The Senate met at 9:30 a.m., on the expiration of the recess, and was called to order by the Honorable Thomas A. Daschle, a Senator from the State of South Dakota.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Richard C. Halverson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us pray:

Except the Lord build the house, they labour in vain that build it: except the Lord keep the city, the watchman watcheth but in vain.—Psalm 127:1.

Father in Heaven, the burden of decision is awesome, the implications are overwhelming. As Congress bears its burden, literally millions of Americans have mobilized for prayer. For this we thank Thee. Save us, Lord, from an attitude so secular that we leave no room for an eternal God to intervene. As the Senators struggle with this awful responsibility, grant them grace to make room in their minds and hearts for a God who understands, who loves, who cares, and who has not uncommonly, in times past, overruled the plans and the schemes of the most powerful leaders. Touch each life in this body with special wisdom and grace for these hours. We ask this in the name of the Prince of Peace. Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. Byrd).

The legislative clerk read the following letter:


To the Senate:

Under the provision of rule L, section 3, of the Standing Rules of the Senate, I hereby appoint the Honorable Thomas A. Daschle, a Senator from the State of South Dakota, to perform the duties of the Chair.

ROBERT C. BYRD, President pro tempore.

Mr. DASCHLE thereupon assumed the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

RECOGNITION OF THE MAJORITY LEADER

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The majority leader is recognized.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, and Members of the Senate, in a moment debate will resume on the Persian Gulf crisis. Under the consent agreement obtained last evening, the resolution which I offered yesterday in behalf of Senators Nunn, Byrd, Pell, Boren, Mitchell and Levin, later cosponsored by many other Senators, is on the calendar, and I intend to move to proceed to that resolution today, as I notified the distinguished Republican leader last evening.

I also advised the Republican leader again, as I have previously in several discussions and as I have stated publicly, that it is my hope and my intention that the Senate can complete action on this matter tomorrow.

I believe that we ought to have a full and open debate. We had a lengthy day of such debate yesterday. I anticipate another one today, and I hope that we could continue the debate and complete action by voting on tomorrow.

As all Senators know but most Americans do not, under the rules of the Senate I cannot fix a time for voting unilaterally, since under Senate rules each Senator has the right to speak for as long as he or she wishes, and, since under those same rules any Senator may offer any number of amendments that he or she wishes, the only way in which we can fix a time for voting is by unanimous consent, or, should the Senate as a whole decide to invoke cloture and terminate debate, then ultimately, at some point thereafter indeterminate as of now, there could be votes.

I hope that we do not have a filibuster. I feel that we ought to have a filibuster. I think that a Senator who chooses to invoke his or her rights under the rules to delay or prevent voting. That is possible, and of course it is understandable under the rules and has occurred in the past. I do not believe that is the course of action we should take in this instance. I think each Senator has a right to express his or her views both in statements and in votes and the American people have a right to know where each of us stands on this important issue.

So I repeat that it remains my hope and my intention that we can reach an agreement and vote on these matters tomorrow. I will continue to pursue such an agreement with the Republican leader and others of my colleagues and will keep Senators advised throughout the day of our progress in that regard.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

ORDER PERMITTING SENATORS TO SPEAK

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order there will now be a period in which Senators are permitted to speak. The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Mexico.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Mr. Bingaman. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of the joint resolution proposed by the majority leader and many of my colleagues. It is a resolution which I certainly add my name to as a cosponsor, which I believe is rooted in strength and in patience and in an awareness of the true costs of war.

On the morning of November 8, before the President announced later that day that he intended to essentially double the size of our forces in the Persian Gulf, I wrote to the President expressing my view that the American people would not support offensive military action until all other efforts had been exhausted. In hearings held by the Armed Services Committee in late November and December, I heard nothing that would change that opinion.

Please understand, Mr. President, that if my view on this issue is rejected and if the Congress and the President decide to proceed with military action beginning on or after January 15, then I will support funding to ensure that we prevail in that military action. As a Member of the Senate I have a responsibility to express my convictions on the question of whether this country should go to war at this time.

However, if the decision is made to go to war, then I also believe strongly that I and all of us must join together to do all in our power to ensure victory.

We all agree that Iraq demonstrated an outrageous and an unacceptable disregard for international law when it invaded Kuwait on the 2d of August. And we also agree that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait.

But I am not convinced, especially after hearing the expert testimony of a dozen defense and national security specialists who appeared before the Armed Services Committee. I am not convinced that offensive military action is the correct course to accomplish that goal at this time. In fact, I have come to believe the exact opposite. That is, that a rush to action would be imprudent, it would be unwise, and it would involve unnecessary
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costs, chief among them the unnecessary loss of human life.

In both the short and the long term, offensive military action soon after January 15 creates some disturbing results for which we as a nation are not prepared. Some will portray this as an argument or a debate between using force now and never using force, but that is clearly not the case. I believe the most appropriate action for the United States at this time is to maintain the international sanctions and trade embargo and to pursue a diplomatic solution while maintaining the credible threat of force in the future.

I supported the President's initial deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia. After the August 2 invasion of Kuwait there were very real fears that Saddam Hussein might order his troops to invade Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states. By his own account, the President said that those moves at that time were defensive. The troops, he said, were intended to fortify the defense of our Saudi allies and to draw a line across which Saddam Hussein dare not cross.

To date that line has not been crossed, and we and our allies have succeeded in that stated objective. So, too, the President has succeeded in building an international coalition against Iraq's seizure of Kuwait and in obtaining release of all foreign hostages. We now have an impressive array of countries, including Arab countries, who are committed to isolating Saddam Hussein and constraining his ability to hold on to Kuwait. The United Nations itself has approved an unprecedented 12 resolutions against Iraq, including only the third international economic embargo in its history.

In these efforts the President has been successful and I have supported him. But I believe the President has erred in recent months as he narrowed his options and imposed an artificial deadline on our actions. Time is on our side if we have the patience to use it. It is not on Saddam Hussein's side.

It became apparent in November the President had changed his strategy. No longer were our troops in Saudi Arabia for defensive purposes. On November 8 the President ordered our Armed Forces in the Middle East nearly doubled, from 230,000 to 430,000. This was accompanied by talk not only of removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait but also of removing Saddam Hussein from power, removing his current and potential control over weapons of mass destruction and, in late November, in the President's speech in the United Nations for an authorization to use force, he joined in creating an artificial deadline, January 15, which now seems to be driving our entire policy in this crisis.

Let me cite four reasons that I oppose the use of force at this time. First I believe that economic sanctions need more time to work. To expect that they would succeed in only weeks or a few months is nothing less than naive. Former National Security Adviser Brzezinski stated recently before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence: "Sanctions are not a blunt instrument for promptly achieving total surrender." The entire intent of sanctions is to deny Iraq any benefit from its seizure of Kuwait and at the same time to exert enough pressure so that Saddam Hussein will continue the lawless occupation of Kuwait. If history is any indication, sanctions can work.

In a recent study by the Institute for International Economics, a study of 115 cases of sanctions being imposed since early in this century, success was achieved 40 times. Iraq is particularly vulnerable, since its economy is dependent on oil exports which have been cut off. It has only recently concluded a bloody 10-year war with Iran. Obviously that is no guarantee of success in this case. But I pose this question: What do we have to lose by waiting?

The current U.N. sanctions are easily the most far reaching ever imposed on any single nation by anyone. Even if they do not work in all respects, Saddam Hussein, with his borders sealed off against all but minor smuggling and with a finite reserve of supplies with which to feed his people and his war machine, is likely to be weaker now than he will be on January 15.

A second reason that we should not resort to force at this time is that just as we need more time to see if sanctions will work, we also need more time to pursue a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. The failed talks in Geneva Wednesday clearly are not the end of diplomatic efforts. The Secretary General of the United Nations is on his way to Iraq at this very moment.

A third reason for us to stop short of early military action it will be "sudden, massive, and decisive."

I would only add that it will also be catastrophic and that we must expect that the loss of human life will be substantial. Many in the administration and even some in Congress appear to be convinced that if we attack now the ensuing war will be short and will result in minimal U.S. casualties. But others, whose opinions I respect, conclude that while that is a possible outcome, it is by no means certain that casualties could be significant and that the fighting could drag on.

I do not know how long a war with Iraq would last. I do know that virtually everything in human experience takes longer than it is expected to take. History is replete with wars which proved to be longer and more costly in human life than their instigators expected.

The Germans, the Italians, and the Japanese made that fatal mistake in their planning of the actions which led to the Second World War. We ourselves learned this tragic lesson in the Civil War.

The fourth reason that a declaration of war would be premature at this time is the potential cost of early military action to the stability of that region and to the U.S. role in that region. Our role as the leader of the international community will be diminished if we force Iraq, then, in my opinion, it would have been more logical and more responsible to exert still further economic pressure on Iraq to comply with international demands. This is the way to avoid a confrontation that could drag on from now to 1992 with Iraq based on the President's declaration of war.

President Bush himself has stated that one of our main goals in this crisis is restoring stability and security to the region. The obvious question is will early military action promote stability in that region, and I have grave doubts.

Can we realistically expect our Arab allies to remain with us, once we begin a mass assault against Iraq? If we succeeded in destroying Iraq's ability to wage war, how likely is it that other regional powers will try to fill that void? How much of a long-term military presence are we committing ourselves to maintain in Iraq, once the war is concluded? And what will be the reaction of other Arab countries to our continued long-term presence there?

At some point offensive action may be necessary, but I believe these and other questions about the costs of early military action on the stability of the Middle East should be addressed before we decide that we have reached that point. Once in the war, these are the questions with which we will be immediately confronted.

Mr. President, I would like to discuss very briefly the New World order that President Bush has referred to in the past few months. In an interview with Newsweek that appeared on November 26, President Bush stated:

We must not reward aggression. * * *. The civilized world is now in the process of fash-
ioning the rules that will govern the New World order beginning to emerge in the aftermath of the cold war. * * * If the world looks the other way in this first crisis of the post-cold-war era, I would believe that we will conclude correctly that aggression pays. We must either be prepared to respond now or face a much greater set of challenges down the road.

Mr. President, I also hope for a post-cold-war era of sustained peace, but I do not believe that aggression is now or in our lifetime will be a thing of the past. Believing that early offensive military action in this first crisis of the post-cold-war era will end aggression is a basic misreading of human nature. I am not certain of what exactly the President means by a New World order, and I have questions about using this particular crisis as a model for future crises.

While I agree that we must not reawaken aggression, I do not believe that running into war is the only way to keep the peace. And I don't believe that aggression will be a thing of the past. But I have grave doubts about the wisdom of predicting future world peace on a rush into war at this time.

If a New World order is to prevail in the coming years, I am also concerned about the role the United States is to play in that New World order. Are we, the United States, to ensure that aggression anywhere in the globe is stopped? Will this responsibility fall to us since the United States is the only country in the world which has a military capability to achieve this? Certainly, no other country could undertake and sustain the mobilization of forces that we have accomplished over the last 5 months.

Is our role that of the enforcer of this New World order?

I also have concerns about the roles that our allies should play in this New World order. Clearly, two of our closest allies—Japan and Germany—both stand to lose more from Saddam's action than we do because of their greater economic dependence on the Middle East. Clearly they have shown little commitment to involving themselves in military actions to punish his aggression.

I am disappointed, as are many of my colleagues, by the lack of action by our allies in an operation which is clearly at least as much in their interest as it is in ours. I wonder how can the American people be asked to sacrifice for this New World order when two of our closest allies are off pursuing a world order of their own.

I also have strong doubts that a rush to war against Iraq will get us to that New World order when many of the other members of our coalition are clearly not willing to begin that war. Yet, uneasiness about war among the members of the United Nations and among our close allies leads me to believe that offensive military action at this time would damage the world's ability to prevent it from happening in the future. I believe that the New World order, whatever that may prove to be, would be better served by continuing sanctions and diplomatic efforts.

Two days ago, we saw the failure of talks between the United States Secretary of State and the Iraqi Foreign Minister in Geneva. Not only did we see the failure of talks, but the refusal of the Iraqi Foreign Minister to honestly address the issue of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The natural response of the American people is one of disappointment but also one of anger and frustration, and the temptation for all of us is to bring U.S. military force to bear at this time.

In my view, Mr. President, that course is not in the best interest of the American people or of the world community. We should not allow our frustration and the lack of a clear path to prevent us from continuing to search for a peaceful solution.

Many statements have been quoted during this debate and I am sure many will be in the next 2 days. One quotation I would like to bring to the attention of all members of Congress, and its statement by Winston Churchill in his extensive writings. He said:

Those who are prone * * * to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure problems * * * have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their heads, to seek patience, and to patiently and carefully, if painfully, live up to their responsibility, are not always wrong. On the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right not only morally but from a practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good will!!

If all other means of obtaining Iraqi compliance with United Nations resolutions prove futile and a consensus is reached at home and abroad that military action is the only solution, then at that point, the President should come to Congress. He should request a declaration of war. At that point, I believe the Senate would grant such an authorization. But we are not at that point today. I urge my colleagues to stop short of authorizing war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I wonder if the distinguished Senator from New Mexico might be willing to engage in a brief discussion with this Senator. Mr. BINGAMAN, I will be pleased to.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank my good friend from New Mexico. He and I have worked closely during the course of the past 8 years during our joint tenure and worked very closely on the impeachment of President Clinton. He has written me a letter, which he included and I cochaired. I have a very high regard for Senator BINGAMAN, and I compliment him on a very well-reasoned presentation, not to say that I agree with all aspects of it, but I did with many aspects, especially his comment about the keen interest of Japan and Germany in Mideast oil and the failure of those 2 countries to assume a fair burden, and the thrust of his contention that others of our allies have not done a fair share.

But the point that I would like to make is that I am in agreement with him. I intend to make a more complete statement later this morning—turns on the consideration that Congress is giving to those important issues at this time, January 11, 4 days from the January 15 cutoff, contrasted with the consideration of these issues at an earlier time.

I was interested to note that the distinguished Senator from New Mexico commented that he had written the President on November 8 objecting to the increased use of force, or the increased allocation of force—strike the use of force, it was not used—but the increase of our force in Saudi Arabia, and that he also was concerned on November 29 when the U.N. resolution was established fixing January 15, 1991, as the day after which force could be used.

I had expressed yesterday on the Senate floor the concern that economic sanctions to have lasted longer and not to have had a January 15 cutoff, but said that it seemed to me that being in the posture we were in as of January 19, January 11, that it was much too late in the day to try to change U.S. foreign policy and representations and commitments which had been made by the President on behalf of the United States. Looking back to November is not useful in the sense of turning back the clock, but I think it does bear on what U.S. policy might be at some time in the future, and I think it also bears on the question as to whether it is appropriate and timely to change that policy today.

When we assembled in mid-November to select our leaders, the distinguished Senator from Indiana [Mr. LUJAN] took the initiative and proposed a special session. Mr. President, that was a good idea. As I know the Senator from New Mexico will recall, the majority leader and the Speaker of the House retained authority after adjournment to reconvene the Congress if the need should arise, realizing that that might be necessary.

It seems to this Senator that Congress had the opportunity to reconvene in mid-November and express itself on a resolution objecting to the buildup of forces in Saudi Arabia and the change of posture from defensive to potentially offensive mode. Congress could have reassembled itself in late November when we were on notice, as was the world, when the President was seeking the January 15 deadline in the United Nations resolution and was negotiating with the Soviets and the Chinese who were hard to deal with at that time, and the French and other members of the Security Council who were also not too easy to deal with at that time. Congress had the opportunity to come
into session in November and say we do not want an arbitrary day, we want to give sanctions an adequate opportunity to work—and there were some projections at that time that they might take longer than a year, as the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon] said yesterday.

I have two questions to propound to my colleague from New Mexico. The first is: Would it not have been far preferable for the Congress to have been convened shortly after the November 8 deployment of additional forces, or sometime hopefully immediately before the November 29 U.N. resolution, or at least shortly thereafter? And the second part which is related to the first part is: Is there not a prejudice to the President's position and substantial prejudice to the other members of the United Nations who have relied upon the President's position and the congressional silence thereby making it extremely difficult if not impossible to alter that key aspect of U.S. foreign policy today?

Mr. BINGAMAN. In my view, there are several reasons we could go back in the last several months and say "It would be preferable if ***." If we want to begin, it would have been preferable for the President to have advised the leadership of Congress before deciding to essentially double the troop strength in the Middle East or Saudi Arabia. No such action was taken by the administration. It was not determined that this was something that required consultation with Members of Congress.

I think that would have certainly been preferable. Had that occurred, then I think it is very conceivable that the leadership of Congress would have seen there was a very major shift in U.S. strategy that was manifest in that decision to double our troop strength and that Congress did need to express itself. But the President chose not to do that.

I point out also that as far as whether we should be acting now, the President has made it very clear repeatedly that he has not made a decision to use military force. Accordingly, I believe it is entirely appropriate and responsible for the Congress to be here carrying out its constitutional responsibility and giving its best advice to the President and determining under the Constitution, as it is required to do, whether the use of force is required at this time.

This is not second-guessing the President's decision to use force. The President has said he has not made that decision. He has set an arbitrary deadline. The United Nations has set an arbitrary deadline after which they would like blanket authority to use force as they determine it is appropriate.

I, for one, am not willing to give them that blanket authority. I can understand why members of the United Nations might, because, quite frankly, they have much less to lose than the United States. Most of the troops engaged in this activity are U.S. troops and U.S. casualties.

But clearly I think that this body, the Senate, is entirely in its rights and acting appropriately in dealing with this issue before a decision to use force is made. It is my clear understanding that that decision has not been made.

Mr. SPECTER. I would disagree respectfully with my distinguished colleague that we are not second-guessing the President, for this reason: It is true that he has not made a decision, but he wishes to have the option to use force. If the Congress adopts the Mitchell resolution, we will be denying him the option to use force. So that he has proceeded for a long period of time, at least from November 26, 1990, to January 11, 1991, and has represented to the other members of the United Nations that he is in a position to carry out U.N. Resolution 678. He has in fact expressed himself that he does not need congressional authority to use force in the Persian Gulf.

My own reading of the Constitution is that authority from Congress is necessary, but there could be a situation if Congress sat back and did nothing, as it appeared for some time, and the Congress did not express itself, and then, given the subtleties of authority under the Constitution with the President as Commander in Chief and congressional inaction, that that would have been a different issue. But if the Congress adopts the Mitchell resolution and says economic sanctions now, no force now, then it seems to me the Congress really is, to use the Senator's phrase, second-guessing the President.

When the Senator from New Mexico says that it would have been preferable for the President to advise the Congress, as he has, in this increase in force, I have to disagree sharply with that contention, for this reason: The Congress was on notice that the President intended to sharply increase U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, on notice well in advance of the time that the first deployments were made, and in fact as of this moment all of the deployments have not yet been made.

There would have been highly desirable had a series of meetings been held in advance. I am not saying that would not have been a good course. I believe that at least one Senator was called in advance.

There is some controversy about having been given only a few hours', perhaps 2 hours' notice, but when we deal with matters of this moment it seems to this Senator that we do not stick to niceties and say well, if the President does not inform us formally and for formal consultation, then we did not have a duty to come forward.

Mr. BINGAMAN. That is certainly not my position, let me make it clear.

Mr. SPECTER. Let me finish the thought and I will yield. It seems to me that once the Congress knows that the President is going to markedly increase forces in the Persian Gulf, to have an offensive posture, and the Congress disagrees with that, then the Congress ought to act immediately.

And once the Congress knows the President is seeking a resolution from the United Nations and they were tough negotiations which lasted a long time before the U.N. resolution was adopted, the Congress had a duty to consider if it disagreed with that policy of limiting economic sanctions to January 15 and putting on that date.

So while I do agree with what the distinguished Senator from New Mexico has said about we could have had a lot of different policies in the past, I think this posture and this timing bears very heavily on the judgment we make today.

Mr. BINGAMAN. I would just respond by saying I am not suggesting there is some kind of formality that should have been followed. I am saying when the Congress adjourned there was no understanding on my part, and certainly I do not know of any—I sit on the Armed Services Committee where we were briefed on a regular basis on this matter. I had no understanding that we were going to increase troop strength in the Middle East or in Saudi Arabia from 230,000 to 400,000 personnel. That was not contemplated at the time the Congress adjourned, in my view.

If the President did have that in mind, he should have called in the leadership and said we have a major change in approach, a major change in strategy. Had he done that, then perhaps we would have had a different set of actions that followed. But what has followed has followed, and clearly the President is doing what it is required under our Constitution to do today, and that is meeting to debate whether we should go to war, whether we should use military action.

I am persuaded that it is an entirely appropriate role for us. The President needs to listen to these debates, and the President needs to abide by the will of Congress on this. And the Congress needs to be in a position where, if circumstances change—I do not know how this vote will come out if it is possible. Were the President to prevail and get a blanket authority to commence military action anytime after January 15, if that is the case, then a declaration of war will have been made, in effect. And certainly, I will support that decision.

But if that is not the case, then the President, in my view, needs to pursue the course that this resolution sets out; that is, economic sanctions, perhaps an arms embargo, continue to try to find a peaceful resolution of this matter. And when and if he determines...
that is not in any way promising, he can come back to Congress. Again, the Congress can consider the situation.

Mr. SPECTER. I agree totally with the distinguished Senator from New Mexico that the Congress is doing what it should do at this time. Better late than never. But on the merits, I think we would have had a very different picture had we looked at it and were on notice about his intention to increase troop strength in the Mideast, in the Persian Gulf, and if we were on notice of his intention to have a military option after January 15.

I just think on the merits, it weighs very heavily against a peaceful resolution at this time.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. WINTH). The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. Mr. President, in 1935—

Mr. JOHNSTON. Did the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. SPECTER. I yield for a question.

Mr. REID. If the Senator from Louisiana has any objection whatsoever—I have spoken previously to the Senator from Pennsylvania indicating that I was going to give a statement. If the Senator would rather I not do that—I would be happy to return the floor to the Senator from Pennsylvania and seek recognition on my own.

Mr. SPECTER. I had thought the Senator from Nevada was interrupting for a question. But I did previously advise, although I was on the floor earlier, that I would yield to the Senator from Nevada for remaining statements, if that is his request. In any event, I now yield the floor.

Mr. REID addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Nevada.

Mr. REID. The President, in 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia. Writing after the World War of which that invasion proved to be the opening shots, Winston Churchill reflected that Mussolini’s designs were unsuited to the ethos of the 20th century, that they belonged to the Dark Ages and that such conduct was both obsoleter and reprehensible.

Both Italy and Ethiopia were members of the League of Nations. Churchill called it a test case for that “instrument of world government upon which the hopes of all good men were founded.” The league failed that test. It imposed sanctions which Churchill noted merely stimulated the Italian war spirit.

Churchill, writing from the wisdom of years of greatness, said that Britain should have interposed her fleet and gone to war. If necessary. If ever. He said, “there was an opportunity of striking a decisive blow in a generous cause with the minimum of risk. It was here and now.”

Mr. President, it is again 1935 and a dictator has invaded Abyssinia. It is 1932 and Japan has slashed into a helpless China. It is 1938 and Germany has goose-stepped into Czechoslovakia. Once again, Mr. President, a dictator is on the march. But this time the world is different. There is an effective world body, there are powers ready to take action on behalf of that body, and there is no countervailing threat to stay our hand.

If it is necessary we are prepared and capable to act in the cause of prevention of aggression, justice for the weak and defenseless and, dare I say, freedom and democracy.

There are those among us Mr. President, who say that Kuwait is a monarchical, far from home and hardly worth a fight or the expenditure of resources, let alone the blood of one American soldier. The simple fact is that what Mr. President, the same was said of China and Ethiopia. By the time the democracies decided to fight it was a very near thing. By the time America, over the vehement opposition of a strong body of isolationism, edged toward supporting the forces of democracy it was almost too late; for millions of innocent men, women, and children it was too late.

Mr. President, I hear whispers of those voices today. I hear in this Chamber the faint echo of men like Senator William Borah who believed that reality and a wide ocean demanded that we look to our own defenses; that we abandon democracy outside this hemisphere as a lost cause.

Mr. President, I remember as a young man, hearing John F. Kennedy tell this body and the Nation in his State of the Union Address that the mere absence of war is not peace. As long, Mr. President, and the nation may subdue an other free and independent state by force of arms there is no peace. As long as one nation may at will threaten to strike the cities of another and attack her civilians with poison gas and weapons of mass destruction, there is no peace.

As long, Mr. President, as Iraq continues to occupy, and pillage, and plunder, and lay waste to Kuwait, as long as the Iraqi Army continues to rape, and torture, and brutalize, and murder the people of that tiny land, for that long, Mr. President there is no peace.

The question before this body today is an essential one of constitutional implications. May the President fulfill his role as Commander in Chief, and what is our role in relation to the President?

I would say this to my fellow Senators. Over the years I have served in Washington I have learned that one way to save a bill by committee. That is the duty, it was de- signed by the Founders to be the job of our Chief Executive.

We have a part as a body, most certainly. If we disapprove of the action taken we may force its cessation by terrorism, but if an action in advance we may order that no funds be spent. We have the power to declare war. What we do not have is the power to make war.

The President must be able to deal with foreign hostilities with a firm hand; to use the diplomatic corps and the Marine Corps with equal facility, subject only to our power to force a halt to actions we deem contrary to the national interest.

Mr. President, at this point and based on what we know about Saddam Hussein and the dark forces which rule Iraq, I do not believe that allowing the President to conduct a strong foreign policy is against that interest. Until he shows me otherwise I believe that George Bush, President of the United States, a man who has seen the face of war in person, will act with the utmost concern for protecting the lives of our service men and women.

I urge the President, to spend money rather than lives, equipment rather than humanity, and to follow the traditions we have always had in wartime, to never send a man where we can send a bullet.

Before I close, Mr. President, I would like to address one other point. We have heard much over these past days and weeks about the failure of our allies to come to our support. Since I have quoted so much today from a British statesman, I would like to mention a special relationship, our alliance with Great Britain.

It is an alliance which for 80 years has held firm, and which once again shows the unyielding bonds between our two peoples. There are 35,000 British troops in the gulf, soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, who have joined in their overall military. They have placed themselves at America’s disposal, and under American command, to join us in the fight, and if necessary, to lay down their lives at our side. Mr. President, that can be no stronger or finer expression of brotherhood.

Mr. President, I will close with another thought by Winston Churchill: “There is no merit in putting off a war for a year if when it comes, it is a far worse war and one much harder to win.”

Mr. President, all the evidence shows the Iraqis are stalling for time while they improve their defense and attempt to destroy our coalition. Delay harden their hearts. If sanctions are working, America can stay its hand. If sanctions are not enough, then let us strike while the coalition stands firm and our convictions and our morale are high. Let us achieve a clear-cut victory and get our troops out of the Middle East.
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East before they become bogged down in inextricable occupational duties. We cannot wait for the far worse war to come. The President must decide when to act. I believe the authority is his. He must act at a time to avoid the far worse war.

I yield the floor.

PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR—SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1

Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the course of the war, Senate Joint Resolution 1, regarding United States policy to reverse Iraq's occupation of Kuwait, Miss Katherine Magraw, a fellow with me, be accorded the privilege of the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. JOHNSTON addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Louisiana.

A Blank Check

Mr. JOHNSTON. Mr. President, under the Constitution, the Congress has the power to declare war. On January 8, the President of the United States asked for just that authority. What would this mean? What has been said over and over by the majority leader, and I think correctly so, as being a blank check, a carte blanche. There is no euphemism. It is, unadulterated, a re

The President must decide whether we should go to war. Since early November, I have spoken publicly all over my State, any chance I could get to speak in Washington and elsewhere, publicly and privately, that the sustained application of sanctions is the proper way to go. The reason I have said that is because I believe Iraq is uniquely vulnerable to sanctions, uniquely vulnerable to a blockade. The flow of oil, as far as Iraq is concerned, has been hermetically sealed off so that almost no oil, other than a few truckloads here or there, moves in or out of Iraq. Saddam Hussein cannot sell his oil. Not only can he not sell Kuwaitis oil, he cannot sell his own oil. And the ability to sustain that kind of embargo, that kind of blockade, I believe, can be sustained over a long time.

Mr. President, I believe that, over time, the economy of Iraq will atrophy, will shrink, and Iraq will go from a Third World country to a fourth world country. And whether or not they agree immediately to withdraw from Kuwait, considering the huge, $80 billion external debt that Saddam Hussein has, by the time the embargo has a chance to work, then Iraq will no longer be a power.

How long will it take? There is the rub, Mr. President. Because Iraq is agriculturally rich, militarily well supplied, the amount of time it would take, I believe, is a year, 18 months, 2 years. Who knows how long it would take. I believe the sustained application over time will work. But the amount of time is the question.

Are we in a position to wait long enough to find out if it will work? Well, Mr. President, we are not now in a position to do that. In order to have a sustained application of sanctions, then the 400,000 troops that we have, and those on the way to Saudi Arabia, are too many to sustain an embargo. There is absolutely no way that we can keep a force of that size sweating in the desert, called away from their jobs, and leave them there for a year or 18 months. It cost $30 billion for last year. For less than half a year, maybe 5 months, it cost $30 billion. We could not sustain that over a period of a year or two.

We have a policy of no rotation, so all of these troops are there, both our troops and others, without rotation, staying in the desert. So, in order to give sanctions a chance, what we would have to do is bring home, 300,000 or 200,000 troops, to be willing and able to reintroduce those troops at a later stage, because, as the Nunn resolution says, we would be prepared, if the sanctions failed, to reintroduce those troops in order to use them. In order to do that, we would have to be willing to do that. And in the meantime we would have to hold the alliance together.

The question is, Can that be done? Can we actually bring home those 200,000 to 300,000 troops, or whatever that magic number is? Can we hold the alliance together? Can we deal in such a way that ability to reintroduce those troops at a later date in case they are needed, in case the sanctions do not finally work?

Mr. President, reasonable minds can differ as to whether that could be possible. I believe it could. I know the Secretary of State believes it could not, I know the Secretary of Defense believes that it cannot be done, because I have asked them both and they say no. I know the CIA says that sanctions will not work on the short term. So the question is, Can we do that which is necessary in order to make the sanctions work? The key fact in this whole debate is that the President of the United States believes sincerely, but strongly, that he cannot bring those troops home in order to let sanctions work. There is no other way to let sanctions work and to bring troops home, massively bringing troops home, 200,000, 300,000 troops, because that is what it is going to take to be able to let the sanctions work. How do I know the President believes that? Because he said so yesterday. I asked him directly and unequivocally. Mr. President, if we convince you that sanctions can work can you bring troops home?" And he says absolutely, unequivocally "No."

The reason he believes that is, he believes that that decision was really made back in November. You have had lives disrupted. You have had young students taken away 2 weeks before exams. You have had doctors, lawyers and people in all walks of life, those in the National Guard, those in the Reserves, taken from their civilian jobs, Navy, Navy, Air Force, and sent to Saudi Arabia.

That having been done, I believe the President believes that he cannot say: "Well, you know, I made a mistake. I made a decision to be ready to go to war back in November but now I am going to change my mind and send you all home and we are going to try sanctions." He believes that the alliance will not hold together during all of that time. He believes that the embargo may leak, that the blockade may leak, that they may build a pipeline to Iran in order to get oil out. That may or may not be correct. But he believes it.

So, therefore, Mr. President, I believe the decision on sanctions for right or for wrong was made in November. It was made by the President. It was not made in consultation with the Congress of the United States but nevertheless it was made. I believe the die is
Hussein. Which leads us inexorably to maximum unity, because if it is in his hands to call off the war at any time, son to suppose at least that he is waiting; Hussein has colder ice water in his veins than most anybody the world knows or has known at any time. He has the power to call off that war. The last card he has to play is the President of the United States with Saddam Hussein, we must show maximum unity, because if it is in his hands to call off the war at any time, then the stronger the demonstration of force, of unity, of resolve, of power in the hands of the President of the United States to go to war, then the better chance we have to avoid that war.

Mr. President, I believe Saddam Hussein has colder ice water in his veins than most anybody the world knows or has known at any time. He has the power to call off that war. The last card he has to play is the Congress of the United States, I believe he thinks that on January 14, or maybe January 15, he can tell the President that, yes, he will get out of Kuwait and it will not be too late, he will not have lost anything.

Now whether or not he is waiting to find out what the Congress does in order to make that decision is something we do not know and cannot know. But I think there is strong reason to suppose at least that he is waiting with that cold ice water in his veins to the last possible time, hoping that the Congress will say to the President: "You do not have the power to go to war," and that that window of opportunity will close.

What do I mean by the window of opportunity? I mean the weather window, sometime between January 15 and the end of March, as Ramadan begins and the hot weather comes on; this attack must take place during that window. If he can get past that then he is home free for the rest of the year. His hope is, so says the President and so says the Secretary of State, that by waiting the Congress, and more to the point, the American people will flag in their desire to maintain the discipline that the international consortium behind the U.N. resolution, behind this effort, will dissipate, that we will accept the fact of his conquering of Kuwait.

Mr. JOHNSTON. So, Mr. President, it is a paradox that by voting to authorize war we make, I believe, peace more possible, if only marginally so. I was very hopeful a few weeks ago of being able to avoid war and I am not so hopeful today because I believe the die is cast.

If Saddam Hussein is listening, then I would tell him I spoke to the President yesterday as did some other colleagues, and I believe this die is cast. I believe, Saddam Hussein, if you do not leave Kuwait we are going to attack and we are going to attack in January. I believe that is going to happen, and whether the Congress votes for it or not, I believe it is going to happen. I believe that decision was made in November, without this Congress to be sure, but I believe that decision was made.

So our last best chance, I believe, to avoid that is to convince Saddam Hussein that that is so, and that you better get out of Kuwait while there is still time. That is why I am going to vote yes, not because I disagree with sanctions. To the contrary, I think the Nunn approach of a sustained use of sanctions is the way to go. But the President rejected that decision back in November and the question is now up to Saddam Hussein.

I am glad to yield.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I just wanted to make a quick comment to you on what the Senator was speaking about.

The rotation policy: We have heard it said many times that if we draw down some of our troops, go to a rotation policy, that might be seen as a sign of weakness. I am going to just quote for the Congress, and more to the point, the Secretary of Armed Forces, double the forces in November, the sustained application of sanctions was made in November, without this Congress to be sure, but I believe that decision was made.

So, if that is true, I believe that we have our last best chance, I believe, to avoid that is to convince Saddam Hussein that that is so, and that you better get out of Kuwait while there is still time. That is why I am going to vote yes, not because I disagree with sanctions. To the contrary, I think the Nunn approach of a sustained use of sanctions is the way to go. But the President rejected that decision back in November and the question is now up to Saddam Hussein.

I am glad to yield.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, it has not been my practice to dissent from the policy adopted by this body, and I believe this is the case. We have time here-who have spent a good time in the hearing before Senator NUNN's committee in December. It was a serious hearing about the policy by Senator Thurmond and Senator Nunn. But here is the last question by Senator KENNEDY. The question is for General Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I read the question in its entirety.

Senator KENNEDY. What is your own sense of whether that kind of policy would be perceived as the Americans backing down? We are over there now, and now we are going to have a large force over there. If we move toward a position of rotation and it looks like we are going to leave there for whatever period, the year or the 18 months, while the sanctions would work, do you have any feelings of, as individuals—Admiral Crowe has lived over there—who have spent a good time in the area? Would that be damaging?

That was Senator KENNEDY's question.

General JONES. I believe with many people it would be seen as a strength that we could stay, we could persevere, we could be persistent, we could keep isolating Saddam Hussein. He is suffering every day. We would have some problems, but they would be minor compared to the ones of Saddam Hussein, so I would see it as a strength, rather than a weakness.

There was some that would call it a weakness that we deployed the force and we received the authority under the United Nations that we might go there for whatever period, the year or the 18 months, and that could work against the sanctions. And in fact, I think it would be damaging to look at the long-term interests rather than the immediate crisis.

Mr. JOHNSTON. I would observe I agree with General Jones, but I can tell you the President of the United States does not.

Mr. HARKIN. I tend to associate my own analysis, I think, in almost every respect, in that when the President made the decision to build up the forces, double the forces in November, the sustained application of sanctions was made in November, without this Congress to be sure, but I believe that decision was made.

I am not certain that the President intended that the die be cast then, and that was the reason I raised the question immediately about the lack of rotation and about the size of the force not being sustainable and about the sanctions policy being discarded.

Mr. HARKIN. I would like to observe I am whispering. I am having a difficult time in making any kind of presentation, and I will be going slow and interrupting my remarks with a little water, here, from time to time. So I will be taking a little more time than I would like because of a voice problem.
It is regrettable that because of Iraqi insubordination, the meeting in Geneva this week with Secretary Baker produced no diplomatic breakthrough and very little that was encouraging. I noted with interest—and I must say with almost complete amazement—that several members of the foreign ministers stated that they had accepted President Bush's letter to Saddam Hussein because the letter, according to the foreign minister, was supposedly not polite. I have not read President Bush's letter. But I find that Iraqi protest both ironic and, indeed, repulsive.

Was it polite when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against his own people? And then, again, against Iran? Was it polite when Iraqi forces launched a brutal, unprompted invasion of Kuwait? Was it polite when Iraqi forces used savage violence against innocent Kuwaiti civilians and took hostage innocent foreigners residing in that country? Saddam Hussein and his top spokesmen do not have the standing in the court of world opinion to raise the issue of politeness.

Mr. President, I still believe there is room for some hope that diplomacy can succeed in avoiding war. But as January 15th approaches, as so many of my colleagues have already observed, Congress must act. Article I, section 8 of the Constitution provides that the Congress clearly has the authority and the duty to decide whether the Nation should go to war. In many past instances it is true that military actions have occurred without congressional authorization. Pursuant to the authority assumed by the President in his constitutional capacity as Commander in Chief in today's fast-moving, interconnected world with instant communications, a world plagued with nuclear weapons and international terrorism, there are certainly instances when U.S. military force must be used without congressional authorization.

But the President, by necessity, has permitted and even encouraged and supported military action by the Commander in Chief without specific authorization and without a declaration of war. I do not deem every military action taken as war. I think there is always room for debate on definitions. But a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait initiated by the United States and involving over 500,000 American forces is not a grey area.

In this case, I believe the Constitution of the United States is absolutely clear. It is essential to comply with the Constitution and to commit the Nation that Congress give its consent before the President initiates a large-scale military offensive against Iraq. I think the Founding Fathers had a great deal of wisdom when they put this provision in the Constitution. One of the main reasons, of course, was to prevent one person from being king. They did not want that. But I also believe that there was another purpose, and that is to make sure that when this Nation goes to war and asks its young men and, increasingly, young women also to put their lives on the line, the Nation must commit itself before we ask them to lay down their lives.

The President's January 8th request that Congress approve the use of military force presents Congress with an issue of great import and its consequences; not simply short term but also long term. Many of us strongly believe a war to liberate Kuwait should be the last resort and that sanctions and diplomacy combined with a threat, a continuing threat of force, should be given more time.

Should we give the President, after all of these debates when the die is cast, should we give him blanket authority to go to war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait? That is the question we face. There are numerous questions that will have to be answered in the minds of each of us before casting our vote.

The first question I try to ask when it comes to matters of war and peace is the question of whether a particular situation is vital to our Nation's security. In this case, is the liberation of Kuwait vital to our Nation's security? We all agree with the goal of restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty; no doubt about that. But have we concluded here that the liberation of Kuwait in the next few weeks is so vital to our Nation's security that we must take military action now instead of waiting a few months, waiting a period of time to allow the economic embargo and the blockade to take its toll?

Back in August and September when the embargo was successfully and, I would say very skillfully brought by President Bush, through what I think was his superb leadership, no one thought or predicted the embargo would go long past December. No one predicted we were going to be able to bring about the termination of Iraqi presence in Kuwait by January. None of the intelligence experts or other experts who testified felt the embargo was really going to have much effect before April or May of 1991 and almost all of them said it would take at least a year.

There was no surprise about that. I am absolutely amazed when people say, well, we have waited 4 months and 5 months and the embargo is not working. They must not have been there at the beginning or they must not have talked to anybody at the beginning about how long it was going to take. It is very puzzling to me how someone could give up on the embargo after 5 months when nobody that I know of predicted that it was going to last less than 9 months to a year, and most people said a year to 18 months from the time of inception, which was August of last year.

When we talk about the question of "vital"—a lot of times we in Washington throw that word around as if it is just another word. Sometimes we use so many words in the course of debate that we lose the true meaning of what we mean. I recall very clearly President Reagan's 1982 declaration that Lebanon was vital to the security of the United States—Lebanon. Shortly thereafter, following the tragic death of more than 300 marines, we pulled out of Lebanon, we pulled out of a country that only a few weeks before had been declared "vital." Today, we debate this 8 years later while pursuing our newly proclaimed vital interest in Kuwait. It was not vital before August 2. Nobody said it was vital then. There was no treaty. In fact, when we were protecting Kuwaiti vessels coming out of the gulf for several years in the Iran-Iraq war, the Kuwaitis did not even let us refuel, as I would have thought important on that one but that is my recollection.

All of a sudden it is vital—vital. And, while this embargo has been undertaken since August 2, and while we have all seemed to take for granted now that the liberation of Kuwait is vital, not just in general but in the next 2 or 3 or 4 weeks—while that has been going on our Government has watched passively and said very little, if anything, while our former enemy, a nation on the terrorists' list for years and years and I believe it still is—Syria—used its military power to consolidate its control over Lebanon, the same country that was our vital interest in 1982. So one of our so-called vital interests, Lebanon, 8 years ago, is now under the control of Syria, while we have pursued another vital interest.

The point is, not all these things are simple. The point is we ought to be careful about defining what a lot of these terms are very important, that are not vital, vital in the sense of young men and young women being called to put their lives on the line. In more recent history, we defined Panama and Nicaragua as vital, and we used force in the case of Panama directly. In the case of Nicaragua, we supported force. I supported both of those decisions. But after achieving our short-term goal in both of these countries, the Aréchiga and, and we cheered the election of President Chamorro—we seem to have forgotten their ongoing economic and political agony. These were countries in which we used or supported force for one reason or another. I think we are putting them in both cases. And now while we are pursuing another vital interest, they are going through economic and political wrenching experiences with the outcome being very uncertain. Both the Bush administration and the Con-
gress have unfulfilled responsibilities regarding those two countries.

My point is, Mr. President, we throw around the word "vital" very carelessly. When politicians declare an interest to be vital, our men and women in uniform are expected to put their lives at risk to defend that interest. Our men and women in uniform are expected to put their lives at risk to defend that interest. When they do, the political, and interests that are vital, are worth the calling by the leaders of this Nation on our young men and women in uniform.

We have an obligation as leaders to distinguish between important interests which are worthy of economic, political, and interests that are vital, that are worth the calling by the leaders of this Nation on our young men and women in uniform to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives.

Former Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director James Schlesinger spoke to this very point when he testified before the Committee. He said that he did not think liberation of Kuwait "was a vital interest on the second day of August 1990." Dr. Schlesinger, however, went on to say, quoting himself, "* * * the investment of the prestige of the President of the United States now makes it vital*-he does not use that word "vital" lightly. Continuing his quote: "for Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, I do not think that it is necessary, to achieve that objective, for us to turn to war. I think we can avoid war and still achieve the objective of Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

This brings up the next question. Are there reasonable alternatives to war? What is the likelihood that sanctions will work?

In testimony before the Congress and in public and private statements as recently as January 3, the Bush administration stopped short of saying that sanctions on Iraq should be "light." The administration acknowledges the significant economic impact sanctions have had on Iraq, but now says there is no guarantee whether or not they will bring about an Iraqi decision to withdraw from Kuwait.

Last August, President Bush asserted himself, saying, "Economic sanctions in this instance, if fully enforced, can be very, very effective. * * * nobody can stand by forever to total economic deprivation." That is from President Bush.

The international sanctions are, indeed, having a devastating effect on Iraq's economy, for two basic reasons. The Iraqi economy is based on oil, which accounts for 50 percent of the country's gross national product and almost 100 percent of the country's hard currency earnings. Iraq is essentially landlocked, dependent upon oil pipelines, foreign ports, and international highways for its imports and exports.

As Georgetown University specialist on economic sanctions, Dr. Gary Hufbauer, testified before the Senate:

On no previous occasion have sanctions attracted the degree of support they have in the Iraqi case. Never have they been so comprehensive in their coverage. Never have they imposed such enormous costs on the Iraqi economy. The economic geography of this country is so peculiar that any economic impact on Iraq is felt immediately in the country. Geographically isolated and skewed as it is toward oil, is far more vulnerable to economic coercion than other economies that have been the target of sanctions.

Mr. President, the net result to date is that the international sanctions have cut off more than 90 percent of Iraq's imports, almost 100 percent of Iraq's exports, including virtually all Iraq's oil exports.

Iraqi industrial and military plants are receiving from abroad virtually no raw materials, no spare parts, no new equipment, no munitions, and no lubricants. Moreover, Iraq now has no way to earn hard currency to purchase desperately needed imports even if they can be smuggled in spite of the embargo. Amstel light beer may be available in Baghdad, but it is a very poor substitute for such essentials as motor oil and transmission fluid.

The key to a meaningful embargo is oil. So long as Iraq's oil exports are shut down—and no one disputes that they are shut down, no one; that is not in dispute—Iraq and Saddam Hussein will be deprived of at least half of his country's gross national product and basically all of his hard currency income. So long as oil exports are shut down, he will become progressively weaker. There is no doubt about that.

We worry about a recession in the United States. We worry right now about a recession. We are talking about whether the economy of the United States is declining by 3 to 5 percent of our gross national product, and it is a great and legitimate concern. Saddam Hussein has to worry about a devastation of the economy of approximately 70 percent of his gross national product by the summer of this year. By the end of this summer, the country will be an economic basket case, and I mean Iraq, and Saddam Hussein may be in jeopardy with his own people.

The question is: Can anyone guarantee that Iraq will abandon Kuwait when their gross national product goes down 70 percent? Can anybody guarantee that? The answer is no. We cannot guarantee that. But the other options we have also must be held to the same standard. A sanctions policy is not perfect. There are no guarantees here. But it has to be weighed against the alternatives.

The Bush administration is correct when they point out that sanctions do not guarantee that Iraq will leave Kuwait. But the story does not end there. What guarantees do we have that war will be brief? American casualties will be light? No one can say whether war will last 5 days, 5 weeks, or 5 months.

It is important to note that there is no doubt about who wins this war. Our policy and our military planning, however, cannot be based on an expectation that the war will be quick and easy. In large measure, the scope and scale of the hostilities, once begun, will be determined by Iraq's willingness to absorb massive punishment and to fight on. A quick Iraqi military collapse is possible in days. We hope it will happen if war comes. But it cannot be assured.

The administration argues that the coalition may crumble before Iraq withdraws from Kuwait. The Senator from Louisiana, my good friend, referred to that.

Adm. William Crowe, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took this issue head-on during his testimony before the Armed Services Committee last November. Quoting Admiral Crowe, the immediate past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, "It is hard to understand," he said, "why some consider our international alliance too strong enough to conduct intense hostilities but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution."

Mr. NUNN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. NUNN. I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think it ought to be said at this point that the President of the United States has gone to the United Nations.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Is there some point in the Senator's delivery at which time the Senator will be willing to take a question? I want to accord the Senator the full opportunity to complete his statement.

Mr. NUNN. I will be glad to. My voice is very weak at this point. I want to make sure I complete my remarks and get through with that, and then I will be glad to take the question.

Mr. WARNER. If the Senator will indicate his willingness to take a question from the Senator from Virginia, I will rise to seek recognition.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I think the kind of outburst we have seen here has no place in our democracy. The President of the United States has gone to the United Nations with the charter of the United Nations. He has come to the Congress of the United States in accordance with the Con-
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stitution of the United States and asked for the authority of the Senate and House in his actions. I am not in this Chamber, but when this vote is over—and I ex-

pect I will not be on the prevailing side—when the vote is over, we are going to stand united. We are going to stand united, and that word should go out. Debate in our society is absolutely essential. The Congress has a role, as I have said. We have, though, the abso-
lute obligation of debate, and for de-
bate to be interrupted with that kind of outburst simply has no place in the Senate, nor in our democracy, as I un-
derstand it.

Mr. President, the administration's position is that if we wait for sanctions to work, Kuwait and its citizens will be further victimized. Tragically, this is no doubt true. But to quote Admiral Crowe again:

War is not neat. It is not tidy. Once you re-
sort to it, war is uncertain, and a mess.

The additional cost to Kuwait of let-
ting the sanctions be enforced must be weighed against the cost to Kuwait in terms of human lives, human suffering, as well as national resources, if the United States-led coalition launches a mili-
tary offensive to liberate the country, which is heavily fortified.

Mr. President, those who support prompt military action argue that delay will allow Iraq to strengthen its defensive positions in Kuwait, thereby adding to the eventual cost of forcing Iraq out of Kuwait.

A couple of observations on this point. This would have been a better argument in September and October of last year than it is today. Iraq already has had 5 months to dig in and for-
tify, and they have done so in a major way. Kuwait has fortifications reminis-
cent of World War II.

This argument also overlooks the costs to the Iraqi military of sitting in Kuwait with a 500,000-man force while logistical support degrades because of the sanctions.

Mr. President, I am aware that Direc-
tor Webster sent Congressman Les-
ssh APIS a letter on January 10 that ad-
ressed this issue.

Mr. President, may we have order?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator is correct. If the Sergeant at Arms will keep the doors to the gallery closed so that Senators may be heard. The Senator may proceed.

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I was re-
ferring to the letter that Director Web-
ster sent yesterday to Congressman APIS. One can read that letter in a lot of different directions. It depends on how you want to read it.

I read the Webster letter as confirming that the sanctions, if kept in place for 6 to 12 months, will severely de-
grade Iraq's armed forces, air force, and air defenses. I consider that good news. For some unexplained reason—and I am sure people have a reason, but

I find it puzzling now because I do not under-
stand what it is—Judge Webster implies that Iraq's tanks, its air de-
fense and air combat aircraft will not play an important role in Iraq's defense of Kuwait.

I would certainly hate to try to ex-
plain this to several hundred American pilots that are out there. Air Force and Navy pilots, who have the job of put-
ting their lives and their aircraft at risk to knock out these very targets at the beginning stage of any conflict.

I do not understand the Webster let-
ter, frankly. Perhaps we will get more from that later. But it is incredible to me that he seems to write off the im-
portance of the tanks, the aircraft, and the air defenses. Everything I have heard is that we are going to have to make those the priority targets, among others, and to write those off and say that degrading them is really not going to play a big role to me is bewildering. But we will wait to hear from Director Webster a letter that I do understand.

Supporters of prompt military ac-
tions argue that our offensive military capability will degrade if our huge force sits for months in the Saudi Desert. This also is true. And for several months I have suggested that we should institute a policy of unit rotation, commencing with quick reaction forces, such as the 82nd Airborne, that might be needed on short notice else-
where in the world.

We should take full advantage of the coalition's of superiority in air and sea power while establishing the capability of deploying additional ground forces to the region quickly if needed.

I find it puzzling, however, Mr. Presi-
dent, that proponents of our early mili-
tary option voiced concern about the degradation of our 400,000-strong force, fully backed by the United States and supported by numerous allies, yet at the same time those favoring author-
ization of an early military offensive minimize the degradation of Iraq's 600,000-man force in the Kuwait thea-
dre. We hear constantly only from Iraq, totally lacking significant al-
lies, and subjected to a remarkably ef-
cfective international embargo.

Mr. President, weighing the cost of the military option, one must also con-
sider our long-term interests in the re-
region. Has there been any indepth anal-
ysis in the administration about what happens in the Middle East after we win? And we will win. The President's declared goals include establishing sta-
Bility in the Persian Gulf and protect-
ning United States citizens abroad.

Considering the wave of Islamic reac-
tion, anti-Americanism, and terrorism that is likely to be unleashed by a short war, and for strategic reasons, it is difficult to conceive of a Middle East as a more stable region where Americans will be safe.

