to achieve a peaceful solution to this conflict.

As many others have said on this floor, a peaceful solution can be obtained only if we couple our resolve, as indicated by our economic sanctions backed by overwhelming military force, with a flexible and enlightened negotiating position. So far what we have lacked is such a negotiating position. Six hours spent telling the Foreign Minister of Iraq how we will destroy his country is not an adequate position.

If the President is sincere in his commitment to a new world order, and I believe he is, he should begin now to demonstrate that commitment. The greatest weakness in our present position, and one which could lead to the rapid deterioration of our multinational alliance over time, is the appearance that it is a U.S.-dominated military adventure aimed at shoring up the Western industrial nations interest in mideast oil resources. We can argue as long as we will that we are really engaged in a crusade to protect human rights and the rule of law in the world, but our past deeds belie our protestations.

Over a generation the United States and the Soviets have joined to emasculate the United Nations and multinational peacekeeping because we preferred a bipolar world dominated by the two super-powers. We revelled in proxy wars around the globe and rejected overtures from the United Nations or other sources to resolve them peacefully. No tyrant was too irrational, cruel, or unjust to his people to be denied our aid and friendship if he stood with us in our holy war against the global Communist conspiracy. Arab and Moslem nations were measured not by their needs or by the quality of their commitment to justice and democracy but by their subservience to the U.S. views of the cold war.

The Arab nations know this history well. They know that many of the problems of the Mideast today are the legacy of irresponsible Western colonialism of the last century. They also know that they have a great challenge before them to rise above this history and to create a new and more just soci-

ety based upon the best of Moslem history, cultures, and religion, but open to the benefits available from the judicious use of Western industrial culture.

If we expect a new world order to emerge from the current confrontation with Saddam Hussein, we must start now to involve the Arab nations in determining the future of their region. A coalition of Arab leaders should be conducting negotiations with Hussein, under the auspices of the U.N. Security Council and backed by the commitment of U.S. resources. The military forces arrayed against Iraq should be guided by an international joint command with highly visible Arab commanders. President Bush and Secretary Baker should adopt a posture of greater respect for the Arab nation and the Moslem world. An attitude of appropriate humility because of our past sins, and of greater sincerity in addressing this "vision thing" of a new world order would help create the setting for a post-crisis approach to a wide range of Mid-East problems.

I believe that a nation such as Iraq which can and has sustained a million casualties in a border dispute with a neighboring Moslem nation—Iran—could in all likelihood accept far greater casualties against an infidel force invading the holy places of Islam. I lament this prospective loss of Moslem lives as much as I do the corresponding loss of U.S. lives. Both losses are irrational, unnecessary, and unproductive in reaching lasting solutions to real problems.

So I beg the President, with respect and humility, to consider now the need to create a new atmosphere in this time of crisis. Take some brave new steps to change the framework of negotiations. Do not retreat from our core position, but be more sensitive to a larger set of core issues. The American people and the world will respect such leadership. You will then truly be able to say that you are helping to shape a new world order.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the remaining time on this side to the distinguished Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY].

□ 1300

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I take the well in what will be an unusual and only occasional circumstance, to speak to my colleagues as a Member rather than as the Speaker. But as I leave the chair and come to the well, I hope I may for just a moment speak to you as the Speaker, and tell you that I think this general debate—the longest in the modern history of the House of Representatives, extending over 20 hours—has done great credit to each Member who has spoken to the House, to all those who have taken opposing and difficult views, and in the highest tradition of this body fulfills our constitu-

tional responsibilities and our obligations to those Americans for whom we stand and speak.

But I would not feel it right to stand behind the usual custom of the Speaker not to vote and not to speak on a question of this importance. I do not ask anyone to follow me, but I do feel the need to explain to my constituents, to those who have sent me here, why I will cast a vote for the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution and against the Michel-Solarz resolution.

I will vote this way not because I do not have the greatest respect for those who take an opposing view. I do. And I know what a difficult choice this is for each of us. I will not go over the arguments again. They have been articulated so well and so ably on both sides.

But let me suggest what this debate is not about. It is not about a lack of determination to see Saddam Hussein, a brutal dictator who has taken a country by force and violence and holds it today, removed from Kuwait. We will not permit him to stay. We are committed to his removal.

This debate is not about who supports the President of the United States and who does not. I honor and respect the President. I know his determination and I also know the awful loneliness and terrible consequence of the decisions that he must make.

In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, James Madison wrote that,

The Constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrate, that the Executive is the branch * * * most interested in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly * * * vested the question of war in the legislature.

I do not believe that the President wants war. I believe that he devoutly wishes peace and will continue to hope and work for it. But it is wrong to suggest that we who have taken our own oath can burden him further by giving to him alone the responsibility that also must be ours today. We must share in this decision. We have been elected to do it. The Constitution mandates it, and we would shirk our duty if we easily acquiesce in what the President decides. That is unfair to him, as it is to our constituents and to our responsibilities.

The President deserves, more than any single person in this country, not our agreement given casually or automatically, but our informed and conscientious judgment. And each Member should strive to give that to the President and the country today.

This debate is not about who supports our troops. We hear constant references that they are eager, almost anxious to fight and to sacrifice and perhaps to die. And I must say a respectful thank God. Thank God we have young men and women who are so committed to this country, to its values, and to its service that they are ready to lay down their very lives for

it, and for their fellow citizens. That is a tremendous gift to this country. And each of us who has seen our troops in the field, our young men and women, and noted their morale and enthusiasm, and, as I say, even eagerness, ought not just respect and thank them for it; we have a duty not to rush them into an early and precipitous war as a way of recognizing their willingness to make that sacrifice.

This debate is not about supporting the coalition that the President has so successfully organized. It is not about supporting the United Nations that has a new and revived role in promoting international order.

It is not about standing with our allies. All of those things can be done in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution.

The debate is not about the use of force. Force is being used every day. Ships are being stopped. Iraq is being surrounded, its military potential has been hedged. We only reserve the right to give final approval to the President to initiate the maximum offensive force in our command, the terrible, terrible force that this country has the power to inflict.

Eight years ago, in the 98th Congress, this House was asked to adopt a resolution providing for the continued peacekeeping presence of U.S. marines and other servicemen in Lebanon. The Speaker of the House, Thomas P. O'Neill, took the well and asked all Members to support the President's request that we should continue the American peacekeeping presence in Lebanon. I voted for that resolution. I regret that vote today, not because one could not honorably support such a resolution; not because I wanted to back the President or I wanted to stand firm with the leadership on both sides of the aisle. Those were all decent reasons. I regret that vote today not just because, as we all regret, 300 marines lost their lives. I regret it also because I cast that vote feeling doubtful, uncertain, unwilling to commit myself fully to its consequence. And those who believe that the President must now be armed with what unquestionably—as DANTE FASCELL so honorably and candidly has told this House—is the virtual declaration of war, should not hesitate to vote that way, should not hesitate to give him that power.

But let me suggest to you one thing. Do not do it under the notion that you merely hand him another diplomatic tool, another arrow in the quiver of economic and international leverage. The President has signaled no doubt about this. He has said again and again that, if given the power, he may well use it, perhaps sooner than we realize. If that is your judgment, vote honorably and calmly and securely.

But if you feel that more can be done; if you feel that the sanctions have not yet wasted their opportunity;

if you believe that Saddam Hussein is growing weaker every day under their impression; if you believe the international coalition will hold; if you believe that this Nation's leadership is best expressed in this body and in the other body, and in the coalition of constitutional consent, then vote for Hamilton-Gephardt.

But however you vote, as the majority leader has said, let us come together after the vote with the notion that we are Americans here, not Democrats and not Republicans, all anxious to do the best for our country, without recrimination as to motive, without anything but the solemn pride that on this great decision day we voted as our conscience and judgment told us we should. And though our opinion may change over years, we will then not bear the burden of a harsh judgment on our honor and our actions at this moment.

And though I too was raised in a tradition that honored silent and private prayer, I offer a public prayer for this House, for all of us, for the Congress, for our President—and he is our President—and for the American people, particularly those young Americans who stand willing to make the supreme sacrifice. May God bless us and guide us and help us in the fateful days that lie ahead.

□ 1310

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered on the concurrent resolution.

The question is on the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 183, noes 250, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 8]

AYES—183

Abercrombie	Costello	Foley
Alexander	Cox (IL)	Ford (MI)
Andrews (ME)	Coyne	Ford (TN)
Annunzio	de la Garza	Frank (MA)
Anthony	DeFazio	Gaydos
Applegate	DeLauro	Gedenson
Atkins	Dellums	Gephardt
AuCoin	Dicks	Gibbons
Bellenson	Dixon	Gordon
Bennett	Donnelly	Gray
Bonior	Dooley	Guarini
Boucher	Dorgan (ND)	Hall (OH)
Boxer	Downey	Hamilton
Brown	Durbin	Hayes (IL)
Bruce	Dwyer	Hefner
Bryant	Early	Hertel
Bustamante	Eckart	Hochbrueckner
Cardin	Edwards (CA)	Horn
Carr	English	Hoyer
Clay	Espy	Jacobs
Coleman (TX)	Evans	Jefferson
Collins (IL)	Fazio	Jenkins
Collins (MI)	Feighan	Johnson (SD)
Conte	Flake	Johnston
Conyers	Foglietta	Jontz

Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kenny
Kildee
Klecza
Kolter
Kopetski
Kostmayer
LaFalce
LaRocco
Lehman (FL)
Levin (MI)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Long
Lowey (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McHugh
McNulty
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
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Moakley
Moody
Moran
Morella
Mrazek

Murphy
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Neal (MA)
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Nowak
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Owens (NY)
Owens (UT)
Panetta
Payne (NJ)
Pease
Pelosi
Penny
Perkins
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickle
Poshard
Price
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Riggs
Roe
Roemer
Rose
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Savage

Sawyer
Schauer
Schroeder
Schumer
Serrano
Sharp
Sikorski
Skaggs
Slaughter (NY)
Smith (FL)
Staggers
Stallings
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Traxler
Unsold
Vento
Visclosky
Washington
Waters
Waxman
Weiss
Wheat
Williams
Wise
Wolpe
Wyden
Yates
Yatron

Paxon
Payne (VA)
Petri
Pickett
Porter
Pursell
Quillen
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Ray
Regula
Rhodes
Ridge
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Santorum
Sarpalilus
Saxton

Schaefer
Schiff
Schulze
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skeltton
Slattery
Slaughter (VA)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solarz
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Tallon

Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Torricelli
Upton
Valentine
Vander Jagt
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weber
Weldon
Whitten
Wilson
Wolf
Wylie
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

NOT VOTING—2

Dymally Udall

So the concurrent resolution was not agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

□ 1330

AUTHORIZING USE OF U.S. ARMED FORCES PURSUANT TO U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 4 of House Resolution 27, it is now in order to consider the joint resolution printed in section 3 of House Report 102-1 by, and if offered by, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] or his designee.

For what purpose does the gentleman from Illinois rise?

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 27, I offer the bipartisan joint resolution sponsored by myself and the very distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], whose extraordinary work in putting together this very unique and unprecedented coalition has to be publicly applauded, and I know, greatly appreciated by the President.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the time be controlled, 20 minutes by the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] and 10 minutes by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the joint resolution.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

H.J. RES. 77

Whereas, the Government of Iraq without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; and

Whereas, both the House of Representatives (in H.J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 147 of the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's inva-

sion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression; and

Whereas, Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace; and

Whereas, the international community has demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's independence and legitimate government be restored; and

Whereas, the U.N. Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter; and

Whereas, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and

Whereas, Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of military Force Against Iraq Resolution."

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.—The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.—Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—

(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and

(2) that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

(c) WAR POWER RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.—

(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION.—Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.

(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS.—Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS

At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

Mr. MICHEL (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent

NOES—250

Ackerman
Allard
Anderson
Andrews (NJ)
Andrews (TX)
Archer
Army
Aspin
Bacchus
Baker
Ballenger
Barnard
Barrett
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Billbray
Billrakis
Billey
Boehlert
Boehner
Borski
Brewster
Brooks
Broomfield
Browder
Bunning
Burton
Byron
Callahan
Camp
Campbell (CA)
Campbell (CO)
Carper
Chandler
Chapman
Clement
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Coleman (MO)
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Cox (CA)
Cramer
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Dannemeyer
Darden
Davis
DeLay
Derrick

Dickinson
Dingell
Doolittle
Dornan (CA)
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards (OK)
Edwards (TX)
Emerson
Engel
Erdreich
Fascell
Fawell
Fields
Fish
Franks (CT)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
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Gingrich
Glickman
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Goodling
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Gradison
Grandy
Green
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hammerschmidt
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Harris
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Hayes (LA)
Hefley
Henry
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Holloway
Hopkins
Horton
Houghton
Hubbard
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Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
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Inhofe

Ireland
James
Johnson (CT)
Jones (GA)
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Kasich
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Lehman (CA)
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Levine (CA)
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Livingston
Lloyd
Lowery (CA)
Luken
Machtley
Madigan
Marlenee
Martin
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McEwen
McGrath
McMillan (NC)
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Meyers
Michel
Miller (OH)
Miller (WA)
Molinar
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morrison
Murtha
Myers
Nichols
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Patterson

that the joint resolution be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] will be recognized for 30 minutes and a Member opposed will be recognized for 30 minutes.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I believe the gentleman from Illinois asked unanimous consent to yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will specify that under the unanimous-consent request, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] will be recognized for 10 minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] will be recognized for 30 minutes in opposition to the resolution.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ].

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL], the very distinguished chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin with an observation that I think all of us share.

I have been here a few years, and for those of you who are serving for the first time, let me tell you that what you have witnessed has been a proud moment in the democratic process and in this legislative body. I am proud of my Speaker and my leader and the leader on the Republican side and my colleagues in what has been characterized, rightly so, as historic debate.

I want to express appreciation to those who had the resolve to start the movement to say that the Congress of the United States ought to share in the responsibility in a major decision of this kind and who made it possible to have a vote prior to the U.N. mandated deadline. Those colleagues deserve a great deal of credit for insisting on maintaining and preserving the constitutional process and to exercise our responsibility in a timely fashion.

Our leadership on both sides needs to be commended and congratulated for the fact that they together, without regard to political considerations, made it possible for us to participate in the

debate on this matter and for the consideration of fulfilling our constitutional responsibilities. The American people owe all of them an everlasting debt of gratitude.

As chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I take special pride in the fact that members of our committee were especially effective in the presentation of this awesome issue to the American people and to the Congress of the United States. Mr. HAMILTON, the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, presented one point of view, along with our distinguished majority leader, Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. SOLARZ, the distinguished chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, presented a second view, along with my distinguished colleague the ranking Republican, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD]. We worked together in order to consider and fashion some of the points and the actual language that is before you today. These Members and the Committee on Foreign Affairs did so in order that we would have a clear debate in this House on this subject and the American people could see how our judgment is being made.

□ 1340

I have never been prouder of the effort which was made by my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on both sides of the aisle, for their participation in this debate. Make no mistake, my friends, that what you are doing here and what you have been doing is fulfilling, to the ultimate, the constitutional responsibility that you were elected to fulfill and that you swore to uphold.

That is what you are doing. And when you vote on this resolution, one way or the other, yes or no, make no mistake about your actions, you are voting to empower the President to use the awesome military force of the United States in a manner that is necessary, to secure the peace.

There is no doubt about it. There is no tomorrow about this decision. It is a decision which you must make today, not tomorrow. When you here make the decision to authorize the use of military force, you are telling the Commander in Chief to implement that authority, and make no mistake about that.

There is nothing to this argument that, "Well, he is going to implement it at his discretion." He is the Commander in Chief. He will carry it out. You are not going to tell him in the resolution how or when to actually do it, like 9 o'clock in the morning or with six tanks or whatever.

He is required under the Constitution to carry out the responsibility as laid down in this resolution, which says:

Mr. President, exhaust all diplomatic means, report to the Congress you have done

everything you know how to do, and then if you have to use military authority, we want you to know that this resolution empowers you to use that force."

There is no question about coming back tomorrow or next week or that you in some way have ducked this decision.

With regard to the constitutional responsibilities, let me make a few points and read to you from the case of *Mitchell v. Laird*, 488 F.2d, 611. I will insert the entire case into the RECORD, and I will add to my remarks in the RECORD additional related material.

The prevailing opinion in this case, 1973, *Mitchell versus Laird*:

Any attempt to require a declaration of war as the only permissible form of assent might involve unforeseeable domestic and international consequences, without any obvious compensating advantages other than a formal declaration of war does have special solemnity and does present to the legislature an unambiguous choice. While those advantages are not negligible, we deem it a political question or, to phrase it more accurately, a discretionary matter for Congress to decide in which form, if any, it will give its consent to war. That is, we regard the Constitution as contemplating various forms of congressional assent, and we do not find any authority in the courts to require Congress to employ one rather than another form.

Mr. Speaker, I cite that simply to point out that every element of the Constitution will be fulfilled as you vote on this issue.

The Congress of the United States, if this resolution is approved, is giving its assent; it is providing the authority, the legal basis for the President to exercise that authority. And it is to his credit that the President of the United States sent a letter and a request to Congress, which will also be inserted into the RECORD in full, saying:

I ask the people of the United States and the Congress of the United States to give their assent at this time.

And that is what we will be doing when you vote on this. And because of the facts that are before us now, because of the situation that exists, I have determined that I must support this request, and I intend to do so. And that is the reason I am a cosponsor of the pending resolution. I trust in your very considered and deliberate judgment you will decide likewise.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 62 which addresses the single most important issue that can ever confront this institution—the question of war and peace.

I support a peaceful settlement that secures Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. Right now is our last, best chance to achieve it. The way to do it is to give Saddam Hussein a clear message that the American people support the United Nations, their President, and the 500,000 troops representing 28 nations in the Saudi desert.

It was the brutal crushing of Kuwait that brought us to this point. If there is to be war, only one individual will have caused it—Saddam Hussein—and he can restore peace by

moving his troops out of Kuwait and settle his differences in a peaceful manner.

This crisis that confronts our Nation, and indeed the global community today is a challenge to the hopes and aspirations of the entire world. With the end of the cold war, we entered a period of hope, promise, and yes, peril. That peril is clearly illustrated by Iraq's brutal and naked aggression against its smaller neighbor and former ally, Kuwait. It is clearly illustrated by Iraq's taking of thousands of hostages and by its threatening to unleash terrorist death squads against its enemies. These actions fly in the face of all norms of international law, the principles upon which the United Nations was founded, and our aspirations for the world of the future.

This ominous trend must be brought to an end.

House Joint Resolution 62 is the result of long and extensive deliberations and consultations between the bipartisan membership of Congress that supports its adoption and that of the President directly. These discussions and negotiations have taken place since the August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The supporters of this resolution believe that it is time for the Congress to speak up and exert its will—one way or another.

I would urge my colleagues to carefully examine the content of this resolution. Simply stated, this resolution gives conditional approval for the use of U.S. military force pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 which embodies the achievement of implementation of 11 previously passed Security Council Resolutions—660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, and 677—which impose international economic sanctions and require withdrawal of Iraqi forces from occupied Kuwait. House Joint Resolution 62 does not endorse any future actions which may be approved by the Security Council. That judgment, that potential future judgment, is reserved for Congress at that time. In other words, our options, our future options—those of Congress—have been preserved.

House Joint Resolution 62 authorizes the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Resolution 678 and other congressionally mandated conditions. This authority is conditional upon the reporting requirements of section 1(b) which stipulate that the United States has used all diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain Iraqi compliance with, and implementation of the 12 previously passed U.N. Security Council resolutions. In addition, the President must assure Congress through this report that those efforts have not and would not be successful in achieving Iraqi compliance with those same Security Council resolutions. Finally, this joint resolution mandates an additional requirement upon the President to report to Congress at least once every 60 days on the status of efforts to obtain Iraqi compliance with those Security Council resolutions. House Joint Resolution 62 mandates real requirements upon the President to comply with congressional concerns before exercising the use of military force.

House Joint Resolution 62 authorizes the conditional approval for the use of military force. This affirms the constitutional authorities and responsibilities that are granted solely to Congress on the issue of war and peace.

More importantly, this joint resolution offers Members of Congress a clear-cut choice.

That of authorizing the potential use of military force in order to achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. It is a choice of yes or no. This joint resolution contains no figleaf or hidden agenda. It is straight forward. It offers us the opportunity to make the simple judgment in favor of, or opposition to the use of military force in confronting the crisis before us. Simply stated, this joint resolution reaffirms the principles of shared powers on matters of war and peace as reflected in the Constitution, as well as that of the War Powers Resolution.

I would also note that this resolution while not using the constitutional language, is the legal and practical equivalent thereof and meets all the constitutional tests. (*Mitchell v. Laird* (488 F.2d 611 (1973.)) This is equivalent to a conditional declaration of war—conditional upon the requirements of House Joint Resolution 62, the implementation of this resolution by the President and the constitutional obligations of the President.

I believe that this resolution will reduce the likelihood of war by convincing Saddam Hussein that American and international resolve is steadfast and unwavering.

Accordingly, passage of this conditional authority is the best means by which to avoid war and compel Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. Passage of this joint resolution demonstrates that the American people are telling Saddam Hussein and Iraq's leadership that their illegal and barbaric actions against the Kuwaiti people and indeed all peoples of the world, cannot be tolerated.

House Joint Resolution 62 strengthens the unprecedented international resolve which has been demonstrated against Iraq. It strengthens the international coalition of the U.N. Security Council's actions against Iraq. This resolution tells the American people that we believe it essential that we, the United States, continue to work within the context of the international alliance that we have assembled in concert against Saddam Hussein.

Passage of this resolution demonstrates our support for the half million United States troops that are being deployed against Iraq. It demonstrates that commitment to their families and friends, and as such the American people who are the ultimate arbiters of the decision we face today.

It is my view that the American people want to know one way or another how their elected representatives stand on this issue. I, for one, support the conditional authorization of military force because I believe it represents the most likely way to restore peace.

Over the past 5 months, Saddam Hussein has received messages from scores of world leaders, private citizens, and the international community as embodied under the auspices of the United Nations. He has turned a deaf ear to all. Now it is time for Saddam Hussein to hear from the Congress and the American people. Our message is plain and simple—support peace through withdrawal from Kuwait.

In assessing the efficacy of economic sanctions, we must ask: are they working and can they meet our objectives?

The facts are clear:

Economically, they are working quite effectively. Little is getting in or out of Iraq.

Militarily, they are eroding Iraq's capacity to fight but there is no evidence that they are precluding Iraq from fighting or that they are affecting Iraq's will to fight.

Politically, there is no evidence that Saddam Hussein has accepted the conditions of the U.N. resolutions. To the contrary, he is not leaving Kuwait, he is incorporating it into Iraq. He is not recognizing basic human rights, he is abusing to the extreme, basic human rights.

Regrettably, I see no indications that sanctions alone will force Saddam Hussein to make the necessary political changes to accept the U.N. resolutions.

I sincerely believe that our positive action on this resolution may finally convince Saddam Hussein to comply with the U.N. resolutions and it strengthens the position of the United States and the coalition of other nations. No one expects at this late date, Saddam Hussein will pull out of Kuwait by midnight January 15. Indeed, he said he will not. Therefore if we are to avert a showdown, there must be negotiations. If there is no credible threat of force because the Congress does not authorize the use of force, it will be impossible for the President or the United Nations to solve the problem. Without a credible threat of the use of force, which passage of this resolution would provide, Saddam Hussein will just stay put in Kuwait and extract a much higher price from the United States and the world community than he already has.

Of course, theoretically, the President could, even if this resolution is not adopted, order the use of force. But we all know that this would create a constitutional crisis with efforts of impeachment and funding fights on every bill going through the Congress.

But with passage of this resolution and a credible threat to use force behind them, the President may not have to use force at all. After the deadline of January 15 passes, if there is to be any chance of negotiations and a peaceful resolution to this mess, we need to give the President the support of Congress.

Otherwise sanctions may be in place forever and never bring about the desired result, which is to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait so that he doesn't get any further reward for his aggression.

Saddam Hussein should take no solace in hearing the differing views of Congress today. One essential ingredient, and indeed the strength of our democracy is our tolerance and defense of dissenting views. Today, Saddam Hussein will hear our voices and differences of opinion but at the end of the day, he will hear the single voice of our unity and resolve against his illegal and barbaric aggression.

The documents referred to are as follows:

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS REGARDING PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

RESOLUTION 660—AUGUST 2, 1990

Condemns Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demands immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces.

RESOLUTION 661—AUGUST 6, 1990

Imposes trade embargo and financial sanctions against Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait. (Medical supplies and humanitarian

foodstuffs are exempt from the trade embargo.)

RESOLUTION 662—AUGUST 9, 1990

Declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void, and demands that Iraq rescind the annexation.

RESOLUTION 664—AUGUST 18, 1990

Demands that Iraq permit immediate safe departure of foreign nationals from Iraq and Kuwait. Demands rescindment of Iraq's orders to withdraw diplomatic immunity and close diplomatic missions in Kuwait.

RESOLUTION 665—AUGUST 25, 1990

Calls upon states to enforce the trade embargo against Iraq and Iraqi-occupied Kuwait.

RESOLUTION 666—SEPTEMBER 14, 1990

Provides for humanitarian provision of any necessary food and medical supplies to Iraq and Kuwait.

RESOLUTION 667—SEPTEMBER 16, 1990

Demands that Iraq protect diplomatic personnel and premises, and take no action that hinders the performance of their duties.

RESOLUTION 669—SEPTEMBER 24, 1990

Authorizes Sanctions Committee to examine requests for assistance from states confronted with special economic problems related to the sanctions.

RESOLUTION 670—SEPTEMBER 25, 1990

Requires states to cooperate with air embargo, and to detain any ships that are being used to violate the sanctions. Food and medical supplies being shipped for humanitarian reasons are exempt, but subject to authorization.

RESOLUTION 674—OCTOBER 29, 1990

Reminds Iraq that it is liable under international law for any loss, damage, or injury arising in regard to Kuwait and third states and their nationals as a result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

RESOLUTION 677—NOVEMBER 28, 1990

Condemns Iraqi attempts to alter Kuwait's demographic composition and destroy Kuwaiti civil records, and mandates steps to be taken by the U.N. to safeguard the demographic composition of Kuwait.

RESOLUTION 678—NOVEMBER 29, 1990

Authorizes member states to use all means necessary to uphold the above resolutions and restore international peace and security in the region, unless Iraq fully complies with the above resolutions on or before January 15, 1991.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 678 (1990)
[Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd meeting, on 29 November 1990]

The Security Council, recalling, and reaffirming its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990, 664 (1990) of 18 August 1990, 665 (1990) of 25 August 1990, 666 (1990) of 13 September 1990, 667 (1990) of 16 September 1990, 669 (1990) of 24 September 1990, 670 (1990) of 25 September 1990, 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990 and 677 (1990) of 28 November 1990,

Noting that, despite all efforts by the United Nations, Iraq refuses to comply with its obligation to implement resolution 660 (1990) and the above-mentioned subsequent relevant resolutions, in flagrant contempt of the Security Council,

Mindful of its duties and responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance and preservation of international peace and security,

Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwill, to do so;

2. Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the foregoing resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;

3. Requests all States to provide appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

MITCHELL V. LAIRD

[Summary of D.C. Circuit Court Decision in 1973]

Any attempt to require a declaration of war as the only permissible form of assent might involve unforeseeable domestic and international consequences, without any obvious compensating advantages other than a formal declaration of war does have special solemnity and does present to the legislature an unambiguous choice. While those advantages are not negligible, we deem it a political question, or, to phrase it more accurately, a discretionary matter for Congress to decide in which form, if any, it will give its consent to . . . war. . . . That is, we regard the Constitution as contemplating various forms of congressional assent, and we do not find any authority in the courts to require Congress to employ one rather than another form. . . . [emphasis added].

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,

Washington, DC, January 10, 1991.

To: House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Attention: Dante B. Fascell.

From: American Law Division.

Subject: Legal Effect of H.J. Res. 62 Authorizing the Use of Military Force.

This is in response to your request regarding H.J. Res. 62. Specifically, you asked whether the resolution constitutes a declaration of war against Iraq and what legal effect it would have upon enactment and upon satisfaction of the condition stated in subsection (b)(2).

At the outset, it should be noted that under international law a declaration of war is no longer deemed a necessary predicate for a state of war to exist. At one time the authorities and even an international convention asserted that a declaration was necessary.¹ But it now appears to be agreed that a state of war can exist as the result of an armed conflict regardless of whether a declaration of war has been issued.

Nonetheless, a declaration of war can itself create a state of war between two or more states, even absent armed conflict. "The declaration of war creates the legal status of war. . . . (T)he announcement is sufficient evidence that peace has been transmuted into war, and that the law of war has replaced the law of peace."²

Neither international law nor United States law decrees any particular form or content for a declaration of war. The enactments declaring war with respect to the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and

World War II all provided in explicit terms that "a State of war exists," or is "declared to exist," between the United States and the enemy in question.³ Several enactments in the nineteenth century that have been termed conditional declarations of war, on the other hand, did not use that language.⁴ More recent enactments have conditionally authorized the President to "use force" or the "armed forces" or "whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms" in particular situations.⁵

What constitutes a declaration of war, in short, would seem to be a matter of legislative intent. If an enactment declares that a state of war exists, or shall exist under certain conditions, the legislative intent is clear. But no particular verbal formula is necessary for a given enactment to be deemed a declaration of war.

H.J. Res. 62 would authorize the President "to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation" of the various resolutions the Security Council has adopted with respect to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. That grant of authority is made conditional upon communication by the President to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tem of the Senate that "all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions . . . have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance." At most the resolution would seem to be a conditional declaration of war, as certain conditions have to be met before its authorization of the use of force takes effect. But whether it should be deemed to be a conditional declaration of war would seem to be a matter of legislative intent. If Congress intends that it be so, nothing in its formulation would prevent it from operating as such a conditional declaration.

If it is deemed to be a conditional declaration of war, it would seem to have no immediate legal impact under either domestic or international law upon enactment. It would not at that point create the legal status of war, because its conditions would not yet have been met. Only upon the President's communication to Congress of the failure and futility of peaceful means of obtaining Iraq's compliance with the United Nations resolutions could the measure constitute a declaration of war and thus create the legal status of war, if Congress so intends.

I hope the above is responsive to your request. If we may be of additional assistance, please call on us.

DAVID M. ACKERMAN,
Legislative Attorney.

FOOTNOTES

¹See, e.g., Hugo Grotius, "Of the Law of War and Peace," Bk. III, Ch. III, V and XI, cited in Ingrid Detter De Lupis, "The Law of War" (1987), at 8, and the Hague Convention on the Opening of Hostilities, 36 Stat. 2259 (1907).

²Clyde Eagleton, "The Form and Function of the Declaration of War," 38 American Journal of International Law 19, 21 (1938).

³See, CRS, "Iraq-Kuwait: Issues Concerning a U.S. Declaration of War," Appendix C (Nov. 30, 1990) (Report No. 90-531).

⁴See Resolution 15 of the 35th Congress in 1858 ("A Resolution for the Adjustment of Difficulties with Paraguay," which authorized the President to "adopt such measures and use such force as, in his judgment, may be necessary and advisable, in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by the Government of Paraguay"); 26 Stat. 674 (1890) (a joint resolution authorizing the President to "take such measures as in his judgment may be necessary to promptly obtain indemnity from the Venezuelan Steam Transportation Company of New York . . . and to secure this end he is authorized to employ

such means or exercise such power as may be necessary"; 28 Stat. 975 (1895) (a joint resolution regarding a grievance between a naturalized citizen of the United States and Spain, which simply directed the President "to insist upon the payment of the agreed upon . . . in liquidation of the claim"); and 30 Stat. 738 (1896) (stating that Cuba ought to be free, demanding that Spain relinquish all authority in Cuba, and empowering the President "to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States . . . to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect").

*See P.L. 85-7 (Mar. 9, 1957) (the Middle East); P.L. 84-4 (Jan. 29, 1955) (Formosa); P.L. 88-408 (Aug. 10, 1964) (the Tonkin Gulf resolution); and P.L. 87-733 (Oct. 3, 1962) (Cuba).

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, August 9, 1990.

Hon. THOMAS FOLEY,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied the sovereign state of Kuwait in flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations. In the period since August 2, Iraq has massed an enormous and sophisticated war machine on the Kuwaiti-Saudi Arabian border and in southern Iraq, capable of initiating further hostilities with little or no additional preparation. Iraq's actions pose a direct threat to neighboring countries and to vital U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf region.

In response to this threat and after receiving the request of the Government of Saudi Arabia, I ordered the forward deployment of substantial elements of the United States Armed Forces into the region. I am providing this report on the deployment and mission of our Armed Forces in accordance with my desire that Congress be fully informed and consistent with the War Powers Resolution.

Two squadrons of F-15 aircraft, one bridge of the 82nd Airborne Division, and other elements of the Armed Forces began arriving in Saudi Arabia at approximately 9:00 a.m. (EDT) on August 8, 1990. Additional U.S. air, naval, and ground Forces also will be deployed. The Forces are equipped for combat, and their mission is defensive. They are prepared to take action in concert with Saudi forces, friendly regional forces, and others to deter Iraqi aggression and to preserve the integrity of Saudi Arabia.

I do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent; to the contrary, it is my belief that this deployment will facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. If necessary, however, the Forces are fully prepared to defend themselves. Although it is not possible to predict the practice scope and duration of this deployment, our Armed Forces will remain so long as their presence is required to contribute to the security of the region and desired by the Saudi government to enhance the capability of Saudi armed forces to defend the Kingdom.

I have taken these actions pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct our foreign relations and as Commander in Chief. These actions are in exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense. I look forward to correction with the Congress in helping to restore peace and stability to the Persian Gulf region.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, August 9, 1990.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On August 2, 1990, I reported to the Congress that, pursuant to sec-

tion 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1703(b), and section 201 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1621, I exercised my statutory authority to declare a national emergency and to issue two Executive orders that imposed a comprehensive economic embargo against Iraq and blocked both Iraqi and Kuwaiti government property within the jurisdiction of the United States or under the control of U.S. persons.

In the days after the imposition of U.S. economic sanctions, the Iraqi government has tightened its unlawful grip over the territory of Kuwait and has installed a puppet regime that in no way represents the people or legitimate Government of Kuwait. On August 6, the United Nations Security Council, to bring the invasion and occupation of Kuwait to an end and to restore the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Kuwait, decided that all nations shall impose sweeping economic sanctions against both Iraq and Kuwait.

Today, I have taken additional steps to respond to these developments and to ensure that the economic measures we are taking with respect to Iraq and Kuwait conform to United Nations Security Council Resolution 661 of August 6, 1990. Specifically, pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1703(b), section 201 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1621, and the United Nations Participation Act, 22 U.S.C. section 287(c), I have issued two new Executive orders.

The order I have issued with respect to Iraq:

Prohibits exports and imports of goods and services between the United States and Iraq, and any activity that promotes or is intended to promote such exportation and importation;

Prohibits any dealing by a U.S. person in connection with property of Iraq; origin exported from Iraq after August 6, 1990, or intended for exportation to or from Iraq to any country, and related activities;

Prohibits transactions related to travel to or from Iraq or to activities by any such person within Iraq, except for transactions necessary for prompt departure from Iraq, the conduct of official business of the United States Government or of the United Nations, or journalistic travel;

Prohibits transactions related to transportation to or from Iraq, or the use of vessels or aircraft registered in Iraq by U.S. persons;

Prohibits the performance by any U.S. person of any contract in support of certain categories of projects in Iraq;

Prohibits the commitment or transfer of funds or other financial or economic resources by any U.S. person to the Government of Iraq, or any other person in Iraq;

Blocks all property of the Government of Iraq now or hereafter located in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, including their foreign branches; and

Clarifies that the definition of U.S. persons includes vessels of U.S. registry.

In a separate order, I have extended to Kuwait all economic sanctions currently in effect against Iraq. Specifically, that order:

Prohibits exports and imports of goods and services between the United States and Kuwait, and any activity that promotes or is intended to promote such exportation or importation;

Prohibits any dealing by a U.S. person in connection with property of Kuwaiti origin exported from Kuwait after August 6, 1990, or

intended for exportation to or from Kuwait to any country, and related activities;

Prohibits transactions related to travel to or from Kuwait or to activities by any such person within Kuwait, except for transactions necessary for prompt departure from Kuwait, the conduct of official business of the United States Government or of the United Nations, or journalistic travel;

Prohibits transactions related to transportation to or from Kuwait, or the use of vessels or aircraft registered in Kuwait by U.S. persons;

Prohibits the performance by any U.S. person of any contract in support of certain categories of projects in Kuwait;

Prohibits the commitment or transfer of funds or other financial or economic resources by any U.S. person to the Government of Kuwait, or any other person in Kuwait;

Blocks all property of the Government of Kuwait now or hereafter located in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, including their foreign branches; and

Clarifies that definition of U.S. persons includes vessels of U.S. registry.

Today's orders provide that the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is authorized to take such actions, including the promulgation of rules and regulations, as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of those orders. The orders were effective at 8:55 p.m. e.d.t., August 9, 1990.

The declarations of national emergency made by Executive Orders 12722 and 12723, and any other provision of those orders not inconsistent with today's orders, remain in force and are unaffected by today's orders.

I am enclosing a copy of each of today's orders.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, DC, November 16, 1990.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House,
Washington, DC.

Dear Mr. Speaker: There have been a number of important developments in the Persian Gulf region since my letter of August 9, 1990, informing you of the deployment of U.S. Armed Forces in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. In the spirit of consultation and cooperation between our two branches of Government and in the firm belief that working together as we have we can best protect and advance the Nation's interests, I wanted to update you on these developments.

As you are aware, the United States and Allied and other friendly governments have introduced elements of their Armed Forces into the region in response to Iraq's unprovoked and unlawful aggression and at the request of regional governments. In view of Iraq's continued occupation of Kuwait, defiance of 10 U.N. Security Council resolutions demanding unconditional withdrawal, and sustained threat to other friendly countries in the region, I determined that the U.S. deployments begun in August should continue. Accordingly, on November 8, after consultations with our Allies and coalition partners, I announced the continued deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to the Persian Gulf region. These Forces include a heavy U.S. Army Corps and a Marine expeditionary force with an additional brigade. In addition, three aircraft carriers, a battleship, appropriate escort ships, a naval amphibious land-

ing group, and a squadron of maritime prepositioning ships will join other naval units in the area.

I want to emphasize that this development is in line with the steady buildup of U.S. Armed Forces in the region over the last 3 months and is a continuation of the deployment described in my letter of August 9. I also want to emphasize that the mission of our Armed Forces has not changed. Our Forces are in the Gulf region in the exercise of our inherent right of individual and collective self-defense against Iraq's aggression and consistent with U.N. Security Council resolutions related to Iraq's ongoing occupation of Kuwait. The United States and other nations continue to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis. We and our coalition partners share the common goals of achieving the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, the protection of the lives of citizens held hostage by Iraq both in Kuwait and Iraq, and the restoration of security and stability in the region. The deployment will ensure that the coalition has an adequate offensive military option should that be necessary to achieve our common goals.

In my August 9 letter, I indicated that I did not believe that involvement in hostilities was imminent. Indeed, it was my belief that the deployment would facilitate a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I also stated that our Armed Forces would remain in the Persian Gulf region so long as required to contribute to the security of the region and desired by host governments. My view on these matters has not changed.

I appreciate the views you and other members of the congressional leadership have expressed throughout the past 3 months during our consultations. I look forward to continued consultation and cooperation with the Congress in pursuit of peace, stability, and security in the Gulf region.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

DECLARE WAR CONDITIONALLY
(By Doug Bandow)

WASHINGTON.—When President Bush consults with Congressional leaders today on the Persian Gulf crisis, he reportedly will seek to devise a way to involve Congress without restricting his options or authority as Commander in Chief. Fortunately, just such a mechanism exists: a conditional declaration of war authorizing the President to take military steps if certain specified conditions are met.

While previous Presidents have acted unilaterally, and almost certainly unconstitutionally, in committing military forces without Congressional consent, such cases cannot justify this President's acting lawlessly. President Bush—if he takes the Constitution seriously—has to gain Congressional authorization for an attack against Iraqi forces.

Unlike a declaration of war, a conditional declaration would not signal imminent hostilities. Rather, like a United Nations resolution, it would provide the legal basis for future offensive action. The war-making decision would still rest primarily with the President.

Although long-since forgotten, a conditional declaration would not be unprecedented. In fact, Congress passed conditional declarations of war on four separate occasions.

The first, against Paraguay in 1858, followed the shelling of a naval vessel. The second, against Venezuela in 1871, demanded in-

demnity for two American steamships that were seized improperly. The third, in 1895, threatened Spain over a debt owed to an American citizen for property destroyed in Cuba in 1886. In each case, the declarations led to negotiations and a peaceful settlement.

The fourth and most important, precedent was in 1896, when Congress approved a joint resolution demanding a Spanish withdrawal from Cuba and instructing the President to use military force to enforce the resolution. The result was the Spanish-American War.

Involving Congress would have several advantages. First, the President would have to decide on his goals and articulate what he expects war to achieve. When he frets over a possible Iraqi nuclear weapon, for example, he suggests that his objective is overthrowing Saddam Hussein rather than liberating Kuwait. The uncertainty over what George Bush intends not only makes it harder for him to unite this country, but also leaves Mr. Hussein uncertain as to exactly what step or steps will avert war.

Second, going to Congress would fulfill the Constitution's dictates by allowing the people's representatives to decide whether the President's goals warrant war. This is particularly important since the President's strategy resembles a giant bait-and-switch operation—he has moved from defensive to offensive objectives without bothering to acknowledge, let alone explain, the change. Congress could ratify Mr. Bush's course, decide for a limited war (to free Kuwait but not conquer Iraq, for instance), or say no, forcing the Administration to rely on sanctions.

Third, a Congressional debate would allow the American people to voice their opinion. Polls suggest that average citizens are less interested in fighting to defend cheap gas, feudal aristocracies, jobs and a utopian new world order than are State Department officials and think-tank analysts. If the President believes his objectives are worth a war, he should spell them out and subject them to a full and fair debate.

President Bush's apparent willingness to sacrifice thousands of lives for dubious goals cannot be beyond debate. Moreover, by law the final decision on war rests with Congress. Although such constitutional niceties may seem unduly restrictive in the modern age, respect for the law is the most fundamental difference between a free society like our own and a totalitarian hellhole like Iraq.

MEMORANDUM ON PAST CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
Washington, DC, January 10, 1991.

Subject: Some Past Congressional Authorizations for the Use of Force.

Author: Mark M. Lowenthal, Senior Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy.

The ongoing crisis in the Persian Gulf has raised the issue of whether and how Congress should assert its role over the possible engagement of U.S. forces in hostilities against Iraq. Assuming that Congress feels that it should have a definitive vote on this issue, several avenues are possible. One would be a declaration of war, which the Congress has voted five times in U.S. history (see CRS Report 90-531 RCO: Iraq-Kuwait: Issues Concerning a U.S. Declaration of War, by Mark M. Lowenthal, November 30, 1991). Congress could also vote an authorizing resolution under the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148). Alternatively, Congress could vote a

resolution authorizing the use of force without reference to the War Powers Resolution.

Several times in U.S. history, Congress has voted authorizations for the President to use force without actually declaring war. The most well-known recent instance was the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (P.L. 88-408). Other significant instances (see below for texts) that may be of interest in the current situation include:

Algerine Cruisers (Barbary War), 1815.

Cuban Resolution, 1962.

Berlin Resolution, 1962.

In two of these cases (Algiers, Tonkin), there had already been hostilities between U.S. and local forces. Hostilities continued in both cases. After attacks by U.S. naval units, the various Barbary states agreed to U.S. demands in July and August 1815. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was used by President Lyndon Johnson as authority for the escalation and prosecution of the war in Vietnam. U.S. troop strength reached roughly 500,000 in 1969, when reductions began. The Cuban and Berlin resolutions served more as measures of support for Presidential policy during times of heightening tension, as well as an authorization to use force at the President's discretion. In neither of these cases did U.S. forces engage in hostilities.

None of the resolutions placed any limit on the numbers or types of forces that could be employed. Each of the resolutions was open-ended rather than finite in terms of how long or it would be in effect or under what conditions it would terminate. The Tonkin Resolution, however, did allow that Congress could, by concurrent resolution, terminate the authorization.

Three of the authorizations (Algiers, Cuba, Tonkin) were joint resolutions; Berlin was a concurrent resolution.

In addition to these cases, there have also been some less well-known instances in which Congress has authorized Presidents to use force if necessary. Two of these involved actions taken against U.S. owned steamers in South America, in Paraguay in 1858 and in Venezuela in 1890 (see below for texts). The resolution regarding Paraguay specifically authorized the use of force; the resolution regarding Venezuela authorized the use of "such means . . . or such power as may be necessary."

ALGERINE CRUISERS, 1815

[CHAP. XC.—An Act for the protection of the commerce of the United States against the Algerine cruisers]

WHEREAS the Dey of Algiers, on the coast of Barbary, has commenced a predatory warfare against the United States—

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That it is shall be lawful fully to equip, officer, man and employ such of the armed vessels of the United States as may be judged requisite by the President of the United States for protecting effectually the commerce and seamen thereof on the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean and adjoining seas.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to instruct the commanders of the respective public vessels aforesaid, to subdue, seize, and make prize of all vessels, goods and effect of or belonging to the Dey of Algiers, or to his subjects, and to bring or send the same into port, to be proceeded against and distributed according to law; and, also, to cause to be done all such other acts of precaution or hostility, as the state of war will justify, and may in his opinion require.

SEC. 3. *And be it further enacted*, That on the application of the owners of private armed vessels of the United States, the President of the United States may grant them special commissions in the form which he shall direct under the seal of the United States; and such private armed vessels, when so commissioned, shall have the like authority for subduing, seizing, talking and bringing into port any Algerine vessel, goods or effects, as the before-mentioned public armed vessels may by law have; and shall therein be subject to the instructions which may be given by the President of the United States for the regulation of their conduct; and their commissions shall be revocable at his pleasure. *Provided*, That before any commission shall be granted as aforesaid, the owner or owners of the vessels of which the same may be requested, and the commander thereof for the time being shall give bond to the United States, with at least two responsible sureties, not interested in such vessel, in the penal sum of seven thousand dollars, or if such vessel be provided with more than one hundred and fifty men, in the penal sum of fourteen thousand dollars, with condition for observing the treaties and laws of the United States, and the instructions which may be given as aforesaid, and also for satisfying all damages and injuries which shall be done contrary to the tenor thereof by such commissioned vessel, and for delivering up the commission when revoked by the President of the United States.

SEC. 4. *And be it further enacted*, That any Algerine vessel, goods, or effects which may be so captured and brought into port, by any private armed vessel, of the United States, duly commissioned as aforesaid, may be adjudged good prize, and thereupon shall accrue to the owners, and officers, and men of the capturing vessel, and shall be distributed according to the agreement which shall have been made between them, or, in failure of such agreement, according to the discretion [of] the court having cognisance of the capture.

Approved, March 3, 1815.

PARAGUAY, 1858

[A Resolution of the Adjustment of Difficulties with the Republic of Paraguay]

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That for the purpose of adjusting the differences between the United States and the republic of Paraguay, in connexion with the attack on the United States steamer Water Witch, and with other matters referred to in the annual message of the President, he be, and is hereby authorized to adopt such measures and use such force as, in his judgment, may be necessary and advisable in the event of a refusal of just satisfaction by the government of Paraguay.

Approved, June 2, 1858.

VENEZUELA, 1890

[(No. 28.) Joint resolution for the relief of the Venezuela Steam Transportation Company]

Whereas it appears from the correspondence transmitted to the Senate by the message of the President, of the second day of February, eighteen hundred and seventy-two (Executive Document Numbered Twenty-eight, second session Forty-eighth Congress) and on the twelfth of April, eighteen hundred and eighty-eight (Executive Document Numbered One hundred and forty-three, first session Fiftieth Congress), that since the year eighteen hundred and seventy-one indemnity has been repeatedly demanded by the Executive Department of the United States from the Venezuelan Government, but without

avail, for the wrongful seizure, detention, and employment in war and otherwise of the American steam-ships Hero, Nutrias, and San Fernando, the property of the Venezuela Steam Transportation Company, a corporation existing under the laws of the State of New York, and a citizen of the United States, and the imprisonment of its officers, citizens of the United States, under circumstances that render the Republic of Venezuela justly responsible therefor; and

Whereas all the diplomatic efforts of the Government of the United States repeatedly exerted for an amicable adjustment and payment of the just indemnity due to said corporation and its officers, citizens of the United States, upon whose property and persons the aforesaid wrongs were inflicted, have proved entirely unavailing: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, authorized and empowered to take such measures as in his judgment may be necessary to promptly obtain indemnity from the Venezuelan Government for the injuries, losses, and damages suffered by the Venezuela Steam Transportation Company of New York, and its officers, by reason of the wrongful seizure, detention, and employment in war or otherwise of the said company's steamers Hero, San Fernando, and Nutrias by Venezuelan belligerents in the year eighteen hundred and seventy-one, and to secure this end he is authorized to employ such means or exercise such power as may be necessary.

Received by the President June 7, 1890.

[Note by the Department of State.—The foregoing resolution having been presented to the President of the United States for his approval, and not having been returned by him to the House of Congress in which it originated within the time prescribed by the Constitution of the United States, has become a law without his approval.]

CUBA, 1962

Cuban Resolution

[Public Law 87-733 (S.J. Res. 230), 76 Stat. 697, approved October 3, 1962]

Joint Resolution Expressing the determination of the United States with respect to the situation in Cuba

Whereas President James Monroe, announcing the Monroe Doctrine in 1823, declared that the United States would consider any attempt on the part of European powers to "extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety"; and

Whereas in the Rio Treaty of 1947 the parties agreed that "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States, and, consequently, each one of the said contracting parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations"; and

Whereas the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Punta del Este in January 1962 declared: "the present Government of Cuba has identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and

Whereas the International Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined—

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

BERLIN, 1962

Berlin Resolution

[House Concurrent Resolution 570, 87th Congress, 76 Stat. 1429, passed October 10, 1962]

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress—

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom.

GULF OF TONKIN, 1964

Tonkin Gulf Resolution

[Public Law 88-108 (H.J. Res. 1145) 78 Stat. 384, approved August 10, 1964]

A Joint Resolution To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression

that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, January 8, 1991.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were now to go on record supporting the position adopted by the UN Security Council on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the necessary unity to act decisively in response to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. It would have been most constructive if he could have presented the Iraqi government a Resolution passed by both houses of Congress supporting the UN position and in particular Security Council Resolution 678. As you know, I have frequently stated my desire for such a Resolution. Nevertheless, there is still opportunity for Congress to act to strengthen the prospects for peace and safeguard this country's vital interests.

I therefore request that the House of Representatives and the Senate adopt a Resolution stating that Congress supports the use of all necessary means to implement UN Security Council Resolution 678. Such action would send the clearest possible message to Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw

without condition or delay from Kuwait. Anything less would only encourage Iraqi intransigence; anything else would risk detracting from the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

Mr. Speaker, I am determined to do whatever is necessary to protect America's security. I ask Congress to join with me in this task. I can think of no better way than for Congress to express its support for the President at this critical time. This truly is the last best chance for peace.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH.

[United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, No. 71-1510]

THE HONORABLE PARREN J. MITCHELL, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS, V. MELVIN R. LAIRD ET AL.

(Argued Nov. 6, 1972)

(Decided March 20, 1973)

(Rehearing En Banc Denied June 21, 1973)

Thirteen members of United States House of Representatives filed complaint against the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the United States of America seeking injunction restraining defendants from prosecuting war in Indo-China unless Congress explicitly authorized continuation of war and for declaration that defendants were carrying on an unconstitutional war. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, William B. Jones, J., dismissed action, and plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wyzanski, Senior District Judge, held that plaintiffs had standing to sue, because the House of Representatives had the duty to consider whether to impeach the President. The Court also held that the President in certain circumstances had the power to initiate a war, but not to continue it indefinitely without Congressional approval, and that even if Congress had originally given by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution a power to continue the Indo-China war, after repeal of that Resolution, the President had no constitutional power to continue the hostilities except to withdraw in safety the forces already committed. But the Court declined to adjudicate the question whether the President had exceeded his Constitutional power because in the case as presented the materials necessary for adjudication were not now available, and, therefore, in the present posture the question was "political."

Appeal dismissed.

MacKinnon, Circuit Judge, dissented from denial of rehearing en banc and filed opinion in which Tamm, Robb and Wilkey, Circuit Judges, joined.

1. INJUNCTION #22

Issues in suit brought by 13 members of House of Representatives against the President, Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the United States seeking injunction restraining defendants from prosecuting war in Indo-China and declaration that defendants were carrying on an unconstitutional war was not rendered moot by the President's formally purporting to end hostilities in Vietnam and Laos; in addition, a declaration respecting past actions could have legal import as regards plaintiffs' duty under the Constitution to consider whether in continuing hostilities defendants committed high crimes and misdemeanors so as to justify, impeachment. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

2. UNITED STATES #135

The United States was required to be dismissed as party defendant in suit by 13 mem-

bers of House of Representatives seeking to enjoin defendants from prosecuting war in Indo-China and declaration that defendants were carrying on an unconstitutional war where the sovereign had not consented to be sued. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

3. WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE #2

There are some types of war which, without congressional approval, the President may begin to wage: for example, he may respond immediately without such approval to a belligerent attack, or in a grave emergency he may, without congressional approval, take the initiative to wage war; were it otherwise, the country would be paralyzed before Congress could act. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

4. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT #306

Since requested declaration whether actions of the President and Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force in continuing hostilities in Indochina was beyond authority conferred on them by the Constitution would hear on constitutional duty of plaintiffs, 13 members of House of Representatives, as regards bringing of impeachment proceedings and on plaintiffs' duties to make appropriations to support hostilities or to take other legislative actions related thereto, such as raising an army or enacting other civil or criminal legislation, plaintiffs had standing to bring action. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW #08(1)

It is not necessarily beyond judicial competence to determine the allocation, between the Executive and the Legislative branches, of the power to wage war; not every case raising such issue is necessarily beyond court's jurisdiction as presenting a "political question." U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

6. WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE #2

It is constitutionally permissible for Congress to use other means than a formal declaration of war to give its approval to a war already begun by a President acting alone; it is a discretionary matter for Congress to decide in what form, if any, it will give its consent to continuation of such a war. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

7. WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE #2

The Constitution contemplates various forms of congressional assent to wage war; there is no authority vested in the courts to require Congress to employ one form rather than another form, if the form chosen by a Congress be in itself constitutionally permissible. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

8. WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE #2

The appropriation, draft extension, and cognate laws enacted with direct or indirect reference in the Indo-China war do not serve as a valid congressional assent to the Vietnam war. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

9. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW #72

Even if the necessary facts were to be laid before it, a court cannot substitute its judgment for that of a President who assumes office in midst of an allegedly unconstitutional war commenced by his predecessor; actions of the succeeding President, who has unusually wide measure of discretion in such area, should not be judicially condemned except in a case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW #08(1)

Complaint seeking declaration that President and Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force were conducting an unconstitutional war in Indo-China was

properly dismissed, as seeking adjudication of a "political question" beyond constitutional jurisdiction of the federal courts; the President, who along with individual defendants, were presented, on taking office, with a belligerent situation not of their creation was not to be judicially condemned in absence of clear abuse, amounting to bad faith, of his wide discretion in conducting the country's foreign affairs. U.S.C.A.Const. art. 1, §8, cl. 11.

Lawrence R. Velvel, Washington, D.C., with whom Stefan Tucker and Christopher Sanger, Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellants.

Gregory Brady, Asst. U.S. Atty. with whom Harold H. Titus, Jr., U.S. Atty., John A. Terry, Michael A. Katz, Asst. U.S. Attys. and Hermine Herta Meyer, Atty., Dept. of Justice, were on the brief, for appellees. Thomas A. Flannery, U.S. Atty. at the time the record was filed and Walter H. Fleischer, Atty., Dept. of Justice, also entered appearances for appellees.

Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, Tamm, Circuit Judge, and Wyzanski, Senior United States District Judge for the District of Massachusetts.

Wyzanski, Senior District Judge: April 7, 1971 thirteen members of the United States House of Representatives, as plaintiffs, filed in the District Court a complaint against the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force, and the United States of America. Plaintiffs alleged that for seven years the United States, by the named individual defendants and their predecessors, has been engaged in a war in Indo-China without obtaining "either a declaration of war or an explicit, intentional and discrete authorization of war" and thereby "unlawfully impair and defeat plaintiffs' Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United States, to decide whether the United States should fight a war." Plaintiffs prayed for first, an order that defendants be enjoined from prosecuting the war in Indo-China unless, within 60 days from the date of such order, the Congress shall have explicitly, intentionally and discretely authorized a continuation of the war, and, second, "a declaratory judgment that defendants are carrying on a war in violation of Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution.

The District Court dismissed the action as to the President, on the authority of *Mississippi v. Johnson*, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 18 L.Ed. 437 (1866), and as to the other defendants, on the authority of *Luftig v. McNamara*, 126 U.S. App. D.C. 4, 373 F.2d 664 (1967), cert. denied 387 U.S. 945, 87 S.Ct. 2078, 18 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1967).

By somewhat different paths, the three judges who have heard this appeal from the District Court's judgment of dismissal have concluded unanimously that said appeal should be dismissed.

[1] The first issue presented is whether the case is now moot. Recently, the President has purported formally to end hostilities in Vietnam and Laos. There has been no similar action with respect to Cambodia, another part of Indo-China. The continuation of hostilities there precludes our holding that this case is moot. Furthermore, a declaratory judgment respecting past action might have legal import, inasmuch as though this point is not specifically pleaded, plaintiffs have a duty under the Constitution to consider whether defendants in continuing the hostilities did commit high crimes and misdemeanors so as to justify an impeachment of the individual defendants, pursuant to

United States Constitution, Article I, Section 2, Clause 5.

[2] The second issue is whether the dismissal of the action against the United States was correct for a reason not given by the District Court. We are unanimously of the view that as to the government, the dismissal was correct because the sovereign has not consented to be sued.

The third issue is whether the dismissal of the action as to the remaining defendants was proper for another reason not given by the District Court: to wit, that plaintiffs have no standing to sue. None of the judges who heard his appeal is persuaded that plaintiffs are sound in their explicit reliance upon defendants' alleged duty not to interfere with what the complaint alleges is "plaintiffs' Constitutional right, as members of the Congress of the United States, to decide whether the United States should fight a war."

[3] Implicit in plaintiffs' contention is their assumption that the Constitution gives to the Congress the exclusive right to decide whether the United States should fight all types of war. Without at this point exhaustively considering all possibilities, we are unanimously of the opinion that there are some types of war which, without Congressional approval, the President may begin to wage: for example, he may respond immediately without such approval to a belligerent attack, or in a grave emergency he may, without Congressional approval, take the initiative to wage war. Otherwise the country would be paralyzed. Before Congress could act the national might be defeated or at least crippled. In such unusual situations necessity confers the requisite authority upon the President. Any other construction of the Constitution would make it self-destructive.

[4] However, plaintiffs are not limited by their own concepts of their standing to sue. We perceive that in respects which they have not alleged they may be entitled to complain. If we, for the moment, assume the defendants' actions in continuing the hostilities in Indo-China were or are beyond the authority conferred upon them by the Constitution, a declaration to that effect would bear upon the duties of plaintiffs to consider whether to impeach defendants, and upon plaintiffs' quite distinct and different duties to make appropriations to support the hostilities, or to take other legislative actions related to such hostilities, such as raising an army or enacting other civil or criminal legislation. In our view, these considerations are sufficient to give plaintiffs a standing to make their complaint. Cf. *First v. Cohen*, 302 U.S. 83 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968); *Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp*, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); *Barlow v. Collins*, 397 U.S. 159, 90 S.Ct. 832, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970).

[5] The fourth issue is whether plaintiffs seek adjudication of a "political question" beyond the jurisdiction conferred upon the courts by Article III of the Constitution. Despite *Luftig v. McNamara*, supra, which admittedly indicates that it is beyond judicial competence to determine the allocation, between the executive and the legislative branches of the powers to wage war, we are now persuaded that there may be, in some cases, such competence. *Massachusetts v. Laird*, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971), aff'g s.c. 327 F.Supp. 378 (D. Mass. 1971); *Orlando v. Laird*, 443 F.2d 1039 (2nd Cir. 1971). Cf. *Powell v. McCormack*, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 23 L.Ed.2d 491 (1969).

Here the critical question to be initially decided is whether the hostilities in Indo-

China constitute in the Constitutional sense a "war," both within and beyond the meaning of the term in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11. That the hostilities have been not merely of magnitude but also of long duration is plainly alleged in paragraph 4 of the complaint. It is there said that "For at least the last seven years . . . the United States . . . has been engaged in Indo-China in the prosecution of the longest and one of the most costly wars in American history. As of the present, one million human beings, including over 50,000 Americans have been killed in the war, and at least one hundred billion dollars has been spent by the United States in and for the prosecution of the war." There would be no insuperable difficulty in a court determining whether such allegations are substantially true. If they are, then in our opinion, as apparently in the opinion of President Nixon, as revealed by his use of the word "war" in his second Inaugural Address, delivered January 20, 1973, there has been a war in Indo-China. Nor do we see any difficulty in a court facing up to the question as to whether because of the war's duration and magnitude the President is or was without power to continue the war without Congressional approval.

But the aforesaid question invites inquiry as to whether Congress has given, in a Constitutionally satisfactory form, the approval requisite for a war of considerable duration and magnitude. Originally Congress gave what may be argued to have been its approval by the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 78 Stat. 384 (1964). See *Orlando v. Laird*, supra. However, that resolution cannot serve as justification for the indefinite continuance of the war since it was repealed by subsequent Congressional action, 84 Stat. 2055 (1971). Apparently recognizing that point, the Government contends that Congressional approval has been given by appropriation acts, by extension of the Selective Service and Training Act, and by other measures.

[6, 7] We are unanimously agreed that it is constitutionally permissible for Congress to use another means than a formal declaration of war to give its approval to a war such as is involved in the protracted and substantial hostilities in Indo-China. See *Massachusetts v. Laird* and *Orlando v. Laird*, both supra. Any attempt to require a declaration of war as the only permissible form of assent might involve unforeseeable domestic and international consequences, without any obvious compensating advantages other than that a formal declaration of war does have special solemnity and does present to the legislature an unambiguous choice. While those advantages are not negligible, we deem it a political question, or, to phrase it more accurately, a discretionary matter for Congress to decide in which form, if any, it will give its consent to the continuation of a war already begun by a President acting alone. See *Massachusetts v. Laird*, supra, aff'g a. c. 327 F.Supp. 378 (D. Mass. 1971); *Orlando v. Laird*, supra; *Berk v. Laird*, 317 F.Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). That is, we regard the Constitution as contemplating various forms of Congressional assent, and we do not find any authority in the courts to require Congress to employ one rather than another form, if the form chosen by Congress be in itself constitutionally permissible. That conclusion, however, leaves unanswered the further question whether the particular forms which the Government counsel at our bar refer to as having been used by Congress in the Indo-China war are themselves of that character which makes them *in toto*, if not

separately, a constitutionally permissible form of assent.

The overwhelming weight of authority, including some earlier opinions by the present writer, holds that the appropriation, draft extension, and cognate laws enacted with direct or indirect reference to the Indo-China war, (and which have been acutely and comprehensively analyzed by Judge Judd in *Berk v. Laird*, *supra*) did constitute a constitutionally permissible form of assent. *Massachusetts v. Laird*, *Orlando v. Laird*, *Berk v. Laird*, all *supra*, and *United States v. Sisson*, 294 F.Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968). Judge Tamm is content to adhere to that line of authority.

[8] But Chief Judge Bazelon and I now regard that body of authority as unsound. It is, of course, elementary that in many areas of the law appropriation by Congress have been construed by the courts as involving Congressional assent to, or ratification of, prior or continuing executive action originally undertaken without Congressional legislative approval. Without a pause to cite or to examine in detail the vast body of cases involving such construction, it is more relevant to emphasize the special problem which is presented when one seeks to spell out from military appropriation acts, extension of selective service laws, and cognate legislation the purported Congressional approval or ratification of a war already being waged at the direction of the President alone. This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to appropriate money or to draft men a Congressman is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and continuation might vote for the military appropriations and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting. An honorable, decent, compassionate act of aiding those already in peril is no proof of consent to the actions that placed and continued them in that dangerous posture. We should not construe votes cast in pity and piety as though they were votes freely given to express consent. Hence Chief Judge Bazelon and I believe that none of the legislation drawn to the court's attention may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war.

Yet it does not follow that plaintiffs are entitled to prevail. When on January 20, 1969 President Nixon took office, and when on the same or even later dates the other individual defendants took their present offices, they were faced with a belligerent situation not of their creation. Obviously, the President could not properly execute the duties of his office or his responsibility as Commander-in-Chief by ordering hostilities to cease on the very day he took office. Even if his predecessor had exceeded their constitutional authority, President Nixon's duty did not go beyond trying, in good faith and to the best of his ability, to bring the war to an end as promptly as was consistent with the safety of those fighting and with a profound concern for the durable interests of the nation—its defense, its honor, its morality.

[9, 10] Whether President Nixon did so proceed is a question which at this stage in history a court is incompetent to answer. A court cannot procure the relevant evidence; some is in the hands of foreign governments, some is privileged. Even if the necessary facts were to be laid before it, a court would not substitute its judgment for that of the President, who has an unusually wide measure of discretion in this area, and who should

not be judicially condemned except in a case of clear abuse amounting to bad faith. Otherwise a court would be ignoring the delicacies of diplomatic negotiation, the inevitable bargaining for the best solution of an international conflict, and the scope which in foreign affairs must be allowed to the President if this country is to play a responsible role in the council of the nations.

In short, we are faced with what has traditionally been called a "political question" which is beyond the judicial power conferred by Article III of the United States Constitution. And on that ground the complaint was properly dismissed by the District Court.

Appeal dismissed.

Before Bazelon, Chief Judge, and Wright, McGowan, Tamm, Leventhal, Robinson, MacKinnon, Robb and Wilkey, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

Per Curiam.

The motion for rehearing *en banc* initiated by a member of the Court in regular active service is denied, a majority of the Circuit Judges who are in regular active service not having voted in favor of it (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure).

Separate statement by Circuit Judge MacKinnon with whom Circuit Judges Tamm, Robb and Wilkey joint as to why they would grant rehearing *en banc*, *sua sponte*.

MacKinnon, Circuit Judge:

I would vote *sua sponte* for rehearing *en banc* of this case to correct the manifest error to which Judge Tamm also dissents in the above opinion. My objection runs to pages 615-616 of the slip opinion which state, *inter alia*, that appropriation, extensions of the draft and other legislation by Congress supporting the Indochina war do not constitute assent to the war. This statement, which is implicitly self-contradictory, fails to give full recognition to the so-called Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which was passed on August 10, 1964 by both Houses of Congress by a cumulative vote of 506 to 2. The Resolution declared *inter alia*:

"Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligation under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is to be prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." (Emphasis added.)²

This Resolution clearly authorized and thereby approved and consented to "the use of armed force" in Southeast Asia. Congress terminated this Resolution effective January 2, 1971,³ but it is impossible as a practical matter to "undeclare" a war in this manner. By subsequently appropriating money⁴ for military forces and materiel with restriction on operations in Laos and Thailand but with no restriction on operations in Vietnam and Cambodia,⁵ Congress impliedly recognized that the war could not be undone completely by terminating the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. The appropriations thus indicate Congress' continuing assent to the prosecution of the war.

The basis stated by the opinion for the self-contradictory statement that Congress in passing measures to support the Vietnam war was not validly assenting thereto is that:

"This court cannot be unmindful of what every schoolboy knows: that in voting to appropriate money or to draft men a Con-

gressman is not necessarily approving the continuation of a war no matter how specifically the appropriation or draft act refers to that war. A Congressman wholly opposed to the war's commencement and continuation might vote for the military appropriations and for the draft measures because he was unwilling to abandon without support men already fighting. An honorable, decent, compassionate act of aiding those already in peril is no proof of consent to the actions that placed and continued them in that dangerous posture. We should not construe votes cast in pity and piety as though they were votes freely given to express consent. Hence Chief Judge Bazelon and I believe that none of the legislation drawn to the court's attention may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war." (Emphasis added.)

In my opinion, contrary to the above quotation, the annual multi-billion dollar appropriations over an eight-year period reflect a clear Congressional assent to the war. The appropriations were intended both for future activities, as with the regular annual appropriations, and for current activities, as with the supplemental appropriations.⁶ Congress was not acting blindly. The annual appropriations followed extensive hearings which disclosed precisely that the money was being used for military operations in the Vietnam conflict. Congress even went so far as to earmark some appropriations for "military activities in Southeast Asia"⁷ and "to provide all necessary support for members of the Armed Forces of the United States fighting in Vietnam."⁸ To state that Congress did not thereby assent to the war is to disregard the obvious Congressional intent on this very important matter. Continuing the war would have been impossible without the consent which Congress manifested in the only meaningful way that Congress acts—by formally adopted enactments.

The primary error in the panel opinion is that it confuses the expressed intent of Congress with what is completely court-created speculation as to motive. Intent and motive are not the same. Even if courts possessed authority and jurisdiction to inquire into the motives of Congress, which they do not,⁹ the panel opinion only asserts a possible speculative motive, i.e., what "A Congressman [not even a majority of either House of Congress] *** might vote." (Emphasis added.) This irrational and illusory base has no support in the record and is not proper support for a responsible judicial decision. I would thus excise the heretofore quoted portion of the opinion. As recently as April 2, 1973, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision which noted the "political nature" of the questions involved.¹⁰ In view of the now complete removal of United States ground forces, the quoted language of the opinion is nothing more than a court-created *post hoc* rationalization, devoid of any support in the record, which is obviously so untimely, illogical and political that it should not form any part of a judicial opinion. Otherwise, I concur in the result reached by the opinion.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Public Law 88-108, Aug. 10, 1964, provides: Joint Resolution

To promote the maintenance of International peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of International Law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in International wa-

ters, and have thereby created a serious threat to International peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and ban no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that those peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of International peace and security in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

Sec. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by International conditions granted eroded by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Approved August 10, 1964. 78 Stat. 384.

²On January 12, 1974 the 91st Congress enacted a motion in Foreign Military Sales Act providing:

Sec. 12. The joint resolution entitled "Joint resolution to promote the maintenance of International peace and security in Southeast Asia", approved August 10, 1964 (78 Stat. 384; Public Law 88-408), is terminated effective upon the day that the second session of the Ninety-first Congress is last adjourned.

P.L. 94-672. Jan. 12, 1974, 84 Stat. 2055. The Second Session of the 91st Congress last adjourned sine die on January 2, 1971 (116 Cong. Rec. 1-1640). Under the terms of the above section the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution became effective on January 2, 1971, which was ten days before the Act terminating it was approved.

³Pub. L. No. 92-204, Dec. 18, 1971, 85 Stat. 716.

⁴*Id.*, 85 Stat. at 735.

⁵This is not generally considered to be reliable authority.

⁶E.g. Act of March 26, 1966, 80, Stat. 79.

⁷Pub. L. 80-18 May 7, 1965, 79 Stat. 109; *Orlando v. Laird* 443 F.2d 1030, 1042 n. 2 (2d Cir. 1971).

⁸Pub. L. 90-5, March 16, 1967, 81 Stat. 5; *Orlando v. Laird*, *supra* at 1012 n. 2.

⁹Courts are not empowered to pass upon the motives that cause legislative bodies to act upon legislation. *Fletcher v. Peck*, 10 U.S. (0 Cranch) 87, 129-131 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810); *D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe*, 148 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 223, 450 F.2d 31211, 1247 (1971), cert. denied, 4105 U.S. 10310 92 S.Ct. 1200, 31 L.Ed.2d 480, (1072).

¹⁰*Atlee v. Richardson*, 411 U.S. 911, 93 S.Ct. 1545, 36 L.Ed.2d 301 (1973), affirming *Atlee v. Laird*, 339 F. Supp. 1347 (E.D.Pa. 1972).

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I take the well this afternoon as an advocate of peace. I come to the well with a heart that is heavy but a spirit that is not broken.

Mr. Speaker, in that context I ask each of us in these Chambers to be neither fool nor naive for brilliant oratory, magnificent analyses notwithstanding, the decision we are about to make is tantamount to a declaration of war.

A decision of such gravity, of such magnitude that the leadership on both sides of the aisle have asked us, each of us, to arrive at this decision as a matter of conscience.

Conscience demands the highest test, for it asks the most difficult question: Is it right? What then is an appropriate test for the issue should not be whether we stand with the President, but whether we can live with ourselves in the aftermath of that decision.

What is an appropriate test? I would suggest that each and every one of us, Mr. Speaker, in these Chambers for this moment assume that we are parents, each with two children in the Persian Gulf, one daughter and one son.

And let us assume the worst, that we went to war and that in the aftermath of war one of our children died in the Persian Gulf and one of them came back with broken body, broken dreams, and broken spirits.

And when that one remaining child comes home and says to you, "Dad, Mom, was this necessary?" that you can answer, without blinking, that question.

I have answered that question for myself: No, this is not necessary; and, yes, there are alternatives.

I am but a humble Member of Congress, but if I were indeed the President of the United States, in order to save one life in the pursuit of peace, I would travel to the ends of the Earth, even Baghdad, to make sure that no one died. But I am a humble Member here.

So all I can do is register a vote. But I say as you go to that electronic device to vote, think of two children, one dead, one broken, that you will have to answer someday as a matter of conscience, as a matter of morality, "Was it necessary?" I believe it was not. If you too join in that belief, then let us stop beating the drums of war, let us oppose this march to violence and let us attempt to challenge risking war and have the audacity, as a civilized people evolving to a new and higher order of evolution of human life on this planet, to dare to seek peace.

I oppose the resolution before this body.

□ 1350

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, this is certainly a very historic day in the history of the United States. It represents the culmination of some of the finest bipartisan efforts that I have seen by a number of distinguished leaders of this body.

I personally want to commend my distinguished leader, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL], my chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL], specially commend the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], and most important President Bush, who gave his strong support to this resolution.

The resolution we now bring before the House is a statement of national purpose. It is a vote of confidence in the President on our gulf policy and a confirmation that America is united. It does send a message to Saddam Hussein. It tells him the President's recent letter was not an idle threat, but a credible warning.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is a credible warning because it is thoroughly bipartisan. It is supported by Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. It says that the President's policies carry the full backing of those who represent the American people.

Authorizing the use of force does not commit the President to waging war, but it does give him that option. This resolution gives him the muscle he needs to wage war, but probably, more importantly, it gives him the bargaining chip he needs to seek peace. It is based on the most recent U.N. Security Council resolution, and it puts Congress in step with the rest of the world.

Mr. Speaker, this is a step in the direction of lasting peace, but it is not, as we all know, an easy vote. We were not elected to make the easy votes. We were elected to take on the tough ones as well.

I believe we are really at the crossroads of history. The superpower standoff has ended. The world is searching for a better way to maintain true peace.

Now we can make a commitment, admittedly a difficult commitment, toward achieving that peace, or we can lose our nerve at this critical hour and thereby call down upon ourselves the judgment of history.

Should we fail to support this resolution, it will be a sign to others in the world that America is eager to praise the ideals of collective security, but shrinks from making the commitment to achieve it.

Today, Congress can take an important step toward attaining the goal of

justice among nations and true world peace, and I urge our colleagues here to support the President of the United States by supporting this very, very important resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. ROE].

Mr. ROE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT], for yielding to me, and I have not had the opportunity to speak during this debate until now, and I wanted to characterize the debate, that it is a debate on patriots and national conscience. Patriots all in this room and national conscience.

Mr. Speaker, this debate is giving the opportunity to the Nation to think, to think, to think and for the Members to be able to think.

I strongly supported the President, continued to support the President, up to this particular juncture. Our greatest concern has been explained by so many Members who have spoken here today. We are concerned about Saddam Hussein, his army, his weapons, his chemical poison gas, his germ warfare and his nuclear weapons, and we want him to get out of Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, we all want that, but what about the broader issue? I ask my colleagues, "What do you do if he gets out of Kuwait? How are you going to stop his chemical warfare and the other items involved?"

Mr. Speaker, there is a much broader issue involved, and the people of America wanted to know.

World oil supply has been part of the debate. There is no oil shortage. There is a glut of oil on the market. The people know there is no shortage. They want to know why this is so and why we would be considering fighting for an oil supply that is not factually correct in the minds of the people, and the people want to know.

It is because, in part, the money-changers in the temple are plundering the world's treasuries is what is really involved, and the people want to know.

There is no particular point that I can add to this debate that has not been discussed, and perhaps it is prospective in part. Saddam Hussein, and I hope my colleagues listen, he would not have the technology, he would not have the expertise, he would not have the arms, had it not been for, in part, the United Nations, namely Germany, France, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and, yes, the United States of America who have provided him the resources for war up until just a few months ago, and some are still doing it.

So, I hope whatever we decide, when it gets to that point, that we look ahead. It is not going to be over when these decisions are made.

Are we going to join with the other nations of the world and say to the

people of the United Nations, "It's not good enough for you to give us money. You provided the resources, and you provided the arms, and, therefore, you owe the world, and you owe us a great deal more."

Let me close on this point so I do not, I say to the majority leader, run out of my time. Somebody said to me in the hall, "Well, you know, are you going to vote this way? Are you going to vote that way?"

I have been here for 22 years, and this is a vote I am casting for myself. I have earned that right, and I am voting for my people.

I went into the Army. I was 18 years old. I served for 3½ years in a combat infantry unit in World War II in Europe, as some other people in this House have done. The World War II veterans are becoming lesser and lesser in this House, and so, too, the corporate memory of what war really is all about. My God, it is so easy to say, "We got to get him. We got to get him." It is so easy to say that.

No aspersions on anybody in this House, but those kids are the ones that are going to be out there lonely, one by one, trying to stay alive. So, Mr. Speaker, I say to my colleagues, "If you have never been there, and you've never participated, it's impossible for you to understand what that means in commitment to a human soul."

So, I would hope, I would hope and pray, that the people of this House would think about that. Never mind the drum beatings and all the things we have heard today. It is those kids that are involved, those kids are involved, yours and mine. And is it worth it at this point without trying that much harder? I tell my colleagues it is not, and we live to see the day soon from here when we will come back again and lament the decision to vote for this particular amendment.

I hope we vote against this particular resolution.

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Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HUTTO].

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

As chairman of the Readiness Subcommittee during the 101st Congress let me speak to you for a moment about the readiness of our forces. I believe our Air Force and our naval forces are fully ready for any contingency, and our ground forces are very near full readiness. This is a tribute to the fine training within the Department of Defense. Additionally over the last 2 years the Readiness Subcommittee and the Congress have authorized \$174 billion in operation and maintenance funds for these forces.

There have been times in our Nation's history when our forces were not as ready, when our aircraft weren't ready to fly and our tanks weren't ready to roll, but such is not the case

today. Our equipment is well maintained and very capable of accomplishing the mission. All of the reports I have seen indicate that our forces are ready, morale is high, and the forces are well equipped.

By every account I have heard, there seems to be no doubt that our Air Force and Navy are fully ready and able to fight and win. Additional equipment and men and women are arriving daily from the United States and Europe. The force is building and will soon be in excess of 400,000.

No one in this Chamber wants war, but if it does come, I believe that the U.S. forces are prepared to carry out their military objective, and this is partly because this body has properly funded the readiness account.

Whatever we decide, and whatever the President must eventually do, our men and women in the gulf are prepared and well equipped for their mission.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bipartisan U.N. resolution, which I am proud to cosponsor. I think it is important to support our President in this crisis. If we do not, we will never be able to get Saddam out of Kuwait.

George Bush is our Commander in Chief. He and Secretary of State Baker have put together a strong U.N. coalition against Iraq and now he is asking that the Congress approve U.N. resolution 678. He has all the diplomatic, intelligence, and military information that is not available to us as Members of Congress. I think we ought to leave the responsibility with the President to make the right decision when to use military force.

I worry that if the Gephardt resolution is adopted, and our forces have to stay longer in the Persian Gulf, and then 6 months from now we take offensive action, we are going to have more American casualties. The reason is that our forces now are at their peak of preparedness. The longer Americans stay in that desert, they lose their sharpness.

Even in Vietnam we rotated our troops after 12 months and the conditions in the desert are much harder to survive in than Vietnam. Because of the harsh living conditions in Saudi, we will have to start rotating our forces out in the next few months and when you rotate military forces, you weaken their effectiveness.

Most of our veterans organizations and military organizations are supporting the President's gulf policy.

Another reason not to delay is that it gives Iraq even more time to dig in and strengthen its defensive fortifications in Kuwait and Iraq. This is what could add to our casualty list.

Sanctions are not going to force Saddam out of Kuwait in my opinion and eventually war will start. No way will our forces be as prepared as they are now.

So I ask you to support the bipartisan U.N. resolution and let's get our American troops home as soon as possible.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. CONDIT].

Mr. CONDIT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Bennett-Durbin resolution (H. Con. Res. 1) and the Solarz-Michel resolution (H.J. Res. 62).

The question before us is this, Will the United States of America stand with the vast majority of nations of the world in resisting Saddam Hussein's aggression?

Will the United States stand with the community of nations and demonstrate that the days of invasion, conquering, and looting of weaker nations by stronger nations are over?

Will the United States Congress stand behind the United Nations, which has formally and officially endorsed actions to force Iraq's surrender of occupied Kuwait?

Mr. Speaker, we dare not compromise or undercut this worldwide effort to remove Iraq from Kuwait.

We dare not send mixed messages to Mr. Hussein at this late hour, or we will find that the last chance for peace will evaporate like water in the desert.

Saddam Hussein stands alone—the United States stands with the rest of the world.

Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait solely for greed and power, not for freedom; not for an overall Middle East peace settlement; not for human rights; and certainly not for the self-determination of peoples.

Every action taken by our President has been in concert with the resolutions of the United Nations. For the first time in a long time, we see the world's most prestigious organization acting as a leader in resisting aggression. We cannot afford to undercut this effort. If the League of Nations had shown this determination and resolve in the 1930's, who knows how world history would have changed—and, as we all know any change would have been better.

The time is to act now, not 6 months from now. I firmly believe that if we wait, we will be having this same debate again. We need to support our troops now. We need to support the rest of the world now. We need to send a clear message today to this greedy aggressor that the United States Congress is prepared to stand by the United Nations resolutions to use all possible means to free Kuwait and bring justice to its citizens.

Mr. Speaker, I have consistently supported a peaceful resolution to the Persian Gulf crisis. I have also consistently supported congressional participation in any decision to commit military action in the crisis. We have given sanctions an opportunity to work. We must stand with the United Nations, the President and our soldiers! I urge you to support the Bennett-Durbin and Solarz-Michel resolutions.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the very distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI], the chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means.

Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] for the job they have done.

Mr. Speaker, this is a serious debate—the most serious in my career—about a very painful decision. This is why every Member of Congress is here—to represent constituents who may be asked to give their very lives in

pursuit of the national policy we are discussing today.

I want to commend the character of this debate. There are honest differences of opinion here that know no partisan boundaries. Each of us—the elected representatives of the American people—is sincerely trying to decide how to best promote peace and stability throughout the world. Each of us is motivated by a sense of duty and responsibility. We want to do what is right, what is in the best interest of this country and all humanity.

We all agree that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait is abhorrent. We all agree that Iraq must leave Kuwait. We all know who the aggressor is—Iraqi President Saddam Hussein. This debate only illustrates our differences on how to respond to Iraq's naked aggression. But we agree totally and unanimously on the goal of the international community—the full restoration of the sovereignty of Kuwait.

Many of my colleagues say that this is the toughest vote they have ever had to cast because it is a decision involving war and peace, life, and death. It is for me, too. This is much more difficult for me than the Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964. Today's situation is clearer. The possibility of armed conflict, casualties, and even death is much more apparent.

I strongly believe that Congress can—indeed must—participate in such an important decision involving such a critical national commitment. But if Congress must make the decision on whether armed combat is an appropriate action, let me caution my colleagues that we cannot and should not attempt to decide how that war should be fought.

After long and difficult personal reflection, I have decided to vote for the Michel resolution. I will vote for it because I want to send a strong message to Iraq that aggression doesn't pay. And I will vote for it because I have full confidence that our President and my friend George Bush will act in a responsible and compassionate fashion.

President Bush does not seek war. He knows how horrible war is because he has served courageously in combat. He is a man of peace. He is a father and a grandfather who both reflects and respects family values. He is a diplomat who has learned that warfare is a last resort. No parent—and he is a parent—no veteran—and he is a decorated veteran—no person of conscience—and George Bush is certainly a person of conscience—would ever lightly decide to commit America's youth to war to resolve international conflicts. So my vote today is not a vote for war, although war may be the ultimate result. It is a vote of confidence in our President and his judgement.

The end of the cold war is a confusing time for all Americans and all citizens of the world. Our worries about a superpower nuclear war have been replaced by fears of regional conflicts that could escalate into international catastrophes. Such conflicts caused World War I and World War II. History has taught us that we must take such challenges seriously and respond quickly. Temporizing—vacillating—can prove to be devastatingly expensive.

For most of this century, America has worked for international peace, acknowledging that the pursuit of peace is more important than the cost in blood and treasure. In this in-

stance, many others have joined us. The nations of the world are united against the Iraqi aggressor—as they belatedly united against Nazi aggression a half century ago.

Some would say that some nations are more committed than others when it comes to paying the bills of the Desert Shield Operation. That is an important question that deserves our attention. It is not surprising, however, that the United States is playing the largest role. But that is a question for another day.

It is a sad fact of history that peace does not come cheaply or painlessly. Achieving it is expensive. Maintaining it demands constant vigilance.

If there is a war in the Persian Gulf, it will be the first conflict carried on live television. It will truly be a living room war. Those of us at home will witness the carnage of war and be shocked. And properly so. War is hell.

But what has happened to Kuwait is also shocking and repugnant. Incredible atrocities to women and children have been confirmed by Amnesty International. What has happened in Kuwait must be undone because it violates all norms of moral behavior and international law.

There is another justification for our policy, equally important and that is to send a clear message about what standards of conduct in the post-cold-war world are to be. The international community must not and cannot tolerate criminal aggression—where the sovereignty of a nation is brutally violated with impunity.

That is why I will vote for the Michel resolution and support our President.

For each of us, this is a vote of conscience—a personal statement of principle. But when all our votes are cast and the last echo of our speeches has faded from this chamber, it is imperative that we again unite as Americans and support our President and the international community and reverse the aggression of Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

We will then send a clear message to tyrants everywhere that there's a very high price to be paid for such international criminality.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. HUBBARD].

Mr. HUBBARD. Mr. Speaker, I ask Members to support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Today, an editorial in the Gleaner, the daily newspaper which serves Henderson, KY, lends further support to this plan of action.

To briefly quote the editorial:

No cause is more noble than that of peace. But in our pursuit of peace in this crisis, we cannot ignore the nature of the beast that confronts us. We should not send a signal of weakness to a despot positioning himself to gain control of much of the world's oil reserves and the power that comes with it. We cannot reward this man's brutal aggression.

The publisher of the Gleaner is Walt Dear and the editor of the Henderson, KY, newspaper is Ron Jenkins.

I urge my colleagues to consider the views expressed by this highly regarded newspaper and vote to support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

The editorial is as follows:

[From the Gleaner (Henderson, KY)
Jan. 12, 1991]

BUSH SHOULD HAVE POWER TO WAGE WAR

Even as we strongly support the continued pursuit of every reasonable effort for a peaceful solution to the gulf crisis, we believe it unwise to strip our president of support he deserves in dealing with Saddam Hussein.

Congress should grant President Bush the authority to wage war against Iraq.

Our nation and the international coalition have been confronted by a ruthless, power-hungry dictator of a country whose invasion of Kuwait had not relationship to the Palestinian problem he so loudly embraces.

While we remain hopeful that Saddam can be convinced to pull his troops from Kuwait under terms of the United Nations resolution, there is no indication that he will accept any diplomatic offers that mandate his compliance with the U.N. resolution.

Instead, Saddam defiantly waves his sword while obviously relishing the division of the American people and their elected representatives over this most troubling issue.

As agonizing as it is for all of us to conjure images of our young men and women in deadly combat, we as a nation should not give the Iraqi leader comfort by undermining our president and the international coalition.

No cause is more noble than that of peace. But in our pursuit of peace in this crisis, we cannot ignore the nature of the beast that confronts us.

We should not send a signal of weakness to a despot positioning himself to gain control of much of the world's oil reserves and the power that comes with it. We cannot reward this man's brutal aggression.

One person's appetite for power has created a very complex problem that has stirred legitimate debate the world over, including, of course, in our own community. With as many as 100 Henderson County sons and daughters already committed to Operation Desert Shield, the gravity of this crisis is ever so real to us. It is because of them and their comrades that we should exhaust every ounce of effort to resolve this crisis without war.

Still, we should not deny our president the support he deserves in facing up to this tyrant and the real threat he poses if he gets away with the invasion of Kuwait.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the very able and distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN].

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Speaker, like many of my colleagues who have spoken here in this well over the last 2 days, I, too, believe that the passage of the Solarz-Michel resolution is the last, best hope to a peaceful solution to this crisis.

But I recognize that if we pass this resolution and Saddam Hussein continues to stonewall us as his foreign minister did this week, then it means war.

We in the Armed Services Committee held hearings on the possibility of war and what it would look like.

Our Members are not unanimous in their conclusions—and I respect my colleagues and their views. Let me now give you my conclusions.

First, I believe we have a proper and limited objective—to get the Iraqi

forces out of Kuwait. We do not seek to conquer Iraq and create further power vacuums in the region.

Second, we plan to fight the war in phases—beginning with air power and ending only if necessary with the use of ground troops. Those who think air power alone will win the war will have their chance. We do not want more American casualties than is absolutely necessary.

Third, our Arab allies will fight Iraqi forces, at least in Kuwait, and we have drawn up our battle plans accordingly.

Fourth, we have worked out an arrangement with Israel and our Arab allies to prevent any attempt by Saddam Hussein to break up the coalition by attacking Israel.

In short, I believe that our forces are capable of achieving our goals. Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait. Peacefully if possible, by force if necessary.

But there is also the question of when we decide to use that force. Many of us, especially among those of us on the Democratic side of the aisle, have wanted a United States that acted with the United Nations in resolving world crises.

We have been acting with the United Nations. Most of us praised President Bush for working with the United Nations last August to set up and then enforce the economic sanctions.

Most of us thought it proper that before we used force we get a U.N. resolution to authorize it, which we did.

We now have that resolution and it sets January 15 as the date that Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait. It was not just a decision by the United States. It was a decision by the Security Council of the United Nations to bring things to a head on January 15.

What would happen now to the authority of the United Nations in the post-cold-war era if we backed the administration down and forced it to change time lines?

In the last analysis, we must mean what we say when we deal with the Saddam Husseins of the world.

If the United States is to be credible in the post-cold-war world, if the United Nations is to be a useful vehicle for collective security, then we cannot shrink from the use of force. A future aggressor can ignore the next U.N. deadline if we ignore this one.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURPHY].

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in sincere opposition to the Presidential Solarz-Michel resolution, pointing out the inconsistencies of 2 hours ago saying it is Congress' authority to declare war, and in this resolution now saying that we pass the authority to the President to declare war some day next week on his own.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the

gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KILDEE].

Mr. KILDEE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution of war.

Mr. Speaker, I had hoped to serve my political career without ever having to confront the awesome and immediate question of war and peace such as we face here today.

I had also hoped that humanity had reached the level of development that we could find alternative, more rational solutions to such international conflicts.

Strictly enforced international economic sanctions can be that alternative.

When we talk of a New World order in the post-cold-war era, we can find no better example than the universal revulsion and rejection of the brutal Iraqi aggression against its defenseless neighbor, Kuwait.

The quick and decisive action by the United Nations has ensured that Saddam Hussein has gained nothing from his occupation of Kuwait.

On the contrary, each day the international economic sanctions are allowed to work weakens Iraq—economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

Time is on our side in this conflict.

And if we continue to enforce the sanctions, the whole world will continue to be on our side.