Finally, the administration has ar-
Oug her there is no guarantee that eco-
nomic hardships will in the end compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Ku-
wait. Mr. President, I have attended in-
ternational community briefings, In-
defense and State Department briefings for 18 years. I have been thinking back. I cannot recall one instance where I ever came out of those briefings with any guarantee of anything. For those in the in-
telligence community to say they can-
not guarantee that Iraq is going to get out of Kuwait because of the sanctions, which is going to reduce its gross na-
tional product by 70 percent and cut off all the hard currency, for them to say that is true, nobody can guarantee it.

But what else are they guaranteeing?

I have not seen any guarantees on any subject from the intelligence com-
nunity. It is not their fault. They are not in the business of guaranteeing. The CIA is not the FDIC. They give you the facts, and then you use common sense to come to the conclusions.

In summary, Mr. President, I believe that the balance of our reasonable expectation that continued economic sanctions, backed up by the threat of military force and international isola-
tion, can bring about Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. I believe that the risks associated with the continued empha-
sis on sanctions are considerably less than the very real risk associated with war and, most importantly, the after-
math of war in a very volatile region of the world.

Many of my constituents in Georgia have written and called and asked me whether this is another Vietnam. Are we about to get into another Vietnam? No. I do not believe so. I agree with President Bush and other administra-
tion spokesmen who assure us that a burgeonining Persian Gulf conflict will not be another Vietnam. I think they are right on that.

The territory of Iraq and Kuwait, is different in most respects from that of Vietnam, particularly in terms of geog-
raphy and vulnerability to air attack and economic embargo. Iraq is very dif-
ficult to invade by land because of the desert. Sanctions of warfare will be vastly different from those in Vietnam.

Of course, there are military lessons we should remember from Vietnam. We should hit military targets at the outset with overwhelming and awesome power, at the beginning of any conflict, as well as knocking out power and communications, nuclear, biological, and chemical facilities. At the same time, Mr. President, we should not overlook the Vietnam lesson. We in America like instant results. We want fast food and we want fast military vic-
tories. However, our Nation places a much higher value on human life, espe-
cially on the lives of our military women in uniform. Depending upon developments after the first wave of air attacks, a short war may be possible and may save lives, but we must avoid an instant vic-
tory kind of psychology with demands and expectations in this country that could cause a premature and high-casualty assault on heavily fortified Kuwait by American ground forces. We do not want to create a psychology that puts pressure on our military commanders in the field to do things that are foolish because we think they should get it over with quickly. We hope they will be able to do it with a minimum loss of life.

When conflict becomes necessary, we should not tell our military commanders to get it over with quickly, no matter what. No. Orders should be to accomplish the mission with whatever force is required but do so in a way that minimizes American casualties even if it takes more time.

Making continued Iraqi occupation of Kuwait untenable with air and naval bombardment plays to our strengths. Rooting out the Iraqi army with ground forces going against heavy fortifications plays right into Iraq's hands.

Mr. President, in conclusion, a message to Saddam Hussein: You are hearing an impassioned debate emanating from the U.S. Capitol, both the House and the Senate. These are the voices of democracy. Do not misread the debate. If war occurs, the constitutional and policy debate will be suspended and Congress will provide the American troops in the field whatever they need to prevail. There will be no cutoff of funds for our troops while they engage in battle.

President Bush, the Congress, and the American people are united that you must leave Kuwait. We differ on whether these goals can best be accomplished by administering pain slowly with an economic blockade or by dishing it out in large doses with military power. Either way, Saddam Hussein, you lose.

Mr. President, in concluding and in closing, I can think of no better person to close this debate. General Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. forces in the gulf, who will bear the heavy responsibility of leading American forces into combat, if war should occur. On the question of patience, General Schwarzkopf said in mid-November in an interview, quoting him, "If the alternative to dying is sitting out in the Sun for another summer, then that is not a bad alternative."

On the question of cost, of waiting for sanctions to work, General Schwarzkopf also said in an interview in November, "I really don't think there is ever going to come a time when time is on the side of Iraq, as long as the sanctions are in effect, and so long as the U.N. coalition is in effect."

On the question of the effect of sanctions, General Schwarzkopf said in October—and this is immediately prior to a major switch in the administration's policy "Right now, we have people saying, 'OK, enough of this business; let's get on with it.' Golly, sanctions have only been in effect a couple of months ** * And we are now starting to see evidence that the sanctions are pinching. So, why should we say, 'OK, we gave him a chance and they didn't work. Let's get on with it and kill a whole bunch of people.' That's crazy. That's crazy." That is a quote from the commander in the field.

Mr. President, in closing, I believe that before this Nation is committed to what may be a large-scale war, each of us in the Senate of the United States, in reaching a decision which will be very personal and very difficult for all of us, should ask ourselves a fundamental question: Will I be able to look the parents, the wives, the husbands, and children in the eye and say that their loved ones sacrificed their lives for a cause vital to the United States and that there was no other reasonable alternative?

Mr. President, at this time I cannot. Thank you.

Several Senators addressed the chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia is recognized.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I would like to engage my colleague in a brief series of questions here. Senator Nunn and I have worked on this for 12 years, and throughout that period, I think we have been together many times. But on this issue we seem to be thoroughly entrenched on opposite sides for the moment. Perhaps we can bridge the gap as time goes on.

My first question to my distinguished colleague and chairman is, what would be the implication of the adoption of the resolution, as proposed by the majority leader and Mr. Nunn, on the allies that have joined in response to a request by our President and the United Nations and have sent their troops to this region? What does the British commander say to his forces when, in his judgment, and I believe he is right, the British forces, when the British commander say to his forces, if the Congress of the United States suddenly withheld from our Commander in Chief the power of the decision to employ those forces when, in his judgment, and presumably in the collective judgment of other leaders, that time had arrived? What, I ask my chairman, is the implication on the other forces that have traveled long distances, endured great hardships, and are now standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the Americans in the desert?

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I say to my friend from Virginia—and we have worked together on many, many things over the years, we have agreed on most of the debates, and we have been on the same side of most of them; I have great respect for him—that the reaction would be mixed. Some of our allies would breathe a sigh of relief. Others would say, you led us right up to the brink of war and now you are going to give sanctions the time to work.

It would depend on how the President handled it, whether he was willing to go to a rotation policy, which I hope he would. It would not be an easy adjustment.

When you consider the alternative, I say to my friend from Virginia, you have to look at the other side. The other side is where we know we are headed—to war. You have to weigh the measures of our opponents. There is a down side to our resolution. There is a down side: there is no doubt about that. There is also a down side to the other resolution, which is probably going to pass, and I say to my friend that this is a very difficult issue for all of us.

I doubt very seriously that if the forces in the field were told that we were now going to give sanctions more time to work that they were working and would work to begin a rotation policy, that very many would say: We are disappointed because you did not let us go to war. I think most of them have been over there long enough to understand that while we will win, and must win, there are going to be some sacrifices made. I think the reaction would be mixed.

The Senator makes a valid point. There are down sides for the moment. Perhaps we can get into this colloquy.

I draw the Senator's attention to that period during Vietnam. I, at that time, was in the Department of Defense and remember firsthand the attitudes at home, the reception that we failed to give those men and women who went into that conflict and returned home, and we all know full well the cold shoulder that America greeted them with.

In this particular instance, there is a very high state of morale of our troops in the gulf today. That has been engendered, first and foremost, by the support here at home. We have seen a mall campaign flowing across the ocean unlike anything since World War II, in terms of volume. We have seen the media, the television, daily exchanging the emotions of loved ones on both sides of the ocean. All of this at home has given a tremendous sense of support to the men and women and instilled in them a fighting spirit.

These are young people. They tend to believe what they hear and what they are told. From General Schwarzkopf on down, the officers, from four star to general, have instilled in them a fighting spirit. And, suddenly, here on the eve of this date of the 15th, across the ocean comes a message that the Congress of the United States is not with them.
I ask my friend, what is his assessment of the impact on the fighting should the United Nations Security Council order an immediate withdrawal of the forces? Upon learning that the Congress does not give full support to their Commander in Chief and, in effect, to them?

Mr. NUNN. I say to the Senator, I just read a quotation from General Schwarzkopf and he ended up saying that time was on our side—I am paraphrasing him now—and it was crazy to give up on the embargo. This was in October.

So I say to the Senator, I do not think the man in the field, based on everything he said, would like to propose some nomination.

I do not think the Senator is implying that I think the men and women believe their role is not simply to go to war but to deter war. They were sent to Saudi Arabia to defend that country.

I talked to General Schwarzkopf, and the Senator and I were together in August of last year. His mission at that time was clear: To defend Saudi Arabia, to deter attack on Saudi Arabia, and to enforce the embargo. They were not given an offensive application. They went there. Everybody who got there before November went over there with a mission of defending. It is only those who have gone recently who have gone with a mission of taking offensive action against Kuwait.

So if the Senator is asking me whether I believe the American forces in the field will be disappointed if we tell them we are going to give this more time and give the embargo more time; they have played a key role and they have succeeded in their mission. They have defended Saudi Arabia. They have deterred an attack. They have enforced the embargo. We applaud them. I think they would not in any sense be disappointed. All you have to do is read the quotations.

I would say to the Senator another thing: When this vote is over—this debate may last another day; I hope we will vote on it tomorrow—I think war against Iraq would be justified. I happen to be one of those who believe the War Powers Act is not a test of whether or not we should use force. The Senator may proceed.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I find the omission of the War Powers Act in this resolution is . . . I draw the Senator's attention to an op-ed piece entitled "War Powers" written Monday, March 7, 1988, and the author is one SAM NUNN, the distinguished Senator from Georgia, in which he concludes:

Third, eliminating the requirement for automatic withdrawal. When U.S. forces are introduced into a host till environment we could provide for an accelerated procedure for a congressional vote on funding if Congress disapproves. It would cut off funds for the operation. In the final analysis, I have concluded that Congress can only enforce its constitutional responsibility to declare war through the power of the purse.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator suspend a moment?

The Chair has advised the Sergeant at Arms to admit spectators to the Gallery again.

The Senator may proceed.

Mr. WARNER. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I find the omission of the War Powers Act in this resolution inconsistent with, presumably, the Senator's viewpoint with regard to this authority. I ask the Senator was it purposely omitted? And, if so, for what reason?

Mr. NUNN. In this resolution? In this resolution, the President has come forward and asked for our authority under the Constitution and recognized our authority under the Constitution and that is why we are debating this.

In the reference to the article the Senator read—I have not seen that lately—but I believe the Senator and I both cosponsored an amendment to the War Powers Act because we do not think the War Powers Act will ever work and that article was written in reference to the automatic withdrawal, and as the Senator knows, if the President declares hostilities are imminent under current law—I am not talking about the Constitution—but under the law, there is a period of 60 days and if Congress fails to act, our troops have to withdraw unless Congress explicitly wanted to apply that war powers law literally when the President of the United States on the 14th of this month, if there has been no breakthrough in diplomatic work may be imminent or if he sends a report up fully to continue with the act, the clock will start ticking. In the absence of specific approval by the Congress, the War Powers Act will call for all of our troops to be withdrawn within 60 days. That is what that article was about.

I think that part of the War Powers Act is not even going to work, would never have worked, and should be amended or ought to be removed from the books. My reference was to the final power the Senate has if the President ignores the Constitution and does not come to the Congress for permission before announcing the war.

If the President wins this vote—and there are all indications that he will win the vote then he will have the backing of the House and the Senate. I believe in majority rule. I may be on the losing side of this vote but I am going back to the President. The theoretical power to cut off funding, in my view, is inapplicable here. As I have said, I think war against Iraq would be justified. I happen to be one of those who think we have other alternatives at this time. But I do not believe anyone out there in the field in the military needs to worry at least from this confrontation to a conclusion—successful conclusion—if the President gets the authorization, and if he decides to use force.

Mr. WARNER. I have no more questions. Perhaps later on today we can engage in another colloquy.

I thank my colleagues for their indulgence.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.

Mr. RIEGLE. Will the Senator from Pennsylvania yield 30 seconds before the Senator from Georgia leaves the floor? I am also waiting to speak, and I follow the Senator from Pennsylvania. Would the Senator indulge me to ask one question that will take only a half minute to answer?

Mr. SPECTER. It is my hope I can ask the Senator from Georgia two questions myself.

Mr. RIEGLE. I will follow the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. I will adopt the 30-second time period.

I will yield at this point, Mr. President, and ask unanimous consent for the arrangement that I will retain the floor and have a chance to ask the Senator from Georgia a couple questions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania retains the floor.
Mr. RIEGLE. I thank the Senator from Pennsylvania for his courtesy. I wonder if I could inquire of the chairman of the Armed Services Committee—and I am only asking for a general percentage estimate here. I do not know if he would have the precise numbers and estimate as to what percent of the combat forces on our side are, allied combat forces, in the field now that will be fighting this war on the ground, that if it takes place, roughly, what percentage of that force would be made up of Americans?

Mr. NUNN. I would have to defer to someone who had the exact number because they vary. But there is a distinction between the number of forces on the ground and the number that are capable or willing to go into combat.

Mr. RIEGLE. Yes.

Mr. NUNN. It is my judgment that those forces willing to go into combat, America composes about 90 percent of those forces.

Mr. RIEGLE. About 90 percent.

Mr. NUNN. About 90 percent. The British have been very forthcoming and have been, of course, as they usually are among our strongest allies; they have a substantial number of forces there, excellent forces. The Egyptians have two excellent divisions there, but there has been no clarity from the Egyptians about whether they would be used on offense, and if so, where they would be used on offense, including whether they would be willing to actually go into Iraq. The Syrians, I understand, have taken the position they are not going to go on the offense.

It is my judgment—and this is a matter of judgment, it is not a matter of definite numbers—that we would be supplying about 90 percent or more of the combat power on the offensive. If this were a defensive operation, if the Iraqis decided to launch an attack into Saudi Arabia, then the ratio would change. America would still be supplying the large amount of forces and the allies would come into play much more on defense than offense.

Mr. RIEGLE. That is very disturbing.

I thank the Senator for the answer.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I have some questions for the distinguished Senator from Georgia. But first let me note my hope that he is correct that the first one concerns the timing of our debate today because I believe that had this debate been held in November, there would be a very different posture, very different consideration of the merits and perhaps a different conclusion.

The Senator from Georgia commented immediately after the increase in the size of the forces, there was a major change and that the posture was being shifted from defense to offensive and Congress knew it was a different world when the President made that announcement far in advance of the actual deployment which has not even been completed at the present time.

The second event of overwhelming importance was the enactment of U.N. Resolution 678 on November 29 and again the Congress had ample notice that the President and his administration were working fervently to persuade everyone of the difficulties with the Soviets then the Chinese, so that Congress was on notice that the President was seeking authority for the use of force after January 15 and in November there were those of us who were calling for a special session.

The majority leader of the Senate and Speaker of the House had the authority to reconvene the Congress, under the usual reservation of power on the adjournment. My question to the Senator turns not only on looking backward as it may provide a precedent for the future, but also turns on the merits now.

Is it not really too late, 4 days in advance of January 15, to pull the rug out from under the Congress, with the expectations of our President being made out of Iraq?

I would say also, to my friend from Pennsylvania, that the original U.N. deadline was explained, as I recall it, by the Bush administration, by the United Nations and others, as a deadline on Saddam Hussein saying to him:

"You have to get out by January 15 or we are authorizing the use of force."

Until recent weeks it was not deemed to be a deadline on us. We have created that psychology, that there is a world expectation now that after January 15 we indeed are going to use force. Maybe we will. Maybe we will not. That is for Saddam to figure out.

But I do not believe in limiting one's own options. I think that we would have been better off to keep the psychology of the U.N. resolution as a deadline on Saddam Hussein and not convert it into somewhat of a mutual deadline, which it appears to me to be. We would also, in talking to my friend from Pennsylvania, that the President is not committed.

Mr. SPECTER. Before propounding the next and final question, let me just observe that I disagree with what the distinguished Senator from Georgia has said about the psychology being different now as opposed to then. When U.N. Resolution 678 was approved it was with the clear authorization to use force. And that was an option at that time. Even as we stand here, do we know what the President will do. There are reports that Saddam Hussein may change his attitude a day or two after January 15. The President is not committed.

We are not going into Iraq and the President or his administration or the U.N. forces might not be there on January 15. Or there might be an event leading to a filibuster or maybe there might have been other postures taken, while Congressman Michel, the Republican leader in the House, might have thought he did not have the votes to get the Presidential authorization, if that was the will of \[Congressional Record—Senate, January 11, 1991\]
the Congress reflecting the sense of the people then it seems to this Senator that would have been a much better time to have had that expression.

My own personal view would have been that the President had a deadline date and not to have abandoned the sanctions. But my view changes completely when we are on the brink of January 15. Which brings me to the second and final question. That is, with respect to that would have been a much better time to have had that expression.

I normally do. But in this case I see the downside, the very, very steep downside, and I see the reasonable alternative which I think we should explore and we should pursue.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank my distinguished friend from Georgia for those comments. Before making a few supplementary remarks, I would say that I agree that the Congress has to use its independent judgment.

In my 10 years, here, no one can say that I have been less than independent when it comes to disagreeing with the President of my own party.

Mr. NUNN. I agree with that. The Senate is very independent. He is one of the independent minds in the Senate. I know what the Senator is going to decide today will be his own position. I understand that completely, because I know him.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the Senator for those comments. I was making that reference because we have put President Bush's prestige, or any other President's prestige, or any other administration's prestige in the balance—so public a balance as U.S. participation is concerned, U.N. Resolution 678.

My question to the Senator from Georgia is: Would the Senate not consider that a vital national interest?

Mr. NUNN. Many times during the cold war when we had so many danger spots around the world, we felt a great deal of legitimacy, for a lot of good reasons, that if we ever backed down or changed policy in one place it could affect us elsewhere. I think at that stage there was a strong feeling—and every time we ever had a question, I believe in my 18 years here, I went along with that feeling—that once the President's prestige was committed personally the Congress of the United States under most circumstances should go along with that.

I think that is still a good rule of thumb. I would have to say to my friend, we, in another era where we do not have the same threats around the world and where the adjustment and change of policy would avert a war and may, in fact, have paid a part of our long-term interests, I think we have a separate responsibility.

I do not think our main duty here in the Senate is to preserve President Bush's prestige, or any other President's prestige. I think we are sworn to preserve the Constitution of the United States and to represent our constituents and this country and to give them our best judgment.

I never want to see a President's prestige not to have been diminished. But if we take the position that any time the President commits his prestige we have to salute and line up and go along, then we have basically said that our role under the Constitution is not important; that once the President commits his prestige we are going to go along no matter what.
There are already leaks in the embargo. It will become a flood, so that there will be a total incapacitation of this President in this situation.

Some say that we will be incapacitating the Presidency as an institution in the future, which will be very, very important. What will happen the next time a Secretary of State goes to talk to the Soviet Union Minister? How effective will the Secretary of State be in dealing with the Chinese, who really were very reluctant to see U.N. Resolution 678 passed? How uncertain will it be for the President, who has acknowledged under the Constitution to conduct foreign relations, to make representations, when the ultimate authority lies in the Congress?

I think that it is very, very important that the Congress express itself on this issue. But what now will be indelibly implanted in a solid precedent in the United States is that we simply cannot accept what the Senate says as to United States policy, that at the 11th hour, at the last minute, the Congress may come in and repudiate the President and repudiate the reliance of the United Nations on the President's representations. That is disastrous, not only for this President in this vital situation, but it is disastrous for the Presidency in the future.

The third concern which I have arising from yesterday's debate is what may be the appearance of partisan politics. I say the appearance of partisan politics because I believe that every Senator who has spoken has articulated his sincere views, aside from party label, and without a partisan motivation.

But there is the appearance, with 17 speakers yesterday in favor of the resolution, all Democrat; and 11 speakers yesterday in opposition to the resolution, all Republicans; that others, including President Saddam Hussein may say, look at these people and that is going to determine the outcome.

I am delighted today to see that there have been two Senators, the distinguished Senator from Nevada, Mr. Reid, and the distinguished Senator from Louisiana, Mr. Journier, who have spoken in favor of the President. I am not as optimistic, frankly, as the distinguished Senator from Georgia was about the President prevailing here. It looks to me as if it is very, very close.

But it is, I think, important that we put the word on notice, including the Iraqi President, that we are not engaging in partisan politics here. And that Second, I believe that we have seen the Senate debate and the eruption in the galleries, "No blood for oil," and that that is part of American democracy. Anyone who wishes to come to see the Senate debate these issues is permitted to come here.

We do not permit the Galleries to interfere with the speech and presentation here. The right of freedom of speech does not include the right to stop others from speaking. If you cannot cry "fire" in a crowded theater, then you cannot speak in Senate Galleries anymore.

It is obvious it was orchestrated, because as soon as two people were permitted to leave, then others spoke up. The Chair appropriately cleared the Galleries for a very short time, for just a few minutes, and now the Galleries are back.

I think this is a very important point, and my final point, Mr. President, that when Iraq and its President, Saddam Hussein, are trying to evaluate the state of mind of the U.S. Congress, and we are trying to evaluate his state of mind, that he should be on notice that if and when, as this Senator hopes, there will be a forceful vote from a Congress supporting the President and U.N. Resolution 678, that is the time for him to leave Kuwait.

The best chance we have to avoid a war is to solidly back the President and U.N. Resolution 678 so that Saddam Hussein and Iraq understand what the consequences will be. That is the best chance of having them withdraw from Kuwait and avoid a war.

Mr. RIEGLE addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

A LIFE AND DEATH ISSUE

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, I just want to acknowledge, in passing, the comments of the Senator from Pennsylvania and his courtesy before. I want to say to him, because he and I know each other well—in fact, we both have gone through a change of party affiliation during our political lives, and so I have thought a lot about the question of politics and partisanship and independence.

I came to the Congress 24 years ago and the Senator from Washington was in a class of new Members of Congress, young Republicans at that time, that included George Bush. I ran for Congress at that time essentially to come to try to do something about stopping a war that we had going on at that time. It took a long time to get it stopped.

But I want to just make the point in passing, and the Senator from Pennsylvania would know this because he knows me. My opposition then, 24 years ago as a Republican House Member, with a Democratic President, continued when we had a Republican President. And, like the Senator from Pennsylvania, I make my remarks, and I make my judgment on this issue without any regard to party whatsoever. I know he would know that but I think that is true really of every Senator. On an issue as solemn as this, a life-and-death issue, and that is what it is, I do not think people are going to make that decision on a partisan basis. In fact, I know that.

Mr. SPECTER. I thank the distinguished Senator from Michigan, my colleague, for those very generous remarks.

Mr. President, if I may, will the Senator yield for an unanimous-consent request?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Michigan yield for this unanimous-consent request?

Mr. RIEGLE. Yes, I yield only for this purpose, without losing my right to the floor.

Mr. SPECTER. On the issue of human rights, there is a very important document which I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the RECORD—I refer to, I think, so long, that it is so important and worth printing—showing the violations of human rights by Iraq in occupied Kuwait, which bears on our debate today.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:


IRAQ/OCUPIED KUWAIT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS SINCE AUGUST 2

NOTE ON SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

This document has been compiled principally on the basis of interviews conducted by Amnesty International with people who fled Kuwait between August and November 1990. Most of these interviews were carried out in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Kingdom, with a smaller number of people in the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Iran also being interviewed. Most of the interviewees are Kuwaiti nationals, but they also include Bahrainis, Saudis, Egyptians, Palestinians, Indians, Filipinos, Britons and Americans. Among them are former detainees, the families of victims of extrajudicial executions and of those who have "disappeared", eyewitnesses and medical personnel. Amnesty International has also relied on information emanating from persons who have remained in Kuwait, and who include both Kuwaiti and foreign nationals. In respect of some of the torture situations documented, Amnesty International sought the medical opinion of forensic pathologists and doctors in the United Kingdom with experience in the examination of torture victims.

All Kuwaiti nationals interviewed requested that their identities not be revealed for fear of reprisals by Iraqi forces against members of their families still in Kuwait. Some Western and Arab nationals have made the same request, also fearing for the safety of their relatives or friends in hiding in Kuwait or in detention in Iraq. Hence their names have either been omitted altogether or their names have been changed in order to prevent identification. The exceptions to this are: 1) several former detainees whose names are mentioned in Section 3 of this document, and 2) the ten victims of extrajudicial executions (and in some cases torture) whose names are cited in Section 6. These cases have either already been submitted to the United Nations, or I believe to reveal their names has been obtained by Amnesty International. The names of over 1,007 other detainees and "disappeared" persons remains to be revealed. Amnesty International are not being made public at this stage.
January 11, 1991

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SERODE 793

1. INTRODUCTION

Widespread abuses of human rights have been perpetrated by Iraqi forces following the invasion of Kuwait. The abuses include the arbitrary arrest and detention without trial of thousands of civilians and military personnel; the widespread tortures of such persons; the implementation of the death penalty and the extrajudicial execution of hundreds of unarmed civilians, including children. In addition, hundreds of thousands of civilians and soldiers have apparently having effectively ‘disappeared’ in detention, and many of them are feared dead. To date, an estimated 300,000 Kuwaitis have fled their country, as well as several hundred thousand foreign nationals working in Kuwait. Their accounts of the abuses they have either witnessed or experienced have received worldwide media coverage. This document details some of these abuses, confining itself to those violations which fall within Amnesty International’s mandate.

Amnesty International takes no position on the conflict in the Gulf, and does not condone killings on either side. In particular, we deplore violations perpetrated by the parties to the conflict. What concerns the organization are human rights violations taking place in that context. Therefore, the organization has been and continues to be entirely consistent with abuses known to have been committed in Iraq over many years, and which have been documented by numerous reports and numerous reports. Iraq’s policy of the brutal suppression of all forms of internal dissent continues, and the Iraqi Government continues to be one of Iraq remains its victims. Amnesty International has repeatedly placed such information on the public record, and regrets that until recently the Kuwaiti Government and international community did not see fit to apply serious pressure in an attempt to put an end to these abuses.

2. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 2 AUGUST

Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on 2 August. In his 17 July speech, sixteen days before the invasion, President Saddam Hussein attacked ‘the callousness of those who have called upon the Iraqi Government to cooperate with the Iraqi authorities. They had been fed lies living in Kuwait who were reported to be kidnapped, tortured and executed in their country, stating that they were led to believe that they had been deployed in order to thwart an external attack on Kuwait. A Kuwaiti doctor specialising in occupational health, al-Shu’aib, said that in the third week of August of several incidents were neither arbitrary nor isolated, but rather reflected a policy adopted by the Iraqi authorities. The organization also expressed its concern that the arrest and continued detention of Western nationals was contrary to fundamental internationally recognized standards of human rights, and urged the immediate and unconditional release of all such detainees. It requested that their names and whereabouts be made known, and that the British Government assist in gaining access to consular officials. Amnesty International called upon the Iraqi Government to take immediate steps to prevent incidents of rape by Iraqi forces, to investigate such incidents and to bring those responsible to justice. The organization also expressed its concern about the extension of the scope of the death penalty to include looting and the hoarding of food. In response to the execution of the third week of August of several people, including the four people executed on 23 August, Amnesty International urged the government to refrain from carrying out any further executions. As soon as the war has ended, we will publish a report on the human rights situation in Iraq.

On 23 August, Amnesty International sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the ICRC, asking him to be informed of the situation in Iraq. The letter stated that the organization had received information that the Iraqi Government had given no reason for its refusal to grant ICRC access. Similarly, Iraq has failed to respond to appeals on behalf of victims of human rights violations in Iraq. The organization has written to the government of Iraq to express concern about the lack of access to consular officials. Amnesty International called upon the Iraqi Government to take immediate steps to prevent further such killings, to investigate such incidents and to bring those responsible to justice. The organization also expressed its concern about the extension of the scope of the death penalty to include looting and the hoarding of food. In response to the execution of the third week of August of several people, including the four people executed on 23 August, Amnesty International urged the government to refrain from carrying out any further executions. As soon as the war has ended, we will publish a report on the human rights situation in Iraq.

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3 August after taking part in a demonstration in the al-Sulaibikhat district of Kuwait City. The demonstrations were organized by Amnesty International.

Amnesty International indicated that the six detainees had been transferred to Baghdad for detention. On 3 October, Amnesty International once more appealed to the President of Iraq to release them. It had received information concerning the widespread abuses being perpetrated by Iraqi forces in Kuwait, including mass arrests, torture under interrogation, summary executions and mass extrajudicial killings.

The President of Iraq was asked to respond to an Amnesty International appeal and to an interview broadcast on British television on 12 November. The appeal was an extract from Amnesty International's own statement issued on 12 November. The following is an extract from that interview (other extracts from which were quoted in sections 3 and 5): [other extracts from Amnesty International's statement were quoted in sections 3 and 5].

Amnesty International expressed its concerns in a public statement about the widespread abuses being perpetrated by Iraqi forces in Kuwait, including mass arrests, torture under interrogation, summary executions and mass extrajudicial killings. The Iraqi Government failed to respond to an Amnesty International appeal. However, on 3 October Iraq's embassy in London issued a public statement commenting on Amnesty International's own statement and said it would not deny that human rights abuses had taken place, but dismissed Amnesty International's statement as an "embarrassment to the practice of international law." [see Appendix B for text of the Iraqi Embassy statement]. Further comment on the human rights situation in Kuwait since 2 August appears in sections 3 and 5.

Arrests and detentions of civilians continued there and the forces allied to them.

President HUSSEIN: Have you seen these atrocities yourself?

INTERVIEWER: I have not seen them, but let me tell you what they are. Mr. President.

Interviewer: Reports received by the President of Iraq are true?

One report speaks of scores of people being tortured and hanged at Kuwait University for opposing the annexation of their country. Another report speaks of 15-year-old boys being shot. An American woman married to a Kuwaiti talks about a pregnant woman being killed. She claims she had been coming out of Kuwait for some time. Do you know about these reports? Do they worry you? Have you heard about them?

President HUSSEIN: What is certain is that I have not heard of any such acts. It is possible that in the same way that the Western media is trying to fill the minds of people everywhere, every day, with the situation that you describe...it is also possible that some false reports may come out of Kuwait, claiming that I have not heard of. I will let me say something to you. There is now, in the province of Kuwait, an instruction whose validity is which is valid: whoever opens fire at our soldiers, they will open fire in return. They will shoot to kill...

INTERVIEWER: Mr. President, these reports of atrocities you see, are encouraged by the fact that you have sealed off Kuwait from the rest of the world. Why don't you let us go in and see for ourselves whether these reports are true?

President HUSSEIN: You are partly right in what you have said. But you must undoubtedly remember that now the province of Kuwait is a military zone for the American forces there and the forces allied to them...

So [the province of Kuwait] and its approaches in the province of Basra are now being expressed its concern for the confrontation of a possible invasion. And you know that, under such circumstances, countries usually take measures preventing people from leaving. And the British public, for example, knows these facts because it has lived through that during the Second World War.

In this document, Amnesty International once again calls upon the Iraqi Government to implement the following recommendations as a matter of urgency:

1. Make known the whereabouts of all detainees and grant them immediate access to their families, legal counsel, medical doctors and consular officials.

2. Initiate prompt and impartial investigations into reports of torture and extrajudicial killings (including those referred to in this document), the results of which should be made public. Military and other public officials found responsible should be brought to justice.

3. Ensure that all detainees are granted their internationally recognised human rights and challenge the legality of their detention before a court, and to receive a trial which meets the requirements of fairness set forth in international human rights and humanitarian law.

4. Make known the whereabouts of all detainees and grant them immediate access to their families, legal counsel, medical doctors and consular officials.

5. Initiate prompt and impartial investigations into reports of torture and extrajudicial killings (including the ten cases referred to in this document), the results of which should be made public. Military and other public officials found responsible should be brought to justice.

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of the city, leading to sporadic armed clashes with Iraqi troops which lasted several weeks. Among those who participated in the armed resistance against Iraqi troops were said to be the members of a group of young and elderly men and women who traditionally wear a beard. The form of civil disobedience from mid-September to mid-October was not used by anyone who, prior to the invasion, had been serving in the military. The number of civilian and military casualties on both sides resulting from these clashes is unknown.

However, opposition to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait also took other forms. For example, in the second week after the invasion, leaflets calling for continued opposition to the invasion began to appear in the streets of Kuwait. These leaflets included al-Samad al-Sha'bi (Popular Resistance) and Sarkha (The Cry). Other forms of non-violent opposition to the Iraqi occupation included the raising of the Kuwaiti flag; putting up photographs of the Amir of Kuwait, Shawkat Jaber al-Humad al-Sabah, and the Crown Prince, Sa'ad al-Mu'tahar al-Imam, who traditionally wear a beard. Slogans on the walls; shouting "Allahu Akbar" (God is Greater) from the rooftops; garment washing and cleaning as a form of protest; and breaking bread in the middle of the street, where possible, non-compliance with the various orders issued by Iraqi forces. Among those arrested in August and September, apparently for non-cooperation with the Iraqi Government, were former members of Kuwait's National Assembly (parliament): Mubarak al-Duwalie; Khaled Sultan al-Isa (also a member of the Islamic Heritage Society); Khaled al-Waami; and Abd al-Karim al-Juhaildi (also a member of the recently formed Islamic Heritage Party). One of them, Khaled Sultan al-Isa, was held for 29 days, principally in Basra. According to information received by Amnesty International, his beard was shaved and he was subjected to beatings and electric shocks.

Opposition to the occupation developed into a form of 'civil disobedience' from mid-September, following the issuing of a series of regulations by the Iraqi Government aimed at completing the 'Iraqisation' of Kuwait (see Section 2 above). The refusal to comply with such orders led to the arrest of civilians who had not participated in any arms resistance. Iraqi forces who non-compliance with other types of regulations introduced in Kuwait, such as the ban on growing beards, were also arrested for non-compliance with regulations introduced in Kuwait, such as the ban on growing beards. Some men interviewed by Amnesty International said they had been arrested simply because they had beards, though none of them could offer a logical explanation as to why that should constitute an offence. One 30-year-old Kuwaiti entrepreneur who left his country on 16 September said:

"... those who had beards were ordered to shave them. Non-compliance consists of plucking the beard with pliers or some other unspecified punishment. Several arbitrary regulations of this kind have been introduced, but they did not take the form of official decrees. The problem for us was that we did not learn of these regulations until we encountered troops at the checkpoints. They would inform us what the latest regulation was, but by that time, it would be too late because we may have unwashed clothes and, therefore, feet and face. One of them, Khaled Sultan al-Isa, was held for 29 days, principally in Basra. According to information received by Amnesty International, his beard was shaved and he was subjected to beatings and electric shocks.

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his testimony, he was slapped, punched and beaten with a hosepipe for one hour, and throughout the majority of his time in custody. On the first day, he said he was interrogated eleven times about opposition activities. Upon being released his car was returned to him, stripped of every available item. Another, a 23-year-old labourer, told Amnesty International that he was arrested on 6 October:

"The day before there had been an attack on Iraqi soldiers. The Iraqis were searching all cars and taking people away. I was told to board a bus near the checkpoint, together with 12 or 13 others. The bus took us to Bayan, where I was held there for three days and interrogated about the resistance. Then they took me to a school, where I was interrogated by two officers and two soldiers. I was punched and had my hair pulled. I was interrogated about the resistance for nearly three days. They also poured an acid liquid on my back and used a pincer-like device which they placed around my fingers and tightened. I was released one week later after my friends paid a bribe."

Another interviewed by Amnesty International was a 16-year-old Kuwaiti boy, a student at al-Farwaniyya Secondary School. He was arrested on 1 October after he and his friends were asked by a Kuwaiti police officer to board a bus near the checkpoint, together with eight other Kuwaiti students. He stated:

"I was interrogated by two officers and two soldiers. They asked me where I was going and why I wanted to go to the other side of the checkpoint. Each session lasted about half an hour. After five days my left arm was marked with the letter H using a hot skewer. I was told that if I got into any trouble in the future, I would be executed. I was taken back and released."

The vast majority of former detainees interviewed by Amnesty International stated that they were not brought before any judicial authority throughout their detention period, and had remained in the sole custody of arresting and interrogating officials. Almost all were held incommunicado and were routinely denied visits from family, friends, lawyers or doctors. Although some detainees were accused of specific offences, no 'official' charges were brought against any. The rights and freedoms of even those in custody were restricted. For example, several of those interviewed had been accused of 'illegal entry' into Kuwait (this pertained largely to Kuwaitis who entered without an entry permit). After the investigator threatened to assist their families in fleeing or to participate in the opposition against Iraqi forces). In some of those cases, the detainees were held by several members of the family. Another 16-year-old detainee, who was held for 'illegal entry' was five to eight years' imprisonment. As far as Amnesty International is aware, however, such punishments have not been codified in law. At the same time, detentions lasting for several days or weeks are not unusual. According to reliable sources, long-term imprisonment have often been released within days or weeks. The decision to release appears to be as arbitrary as the decision to arrest. Amnesty International received the following details of the following incident from a group of Kuwaitis reporting directly from Kuwait on 10 November:

"In the afternoon a Kuwaiti officer interrogated the six of us, said we were leaving the country and that we should be consequences. He said to us he could help us and also that he could explain the 'officials of the office'. The judge appeared. He said he was a lawyer and identified himself as ... [name withheld by Amnesty International]. He said to us he could secure our release in return for 4,000,000 KDW. He offered to take us to the prison. The judge did not speak to us, but the lawyer spoke to us. He said he could secure our release in return for a television, a video machine and other goods. We stayed there for three days without being interrogated, but occasionally the guards would instruct us to light cigarettes. The following is his account of what happened later:

"We were put in a cell measuring 4 x 3 metres where there were already other detainees. There were two bedrooms that four Jordanians. The detainees were wearing army uniforms. They had been accused of carrying false car documents. We stayed there for three days without being interrogated, but occasionally the guards would instruct us to light cigarettes. The following is his account of what happened later:

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themselves and their relatives, such as that described below by a Red Crescent doctor released from detention on 11 October:

"Upon release, the Iraqis asked us to provide them with details of the detainees. They wanted the names, addresses and professions of my immediate family, my brothers and sisters, my brothers-in-law and my nephews. After all this information was written down, we were made to sign an undertaking that if we talked about what happened to us, members of the family might not return. And that the penalty was death. They also asked us for information about any past political activity and any period spent in detention. They even took down information on our brothers and sisters, my brothers-in-law and their whereabouts until they had either been transferred to a hospital. The father had been arrested in the district of al-Sabahiyya in late August in suspicion of taking part in opposition activities:

"When (the former detainee) told me that my father was in hospital, I went looking for him in the hospital. I went looking for him in the hospitals but I couldn't find him. I looked in the cemeteries but I couldn't find him. Then I was advised to go to al-Amiri Hospital where photographs had been taken. There, I saw a photograph of my father. There were traces of beatings on his head, an open wound in his stomach and the skin on his face was flayed. I left the hospital with my cousin, and we came across a checkpoint near al-Hamra Cinema. The checkpoint sold us to the police and asked me why I was crying. My cousin replied that my father had died. The soldier said that it was no problem that my father died. My cousin replied that his father was more honourable than any Iraqi . . ."

Both the former lieutenant and his cousin were arrested at this point and held for five days.

The detention of Western and other foreign nationals

The information in this section relates to period up to 6 December when President Saddam Hussein announced that all detained Western and other nationals were to be released and allowed to leave Iraq. Developments after 6 December are not referred to in this document.

On 19 August, seventeen days after the invasion, where British and French government sources confirmed that 82 Britons and six French nationals were moved from hotels in Kuwait City and taken to unknown destinations. In addition, some 200 British and American nationals who had also been transferred from Kuwait to Iraq were detained in several hotels in Baghdad. On 21 August, the Iraqi authorities confirmed that some foreign nationals had been transferred to military sites in the country.

Subsequently, hundreds of foreign nationals were rounded up in Kuwait City and taken to Iraq. They included French, British, Japanese, Australian, Kuwaiti, Scandinavian and other nationals. Hundreds of others of these and other western nationalities were arrested in Kuwait. Japanese nationals were not detained until United Nations observers arrived. They were at the time were detained in hotels in Baghdad or transferred to undisclosed locations. In the third week of August, the Iraqi authorities announced that some 13,000 Westerners, Soviet and Japanese nationals would not be permitted to leave Iraq or Kuwait. This affected the 3,000 Australians, 5,000 British, 1,000 Canadians, 1,000 Dutch, 1,000 Germans, 1,000 Japanese, 1,000 Kuwaiti, 1,000 Scandinavian and other nationals, as well as Japanese nationals. Hundreds of others of these and other western nationalities were arrested in Kuwait. Japanese nationals were not detained until United Nations observers arrived.
were lifted. Nevertheless, up until 6 December, several hundred of these foreign nationals were held in Iraq, largely as a result of allowing visits by former heads of state and political leaders from countries including Britain, France, the United States, Austria, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. The majority remained in Iraq, however, and were dubbed 'guests' by the host country. The precise numbers of those among them who had been shot, were detained, or died as a result of strategic military and industrial installation visits, were not known. According to one estimate, some 600 British, Japanese and Americans and perhaps 150 others were being held at estimated 30 sites in both Iraq and Kuwait, while up to 2,000 Western nationals remained in hiding in Kuwait (figures compiled by the Asiatic were themselves attuned to diplomatic immunity when diplomatic immunity was invoked by Amnesty International stated that all embassies in the country had compiled dated 6 November.

Scores of Western nationals took refuge in their embassies in Kuwait City in the third week of August when the 'human shield' policy began to be implemented. But most remained in hiding elsewhere. A group of British and American nationals who, at the time of writing, were in hiding in Kuwait described their predicament in a report they had compiled dated 6 November. They have been in hiding at various locations for over three months. We never go outside and the only daylight we see is by peeping round a curtain. As for escape, that is totally impossible. We would have to get through as many as six checkpoints manned by armed Iraqi soldiers to reach the desert. Even if we got that far, which is very unlikely, we face the prospect of being shot without warning by soldiers in and around Kuwait."

One British national was in fact shot dead on 11 August as he tried to cross the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia border (see Section II). The situation became more precarious with the introduction of the death penalty for harrassing nationals of other countries. The most depressing of the events reported by Amnesty International stated that during interrogation, they were questioned on their activities as foreigners. Many were reported that Iraqi soldiers conducted house-to-house searches looking for foreigners, and that in some cases violence was used to force them to confess. A former Kuwaiti national, Miles Hoffman, was reported to have been shot in the arm while trying to evade capture from his home. Also in early September, a British man and his Filiphino wife were allegedly beaten prior to their arrest. And in September, when a general description of the situation, is provided by a British woman who had been living in Kuwait and whose husband remained in hiding. She told Amnesty International in October: "Our home was in al-Fahal ... we heard lots of stories. I knew a British guy with a Filipina wife; he's about 25 or 40 years old. The Iraqis broke into their flat while they were in hiding in the back room. It was between 1 and 3 September. They kicked the wife in the chest and her husband was badly beaten around the head. I think she's here now (in the United Kingdom), but he's a hostage ... My husband and I were in hiding almost from the beginning. We went out only if it was absolutely necessary. Eight days after the invasion we moved from our flat because it became unbearable. We were afraid the Iraqis would come, so we moved southwards. Someone told us they were picking up Brits in house-to-house searches ... Now the situation is much worse. I got a letter from my husband on Sunday. It was dated 25 September and was smuggled out of Kuwait. He says there's an atmosphere of despair. He seems to think the soldiers are getting ready to move in, and it's a lot more tense than it was at first. He says they're picking up more Brits, and mentioned that at least twenty more were picked up last week. He's back in the house-to-house searches. The Iraqis were helping with food, but they can't help any more because they don't have money."

The 6 November report quoted earlier, which had been sent to Amnesty International (among others), gives further details about the situation of some of the Western nationals. "We have to report that the American Embassy is now totally out of touch with the situation in Kuwait and the conditions under which its people and themselves are surviving. They are virtually powerless to help us in any way. For us in hiding, it means that for our daily needs we have to rely totally on ourselves. We have been in hiding and have no other source of information than the one from which we have been informed."

An additional problem in respect of our security is now getting close. All Kuwaitis will be banned from leaving the country on November 25 ... unless they register themselves for Iraqi citizenship. Those not complying will become fugitives from Iraqi justice in their own country and, like us, will have to go into hiding. Many others will take the opportunity to leave the country if possible before November 5th. This will leave many of us in hiding without protection. It will assuredly force large numbers of us to give ourselves up, as there will be no body to supply us with food.

The 25 November deadline for the taking up of Iraqi identity documents has since been extended by one month. An earlier report sent in mid-October by the same group of British and American nationals gave details of the case, which highlighted the predication of Western nationals in hiding who required medical attention: "A Scotzeeman in hiding in Kuwait City was rushed to a hospital with a perforated ulcer. He had been reluctant to expose himself for fear of capture, despite his condition. Unfortunately, when he was examined in hospital, his body has still not been released by the Iraqis for burial."

4. TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINERS

In the period August to November, Amnesty International interviewed scores of detainees. The majority of the victims were Kuwaiti males between the ages of 16 and 35, some of whom had been subjected to torture while in the custody of Iraqi forces. In the cases of those who died, the people who died. Some have also given accounts of the torture and ill-treatment of women generally, who are said to have been subjected to beatings and rape. The methods of torture and ill-treatment said to have been used by the Iraqi forces since 2 August are listed in detail at the end of this section.

Iraqi forces at all levels appear to have been involved in the infliction of torture on detainees. They include ordinary soldiers from Iraq's regular army, senior military personnel, and agents of Iraqi intelligence and the security forces. Based on the information it has received and the interviews it has conducted, Amnesty International believes that torture is being systematically used during interrogation, both in order to extract information and as punishment. It is widely reported that torture is being used at its most brutal, when the interrogation methods used by Iraqi forces have frequently resulted in permanent physical or mental damage. The conditions under which these circumstances are compounded by their deprivation of medical treatment while in custody and, following their release, by the almost total absence of medical facilities.

Two categories of detainees appear to have been targeted for particularly severe torture: actual or suspected members of the Kuwaiti armed forces, National Guard, police and security forces, and individuals suspected of having participated in armed resistance against Iraqi forces. However, others have been tortured for involvement in non-violent activities such as peaceful demonstrations (in the early days of the invasion), writing anti-Iraq slogans on walls, possessing opposition leaflets and raising the Kuwaiti flag. In large measure, torture in such cases was aimed at inducing acts of defiance. It was also aimed at extracting information about the identity of persons involved in opposition activities, the locations of weapons, and the whereabouts of individuals or families being sought by the Iraqi authorities. In other cases, the objective was to force detainees to cooperate with other authorities, or to permit them to escape. Coupled with that was forcing them to make statements against the Kuwaiti ruling family and government and making declarations of allegiance to Saddam Hussein. Finally, the sheer brutality of the torture inflicted on detainees was designed to terrorize the population at large and to discourage others from expressing in whatever form their opposition to the Iraqi presence in Kuwait.

As of this document contains the testimonies of eight Kuwaiti men and youths who stated to Amnesty International that they had been tortured at the hands of Iraqi forces. Their testimonies have been withheld at their own request: A1. A former interrogator in his early 30s, arrested on 22 September after being found with a political poster, put under interrogation for 12 hours on chemical weapons. He was detained for one week, principally at al-Fawaniyya po-
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ice station, and subjected to beatings, kick­
ning, burning of the skin and sexual torture.

A2. A 17-year-old student arrested in early
September after being found in possession of a
gun and leaflets containing information on
ing, burning of the skin and sexual torture.

He was detained for 36 days in several
detention centres in Kuwait City and later in
Basra and subjected to beatings, mock execu­
tion, finger and toenail extraction, burning of
the skin, electric shocks and beatings.

A3. A 32-year-old office clerk arrested on 3
August as he returned home after buying
foodstuffs from the local cooperative society.
He was detained for five days at al­
Suflahiyya police station and subjected to
beatings and electric shocks, and was shot in
the leg at point blank range.

A4. A 22-year-old student arrested on 24
August following house-to-house searches
in the district of al-Rawda. He was detained for
eight days in al-Rawda and al-Farwaniyya
police stations, and subjected to beatings,
mock execution, kicking and flagellation.

A5. A 24-year-old former detainee arrested
on 6 September after another detainee allegedly
revealed that he was active in the armed oppo­
sition. He was detained for one week at the
Kuwaiti army intelligence centre in the district of
al-Shuwailkh and later in Basra. He was
subjected to beatings, mock execution,
exposure to cold air and to the sun for
prolonged periods, as well as electric shocks.

A6. A man in his 30s arrested twice, in
the third week of August and later on 20 Septem­
ber and accused of being member of the Ku­
waiti armed forces and of having partici­
pated in opposition activities. He was held for
eight days at al-Habab police station and sub­
jected to beatings, kicking, electric shocks and
the placing of heavy weights on his body.

A7. A 22-year-old student arrested around
22 September after returning to Kuwait to
assist his family in fleeing the country.
He was detained for eighteen days in several de­
tention centers in Kuwait City and later in
Basra. He was subjected to beatings, whipping,
exposure to cold air and to the sun for
prolonged periods, as well as electric shocks.

A8. A 31-year-old man arrested on 14 Sep­
tember at his home during a diwaniyya [a
traditional male gathering where social and
political discussions take place]. He was
subjected to beatings, electric shocks, mock
execution, exposure to cold air and to the sun
for prolonged periods, as well as electric shocks.

One of six Red Crescent workers held in
Kuwait City and later in Basra. He was
detained for five days at al-Surra police
station and subjected to beatings, kick­
ing, electric shocks and the placing of heavy
weights on his body.

Numerous other testimonies have reached
Amnesty International, from which only a
selected few are published in this document.
The following is an extract from the testi­
mony of a Kuwaiti former detainee held in
al-Kadhimia Sports Club. Here he describes
the condition of other detainees held with
him, including that of a 13-year-old boy:

"One of the soldiers led us into the squash
court, and we saw many Kuwatis of differ­
tent ages, so we left the court and escaped.
Many of them had fainted from torture. I sat next
to a 13-year-old boy whose body looked blue.
I asked him, "What have you confessed to?"
The soldier said, "I was with the resistance
about midnight in [August]."

Amnesty International has also inter­
viewed several doctors who, following the in­
vasion of Kuwait, worked as volunteers in
various hospitals. All of them stated that
the bodies of victims of extrajudicial killings
brought to the hospitals bore obvious signs of
torture, some of them having been badly
mutilated. Scores of these bodies have been
photographed, and the photographs provide
irrefutable evidence of the abuses committed.

The following are accounts provided by medical
doctors to Amnesty International:

A. A 31-year-old former detainee [name with­
held by Amnesty International] who suffered
from a physical handicap told of how he and
others with similar disabilities had also been
subjected to torture:

"I was with the resistance working in one
of the districts of Kuwait. A detainee had
given my name to the Iraqis. The soldiers ar­
tested me and beat me five days with my head
about midnight [in August]. They dragged
me from my bedroom and took me to the
local police station. The first day they beat me
several times before bringing me to al-Da’iyya
police station, and there they beat me
about two weeks. Thereafter I was taken
to the prison in al-Firdos where I stayed
for four days, until they took us out of the
cell and brought in four Iraqi soldiers
who had been tortured with electricity. We
were beaten and tortured with electricity.

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The following are accounts provided by medical
doctors to Amnesty International:

- Account provided by a 31-year-old Kuwaiti
detainee who was active in the armed oppo­
sition at the Iraq­
"On average, five or six new bodies were brought to the hospital each day. All were males and most were in their 20s. Many bore marks consistent with having been suspended upside down. One had been shot in the thigh. Those burned with heated implements had had their finger and toenails pulled out. Some had broken limbs, others bore black spots on them. One of the Egyptians I saw had been shot at point blank range in his hand, which looked as if it had been torn to pieces. Some had had their beards plucked out."