But if we choose war at this time, America alone will bear the burden and pay the costs of that military action.

Let us more strictly enforce the international sanctions.

Let us use the multinational military force in the region to impose an airtight naval, air, and land blockade of Iraq.

Let us use our highly capable electronic intelligence capabilities and rapid communication facilities to monitor compliance with the sanctions.

Let us punish countries and companies who violate the sanctions by denying them access to our American market.

Mr. Speaker, the Members of this body face no greater question than whether or not to commit American troops to the horrors of combat.

But if we take that momentous decision—let it be with a full understanding of the consequences.

Let us not assume it will be used only as a negotiating tactic.

With our votes, we are authorizing the President to lead this Nation into war.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in regret that the previous motion did not carry, and in strong opposition to the Solarz resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KANJORSKI].

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz amendment.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the

gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. COLLINS].

Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz amendment. Even though it is tactfully worded, it amounts to a de facto declaration of war. Its significance is that it gives President Bush a green light to use any kind of military power in the gulf that he so chooses. Passage of this resolution would mean that, if the President wants to initiate a full-scale military offensive, there would be absolutely nothing that Congress could do to delay or restrain him. If this resolution passes, then henceforth, we are powerless in the question of America's response to Iraq's actions in the Gulf.

The idea of granting the President the authority to make war is not automatically unthinkable. But the problem is that, under the present circumstances, at the present time, it is wholly premature.

The United States has long been a pillar of justice and reason in the international community. The initiative for the League of Nations and United Nations originated with our Presidents. We regularly implore other nations to adhere to international law and utilize negotiation, arbitration and the international courts for peaceful resolutions of disputes. Why, then, are we rushing off to war?

Just as the schoolyard bully usually chooses that path due to a shortage of acuties that would facilitate reasonableness, the choice for war is one that involves a similar nearsightedness. Have all our intellectual resources been consumed? Have we tried everything imaginable in order to avert the severest of consequences? If war really is to be a last resort, have we fully exhausted all alternatives?

To each of these questions, I answer, "no." I firmly believe that we could try harder, try again, try a different approach, try with a new offer. We could do more, and I have faith that the President could still come up with a peaceful resolution of this conflict if he fully applied himself to that end.

Mr. Speaker, we are not yet on an irreversible path to war. Yet, I believe that if we vote for the Solarz resolution then we very possibly may be. I am not ready to accept that. I believe peace is still possible and so, I urge all my colleagues to oppose the Solarz resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. CHAPMAN].

Mr. CHAPMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. HERTEL].

Mr. HERTEL. Mr. Speaker, I oppose going to war, and I oppose this resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. VENTO].

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this amendment. We must not act on the lowest common denominator in terms of the Middle East.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Our actions should be based in this House on our very special responsibilities, indeed our sacred trust.

Congress has but one option to state our view to have an impact upon the course of our national policy whether to wage war, to take offensive action or not against Iraq.

Our decision in the affirmative is not reversible, such decision and vote is a one way street. Once President Bush has this authority, our role to commit U.S. troops or not commit troops to war, the decision will be out of Congress' hands and the President has been clear as to his intention to use such military force.

We in Congress can take no comfort in the reasonableness of Iraq or of Saddam Hussein. We should well understand that the near decade long Iraq-Iran conflict resulted in over 1 million casualties. This Nation, the United States of America, should understand better than any other the importance of the individual life, the special meaning of life, because Iraq's Saddam Hussein doesn't. Because Saddam Hussein is willing to dump his nation into a meat grinder of war, should our policy for offensive military action, nearly unilateral U.S. troops and dollars, be geared to this common denominator, the lowest common denominator? I would plead with my colleagues to recognize the consequence of this conflict. In the Middle East we have the greatest concentration of military personnel and weapons arrayed since World War II, but armed with the exponentially more effective weapons of the 1990's.

I've repeatedly noted my colleagues intention and remarks geared to backing up our troops and military and the implication that the only way that we can do so is by voting to go to war.

Well the intention of my colleagues may be good but the logic is seriously flawed.

We in Congress have a responsibility, a sacred trust to be certain in placing our military service men and women into a war, to be certain as to the vital U.S. interests involved and that offensive military action is the last resort.

Maintaining the economic sanctions, the blockade of trade, and the defensive deployment of U.S. military are not actions exclusive of the use of military force, they are the appropriate and proportionate response today to the circumstances, not perfect but far preferable and much better suited to the needs of the Persian Gulf in January 1991. The new world order ought to be based upon what has been the greatest strength and success of the United States for over 200 years, that is our democratic values.

The Iron Curtain and the uncommon events in just the past 2 years within the Soviet Union were based on the strength of ideas and values not military might.

It was the scientists, the labor organizations, and workers the artists and poets that finally prevailed against a nation armed to the teeth to suppress its people but those weapons were of no use against the human spirit and the freedom of people to think. The new world order isn't based upon the mistakes of yesterday such as the intemperate decision to commit U.S. troops. To commit U.S. offensive military action without the broad support of the American people, the vast majority I believe have not focused upon the commitment and

consequence of such action. In fact that minority who do support the President really believe that some how this last threat will avert war—the Members of this House should know better, but some have wrapped themselves in the same thought.

Mr. Speaker, the United States can do better, we can lead to a new world order by sharing the responsibilities of achieving the result, the objectives, with the global coalition supporting the U.N. resolutions. They should be doing far more than offering their uncertain vote to commit the United States to a conflict. Their votes in the United Nations would be much more meaningful if cast without the promises of U.S. assistance and debt relief and with a commitment of their troops, their sons and daughters and their financial resources.

Today we should take heed of the American people's views and our sacred trust and vote to continue diplomacy and the economic sanctions the blockade and defensive deployment of our military forces. We have not exhausted such efforts, they have scarcely had the opportunity to have had their full effect. The action to commit our Nation to war should be the last resort not precipitated by impatience, for a conclusion. The coalition of nations and the U.N. members would be better off if tempered by discipline and sacrifice rather than have their anxiety solved by a premature nearly unilateral U.S. military solution, the new world order begs for a better policy path.

Today it is Saddam Hussein and Iraq, but tomorrow it will be other Third World nations. Are we to respond again and again with the use of U.S. military force with all the human carnage and tragic consequences such entails. I would hope not and I fear for the opportunity lost in the Persian Gulf and cost in human life both United States and others and the hundreds of billions of dollars that will be expended, really dead-end spending today and tomorrow with no real solution but a throw-back to yesterday and all those conflicts and wars framed in the good intentions of achieving peace.

This joint resolution of war is a crucible that will not produce a new world order and peace will not come from the amalgam of elements and policies that are present here today—the base metal of premature war can't make the gold of peace that has proved so illusive in the 20th century. We must strive for peace, there is no easy path, no comfort, there are risks but such pushbutton solutions as the joint resolution before us if employed by the President will do much more harm than good, and therefore, I shall vote against it and ask my colleagues careful consideration to vote against this measure.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair, under its prerogative, would announce to those Members controlling the time of the debate that the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] has 23½ minutes remaining, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] has 10½ minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 7 minutes remaining.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS].

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Speaker, I said the other day in this debate that the Congress had declared war in my lifetime twice. I correct that statement now. The Congress is declaring war for the third time in my lifetime. If you doubt my word, ask Mr. SOLARZ; if you doubt my word, ask Mr. MICHEL. I have confirmed it with both of them. This is a declaration of war.

Think about it. I ask you to vote against it. I am not saying that I would never vote for a declaration of war, or a declaration of war in an event similar to this. But this is not the time. This country is not united in a declaration of war. If there is one thing we learned out of Vietnam, as the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PETERSON], who spent 7 years in a POW camp in Hanoi said, the people of the United States must be behind our Armed Forces and back them up, and our people are not ready for that.

Mr. Speaker, I think we must begin to face the future. This is perhaps the last act that this Congress will have to do with this gulf.

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Except we must raise taxes to pay for this. It has already cost us some \$30 billion, and the best revenue estimates are that it will cost us around \$1 billion a day to conduct this operation. Are you ready for that? If you are not ready to vote for those kinds of taxes, you are not ready to vote for this resolution.

We are going to need a draft. The recruitment for the Army has already dropped off significantly. There are not enough troops in the Armed Forces to rotate those that are in the desert. And who of you believes that a ruthless dictator like Saddam Hussein, who could take a million casualties before he declared an end, will not take a million casualties again before he declares an end.

And who of you can believe that we will not be called upon to occupy and to police that desert and those countries for the rest of my lifetime and perhaps for the rest of all of the lifetimes of the people that are in this Chamber today? If we win, we cannot come home. We must stay there, and our young people are not fools. They will go if drafted. Those who are there have signified their willingness to fight, but we do not have the manpower pool in the Armed Forces now to conduct the kind of war that I foresee and the kind of peace that faces us.

This is a terribly serious question. None of us know what kind of forces we are going to unleash in that part of the world. We know that Israel will be attacked and we know that if Israel is attacked it will respond.

As I count the votes, I can see that my side has lost. We have given up on patience and firmness, on an embargo that is working and will work, the best

embargo that mankind has ever created. I hope that Michel-Solarz resolution will be defeated.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. TRAXLER].

Mr. TRAXLER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution. First I would like to extend my appreciation to the majority leader, Mr. GEPHARDT, and my distinguished colleague from Michigan, of course, Mr. BROOMFIELD, my very dear friend, for the high level debate that has been achieved in the course of this discussion over the last several days. It is a credit to both of you, to this institution and to the Congress as a whole.

Mr. Speaker, from the very beginning I have publicly dissented from the policies our Nation is pursuing in the Persian Gulf. Neither the President nor the Congress has rethought what form our Nation's diplomatic and military policy ought to be in, in the postwar era. Sadly, we are still behaving as if we are the supercop of the world, and we are substituting Third World regional conflicts for the cold war with the Soviet Union.

Mr. Speaker, wise rulers never commit their nations to war, and this is a war resolution, never commit their nations to war unless it is overwhelmingly agreed that their nations' vital interests have been severely threatened. I cannot conclude that there are vital American interests at stake in the gulf.

The continuing appropriations to maintain our military power, not at this moment, but in the months and years to come, is going to sap the vital economic abilities of this Nation. Our vital national interests are no longer served by our continuing to be the world's policeman. We cannot afford it.

We are in the Persian Gulf today simply and plainly for one reason—there was a gentleman in the Senate who said it, he spelled it out, o-i-l, oil. We are defending the oil interests of the Middle East and other parts of the world, and make no mistake about it. That does not relate to our own national vital long-term interests.

We all know that this country could be energy independent if we chose to be. Just ask the American farmer.

The preservation of oil supplies for our economic competitors, our economic competitors is not the proper use of our military waning power. We cannot afford to strengthen our foreign rivals at our own economic expense. We must not send our sons and daughters into war for the preservation of our competitors' economies. Indeed, the warfare of the 1990's and the next century will be economic, not military. Every dollar we borrow from the Germans and the Japanese, the Middle East Arab Nations to finance this war and our continuing military buildup and national debt steals from our econ-

omy and our Nation's well-being and its future.

If war comes, we will be wasting our economic resources and our precious young people. We will most assuredly be weakening our ability to confront the urgent domestic problems facing our Nation.

We are a nation that quickly can deploy troops around the world, to the other side of the planet, yet we cannot afford to fix our roads and bridges? We cannot afford to improve our water and sewer systems? We cannot afford to restore our rail and our transportation infrastructure? We cannot do education, we cannot do health, and we will not be able to compete in the next century.

This is a de facto war resolution. I will not vote to go to war for the oil supplies of Europe and Asia.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN].

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Michel-Solarz resolution authorizing our President, if all else fails, to use whatever force is necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support for this critically important resolution, House Joint Resolution 62, authorizing the President to use force to support the U.N. resolutions and I commend my distinguished colleagues on the Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. SOLARZ, our Committee's distinguished chairman, Mr. FASCELL, our ranking minority member, Mr. BROOMFIELD, and our distinguished Republican leader, Mr. MICHEL, for their extensive work in drafting this timely, bipartisan measure.

Mr. Speaker, the wanton, brutal violations of international law by Iraq must not be allowed to stand. The rapes, the pillaging and the destruction of Kuwait by Iraqi occupation forces must be brought to an end. How do we make that happen? We bring that about best by fully supporting our President's initiatives and the 12 U.N. Security Council resolutions opposing Saddam Hussein's offensive actions in the Persian Gulf.

None of us want war, and particularly those of us in this body who have served, in combat.

Support of this measure can help us to avert war. If Saddam Hussein does not believe the Congress is behind our President and the multinational effort, and if he is not convinced that we are willing, as a last resort, after all other diplomatic, political, and economic means fail, to resort to the use of force, then, we will indeed be led into war.

The issue before us is not the authorization of U.S. offensive action. The offensive war was started by Saddam Hussein on August 2, 1990. What we are considering is not just the United States-United Nations defense of Kuwait, by all means, as spelled out in the U.N. resolution. What we are considering is ruthless aggression, the rule of law, of order and the world's collective security. This is no more offensive than our retaking the islands in the Pacific during the Second World War, or our in-

vasion of Normandy, or our actions in Panama, Inchon, or Grenada.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is, in the words of Secretary Baker, a last, best chance for peace. This resolution does not suggest that on January 15, 1991, we will attack Iraq. However, it does send a strong message to Saddam Hussein that if he does not leave Kuwait he will suffer. It also sends an important message to our allies throughout the world—to the 37 nations which are standing by us in this crisis, that the Congress is in agreement and supports the international community, and that we stand solidly with our men and women in uniform, who are courageously implementing our Nation's foreign policy. Let us stand firm sending a clear message that their efforts are not for naught.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Speaker, I rise to insert in the RECORD an analysis of why precisely this is not intended either in a historical or legal sense as a declaration of war.

Mr. Speaker, one of the more complex legal issues to arise in the context of this debate is whether—for the purposes of constitutional law, as well as public and private international law—a congressional authorization of the use of force in an international police action of the kind contemplated today is equivalent to a declaration of war.

For the record, I would stress as an original cosponsor of the resolution before us, that I do not consider this approach to amount to a declaration of war in either a historical or legal sense, and, for reasons stipulated below, would oppose such a declaration in today's international context.

Not merely the theory but the history of international relations since the First World War embodies the distinction between just and unjust causes of war. The covenant of the League of Nations, the United Nations Charter, and the charter of the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg all reject the realpolitik doctrine of *staatrason*—the tyrannical notion that might makes right.

Instead, modern world politics are founded upon a conception of international society analogous to the laws and customs on coercion in domestic societies, that resort to violence in international affairs must be regarded either as lawful police action or crime. In other words, resort to armed force in international society is legitimate only if it is used on behalf or in service to the fundamental principles and purposes undergirding international law.

Thus the moral philosopher Michael Walzer observes that, "aggression is the name we give to the crime of war." Indeed, the founders of the United Nations were determined, in the words of the charter, "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war * * * and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution

of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest." Similarly, the U.N. General Assembly has defined aggression as "a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law." Specifically, the signatories to the charter undertook in article 2(4) to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state."

In postwar American diplomacy, the classic exposition of this principle was stated by President Truman in October 1945, when he declared that the fundamentals of American foreign policy would rest in part on the proposition "that the preservation of peace between nations requires a United Nations Organization comprised of all the peace-loving nations of the world who are willing to use force if necessary to insure peace."

The concept of international law enforcement through collective security, therefore, is embodied in the U.N. Charter and is an integral part of international law, as well as—through the supremacy clause in article VI of our own Constitution as applied to treaties—the law of the United States.

In other words, a congressional declaration of war in this circumstance would be contrary to the purposes of the United Nations. It might also frustrate our diplomacy by making it appear that it is the United States versus Iraq rather than the world community versus Saddam. In addition, it might needlessly prolong a potentially bloody and unpredictable conflict with Iraq, because of the legal and political complications associated with the problem of war termination. Indeed, as Americans understand, it is in part for such reasons that there have been only five declarations of war in our history and none since 1941. Rather than the declaration of war analogy, the apt legal comparison in the current circumstance would be closer to Korea than to Vietnam or World War II, though all historical analogies are to some extent imprecise and potentially misleading.

In some ways, the psychological dimension of a declaration of war is as important as the legal. Psychologically, a declaration of war implies that what is at issue in our confrontation with Iraq is traditional war and the instincts of patriotic nationalism on both sides which springs from such a circumstance. But from the American perspective what is actually at issue with this resolution before us is response to international criminality, not war, with sufficient grounds for cessation of hostilities, if they commence, being the removal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and the possible holding of Saddam and his henchmen accountable before an international

bar of justice, a Nuremberg-like tribunal, if apprehended.

The articulation of more limited intentions is of crucial importance because it makes clear to the Iraqi people that America would define victory as Iraqi acquiescence to the constraints of international law, without either the humiliation of surrender or the prospect of societal annihilation. Police actions imply force is authorized for limited, not total purposes.

Operating under Security Council resolutions, America therefore has an obligation to walk the extraordinarily difficult line of applying all force appropriate to protect our own forces but not so much as to wreak havoc on that part of Iraqi society which is unrelated to Saddam's aggression or war-making capacities.

While this Member is convinced that a congressional declaration of war is inappropriate under current circumstances, the constitutional duty of Congress is clear. Not only does the Constitution vest the power to declare war in the Congress, but it further contemplates that a status or condition fairly described by armed hostility between the United States and another state—whether declared or undeclared—must be legislatively authorized.

The Framers of the Constitution did not entrust the war power to Congress to protect Congressmen; they did so to protect the American public. They believed that the gravest of all governmental decisions—the making of war—should not be the responsibility of a single individual. It should be taken by a democratically elected, geographically and socially balanced legislature after careful debate and deliberation. It would either be tyrannical or irresponsible for a Congress of, by, and for the people to shirk its responsibility and transfer the power to make war to the Presidency. In America, after all, process is our most important product.

In this context, neither the Congress nor the Executive can duck the fundamental question of constitutional fidelity. Accordingly, I voted earlier today for the Durbin-Bennett resolution, despite my concerns for its legal and constitutional imprecision, and support the resolution before us giving the executive branch explicit approval for discretion to implement a spectrum of U.N. resolutions.

While the authorizing resolution before us has the effect of granting the Executive discretion to use American Armed Forces as constables enforcing international law in an international police action, it most emphatically is not tantamount to a declaration of war for the domestic legal purpose of triggering statutes which confer special powers on the executive branch in the event of a declaration of war or the existence of hostilities.

Most of the executive powers which are conditioned upon a declaration of war or a state of war relate to military administrative matters, such as term of service, leave of absence, promotions, retirement, compensation, and senior officer appointments. Some, however, relate to other important issues such as civil liberties, budgetary spending limits, commercial transactions, and international trade:

Civil liberties: Under 50 U.S.C. section 1811, the Attorney General, "for a period not to exceed 15 calendar days following a declaration of war by Congress," may authorize electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information without obtaining a court order.

International trade: Under the Trading with the Enemy Act, the President may, "[d]uring the time of war," control and prohibit banking, property, and other commercial transactions with an enemy foreign country and its nationals. (50 U.S.C. App. 5(b).)

Budgetary restraints: The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 provides that "upon the enactment of a declaration of war," subsequent sequestration reports and orders are precluded—2 U.S.C. section 907a(b). In addition, the legislation prohibits parliamentary points of order regarding legislation that would exceed the level of budget authority and outlays set in the most recent concurrent resolution on the budget.

The bipartisan, bi-institutional approach to upholding international law and order implicit in the Solarz-Michel resolution does not automatically trigger any statutory provisions which are based upon the existence of a state of war. Nor does congressional authorization of the United States' use of force in an international police action have the same effect as a declaration of war for purposes of triggering such statutory authorities. Unlike a declaration of war, which creates the formal legal commencement of a state of war, the authorization this body contemplates today does not affirm that a state of war exists. Nor does it assume conflict is inevitable. Rather, it merely authorizes the President to use force if necessary pursuant to specifically designated Security Council resolutions.

In conclusion, it may be a paradox but I am convinced that the prospect of peace in this medieval Middle Eastern setting is clearly enhanced by preparation for war and the avoidance of political equivocation in Washington. It is my firmest conviction that the prospect of war looms more dangerously if Saddam concludes that he has punctured American resolve. Accordingly, it is my judgment that Congress best advances the imperative for peace by making Saddam aware that as concluded by Congress which is the reflection of the will and judgment of the American people a police action war

with Iraq would be just, although undesired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. COUGHLIN].

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the resolution supporting the United Nations, and as requested by the President of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, I believe the time is now for the Congress to stand up and be counted in support of the principled stand that the U.N. Security Council has taken and the President has supported.

Can it possibly be in our interest to allow brutal dictators like Saddam Hussein to march into small, innocent neighboring nations?

Can it possibly be in our interest to allow a man who has already killed thousands of his own citizens with chemical weapons, who has already initiated one war that cost his nation some 1 million casualties, who has already made clear his desire to possess nuclear weapons, who has already iterated a radical, pan-Arab philosophy that would establish him as the Arab world's leader, who has already threatened America's other friends throughout the region with weapons of mass destruction, which he has certifiably used in the past—can it possibly be in our interest to risk giving such an individual control of more than half of the world's total proven oil reserves?

If we fail to back up the President and the U.N. Security Council's actions now, the coalition that stands poised to reverse Iraq's aggression will simply disintegrate. Like it or not, America is the only nation capable of leading this effort, and the failure of U.S. leadership in this regard will result in the coalition's failure, and I would suggest, a catastrophic change in the political order of the Middle East that would haunt us for years to come.

Some say that we should simply wait a bit longer to see if sanctions might work. I am persuaded that they will not. The Director of Central Intelligence has apprised us that the sanctions have taken a toll on Iraq, but that in his judgment, they will not succeed in removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait. While the Iraqi GNP has been reduced by some 50 percent, Iraq's per capita income still remains double that of our coalition ally, Egypt. Clearly, Saddam Hussein—a man who withstood 8 years of war with Iran, replete with 1 million casualties and missile attacks on Baghdad—surely, this man will survive economic sanctions for another 6 months.

Meanwhile, what will occur if we wait another 6 months for sanctions to take hold? First, it will expose our forces and their equipment to some of the harshest conditions on Earth, including daytime temperatures of 140 degrees. This would diminish morale and our ability to use force at a later time. It would impose an especially undue burden on our Reservists and Guardsmen in the gulf.

Second, knowing that an attack is not imminent would give Saddam Hussein the ability to cut back his own military exercises and would, in fact, minimize the toll that sanctions would take on his military.

Third, waiting would give Saddam the ability to improve further the military fortifications on

his borders, meaning that, when sanctions are deemed to have failed, we will face a more entrenched foe and will put more American lives in jeopardy.

The same is true of Saddam Hussein's arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Does it make sense to give him another 6 months, another year, to produce more chemical weapons, to develop more biological weapons, to continue his work to develop nuclear weapons, so that he can then confront our forces with these additional tools of death?

No. The time is now to put the Congress on record in support of the United Nations and the President. The time is now to oppose dictators.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. THOMAS].

Mr. THOMAS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I believe that Saddam Hussein's aggression must be stopped and that is why I am supporting the Solarz-Michel resolution. As the President has said—it is not the United States against Iraq—it is Iraq against the world. Indeed, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously in favor of economic sanctions, and then after hostages were taken, to approve use of force to support those sanctions.

Like all Americans, I want a peaceful resolution of this problem. All involved are hopeful that the current military buildup and threat of force will encourage Hussein to pull out of Kuwait without conflict. But in order for this strategy to succeed, we must continue the pressure on Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait.

Supporting this resolution clearly does not preclude negotiation. There is still time to negotiate a peaceful settlement, though such a settlement must include a complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait. However, a time limit must be set or this standoff could go on for years, resulting in smaller countries who rely on Iraq oil lifting their sanctions, the continued plunder and starvation of the Kuwaiti citizens, and the escalation of costs. Nobody wants to go to war, but the only way to avoid it is to support the current aggressive stance which has brought results thus far.

If we fail to authorize use of force, Hussein will undoubtedly conclude he was won Kuwait forever. CIA Director William Webster has indicated that he believes Saddam Hussein is willing to endure economic hardship, even a subsistence economy, to outlast international efforts to make him leave Kuwait. Even if sanctions do bite, no one knows how long it will take or whether they will ever change Saddam's mind about being an aggressor. The CIA Director also made it clear that he feels Iraq can maintain its military power for an extended period even if the sanctions do work.

I do not want a war. None of us does. It is imperative, however, that we show Saddam Hussein and other potential aggressors that we and others in the world will not tolerate military solutions to their private problems. This resolution, and the U.N. resolution it so clearly supports, are necessary steps in convincing Saddam of that fact.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON].

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz amendment because, in my judgment, it does not require the use of force, but offers the best hope for a diplomatic solution to the Persian Gulf crisis by backing the U.N. resolution and the position of the multinational coalition.

Mr. Speaker, the choice presented by the resolutions offered today requires the most difficult, wrenching choice of my 8 years in Congress. This matter has weighed heavily upon me for many months.

During the holiday season this year, I watched families celebrate together and could not put aside the enormity of this decision for our Nation. I have listened to the concerns of the families in my district; I have pondered the implications of my vote and the consequences of the action we are about to take.

Mr. Speaker, it is my judgment that the best chance for peace and stability not only in the Middle East but throughout the world lies in casting my vote in support of the world community's position on this crisis, as expressed in the U.N. Resolution 678. Of the two measures presented today regarding the use of force, only the Michel-Solarz resolution is consistent with the U.N. position.

I believe the United States and the other members of the multinational coalition opposing Iraq's utterly unconscionable, brutal aggression have exercised restraint. I believe we will continue to exercise restraint beyond January 15 as long as authentic diplomatic possibilities for resolving the crisis exist. Surely, though Saddam Hussein has refused our effort to present our position to him, we will not undercut genuine diplomatic efforts of the United Nations, other Arab States, the Soviet Union, or the nations of the European Community as long as they exist.

But, if we vote today to undercut U.N. Resolution 678, how will diplomatic efforts have the backing needed to bring about a peaceful resolution? If we now place new conditions on an already clear and firm international position, what urgency will there be for Saddam Hussein to participate in any substantive effort to end the occupation of Kuwait?

Make no mistake, the U.N. resolution was not a vote to start a war on January 15. Neither is our vote today reaffirming that resolution a vote for war. But the United Nation recognized that, for diplomacy to work, the threat of force must be credible and the absolute, resolute unanimity of world opposition to the continued occupation of Kuwait clear. While the gentleman from Missouri's resolution is offered with the best intentions, it undercuts both the credibility of our commitment and the unity among nations and so would make peace harder to achieve.

I believe we must stand together with the world community, not in support of war, but in support of the most effective means of achieving peace—the clearly expressed message to Saddam Hussein that he faces grave consequences by not complying with the world's

call for his unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

Some of my colleagues have said that we must rely on waiting for economic sanctions to work. However, the embargo has thus far been at least 90-percent effective and still Saddam has not budged. Our best intelligence sources tell us that Iraq can weather the most effective embargo for many more months or even years, can increase its self-sufficiency over time, and will retain a per capita income far above that of neighboring nations. Both Egypt and Turkey continue to experience huge and painful economic disruptions as a result of participating in the embargo. The gentleman from New York who sponsored this resolution has pointed out that, even if sanctions are fully successful, Iraq's per capita income will still be twice that of Egypt and greater than Turkey's.

If we were to vote today to simply rely on sanctions not backed by the credible option of force, Saddam would have the luxury of ignoring diplomacy and concentrating on fortifying both his economic and military strength and maximizing the price paid by our allies. Saddam can use time as a weapon if the failure of diplomacy does not carry with it the risk of multinational commitment to other means to dislodge him from Kuwait, as the United Nations intended.

And let us put to rest the notion that we have acted simply in the interests of cheap oil. Not one of us would put our service men and women at risk for such a narrow purpose, and even those among us who oppose the size of our deployment have no basis to attribute such a cynical position to the President. It is not cheap oil we seek to protect, but the functioning of the world's economy which is dependent upon the Middle East's oil. Were Saddam Hussein willing to control it for his own benefit, the economic impact on the world would be devastating. The cost of Desert Shield is enormous but it is a fraction of the worldwide economic disruption that would ensue if the Middle East's resources were under control of one so arbitrary and ruthless as Saddam Hussein.

As the Washington Post said yesterday, does anyone think Saddam would not take heart from a vote that denies the President the option of using force in conformity with both national policy and international mandate? Let me emphasize that the Gephardt resolution is not in conformity with international mandate and so would weaken the U.S. position not only with Saddam Hussein but with our allies in the world who have aligned with us against Saddam.

Diplomacy must continue because the search for a settlement of this crisis must succeed if the interests of the world community are to be served. Time is not our ally, unity is. If we are truly unified as a Congress and as a nation with the world position, we must step forward today and affirm it. Thereafter, I would hope that other problems be addressed through a regional peace conference and long-term stability and hope be the true legacy of this crisis for the Middle East. I urge my colleagues to stand together in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. OXLEY].

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel amendment. I believe that peace through strength really works and will work in this case for peace.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Michel-Solarz, peace through strength resolution. Contrary to the contentions of some, this resolution is not a declaration of war. This resolution authorizes the use of force against Iraq only if and when the President informs the leaders of both Houses of Congress that sanctions and all other diplomatic efforts have proven futile in convincing Saddam Hussein to quit Kuwait.

As the President has said, Iraq sorely miscalculated the response of the world community. The unity of the international response has been unprecedented. The Michel-Solarz resolution simply endorses United Nations Resolution 678, authorizing the use of force against Iraq, should it prove necessary. The United Nations took a courageous stand. The U.S. Congress should do no less.

I do not want war, and I do not believe that President Bush wants war. However, the world community has been clear that Saddam Hussein can avert armed conflict by leaving Kuwait. The United Nations has passed 12 resolutions in this regard, yet he continues his occupation of Kuwait.

Some have argued that economic sanctions will force Saddam to comply with U.N. resolutions. Unfortunately, sanctions rarely, if ever, work. A full-scale embargo against Nicaragua could not change its totalitarian policies under Daniel Ortega, and 2 years worth of sanctions could not bring Manuel Noriega to his knees in Panama. Certainly, Iraq is more economically self-sufficient than Nicaragua or Panama, and Saddam is more brutal and dangerous than Ortega or Noriega.

Others have suggested that the United States should not lead the effort against Iraq. Japan, Germany, and other nations are more reliant on foreign oil than are we. However, this suggestion ignores the fact that military units from 28 countries are now directly involved in Operation Desert Shield or in the enforcement of sanctions. A total of 250,000 coalition troops have joined the 360,000 American troops in the gulf region. Moreover, about 80 percent of U.S. expenses through December 31, 1990—over \$6 billion—has been pledged or collected.

We have seen time and again during this century that appeasement will not buy lasting peace. We must not allow this body to become the Neville Chamberlain of the 1990's. And make no mistake, to give Saddam more months to consolidate his plunder of Kuwait without the threat of military force would be to appease him—but only temporarily. Like all tyrants, Saddam Hussein's ambitions know only the bound-

ary of vigorous military resistance. The language of force is the only language this bloodthirsty dictator understands.

Teddy Roosevelt said that the United States should speak softly and carry a big stick. We have a big stick, and Saddam still has not heeded our warning. He has not, because he does not believe that we will use the stick. He is watching today, to see if we will confirm his belief. It is time we raised the stick over our heads.

It is time Saddam understands that we want peace, but not at any price. If we must, we will act to liberate Kuwait. We will enforce peace through strength.

Over the past 3 days, we have heard numerous speakers lament the awful precedent which would be set for the new world order if we used force to dispel Saddam from Kuwait. My friends, think of the terrible precedent which is set if Saddam's illegal annexation of Kuwait is allowed to persist.

Yes, peace through strength has served our Nation well for over 200 years and it will again. I ask for your support for the Michel-Solarz bipartisan resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. RAMSTAD].

Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Speaker, because I truly believe this is the best course for a peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis, I rise in strong support of the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, today I rise to cast what could very well be the most difficult vote I will ever face. As one who saw the lives of three friends taken by the Vietnam war, I cast this vote with a heavy heart.

I have agonized long and hard over the best course of action to preserve peace in the Middle East while getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

There is a consensus in this country that Iraq's naked aggression must not be rewarded. If left unchecked, Saddam Hussein's quest for power and heinous atrocities will only turn to other targets.

The real debate is over how to best check this imperial dictator's aggression. In an area as strategically and economically vital to the United States as the Middle East, our choice is either to thwart that aggression now, or be forced to face it later.

Since the Iraqi invasion, I have strongly supported economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts to bring this crisis to a peaceful resolution. I have not supported the use of military force because I believe that these sanctions alone would work.

At this point, however, I believe our last best chance for peace is for Saddam Hussein to fully appreciate that the President of the United States has the full support of Congress to use military force to remove Iraq from Kuwait should diplomacy fail.

After much thought and careful deliberation, I am convinced that a credible threat of force is essential to a peaceful resolution of the Per-

sian Gulf crisis and a complete withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.

I have reached this conclusion following several briefings with the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a careful review of the testimony of the CIA Director. It is clear that neither diplomacy nor sanctions has a chance if the credible threat of military force is removed.

Accordingly, I have decided to support the bipartisan Michel-Solarz-Broomfield joint resolution which affirms Congress' support for the President and U.N. Resolution 678.

Unfortunately, we don't have unlimited time to rely exclusively on sanctions. Prolonging this crisis only works to the advantage of Saddam Hussein according to our intelligence, military, and diplomatic sources.

First, there are credible reports that Iraq could possibly have nuclear weapons in a matter of months. If we don't stop Hussein now, we will have to confront him later when the cost in American lives could be infinitely greater.

I cannot in good conscience vote to set the stage for our troops to become embroiled in a nuclear conflict when addressing this issue now could avoid it. We must not subject our Nation and the rest of the world to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein.

Second, military sources tell us that delay will only allow Saddam Hussein to further develop his military capacity. This would also add to the potential loss of life should we have to take military action later.

And finally, diplomatic sources tell us that the unprecedented international coalition of support behind our policy will begin to erode if other nations begin to doubt the resolve of the United States to see this crisis through.

Like all Americans, I do not want America to go to war. But as ironic as it may seem, if we wish to vote today for peace, we must vote to threaten war.

If Congress were to vote down the Michel-Solarz-Broomfield joint resolution, it would send a message to Saddam Hussein that he faces no serious consequences if he ignores the January 15 deadline set by the United Nations. With that assurance, he clearly would not have any incentive to negotiate, much less withdraw peacefully from Kuwait.

My vote today is not a vote for war in the gulf. Rather, as the resolution itself mandates, the President will not be authorized by Congress to use offensive military force until "the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations Security Council resolutions * * *."

I hope and pray there is no war. I firmly believe that a strong affirmative vote by Congress in support of the President will substantially improve the chances of achieving peace.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. NUSSLE].

Mr. NUSSLE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel resolution. It is vital to the security of our troops in the Gulf and our Nation that the United States sends a clear message to Saddam Hussein—that we will not

ignore his acts of aggression against Kuwait. If sanctions and other diplomatic efforts are to have a chance of working, Saddam Hussein must know that we have not closed any doors.

More importantly, Mr. Speaker, I believe that the most important goal of this special session of Congress is to ensure peace in the world. Our Nation must stand together with one clear and firm voice if we are to resolve this situation in a peaceful manner, and the Solarz-Michel resolution is our last best chance to achieve this goal.

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Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPENCE].

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. Speaker, a wise soul once said something to the effect that those who forget history are doomed to repeat it. This remark weighs heavily on my mind as we consider the situation before us. It prompts me to think of Neville Chamberlain who, so anxious for peace, came back from Munich where he had agreed to give in to Hitler's demands for a part of Czechoslovakia. Hitler had promised him that he wanted only this small part and nothing more. At the time, Chamberlain returned to wildly cheering crowds on the streets of London and in his own Parliament building, such as had never been heard there in some time. He had bought peace at the price of appeasement. His umbrella became the symbol of appeasement. A sadly, prophetic Winston Churchill remarked, "You were given the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have war." That's history; and let not our action today be our umbrella of appeasement.

As we all know, Chamberlain's efforts for "peace in our time" and his policy of negotiation with authoritarian states, rather than a concerted show of strength, led the peaceful world into the greatest conflagration yet known. Chamberlain later came to realize that the aggressor could not be appeased. His biography attests to his conversion but it was too late. Appeasement only whetted the appetite for more, more, more.

Reflecting upon this lesson in history, how long are we willing to wait for it to catch up with us again. Granted, there are slight differences between 1939 and the current crisis, but should Hussein be successful in his land grab, he, too, will only want more. His position will have been strengthened and he will be confident, that having stolen Kuwait, he will be able to take more. The West, as with Hitler 50 years ago, will not have had the resolve to stand firm against aggression, thereby having missed the opportunity to save the very lives that they were trying to save.

The world cannot again make the same mistakes that it made a half century ago. It must stand firm now against another tyrant in order to preserve the peace that it so desperately values.

Mr. Speaker, we must pass the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. HOBSON].

Mr. HOBSON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel bipartisan resolution.

Mr. Speaker, this is a unique time in world history. For the last 5 months, we have seen the world stand together and condemn the aggression of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Government. Never before has the world been so united against such a brutal transgression of the rights of a sovereign nation.

The resolutions before us today raise the question of whether Congress should grant the President the authority to use force if Saddam Hussein's forces do not leave Kuwait before January 15. I believe that in the effort for world peace this Congress must stand with the President and the world and support the U.N. Security Council resolution.

In light of Secretary Baker's disappointing meeting with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva this week, when Iraq refused to participate in any negotiations for an unconditional and nonmilitary resolution to this situation, it is more important than ever that the United States present a united front with the rest of the world. I believe the Solarz-Michel resolution is the best approach for a peaceful solution. A vote against this resolution would most certainly be interpreted by Saddam Hussein as evidence of division and paralysis in the world coalition.

By demonstrating our confidence in the U.N. policies, we will grant the President the trump card he needs to bring about peace. We can only negotiate peace from strength. Saddam Hussein is a dictator and, therefore, only understands power. He must know we are serious and will take every step necessary to stop the destruction of an independent country and the murder of an innocent people.

This Congress must send Saddam Hussein a clear message that this country will not tolerate naked aggression. We cannot permit Saddam Hussein to benefit from his brutalities—because if he does, he will surely strike again.

Clearly, none of us wants to go to war. We all pray that this situation is resolved peacefully. However, this vote today is not one to declare war, but to decide which is the best path toward peace. I believe this bipartisan resolution will give the President the power he needs to force Iraq out of Kuwait and is the best course to prevent bloodshed of our young men and women stationed in the Persian Gulf.

For these reasons, I support the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE].

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Speaker, because I believe it is the only opportunity we have for peace, I rise in strong support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SCHAEFER].

Mr. SCHAEFER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. Speaker, this debate and the following votes will undoubtedly be the most important of this Congress. Despite the gravity of the issue, the right course of action is clear. The only reasonable decision Congress can make is to support the President, and endorse the Michel-Solarz resolution. I do not make this decision lightly with a nephew on the front lines and another ready to go. The best chance for peace, in this the 11th hour, is to make credible to Hussein the threat that he faces the destruction of his army, as well as his government, if he fails to withdraw from Kuwait.

Congress has demanded a say in our policy toward Iraq. Now we are making that decision with the whole world looking on. Do we stand with the President and the world community, or do we falter, and allow Saddam Hussein to tighten his grip on Kuwait? There are those who want to give sanctions more time. When this crisis started, we were told that sanctions would yield results in 6 months.

Now we are told it will take more months or a year, or 2, while he continues to sneer at the nearly unanimous condemnation of his actions and eventually lead to a draft of our young men and women. Our own CIA Director informed us that the sanctions have been ineffective. I find it hard to believe that Hussein will succumb to economic pressure when he now ignores the threat from the nearly half a million troops massed against him on his border.

Our troops have sat in the desert for 5 months. How much longer should we keep them there? We all know of the hardships they face, as well as the special problems for those serving in the National Guard and Reserves. We have given Iraq every opportunity to reconsider its invasion. President Bush invited the Iraqi Foreign Minister to meet with him, and offered to send Secretary of State Baker to talk with Hussein, but these moves were rebuffed. Only recently did Iraq agree to the meeting between their Foreign Minister and Secretary Baker, but Iraq refused to even consider the demands of an outraged world. It is now time to give our President the authority to act decisively.

We must recognize that the Middle East is vital to America's interests, and that Hussein's brutal actions pose a direct threat to them. We must also understand that America must protect these interests, even with force. As a former marine, I know what this could entail, and do not take this position lightly. However, we cannot allow international lawlessness to go unpunished, let alone rewarded. With adoption of the Michel-Solarz resolution, the decision between war or peace will solely be that of Iraq.

It is time to act as one, and provide a united front to Hussein. I urge my colleagues to join our military, the American people, and world opinion in supporting the President. Thank you.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. BILIRAKIS].

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Speaker, because I, too, honestly feel that it is the best chance for peace, I will support

the Solarz-Broomfield-Michel bipartisan resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm support of the only resolution before us today that holds any chance of a peaceful solution—the Michel-Solarz resolution.

I would like nothing more than to put my faith in continued economic sanctions in the hope that they alone could force Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. However, the recent events in Geneva and the rhetoric from Baghdad have convinced me that this course cannot succeed.

I believe that Saddam still doubts the will of the international force on his borders to use armed force if necessary to liberate Kuwait, largely because he doubts the will of those of us in this Chamber to authorize the President of the United States to employ United States troops.

It is my deepest hope that passing the Michel-Solarz resolution today and giving the President that authority, will finally convince Saddam that we are, in fact, serious, that we are willing to stand up for the inviolability of recognized borders and the preservation of true, lasting peace.

I believe that Saddam understands only the language of power and strength; that he has no intention of giving up anything unless he is forced to do so and that diplomacy and sanctions mean nothing to this terror-monger and brutalizer of his own people, let alone those of other nations.

This authority, that contained in the Michel-Solarz resolution, speaks the language that Saddam understands. Furthermore, each day that we wait without sending this message to Saddam consigns the people of Kuwait to a living hell of near unimaginable proportions.

In a report of Iraqi human rights violations in Kuwait released by Amnesty International last month account after account of beatings, torture, and rapes are documented by eyewitnesses. The longer we wait, the less of Kuwait there will be to retrieve and rebuild. No, we must force Saddam to withdraw now.

Furthermore, it is important to recognize that this is not the last Congress will hear on this matter. Indeed, the Michel-Solarz resolution requires that before exercising the authority granted to him by the resolution, he shall provide the Speaker of the House and President pro tempore of the Senate a specific determination that all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the U.N. Security Council resolutions and that those means have not been and would not subsequently be successful.

The resolution further stipulates that the President shall submit to Congress a summary of his efforts in this regard every 60 days.

Mr. Speaker, it is only fair to point out that the President is not rushing to war. After all, he has tried again and again and again to meet with Saddam to try to come to a peaceful resolution and he has been ignored. Also, as we all know, the Iraqi Foreign Minister refused even to accept President Bush's letter in a last minute attempt for a peaceful solution.

The President will do all that he can to achieve our goals peacefully; that is plain. It is not our President who is rushing to war, but Saddam Hussein.

Finally, I would like to quote to you from a letter that I received yesterday. It was from Bob Radcliff, a good friend of mine who lives in Tampa, FL. In that letter, my friend included the words of his son, Roger, an Air Force colonel who flies A-10 ground attack planes and is currently in Saudi Arabia with Operation Desert Shield. His son wrote the following to him:

The machine that has been assembled here since August is unbelievable. No other nation in history could have pulled this off. You can't begin to appreciate the size of this effort unless you're here. Having said that, it will be one hell of a mess if this is allowed to drag on. We are not geared to sustain this effort over the long term. Even a draft won't get the people with the right training fast enough.

In the meantime, urge our Congress to support the President. Let's get this over with when the time is right.

Mr. Speaker, for the sake of the Nation, for the sake of world peace, I urge my colleagues to support the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Solarz-Michel resolution as the last best hope for peace and a strong, strong message that Perez de Cuellar can bring to Baghdad in the days ahead.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. DOOLITTLE].

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the President's policy in the Middle East and fully intend to vote in favor of a resolution authorizing the President to use military force against Iraq.

After careful consideration and based upon the opinions of knowledgeable foreign affairs specialists, I am persuaded that this resolution offers the best hope of averting armed conflict with the country of Iraq. I do not desire war and seek to avoid it. My vote is a vote for peace.

I have spoken personally with the President and have been briefed by his most senior advisors. Only by presenting a strong, unified front between the executive and legislative branches of our Government can we hope to avoid war. Congressional equivocation on this matter will induce Hussein to believe that President Bush is bluffing. He may then call the bluff, which would trigger the war.

The United States and the international community have responded to Iraq's aggression because of an alarming combination of dangers. First, there is the threat of terrorism against our own citizens. Because Hussein has threatened to retaliate against innocent Americans if there is U.S. military action in the Middle East, the State Department has issued a strong warning against American travel abroad, broader geographically than any warning since World War II.

Second, there is the chilling prospect of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies. If we do not repel him, he will gain control over almost half the world's oil. Regardless of price, we cannot risk such domi-

nance by a regime which flagrantly ignores international rules of peaceful coexistence.

Third, there is the undeniable threat of greater Iraqi aggression, particularly against Israel. When asked if Iraq would attack Israel should Iraq be attacked by any nation, Iraq's Foreign Minister replied, "Absolutely, yes." Surely we cannot ignore such an explicit statement against such a good ally of the United States.

Hussein has made it clear that he is prepared to take great risks. It is now up to us in Congress to convince him that he has miscalculated and that this risk is too great for him to proceed with his plan to stay in Kuwait. By taking strong legislative action now, we may be able to avert strong military action later in the Middle East. Let's hope that congressional passage of this resolution causes Hussein to rethink his position.

In the meantime, my prayers are with the President and for our Armed Forces stationed in Saudi Arabia.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel resolution. I think it is the last best hope for peace.

Mr. Speaker, recent reports reveal that Iraq may have intended to invade Saudi Arabia and capture that oil-rich nation after its cruel seizure of Kuwait. We already know that he clearly intended to attack the United Arab Emirates. All of Iraq's threat against Kuwait included the U.A.E.

Yesterday's Financial Times newspaper reported that the Iraqi Government bought satellite photography of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia just 3 months before Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait.

This new information seems to confirm earlier reports that Iraqi military units had crossed the Saudi Arabian border on three occasions after having seized Kuwait.