"Account provided by a Kuwaiti medical doctor, aged 40s [name withheld by Amnesty International] who examined the bodies of victims at the Red Crescent headquarters between August and October:"

"Judging by the bodies. In addition to the shot through the back of the head, some of them also bore marks of torture, such as burns on various parts of the body which were consistent with having been beaten with heavy implements. One victim had clearly had his beard plucked out. I also had had their fingernails extracted, and others had swollen feet with pockets of pus as a result of being subjected to falasqa for prolonged periods. Some had marks round their ankles, consistent with having been suspended upside down. One had been shot in the thigh. Those burned with heated implements had had their finger and toenails pulled out. Some had broken limbs, others bore black spots on them. One of the Egyptians I saw had been shot at point blank range in his hand, which looked as if it had been torn to pieces. Some had had their beards plucked out."

Several doctors also informed Amnesty International that Iraqi officials forced them to issue death certificates in respect of some victims, giving an incorrect cause of death. For example, the doctors were forced to state that the victims had died of internal bleeding instead of torture or bullet wounds. According to one Red Crescent worker, this happened at al-Farwaniyya, al-Amiri, al-Addan and Mubarak hospitals. All the torture victims referred to thus far in this document have been males. Although a number of former detainees interviewed by Amnesty International reported that they had seen women held in the same detention centre or had heard their screams, none was able to provide detailed accounts. Nevertheless, several claimed to have seen women taken into the officers' room. Later I heard screams, and I think they were those of a woman. I don't know what happened to that woman."

On the basis of the information received by Amnesty International, it was not possible to determine the extent to which the torture methods described above were used on women. Apart from psychological torture, such as having to watch their sons being shot (see Section IV), the prevalent form of torture used on women has been rape. By its very nature, this form of torture makes the victims, as well as their relatives, reluctant to talk about it. A number of men interviewed said they knew of cases of rape, but refused to reveal the names of the victims even in confidence. In this context, it has proved difficult to verify or substantiate the numerous reports of rape emanating from Kuwait since 2 August. In the first week of August, a British doctor in her early 40s (name withheld by Amnesty International) who had been working for the Red Crescent told Amnesty International that he knew of fitted acts of rape reported in the first three weeks of the invasion, however, suggested that Asian women were the prime targets, particularly Indian and Filipino domestic servants. Eyewitnesses stated that they had seen some of these women being dragged out of their employers' homes by a Kuwaiti family at the time of the invasion. He told Amnesty International:"

"On 2 August, early in the morning, my boss received a telephone call. Immediately afterwards the family started packing their belongings. Then they called Mary and me and told us that they were leaving for London. They took the house keys, a few gold coins, told us to take care of ourselves and left. For one week we stayed alone in the house. Then about ten or fifteen Iraqi soldiers arrived in front of our house. They decided to take everything in the house, and ordered Mary and me to load the vehicles. This took two hours. When we finished, two of the soldiers told Mary to go with them. Mary said to them, "Please, I am not coming with you, please help me!" She was crying too much when she said this. The soldiers pushed her into one of the vehicles beside the driver while pointing a gun at her. Then one of them turned round to me and hit me in the face with the butt of his machine gun. I didn't see Mary again."

Such reports were rife in Kuwait, and although the actual extent of such incidents is difficult to determine, they bear witness to a widespread practice of extensive penetration. One informant stated that her 37-year-old Filipina nurse staff nurse was visiting Kuwait at the time of the invasion, who informed Amnesty International:"

"[In August] there were about 20,000 Filipina resorting at our embassy in Kuwait. Of these, some were secreted in the centre or prison. Some were tried in three unfinished buildings nearby. Among them were housewives who were alone and scared, their employers had been away on holiday. They were all scared, having heard stories of rape. I don't think they would come forward even if they were. There were only seven officials working there."

Since early September, Amnesty International has received reports that increases in torture had continued, with several Kuwaiti women reported to have been raped by Iraqi military personnel, although some cases were reported earlier. According to Egyptian diplomatic sources, three female nurses working at the Red Crescent at the Meriden Hotel on 3 August. An Egyptian female nurse working at Mubarak Hospital in early September told Amnesty International that she knew of several Arab women admitted to the hospital after being raped. She stated that she had personally participated in carrying out gynaecological tests on one of them, a Palestinian woman in her early 20s, and that the test were positive. The nurse said that when she arrived at the hospital (in mid-August) the woman was hysterical, having apparently been taken to the district of Hawaii, raped by five soldiers and then thrown out onto the street. She also said that the previous day, a Kuwaiti woman was admitted to Mubarak Hospital, having been raped by Iraqi soldiers at her home in the city. Another doctor who had been working for the Red Crescent told Amnesty International that he knew of fifteen acts of rape reported in the first three weeks of the invasion, however, suggested that Asian women were the prime targets, particularly Indian and Filipino domestic servants. Eyewitnesses stated that they had seen some of these women being dragged out of their employers' homes by a Kuwaiti family at the time of the invasion. He told Amnesty International:"

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"A Kuwaiti woman [name withheld by Amnesty International] who led her country on 29 November stated that Iraqi soldiers had threatened to rape her and her sister in front of their brother, a journalist, who had been arrested on suspicion of involvement in opposition activities. She told Amnesty International her reason for fleeing Kuwait, and she gave details of cases of rape she knew of. These incidents were confirmed by one of their father in al-Rumaihiyya in mid-November.

A Kuwaiti woman [name withheld by Amnesty International] who led her country on 29 November stated that Iraqi soldiers had threatened to rape her and her sister in front of their brother, a journalist, who had been arrested on suspicion of involvement in opposition activities. She told Amnesty International her reason for fleeing Kuwait, and she gave details of cases of rape she knew of. These incidents were confirmed by one of their father in al-Rumaihiyya in mid-November.

She said that on 11 November when I was in the casualties ward, the Iraqi police brought me two
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Iraqi forces in Kuwait, which reveal a total disregard for the most fundamental human rights principles, it is Amnesty International’s view that the likelihood of any alleged offender receiving a fair trial under such circumstances is indeed remote. In light of its findings, Amnesty International also takes into account Iraq’s past and current record vis-a-vis the conduct of trials in its own courts. The organization has received a number of specific concerns to the Iraqi authorities about unfair trial procedures which failed to meet not only internationally recognized standards for a fair trial, but also those prevailing in Iraq’s own domestic legislation. Such deficiencies apply in death penalty cases as well, where defendants have been repeatedly denied the opportunity to appeal against a death sentence which, in many cases, had been secured on the basis of “confessions” extracted from the defendant on August 18, two days after the use of these procedures is most apparent in trials before Iraq’s permanent and temporary (ad hoc) special courts, whose decisions by law are final and not subject to appeal. Further details, see Amnesty International’s report entitled “The Death Penalty in Iraq: Legal Aspects”, published in June 1987. The RCO’s own information also confirmed the death penalty for looting on August 14, provided that such cases will be heard before a special court whose procedures are also final and not subject to appeal.

To date, Amnesty International has not received any information suggesting that any death sentences have been passed or carried out on individuals accused of hoarding food. Reports that a Kuwaiti man was executed in early September for harboring a Western national remain unconfirmed. The person in question was said to be among the thousands of Kuwaiti military personnel arrested by Iraqi forces, and may have been executed for other reasons. At least 18 executions for looting, however, have been officially confirmed by Iraq. The first known case was reported on August 18, two days after the offenses became punishable by death. The body of a man said to be an Iraqi soldier was found hanging from a crane in al-Hilali Street, opposite the headquarters of al-Nida’. Another person, a Kuwaiti man in his late 30s: "This is the punishment for those who steal the riches of the public as an example to others. The following is one such account given to Amnesty International by a Kuwaiti housewife in her late 30s:

I saw his body that morning [August 16], suspended from a crane near Muhafazat al-'Asima. There was a placard round his neck which read: "This is the punishment for those who steal the riches of the people". Another placard with the same message was placed on the ground beneath the suspended body, together with the goods he was supposed to have stolen. The body had been publicly hanged, but subsequent accounts from eyewitnesses saw the body indicated that he had been shot first, and then his body was later hung in public as an example to others. The following is one such account given to Amnesty International by a Kuwaiti woman in her late 30s:

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for burial. The name of the victim is not
known, neither is it known whether he had
any special burial preparation made.
A former lecturer at Kuwait University
in her mid-50s remarked to Amnesty
International: "We heard he was guilty of
looting, but that was probably a pretext. How
can they execute him for looting when they are all
looting themselves? If we are being shipped
from Kuwait to Baghdad, fourteen lorries
are carrying televisions and other electrical
equipment. Maybe that person was an hon­
ored family member and they say 'no' to them,
and was executed for it.'"

According to information received by Am­
nesty International, the photographs of ten
Kuwaiti civilians executed elsewhere in Iraq
were shown on Iraqi television be­tween
17 and 21 August. Among them were
Iraqi, Kuwaiti, Egyptian and Syrian nationals.
The university lecturer (mentioned above)
told Amnesty International: "In the days immediately after the 18
August execution, Iraqi television announced
that others had been executed for looting.
They showed their photographs on tele­
vision. I saw four or six of them. One of them was a Kuwaiti employee
of Kuwait Oil Company. A maternal cousin
of mine recognized him, but I don't recall his
name. On 18 August they showed on tele­
vision the photograph of another of those ex­
ecuted. He was a Kuwaiti from the al-Hajiri
family, also accused of looting. I don't know
his first name. On 28 August they showed on tele­
vision photographs of two other persons.
Her account was consistent with those
given by several other people interviewed by Amnesty International, including that of a
Kuwaiti businesswoman in her late 20s.
She also told Amnesty International that one of
the Kuwaitis executed was from the al-Hajiri
family, and another was arrested since leaving a diamond shop and was ar­
rested after leaving a diamond shop and was
accused of looting. Further confirmation
that executions for looting have been carried
out since the invasion of Kuwait was pro­
vided by President Saddam Hussein in an
interview broadcast on British television on
13 November. In response to a question on
human rights violations posed by the inter­
viewer, President Saddam Hussein stated that:"

** * * any Iraqi from Baghdad who steals
or robs a house in the province of Ku­
wat, and is caught red-handed, will be tried.
In a few cases, they have been shot dead
by firing squad. Sometimes in public,
apparently without prior legal proceedings.
Others, including infants, have been killed
through the deliberate deprivation of essen­
tial medical treatment.

During the first few hours of the invasion,
an unknown number of Kuwaiti military per­
soneel were extrajudicially executed in the
case of armed clashes with Iraqi forces.
In the ensuing month, many civilians
who viewed the invasion and participated in
looting have been killed in similar circumstances, and their
numbers are also unknown. However, all the cases referred to below involve killings
which, according to Amnesty International's
assessment of the situation, hundreds of extra­
judicial executions reported since 2 August were carried out in the
manner described above. However, many
other victims were said to have been exe­
cuted by firing squad, sometimes in public,
apparently without prior legal proceedings.

According to his account, they were taken
by firing squad, sometimes in public,
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by firing squad, sometimes in public,
apparently without prior legal proceedings.
Others, including infants, have been killed
through the deliberate deprivation of essen­
tial medical treatment.
January 11, 1991

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

The Iraqis came four times to our house. They were searching for Kuwaitis who had been in the armed forces. I have seven sons, five of whom were in the army. My two younger sons were aged 24 and 19, and 'Abdallah, a student aged 18. Since the invasion, Hassan had been working as a volunteer in the cooperative society in our district. They found him sleeping on the ground in al-Riggs cemetery. Each time the soldiers came, they searched the whole house. On 16 September, they arrested Hassan and 'Abdallah. Before taking them away, the soldiers hit Hassan with a metal rod in his head. Then he started walking. I didn't know where...

Several days passed. I couldn't believe what was happening. Then I saw the bullet hole in his head, and just at that moment he died.

... They went over to Muhammad and found him dead. He was the brother of my younger son. The soldiers shot him in the head with a gun fitted with a silencer. They must have believed we were all dead.

My head was bleeding profusely. I crawled over to two Kuwaiti brothers and cried to revive him. I thought he had been pretending, just like me. Then I saw the bullet hole in his head, and just at that moment he died. I couldn't believe what was happening. Then I went over to Muhammad and found him dead too. I managed to drag their bodies over to one side and recited a short prayer for them. I was 14 at the time. I didn't know what I was going, but I was afraid the soldiers would come back.

He was able to get medical assistance, and he was pronounced dead on arrival. My testimony is reproduced in Appendix B.

As this student's testimony shows, and as documented at greater length in the introduction, killings of extrajudicial killings were invariably also victims of torture. Many of the cases known to Amnesty International involved the torture of detainees during several days or weeks, during which time their families remained ignorant of their fate and whereabouts. The detainees were routinely tortured while in custody, and then publicly shot outside their homes after a member of their family had identified them to the authorities. On 9 September after weapons and a pistol silencer were found at their home in the district of al-Nusha. They were initially held at al-Kadhima Sports Club and then at the Iraqi Intelligence Centre in al-Jahra' municipality. The younger brother, an 18-year-old student, told Amnesty International that he was taken to a military hospital, where he was given enemas. For eight days we knew nothing of his fate and whereabouts. On the tenth day, they brought 'Abdallah back. It was eight o'clock in the morning, and I had just finished the morning prayers. I heard the doorbell ring, followed by two gunshots. I ran down and opened the door. I saw 'Abdallah lying down on the ground. His eyes were bound with a black cloth. He had been shot in the back and the head. I asked them about his life and they said: 'We took him to the cemetery for burial.'

As mentioned earlier in this document, many of the detainees were extrajudicially executed by Iraqi forces without any connection whatsoever with membership of the Kuwaiti armed forces, or with suspected acts of armed or non-violent resistance. Reports received by Amnesty International indicate that these killings were arbitrary in the extreme, and that decisions as to which suspects were to be executed were taken on the spot by soldiers or officers without prior clearance from their superiors. A lecturer in politics at Kuwait University told Amnesty International about the killing of a male relative of hers in such circumstances:

"During the first few days of the invasion, there was a lot of pressure on the bakeries to keep up supplies of bread to the people. On the fourth or fifth day my relative, who was 45, was queuing outside a bakery in al-M'amariyya. An Iraqi soldier from the Republican Guards was there. My relative could not control himself. He started shouting at the soldier, saying: 'Why have you ruined our lives, why did you come?' The Iraqi soldier shot him dead there and then, in front of everyone.

In another incident, a Kuwaiti man was reported to have been killed in similar circumstances at a checkpoint, apparently for carrying Kuwaiti currency. The following is an eyewitness account of his execution given to Amnesty International by a Lebanese engineer working for the Kuwait Oil Company:

"On 17 October I was on duty in the al-Ahmadi area near the main office of the Kuwait Oil Company. I was in my car. There was a man in front of me in a blue Mazda. He appeared to be reaching for his wallet. It was about 4 pm because I was supposed to be on duty and I was already running late. I was thinking 'please don't let this guy be a Kuwaiti!'. I shot him in the head. The soldier took him out of his car. I opened the window of my car so I could hear what was going on. 'What's your national- identity number?' he asked. I answered: 'What's your national-identity number?' We argued. The soldier said: 'Where's your wallet?' As he was reaching for his wallet one of the Iraqis pushed him and pulled it out. They took his wallet, while shouting: 'You've got that dog Jaber's money [referring to the Amir of Kuwait].' The Kuwaiti was going to explain (why he had the money) when the soldier pushed him hard, making him stumble, and then he sprayed him with bullets, with his machine gun. Within a few seconds a pickup truck drove up—they must have been waiting there, as if they knew. The Kuwaiti had fallen to the ground and the soldiers continued to spray him. Three soldiers grabbed him like a rubbish bag and dumped him in the truck, and then disappeared. I asked one of the soldiers what happened, and he said: 'We only got that dog Jaber's money.' He then asked me where I was from, so I told him I was Lebanon. He said: 'Don't worry, you'll free your country from the Syrians. They're next...'."

I went to al-Ahmadi Hospital to look for the man whom they had killed, and then told the doctor. He went to the cemetery, but the body had been brought there. No one knew anything about it."

Information gathered by Amnesty International indicates that several killings, which began in earnest in mid-August continued and increased in September and October. In addition to those detainees who were killed, and whose identification by relatives, others were reported to have been killed in police stations or other places of detention where they were held. As many as 50 were killed between the 30 July and 30 September. One of the Kuwaiti armed forces in his early 30s told Amnesty International that a detainee held with him at al-Sulabiyya police station had been shot in front of him during a torture session (see Appendix A3).

In such cases, the bodies of the victims would invariably be thrown out onto the streets or dumped in rubbish bins. A Kuwaiti engineer working for the Kuwait Oil Company, who left Kuwait in mid-October, told Amnesty International: "After a while there were so many bodies that there was no more room at the morgue of the nearby Maharba Hospital. We began putting some of the bodies in the large hospital refrigerators normally used to store food. Families would come looking for missing relatives in the morgues and refrigerators. Most of the bodies were buried in al-Riggs cemetery. We buried about 30 or 40 bodies in one night, and then the soldiers would come too frightened to remove the bodies for burial."

A Kuwaiti doctor volunteering at al-'Addan and al-Ahmadi hospitals told Amnesty International:

"If a body's identification remains unidentified bodies remained in the morgues of several hospitals for a long period without anyone claiming them, to the point that the morgues were packed with bodies, we would contact the Red Crescent and the cemetery employees and the necessity for each family to dig the graves of those of them it had lost. But some of the young men volunteered to do the job with the bodies, digging the graves and praying for the dead. Some Afghan workers were
also hired to dig graves. Al-Rigga cemetery was also compromised by the practice of digging up bodies, which had been turned into a military zone early on in the invasion.

The Red Crescent worker quoted above described the situation as "...Towards the end of September beginning of October, even the burial operations by the Iraqis had stolen the equipment used for burial, even the bodies used to wrap the bodies. Some of the volunteers were in charge of digging the graves and removing the remains of the bodies."

A former member of the Kuwaiti armed forces who left Kuwait on 12 October told Amnesty International that his brother had been one of the volunteer grave-diggers. Through him, he learned that on 7 or 8 October, Iraqi forces had taken control of Al-Rigga cemetery. "After that," he said, "some families who took the bodies of their relatives for burial there were made to pay 100 dinars per body." In addition to paying for the burial of these victims, reports were also received that some families had been made to pay for the bullets used to execute them. In one case, two Kuwaiti brothers aged 18 and 19 [names withheld by Amnesty International] were shot dead in front of their homes in al-Khalidya on 4 October. According to one of their friends in al-Jabriyya on 4 October after reportedly refusing to lower the Kuwaiti flag from their home, their parents were asked to pay the price of the bullets used to kill them—in this case 15 Iraqi dinars each. In other cases reported, the sum of money being asked were 70 or 100 dinars per person. This practice of asking families to cover "state expenses" for executions is common in Iraq and has been documented by Amnesty International over a number of years. In some instances, the sums of money requested have been as much as 500 Iraqi dinars, apparently to cover the costs of coffins and transportation of the bodies for burial. It is the practice of instructing the families of victims not to hold public mourning is also common in Iraq. According to reports received, Iraqi forces have tried to enforce such instructions in Kuwait since 2 August, apparently without much success.

Below are the details of ten identified victims of extrajudicial executions who died in the period 8 August-first week of October.

**Case 1: Badr Rajab**
- Age unknown, employed as an administrator with the al-Sabahiyya cooperative society. He was married and had eight children. His body was found in a rubbish bin and was brought to their house on 8 September. According to the family, he had been tortured prior to execution; his head had been cut off, his nails and toenails extracted, and his body bore burn marks consistent with the use of a hot metal implement. The reasons for his arrest and execution are not known.

**Case 2: Sadeh Dahi**
- Reported by a 53-year-old Kuwaiti banker who left the country on 16 September and was subsequently interviewed by Amnesty International. He said that he had just left his house, apparently to go shopping, when he was shot outside his home several days later, and had been tortured while in detention, including with electricity.

**Case 3: Mahmoud Khalifa al-Jassem**
- A writer on Islamic affairs in his early 30s, living in the al-Salamiyya district of Kuwait City. According to an eyewitness interviewed by Amnesty International by medical personnel of the Red Crescent, his body had been found in a rubbish bin and was brought to their headquarters in the Red Crescent after the body was examined by doctors who questioned the body and questioned him about his [name withheld by Amnesty International].

**Case 4: Ahmad Obeelarden**
- An employee of the Department for the Protection of Personalities (Darat Hilmayat al-Shakhshiyiyat) of the Ministry of the Interior, he was a Shi'ite Muslim in his late 30s, and held the rank of captain. According to reports received, he was arrested for the possession of opposition leaflets and, in prison, was instructed to instruct the families of victims not to hold public mourning in response to taking a photograph of the Amir of Kuwait and replacing it with one of President Saddam Hussein.

**Case 5: Sadeh Husain**
- Age and profession unknown; he was arrested on 2 September at a dike road in the al-Sabahiyya district of Kuwait City, together with seven other Kuwaiti men. According to reports received, he was brought back to his house on 8 September and publicly shot by firing squad outside al-Ardiya cooperative society on 7 September, apparently for refusing to take down a photograph of the Amir of Kuwait and replacing it with one of President Saddam Hussein.

**Case 6: Badr Rajab**
- Age unknown, employed as an administrator with the al-Sabahiyya cooperative society. He was married and had eight children. His body was found in a rubbish bin in the al-Sabahiyya area on 8 September. According to reports received, his hands had been tied and his head wrapped in the flag of Kuwait. He had been shot twice in the head, just above the ear. The reasons for his execution are unknown; when arrested, he had been wearing his glasses. The body was returned to his family on 11 September.

**Case 7: Adel Dahi**
- Age unknown, he was employed as a doctor at the Red Crescent al-Addan Hospital. According to several accounts received by Amnesty International, on 9 September several wounded Iraqi military personnel were brought to the hospital for treatment, one of whom, an officer, died the same day. In retaliation, five of the hospital's administrative staff, including 'Adel Dahi, were reportedly lined up and shot on the same day. A woman's body, killed by an unknown assailant, was reportedly found in a rubbish bin and was brought to their head­quarters in the Red Crescent after the body was examined by doctors who questioned the body about his arrest and execution.

**Case 8: Abdul Salam**
- A former member of the Kuwaiti armed forces who left Kuwait on 11 August near the Kuwaiti border with Saudi Arabia as he was trying to flee the country. Two other British men traveling with him who did succeed in crossing the border stated that they had witnessed the killing. British Embassy officials in Kuwait informed Amnesty International of the incident and made attempts to recover the body. The British Foreign Office has confirmed that Douglas Croesker's body has not been handed over to his officials to date.

**Case 9: Majid al-Halil al-Balhan**
- A writer on Islamic affairs in his early 30s, living in the al-Salamiyya district of Kuwait City. According to an eyewitness interviewed by Amnesty International by medical personnel of the Red Crescent, his body had been found in a rubbish bin and was brought to their headquarters in the Red Crescent after the body was examined by doctors who examined the body and questioned him about his [name withheld by Amnesty International].

**Case 10: Dr. Sadeh al-'Ubaidan**
- An obstetrician in his late 30s working at the Maternity Hospital in Kuwait City. According to reports received, he had been extracted; his body was burned with a hot metallic instrument. The reasons for his arrest and execution are not known.
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Several cases of this kind were reported to Amnesty International, the information in large part being provided by doctors working at the hospitals where the deaths occurred. Among the victims were two patients [names withheld by Amnesty International] who died after life-support machines had re­ceived orders to be dismantled and looted. Two of them suffered renal failure: a Jordanian woman and a Kuwaiti businessman at Hamad al-Issa Centre for Kidney Transplants (part of al-Razi Hospital). The third case was that of a Kuwaiti woman under intensive care at the Cardiac Unit of al-Sabah Hospital and who died of cardiac arrest.

In addition, over 200 premature babies were reported to have died after Iraqi soldiers re­moved them from incubators, which were then looted. In the latter cases the would-be patients were probably switched off.
the gun and leaflets. They did not believe
officer had with him four soldiers carrying
but when they pulled the trigger it turned
ficer told me to smile and that it was my
out that the ammunition was blank. The off­
erned out yesterday's operation and killed our
in the same way. Then they subjected me to
Abu Khaled's office. He is in charge of the
police station and his rank is that of major.
off all my clothes except for my shorts. Then
tric baton.
when I came round I was being whipped. [The
wire on my nipple and stuck it on. Then he
a little over my eyes. [The officer) placed a
me back to the Municipality Building in al­
was not [registered with them]. So I stayed
as in Kuwait). I was asked to put my fingerprint on
I tried to leave Kuwait I would be exe­
I was arrested on 24 August. Iraqi soldiers
was a Friday and I was at home. 
I was arrested for eight days. I was taken to
in Kuwait City. He was de­
tinguished on his body and his leg was plastered with a cast.
"I was arrested on 24 August. Iraqi soldiers
were searching all houses in the area where I lived. They raided my
home. It was a Friday and I was at home.
They knocked on the door and when I opened
it they arrested me. I was put in the back of a lorry together with eight others who had been
rounded up. We were not allowed to talk to
each other. We were taken to al-Rawda po­
lion. I was put in a cell measuring 3 x 5 metres together with eight other detain­
ee. We were all blindfolded and our hands
and feet tied. For a while I also had a rope
put around my neck, and which was tied to
the ceiling. We remained in the cell for two
days, during which we were beaten by
guards. Groups of four or five guards would
drag us by the hair, before making us the
other way up. I was choked and my
body in order to avoid being executed.
cause anybody who has clear traces of tor­
ture on his body or is suffering from perma­
nent damage is executed. After the examina­
tion was over we had to give an undertaking
to cooperate with the Iraqi authorities. Then
I was released."

Testimony A43
A 32-year-old office clerk arrested on 3 Au­
gust as he returned home after buying food­
stuff from the local cooperative society. He
was detained for five days at al-Sulabiyya po­
lice station in Kuwait City and subjected
to beatings, kicking, falaga; cigarettes were ex­
tinguished on his body and his leg was plastered with a cast.

"I was supposed to take one of my chil­
dren to al-Sulabiyya for a health check-up. When I arrived there I was pre­
vented from entering. I tried to go to a phar­
macy near the police station to buy some things.
In the afternoon I went to the cooperative society
in our district to get some foodstuffs. On the
way back to my home I was stopped by Iraqi
soldiers. They took the milk and other food I had bought, blindfolded me and took me to
al-Sulabiyya police station.

When I entered the police station, I was taken
into a room where about 70 Kuwaitis were held. There were young boys among them. I asked
whether they were my friends, and I under­
stood that he had been arrested in circumstances
which I would not have recognized
were interrogated individually. I was told to wait my
turn.

There were three officers in the interroga­
tion room, and when they asked me questions, another took notes and the third
stood by the door, holding a gun. I was asked
for my nationality card. Then the officer
asked me: "Are you happy with the situation
ie, the situation in Kuwait) in which you
are here to. You are happy with the
situation in Kuwait?" I replied: "Yes, we are
are happy with the situation in Kuwait. Apparently,
in my absence, they had gone to the house
and told my wife that I had decided to
give away our possessions. When my wife ob­
jected, one of the Iraqis hit her. They took
our furniture and even my wife's wedding
ring. Eight days after my release, my family
and I left for Saudi Arabia.

Testimony A44
A 22-year-old student arrested on 24 August
following house-to-house searches in the
al-Rawda district of Kuwait City. He was de­
tained for eight days in al-Rawda police station
and subjected to beatings, kicking, falaga; cigarettes were ex­
tinguished on his body and his leg was plastered with a cast.

"I had bought, blindfolded me and took me to
al-Sulabiyya police station.

They were laughing and making jokes. In the
evening they transferred me to al­
Farwaniyya police station. . . . They told me
it would only be for two days and then I
would be released. The following day after inter­
rogation and beating they returned me to
Farwaniyya, where I was arrested. At Khaitan they told me that I was to be re­
leased tomorrow and that they have my re­
lease papers, and in fact I saw these papers
bearing my name. At midnight I was sum­
med individually. I was told to wait my
turn.

There were three officers in the interroga­
tion room, and when they asked me questions, another took notes and the third
stood by the door, holding a gun. I was asked
for my nationality card. Then the officer
asked me: "Are you happy with the situation
ie, the situation in Kuwait) in which you
find yourselves?" I replied: "Yes, we are
are happy with the situation in Kuwait. Apparently,
in my absence, they had gone to the house
and told my wife that I had decided to
give away our possessions. When my wife ob­
jected, one of the Iraqis hit her. They took
our furniture and even my wife's wedding
ring. Eight days after my release, my family
and I left for Saudi Arabia.
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Testimony A5

A 38-year-old man arrested on 5 September after another detainee allegedly revealed that he was active in the armed resistance. He was detained for one week at the Kuwaiti headquarters in al-Shuwailk, the headquarters of the al-Shuwailk district in the city and later in Basra. He was subjected to beatings, mock execution, exposure to hot and cold temperatures, electric shocks and suspension from a rotating fan.

"I was arrested on 5 September. A treacherous person in al-Jafiriyat informed about me to the Iraqis. On the day of my arrest I was armed and traveling in one of the cars used by the resistance. I was alone. I was stopped at a checkpoint. One of the Iraqi soldiers asked me: "Are you [the mentioned name]?" I realized that they knew about me and I drove away at top speed. The soldiers began shooting. At the next checkpoint there were about 30 soldiers. I did not stop and they pursued me. They fired in the direction of my car, as a result of which one of the tyres was punctured. The soldiers caught up with me and dragged me out of the car. They tied my hands and feet and blindfolded me with a piece of green cloth.

I was taken to the Kuwait General Staff headquarters in al-Shuwailk, where the blindfold was removed. I was brought before an Iraqi captain. Without asking me any questions he started hitting me Karate-style, then he said, "Execute him." This was about 8 o'clock in the evening. I was beaten for about a quarter of an hour, and then taken to a courtyard where I was put in a firing squad consisting of three soldiers. An officer read out the charges against me: he accused me of weapon against the country and of having stolen arms and ammunition. The soldiers then pointed their rifles at me; I was still without a blindfold. One shot was fired, deliberately missing me. The officer said, "Stop, the interrogation is not over."

They locked me up in a room for about one hour. Then I was taken to another room which had four air conditioning units. I was practically naked, wearing nothing except a t-shirt worn by Kuwaiti Airways stewardesses. I could hear the sounds of people screaming even here at the airport.

After that I was taken to an office, where the Palestinian lieutenant and the Iraqi officer were seated. I was asked again about whom I knew in the resistance. I refused to give any information. The Iraqi officer then asked me: "Do you belong to the armed forces, or are you a civilian?" I replied: "I am a civilian." The Iraqi officer then said: "You are about to die." They then brought a video camera, and gave me a piece of paper which contained statements against the [Kuwaiti] government. For example, it said that the government was corrupt and that the Kuwaiti army opposed their liberation by Iraq. They told me to memorise the statement in preparation for filming. After the filming was over, they asked me to write down a confession, which I refused to do.

I was then interrogated once again. Finally one of them said that there was no use in interrogating me anymore that I would be executed. However, they took me to another room which had a fan in the ceiling. I was turned upside down and my ankles were tied together. I was then spun around two or three times and then I was taken down. I was taken back to the cell and left alone for two days.

After that, I was put in a car and driven back to Kuwait. I was taken to the Mudiriyyat Al-Amn (General Intelligence Directorate) and kept there for four days in a small window. Then I was taken to a detention centre. I was made to sign various papers and was then released. After my release I was warned by various people that I was under surveillance and that I would be rearrested and executed. So I fled Kuwait and went to Saudi Arabia.

Testimony A6

A man in his 30s arrested twice, in the third week of August and later on 20 September and accused of being a member of the Kuwaiti armed forces and of having participated in opposition activities. He was held in detention for about one hour. He was subjected to beatings, kicking, electric shocks and the use of hosepipes.

"I was first arrested during the third week of August, in a residential area. It was in the middle of the day, about 12 o'clock. I was alone in my car, and I was stopped by soldiers. They ordered me out of the car and accused me of being in the resistance. They took me to a school which had been turned into a military barracks. I was taken into a large hall, where I saw about 100 Kuwaiti detainees. All were men and were hardly wearing any clothes. They were surrounded by guards.

The following day I was taken to the police station, where I was tortured. Three officers interrogated me. They asked for my personal details. I was kicked and beaten with a rifle butt. They accused me of being in the army and of being a member of the armed resistance. I was kept in solitary confinement for several hours. Then they took me to another room, where they applied electricity to my hands, feet and genitals. I was subjected to lashing with a whip. Then I was taken for interrogation once again. They asked me the same questions. One of them punched me in the mouth with his elbow, and one of my teeth broke as a result.

After a while three men entered the room. One of them carried a bucket of very hot water. First they beat me up by using Karate blows until I lost consciousness. Then all three of them lifted me up. They turned me over and dropped me on the ground. My head hit the ground and my jaw broke as a result. By that time I was bleeding profusely and vomiting. They then carried me and dropped me on the ground. In the hot water about six or seven times, all the while ordering me to confess. I repeated that I would not confess. Then they left me there. After about two hours another group of men entered the room. One of them attacked me with a sharp implement, cutting any face and arms. Then they beat me with hosepipes and electric cables. After that they gave me two pills to swallow, which they called 'confession tablets'. These pills were supposed to calm me down, but they did not seem to have any effect on me.

Then they put me in cell on my own. The room measured about 2 x 3 metres and had a small window. The following day they tortured me with electricity. First they poured water on my body and then applied the electricity. Then they placed electrodes on my toes and genitals. I was taken for interrogation once again. Finally one of them said that there was no use in interrogating me anymore that I would be executed. However, they took me to another room which had a fan in the ceiling. I was turned upside down and my ankles were tied together. I was then spun around two or three times and then I was taken down. I was taken back to the cell and left alone for two days.

After that, I was put in a car and driven back to Kuwait. I was taken to the Mudiriyyat Al-Amn (General Intelligence Directorate) and kept there for four days in a small window. Then I was taken to a detention centre. I was made to sign various papers and was then released. After my release I was warned by various people that I was under surveillance and that I would be rearrested and executed. So I fled Kuwait and went to Saudi Arabia."
They took me to a large cell, where I was held on my own. The beating continued intermittently throughout the day and night. I was blindfolded and handcuffed. The soldiers stepped on me with their heavy army boots and they placed heavy weights on my body. The following morning one of the officers came to fetch me. He gave me a cigarette and then told me to start walking. I thought he was going to shoot me since he was already holding a gun. He then asked me to go to the bathroom, where I found a friend of mine. He had paid a sum of money in exchange for my release. I left the police station.

My second arrest was on 20 September. I was held for six hours. I was arrested in al-Jahra', again as I was driving a car. They interrogated me again, and I was then blindfolded and handcuffed. They asked me about my family. I told them I was running for prolonged periods, and electric shocks. I was not in Kuwait when the invasion occurred. They asked me how I got to get my family out. I was arrested in mid-September, in al-Salim district. First I was taken to 'All-Salem [military] base, close to the border with Israel. Then they put me on my left on my own for about three hours. No one talked to me. Then I was taken to al-Liwa' al-Sades [military base on the al-Jahra' road]. I was put in a room where the air-conditioning was switched on. They left me there overnight without a blanket, and I was shivering in the cold. I was not even given any food. The following day I was interrogated. They asked me to tell them where the American forces were stationed, where the resistance in Kuwait was based, etc. I was being interrogated on my own, but after it was over they took me with two other detainees to the Iraqi embassy in Kuwait City. We were taken into a small room, escorted by two soldiers. At the embassy we were left for three hours in the sun, without food or water. After we were released, we were taken back to al-Liwa' al-Sades. From there we were taken to Basra in a lorry loaded with goods stolen from Kuwait. These were mainly refrigerators and office equipment.

In Basra we were taken to the offices of the Iraqi Istikharat [Intelligence]. As soon as we entered we were blindfolded. The Iraqis started whipping and beating the three of us. They took us down some stairs into a basement. Although I was blindfolded, I managed by looking downwards to see scores of detainees who were also blindfolded and handcuffed. The three of us who arrived together were put in a cell measuring 3 x 4 metres, together with about 300 detainees. One of them, aged 18, had been tortured with electricity. Another one had been kept for 20 days without food and had heard cries and screams all the time. The whole basement was stifling—there was no ventilation whatsoever. We were constantly beaten by soldiers, who were also blindfolded and handcuffed. The water was warm and salty. We were allowed to go to the toilet once a day only.

I remained in that cell for about one week. The interrogations were taken upstairs, blindfolded and handcuffed. One person interrogated me, and another person whipped me. The questions were mainly related to the specific locations of the American forces and the centers of resistance in Kuwait. The interrogation lasted about five minutes. Then I was taken to another room, still blindfolded and handcuffed. The interrogator put a gun to my head and pulled the trigger again. I was then forced to sign papers based on my interrogation. On Monday at 4 pm we were taken in three cars to al-Jahra's police station. We were put in one cell—eight of us plus four others (the three Indians and the Yemeni had been released). We were not told to speak to each other.

Interrogation began at 9 pm. There were no beatings, just questions about previous statements. The charge was entering the country. They interrogated me for about five minutes. I was told I had to pay the bus fare, which I did with the little money I had on me. I was held in a large hall, where there were hundreds of detainees, some in the prison for seven or eight days, and then one of the detainees was summoned for trial. I was one of them. We were taken to another building which was also known as 'Basra Court'. We sat in a waiting room, and each of us was brought before a judge individually. I didn't know whether he was really a judge, but the sign on the door of his office said 'The Judge'. He wore civilian clothes. There was also an officer in the room, taking notes. I was before the judge for three minutes altogether. He asked me for my name and why I had returned to Kuwait. The charge against me was entering the country illegally and remaining there. Then the judge asked me to sign a statement, the contents of which I had not read. He warned me that if I was caught again I would be executed. I was taken back to the waiting room while the other detainees went through the same process. When it was over, we were taken back to the prison, where they gave us back our identity documents and released us. A few of us took a taxi as far as Safwan, and from there entered Kuwait.
February 11, 1991

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Photographs 1, 2, and 3

These are photographs of the bodies of three unidentified persons. The bodies were found in the streets of Kuwait City and brought to the headquarters of the Red Crescent in the period late August/early September. Amnesty International interviewed the doctors who took the photographs. They stated that the victims had been tortured (beaten and burned) prior to their execution. There is no forensic examination. The following is the medical opinion of the British forensic pathologist:

Photograph 1

There is clearly a lot of blood soaking the body which has made the sky-blue torn eider a wound to the head, neck or chest. A striking feature of the photograph is the dark staining of the hands which may represent (a similar substance) or alternatively burns.

Photograph 3

This is a view of the top of the head together with the forehead. There is an obvious gun-shot wound which extends from the left side of the forehead, just in front of the hairline, backwards towards the top of the head. There is no evidence of entry or exit, the wound and beneath it can be seen white skull. The back half of the wound shows loss of skin and skull and there is brain tissue hanging out. Over the top end of the wound it has an arc shape and from this the main wound which is linear passes backwards. I interpret this as most likely a tangential gun-shot wound which has barely penetrated the skull. The arc shape at the front of the wound is likely to be the entry and, running backwards from this, the bullet has merely penetrated the skull; then in the most posterior part of the wound it has made a rent in the brain. It is not possible to say what the range of fire was other than that it was either a contact wound or fired from a range of greater than 1m. There are clearly some marks to the face but it is impossible to say whether these are injuries or dried blood stains.

Photographs 4 to 7

These show the traces of torture still apparent on the bodies of three Kuwaiti men [identities withheld] who fled to Saudi Ara­bia. The chief咫 quantity of photographs has been provided. The following is the medical opinion of the British forensic pathologist:

Photograph 4

The man in this photograph shows prominent bruising to the right side of the forehead and the right eye which might either represent a fall or a blow. The most significant injuries from the point of view of interpretation are those to the right upper arm and adjacent right chest. These comprise at least three and possibly four parallel lines (similar to curving railway lines in appearance). This is a forensic classic and is produced by blows from a rope or electrical object which has been doubled up to form a loop. There is no doubt therefore that this man has been assaulted. It is significant that the three or four blows are very localised to the outside of the right shoulder since it implies that he was not moving in an attempt to escape the blows at the time they were struck. This is unconscious or semi-conscious as a result of his head injury or alternatively that he was in a supine position. When he was psychologically restrained by fear. The injuries appear fresh and are likely to be only a few days old.

The Information below relates to Photographs 1 to 9 in Appendix D. It consists of extracts from a) a medical report from a British forensic pathologist following an examination of victims of torture and b) the written medical opinion of a prominent British forensic pathologist.

APPENDIX D—FORENSIC REPORTS

Photographs 1 to 3

The injuries shown in these photographs are consistent with torture and consistent with torture extended over several days. The man on the left of the photograph has been hit on the forehead, the right side of the forehead and the right eye. The man on the middle of the photograph has been hit on the upper chest and the lower chest. The man on the right has been hit on the upper chest and the lower chest. The injuries are consistent with the man on the right being hit by a rope or electrical object which has been doubled up to form a loop. There is no doubt therefore that this man has been assaulted. It is significant that the three or four blows are very localised to the outside of the right shoulder since it implies that he was not moving in an attempt to escape the blows at the time they were struck. This is unconscious or semi-conscious as a result of his head injury or alternatively that he was in a supine position. When he was psychologically restrained by fear. The injuries appear fresh and are likely to be only a few days old.

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There are surgical scars on the left arm and the single one on the right arm. There is a recent 2 cm transverse linear scar on the front of the left thigh and a similar one on the adjacent area of the left chest.

**Photograph 7**

This elderly man shows some small irregular scabbed injuries to the inside of his right elbow. One of these appears to have prominence puckering around the margin which is common in the healing of skin injuries where there has been a loss of surface tissue. The original injuries are likely to have been abrasions or lacerations, scars or tears of the skin produced by blunt force trauma, i.e., either through a fall or a blow. A unusual location for an injury produced in a fall although the possibility cannot be discounted.

**On Examination**

There are nine lcm circular scars, recently healed, arranged in a cluster on the outer aspect of the left arm. There is a single similar one on the adjacent area of the left chest.

There are two tiny, recently healed scars on the posterior aspect of the left arm and a single one on the right arm.

There is a recent lcm transverse linear scar on the front of the left thigh and a similar lcm scar close by.

**Comments**

He states that the nine circular scars on the left arm and the single one on the chest were caused deliberately by cigarettes.

He attributes the tiny recent scars on both arms to scratches inflicted during interrogation, the scabs of which have only recently finally separated.

He states that the recent linear scars on the left thigh were inflicted deliberately with a razor blade.

**APPENDIX D: PHOTOGRAPH OF VICTIM OF TORTURE AND EXTRADURAL EXECUTION**

(Photographs not reproducible in the Record.)

**APPENDIX E: STATEMENT BY THE IRAQI EMBASSY**

Once more, Amnesty International has reported to the unenviable lip-service in matters related to Iraq. Perhaps, what is most regrettable on this occasion is that the end product of its service concerns a country where the entire population is now the victim of illegal armed embargo on all necessities for ordinary life, including food and medicine with the intention of starving its people and exposing their children to diseases. But our past experience with the Amnesty shows that no humane motives towards Iraq could have galvanized Amnesty into action.

However, we find it regrettable that under the present circumstances in the concerned area any outsider would have the audacity to write to the United Nations and the so-called "testimonies" as one-sided stories would only further expose the intentions of its authors. We have cooperated with Amnesty International.

Yet, on our part, we renew our advice to the Amnesty on the need to approach an official representative of the Iraqi government and examine these so-called "testimonies" as one-sided stories which would only further expose the intentions of its authors. We have cooperated with Amnesty and lack of evidence to its reports on Iraq renders its recent report an embarrasment to the practice of reporting, and Amnesty itself is in no better position in this regard.

LONDON, October 3, 1990.

The PRESIDENT OFFICER (Mr. ROBB). The Senator from Michigan.

Mr. RIEGEL. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, going back in time to the reference that the Senator from Michigan made, the Vietnam experience, clearly that situation was different, and we know that, in many important ways. But by the same token, there are a number of dis­ similarities, and I am concerned that we make sure that situation and this one. I think it is very important to reflect on our history, that history, and other history, before we move ahead at this time.

There are a lot of levels upon which we can analyze this problem, and I want to just touch on some of those this morning. One of them relates to other events that are going on in the world.

I was profoundly struck and troubled by the news this morning that Soviet forces have moved into Lithuania, and there you have an invasion, in effect, against an authentic democracy. Kuwait is not a democracy; it is a monar­chy, which is a very different thing. So there are a lot of problems around the world that would invite our attention.

I must just say in passing that I am very troubled about invasions any way and very troubled today that we are seeing occurring right now in Lithuania and, I suspect, possibly in the other Baltic States. I hope the Soviet officials will understand that if they take advantage of our distraction in the Persian Gulf to crank down on captive nations that in fact have dem­ocracies in place, they are going to pay a price here. They are certainly going to pay a price with respect to the views and the actions of this Senator and, I expect, many others.

But it is relevant to think about that in the context of the stakes that we face in the Persian Gulf, because the question that we are dealing with right now is whether the United States decides to start a war. Our war. It will be our war. We just heard the chairman of the Armed Services Committee say that if this thing moves into an offensive mode, 90 percent, his best est­imate, or perhaps more of the combat
forces are going to be American forces. People from some place else may agree with what we are doing, but it will be our American blood that is pouring out. I believe that the majority of the American people, while they may not want to fight, do not want to back out of this war. The choice on the other side is whether we continue to use every other form of pressure that we have, the economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, everything else that we can bring to bear to try to resolve this situation in a way satisfactory to us and to the views that we hold.

Now, if a war starts, there are going to be an awful lot of people who die. We should not have any illusions about that. This is not going to be a clean, quick, surgical war. That is not the nature of the region, not the nature of the history, not the nature of the passions that are involved. This is a situation, I think, where we will find that, if a war ensues on that scale, initiated by us, principally conducted by us, we are going to find ourselves with a subsequent chain of events that no one can forecast. I think that is the dark and monstrously complex and dangerous and costly to our country.

War is about, as I just said, people dying, and there are going to be a lot of Americans who will die in this war. A good number already have just in accidents and other circumstances. Most of the forces that we have over there on that frontline situation right now are very young. They are not much older than these pages sitting down here in the well of the Senate, a few years older, but they have not lived very long. If the bullets start flying, there are going to be a lot of them who are not going to live much longer. That is just the sheer, miserable fact of war. War is about fire and steel and people dying.

I am convinced in my own mind that if the sons and daughters of all of us, or the President, of the Vice President, the Cabinet, were all over there in the Persian Gulf right now right up on the front line and were going to be part of that first assault line that would go into Kuwait, I think we would be looking at a much longer time. I think we would be working harder on the sanctions policy. I think we would be trying to squeeze Saddam Hussein in every other way that we could, short of a shooting war.

But that is not the nature of it. I must say I am troubled about that. It is even different than when we had the Vietnam war because when we had the Vietnam war, we had the draft in place, which was not a perfect device. We collected people in this country in a far more equitable way when there was a requirement, or so it seemed—I guess whether it was right or not, but that the boys of this generation were not at risk and ask them to fight and die for their country. We lost over 55,000. We lost over 55,000. And I can tell you this, I did not know Lyndon Johnson well, but I knew him well enough to be able, I think, to make this statement. I think if he had known at the outset that that war—or John Kennedy knew him—he was going to take 55,000 American lives and over 200,000 American wounded, he would have said, no, we are not going ahead with it; it is not worth it.

It was not worth it. It was not worth it. And any of us who served during that time who did talk to the parents who lost sons principally and some daughters in that war and tried to make sense out of it and explain it to them, whether out in Arlington Cemetery or military hospitals, which all of us who served at that time did, and to try to find words to explain why their son either had to die or be incapacitated in some way, it was very difficult to find the words.

It is not going to be any easier in this situation. I have to tell you I care about people, and people that I do not know. But I do not care much about the emir of Kuwait. I've never met him. I do not care if I ever do meet him. I do not care much about monarchies. Whether he runs the show in Kuwait or not I do not think is really very important to this country. I do not mean by that that I want Saddam Hussein to run it. But the issues at stake over there are very unclear and very fuzzy, not about democracy, I will tell you that, because there is no democracy there. There was not before, there is not now, and there will not be, in my view, in the future. So that is not why we are asking a combat force, 90 percent plus of whom are Americans, to be ready to start to fight and die. So I have very serious reservations about that. We have changed the draft, as I say, so now we have a volunteer army. And in that volunteer army we have a very high proportion of people in our society who represent minority groups in our country, partly because it was a professional opportunity, a job opportunity, a chance to get ahead.

So we do not have, in a sense, an even distribution throughout our country of who it is that is up there on the front edge of this thing, and who are going to be the ones that are asked to pay the price.

I will make a prediction right now, and I hope I am wrong. If the shooting starts I think there are going to be many, many, many thousands of deaths, civilians and combatants on both sides, and a lot of other innocent people who get caught in the crossfire. Those people were all over Vietnam, too, by the way. I am talking about civilians who get caught in the crossfire, children, old people, people who pay that price, is every bit as severe as people who are in combat responsibilities.

I have been hearing from the people of Michigan about this because they care very deeply about it. I only want to make two references to it and I will move on.

This week, from Michigan, I received over 800 phone calls and letters. In December I had a total of about 3,000. The messages that I am getting, obviously this is not a perfect sample, these are self-initiated, are running 9 to 1 against going to war at this time. But what happens if we have a war, beyond just the mayhem that will occur that any war brings? I received a letter from a professor at Michigan State University. I want to read it into the Record because I think it is directly relevant to what the stakes are here. It is written to me by a professor named Alan Fisher, director and professor of Middle East history at Michigan State University. This is what he says. He sent this in on his own.

In this difficult time of debate over what to do in the Middle East, please consider the following questions as you grapple with the options available (continued reliance on sanctions or war): What will the Middle East look like after a war?

He then goes on to write as follows:

Besides the inevitable enormous loss of life, mostly non-combatants, and mostly Arabs to begin with:

1. Will there be a Kuwait left to return to sovereignty?
2. Will Iraq be a more stable place with Hussein removed by military means?
3. Will the Iraqi civilians who survive our bombing be likely "good citizens" in the New World Order?
4. Will Israel be further along the road to a secure future? Will many Israelis also be dead, wounded, and will not Israel be even more of an economic dependency of the United States?
5. Will Israel be more likely to be able to move in the direction of peace with the Arab world?
6. Will Turkey's democracy survive? Is it not more likely that Turkey's largely Islamic population will be less Western-oriented and more receptive to the influence of another Islamic Republic as one of the results of such a war?
7. Will Jordan possibly survive at all as a country? Think of the likely millions of refugees of out Iraq/Kuwait to Jordan, Syria, Arabia as the result of heavy bombing and war.
8. Can the Saudi family possibly survive such a catastrophe as a war on their borders (particularly the war that most seem to be forecasting)? What will this mean for the economy of the world, let alone Michigan?

These questions and others need asking, and he is exactly right. There has not been much debate yet about the question of where this all leads. Where does this all lead?

If we have the mayhem that will come from a shooting war of the kind that one can anticipate here, what are the down-the-line consequences, if not instability probably spreading off in all directions?

But I want to ask this question: if this is so important to the world, to the rest of the world, the rest of the world that is on our side, where are they? Where are they? Why are not
they there? Why are not they there when it is possible to do it?

I will tell you why they are not there: the rest of the world, what we call our allies, are not willing to fight this war. They are not willing to fight it. They are willing to say that it is OK for us to do it. But they are not willing to fight it.

I saw a woman in my hometown of Flint, MI, a few months ago. She said to me, and I was powerfully struck by this, that she has three sons in the Marine Corps and they are all over there right now in that situation in forward positions.

It just knocked the wind out of me because I think of a family being called upon to maybe send one child, or at the most two. This woman looked me in the face and explained to me that she has three sons there.

In my mind, I was thinking to myself, as our forces rush in, the rest of the world are out in the front positions in these sand dunes out there in Saudi Arabia, why are not there some Japanese combat forces over on the next sand dune? Why are not there some German forces over on another sand dune, and some French forces over on another sand dune?

They are not there, as we were just told by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee. And you will not see them there.