And, this new information shows that Iraq planned the invasion of Kuwait, and probably Saudi Arabia, well in advance of the August military operation, long before he promised King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Mubarak of Egypt, and others that he would not invade Kuwait.

The detailed photography provided Iraq with sensitive information about roads, infrastructure, and other facilities in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

It is likely that the Iraqi military strategists found the sensitive photos invaluable for assessing potential targets in both nations when they planned and carried out their invasion of Kuwait.

The Iraqi purchase of satellite imagery was made from Spot-Image, a privately owned French company with ties to the French Government.

Despite Saddam Hussein's claim that he invaded Kuwait because of historic claims to that country and a disagreement with Kuwait over oil production levels, the truth is that the Iraqi dictator probably intended to capture Saudi Arabia as well and thereby control 65 percent of the world's oil production capacity.

It is clear also that his claim that he did all of it for Palestine is a bold-faced lie.

In light of this new information, it is clear that Saddam Hussein's decision to invade Kuwait was premeditated and may have included the intention to seize Saudi Arabia.

We now have additional justification for supporting the President's decision to stand firm against Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia.

Making satellite photography available to a dictator is unwise and may have contributed to the speed of Iraq's seizure of Kuwait. We should work with the French Government in an effort to better control such sensitive photography and further restrict the export of sensitive technology both by this country and our allies.

[From the Financial Times, Jan. 11, 1991]

IRAQ BOUGHT SATELLITE PICTURES OF KUWAIT
(By Lionel Barber)

Iraq bought high-definition satellite photographs of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from a French company specializing in photo-reconnaissance three months before the August 2 invasion.

The pictures contained sensitive information about roads, infrastructure and other installations helpful to a potential aggressor. Despite this, Spot-Image, a Toulouse-based business with close links to the French government and the US department of defence, went ahead with the sale.

The last batch of photographs was delivered to Baghdad on May 2 last year, and formed part of a contract signed in 1988 to provide satellite data.

Mr. Gerard Brachet, Spot-Image's chairman, who was in Washington this week, defended the deal with Baghdad in an interview with the Financial Times: "Iraq was not an unusual customer or one which commanded special attention."

Spot-Image is the privately owned sales company for the French government's heavily subsidized satellite programme. It is supplying the Pentagon and other clients in the multinational coalition with photographs of the Gulf region.

Out of a total 20 pictures delivered by Spot, "five, three or seven" were deemed sensitive by the company.

These overlapping photographs of the targeted areas in the region, taken from two different perspectives, allowed the Iraqis to look at territory and installations to map a route for an invasion and identify potential points of resistance from Kuwaiti defences.

Satellite experts in Washington say that civil customers interested in exploring land for urban planning only require pictures from one angle. Military clients want pictures from two or three perspectives to gain an impression of the height of structures and the physical dimensions of potential targets.

This tends to confound Iraq's claim at the time of the invasion that its move was unpremeditated and was instead provoked by Kuwaiti intransigence on issues such as oil production levels and outstanding loans to Baghdad.

Spot was sufficiently alarmed by the Iraqi request for data on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia that it subsequently halted future deliveries to its customer in Baghdad, the National Remote Sensing Centre, a front organisation for the Iraqi government. Asked if he had passed on details of the Iraqi request to French or US authorities, both of whom would have viewed it as potentially critical intelligence, Mr. Brachet said: "I doubt that;

I am not aware of anything we did, but I am not saying anything against information you have."

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. PURSELL].

Mr. PURSELL. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution and congratulate its leadership as a united front with the President and the United Nations.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel resolution in an effort to strengthen our 11th-hour peace efforts in the Persian Gulf. The President, Congress, and the United Nations, solidly united at this moment in history, puts us on the best path for peace. As we approach the U.N. deadline for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, it is important that the international community remain united in its support for the U.N. sanctions and the Security Council resolutions.

Solarz-Michel is the best means for keeping pressure on Saddam Hussein and, without that pressure, the chances of a peaceful withdrawal are unlikely. Support for President Bush's unprecedented accomplishment in putting together an international coalition calling for a peaceful solution, as well as support for the U.N. process and U.N. efforts, is critical at this late date. This resolution sends a message to Hussein that this weekend's meeting with the U.N. Secretary General may be his best chance for peace. It also strengthens any other international efforts toward a negotiated settlement—which remains our first priority.

Hussein's decision to act with force and dismember a sovereign Arab State comes at a critical time in world history, a time when post-cold-war relationships and alliances are being defined. During this crisis, the international community must stand united against acts of aggression like that carried out by Iraq.

Last Sunday I met with the families of Jackson's 1461st National Guard unit, now serving in Saudi Arabia. They know firsthand of the sacrifices being made. I remain deeply concerned about our brave men and women in uniform, as well as their families.

No one wants this crisis resolved through military conflict. Diplomacy is the preferred option. Unfortunately, Saddam Hussein will not respect diplomacy unless it is backed by our forceful resolve.

My prayer, like so many others, continues to be that our resolve will not be tested.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BENTLEY].

Mrs. BENTLEY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution on the basis that this is our best way to proceed right now, and it is with a heavy heart that I do it right now.

Mr. Speaker, today I speak with a heavy heart after listening for many hours these past few days to my colleagues who have spoken so intensely and sincerely on the crisis that has unfolded over the past 5 months. After hearing all sides of the debate, I am firmly convinced that each and every Member of this body has spoken from his or her heart. During

this period, I've been talking nonstop with my constituents, each one of which has a valuable pearl of wisdom to offer.

One constituent of mine who is opposed to military action is a World War II veteran who lost a brother in that war and whose son served honorably in Vietnam. There was another who voiced her support for using any and all available means of neutralize Saddam Hussein's war fighting capability. Others have expressed concern about the notion of extending sanctions indefinitely and what that would mean for our troops in the desert. Perhaps the most persuasive call that I received, however, was from a member of the National Guard associated with the 290th Military Police Unit, from my district—poised only a few miles from the Iraqi border. The message that he delivered from his colleagues in the gulf was that they wanted the Congress to support the President.

As such, Mr. Speaker, I plan to support the bipartisan joint resolution that is being offered today because in this hour, I believe it imperative that the Congress of the United States send our troops and Saddam Hussein a unified message of resolve and support.

I wish that Congress had engaged in a debate over this serious issue many months ago—but it never happened. We are now at a crossroads. This is not the time for Congress to speculate about armored tactics. Nor should this body offer pronouncements about who should or should not have blinked. With only 3 days to the deadline, this is not the appropriate time to be second guessing the President.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. MARTIN].

Mr. MARTIN. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution. I want to commend in particular the Speaker and the majority leader for their commitment that today we leave this Chamber united.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. PAXON].

Mr. PAXON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER].

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to war and in strong support of President Bush and the bipartisan compromise to ensure that we do not have to go to war.

Mr. Speaker, the decision to commit America to war is one of the most difficult and painful votes that Congress will ever take. However, for a host of reasons, President Bush's policy in the gulf must be supported. This is not simply a question of protecting the world's oil supplies. Indeed, if it were, I could not support the President's position. It is also not just a question of defending an ally or stopping world aggression.

Instead, it is a combination of all of the above and more. One analyst has pointed out

that "This is not just someone who wants a leading role in the Middle East, but someone trying to establish dominance of the Arab world." Today, Saddam Hussein is a threat to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Israel, and all of the other countries in the region. If left unchecked, Saddam will pose a threat to the entire world because of his chemical and nuclear weapons coupled with missiles to deliver them around the globe. He is also responsible for some of the most heinous human rights violations ever.

Some have argued that sanctions will do the job. It is still possible that they may damage Iraq's economy. However, Iraq was able to suffer through 8 years of war with Iran and endure the chronic shortages and sacrifices that the effort entailed. We are fooling ourselves if we believe that 6 months or a year of sanctions alone would compel Saddam to give up his newly won prize.

In addition, news reports have suggested that Iraq is already circumventing the embargo. German companies have shipped chemicals and oil supplies through third countries. India has provided food aid to Iraq. And just Monday, a Soviet freighter loaded with military supplies was intercepted in the gulf.

The Associated Press reported this week that 1,000 Soviet advisers had decided to stay in Iraq because the economic conditions were so much better than in the U.S.S.R. What does this say for the effectiveness of the sanctions so far?

Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that war is inevitable. There is still time for Saddam Hussein to see the light. Like many of my colleagues, I held out hope that international sanctions against Iraq would succeed in forcing Saddam Hussein's military out of Kuwait. But I am no longer convinced that sanctions can work by themselves.

Given the outcome of Wednesday's meeting between Secretary Baker and the Iraqi foreign minister, it appears that the only way Saddam Hussein is going to leave Kuwait without going to war is if he is convinced that the United States and our coalition partners will use overwhelming force to achieve our objective. He must be convinced of our resolve. It does not mean that war is the only solution. It does not mean we are abandoning sanctions. Rather, we are giving the President the added leverage to achieve a diplomatic solution and reign in the maniacal ambitions of Saddam Hussein.

Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan package which provides us with the best hope for peacefully removing Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, it has often been said over the past few days that the votes we cast today will be the most significant any of us will have to make. There is no question that we have an awesome responsibility and one that strikes home for me. My grandson, Drew Miller, has been deployed to the Persian Gulf since August aboard the Navy hospital ship, U.S.S. *Comfort*. Having a family member in the gulf gives this decision a personal dimension that weighs heavily; at the same time, I know all of us here today value the lives of each and every one of those

men and women who have volunteered to serve in our Armed Forces.

I will be voting for the Michel-Solarz resolution, and I do so because I believe it is the only way we can uphold our Nation's interests and achieve our objectives without going to war. Demonstrating that the Nation is united with the President in his determination that Iraq's aggression must be reversed, that the legislative branch will back the President in threatening the use of force, offers the best hope of convincing Saddam Hussein that he must withdraw from Kuwait. I do not believe my grandson, nor any of the other service men and women who have been sent to the gulf, would want to come home without accomplishing what they had been sent to do. We must give the President the authority he needs to implement the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, this is possibly the most important moment of any of our careers in the Congress—it is a solemn, serious moment—these are perhaps the most important votes any of us will ever cast. What we do here today may well determine the prospects for war or peace now and for years to come. None of us wants war. It is not only the opponents of the bipartisan resolution who shudder at the image of young Americans losing their lives in the desert.

But the issue is not just what happens if we pass this resolution—the issue is also what happens if we do not pass it.

Saddam Hussein believes the Congress of the United States lacks the will to stop his aggression. This is our last hope to convince him that his only chance for survival is to pull his invading army out of Kuwait. Sanctions will not force him to pull out. The lack of fresh vegetables in the markets will not sway a dictator who has used chemical and biological weapons against his own people and who was willing to endure hundreds of thousands of casualties in the war with Iran. This—this show of resolve to stand against aggression—is our last chance to keep the peace.

We had the same opportunity when the Germans marched into Czechoslovakia and the world did nothing. Our wishful thinking led to an escalation of aggression and miscalculation which resulted in 12 million deaths.

My friends, you are distancing yourselves from the reality of what is happening in Kuwait—the torture too hideous to describe, the murders of parents in front of their children. We need to end the tyranny of this Iraqi dictator.

Let us not be the Neville Chamberlains of our day. Let us show that we have learned the lessons of history. Let us stop this cancer now before it

spreads and the entire world is threatened by Iraq's nuclear and chemical weapons.

Let us in this Congress not show timidity and indecision while half a million brave young men and women in the Arabian desert show the courage and the will to stop aggression and to build a future in which dictators will know that free nations will not tolerate aggression and murder and rape and torture. Today we shape the future. Let us have the courage to do it wisely. We must vote for this resolution. Let us do so today and send a clear message to the world.

What message will we send? Opponents of this resolution refer to our troops as kids. Well, they certainly are young, as were the young soldiers who fought against Hitler. They are not kids. They are dedicated, committed young Americans who understand—and who have told many of us, in words far more eloquent than those spoken on this floor today—that Saddam Hussein cannot, must not, be allowed to get away with this aggression, and who fear for a world in which such aggression goes unanswered. They know far more of them will be at risk tomorrow if we do not act today. Today, let us live up to the trust they have put in us to share the ideals and the courage they exemplify so well.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. PENNY].

Mr. PENNY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Solarz substitute.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. YATES].

Mr. YATES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the resolution under consideration for many reasons, and particularly those stated so eloquently and analytically by my good friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Washington [Mrs. UNSOELD].

Mrs. UNSOELD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I am saddened and disappointed that we voted down the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution; we did not have the will to stay the course. We did not have the patience to put the screws on Iraq steadily, resolutely, and with strength. We did not have patience to exhaust all other options to achieve our goals before selecting the ultimate option: war. We were afraid that the morale of our men and women would be eroded, so we chose war.

Twenty-seven years ago, Congress approved the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that declared our goal, "To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia." Today this body again adopting a resolution of war with the stated intent of bol-

stering the prospects for peace. We have given authority to one person—one person alone—to take this Nation into war. I can only hope the President will use this authority wisely, but I fear that we have learned nothing between then and now.

I fear that we are about to choose tears and pain and mangled bodies; I fear that we are choosing burned flesh and children losing their fathers—and yes, their mothers, too; I fear that we are choosing the putrid stench of death.

Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, "Violence never brings permanent peace. It solves no social problems; it merely creates new and more complicated ones." Peaceful means to force an Iraqi withdrawal remain, and I urge our President to explore them fully.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. OAKAR].

□ 1430

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this resolution. My friends, the moment of truth is here. Each Member can never go back. Make no mistake, a vote for this resolution places war as the first option, not the last option, and we abdicate the congressional checks of power our constitutional forefathers warned citizens about. We give one person supreme authority—the President—insulated by a handful of military advisers, all because a 6-hour meeting did not work out, and because of the lack of resolve to let the international sanctions work, to squeeze out Saddam politically and economically, and they are working.

So examine closely the U.N. resolution which these authors want Members to endorse. It authorizes all means of force. It requests all countries to provide appropriate support for these actions. But will all countries participate in military force and all means possible? The answer is no. Only a handful of countries are participating in Saudi Arabia right now.

I was not elected by Europe, Japan, or Saudi Arabia. I was elected by the American people. In reality, the President has personalized this and made this America against Iraq, and not the world against Iraq. Irrespective of what the U.N. resolution says, it is the American people who are picking up the tab. Essentially, the American taxpayer is paying to protect the world's oil, \$2 billion a month, without a shot fired. It will go up as combat begins. This has led the United States into a recession, costing thousands of jobs of our own people. We cannot even get Japan and other countries to pay their pledged share.

And whose sons and daughters, fathers and mothers lives will be on the line when the war breaks out? American lives, and the lives of the middle-class and the moderate income people in this country. I visited the troops of Saudi Arabia. Let Members be honest:

The lion's share of those troops, 400,000 strong, are Americans. These young people are among our best and our brightest. They are loyal and patriotic. Can we afford to drain our country of its most valuable resource, its youth? Can we afford the estimated thousands of lives lost, when our goals are confused? And can we afford to destroy ourselves as a country, internally, with the loss of our people's lives?

The division in this country will be more insidious than the war itself. The divisions in this country have already begun. It is time we said "America first."

Finally, what are the consequences of war for America and the world? Today, with the deafening silence on the part of the administration about a national energy policy for our own energy security, we see the Soviet troops marching into Lithuania and the Baltic countries, the unrest in the Asian provinces of the Soviet Union, the civil unrest, unjust trials in China, the extreme tensions in the Middle East, the disparity of wealth, and poverty of the people in Africa and Central America.

If war breaks out, there will be no surgical strike for Saddam Hussein. There will be a world war of untold dimensions.

All of our dreams for world peace will have been shattered because of the failure to negotiate and let the sanctions work. The American people's future, the world's destiny is in your hands. It is essential that we understand that we are the people's House. It is appropriate that we have the last vote on this issue. Let Members uphold the Constitution and think of our people for a change. Vote "no" on the Solarz-Michel resolution which I believe will lead our country into war, and vote for the American people.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by thanking our colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] and so many of our other colleagues, as well as the leadership of this House for bringing Members back to a constitutional form of government.

It has been said many times today that this is a historic day, and truly it is, but we must remember why it is. Because either we will declare a war or we will not, because the vote that we are about to cast is all that stands between war and peace.

This declaration of war is the final piece in a plan to rid the world of Saddam Hussein. For that is the intent, not just the liberation of Kuwait. That goal can only be achieved by war. War in Kuwait and war in Iraq. Not a war of surgical strikes, but a war requiring surgeons. A war in the air, and a war on the ground.

This is the beginning of a war and a burden that will not be shared by our allies. With this declaration of war on Iraq, the coalition is already weakening. This is an American declaration of war. No other member and no other parliament of the international coalition will take such action. This resolution is a declaration of war, is an admission of the utter and final failure of diplomacy. War cannot be chosen because of frustration, impatience or anger. War can be chosen only when all the hopes for alternative resolution have been exhausted. We have not reached that fateful division in the road.

The Solarz-Michel resolution slams the door on diplomacy by raising the provocation that will unquestionably necessitate Saddam Hussein's renewed resistance to the threat of war. Passage of this resolution gives one man, the President, the sole decision to take this Nation to war. He will never have to come to this Chamber to make the compelling argument that all economic sanctions and diplomatic efforts have failed. A compelling argument, a case that the soldiers and their families deserve, from the President. He has not made that case, and that compelling case cannot be made today.

Virtually every witness who testified before the House and Senate committees told Members that the sanctions are working, and that they are extracting a terrible price on the economy of the war-making capacity of Iraq. Diplomatic efforts have not been exhausted by a 6-hour meeting in Geneva.

The President has said he will defy public opinion, he will defy our allies, and he will defy this Congress. That he, alone, has the power to make that decision, when and where and how to initiate war, and this declaration of war gives him that authority. But we, we all will live with the results of that decision for a decade or more long after George Bush leaves the White House. A decision to expend tens of billions of tax dollars on a war, that we do not have; a decision to triple an already handicapped economy, with tens of billions of dollars in additional debt; a decision to forego the efforts to improve health care and crime prevention and drug prevention because we will not have the resources, even to consider these programs, because of this war; a decision, more importantly, to commit tens of thousands of young persons to an occupation and peacekeeping force in the Saudi sands, while the young talent and the young people of our economic competitors are fulfilling their ambitions and their aspirations, and expanding their competitive advantage over our Nation.

War may only last a few weeks or a few months. I can tell Members that 30 years ago John Kennedy stood 100 yards from this floor and warned Members to "Never fear to negotiate." Even

when Soviet missiles just 90 miles away presented a true threat to our national security, endless, endless efforts were expended, both publicly and secretly, to stop war, to negotiate a settlement, so that all parties could participate privately, secretly, publicly, and successfully when missiles were 90 miles from the shores of this Nation.

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Today we have a crisis halfway around the world, backed by an unprecedented international alliance. We must not fear to give an opportunity to these current diplomatic efforts that will be crushed by a declaration of war and will be crushed by the war that ensues. By voting not to declare war today, we hold open the option for peace. By voting for war, we very well may preclude the possibility of peace. I would hope that we would reject this resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the gentlewoman from Tennessee [Mrs. LLOYD].

Mrs. LLOYD. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution, which authorizes the President to use force, if necessary, to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. I believe that Congress must send Saddam Hussein a clear and unequivocal message that unless he complies with the United Nations resolutions he will pay a very heavy price. If Congress is willing to stand by the President and back up the international coalition confronting Saddam Hussein, peace remains possible.

If Congress fails to send a message of strength and solidarity, Saddam Hussein will be encouraged to dig in his heels and remain in Kuwait. He will continue his search for ways to fracture the international coalition so painstakingly assembled by President Bush. The disparate nature of the coalition makes it extremely fragile. We cannot guarantee that it will remain together for the indeterminate amount of time it might take for sanctions to work. And that's assuming Saddam Hussein can be compelled by the hardships sanctions impose upon his people to withdraw from Kuwait. Given the brutality of his rule, his complete contempt for human life, and his willingness to employ weapons of mass destruction against his own people, I doubt very much that the hardships experienced by the Iraqi people will force him from Kuwait.

We must also be concerned with Saddam Hussein's next move if he is allowed to keep Kuwait. Saddam Hussein's appetite for power and territorial aggrandizement will only be whetted by a success in Kuwait. His expressed desire to unite the Arab world under his leadership, his desire to control the wealth and resources of the Gulf States, and his clear willingness to use force to achieve these aims will undoubtedly bring him into conflict with the United States sometime in the future. If we fail to act now, we may be forced to confront Saddam Hussein alone and when he has had the chance to expand his already awesome military arsenal to include nuclear weapons. The

cost of confronting him then will be much higher than the cost we are contemplating today.

I would like to address an issue that has been raised by critics of the President's policy. They have suggested that by confronting Saddam Hussein with the threat of force, we will hand victory to the radical forces in the Middle East and America's long-term interests in the region will be jeopardized. My colleagues, Saddam Hussein and his terrorist allies are the radical forces of the Middle East. They are already challenging American interests in the Middle East. The moderate forces, like Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, are part of the coalition confronting Saddam Hussein. If we permit Saddam Hussein to retain Kuwait, the forces that the President's critics fear will have already won.

Mr. Speaker, by supporting the President and sending a clear message to Saddam Hussein that America stands shoulder to shoulder with its allies against his aggression, we are preserving the last best chance for peace. I urge my colleagues to support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. THOMAS].

Mr. THOMAS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz resolution.

It is my fervent hope that my vote will give the President one last tool to secure a peaceful solution on this crisis. But I fear that Saddam Hussein has made it clear he does not want peace. So I cast my vote with the understanding that it amounts to a declaration of war.

I have no illusion that war, if it comes, will produce a swift and happy ending. It will be a tragedy. It will cost lives abroad in the field of battle and quite likely cost lives at home through terrorism. The Arab world will not love us when this is over. Our allies will second-guess us. We will not be spared a financial burden in the future.

But I have had to ask myself two questions. What would happen if Saddam Hussein is allowed to dominate the wealth of the Middle East and thereby spend this decade shopping in the arms bazaar of the world? My answer is that he would become a strategic threat to my Nation and my State.

My second question is whether our young men and women in uniform would be in more or less danger if we allow the sanctions to work for another year or more. My answer is that Saddam Hussein will starve his people to feed his military, and a delay gives him time to win new allies and manufacture more nerve gas and biological weapons. So it we are to save American lives in the long term, we must move now.

I want to reiterate that this is not a war over oil. It is not a war over the price of a gallon of gas. It would be immoral for the President or the Congress to send the American military into combat for some degree of comfort at home or to boost our national economy. If I thought that was the President's motivation, I would vote to impeach him. If that were my motivation, I should resign my office in shame.

But the wealth that would flow from control over half the world's oil for years to come is what would transform Saddam Hussein from

being just another petty tyrant into the unchecked commander of a nuclear arsenal. We decide today if we will stop him now when he is weak, or pass to my children or their children the task of stopping him when he is strong.

This has not been an easy decision for me because I have thousands of constituents and countless friends deployed in the desert. I hope and pray to God that I have made the right choice.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. SWETT].

Mr. SWETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the Michel-Solarz resolution, not to give the President the marching orders to go to war, but to strengthen his hand in negotiating for a peaceful solution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution and the U.N. Resolution 678. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait over 5 months ago. President Bush, in my opinion, acted decisively and wisely. He garnered the cooperation of 28 countries, and obtained the endorsement of the Security Council of the United Nations to use military force to expel Saddam Hussein and his forces by January 15, if he did not withdraw or initiate a withdrawal action by that date; 82 percent of Americans approved of his initial action according to polls.

There have been a number of initiatives to encourage Saddam Hussein's peaceful withdrawal before this January 15 deadline, and we remain hopeful that these will work. President Bush offered Iraq 15 different dates for a meeting in Baghdad, or elsewhere, between Secretary Baker and Saddam—none was accepted, and time is running out.

On January 3, President Bush made his last attempt to avoid war by inviting the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to meet with Secretary Baker in Geneva. The meeting took place on Wednesday, January 9. This meeting was made subject to the same conditions, which are: No negotiations; no compromise; no attempts for an Iraqi face-saving; and no rewards for aggression.

To date, there has been little if any movement on Iraq's behalf. Minister Aziz even refused to take President Bush's letter back to Saddam Hussein, which was delivered in Geneva on January 9.

Secretary Baker and Secretary Cheney on Wednesday, January 2, briefed several Members and myself on the current status. Secretary Baker has publicly said that he is not optimistic about peace in the gulf. The leadership of the House and Senate had said that full scale debate should not occur until after the Baker-Aziz meeting and we are not engaging in that debate, which in my opinion is timely.

In this briefing, Secretary Cheney and Secretary Baker told the Congress that the coalition of 28 countries is holding together—currently there are 280,000 American troops and 150,000 prepared to embark or already underway, with 200,000 foreign troops in place. Our

allies have committed \$23 billion toward support in 1990, and Secretary Baker is requesting additional funding for 1991. I agree very strongly with the administration that America cannot and should not bear the major financial burden of this conflict.

On Friday, January 4, I was visited by former hostage Miles Hoffman from Columbus, GA. He was the only American wounded by Iraqi soldiers, held captive, and thankfully was released. In this meeting, Mr. Hoffman was accompanied by three other former hostages—Mr. and Mrs. Christopher Folsom of New York, and Mr. Cecil Brown of Atlanta, who were released in December.

I had a very interesting conversation with this group. The former hostages advised me:

First, that we should not drag the negotiations out. We should strike forcefully in Baghdad, or other areas of Iraq, and temporarily ignore Kuwait where Iraqi troops are amassed; we should destroy Iraq's communication and command centers, and cut off their supply routes—in effect, isolate Iraq's forces in Kuwait.

Second, it is their impression that the Iraqi troop morale is not high, and that they will largely collapse in the face of a massive strike—a small number have already defected. Intelligence sources have publicly repeated expectations that up to 200,000 Iraqi defections will occur.

Third, according to them, sanctions are not working—and will not work. Food and other supplies are entering Iraq unrestricted from Jordan and Iran, and goods are being smuggled in through Turkey. It is suspected that Libya and other sympathetic countries are sending hard currency to Saddam as a share of their oil profits. This money enables him to buy needed goods. In addition, Iraq does have an agricultural capability, which they are accelerating.

Mr. Speaker, there are those who want to give sanctions more time to work, and there are those who believe that if we were to wait for more time we would be giving up an essential edge to our strategy. In my opinion, each view on this very important matter is sincerely held, and debate on this issue should occur.

Miles Hoffman pointed out that Saddam will not understand the concept of democratic debate. Mr. Hoffman said that the people of Iraq do not understand the debate that goes on * * * because in Iraq, anything against Saddam Hussein is a death sentence. So it is very important for us on the floor today and tomorrow to show our resolve, and to show America's will to carry out the U.N. sanctions.

However, I would suggest to my colleagues who are raising the specter of thousands of U.S. casualties and body bags coming home that they are rendering a serious disservice to the families who have loved ones deployed in the Persian Gulf. My colleagues, I would urge that we refrain from the use of such rhetoric. Our service people and their loved ones know the risks—let us not make their lives even more uncomfortable than they already are.

My view is that the President has the authority to engage American troops in an offensive action without a declaration of war from Congress. There have been over 105 offen-

sive military actions in our Nation's history and only 5 declarations of war.

However, I concur in the fact that the Congress should debate the issue as we are doing now, and at a minimum endorse the U.N. Security Council's action. That resolution, No. 678, authorizes an offensive action against Iraq after January 15 by United States and U.N. forces. I hope that such a measure is accepted here in the House, and it will be my intention to support the Solarz-Michel resolution and to work for a strong vote in support of the President.

I do believe, very strongly, that we should move positively after January 15, if Saddam has refused to cooperate. The perception of the constituents in the Third District of Georgia is that the President and the United Nations have drawn a line in the sand, and that this commitment must be respected. President Bush and the United Nations have not waived from the statement that "Iraq must withdraw with no rewards for aggression," and I would support our carrying through on this demand.

If the Iraqi forces do withdraw, and this appears doubtful at this time, it is most likely that U.N. forces will remain in sufficient numbers indefinitely to assure that no further aggressive activity will occur by Saddam Hussein. There is no doubt that he will be up to further mischief in one form or another in the future. However, that issue will require debate on another day.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GEREN].

Mr. GEREN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution. It is the last best hope for a just peace.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the very distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. SPRATT].

Mr. SPRATT. Mr. Speaker, I envy those who come to this well clear and certain about their vote. I am torn by mine. I understand that sanctions may not work their purpose, but for now, I think they work in our favor. I understand that diplomacy has not worked; but I am not persuaded that diplomacy has played out.

Mr. Speaker, I do not think we should rush to war.

But if Congress fails to give the President the authority the Security Council gave when it passed Resolution 678, we will weaken his hand just as diplomacy is getting dead earnest. Hamilton-Gephardt urges the President to apply "diplomatic pressure," and I wholeheartedly agree. But the President has made the only diplomatic concession he can make: he has promised not to attack if Iraq pulls out of Kuwait. The only pressure the President can now apply is the threat of war; and we will muffle that threat if we do not give approval to Resolution 678.

Like many, I am voting for Solarz-Michel because it urges the President to keep trying diplomacy, while giving him the authority he needs to make his diplomacy credible. I wish the resolution were stronger in this respect. I am opposed to immediate military action; I think January 15 should be a starting line, not a deadline, for serious diplomacy. But I have

no illusions about the language of this resolution; as it is written, we can only trust that the President will use the power we grant him to step up diplomacy before stepping up to war.

This debate, like most debates, has stressed the differences in these two resolutions. In truth, they converge on every important point but one: Solarz-Michel gives the President the power to wage war without further action of the Congress; Gephardt-Hamilton makes the President obtain a declaration of war, but promises him an expedited vote. If Gephardt-Hamilton were to pass, and if diplomacy continued to fail, I am convinced the President would be back to us in a matter of weeks, seeking the authority to wage war. I think the President would win that vote. But I doubt the Iraqis will get that message. I think they will see it as a sign our will is weakening. And at this juncture, I do not think we should send that sign. I also do not think we should go to war yet; and I vote for this resolution hoping it will avert war, but fully appreciating the awesome power we are giving the President.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield 5 minutes to the very distinguished gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SLATTERY].

Mr. SLATTERY. Mr. Speaker, the debate today has made me proud to be an American and proud to be a Member of the U.S. Congress House of Representatives. I thank my colleagues for the quality of the debate to this point.

The Bible tells us that there is a time for everything under the heavens, a time for peace and a time for war. I do not believe that it is time for war, and I pray that war will be avoided; but I do believe that the real threat of war, as paradoxical as it may seem, is our last best chance for peace in the Persian Gulf.

Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator. He has personally carried out the death sentences of his political opponents. The sad truth is that he understands but one thing, and that is force. He must be convinced that the threat of force is real. Otherwise, he will have no motivation to accept peace.

Edmund Burke once said that the only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing. I do not want history to say of us that we did nothing.

Only by giving the President the authority to use force pursuant to our Constitution do we make the threat of force real. If Saddam Hussein knows we will not use force to drive him from Kuwait, he can simply wait for the world coalition to collapse around him, and we all know that this coalition is very tenuous.

With the passage of this resolution, he must make a choice, either withdraw from Kuwait or face a reprisal from an outraged world community, and justly so. The choice is his.

I recently returned from the Persian Gulf. I left on that trip hoping that economic sanctions alone would work.

I was inclined to deny the President the authority to use force at this time.

I returned with a strong view that economic sanctions are not working as I had hoped, and there are real dangers involved in an indefinite delay.

Several days ago a Soviet ship was intercepted carrying missile launchers to Jordan. Undoubtedly they eventually would have found their way into Iraq.

Imagine what would happen in the Persian Gulf if Soviet policy changes while we wait on economic sanctions to work.

Scientists and engineers from around the world, whose loyalty goes to whoever pays them the most, are working day and night as we debate here to help improve those god-awful weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

I am absolutely convinced that by indefinitely delaying, we increase the dangers that young Americans will ultimately confront.

Few in this Chamber believe the United States can act as a policeman in the world. The primary question we must always ask is whether proposed military action is necessary to defend America's vital interests.

Saddam Hussein has the potential to develop and use chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and he has demonstrated the willingness to use them. He also has the potential to put an economic stranglehold on the world economy by manipulating the price of oil.

My colleagues, his threat is real to our vital interests, and to stop him our threat must also be real. Saddam Hussein will not see our threat as real until Congress gives the President the authority to use force.

It is difficult in a democracy such as ours, made up of people who cherish human life, to face the prospect of using force, even in the face of incredible brutal aggression.

But today is a defining moment in our history. It is time for us to stand together at the water's edge. Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives, to deliver one clear message to Saddam Hussein. That message must be that the United States of America, the greatest democracy in the history of the world, wants peace, but is prepared to use our enormous military power as a last resort to force Iraq out of Kuwait and thereby make it clear to the world that naked, brutal aggression will not stand.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHUMER].

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Ms. KAPTUR].

Ms. KAPTUR. Mr. Speaker, I rise for patience and courage and oppose going

to war for profits related to the control of Mideast oil, and oppose the Solarz-Michel resolution.

I consider these to be the most important set of votes that I will cast in my congressional career to date. I support the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution, and oppose the Solarz-Michel alternative. I am a Member who is not prepared to give the President a blank check in the situation in the Middle East.

Let me speak as one of the Members of Congress who grew up during the Vietnam era, whose friends fought and died in that battle where America lost over 50,000 of its finest young men and women in that conflict, and in an equal tragedy, since that time, another 50,000 have died here at home from war-related illnesses and suicide. Theirs is largely an untold story. They fought an undeclared war, one that split the Nation in two, and left our troops subject not only to the abuses of war, but the equal abuses of coming home to a Nation divided. This is today again a nation divided.

The State of Ohio and the district that I represent are patriotic beyond measure. We well understand the meaning of duty. Our Veterans of Foreign Wars, the VFW has the second largest membership in the United States, even though we are not the second most populous State. Ohio's American Legion sends more boys and girls to Boys' State and Girls' State than any other State in the Union, and we are not the most populous State in the Union.

We are home to Wright-Patterson Air Force Base and dozens of other Active and Reserve units. In fact, Ohio leads the Nation in the number of Active and Reserve members of the Armed Forces who have enrolled in the G.I. educational benefits program. Most of our medical and naval reserve units have already been called; others are on standby.

Our citizens have the experience and willingness to serve and fight, but they want to understand why. We as Members of Congress hold a sacred trust with our troops in the field as well as our citizenry here at home. There must be no doubt about why America moves to war. The reasons must be crystal clear and the objectives honorable. War must be the very last of resorts, not the first.

I appreciate our congressional leadership responding to the pleas inside this body to hold this debate and discussion prior to January 15. I wish it had come earlier, last year in fact. Because in many ways decisions made by the Executive have already placed us in a position that if we support our President fully now we automatically approve the deaths of hundreds and thousands of our own U.S. forces. What a position to be in.

Yet, the Constitution demands our involvement, and like the President, we also take on oath of office to protect our Constitution against all enemies, foreign and domestic. We must discharge our duties, and if Saddam Hussein is listening to this debate, let him understand that in America we allow for debate, even in our highest legislation bodies, for we fundamentally believe in the capacity of our people, through their elected representatives, to make their opinions known, to be represented.

That is why the United States is the most stable political republic on the face of the

Earth. It is why we love this land and her remarkable people.

The American people have a right to a Congress that meets its constitutional responsibilities today and in the future. This branch of government is not an extension of the executive branch nor its handmaiden. Each of us is elected in our own right and is sworn to the very same oath as the head of the executive branch, our President. Each of us must uphold the oath to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

When I was privileged to be sworn in as a Member of Congress, I promised myself that I would never be a party to any undeclared war. The Vietnam experience was too divisive and lacked the national will to carry forth national policy.

Today we are afforded our constitutional rights to debate war before it happens, and so we should.

I speak on behalf of every mother, every wife, every father, every husband and relative who has a loved one serving our Nation in the U.S. military. All of them must be assured by our actions here in the Congress and the President's actions that all diplomatic and peaceful means toward resolution of this conflict have been exhausted before the war option is triggered.

How can anyone in this body honestly say that all diplomatic means have been exhausted? Our Secretary of State spent all of 6 hours in a meeting the other day. One cannot even conclude that any negotiations even occurred. It was another press event at which ultimatums were delivered by both sides.

Our troops deserve finer and more committed efforts. Even as we speak, diplomats from around the world are trying to find a keyhole through which negotiations can begin. In the meantime, the economic sanctions are locked in place. They will take time to be fully felt. It is no secret, over one-half of Iraq's GNP is tied to its ability to sell its oil, and it is unable to do that. Sanctions will exact a heavy toll as the months proceed and allied cooperation on these sanctions is the one area where we can say our allies are helping us fully. They certainly are not helping us with the money to pay for this massive deployment, nor with significant troop strength, combat troop strength that is battle-hardened.

Letting the economic noose tighten slowly around Iraq is a much more credible posture for the United States at this juncture than becoming an aggressor nation ourselves to respond to Hussein's aggression. War should only be a last resort. The lives of our people and civilians in that region are much too precious.

During this debate, it is important to place on the record reasons about why America should be involved in this conflict. Of late I have become more and more concerned that the debate has centered on the how of it all. We read about perhaps air strikes will happen first, and then perhaps ground forces. And then we read estimates of how many will die, 500, 1,000, 10,000, perhaps more. The Department of Defense has ordered 50,000 caskets just in case, and now over 16,000 body bags. We see on TV our troops being immunized and donning gas masks. What we do

not hear enough about is why we are there, and for how long and the causes for which we are fighting.

First, we heard that America was there to deter aggression and restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait. That did not ring to the American public; a new rhetoric was forthcoming. America, it was said, was there to preserve key resources. Oil was never mentioned outright, but other words were: Jobs, economic security, and then the real clincher, the American way of life; then later the administration began talking about Iraq's nuclear capability and its potential threat in the future.

I would like to examine each of these issues. The President says that America must stop aggression. If this is so and America is the world's policeman, why did not America intervene and stop aggression when the U.S.S.R. invaded Afghanistan or Hungary or Czechoslovakia in years past? If the Soviet Union soon occupies the Baltic States which long for democracy, will America stand up for those subjugated peoples, or how about when Turkey invaded Cyprus? Where was America then? Or when Israel invaded Egypt, or when China moved into Tibet, or, in fact, where was America during the Iran-Iraq war? We seemed to be on both sides of that one depending on what month it was. Or how about when Syria went into Lebanon as recently as a few days ago? Where was America then in standing up to aggressors? Why does America now see only this particular Iraqi aggression as in its vital interests?

There is only one common denominator that explains President Bush's rush to war, and that is oil, on which the Western World for too long has become increasingly dependent.

Although some of the oil companies have been nationalized, the distribution and marketing of Middle East oil is a Fortune 500 company activity. What are the interests of Aramco and British Petroleum and Shell and Exxon and Gulf and Texaco and Mobil and Chevron?

It is surprising how very little has been written about the role of the international oil companies, and the silence is deafening. Yet we can read very clearly in economic reports that come out. In December of last year, the New York Times reported that as a result of the Middle East situation there was an average fourth quarter gain of 64 percent in forecasted new profits for the 12 major oil companies. The companies included Amoco with a 57-percent increase in profits, Arco, a 61-percent increase in profits, British Petroleum, whose major interest is in Kuwait, a 112-percent increase in profits, Chevron, a 113-percent increase in profits, Exxon, a 41-percent increase in profits, Mobil, a 42-percent increase in profits, Phillips, a 265-percent increase in profits, Texaco, a 110-percent increase in profits, and Unocal, a 500-percent increase in profits.

Fourth quarter earnings for oil companies have significantly increased. Big oil companies have sold crude at about \$30 a barrel in this quarter, or \$10 a barrel more than in the corresponding quarter a year ago. That is a 50-percent increase.

The inter-Arab oil conflict inherent in this invasion of Kuwait by Iraq concerns control of oil and access to the Persian Gulf. In the book entitled "Oil Turmoil and Islam in the Middle

East," the author discusses the dominant role of Saudi Arabia looms over her neighbors as a source of potential envy, conflict, and unrest in the Arab world. To quote,

Saudi Arabia's apparently boundless wealth fuels Saudi influence in the Arab world, often to the consternation of her neighbors. Saudi wealth and predominant share of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries' proven reserves give King Fahd control over any decision concerning the collective use of Arab oil. If the share of oil exporting nation's reserves controlled by Saudi Arabia's political allies is added to the Saudi share, the conservative bloc in that region controls fully 75 percent of all of those Middle Eastern countries' total reserves. In comparison, the so-called radical oil producers, which include Iraq, Libya and Algeria, control only 19 percent of Arab reserves, seventy-five percent versus nineteen percent. Production capacity also strengthens the conservative bloc's hand. From 1973 to 1975, the conservative bloc produced an average of 70.3 percent of the Arab exporting nations' total output. The Saudi share alone averaged nearly half. Saudi Arabia is the only member able to increase production significantly. At any time the Saudi fields could increase production by 3.5 to 4.5 million barrels per day. Out of their additional production capacity, all of the other nations' of 7.5 million barrels per day, the radical states combined can produce only 2 million barrels per day, only about one-third of it, which obviously weakens their bargaining position in their own inter-Arab union.

It is ironic that while the radical states have consistently advocated the use of the oil weapon, it is the conservative states which control the issue. The inter-Arab tension is historic and growing.

The Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries could never use politically their oil wealth without the cooperation of the Saudi-led conservatives. Without Saudi consent, the oil weapon is quite like a large artillery piece without ammunition. Therefore, the conservative bloc can render impotent any maverick attempt by the radicals to impose an oil policy similar to that of 1973.

The conservative members actually control the use of oil for itself and the other Arab States. The conservative bloc's influence on the use of the oil weapon is manifest in its foreign currency reserves. The reserves allow the petroleum exporting countries to cut production drastically for several months without significant loss or suffering.

If the radical states, Iraq, Libya, Syria, attempted to reduce production significantly, the consequent impact on their domestic economies would likely lead to civil unrest and to political instability.

The combination of factors such as oil production, reserves, surplus capacity and surplus capital makes Saudi Arabia and its conservative allies the only states capable of determining when, whether, how, and for how long oil could benefit Arab foreign policy.

It is not hard to understand what is at the base of the simmering unrest in the region of Saudi Arabia and her allies, and that unrest is all tied to oil money and the control of it.

If we look at maps of that part of the world and each of those nations, they are largely deserts with the population concentrated in the

areas where oil is drawn, refined and ultimately shipped.

In fact, if we look at the eastern edge even of Saudi Arabia along the gulf, the largest concentration of United States citizens living outside the United States works for Aramco on Saudi Arabia's eastern border.

For the last several decades, America has become more and more dependent on Middle East oil. Germany and Japan are even more dependent, but it is interesting that these nations are nearly silent on the war option that this Congress is considering but quite vocal on using diplomatic and economic sanctions for a long period of time.

For our Nation which has failed to develop energy independence to now ask our troops to fight for continued access to a diminishing oil resource halfway around the world, in my judgment is morally wrong. I would rather take the billions of dollars the United States is investing in the deserts of the Middle East and judiciously bring money, our money, and our troops back home.

Our Nation that landed a man on the Moon in 10 years can be energy self-sufficient by the 21st century, just 10 years from now.

America saw this crisis coming. This is not news to us.

Senator Frank Church of Idaho, magnificent American, held hearings in the Senate on the role of multinational oil companies and concluded that if the world failed to set up international institutions capable of resolving Middle East oil-related disputes and distributing those profits fairly, the world was headed for armed conflict. Then, in the late 1970's, at the height of the U.S. energy crisis, President Carter warned the energy challenge was the "moral equivalent of war." Some Members may be old enough to remember that phrase. However, during the decade of the 1980's the Reagan-Bush administration failed to follow through on developing an energy policy for America. They did not lead this country for our people. They fought this Congress on filling the strategic petroleum reserve, and they fought Congress on developing alternative fuels. They resisted conservation efforts in everything from home construction to energy-efficient engines.

So now, our people, our neighbors, are being asked to send their relatives, America's troops to make up for political blindness at the highest levels of this Government. Oil is not worth the loss of life of one person from my district or any other district in this country. Let's spend those billions of dollars being wasted in the desert, let's spend them here in America to develop our clean coal technologies, our agriculture and alcohol fuels, hydrogen and solar power, and create thousands of jobs here at home in communities from coast to coast, where people are looking for work.

Even if the United States invaded Kuwait tomorrow and took all of it, all of its oil, how many years of oil lie under the ground of Kuwait? Only 30 years. While here in America we have over 1,200 years just in recoverable coal reserves that can be mined and separated into clean fuels with the new technologies available to us. Of course, the oil companies do not want to do that, but this is

certainly within the capacity of the Nation which landed a man on the moon.

Now, this is a time of deepening recession in America, and we know that 75 percent of America's world trade deficit is due to oil and auto imports. Over half of our energy is imported. At the same time as we do that, we have States like Texas and Louisiana and Oklahoma, and Members can go all the way from Lorain, OH, and Denver, CO, and all the mining States around this country in deep recession where people are in need of work. The answer to the energy problem lies within our own borders. Not sending America's best to fight a desert war for a dwindling resource.

Even if America took control of Saudi Arabia, of Kuwait and Iraq, and all of their oil, we still have more recoverable, twice as much, just recoverable coal reserves underground in this Nation, if we but have the will to develop it. Our goal should be to take care of our business here at home as soon as possible. Let us put America back on a sound economic and energy footing so we can remain the standard bearer of liberty throughout the world, and do so not by the force of our arms, but by the greater power of the ideal of our democratic republic, the oldest functioning democracy on the face of the Earth.

Now, America has no treaty obligations in the Middle East akin to the Versailles Treaty which bound us to Western Europe's defense after the First World War. Rather than coveting oil, America rather must ask what is our proper role in a region where we have systematically seen the collapse of the old order—the oil-rich monarchies that kept the oil flowing from the Middle East for most of the century. Of late, we have seen much change. Recall with me, we have seen the Shah of Iran deposed, much to the surprise of most of the West. We have seen the President of Egypt, Anwar Sadat, assassinated. One week he was on the cover of Time magazine as Man of the Year, and shortly thereafter, dead in his own land. We have witnessed kings in that region overthrown in Libya and Iraq. Saddam Hussein overthrew a king. We have seen unrest in Sudan, and certainly in Israel, and we saw for 8 years in the 1980's Iran-Iraq war in which over 500,000 of their citizens died.

This is the time of America to recognize that the old order in the Middle East, based on kingdoms, not democracies, is being torn from within by power pressures for change. Before going to war, America must ask how deeply, and for how long does the United States intend to police inter-Arab politics to preserve the old order. What is America's obligation to bolster the power of monarchies in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and for the Emirate of Kuwait?

Fundamentally, the Middle East needs an inter-Arab version of NATO to resolve the continuing disputes in the region which will continue whether America is there or not. America cannot be the sentry at the gate for all the upheavals that will be forthcoming in that region in years hence, but we can be a constructive force, with our allies, to forge a Middle East version of NATO.

Let me continue for the record.

The President likens this conflict to World War II. But unlike World War II, the United States has no Treaty of Versailles binding us

to mutual security pacts in the region. In World War II, America fought to preserve democracies. In this instance, we are doing just the opposite. We are fighting to preserve kingdoms and emirates because of our dependence on their oil. We are fighting to preserve governments that have invested the bulk of their revenues outside the nations in which their leaders reside. Saddam Hussein is likened to a Hitler. But just last July our own government told him the United States would not intervene in inter-Arab border disputes, and just a few years ago the Reagan-Bush administration officially recognized the Government of Iraq, and the Bush administration fought the Congress as recently as last summer on trying to place sanctions on Iraq for its human rights abuses. During the Iran-Iraq war United States Arms were channeled to Iraq by the Reagan-Bush administration. So which Iraq is it that the administration now claims we must fight against? Did the Iraqi nation change its stripes, or did we?

After World War II the United States waited in Europe and supported NATO for over 40 years—to stem the tide of Soviet expansion. Why must we now choose the war option rather than patient, deliberate sanctions? In World War II, Hitler systematically rolled over the industrialized nations adjoining him. Though Hussein is an aggressor, he has been turned back in his adventures, by Israel, by Iran, and will be turned back in Kuwait as well.

If he is a Hitler, he is certainly much less successful, and he is not an industrial power as Germany before and during World War II.

We know for the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq war, the Reagan-Bush administration supported Iraq and Saddam Hussein. In fact, up until last August. Members of this Congress tried to enlighten the Bush administration of the human rights abuses going on in Iraq, but our repeated warnings fell on deaf ears. Then, all of a sudden last August, the administration began calling Hussein a new Hitler. Why was he not a Hitler in July or a year ago, or when President Reagan and Vice President Bush recognized the nation of Iraq. When did he change? Within 1 month, we saw the administration trying to transform the desert dictator into a Hitler. Somehow it does not ring true when the United States Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie and our own Deputy Secretary of State John Kelly told Congress and Hussein both back in July that the United States would not interfere in inter-Arab border disputes, and then within hours, the United States had deployed 200,000 troops. Two months later, 200,000 more troops. And on a dime, the administration reversed itself and said the situation was vital for U.S. interests.

By contrast, the United States waited in Europe and NATO for over 40 years.

We withstood the insults of Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and so many other dictators. The world loves America, not because of the strength of her arms, though security is essential in today's world, but more because of the force of the idea of freedom and our liberties. It is these ideas to which emerging nations aspire. Let us not be distracted by those who would use force as a first means in this most recent test of national wills. Those with the will to wait out sanctions will be victorious in the end, and thousands of lives will have

been saved. This is a lesson for America to teach the world.

Now, on the nuclear threat, some say it is Iraq's nuclear threat that America should fear, but America has withstood nuclear threats to date, all of them. We acknowledge this is a dangerous world. We also know mutual assured destruction is the only answer other than total disarmament by all powers to withstand a nuclear threat. Our ultimate posture must be that nuclear detonation by one power will be met in equal or greater force by another. It is this mad system which holds the violence in check.

America cannot really stop Iraq, nor China, nor Pakistan, nor the dozens of nations that will seek to operationalize this terrible technology as we move into the 21st century.

We must be diligent in moving to limit and disarm where possible, but in the end our ultimate weapon is our own ability to wreak havoc on would-be aggressors. Such is the world we have helped to create.

As far as the importance of the U.N. resolution, let me commend the President and the Secretary of State for seeking allied support. This is essential and the first test of the new world order; but those nations who signed that commitment have a largely verbal commitment. They do not have combat troops in place in any manner similar to the U.S. deployment, nor have they committed real money. Even Japan and Germany, whose economies are chugging along, have not met their early obligations expected as of this month.

This Congress cannot fulfill its responsibility by approving a blank check resolution such as the U.N. resolution or the administration's proposal. It simply puts too much faith in an uncertain future that no one at this point can predict. We must preserve our congressional prerogatives.

Now, the President says that the United States must restore the legitimate governments in the region. We all desire this; but an equally important question is how legitimate are any of these governments in the eyes of each other when their borders were largely drawn by the colonial powers who physically vacated the region over the last 20 years and who were more interested in oil than in democracy. It was they who initially let the big oil companies draw the borders between these nations and then drained the oil fields for generations, ignoring the fact that the politics of the region might catch up to the economy someday.

One of the fundamental problems of the Middle East is that certain families became extremely wealthy and did not invest enough of their oil profits in their own homelands. They put their money in Western banks, they sent their children to frolic in the jet set capitals of the world while the vast majority of the people there remained poor.

Let us look at Kuwait, a most interesting nation to check the balance sheets on. Kuwait's economy, and some have called Kuwait a large oil well, is dominated by the Kuwait Petroleum Co., which is effectively a holding company with a large number of subsidiaries involved in the production and distribution of petroleum and natural gas.

Another source of Kuwait's power is the large worldwide investment portfolio which is believed to yield revenues equal, if not larger, than income from petroleum exports. And where is that portfolio invested? The Kuwait investment authority is located mainly in the United States and Great Britain. Thus we see Britains rush to join the gulf effort. The Kuwait investment authority holds nearly 10 percent of British Petroleum.

The New York Times reported back in December that the fourth quarter profits for B.P. are estimated to increase 112 percent this year.

Kuwait also holds investments in the United States which total nearly \$50 billion in assets overall. These investments include a \$3 billion portfolio of stocks and securities managed by Morgan Stanley. Undisclosed portfolios managed by Citibank and Chase Manhattan, gold reserves at the New York Federal Reserve Bank, a stake in the partnership led by the Gordon Investment Corp. that plans to buy Columbia Savings and Loan \$3 billion junk bond portfolio.

Kuwait's investment in Britain includes 10.5 percent of the Midland Bank, 11 percent of Travel and Financial Services concern of Hogg Robinson. They are the owner of the St. Martins Property Corp., builders of London Docklands Development. They also hold gold reserves at the Bank of England.

Kuwait's investment authority holds \$8 billion in stocks and securities in Japan, and the Kuwait Petroleum Corp. also has European holdings of more than 4,500 service stations in Hungary, Italy, Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and four oil refineries in Europe. Not bad for a nation of less than 2 million people of which only about one-third were ever allowed to vote within the nation of Kuwait in the first place.

Is it any wonder to use that revolutions, both religious and military, have plagued the region in most recent years. The region's indigenous politics is just emerging and subject to violent change. The world will not be able to contain those pressures.

The United Nations would best focus its efforts on how to create a Middle East multinational peacekeeping structure as part of the solution to this situation and to resolve other border disputes.

In talking with the citizens of my district, I have listened closely to what they have been saying to me. They want to support our President, but fundamentally they do not believe in an early rush to war. They want to give tough sanctions a chance to work.

Many have said to me, "MARCY, don't let America become the bad guy in the Middle East."

They say to me, "Why aren't our allies paying their fair share of the cost of this? Where are their troops?" They ask me.

Many have said that dying for oil is not worth the price.

In fact, I am getting these little canisters in my office now from citizens saying, "No blood for oil."

Many have asked me how they can conserve in their households, in their buying of automobiles, how they can cut down on their energy consumption per year. Frankly, more women have asked me that question than

men, but I have been surprised at how many people in my district have asked me that question. They do not want their neighbors to die in the Middle East.

Others have said to me that they are willing to pay more for gas if it will save lives.

For the record, I will enter some of their other statements for history.

"Talk and negotiation are the only ways we can really solve problems. The President should temper his words and soften them. Otherwise, he will only create unnecessary tensions and risk an armed conflict."

"As a democracy we must have discourse and debate and it cannot be stifled because the Administration feels it will expose a divided or unsupportive American people. I am unsupportive and I expect the truth is that the nation would be deeply divided by war."

"He (President Bush) has not communicated to the American people the reasons why we are in Saudi Arabia. Regardless of the cause, I feel it is not worth losing American lives. Can the President go to war without a national debate? Without Congress' consent? And just what are the goals in the Gulf? I believe he has gone too far, too fast. I know I speak for the majority of Americans when I say our hope is for our service people to return home unharmed."

"I hope you and the other Congressmen and women will consider all of the alternatives to war. I wouldn't want my brother to get drafted and killed in another Vietnam. Would you?"

"According to the Constitution the power of declaring war belongs to Congress. I hope as a Member of the Congress you will remind the Executive Branch that they don't have the power to declare war. Tell George Bush we don't want another Vietnam."

"The statements that we do not want war, and yet the continued exchange of threats makes me wonder if we might not be looking for an excuse to engage the Iraqis in battle."

"As a father of three sons, ages 21, 19, and 18, I also have a deeply personal stake in the decisions you make."

"The irony is that both our own rhetoric and Iraq's rhetoric have fed upon the other and have consequently dragged us both further into the mire of non-communication and closer to military confrontation. Recent positive action by both countries (the call for face-to-face negotiations, the release of hostages) have lost momentum in the face of dogged insistence upon rhetoric."

"We should remember to try to give peace a chance. The military option should be the very last resort. The United States must exhaust all possible negotiations before ever rushing into war."

"Congress must be able to have a say in this matter. As the Constitution so clearly states, Congress represents the American people. Therefore, only Congress can express the will of the people. President Bush must consult with Congress before taking any other action. It is the only way we citizens can either provide or deny our support."

"Since Iraq invaded Kuwait I have not heard one person say we should go to war over it. I honestly do not believe that war would be supported by the U.S. population. A serious energy policy would get a lot more support."

"We feel that there has been an insidious movement to divert attention away from domestic problems by calling up the troops and sounding the call to battle. We can hardly afford the costs of maintaining our armed forces in Saudi Arabia and ought to withdraw. This President may need to lose face

in order to establish once and for all that, while the President may be Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces after war has been declared, he or she may not threaten or attack another country without the consent of Congress."

"It appears that George Bush is single-handedly leading us into a war that is not what most citizens feel is justified or necessary . . . U.N. Security Council approval of the use of force does not make it right for us to take the offensive and attack Kuwait. War does not solve anything, and in this case, bombings would destroy the oil anyway."

"I hope that you as a Member of Congress will consider all alternatives to military force, and make sure that George Bush realizes that he does not have the authority or support of the citizens to declare war. This country cannot afford another situation like Vietnam. Diplomacy and withdraw should be the words rather than war."

In sum, let me say that I support our President so long as our troops remain in a defensive posture. But to oppose the Solarz-Michel resolution as too open-ended, too much of a blank check in a possible war where future events can not possibly be predicted today. Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait and we should give tough economic sanctions sufficient time to work. But 4 months just is not realistic. In the meanwhile, America must develop our own energy-sufficiency. I await the President's State of the Union Address in this regard. We should set a national goal to make this Nation energy self-sufficient by the 21st century, and if we set our minds to it, we could do it.

We should work to transfer the Armed Forces currently in the Persian Gulf into an international peacekeeping force and downsize America's commitment slowly as the sanctions take effect and we are able to replace our troops with those from other nations as well.

And we should support the President in all diplomatic initiatives and other government-to-government efforts to reach settlement in the region.

I think that doing this we would exhibit to the best of our ability what President Dwight Eisenhower not so many years ago wisely counseled and described as "patient courage."

Mr. Speaker, I submit these additional comments.

WAR CANNOT HAPPEN WITHOUT BODY BAGS

The Washington Post-ABC Poll shows that 68% of the American public think the Congress should be more actively supporting the President's policies in the Persian Gulf. Of the same people interviewed for the poll their support for the use of force diminishes as soon as casualties are mentioned, when asked if they would support the use of force if it meant the loss of 1,000 American lives, 44% favor the use of force and 53% oppose. When asked if they would support war if it meant 10,000 casualties 35% favor the use of force and 61% oppose force. One is forced to conclude that support for the President is support for war. War does not take place without body bags.

Who is fooling who? The Defense Department just placed an order for 16,099 body bags with a company in Philadelphia. Why is the Defense Department not leveling with the American public and telling us how many casualties to expect.

JOBS

Secretary of State James Baker has stated that one of the reasons we are in the Persian Gulf is to protect jobs. It is estimated that 3,000 U.S. nationals were employed in Kuwait. Should President Bush risk the killing of 3,000 soldiers to save 3,000 workers? Does that make sense?

The cost of Operation Desert Shield is estimated to be \$1 billion a month. A few months ago the Bush Administration claimed that we were involved in the Middle East to protect jobs. One billion dollars would be more appropriately invested in the United States to develop new jobs.

What is the point of fighting over oil fields when in a war they will be destroyed thus driving up the price of oil again.

KUWAIT INVESTMENT AUTHORITY

Kuwait's economy is dominated by the Kuwait Petroleum Company which is effectively a holding company with a large number of subsidiaries and partially owned companies involved, directly and indirectly, with petroleum and natural gas. Another source of economic power is the large and presumed worldwide, investment portfolio of Kuwait, which is believed to yield revenues equal if not larger than income from petroleum exports.

All main industrial activities in Kuwait are related to oil, natural gas, or the booming construction industry. Efforts to foster other industries have been hampered by the small size of the domestic market and lack of natural resources other than hydrocarbons.

The Kuwait Investment Authority is located mainly in the United States and Britain, thus we see Britain's rush to join the Gulf effort. Kuwait Investment Authority holds 9.8% of British Petroleum. The New York Times reported on December 26, 1990 that the fourth quarter profits for British Petroleum are estimated to increase 112%.

Kuwait also holds investments in the United States which total \$45 billion to \$50 billion in assets overall. These investments include a \$3 billion portfolio of stocks and securities managed by Morgan Stanley; undisclosed portfolios managed by Citibank and Chase Manhattan; Gold Reserves at the New York Federal Reserve Bank; a stake in the partnership led by the Gordon Investment Corporation that plans to buy Columbia Savings and Loan's \$3 billion junk bond portfolio. (Washington Post August 6, 1990)

Kuwait's investment in Britain includes 10.5% of Midland Bank; 11.3% of travel and financial services concern Hogg Robinson; Owner of St. Martins Property Corp., builders of London docklands development; Gold reserves at the Bank of England.

Kuwait investment authority holds \$8 billion in stocks and securities in Japan; 72% of Torras SA, a Spanish industrial holding company with interests in 170 different companies in chemicals, paper, food and financial services; 37% of Dao Heng Holdings, holding company for one of the six biggest of 30 or so local Hong Kong Banks.

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation also owns Santa Fe International, a California-based engineering and oil exploration company purchased in 1981 for \$2.5 billion and has European holdings of more than 4,500 service stations in Hungary, Italy, Britain, Scandinavia, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and 4 oil refineries in Europe.

OIL COMPANIES FOURTH QUARTER PROFITS

On December 26, 1990, the New York Times reported that as a result of the Middle East situation an average fourth quarter gain of

64% is forecast for 12 companies. The companies included Amoco (57%), Arco (61%), British Petroleum (112%), Chevron (13%), Exxon (41%), Mobil (42%), Phillips (265%), Texaco (110%), and Unocal (500%).

Fourth quarter earnings for oil companies have significantly increased. Big oil companies have sold crude at about \$30 a barrel in this quarter, or \$10 a barrel more than in the corresponding quarter a year ago. This is a 50 percent increase.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as she may consume to the delegate from the District of Columbia [Ms. NORTON].

Ms. NORTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Solarz-Michel amendment, in light of the fact that I represent more than 600,000 people in the District of Columbia, many of whom are serving in disproportionate numbers in the gulf today, even though their Representative in this body cannot cast a vote yea or nay for any of the resolutions before the body at this time.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this proposition. Members who vote for it are going to have to tell their constituents that we are dropping out of the process and from now on they are going to have to direct all their inquiries to the White House because we are abdicating our responsibilities.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER].

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Speaker, I firmly believe that sanctions can work, that they can wipe out Saddam Hussein as a threat to the stability and peace of the Middle East, without firing a shot, and I therefore oppose the Solarz-Michel initiative.

More in sorrow than in anger, I regret that this body seems destined to choose a resolution tantamount to a declaration of war.

If it is done, we must link arms and support our decision—and our President—to show Saddam Hussein that a democracy, which listens to all its citizens, speaks and acts with one firm voice. *E Pluribus Unum*. From many comes one.

And we will have vested an awesome responsibility in the President. We will trust that he will draw on his wellsprings of wisdom and vision in leading this Nation through this critical juncture, so fraught with danger.

We hope and pray that from the depths of his character he will find the inner strength to exercise patience, to resist the temptation to act out of frustration, anger, and outrage to achieve instant gratification: the destruction of Saddam Hussein.

We pray he will act out of prudence and caution, to exhaust every acceptable peaceful option, to exhaust the potential of economic sanctions to achieve in peace—what could, perhaps, more swiftly be achieved in war: removal of Saddam Hussein as a 900-pound go-

rilla towering like an ominous, black cloud over the sand dunes of the Middle East, threatening and intimidating his neighbors, and destabilizing the entire Arabian peninsula and the land of Israel as well.

Economic sanctions are working.

If you don't believe me ask seven out of the eight Secretaries of Defense. I'll quote two of them.

Secretary James Schlesinger:

In effect, we can leave Iraq in isolation until it comes to its senses, the probability of success for the sanctions is very, very high * * * it seems rather illogical to express impatience with them (sanction) because they will not have produced the hoped-for results in six months time.

Secretary Robert McNamara:

Surely we should be prepared to extend the sanctions over a 12- or 18-month period if that offers an opportunity to achieve our political objective without the loss of American lives. Who can doubt that a year of blockade will be cheaper than a week of war.

If that isn't good enough, ask the last two chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Adm. William Crowe testified that the embargo is "biting heavily" and that "it is the most effective peacetime blockade ever levied * * * he believes that "we should thoroughly satisfy ourselves that" sanctions will not work, and "that hostilities would best serve our interests before resorting to unilateral offensive action against Iraq."

Admiral Crowe, a man we entrusted with the defense of our Nation, is puzzled that "some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution."

Should not we all be puzzled as well?

Gen. David Jones:

My main concern with this latest scheduled reinforcement isn't that we might choose to fight, but rather that the deployment might cause us to fight perhaps prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily.

And if that isn't good enough, ask the current Director of the CIA.

William Webster:

Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain near-current levels of readiness for as long as nine months.

And what happens to Saddam Hussein's ground and air forces after that? He continues—

Major repairs to sophisticated aircraft like the F-1 will be achieved with significant difficulty, if at all, because of the exodus of foreign technicians. Iraqi technicians, however, should be able to maintain current levels of aircraft sorties for three to six months.

And after that, what?

Admiral Crowe said "Give sanctions a fair shake," because even if we must go to war, it will be against an Iraqi military debilitated by the invisible weapon of sanctions.

Paradoxically, many of my colleagues who voted for Solarz-Michel, did not vote for war, but for peace.

It worries me that, in this high stakes game of confrontation and brinksmanship, we may back ourselves into war, prematurely.

If Saddam Hussein does not leave Kuwait immediately, will we have the courage to continue sanctions? Or will thousands, perhaps

tens of thousands, die because we misjudged Saddam Hussein?

Or because we lost sight of what our truly top priority should be: removing Saddam Hussein not just from Kuwait, but from the map of the Middle East as a towering threat to his neighbors as well as to the peace and security of the region, and all, my colleagues, without firing a shot.

My distinguished colleague U.S. Congressman STEVE SOLARZ has stated several times that economic sanctions may not force Saddam Hussein to make the political decision to withdraw from Kuwait. Perhaps so, but sanctions can degrade and demean Iraq's economy and render Saddam's military machine impotent.

Historically, sanctions have changed a countries behavior when sanctions have reduced their economies by an average of 2.5 percent. Iraq's economy will shrink by a staggering 50 percent, perhaps as much as 70 percent according to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, U.S. Senator SAM NUNN.

Clearly, sanctions have the potential to squeeze Saddam Hussein inexorably, bloodlessly, bringing him, as a practical matter, to his knees.

There is another benefit to sanctions barely touched on in these 3 days of always deeply felt, sometimes emotional, and frequently heart wrenching debate; while economic sanctions against Iraq are in place, the climate is opportune to construct an international arms control regime.

As we sit on the precipice of war, we must ask ourselves, how we arrived at this point.

How is it that a ruthless, amoral dictator of a simple developing country with a primitive economy like Saddam Hussein, can sit on top of a horrifying state-of-the-art arsenal of conventional and nonconventional weapons of mass slaughter and destruction? And how could the very weapons we produced now be threatening American lives and global stability?

What madness, has led us to this point?

What greed has induced us to turn a blind eye to the law of unintended consequence.

What madness drove us to disperse these tools of death to countries and leaders who are demonstrably irresponsible and unstable? How come that Qadhafi, Homeini, Assad, Saddam Hussein, and other ruthless, amoral, vicious tyrants have had so little trouble satisfying their lethal shopping lists to terrorize and intimidate their neighbors, at best, and rain destruction and death on them, at worst?

There is a fundamental problem with a foreign policy that feeds war and instability, rather than peace and stability, a foreign policy that cannot accept that supplying brutal Third World dictators that focus power in one person and rule by force and terror, threats, and intimidation is desperately prejudicial to our interests—outrageously expensive and threatening to global peace and security.

For the developed, arms-supplying countries, these were the policies of the cold war. An era when both the United States and the Soviet Union, in pursuit of their bitter cold war confrontation, bought loyalty with whatever lethal weapons they had to offer, sell, or give away.

In an era when our defense against the menacing and oppressive Soviet Union was paramount and the arms race persisted at a dizzying pace, simple economics sent us looking for arms buyers, to reduce our cost of arms production in order to achieve economies of scale. Other arms producing countries, including the Soviet Union, did likewise.

Now we see the folly of those policies. We spent billions more developing weapons to counter the weapons we had sold to governments we should hardly have trusted in the first place, or to governments who would use those weapons against our friends.

The arms industry fuels the arms industry. And it does so at the cost of the lives of hundreds and thousands of people, billions and billions of dollars, great detriment to the environment and the erosion of the quality of life in America, and the world over.

Hindsight is irrelevant if we simply criticize and bemoan our mutual errors in arms production and sales. We must learn from our mistakes and shape future policy to avoid the pitfalls.

It is time for this Nation, and all civilized, developed nations of the world, to invest in our common security, and band together to form an arms denial regime that would end the folly once and for all of developed countries fueling the pitfall and tragic succession of regional

conflicts—small and local perhaps, but all too lethal, and too threatening to world peace.

We have met the enemy and he is us.

The Simon Wiesenthal Center published a list of the companies and countries that have supplied Saddam Hussein with his awful chemical and biological weapons which he has used before on others, as well as on his own hapless Kurdish tribesmen, and which now menace our own troops in the desert of Saudi Arabia. This list also chronicles those who have helped aid his quest for nuclear weapons.

Ironically, this absurd, costly, immoral arms sales practice, fueling regional conflicts the world over, is what now threatens global stability, after we and the Soviets have mercifully, and at long last, consigned the cold war to history.

The developing nations must finally achieve a unanimous consensus to bury regional conflicts, as the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic have buried the decades old superpower conflict, simply by negotiating an ironclad, absolute prohibition on the sale or gift of weapons of mass destruction to any Third World country.

And this is the challenge that our diplomats and our statesmen must address in the post-cold-war era.

[Western suppliers of unconventional weapons and technologies to Iraq and Libya supplied by the Simon Wiesenthal Center and prepared by Kenneth R. Timmerman.]

Saddam's Foreign Suppliers (Companies supplying Iraq's unconventional weapons programs)

Country of domiciliation:	Number of firms
Argentina	3
Austria	17
Belgium	8
Brazil	1
Switzerland	11
Egypt	1
France	16
Federal Republic of Germany	86
Greece	1
Holland	2
India	1
Iraq	2
Italy	12
Japan	1
Jersey	1
Monaco	2
Poland	1
Spain	4
Sweden	1
United Kingdom	18
United States	18
Total	207

THE POISON GAS CONNECTION—IRAQ'S SOURCES OF UNCONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES

Company	Country	Type	Equipment delivered	Source
Aerotech (Buenos Aires)	Argentina	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Conseltech SA	Argentina	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Intesa S.A. (Cordoba)	Argentina	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
AST Consult Co	Austria	CW	Laboratory construction	Profil, 6/3/89.
Consulco	Austria	CW	SAAD 16 construction	Spiegel, 13/89.
Emmerich-Assman	Austria	CW	Owner of Hutter and Schramtz	Profil, 6/3/89.
Feneberg	Austria	CW	Construction planning	Profil, 24/4/90.
Lenhardt Metal Construction and Roofing	Austria	CW	Steel construction, CW plant	Kurier, 13/1/90.
Neue Berger	Austria	CW	Percursor chemicals	Austria State Radio, 4/1/89.
Swatek and Cerny	Austria	CW	Sanitary equipment	Profil, 6/3/89.
Consulco	Austria	MT	Saad 16 Engineering	Stern, 26/1/89.
Delta Consult Studien GmbH	Austria	MT	Electronics, plans (Consen)	Kurier, 13/5/90.
Delta System GmbH	Austria	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT, 20/11/89.
Girozentrale Bank	Austria	MT	Financing of weapons lab	Profil, 6/3/90.
Hutter and Schranz	Austria	MT	Construction of weapons lab	Profil, 8/5/89.
Ibau	Austria	MT	Blow-out wall, missile plant	Profil, 8/5/89.
Denzel	Austria	WT	Helicopters from MBB	AFP.
Hirtnerberger	Austria	WT	Percussion caps and traction machines	Profil, 13/8/90.
Steyer-Daimler-Puch	Austria	WT	Nonferrous-metal cartridge case facility	Profil, 24/4/90.
Voest-Alpine	Austria	WT	GC-45 Howitzers	The New York Times Magazine, 26/8/90.
Philips Petroleum	Belgium	CW	Thiodiglycol sold to KBS	BBC Panorama, 2/2/87.
Sebatia	Belgium	CW	Built CW plant	The Washington Post, 25/8/90.
PRB (Poudrières Reunies de Belgique)	Belgium	MT	Solid fuel, munitions/rockets	Groot Bijgaarden De Standaard, 17/5/90, WSJ, 19/4/90, At Tayar 4/9/90.
Amalgamated Trading Ind. (ATI)	Belgium	WT	Super-gun	Groot Bijgaarden De Standaard, 18/5/90, Monde et Vie.
Cockerill	Belgium	WT	Super-gun parts	
Forges de Zeebrugge Herstal	Belgium	WT	Super-gun parts	
Sin Construct	Belgium	WT	Air base construction	Mednews 3,21/22 (27/8/90).
Space Research Corp	Belgium	WT	Super-gun prime contractor	
Avibras	Brazil	MT	Joint missile R&D programs	Mednews 1,12 (12/11/88).
Companies Inc	CH	CW	Chemical precursors	New York Times, 31/1/89.
IFAT Corp Ltd	CH	CW	Engineering, Saad 16	Spiegel 18/89, Profil, 24/4/89.
Condor Projekti A.G.	CH	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 21/11/89.
Consen S.A. (Zug)	CH	MT	Missile technology; provided 150 electronics and computer engineers.	FT 20/11/89; NBC News 30/6/89, Kurier, (Austria) 13/5/90.
Desintec A.G. (Zug)	CH	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Schaeublin	CH	Nuclear	Tools for nuclear facility	Berliner Tagesspiegel 22/8/90.
Schmiedemechanica	CH	Nuclear	Centrifuge assemblies	Tagesspiegel 3/9/90, Berliner Tagesspiegel 22/8/90.
Georg Fischer	CH	WT	Tadji, casting molds, machinery for cannon plant	Spiegel 28/90, 11/7/90.
Space Research Corp	CH	WT	Super-gun procurement office	
Von Roll	CH	WT	Tadji, super-gun parts	Tribune de Geneve, 17/6/90, the New York Times Magazine 26/8/90.
VUF AG(Verwaltung und Finanzierung)	CH	WT	Middleman, financing	Mednews 2/4/90.
WTB International AG	Egypt	CW	Saad 16, controller	Spiegel 19/89.
Atotech	France	CW	Sarin precursors to Montedison	BBC Panorama 2/2/87.
Carbone Lorraine	France	CW	Subcontractor to Protec	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90.
Le Vide Industriel	France	CW	Subcontractor to Protec	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90.
Pirep	France	CW	Subcontractor to Protec	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90.
Prevost	France	CW	Subcontractor to Protec	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90.
Protec SA	France	CW	French partner to Karl Kolb; purchased manufacturing equipment and Tabun precursors for Samarra plant.	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90; IHT 21/9/90.
SVCM	France	CW	Subcontractor to Protec	Nouvel Observateur 20/9/90.
Sagem	France	MT	Missile guidance systems	Mednews No 1.17, 30/5/88, the New York Times 24/5/90.
SEP	France	MT	Rocket motors, nozzles	Mednews 3,21 (12/4/90); SEP denies.
SNPE	France	MT	Solid rocket fuel (w/Snia Bpd)	Mednews 3, 12 (12/4/90).
Framatome	France	Nuclear	Nuclear fuel for Osirak reactor	CEA.
St. Gobain	France	Nuclear	Nuclear Technologies	Mednews 2/4/90.
Technatome	France	Nuclear	Osiris nuclear reactor	CEA.
Usiner-Saclor	France	Nuclear	Special steels for centrifuges	Spiegel, 8/90.
Intespace	France	WT	High resolution infrared cameras for observation satellites	Defence, Dec. 1989.
			Via Brazil.	

THE POISON GAS CONNECTION—IRAQ'S SOURCES OF UNCONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES—Continued

Company	Country	Type	Equipment delivered	Source
Thomson-CSF	France	WT	Saad 13 electronics factory	Jane's Defense Weekly, 6/4/85.
Tesa	FRG	??	??	Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Josef Kühn	FRG	BW	Mycobolins TH-2, T-2	Spiegel 33/90.
Anton Eyrie	FRG	CW	Mobile toxicological labs	Spiegel 4/89.
Aviatests (Rheinmetall subsidiary)	FRG	CW	Saad 16: wind tunnel for missile and aerodynamics research	Spiegel 33/1990, Profil 6/3/89.
BP	FRG	CW	Military research	Spiegel 13/89, 33/90.
Carl Zeiss	FRG	CW	Equipment for Saad 16 CW lab	Spiegel 13/89, 33/1990.
Deutscher BP	FRG	CW	Military research	Spiegel 13/89, 33/1990.
Heberger Bau GmbH	FRG	CW	Buildings for CW plant	Blundestag, 20/12/88.
I.B.I.	FRG	CW	Construction, procurement	Spiegel 3/89, Stern 26/6/89.
Industriewerke Karlsruhe, Augsburg (IWK)	FRG	CW	Machine tools, CW packing	Spiegel 24/6/89.
Infraplan	FRG	CW	Project 9230, nerve gas plant	Stern 1/89, NBC News.
hewco/Magirus/Deutz	FRG	CW	Vehicle for mobile labs	Spiegel 4/89.
Karl Kolb	FRG	CW	Saad 16, laboratory equipment for material testing; biological agent equipment; Prime contractor of Samarra CW plant.	NYT 8/8/84, Spiegel 3/89, Stern 27/3/89, Christian Science Monitor 13/12/89.
MBB	FRG	CW	CW lab equipment for Saad 16	Stern 26/1/89.
Pilot Plant, dissolved	FRG	CW	Equipment for Samarra plant	Spiegel 3/89, NY Times.
Plato-Kuehn	FRG	CW	Toxins	Spiegel 30/1/89.
Preussag	FRG	CW	Water-treatment, buildings for Samarra CW facility	BBC Panorama 2/2/87, Spiegel 13/8/90.
Quast	FRG	CW	Reactor vessels for Sarin; corrosion-resistant alloy parts	BBC Panorama 2/2/87, Christian Science Monitor 13/1/89.
Rhein-Bayern Vehicle Construction	FRG	CW	Mobile toxicological lab	Spiegel 13/8/90.
Rhema-Labortechnik	FRG	CW	Inhalation system for toxic research	Spiegel 4/89.
Sigma Chemie	FRG	CW	Precursors for BW	Washington Times 31/1/89.
Sigma Chemie	FRG	CW	??	Monde et Vie.
W.E.T. Engineering	FRG	CW	Precursors, production plant	Spiegel 34/90, NY Times.
WTB Walter Thost Boswau	FRG	CW	Nerve gas plants	Stern 26/1/89.
AEG	FRG	MT	Weapons and ammunition production equipment	Spiegel 33/1990.
Blohm Maschinbau	FRG	MT	Saad 16, computer controlled grinding facilities	Spiegel 13/89, 33/1990.
Brown Boveri	FRG	MT	Electronics	Profil, 8/5/89.
Daimler-Benz	FRG	MT	Vehicles	Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
DeGussa	FRG	MT	Saad 16, military research; unspecified equip at CW plant	Spiegel 13/89, 33/1990.
Fritz Werner Industrie Ausrüstungen	FRG	MT	Machine tools	Spiegel 13/89, Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Gildemeister Projecta GmbH	FRG	MT	General contractor for Saad 16 missile programs, computer programs; supplied machine tools, test equipment.	Stern 26/1/89, 9/8/90 Spiegel 13/89, 24/90.
GPA	FRG	MT	Consen group	Financial Times 21/11/89.
Integral/Sauer Informatic/ICE	FRG	MT	Saad 16, computer programs	Stern 26/6/89.
Leifeld & Co	FRG	MT	Rocket nozzles, via Nasr (GB)	Der Spiegel 28/90.
M.A.N.	FRG	MT	Tadji, missile launcher parts	Financial Times 21/11/89, Spiegel 28/90.
Maschinenfabrik Ravensburg	FRG	MT	Machine tools	Spiegel 33/1990.
Mausser-Werke	FRG	MT	Saad 16, research	Spiegel 13/89, 33/1990.
MBB	FRG	MT	Training, engineering, R&D; electronic & testing of Condor II missile.	Stern 9/8/90.
Nickel GmbH (Hamburg)	FRG	MT	Climate control, missile plant	Vienna Profil, 8/5/89.
PBG (Freiburg)	FRG	MT	Consen group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Promex Explorations GmbH	FRG	MT	Middleman, CW, missile tech	Mednews 3.12 (12/4/90)
Rheinmetall	FRG	MT	Tadji, missile propellants; parent firm of Aviatest	Spiegel 28/90, Monde et Vie, Profil 6/3/89.
Siemens	FRG	MT	Electronic rocket fuel mixers; precision lathes and computer control equipment; programming equipment for Tadji complex; non-echoing room for Saad 16 missile R&D.	(DS 27/3/89).
International Trade Consulting SA Transtechnica (MBB subsidiary)	FRG	MT	Main Saad 16 subcontractor, providing lab equipment for missile and CW R&D.	Stern 26/1/89; NBC News, 3/3/89, Spiegel 18/89, 19/89.
Waldrich-Siegen	FRG	MT	Machine-tools at missile plant	K. Timmerman; La Grande Fauche (Paris, Editions Plon, 1989).
Wegmann	FRG	MT	Tractor rocket launch system	Financial Times 20/11/89.
Weiss Technik	FRG	Nuclear	Hot and cold chambers	Vienna Profil, 8/5/89.
Dillinger Huette-Sarstahl	FRG	Nuclear	Special steels for centrifuges	Spiegel, 13/8/90.
Export-Union GmbH	FRG	Nuclear	Metal for production of gas centrifuges	Spiegel, 13/8/90.
Ferrostaal (MAN subsidiary)	FRG	Nuclear	Main contractor, Tadji	Spiegel, 28/90, 32/90, 33/90.
H+H Metallform GmbH	FRG	Nuclear	Rolling mill to manufacture centrifuges, computer controlled facility for material checks, hardening of cannon barrels, cartridge cases, missile bodies.	Spiegel, 9/7/90, 13/8/90, 33/90, AFP.
Inwako GmbH	FRG	Nuclear	Ring magnets for uranium enrichment processing plant; SCUD-missile upgrade.	Spiegel, 35/90, 20/8/90.
KWU	FRG	Nuclear	Reactor core technologies	Mednews 2/4/90.
Leybold AG	FRG	Nuclear	Tadji, high-temperature furnace; recasting plants for cannon factory.	Nucleonics Week 9/8/90, Spiegel 6/8/90, 32/90, 33/90.
M.A.N. Technologies Ltd	FRG	Nuclear	Middleman for H+H	Der Spiegel 18/12/89.
Nukem	FRG	Nuclear	U-235 fuel pins; blocked	Spiegel 33/1990; Energy Daily, 3/10/80.
Saarstahl	FRG	Nuclear	Maraging steel for centrifuge production at Tadji complex	Spiegel 33/1990.
TiV	FRG	Nuclear	Materials testing, Tadji	Spiegel 33/90.
ABB (Mannheim)	FRG	WT	Electrical equipment for furnaces at Tadji complex	Spiegel 28/90, 33/1990.
Buderus, Feldmühle subsidiary	FRG	WT	Casting technology for cannon plant at Tadji	Spiegel, 32/90, 33/1990.
Daimler Benz	FRG	WT	Security vehicles	Der Spiegel 27/3/89.
Dynamit Nobel (Troisdorf)	FRG	WT	Explosives	Spiegel 33/1990.
Faun	FRG	WT	Transportation facilities	Spiegel 13/8/90.
Hochtief (Essen)	FRG	WT	Construction, Tadji	Spiegel 28/90, 32/90, 33/1990.
Köckner Industrie-Anlage GmbH	FRG	WT	Steel boiler, foundry, compressors, machine parts for Tadji	Spiegel 9/8/90, 32/90, 33/1990.
Krauss-Kopf	FRG	WT	Unspecified equipment at weapons plant	International Herald Tribune 7-8/1/89.
Lasco Umformtechnik	FRG	WT	Weapon and ammunition manufacturing facilities	Spiegel 33/1990.
LOI Industrieöfenanlagen	FRG	WT	Special furnaces for hardening steel at Tadji complex	Spiegel 32/90, 33/1990.
Ludwig Hammer	FRG	WT	Unspecified equipment at weapons plant	International Herald Tribune 7-8/1/89.
M.A.N. Roland	FRG	WT	Transportation equipment	Spiegel 13/8/90.
Mannesmann (Duisberg)	FRG	WT	Super gun components	Spiegel 33/1990.
Mannesmann Demag-Hüttentechnik	FRG	WT	Casting equipment for Tadji	Spiegel 28/90.
Mannesmann-Rexroth	FRG	WT	Components for super-gun	Groot Blijgaarden De Standaard (Belgium) 8/5/90.
Marposs (Krefeld)	FRG	WT	Weapons and ammunition production facilities	Spiegel 33/1990.
Matuschka	FRG	WT	Parent of Leico (Leifeld & Co)	Spiegel 9/7/90.
MBB	FRG	WT	License for fuel-air explosives	BBC Panorama 3/9/90.
Ravensburg	FRG	WT	Boring equipment for cannon manufacturer at Tadji	Spiegel 32/90, 33/90.
Ruhrgas	FRG	WT	Tadji	Spiegel 32/90, 33/90.
Schirmer-Plate-Siempeklamp	FRG	WT	Weapon and ammunition production facilities	Spiegel 33/1990.
Schmidt, Kranz & Co	FRG	WT	Computer controlled facility for materials checks, hardening of artillery tubes.	Spiegel 33/90.
SMS Hasenclever	FRG	WT	Forging press for Tadji	Spiegel 32/90, 33/1990.
TBT Tiefbohrtechnik	FRG	WT	Machine tools, Tadji complex	Spiegel 32/1990.
Thyssen	FRG	WT	??	Spiegel 33/1990 (13/8/90).
Züblin	FRG	WT	Steel plant at Tadji complex	Spiegel 28/90, 33/1990.
Dango & Dienenthal	FRG	WT	Molten metal treatment, Tadji	Spiegel 9/7/90, 33/1990.
Körber AG (parent firm of Blohm)	FRG	WT	Machine-tools for Saad 16	Spiegel 13/89.
Advanced Technology Institute	Greece	WT	Super-gun engineering w/SRC	NYT Mag 26/8/90; Figaro 1/6/90.
KBS	Holland	CW	Thiodiglycol	BBC Panorama, 2/2/87.
Melchemie	Holland	CW	Precursor chemicals	Spiegel 3/89, Christian Science Monitor 13/12/88.
Transpek India Ltd	India	CW	Trionyl chloride	Far Eastern Economic Review, 30/8/90.
Teco (German-owned)	Iraq	CW	Tadji, (middle-man??)	Spiegel 33/90.
Al-Arabi Trading company	Iraq	MT	State-owned front; owns TDG	MEED, 22/9/89.
Ausidet	Italy	CW	Sarin precursors for Montedison	BBC Panorama, 2/2/87.

THE POISON GAS CONNECTION—IRAQ'S SOURCES OF UNCONVENTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES—Continued

Company	Country	Type	Equipment delivered	Source
Montedison	Italy	CW	Sarin Precursors to Melchemie	BBC Panorama, 2/2/87.
Snia Techint (Fiat group)	Italy	CW	CW lab for Saad 16	Mednews 3.12 (2/4/90).
Technipetrole	Italy	CW	Nerve gas plant, Akashat	Liberation 12/3/84.
Snia Bpd	Italy	MT	Solid rocket fuel	Mednews 3.12 (12/4/90).
Eurochem (European Manufacturer Center)	Italy	Nuclear	Iraqi front; krytron triggers	AFP, AP, 29/3/90, Spiegel 9/7/90.
Snia Techint (Fiat group)	Italy	Nuclear	Hot Cells for Thwaittha	L'Express 4/10/80.
BNL (Banco Nazionale del Lavoro)	Italy	WT	Financing	
Danielli	Italy	WT	Tadji, steel rolling mill	Spiegel 28/90.
Iiva	Italy	WT	Forge equipment	Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Istituto per la Ricostruzione Industriale (IL VA)	Italy	WT	Owens Fucine; super-gun parts	Reuters 14/5/90.
Societa delle Fucine	Italy	WT	Super gun parts (IL VA)	Reuters 14/5/90, Financial Times, 15/5/90.
Minolta	Japan	WT	Duplicating equipment	NBC NEWS, Monde et Vie.
Transtech Ltd	Jersey	MT	Consent group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Consent Investment S.A.M.	Monaco	MT	Consent group, financing	FT 20/11/89.
Consent S.A.M.	Monaco	MT	Consent group; Missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Chemadex	Poland	Nuclear	Repair work on uranium processing plant	Washington Post 25/8/90.
Int'l Trade Consulting SA	Spain	MT	Middleman for missile tech	Mednews 3.12 (12/4/90).
Casa	Spain	WT	Helicopters from MBB	AFP.
Trebelan	Spain	WT	Steel cradles for super-gun	Financial Times 26/5/90, Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
International Trade Consulting SA	Spain	MT	Middleman for missile tech	Mednews 3/12 (12/4/90).
Bofors	Sweden	MT	Electronics; Missile launchers	Financial Times 26/5/90, Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Canira Technical Corp	UK	MT	50 percent share owned by TDG; attempted buyout of Learfan, Belfast, to acquire carbon-carbon technology.	MEED, 22/9/89.
Matrix Churchill	UK	MT	Machine-tools, precision lathes (owned by Iraq)	WSJ, US News and World Report 4/6/90, MD.
Nasr Dependence Meed Int'l	UK	MT	Iraqi front; rocket nozzles	Der Spiegel 28/90.
SRC Composites	UK	MT	Joint venture SRC/TDG; attempted buy-out of Canira/Learjet factory in Ireland, 1989.	Financial Times 17/4/90.
TMG Engineering	UK	MT	Iraqi front (TDG); bought Matrix-Churchill	MEED 22/9/89.
Trade Development Group	UK	MT	Iraqi-owned front, MT and WT purchases, finance of carbon-tipped machine tool plant.	BBC Panorama 3/9/90, Mednews 2/4/90.
Transtech UK	UK	MT	Consent group, missile tech	FT 20/11/89.
Consarc Engineering	UK	Nuclear	High-temperature ovens	NY Times 16/7/90.
Astra Holdings	UK	WT	Super-gun parts, owner of PRE	WSJ 19/4/90, MD, AFP 5/5/90.
BSA	UK	WT	Machine-tools for weapons plants	BBC Panorama 3/9/90.
Eagle Trust	UK	WT	Owner of Halesowen (equipment for super gun)	Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Global Technical & Management International	UK	WT	Mine detection, acoustic detonators for sea mines	London Press Association 30/3/90, Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Halesowen	UK	WT	Parts for SRC supergun	London Press association 17/4/90.
Int'l Highway Transports	UK	WT	Transport of super-gun parts	TRT/TV 29/4/90; Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Meed International	UK	WT	Iraqi front; machine-tools	BBC Panorama 3/9/90.
Sheffield Forge Masters	UK	WT	Super-gun barrels	Reuters, AP, 11/4/90.
Space Research Corp	UK	WT	Super-gun procurement office	Reuters, AP, 11/4/90.
Walter Somers	UK	WT	Hydraulic equipment super-gun	Wall Street Journal 23/4/90.
Center for Disease Control	USA	BW	West Nile Fever virus	NBC News, 11/4/90.
Al Haddad Trading	USA	CW	Sarin Precursors	BBC Panorama 2/2/87.
Alcolac International	USA	CW	Precursor chemicals	US News and World Report 4/6/90.
Nu Kraft Mercantile Co	USA	CW	Precursor chemicals	New York Times 31/1/89.
United Steel and Strip Corporation	USA	CW	Precursor chemicals	New York Times 31/1/89.
US Steel and Strip Corp	USA	CW	??	Monde et Vie 23/8/90.
Lumsum Crest	USA	CW	Ethylene oxide	Washington Times 27/4/90.
Electronic Associates, Inc	USA	MT	Computers for missile R&D	ABC News 7/9/90.
Hewlett Packard	USA	MT	Computers for missile R&D	Mednews 3.12 (2/4/90), Washington Post 3/5/90.
Scientific Atlanta	USA	MT	Computer for missile R&D	Washington Post 3/5/89.
Wilton Company	USA	MT	Computer equipment, scalar analyzer system	L'Express 7/9/90, Washington Post 3/5/89.
XYZ Options	USA	MT	Carbon-tool machine tool bits	Financial Times, 21/11/89.
Consarc	USA	Nuclear	High-temperature ovens	NY Times 16/7/90.
BNL (Banco Nazionale Lavoro)	USA	WT	Atlanta branch of Italian owned bank, financing	Chicago Tribune 6/5/90.
Centrifugal Casting	USA	WT	Machine-tools for gun barrels	ABC News, 20/8/90.
Sitico	USA	WT	Iraqi financed from for VUF AG	Mednews 2/4/90.
Tektronix, Inc	USA	WT	Computer graphic terminal	Washington Post 3/5/89.
Textronix	USA	WT	Computers for missile R&D	Mednews 3.12 (2/4/90).