As long as we are willing to carry this load for the rest of the world, wisely or unwisely, whether we can afford it or not, whether it is fair or not, the rest of the world will stand aside as they are doing.

Yes, we have a few allies there. Quite frankly, just as we did in Vietnam, in effect we are paying some of them to be there with us. I am glad the Egyptians are there with us. They are there to defend Saudi Arabia. They are not prepared to be part of assault wave into Kuwait. Of course, we just forgave 8 billion dollars' worth of bills that they owe us, and that has something to do with why they are there in a defensive capacity, and the same applies to U.N. votes.

We have looked the other way at some of the outrages that have gone on in China with respect to the brutality and repression there.

Now there is some brutality that is going on in the Baltic States with the Soviet Government. We got their votes and their support, at least adequately endorsing the United Nations, and how did we get that support to let us go in and fight this war for everybody else, by looking the other way and soft-pedaling some of the things that they are doing and in fact helping them directly and in other ways.

So I think it is fair to say that we bought a little support there as well. I am convinced, as I stand here, if the issue put to the United Nations today was this: Look, we would like you to put together a 500,000-person international, multinational force that over the next 90 days would replace the American force, and we would be part of it, we would do our fair share, and get all of the rest of the U.N. nations involved, let us have an honest-to-goodness U.N. force in there, and then if we are going to have an offensive action, let us let that be who carries it out. If that were put on the floor of the U.N. today for a vote, how many votes do you think that would get? How many votes do you think that would get? That is why it has not been done that way, because there are not the votes for that, because the rest of the world is not willing to fight this fight, unless it is being done with young people from this country. And that is wrong.

It is just plain wrong. There is no justification for it.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a letter be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY,

Senator DONALD RIEGLE,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR RIEGLE: In this difficult time of debate over what to do in the Middle East, please consider the following questions as you grapple with the options available (continued reliance on sanctions or war): What will the Middle East look like after a war?

Besides the inevitable enormous loss of life, mostly non-combatants, and mostly Arabs to begin with:

1. Will there be a Kuwait left to return to sovereignty?
2. Will Iraq be a more stable place with Hussein removed by military means?
3. Will the Iraqi civilians who survive our bombing be likely "good citizens" in the New World Order?
4. Will there be further along the road to a secure future? Will not many Iraqis also be dead, wounded, and will not Israel be even more of an economic dependency of the United States?
5. Will Israel be more likely to be able to move in the direction of peace with the Arab world?
6. Will Turkey's democracy survive? Is it not more likely that Turkey's largely Islamic population will be less Western-oriented? I foresee the establishment in Turkey of another Islamic Republic as one of the results of such a war.
7. Will Jordan possibly survive at all as a country? Think of the likely millions of refugees to pour out of Iraq/Kuwait to Jordan, Syria, Arabia as the result of heavy bombing and combat.
8. Can the Saudi family possibly survive such a catastrophe as a war on their borders (particularly the war that most seem to be forecasting)? What will this mean for the economy of the world?
9. Will the United States able to remain in authority in Egypt? Is it not more likely that he will be replaced there with a variant of an Islamic Republic too?

10. Is it not likely that there will be civilian casualties of a terrorism campaign as a part of this war?

Is it not a better alternative to take the "triumphal record" and call upon the international community (in the hopes of avoiding civilian and non-combatant casualties, and in the hopes of preserving the stability of the rest of the Middle East) to tighten the sanctions, to isolate Iraq from the world community, to send home their diplomats and close world airports to their planes, to sell them back to Iran, to cut off the KUWAIT oil, to make it thus more likely that there would be, in time, an internal (Iraqi) solution to Kuwait? But such a strategy might take a year.

Is this too much of a sacrifice to make in order to avoid the collapse of the Middle East's political order, and to avoid the tens of thousands of deaths which the military option now would produce?

I have heard no one in the public side of the debate ask these questions, and they need asking.

Sincerely,
ALAN FISHER,
Director, and Professor of Middle East History.
January 11, 1991

I will tell you—mark it down—we have tremendous accumulated stresses and strains and dangerous conditions in our financial structure. You are seeing it in the banking system right now. But it radiates out beyond that.

These are problems building up over a long period of time, and they are very difficult to solve. When a nation goes off to war and conducts it essentially by itself, in terms of the costs and lives and dollars, it is even in a weaker position to be able to deal with its fundamental economic problems here at home. We are way overdue in that respect. It is time to start investing in America and in our people.

Here we are over in Saudi Arabia. I asked how much the Saudis have given to this war effort so far. The figure is about $6 billion. It is a laugh. In fact, I think the Saudi royal family ought to be ashamed of themselves. It is a disgraceful thing. I will tell you this, they have a lot more at stake in this than any family in America.

I am not prepared, as I stand here, to put on the record the names of any member of the royal family of those countries that are under immediate threat. I should think they would want to be up on the front line ahead of us.

That is not the way it works. No, let us just go get some kids, hither and yon from this country and, yes, as the Senator from Virginia said a while ago, who in their youth and in their enthusiasm and so forth, and send them over there. It is one thing before the war starts, but it will be a very different thing after it starts.

It is regrettable what happened up in this gallery earlier today. I condemn that kind of outburst in here. But it is a sign of things to come if this war starts, and we all know it, at least anybody who has a memory.

I know this President, as we all do, and I would like to put on the record the presence from him personally, and in the duties and responsibilities that he carries. I want this President to succeed in everything he does, not just on this matter. It is not a decision that any one person in this country under our system or under common sense ought to take by himself. If we are going to war—and as I say again, it is going to be an American war if it starts—than we better have a real consensus in this country. I do not mean a 52-to-48 vote or 51-to-49 vote or 50-to-49 vote, because what that vote will say to whoever might be President is: Look, we are not convinced, we are not convinced that the stakes require this, or that this is the action to take at this time. I speak only as one Senator. But that is my view.

So my prayers, and the prayers of everybody here, will be with everybody who carries the weight of deciding and carrying this out, our military people in the field, first and foremost, and the President, as he weighs the judgments he is called upon to make. America needs a good decision here, and so does the world as a whole. I think the decision is to try every last thing that we can find, as long as we can try it, before we initiate and initiate an American war, the consequences of which no one can foresee.

I thank the Chair and yield the floor.

Mr. HARKIN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Iowa [Mr. HARKIN].

Mr. HARKIN. Mr. President, let me make a comment on something that the Senator from Michigan brought up. There is a misconception that this is a U.N. resolution. The Senator from Michigan did us a great service by pointing out that the resolution giving the green light to use force against Iraq after January 15 was a Security Council resolution voted on by 12 nations, only 2 of whom beside the United States have sent military or economic assistance to the effort in Saudi Arabia.

Again, I want to read into the RECORD a list of those countries that voted to allow our young men and women to shed their blood in Saudi Arabia: Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, Finland, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Romania, Zaire and Britain, France, U.S.S.R., and the U.S.A.

Again, France and Britain have troops over there. I might point out that China did not vote for the Security Council resolution. They simply abstained. Because of China's position as a permanent member of the Security Council, they could have killed the resolution using their veto power if they had voted against it.

It is interesting to note that the day after this vote the Chinese Foreign Minister was welcomed to the White House here in Washington.

We have to point out this is not a U.N. resolution. Thirteen member nations did not vote on it; 12 nations voted on it. I just read the list.

Mr. RIEGLE. If the Senator will allow me, I shall add one other final thought and then take my seat. Others wish to speak.

I mentioned the mother who spoke in Flint, Michigan, who has three of her sons in positions as Marines over there at the present time. If a Japanese family would send one of their sons and a German family or French family would send one of their sons, then two of her sons could come home and only one would remain. That to me is the test that we ought to be applying in this area of this discussion.

I thank the Senator, and I thank the Chair.

Mr. HARKIN. I thank the Senator.

Mr. President, I think we need to remember just how we got into this mess so that we can avoid repeating our past mistakes and sort of do a review of events that have unfolded so far.

Again, I am not going to go into every detail, although I think we have enough material to back up the things that I am about to say with cites of events, comments, many of which I will be inserting into the RECORD.

The fact is, the United States for a long time supported Saddam Hussein. He was one of ours. We supported him in the Iraq-Iran war. Throughout the 1980's, the administration, first the Reagan administration and then the Bush administration, continually played down, did not want to rock the boat on the human right violations in Iraq. Senators took the floor to talk about it. Members of the House spoke about it. But the administration did not want to do anything to rock the boat.

When Saddam Hussein gassed his own citizens, the Kurds, there was not a peep from this administration. When Iraq commenced building chemical and biological weapons, there was a deafening silence from the administration and from the Reagan administration. When they began developing intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel, again nothing was said by the Reagan and Bush administrations.

When they attempted to develop a nuclear weapons capability, there was nothing from the Reagan and Bush administrations.

I said, Mr. President, on many occasions after Iraq invaded Kuwait, we have the Israelis to thank for going in there and taking out what was beginning to be a national nuclear capability being developed by Iraq.

Throughout 1990, long before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Congress tried to impose economic sanctions against Iraq for its human rights and weapons violations. The administration opposed them all. On July 27 of last year, 1990, less than a week before the invasion, the House voted 83 to 12 to impose sanctions. The House approved them, but the administration opposed them.

On June 15, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, testified that the administration opposed these economic sanctions.

We keep hearing how Saddam Hussein is isolated; he does not get the support from this administration, the support of the United Nations, the support of Muslims, the support of the Arab League. They said, Mr. President, over and over, that they are not going to support Saddam Hussein. They did not support him emotionally, financially, militarily.

The fact is, the United States for a long time supported Saddam Hussein. He was one of ours. We supported him in the Iraq-Iran war. Throughout the 1980's, the administration, first the Reagan administration and then the Bush administration, continually played down, did not want to rock the boat on the human right violations in Iraq. Senators took the floor to talk about it. Members of the House spoke about it. But the administration did not want to do anything to rock the boat.

When Saddam Hussein gassed his own citizens, the Kurds, there was not a peep from this administration. When Iraq commenced building chemical and biological weapons, there was a deafening silence from the administration and from the Reagan administration. When they began developing intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could reach Israel, again nothing was said by the Reagan and Bush administrations.

When they attempted to develop a nuclear weapons capability, there was nothing from the Reagan and Bush administrations.

I said, Mr. President, on many occasions after Iraq invaded Kuwait, we have the Israelis to thank for going in there and taking out what was beginning to be a national nuclear capability being developed by Iraq.

Throughout 1990, long before Iraq invaded Kuwait, Congress tried to impose economic sanctions against Iraq for its human rights and weapons violations. The administration opposed them all. On July 27 of last year, 1990, less than a week before the invasion, the House voted 83 to 12 to impose sanctions. The House approved them, but the administration opposed them.

On June 15, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, John Kelly, testified that the administration opposed these economic sanctions.

We keep hearing how Saddam Hussein is isolated; he does not get the right kind of information. But all throughout the 1980's he had to be thinking America is on his side in supporting him. Even when one of his missiles killed 27 of our men on a ship we said "Oh, it was a mistake," and took no action against Saddam Hussein.

Then we come up to the fateful meeting between April Glaspie, our Ambassador to Iraq, and Saddam Hussein just a few days before the invasion. Listen to what April Glaspie had to say directly to Saddam Hussein before the invasion, which was recorded on videotape.
First, she tells Saddam Hussein, in reference to the British colonial power that drew the Iraq-Kuwait border:
I think we know that well. As a people we have experienced that.

When later in conversation Saddam Hussein said Iraq needed higher oil prices, our Ambassador said:
I know you need funds. We understand that. And our opinion is you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country.

Then Ambassador Glaсpie went on to say this:
We have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 1960's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not one associated with Americans. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction.

So if we are told that Saddam Hussein does not get outside information, that he is isolated over there, what is he to think after all the 1980's with all the United States and United Nations' involvement. Then our own Ambassador telling him we have no opinion on Arab-Arab conflicts, “specifically your border dispute with Kuwait.”

I do not know Saddam Hussein. I never met him. I can only take what I read and what other people said about him. But he must have been thinking that this is a green light from the United States for him to take action.

Then Ambassador Glaсpie was quoted in the New York Times after the invasion saying, “We never expected they would take all of Kuwait.”

I think it is important for people to understand what led us up to this invasion.

I am not saying this somehow excuses the invasion. Absolutely not. I supported and still do support President Bush’s initial actions that he took in Saudi Arabia. I said so publicly. The only thing that I disagreed with was in August was calling up Reserves. I did not think that was necessary. But I supported sending troops in a defensive posture to Saudi Arabia; I supported the United Nations’ Resolution 660. I supported efforts to get other countries involved; and I supported his efforts to get all the nations of the world together in the economic embargo and sanctions.

This is the kind of new world order that we ought to be talking about. Rather than responding with brute force and military power, we need a new world order wherein we respond to the Saddam Husseins of the world with isolation, economic and diplomatic isolation, to the point where their economy crumbles and they cannot operate.

If we can do that, then we truly will have achieved a new world order. But if we are simply going to use the votes of 12 members of the Security Council— and who knows what promises were made to them—as a pretext for America, again, being the policeman of the world, going in and conducting offensive military actions, we are back to where we were before the United Nations, and indeed before the League of Nations.

The President’s global economic blockade was unprecedented, replacing unilateral military action with collective economic sanctions. When we left here in October to go home, we had a unified purpose, and a unified position. I supported the President. I supported the economic sanctions. I supported the defensive structure we had in Saudi Arabia. I searched the RECORD, and I cannot find anyone in this body who disagreed with that, Democrat or Republican.

Last fall, we were up for reelection. During the campaign, I specifically said time and time again that I supported President Bush’s actions in the Mideast, although I did not think we needed to call up the Reserves. But, the time they were available was a good point. Only after the election, much to my surprise, the President unilaterally and without consulting Congress changed his policy and position in the Mideast in two ways. One, he upped the ante by going from a defensive position to an offensive position. I said at the time I thought that was not the right course of action to take. He could have consulted with Congress or called Congress back into session to consider whether we agreed with this policy change. But he made that decision without consulting us.

Another decision was made unilaterally by the President without consultation with Congress: to go to the U.N. Security Council to get this resolution setting the date of January 15. What is magic about January 15? Where did that date come from? I will tell you where it came from: It was plucked out of the air.

Actually, as my understanding goes, the Bush administration wanted January 1 to be the deadline. Some of the other nations of the Security Council wanted later dates. They compromised on January 15 as the deadline.

So the policy and position that was supported uniform among most people was changed. As I said, I cannot think of one Senator who disagreed with that policy before the election. The President, doubled troop levels moved from a defensive posture to an offensive posture. And set an arbitrary January 15 deadline. And again, I repeat for emphasis sake, this was not a date set by the nations of the world. It was set by the President.

That policy was supported wholeheartedly and uniformly, and we succeeded. We stopped him in his tracks.

Another reason cited for our involvement was oil. I agree with those who say in our economy we must have oil to function. I am one of those who think we ought to have a different energy policy and move forward on an energy policy that would make us more energy independent. But the fact is, right now we have to have it.

But we are looking at oil from Iraq and Kuwait. All of the oil that we had previously gotten from Iraq and Kuwait could be replaced just by raising the average fuel economy of the automobile fleet in America, the CAFE standards, by 3 miles per gallon. Think about that. We ask thousands and thousands of young American boys and women to die because Detroit cannot change the average fuel economy of their cars by 3 miles a gallon? How ridiculous; how absolutely ridiculous. In any event, Saudi Arabia has increased its production.

The next reason we were given was Secretary Baker again, that he wanted later dates. That was not true. I called the United Nations on the 7th of January. I was told to go to the Security Council, only two of the 15 members were there.

One reason enunciated was to stop naked aggression. I think we know that well. As a people we understand that. As a people we know that Saddam Hussein has been naked aggressor in Chad and Zaire.

Another reason was to stop naked aggression. We have heard that a number of times recently. Certainly naked aggression should be stopped. But what about a few weeks ago when there was naked aggression in Chad by Libya? We should be putting people to work on alternative energy projects: Environmental restoration, repairing our highways and bridges, and infrastructure in this country?

Another reason was to stop naked aggression. We have heard that a number of times recently. Certainly naked aggression should be stopped. But what about a few weeks ago when there was naked aggression in Chad by Libya? We did not rush over there with our troops. How about Syria? Syria, now one of our allies. Not too long ago Syria went into Lebanon and massacred 700 civil-
ians. That was naked aggression. We did not do anything about it. Now Assad is on our side. The Indonesians knew we were not going to do anything about it. Now Assad is on our side. Indonesia knew we were not going to do anything about it. Now Assad is on our side. But if we establish this new world order of economic sanctions and embargo on the United States, that would be more of a threat than the United States sending troops, because they know the United States is not going to send troops in many of those cases.

And that is more responsible to restore the legitimate Government of Kuwait. What does this mean? Does this mean the national legislature? The emir dissolved the national legislature in 1986. Only adult males whose fathers or grandparents resided in Kuwait before 1920 could vote, which amounts to about 8 percent of the population. The emir, as I said, dissolved the national assembly in 1986. So it is ruled by a monarchy, a virtual dictator, who has untold wealth.

But at the same time, is Kuwait a friend of the United States? How do we mark friendship? Kuwait has voted more often against the United States in the United Nations than the Soviet Union. What about going to Grenada to protect our people in Grenada, there was a vote taken in the United Nations, in 1983, on the subject of Grenada. There were 100 votes against us for committing naked aggression in Grenada. Kuwait voted against us. Just a year ago in Panama, there was a vote, again, on what we did in Panama, in the United Nations. Kuwait voted against us. So we have to really wonder, and the people of America ought to know this. Again, I do not say this in any way says we cannot take action. I am going to get to that, obviously, at the end of my remarks. I am just saying, at what price? At what price? How many lives?

Another reason to stop Iraq's nuclear capability. I will respond to my good friend, Senator HATCH, who talked about me on the floor yesterday. I said to him this morning that I was going to mention his name in response to, I think, a misinterpretation or misunderstanding that he may have of my position on this. There is a lot of talk about Iraq becoming a nuclear power and having a nuclear weapon's capability.

Let us look at the facts. Iraq has 12 kilograms of enriched uranium, which means they have the ability to fuel their nuclear reactor, which, of course, was taken out by the Israelis. Iraq is also a signatory to the nonproliferation treaty. When a country signs onto the nonproliferation treaty, they agree to two provisions: They will not obtain nuclear weapons and, second, in exchange, countries with a nuclear capability can help the treaty signatory to establish a domestic nuclear generating capacity. But any country that is a signatory has to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and account for the nuclear materials at any time. Last month, the International Atomic Energy Agency inspected the enriched uranium stockpile of Iraq and accounted for the 12 kilograms which they had obtained 10 years ago.

So they do have 12 kilograms. What can they do with 12 kilograms of enriched U-235? They can make one very crude nuclear device. I said device, not bomb. Bomb envisions something that can be picked up, carried by a plane, dropped and it could probably make one bomb. How big would it be? Again, this is where we get in the area of nuclear physics. It would be a big bomb, bigger than the one we dropped near Alamogordo, which they had to raise with a crane, probably bigger than the "little boy" we dropped on Hiroshima, which required a B-29 bomber to carry.

So let us say they were going to build this bomb with the 12 kilograms of uranium, what are they going to do with it? They send one bomber across the border and that plane will be shot down so fast. That is why we have AWACS over there. They cannot afford to lose one of their country. Are they going to put it on a truck and take it to Jordan? As soon as they did that, we would know they diverted their 12 kilograms and made a bomb. There is no way to deliver it. It is absolutely impossible to put it on a missile. As I said, they have not done anything to divert that 12 kilograms to any kind of bombmaking as of last month.

You say, well, they may develop other types of facilities later on. To build a nuclear weapons capability, Iraq would have to develop much greater quantities of enriched uranium or plutonium, one of the two. You cannot make a nuclear bomb out of nothing. You have to have the nuclear material. To get enriched uranium—let us take that first—they would have to build either a gaseous diffusion plant or gas centrifuge plant. A gaseous diffusion plant, if anybody has been to Oak Ridge, is very large and very costly. Ours was built during the Manhattan project that cost billions of dollars, a lot of time, and a lot of high technology.

We are going to have a briefing by our Intelligence Committee soon, but all the information I have from the Intelligence Committee is that the gaseous diffusion plant in Iraq and have not started to design or build one. They can build a gas centrifuge plant. Again, our intelligence shows they have enough hardware to build 260 centrifuges to separate U-235 from U-230. But you need 1,000 such centrifuges to get the enriched uranium to build nuclear weapons.

Why do I go into elaborate detail? Because so many people talk about this, but they do not have their facts straight. They have 26 while they need more than 1,000 gas centrifuges in order to separate out U-235 from yellow cake, which is mostly U-238.

The only other way they could enrich uranium is through laser isotope separation. This Senator spent 10 years on the House Science and Technology Committee. We talked a lot about laser separation, which Israel has developed it commercially. We think we can, but we have not even started the process of building large laser isotope separation facilities. It is very high technology.

The other route to fissile material is plutonium. Where do you get plutonium? Out of nuclear reactors, either military reactors or those that generate commercial electricity. Again, thanks to the Israelis, the Iraqs do not even have a research reactor and are not about to have one for quite a while. Even if they did have an operating nuclear reactor from which they could get the plutonium after a while, they cannot make a uranium reprocessing plant to extract the plutonium from spent fuel rods. They are not even near building anything like that.

This whole idea of this nuclear capability of Iraq is nonsense. So much for my uranium.
from Secretary of State Baker's no-invasion pledge. If Iraq withdraws from Kuwait by the 15th, we will not invade them and we will take no military action against them. That leaves Hussein in power and leaves whatever nuclear facilities people may think he has in-tact. So it cannot be an issue. It is one that al-Qaida, in proportion to the issue, is no basis in fact for the fear that they either have a nuclear capability, delivery capability, or are about to acquire one. As I said, if he leaves, they get to keep everything. So it cannot be too much of a concern of ours.

The last reason for our involvement is to force Iraq out of Kuwait. I submit, Mr. President, that is the only legitimate reason. We cannot condone in the post-Cold War era this type of naked aggression. I think that those of us who are supporting the resolution offered by the majority leader, and even those who are opposing it, all agree that Saddam Hussein's troops have to get out of Kuwait. On that there is no disagreement and no negotiation. The question is how best to accomplish Saddam's eviction from Kuwait in the long-term best interest of the United States and the Mideast and at least cost in money and lives.

That is why we emphasize sanctions. They are working, as so many have said, including the distinguished Senator from Georgia, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee—87 percent of Iraq's exports, 90 percent of its imports, 45 to 50 percent of its GNP, according to intelligence estimates. In the worst year of the Depression in this country our GNP went down by 14 percent—1931-32. We know how devastating that was in this country. Think what it must be like in Iraq when their GNP has gone down 5 percent in 5 months. So they have been reduced more than 5 months than the United States suffered during all 4 years of our Depression.

Again on the question of sanctions, Admiral Crowe in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee—97 percent of Iraq's exports, 90 percent of its imports, 45 to 50 percent of its GNP, according to intelligence estimates. In the worst year of the Depression in this country our GNP went down by 14 percent—1931-32. We know how devastating that was in this country. Think what it must be like in Iraq when their GNP has gone down 5 percent in 5 months. So they have been reduced more than 5 months than the United States suffered during all 4 years of our Depression.

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Mr. President, my conclusions are these. First of all, as to the constitutional position, only Congress can declare war. Only Congress can designate a war. And by the way, the other war. And by the way, the other war. And by the way, the other war.

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Sanctions must be given a chance to work is my second conclusion. I have talked about that enough.

Mr. HARKIN. Assad, I tell you Assad would like nothing better than to knock out Hussein. Then he becomes numero uno over there. If he can get it done with Americans, fine. This, the same Assad who just practiced naked aggression against Lebanon.

Or Iran. You have to believe that Iran would like nothing better than for us to take out Hussein, to do their work for them.

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Sanctions must be given a chance to work is my second conclusion. I have talked about that enough.
I had a different responsibility. I had a different oath. I supported the President.

When I left the military and later became a Member of the House of Representatives, I began to speak out against Vietnam. I swore at that time that never again would there be an unjust war. There will be times when the United States must use its military might—I am not a pacifist. But our cause must be just. Our purpose must be clear, and our people must be united. Nothing less will suffice for America going to war.

Quite frankly, if the Congress is divided on this issue, it is because the President of the United States has not made his case to the American people that war is necessary at this time. The polls all show a split. The recent New York Times CBS poll asked the question, “Should we go to war now or should we let sanctions have more time to work?” The results were 47 to 46. Evenly split.

I do not want our young men and women going into war with a divided United States. The President has not made his case to the American people. The American people are divided on this issue. That is reflected here in the Senate of the United States because we are divided, because we reflect that division among the American people. We should not go to war when the people of this country are divided and when our purpose is not clear.

Now I hope that we have the votes to do two things: To insist that the President come to the Congress before he takes any offensive action. That, I believe, is crystal clear in the Constitution. He must do that.

Second, to express the Congress' support for continuing the sanctions. There must be a time when force must be used. The President must make that case to the American people. He must get them united. Second, if we have to use that force, use it on a weakened Iraq, a nation that is going to be much weaker than it is now when they cannot get spare parts, when they cannot get tires, when they cannot get lubricating oil, and when they cannot fly their airplanes. Think of 1 year’s GNp loss of 50 percent or more, of what that would mean to their economy.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to put in the RECORD a number of items, one of which is this article that came in the paper yesterday from Philadelphia, to the Washington Post. It is entitled “Working Overtime, Preparing for the Worst.” “U.S. Companies on Tight Schedules to Fill Pentagon Order for 16,099 Body Bags.” They are working round the clock. The Pentagon ordered 16,099 body bags. That means something to me. As I understand, they have already shipped about 12,000 body bags over there.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

(From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 7, 1991)

WHITE SLAVES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

(Asby Schlesinger, Jr.)

President Bush's gamble in the Gulf may pay off in the form of sanctions. The combination of international economic sanctions, political pressure and military build-up will force Saddam Hussein to retreat. From the White House's tough talk we have learned that the Gulf War is designed primarily as a psychological warfare— and that it will work.

But tough talk creates its own momentum and may itself control. It's too late to gamble. If the gamble fails, the president will be hard put to avoid war. Is this a war Americans really want? Sen. Robert Dole (R., Kan.) said the other day that Americans are not yet committed to this war, and he is surely right. And is it a war Americans are wrong to fight? Sen. Robert Dole (R., Kan.) said the other day that Americans are not yet committed to this war, and he is surely right.

Among our stated objectives are the defense of Saudi Arabia, the liberation of Kuwait and restoration of the royal family, and full establishment of a free Kuwait. The phrase of a "stable and secure Gulf." Presumably these generous-hearted goals should win the cooperation of most of the Arab states, and the Gulf locals. Indications are, to the contrary, that our involvement is increasing Arab contempt for the U.S.

WHITE SLAVES

In this newspaper a few days ago Geraldine Brooks and Tony Horwitz described the reluctance of the Arabs to fight in their own defense. The Gulf states have a population almost as large as Iraq's but no serious armies and limited inclination to raise them. Why should they? The Journal quotes a sen­ or in the Arab diplomatic corps: "I see no desire to send my teen-aged son to die for Kuwait?" He chuckles and adds, "We have our white slaves from America and Japan."

At the recent meeting of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab states congratulated themselves on their verbal condemnation of the war in the markets and streets. The scenes of cheerful American families saying goodbye to their sons and daughters are being repeated in few Saudi homes." Mr. LeMoyne continued. "Some Saudis' attitude toward the American troops verges on treating them as a sort of contracted superpower en­forcer."

"He quoted a Saudi teacher, "The American soldiers are a new kind of foreign worker here. We have Pakistanis driving taxis and now we have Americans de­fining us.

I know that the object of foreign policy is not to win gratitude. It is to produce real ef­fects in the real world. It is conceivable that we should have some of the Arab insults and soldier on as their "white slaves" be­cause vital interests of our own are involved. But, as Mr. Dole implied, the case that U.S. troops should cross the Persian Gulf is simply not been made to the satisfaction of the Congress and the American people.

Of course, we have interests in the Gulf. But it is essential to distinguish between pe­ripheral interests and vital interest. Vital interests must exist when our national honor is truly at risk. Vital interests are those you kill and die for. I write as one who has no particular quarrel with the use of political force to defend our vital interests and who had no doubt that vital interests were involved in preventing the domination of Europe by Hitler and later by Stalin.

In defining our vital interests in the Gulf, the administration's trumpet gives an awf­fully uncertain sound. It has offered a rolling series of peripheral justifications—oil, jobs, regional stability, the menace of a nuclear Iraq, the creation of a new world order. The pretext for war grow increasingly thin.

If oil is the issue, nothing will more cer­tainly increase oil prices than war, with long-term interruption of supply and wide­spread destruction of oil fields. Every whisper of peace has brought oil prices down. And the idea of spending American lives in order to save American jobs is despicable—quite unworthy of our intelligent secretary of state.

One aspect of the stabilization of the Middle East, this is a goal that has never been attained for long in history. Stability is not a likely prospect for a region characterized from one end to the other by tribal antagonism, religious fanaticisms and desperate inequalities. I doubt that the U.S. has the necessary capacity or the desire to replace the Ottoman Empire, and our efforts thus far have won us not the respect of the Arab rulers but their contempt.

What about nuclear weapons? The prevent­ive-war argument is no more valid against Iraq than it was when nuns proposed it against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In any case, Secretary of State Baker has in effect offered a no-invasion pledge if Iraq withdraws from Kuwait—a pledge that would leave Saddam Hussein in power and his nuclear facilities intact.

As for the new world order, the United Na­tions will be far stronger if it succeeds through resolve application of economic sanctions than if it only provides a multilat­eral facade for a unilateral U.S. war. Nor would we strengthen the U.N. by wreaking mass destruction that will appall the world and discredit collective security for years to come.

No one likes the loathsome Saddam Hus­sein. Other countries would rejoice in his over­throw—and are fully prepared to fight to that end. The American troops in the Gulf since the threat he poses to the United States. Is far less than the threat to the Gulf states, why are we Americans the fall guys, expected to do 90% of the fighting and to take 90% of the casualties? Only Britain, loyal as usual, has made any serious military contribution to the impending war—10,000 more troops than Egypt. If we go to war, let not the pose fade away, as befell the unfortunate marshal in High Noon.

And, please, Mr. President, spare us the sight of Dan Quayle telling the troops that this war won't be another Vietnam. How in hell he knew?

No one ever supposed that an economic embargo would bring Iraq to its knees in a short five months. Why not give sanctions a reasonable period to work? The Central Intelligence Agency already reports shortages in Iraq's military spare parts. If we must fight, why not fight a weaker rather than a stronger Iraq? Why not offer a pledge of a cease­fire in exchange for a pledge of a withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Gulf? The phrase of President Eisenhower's that comes to mind: "the courage of patience."

I also recall what President Kennedy used to recall during these dark days:
"Don't push your opponent against a locked door." What is so terribly wrong with a negotiated settlement? Iraq must absolutely withdraw from Kuwait, but the grievances that explain, though not excuse, the invasion might well be adjudicated. As for the nuclear threat, that can be taken care of by a combination of arms embargo, international inspection, and great-power deterrence. There is no real threat, that can be taken care of by a collective security and build a new world order.

One has the abiding fear that the administration has not thought out the consequences of war. Fighting Iraq will not be like fighting Grenada, or Panama. The war will most likely be bloody and protracted. Victory might well entail us in Middle Eastern chaos for years—all for interests that, so far as the U.S. is concerned, are at best peripheral.

IRAQI SIDELINE

Worst of all, the Iraqi sideshow is obfuscating us in areas where vital interests are truly at stake. While we concentrate energies and resources in the Middle East, Eastern Europe is in travail and the Soviet Union is in troublesome transition. While we substantially hand off defense democracy in the ex-communist states, but at least we ought to be thinking hard about ways we could help on the margin. Finally, we lose sight of the most essential of our national security than the Middle East.

And we confront urgent problems here at home. Our economy, decaying infrastructure, deteriorating race relations, a shaky banking system, crime-ridden cities on the edge of bankruptcy, states in financial crisis, increasing public and private debt, low productivity, diminishing competitiveness in world markets. The crisis of our national community demands major attention and resources too. While we fiddle away in the Middle East, the American economy will continue to decline, and Japan and Germany will seize the world's commanding economic heights.

War against Iraq will be the most unnecessary war in American history, and it will make most serious damage to the vital interests of the republic.

(Mr. Schlesinger is Albert Schweitzer professor of moral philosophy at Harvard University and a Pulitzer Prize winner for his book "The New World Disorder." He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.)

[By Mary Jordan]

PHILADELPHIA—In a one-story factory on a quiet side street in the blue-collar Port Richmond neighborhood here, workers who make these bags for military use under a rush order for 16,099 body bags for soldiers who may die in Operation Desert Shield.

"I hope nobody has to use these," said Edward Leach, an employee of the firm that makes the bags. "But it's a bit like our military, I suppose. You need them."

"We're running three shifts around the clock. We can't do more than that," said Harry Fleischer, Aldan's vice president for marketing. "We're working overtime and Saturdays.

Most of Aldan's business is in commercial products, including material for Gerber waterproof bedheads for babies. "I choose not to think about it's for because it's for human beings," Fleischer said. "I prefer not to think about it's for because it's for human beings." "I'm seeing quite a bit of this these days," said Winston Parker, the factory's head oven operator as he checked the rubber-coated material on one of the ovens. "I don't hope nothing is going to happen that means we have to use these. It's not going to prove anything if we go to war."

[From the Washington Post, Sept. 13, 1990]

By Jim Hoagland

One week before he ordered his troops into Kuwait, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein warned the U.S. ambassador in Baghdad that American officials could not oppose his amilies in the Middle East because "yours is a society that cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle" and is vulnerable to terroristic attack, according to the Iraqi minutes of the July 26 conversation.

U.S. Ambassador April Glaspie did not respond directly to Saddam's menacing command. But waiting instead on Saddam's "extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country," she also gently probed the Iraqi leader's intentions in massing troops on Kuwait's border, but did not criticize the Iraq troop movements, according to the Iraqi transcript.

The State Department did not challenge the authenticity of the transcript yesterday. Spokesman Richard Boucher declined to comment on specific remarks it contains. He said his office was not able to confirm the Iraqi version of the meeting that has shaded giving Glaspie explicit warnings that he would take whatever action he deemed necessary to protect the Iraqi government from an "economic war" against Iraq. Her response, as recorded by the Iraqis, was to reassure Saddam that the United States takes no official position on Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait.

In response to Saddam's comments about Iraq's need for high-oil prices, the ambassador said: "I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But waiting instead on Saddam's "extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country," she also gently probed the Iraqi leader's intentions in massing troops on Kuwait's border, but did not criticize the Iraq troop movements, according to the Iraqi transcript.

The State Department did not challenge the authenticity of the transcript yesterday. Spokesman Richard Boucher declined to comment on specific remarks it contains. He said his office was not able to confirm the Iraqi version of the meeting that has shaded giving Glaspie explicit warnings that he would take whatever action he deemed necessary to protect the Iraqi government from an "economic war" against Iraq. Her response, as recorded by the Iraqis, was to reassure Saddam that the United States takes no official position on Iraq's border dispute with Kuwait.

The disclosure of the transcript to Western news media, which originated with Iraqi officials, appears intended to emphasize that Saddam had reason to believe that the Bush administration would not offer any serious opposition to his move against Kuwait. But the transcript makes it clear that the Bush administration's misreading of Saddam's intentions and capabilities may have emboldened him to commit an act of aggression that has brought the United States to the brink of war in the Persian Gulf.

Mr. HARKIN, Mr. President, that is what this is about. It is about body bags. There may come a time when we have to deal with it. But it is not a time now and it is not now. The time is here and now for a new world order based on economic sanctions, isolation, keep our allies together, and making Saddam Hussein pay a much, much higher price with a minimal loss of our lives of our own young men and women in Saudi Arabia.

I yield the floor, Mr. President.

Mr. BENTSEN addressed the Chair as PRESIDENT pro tempore.

The Chair recognizes the Senator from Texas.
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If the Senator will withold, I want to indicate to the various Members of the Senate who are here that I have received from my predecessor in the Chair, the Senator from Virginia, a list of Senators who have been in the Chamber waiting to be recognized in order of their appearance in the Chamber. I will proceed according to that list, and therefore recognize the Senator from Texas (Mr. Bentsen).

The Gulf Crisis

Mr. Bentsen. Mr. President, I am in an unaccustomed role. I have a reputation of being somewhat of a hawk for the things that I have done in this Chamber. I have received from my predecessor in the Senate the Senate floor waiting to be recognized in the Chamber. I will proceed according to that list, and therefore recognize the Senator from Texas (Mr. Bentsen).

This debate that we have today is more than just about principles and policies and prerogatives. It is about American men and women and their lives. I have every morning television on television wishing their families well. I do not think anyone in this chamber or the generals themselves can have an accurate, sure knowledge of what costs there will be to this war. I heard the Senator from Michigan saying that he did not know Lyndon Johnson well but he was sure if Lyndon Johnson had known there was going to be 58,000 lives lost in Vietnam, that he would have been following the suggestion of the Senator from Vermont. Senator Aiken, to declare victory and go home. And I must tell you there is intense debate in the Senate that you see every morning television wishing their families well.

I do not believe that for a minute. I have a reputation of being somewhat of a hawk for the things that I have done in this Chamber. In the Persian Gulf, if they do not go ahead into combat, that they will be disappointed.

I do not think that for a minute. I have a reputation of being somewhat of a hawk for the things that I have done in this Chamber. In the Persian Gulf, if they do not go ahead into combat, that they will be disappointed.

Mr. President, I fully recognize that it may only be possible to eliminate the consequences of Iraqi aggression by liberating Kuwait by Armed Forces. And certainly the meeting this week between Secretary Baker and Foreign Minister Aziz gave us little reason to be optimistic about a negotiated settlement or unilateral Iraqi withdrawal. Let me make that quite clear. I do not rule out the use of military action to force the Iraqi military from Kuwait. But I strongly believe there is less risk overall in giving those sanctions more time to work. It is not clear to me that the people of the United States are committed to the option of invasion and all it entails.

Mr. D'Amato. Will the Senator yield for a question, Mr. President?

Mr. Johnson. If I may continue, I ask the Senator to wait until the end of my statement, please.

Some are saying that this debate divides us. But the truth is that the American people are already divided on the wisdom of war in the Gulf. We cannot wish away those divisions or swallow them in a great gulp of patriotism. But I think we can try to minimize their consequences abroad by limiting this debate in time and reaching an early conclusion.

Only the President, I believe, by rational persuasion from his position of leadership, can bring about a consensus.

I think we need to keep the invasion option on the table, right out front, where the Iraqis can see it. I believe it is premature to authorize the President with our forces to march on Kuwait, because in the largest country, in the largest country in the world, where the Congress gives the President clear authority to fight in defense of our interests, guarantees expedited procedures on the use of force to liberate Kuwait, if the President specifically requests it, and provides for the alternative option of holding our fire while we see if those sanctions will work.

If someone thought they were going to work in 4 or 5 months, we should have never taken that route. That is not a realistic timetable.

I think this resolution by the majority leader and the Senator from Georgia is the best course of action under the circumstances. I believe it preserves the constitutional role of the Congress and the President, and guarantees the President a prompt vote if he should seek an authorization for offensive operations.

President Eisenhower knew the horror of war. Yet he talked about "the courage of patience." Two of our highest ranking military officers, recent Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
are Admiral Crowe and General Jones. Admiral Crowe said that the embargo is biting heavily. He said it is the most effective peacetime blockade that has ever been imposed. He added that it is not working as fast as many would prefer, he noted that most experts believe that it will work with time. And the estimates range all the way from 12 to 18 months.

Admiral Crowe concluded, "It would be a sad commentary if Hussein, a two-bit tyrant presiding over 17 million people and possessing a GNP of $40 billion, would have more patience than the world's most affluent and powerful nation."

General Jones called for "patient resolve" and expressed concern that the most recent reinforcements might cause us to fight prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily.

What we are looking at here is a country that is about the geographical size of California, has the population of Texas, and has the income of Louisiana, a country that has never been as isolated as this one is, surrounded by those economic sanctions.

CIA Director Webster gave unclassified testimony about the potential effects of the sanctions on Iraq's war machine. He said, "Under noncombat conditions, Iraqi ground and air forces can probably maintain their near-current levels of readiness for as long as 9 months." He said, "Iraqi technicians would be able to maintain current levels of aircraft sorties for 3 to 6 months."

What that means is, as these sanctions continue—and we heard statements about their GNP being cut by 50 percent already, 70 percent at the end of 12 months. What kind of a fighting force do you think you have when you only have 50 percent of your GNP left? What do you think has been happening to the resupply of parts, to the effectiveness of the vehicles that they have to use? These estimates mean that you have very serious problems for Iraq insofar as their economy, and have that by summer.

I also recognize it is a genuine question whether our international coalition can hold together for that long. But there are enormous uncertainties over the scope of that war—and the consequences of a full-scale war—and what might encourage the further destabilization of that area.

Mr. President, I know it can be frustrating for our Government and for some of our troops in the field to hold back and wait for sanctions to take their toll. But that time will not be wasted. A year of sanctions will force them to cannibalize their parts, create a shortage in those parts, dry up supplies of processed fuel and foreign exchange. When you finally cut back that much, well over 90 percent on those things they can sell, they will not have the foreign exchange to buy those things they need to wage war.

I still cannot see any compelling reason to rush into war, with all it means in terms of national security, economic dislocation, and dangers to our interests throughout the region.

But there is another point I would like to make while we are debating questions of principles as related to the gulf. I am proud that America has the will and the capability to respond to grave threats to the international order, and it is good to have friends like the English, the French, the Egyptians, and the Saudis prepared to stand with us.

But there are other nations with vast economic interests in the region and in this crisis that are doing far less, when they could do much more. Major world powers like Germany and Japan, two of the largest economic powers of the world, have demonstrated that they can be aggressive, resolute, and make tough decisions when it comes to establishing market share in other countries, and economic sanctions on trade. But when it comes to taking risks and devoting the resources necessary to protect the system that enables them to continue to progress and prosper, many of our friends dial 911 and expect the United States to be on the other end of the line. We need friends who will do more than just hold our coats.

The fact that the expenses of Desert Shield are apart from the budget does not mean that we do not have to pay them. I can recall that we stayed out there for months, 4 and 5 months, debating the budget, making painful decisions, raising taxes, cutting back on essential programs, to save $41 billion. Now we will be spending it in the Middle East, in the gulf, and if we go to war, we will be spending an additional $1 billion to $2 billion a day. That is with all of our deficit problems, with the recession in our country, with unemployment going up.

We got into an arms race with the Russians. Fortunately, they went broke first. But we cannot afford to mortgage ourselves further unless we get adequate help from those who have the capability to pay.

There are many nations that have an undeniable major stake in effective response to Iraq aggression there that are not helping enough on that score. But if that aggression is overcome by force of arms, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States will pay a disproportionate share in lives and costs.

I feel very strongly that the President must have a fail-safe, expedited process to get a vote on the invasion of Kuwait. I have heard estimates are we had better be given those sanctions more time to work. I think there is less risk in that than going to war at this time.

We all want to bring this crisis to a conclusion. It has been stated we cannot keep 400,000 combat troops in the Middle East. There are many nations who have some extended tours. This is one fellow that did not see his first birth until he was a year-and-a-half old. At some point, maybe military action will be the only option left open. But I do not think that is the case today. We are approaching a moment of truth in the gulf, with enormous uncertainties and difficult choices. There is no easy answer, but there are important principles involved, and thousands of lives. Congress has a responsibility, Congress has a right, to share in the fateful decisions of war. We have a right and a responsibility to debate the options.

We must commit the Nation before we commit the troops, and by fulfilling our role as representatives of the people, I would hope that we could develop policies and priorities that commit the Nation both now and in those fateful weeks ahead.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Colorado [Mr. WIRTH].

U.S. POLICY IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. WIRTH. Mr. President, we begin the 102d Congress with the most critical vote any of us will be called upon to make: Whether or not to commit our Nation to war. After months of debate, hearings and consultations with the administration, we are now in the Senate fulfilling our constitutional responsibility of the war power by voting on the pending and related resolutions. There can be no doubt that the American Constitution grants the power to declare war only to the Congress. If article I, section 8 has any meaning, any clear applicability, it is in this precise circumstance.

The debate is not about American goals in the gulf crisis. On this, we all agree: Iraq's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait must be reversed; stability in the region restored; and a proper international process to get a vote on the invasion of Kuwait.

The debate is not about the ends, but about the means to achieve those ends. And here, there is significant difference of opinion on whether we should send American troops into Kuwait after January 15—or whether we should tighten the economic stranglehold on Iraq, while holding out the use of force as a last resort.

I cannot now support a resolution which gives the President the authority to initiate combat against Iraq forces. Such a course of action at this time—although fully justified by Iraq's aggression last August—is neither necessary nor prudent. For this reason, I have cosponsored the resolution offered by the majority leader, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee and others which urges continued application of economic and
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diplomatic pressure, while not ruling out the use of force at a later date.

Mr. President, as we contemplate sending over 400,000 young Americans into battle against Iraq, it might be in instructive for us in understanding this decision to review how precisely we have arrived at this historic juncture.

U.S. POLICY IN THE 1980'S

There can be no doubt that the responsibility for Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait lies squarely with Saddam Hussein's ruling regime in Baghdad. Secretary Baker spoke in Congress of Saddam's miscalculations, and he certainly has made many in the 1980's, if not before, beginning with his attack against Iran. But we too have made some miscalculations in that troubled corner of the world.

Sadly, the United States Government has contributed to the current crisis through the mixed signals of support we sent Saddam throughout his war with Iran. For example, the United States sold helicopters to Baghdad and took Iraq off the terrorist list in 1982; the following year we granted export credit guarantees for agricultural purchases—purchases which totalled $5 billion in the next four years. It has been reported that we shared intelligence data with Saddam.

Only in the past year, we have apologized to Saddam for offending him with a United States of America broadcast critical of Iraqi human rights abuses. Weeks before the invasion of Kuwait, the Bush administration vetoed congressionally mandated economic sanctions against Iraq. And in the week before the invasion itself, our Ambassador gave Saddam no reason to believe that the United States would intervene in Iraq-Kuwaiti affairs.

This is not to excuse Saddam, but to serve as a reminder that Saddam was given no firm, clear delineation of responsibility for Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait. We did not send in troops. There is no question but that we are in the Gulf in large part because of oil, and our concern about oil relates directly to our increasing dependence on imported energy. It would be a mistake not to point out that it was the Reagan-Bush team that dismantled this Nation's commitment to energy independence through alternative energy and energy conservation programs. In the area of R&D, for example, expenditures have been cut by more than two-thirds in the last decade. Fuel economy standards for automobiles have been rolled back, and just last year the President backtracked on his own goal of putting 1 million alternative-fueled vehicles on the road by the turn of the century.

We receive, Mr. President, disturbing reports about the White House's reaction to the comprehensive suggestions made by Secretary Watkins and the Department of Energy, saying we should not have aggressive conservation measures, we should not take the steps that I think most Americans know have to be taken. Simply put, cheap supplies of energy, not secure, reliable, domestic sources of energy, were the objectives of energy policy in the 1980's. This administration and the previous one strived for cheap supplies of energy, not energy independence. But, like the budget deficit, generated by the policy of the 1980's, we are now paying the bill and the price in even greater than anyone could have imagined.

In the 16 years I have been in the Congress, Mr. President, I have worked in the House and here on a national comprehensive energy policy, and never has the need been more apparent and never has the opportunity for success been greater than it is today. If there is a silk purse to be made out of this whole situation, Mr. President, maybe it is that we can expect President Bush—to make a statement of his long-term energy goals as he makes his State of the Union Address to Congress; and that he in that commits himself and this country to a national energy policy.

Maybe there is some light at the end of the tunnel of this otherwise very, very unfortunate situation in which we find ourselves. We must hope that our national energy policy will reflect the same vigor and commitment of the President that he has exercised in the international policy made and in pursuing Saddam in Arabia. Let us hope that same commitment comes for all of us here at home that he is making for more than 400,000 American troops overseas.

Mr. President, I applaud President Bush's initial reaction of Saddam's aggression. Following Iraq's brutal aggression toward Kuwait, the United States last August embarked upon a proper three-pronged approach to aggression in the Gulf. To stop Iraqi aggression and defend Saudi Arabia; to impose economic sanctions against Iraq; and to weave a broad international coalition to isolate Iraq. That policy and that deployment were broadly supported by the American public and broadly supported here in the U.S. Senate.

The initial U.S. policy has also been very successful internationally. The President quite rightly characterized the world's response to this first cold war crisis as critical in establishing a new world order. We have cooperated with the Soviet Government in a manner unimaginable since 1945. What once could have been the start of World War III is now the subject of broad superpower harmony. The United Nations, through the Security Council, has begun to fulfill its mandate of collective action for collective security.

But the day after the November election, the day after the elections, President Bush, without any consultations with this Congress, abruptly shifted U.S. policy by announcing his intention to add an additional 200,000 troops to Operation Desert Shield. Without a troop rotation policy, this decision to deploy 430,000 troops in the gulf put the United States on a clear path to war. With this decision, the President veered away from his successful three-part August policy and toward one fraught with significant danger. It is with the administration, and to the U.N. Security Council, that we ask why the administration chose to cast aside the course it originally set, especially when the best evidence we have indicates it had been working and when the U.N. resolution itself suggested that sanctions would require at least 1 year to be effective.

The former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones, testified before the Armed Services Subcommittee that—

My main concern is not that we might choose to fight but rather that the deployment might cause us to fight, perhaps prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily. ** * * Adding such a large increment of forces ** * could narrow our options and our ability to act with patient resolve. Mr. President, this is exactly what is happening.

Why the apparent change of strategy last November? Iraq is now the object of the most comprehensive set of sanctions in history, sanctions endorsed by the United Nations and actively supported by the world community. These sanctions are slowly but surely squeezing Iraq. As CIA Director Webster has testified:

Sanctions have dealt a serious blow to the economy. ** * All but 1 percent of Iraq's exports are removed from the world market. Iraq's exports are barely 10 percent of their preinvasion level. All sectors of the Iraqi economy are feeling the pinch of sanctions and many industries have largely shut down.

This from the President's own Director of the CIA.

Current estimates suggest that the sanctions have reduced Iraq's gross national product by 50 percent. Foreign exchange reserves are nearly depleted. Military support—spares, technicians—from the Soviet Union and France, previously major suppliers of the Iraqi military machine, is now nonexistent.

The impact of these sanctions on the Iraqi military is already palpable, and continues daily to erode their military preparedness. Tires, spare parts, special lubricants, and countless other
items are in short supply, and the list will only grow. If we must commit U.S. forces I would prefer to send them up against an enemy rendered anemic by an economic embargo, rather than send them to their deaths due to our own impatience against a better prepared enemy. Sanctions will clearly take time, Mr. President, but patience in this matter is a sign of strength, not weakness. And it certainly is the correct military route to take.

If sanctions do work, and the crisis can be peacefully resolved, we will give them that chance. If, as many argue, sanctions alone will not force Saddam out and we must use force, we will certainly do so with fewer casualties going up against a much less prepared enemy.

Proponents of the war option assert that the sanctions cannot work because the coalition will not hang together. Mr. President, for nearly 6 months Iraq has been the object of unprecendented international isolation. Post-cold-war diplomacy is at work, and it is focused on Saddam. Where is the evidence that our collective will to enforce sanctions is weakening? Where is that? I have not seen it. There is none. That coalition is holding together and holding together well.

Alternatively, the costs of offensive military action are incalculable. How many lives would be lost? What would be the impact on the United States and the world economy? Will Israel be drawn into a widening gulfs war? What happens to the forces of Arab nationalism when Americans begin killing Arabs? And what do we do after a war? Can we defang Saddam without creating further instability in the Middle East? Mr. President, has anyone at the White House thought through what we will do after a war against Iraq?