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. ENGLISH].

Mr. ENGLISH. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. Speaker, obviously, voting to commit our American forces to war is the toughest vote any Member of Congress can cast—and that is as it should be. It is difficult to work one's way through the slogans, friendships, and political alliances to reach the hard basic facts and then weigh them carefully in making a decision.

In this case, I weighed carefully the stated goals as outlined by President Bush over the past few months—protecting our allies, releasing the hostages, halting the development of nuclear weapons, stopping a tyrannical dictator, protecting jobs and oil, as well as getting Iraqi forces out of Kuwait. These are all worthwhile goals. Some have already been achieved.

However, the resolution passed by the United Nations and the Solarz-Michel resolution authorize the use of whatever means are necessary to achieve one of the remaining goals—the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

At a breakfast I attended at the White House yesterday morning—Friday, Jan. 11—I asked President Bush whether he would approve—if hostilities should begin—the continuation of those hostilities until Saddam Hussein is removed from power. The President responded that he could not provide me with that assurance.

As I weigh the cost in lives—and military experts tell us a war will cost us several thousand American lives—it simply is not worth the cost to achieve the goal of pushing Iraqi forces out of Kuwait while possibly leaving Saddam Hussein in power. The source of the problems we are facing is Saddam Hussein. To leave the door open for him to remain in power after the loss of thousands of American lives is unacceptable. For this reason, I oppose the Solarz-Michel resolution.

If hostilities should begin, I strongly support allowing our military commanders to take whatever steps they determine are necessary to bring the conflict to a speedy conclusion with as little loss of American lives as possible. I hope that if a war begins, President Bush will see the wisdom of doing it right—not stopping our forces until Saddam Hussein is out of power. If History has taught us anything, it's that war is an all or nothing business.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. ROEMER].

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Speaker, I rise to oppose the Solarz-Michel resolution. Yesterday, I received this advice from the President—Vote with your heart. Let me speak from the heart. With my sincere respect, I will not be with you today, Mr. President, but maybe tomorrow, and many times in the future.

But today I rise as a freshman casting my first votes. I am one of the youngest members of this august body and come here with high hopes in my heart, prayer in my thoughts, idealism in my dreams, and a belief in the magnificence of America. Let us work a little longer with purpose toward peace and with patience and principle.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. PICKLE].

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Speaker, I thought the previous resolution offered the best hope to gain some valuable time for negotiation—a week or 2 weeks. I hope that the President will nonetheless hear the message that we continue to hope and pray that a peaceful resolu-

tion to the Persian Gulf crisis can be found. A few days extension past January 15 is not a sign of indecision on the part of the President, nor grant of delay for Hussein.

Only three days remain until the January 15 deadline set forth by the U.N. Security Council for Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. As that date draws closer, I hope the President will bear foremost in his mind that January 15 is a deadline for Saddam Hussein alone. It is not a deadline for this country or our allies to initiate offensive military action to drive Iraqi troops out of Kuwait.

If this House votes to authorize the President to use offensive military force, it is my most fervent hope that he will not use it too quickly. It must remain as the ultimate and final alternative, to be used only after every other avenue to resolve this crisis peacefully has been completely exhausted. I'm confident the President feels the same way.

Once again, I call upon the President to continue to remain patient and flexible, and to consider any viable, responsible possibility to resolve this crisis peacefully. I know the hope grows dimmer with each passing hour, but I want to believe hope still exists for bloodshed to be averted.

If every hope for diplomacy and negotiation has expired, then so be it. We should close ranks and support the President. But I pray that such a conclusion is only considered after all others have failed. Help us Mr. President, if you can. Show the American public you will go the extra step if any possible settlement can be achieved.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine [Mr. ANDREWS].

□ 1454

Mr. ANDREWS of Maine. In a few minutes the Congress of the United States will vote to go to war. I will not.

Resolving conflict, standing up to brutality and aggression without rushing into war is and always will be the most difficult course. But it is and it always will be the right course.

It was a lesson that was taught to me by my parents and a lesson that I learned in the schoolyard. It is a lesson that we are all taught by the Bible. And, yes, it is indeed a very difficult lesson and it is a very difficult course.

But indeed it is the right course. That course, giving peace every possible chance to work before rushing into war, is about to be rejected by this Congress. Hundreds and hundreds of people from my district at home in Maine have called me in just the last few days. Some are angry. Many are scared. All are worried.

But just about every single one of them has asked me, "Why, why when we have such a powerful alternative to

war, are we committing this Nation to war?"

Yesterday was the most difficult day, one of the most difficult days of my life, not because I struggled with how I was going to vote today but because I struggled to understand, myself, why, with the effective and real alternatives we have before us, why this Congress will vote today to go to war.

That question has haunted me every day of my young congressional career, and it haunts me as I stand before you today. But it will tear and it will rip at me when the mother or the father of a soldier from my district in Maine who has died in the desert in the Persian Gulf looks me in the eye and asks: "Why?"

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BUSTAMANTE].

Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished majority leader for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution. Our common goal is to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Our differences exist on the tactics that get us there.

The choices before us today are clear: Either we bomb Iraq or starve it. The war option results in immediate sacrifices.

The economic option, in my opinion, is the wiser course because it will reduce the risk of American casualties and cost.

Since we are dealing with the issue of life and death, it is a mark of prudence to take the safer, wiser course.

Economic sanctions may not have the effect of toppling Saddam Hussein quickly from power. But they will work to further weaken Iraq militarily.

I don't question the use of the war option, but I do question using the war option at this time. We waited 40 years to win the cold war.

Why can't we show a little more prudence in letting the sanctions work to weaken Iraq militarily while the multinational military capability increases?

I don't question the comparison that many have made that Saddam Hussein is another Hitler. But let's not forget that for 10 years he was our Hitler. We were in bed with Saddam.

When Saddam Hussein unleashed biological and chemical warfare against the Iranians, we assented.

When Saddam Hussein used biological and chemical warfare against his own people, the Kurds, we assented.

When some of us tried to block shipments of military spare parts, the administration said, no, Saddam Hussein is our friend.

When some of us urged the President to reduce subsidies of agricultural products to Iraq, the administration said, no, Saddam Hussein is our friend.

Now we are being asked to support this resolution because Iraq is on the

brink of becoming a nuclear power. And what did this administration do to prevent that?

Shortly after our first deployment to the Persian Gulf, the Commerce Department approved an export application for a supercomputer shipment that would assist Iraq's goal in its nuclear program.

Mr. Speaker, this resolution is a product of an imprudent and failed policy of the past decade by this and the prior administration.

It further paints us into a corner of our own making and provides us with no real further options in dealing with the creature of our own making that we call Saddam Hussein.

This resolution leaves us with only a single isolating option—war.

It is our duty to explore every possible diplomatic and economic option available to us, and this resolution limits this Nation from considering a broader range of alternatives.

It is for these reasons, Mr. Speaker, that I cannot support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

□ 1500

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, I ask a question. How long, Mr. Speaker; how long, Mr. President, will our economic, political, and military strategies be dependent on foreign oil?

I oppose the resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA].

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Michel-Solarz resolution. My colleagues, make no mistake about the meaning of this resolution and of this vote. This resolution amounts to an abdication of the Congress' exclusive responsibility to declare war. Let us be very clear: Our approval of this resolution will hand over to the President the ability to place the lives of American men and women at risk on January 16.

My friends, I am not convinced that we have reached that last resort. I am not persuaded that the President of the United States and the President of the United Nations have exhausted every last remedy short of war. And I am troubled by the possibility that the U.S. Congress may vote to allow one man, the President of the United States, to make that determination.

The Persian Gulf crisis is a critical test for the new world order. The leadership and the deeds of the United States and of the nations united against Iraq's aggression will determine whether we will enter the post-cold-war era in the last decade of the 20th century with a strong victory for collective international action or with yet another failure of the global community to discipline a lone outlaw. Yet peace may be preserved and aggression deterred without a shot being fired.

Mr. Speaker, I supported the President's initial response to Iraqi aggression, and, as I have said, I am just as determined as the next American to force Iraq out of Kuwait. My differences with the President are on our means toward that goal. It seems very clear to me that the administration has not walked that extra mile to pursue a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of this crisis. When thousands of lives are at risk, it ought to be incumbent upon the President to continue to seek out every avenue, every forum, every interlocutor to discuss means of resolving the crisis without bloodshed. Some have said that we cannot allow Iraq to "save face." My colleagues, I do not mind Iraq saving face if it saves the lives of 5,000 American citizens.

Much of our debate has centered on one question: Are the sanctions working? Two former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Secretaries of State and Defense and a former National Security Adviser have testified that the United States should maintain the sanctions well past that arbitrary deadline next week until Iraq does begin to suffer from the embargo and expresses a willingness to discuss its withdrawal or until it is clear to a majority of experts and the Congress that the sanctions will not be severe enough to force that concession. I am willing to give the sanctions time, with American lives at stake, and I would urge my colleagues to hold that line as well.

Every Member of this body agrees that war should be the last resort. We have not reached the last resort. The most experienced and knowledgeable former members of our Defense, State and Intelligence agencies testify that sanctions have not been given a chance to work. U.N. diplomatic efforts have not been exhausted. And the lives of thousands of Americans hang in the balance. We gain nothing by handing over the Congress's assent to war at this early hour, and we have everything to lose by refusing to maintain a policy that is working very well. Give peace a chance for the sake of your countrymen on the front lines. Vote to preserve the Congress' prerogative to declare war, and vote against the Michel-Solarz resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. GEPHARDT], the majority leader, for recognizing me for 3 minutes.

Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak against the Solarz-Michel resolution. I also rise to speak for peace.

The vote, this vote, this simple vote, this one little vote, that we are about to cast today has become a vote of conscience. However we vote, it says something about who we are as individuals and who we are as a people.

We used to call this resolution, for that is what it really is. By voting for this resolution my colleagues are voting for a declaration of war. The American people do not want war.

Mr. Speaker, people called my office this morning crying on the telephone

saying, "Stop the war. We don't want war."

History will testify to the fact that wars are poor builders of a peaceful tomorrow. We should be prepared to cast our lot with sanctions. We have an opportunity; it is not too late to turn back the dark clouds of war. It is not too late.

What is wrong with being patient? Patience is not appeasement. Patience is not a dirty and nasty concept.

I ask my colleagues, "Are we ready to accept the burden of history? Will we fight a war that didn't have to be?"

As a nation, as a people, and as Members of this body, we must accept the idea that means and ends are inseparable. If we are going to make real the idea of a new world order, a world community at peace with itself, then the means by which we struggle must be consistent with the end we seek. If peace is the end we seek, then the means must be peaceful.

During the past few years we have witnessed a nonviolent revolution in Eastern Europe, a revolution of value, a revolution of ideas. We are seeking people in Africa, Asia, South America, moving toward democracy using the discipline and philosophy of non-violence. These people were not inspired by bombs, or guns or missiles. They were inspired by our Constitution, our Declaration of Independence, and our Bill of Rights.

I say to my colleagues, "We have a chance, a last chance, a last opportunity to give peace a chance in the Middle East and not the tools of destruction and death."

Mr. Speaker, there is a better way, a more creative way, a more excellent way. I do not want the blood of American young men and women, nor the killing of tens of thousands of innocent people who call the Persian Gulf home to be on my hands, nor on my conscience. Whatever we do as a Congress, it will happen on our watch. Both the spirit and judgment of history will be on us.

Maybe we should all lay down the burden of war. I have made up my mind that I am going to follow the words of the old spiritual. "I am going to lay my burden down, down by the river-side. I ain't gonna study war no more."

We should also heed the words of the Scripture, "Blessed are the peace makers, for they should be called the children of God."

We should be the makers of peace, not war. Mr. Speaker, and my colleagues, let January 15 serve as our moral deadline by rejecting this resolution of war. Let us vote for peace. Give peace a chance in the Middle East.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. WEBER].

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to

the gentleman from California [Mr. GALLEGLY].

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Speaker, as an original cosponsor of Michel-Solarz, I rise in support as a last hope for peace.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FIELDS].

Mr. FIELDS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of our President and his constitutional capacity as Commander in Chief.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BARRETT].

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solarz amendment.

Congress must send the signal, and not empty threats, to Saddam Hussein that the Nation stands behind the President and is serious and committed to enforcing the U.N. resolutions. To do otherwise would only encourage further Iraqi intransigence and Hussein's terrorism, brutality, and quest for military domination of the Middle East.

I believe that signal is best made with the passage of House Joint Resolution 62, the Solarz-Michel resolution, which authorizes the President to order our troops to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. The House accepted House Joint Resolution 62. I rejected the two nonbinding resolutions also debated by the House.

The first, as worded, House Concurrent Resolution 1, is confusing and has the wrong message for Saddam Hussein; however this resolution passed the House 302-131. This country must stand together against aggression, but sincerely, this resolution does not deal with the reality of the situation in the Persian Gulf.

This nonbinding resolution unnecessarily tries to reaffirm Congress' authority in declaring war. I believe the Constitution clearly stipulates that Congress has the sole and awesome responsibility to declare war. And Congress is deciding this issue and will have the opportunity to vote. House Concurrent Resolution 1 could not further define that burden.

The second resolution debated, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 33 would have also sent a mixed signal to Iraq. While giving approval for the use of force to defend our troops and to enforce U.N. economic sanctions, this resolution also required further congressional approval of any military action. Signaling Hussein that we have more patience to offer, as this resolution proposed, was defeated 183 to 250.

Hussein has demonstrated time and time again that he does not respond to patience, diplomacy, or to our appeals on moral decency, with any movements toward peaceful settlement. He only uses our goodwill to strengthen his stranglehold on Kuwait and ready his military machine to bring down upon the peoples of the Persian Gulf and the world his most heinous and destructive weapons of war.

House Concurrent Resolution 33 would have tied the hands of our President, and of our troops in the gulf, with conditions that ca-

putulate our responsibilities in defending what is right and defeating what is wrong.

I cannot fathom a more soul wrenching experience, nor am I likely to ever make a more difficult decision, than the votes I made today. I voted to give our President the authority, provided that diplomatic efforts and economic sanctions have failed, to commit our forces to battle in the event that Saddam Hussein's forces fail to leave Kuwait.

The President, as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, must be given the flexibility to meet the demands placed on our country and to preserve and protect our national interests.

Presidents have deployed our troops over 200 times in our country's history. Congress has declared war only five times. In this instance, and as a veteran, I believe that authorizing the President to commit our troops to battle in the Persian Gulf, fundamentally improves our chances of achieving peace and reaffirms Congress' role as described in our Constitution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, to close debate on this side I yield the balance of my time to the leader of the Republican Party, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL], principal sponsor of the resolution we are now considering.

□ 1510

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, may I at the very outset compliment you for coming off the rostrum to become just the Member of your district from Washington and for the caliber and quality of your remarks, so appropriate for the occasion. Yes, I would have to say it was a fine hour for the House of Representatives, particularly in your dissertation that you gave.

I do not know what history will say about our debate, but I do know it will be said that during the crisis of the gulf, the Members of the 102d Congress stood up and were counted. The Constitution, the American people, and the cause of freedom have been well-served during these 3 days in January 1991.

Now the question of each of us is how best can I help to achieve a just peace? I believe it is far more preferable to pursue a long-term objective of real peace in the region by sharing with the President of the United States the risk of war in the short term. That is a question of high public policy, but it can be answered only in the private reaches of the heart, where the still small voice of conscience roars like thunder.

Mr. Speaker, I voted against the last resolution, one of those 250. Let me tell you why.

I guess younger Members are tired of hearing of World War II types always using the prelude to that war as a model for foreign policy. For so many Members, your war was the Vietnam war. That war shaped your thinking one way or the other. A different war, different lessons.

But allow me one last reference to the period with a Churchillian quote. He says:

Those who procrastinated in the face of Nazi aggression, "were decided only to be undecided, resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift, solid for fluidity, and all powerful to be impotent."

It sounds like a critic's characterization of our own Congress in the past several years at times.

I, like so many other members of my generation, am haunted by the ghosts of Munich and the ghosts that Munich produced, and that is why I am so opposed to a policy of delay against aggression threatening our vital national interests.

At this point you might be saying all right, but that was then, and this is now. And I agree. There is not a perfect fit between the lessons of Munich and the problem of Kuwait. New problems demand new approaches.

All I could ask is that we at least consider that delay often can have more serious consequences later on than swift action. This is not just a theory. It happened once, to the horror of the world. What reason do we have to believe our time is immune from a similar disaster?

Mr. Speaker, President Bush has forthrightly and openly asked for our help. How can we at this time of crisis turn our backs on him before the entire world? Our American troops in the gulf have bound themselves by sacred ties of duty and honor and willingness to sacrifice. Cannot we at least be bound to a binding resolution that will give their Commander in Chief what he has requested?

This is, in the final analysis, a vote that transcends all the differences we may have, political, ideological, or generational. And, yes, as the Speaker so eloquently said in his remarks, this is a vote of conscience, and I am so proud to be associated with our distinguished array of bipartisan cosponsors. I want to thank them all, the Democratic side, the Republican side, for their great contributions to this effort. We hope that the contribution of your conscience will persuade you to vote with us on our resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFazio].

Mr. DEFazio. Mr. Speaker, I rise as I have several times over the last 2 days in opposition to the declaration of war and in opposition to Solarz-Michel.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. McCloskey].

Mr. McCloskey. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz resolution.

As has been stated by the most respected Admiral Crowe among others, the consequences of war would be unpredictable.

The Pentagon's own casualty estimates for ground attacks on Kuwait show casualties could exceed 50 percent.

The President plans to attack under U.N. auspices. A U.N. Administrator in the Sudan laments that likely blockage of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea will bring famine of massive and biblical proportions for millions of Ethiopians and Sudanese.

And just think of the environmental catastrophe stemming from burning oil fields and oil-choked seas.

Let's not pretend we're going to easily control the consequences.

Vote against the Solarz resolution a declaration of war.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANNUNZIO].

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the Solarz resolution.

It is a premature and hazardous course to follow when we have not yet exhausted all of the diplomatic and economic avenues available to us.

Toughness, patience, and persistence pay off when economic sanctions are imposed. Five months are not enough. It will take until at least spring or early summer to weaken Saddam militarily and destroy his ability to effectively wage war.

There are those who feel that a quick-fix war will force Iraq out of Kuwait. I do not agree. The hoped-for quick-fix could easily lead to sending the world up in flames. It is easy to start a war, but difficult to stop it. And once started, there is no going back. And the price to pay will be devastating.

Are we ready to reimpose the draft on our young people?

Are we ready to raise taxes to pay for this war?

Are we ready for the certain death and destruction, and the loss of American lives that will come from this war?

Are we ready for the acts of terrorism and sabotage that will be unleashed on Americans?

I think not, and therefore, I urge that we exhaust every alternative before turning to war. I urge my colleagues to vote against the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. WISE].

Mr. WISE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I came to this body as an advocate for jobs, justice, and peace. As the Member who introduced the first Martin Luther King holiday bill, I cannot tell you how disappointed I am that this resolution, an undated declaration of war, would go into effect on the birthday of this great leader of nonviolence. I conclude that our national interests are not at stake, and I will oppose this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Gephardt resolution calling for continued sanctions against Iraq, and I strongly oppose the throwback to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, the Solarz-Michel resolution, which effectively gives the President an undated and cloaked declaration of war.

I came to Congress in the spirit of Dr. Martin Luther King, whose birthday and message of peace we celebrate next week. Dr. King taught us of the wisdom of dialog and peace, its possibilities for the ultimate enhancement not only of human rights but of our self-interests. He taught us of the dangers of the impetuous temptations toward violence, its unpredictable consequences and unanticipated costs. He taught us that peace is the ultimate civil right, that it is our incumbent obligation to ensure its survival to the greatest extent of our ability.

It was on this basis that I opposed the undeclared wars of Vietnam and Nicaragua, the military strikes in Grenada and Panama, the military support for paramilitary death squads in El Salvador. I believe they enhanced neither democratic rights nor ultimate U.S. interests. And it is on this basis that I oppose the Solarz-Michel resolution, giving the President a declaration of war.

The August 2 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was, by any standards, a ruthless act of aggression. And the world's response to date has been a miraculous one: A Congress of nations made a virtually unanimous moral judgment in its first major cooperative undertaking in years, taking swift action against Saddam Hussein's military subjugation of his neighbor. In the face of this barbarism, old hatred and distrust was discarded, new alliances were forged, and many a speech was given by our President and others about the new world order, founded in the unprecedented events of 1990, were international frictions were relieved by means other than force. By passing the Solarz-Michel resolution, we threaten that new world order, the lives of thousands of young Americans, our domestic strength and the American Constitution.

Passage of the Solarz-Michel resolution is a declaration of war: It authorizes the President to take this Nation to war if he sees it necessary. Its wording—a modern day equivalent of a Gulf of Tonkin resolution—reveals two critical truths: That the President would lose critical votes by asking the Congress for a formal declaration of war, and that he will not concede to the fact that only the Congress has the power to declare war.

Intelligence reports tell us that a war in the Arabian desert is likely to be protracted over a period of many months, with hundreds of thousands of American troops caught in an unfamiliar desert, fighting a high-technology war with divided support around the world and at home.

While the world coalition is likely to maintain solidarity during the course of peaceful sanctions, its already unenthusiastic support for war is likely to further fracture in the course of an extended war. Europe and Japan are more likely to pursue their agendas of economic advancement in the coming year than they are to become embroiled in an inferno on the Saudi front. A United States war in the Arab Peninsula could be a very lonely one.

And whether the war lasts 10 days or ten months, whether it is fought with some of the allies or by ourselves, the decimation of Iraq and its rules will have geopolitical consequences—the creation of new power vacuums—that are being generally ignored. Therefore, even if we win, we still lose. Blowing away Saddam Hussein might give great satisfaction to even the most reasonable of men and fulfill a desire for an ultimate censure of a despot. But his removal would only fan the flames of this politically volatile region.

Regional security would be the first casualty of a gulf war. With Iraq removed as the dominant military power in the region, terrorist Syria and fundamentalist Iran will inherit the mantle of leadership among Arab countries. Arab masses, reacting to the specter of the loss of Arab lives, may become hostile to Arab regimes that endorsed military action and to the United States. Israel, threatened by an increasingly radicalized and hostile Arab world, may be more likely to resort to use of its nuclear weapons to impose its will on this region. American prestige, the critical multilateral balance of power in the region, and principle of collective security are therefore all likely to be casualties of the war.

And while we speak about the casualties of war what are we to tell the thousands of American parents and spouses—and the disproportionate number of African-Americans, still aching from the President's veto of the Civil Rights Act—when their loved ones come home bagged in plastic? That because the President ordered more than 400,000 troops to the desert he had to save face? If we attack, whose face do we save? The famed novelist E.L. Doctorow wrote this week that in the new world order, "A modern nation's honor is not the honor of a warrior, it is the honor of a father providing for his children."

Another cost of war would be our already faltering economy, the risks to which also argue for diplomacy. In December it was reported that the Pentagon estimated a \$31 billion cost in fiscal 1991 for the gulf deployment—a figure that assumes that fighting will not break out—\$31 billion that will be devoured by war costs. Even without a shooting war, it will cost \$85 million a day to maintain Desert Shield. When it comes to war for ambiguous reasons in remote lands, cash flows freely. When it comes to the war against poverty, illiteracy, and despair in our inner cities, the eagerness is replaced with the rigidities and rhetoric of budget sequestration.

The entire 1990 Federal budget allocation received by Detroit—\$291 million—would be eaten alive by Desert Shield in 3½ days. The entire 1990 budget for our Community Development Block Grant Program—\$3 billion—is gone in a month for the gulf deployment. The entire \$1.3 billion 1990 budget for Head Start dwindles to nothing after 15 days to support the President's war effort. All of these costs are occurring without a single shot fired. This Government would not even blink to commit these critical funds to war, but we see nothing but empty pockets when it is budget time for these critical programs.

Let us not delude ourselves that this will be a clean war. To those who talk about a quick victory against Iraq, I say there is room for doubt. Gen. Colin Powell, the Chairman of the

Joint Chiefs, said that a quick, clean victory against Iraq is highly unlikely: there are too many variables in war and too many strategies to counter single-dimension initiatives like massive air strikes. Quick, massive strikes as well would claim thousands of Iraqi civilians but ensure no victory. The infliction of casualties a large number of the 1 million Iraqi troops would almost certainly ensure our own massive troop casualties.

However, we need not speculate on what might happen in a pitched battle with Saddam Hussein. We have already provided a military response. It is called a siege, and not only has history proven it to be the best of military strategies, it is working with great effectiveness and cost-efficiency today. Reports last week showed that since September, when sanctions were implemented, Iraq has suffered food prices seven times higher and declines in food rations of up to 50 percent. Already 40 percent of Iraqi domestic production has been cut and their economy is losing at a rate of \$20 billion annually. Inarguably, sanctions are working. Without putting our children in harm's way, we are bringing slow but inevitable doom to Saddam Hussein. Because of the power of our sanctions, what we should be doing is giving sanctions an opportunity to complete their purpose, without the mass death and destruction of all-out war.

It took us 40 years to negotiate the end of World War II. So what if it takes us 1 year to negotiate the withdrawal of an isolated and despondent despot? Sanctions and strategic diplomacy—our collective willingness and strength to enter into a broad dialog to enhance, rather than wreck, the principle of collective security—may not bring the immediate gratification of military exploit that some of us think will enhance U.S. prestige, but will bring the results of peace, regional security, and the protection of U.S. lives that we all seek.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I yield the balance of our time to the distinguished deputy whip on the majority side, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR. Mr. Speaker, we have come to the closing moments of a long and wrenching debate. For the past 48 hours, the media have carried our deliberations live, gavel to gavel, into millions of our homes. Calls have been jamming the Capitol switchboard.

America, indeed, the world is watching us.

We are about to cast what so many Members have acknowledged may be the most important vote of our lives, whether or not to go to war.

Make no mistake about it—this resolution is tantamount to a declaration of war.

Before we cast this vote, each of us must ask ourselves: Do we really have no other choice?

War is the least predictable and most painful of our options. It must be the very last resort.

We support the goals of the President's policy. And Saddam Hussein must know that this country is united against his aggression, and determined that he will leave Kuwait.

We support the deployment of troops to enforce the sanctions and to maintain international pressure.

But January 15 is an arbitrary and unrealistic deadline.

The sanctions against Iraq are working. Now is too soon to declare this policy a failure and rush to war.

As we speak, over a million men and women face each other in the open desert, on the open seas. All the firepower of modern weaponry is ready to be unleashed. The cost in human lives could be enormous.

There are those who believe a war in the gulf will be a short war, that the casualties will be few, and the consequences contained.

But there are no short or easy wars. In fact, no war is ever really over. And for some men and women, war is an eternity.

Ask the families and friends and veterans of our last war. Their lives were forever changed.

America has 400,000 men and women on the front line. We are proud of them. And we stand behind them 100 percent.

But the best way to support them is to make sure that we do not ask them to make the ultimate sacrifice unless it is absolutely necessary.

Can we really say to those men and women in the desert today that we have given diplomacy a chance?

Will we just cast aside the testimony of Admiral Crowe and General Jones? Will we ignore the advice of six of the seven last Secretaries of Defense, all of whom have told us to stand firm with economic sanctions rather than use the military option?

Do we really want to go to war with this country so deeply divided? Have we learned nothing from the bitter experience of the last generation who went into battle?

I am aware, as is every one else in this Chamber, that this resolution will pass. And with its passage, the road to war opens before us.

Nearly a generation ago, we sent hundreds of thousands of our young to fight a war that no one wanted—in a land we did not know—against a foe we did not understand. We made the grave mistake at that time of failing to separate the warrior from the war.

To the men and women who carry our flag in the Persian Gulf today and in the weeks and months to come, let me say to you—we will not make that same mistake twice. You are our own; we draw strength from your courage and we will stand by you, regardless of how we cast our vote today.

To each of my colleagues here in this Chamber now, let me appeal to you one more time to pause before you cast this vote, and ask yourself the very same question that hundreds of thousands of families in America are having to face today. Is this the time? And is this the

cause for which you would ask your son or your daughter to risk their life?

I urge you to vote against this resolution.

□ 1520

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. ROWLAND].

Mr. ROWLAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz resolution.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HUGHES].

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding the time.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution because I am persuaded that we do not advance the cause for peace by undercutting the President or repudiating U.N. Resolution 678. We advance it by strengthening the President's hand.

Mr. Speaker, these are difficult times. Our actions in the next few hours will shape history for decades to come, and will perhaps determine the fate of thousands of lives.

All of us want to see the crisis in the Persian Gulf resolved without any loss of life. I also fervently believe that war should be the option of last resort. But it will not occur because we wish it so.

Nothing will be served by a lengthy debate over the policy failures on the part of our Government that have led us to this unhappy chapter in history. Nevertheless, I feel compelled to make a few observations about policies which trouble me. The economic sanctions endorsed by the United Nations and enforced by the world community were undermined by the November decision to set a January 15 deadline for Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Moreover, our range of options was seriously eroded by a decision to commit some 200,000 additional troops to Saudi Arabia as part of Operation Desert Shield.

I am also disturbed over the disproportionate number of American troops in the multinational force in the Persian Gulf. Those with the most at stake have committed the least. That's wrong.

I realize quite well, however, that we have to deal with the realities of the moment—not the way we would have it or the way it should have been. Leadership is attempting to shape events as they are evolving, not to sit back until a policy has been developed and then suddenly attempt to chart a new course at the last minute.

We should have come back into session last year to debate the events as they happened. I can tell you that I would not have supported a January 15 deadline which virtually assured that economic sanctions and diplomatic endeavors would not have a reasonable time to work. I would not have supported the additional deployment of some 200,000 American troops to Saudi Arabia when it was apparent that our allies were not making comparable commitments of manpower, and that we were raising the stakes

and essentially going it alone on the battlefield.

Unfortunately, the time to debate those issues has come and gone. We are now at the end of a well-developed policy that leadership required us to challenge months ago, not today. It is up to us now to support this policy, to make the best of our limited options, and hope that it does indeed lead to peace, not war.

I have listened very closely to the debate in this Chamber this past 2 days. I find there is a remarkable consensus in the Congress about most of the critical issues we face.

Members on both sides of this issue are willing to authorize the use of force. Both Hamilton-Gephardt and Solarz-Michel are declarations of war, for they both approve the use of our military forces to enforce the economic embargo. The major difference in their effect is that Hamilton-Gephardt would require a second vote for an offensive against Iraq. Unfortunately, that works to the advantage of Saddam Hussein, not ours.

Most everyone on both sides of this debate agree that Saddam Hussein is an international renegade who the world will have to stop either now or in the future. It is uncertain whether it will be easier or more painful in the future. I fear it will be the latter.

Everyone agrees that Saddam Hussein must be forced out of Kuwait and not benefit in any way for his rape and pillage of that small country. The only questions are how, when, and at what cost.

Most everyone in this Chamber agrees that economic sanctions will not guarantee the result that we seek—the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We hope they will—and we should pursue that policy vigorously. But our intelligence is inconclusive, and not particularly helpful.

And most everyone agrees that a blockade is doomed to failure without a real and credible threat of force should sanctions fail.

But it must be a credible threat to use force. Credibility depends on whether by our words and deeds we have demonstrated clearly that we mean what we say about our willingness to use force to achieve our policy goals.

The President has worked hard to rally the international community behind a global position and strategy to compel compliance from Saddam Hussein. It set a deadline of January 15, and authorizes force should he fail to give up Kuwait.

Make no mistake about it, the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution seriously undercuts U.N. Resolution 678. It erodes the credibility of that threat to use force, cuts the legs out from our President, and sends the wrong message to Saddam Hussein and his kind.

Hamilton-Gephardt is tantamount to a repudiation of U.N. Resolution 678 at the very moment that U.N. Secretary Perez de Cuellar is meeting with Saddam Hussein to try to salvage peace. Instead of supporting this effort, Hamilton-Gephardt might very well trigger an unraveling of the international coalition now standing up to Saddam Hussein. At the very least, it will certainly shake their confidence in our leadership.

For those that want to rely upon continued sanctions, I can only say I do too. But they have to go hand-in-hand with a credible threat

of force, and when you undercut that, you lessen the chance of its success.

Frankly, how can the President as our Commander in Chief persuade anyone—particularly Saddam Hussein—of our resolve and determination if we tie the President's hands as we approach these next few critical days of decisionmaking?

The Solarz-Michel resolution does not foreclose the continued use of sanctions. It does not foreclose the use of diplomacy after January 15. It does add an authorization to use force to the arsenal of tools afforded to the President. I do not give him that authority lightly or without a lot of reservation.

We cannot all be Secretaries of State; 535 Members of Congress cannot possibly carry out the day-to-day negotiating, consulting, and decisionmaking to deal with such difficult and complex matters of state.

I sincerely believe that the President wants peace, not war. He has persuaded me that he is our last best hope for peace. I cannot, in good conscience, tie the President's hands at this late moment and simply hope for the best. We've traveled too far down the road at this point to change the course.

In closing, I just want to point out that I, like everyone else in this Chamber, has deliberated, and indeed agonized over this decision. I have tried my best to listen to our President, to my constituents, and to my heart. In every instance I find that it is a close call.

In the final analysis, I sincerely believe that our last best hope for peace is to support our President and U.N. Resolution 678. I only hope and pray that I have made the right choice. Just as importantly, I hope and pray that the President will use the power we have granted him with great wisdom and care. He holds our country's last best hope for peace.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.

Mr. Speaker, as we come to the close of this historic debate, I find myself in a somewhat anomalous position. It was almost 25 years ago that I got my start in politics as the campaign manager for one of the first antiwar candidates for Congress in the country. It never occurred to me then that I would be speaking on the floor of the House of Representatives a quarter of a century later in support of a bipartisan resolution that many whom I respect fear could lead to another Vietnam.

Yet, I believe there are some fundamental differences between the situation in which we found ourselves in Vietnam then and the situation we confront in the Persian Gulf today.

In Vietnam, vital American interests were never at stake. In the gulf, they are. In Vietnam, the cost in blood and treasure was out of all proportion to the expected benefits of a successful defense of South Vietnam. In the gulf, the enormous benefits of a successful effort to get Iraq out of Kuwait far exceed the admitted price we will have to pay if force must be used.

We have heard a lot of talk in this debate about the need for patience. We were patient when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. We were patient when

Italy attacked Ethiopia in 1936. We were patient when Germany blitzkrieged Poland in 1939. We were patient when Germany overran France in 1940. We were patient, Mr. Speaker, right up to December 7, 1941, when Japan attacked us at Pearl Harbor, by which time Germany had conquered almost all of Europe and Japan controlled much of Asia.

The great lesson of our time is that evil still exists, and when evil is on the march, it must be confronted.

In the Persian Gulf, almost half a year after the brutal and unprovoked annexation of Kuwait, the time for patience has ended and the time for firmness has arrived. Saddam Hussein represents a clear and present danger, not only to the region, but to the world. He has gone to war twice in the last 10 years. He has used chemical weapons not only against his enemies, but against his own people, and he is well on his way toward acquiring nuclear weapons as well.

Driven by a megalomaniacal lust for power, he is determined to dominate the entire Middle East, and if he is not stopped now, we will have to stop him later under circumstances where he will be much more difficult and much more dangerous to contain.

None of us wants war. Yet the truth is that not until Saddam Hussein is stripped of any lingering illusions he may have about our willingness to use force will there be any real chance of a peaceful resolution of this crisis.

That is why, with only 3 days left before the expiration of the U.N. deadline, this bipartisan resolution, by confronting Saddam Hussein with a choice between leaving and living or staying and dying, represents the last best chance for peace.

The vote on the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution a short while ago demonstrates that a majority of the House believes that the protracted application of sanctions is a formula for failure rather than a strategy for success.

□ 1530

Judge Webster, the head of the CIA, does not believe the sanctions will be sufficient to get Iraq out of Kuwait. Nor do the British, nor the French, nor the Egyptians, nor the Saudis. Not one of our coalition partners believes that sanctions will be sufficient to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

The reason they do not believe sanctions will be sufficient is because they know that Saddam Hussein does not give a whit for the welfare of his own people. All he cares about is the maximization of his own power. However great the economic impact of the sanctions may be, they know, as we know, that Saddam Hussein does not have to run for reelection in 1992. He does not have to worry about a contentious Congress or a critical press. He will hunker down. He will wait. And while he waits,

there is a very real possibility that this inherently fractious and fragile coalition will begin to unravel, and the sanctions will erode, and he will prevail.

With the adoption of the bipartisan resolution, however, we should be in a position to achieve our objectives by peaceful means if possible, but, yes, by the use of force if necessary.

If we prevail, as surely we will, we will have prevented a brutal dictator from getting his hands on the economic jugular of the world. We will have protected and stabilized the Arab governments courageous enough to have opposed him. We will have eliminated his weapons of mass destruction and greatly reduced his conventional military power. We will have enhanced the prospects for progress in the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors. And perhaps most importantly of all, by demonstrating that aggression does not pay, and that the international community will uphold the sanctity of existing borders, we will have established a precedent that could lead to the creation of a new world order governed by the rule of law rather than by the law of the jungle, and in which nations shall not make war against other nations anymore.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the bipartisan resolution.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Speaker, 2 hours ago, this House, by an overwhelming majority, reaffirmed the sole right of Congress to declare war. Despite citations of over 200 instances of the use of force by the United States and its representatives without a congressional war declaration, when we assemble the largest concentration of military power in one location since the beginning of time, it is proper and fitting that Congress reaffirm its constitutional right to authorize the unleashing of these horrific forces.

It has been said here on this floor time and again over the past 20 hours of debate that we, this House must unite and support the President and his actions in the Persian gulf. But this support should not be the moral equivalent of a rubber stamp, or the blind leading the blind, or of the unquestioned obedience of a follower to a leader.

When we all took the oath of office, here in this Chamber 9 short days ago, we swore to uphold the Constitution of the United States, as members of the legislative branch, we have that right and that solemn obligation. Our vote shortly after noon this day confirms and reaffirms this responsibility and say to the President, "When you decide that there is no other alternative, when all other options are exhausted, come to and make your case and Congress will decide the appropriate time and place to wage war."

What a difference a few hours can make in the life of a democracy. After defeating a resolution which called upon the President to continue to use American forces to protect Saudi Arabia, to enforce the U.N. embargo and to protect our forces in the region, we spin 180 degrees and overwhelmingly pass the Presidential-Solarz-Michel resolution giving Presi-

dent Bush a virtual blank check to make war, perhaps within the next 72 hours.

The vote for the Presidential-Solarz-Michel resolution is a vote for inconsistency. It is a vote for impatience. It is a vote for the congressional equivalent of passing the buck and the responsibility for war to a President without the need for further legislative branch input or oversight for at least 60 days.

The overwhelming vote for the Presidential-Solarz-Michel resolution is a vote to diminish congressional power scarcely 3 hours after we so strongly reaffirmed it earlier today.

It is inconsistent to talk about the great costs of war without explaining how those financial costs will be paid. It is inconsistent to keep reminding America to remember the hundreds of thousands of American forces stationed there in the Mideast while forgetting that we have the obligation to see that they are used wisely, properly and only when there is no other alternative. But the greatest inconsistency of all, Mr. Speaker, is to boldly reaffirm a constitutional right to the sole power to declare war and then to turn around moments later and hand off this responsibility without any guarantee that it will be used only as a final step in a still unfinished search for a peaceful solution to this situation.

This is indeed a historic day for this Nation unfortunately, Congress has been less than spectacular in meeting the challenge and upholding its constitutional mandate to contribute to a peaceful solution to the crisis.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to strongly support the Michel-Solarz resolution expressing the same sentiment as the U.N. Resolution 678.

After defeating the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, which I opposed, I believe it is imperative that Congress reaffirm this Nation's resolve to do whatever necessary to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

It is important to remember, however, that this resolution is not an order to commence hostilities on January 15. It simply allows the President to have all options available to him after this date—a fact that will not go unnoticed by Saddam Hussein.

Again, let me state that, in my view, this resolution is the last, best hope for a peaceful resolution of this conflict. Only by giving the President adequate authority and bargaining power can we ensure that all diplomatic solutions have been attempted.

Mr. Speaker, we all want to avoid war. In my view, the Michel-Solarz resolution is the best method of accomplishing this goal.

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Speaker, after careful thought, I intend to support the Michel-Solarz resolution. All three resolutions before us today recognize that force may be necessary to liberate Kuwait. Only the Michel-Solarz resolution has the force of law, and if we are condoning military action, the timing is best left to our Commander in Chief. I am confident that the President has listened closely to this debate and that he will navigate this incredibly complex and dangerous conflict with the use of force as an absolute last resort.

We simply cannot face the possibility of war with a cacophony of voices enunciating American policy. I recognize that this resolution may be viewed by history as a declaration of war in spite of the carefully drafted language.

We will not be able to reverse our course once hostilities begin.

Economic sanctions have had some effect, but our ability to sustain combat readiness and international cooperation is limited by many factors.

In the time between our vote and any decision to commence hostilities, the United States should continue to actively seek substantially greater commitments of personnel and financial support by our allies in this effort. Many U.N. members have simply raised their hands to vote while we have sent our sons and daughters to a harsh and potentially bloody battlefield. If we are truly part of an undertaking of the entire international community, we should not be ashamed to demand their full participation.

This has unquestionably been the most heartwrenching decision of my career. Whether we all agree on the immediate issue, I urge every American to join me in praying that we can achieve a peaceful solution, and for the protection of the brave citizens of our Nation who face great danger on our behalf in the days ahead.

At this point, I ask to insert in the RECORD an editorial of New York Newsday, January 11, 1991, which very adequately reflects my views on this issue:

CONGRESS' DUTY: GIVE BUSH ROOM

The decision for Congress is clear: It is time to authorize the use of force in the Persian Gulf.

The vote is necessary not only to meet the constitutional requirement that Congress declare war, but to strengthen President George Bush's hand in trying to convince Iraq's Saddam Hussein that, unless he withdraws from Kuwait, he faces a war he cannot possibly win. The paradox holds true: To avoid war, there must be a credible threat of war.

War is not inevitable. Hussein is a consummate high-risk gambler who is likely to try for a last-second—or even overtime—deal. It could be that the diplomatic process really just began Wednesday in Geneva. If that is the case, then there is all the more reason to give Bush maximum support, to give him the strongest possible hand.

There might have been a time, even a few weeks ago, when it would have been appropriate to tell the administration not to use force and continue with economic sanctions. But events have overtaken that view. From the United Nations vote to authorize the use of force if Iraq did not begin to leave Kuwait by Jan. 15 to Iraq's stonewalling in Geneva, the terrain has changed.

Having brought Hussein face to face with the prospect of war, would waiting another year or more for sanctions to take hold have greater effect? It's not credible. It's more likely that the delicate international coalition that Bush stitched together would come apart at the seams long before sanctions hurt Iraq. It's more likely that domestic opinion will acclimate to the status quo and accept Hussein's monstrous devouring of Kuwait.

This is not an easy or a happy decision. An affirmative vote is clearly more than a tactical ploy. If diplomacy fails, there will be war and American soldiers will die. There is a lingering feeling that the administration has needlessly rushed into this position. And Congress deserves considerable blame as well. Action in November might have preserved U.S. options.

But that is past. Congress must deal with the reality before it. Bush has properly asked Congress for authorization to use force. It was essential he do so. Significantly, the major resolutions introduced in Congress all include authorizations for the use of force. The difference is in the matter of timing.

A group of prominent Democrats, including Rep. Lee Hamilton of Indiana and House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt, have offered a resolution that calls upon the president to pursue economic sanctions first and, if they fail, to return for an authorization to use force. This might have made perfect sense—two months ago. Not now.

The bipartisan resolution we support, sponsored by Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-Brooklyn) and House Minority Leader Robert Michel (R-Ill.) and backed by the White House, authorizes the use of U.S. armed forces pursuant to the U.N. resolutions, calls on Bush not to use force until he has determined all other appropriate avenues have been explored, and states that the War Powers Resolution applies to his actions.

We urge the President to pay particular attention to the last two parts of the resolution. If a war must be fought, it is essential that the American people believe that every reasonable alternative has been thoroughly explored. It could be that the authorization to use force will prove to be a more effective weapon than the use of force itself.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of peace, and in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution that is the last best chance for peace.

I am convinced that when dealing with a bully like Saddam Hussein, peace can only come from a position of strength. Therefore, the threat of the use of force, along with sanctions, offers us the most hope for not having to use force. But if force must be used, and even the supporters of the Gephardt sanctions-only resolution do not rule out the use of force in the future, then sooner rather than later is safer for our servicemen and women in the field.

Our men and women in the desert fear what might happen in 6 months or 1 year while Saddam increases his capability to deliver weapons of mass destruction—chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear. In the meantime, they cook in the desert.

In approving the Solarz-Michel resolution, the Congress joins 160 of the United Nations, the 28 allied nations active in the Persian Gulf deployment and the President in sending a strong message to Saddam that the U.N. resolutions must be adhered to by Iraq.

It is my sincere hope that this strong message of unity will help U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar convince Saddam that he must comply with the U.N. resolutions.

No one hoped more fervently than I that economic sanctions alone would force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. But in light of what we have witnessed in Iraq and Kuwait, and in light of my recent visit to the Mideast and Persian Gulf and my meetings with experts and officials there, it is obvious that sanctions alone will not get Saddam Hussein to withdraw.

I also feel strongly that the other members of the coalition deployed against Saddam, and the United Nations should have more forces on the ground beside our men and women. I also hope to see our richer allies like Germany and Japan share a far larger part of the finan-

cial burden of this operation. Japan's limited contribution thus far, given its far greater dependence on Mideast oil, is a scandal. All of this relates to working out the details of what constitutes the new world order.

But until such time as we have the details of the new world order worked out, we cannot stand by and allow Saddam to swallow up any country he chooses, to strike at the jugular of the world economy, to rape, torture, pillage, and murder, and to generally wreak havoc on the existing world order.

By showing our resolve to act if necessary, the Solarz-Michel resolution offers us the last best chance to stop Saddam peacefully.

I do not cast my vote lightly. This is a solemn occasion and the weight of responsibility is enormous. It is likely the most important vote I have cast in 12 years in Congress. Yet, in the search for real peace, where surrender to the forces of evil embodied by Saddam Hussein is unacceptable, it is the only alternative.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, for the past 2 days this body has been engaged in an interesting debate; a debate on a high plane of thought. I question no one's motive for this debate, but wonder why we are doing this when the United Nations, with our support and, indeed, the support of nearly every member nation has spoken: Iraq must leave Kuwait by January 15 or face being forced out.

The question has been raised, "Why must the United States bear the brunt of enforcing this decision?" While it is true that the United States is shouldering a sizable burden, consider this: Of the forces united in the gulf against Saddam Hussein, more than a quarter million are from over a dozen nations, including sizable contingents from our British allies, from Egypt, and from Syria. NATO aircraft from Germany and Italy have moved into Turkey to protect that nation from retribution for their swift and decisive stand they took in the wake of the Kuwaiti invasion. The Kuwaiti Government in exile has offered to pay for one-half the cost of this operation. The Saudis have supplied our troops with food and fuel and our Government with money.

Yes, I agree, there are those nations who are not doing their fair share. It troubles me, particularly when I see those nations who not only have ample resources, but have the most to lose, being penny wise, but pound foolish.

I have listened with interest as my colleagues have discussed what message we would send Saddam Hussein if we vote to allow the sanctions more time. I am also concerned about the message such a vote would send to this fragile coalition President Bush has so skillfully drawn together. We not only show a lack of resolve to the Iraqis, we show it to our allies. How long will the coalition last in anything but name if we falter now? How long will the sanctions last in anything but name if we lack the conviction to enforce the very resolution we worked so hard to obtain? Friends, a vote to give the sanctions more time is nothing more than a vote to give Iraq more time. Time to circumvent the sanctions by dealing with greedy nations and unscrupulous rulers. Time to appeal to Arab unity to weaken the coalition against him. Time to build up his deadly arsenals of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and a delivery

system for those weapons which would threaten the whole world. Time to become a hero among Arabs for defying the entire Western world.

Diplomacy, another much bantered about word, has been, and is still, vigorously being pursued. As we debate this issue today, U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar is pleading with Saddam Hussein to listen to the voice of reason, the voice of right, and leave Kuwait. But Hussein has shown little or no interest in listening to reason or doing what is right. His recent refusal to even see a letter offered by President Bush should be ample evidence of that.

This Nation sought and received the strongest sanctions from the United Nations possible. They have not worked. This Nation has sought to reason with Saddam Hussein. He has not listened. We sought and received a U.N. resolution calling for Iraq's removal, by force if necessary, from Kuwait. That resolution must work.

In closing, I would like to note the American people must be awfully confused by the vast amounts of conflicting data during this debate. We have all used the facts and figures which best suit our individual positions. Democracy is where everyone has his say, but not everyone has his way. But through this all I have detected a common thread, and that is a consensus that Iraq must leave Kuwait. I don't think there is a Member here who believes otherwise. And how should we do that? By giving the President the freedom to join with the United Nations in enforcing U.N. Resolution 678.

Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ORTIZ. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution authorizing the use of force to implement the U.N. resolution not because I support war, but because I support peace. I strongly believe that our last and best hope in avoiding war in the Middle East is the diplomatic effort of the Secretary of the United Nations, Gen. Javier Perez de Cuellar.

I do not want war. I am concerned about the lives of our young soldiers and about their families and loved ones in the United States. But we are running out of options. Saddam Hussein has refused all reasonable attempts at a diplomatic solution, indicating a complete unwillingness to withdraw from Kuwait without force. Our greatest intelligence indicates that although economic sanctions are having an impact, they have not and will not cripple the Iraqi Army or force Saddam's withdrawal from Kuwait. Therefore, I am convinced that the only way to achieve a peaceful solution to the Persian Gulf crisis is the successful mission of General Perez de Cuellar.

General Perez de Cuellar has been called the world's last messenger for peace. He is planning today to present Iraq with two options: withdraw from Kuwait and there will be peace or remain in Kuwait and face forceful removal. In order for this message to have impact, it must be credible. The U.S. Congress today has the opportunity to strengthen the negotiating power of General Perez de Cuellar or weaken him. I believe we must allow him to negotiate from a position of strength and world unity.

The world community has spoken unanimously in its condemnation of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. The United Nations has warned that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait by January 15. The deadline is not a U.S. imposed deadline, but a date agreed upon by the world. And the goal is not negotiable. Iraq must withdraw completely. There should be no prize for the aggressor.

My friends, today is a day on which we must make one of the most difficult decisions we will ever make in our political lives. Diplomatic efforts have failed us so far. We sit facing a dictator more brutal than any we have seen in recent history. Saddam is a man who has shown an exuberance for massive killings; the like of which we have not seen in five decades. We are a country in a community of nations who cannot be happy about war. And yet we must do the right thing now and avoid a much more massive amount of American casualties in the not-too-distant future.

As General Perez de Cuellar attempts today to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, he must have the undivided support of the American people. Without the threat of force and possible destruction of his country, Saddam has no incentive to comply with the demands of the world that he completely withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam Hussein must be convinced. Secretary Perez de Cuellar must speak with authority, and this Congress must stand up now and make the difficult decision.

Only Congress has the power to make this decision. The Constitution gives Congress, and not the President, the power to declare war. Therefore, it is the Congress which must support the U.N. resolution. The vote today cannot and must not be a political issue. It is an American issue.

In closing, I am reminded of the words of a great American general and President, George Washington. Washington stood in the well of Statuary Hall and told the assembled Congress in 1780 that, "To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace." Those words spoken so wisely almost 200 years ago are still true today.

I ask my constituents and all of the American people to pray for peace, and support the enforcement of the U.N. resolution.

Mr. HOPKINS. Mr. Speaker, the vote cast today will likely be among the most important that we as individual Members of this body will ever have to make.

We will not only have to account for this vote to our constituents and the American people, but also to our children and grandchildren.

For how we vote today will have a significant impact on how the post-cold-war takes shape and how nations settle their differences in the future.

We are at a turning point in history.

We can either look military aggression in the eye and stop it, or we can look the other way and pray that other would-be Saddam Husseins fail to notice that under the New World order aggression pays, and pays very well.

Mr. Speaker, we need to send a message today.

A message that the Congress stands united with the President and American people in our

resolve to thwart his vicious invasion of Kuwait.

This message is truly the last and best hope of averting a costly and unwanted war.

Whether we like it or not, this Congress has always been viewed abroad as a credible and significant obstacle to our commitment to resort to force if necessary.

Unless we send a clear message that we, the Congress, also consider military force to be a legitimate and possibly necessary tool to achieve our objectives, I fear that, sanctions or no sanctions, diplomacy or no diplomacy, Saddam Hussein will simply hunker down and wear us out.

Wear out world opinion, the integrity of our coalition and the embargo. And in the end, he will keep Kuwait or some piece of it and have proven that aggression does pay, bullies do win and the prospects for a lasting world peace is nothing but an illusion.

What we are really debating today is not whether our objectives merit the use of force but when is the most prudent time to employ force.

Mr. Speaker, I submit that this is not an issue to debate on the floor of the House; when to use force is a tactical military decision best made by our President and his national security advisers.

If we have collectively agreed that the use of force is justified, then when we resort to war cannot be decided by a committee of 535.

But that is precisely what the democratic leadership resolution proposes to do.

It says to the President: While we agree with your conclusion that using force may be inevitable, the Congress, in its infinite wisdom, believes it knows better.

The Congress based on hearings, briefings, and a couple of trips to the area claims to have reached the more enlightened conclusion that waiting for a few more months is in our national interest and a more effective way to achieve our goals.

Mr. Speaker, if the Congress has reached the conclusion that our objectives are not worth going to war to achieve, then it should vote on this conclusion.

But we should try to direct the Commander in Chief on the tactical question of when is the most opportune time to use force.

I say to my colleagues, if you agree with the majority of Americans that the use of force to oust Iraq from Kuwait is justified and may be inevitable, then you only have one choice today—support the bipartisan joint resolution and defeat all the others which only serve to muddy the issue and undermine our objectives in the eyes of Hussein, the world, and the 300,000-plus young Americans waiting in the Saudi desert.

Mr. HOAGLAND. Mr. Speaker, my friends have said "You are voting for war."

I have said "No, I am voting for best hope for preserving peace."

After considerable soul searching, I have concluded that the best hope for preserving peace is a strong congressional vote of support for the President's policy.

Saddam Hussein must understand clearly the consequences of refusing to accede to international demands.

If he continues to refuse to cooperate, to brutalize people and nations, to violate every

standard of international law and human decency, we must, given where we are at this moment, act decisively.

I have said before that it would be appealing to implement a 1990's containment policy, to dig in around Iraq, continue to isolate it, and settle in for the long haul, as we did along the Warsaw Pact border following World War II. That policy worked with the Soviet Union. It lasted over 40 years and cost virtually no American lives. This is the alternative, the policy that would let the sanctions work.

But the President has taken us down a different path. And Congress has chosen to address these issues too late in the game for that option. Such a dramatically different policy is no longer feasible.

With the President's determined leadership, the United Nations adopted the January 15 deadline. Over 25 nations have relied upon our actions and have committed troops, material, or money to the unprecedented international effort. Turkey and Egypt are under tremendous economic pressure because of the embargo. Saudi Arabia for its own reasons is urging a quick resolution. The Soviet Union has backed our hand in the Middle East fully, over the objections of the Soviet military, who have developed relationships with the Iraqis during arms sales, because of the leadership of Shevardnadze. Now he has resigned.

What would the consequences be if the Congress overruled the President on the use of force and nullified the January 15 deadline?

First, Saddam Hussein would surely take heart. Serious negotiations—such as there have been—would surely be out the window.

And what would the effect be upon the members of our coalition? Confusion and chaos. What would happen to our credibility? Why would other nations, friends or foes, rely upon U.S. representations again?

The administration has made mistakes along the way, leaving us with no other real option. Former American Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie made a gross miscalculation when she told Hussein shortly before the invasion of Kuwait that America would not be concerned about border conflicts between Arab States.

And the administration did not seek the authorization it should have when, just after the election, it announced the massive troop buildup to over 400,000, and unilaterally changed America's strategy from a defensive one to an offensive one. This did not allow Congress and the Nation to debate whether to choose the containment option, the "let-the-sanctions-work" option, as an alternative. The President has been unnecessarily bellicose in many of his statements, and has excessively personalized the argument with Hussein.

But present reality is the President has committed our Nation to a schedule and to a clear course of action. The question is, where do we go from here?

With delay, Hussein will only become more dangerous. He has over 200 rockets capable of firing chemical and biological warheads of mass destruction on many nations in the Middle East. He is hard at work developing a nuclear capability. Once he acquires that, the costs of stopping him skyrocket.

I am convinced we must keep his feet to the fire. If he will not accede to our demands, we

must recognize that if we delay confrontation, we are increasing the risks, not decreasing them.

In difficult times, we search history for guidance. At a similar time of crisis, the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962, President John F. Kennedy said:

My fellow citizens, let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take, but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing. The 1930's taught us a clear lesson: aggressive conduct, if allowed to go unchecked and unchallenged, ultimately leads to war.

We are here to make the tough decisions. None of our options are good. We must give the President the authority he seeks.

If war results, our military leaders tell us we will have a relatively quick victory, with fewer rather than more American casualties. Let us pray that that will be the case.

Mr. RAY. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in firm support of the United Nations Security Council Resolution No. 678 enacted on November 29, 1990, which authorizes military force against Iraq providing Saddam Hussein has not withdrawn his forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.

Mr. Speaker, I am against the Bennett-Durbin resolution. I believe extraordinary effort has been made by the United States and the United Nations in an effort to resolve the heinous acts committed by Iraq against Kuwait, a United Nations member and a United Arab Council member. The President's actions during the 5 months leading up to this debate have been very much in order. Further drawn out debate would not help, and, in my opinion, would even seem to be taking on a hint of begging and pleading to Tariq Aziz to accept the demands of:

No negotiations; no compromise; no attempts for an Iraqi face saving, and no rewards for aggression.

These demands have, on a number of occasions, been clearly spelled out.

To me, the insulting and unmovable stance of the Iraqi Government reached a level of intolerance which the American people should not accept. The ultimatum given to Iraq to be out of Kuwait by January 15 is a decisive one, and I concur with the perception of many who have contacted me that threats made by the United Nations and the administration must be followed through and not delayed.

The word "oil" has been used frequently—that is, "Is American blood worth shedding for oil?" I assume this means oil profits. I want to take a few minutes to comment on oil.

Oil is a major energy source. If in the hands of a manipulative country, oil could be the source of great power. A prime concern for the last 40 years of the NATO Alliance has been that the Soviet Union was posturing to take control of the oil and minerals of the world. If this had occurred with a substantial portion of the oil in the Persian Gulf region, the Soviet Union would have, without question, controlled Europe and possibly Japan. The end result could have been the isolation of the United States with severe economic demands and extreme energy costs, coupled with political concessions by the free world.

Oil is a resource which should be made available to all countries at an affordable market price, not by extortion or methods of intimidation. Oil should not be held hostage by thug countries such as Iraq.

There is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein would be in Saudi Arabia today in control of its oil if the United Nations had not acted wisely and decisively. I suggest also that the current prices of oil at \$27 to \$35 per barrel would be rather modest compared to the world price that Saddam Hussein would be able to set under such conditions as a world power broker. Our staunch ally, Israel, would also be in an untenable situation which might jeopardize their survival.

Mr. Speaker, our economic and diplomatic alternatives have expired. Therefore, we must prepare ourselves for what likely remains our last option to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait unconditionally and unequivocally. I do not take lightly the notion of authorizing possible military force to get Iraq out of Kuwait. I have contemplated the consequences of such an action, and they are devastating. A military offensive will undoubtedly cause pain, suffering, and death. But Mr. Speaker, Saddam Hussein has already caused much pain, suffering, and death.

It is clear to me that Saddam Hussein is not interested in further negotiation. This was evident by his unwillingness to select one date for a meeting in Baghdad when presented with 15 dates by the Bush administration. This was also evident in Minister Aziz's failure to deliver President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein.

While no one would advocate war over diplomacy, we find ourselves in a precarious situation. Our adversary is unwilling to budge, and we are unwilling to budge. At some point, we must draw the line.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Michel-Solaz resolution. In passing this resolution, we will be sending a strong message to Saddam Hussein: We Americans have the courage of our convictions. Just as our strength and resolve brought us a peaceful victory in the cold war, this vote is our last best chance for a peaceful solution to the crisis in the Persian Gulf. I hope and pray that Saddam heeds this message and pulls out of Kuwait.

Let me emphasize my sincere hope that offensive action by the United States is not needed to persuade Saddam to get out of Kuwait. No sane person ever wants armed conflict; I pray that we will not have to ask our young men and women in the military to risk their lives in a Persian Gulf war. But I believe that there are some things that we must as a nation be willing to fight—and even to die—for. Among those things, as our Founding Fathers declared more than 200 years ago, is the right to “... secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” That very basic constitutional right is what is currently at stake in the crisis the world faces in the Persian Gulf today.

President Bush has made a strong case for why we cannot afford to appease Saddam Hussein. Peace on Saddam's terms would only feed his “appetite for conquest,” he tells us, and “would be paid many times over in greater sacrifice and suffering.” I agree. We know that Saddam is ruthless: He has used

chemical weapons against his own people, he invaded Kuwait without provocation, and would have continued into Saudi Arabia had he not been stopped by a military presence supported by the entire world—including all of his Arab neighbors.

In my judgment, the idea that economic sanctions will eventually force Saddam out of Kuwait is not a sound one. CIA Director William Webster recently laid out the reasons why economic sanctions won't work in a letter to Armed Services Committee Chairman LES ASPIN.

Mr. Webster notes that,

Even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq * * * Saddam currently appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to maintain the sanctions, especially if the threat of war recedes significantly. He probably continues to believe that Iraq can endure sanctions longer than the international coalition will hold and hopes that avoiding war will buy him time to negotiate a settlement more favorable to him.

In other words, economic sanctions alone will not get Saddam out of Kuwait. That is why I voted against the resolution to preclude the President from taking offensive action in order to give the sanctions more time to work.

This standoff between Iraq and the rest of the world is not about oil or about restoring the emir to power in Kuwait. This is about Americans' ability to live our lives free from the constant threat of terrorism and unprovoked military aggression. If we appease Saddam today, we—and our children—will surely pay the price tomorrow.

So what should we do? For starters, we need to make clear to Saddam that, while we want a peaceful solution to this crisis, we are indeed ready and willing to use force to stop his unprovoked aggression. U.N. Resolution 678 sends just this message. It authorizes the use of force to compel Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait, it does not require the President or anyone else to start dropping bombs at 12:01 a.m. on January 16. That is why I am voting today to support that resolution.

I think it is extremely important that Saddam knows that President Bush has the authority to launch an offensive if he believes it is in the best interest of the United States to do so. I believe that, as Commander in Chief, the President already has that authority under the Constitution. But a strong message of support from Congress should make America's resolve that much more clear to Iraq's leader, and perhaps could help to convince him to pull his troops out of Kuwait voluntarily.

A voluntary withdrawal is the resolution we all hope and pray for. But if that is not to be, the President must have the authority to respond militarily.

Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Speaker, deciding a position on the various Persian Gulf resolutions presented today is one of the most difficult decisions I have had to make as a Member of Congress. I have concluded that the United States does have vital interests at stake in engaging the conflict with Iraq. Our interests are defensive in nature and founded in

the rule of law—not the law of some imagined new world order, but law to halt naked aggression.

I am convinced that Saddam Hussein seeks to dominate the region and its vast oil reserves. While we do not receive but about 10 percent of our imported oil from the Persian Gulf, much of the world relies heavily on it. The U.S. economy, domestic jobs, are at stake as we participate in the global economy.

However, oil alone is not reason enough for me to support military engagement in the Persian Gulf. I feel certain that Saddam Hussein would have combined against the entire Arab nations, moving on to Saudi Arabia after Kuwait, and then wherever his ego would take him were we not to make our presence felt.

Mr. Speaker, I have been extremely sensitive to divergent views throughout this debate. All sides have some merit, some views raise questions fundamental to the nature of American foreign policy. One of these views is proffered by a member of my own staff. I urge my colleagues to take notice, especially those colleagues who consider themselves political conservatives.

A REAL CONSERVATIVE POSITION ON THE PERSIAN GULF

(By Paul Mero)

Most conservatives defend the President's actions in the Persian Gulf, many call it heroic. I call it unwise. The true conservative position must address these points: (1) what is moral, (2) what is consistent, and (3) what is prudent as a long-term policy.

What is moral? No conservative consensus exists, as far as I am aware, in answer to the question, what is the national interest? Or, to put it a different way, for what causes are we willing to sacrifice American lives?

Some say the cause of “democracy.” Notwithstanding a clear definition of democracy, no Arab nation involved in the Persian Gulf is even close to being considered a democracy. Some say “stability,” as in Baker's comment that “instability is not in the best interests of the United States,” but this policy simply puts American lives on the line for even non-democratic nations—American blood spilt in the name of defending an oligarchy? Socialism? Totalitarianism?

Some say the cause of “economics.” That's right, some are actually willing to risk American lives over oil, a consumer product—a product we have an abundance of domestically and throughout the western hemisphere.

A simpler cause to die for, the only cause to die for, is a direct physical threat to the United States. Conservatives stand firm on the right to life of the unborn. Is this right diluted for adults in the name of war? I don't think so. Human lives are too precious, especially American lives, to be spent in anything less than a direct physical threat to their safety.

Iraq is not a direct physical threat to the United States. They are half way around the world. We are separated by vast oceans. They do not have a ballistic capability to reach the United States. They do not have nuclear capability. What threat are they as a nation to us?

Some conservatives say that Iraq's military capabilities are limited at present but are not long from being developed into a direct threat. They say, as they did in WW I, WW II, Korea, and Vietnam (wars that sacrificed over 426,000 American battle deaths), “better to take action now than to fight a

stronger enemy later." This might be true were we not moral agents. A moral people would not kill someone because they perceived a potential threat. I would feel much more comfortable killing a rabid, adult pitbull than I would a pitbull puppy on the notion that it one day might grow up to attack me. Just think what the world would be like if we acted against anybody whom we perceived to be a potential threat.

Our life insurance policy as a nation is a strong national defense, based on a firm commitment to develop SDI, not a policy of preemption to kill all potential threats around us.

The moral position, as I see it, is to risk American lives only when faced with a direct physical threat. Iraq is not in this category. The day Hussein has nuclear ballistic capability to reach the United States, and the day he threatens the U.S. directly, is the day to engage the thought of war.

What is consistent? Another argument offered by interventionists to engage in conflicts such as the Persian Gulf is that the United States is obliged to help others in need—that we are such a prosperous nation and that we should spread our prosperity with others, even if that means fighting and dying to give them what we have, assuming they want what we have.

When that rhetoric was posed to me at a Heritage Foundation roundtable I chastised these esteemed conservatives for being "international liberals." Actually what I said was that that kind of rhetoric, when applied to domestic policy, would buy these conservatives a seat at the Democratic National Committee.

Consistent conservative public policy would not, on the one hand, support a domestic policy that encourages personal accountability, responsibility, preparedness, self-reliance, and the free market (including the right to fail) and then, on the other hand, support a foreign policy that makes the United States the guardian of the world, wreaking havoc on self-determination and accountability just because in our paternalism "we know what's best" for everyone else or because the State Department prefers "stability."

It is arrogant to believe that we know what is best for a world whose many communities are at varying stages of national progression. It is sad to see needless human suffering anywhere in the world. But an even greater tragedy is to intervene to not permit failure that can lead to true growth and progression. This is why most of the world remains unprepared and weak and relies so much upon our all-too-eager benevolence.

Conservatives understand this rule as it applies to domestic policy, but some fail to see how it applies, internationally. Some argue that Kuwait is being denied its self-determination by Iraq. I suggest Kuwait is living a reality it could have, but was not, prepared to meet. War is endemic to a prosperous nation with no desire to do what it takes to protect its prosperity from foreign aggressors. If tiny Israel can hold its own, so can a tiny emirate such as Kuwait.

What is a prudent, long-term American foreign policy? This is an America First policy. A policy that recognizes the value of human life, especially American lives. A policy that holds the virtue of example higher than intrusive good intentions. A policy that puts our national defense, not offense, as a priority of public policy. A policy that extends the hand of trade and diplomacy. A policy that acknowledges that we cannot rid the world of evil. A policy that allows for-

eign nations to live or die as they choose. A policy that allows a charitable people to privately assist distressed or ravaged nations, but that requires our government, a volatile power fueled by special interests, to resist the temptation.

An interventionist conservative is an oxymoron. When will conservatives understand this?

Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of the resolution to authorize President Bush to use force, should it be necessary, to enforce U.N. Resolution 678.

I do not make this vote lightly, nor with any amusement. I recognize full well that the policy options before us are limited, and that the consequences of this action are potentially great.

I have three college-aged children, two sons and one daughter. So I understand in very real, human terms what is at stake in this decision.

But, Mr. Speaker, there is simply too much at stake for this Congress to walk away. President Bush has done an admirable job of marshaling international opposition to the Iraqi aggression. He has literally enlisted the entire world's support for sanctions and a united military threat against Iraq, and his statesmanship should be highly commended.

The United Nations is finally living up to its promise, and fulfilling the potential for true security so many of this body's Members espoused before the agenda became real. If you support collective security in the abstract, you ought to support it in this very real atmosphere, because for perhaps the first time ever, the United Nations is making collective security a credible policy option. We cannot walk away from that.

Mr. Speaker, I want peace. But that is Saddam's decision. His aggression will not stand. And if we present a united front to the aggressor—just as the United Nations has done—we will have the best hope of securing that peace.

United we stand, divided we fall—it is that simple. President Bush has acted boldly and responsibly to counter Iraqi aggression, protect Americans and American interest in the region, and mobilized an unprecedented international front.

This Congress is obligated to join the President and solidify that united front. If we do not—if we undermine the President, we undermine our policy and the strength of the international coalition and that, ultimately would place our troops in the gulf at greater risk. I won't do that.

I stand with the President and with the United Nations, and I urge my colleagues to join me.

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, if international law and rules of world order are not enforced, then there are no rules and chaos reigns.

Wednesday's meeting between Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and Secretary of State James Baker put us near the end of all reasonable efforts of achieving a peaceful solution in the Persian Gulf. Iraqi officials have consistently dodged meetings with Baker and have refused a letter stating President Bush's desire to achieve a peaceful withdrawal.

At the end of more than 7 hours of talks between Baker and Aziz, not one reference was

made to Kuwait in Aziz's news conference. This shows their continued refusal to talk about peaceful withdrawal.

Iraq attacked Kuwait, a neighboring country, seized its resources, and brutalized and killed its citizens. The evidence shows that its military machine would have invaded Saudi Arabia if a peacekeeping force had not intervened.

To negotiate and allow Iraq to keep part of Kuwait would be to reward aggression.

Iraq has demonstrated that it is willing to unleash its military machine on neighboring countries. It has directly threatened world stability. Its actions are those of an outlaw nation and must be put down if we are to preserve world order in the years immediately ahead.

We must not give up hope. Many nations, including the United States, are interested in achieving a peaceful withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

Why not continue with the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, dropping the January 15 deadline?

Sanctions have been shown to help but are not a solution.

In a January 10 letter to Chairman LES ASPIN, CIA Director William Webster states, "Saddam currently appears willing to accept even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the international resolve to maintain the sanctions." The letter further states that, "Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically."

Sanctions can only be used as a part of a larger plan to remove Hussein. They can not stand alone and be successful.

Furthermore, by dropping the deadline, we will only be saying to Hussein that we are now less serious about his leaving than before. If Hussein will not withdraw under the present circumstances—confronted by a clear deadline, 12 U.N. resolutions including a resolution authorizing force and a 28-nation peacekeeping force of more than 750,000 troops—then there is no reasonable hope that he will withdraw later because of economic sanctions alone.

As a totalitarian dictator, Hussein need not worry about reelection. He does not need to worry about confronting a disgruntled Congress. He does not have to face a critical press. Nor does he need to worry about protests being staged in front of his Presidential Palace.

The brutal gassing of his own citizenry demonstrates his conviction that civilians are disposable, secondary to the pursuit of political goals.

Members of Congress have introduced resolutions that attempt to limit the President's power of diplomacy. Congressional restrictions on when, where, or even if the President may use force are not what is needed. Such resolutions destroy the President's ability to conduct foreign policy. The President must retain his ability to call for the use of force as he deems necessary.

The role Congress should play in the current situation is to prevent the abuse of Presidential power. Congress should only interfere with Presidential authority if there is a consensus that the President is not acting in the best

interests of the Nation. If Congress comes to the conclusion that the President's actions are an abuse of this power, then it could take action to infringe on the President's ability to use force.

Congress must give the President the authority to use force if necessary. An emergency military action requires a clear and direct chain of command culminating in a single Commander in Chief. The President serves in that position.

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the Solarz-Michel resolution. By this act, the United States will become the only member of the anti-Iraq coalition willing to make a declaration of war. I deeply fear that we also will be the only member of that coalition willing to sacrifice its economic well-being and the lives of thousands of its young people.

Time draws short, and a terrible dark night approaches. Yet it is not too late, if only because it must not be. This war will only be stopped by those who refuse to allow it.

It is not too late. It must not be.

Today is an unspeakably tragic day. For the sake of our Nation and the stability of the Middle East, I hope and pray that President Bush will have the wisdom to use restraint and allow sanctions time to do the job.

Mr. RIGGS. Mr. Speaker, as a new Congressman, I can't pretend to be an expert on foreign policy. I am a citizen-legislator deeply concerned about matters of war and peace, who has been given the grave responsibility to act on behalf of my constituents, and in some small way, the people of America. I cannot shirk this responsibility or my conscience in these matters of war and peace and of life and death.

President Bush is to be commended for stopping Saddam Hussein's ruthless advance in its tracks. He has quickly deployed United States forces and succeeded in protecting the borders of Saudi Arabia. He has rallied the nations of the world—including fractious Arab States and former enemies—to oppose aggression and to implement an international embargo against Iraq. He has breathed new life into a moribund United Nations, rekindling the hope of a world of peaceful international order.

The President has set four United States goals in Kuwait which have been repeatedly stated in U.N. resolutions. I stand with the President foursquare behind these goals, but I must differ on how they are implemented. I strongly believe that aggressive action by the United States at this time would not only result in the potential loss of thousands of American and civilian lives, it would undermine one of the President's and the U.S.'s principal goals: the creation of long-term stability in the Middle East.

Our own military is unable or unwilling to give us a worst case scenario of casualties, military and civilian. Five former Chiefs of Staff have warned against the dangers of a premature attack. Conservative opinion makers like Patrick Buchanan, George Will, and Paul Nitze have urged restraint. Why? A massive conflict in the Arab world could result in an explosion of factionalism, terrorism, and perhaps even an angry backlash of Islamic fundamentalism.

The prudent alternative is to stay the present course. We have cut off Iraq's sale of oil, resulting in a 50 percent cut of that country's GNP. Intelligence reports say that the international embargo has interdicted more than 90 percent of Iraq's imports and exports.

I am deeply concerned about the continuing threat of Saddam Hussein even if he is evicted from Kuwait. But I must respectfully submit that the administration has not convinced me that the immediate threat of this despot to U.S. security overrides the compelling reasons for caution in this incendiary situation. Iraq's economy is limping backward into scarcity. Hussein's military machine daily deconstructs because of the unavailability of spare parts. His development of nuclear capability is rendered impossible because of the embargo. The sanctions are tightening a noose around Hussein. They should be given more time.

Diplomatic efforts have not been exhausted. It may be possible that the United States and Iraq cannot negotiate, but there are third parties more than willing to make an effort for peace. The United Nations and especially the Arab countries should be given the time to seek a peace that ensures the liberation of Kuwait and sets the stage for further conflict resolutions in the region.

War now also ensures a tremendous financial burden on Americans. Even if we just hold the line in Saudi Arabia, we will have to maintain an expensive military presence sufficient to deter any further acts of aggression. If we go to war now those costs accelerate tremendously, and if we clobber Hussein, we will have to pay for the unwelcome task of occupying Iraq until a stable nonbellicose government can be established there. Dollars pale when compared to sanctity of life, but here we are talking about an action that can result in both the unnecessary emptying of our Treasury and the loss of life.

On one hand, we have an international embargo and a naval blockade that we know is working. On the other, military force promises a dice roll in the region, where even the best case promises immediate casualties and long-term instability in the region.

Make no mistake, Saddam Hussein did not invade Kuwait to free Palestine. There should be no linkage on these questions, and if there is justice in this world Hussein will have to pay for his brutality.

But we must have a wider vision of the future. We have come to the brink of war against a strongman whose power is derived from the anti-Western sentiment in the region. President Bush has worked a miracle in aligning former enemies against this despot. Now, if we are able to reach a peaceful solution to this problem, the stage has been set for a multilateral conference on the issues that threaten peace and stability in the region.

We need also to look toward a future not dependent on fossil fuels. Oil dependence is both a political and environmental liability. The message is clear: We must begin to work for energy independence and to develop sustainable energy resources.

This is a difficult time for me. I understand the strong feelings on both sides of this question, and I'm especially cognizant of the need to support our brave young men and women in the Saudi desert and the Persian Gulf. If

war does break out, we must stand strongly behind them. But now even in this darkest hour, we must continue to search for a peaceful solution.

I have had to throw the normal course of politics to the wind in my search for truth and the correct course of action. In the end, I have not been convinced that diplomacy has been exhausted or that sanctions won't work. I can only conclude that if I must err, it must be on the side of caution.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Speaker, this is the most important and difficult vote I have cast in my congressional career. The vote before the House today is whether we will authorize the President to go to war against Iraq or continue to support international economic sanctions and exhaust all available peaceful options in resolving the Persian Gulf conflict.

I rise in opposition to the resolution offered by Representatives STEPHEN SOLARZ and BOB MICHEL which would authorize the use of United States military force against Iraq. I cannot give the green light to the President to go to war. Instead, I am casting my vote for international sanctions in order to prolong peace and for continued diplomacy. I join my colleagues in voicing my strong support for the Hamilton-Gephardt concurrent resolution.

Hundreds of my constituents and concerned Americans from around the country have contacted my office to express their reservations regarding our vote today and their objections toward taking the path toward war. Many of them have sons, daughters, or family members in the Persian Gulf serving on board ships or in Saudi Arabia. They are patriotic Americans who love their country and are working hard to provide a decent life for their families.

I have heard from veterans who served in Vietnam, the Korean War and World War II. Others were students in the 1960's and remember how deeply our country was divided during that period. They come from all walks of life. Yet, the agony of their message is clear. Our country should not go to war against Iraq.

Mr. Speaker, I am torn by the heartfelt messages of my constituents, the global role of our country as a world leader, and the stark brutality of Iraq President Saddam Hussein with his weapons of mass destruction. President Hussein imposes a clear and present danger to the Middle East and world peace as long as he occupies Kuwait. You can be assured that I am firmly committed to reversing Iraq's brutal and illegal occupation of Kuwait. However, war is a grave and serious undertaking and inevitably, American lives will be lost and an untold number of our service men and women will return wounded. Yes, the vote today is a troubling one. But I believe we must stay the course for a little while longer.

At this time the wisest course of action to follow is to continue with international sanctions and diplomatic efforts to pressure Iraq to leave Kuwait. We must be patient and give sanctions every opportunity to work, while at the same time maintaining our military option. After all, sanctions are working.

Sanctions have completely shut off the flow of Iraqi oil to the world market and have denied Iraq the huge oil revenue that has financed its development. Iraq's GNP has al-

ready been reduced by 50 percent, and is expected to fall to about 70 percent within the coming months. Sanctions will continue to weaken Iraq's military capability, and the embargo is also very effective in blocking Iraq's effort to develop nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems. Sanctions require some patience and do work. We learned this lesson well when we imposed economic sanctions against South Africa's apartheid government.

I commend President Bush for his leadership in putting together the international coalition resisting Iraqi aggression. But using military force now is the surest way to dismantle that coalition. We should wait longer for sanctions to squeeze Iraq further, and in turn, reduce United States and allied casualties if military force is used later.

The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution does support President Bush. The resolution endorses the actions the President has taken so far to secure an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; authorizes the use of force to defend Saudi Arabia and enforce the embargo; and ensures that if the President should seek to use force against Iraq in the coming months, his request for authority will be given expeditious consideration in the Congress.

Mr. Speaker, I continue to hope that war can be avoided, and that the lives of our young people in the Persian Gulf will be spared. If sanctions prove unsuccessful, there may come a time when the President may make a compelling argument for taking more aggressive action. We stand at a moment in history that is so grave and the cost so great that we can ill afford to stop and consider every possible option. As William Jennings Bryan once said: "Destiny is not a matter of chance, it is a matter of choice." As we stand at this crossroad, we have a choice—let's give sanctions more time to work.

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to extend congratulations to my colleague, LEE HAMILTON. Not only has the gentleman from Indiana been my friend, but our districts adjoin across the Ohio River, and so I have had the opportunity to observe his performance for many years. I am now happy that the merit that we knew he had, but was somewhat hidden under the bushel basket, is now for the entire country and the world to view because he is certainly bringing great dignity to this debate.

I would like to extend congratulations to the majority leader, who has shown his leadership on this issue, as well as the budget issue last autumn; Speaker FOLEY, because it is Speaker FOLEY who showed the courage and the tenacity to bring this issue up as it ought to be brought up; and certainly last, but not least, the President of the United States, who has these tremendous and weighty burdens on his shoulders which all of us join in praying God that they be discharged in a way that will bring the situation in the Mideast to a speedy and, we hope, peaceful conclusion.

I think there are some postulates that ought to be talked about here as we get the debate started. One is that all Members, whichever resolution of the three before us that Members would support, all Members are serious and have approached this with a great deal of thoughtfulness.

As one who has served in this body for over 20 years and having observed the debate for the last day or two, I think this is really going to be one of the high points of congressional service for all of us.

I think another postulate is that Saddam Hussein is a vile, mean, and evil man who ought not to be condoned in any fashion by any civilized nation of the world. I think I ought to say, as a veteran of the U.S. Army, back in the 1950's, that I believe wars need to be fought from time to time, that they are not totally avoidable. My belief is that this one ought not to be fought now, but I believe many of us approach on the premise not that all wars are bad but that this war may not be necessary now.

Whatever is voted up at the end of the debate day after tomorrow, I think it is our responsibility as Members of the House to support the men and women in Operation Desert Shield, to be sure they have the material and all the support necessary to carry out their function.

Having said that, Mr. Speaker, I rise in very strong support of the gentleman's resolution. I intend, also, to support the resolution of our friend, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BENNETT], which I think establishes correctly that the real power to declare war is vested in article I, section VIII of the Constitution, in the Congress, and not the President.

But the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution is a stay-the-course resolution. It allows that the sanctions currently in place be continued, and that those sanctions be tightened. It makes sure that all the diplomatic efforts which are under way are continued and strengthened. It keeps the forces we have in place so that they would be available to thwart any attack or to mount an offensive action if that is deemed necessary and voted up by the body at some time in the future.

However, unlike the Solarz-Michel resolution, this one before us does not give the President a blank check or a carte blanche authority to take an offensive action.

I have to ask these very simple questions, Mr. Speaker. Why would we need to go to war right now or at midnight on Monday night, the beginning of January 15? The President's objectives have largely been realized. Our hostages have been returned. The oil supplies are protected. Neither Saudi Arabia nor any other nation in the area is threatened. The area is stabilized.

The two other things the President desires to be done, that Kuwait be rid of Saddam Hussein and his forces, and that the Sabah family be returned to the throne in Kuwait, I do not think are needed at this actual moment in time—needed eventually, but not right now needed enough to warrant going to war.

I hear so much about this fragile coalition which might fall apart unless a war is fought at midnight Monday night or soon thereafter. If the coalition is that fragile, then maybe it is not really a coalition except in name only.

Many of the members of the coalition are not paying the money they pledged. Many of the members of the coalition are not sending their men and certainly not their women into this fight. So what is the coalition? Maybe that coalition is not really one anyway, and so it should not be the determining factor of whether

we send our men and women to a sure death, in some cases, in order to preserve this coalition.

I liken this to: "We will hold your coat while you do the fighting". That is what this is. There are a number of nations in the so-called coalition that said, "Hey, we will hold your coat, but we want you guys to do the fighting, and we then want you to pay for the fighting." They have not ponied up the money. They are not going to. They do not send us their troops, and they are not going to. But they want the benefits of our war. I do not think that is fair. I do not think that is something this House and this Congress ought to do.

The whole idea is to demonize Saddam Hussein and defy Kuwait. We hear so much about Kuwait. We have got to restore the Al Sabah family; this is a great nation that has been run over by an aggressor.

I will sum up by saying that Kuwait is a feudal dictatorship, a feudal kingdom. Its people do not vote. The majority of the people who lived within the bounds of Kuwait before the takeover were not even Kuwaiti citizens. They were guestworkers or U.S. people who were there doing work for the oil companies.

The fact of the matter is there is nothing free and democratic. There is nothing devoted to human civil rights in the nation of Kuwait. Why, pray tell, should we sacrifice ourselves and our future to restore that?

Mr. Speaker, I think what we ought to do is continue the sanctions, make sure they do not leak, make sure these members of the coalition who are knowingly allowing these leaks to take place do not take those actions, and then let us see what happens.

If later down the road we have to take offensive action, we will do so. We should do it. But, it ought not to be done now at this point in time.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the bipartisan Solarz-Michel amendment. And I do so with a great sense of responsibility, as we all must feel here today. This is, indeed, one of those historic occasions when we are called upon to perform our ultimate duty, to our constituents, and to our Nation. The responsibility weighs heavy on our shoulders, but we cannot shrink from it.

This debate, and the votes we will cast, are momentous indeed. But the resolution I support is not a declaration of war. Let us be very clear about that. It is rather a vote to stand firm, stand tall, and stand together, as one Nation. It is a vote to give our President the support he has asked for, the support he deserves, the support he needs. At this critical moment for our country, and for the world, we have been called upon to give the President of the United States the authority he requires to meet this great challenge. Yes, Congress does have a constitutional prerogative. But we must exercise that prerogative soberly and responsibly.

If anything, a yes vote on Solarz-Michel is the best chance to avoid war. For only if Saddam Hussein sees unity and resolve on our side, will he finally understand that he has no choice. Only a credible threat will force him to yield. If we fail to send that unequivocal message, Iraq might miscalculate once again. Saddam may conclude that we lack the will to

use force, and that if he stays put, his illegal occupation will stand. If you don't believe that, ask President Ozal of Turkey. He knows the Iraqis very well. He shares a border with them. His forces have 10 Iraqi divisions pinned down on that border. He is quoted in this morning's Washington Times as saying that it is crucial that we "send the right message * * * only * * * Congress can convince (Hussein) that the Bush administration is now authorized to use force to evict him." Mr. Speaker, that realization on the part of Saddam Hussein may be our best chance to avoid war. That's why it is so crucial that we do the right thing here, and give the President the support he asked us for.

During the past few months, we have heard much discussion centering on one small question: Why are we in the gulf?

The answer to this question is crucial in terms of this debate. What indeed is this conflict all about? Well, first let's determine what it is not about. Oil is certainly a consideration, but it is not the primary consideration. We have other sources of energy. And it is high time that we developed a real independence of Arab oil.

It is not even about Kuwait, and it is certainly not about democracy. Kuwait was a benevolent dictatorship, but it was a dictatorship. So is Saudi Arabia. It is not about human rights. Unfortunately, human rights abuses are rampant throughout the Arab world, and in so many other countries, like Cuba, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

The fact remains however, that we do have a vital stake in this confrontation. Our national interests really are at stake. For Kuwait is only the beginning. If Saddam Hussein is allowed to prevail, what kind of world will we live in? If Saddam stays in Kuwait, he will undoubtedly become the leader of the Arab world. His appetite for conquest and intimidation will grow. Other dictators will be encouraged. Instability in the world will be rampant.

We and our allies will be affected. Saddam Hussein will increase his arsenal of nuclear and chemical weapons, and he will use them, make no mistake about it. The threat lies not necessarily in what will happen tomorrow, but what will happen the day after tomorrow, if we do not act now. Winston Churchill put it best:

Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong—these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.

Mr. Speaker, this is the history that we must avoid, because our children will pay the price.

I would just like to interject one note of caution into this debate—for those, whether in Europe, in the Arab world, or anywhere else, who think we should give something to Saddam, who think we should press Israel to make concessions. We must continue to categorically reject linkage. It is unconscionable that Israel be made a victim of this crisis. Of course, we want to solve the Palestinian problem. So do the Israelis. All the Arabs have to do is accept Israel's existence. Egypt recognized the State of Israel. In return, they got every inch of the Sinai Desert, although Israel won that territory in a war of self-defense. All

problems in the Middle East can be addressed, but the solutions must be based on rationality and goodwill.

To those who oppose this bipartisan approach, I say this: I respect your view. I know we all want the same thing. But please, please, ask yourselves this question: What is the cost of waiting?

Ask yourselves these questions:

Can we afford to wait?

Can our men and women continue to sit in the desert, away from their loved ones, and in many cases away from their jobs and studies here at home?

Can our coalition stand the erosion of support that may come in the interim?

Can the Kuwaiti people continue to suffer from the horrible atrocities they have been subjected to?

Can our allies—Egypt, Israel, Turkey—continue to suffer the damage to their economies caused by the protraction of this crisis?

Can we wait around while a vicious, blood-thirsty dictator holds the world at bay?

Can we wait around while Saddam makes a mockery of civilized norms of behaviour?

Please ask yourselves these questions. Please be honest. Please vote your conscience.

Let's stand shoulder to shoulder with the President during this trying crisis.

With God's help, we may just be able to avoid a greater catastrophe later on.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, arriving at this point in the discussion of this issue has been very difficult and painful. I would like to respectfully share with you my views at this time.

I support the President. I support the troops in Operation Desert Shield. But I am deeply disturbed at the events and the persons who have led us to this point in our history. I have and I will continue to support our troops and will support all efforts to give them the necessary tools to fulfill their mission. Having said that, the most important support we can give them is to do our utmost to keep them from having to use these tools.

I am not prepared at this time to accept the fact that all of the resources of the free world through the United Nations have failed in this instance and that the only recourse is war. What a shame and how sad if this is true that in 1991 the world admits failure for a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of the Kuwait affair. I support the U.N. resolutions—that's no problem—but do you know what they say? Get the Iraqi troops out of Kuwait. That's all they say.

I now ask, is that Emir of Kuwait worth dying for? No. Is the Emir of Kuwait worth one American life? No. I condemn the actions of Mr. Saddam Hussein, and I agree he is a menace to that area of the world and possibly beyond. I think that what he has done should not be the order of the day, but under the U.N. resolutions we drive him out of Kuwait. Again, that's all they say. What then, what have we gained? They do not speak of chemical weapons or nuclear weapons. All they say is he's a bad guy and should be driven out of Kuwait. Having done that, what have we gained, I respectfully ask?

The Hamilton-Gephardt resolution does not prohibit the President from acting. All it says is if should all else fail then Mr. President you

tell us that's the case and we will act together. That's all it says, but let's do it together. Mr. President, as the elected representatives of the people, is that too much to ask? I support you Mr. President, but my conscience and my district demand that we give peace a chance first. Should that not be humanly possible and war is the ultimate need I would be with you and will pray that it be achieved with the least loss of life possible for it will be our young people in great part that will bear the burden. God bless and protect them.