By initiating a conflict in the gulfs war we will set in motion unforeseeable and possibly disastrous consequences. Can the administration confidently say that a military solution will end this crisis in a predictable way and at a reasonable cost? Obviously not. The unknowns and the liabilities of the war option are far more troublesome than the problems of maintaining the international sanctions today.

Adm. William Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs under President Reagan, put it most succinctly in his testimony before the Armed Services Committee. Admiral Crowe said:

"If in fact the sanctions will work in 12 to 18 months instead of 6 months, the tradeoff of avoiding war, with its attendant sacrifices and uncertainties would, in my view, be more than worth it."

This from one of the most distinguished military men in our recent history.

This sentiment was echoed by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, our commander in the war, who stated in an interview with the Los Angeles Times, on November 29, that:

"If the alternative to dying is sitting in the sun for another summer, that is not a bad alternative."

And here is President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, before the Foreign Relations Committee:

"President Bush's initial commitment to punish Iraq and to deter it remains the wisest course and one which this Nation can reasonably and in unity support over the long haul. By any rational calculus, the tradeoffs between the discomforts of patience and the costs of war favor patience. Both time and power are in our favor—and we do not need to be driven by artificial deadlines, deceptive arguments, or irrational emotion into an unwinnable war."

Mr. President, a key question here is: What is the rush?

None can doubt for a moment the seriousness of the gulf crisis, nor the imperative of a vigorous American response to Saddam's aggression, but few would agree that this response will remain capable of taking military action if and when necessary, especially with devastating air and naval power. If force must be used, we should not play into Saddam's hands by sending ground forces against his heavily defended positions in Kuwait. I suspect that had President Bush not augmented our forces in the gulf to provide this kind of offensive capability on the ground, the question of the use of force would not be as contentious as it is today.

If force must be used, we would be well advised to restrict offensive action to air attacks, using armored forces defensively to deter any attempt by Iraq to widen the conflict on the ground.

We could, for example, assert the sovereignty of Kuwaiti air space quickly and without great casualty. Then any Iraqi attack on Kuwaiti-sanctioned aircraft in Kuwaiti air space would be dealt with immediately and decisively. The onus for escalation would be with Iraq, while the coalition air forces could use control of the air to interdict any illegal Iraqi resupply in Kuwait, thereby isolating Saddam's army in the Kuwaiti desert.

In this critically important debate over war or sanctions in the Persian Gulf, scant attention has been paid to the cost of the American response to Saddam's aggression. The American people and the Congress deserve a full accounting of those costs, direct and indirect, financial and political, incurred by the administration on behalf of the American people in pursuit of policy objectives in the Persian Gulf. And that cost has been staggeringly high.

Before the decision to nearly double our troops in the region, the United States constituted 57 percent of the troops in the coalition arrayed against Iraq. Allied pledged of nearly $9 billion offset about 50 percent of the then estimated U.S. cost, but now with the addition of 200,000 more troops, our share of the forces will rise to 75 percent, and those which will go into combat, as Senator Nunn has pointed out, over 90 percent. And yet we depend upon the gulf for only 10 percent of our total oil consumption. We are 80 percent of the fighting force, and we get less than 10 percent of our oil from the region.

It is certainly outrageous, Mr. President, that those countries most directly affected by the threat posed by Saddam are not contributing a greater share of those ground forces. It is outrageous that those who are most dependent upon gulf oil, such as Japan, are paying a disproportionately low share of the total cost of maintaining the free flow of that oil. The entire Japanese contribution to support Desert Shield is less than what one Japanese company has spent to acquire the MCA Corp $6 billion for "Jaws", "ET", and the rights to the concessions in Yosemite. Maybe one-third of that is committed to the Persian Gulf and of that, Mr. President, only $400 million has actually been paid. Six billion dollars for MCA, a commitment of $3 billion for the whole of the Persian Gulf; only $400 million of that commitment delivered. It is a disgraceful demonstration, Mr. President, of the commitment by an ally of the United States that is dependent for more than 60 percent of its oil on the Persian Gulf.

Finally, many of the oil-producing countries themselves whose interest in containing Saddam is greater than our own have reaped enormous windfall profits in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion. Yet how much of this is being channeled to support Operation Desert Shield? Saudi Arabia's contribution to Operation Desert Shield to date equals a week's worth of its crisis-related oil profits. How can we send young Americans to their deaths to defend Kuwaiti independence when able-bodied Kuwaiti students watch from the safety of American air bases in Saudi Arabia? And why are we still being asked to be our brother's keeper in every way. Everybody else is saying we will hold your coat, you go fight and, by the way, while you are fighting, you pay the tab as well.

Americanizing the gulf conflict is neither in the best economic interest of the United States nor the best political interest of the Arab world. The purpose of Desert Shield is to provide collective security to the Middle East, and it is imperative that this be accomplished through collective cost sharing and collective responsibility. The less our allies contribute, the more Americans will have to pay in war, the less the alih's efforts do the greater the loss of American lives.

The fundamental question in the gulf, Mr. President, is not whether or not Saddam Hussein is a brutal dictator who deserves to be overthrown. Clearly he is. Or whether his
unprovoked aggression against Kuwait should stand. It clearly will not. The issue is whether going to war with Iraq now is necessary to achieve our goals, whether war will put the United States in a better position to advance our national interests. The decision will bear heavily on our ability to show in the long run. An Americanization of war with Iraq now would not only be fraught with dangers in the short run but also likely lead to a destructive polarization in the Arab world that would make it much harder for us to advance the interests in that important region even more difficult to achieve for generations to come.

Before we send thousands of brave young Americans to battle in the Middle East, we have a duty to continue the course the administration correctly embarked upon in August and for which there was very broad national support. There is no guarantee that the economic and political sanctions will move Saddam. There is no guarantee of that. But what is the guarantee that war is not going to be fraught with much more danger? That is the question we face here.

I believe that before we sacrifice our sons and daughters, we better be certain we pursued fully and in good faith all of the options.

Mr. President, before closing, I want to also spend a couple minutes on the arguments that have been made over and over again by those who are critical of the resolution being brought forward by the majority leader, Senator Nunn, and others. Let me just touch upon those arguments because they deserve our attention and deserve to be refuted.

The argument has been made that there is a parallel between what may be doing now in this option and what was done in the 1930's: In 1932 in Manchuria, 1935 in Ethiopia, 1938 in Czechoslovakia. But the analogy does not apply. In fact, we have acted very decisively when we blocked force was sent to the Middle East to stop Saddam Hussein. Anybody who suggests this is a parallel to the 1930's when nothing was done is misreading history dramatically.

Second, the quite glib political argument is made that "the Democratically controlled Congress should have had this debate before now." Let me respond to that.

We had no request from the President, and in fact he did not want a resolution up here which would generate divisive debate. We forborne going ahead. There was an enormous amount of pressure on the majority leader to bring this thing up, and he did not want to undercut the negotiations that were going on in the Middle East.

If we had gone ahead with that debate, the same kind of political bashing that occurred that is going on now. If we started that debate, we would have been accused of undercutting the negotiations. We waited for the negotiations to be over and now the argument is we should have gone before. I find it quite disingenuous to pursue that criticism, particularly when the President, in fact only 10 days ago, said to the country and to Speaker of the House for their forbearance in this situation.

Third, the argument has been made over and over again that we have to re-store the legitimate Government of Kuwait. But let us remember that during the Iraq-Iran War, when we were reflagging Kuwaiti vessels, it was the Kuwaitis who would not allow U.S. forces to be put ashore for rest and recreation, or U.S. ships to come ashore to be repaired in Kuwait itself. We were reflagging their vessels and they would not let U.S. forces come on shore even in Kuwait.

Certainly, I think none of us would condone the rape of Kuwait, but let us keep this in proportion. Is it now in our interest potentially to bring this question to the U.N. to maintain an immoral war? I think not. Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait. To push him out at this time with military means is far out of proportion to the problem we face.

To those who say, well, the embargo is not going to work on time, I would ask: How long did we expect an embargo is going to take and why did we embark on this embargo to begin with? If we were not willing to stay the course? The argument has been made that somehow the Congress is going to blink in this situation. You can turn it around and say, in fact, the administration blinked. They had a very successful program going with the embargo, demanding a kind of patience, and we ought to be pursuing that.

Another criticism is that we are "pulling the rug out from under our U.N. partners." As the distinguished Senator from Iowa made very clear, the "January 15 Resolution" passed the U.N. Security Council by a vote of 12 for, 2 against, and 1 abstention. Essentially, this is a "hold your coat" resolution. A number of countries are saying, "We will hold your coat, Uncle Sam, while you go out and fight." Few have made any commitment to this at all.

I ask, Mr. President, if today the question facing the United Nations was going to war now or allowing economic sanctions to work, I would wager that the United States would clearly vote for the continuation of sanctions. We just went through 40 years of the cold war. We were enormously patient, holding together a very complicated, a very different, and a very important coalition. That coalition held together. We were patient for 40 years and we won the cold war. There were some during that period of time, since December 15 we have received 2,600 letters against the President's position, 196 for the President's position.

Obviously, none of us in making this decision is in a situation of simply making a bet that comes in: if we did that, there would be no point in being elected. You would just have a set of scales in everybody's offices and do that. But I think it is useful to note for the record how the people of Colorado have registered their concern and views on this crucial issue.

Mr. WIRTH. I have great respect for this debate. I hope that we have the wisdom and we come to the point, Mr. President, to persist in patience and to let the sanctions work, rather than rush to war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. BOND addressed the Chair. (Mr. KERREY). The Senator from Missouri.

A GRAVE AND IMPORTANT TASK

Mr. BOND, Mr. President, the task we have undertaken today is a grave and very important one, perhaps one of the most important that we will have, for it will offer the opportunity to exercise in our serv-ices in this body.

For more than 5 months now, Iraq has illegally occupied the sovereign nation of Kuwait. The occupation of Kuwait has been a brutal one. We have heard discussion today about the possibility of people dying. Well, people have died and people are dying. The Iraqi soldiers have murdered, robbed, raped, and tortured Kuwait citizens. They have taken newborn infants and thrown them out of incubators. Kuwait City has been dismantled and taken back piece by piece by Iraq.

In the wake of this outrageous violation of international law and common decency, President Bush has brought the international community together and the United Nations has issued some 12 resolutions from the Security Council. In November, the Security Council passed a final resolution authorizing force if Iraq does not agree to
withdraw from Kuwait. There has not just been talk. There has been action. We have imposed sanctions. We have not withdrawn from Kuwait. He refuses to do so. The Director of the CIA, Bill Webster, has indicated that there is no evidence that the sanctions will work, that the sanctions will get the Iraqi ground forces out of Kuwait.

No one would argue that perhaps the sanctions have cut the GNP, the gross national product, of Iraq, that the sanctions have lengthened bread lines, that the sanctions have driven up the cost of bread, that the sanctions have worked some hardship on the citizens of Iraq, but they have not squeezed Iraq sufficiently to get its ground forces out.

In his letter to Congressman ASPIN, Bill Webster, on January 10 said:

Our judgment remains that even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam currently appears willing to accept, even a subsistence economy in a continued attempt to outlast the coalition that is insistent on maintaining the sanctions especially if the threat of war recedes significantly.

Director Webster also says:

Iraq's infantry and artillery forces, the key elements of Iraq's initial deterrence, probably would not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically.

Today, as we enter the final days before the January 15 deadline set by the United Nations, I believe it is absolutely critical that the entire world send a clear message to Saddam Hussein, and that message should be we are not bluffing. As Secretary Baker said on Wednesday after his meeting with President Mitterrand of France, for thinking we will not follow through this crisis has been characterized by one miscalculation after another. First a miscalculation of world response to his invasion of Kuwait; second, the miscalculation of the response of the world to the taking of innocent hostages and the using of them as shields; and third, the miscalculation at Wednesday's meeting in Geneva that the United States and the world would not follow through on their promises to use force against him.

Given this record, we must not allow any action to be taken here that would cause Saddam to make the greatest miscalculation, the one that would result in his troops ultimately being forced into battle.

I can tell you, Mr. President, that I for one have been somewhat disappointed in recent days by comments of some of our allies who appear to be more and more willing as each day goes along to give Saddam some hope that there is a way out of the situation short of unconditional withdrawal, that he will get something as a result of his invasion if he compromises just a little bit.

President Mitterrand of France, for example, has been quoted as determined to do nothing toward Saddam for his crimes against Iraq. President Mubarak of Egypt made comments earlier this week that he would reevaluate Egypt's position in the coalition. Those comments are what I think both unnecessary and unhelpful. Furthermore, they show that there is a real danger that the coalition could come apart with further delay, a delay which would be countenanced by the resolution introduced by the majority leader.

We may have little influence over what the heads of other nations say, but we do have a President who is willing to lead. He has kept the coalition together. He and his Secretary of State deserves great praise I believe for that effort. There is something, however, that we can and I believe we must do to strengthen the President's hand, to strengthen the resolve to maintain the sanctions especially if the threat of war recedes significantly.

That means we must act. We have had a lot of debates on whether Congress can and must act on what the President can or cannot do. Those questions are all most now because the time has come for us to act. The President has asked for us to act. We must.

I believe there is only one place we can stand and that is solidly behind the President. I believe we must pass a resolution similar to the one that was passed by the U.N. Security Council in November, one that unconditionally authorizes the use of force. Any other action is certain to be interpreted by Saddam Hussein and the world that the result of the crises will go on and on and he will not withdraw.

What does Saddam Hussein want? Obviously he wants to keep Kuwait. He wants to be able to stare down the international community, in particular the United States. That will make him in his eyes and in many others, the leader of the Arab countries. He wants to be in that position.

How can he stay there? First he wants to make sure that we do not attack him. He wants a guarantee that he will have an opportunity to wait out the sanctions. He wants an opportunity to work to break down the coalition. He needs time in order to work to break down the coalition, to work his way back into his channels of distribution.

When I took at his goals and compare them against what I believe will be the result if the resolution I referred to earlier is adopted by Congress, it is clear that Saddam Hussein will be not even being willing to support the U.N. resolution; it would show that the United States is in retreat from the strong position taken by the United Nations.

Second, it will delay any possible action or the threat of any possible action. And speaking today with the Secretary of Defense, I learned that the ability to stand down his forces, to put less of an effort into total wartime mobilization, would allow him to regroup and recoup his strength.

The threat of war, the threat of military action against him is wearing on his abilities, on his supply lines, and on his troops. To give them a free pass, to give them a recess, to give them a winter vacation, allows them to rebuild their strength.

Third, giving Saddam Hussein more time to make a decision gives him more time to work to break down the coalition. In his eyes and in many others, the threat of war, the threat of military action against him is a very dangerous message to allow him to convey because it might attract others to him.

What does the resolution before us do for our country's efforts to resolve the crisis? No. 1, it ensures that Saddam Hussein will not beat the January 15 deadline. No. 2, it strengthens Hussein's resolve to wait us out, No. 3, it undermines the President's efforts to get Hussein to believe we are serious, which is our only real leverage to get him to withdraw his soldiers from Kuwait.

It is clear to me and the American people as well that the only way to get Hussein out of Kuwait is to make him believe we will use force. The resolution before us goes in just the opposite direction.

Saddam has made it very clear time and again that he understands only force. And he has made it clear that he does not think the United States nor the world will use force against him. Until we convince him otherwise, he is unlikely to back down.

We saw an excellent illustration of the obstinacy of Iraq on Wednesday. The Foreign Minister of Iraq, Azziz, showed absolutely no indication that Iraq intends to comply with the U.N. resolutions. He even refused to convey a message from our President to his President.

This can only be because Saddam is convinced that we will not follow through on our threats. It is sometimes hard to blame him for thinking we will not follow through. We have talked about the messages from the heads of other coun-
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tries. Certainly anyone who watches television, as we are told Saddam Hussein does, and sees the comments on our television about people pledging to withdraw our troops, or we will cut off our television about people pledging to try. Certainly anyone who watches television, as we are told, understands that someone not accused of policy declarations. The hide of the war. Here is a good one. I and peace.

We have heard a lot about what other countries should be doing to support and more military support. In case you do not recognize that quote, it was from Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in London broadcast on September 27, 1938.

I believe the better policy then and the better policy now was summed up by Winston Churchill in the dark days leading up to World War II. Churchill said:

Civilization will not last, freedom will not survive, peace will not be kept, unless a very large majority of mankind unites together to defend them and show themselves possessed of a constabulary power before which barbaric and statistice forces will stand in awe.

Also, we have heard lots of discussions today about how our situation shows we do not have an energy policy. We have heard a lot about what other countries should be doing to support our efforts. There is no disagreement with that.

If the resolution were to say we demand more support from Japan, from Germany, we demand more financial support and more military support from those countries we are defending, I suspect the vote would be 100 to nothing.

No. The reason we are here is to debate which resolution we pass. I believe the reason we must adopt a resolution supporting the position of the U.N. resolution is very simple and straightforward. The simple reason we must adopt that resolution is that we cannot allow Saddam Hussein to profit from his aggression.

The world stands poised at a critical moment. A cold war has come to a close, and the world is entering into a new era, one that I hope is going to be characterized by democracy and that.

On the other hand, there is a danger that it will instead be characterized by regional strife and violence. If we allow Saddam Hussein to succeed in this venture, the first of the truly post-cold war era, we will pay the price for years to come.

If the world makes it clear that we will stand by, not get in the way, and allow a large country to erase a smaller one, and to do it without a strong and immediate response, we will see that pattern followed time and time again in Europe, in Asia, in Latin America, in Africa.

In addition, if we allow Saddam Hussein to wiggle out of the current situation on any terms other than complete and unconditional withdrawal, we will serve only to strengthen his hand and we will be forced to deal with him in the future when he attempts to attack Saudi Arabia or Israel or when he bullies his smaller neighbors such as Jordan and Bahrain; then we will be forced to face an Iraq armed with long-range missiles and possibly even nuclear weapons.

Appeasement of a bully has never worked. We should have learned that in the 1930's. Less than 60 years ago, the nations of Europe tried appeasement with "peace in our time" and Hitler showed it did not work. Instead of standing up to Hitler when it could have done so at a relatively small cost, the other countries of Europe tried appeasement first by ignoring his military buildup and then by allowing him to keep Czechoslovakia, none of which had any effect other than to make him stronger and more bold.

As Churchill wrote in the first volume of his excellent history of the Second World War:

All this terrible superiority had grown up because at no moment had the victorious allies dared to take any effective step, even when they were all-powerful, to resist repeated aggressions by Hitler and breaches of the treaties.

One other matter that I would like to take just a moment to address is the issue of linkage, which has attracted a great deal of attention recently. Instead of discussing Kuwait's situation, destroying the invasion of Kuwait was motivated by Saddam Hussein's concern for the Palestinian people in Judea and Samaria. If you think about it for a moment, that is a truly incredible statement.

First of all, Saddam Hussein has never been a champion of the Palestinian people. In fact, he has only rallied to their cause when doing so furthered his main goal of becoming the preeminent leader in the Arab world—the next Nasser.

Second, Saddam's invasion of Kuwait resulted in great hardship and suffering for many Palestinians living in Kuwait—thousands have lost their savings and their homes and have been forced into refugee camps in Jordan and other countries.

And finally, to argue that Iraq's attack on Kuwait was somehow on behalf of the Palestinians and that Israel should somehow be forced to pay the price of that invasion is simply ludicrous. Kuwait is no friend of Israel; in fact, it remains in a state of war with Israel, and it has funneled billions of dollars to PLO terrorist groups over the years. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is exactly what it appears to be: territorial aggression designed to increase his power over Arab countries. The invasion had nothing to do with Israel and nothing to do with the Palestinians. To allow Saddam even the smallest success in this attempt to rewrite history would be an egregious error.

Put in its most simple terms, Iraq is in Kuwait because it invaded that country without provocation and without attempts at diplomacy. Its actions in that country have been beyond any bounds of decency or morality. Iraq, on the other hand, occupies the West Bank and Gaza as a result of its attempts to defend itself against decades of armed aggression by its neighbors. Saddam Hussein's main goal has been to increase his power over his neighbors—an offer we saw backed by bold action in the 1979 Camp David accords.

Certainly we would like to see a peaceful resolution of all of the problems throughout the Middle East, but the issue today—and the only issue—that we are dealing with is Saddam Hussein's crimes in Kuwait.

In closing, I would simply urge my colleagues to consider the gravity of the action we are considering today. Not only are we facing a decision that will affect the lives of hundreds of thousands of young Americans now in Saudi Arabia, but we are also facing a decision that could have an impact on the lives of many more Americans in future conflicts.

In making our decision today, we must consider what will be its long-term impact. We must understand that a decision to avoid conflict today may result in a greater conflict, greater loss, much greater hardship, and many more deaths down the road.

As much as any other member of this body, I dread the thought of sending American troops into battle, and I continue to cling to the hope that the current crisis can be resolved diplomatically. However, it now seems patently clear to me that the best way to peace is through strength, and the only way that we in this body can show strength today is to stand with the President and all of our brave men and women in the Middle East.

We have assembled such a tremendous force against Iraq. Now we in the Congress must act in a way that will finally cause Saddam to stand in awe of that force and the moral power that stands behind it. Only through such strong, clear-cut, and direct action can we hope to avoid conflict and convince Saddam Hussein that he must get out.
or face terrible consequences. As Director Webster has said, economic sanctions will not get ground troops out of Kuwait. Time is on Saddam Hussein's side, not our side. We need the credible threat of force to tell him that his time is up. I thank the Chair.

Mr. McCain addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.

ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to the resolution which is before us, and in support of a resolution which would, if necessary—and I emphasize only if necessary—give the President the support of this body for the use of force. It is only by supporting our President that we can achieve the goals of our national policy and meet our urgent national security requirements in the Middle East.

Mr. President, I stand here with some confidence, that the proposed resolution will be defeated. I have this confidence because, quite frankly, I cannot envision this body of responsible men and women endorsing a resolution which would tie the hands of the President at a time when he must be free to act, but which also endorses and I quote:

* * * the use of force at a later time, should that be necessary, to achieve the goal of forcing Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Mr. President, anyone who is a credible observer of Saddam Hussein recognizes one basic fact: It is a credible threat of the use of force which now has any possibility of succeeding in convincing Saddam Hussein that the evacuation of Kuwait is in his best interest. The correct resolution would undercut or destroy our last hope of a peaceful withdrawal, and then commit us to the use of force only when that threat has lost its meaning and credibility.

We also cannot rely on sanctions. First, sanction are not necessarily more humanitarian. In many people's minds, sanctions means that we will just cut off parts of Iraq's economic activity. That Iraqis will not be able to drive their cars, or buy luxury goods, and sooner or later minor inconveniences will make an individual such as Saddam Hussein accede to our request that he leave Kuwait.

Mr. President, in order for sanctions to succeed, we must inflict significant pain upon the people of Iraq. That is the object of those sanctions. Yet, Saddam Hussein is certain to allow massive pain to be inflicted upon his people before he will consider withdrawing from Kuwait. He will make innocent civilians and children suffer. It is the ordinary Iraqi that Saddam Hussein views as nonessential to his war effort. If we are not prepared, as a nation, to attack our military forces, we are prepared to watch films of children suffering from malnutrition and swollen bellies as a result of our sanctions?

Mr. President, it is intellectually dishonest to believe it will have decisive effect without the use of force. The best estimates of the CIA indicate that this is not the case. The Director of the CIA, Judge Webster, has stated publicly that the embargo will not have a significant impact upon Saddam Hussein and his policies in the short run.

We have already imposed sanctions for 5½ months, and we still have no clear timeline or date when we can be sure that sanctions will change Saddam Hussein's behavior. The question that I believe the sponsors of this resolution must answer before it can be seriously considered when this situation will change? When will they feel that sanctions have had enough time? Will it be 1 month? Will it be 2 or 6 months? Will it be 1 year, 2 years, 5 years, 10 years? When will they admit sanctions have been given enough time? Not only do the American people deserve that answer, but I do not see how we can consider this resolution, but so do some 400,000 American service men and women who are now in the Middle East? Are we deferring action or avoiding it? Are they reducing the risk of war, giving Saddam a political victory, or allowing Iraq time in which it can improve its defenses and make our men and women pay a higher price for victory with their lives?

Mr. President, during this debate we hear references time and time again to the implementation of sanctions and the embargo and sanctions could not do the job.

Mr. President, another key issue of this debate is the risk war poses to human life. Let us first establish during this debate that no matter where we stand on this resolution, none of us want to see the needless loss of human life, especially American lives. I reject categorically any argument by those who support this resolution that those in opposition to it do not share that fundamental concern.

The truth is that if we are forced to fight later—if we can fight later—Iraq will be more ready, more dug in, and more able to absorb our air attacks. We cannot use our power; there are other lives at stake here, lives that already are being lost day by day. I wish that every American would have the opportunity to read the report of Amnesty International. Amnesty International, I must know, is the most credible body on this globe concerning human rights and its observance. They have contributed more to the furtherance of the observance of human rights than any organization that I know, and I say...
that not always having agreed with them.

Mr. President, I will not read all of the Amnesty report. In fact, I will not read some of the excerpts from this report because some of it is so graphic and appalling that I feel some restraint is called for in reading all the details in public. I will, however, read some excerpts.

The report quotes a description of the general pattern of arrest described in a memorandum prepared by officials of the Kuwaiti Red Crescent dated October 23, 1990:

The daily arrests and attacks on civilians became widespread. People could not move about freely, even to carry out essential tasks for fear of being arrested, or killed, or disappearing. Raids on homes became a daily occurrence that people could expect at any time. The arrest and torture of people is something which threatened every individual. Young men were shot near their homes and in front of their families, and this method was used by the occupiers to terrorize the people and eliminate the young men on the pretext that they worked in the resistance. There were no fair trials for these people. On the contrary, arrests, interrogation, torture, punishments, and killings were carried out in an arbitrary and whimsical manner decided upon by intelligence agents and others in the occupying forces.

Mr. President, a number of people interviewed by Amnesty International also stated that detainees who are badly maltreated as a result of Iraqi torture are either kept in detention in Kuwait, or executed. This appears to be a more recent development prompted in all likelihood by widespread media coverage of human rights abuses. For example, the Amnesty Report quotes a 17-year-old former detainee released in early October, who states that:

...They transferred us to Muhafaxat al-'Assima where we examined. I hid the traces of torture on my body in order to avoid being executed, because anybody who has clear traces of torture on his body or is suffering from permanent damage is executed.

Mr. President, let me read a list of the following details of torture and ill-treatment which have been made to Amnesty International since August 2.

There are some 20 forms of torture on this list:

1. Beatings on all parts of the body, involving punching, slapping, delivering Karate-style blows and kicking with heavy army boots. Implements used for beating include canes, metal rods, whips, steel cables, hosepipes, rubber truncheons, and rifle butts.
2. Falsas: prolonged beating on the soles of the feet. Sometimes the detainee is then forced to walk or run.
3. Suspending the detainee by the feet, or by the arms which are tied behind the back.
4. Beating the detainee while suspended from a rotating fan in the ceiling.
5. Breaking of the arms, legs or ribs; dislocating the rib and shoulder joints.
6. Lifting the detainee high up in the air and then dropping him, sometimes resulting in the fracturing of bones.
7. Piercing the fingers with a clamp-like instrument.
8. Slapping the face, arms or legs with knives.
9. Extracting finger and toenails.
10. Boring a hole in the leg, apparently with a type of probe.
11. Cutting off of the tongue and ear.
12. Gouging out of the eyes.
13. Castration.
14. Hammering nails into the hands.
15. Piercing the skin with pins or staplers.
16. Shooting the detainee in the arm or leg at point blank range, followed by deprivation of the necessity of medical treatment.
17. Rape of women (including virgins) and young boys.
18. Inserting bottle necks, sometimes when broken, into the rectum.
19. Tying a string around the penis and pulling it tightly.
20. Pumping air using a pipe through the anus, particularly for young boys.
21. Applying electricity to sensitive parts of the body, including the ears, lips, tongue, fingers, toes and genitals. Sometimes the detainee is doused with water prior to the administration of electricity. The electrical instruments used include electric batons as well as wires, as well as metal rods (like those used to recharge car batteries but smaller in size).
22. Burning various parts of the body, including the genitals, using domestic appliances such as electric irons, with heated metal rods, or with a naked flame.
23. Extinguishing cigarettes on the eye balls or on various parts of the body, including the genitals, nipples, chest, and hands.
24. Pouring hot and cold water alternately over the detained person.
25. Placing the detainee in a cold, air-conditioned room for several hours, and then immediately into a heated room.
26. Pouring an acid-like substance onto the skin.
27. Pouring caustic substances onto the eyes, causing blindness.
28. Plucking facial hair, particularly the beard, with pincers or pliers.
29. Placing heavy weights on the detainee's body.
30. Splitting into the detainee's mouth.
31. Exposing the detainee to the sun for several hours at a stretch without water.
32. Subjecting the detainee to mock executions. This includes holding the head below water to the point of near suffocation; going through the motions of execution by firing squad; and holding a gun to his head or in the mouth and pulling the trigger.
33. Forcing the detainee to watch others being tortured, or to hear their screams.
34. Raping or torturing the detainee's relatives in his or her presence; threatening the detainee with such acts.
35. Threatening the detainee with torture methods such as the electric chair [al-Kursi al-Rajji], or with death by immersion in an acid bath.
37. Deprivation of sleep, food, water, fresh air, and toilet or washing facilities.
38. Depriving the detainee by using ob-scene language or insults.

Some of the cases Amnesty reports upon are too degrading to read.

One case, however, that merits worldwide investigation is a report by a Red Crescent doctor that over 300 premature babies died after Iraqi soldiers removed them from incubators, which were then looted. Such deaths were reported in the al-Razi and al-Addan hospitals, as well as the Maternity Hospital. According to the Red Crescent doctor:

Premature babies at the Maternity Hospital died after Iraqi soldiers took them out of the incubators. This happened in August, in the early days of the invasion. A total of 300 babies died in this way. I personally took part in the burial of 72 of them in al-Riggs Cemetery.
is interested in power and regional dominance. I believe that this would inevitably lead him to cut off or ration the world's oil supplies and thereby disrupt the world's economy. We cannot risk turning into his hands, the capability to undermine or destroy the world's economies.

We have also debated allied participation and burdensharing. Mr. President, as if this somehow excuses us from the necessity to act. I, too, am bitterly disappointed at the lack of active military participation by many of our allies. I suggest if there is any message President Bush and Secretary Baker need to carry to many of our allies, it is the great and enormous dissatisfaction that the American people feel about their lack of military and economic participation, particularly since we know it is the lives of American men and women that are principally at risk in the gulf. I believe we need to address that issue in the future.

Yet, Mr. President, we are in a time of transition, a time of transition to a new world order. Some 37 other nations have shown they are willing to make some contribution. Hopefully, when the next crisis arises, and unfortunately there will be one, we can expect a greater participation on the part of our allies.

We also cannot ignore our obligation to Israel. The distinguished majority leader of the Senate recently raised the issue that if we attack Iraq, Iraq might attack the State of Israel in response and thereby divide the coalition that supports the U.N. effort in the gulf. I believe this risk is minimal, and ignores the threat to Israel if we do not act. As recently as yesterday, President Hosni Mubarak stated that he felt if Israel were attacked, Israel had every right to respond in a military fashion.

It is also clear that many Americans understand that Saddam Hussein threatens the entire Middle East, and Israel's very existence, and not just the gulf. I think it is important at this time to mention a statement made by the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations on Wednesday, June 9, issued the following statement on the current crisis in the Gulf:

We support the policy of the Bush Administration in demanding the complete and immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait and its land, and the dismantling of Iraq's huge arsenal of conventional and nuclear weapons as well as its potential for developing biological and nuclear arms. Such measures are essential to prevent Saddam Hussein from renewing his threats against other states in the region and his attempts to further radicalize other Arab regimes.

Mr. President, this is a critical point in history. We determine at this moment whether we, in the first crisis of the post-cold war era, can act together with the United Nations and every other civilized nation in the world, to prevent naked international aggression of the most heinous and disgraceful kind. It is clear to me that if we fail to act, our New World order will be inevitably a succession of dictators, more Saddam Husseins. There is an abundance around this globe of real or would-be dictators who will see a green light for aggression and a green light for annexation of its weaker neighbors. We will have created a threat to the stability of this entire globe.

It is unfortunate at this time in history that the United States has to bear the majority of this burden. I believe over time we can rightfully expect other nations to provide the kind of cooperation and assistance that will be necessary in the next crisis.

Let us also not forget that American determination is our only real hope for peace. I am convinced that somewhere deep down, Saddam Hussein still must, somewhere, have a spark of sensibility. Convincing him that we will use force if necessary is the best and most viable option that we have to convince him that it is in his best interests—which is the only interest he is concerned about—to have an orderly withdrawal and a speedy one from Kuwait. If he cannot understand the threat of force, he will not understand the threat of any embargo. He will have forced us to war, and we will have been forced to act.

Let me speak about the history of sanctions in this body. It was on May 17 of this year when with a number of our colleagues, Senator PELL and I attempted to offer an amendment to the Chemical and Biological Weapons Act of 1990. I never heard more double talk, more triple talk, more quadruple talk about why, on May 17, we should not do anything to disturb our relations or our trade with Iraq. We had people telling us what a wonderful guy he was. Oh, he was changing. Incredible; it is in the RECORD.

We had a little fandango here about, oh, how the Ways and Means Committee would blue slip it; how we did not want to stop that legislation. We...
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adopted a policy that what is good economically for my region is what is important. We did not care about the butchery. We did not care about the chemical weapons. We did not care about the report that Amnesty International showed up, incredible. Did we not think they do not share the blame. Right up until the final days: Oh, we see him moderating.

I said, "Why?"

"Well, he's sending someone to the international convention on chemical weapons."

I asked the question, Was that to find out how he could use them better, more effectively? He was moderating.

He said, "Yes, my friend." How many times have we heard that from Assistant Secretary Kelly and the other groups of absolute wishful thinkers who showed no pragmatism, no practicality.

If on May 17 we had done something and sent the butcher of Baghdad a message—by the way, when I called him the "Butcher of Baghdad," the Iraqi Ambassador complained. I offended his sensitivities. Do I offend his sensitivities now? Will I be accused of being undiplomatic now? Is it any less truthful or was it any less truthful then?

I do not hear anybody bashing Saddam Hussein. I think we ought to be pretty careful when we speak about our President. I heard some language here that is less than careful and judicious. You may disagree. But to take the President on the way we have sends a terrible signal. And it is wrong.

This is not a question of whether or not we declare war. It is a question of whether or not we back up our President and our Nation's commitment and authority to make a more plausible threat in these 11th-hour circumstances of President Hussein's predeadline countdown. Our judgment is that Congress, by deciding to authorize the President to conduct war, materially improves his chances of achieving peace.

Let me read a part of today's editorial in the Washington Post: "* * * but do support putting in the hands of the President—a President who personally knows something about war—the authority to make a more plausible threat in these 11th-hour circumstances of President Hussein's predeadline countdown. Our judgment is that Congress, by deciding to authorize the President to conduct war, materially improves his chances of achieving peace."

If Saddam Hussein faces no credible punishment, no credible threat but the continuation of an economic boycott that, yes, is bringing real problems in Iraq. We are going to see if the sanctions work in the face and in the light of our expert testimony that indicates an evidence and facts that they will not.

Do we want to undercut the President, a blow to our President and to future Presidents and to our young men out there? Do it. That is what happens if we pass this resolution. It is incredible.

I have heard about the letter and the assessment of January 10. But when we look at the record, it seems that we want to disregard this. Mr. Webster in his latest analysis on January 10 said, "The ability of Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months."

Here are the CIA's comments as of January 10, in a letter to Congressman ASPIN. He said the situation in Kuwait is unlikely in the next 6 to 12 months to change. Twelve months from now, we will be here. Will our position in the field be strengthened? What about the resolution? The determination of our young men and women? What will the country be asking? What about the fragile coalition? And it is fragile, and we understand that. What about the economic burden? What does Mr. Webster continue to say, because we talk about whether or not the sanctions are working.

By the way, the same group who would not vote sanctions, who would not cutoff trade with him prior to his invasion, is now supporting sanctions. I find it interesting that we wait for him to wipe out, we wait for him to occupy, we wait until we send a quarter million-plus boys over there and now we are talking about whether or not sanctions are going to be effective and maybe we should give it some time. How much time? Is there anyone here with some expertise who can tell me 6 months from now that his Armed Forces are going to be degraded to the point that we are enhanced and he is going to withdraw particularly when we say we will not give the President the ability to back up any credible threat with the military? What nonsense.

"The enemy of my enemy is my friend." How many times have we heard that from Assistant Secretary Kelly and the other groups of absolute wishful thinkers who showed no pragmatism, no practicality. They did not. The administration was wrong. And they have come forward today and they admit it because those are the facts. I am not just saying that. I committed that to paper August 24 in an article to the New York Times. I said to them, "It is simply naive to believe that an economic embargo will starve Mr. Hussein into capitulating to our demands." It is in the RECORD. It is in the RECORD that we failed to do even a prudent thing, to send a signal to Saddam Hussein, "Do not undertake this aggression."* * *

Now after the aggression is undertaken, after the failure of the administration to stand early and the Congress to do what it should have done, now when the President commits hundreds of thousands of young men and women, what are we going to say to Saddam Hussein? We are going to see if the sanctions will work in the face and in the light of our expert testimony that indicates an evidence and facts that they will not.

Economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam Hussein to retreat from Kuwait or cause a threatened popular discontent in Iraq. Saddam Hussein faces no credible punishment, no credible threat but the continuation of an economic boycott that, yes, is bringing real problems in economic deprivation to his people, but that is not the kind of credible punishment that will move him, he has no incentive to withdraw from Kuwait.

History has pointed that out in the case of Saddam Hussein. But only when he faces an overwhelming threat to his well-being and that of his military machine do we have an opportunity to resolve this matter peacefully. So I say if we pass this resolution, we deprive the President of demonstrating that we have the will and the capacity and the ability to inflict the kind of punish-
ment that even Saddam Hussein will not countenance. This is our best opportunity to resolve this even if it is a minimal opportunity to resolve this peacefully. That is why I will vote against this resolution.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.

**THE PRESIDING OFFICER.** The Senator from Louisiana.

Mr. BREAUX. Mr. President, today we are all engaged in a debate on a subject matter with more important consequences than any other that can come before the Senate: The question of whether we as a country will vote to authorize the use of military force against another nation. I trust that our decision today will be the correct one. To do the wrong thing today can have terrible consequences tomorrow.

There is no disagreement in America today that Saddam Hussein represents the embodiment of evil and that he must get out of Kuwait which he has brutally invaded and now illegally occupies. The only debate is how do we best achieve our goals?

While Kuwait is only a small country, many thousands of miles from our shores, I know that Americans today realize that the world of the 1960's is, indeed, a smaller place where any event anywhere can affect us all everywhere. Even in 1945, Franklin Roosevelt recognized this when he said during his fourth inaugural address:

> "We have learned that we cannot live alone at peace. Our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned that we must live as men and not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world and members of the human community."

A year ago the world was basking in the aura of free and democratic harmony that many hoped would be the underpinnings of what has become known as the "new world order." The Berlin Wall had fallen, Ceausescu toppled in Romania, Mandela freed in South Africa, and free elections scheduled in Nicaragua. People around the globe looked forward to an era when domestic political disputes would be settled at the ballot box, and international problems resolved at the conference table.

Mr. President, Iraq shattered this dream on August 2 with its brutal blitzkrieg against its tiny neighbor, Kuwait. From the beginning, there have been stories of atrocities by the Iraqi Army, the likes of which have not been seen since Hitler's panzers rolled across Europe half a century ago. Summary executions, torture, rape, pillage, and looting have left Kuwait in ruins. In hospital maternity wards Kuwaiti infants were taken from their incubators and left to die. The incubators were sent back to Baghdad, Kuwait, which Iraq now claims as its 19th province has, for all intents, ceased to exist as a nation.

Mr. President, Amnesty International, the globally recognized international organization, has documented the types of torture that the Iraqi Army perpetrated on the people of Kuwait. I quote from this publication:

**METHODS OF TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT**

> The following are details of allegations of torture and ill-treatment which have been made to Amnesty International since 2 August, some of which are supported by medical evidence and photographic material. These reports are entirely consistent with methods of torture and ill-treatment known to have been used in Iraq over many years.

1. Beatings on all parts of the body, involving punching, slapping, delivering Karate-style blows and kicking with heavy army boots. Implements used for beating include canes, metal rods, whips, steel cables, hosepipes, rubber truncheons and rifle butts.

2. Falaqs: prolonged beating on the soles of the feet. The only debate is how do we best achieve our goals?

3. Suspending the detainee by the feet, or by the arms which are tied behind the back.

4. Beating the detainee repeatedly from a rotating fan in the ceiling.

5. Breaking of the arms, legs or ribs; dislocating elbows and shoulders.

6. Shooting the detainee in the air and then dropping him, sometimes resulting in the fracturing of bones.

7. Applying pressure to the fingers with a clamp-like instrument.

8. Slashing the face, arms or legs with knives.

9. Extracting finger and toenails.

10. Boring a hole in the leg, apparently with a type of drilling tool.

11. Cutting off of the tongue and ear.

12. Gouging out of the eyes.

13. Castration.

14. Hammering nails into the hands.

15. Piercing the skin with pins or staplers.

16. Shooting the detainee in the arm or leg at point blank range, followed by deprivation of the necessary medical treatment.

17. Raping women and men.

18. Inserting bottle necks, sometimes when broken, into the rectum.

19. Tying rings around the penis and pulling it tightly.

20. Pumping air using a pipe through the anus, particularly of young boys.

21. Applying electricity to sensitive parts of the body, including the ears, lips, tongue, fingers, toes and genitals.

22. Burning various parts of the body, including the genitals, with domestic appliances such as electric irons, with heated metal rods, or with a naked flame.

23. Extinguishing cigarettes on the eye, balls or on various parts of the body, including the genitals, nipples, chest and hands.

I could go on and on, Mr. President, with this list of documented types of torture that have been used by the Iraqis on citizens of occupied Kuwait. There have been reported chemical weapons on their own citizens.

I doubt very seriously, Mr. President, that a nation which has used these types of torture methods on the people of Kuwait and chemical weapons on its own citizens is going to be too impossible by sanctions which merely sometimes reduce caloric intake on the citizens of Iraq while the army continues to get well fed.

A similar question faced this Nation in the late 1930's as Adolf Hitler's shadow fell across Europe. As late as 1936 Hitler's Germany was neither seen, nor in fact was a credible threat to world order. America wished hoping for peace and watched as a mad, power-hungry dictator ran over one country after another. People like Charles Lindbergh warned that, "If we enter fighting for democracy abroad, we may end up by losing it at home." Many people listened and the question asked was "Why die for Danzig?" The answer, history tells us, is that the terrible world war that followed could have been avoided had we responded earlier.

I say to President Bush, your responsibility, Mr. President, is to lead, and you have done a remarkable job internationally in convincing the world community that Saddam Hussein must pull out of Kuwait. The world is united we are all resolved. It is time to convince America of the corrections of your position. This is the most important moment of your presidency, it is worth a few more minutes clearly explaining what you have done and what is now needed. Americans want strong leadership and they deserve no less.

I have heard my constituents in Louisiana. They love America and what our country stands for, yet they are also concerned. They do not want another Vietnam, and we must clearly stand for the proposition that never again will that occur. They question whether this effort is worth the price. They need to be assured by our President of the importance of America standing strong in these critical times. We owe it to the American people, to our military men and women, and to their parents and children that in this era we will be united, clear in purpose, and successful as quickly as possible.

I believe that there are compelling reasons for America's presence in Saudi Arabia and our leadership of the multinational coalition fighting Iraq. A restoration of regional stability; continued access to reasonably priced Arabian oil supplies; stopping Iraq's quest for nuclear weapons; and the continued forging of a new world order from a sound basis for our effort to reverse Iraq's absorption of Kuwait. In addition, American credibility and our commitment to global security are at stake.

Iraq's enormous military is a serious threat to the entire Middle East. While Iran had heretofore been a counter to Iraqi strength, the Iranian armed forces were greatly weakened during the 8-year war with Iraq and no longer represent an adequate counterweight to Baghdad. Thus, Saddam Hussein has been able to train his sights on his far
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weaker, but oil-rich neighbors to the South. I consider it vital, irrespective of the outcome of this crisis, that Baghdad’s military might be reduced to prevent Iraq from preying on its neighbors. If Iraq is to be contained, the balance of power in the Gulf region and throughout the Middle East.

Mr. President, the invasion of Kuwait doubled the volume of oil under Iraq’s control. Saddam Hussein now holds 20 percent of the world’s proven oil reserves. Unless he is stopped, Saddam will be in a position to manipulate oil pricing and supply, either by continued conquest, or by threatening his relatively lightly armed neighbors. This is unacceptable and poses a grave threat to America’s economy and security, and those of our allies.

Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons is expected to result in nuclear capability within the next 3 to 10 years, although some analysts predict that Baghdad may be capable of exploding a crude nuclear device within 12 months. Mr. President, the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iraq, not to mention Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use chemical weapons, not only against Iranian troops, but also against Iraq’s own Kurdish minority, leads me to conclude that he would have no hesitation to use nuclear weapons. It is vital that Iraq’s effort to acquire nuclear weapons be stopped as part of a diplomatic settlement; or, if war breaks out, that Iraq’s nuclear weapons development facilities be taken apart and destroyed. Iraq’s capability to manufacture and deliver chemical and biological weapons must also be eliminated.

The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the ongoing rapprochement between the United States and the Soviet Union has reinvigorated the United Nations and given rise to hopes that conflict resolution can take place peacefully. Implicit in this “new world order” is the expectation that the world community will respond collectively in opposing, by force if necessary, those countries which violate the precepts and norms of international behavior. Iraq’s brutalization of Kuwait clearly falls into this category, and the global response to Baghdad’s invasion is a test of the world’s willingness to exercise collection security.

So far, the world has responded with a remarkable degree of unanimity. On 12 separate occasions the U.N. Security Council has passed resolutions demanding that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait and that the legitimate Kuwaiti Government be returned to power.

Mr. President, if this new approach to international affairs is to succeed, this Congress must demonstrate and resolve that aggression will not be rewarded and that it will be reversed.

There are those in this body and throughout the Nation who do not believe that we should resort to force to secure an Iraqi departure from Kuwait. They argue that the sanctions are working and that the Iraqis will withdraw peacefully. With all due respect to my colleagues, I do not believe that the sanctions alone are enough to force Saddam Hussein to avoid Kuwait’s fate.

The history of economic sanctions clearly indicates that the longer they remain in effect, the more porous they become. There have been a number of reports in the media detailing efforts by countries in Western Europe to circumvent the sanctions. I am also concerned that Iraq will be able to expand the illegal trade now occurring along its border with Iran.

I do not doubt that the sanctions are taking their toll on Iraq; recent reports in the media detailing efforts by countries in Western Europe to circumvent the sanctions. I am also concerned that Iraq will be able to expand the illegal trade now occurring along its border with Iran.

I urge my colleagues to join with me in sending a clear and unmistakable message to Baghdad by supporting the President.

I yield the floor.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North Dakota.

The Senator from North Dakota.

Mr. BURDICK. Mr. President, war is the last thing any of us want. I cannot vote to authorize military force at this particular time. I support the Democratic resolution which stops short of war. But it says Congress will work with the President as the situation changes. Sanctions should force Iraq out of Kuwait if we give ample time.

Let us continue to work for peace instead of working for war.

Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The Senator from Ohio.

Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank the Chair.

Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the resolution authored by our Democratic leader. I commend Senator MITCHELL for his diligence and his diplomatic skills in crafting this measure with the assistance of Senators Nunn and Levin, Byrd, Pell, Wirth, Leahy and so many others.

It lays out a course of action that is measured and sensible. It ensures the protection of the constitutional balance envisioned by our Founding Fathers.

That balance prohibits any one man or woman, even the President of the United States, from committing an entire Nation to war.

Mr. President, Saddam Hussein is a tyrant—a bully; an insecure leader trying to prove his importance with a reckless disregard for the lives of his people and the future of his country. Over the past 10 years, he has menaced his neighbors—he has gassed his own people. He invaded, smashed and pillaged a small powerless neighbor. Kuwait as a nation no longer exists. Everything of value was stripped, stolen and shipped off to Baghdad.

I agreed with the President when he said that the situation in the Persian Gulf presented a serious threat to vital U.S. interests.

All nations that depend on a stable supply of Middle East oil were threatened and endangered when Saddam Hussein marched into Kuwait. I supported the tremendous effort the President and his Secretary of State made in mobilizing worldwide condemnation against this outlaw dictator. But after that, the President and I parted company.

I believe the International Coalition has stopped Saddam in his tracks. The sanctions are beginning to bite. They are beginning to strangle his economy.
And I believe these hard-earned sanctons should continue to work. Iraq's economic output is down 40 percent since August. According to Jim Schlesinger and Admiral Crowe, certain-ty two knowledgeable men. What possible reason can there be now for abandoning this successful effort?

Sanctions or war—Saddam will lose either way. But this economic embargo of Iraq is enabling us to avoid the ter-
rrible costs of war. Let us not forget. It is the lives of young Americans that will be lost in war. And, if we go to war, someone will have to explain why.

It is war that will drive the price of oil to $80 or $100 a barrel. It is war that will result in the destruction of the Gulf countries. It is war that holds the greatest uncertainty.

When the shooting stops, it is the United States that will bear the lion's share of the cost of reconstructing the region.

Now let me address myself to another extremely troubling aspect of the Gulf crisis. That is the issue of burdensharing. Our allies are not paying their way. The United States is bearing almost the entire cost of the Desert Shield Operation; 430,000 U.S. troops, far more than the rest of our allies combined.

How many troops have our allies there? 245,000. About 30 percent of the total.

But as the chairman of the Armed Services Committee Senator Nunn pointed out, the Syrians have indicated that they will not use their troops in an offensive operation and we do not know whether the Egyptians will per-
mits their troops to be used in such an operation against Iraq.

So, the reality of the situation is if the coalition attacks Iraq, United States troops will make up about 90 percent of the total attacking force. It is our soldiers whose lives are on the line, our allies in Europe and Japan are far more dependent on Middle East oil than we.

Yet their contribution to Desert Shield is penurious. It is insulting.

Look at the facts. Japan promised $2 billion in calendar year 1990.

What has Japan provided to date? $290 million in cash, and their estimate of $50 million in-kind services.

I was informed today they have pro-
vided as part of those in-kind services 40,000 Sony Walkman radios. At best, including all of their contributions, even the Sony radios, that is a total of $475 million—less than a quarter of what they promised.

This is from a country with the sec-
ond largest economy in the world, a country that is taking the rest of the world to the cleaners economically—a country that imports 99 percent of its oil—70 percent of which comes from the Gulf.

Japan can afford to do more—they should be doing more! They are shirk-
ing on their responsibilities.

What about Germany, the economic powerhouse of Europe?

Germany agreed to provide $2 billion in support.

What have they contributed so far? $337 million in cash and useless East German military equipment—one-sixth of what they promised.

Frankfurt imports 96 percent of its oil; Italy imports 93 percent of its oil; the Netherlands, 94 percent; Belgium, 99 percent; Sweden, 95 percent.

All of these countries should be standing shoulder to shoulder with America, shoulder to shoulder with our boys in the field. Yet, they are contrib-
uting almost nothing. And it is our men and women who are being called upon to face the Iraqis in the field.

At last count, France was sending about 15,000 troops.

Britain had sent 30,000 troops.

Compare that to the U.S. commit-
ment of 400,000 combat troops.

In Europe and Japan, Brazil, the so-called tigers of Asia—Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—all countries that must have a reliable supply of oil to keep their economies going, to maintain their standard of living—
countries that can afford to help—are not helping.

We still spend $3 billion every year defending South Korea.

Now we are going to protect their oil supply. It is any wonder that we have such difficulty in competing with Korean goods as they come into this country and compete with American products?

The fact is, the gulf burdensharing issue is so egregious, it has become an embarrassment to the administration.

Until recently, the Pentagon and the State Department were publishing an accounting of foreign contributions to Operation Desert Shield and assistance to the frontline, Middle-Eastern coun-
tries.

They are no longer doing so.

In addition, the Pentagon is no longer providing cost estimates for the Desert Shield Operation.

Last Friday, the administration de-
cided at the last minute to forbid Pen-
tagon officials from testifying at a House Budget Committee hearing on the cost of Desert Shield.

According to the chairman, Mr. PA-
NETTA, the administration "informed us that it will not be willing to discuss the cost of Desert Shield for an indefi-
nite period."

At the same hearing, Charles Bowsher, Director of the GAO, com-
plained that Pentagon chiefs know how much foreign governments have con-
tributed to the frontline states, but now refuse to release the data.

That is an outrage.

The frontline states know what they are contributing. Other nations that are contributing know. But the American people are being told by their own

Government representatives, "We will keep the facts secret from you; we will refuse to testify to a congressional committee. This is secret infor-

mation.

What is so possibly secret as to the amount that foreign governments have contributed, unless it is just a total embarrassment to the U.S. Govern-
ment? How can the U.S. Government possibly justify asking the American people from that information, refusing to share it with us, refusing to share it with Congress?

Most recent estimates place the cost of Desert Shield at $30 billion in 1991—
and that is without a shooting war.

Mr. President, once again, it is Uncle Sam, U.S. soldiers, and U.S. tax-
payers that will carry the world on its back.

It is wrong and it is unfair.

And these with the President that we cannot negotiate, we cannot accept linkage; I salute him for his position on those points. But we cannot reward illegal aggression, either.

And I abhor the deal the French are trying to cut with Hussein at the world's expense.

This is not the first time France has had its own agenda.

France is that one nation in the world that never can be counted upon that is always looking out for its own welfare and no one else's concerns. It has done it time and time again.

The French pulled their forces out of NATO when Europe faced a Soviet menace during the depths of the cold war.

They sold arms indiscriminately to anyone with cash on the table—including both Iraq and Iran during their 8-
year war.

And they refused to let United States pilots overfly French airspace during the Libyan raid.

Probably in the history of this coun-
y, there are few nations that have been more remiss, more turning their back on their obligations to the world community and their responsibilities as far as their relations with this coun-
try are concerned than the French. We have not been able to count upon them for many years. Going back in history, they were one of our great friends, but in more recent years, they cannot be counted upon.

Mr. President, make no mistake about it, I support the blockade against Iraq.

I do not rule out war as a last resort. But war should be the solution when all else fails.

Mr. President, it is outrageous that the American people must carry so much of the financial burden for Desert Shield. But I believe they are willing to stick it out until the sanctions break Saddam's back.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. President, it is a terrible frustration, indeed a painful irony that Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait has brought our world back into crisis just months after the collapse of Eastern European communism. We have hardly had the time to enjoy the peace before confronting war once again. Indeed, nearly half the men and women who form the vanguard of our defense of Western Europe have suddenly been shifted from Germany to Saudi Arabia, trading uniforms and tanks of forest green for those of desert brown.

This sudden reversal of our fortunes reminds us of a sad and old lesson which runs throughout the course of human history. We are an imperfect species, capable of great good but also great evil. Saddam Hussein's fascistic tyranny and brutal aggression are but the latest examples of the capacity of human beings to inflict pain on one another.

Within our society, we rely on the adoption and enforcement of laws to control our worst inclinations. In the world community, civilized relations between nations are dependent on alliances of peace and defenses against war. But when alliances have been broken and defenses breached by acts of aggression, the civilized world has often had to meet force with force.

Regrettably, I have concluded that this is such a time. We are now joined in a conflict from which there is no turning back. That is no easy conclusion for me to reach. I am honored, in fact, by the responsibility which has been placed in me by the people of Connecticut who sent me to be their U.S. Senator at this moment, and by the responsibility that I feel for every one of the men and women who are defending us today in the Persian Gulf, and every one of their fathers and mothers, their husbands and wives, their sons and daughters.

The horrible possibility of war became clear to me one recent Sunday morning in the Gofta Street Armory in my hometown of New Haven, CT, where the 142d Medical Clearing Co. of the Connecticut National Guard had gathered for departure to Fort Devens in Massachusetts and, from there, to the desert of Saudi Arabia. I felt an obligation, as have so many of my colleagues in recent months in similar circumstances, to inform women for a brief time to convey to them my own sense of gratitude for the tremendous sacrifice they were about to make, my support for their cause, and my belief that they are heroes too.

It is no easy thing to look into the eyes of men and women who are marching off to the drummer of war. It is no easy thing to look into the eyes of their families gathered to see these soldiers off, all of them haunted by the ultimate question, "Will I see my loved one again?"

It is no easy thing to stand on the floor of this historic Chamber and cast a vote that may join the fate of so many of our American friends and neighbors. It is not easy. We all know that.

We know from the tone and tenor of the debate in the Chamber over the last few days that all of us comprehend the gravity of this moment. The political intrigue that often marks debate on issues here in the Senate is absent, replaced by a common knowledge—in the midst of diverse opinions—that the fate of people and nations hangs in the balance as we marshal our arguments for or against a resolution that may lead to war.

No, it is not easy. But it must be done. It must be done because our President has asked us to vote to support him in this hour of challenge, and our Constitution demands that we vote before our Nation is committed to war.

The issue before us is not to pick a day or time for hostilities to begin, or to determine how a war is waged. No; that in my opinion is the clear responsibility of the military commander-in-chief under article II of our Constitution. The issue before the Congress under article I, section 8, is whether or not we authorize the President to use force to achieve our goals in the Persian Gulf, if the President chooses to wage war.

On that issue, I will vote to authorize the President to have the power to go to war. I will do so in the knowledge that war may, indeed, be the result and that many good people may die. But I will cast that vote in the hopes that, by so doing, I will make the prospects of peace more real.

Mr. President, it is one of the ironies of this crisis that the prospects for peace may not be fully realized until we are fully prepared for war. That is not a new concept. More than 15 centuries ago a Roman historian, Vegetius, said it: "If you have peace you must prepare for war."

In Saddam Hussein we face a threat of the most dangerous nature, a rigid, unyielding dictator. Our best hope for true peace is to convince Saddam Hussein that he faces swift, utter, devastating defeat if he fails to withdraw completely, and without condition, from Kuwait. President Bush has been absolutely clear and resolute on this point.

But it seems that Saddam has not yet gotten that message. How else to explain the contempt he displayed through the person of Tariq Aziz in connection with those days ago? How else to explain the intransigence of Saddam in instructing his emissary to refuse to even accept a letter from the President of the United States? That insult was to me, and I am sure to many Americans, a defining moment in this crisis, a moment that encapsulated the nature of the threat we face—stubborn, rigid, unyielding dictatorial, and arrogant. It demonstrated more clearly than ever the need for American unity and American determination.

Our final best chance for a truly peaceful end to this crisis, I am convinced, is to send a clear and unequivocal message to Saddam Hussein that the American Congress and the American people stand shoulder-to-shoulder with our President at this critical moment of confrontation. And that is why I will vote to support and affirm the U.N. resolution.

Mr. President, those who argue that economic sanctions must be given more time to work, who have joined in the resolution to require that sanctions be given more time to work, have made serious and thoughtful arguments on this floor and they deserve an answer from those of us who will oppose that resolution and instead counsel authorization for war. There is a surface appeal to the position that sanctions should continue. But in my respectful opinion that appeal does not run deep and it does not run strong. The sanctions have cut off most of Iraq's imports and exports. But 5 months of sanctions have not led Saddam Hussein to cede 1 inch of Kuwaiti territory, not to bring forward one hint of compromise. Rather, 5 months of sanctions have given Saddam 5 months to pillage and rape Kuwait, to fortify his defenses, to endanger further the lives of American soldiers who are there.

Five months later in Baghdad, restaurants and cafes and discos remain open, car dealers continue to sell cars, and high-rise apartments continue to be built. Starvation seems very far away in this land where the science of agriculture was in fact invented at the dawn of civilization.

Yes, industry in Iraq has suffered somewhat, but we must remember industry accounts for but 10 percent of Iraq's gross national product. The part of Iraq's military forces most vulnerable to sanctions is the air force, which will probably atrophy...
somewhat from lack of high-tech parts over a period of time. But the air force is not critical to Saddam’s ability to maintain his power in Iraq and in Kuwait. It would, in fact, by most estimates be destroyed early in any war that we do begin.

No, it is Iraq’s ground forces that represent the greatest threat to all of us. Tanks, artillery armored personnel carriers, and soldiers need only dig in and stay put in Kuwait, as they have. It takes little to maintain them, especially if we remove the threat of imminent war and promise them months of peace, while we wait to see whether sanctions work.

Sanctions in the present case, in my opinion, are a tactical, not a strategic, weapon. There is a man in Connecticut by the name of Uwe Jahnke, who lives in Washington Depot. He was taken prisoner in Kuwait after the Iraqi invasion, and held as a human shield at an Iraqi military site. He wrote to me recently to say:

I think that delay will help the Iraqis, will most likely result in Iraq remaining in Kuwait and will be a major blow to the United States and our allies, both economically and politically, both in Iraq and regionally. I believe that sanctions alone will not result in Iraq withdrawing from Kuwait.

Mr. President, sanctions are a very blunt instrument which hurt civilians before they hurt the military, which hurt the weak before the strong.

I ask the question here: Is it truly more moral to maintain a strategy that inflicts the most punishment on a civilian population, the most vulnerable in society, the poorest, the youngest, the oldest? If people think that sanctions will work, they must think that they will bring terrible destruction on the heads of the Iraqi people themselves. It is important to consider the morality of this strategy before decrying the immorality of war.

Consider, too, the fact that making the Iraqis suffer will in no way guarantee the achievement of our goals in the Persian Gulf. Where is there one shred of evidence over the last 5 months that leads to a conclusion that massive suffering on the part of his people will convince Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait? This is a man who let as many as 1 million of his fellow Iraqis suffer casualties in a war against Iran. That is a casualty rate greater than what Americans suffered—North and South—during the Civil War.

No sanctions we impose can compare to the suffering the Iraqi people faced in their 8-year war with Iran, suffering which did nothing to dislodge Saddam from power or to change his course. How can we hope that a man who would kill his own people with poison gas will not kill because his people may have to stand in line for food?

Supporters of sanctions, I think, not only fail to fully consider the mind of Saddam Hussein, they fail also to look at the calendar on the wall. Their argument suggests, what do we have to lose by taking more time to see whether the sanctions work?

Mr. President, more time for sanctions is not a course full of risk. What is a course full of risk and peril for the world, for the United States, and particularly for America’s fighting men and women in the Gulf today. What impact will the passage of time itself have on our ability to achieve our goals? Do supporters of continuing sanctions imagine that all other aspects of the Persian Gulf crisis will remain static, unchanged? Will the Gulf States countenance the presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops within their borders for a period of a year or more? What will happen to our ability to use military force if 1 or 2 years from now sanctions fail? Will our troops be able to maintain their sharpest combat edge for that long? And what will Saddam do over that time to further protect himself and imperil our forces, to target and destroy Iraqi targets, to dig in more in Kuwait, to make even more difficult and dangerous the service of American soldiers there?

No, allowing the sanctions more time is not a course without peril. It is full or peril. Tying the President’s hands indefinitely would give Saddam additional time to perfect his weapons of mass destruction. They will enhance their ability in this time to develop new biological weapons and to deliver them: botulin toxins, various strains of anthrax, typhoid, and cholera bacteria, the most nightmarish forms of combat. Within a year I am convinced he will develop a crude yet destructive nuclear device. Our soldiers, if indeed any would remain in the Gulf to carry out the military option a year from now, could well face a greater threat on the battlefield than they face today. My point again in that those who wish to use sanctions must face the fact that they have a price. They are not without cost.

What of the coalition, the essential ingredient of our ability to maintain sanctions and threaten force? Will Turkey remain firmly allied with us for years? We forget the toll that these sanctions have taken on that nation. The internal pressure in Turkey to reopen its oil pipeline or its agriculture trade with Iraq will grow with each passing month.

In Egypt, extremists who assassinated the head of the parliament last autumn could undermine the government’s support of our policy. Clashes between Israelis and Palestinians will continue, possibly straining our relations with our own moderate Arab allies.

In Europe, the growing conservative forces in the Soviet Union could compel President Gorbachev to renew Moscow’s once-close relationship with Saddam. France, affected by its own domestic political cross-currents and its north African neighbors, could decide against any use of military force.

Any one of these developments would generate more pressure on nations to compromise with Saddam. Already there is talk of an Iraqi demand that Kuwait cede two strategic islands, Babyyan and Warba, and the southern end of the huge Rumaila oil field. Those concessions are already being discussed. Is it realistic to conclude that within a year from now, they will not be much more seriously considered? Arabs who now stand with us ready to fight Saddam, if necessary, may well lose faith in our will if we send an uncertain message from this Chamber, and may begin to seek ways to make a deal with Saddam if we retreat from the course of strength that our President has set.

I know none of us in this Chamber advocates appeasement. I am not saying that. None of us want to offer Saddam real concessions. But I want to suggest that to delay the threat of force, to rely on sanctions for a period of a year or more, opens the door for accommodation—some might call it appeasement—by others. And that is something we cannot stop, we cannot control.

We all know how high a price we will pay for that result. Appeasement of Saddam, even if not by our design, would leave him the victor in this crisis and the United States the loser, and a lesser power in the world. Who could trust our word? Who could have confidence in our will as we tried to lead the civilized world into the new world order?

I fear that concessions and delay will only embolden, not satisfy, Saddam Hussein. Delay will strengthen his resolve for victory more than it will use his capacity to survive. That is a lesson that has been taught to us throughout the span of human history.

Remember the words of Pericles, responding to the demands for peace with the Spartans at the price of compromise?

He warned:

There is one principle which I hold to through everything. *** If you give way, you will instantly have to meet some greater demand.

Two thousand four hundred years later, another great general offered a similar warning to his country, our country:

Eagerness to avoid war can produce outright or implicit agreement that injustices and wrongs of the present shall be perpetuated into the future.

Those were the words of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. And he added:

We must not participate in any such false agreement. Thereby we would outrage our own conscience. In the eyes of those who suffered injustice we would become partners of
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their oppressors. In the judgment of history we would have sold out the freedom of men for the poggage of a false peace. **We would assure future conflict.

Those words of Eisenhower’s ring so clearly and directly in the situation we face today.

Then another great American, 4 years before World War II, in a pre­class speech for which he was severely critical a few years later, President Franklin Roosevelt said:

There can be no stability or peace either within nations or between nations except under laws and moral standards adhered to by all. International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It jeopardizes either the immediate or the future security of every nation, large or small. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the maintenance of international morality be restored.

Roosevelt expressed a clear understanding that when immorality is allowed to run loose in the world, aggression is tolerated, though it may occur far away, all of us suffer. That is what is at stake in the Persian Gulf. A victory by Saddam Hussein is a victory of anarchy over order, or war over peace, of brutality over liberty, of immorality over morality. Saddam will breathe new life into that discredited old notion of Machiavelli that the power of the state is the supreme right.

No peace-loving people or nation is safe once the terror of the state is loosed against people around the world. Saddam, victorious, cannot be shunted to the sidelines of world affairs, ignored as a grotesque anomaly, a side­show. Like a virus, Saddam, the victor, will infect the body of international order, and we cannot let that happen.

Mr. President, I know that comparisons between Saddam Hussein and Adolf Hitler are made often. Sometimes they are too easily drawn. Sometimes, on the other hand, they are too simply dismissed.

The elements of wealth and power that would be Saddam’s, if we did not strongly respond to the threat that he represents, will not satisfy his thirst for conquest. That is clear from his ideology; it is clear from his record. It will not satisfy him any more than it did satisfy Adolf Hitler in the 1930’s. Saddam is in his 13th year as leader of Iraq and he has been an aggressor in 11 of those 13 years. That is the record. There are ominous historic parallels to the current situation. Compare Saddam’s Scud missiles with Hitler’s V-2’s, both weapons launched against civilian populations. Compare Saddam’s gas attack on the Kurds of Halabja in his own country to Hitler’s air attack against the villagers of Guernica. Scale of destruction may be different so far, but the horror on the face of the dead are quite the same.

Mr. President, we must uphold the present turning point in world history. The waning of the cold war has ushered in a period of tremendous promise. The spread of democratic ideals, of competitive economic markets, of worldwide communications, have put the forces of tyranny on the defensive around the globe. Those forces now look back to Saddam and they look particularly to us as the one remaining super­power in the world, the torch of liberty within our grasp, standing for freedom and stability throughout the world. They look to us to see how we will act in this crisis.

Victory for Saddam will embolden all who share his thirst for power and disregard for civil conduct.

The defeat of Saddam will restore international morality and enhance prospects for a generation of civilized relations, peaceful relations among the nations of the world.

Mr. President, in the end, in this humbling, awesome debate and deci­sion, we must each face the ultimate question, which is whether our goal, the goal of defeating Saddam Hussein, is worth the terrible price that we may have to pay in a war. That question really cuts to the heart of this debate today, and it cuts to each of our hearts as well.

To answer that question, I have tried to imagine what I would say to give comfort to a parent whose child may confront an Iraqi artillery bombardment, to a parent whose child may endure an Iraqi chemical attack, to a wife whose husband may face an Iraqi terrorist raid. I can truly say to them, your son or daughter, your mother or father, your wife or husband is a hero defending our country and the civilized world, and the people of the United States will be eternally grateful for their service and their courage.

As horrible as war is, its horror pales in comparison to the fate of the world if Saddam Hussein’s power is allowed to grow. The lives of loved ones are put on the line every day. The price of our forebears was paid for the survival of all of our lives for years to come hangs in the balance. The heroic work of our men and women in the Persian Gulf will mean the survival of the kind of world that we want for our children and the prevention of a world in which our children may not survive, certainly not survive as free men and women.

One of those heroes that I have just talked about is another resident of my State, Sgt. Douglas Champaigne of Stratford, CT, who sent me a holiday card from the Persian Gulf where he is serving, and he said to me:

All of us here hope for a peaceful end to this crisis, but if that is not possible, I sincerely hope that Congress and President Bush will see eye to eye on the quickest and least destructive way to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Sergeant Champaigne concluded:

We are prepared to do the job that we are trained for.

Mr. President, now let us in Congress do the job that we were elected for. Let us not “sell out the freedom of men for the poggage of a false peace.” None of us wants war. None of us in this country, right up to the President of the United States, who himself has known war and is a man of strength and balance who wishes peace. But we must, as Lincoln said, be ready to accept that war may be required. Let us face the awful task before us with the conviction that the price we set for a civilized world is a price that we Americans are prepared to pay.

Thank you, Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. GLENN addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRYAN). The Senator from Ohio.

THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION CANNOT BE OVERSTATED

Mr. GLENN, Mr. President, the gravity of the situation we face, which has been discussed here yesterday and today, cannot be overstated.

I would like to begin by saying I believe we all agree with President Bush in a very fundamental way, and that is the overall objective of our policy toward the Persian Gulf. We all agree that Iraq must get out of Kuwait.

The debate here is not over that subject. The debate here is how we accomplish that end with the least potential loss of life. I would add, Mr. President, that I am concerned about the loss of life on both sides. We tend to think solely of loss of American life, but we know that the loss of a son or father, or any family member, to an Iraqi mother is just as grievous, and we do not want to see that pain inflicted on anyone.

We are told that Saddam Hussein quite often watches American tele­vision, so perhaps our remarks here today should be tailored to send a message directly to Saddam Hussein:

And that message is, do not misread this debate in the Halls of Congress. Do not construe this as a constitutional debate, which is largely an internal matter for us to resolve here. Do not mis­construe this debate as a lack of commit­ment to seeing Iraq leave Kuwait.

We have a united United States of America. We have a united Congress. We have a united United Nations. We have a united coalition of nations that agree with the President that Iraq will leave Kuwait.

It is important to all of us that the collective of the move into Kuwait was but the first step. We saw the forces of Iraq move into a southern position and assume attack positions: artillery forward, troops forward, tanks forward, aimed toward Dhahran and the oil fields in that area.

By insisting that Iraq get out of Ku­wait we signal that we will not permit Iraq to dominate some 71 percent of the world’s oil. I will address that a little bit later.

We would ask Saddam Hussein what does he have to gain by defying world
opinion? What does he have to gain by defying the U.N. sanctions? We would say to him directly. What does he have defying the opinion? What does he have to gain by tended into timetable combat before be as effective as I believe it can. sound bite justifications for war which same intelligence information, I saw about whether we were being given all President putting together an inter­national coalition and the most effective embargo ever put in place. Then we started seeing, a short time ago, a shift. I was concerned about this and questioned our intelligence people about whether we were being given all the same information that the Presi­dent gets. If I was being given that same information, I saw no reason for that shift to occur. And we saw, during that period, many statements which I have called sound bite justifications for war which did more to confuse than to clarify dur­ing that period. I submit that we can never again get into a war that is not fully understood and fully backed by the American people. In other words, we do not want to repeat the Vietnam experience. It seems that discussion of real and important Persian Gulf policy issues somehow got set aside for short, catchy, attention-getting statements. The important thing in going to war is not whether the President says, “I’ve had it.” The important thing is whether the American people have had it and will support whatever action comes thereafter. It is not just mistreatment of host­ages or denial of normal Embassy rights, which had their turn of empha­sism. Important as those things are, de­pending on oil and all that flowed therefrom. The CIA’s first dirty trick sought to safeguard oil by re-installing the shah in Iran, a gambit that triggered his hubris and ultimate downfall. Britain’s Anthony Eden put all his chips in 1956 on seizing the Suez Canal to fuel the allies. U.S. submarines and air­planes destroyed Japan’s tanker fleet. Allied bombers crushed Nazi coal-gasification plants. Even so, Patton’s tanks would have taken Berlin in 1944 had they not run out of gas.

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The men and women of our Armed Forces have been our very first concern since this crisis began, and they will continue to be. And that is the reason I will vote as indicated when this issue comes before us on the floor.

Mr. FOWLER. Mr. President, there is only one President of the United States, one Commander in Chief. And in foreign policy, particularly in crisis situations when time is of the essence and where it is vital we speak with a strong and united voice, it is the President who must be the primary spokesman and policymaker for our Nation.

Throughout this latest crisis in the Persian Gulf, I have urged support of American policy as proposed by the President, praising his prompt and resolute response to Saddam Hussein's aggression. I have echoed his skillful diplomatic efforts uniting together an unprecedented international wall of resistance to Saddam Hussein, his perseverance in putting into play political and economic sanctions to pressure Iraq.

In spite of misgivings about the change in administration strategy in November—the doubling of our troop commitment in Saudi Arabia and the transformation from defensive to offensive capabilities—I have continued my willingness to support a Presidential request for an authorization of offensive force, as long as the President provides evidence that our current course of economic and political sanctions cannot achieve our objectives, and that our allies are doing their fair share.

In my view, the formulation of America's response to international crises rests chiefly with the President, and I am sympathetic with the lament of the current and previous administrations that we cannot afford to have each of the SSS Members of Congress serve as our Nation's matron or judge. Only the Commander in Chief must be in clear charge once hostilities begin.

As Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg said in the Senate Chamber on December 8, 1941:

I am constrained to make this brief statement on my own account, lest there be any lingering misapprehension in any furtive mind that previous internal disagreements regarding the wisdom of our policies may encourage the despicable hope that we may weaken from within. I have fought every trend which I thought would lead to needless war; but when war comes, particularly when it comes like a thug in the night—I stand with my Commander in Chief for the swiftest and most invincible reply of the United States, that America fights when she is still hates war, America fights when she is
There remains one area, however, where the President should not, and unless otherwise limited, cannot, act without full congressional assent. This act commits our Nation to war.

And make no mistake about it, that is where we are today: We are on the brink of full-scale, all-out war, not a police action, not a limited reaction to attacks on American forces, not a rescue mission, not a response to an imminent threat to American lives, but war. The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all have stated clearly and publicly that if and when we employ the force we are here to authorize today, it will be total war against Iraq.

The Founding Fathers clearly held, correctly in my view, that no one individual should have the capacity to take our country into war—thus the constitutional requirement for Congress to declare war with all its consequences, with all its costs in lives and resources, with all its consequences, known and unknown, must be the result of the collective will of our Nation's citizenry exercised through their elected representatives.

I have previously said on this floor that there is no more important responsibility facing a U.S. Senator than our votes on confirming Supreme Court Justices. I still believe that to be the case, for it is the only dispassionate accountability required of the judicial branch of our Government, whose decisions fundamentally affect the way Americans live, work, and worship.

But the decision we face today, in essence whether to confirm the President's request for an authorization of war, is of the same magnitude, affording the best opportunity for accountability of the other independent branch, the executive, whose decisions in this case quite literally will affect the lives of thousands of young Americans, Iraqis, Kuwaitis, and others.

Surely when we decide, we have looked to history to help provide some larger perspective. In reading about the First World War, I was struck by the prewar predictions of quick victory: the German general staff thought the war it helped start would be over in 4 months; the Russians were even more optimistic, looking for a victory in 2 or 3 months; the English and French also expected quick and relatively painless success. How wrong they all were!

I was also deeply impressed by the fact that, once the major powers began to mobilize their forces for war in late July and early August of 1914, they largely became the prisoners of their own mobilizations: There was a frightful moral certainty that there was no useful purpose to debate the wisdom of our original decision to go into Vietnam. It is unnecessary for me to state that I had grave doubts about the wisdom of that decision. * * * No action whatever can be taken in the field of international relations in today's troubled world that does not involve some danger. But I submit to this body the view that I firmly believe there is much more danger in ignoring aggressive acts than there is in pursuing a course of calculated retaliation that shows we are prepared to defend our interests.

Or to Senator Russell once more:

In the present circumstances, it will serve no useful purpose to debate the wisdom of our original decision to go into Vietnam. It is unnecessary for me to state that I had grave doubts about the wisdom of that decision. * * * No action whatever can be taken in the field of international relations in today's troubled world that does not involve some danger. But I submit to this body the view that I firmly believe there is much more danger in ignoring aggressive acts than there is in pursuing a course of calculated retaliation that shows we are prepared to defend our interests.

Or to Senator Fulbright once again:

The point which I wish to make is that while we must be consistent in the objectives of our foreign policy, we must be flexible in the instruments we use to attain them. We must bear in mind that military force is not an end but an instrument, a dangerous and repugnant one which is never desirable but sometimes essential. It is equally unwise to assume that force must never be used and to assume that force must necessarily be used in any instance warrants its use in any or all others.

Objectives and means, the appropriate degree of response, the place of force in our foreign policy options, these are all issues which are at the heart of today's debate.

Parenthetically, in fairness, I must point out that the three Senators I just quoted supported the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, as did all but two of their colleagues, the exceptions being Senators Morse and Cruzeen.

But if my colleagues will indulge me for a moment, in addition to considering more recent history, I was also interested to read Thucydid of account of the fifth century B.C. Peloponnesian War, particularly his account, written shortly after the events he described, of the Athenian invasion of Sicily from 415 to 413 B.C.

The Peloponnesian War, primarily involving Sparta and its allies against the Athenian empire, had started in 431 B.C. But after 10 years of inconclusive warfare, a peace treaty was signed in 421 B.C., which lasted, after a fashion, until 405 B.C. So do we not try to avoid war against Syracuse took place during a respite in the war, as another parallel to today.}

Thucydid, in many ways the first historian who set high standards of objectivity in his work, reports the debate within the Athenian assembly over the proposed intervention in Sicily. Nicias, the cautious Athenian politician who had helped secure the peace treaty of 421 and who was very concerned about Athens overthrowing itself in Sicily, and Alcibiades, the oft-brilliant strategist and enthusiastic supporter of an expansive Athenian empire present the arguments.

Nicias: It is true that this assembly was called to deal with the preparation to be made for sailing to Sicily. Yet I still think that this is a question that requires further thought—is it really a good thing for us to send the ships at all? I think that we ought not to give such hasty consideration to so vast a matter as the enemy foreigners get drawn into a war which does not concern us * * * What I am saying is this: In going to Sicily you are leaving many enemies behind you, and you apparently want to make new ones there and have them also in your hands. * * *

We should remember that it is only recently that we have had a little respite from a great plague and from the war, and so we are beginning to make good our losses in men and money. The right thing is that we should make no further respite from a great plague and from the war, and so we are beginning to make good our losses in men and money. The right thing is that we should spend our new gains at home and on ourselves instead of those exiles who are beginning for assistance and whose interest it is to tell lies and make us believe them, who have nothing to contribute themselves except speeches, who leave all the danger to you and me. If the danger is there, if they are not properly grateful, while if they fall in any way they will involve their friends in their own ruin. * * *

If one of you is sitting next to one of his (Alcibiades') supporters, do not allow yourself to be brow-beaten or frightened of being called a coward if you do not vote for war. Do not allow them, indulge in hopeless passions for what is not there. Remember that success comes from foresight and
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not much is ever gained simply by wishing for it. Our country is now on the verge of the greatest danger she has ever known. Think of her, hold up your hands against this proposal.

Alcibiades: Do not change your mind about the expedition to Sicily on the grounds that we shall have a great power to deal with them. The Athenian states have evolved a plan, an expedition for the purposes of war, and we are not far from the sea. The fleet is at the port, and it remains at rest, and its skill at everything growing more used to defend itself, not by the greatest danger she has ever known. Think that will grow out of date; but in conflict it will be decisive. We have sworn to help them, and it is our duty to help them, without raising the objection that we have had no help from them ourselves. Moreover, the expedition was not what we wanted them to send us reinforcements here, but in order that they should be a thorn in the flesh for our enemies. I spent them from coming here to attack us.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I do not attempt to draw close parallels with events of the past. There are not clear analogies between the classical Greek world of the 5th century B.C. and the late 20th century, and I am not for a moment suggesting that our forces would suffer the Athenians' fate.

Indeed, I have every confidence that our military would prevail in any conflict that enters into with Iraq. No, the lesson is, first and foremost, the uncertainties of war, as true when the European powers had plotted a short, decisive war in 1914, as in 1964 when we sought no wider war in Vietnam, or in 415 B.C., when Athenians dreamed of glory on a far-off battlefield. In none of these cases did those who planned the conflict foresee the ultimate cost in blood or treasure or the long-term consequences of their actions.

As we stand here today, deciding on whether or not to go to war, now let us remember these cautionary tales from the past, not because we are doomed to repeat them but because they do remind us that war, all-out war, should not be entered into lightly even if our best guesses point to swift and near certain success.

Is war with Iraq justified? Absolutely, yes. The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait was a blatant act of aggression and an affront to the international community of civilized nations, thus justifying an international response.

But there is a difference between a war being just and a war being prudent. Given the high costs and uncertainties of war, I believe the answer is, we should choose the war option only when other less costly, less risky alternatives such as the use of economic and political sanctions are shown not to be able to achieve our objectives.

One way or another, sooner or later, Saddam Hussein, who is after all moribund, will leave the scene. So our long-range policy goals should be shaped by a decision to this one venture.

What if we go to war with Saddam Hussein on January 15 or 16, defeat and destroy him and Iraq in 3 weeks, with relatively few casualties? Will our long-range position in the gulf and regional stability be guaranteed or undermined in the aftermath of our military victory?

What if, after our victory over Iraq, the Arab masses throughout the Middle East perceive our successful war as an instance of Americans invading Arab lands and killing Arabs, and then hold their own nondemocratic governments to blame for supporting us? What if, after our military victory, the Iraqis, the Kurds, the Syrians, and the Turks, all press for immediate and favorable resolution of their border disputes with a badly weakened Iraq?

What if, after our military victory over Iraq, the Kurds in Iraq obtain, formally or informally, autonomy or outright independence and exert a possibly destabilizing influence on their fellow Kurds in the neighboring nations in the Middle East? What if the American and possibly other forces necessarily left behind to secure the new status quo in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula are subject to frequent terrorist attacks, at a minimum?

What if a devastated Iraq, facing potential starvation, is increasingly sub­ject to the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism as a response to its total defeat?

Should not we, the United States of America, maintain our military threat, let the world know—as all of us are doing on all sides of this debate—that military threat remains our option, that it will be used if all else fails? But should not we try all else and begin debate on what happens after we win and not look at this in terms of 3 days or 5 days or 7 days, when these overwhelming questions have achieved no attention in the public debate or an discussion from the executive branch?

It is obviously my conclusion that now is not the time to lead with our military option. Surely we can be more tough-minded than that.

We must not become, as did the European leaders in 1914, prisoners of our own force mobilization. We must not spend a moment on a military option, in any sense of international goals where the cost and risk is so overwhelmingly borne by us alone.

Need I remind us that once the fighting starts it is unlikely we will be able to equalize this disparity? Ninety percent American forces—90 percent of the fighting forces are American. Once our fighting starts, our allies will conclude, rightly, that once we have committed American lives to the fighting we certainly will not refuse to provide for them.

Above all, we must not embrace the war option with its inherent and unforeseeable risks, unless we have concluded that other policy options—in this case the international political and economic sanctions against Saddam Hussein—cannot succeed in driving him out of Kuwait.

I am not one who believes—and with this I conclude, I say to my friends who have been patient—I am not one who...
believes that it is never appropriate for the United States to use armed force to protect our interests. Quite the contrary, in the 14 years that I have served in the United States Congress I have backed American military deployments in Grenada, in Panama, in Lebanon, and the ongoing defensive deployment in Saudi Arabia.

At this moment I believe the President has the inherent right to use force if necessary to protect our interests. Quite the contrary, when it comes to resisting the naked aggression of all the Saddam Hussein's of the planet. We will continue to vigilantly pursue diplomatic solutions in order to continue weakening his outlaw regime and to continue denying him any benefits from his occupation of Kuwait.

At present, in my opinion, we should do everything short of immediately initiating a war to achieve our just aims. And if all else fails, then that option will be exercised. I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Virginia.

AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, on behalf of a bipartisan group of Senators, myself, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Robb, Mr. Helms, Mr. Dole, Mr. Shelby, Mr. Danforth, and others, I lay before the Senate a resolution in support of the President, in support of the constitutional process, and in support of the United States continued participation in and leadership of the United Nations policy in the Persian Gulf.

I ask this resolution be printed.

There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Joint resolution to authorize the use of United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678.

WHEREAS the Government of Iraq, without provocation invaded and occupied the territory of Kuwait on August 2, 1990; and

WHEREAS both the House of Representatives (in H. J. Res. 658 of the 101st Congress) and the Senate (in S. Con. Res. 167 of the 101st Congress) have condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and declared their support for international action to reverse Iraq's aggression; and

WHEREAS, Iraq's conventional, chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and its demonstrated willingness to use weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to world peace; and

WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council has demanded that Iraq withdraw unconditionally and immediately from Kuwait and that Kuwait's sovereignty and legitimate government be restored; and

WHEREAS the United Nations Security Council repeatedly affirmed the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; and

WHEREAS, in the absence of full compliance by Iraq with its resolutions, the United Nations Security Council in Resolution 678 has authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area; and

WHEREAS Iraq has persisted in its illegal occupation of, and brutal aggression against Kuwait: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled

SECTION 1. TITLE.

This joint resolution may be cited as the "Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.

SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.

(a) AUTHORIZATION.-The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use United States Armed Forces pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) in order to achieve implementation of Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 666, 667, and 97.

(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY.-Before exercising the authority granted to subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination thereof; and

(1) The United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with the United Nations resolutions and Council resolutions cited in subsection (a); and

(2) That those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS.-Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.

SEC. 3. REPORTS TO CONGRESS.

At least once every 60 days, the President shall submit to the Congress a summary on the status of efforts to obtain compliance by Iraq with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council in response to Iraq's aggression.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, quite simply, this joint resolution, unlike Senate Joint Resolution 1 laid before the Senate yesterday by the distinguished Senator from Nevada, and others, recognizes that a continued credible threat of military force is an essential ingredient if we are ever to attain the goal of requiring Iraq to withdraw immediately and unconditionally from Kuwait and to fulfill the goals of the United Nations resolutions and the war powers resolution.

While many of those who have spoken in support of Senate Joint Resolution 1 have attempted to claim they support the President's policy in the Persian Gulf, and that their only difference with the President is over the matter of timing of the use of military force, that is simply, in my judgment, not the case. Senate Joint Resolution 1, if enacted, would decouple from economic sanctions and all other peaceful and diplomatic initiatives the essential ingredient of the U.N. policy; namely, the credible threat of military force linked with the sanctions. Our resolution provides the President with all of the elements necessary to see that the U.N. goals are achieved.

Let me explain briefly what this resolution seeks to achieve. This resolution, which is identical to a bipartisan resolution being considered by the House of Representatives, would provide the President with the authorization of Congress to use the United States Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678 to achieve implementation of the other 11 U.N. Security Council resolutions pertaining to the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.

However, before the President could exercise the authority in this resolution, the President would first have to determine and notify the leadership of the Congress that the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance with the United Nations Security Council resolutions and that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

Mr. President, the sponsors of this resolution believe that we have now presented the Senate with a clear choice: Do we support the President's policy of actually achieving the clear objectives of the U.N. Security Council in the Persian Gulf, or do we repudiate the President, repudiate U.S. policy, and repudiate the United Nations?

It is important to note the reasons we believe our approach is the right one.

Proponents of Senate Joint Resolution 1 assert that Iraq is uniquely susceptible to economic sanctions and that we should give those sanctions more time. It may be correct that Iraq is unique, but the best evidence available to the United States and its allies and, indeed, to the U.S. Senate, in my judgment, shows that it is not so unique that economic sanctions, standing alone, will reverse Iraqi aggression.

As CIA Director Webster stated in his letter to the chairman of the House
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York. THE DEFENSE. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio. Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I rise to join the debate to help resolve the question on whether or not the Congress should vote to give the President authority to lead our Nation into war now or whether we should give the policy of economic sanctions, coupled with the threat of force, more time to work.

Mr. President, as an aside, I am committed to the Mitchell-Nunn amendment that would be more than willing to look at any proposals that are offered so that we can, in good conscience, make the clearest decision for each one of us.

The decision of whether to commit our Nation to war is one of the most difficult, complex, and wrenching ones that a nation can make. The stakes are enormous. It cannot be overstated. The consequences are the difference between life and death for thousands of American and allied soldiers. It could alter the lives of families and friends forever. It could fundamentally change the shape of the post-cold-war world and America's place in it.

Because the decision to wage war or seek peace is the gravest decision a nation can make, I have thought long and hard about what the right course of action should be at this time. I have carefully considered the options that will be introduced, once we have an agreement, is the resolution that we indicated last evening that would be putting forward. I have indicated to the majority leader privately that we would be prepared to do this. I have added that it is pointed out by the Senator from Virginia, that it is identical to the bipartisan resolution offered in the House, the so-called Solarz-Broomefield-Fascell resolution. It is identical to the House version. We hope that colleagues on both sides will take a hard look at this resolution. Even some who may be supporting the Nunn-Mitchell resolution, if that should be defeated, may want to support this resolution. I thank the Chair, and I thank the Senator from New York.

Mr. President, this resolution puts Congress on record in favor of giving economic sanctions more time to work before concluding that they will not be sufficient to dissuade Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. It also requires the President to seek congressional approval before going to war, and authorizes the President to use military force to protect United States forces, enforce the embargo, and protect Saudi Arabia.

I believe the policy expressed by this resolution charts a wise course between those who want Congress to simply give the President an open ended authorization to use force once we have passed January 15 and those who would rule war out totally. This resolution concludes that now is not the right time to go to war, while preserving clearly our option to go to war at a later point.

Some have suggested that by refusing the President the authority he seeks to go to war, we are undercutting him in the eyes of other nations who wish to use military force to protect our friends and allies. Others have suggested that by giving the President an open ended authorization to use force, we are no different from the United Nations. But the hand of the President will be considerably stronger if he decides to use economic sanctions, economic pressure, and instead of going to war without the support of the American people, than if he goes to war without it.

We each have our constitutional responsibility. Each Senator must examine his or her own conscience and determine what is the best course for the
country to follow, as he or she sees it. We cannot be guided, in this weighty decision of war and peace, by anything other than what our best judgment tells us is the right course.

In deciding whether the use of force is appropriate to resolve conflict at any given point, it is important to evaluate such proposed action in light of general criteria that we believe are relevant.

Question: Is the issue at stake demonstrably vital to U.S. security interests?

Do we have clearly defined and agreed-upon political and military goals?

Have all other means to resolve the dispute been exhausted?

Are the American people committed to the use of force?

Is the Nation willing to commit the resources necessary to achieve our objectives?

Has Congress, representing the American people, fully explored the issues and met its constitutional mandate to approve the use of force?

Careful consideration of these criteria leads me to the conclusion that while force may ultimately be required in this situation, given our vital national interests, it is not the only alternative at this particular point in time.

Mr. President, there is no question in my mind that we have vital national interest at stake in this conflict.

There can be little doubt about Hussein's aggressive intentions, or his willingness to use force to achieve his boldest aims. His invasion of Iran in 1980 and Kuwait in 1990 made it crystal clear that the civilized norms of international behavior are no brake on his ambitions.

Today, with his million-man army, his biological and chemical weapons, and his budding nuclear capability, Hussein's eyes are turned on the spoils to be found in the Middle East. But if his invasion and occupation of Kuwait are not reversed, he will surely look further afield.

And, if his aggression stands, he will have won not only the ability to control the oil resources of Kuwait, but by intimidation or outright force, those of the rest of the gulf. Think of the military arsenal he could build with a stranglehold on almost half the world's oil.

Saddam Hussein already possesses weapons of mass destruction and has demonstrated a willingness to use them against enemies and his own population. We have all heard his threats. He has said that he would torch half of Israel with binary chemical weapons. He used poison gas against his own Kurdish citizens, causing over 5,000 civilians to die. He has shown that he will resort to anything to punish dissent or perceived disloyalty in his population, including torture and murder of children to punish their parents.

Today Hussein's sights are set on domination of the Arab world. But his possession of biological and chemical weapons, and his relentless drive to acquire a nuclear weapon, is a threat to the safety of the entire world. Today, this tyrant is content with Kuwait. But tomorrow, no one knows.

Further, because this crisis is the first of the post-cold-war world, how we deal with it will have an influence on whether we are able to deal with future aggression.

If sanctions succeed in reversing Hussein's aggression, we will have set a powerful precedent for the peaceful resolution of crises through concerted international action.

Finally, we also have a vital national interest in preserving the continued flow of oil. I am not talking about the price at the gas pump when I refer to oil. Oil is the single most important commodity in the industrial world. Its assured supply is essential to the functioning of our society, and to the health of the world economy.

If Iraq is left to go its own way with wanton aggression, it could be in a position to control the oil resources of the entire gulf through intimidation if not outright conquest. We would cede to Hussein the right to dictate the price and availability of roughly half the known oil reserves in the world, giving him inordinate power over the destinies of not only the United States but the entire world.

Such control would simply mean the unavailability of the fuel we use to warm our homes, to bring our harvest to market, to keep our hospitals and our institutions operating, and our economy functioning. Even if we are able to deal with the higher oil prices ourselves, such higher prices would have a pervasive and detrimental effect on the economies of our trading partners and developing countries.

So far, the economic sanctions that the first test has been met. America does have vital national interests at stake.

Mr. President, there is broad agreement in the Congress on the President's decision to reverse the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait. Further, we appear to have moved toward consensus on other political and military goals as this crisis has progressed. These include reducing Saddam Hussein's future warmaking capabilities, setting a precedent in the post-cold war era that aggression will not be tolerated and preventing Saddam Hussein from gaining control of almost half the world's oil resources or perhaps more than any other consideration to believe that we ought not to authorize the President to go to war at this time. Despite the belligerence of Iraq and the failure of diplomacy in Geneva, I believe that we have to give international economic sanctions backed by force and readiness and the threat of diplomacy more time to work.

We have heard from the military experts, people like Adm. William Crowe, Gen. David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, former Defense Secretaries, James Schlesinger, former Defense Secretary Cap Weinberger, and the respected chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Sam Nunn, among others, all of whom have stated their belief that we ought to give sanctions a chance to do their damage before making a decision to go to war against Iraq. Each day they remain in place Iraq's military capability is degraded and it becomes less able to withstand military attack.

Historical analysis of the use of economic sanctions suggests that they can be effective over time in forcing the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and in putting the flow of oil back to the international market.

Sanctions actually have an impact, because crude oil represents 80 percent of Iraq's hard currency reserves, which provide 90 percent of its foreign exchange earnings each month.

The embargo on oil exports, while providing a source of leverage, is by itself inadequate. Economic coercion like this because of the unprecedented coverage of sanctions which cover virtually all of the Iraq's trade and financial transactions, and the strong commitment to these sanctions by the global community.

Sanctions have rarely been applied in such a comprehensive manner, even in wartime. All of Iraq's oil exports, which provide 90 percent of its foreign exchange, have been cutoff. Iraq has been forced to forfeit $1.5 billion in foreign exchange earnings each month since the embargo was put in place.

Iraq's hard currency reserves essentially have to pay for smuggling and running out. Iraq is unusually vulnerable to economic coercion like this because crude oil represents 90 percent of its exports.

There are other economic sanctions that can be strongly monitored and easily interdicted.

This squeeze on Iraqi income facilitates enforcement of the embargo since smugglers do not take credit and do not charge full price. Denied critical inputs like fuel additives, Iraq's economy is slowing down. Iraq is clearly beginning to feel the pinch of the embargo. They indicate that Iraq is counting on their economic isolation. Its factories are shutting down, and its productive capabilities have been impaired. Recent press reports confirm that the Iraqis across the board are feeling the pinch of the embargo. They indicate that Iraq is counting on their economic isolation. Its factories are shutting down, and its productive capabilities have been impaired. Recent press reports confirm that the Iraqis across the board are feeling the pinch of the embargo. They indicate that Iraq is not making progress in its implementation of UN sanctions program that has helped Iraq sustain its defiance of the U.N. embargo.

Since September Iraqi families have suffered a 25 to 50 percent decline in the amount of basic food items they can purchase, in government stores with their ration coupons. With the reduc-
The article goes on to say, "I asked why it was such a crazy number. Why not 16,000, or 17,000?" said Hugh Blaha, vice president of C.R. Daniels, an Ellicott City, Md., firm assembling 8,500 body bags in its Tennessee factory. The Defense Department official "said that it was based on computer models that were made and that this was the number that they had in the event of hostilities." Blaha said.

Mr. LAUTENBERG. Offensive military action could cripple our access to gulf oil. If we attack Iraq, the Iraqis might in turn attack and destroy Kuwaiti and Saudi oil facilities.

Further, that military action to "free" Kuwait could actually result in its total destruction. With some half million Iraqi troops presently in or near Kuwait, in well fortified defensive positions, a quick military strike may not be realistic. It may require a longer, more drawnout conflict to achieve the desired goal, destroying whatever remains of Kuwait in the process.

Going to war at this time could fracture the international coalition we have so painstakingly constructed. Our allies are not united on the wisdom of pursuing such a course, by any means, and some of them might even switch sides in the event of hostilities. The probability that Israel would wind up fighting alongside of us in the fight to liberate Kuwait increases the possibility that Arab opinion would turn against us in the Middle East.

If America attacks Iraq, Iraq's Foreign Minister Aziz has stated in absolutely clear terms that Iraq would attack Israel, bringing Israel into the war on the side of the United States coalition. A highly destructive war, fought by American and Israeli forces, with many Arab casualties, may unleash a wave of anti-Americanism that hurts our long-term interests in the Middle East.

Mr. President, if we propose to fight a war, then the American people have clearly supported the use of force. They have to believe that the good of the Nation warrants the risk of the lives of their children, spouses, and parents. In my view, this test has not yet been met. Americans are divided over whether to go to war after January 15, or to give sanctions more time to work.

A new Washington Post-ABC poll found that 63 percent of Americans favor going to war with Iraq to force it out of Kuwait at some point after January 15. But the same poll shows that when asked if they support such a war if it means 1,000 to 10,000 Americans would die, the majority of those polled oppose the war.

And if those American people are divided at the outset on the wisdom of embarking on war, before a single shot has been fired, they almost certainly will be less supportive when the casualties start to mount.

The fifth test is our willingness—the President's and that of the American people—to commit the resources needed to do the job, and the wisdom of such a course, given the impact on our society and economy.

The President appears willing to undertake the expense of Operation Desert Shield, given the massive deployment of over 400,000 people in the gulf and his request to the Congress to authorize him to spend the money to fulfill his national objectives.

Recent reports suggest that the budget deficit in the coming fiscal year will exceed $300 billion and might even reach $400 billion. While our Nation's security can never be mortgaged, the costs of Operation Desert Shield must be seen in the context of our ailing economy and the need to provide for our urgent domestic needs.

Will the American people be willing to finance the cost of Desert Shield when they realize that Saudi Arabia will make $52 billion more from oil in 1991, or $143 million more per day as a result of this crisis, but has contributed less than $1 billion in cash and material support to Desert Shield through the end of November?

Will they be willing to shoulder this crushing burden when they realize that the American people have paid $300 billion for the war in the gulf against Iraqi aggression?

Will they be willing, when they realize that we paid 80 percent of the burden of defending the gulf against Iraqi aggression?

Will they be willing, when they realize that not only are Americans being asked to shoulder the lion's share of the financial burden but are being asked to do the lion's share of the fighting as well?

I am not saying that we should forever wait on the sidelines to defend our national interests because our allies and friends have not come forward. But I am saying that the American people's perception of how fairly the burden is
being shared will affect their support for embarking on the path of war.

Mr. President, a final consideration in deciding whether to use force is whether the President has sought and secured the approval of the Congress to do so.

Before the President commits the country to war, he must, under the Constitution, seek congressional approval and he should, as a matter of common sense, seek that approval in order to assure that the Nation is behind him.

Congress is not the only final arbiter of what is right or wrong in international affairs, but Congress is charged with the solemn responsibility of declaring war. And in this, we are the representatives of the American people. We represent the collective wisdom, the views, and the common sense of those who elected us. We are their voice and their vote in the councils of power. We are their proxy.

It is my responsibility to every New Jersey family and every American family as well, before we risk the lives of our beloved American soldiers any further, we have exhausted every option that has a reasonable chance to achieve our goal.

It is my responsibility to ask if I would be willing to send my own child to war in the gulf at this juncture before I send anyone else's child to war. And it is my responsibility, as one who has fought a war, and experienced first hand the terrible loss and sacrifice that is asked of our soldiers and of a nation that commits itself to war, to determine whether such a course is justified at this time.

Now is the time for the Congress to speak its mind. It would be folly for the President to commit to a war without a national debate and congressional approval to do so. When the going gets rough, he will want and need Congress behind him. The decision to go to war was vested in the Congress by the Constitution, so that the decision to risk American lives would not be made by one person, but rather by many, by people elected by our citizenry and answerable to them.

Mr. President, I want to stress that the Nunn-Mitchell resolution does not rule out going to war at some point down the road. It merely expresses the view that we ought to give the economic sanctions, coupled with the threat of war and the possibility of diplomacy, more of a chance to work before we have concluded that they have failed.

Mr. President, one novelist has written that the strongest of all warriors are these two: Time and patience. We are asked on the floor by colleagues what kind of a message it is that we are sending is that we are behind you, that we are trying to protect your lives and your well-being, and we are also sending a message to American families across the country that before we take the risk, we are going to exercise every option available.

Mr. President, I hope the Senate will support the Nunn-Mitchell resolution.

Mr. BURNS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Montana.

Senator COHEN, for a Statement of DESERT SHEILD.

Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, maybe a little fall on the ice was good for me because I have had the opportunity to listen to almost all of the arguments made here over the past few days. The arguments for and against giving the President—my President, your President—of these United States of America the kind of support he needs to bring the Middle East situation to resolve.

Let us sum it up. I hope Saddam Hussein watched this whole debate because it was pretty clear to me that almost every man and woman in this Congress believes very strongly that Iraq should get out of Kuwait. There are few who would support anything to stop Saddam Hussein now, it will be as Vice President QUAYLE has said, "others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed."