With all my mind, body, and soul I pray that what we do here today be worthy of our service as representatives of the people of the United States, our troops, abroad, and our own conscience.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the bipartisan resolution—backing the U.N. Security Council.

I wish, frankly, this were not the case. Because although through this resolution—war is not a fact on January 15, by any means—it does involve great risk. Risk is something we try to avoid, since it centers on something deep within every politician.

But, I am persuaded that now is the time to stand up, to take that risk. If we do not, I fear that we look straight into the barrel of higher risks for our children, our children's friends, and our grandchildren.

I did not set January 15, as a decision point. The United Nations did. I have no idea whether January 15 or February 15 or any other date is the right date. But, some date is, since without it, things will drag on and on, and it is we who will be bled dry by the costs—not Iraq.

If that happens, not only do we suffer, but two other things take place:

First, the so-called new world order following the end of the cold war would be pushed aside. There would be no order—no strengthening of the United Nations to evolve as the good cop, the strong balance wheel of the world.

The second thing to take place would be that Saddam Hussein would see without even a rap on the knuckles that he could bully and intimidate his part of the world—not unimportant to us in ways too long to list.

Mr. Speaker, the sanctions approach, as I understand it, pleads for time. This makes sense. I am sympathetic to the sanctions argument. I would like to see them work. I come from a world in which even a moderate economic squeeze can be brutal on people's lives. Sanctions are powerful tools. If pursued, certain questions would follow. Will Saddam Hussein be weaker? The answer would be yes. Will Saddam Hussein be less popular? Again, the answer would be yes. But, what I fear is that by going the sanctions route alone, you write off the military option. And, if you write off the military option, you cancel the one threat, the one message experts say Saddam Hussein understands.

Abraham Lincoln used to say that if the only tool you have is a hammer, soon everything begins to look like a nail.

This is the mindset of this cagey, wiley, back alley smart leader of Iraq, according to those with whom I talked recently in Cairo—Egyptians, Israelis, leaders of over 30 African nations—in other words, his neighbors.

Now, I know that this is not self-confession hour. But, I must say that I have tried to pray for peace, for wisdom in making my vote and other subsequent votes. The Lord gives no easy answers, and he didn't fail me in this case.

Yet, having been down here about 4 years, one point is clear: You can only do what you think is right for the greatest number, in the fullness of time, and not try to concoct the political decision.

Sometimes leaders have to do what is uncomfortable. The put-it-off, let-others-handle-it approach has its merits. There are times when no action is the best action.

But, I sense that this is not one of those times. As Richard Murphy, former Ambassador to Syria, told me today, it is a mean, brutal scene over there in Iraq. This is a man who already has killed 500,000—not of the enemy, but of his own people. It is reported by our Embassy in Cairo that in a not-so-distant dispute about military strategy, Saddam Hussein pulled out a revolver and shot dead one of his generals in front of all the other battalion commanders.

For us there is one lesson. If we want peace, we must put ourselves inside the head—not of the Marquis of Queensberry, but of a man who watches for any weakness, any sign of hesitation.

Make no mistake about it, through C-SPAN and CNN the eyes of Saddam Hussein are on us. Our talk and our action tomorrow will send the one signal he has been waiting for.

If we are resolute, unified with the rest of the world, he will move. If we stutter, he will hold.

I cannot be sure of any future event, but I am told that depending on the Saturday vote, Saddam Hussein is looking for a way to back down, yet not lose face.

He will not give us that satisfaction. More than probably he will not give it to the United Nations which he holds in contempt. He may give it to the Saudis, probably the PLO.

But, everything is on hold until we give the signal.

As proven by the Iranian war, this man has an obsession about not looking weak. He does not want to appear as if he had been pushed. But he will play the hand out right to the last card. I plead with you, then let us not fold prematurely.

I have had great difficulty coming to this decision, with great uncertainties having talked with hundreds of people in and out of the southern tier of New York—listening to their cries for peace.

But, you see, I cry for peace, too. I'm afraid this is not the issue.

The issue is how best to achieve it. And, I guess I come down on the side of standing tall rather than standing aside.

Good people differ, and I don't claim to have all the answers. I certainly don't claim to be a Middle Eastern psychologist, or a student of dictators. I just have a sense having come back only Thursday from Cairo, that now is the time to be firm.

If not, then conflict will fall, as it did after Mr. Chamberlain in the 1930's, on the shoulders of others at far, far greater cost.

I support our President. I support the United Nations of this world, arrayed for the first time

in history—hand in hand—against a man who in time can only produce a holocaust. This we cannot allow to happen.

I now pray that what we do here helps to avoid, not promote conflict.

Mr. COSTELLO. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution. Before I explain my reasons for supporting this resolution, I would first like to commend the leadership of the House of Representatives on both sides of the aisle for bringing this issue to the floor for a full debate. Mr. FOLEY, Mr. MICHEL, and the Rules Committee have allowed ample time for all Members to be heard on this issue.

These are very difficult times for our country and for each and every Member of the U.S. Congress. The vote that we are to cast on Saturday will be the most important vote of our careers. I cannot imagine a more difficult decision than one that may lay the lives of thousands of American soldiers on the line.

As you know, my son is a very proud 21-year-old infantry paratrooper with the 82d Airborne of the United States Army. He has been in Saudi Arabia since August of last year. He is not in Riyadh or tucked away in a safe place like some might imagine, he is in the sand in Saudi Arabia.

If we go to war it is almost certain that my son will be one of the first on the ground to see action.

My son enlisted in the U.S. Army and volunteered for the 82d Airborne Division, a first strike special forces unit. He left college to enter the U.S. Army. He is a very proud American and feels a sense of obligation to serve his country. He never intended to be a career soldier nor does he intend to stay in the Army past his 2-year enlistment. He told me when he enlisted that he wanted to do everything he could possibly do in a 2-year period.

God willing, he will return to southwestern Illinois to complete college and pursue a law career.

My son is proud to represent this country—he is proud to wear his uniform. He has been well trained, he is both physically and mentally prepared to go into combat. I hope and pray that my son and the 400,000 troops that are in the Persian Gulf never receive the order to go to war. But if they do, they are well prepared, well trained and ready for war. If we go to war, my son and thousands like him will win the war and make us very proud.

This debate is not just about the welfare of my son or any one soldier serving in the Persian Gulf. This debate is about how we best accomplish the goal of getting Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. I have heard it said in this Chamber and in the media that some "liberal Democrats" will never vote for war. I have not ruled out war. I believe that we as Members of the House of Representatives—the people's Representatives—have an obligation to exhaust every available option before resorting to war.

In supporting the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution, I have not ruled out war and the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution does not rule out war. Hamilton-Gephardt simply gives economic sanctions and international diplomacy a reasonable period of time to work.

I have supported President Bush in the decisions he has made thus far in the Persian

Gulf. I told him so in early December at a social function at the White House. I told him that I felt that he was doing a good job and that his administration should be commended.

The Department of Defense—the military and the Uniform Transportation Command/Military Airlift Command at Scott Air Force Base in my congressional district in Belleville, IL, has done a phenomenal job in moving people, troops, and supplies to the Middle East.

I intend to continue to support the President. However, I am not willing to abdicate my responsibility and give the President the authority to declare war when there is substantial evidence that economic sanctions and international diplomacy are working.

There is substantial evidence that economic sanctions and international diplomacy are in fact working. When President Bush asked the United Nations to support an economic blockade in August, the President said that it will take time and he asked the American people to be patient.

In every briefing here on the Hill and in the Middle East that I have attended, experts have stated that economic sanctions are working, the question is how long will it take for economic sanctions and international diplomacy to run Hussein out of Kuwait. No one has the answer to that question. Experts disagree but predict anywhere from 3 to 12 months. General Schwarzkopf stated in a briefing in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that economic sanctions were working. He said the only question is how long do we want to wait. In fact, 97 percent of Iraq's exports have been cut off. Fifty percent of Iraq's GNP comes from the sale of oil. The sanctions in effect have cut the GNP of Iraq by 50 percent. When we have a 2- or 3-percent drop in our GNP in this country, there is a panic. I cannot imagine how the American people would react to a 50-percent reduction in our GNP.

It seems to me that we face two options to accomplish our goals in the Persian Gulf:

First, we can either abdicate our responsibility and turn the decision over to President Bush to do whatever he chooses at anytime.

Second, we can give economic sanctions and international diplomacy a reasonable length of time to work.

There is no question in my mind that the only course to follow is the course of economic sanctions and international diplomacy.

If the President after a reasonable time can demonstrate to the Congress that economic sanctions and diplomacy have failed, we can always give the President the authorization to take this country to war.

If economic sanctions and international diplomacy are not given a reasonable time to work, we will never know if peace could have prevailed.

I am not willing to go back to southwestern Illinois in my congressional district and tell the families of those who have loved ones in the Middle East that economic sanctions were working but we did not have the patience to wait a reasonable length of time to give them a chance to succeed. Instead, we sent your sons, daughters, husbands, and wives into combat.

Finally, I want President Bush and my colleagues to know that when the debate concludes and the votes are counted that I will

accept the will of the peoples' representatives and support the decision of this body.

I support the Hamilton-Gephardt resolution because I know that it is in the best interest of this country.

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Speaker, we are gathered here today to debate the most momentous decision any Member of this Congress will ever face—the decision whether to commit our Nation to war in the Persian Gulf, or to stay the course of economic sanctions in hope of a peaceful solution to the gulf crisis. As I listen to this debate, I am torn, because many Members of this House whose advice and opinions I respect on this issue are split between authorizing the immediate use of force and continuing to enforce the sanctions. There are, indeed, many sound arguments in favor of each option.

No one in this House believes in appeasement. All of us share the conviction that Saddam Hussein must remove his troops from Kuwait. But as we debate the means by which this withdrawal is to be effected, I come back again and again to what I believe is an inescapable fact—once we commit troops to combat in the Persian Gulf, there is no turning back to seek a peaceful, diplomatic resolution of this crisis. And because this is true, I believe we must make every effort, take every extra step, toward a peaceful solution in the gulf. Have we exhausted those efforts? I think not.

The decision to make war is an awesome one. I am moved by the words of Speaker FOLEY, who said that if a Member has any doubts about the wisdom of committing our children to war, he or she should err on the side of peace. Though I am tempted by the desire we all share to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait by force of arms, I am not completely convinced that this is the path our Nation should follow. And so, I am supporting the Gephardt-Hamilton resolution to continue diplomatic efforts and the economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations upon Iraq.

Many of those Members who support authorization of the use of force in the region have evoked the notion of a "New World Order" to justify their vote for war. I, too, have a vision of our world in the post-cold war era. I believe in the rule of international law, in the peaceful resolution of international conflicts, and in the vital importance of the United Nations for the preservation of peace. Many people feel that unless we go to war, international law will never govern the actions of nations, that the United Nations will never be an effective instrument of international stability and peace. But I say to those Members, that the idea that we can enforce international law through peaceful means alone, without the horrors of war, is not a utopian goal to be reached some day in the future—that day is here, now.

Saddam Hussein is a ruthless dictator, whose actions against his own people and the people of Kuwait are infamous and reprehensible. I want him out of Kuwait as strongly as any other Member of this House. The time may come when this Nation must go to war to ensure the freedom of the Kuwaiti people, and further the rule of law and the preservation of peace in the region. But I believe the time has

not yet come when we have no other option but the last, most horrible recourse of war.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of House Joint Resolution 62, sponsored by my good friends Mr. MICHEL and Mr. SOLARZ. I am also proud that my name appears on this most important legislation as an original cosponsor.

My decision to vote to give President Bush the authority he may require to use armed force to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait is not taken lightly. None of us wants to send young men and women into battle. The fact that I have a nephew, Don Dornan Jr., serving on the U.S.S. *Ranger* as Naval flight officer, an AWACS controller, on an E-2C Hawkeye makes it even more difficult. And just let me say that everyone in my family is very proud of Don and the job he volunteered to tackle.

But frankly I now see no other way to accomplish our goals in the gulf. Let us hope that after this vote today Hussein gets the message and gets out of Kuwait forthwith, though I am not holding my breath. We seem to be dealing with an irrational man locked in the Dark Ages, at least by our standards. But I would venture to say that even by Middle Eastern standards Saddam, a secular dictator who seems bent on martyrdom, is somewhat unusual.

After countless briefings on the issue and a first-hand look at the situation on the ground in Saudi Arabia, I had been hopeful that sanctions alone would be enough to drive Hussein from Kuwait. I have come to conclude, however, that sanctions alone cannot do the job. President Bush needs the big stick and the flexibility the authority to use force will give him if we are to have any chance of solving this problem peacefully, without sacrificing our principles. If, however Saddam remains unconvinced in the face of a very real military threat and sanctions, then we must not shrink from our duty to impose the will of the United Nations by force. If it comes to that I know our military personnel will do their duty with courage and conviction, and they will get the job done quickly.

First let me address the question of sanctions. Now I know that most of those who oppose this resolution do so because they believe that sanctions are working and will continue to squeeze Hussein, eventually driving him out of Kuwait.

But there is absolutely no reason to believe that sanctions alone will be able to accomplish our objectives. Indeed, those advocating such a position cannot say with any certainty that the international coalition now arrayed against Iraq will be able to sustain sanctions.

Will Germany, given its costly obligations in the East, be willing to continue subsidizing those front line nations hurt by the embargo?

Will Japan, which sees this as an American problem, not a Japanese one? As a recent article in the Wall Street Journal said:

Japan's security has been assured by somebody else for so long that security is like air; there isn't any sense that someone has to pay for it. The U.S. would have to be in the Middle East anyway, some say, so why should Japan pay the U.S. to act in the American interest?

And will those front line countries of Turkey, Egypt, and so forth, be able to sustain the em-

bargo in the face of economic dislocations and mounting economic pressure? No one can say.

But we can all be pretty sure that the longer the embargo is in place, the more porous it will become. As one of the former American hostages in Iraq told me just a couple of days ago, smuggling is a way of life in that part of the world, and no amount of blockading will be able to stop it. Almost all the hostages I spoke with saw definite signs that there was severe leakage in the embargo.

In short, there is absolutely no reason to believe that sanctions will become more effective. In fact, it is likely sanctions will be less effective; the Iraqis will surely find ways around them and will make economic adjustments to minimize their impact.

If the threat of military annihilation combined with sanctions—the current policy—is not enough to convince Saddam Hussein of the error of this ways, what reason is there to believe that sanctions alone will be successful? And how long are those of you advocating sanctions willing to give your policy time to work? One year? Five years? Ten years? And what if sanctions break down and Hussein becomes stronger as a result? Will anyone want to use force then?

Now let me turn to the question of the morality of what we are about to do here. Many of the opponents of the Solarz-Michel resolution have made the case that the military option will needlessly result in casualties and that those of us authorizing the use of force will have the moral responsibility of that decision. But those opposed to the use of force must also be held to account for the moral decision should their side prevail. Let's not forget that Hussein already has the blood of half a million dead on his hands, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of other casualties directly caused by his actions. If he is allowed to remain in power, what reason is there to believe he won't kill another half a million before he is through? Which is likely to cost more lives, the use of force now, or an unchecked Hussein running amok in the Middle East.

This issue was thoughtfully addressed by George Weigel of the Ethics and Public Policy Center. Mr. Weigel is perhaps the leading American authority of the Catholic just-war tradition. In the case of Hussein, Weigel claims that armed resistance would fall within the just-war doctrine because "what is being determined in the gulf is whether there will be a minimum of political and economic order in international public life, or whether we will descend in Hobbes's war of all against all."

Weigel also eloquently makes a point that I have been making, to wit, that voting either way involves unpleasant moral choices.

There is no escape from moral responsibility in these matters. Those who urge a proportional and discriminate use of armed force against Saddam Hussein take on the moral responsibility for their action; which will, tragically but certainly, include the killing of innocents.

This is my position and I accept that responsibility.

Weigel continues.

But it should also be understood that those who reject the use of military force, in the

case of Saddam Hussein, have not been absolved from moral responsibility for what follows: which will, certainly, include the killing of innocents, and in large numbers.

Indeed, I think this is a critically important point. For in Vietnam, the antiwar left got its way in the end and we all know what followed: the killing fields, reeducation camps, boat people, new economic zones, the Vietnamese gulag, the Bamboo Curtain, and so forth. Well over a million people lost their lives because the United States was driven out of Indochina by the American left. The antiwar crowd, which thought itself so morally superior, has never been held to account for the ghastly outcome of its policy. So I think it is important to point it out before we make these decisions that both positions have moral consequences. And I think history has shown that confronting evil early and decisively will, in the end, save more lives. This is the policy we should have used against Hitler.

Which brings me to my next point, the comparison of Hussein to Hitler. Some believe it is an accurate comparison, others say it is absurd. Well, the answer really depends on which Hitler you are talking about. I happen to think it is a very accurate comparison of the Hitler of the mid-thirties. As Norman Podhoretz recently wrote:

When Hitler occupied the Rhineland in 1936, a moment which roughly corresponds to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, he had not yet attained to the level of evil Saddam Hussein has already reached in launching a pointless war against Iran that resulted in a million casualties, in using poison gas against his own Kurdish citizens, and in the grisly atrocities he has committed in Kuwait. Nor was the Hitler of 1936 as powerful as he later became, which is why there is general agreement that he could have been stopped (and a larger war averted) by early resistance.

Indeed, the comparison doesn't end there. The Ba'ath Party's leading ideologue, Michel Aflaq, who remained closely associated with the Iraqi regime until his death in 1989, was, according to one historian, "full of enthusiasm for Hitler" and other German Fascists. Indeed, Aflaq saw in Nazi Germany a model for his ideas of a synthesis between nationalism and socialism.

The Hitlerian use of terror by Hussein to maintain control of the population has been well documented. Hussein personally conducted the war with Iran, much as Hitler took control of Germany's army in World War II. Hussein speaks of doomsday weapons that will "astonish our enemies and fascinate our friends," much as Hitler held out hope that his scientists would develop such weapons to save the Third Reich. And both are willing to lay waste to their countries in service of their megalomania.

When I was in Israel recently, I asked the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister and many other elected officials if they were put off in any way by the comparison of Hussein and Hitler. To a man they said absolutely not, that it was a valid comparison.

I'll give Eliot A. Cohen of Johns Hopkins University the last word on this.

Unless we crush (Saddam Hussein) and batter his war machine we will open the way to schemes of Iraqi hegemony in the Arab world fed by vast financial resources, a surpris-

ingly sophisticated technological base, and absolute ruthlessness. The stakes are * * * the very nature of the world our children and grandchildren will inhabit. A world safe for Saddam Hussein is a world safe, ultimately, for nuclear, chemical, and biological warfare waged to feed or, in defensive desperation, to thwart the ambition of Saddam and his ilk. That world looms less than ten years ahead of us. The Hitler analogy may be overdone, but at the end of the day there is a good bit to be said for it.

Now I am sure most of my colleagues have received from some of the leftwing groups which have discovered a convergence of aims with Saddam Hussein these posters proclaiming "No Blood For Oil." Done in a sort of cross between Communist and Fascist art, the posters, as usual, ascribe the basest of motives for U.S. actions. Now I am not one of those who is going to come before you and claim that oil doesn't have a major role in this crisis, it clearly does. Oil is a vital national interest. But it is ludicrous to suggest that access to oil is any more vital to the United States than for other countries, especially Third World countries. For if the advanced industrial economies of the West suffer from oil disruptions, the poor countries of the Third World will suffer as well, perhaps even more, resulting in more instability in many emerging democracies, and more poverty and death. Oil, as vulgar as it sounds, is a vital commodity. Even Jimmy Carter understood that, which is why he said the gulf was within "the vital interests of the United States" and that he would go to war to protect hostile powers from dominating that region, the so-called Carter doctrine.

But oil is not the only reason, or the most important reason, that we are engaged in the gulf. In my view the most compelling reason for our intervention is to contain aggression, and Hussein's aggression is of a particularly vicious variety. Now I know many of my colleagues will make the case that aggression occurs all over the world without our intervention, for instance in Red China or the Baltics. Well I would reply that the United States cannot confront all aggression everywhere. But where we can confront aggression with acceptable losses and while maintaining our principles, we should do so—if all else fails. In the case of the gulf, we are the only ones who can do the job.

And as I said, Hussein is a particularly brutal man. Any doubts as to his brutality should have been dispelled with the Amnesty International report on the atrocities—no other word will do—committed in occupied Kuwait. Now many of my liberal colleagues have expressed surprise that conservatives have embraced the Amnesty International report because we are often at odds with that group because of its Socialist sympathies. In this case, however, there is so much corroborating evidence and so many eyewitness accounts that the Amnesty report is really nothing more than a compilation of what we already know. That is the reason conservatives can feel comfortable with Amnesty's report.

Having said that, the reports out of Kuwait are truly grisly. Hussein's torturers have learned their lessons well from the Soviets, the Cubans, the North Vietnamese, the Nazis, and the Rumanians. One of the thirty ex-hostages I recently spoke with said that he wit-

nessed an entire Kuwaiti family—a husband, wife, and three young children, the oldest only about 7 years old—executed by Iraqi soldiers for hiding a British citizen in their apartment. This type of atrocity has been repeated God only knows how often all over Kuwait.

For Hussein's goal has been to destroy all traces of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti people. One of the first acts committed by Iraq after its conquest of Kuwait was to destroy the documentation of all Kuwaitis, the personnel files of the entire country, if you will. He then urged Iraqis to move into Kuwait in an effort to repopulate the country with Iraqis, thus truly making it the 19th Province of Iraq. This is a version of Hitler's policy of Lebensraum, or increasing the living space for Germans in the east. The Vietnamese have also attempted this in Cambodia. It is a policy which is, at its heart, genocidal.

This should surprise no one. Saddam and the men he surrounds himself with have a history of brutality that is truly extraordinary, even by the inflated standards of the 20th century. His inner circle consists of relatives and loyalists drawn from his hometown of Tikrit. But they resemble a Mafia don and family more than a government. As one historian wrote:

Iraq is run as a private preserve of Saddam and his inner clique. He distributes wealth, assigning sectors to his family and other close associates to control and to milk.

For example, those Scud missiles we are all concerned about were purchased by Husayn Kamil al-Majid, Saddam's son-in-law and the second most powerful man in Iraq, who pocketed a \$60 million commission on the deal. Dick Cheney eat your heart out. The Hussein mob has its hands in almost every business in Iraq and they live high as a result. In short, it is a gangster state. Why President George Bush has to address this thug as Excellency is I'll never know. He is not a head of state, but a mass murderer.

Let me close by saying that I pray force won't be necessary to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. But if war does come, I know our fighting men and women will cover themselves in glory, and that we will be victorious in a fairly short time.

Our cause is just. Our people are ready. The Nation is united. We are the only ones who can do the job. I know we will not fail.

It is always easy to vote against a resolution like this and lay claim to the title of peacemaker. But that would be a phony peace, and for future victims of Saddam Hussein it would be the peace of the grave. I, therefore, urge all my colleagues to support the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. SWETT. Mr. Speaker, I stand before you today faced with the decision of whether or not I should vote in support of a resolution which authorizes the President, if necessary, to use force to end Iraq's occupation of Kuwait.

The crisis in the Persian Gulf is a deadly and explosive situation. Clearly, there is an enormous amount at stake. Already, two New Hampshire servicemen have given up their lives to this cause.

Air Force Capt. Michael Chinburg, 26, of Durham was killed on Jan. 8, 1991, when the fighter jet he was piloting crashed in Saudi Arabia. Captain Chinburg served heroically

with the 388th Tactical Fighter Wing of the Air Force. He was a 1982 graduate of Oyster River High School.

Marine Capt. Gary Dillion, 29, of Concord died on Oct. 8, 1990, when his helicopter crashed in the Saudi Arabian desert during a night mission. Captain Dillion was a 1978 graduate of Concord High School.

It is important to their memory that we act with courage and conviction when facing the crisis before us.

As a new Member of Congress, I am being asked to help clean up a mess that was at least partially created by the past failure of U.S. foreign policy to deal in a timely and morally correct fashion with the terrorist regime of Saddam Hussein.

Because of our preoccupation with the power of Iran in the Persian Gulf, American foreign policymakers turned a blind eye to Iraq's atrocious record on human rights and its support of terrorism against United States citizens. Instead of imposing economic sanctions on Iraq for its senseless and brutal use of terror, the country was removed from the list of terrorist nations and soon became the second largest importer of United States grain products.

When an Iraqi plane fired a missile at a United States warship in 1987, killing 34 American seamen, administration policymakers accepted a half-hearted apology from Iraqi diplomats in order to maintain good relations between our countries.

Even 2 years ago, when Saddam Hussein used poison gas to kill 5,000 of his own people, the administration was not courageous enough to initiate economic sanctions against Iraq.

The failure to develop and implement an aggressive national energy policy has left us far too dependent on oil fields in the Middle East. Instead of encouraging the use of renewable and alternative energy sources—such as cogeneration and solar power—we have sat by idly, importing more and more foreign oil over the past decade.

If, during that time, we had invested even a fraction of what we are now spending on Operation Desert Shield into research and development of alternative energies, our increased energy independence would have made us considerably stronger.

Even today, 2 years into the current administration and 5 months after the brutal and bloody Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Department of Energy still has no formal energy policy. I stand before you, Mr. Speaker, 4 days before the January 15 deadline is due to expire, as an angry witness to the administration's failure to develop a framework for encouraging our Nation's independence from foreign oil.

Other Members of this House—some of whom have served in this body since before I was born—have said this is the most difficult vote they have had to cast in their entire congressional careers. It is even more difficult for me, being my first substantive vote and coming little more than a week after I was sworn in as a Member of this body.

Mr. Speaker, I have listened long and hard to the impassioned arguments made by my colleagues on both sides of the issues and have reflected on the feelings of my constitu-

ents in New Hampshire, many of whom have contacted me during the last 2 weeks. After truly anguished reflection, I have decided that only by authorizing the President to use force, if that becomes necessary, can we accomplish the vital and just objectives and achieve observance of the U.N. Security Council's resolutions in the Persian Gulf.

At this time in history, we are witnessing the birth of a new world order, where differences will be settled on diplomatic and economic playing fields, rather than on battlefields, and where the will of the people and the rule of law will be supreme.

Sadly, as the current crisis shows, some countries, like Iraq, are not willing to let diplomacy resolve disputes. Iraq seems incapable of understanding or responding to anything but the credible threat of force.

Mr. Speaker, I am voting for the Solarz-Michel resolution, not to give the President the marching orders for war, but to strengthen his negotiating hand. I am not voting for war, I am voting for a chance at a lasting peace. I implore the President to use the powers granted in the Solarz-Michel resolution with caution and great care.

I remind the President that he should not use force until the United States has first exhausted all appropriate peaceful diplomatic means to gain Iraq's compliance with the U.N. Security Council resolutions.

But while I urge the President to use restraint, I also firmly believe that the stakes are too high to sit by idly while Iraq thumbs its nose at the entire world and commits further atrocities against the people of Kuwait. Saddam Hussein should not doubt that we are united and committed to seeing his unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

Mr. Speaker, it is better that we stand with the President now in the face of Saddam Hussein's act of naked aggression, than to wait a year or two to authorize the use of force. If we wait, Iraq will continue to increase its stockpile of chemical and biological weapons.

Saddam Hussein will also continue his relentless pursuit of nuclear capability. We have learned from watching Saddam Hussein that once he has a weapon, he will use it. As he has demonstrated so often in the past, he will not let compassion for his fellow man get in the way.

Mr. Speaker, the choice is a difficult one for all of us, but at this time, I believe it is the right one. I urge my colleagues to join in support of the Solarz-Michel resolution.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Speaker, while we hope for a peaceful resolution to the Persian Gulf crisis, we must prepare for the threat of war. And if it comes to war, we must know that we fight for a just cause.

Saddam Hussein's August 2 invasion of Kuwait changed the Middle East. The horrible depredation of the Kuwaiti people is already fact. However, Saddam's unprovoked aggression, his willingness to use chemical weapons, and his potential nuclear arsenal have jeopardized the security of the region and the rest of the world. Preserving the supply of oil or restoring the Kuwaiti monarchy are not sufficient reasons to get involved in a conflict, but by his behavior and intransigence in relinquishing Kuwait, Saddam has brutally given us the

choice of stopping him now, or facing a stronger and more defiant challenge later.

Some have argued that the burden the United States is carrying is disproportionate to the burden on our allies. Of course we must work relentlessly to get all the support we can from our allies. The decision to go to war cannot, legitimately or morally, be based on economics or rest on the contribution of a particular ally. Either this war is justified or not.

The ultimate reason war would be necessary and morally justified is to stop Saddam's brutal aggression and eliminate the threat he poses. History shows the terrible cost of appeasing those bent on aggression, and we have seen Saddam's reckless disregard for international law and world sentiment.

The conclusion is obvious: Something must be done to stop Saddam's aggression and restore stability. Right now, we have the means to achieve this. The coalition, while not perfect, is determined and prepared to do what it needs to do to carry out U.N. resolutions. We pray that this can be done through peaceful means, but it is important that we not tie the hands of the President. He needs to have all options available to him. Most importantly, he needs the prayers and support of the Congress and the American people.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 250, nays 183, not voting 2, as follows:

[Roll No. 9]

YEAS—250

Ackerman	Burton	Dornan (CA)
Allard	Byron	Dreier
Anderson	Callahan	Duncan
Andrews (TX)	Camp	Edwards (OK)
Archer	Campbell (CA)	Edwards (TX)
Armey	Campbell (CO)	Emerson
Aspin	Carper	Engel
Bacchus	Chandler	Erdreich
Baker	Chapman	Fascell
Ballenger	Clement	Fawell
Barnard	Clinger	Fields
Barrett	Coble	Fish
Bartlett	Coleman (MO)	Franks (CT)
Barton	Combest	Frost
Bateman	Condit	Galleghy
Bentley	Cooper	Gallo
Bereuter	Coughlin	Gekas
Berman	Cox (CA)	Geren
Bevill	Cramer	Gilchrest
Blibray	Crane	Gillmor
Blirakis	Cunningham	Gilman
Bliley	Dannemeyer	Gingrich
Boehlert	Darden	Glickman
Boehner	Davis	Goodling
Borski	de la Garza	Gordon
Brewster	DeLay	Goss
Brooks	Derrick	Gradison
Broomfield	Dickinson	Grandy
Browder	Dingell	Green
Bunning	Doollittle	Gunderson

Hall (TX)
Hammerschmidt
Hancock
Hansen
Harris
Hastert
Hatcher
Hayes (LA)
Hefley
Henry
Herger
Hoagland
Hobson
Holloway
Hopkins
Horton
Houghton
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Inhofe
Ireland
James
Johnson (CT)
Jones (GA)
Jones (NC)
Kasich
Klug
Kolbe
Kyl
Lagomarsino
Lancaster
Lantos
Laughlin
Leach
Lehman (CA)
Lent
Levine (CA)
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Livingston
Lloyd
Lowery (CA)
Luken
Machtley
Madigan
Marlenee
Martin
McCandless
McCollum

McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McEwen
McGrath
McMillan (NC)
McMillen (MD)
McNulty
Meyers
Michel
Miller (OH)
Miller (WA)
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morrison
Murtha
Myers
Nichols
Nussle
Ortiz
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Patterson
Paxon
Payne (VA)
Petri
Pickett
Porter
Pursell
Quillen
Rahall
Ramstad
Ravenel
Ray
Regula
Rhodes
Ridge
Rinaldo
Ritter
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Santorum
Sarpalius

Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Schulze
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter (VA)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solarz
Solomon
Spence
Spratt
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Tallion
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Thomas (WY)
Thornton
Torricelli
Upton
Valentine
Vander Jagt
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weber
Weldon
Whitten
Wilson
Wolf
Wyllie
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer

Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Owens (NY)
Owens (UT)
Panetta
Payne (NJ)
Pease
Pelosi
Penny
Perkins
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickle
Poshard
Price
Rangel
Reed
Richardson
Riggs
Roe
Roemer

Rose
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Savage
Sawyer
Scheuer
Schroeder
Schumer
Serrano
Sharp
Sikorski
Skaggs
Slaughter (NY)
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Staggers
Stallings
Stark
Stokes

Studds
Swift
Synar
Taylor (MS)
Torres
Towns
Traficant
Traxler
Unsoeld
Vento
Visclosky
Washington
Waters
Waxman
Weiss
Wheat
Williams
Wise
Wolpe
Wyden
Yates
Yatron

NOT VOTING—2

Dymally

Udall

□ 1551

So the joint resolution was passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, because of medical reasons, I was unable to participate in the debate regarding the Persian Gulf crisis.

If I were present, I would have voted in the following way: "Yes" on Bennett-Dubin; "Yes" on Hamilton-Gephardt; and "No" on Solarz-Michel.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I have asked to proceed for 1 minute so that I might inquire of the distinguished majority leader how he perceives the program to be in the coming week, or before the 23d when we are formally in session.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICHEL. I am happy to yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

Our intention is to stay in session now for a few more moments. We believe the Senate resolution, which we believe is worded exactly as our resolution is worded, will be coming here soon. We have to stay in session until that happens. We will have special orders until that happens.

When that happens, we will then adjourn until Monday noon and we will be in session each day next week in pro forma sessions meeting at noon each day.

Members will not expect there to be votes next week. I have no plans for bills or votes, but we felt that it was important that the Congress stay in

pro forma session each day of next week.

The message from the Senate will be coming in a few moments.

Mr. MICHEL. Yes, and that, of course, will tell us for all practical purposes that the Senate will substitute the language of the House bill, which then will not require it coming back to this body.

Mr. GEPHARDT. That is correct. We expect no further action here.

Mr. MICHEL. So that we expect no further action today here.

Mr. GEPHARDT. That is right.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, might I inquire further of the distinguished majority leader, I do not know that we made it all that clear for next week with the pro forma sessions during the course of the week.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, again the sessions next week are pro forma sessions, no votes, pro forma sessions each day at noon.

Mr. MICHEL. And Mr. Speaker, may I have the liberty to convey our conservation that we might very well just have pro forma sessions up until the 23d?

The SPEAKER. The Chair has had discussions with the majority leader and with the Republican leader. Members should be advised that the probability is that votes will not occur, but that the House will be in session each day between now and the regular session January 23, beginning with each day next week, as the majority leader has announced.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICHEL. I yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Speaker, I just wanted to ask the majority leader, since we obviously are entering unchartered waters, can Members generally assume that if for some reason we do have to have votes, this being an unknown time, that Members would get say 24 hours' notice or some kind of minimum notice, particularly on the west coast, in order to get back in time. I just raise that issue since we do not really know what may happen.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, if there is a need to be here, we will give Members 24 hours' notice so that they can know when to be here.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman. If there are no other questions, I yield back the balance of my time.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include therein extraneous

NAYS—183

Abercrombie
Alexander
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Annunzio
Anthony
Applegate
Atkins
AuCoin
Bellenson
Bennett
Bonior
Boucher
Boxer
Brown
Bruce
Bryant
Bustamante
Cardin
Carr
Clay
Coleman (TX)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Conte
Conyers
Costello
Cox (IL)
Coyne
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Dicks
Dixon
Donnelly
Dooley
Dorgan (ND)
Downey
Durbin

Dwyer
Early
Eckart
Edwards (CA)
English
Espy
Evans
Fazio
Feighan
Flake
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Gaydos
Gedjenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gonzalez
Gray
Guarini
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hayes (IL)
Hefner
Hertel
Hochbrueckner
Horn
Hoyer
Jacobs
Jefferson
Jenkins
Johnson (SD)
Johnston
Jontz
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy

Kennelly
Kildee
Klecza
Kolter
Kopetski
Kostmayer
LaFalce
LaRocco
Lehman (FL)
Levin (MI)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Long
Lowey (NY)
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McHugh
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mink
Moakley
Moody
Moran
Morella
Mrazek
Murphy
Nagle
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Neal (NC)
Nowak
Oakar

material on the Solarz-Michel joint resolution just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair wishes to announce that in accordance with the announcement of the leadership, we will be meeting on each day, Monday through Friday, except on January 21, which is the anniversary of the birthday of Dr. Martin Luther King, which is a Federal holiday, on which day the House will not be in session.

The Chair will receive a limited number of 1-minute requests.

RECESS

The SPEAKER. If there are no requests, the Chair declares the House in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

Accordingly (at 3 o'clock and 56 minutes p.m.), the House stood in recess subject to the call of the Chair.

□ 1622

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker at 4 o'clock and 22 minutes p.m.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Hallen, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate has passed without amendment a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

H.J. Res. 77. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678.

A message also announced that the Senate has passed a joint resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S.J. Res. 2. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678.

The message also announced that, pursuant to Public Law 85-874, the Chair, as President of the Senate, appoints Mr. HATFIELD, to the Board of Trustees of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE REPUBLICAN LEADER

The SPEAKER. The Chair lays before the House the following communication from the Republican leader:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, January 11, 1991.

Hon. THOMAS S. FOLEY,
Speaker of the House, House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Pursuant to Section 400DD(e)(2)(B), Public Law 100-494, I hereby

appoint the gentleman from California, Mr. Lewis, to serve as a member of the United States Alternative Fuels Council.

Sincerely yours,

BOB MICHEL,
Republican Leader.

REAPPOINTMENT OF MEMBER TO U.S. ALTERNATIVE FUELS COUNCIL

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of section 4 of Public Law 100-494, the Chair reappoints to the U.S. Alternative Fuels Council on the part of the House the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

Mr. ROSE, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a joint resolution of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.J. Res. 77. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. ECKART. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 4 o'clock and 24 minutes p.m.) under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, January 14, 1991, at 12 noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

294. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-228, "D.C. Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, Section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

295. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-289, "Assault Weapon Manufacturing Strict Liability Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

296. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-279 "District of Columbia Uniform Disclaimer of Property Interests Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

297. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-281, "District of Columbia Fire Prevention Code Outdoor Grill Safety Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, Section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

298. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a

copy of D.C. act 8-277, "Advisory Neighborhood Commission Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

299. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-266, "Task Force on Hunger Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code Section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

300. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-280, "Uniform Law on Notarial Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

301. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-278, "Smoking Regulation Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

302. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-268, "D.C. Family Support Act Federal Conformity Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

303. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-298, "General Obligation Bond Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

304. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-299, "Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Repeal Minimum Guidelines Temporary Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

305. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-262, "Washington Convention Center Management Act of 1979 Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

306. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-263, "Child Abuse and Neglect Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

307. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-292, "Paramount Baptist Church Equitable Tax Relief Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

308. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-291, "Petworth Methodist Church Equitable Real Property Tax Relief Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

309. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-293, "Jerusalem Baptist Church Equitable Real Property Tax Relief Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

310. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-294, "Episcopal Church Home Equitable Real Property Tax Relief Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

311. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-295, "Mount Ephriam Baptist Church, Inc., Equitable Real Property Tax Relief Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

312. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-296, "Closing of a Public Alley in Square 67, S.O. 88-309, Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

313. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-297, "Closing of a Public Alley in Square 76, S.O. 89-46, Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

314. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-283, "Paper and Paper Products Recycling Incentive Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

315. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-284, "Real Estate Transaction Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

316. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-261, "D.C. Workers' Compensation Equity Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

317. A letter from the Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia, transmitting a copy of D.C. act 8-282, "Real Property Improvements and Construction Tax Amendment Act of 1990," and report, pursuant to D.C. Code, section 1-233(c)(1); to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

318. A letter from the Chairman, Harry S. Truman Scholarship Foundation, transmitting the annual report for 1990, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 2012(b); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

319. A letter from the Acting Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting by direction of the President a report that on January 4, 1990, at approximately 3 p.m., a United States UH-1H helicopter came under groundfire as it exited the landing lane at Canton Y Caserio San Francisco, El Salvador; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

320. A letter from the Chairman, Farm Credit Administration, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

321. A letter from the Deputy Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

322. A letter from the Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

323. A letter from the President, Overseas Private Investment Corp., transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers'

Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

324. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the annual report under the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act for fiscal year 1990, pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3512(c)(3); to the Committee on Government Operations.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

[Omitted from the Record of January 11, 1991]

By Mr. WHEAT (for himself, Mr. CALAHAN, and Mr. GEPHARDT):

H.R. 520. A bill to encourage States to establish parents as teachers programs; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

[Introduced January 12, 1991]

By Mr. BEVILL:

H.R. 521. A bill to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to carry out a highway project to construct Appalachian highway corridor X from Appalachian highway corridor V near Fulton, MS, to Interstate route 59 at Birmingham, AL; to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr. ESPY (for himself and Mr. EMERSON):

H.R. 522. A bill to transfer the personal property of the Lower Mississippi Delta Development Commission to the Lower Mississippi Delta Development Center and to authorize appropriations for the center; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. VOLKMER (for himself, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, and Mr. JONTZ):

H.R. 523. A bill to provide for the calculation of certain wheat deficiency payments on a calendar year basis; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. MICHEL (for himself, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. GALLEGLY, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. HYDE, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. KYL, Mr. LAUGHLIN, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. LANTOS, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. McEWEN and Mr. BLAZ):

H.J. Res. 77. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678; considered and passed.

By Mr. BENNETT (for himself, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. STARK, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. TOWNS, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. SANGMEISTER, Mr. EVANS, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. McHUGH, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mrs. UNSOELD, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. SANDERS, Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. YATES, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. NAGLE, Mr. SABO, Mr. GEJDENSON, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. UDALL, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. MFUME, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. POSHARD, Mr.

LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. PEASE, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MARKEY, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mr. TORRES, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. ROE, Mr. VENTO, Mr. DeFAZIO, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. OLIN, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. McDERMOTT, Mr. NEAL of North Carolina, Mr. MOODY, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. COYNE, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. FOGLETTA, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. SCHEUER, Mrs. LOWEY of New York, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mrs. MINK, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Mr. ESPY, Mr. BEILENSEN, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. BACCHUS, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. LaFALCE, Mr. WASHINGTON, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. REED, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. RUSSO, and Mr. ANDREWS of New Jersey):

H. Con. Res. 32. Concurrent Resolution to express the sense of Congress that Congress must approve any offensive military action against Iraq; considered and agreed to.

By Mr. GEPHARDT (for himself and Mr. HAMILTON):

H. Con. Res. 33. Concurrent resolution regarding United States policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait; considered and not agreed to.

By Mr. HUCKABY:

H. Con. Res. 34. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President should develop a plan for increased financial contributions by nations allied with the United States which benefit from the commitment of United States military forces in the Persian Gulf; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. McEWEN:

H. Res. 31. Resolution to provide that the new franking requirements and procedures, as they pertain to the House of Representatives, be suspended pending the completion of a study and report thereon; jointly, to the Committee on House Administration and Rules.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 2. Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. GAYDOS, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. AuCOIN, Mr. BEILENSEN, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BONIOR, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BROWN, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. CAMPBELL of California, Mr. CARPER, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mrs. COLLINS of Illinois, Mrs. COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. DeFAZIO, Ms. DeLAURO, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. ESPY, Mr. EVANS, Mr. FASCELL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FISH, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. FOGLETTA, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. FROST, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GRAY, Mr. GREEN of New York, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. HOYER, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. KOPETSKI, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr.

LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. MANTON, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MARTIN, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. McNULTY, Mr. MINETA, Mrs. MINK, Ms. MOLINARI, Mr. MOODY, Mrs. MORELLA, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. NEAL of Massachusetts, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. PAYNE of New Jersey, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. REED, Mr. ROE, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. SABO, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SHAYS, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. SNOWE, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. SWETT, Mr. SWIFT, Mr. TORRES, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. UDALL, Mrs. UNSOELD, Ms. WATERS, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WEISS, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. WILSON, Mr. WISE, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. YATES, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. PERKINS, and Mr. DIXON.

H.R. 5: Mr. FORD of Michigan, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. ROE, Mr. ABERCROMBIE, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. APPELATE, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. AUCOIN, Mr. BACCHUS, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BONIOR, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. BROWN, Mr. CAMPBELL of Colorado, Mr. CARPER, Mr. CARR, Mrs. COLLINS of Michigan, Mr. CONDIT, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. COSTELLO, Mr. COYNE, Mr. DAVIS, Mr. DEFazio, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. DICKS, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. DOWNEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. ENGEL, Mr. ESPY, Mr. EVANS, Mr. FASCELL,

Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FLAKE, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts, Mr. FROST, Mr. GEJDENSON, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. HAYES of Illinois, Mr. HERTTEL, Mr. HOAGLAND, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HOYER, Mr. JEFFERSON, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. KANJORSKI, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. KOPETSKI, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. LIPINSKI, Ms. LONG, Mrs. LOWEY of New York, Mr. MANTON, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. MCCLOSKEY, Mr. MCDERMOTT, Mr. MCHUGH, Mr. McNULTY, Mr. MFUME, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. MINETA, Mrs. MINK, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. MOODY, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. NAGLE, Ms. OAKAR, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. OBEY, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mr. PALLONE, Mr. PEASE, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. PENNY, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. SABO, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. SCHEUER, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. SKAGGS, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. SLATTERY, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. STARK, Mr. STOKES, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. TORRES, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. VENTO, Mr. VISCLOSKEY, Mr.

WEISS, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. WILSON, Mr. WISE, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. MATSUI, and Mr. SWIFT.

H.R. 233: Mr. ROYBAL, Mr. MILLER of California, and Mr. JONTZ.

H.R. 290: Mr. MILLER of California, Mrs. LOWEY of New York, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. WISE, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mr. SERRANO, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. DURBIN, and Mr. POSHARD.

H.R. 292: Mr. SERRANO and Mr. FROST.

H.R. 317: Mr. REGULA, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. POSHARD, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. NOWAK, and Mr. CAMPBELL of Colorado.

H.R. 346: Ms. DELAURO, Mr. WILSON, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. MILLER of Washington, and Mr. CHAPMAN.

H.R. 426: Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. GIBBONS, Mr. HEFLEY, Mr. HORTON, Mr. JAMES, Mr. MACHTLEY, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. RANGEL, Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN, and Mr. WILSON.

H.R. 469: Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. BACCHUS, Mr. PAXON, Mr. STOKES, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. FALEOMAVAEGA, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. OXLEY, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. CAMPBELL of Colorado, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. GOSS, and Mr. WILSON.