It is often said that those who either forget or ignore history are doomed to repeat it. In light of that, I ask only two questions.

First, is Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait or even considering getting out of Kuwait? I do not believe that this veteran of Middle East confrontations has any intention of ever yielding to world opinion let alone the opinion of the United States. This is not a man who yields to pressure. History has shown that.

Second, will sanctions really work? Have sanctions ever been 100 percent effective in achieving a foreign policy goal of this magnitude? I have never heard anyone claim that they have. I have heard that the sanctions imposed against Iraq are more successful than others have been in the past. Sanctions will only work if they are air tight. They never have, they are not now, and they never will be in my opinion. In fact, as time goes on, there will only be bigger leaks and more of them.

Finally, the most compelling argument for the President's position yesterday was that of Senator CONY of Maine. We either deal with Saddam Hussein now at a cost no one can estimate or deal with him later at an even greater cost. This is a lesson of history that we must not ignore of forget. I have heard many draw parallels to Vietnam. The lesson I draw from Vietnam is that an indecisive response leads to greater loss of life.

President Roosevelt did not want war. President Truman did not want war. And President Bush does not want war. I do not believe there is a single person in this town who wants anything that resembles war. To me, American lives are faces and friends. It is a terrible way to settle disputes. There are no winners and lots of losers. However, recent history teaches us that a strong policy in strong hands is the greatest deterrent to armed conflict.

I shall vote to give the President the authority he needs to deal with the situation in the Persian Gulf. To do nothing is the contrary will destroy the coalition that was so masterfully put together by our President and his administration. To do nothing to the contrary puts peace at risk. That is not a risk I am willing to take.

Several Senators addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. In the opinion of the Chair, the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY] is recognized.

Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am recognized; am I not?

Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum, Mr. President.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I do not yield for that purpose.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. In my opinion, the Chair recognizes the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KENNEDY].

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, President Bush is marching this country toward a senseless and unnecessary war. It may well be that only the U.S. Senate can stop him now.

The United Nations is willing to let America go to war, because the United Nations will not have to fight the war, or fill the body bags that will be returning to the United States.

We know that time is short until the votes are cast tomorrow, but the House of Representatives has apparently acquiesced in war, for reasons that are difficult to comprehend.

So now the issue of war or peace is in the lap of the Senate of the United States.

One reason that our democracy works as well as its does is that the House and Senate can take opposing views of what the national interest is. In the all-important decision that our democracy is about to make, President Bush cannot go to war unless he has the consent of both the Senate and the House.

In the many months ahead, there will still be ample opportunities left for war, if all peaceful efforts fail. But if the U.S. Senate votes for war tomorrow, there may well be no time left for peace.

It has never been the Senate's role to be a rubber stamp for the President, or to yield to the prevailing passions of the times. The Senate was designed from the beginning as a place where the Nation could be protected—and would be protected—from being stampeded into profoundly unwise and potentially disastrous actions. Now, it is up to us in the Senate to fulfill that historic role again.

A century ago, the House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly—126 to 47—for the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson.

But by a single vote—the vote of Senator Edmund Ross, a courageous Senator from Kansas—the impeachment was defeated in the Senate.

When the Senate rolls is called tomorrow, who will be Senator Edmund Ross, a courageous Senator from Kansas—the impeachment was defeated in the Senate.

We all agree on the goals we seek in the Persian Gulf. There is no dissent on that. America and the world are united that Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait—no ifs, no ands, no buts, no compromise.

But America is deeply divided over whether now is the time for war, on the January 16 timetable that President Bush set last November for the use of force.

War is not the only option left. Our policy in the Persian Gulf is not broken, and it cannot be fixed by war. There is still time for the Senate to save the President from himself—and save thousands of American soldiers in the Persian Gulf from dying in a war whose cruelty will be exceeded only by the lack of any rational necessity for waging it.

In dedicating the battlefield at Gettysburg, our greatest Republican President, Abraham Lincoln said, "We here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain."

President Bush cannot make that statement, if he goes to war on the indefensible timetable he has set. If President Bush wants to fight, I urge him to give peace a fighting chance.

Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to try to see if we can reach some accommodation here. I understand there is no effort here to close anyone out. And I know Senator Stevens was here previously and there was something of a list. I had actually been operating by it. I know the Senator who was ahead of me on that list. I think in the change of chairs, unfortunately, some people were away for a briefing and that list was changed.

I would be very, very amenable to yield to the Senator. Perhaps we could even get a rotation or something going. I think we need to be fair in this process.

Mr. President, if the Senator from Alaska were to agree to that—I know it is hard because the rules of the Senate are that the first Senator up is recognized. But I think, given the passions of this, and obviously the length of time people are waiting, it is the interest of all of us to try to accommodate everyone on a fair basis.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, if the Senator is willing to yield to me, I would recommend that the Senator from Massachusetts is to be commended for helping to maintain civility in the throes of debate.

I would recommend to the Senator from Alaska, while the Senator from Massachusetts is speaking, because I believe his remarks will be extensive, that we can reach this framework of fairness that he has talked about and not beginning that after he concludes his remarks. We could get that list in and work on it while the Senator from Massachusetts is conveying to us and the people of America his views on the subject.

I think it is important for us to maintain civility in the throes of this debate and get recognized. This is a bipartisan body.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would be happy to do whatever my colleagues think would work best here. I know we do not want to lose time in a quorum call at all. The distinguished majority whip is here. He wanted to work this out with the leader.

Mr. President, without losing my right to the floor, I yield to the Senator from Kentucky.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I believe the distinguished Senator from Maryland is correct, and the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KERRY] does have 25 minutes of remarks. During that period of time I intend to work with the distinguished whip on the other side and we will see if we cannot work out some form where everything would be fair.

As far as time is concerned, the individuals, that is one thing. We cannot be timekeepers. And the only list, at the desk is an informal list of the ones recognized first.

There has been—not been—this many on this side here all day. Most of them have been over here. They have been in and out, reading newspapers, and that sort of thing. We do not mind that at all.

At the first juncture the distinguished assistant Republican leader and I will have to try to work things
out. I see my good friend from Alaska smiling, and he will be the first one we help. We do not want a quorum call. If he will just relax and allow us to move forward here, I think we will be able to accomplish what we need to accomplish.

Mr. BRYAN. Mr. President, will the distinguished Senator yield for the purpose of questioning without losing the right to the floor?

Mr. KERRY. Without losing the right to the floor, I am glad to yield.

Mr. BRYAN. I say to the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts that I have physically been on the floor for 3 hours. I intend to speak in support of the President. So I do not want any system to be devised that would alternate back and forth with the expectation that because a Senator happens to be on this side of the aisle he will be speaking in opposition to the resolution offered by the senior Senator from Virginia.

I am going to work out—it seems to me those of us who have waited on the floor and physically sat in—not in and out, of course—right, just the rules, ought to be recognized first to seek recognition and be recognized by the chair.

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I am confident, watching the Senator from Kentucky that he will take that into consideration. I am sure agreement will be worked out.

INSTEAD, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WAR

Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wish, like everyone else here, that we were not at this moment talking about sending people to another war. Like many of us, I suspect, I had hoped after my re-election, and given the economic problems that we face in Massachusetts, to be able to return here and to talk about what we need to do to move our economy, to talk about economic priorities, about education, and the crime in our streets, and about the priority of health care. But these past several years. They cannot care for those already needing help. So, are we ready to spend the money on a new generation of patients? And can we afford to?

In a country that still struggles with jobs, the problem of drug abuse, posttraumatic stress disorder, homelessness—veterans—is this country ready for the next wave?

I remind my colleagues that cost in human lives is not limited to the battlefield. In the case of Vietnam—we have lost more Vietnam Veterans from suicide and slower forms of suicide such as alcoholism and drug abuse that have had the same end-result of death, than we lost in battle—60,000 of them. The human costs, pain, and suffering do not end when combat ends. Are we ready?

Are we ready for the changes this war will bring? Are we ready for the veterans who return from combat never the same, some not knowing their families and their families not even recognizing them. Are we ready?

Are we ready for another generation of amputees, paraplegics, burn victims, and whatever the new desert war term will be—combat fatigue, shell shock, or PTSD?

Since the time of Vietnam we have been reaching for a set of ruling principles about when we go to war and many have tried to set out what those principles ought to be—commentators, Secretaries of Defense, Presidents—both present and former. A consensus seems to have been arrived at that we should go to war when our vital interests are at stake in a way that the majority of Americans have identified and are agreed upon, and when we have exhausted all peaceful alternatives that could have achieved the same goals as war. That is not, Mr. President, the situation that exists today, and we know it.

To those of us for whom Vietnam remains much more than just a distant memory, there are analogies which create deep-seated doubts over the apparent willingness of this Administration’s rush to war. Let me say right up front that the Iraqi crisis is in most ways not like Vietnam.

It is very different indeed—different in International implications—different in purposes—different in risks—different in stakes—different in military strategy and opportunities. I am convinced also that it will be different in outcome.

But in one inescapable and absolutely critical facet, it demands that one of the central lessons of the Vietnam experience be applied—do not commit U.S. forces to combat in a potentially prolonged or bloody conflict unless Americans have reached a consensus on the need to do so. That consensus must be broad and openly arrived at with full respect for the consensus on the need to do so. That consensus must be broad and openly arrived at with full respect for the consensus on the need to do so.

So, are we ready to talk about war, about countless of our families torn apart by duty and commitment to our country, of countless lives put on hold.

Mr. President, we are here talking about all of the repercussions that go with a war, about countless lives that will be put on hold. And surely the consequences of this discussion can make our domestic concerns even greater than they are today. But that is not the issue. That is not what we are here to talk about.

We engage here in one of the most important debates that we could ever engage in. And it is certainly the most important debate that I have engaged in since I have been in the U.S. Senate. And this will be the most important vote we will take.

There has been a lot of talk on the floor about treaties, resolutions, principles, slogans, and all the political and strategic reasons for going to war or not going to war, and they are indeed a legitimate part of this debate.

But sometimes I think in the words we lose sight of the personal stakes of this conflict and what it will really mean to us at home—and to the rest of the world.

We have a way of quietly saying “war is hell” or “war is horrible” and then we move on, lost again in the words which have become the cliches and the politics. I am willing to accept the horror that goes with war—when the interests or stakes warrant it. My belief is that our impatience with sanctities and diplomacy does not yet warrant accepting that horror and my fear is that our beloved country is not yet ready for what it will witness and bear if we go to war.

The question of being ready and certain is important to many of us of the Vietnam generation. We come to this debate with a measure of distrust, with some skepticism, with a searing commitment to ask honest questions and with a resolve to get satisfactory answers so that we are not misled again. And I might add that also come to this debate determined that whatever happens we will not confuse a war with the warriors. I am determined that our troops will receive complete and total support. And, that if we do go to war, I am committed that we do everything in our power to accomplish our mission with minimum casualties and bring the troops home to the gratitude and respect they deserve.

But until the first shot is fired I remain troubled by the unanswered questions and by the human considerations. Our VA hospitals are already full of veterans who carry or wear daily reminders of the costs of war. Those hospitals have been cutting staff and services these past several years. They cannot care for those already needing help. So, are we ready to spend the money on a new generation of patients? And can we afford to?

In a country that still struggles with agents orange, outreach centers, posttraumatic stress disorder, homeless veterans—is this country ready for the next wave?

I remind my colleagues that cost in human lives is not limited to the battlefield. In the case of Vietnam—we have lost more Vietnam Veterans from suicide and slower forms of suicide such as alcoholism and drug abuse that have had the same end-result of death, than we lost in battle—60,000 of them. The human costs, pain, and suffering do not end when combat ends. Are we ready?

So, are we willing to act, it seems, with more braverado than patience. It is as if the whole theory of deterrence developed through the cold war period has suddenly been turned topey-turvey and we are behaving precisely in such a confrontational manner because we are
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not facing a superpower and because the same rules of deterrence do not apply. That, I think, is not the way a great and responsible nation should act in these dangerous times, particularly now when it has other options available to it.

In recent days we have heard some try to cower those with legitimate concerns or questions into political submission by suggesting that we are weakening the country or pulling the rug out from under the President with this debate or an adverse vote. I believe it is those who make that argument who do a disservice to country and to Constitution, and perhaps even to the troops.

I believe we strengthen our country through this debate because we show the world what real democracy means. And, more importantly, we strengthen our country because our citizens see our own democratic process working as it ought to. But most importantly, consider what a farce we would be perpetrating if the U.S. Congress did not exercise an independent judgment about war. Are we in the United States of America supposed to go to war simply because the President thinks we should and has put so many people in the position of having to support him just to back him up? Is that the reason we go to war in 1991 in the United States of America?

I hear it from person after person—"Well, I want to back up the President." "I do not want the President to look bad." "The President got us in this position, I am uncomfortable—but I cannot go against him."

Mr. President, it looks to me like backing up the President's decision has become the new vital interest, not the immediate liberation of Kuwait—not some real threat to our country.

To me it looks like war for pride, not for vital interests.

Are we supposed to go to war simply because one man—the President—makes a series of unilateral decisions that put us in a box—a box that makes that war, to a greater degree, inevitable? Are we supposed to go to war because once the President has announced something publicly, to reverse or question him is somehow detrimental to the Nation despite the fact we are a constitutional partner in government?

Obviously, such an argument and such an approach to the governing process of this country makes Congress nothing more than a rubber stamp and literally renders inoperative our coequal decisionmaking responsibility in a matter of war and peace. It might be wise to remind ourselves that we still are a nation of laws and not of men; that we still elect our Presidents: We do not have a monarchical system. We had a revolution more than 200 years ago to settle that question and the Constitution put the war-making power in Congress' hands precisely to avoid the very individual decisionmaking—that places us in the box we are told we are in today.

Mr. President, I suspect that 75 percent or more of those who will vote for you and who vote for your war because you want it to be used, and a significant number will vote for it only because they want to prevent the President from being reversed. That really means that this vote to grant the use of force may very well carry—if it does—only because some will succumb to the very box the President has put us in.

The danger of that is that those who vote for use of force will create a situation where it becomes more, rather than less, likely that the force they hope will not be used will, in fact, be used. They escalate the stakes. They narrow the box further. That is a terrible way to make policy. Mr. President, but it is an even more terrible way to go to war by any account. That is called rolling-the-dice policy; big rolling the dice. Perhaps it will work.

There are many who suspect it might. But, Mr. President, I would rather use good, prudent policy which would have the same good end result or which, if it ultimately brings you to war, does so because there was no other option. I would rather vote for that than a roll-the-dice policy with all the attendant risks and questions about who fills the power vacuum in Iraq. What happens if we win? What happens with Israel? What happens for years to come to American businessmen trying to do business in the Middle East? All of those are unanswered questions, Mr. President, and I think the American people would prefer that we vote that way, too.

But now, because of the decision of the President of the United States, because he set a January 15 deadline, because he significantly increased the number of troops in the desert, turning a decision into a commitment, and, finally, we are in the position of either debating this issue and slowing the rush to war, or forever giving up our responsibility to decide whether or not this Nation goes to war. I believe we have a basic duty and a responsibility to ask why the unilateral conversion of Desert Shield to Desert Sword now demands that, like lemmings marching to the sea, we must march off to war.

Many have argued in recent days that we must, by a large majority, vote to give the President the right to use force, because that is the best way to send the message to Saddam Hussein, and that only the threat of force, a new threat of force, will steeply down give him that message.

Mr. President, I believe such thinking is dangerous, and I believe it is flawed because it requires us to surrender the most important responsibility of the Congress: The power to make war. This is not a vote about sending a message. That message was already on the table. This is a vote about whether or not to put ourselves in a smaller box where war may become more likely, whether it needs to or not, and where we will have nothing further to say about the war.”

For us in Congress now, this is not a vote about a message. It is a vote about war because whether or not the President exercises his power, we will have no further say after this vote. But voting to keep sanctions and diplomacy is not a vote against war if all other options fail because we continue to hold that lever in our hands.

I ask you, Mr. President, which is more prudent? The argument that this vote will somehow send Saddam Hussein a different message ignores the fact that from the outset there has already been a realistic force on the table and there remains a threat of force as long as the sanctions are in place and troops are in the region. So the decision is not a decision that sends some new threat of the use of force that somehow will accomplish what the last threat of force was unable to. It is a vote which says we are ready to go to war and it says we are ready to go to war before all the other options have been exercised. I, therefore, do not believe that we can treat this as somehow passing on to the President some casual affirmation of his diplomacy.

There is also the argument that we must support the President because he is the President, and if you do not support the President when he asks you to, you will hurt the policy. That is an argument of enormous appeal, Mr. President, and that is why it is made. All of us, I think, every single one of us by natural instinct wants to support the President. None of us wants to be perceived somehow as taking away from the ability of the President to act in the greater interest of the country.

Sometimes this appeal of the President, political as it is, can trample on the duties and responsibilities of others that the Founding Fathers said share in the governing process. Mr. President, in all candor, I would rather be here on the floor voting to support the President. I would rather case a vote that tallies in the eighties or nineties or is unanimous and I can walk away without a sense of division. I can assure you it is easier, but if we were to succumb to this argument, if anybody in this Chamber succumbs to this argument right now, if we just close ranks with the President for the sake of closing ranks, we have already given up our warmaking power, and we will set an extraordinarily dangerous
precedent, and, most of all, we will not have done, I think, our service to the troops and to this country.

All the President would have to do at any time, Mr. President, would be to close ranks, Mr. President, let it be the correct time. If there is a call to close ranks among ourselves here in this Chamber with our responsibility mothers and fathers and brothers and whose hearts and souls are heavy with thousands of lives in ever policy they want to in the name of peace and justice, what would be the policy that we have to implement what essentially amounts to a Pax Americana? Is that a New World order?

Can it truly be said that the United States of America, trading off better treatment to China for an abstention on a vote, cozying up to Syria with its record of support for terrorism, or making promises to other countries in exchange for a hold-your-coat, you-go-ahead-and-take-the-risks-and-casualties endorsement, can it truly be said that these dictate a New World order?

If so, then it is a New World order that we are building a New World order when it is almost exclusively the United States who will be fighting in the desert, not alone, but almost, displaying pride and impatience and implementing what essentially amounts to a Pax Americana?

Mr. President, I regret that I do not see a New World order in the United States going to war with shadow battlefield allies who barely carry a burden. It is too much like the many flags policy of the old order in Vietnam where other countries were used to try to mask the unilateral reality.

I see international cooperation; yes, I see acquiescence to our position; I see bizarre new bedfellows and alliances, but I question if it adds up to a new world order.

Most important, I do not see a New world order in fighting before we wait out more peaceful approaches. In fact, I see more of the old world order where countries are quick to try to resolve their disputes by force, where countries that do not try to exercise the patience for real international cooperative efforts—slow as they might be, become disillusioned with the current world and common sense becomes one of the first casualties of conflict.

Some Senators and the administration have suggested that sanctions alone cannot force Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait. They argue that the sanctions can be evaded; that the alliance could break up, with Iran agreeing to pipe Iraqi oil or the Soviet Union suddenly shifting its support for our policy to opposition. They say now is the time to strike, while the alliance is strong. They suggest that the failure of sanctions is an obvious truth that the rest of us will willfully ignore.

This obvious truth is contrary to the testimony of our own intelligence estimates. As CIA Director Webster testified before the Congress just 1 month ago—on December 5, 1990—the CIA estimated that sanctions would need another 9 months to be effective—only then could we determine the extent to which they were working.

That means that according to the Director of the CIA, we cannot conclude that sanctions are ineffective until next September.

Other experts have suggested that the full impact of sanctions in degrading the Iraqi military, in addition to its civilian economy, would take some 2 years in all to be felt. By that time, they have testified, “the industrial infrastructure of the Iraqi economy will grind down for lack of spare parts, and factories will close for lack of raw materials.” As they have testified, “sanctions do not yield immediate results. They are not a surgical tool; rather they are an undiscriminating sword.”

With the sanctions, time is not on Saddam Hussein’s side, but ours. Sanctions cost Iraq much, they cost us little. Iraq’s gross national product before the sanctions were imposed was $22 billion a year—its exports were $12.4 billion, almost entirely in oil, its imports another $13 billion. Those exports are now wiped out; those imports are largely stopped. The grinding down has begun and will only intensify with time.

As a top-level member of the Bush administration told the New York Times and Washington Post on August 9, on the condition that he not be named, sanctions will work against Iraq, because “we don’t have the cold war situation where it was difficult to enforce sanctions because of ideological competition and huge divisions in the world. This time, we’ve got the Soviet Union on board and virtually everyone else as well.”

This time we’re dealing with a single-source economy based on oil sales that
is on its knees working of the war and can be hurt very easily."

As a former Iraqi army colonel told the Washington Post on August 23, "It's more important to stop the oil from flowing than to stop food from getting in." If the oil doesn't get out, in time Saddam Hussein cannot pay for anything—let alone the huge military establishment that is bleeding his country's economy dry.

I have heard Senators and others argue that coalition is weak or fragile. I would suggest respectfully that every parent in America with a child in the desert must ask: If our allies, the coalitions, cannot stay the course of World order. The President says little-let alone the huge military establishment that is bleeding our economy further and its impact on energy prices is impossible to predict. But we should ask, can we really afford what we are possibly embarking on.

In the long run, such a war could lead to renewed terrorist attacks on Americans as a result of our having killed innumerable Arab civilians. Is America prepared? And what of the war's impact in the Middle East generally? What of the grave risks of new instabilities that could lead to still further wars, involving many nations in the region, including Israel. Is the liberation of Kuwait in a few days so imperative that all those risks are worthwhile at this moment?

As we approach this historic vote, we must ask ourselves the most important and fundamental question we are ever called upon to discuss in the United States—whether our Government has done every-

their sons and daughters, their husbands and wives, their grandchildren off to war in the Arabian Desert?

If ever there was a time to heed the counsel of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower, it is now. For in matters of war, President Eisenhower said that we have to have the courage of patience.

I would ask another question, Mr. President. I have not heard one single person within the administration suggest that somehow at this point in time we are losing this effort and Saddam Hussein is winning it. There is no one who suggests that Saddam Hussein is winning anything today. In fact, all we are told is, we do not think the sanctions are going to drive him out of Kuwait.

But, tragically, we will never know the answer to whether or not they will drive him out, and some family that might lose a son will never know the answer of whether there was another way because we were not willing to find out whether or other way might work.

So if Iraq is not winning and we are not losing, Mr. President, then why the rush to send us our men and women to war? What happened to the very patience that the President and Secretary of State Baker asked of the American people as a requirement necessary for the success of the President's policy?

The answer is regrettable I think. We are asked to authorize the President to go to war now, not because the President's original policy—which we all supported—has failed. We are asked to authorize war because the President put 40,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and it may be impossible to maintain them in a high state of readiness if they are not engaged soon.

There are other unanswered questions about this war. It will cost Americans money, it may damage our weakened economy further and its impact on energy prices is impossible to predict. But we should ask, can we really afford what we are possibly embarking on.

In the long run, such a war could lead to renewed terrorist attacks on Americans as a result of our having killed innumerable Arab civilians. Is America prepared? And what of the war's impact in the Middle East generally? What of the grave risks of new instabilities that could lead to still further wars, involving many nations in the region, including Israel. Is the liberation of Kuwait in a few days so imperative that all those risks are worthwhile at this moment?

As we approach this historic vote, we must ask ourselves the most important and fundamental question we are ever called upon to discuss in the United States—whether our Government has done every-

the maximum military advantage possible, than to force a hasty con-

frontation which is almost certain to result in more body bags and casualties than we would have had to endure if we had been more patient. Those who want the President to have an unfettered hand may be willing to overlook this reality. But the hearings have shown that the American people are not.

Most amazingly, until November 8, the administration on numerous occasions urged the American people to be patient—that sanctions would take time to work. We were told that the economic sanctions would make Sad­

dam Hussein's position untenable.

The August 9, 1990, New York Times carried an analytical piece quoting various administration sources that the economic embargo would cut off Iraq's supply of military spare parts and ammunition making it impossible to sustain long supply lines and perhaps eroding Hussein's political stat­

utes at home.

A senior administration official was quoted as saying: "The embargo is the key." He, and other officials warned that it would take months for such a strategy to play out.

On September 5, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker, in testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, stated:

Iraq's import-dependent economy is begin­

ning to feel the strain, and international pressures will continue to grow over time as shortages mount.

The Secretary made a very important and unequivocal point:

Time is on the side of the international community. Diplomacy can be made to work.

The Secretary concluded his remarks by stating the administration believed:

••••• this coordinated and comprehensive international isolation of Iraq is the only peaceful path to meeting objectives set by the President. However, it will take time and that is what we ask most of the American people: Stand firm. Be patient. And remain united so that together we can show that aggression does not pay.

Thus, the fundamental question Congres­

s is legitimately asking is why, all of a sudden, did all the talk of patience and time being on the side of the inter­
national community vanish so quickly? We have a right to still ask that ques­
tion. To date, we have not received a believable explanation.

Mr. President, it has been said again and again on this floor but it bears re­peating: You only go to war when it is imperative to protect vital national in­
terests—when it is the last alternative available to you—when there is none other. Until we reach that point, no one should send our young people into battle to die.

Have we reached the point where we can tell the American people that there is no other moral choice but to send
thing possible, short of war, to bring about the outcome we all desire? Did our leaders exercise enough patience. And if it were my son, or daugh- ter, I would be painstakingly and pa­ tiently exhausted. This question is fundamental to why we are here today, exercising our constitutional responsibility in deciding whether or not to authorize one man­ war, had been painstakingly and pa­ tiently exhausted. That is the only issue before this body. Mr. FORD addressed the Chair. Mr. FORD. Mr. President, so that we might develop a schedule of speakers as relates to this issue, I have con­sulted with my distinguished friend, the assistant Republican leader, and the Senate is both sides of the aisle, and that is the reason I will make this unanimous-consent request. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con­ sent that the Senators listed below be recog­ nized in the order listed and for such time as indicated—and some have not given me a time. I hope they will not be too long. But those in order will be first, Sen­ ator MIKULSKI from Maryland, Senator STEVENS from Alaska, Senator BRYAN from Nevada, Senator KASSEBAUM from Kansas, Senator KERREY of Nebraska. I am going to Senator CHAFEE, Senator DODD, Senator WALLOP, Senator SAN­ ford, Senator PRESSLER, Senator BYRD, Senator Gorton, Senator DECONCINI, Senator MCCONNELL, Senator GRAHAM of Florida, Senator RUDMAN, Senator RYDEN, Senator COHEN, and we have Senator GRAMM and Senator SIMPSON. At the conclusion of Senator COHEN’S statement, the Chair will endeavor to recognize the majority and minority members ultimately. We would be glad to have Senator SMITH from New Hampshire be included, after Senator SIMPSON.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, before we listen to the distinguished Senator from Maryland, it is my understanding that she will need approximately 5 minutes. The Senator from Alaska will need approximately 20 minutes; Sen­ ator SANFORD, approximately 10 minutes; Senator KERREY of Nebraska, approxi­ mately 15 minutes; Senator CHAFEE, approximately 15 minutes; Senator DODD, approximately 25 minutes; and Senator KASSEBAUM, approximately 10 minutes. So these are in the proximity so we can have some idea of the time. Senator SANDFORD, approximately 20-25 minutes; Senator BYRD would be 30 minutes.

Senator PRESSLER, does he know how much time he will be taking? Senator PRESSLER will be 15 minutes. That is the approximate time.

We want to add after Senator COHEN, Senator CONRAD, and then Senator HARDY will be added to the list.
Mr. FORD. The Senator from Connecticut, all have been given time limits. The Senator from Massachusetts, Senator STEVENS 20 approximately, Senator BRYAN 10, Senator KASSEBAUM 10, Senator KERRY of Nebraska 15, Senator CHAFEE 15, and then the Senator from Connecticut 25.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Senator CONRAD and Senator HATCH will be added to the list.

THE SUBJECT OF WAR

Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. President, today I rise to exercise my responsibility as a U.S. Senator, to offer my opinion, to give guidance, and to ultimately cast my vote on this most important subject, the subject of war. Should we or should we not provide an unlimited authority on going to war?

Mr. President, there is no greater responsibility that a Senator can face than the decision about war. In the course of several days, I have agonized over this, because I belong to the President's men, consulted with experts, and listened intently to my own constituents because I know the decisions that we are about to make will affect the lives of Americans and of our sons and daughters in the desert and the future of the United States of America.

Let me say a word about the troops. Every one of our troops in the desert is a part of my American family. I know they are there at tremendous sacrifice and great risk. They are ordinary men and women who have been called on to act in an extraordinary way. And they have responded quickly and gallantly. They have been willing to face physical hardship, the threat of ghoulish weapons, and financial sacrifice for their families. They have been challenged by the scourging heat of the desert and the looming threat of confrontation.

Those men and women have met a great test, a test of patriotism and devotion, and everyone here owes them a great debt of gratitude for the way that they have acted.

Mr. President, there is a need to keep them in mind and know that however we make use of them there, it has to be the wisest and most prudent course.

Mr. President, there are those now watching this debate on TV who are not friendly to the United States or to its interests. There are Americans who are mesmerized by this discussion, who are also watching these great processes unfold. I would like to make a comment, if I could, about the very nature of the fact that this debate is being broadcast worldwide, even to the councils of war of those who might wage an attack against Saudi Arabia or against our own country.

I know this: In this country, the mere fact that we are here and that we are willing to do this in an open way and to broadcast across the globe village demonstrates the American commitment to democracy.

This is a democratic institution, and it sets a norm for democracy. It also says that a democracy, difference is tolerated, and also that difference is not division.

I want those who are watching this debate who are not friendly to us to understand that: where there is difference, there is not division.

Then there are those saying: Where is the debate? When are they going to get into the argument? When are we going to see "Geraldo goes to the United States Senate?"

Mr. President, that is not the way this body is conducting itself. I am proud to have been part of this discussion that I have heard. I see that my colleagues here do not want to argue with other Senators. The Senators getting up here today are giving their thoughts, their views, and their conclusions, arrived at in very responsible ways.

We are not here to be glib, to be facile, to engage in a kind of debate that we would do on some other issues. I think that this procedure also shows the sincerity of our efforts and the true test of what leadership is all about.

Mr. President, that takes me to where we are in a legislative framework. When I ran for the U.S. Senate 4 years ago, I came in here and said I want to get Maryland and this country ready for the future. I was excited because a new century was coming, a new millennium was on its way, and I was looking forward to it.

A year ago, in January of 1990, I thought we were on the brink of a new age. I feared the dawn of a dark age because of the August 2 invasion of Kuwait by the Saddam Hussein war machine. And though I was shocked at the brutality of it, I had believed for some time that Hussein was a bully. That is why over the past several months I voted for sanctions, even before the invasion, that I hoped would curtail his human rights abuses. That was to no avail. And now he has invaded, and the President has organized a multilateral and economic and diplomatic pressure to stop him.

Where do we go from here? Well, Mr. President, let me say this: I have been doing a lot of thinking and talking with my constituents. They are very clear in that they urge two policies.

A word about our President. Resolution we also continue to give the Congress of the United States of America stands.

We go on to say that the Congress pledges its full and continued support for sustaining the policy of economic and diplomatic pressures against Iraq.

There are those who have made convincing arguments that those sanctions are working. They are working and are eroding the ability of Iraq to conduct its war and are having an effect on destabilizing the internal politics of Iraq.

There are those who feel that economic and diplomatic pressures are a kind of wimpy, that this is a soft way to go. I argue just the opposite, that they show resolve and commitment and should be followed.

Mr. President, in the Mitchell-Nunn resolution we also continue to give the President the authorization to use American force—conditional force, yes—but military action to enforce the U.N. embargo, to defend Saudi Arabia against Iraqi attack, and to protect American forces in the region.

So I think we offer a commitment to sustain military options, to a wise course of a continued policy of embargo and sanction, reserving the right for further assertive action.

Mr. President, I think that offers resolution and restraint. I know that the time is late, and I hope that the brevity of my remarks here does not imply that I have not thought about this with a great deal of care.

Having reached my conclusion, I think that this resolution says a lot, not only about American policy, but about American character. It says that we have a commitment. We have a commitment, first of all, to peace, and we have a commitment to use force as a last resort. We have a commitment to being tenacious, even when the U.N. embargo, to defend Saudi Arabia and to our own Nation. We have a commitment to flexibility, with the changing nature of diplomatic initiatives offered by ourselves and also by other nations. It is also a commitment to self-
sacrifice. I hope that the other nations who talk about being part of the coalition stick with us on the same issues of tenacity and self-sacrifice.

Mr. President, when my name is called, I am going to vote for the resolution offered by Senator Mitchell, which I believe is in the best long-term interest of the United States of America and will get us ready for the future and the new age that I hoped for a year ago.

Mr. President, I took the commuter train from my home into the Senate this morning. And for that hour, moving through a snowstorm, I held a town meeting about our policy toward Iraq and what we should do about Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. Like most Americans, those men and women were worried about the possibility of war. Some were adamant that we should not go to war at all. Others were worried about the possibility of war. Some were worried about the possibility of war. Some were worried about the possibility of war. Some were worried about the possibility of war.

Like my colleagues here on the floor today, they were sober and deliberative—they took the possibility of war seriously, and they were pained by the thought of sending our men and women in the desert into battle.

The question of war worries everyone—from commuters on the train, to my colleagues, to the President of the United States.

I want to say a few words about the leadership of President George Bush. When Saddam Hussein was ready to invade Saudi Arabia, President Bush moved quickly and decisively. His actions stopped Saddam Hussein, saved our Persian Gulf allies, and strengthened our policies of international cooperation.

We were served well by his experience as he moved in short order to begin a sustainable and supportable policy of diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions. I believe that he is a man of intelligence and a man of integrity. And I have continually supported the leadership of President George Bush.

When the President sent our troops to the desert to protect Saudi Arabia and the entire Persian Gulf from Saddam Hussein's aggression, I stood with him and with them. When he condemned the brutality and belligerence of Saddam Hussein, I agreed. When he worked to build an international coalition, I offered by full support. And with every attempt to negotiate a peaceful solution for this success.

And even when I had differences with our President, those differences did not lessen the resolve I share with the President to bring Saddam Hussein to account for his invasion of Kuwait. Because in our democracy, difference is not division.

Today, Mr. President, I stand up to my responsibility to offer my opinion and my guidance. And tomorrow Mr. President, I will support the judgments made by this body and my colleagues. That is democracy in action. And I believe those who are listening to this debate understand one thing very clearly: We will stand united.

There can be no greater responsibility than decisions about war. The decisions we are making are about the lives of our American sons and daughters. Every one of our troops in the desert is a part of my American family. They are there at tremendous sacrifice and great risk.

They face personal risk in the desert and financial sacrifice for their families at home. They are challenged by the scouring heat of the desert, the looming threat of confrontation, and separation from the ones they love. And those men and women have made that test.

Every single person I have talked with finds the same thing about these young men and women. They are waking up to do whatever is asked of them by their country. And they are incredibly fit for duty.

They are ordinary men and women called to an extraordinary event. My heart goes out to them. I have been truly prepared for the consequences of war. We have heard assurances that a surgical strike will end the war in a few days. But Mr. President, too many of the experts who have led our military say otherwise. It will not be easy.

Two of the world's largest armies are facing each other in an area smaller than my own State. The distance across Kuwait is not much longer than my train ride from Baltimore. A fighter-bomber can fly over in 10 minutes.

With over 1 million troops on the battlefield, there could be 300 men fighting for each square mile of Kuwait. The casualties could be horrendous. The weapons will be grisly and ghoulish.

And the war may not end on the battlefield. We must anticipate that this action could trigger a widespread and lasting wave of terrorism. On airlines, in Europe, and here at home.

That is why we must exhaust the possibilities of sanctions. And in fact, sanctions are working—90 percent of Iraq's imports are now cut off. Almost 100 percent of the exports. Iraq's GNP has gone down 50 percent. The best estimates are that it can go down over 70 percent.

Sanctions can mean an enemy that is worn out and worn down.

I have listened to arguments from all sides. Here on the floor. In briefings from the President, our military leaders, and the CIA. In the past few weeks, as I have moved around my State, I have heard from Marylanders of every opinion.

The agonizing does not end with this vote. I will continue to pray and work for peace. I believe that continuing the sanctions and embargo is the best decision for our country.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, first let me commend the whips for their action. I do believe it is much better to have some order and understanding of how we are going to proceed. It is the first act of our new majority whip. So
I congratulate both him and Senator Simpson for their action. I think first it would be important for us to remember why we are here. I am one who went to the Persian Gulf during the period when Senator from Hawaii, [Mr. DOCTER], when we came back, we visited with the President, and the President once again reiterated to us that he would be happy to have the support of Congress. On Friday, the President wrote to Senator Dole and made this statement:

THE WHITE HOUSE, Washington, DC, January 6, 1991

DEAR SENATOR DOLE:
The current situation in the Persian Gulf, brought about by Iraq's unprovoked invasion and subsequent brutal occupation of Kuwait, threatens vital U.S. interests. The situation also threatens the peace. It would, however, greatly enhance the chances for peace if Congress were not to go on record supporting the position adopted by the United States on twelve separate occasions. Such an action would underline that the United States stands with the international community and on the side of law and decency; it also would help dispel any belief that may exist in the minds of Iraq's leaders that the United States lacks the determination to respond decisively to Iraq's continued aggression against Kuwait.

Secretary of State Baker is meeting with Iraq's Foreign Minister on January 9. If he were convinced that Iraq is going on here, and I would remind them that most of our citizens do not realize how small nations. It is at least doubtful to my mind whether Great Britain or ourselves, for instance, could go to the defense of Turkey against the threat of a major war. They may be a number of different purposes dissolved in failure. Of course, we look forward with hope for an action by the great powers, and a willingness on their part to submit their disputes to peaceful settlement. On this continent we could clearly go to the defense of any American state under the doctrine of collective self-defense in article 51.

VETO POWER CAN BE A WEAPON TO PROTECT JUSTICE

So long as action under the Charter is based on expediency and not on justice, I believe that the veto power is necessary. Otherwise it might be possible for the great nations of the world, who could be expected to fulfill the definite obligations of the Charter, to act unjustly and contrary to the interest of many smaller nations. Apparently, under paragraph 4 of article 2, boundaries fixed in the treaty of peace are to be frozen in the absence of some voluntary readjustment, for the purpose of preserving the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. If unjust boundaries are to be preserved in this way, any attempt to rectify those boundaries by force would be a violation of the Charter no matter how just that rectification might be. The veto power thus could be used against a nation fighting in effect, for the freedom of its own people. I have also been interested in the problem of preventing one nation from obtaining assistance from any other which is attacked by one of the powers holding a veto. Thus, conceivably, Russia could use its veto to prevent one nation from obtaining assistance from the United States which is attacked by another.

I am determined to do whatever is necessary to prevent any aggression that may come about. I also believe that we should go further and provide that the Charter should always be willing to submit any dispute, as well, to arbitration, providing that the boards or courts established are bound to decide the question on principles of justice. This, however, involves authority to arbitrate disputes. That has always been a matter determined by Congress. I should be inclined to pass a statute defining the conditions under which the American representative could agree to a proper submission. I should make the authority as wide as possible.

I should like to hear from Minnesota that we should adhere to the World Court with regard to matters which are justifiable. I also believe that we should go further and submit other matters, as well, to arbitration, and direct our American representative to do so. Moreover, we should state the conditions upon which we should do this.

Mr. President, if our representative, in some extraordinary circumstances, should find it necessary to refuse to agree to arbitrate, I believe he should be instructed to veto any measures thereupon threatened against us under articles 41 and 42.

I am determined to do whatever is necessary to prevent any aggression that may come about.
There may also be cases in which the threat to the peace is so distant from us that other nations should undertake the police function. Probably the most well-known situation covered by the supplemental treaty under article 43.

There is this consideration, however, in declaring war and in delegating to our representatives the authority to authorize sanctions or force. If we assume certain definite obligations, I am prepared to leave to the President the performance of those obligations. But the veto power given under article 27 makes every individual case a question of national policy and not of justice. There is no obligation of any kind on us to vote for sanctions or force if we consider that it is unwise to do so from a question of our own national policy. Ordinarily, national policy in the field of sanctions and war has been decided by Congress. Under the Constitution, only Congress can declare war. It would seem desirable therefore, that some provision be made which would enable the President to intervene in Cuban affairs.

In 1914, Congress passed a joint resolution similar to this one, justifying the President to send members of the United States military to Nicaragua. Again in 1927, Congress dealt with the involvement of our forces in a Chinese civil war. In 1955, Congress passed a joint resolution which authorized the President to intervene in the affairs of the United States as he deemed necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. And in 1957, Congress passed a joint resolution to authorize the President to use armed forces in Lebanon.

We have had a series of such involvements. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, Congress passed a resolution to support President Kennedy and to prevent the Soviets from establishing a military presence in Cuba. And we all know about the Gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964. And in 1965, we had another resolution supporting the President in the Dominican Republic.

In the absence of strong congressional support, the President, in his role as Commander in Chief, may not be understood abroad when voices are raised here in Congress that they want to declare war. What we think that is the reason we are here.

The President kept hearing this, kept trying and keep the peace. We have the largest military force deployed since World War II in the Persian Gulf region. It is there to support the objectives of the United Nations. Having just come back from there, as I said, I can tell the Senate that every single person in the military that I talked to asked me about what Congress was going to do: Was Congress going to make the President不对 in Desert Storm, another Vietnam, into another Korea, and set down guidelines which would prevent the maintenance of peace?

That is what is going on here, and I am sick at heart to hear so many people say on the floor of the Senate they support our people over there, they support what the President had done, but we should wait. We should wait because they believe the President's request for the use of force to keep the peace ought to wait until the sanctions work.

Wait until the sanctions work. We saw marines that had been in the desert since August. They had been training daily. One of them said to me: Senator, can you imagine what it is like for a marine to be without beer for 4 months? They have been out there, day in and day out, on that desert getting used to it, and they are ready. We have to convince Saddam Hussein that they are not going to do the job if he does not comply with the U.N. resolution.
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We also went to a whole series of areas. We visited vessels on the gulf. We visited with pilots. We visited with the Army people, with the commander over there, General Schwarzkopf, and his very dedicated and capable staff. All of them, even the foreign leaders in those situations we went to, said the problem is that Saddam Hussein is not getting the message. He does not believe you. He listens to the voices from home. He hears these people on CNN who say we are not going to support that, and that the President does not have the authority he says he has.

So the President did ask us to come on board. As Senator Vandenberg used to say, "If you want to be on board at the time of the landing or the crash landing, you have to be on board at the takeoff." The President has asked for us to get on board, to show the Nation is united behind those people who are dedicated not to building an infrastructure and command and control. Isolated instances of abuses and atrocities can happen in war, but I challenge my colleagues to read this, read this report of Amnesty International, to read this report of Wide Area Munitions, and then to stop and think about torture and killings and the widespread human rights violations and come to the conclusion that somehow or other this military machine is going to be deterred by economic sanctions alone. It has not been deterred by any concept of economics the world knows. It has dedicated all of its income to building the facilities of war: chemical warfare, biological warfare. It is working on a nuclear capability, and if it were not for Israel, they would have it now.

I believe it is time that we take a look at, really, what can we do, what are we going to support. The U.N. resolutions support the U.N. goals of trying to have Saddam Hussein and his forces leave Kuwait without the use of force. To me it is plain; that is, to do what has been asked by the President. I do not think he has the duty to do that. After we already acquiesced in financing that Desert Shield operation, after we acquiesced in extending the periods of enlistment, extending the authority for calling up the reserves, any President would have the right to assume Congress agreed with what was going on and did not seek to interfere. But because of the voices that have been raised, and they continue to be raised here, I believe it is necessary for us to do what has been requested and that is to give the President of the United States the authority to carry out the objectives of the U.N. resolutions. And specifically the one that says that such force as may be necessary may be used to remove the forces of Iraq from Kuwait if they do not withdraw by January 15.

In my judgment, there is ground here for people to have a difference about sanctions in terms of whether, standing alone, they will work. The question is not whether they will work, but whether they will work in time. Can we preserve the coalition that is in place now, and can we maintain the support of the American people in the deployment of this many people, the maintenance of this credible force to carry out the U.N. resolution?

I still am of the opinion that if the Iraqis realize that there is no further impediment in the way of the use of the U.N. forces, the forces arrayed under the banner of the United Nations in the Persian Gulf, there will be a peaceful resolution of this. I must confess I am a little more pessimistic since I read the Amnesty International report than I was before, because the extent of those atrocities is just overwhelming. I do believe that Iraq has destroyed the birth and death record of Kuwait. It has destroyed the passport records. It has destroyed even the little list of children who were eliminated Kuwait from the memory of man, as far as they are concerned. It has even barred access to Kuwait. I am informed, by our news media. They are trying to get into Iraq but they cannot go into Kuwait.

Is that not a dichotomy since Iraq believes Kuwait is now Iraq? Why should we not have free access for the press to know what is going on in what we believe is Kuwait and what the Iraqis believe is now part of their nation?

I am of the opinion, Mr. President, that the people who do not vote to support the request of the President are not really supporting our forces in the field. That is what makes me sick at heart.

The array of our young men and women here is tremendous. They have a moral task that is amazing. Everywhere we went, the Senator from Hawaii asked about absent-without-leave statistics, about sick-leave statistics, about reenlistment statistics. It might interest the Senate to know: No AWOL's; the lowest sick leave in the world in the American forces; the highest level of reenlistment in U.S. forces. The morale of these people over there is just tremendous.

Would we like to send them a signal that this Senate is unwilling to give them support? That is the way they are going to read it. I hope they do not have to read about some cliffhangers. They have moral tasks that are amazing. Everywhere we went, the Senator from Hawaii asked about absent-without-leave statistics, about sick-leave statistics, about reenlistment statistics. It might interest the Senate to know: No AWOL's; the lowest sick leave in the world in the American forces; the highest level of reenlistment in U.S. forces. The morale of these people over there is just tremendous.

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But I wonder, does the world understand it? Does the world understand that the Senate of the United States can come in response to a request of the President of the United States to take and reaffirm what we have done? We went to the United Nations, got the U.N. support. The people are there. Our forces are there. The President has had more negotiating all over the world to get money to support this deployment.

Now will the world understand a close vote in the U.S. Senate? I do not think the world even understands, as I said in the beginning, why we are here in view of the U.N. Charter. We committed as a nation to deploy forces at the request of the Security Council to meet its objectives. We did.

Now the question is can they be used?
The world looked the other way, believing that this would satisfy Adolf Hitler. And then, after terrorism and political turmoil, fostered by Berlin, Austria was annexed into the Third Reich.

In the ultimate abdication of moral responsibility, the world learned a new word to equate with appeasement: Munich.

In Winston Churchill’s chilling words, we are reminded of the results of that naive attempt to placate aggressors: “Silent, mournful, aban­doned, broken, Czechoslovakia recedes into the darkness.”

The breakdown of collective security, of free nations failing to confront ag­gressors, resulted in the most devastat­ing war in history. Millions of people perished as armies marched and countermarched as bombs leveled cities, and the darkest nightmare of genocide became a reality.

American soldiers died a thousand deaths on remote beaches and in snow­covered forests. The cemeteries of Eu­rope and the Pacific are testament to the price America has paid for standing up late to aggressors.

It is argued that Saddam Hussein is no Hitler; that the desert wastes of Iraq are not industrial Germany; that this petty aggressor does not warrant the full measure of our response.

Mr. President, the folly of that argu­ment is clear. Hussein now, today, has under arms more men than Hitler when the German Army marched into the Rhineland.

The Iraqi regime has used one of the 20th century’s most terrible inven­tions: chemical weapons not only aga­nized Iraqis, but they also terrorized irre­sponsible of the world. The Panzer Divisions crushed France in May 1940. And, most chilling of all, Hussein is much closer today to having a nuclear weapon than Adolf Hitler ever was.

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that his arguments are persuasive and compelling. Moreover, we should not risk the sending of anything less than a unified signal to Saddam Hussein. This dictator is less predictable than uncalculable. To date he has made several deadly miscalculations: Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, hoping for a quick victory, he ended up with an 8-year war. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait thinking they would not fight. Kuwait did fight. Saddam Hussein believed the Saudis would never invite American forces to its soil, and now he faces a massive American military force.

Saddam Hussein calculated that America would never react, would never move to Saudi Arabia's defense. President Bush launched the swiftest buildup of military force in history in defense of Saudi Arabia. And now he is calculating that America lacks the will and resolve. That we are divided, that we will not back up the President. We cannot afford to send that kind of signal to provide him with the false hope that we are anything less than unified. To provide the President with the authority to launch a military offensive operation if the President of the United States deems that necessary.

But the U.N. resolution is no order to attack, no ultimatum requiring an immediate offensive. It is up to President Bush to discern if diplomatic movement can continue in the policy of sanctions and containment. And ultimately it will be up to the President to make that awesome decision of launching a military offensive.

We in this Chamber should not deceive ourselves or the American people by believing the rosy scenarios of a quick and bloodless victory. While we all hope, should President Bush decide to attack, that the conflict will be swift and the cost small, history has seldom been the case. Phrases such as "Home before the leaves fall" and "On to Richmond" echo in the pages of history as a warning to those who hope for quick and painless victory.

President Bush, who himself has experienced the horrors of war, must be trusted to leave no stone unturned in the quest for a peaceful resolution. I trust the President.

As we approach this crisis we should keep two additional points in mind: our dependence on foreign oil and the failure of our allies to stand by our side.

In no small part the invasion of Kuwait, and the world's concerns about the Persian Gulf, more dependent than when we faced the mid-seventies.

Our level of dependence on foreign oil is a latent threat to our security. The administration's tenure is half over, and each year we become more dependent, more at risk. To not address our energy dependence now, when the country is galvanized and understands the true costs of such a dangerous dependence, would be a failure equal to a failure to expel Saddam Hussein.

The President and Secretary of State Baker have marshalled the world community in the diplomatic effort. Yet, while there is success in diplomatic unity, there is a real lack of support both financially and militarily to this cause. Countries which have as much at stake or more in the Persian Gulf are conspicuously hanging back. The President should renew the effort to provide the President with the authority to expel Saddam Hussein.

With the notable exception of the British, who are standing fast with America both diplomatically and on the ground in Saudi Arabia, Western Europe could do much more. I have travelled in the Gulf and I wish I had seen more foreign uniforms, rather than just the desert fatigues of American military personnel.

Even if one accepts the argument that both Japan and West Germany are playing a minimal role in the Gulf crisis, they are not right now. Not today or tomorrow. Not right now. Not today or tomorrow.

Everyone has hoped that since August the various diplomatic initiatives would have succeeded. Up to this point, they have not. Earlier this evening the Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. KERRY] made an eloquent statement. I would take exception, however, to his statement that the issue is about closing ranks with the President or meeting a deadline set by the Security Council of the United Nations. It is much more than that.

The basic issue of Saddam Hussein's withdrawing from Kuwait is agreed to by everyone. But what is before us at this particular moment is the question of whether we wait or whether we proceed with the policy that was called for by our allied coalition and the President.

Do we support the efforts of the international coalition to isolate Iraq, or do we in Congress want to stand back and undermine that coalition by setting our own goals and our own force?

For many of us who have argued over the years, we should not go it alone—we should work with the United Nations—the coalition mobilized by the President is a landmark achievement.

It is now clear that the broad and overwhelming domestic consensus of last August has unraveled and, as Winston Churchill once said: "The terrible its accumulate.

From the start of this crisis, the President has always demanded "immediate and unconditional withdrawal." The word "immediate" is the nub of our disagreement at this particular juncture.

If we adopt the resolution introduced by the majority leaders and others that calls for a policy of sanctions and patience, the message we send to Saddam Hussein and the rest of the world will be as muddled and ambiguous as the resolution itself. This is an open invitation to disaster.

What will we be saying is that Saddam Hussein must get out of Kuwait—but not right now. Not today or tomorrow.
row, not this month or next, but some-
day.
To the question of whether the Janu-
ary 15 deadline set by the U.N. Secu-
ritv Council is real or whether it will be
an "extension of 60 days," Mr. President,
I would say "No." To my way of think-
ing, the issue is whether the United Na-
tions can and will be a barrier to war.
Mr. President, the present crisis has
provoked an outpouring of thoughtful
comments from hundreds of Kansans
on both sides of this question. I will
conclude by quoting from one of the
comments from hundreds of Kansans
that I have received. It expresses a
sentiment which I strongly support:
Anarchism cannot be tolerated. The
principle must be made concrete that an
attack on one of us is an attack on all of us. The
world has no better hope for peace.
I certainly believe that is true. I
yield the floor, Mr. President.
Mr. KERREY addressed the Chair.
Mr. PRESIDING OFFICER. The
Senator from Nebraska.
SOMETHING APPEARED TO BE MIS-
SING
Mr. KERREY. Mr. President, let me,
first of all, assert that though I believe
most of us share the sentiments as ar-
ticulated by the President, some of us
have a different view of several things in particular that he has done.
In particular, Mr. President, I have
been critical from the first moment,
because I believe he improperly ration-
alized—not to protect Saudi Arabia;
that was legitimate. Not to enforce the
naval blockade; that was legitimate.
But to begin to say that anyone who
had an objection to the policy was an
appeaser, Mr. President, was to ignore
the administration's own participation
in appeasement.
In addition, I do not believe that
the President of the United States has suf-
ficiently identified the interests that
would justify a war. It is the most seri-
ous problem we have today. He justi-
fied the interest that would cause us to
send troops to Saudi Arabia, but not to
advance those troops to drive the Iraqi
forces from Kuwait.
I was in Washington, after listening
to public confusion over our actions in
the gulf, I declared that something ap-
peared to be missing. And now after lis-
tening to 2 days of debate in this
Chamber, I must confess that I have
the same feeling.
President Bush may eventually, as it
appears, get a resolution passed by
both Houses of Congress, which will au-
thorize the use of force. Public opinion
polls, as well, appear to support this
course of action, after Iraq's rejection
of the President's attempt at a diplo-
matic solution.
Still, Mr. President, something seems
to be missing; something the polls are
not measuring. What that something is
a personal, individual commitment to
pay the price that would be necessary
in this war.
I know and I believe the President is
depressed by this debate. He has
pointed out that something is at stake
in assembling a coalition of partners
to oppose Saddam Hussein's aggression.

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My sincere hope and prayer is that the President and others who support granting him the authority to use force now—look at himself and lack of enthusiasm for this war as evidence that something is wrong.

In every other instance since the War of 1812, when the President of the United States has asked Congress to declare war—there has been minimal or nonexistent. In the Mexican War, the Senate vote was 40 to 2. In the Spanish-American War, it was 67 to 21. In World War 1, it was 82 to 6. In World War II, it was 88 to 0.

Something is missing, Mr. President, on our campuses, when President Bush feels the need to send a letter to college students asking them to consider what is at stake. Something is missing among America's most visible citizens, we here in the Congress.

In the Second World War—and I make this comparison because it is used so often by supporters of an authorization of the use of force—Members of Congress actually resigned to enlist and serve. Vincent Francis Harrington of Iowa, Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and congressional candidate Paul Douglas of Illinois enlisted for active-duty service. Other Members, including Lyndon Johnson of Texas, joined the Armed Forces Reserves.

Mr. President, the absence of prominent, enthusiastic volunteers like Joe Lewis, Jimmy Stewart, and Ted Williams should tell us something about our cause and what will happen if we pursue it to the bitter end.

I rise today to support the resolution that is offered by the distinguished majority leader and the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Nunn, and in strong opposition to a resolution which authorizes whatever force is necessary and authorizes that force to be used now.

The resolution of the majority leader declares that America is willing to confront the danger of Saddam Hussein. It is not a resolution of retreat. It is an invitation to a nonincremental battle plan. The first, the third, and the most important aspersions are of appeasement. It is not an isolationist's manifesto, but a prescription for success and a blueprint for a sustainable engagement.

This is a resolution declaring our willingness and our commitment to defend the vital economic interest and to confront a dangerous military dictator whose conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction we can no longer ignore.

This resolution authorizes the continued use of military force and the continuation of economic sanctions, both of which are a heavy price for American citizens.

Those who stand and say that the backers of this resolution have ignored the lessons of the 1930's ignore the actions that this resolution authorizes. We are not calling for a return to the policy of the United States prior to the August 2 invasion, when the threat of invasion was greeted with official statements about this simply being an Arab-Arab border dispute.

The message which this resolution sends to Saddam Hussein is powerful. It says that we are, on behalf of the peace and stability of our Arab, Jewish, and Christian allies, sending our sons and daughters to contain Iraq's armies. We have joined the entire world community in opposing Iraqi aggression. We will not buy Iraq's oil. We can live without it. We will not sell Iraq the goods of our labor, either those things their people need to raise their standard of living, or the things that their army needs to threaten us again.

It is a resolution of force, Mr. President, and it is a resolution of force which I am certain can be sustained. This is a debate which unquestionably is made more difficult by our concern for the safety of our soldiers. There is a legitimate fear that leaving them on the sand for too long can cause a deterioration of their morale.

But concern for our soldiers' morale should not drive us into an early war. When there is such a clear and present amount of public doubt about what it is we are doing.

No one in this body wants war, Mr. President. All of us hope and all of us pray that it does not happen. To those who have assessed the current situation and have concluded that we need to give the President authority to use whatever force is necessary to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, I do not question your desire to avoid war, and I do not question your commitment to the soldiers we have asked to go to Saudi Arabia.

Rather, I am asking you to consider my strong belief that the battle plan for a quick military victory will be politically unacceptable after the fact, if not before.

I do agree, Mr. President, with those who say that we should fight a war all out. If war becomes the final solution, we must be right to develop a military plan according to the lessons of Vietnam.

However, it is precisely because of the probable consequences of this total war that we should question—question, Mr. President—whether public support can be sustained for the military strategy that is planned. We have a duty to do more than make a case for the starting of a war. We have a duty to make certain it can be continued to completion.

Mr. President, I want to make it clear that my feeling is that I am far from certain. Thus, I believe it would be better policy for the United States to retreat from the future. Saddam Hussein does not withdraw from Kuwait. Rather than threatening war, we should declare, just as we did in the cold war, that we are not going to launch an offensive attack under present circumstances. We will defend—with awesome, sobering power if we are attacked—but we will not initiate an offensive attack in any circumstance we face.

It has become clear to me the purpose of driving Iraq from Kuwait as important and worthy as it is, should no longer be the first principle of our and our coalition partners' policy. Its preeminence tends to force us into a corner. We are trapped between a fear of Saddam Hussein's full or partial withdrawal, leaving his threatening military intact, and our fear of the bloody consequences of the war which we are now staring in the face.

Before we go to war there is an urgent need for elected representatives to examine several assumptions which presage the selection of a massive, nonincremental battle plan. The first, that the threat of an attack would make a war unnecessary because Iraq would see our power and withdraw; has become academic. Iraq has not withdrawn from Kuwait and does not appear to be willing to do so.

The second is that Congress' vote of support for the President's request is crucial is demonstrating our resolve. Some have even suggested that the lives of the troops are endangered by any dissent as the suggestion that we should not go to war now somehow endangers the lives of our soldiers more than suggesting that now is the time to go to war.

Further, Mr. President, I believe that personal, bellicose threats are much more likely to have stiffened the resolve of Saddam Hussein than the reassuring words of those who have assessed the sudden escalation of our commitment was a mistake.

The third and most important assumption is that the battle plan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is right to develop a relatively quick victory. Several facts should give every Member of this body a sobering moment of reflection. Most wars begin with the military claiming to be able to achieve a quick victory. The longest and the bloodiest began with the expectation of an early resolution.

Further, even if Iraq is forced to withdraw from Kuwait in an acceptably short period of time, the loss of American and Arab lives will be shockingly high. Rather than providing the deterrent for future aggressors it is much more likely to deter us from fulfilling our international responsibilities.

Finally, a military victory will not necessarily lead to a political victory. It is my strong belief our political position in the Middle East will be significantly weakened not strengthened if
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I believe President Bush is personally committed to avoiding war. If war is begun, I believe he is also personally committed to avoiding a replay of the Vietnam war. However, one of the most painful lessons of the Vietnam war was that the need to hurry up to the battlefront is not the same as putting the American people behind the effort before sending our armies into the field.

Mr. President, the alternatives are not just the extremes of waiting for sanctions to work or going to war to get the job done. Both of these strategies—and many others in between—are based upon the premise that our No. 1 objective should be to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

There is another option: Change the objective so that the liberation of Kuwait is a secondary objective to stabilization of the entire area. This does not mean that we retreat from our opposition to this invasion, the obligation of a sovereign nation and the cruel abuse of the people of Kuwait. Rather, it means that we should stop asking the question will economic sanctions, military containment, and a naval blockade result in the timely withdrawal of Iraq's occupying forces and start asking the question will this international effort enable us to build a more stable region.

I believe it can. I believe it must. There are two good examples of a changed American attitude which provide us with the basis for constructive action.

The first is that prior to the invasion of Kuwait few of us were giving speeches about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, chemical and biological weapons, and the need to stop the conventional arms race. Those who were so inclined had to search for a receptive audience. Now, both the people and their representatives actually fear the danger and are prepared to do something about it.

The second is that prior to the invasion few of us saw much of a danger in Iraq's growing military threat or their willingness to apply inhumane, brutal force on their own people. Those who did also had to search for a receptive audience. We owe these brave souls our thanks and our apologies for not seeing the danger sooner.

Mr. President, I believe the best course—the path of strength and wisdom—is to tell Saddam Hussein that we have been patient to no avail. We should tell him he has lost the opportunity to simply withdraw from Kuwait. We should tell him we are not going to declare war and will not initiate the attack under the current circumstances. However, not only do we intend to keep in place our economic sanctions and the warning of swift and certain use of force if his appetite for more aggression is not sated, but we are changing the order of our objectives.
January 11, 1991

The first priority will now be a reduction of his military power and elimination of his most endangering weapons. We want more than just to have him gone from Kuwait. We want his destabilizing influence on the region gone and we want it gone for certain.

To change directions in this manner will most certainly make the downsizing of our military force a necessity. The offensive purpose will be gone. Still, some force must remain to guarantee that we can protect Saudi Arabia, enforce our economic embargo, and to present a credible deterrent to Iraq's military dictator.

The brave men and women of Desert Shield deserve a hero's homecoming. They have already faced great danger and have done so with impressive speed and intrepidity. They have accomplished the most important goal—stopping Saddam Hussein's aggression—and have done so in a way that has brought honor to themselves and to the United States of America. America has demonstrated her resolve. We have sent our best and most precious treasure to stop Saddam Hussein. Now, it is time for us to stop before we do something which in our political stomach and in our human heart many of us believe we will regret.

Led by President Bush the world community has achieved a great victory. We could achieve an even greater one if we will only see there is a better way to peace than through this war.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.

CONSEQUENCES OF A UNITED STATES-IRAQ WAR

Mr. PELL. Mr. President, "War is neither inevitable nor necessary to resolve the Gulf crisis." So begins a letter I have just received from former President Jimmy Carter and which I would like to share with the Senate. President Carter has a keen understanding of the Middle East. His efforts at Camp David were the greatest successes of American diplomacy in 40 years in that troubled region. Indeed, one might say, the Camp David accords have been our only success.

Therefore, his warnings about the consequences of a United States-Iraq war for the Middle East bear special scrutiny by this body. He makes clear that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, and also argues that nothing is to be lost if we accept the idea of a peace conference to deal with the broader Middle East questions including the Palestinian issue.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that President Carter's letter be printed in the RECORD at this point so that all Members might consider the views of this statesman prior to our vote.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Mr. President, I submit a letter from President Jimmy Carter which I received two days ago. It begins:

"Dear Senator PELL: War is neither inevitable nor necessary to resolve the Gulf crisis. Iraq's obstruction and U.S. quibbling over meeting dates and "linkage" have moved us seriously off course. The urgency of the situation is putting us in danger of action.

The devastating consequences will be both immediate in human blood and, for those in power, the immediate and political destabilization of the Middle East region. Massive bombing and missile bombardment will be necessary to minimize American casualties. The cost of the operation to the American people will be immense, including the lives of some of our presently staunch Arab allies.

The world community, it is obvious that many of those contributing to the Gulf military forces are much more amenable to patience as the economic sanctions and Israeli response to an Iraqi attack on their country will cause grave defections among some of our presently staunch Arab allies.

In the current atmosphere, it is imperative that those who may disagree on what the outcome might be, an allied invasion will be viewed simplistically as a devastating attack by United States forces against the people of Iraq and Kuwait. Religious sensitivities among Moslem believers in all countries will be further aroused by Israeli response to an Iraqi attack on their land. Israeli concerns about biased convenors can be largely assuaged by U.S.-Soviet bilateral sponsorship, now that relatively good Israeli relations with the Soviet Union have evolved. If necessary to save face, we can continue to deny what everyone knows: that linkage does exist.

Iraq must comply with United Nations requirements on the Gulf issues. Iraqi forces must be withdrawn from Kuwait, and any aggression will be ignored for the sake of the peace settlement. The Palestinian question, this has already been endorsed by the United Nations Security Council, and is compatible with the historical policy of the United States government. Israeli concerns about biased convenors can be largely assuaged by U.S.-Soviet bilateral sponsorship, now that relatively good Israeli relations with the Soviet Union have evolved. If necessary to save face, we can continue to deny what everyone knows: that linkage does exist.

I suggest that all Members might consider the views of this statesman prior to our vote.

JIMMY CARTER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Connecticut.

THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS

Mr. DOUGLASS. Mr. President, before beginning with some remarks I would like to take a moment to respond to some comments made by some previous speakers only a few short moments ago.

As I understand, my colleague from Alaska, Senator STEVENS, is not still on the floor. In his remarks he suggested that those who will not be supporting the resolution sought by the White House are in some way expressing that opposition to the young men and women who make up Desert Shield, our Armed Forces present in the Persian Gulf.

We have moved over the last several weeks, assuming for a second that Saddam Hussein will not take the advice that is being offered by many—including, I gather, the Secretary General of the United Nations, who is on his way to Baghdad—to remove himself from Kuwait and to avoid the possibility of conflict.

If he does not do that, whether it occurs on January 15 or 16, at some point in the near future, that will be the case. And our collective hope in this body
The irony is that those who initially doubted the effectiveness of economic sanctions and the ability to mass global consensus against Saddam Hussein have become believers, while the architect of this bold policy, the President, has become his own worst skeptic. At this, the critical moment up to now of the gulf crisis, the President appears to have lost confidence in his own successful strategy: A strategy that has led to the adoption of 12 resolutions by the U.N. Security Council, condemning Iraq:

- Achieved unprecedented political unity in the Arab and non-Arab world against Iraq;
- Marshalled the military forces of 28 nations in the gulf to prevent further Iraqi aggression; and
- Last, imposed an effective worldwide trade embargo and economic sanctions.

Those are no small feats. That is a remarkable set of accomplishments over the last several months. This is not a Chamberlin; this is not 1939. This Nation and others have responded to this call from the President.

By requesting, however, blank check approval for the use of force at this particular juncture from the Congress, the President appears to me to be saying that these historic achievements have failed.

The President now has done what only a few short weeks ago he cautioned all of us against — he seems to have lost patience.

Even though there is overwhelming evidence that the President’s original approach is working, we are told we must now change course and place in harm’s way thousands of U.S. service men and women.

Mr. President, I shall vote against this request. Allow me to explain why.

This debate is not about the option of military force as a legitimate means of pursuance of our objectives in the gulf crisis.

I supported the deployment of military forces to the gulf in August.

I would strongly support the use of force to protect our service men and women.

I would strongly support the use of force to protect our allies in the region from Iraqi aggression.

I would strongly support the use of force to enforce the trade embargo; and

Mr. President, I would strongly support the use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait and neutralize his future warmaking capacity if our present strategy of political, military, diplomatic, and economic pressure should fail to do the job.

No one, Mr. President, is kicking a third leg out of the strategy of economic, political and military presence to deal with this crisis. All we are suggesting is that those particular efforts be maintained and pursued equally.

However, Mr. President, just as it would be foolhardy to remove altogether the arrow of military force from our quiver, so too would it be foolish to draw this arrow prematurely.

I say this because, of all the available options, military force is the only one which, once embarked, is almost impossible to stop. To put it mildly, the use of military force in the Middle East is always risky business, with no guarantees of success. It is a leap into the abyss. We learned this painfully in Lebanon.

I accept the fact that we may be with no other choice. But, Mr. President, just as I am convinced we may have to make that choice one day— we do not and must not make that choice today.

Mr. President, those who argue that now is the time to back down from the present strategy, that we have no other choice, that those particular efforts be maintained and pursued equally, have failed. But, Mr. President, I am convinced we may have to do just that.

I accept the fact that we may be with no other choice. But, Mr. President, just as I am convinced we may have to make that choice one day— we do not and must not make that choice today.
Indeed, at a September joint session of Congress, the President of the United States reassured us and the American people that sanctions were working and working well. And, in asking for our patience, the President reminded us that sanctions could take 12 or even 18 months to prove fully effective.

In fact, no case of sanctions in modern history has ever had more than a 16-percent impact on the target nation's gross national product. Already the impact of the sanctions is unprecedented, affecting over 40 percent of Iraq's gross national product, and over 90 percent of Iraq's trade. And their vitality, Mr. President, increases with each passing day.

Second, the door to political and diplomatic alternatives should never be shut.

President Bush insists that he has gone the extra mile. However, it seems he is rebuffed the diplomatic solution as vigorously as we would fight for a military solution.

If Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz has rebuffed the United Nations, through the European Community, through anyone who is willing to continue the diplomatic track.

We must be prepared to fight for a diplomatic solution as vigorously as we would fight for a military solution.

If we practice trench warfare, Mr. President, on the economic, political, and diplomatic front, we may be able to avoid it on the battlefield.

I am also concerned, Mr. President, as to whether we can even achieve our objectives with military action. The course of history in the Persian Gulf suggests we should be skeptical of any proclaimed diplomatic victory.

War in the gulf will pit Arab against Arab, Arab against American and the real possibility of Arab against Israeli.

Mr. President, a military war with Iraq could very easily get out of control, and that would be disastrous.

Our concern for the coalition's stability is to begin with Israel.

We know that Iraq will attempt to attack Israel in a war.

We know that Israel will respond. But we also know that Syria and Jordan will not permit Israel to pass over their territory en route to Iraq.

The Egyptians have already indicated they would have serious reservations about fighting side by side with Israel.

Mr. President, that raises serious problems. We are firmly committed to the security of Israel, as we should be. But how will we react, Mr. President, if Syria or Jordan, or some other member of the coalition, were to attack Israel? These are serious questions, Mr. President. They deserve serious answers.

What if, rather than attack Israel, Egypt, and the other Arab members leave the coalition altogether? What then is the future of the multilateral support for our forces? Remember, there are no Soviet troops in the region, no Chinese troops, no Japanese troops, and no German troops. The British have contributed a small number, but they, too, have only a token force. How do we avoid the impression that this is, once again, an Arab-American conflict? That perception alone would be sufficient to upset in my view, the delicate nature of any postwar balance, even if Saddam Hussein is entirely defeated.

And, Mr. President, it is not enough to concern ourselves with who loses influence in the postwar Middle East region. We must also worry about who will gain.

In the wake of Iraq's defeat, Syria and Iran will certainly attain far greater influence over the events in the Persian Gulf. Are we prepared to face Hafiz al-Assad and the Ayatollah Khomeini a generation from now should we undertake territorial ambitions? Would we be able once again to summon the political will necessary to send half a million troops to the region? These concerns, Mr. President, must also be addressed.

Decades from now, Mr. President, how will future generations view this confrontation with Iraq? Will they read about a glorious military campaign, about bombing followed by limited but effective ground combat? Or will they read about how superior forces were bogged down by sandstorms and a determined energy? Will they visit the museums to find displays devoted to the courageous leaders who bravely managed this conflict? Or, Mr. President, will they reach out their hand and solemnly trace out on yet another black slab of granite the names of the Americans who fell in this conflict? Will they remember a nation that acted decisively and effectively in the face of a dangerous enemy or one that lost its patience when patience was most called for? We do not know. No one can answer those questions.

But if we give up on the sanctions and the diplomatic effort now, we will never know whether those efforts would have worked. That perhaps, Mr. President, is the critical point. We have pursued the unworkable at the sacrifice of the possible.

The President reminds us what we do here will constitute the makeup of a new international regime, a new world order for years to come. But if we go to war now, Mr. President, we risk the undermining of that global effort. We will gravely tarnish if not discredit our economic and diplomatic tools. And once again we will have reverted to aggression and conflict rather than diplomacy to solve international disputes.

Mr. President, let us not step into the black abyss of war in the Middle East unnecessarily.

As is the case so often with me, Mr. President, maybe my favorite poet, William Butler Yeats, said it best:

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Widening gyre the falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Every man is mad. The center cannot hold;
Our wills have pitied other men's; ours
The black abyss of war in the Middle East.

Mr. President, let us not step into the black abyss of war in the Middle East unnecessarily.

As is the case so often with me, Mr. President, maybe my favorite poet, William Butler Yeats, said it best:

Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
The best lack all conviction,
The worst are full of passionate intensity.

With deep respect, I urge the defeat of the Warner resolution.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Gore). The Senator from Rhode Island is recognized.

Mr. CHAFFEE. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Wyoming go ahead of me and I follow him.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The Senator from Wyoming is recognized.

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.

A DEBATE OF PASSING INTEREST, OF PASSING PASSION

Mr. WALLOP. Mr. President, this is a debate of passing interest, indeed, of passing passion. We hear those on the majority side just expressing themselves in seeking guarantees. Mr. President, while we seek them, there are no guarantees of success. And there is no way on Earth in which a committee of 100 or a committee of 435 in the House or a committee of 535 in the House and Senate or even more can choose the moment in time when success is more likely by one means than another.

In fact, Mr. President, as much as the Senate and Congress may dislike it, only the Commander in Chief can choose the moment and only upon his shoulders rests the chilling aspect of success or failure.

Congress will find a way to excuse itself or to take credit, no matter what happens.

I have heard speaker after speaker, and most recently my friend from Connecticut, suggest that we were only to be patient and not impatient we would know with some certainty the course of events. His suggestion is that were the President of the United States to choose the use of force over the continued use of sanctions, we will never know whether sanctions could have succeeded or not.

Mr. President, I suggest that is the truth. But an even more chilling truth. Mr. President, is that when we have seen that economic sanctions have failed, we will never know if the credible threat of force would have worked and the interests of the United States and its allies might have been served.
So therefore, Mr. President, I rise to oppose the Nunn-Mitchell joint resolution which is today's version of the Boland amendment. It is a political statement and not a policy position. Like the Boland amendment, it is pusillanimous in its continuance. It says neither yes nor no. It does not oppose war but it opposes war now.

Mr. President, my question to the Senate and to the country is: When will these Neville-ites be able to decide?

The posture of the Nunn-Mitchell-Mitchell-Nunn proposition basically says we the majority will wait until the end of the battle to interpret its results and harvest the politics as the opportunities arise. Should the operation succeed, we have been with you all along.

How many, many times have we heard in here "I support the views of the President, the purpose of the President"? Should it not succeed, we have already heard the threats of impeachment. I ask again: Upon whose shoulders does the most compelling question rest?

Make no mistake, Mr. President, the majority proposal is not a message to the President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, but to the President of the United States, George Bush.

Last October, just before the end of the 101st Congress, I spoke at length on this floor on this crisis, as some colleagues may recall. I felt then and I still feel that the Persian Gulf conflict is sufficiently serious to justify a formal debate on a declaration of war against Iraq.

I felt then and still feel that the United States has a direct, worthy, and significant national interest to be defended and that we should have debated and clarified those interests at the time.

Mr. President, a declaration of war is not just a combat. Let me point out to those who may be watching and those who may be listening that some of our allies in this alliance are still in a state of war with Israel. Are they engaged in combat? No, Mr. President, they are not.

Their's is a statement of national purpose of enmity with Israel one with which I disagree and so, too, does this president.

What has taken place today, is somehow or another a means of carrying on a debate to express that we have concern, but to avoid being pinned with a decision the likes of which the President of the United States must make and cannot avoid.

Had we, back in October or November or December, authorized the use of force, it would have said to Saddam Hussein that Americans were both determined and united. And what a stronger message that would have been than this subsequent dithering and inaction. Action then would have permitted us to stop at any point short of combat operations without harming our vital interests, had events warranted.

Regrettably Congress, the modern Congress, especially, is designed to evade its responsibilities. We try to have it both ways, or even any number of ways. We want the credit for its successes, but none of the blame for its failures. We would carefully trim our sails to watch the winds of favorable public opinion, but dive overboard rather than truly be held accountable in the eyes and minds of the public. We hold hearings, sometimes interesting, most often meaningless. We carp in the press. We remain silent when we should remain silent. Is there any wonder that it seems we stand behind the executive branch refuses to relinquish its powers to such a body?

So I suppose, indeed, I admit, that there is nothing to be gained in reiterating the problems over what we have failed to do. Yet it is worth pointing out in passing that nothing is irredeemable as a missed opportunity. So we are now at the point where we can no longer evade responsibilities.

The march of events and passage of time has brought the Nation to the brink of engagement. Yet, its very imminence vastly increases the sensitivity of what we say and do here in the next few days.

On the floor last week, Senator Warren put it very neatly. We are on the horns of a dilemma. Congress has a duty to act. Yet we ought to feel at least an equal duty to give the executive branch the flexibility to conduct the operation safely and to protect the interests of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who happen to be serving this country's interests abroad.

This dilemma illuminates the dual nature of the debate on the gulf crisis. We are essentially confronting two issues: What one might call the war powers issue or the constitutional issue of executive versus congressional prerogative; and, secondly, the policy debate, the substance of America's conduct of Operation Desert Shield itself.

Simplified, the policy debate asks, "Should we fight at a time of our choosing after January 15, or should we wait for some indefinite period to let sanctions work, to achieve some indefinite goal?"

Critics of force in the gulf have consistently linked these two issues in complaints about the President's handling of the crisis. They seem to equate Congress' prerogatives to declare war on the one hand, with a condemnation of force on the other. Ironically, the Senate's linkage of these two propositions has assured the administration's continued reluctance to place the issue before Congress, and has perpetuated an incipient crisis right up to the very threshold of hostilities.

I do not intend to discuss the constitutional issues which, Mr. President, is largely irrelevant at this late date, in any case. It remains unresolved. Indeed, in the current climate, it will be impossible to resolve, as it has been proven impossible to resolve hundreds of times in our past.

Mr. President, there is an old-fashioned word called victory. Our experience in Korea and Vietnam seems to have excised that word from our national vocabulary. The victory is what we should be seeking. Victory, therefore, is what President Bush should define.

Any resolutions this Senate, that House, and this Congress passes should—but I regret to say certainly will not—define what constitutes victory, should define our goal, define...
what it is that we as a nation have as our perfect and special interest.

Mr. President, should we define that, it will become then our choice to stop at any point along the road that we deem satisfactory. But should we fail to define it, it will be defined by the world, by the French, by the United Nations, by somebody else whose boys are not committed.

So, Mr. President, I suggest that it ought to be an obligation that the Senate of the United States would willingly shoulder, and I suggest to you that it is an obligation that the Senate of the United States will willingly shirk.

Regrettably, those on the side of saying stay the course, waiting for sanctions, no one asks on that side what must these sanctions do? How will they achieve a successful end? If we have to fight, how will we know when to start and when to stop? What constitutes success? Rather than deal with these fundamental requirements the majority attempts to ride the issue of Congress' ambiguous war-making power into the White House and substitute Congress' role for that of the Commander in Chief.

The Mitchell-Nunn resolution spells out the specific conditions or scenarios under which the President may use force. Why, then, do they not also establish the rules of engagement, write operational field orders, and delineate the targets, and determine when they have and have not been satisfactorily hit?

I am sad to say I have seen few arguments from the Nevilleites that would contribute to our victory over Saddam Hussein and defeat his aggression. Indeed, under the guise of constitutional prerogatives, some would forfeit a permanent advantage to Saddam Hussein.

In my view, Mr. President, it is a modern political tragedy that appeasement and compromise and retreat have been identified with the so-called constitutional position. A Nevilleite measure, a new Boland amendment, is not worthy of the Senate, but it does illuminate how prone we are as a body to avoid discussing the demands and the fulfillment of national interests.

This crisis does abound with wild improbabilities. Was there ever a conflict in which we sought to give the enemy such a preelection advantage, advance notice of the earliest date of possible military action? And even worse, in the majority’s resolution, advance notice of when we have changed our minds about sanctions of the United States, sanctions for which Saddam Hussein has at least until January 15 to dig in safely, reinforce his troops, and continue his rape of Kuwait with impunity. But the majority’s resolution seeks to offer him even more months of security to strengthen his defenses and manipulate world opinion, while they attend the day when sanctions may work.

Saddam Hussein, Mr. President, knows himself to be ruthless, knows himself to be tough. He demonstrates it daily, and has over the last decade, when and where may have more resolve than Mr. Bush. He knows he has more resolve than the Congress of the United States, and resolve can be the decisive element of the military equation, despite an imbalance of forces which rests largely on our side. He may actually think we are bluffing, and that he can face down our bluff. That is why we do here in the next few days is so critical, because I do not believe the President is bluffing.

While I have some concern about the extreme multilateralism that has characterized the President’s actions, I commend him for the cool, steadfast, resolute, and clearheaded manner he has displayed. He has in all major respects been an exemplary Commander in Chief.

But this debate stands in startling contrast to the actions of the Commander-in-Chief, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, the commanders and troops in the field. The Senate presents a picture of vacillation, and indecision. We stiffen Saddam’s defiance based on his misreading of our intentions and our resolve. No amount of repetitive statements on the floor of the Senate of the United States that we stand together on the ultimate goal will persuade Saddam Hussein that there is a credible threat of force that can make our resolve believable.

Saddam Hussein has shown himself to be capable of major miscalculation. Invading Kuwait in the first place and attacking Iran in 1980.

Today we may be witnessing a classic case of further miscalculation leading inexorably to war. The tragic irony is that the majority’s appeals to avoid war at all costs have created it.

In the final analysis, Mr. President, this Nation cannot afford to let this debate, or even legitimate doubts and questions about the administration’s priorities, obscure our obligations and the vital national interests at stake. If we have no vital interest at risk in this situation, we have none anywhere. And if we have none anywhere—in God’s name, let us stop equivocating and come home.

Many people have trivialized this crisis by claiming it is merely about cheap oil, that we are going to shed Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. Sooner or later Saddam Hussein must be defeated in order to guard the principle that aggression across borders—especially in such a critical region—must never succeed.

Senator NUNN has asked us to make a distinction between interests that are truly vital and those that are merely important. That’s a legitimate question, and I can cite at least one. Above all, now that we are committed, it is in our interest not to fail.

Turning our backs now on this responsibility will fatally undermine our credibility, our national power, and our ability to defend our interests. And it will unleash an era of international aggression, piracy, and terror. And in due time our failure will leave us beset by threats to our well-being on every side.

Make no mistake about it, Mr. President. If we fail to deal with Saddam now, we will have to later. Only then, when his weapons of mass destruction are perfected, when our allies have melted away, the cost in blood and treasure may be far, far higher. If we succeed now, this may well be the last such crisis we have to face for a long while. If we fail, then Saddam’s threat will grow, and there will be others. We will reap a Breughelian world of massive instability, increasing violence, and remorseless exploitation of the weak by the strong.

It is self-evident that sanctions alone cannot work. To suggest otherwise is a delusion. Anything short of a credible threat Saddam Hussein will take to be the negotiations with our allies who want to eliminate the Iraqi threat—present and future—is merely an excuse for inaction.

Those who advocate open-ended sanctions, or more diplomacy, or anything other than force to eliminate this threat have no theory of victory. They cannot explain how economic privatization...
in a military dictatorship like Iraq can ever translate into a political conces-
sion by Saddam. And when asked, the advocates of open-ended sanctions can-
not say when they will conclude, they have not worked.

They will not even define the mea-
 surement by which their successes can be eval-
 uated. The Neville-ites will not de-
 fine it, for they will have to admit that
sanctions will not force Iraq to with-
draw from Kuwait. The President believes the embargo also de-
pends on the Iraqi regime's willingness to kill those who dissent. Who can
doubt that willingness in light of Saddam's bloody history? To whom
will the Iraqi people appeal when the pain of the embargo grows too great?

Finally, sanctions are hurting the
real world and its economy in relative terms perhaps as much as they are hurting Iraq. The longer they are in force, the less effective they will be-
come. Consequently, sanctions alone is not a true policy, only an excuse to avoid the difficult choice.

There are other excuses for inaction. Mr. President. Some say that war risks
alienating the entire Muslim world and harmin United States relations with
present Arab allies. Some fear a world-
wide Muslim reaction against us. But the
Muslim world is not a monolithic entity, and in any case Muslims have never achieved peace among them-

themselves, much less with the rest of the world. But of this I am certain: Mus-
lims, and Arabs in particular, under-
stand weakness and strength. If we do
nothing but prolong the stalemate, we risk a far greater likelihood of losing al our friends in the Muslim world.

It is the wiser course, Mr. President, that some of our Arab allies in
the coalition are still technically at
war with Israel, our other ally in the
region. Yet, they have stood with us loyally, admittedly because it is in
their interest to do so. But there would be no United States-Arab coalition without the credible threat of the Unit-
ed States to use force.

The danger to the Arab States who have supported us will be acute with-
out the continued credibility, and reli-
ability, of the American military op-
tion. And if we falter, is there any
  
doubt that they will begin to accom-
modate the true military power in the
region—and quickly.

Mr. President, we simply cannot sus-
tain an embargo and a "line in the sand" for an indefinite period. But even if we could, would it solve our basic problem? Of course not. Indeed, an American—non-Muslim—garrison per-
manning a base on the holy soil of Islam would soon unite the Arab masses against us. Continued passivity

will cede the initiative to Saddam Hus-
sein.

Under the Nunn-Mitchell resolution, Saddam Hussein can win simply by standing fast, and continuing his clever political warfare. That would
produce an appeal for peace to our antiv
movement. His pan-Islamic propa-
ganda, threats of Jihad against Israel, and linking the gulf crisis with the
Palestinian problems will inevitably frustrate and wear us down. Finally, he
can wear down the resolve of the coal-
ition by promises to withdraw from Ku-
wait, to negotiate, anything to keep
the game going. And in time, we will
find ourselves isolated—and defeated.

Mr. President, the threat to our in-

terests is Saddam Hussein, his regime, and its military power, and nothing
but their removal will suffice in the present circumstances. Even the lib-
eration of Kuwait, if it does not con-
tribute directly and quickly to the elimination of that regime, will not suffice.

Mr. President, the roman poet Virgil
wrote in his epic Aeneid, "The God of
war favors bold beginnings." We as a nation began this operation boldly, and
here we have major advantages as the
fruit of our boldness. We have the
psychological edge, worldwide and
domestic political support, troops at
their peak, and justice on our side.

Yet in Congress we are faced with a
failure of both judgment and courage. As Paul Gigot wrote in today's Wall
Street Journal, "crises reveal char-
acter." This crisis is a true test of our
national character. According to the
Greek philosopher Heraclitus, "a man's
character is his fate." The same may
be said of nations. And courage is the
core of character, the ladder on which
all other virtues mount.

Our armed forces, marines, and
airmen are showing great courage. I

think about them often. Some of them
are my friends and neighbors from Wy-
oming, a State with only half a million people, which has the second high-
est number of guardsmen and reserv-
ists called up relative to population.

But whether from Wyoming, Califor-
nia, or New York—they are all my
countrymen. They are also all volun-
teers, and they are ready.

Our servicemen are not shrinking from
the battle, even though some of them
will be wounded, and some will die.
But I fear the collective courage of
this body does not match theirs. If we
readily capitulate, if we abandon our
service men, let us at least have the decency to stop invoking their courage to camouflage our own weakness.

Gentlemen cry "peace, peace," but
there is no peace. In the rest of the world, we are not only in war, but we have already been lost, if not in combat, at least in prepap-
 ration for combat. And we have used
force to enforce the blockade, in itself
an act of war.

No, Mr. President the time to act is
now, while we have the advantage,
while we have the means amassed in
the right place, and while we can keep the very thing which those who were
risking their lives for the gulf crisis are
awaiting. And when asked, the advocates of open-ended sanctions can-
not say when they will conclude, they have not worked.

The President has—cannot this body have
the courage to do the same?

This is not an easy choice, I grant. But then, leadership and responsibility
seldom offer us easy choices. Any

course of action that says "yes, but
ignores the harsh reality that the
history of conflict allows no
"buts." There are only choicess, dif-
cult choices. The Senate can achieve
no purpose, by failing to choose or
postponing choice. Can we make the
correct choice. Of course. But we can
never succeed without taking the risk
that choosing imposes.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Accord-
ing to the previous order, the Senator
from Rhode Island is now recognized.

Mr. SANFORD. Will the Senator
yield for a moment?

Mr. CHAFFEE. Yes.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that the previous consent agreement regarding recogni-
tion of Senators for speeches during to-
day's session be amended to reflect the
following addition:

Add Senator Levin after Senator
GRAMM of Texas, for up to 25 minutes.

Add Senator BACUS after Senator
PRESSLER, deleting Senator BYRD, and
that Senator SASSER be added after
Senator SMITH; and that Senators
DURENBERGER, MURkowski, HINZ, DO-
MENICi, MACK, HILMs, and COATS be added after Senator HATCH, and that
Senator HEFLIN be added after Senator
HATCH prior to Senator DURENBERGER.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there
objection?

Mr. CHAFFEE. I wonder if he could re-
peat that last part.

Mr. SANFORD. And that Senators
DURENBERGER, MURkowski, HINZ, DO-
MENICi, MACK, HILMs, and COATS be added after Senator HATCH, prior to Senator DURENBERGER.

Mr. CHAFFEE. If he could withhold 1
minute, I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Withoul
objection. Mr. President, might I add a note from the leadership for the
information of Senators that if they are not present and ready the Chair
will recognize the next Member on the
list.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen-
ator from Rhode Island.
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. President, as we debate this very serious matter, I wish there was emblazoned on the pediment above the presiding officer's head the words, "The objective is to have Iraq out of Kuwait." That is the U.N. objective. That is the objective of the President of the United States. That is the stated objective of the majority leader and others supporting the resolution that is before us today.

The nations of the world have rightly declared that they will not countenance the savage aggression that Saddam Hussein visited upon a helpless neighbor, if that aggression is tolerated the world, for all of us, even a big nation like the United States will be a far more dangerous place. I deeply believe that. I deeply believe in the analogy comparing this situation to 1938 through 1939 in Europe when aggression went unpunished.

Now, Mr. President, having agreed upon the objective, let us review the situation that confronts us as we attem­pt to achieve that goal. I believe, I wish to keep this before us, the goal being to have Iraq out of Kuwait.

Iraqi forces are solidly entrenched in the country now. Estimates are they have in Kuwait itself about 530,000 soldiers, and available in nearby southern Iraq an additional 240,000, making 530,000 Iraqi forces, a total of over half a million. Facing them are 355,000 American troops, and 245,000 allied troops, close to 600,000 from 28 different countries.

The Iraqi Air Force is estimated to have about 740 fighters and attack bombers. The United States has 1,200 alone, and our allies have something in the neighborhood of 800 more, making 2,000 aircraft.

Leading the Iraqi forces is a proud and skillful leader who, with iron dis­cipline, has been able to lead his forces through an 8-year war with Iran that is said to have cost him a million casualties, a million civilian and military out of a nation of 17 million people. If you applied those same ratios to the United States of America that would mean that we would suffer losses of close to 15 million people. That is the population of that State of Florida.

Therefore, I think it is easy and logical for us to conclude that we are facing a very determined leader who has clearly shown he is not disposed to blink. He is no fool and therefore we can, I think, expect that he will recognize that the military blows that the allies have been able to throw him will eventually overpower him if, if he believes that we will ever resort to using that force.

Let us move now to alternative approaches that are being debated by the Senate. The majority leader's proposal says that we shall continue on the present course of the sanctions outside of that, it does not do anything. It does not put up the current pressure on Saddam Hussein. It does not up it one iota.

As a matter of fact, I think I can say it reduces the pressure because the cur­rent pressure says, "January 15, if you are going to be attacked, or could be attacked, whereas under this resolution it says, no, we will continue the sanctions and if there is to be the use of force the administration must come back to Congress seeking approval for that use of force.

Therefore, it assures Hussein there will be no shooting until some possible indefinite time in the future when Con­gress will consider the matter.

Now the resolution in three separate paragraphs discusses the embargo or sanctions, and somehow it seems to me it demonstrates a faith that these ef­fects will in kind of a painless way per­mit us to attain our goal.

But two questions immediately arise. First, will the sanctions permit us, or materially assist us, in achieving that goal of getting Iraq out of Kuwait?

Second, when do we say we have given the sanctions enough time?

Note that the first question deals with whether the sanctions will help us achieve our objective of getting the Iraqis out of Kuwait. It does not say will the sanctions produce bread lines in Baghdad, or will the sanctions affect the Iraqi Air Force. No. The question is will they help us get him out of Ku­wait?

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The answer to both questions is clearly the United States of America. If our Nation cannot back a U.N. resolution, then these nations asso­ciated with us, many of them at a very high economic and a very high po­litical cost, are going to drift away, each, perhaps, making whatever ac­commodations it can with Saddam.

The second question: When do we say we have given the sanctions enough of a try? It is never answered by the proponents. And, indeed, they cannot an­swer that question. I suppose if their resolution succeeded, some time in the near future we would revisit this ques­tion, with strong voices saying, "Give the sanctions more time," while we face an even stronger entrenched Iraqi force in Kuwait. Should we at that fu­ture time decide to attempt to achieve our goal by force or authorize the use of force, our position vis-a-vis the Iraqis would be most likely less favor­able than it is today.

But more important than that, Mr. President, we would have lost the opportunity that we now have, an opportunity that might succeed in getting out of Kuwait by Vote of Congress, the marginal decline of the combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous im­provement of its defensive fortifications.

That is the end of the quote from Mr. Webster.

Mr. President, I try to give as much credence as possible to the viewpoint of those favoring this resolution. Amongst them are individuals for whom I have a great deal of respect. But I find it extremely hard to fathom how this resolution advances or attains our agreed-upon objective.

The supporters say "Give the sanc­tions a chance" while at the same time saying to Saddam, "We are giving you a further period of grace from even the threat of fighting." During that period of grace, Hussein can strengthen his position in Kuwait. He can carefully conserve or even replenish those items in short supply.

We suddenly apply the Marquis of Queensberry Rules to warfare: No at­tack without penalty of warning, and meanwhile he proceeds to make all preparations possible against our forces.

Meanwhile, what of our allies? Are they to assume anything other than that we suddenly lost our nerve just as we arrive at the critical date of January 15?

The leader of the United Nation coa­alition is clearly the United States of America. If our Nation cannot back a U.N. resolution, then these nations asso­ciated with us, many of them at a very high economic and a very high po­litical cost, are going to drift away, each, perhaps, making whatever ac­commodations it can with Saddam.

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In this life of ours, nothing is certain. We, none of us, know exactly how we should decide this issue. We are given powers of judgment, supported by the experiences that we know of and rely upon. From a personal viewpoint, we thus arrive at the best decisions we are capable of.

It is my very firm belief, based upon some experience, that to delay here, to postpone, to temporize, would be extinction, not only for our Nation in terms of American lives. The best chances for success are not only to defeat this resolution but to endorse one giving the President the authority to use force, should he deem it necessary, which hopefully will not be true.

Mr. SANFORD. Mr. President, this debate may very well have started out to be a debate about the Constitution and the constitutional requirement that this Nation cannot go to war without a declaration by the Congress. It is not that really, now, what the argument is about I am afraid.

The reason I am so much in support of the resolution that has been put in by the leader—the resolution prepared by Senator S. Nunn—is that I think if we do not vote for this, we are going to war very shortly. So I think we either support this resolution which brings, I think, some sanity to the discussion, or we are going to see this Nation go to a war, and a war that certainly does not need to be fought—the most unnecessary war in the history of this Nation and a war that could have disastrous effects.

There is not much we can do about the President going to war unless we pass this kind of a resolution. As George Will said today in his editorial in Newsweek making the point that, were it applied to debate tonight which supports the Nunn resolution, if the President decides to go to war there is not anything the Congress can do except to impeach him or to cut off the funds for the military.

It was quite correct in pointing out that we are not going to cut off the funds for the military, not when our young men and women are out there exposed. And I suspect we are not going to impeach the President while fighting is going on and while war is going on and probably should not anyhow.

But, in any event, I think we either support Senator S. Nunn’s resolution—and I might say here parenthetically that there is no Member of the U.S. Senate more thoughtful, more knowledgeable about the military, more aware of the position of this Nation’s leadership in the affairs of the world than S. Nunn.—I am pleased to have an opportunity to be a cosponsor and to support this legislation.

If we do not pass it, you may be sure we are almost certain to go to war. It is possible—and I certainly hope it does turn out—that Saddam pulls out of Kuwait. But there is nothing in his history to indicate that is going to happen. And if we do not say “let us be cautious, let us go back to our original plan, which is to support the Nunn resolution, then we are going to see this Nation dragged into a war that brings pain and suffering and death and loss and added costs of all kinds, not only to this Nation but to other nations. Not only that, but it brings in its wake the kind of turmoil that we will be a generation getting under control.

We will see turmoil in the Middle East, bringing all kinds of results that are going to lead to the instability of that region. We are going to see the State of Israel put in jeopardy. And we ought not to do that—not at all.

I think the aftermath of this war might very well be far worse than the war itself.

I have tried to find out from the administration just how they see the war. How many deaths? I have asked.

“Much how much time do you think it would take?”

The answer has not come. The answer has been very vague.

“Oh, we can go in there and bomb for 2 or 3 days and Saddam will give up. Or we can take a scenario that is a little bit more pessimistic, and it might take us 11 days to carry it out. It depends,” they said, “on the scenario.”

“And how many deaths will there be?”

“It depends on the scenario.”

I can tell those gentlemen what their War College says about the scenario. I can tell them what their War College—and surely most of them have attended—what they say about how you calculate the time of conflict in a war and how you calculate the number of deaths. You take the worst case scenario. The worst case scenario could have us losing thousands and thousands of young Americans.

The worst case scenario could have us bogged down for months and months, and maybe years. So there is no easy way to end this war. This is not an easy war to be fought and this is not a war that ought to be fought.

I grant you that the President has put himself in a position that more or less is the case of painting oneself into a corner. He added the buildup. He turned, without real consultation with the Congress, a defensive operation sent there to defend against further aggression into Saudi Arabia into an offensive potential and decided that he would say this is going to be a demand that you get out or we are going to come in. There was not any consultation with the Congress about that.

It is a game of bluff. If a game of bluff works, well and good, and I hope it will. But if it does not work, then where are we left standing if we have had our bluff called? Then we have to go to war, the administration contends.

The President said after Secretary Baker’s meeting that now it is up to Saddam Hussein. I say it ought not be up to Saddam Hussein. We ought not to let Saddam Hussein’s stubbornness, his inflexibility, his refusal to move, decide that we are going to make such a tremendous blunder as going to war now would be.

It is not so, Mr. President. It is up to the United States. It is up to us to decide whether there is going to be a war.
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As we carry on this debate, I think it is important for us to remind our colleagues from time to time that all of us share a common understanding, and have from the beginning, that we cannot let Saddam Hussein have any of the fruits of this aggression; that he must leave Kuwait.

The debate is really about the best road to reach that goal, and I think, Mr. President, equally important, we are overlooking this, but it was obvious from the beginning, equally important that this debate ought to also be about building now with the use of this experience a mechanism for the resolution of this conflict itself and future conflicts that might arise.

On Wednesday, we learned of the failure of the meeting between Secretary of State Baker and the Foreign Minister of Iraq, and while the results of that meeting are disappointing, they are not surprising. The failure to reach a diplomatic solution has left us in the same position that we were in the day before the meeting, the same position we have been in; nothing has changed.

There is no reason for this added fervor. There is no reason for the United States to succumb to anger and rush to war. There is no reason to say we have been insulted, we have been stiff-armed, we have been isolated. Of course we have been, and we have stiff-armed them. That is part of diplomacy. But there is no new justification for the President to send thousands of our people to their deaths in the Middle East.

Our resolve to see Saddam Hussein forced out of Kuwait has not changed and has not weakened. But the way to do it is what this debate is about and the way to do it is not to go into a deadly war.

Mr. President, it has always been easier to settle an argument with a gun, and it is much more difficult to settle one without one. This is true throughout the world have been struggling all of this century and longer to find a way to resolve national differences without war. We finally have the opportunity today to make real and important progress toward a better way of resolving conflicts and at the same time get the job done in Iraq and get it done right.

Probably the greatest development that resulted from World War II was the birth of the United Nations. Until now, that institution has been stymied by the cold war conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. For the first time, in the Iraqi crisis, we have seen that the United Nations can come together to exert its moral force and can be backed up with economic sanctions and with the military might of its members, including especially the United States, to punish unwarranted aggression.

We ought not to miss the opportunity to establish that this is the way that aggression ought to be dealt with in the future.

But we have arrayed now in Saudi Arabia the greatest concentration of military might since World War II. The question is: Which way do we go first? That is the fateful decision. Do we resort to the age-old way of war, or do we at least try this new moral force available through the combined weight of the nations of the world?

We can teach Hussein a lesson. We can get him out of Iraq. And I would add that we ought to also insist right now that before we lift the sanctions, he has to destroy all weapons, chemical, biological, nuclear, and the capacity to make them, and give the United Nations a right for on-site inspection, which we have not yet required.

We not only teach Hussein a lesson, we not only can bring him in line with the norms of the world community, but we can teach would-be aggressors the same lesson, not by going to war, but by making the United Nations moral force work, and we can greatly diminish the chance of future invasions of neighboring nations.

The lesson is that acts of aggression will not be tolerated and that those who attempt to engage in them will be isolated and crippled by the moral, economic, and military might of the United Nations.

It is through the United Nations that we have isolated Iraq politically, commercially, and economically. We have sealed Iraq off from the rest of the world. If we continue relentlessly to enforce the embargo, we can cause an economic collapse which certainly will have the capacity to bring Iraq into compliance with the demands of the world.

Strict enforcement of the embargo at the very least will leave Iraq in a much weakened condition, lacking the spare parts and supplies it will need, including food, which I might say I do not think ought to be part of the embargo, but it will cut off all of those supplies that he needs to prepare for war.

Of course, the embargo would work. It has already started to take its toll. Virtually all of Iraq's exports, mostly of oil, have been stopped. We cut off its money so Iraq is not earning anything from export sales. We have simply cut off its income. Ultimately, Iraq will have no funds to buy goods even if it could find those willing to sell them.

The embargo has also stopped over 90 percent of all imports, cutting Iraq off from most of the supplies it would need, including food, which I might say I do not think ought to be part of the embargo, but it will cut off all of those supplies that he needs to prepare for war.

Obviously, it takes time. We know that in the beginning. We did not send the military over there to fight a war.

We sent the military over there because we knew it was going to take patience and time if we wanted the embargo to be the new way that we dealt with aggression, the new way that we avoid war as a solution.

There is not any question that it takes time and it takes courage and it takes moral strength and it takes patience and it takes wisdom to make Iraq realize that the embargo can last forever. That is the path I hope our President will take. The risk of the embargo must be weighed against the alternative risk of war.

To those who say that the sanctions do not guarantee an Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, I would remind them that war offers few guarantees other than the almost certain loss of many American lives.

To those who express concern about the ability of the United Nations and the coalition supporting the embargo to stay the course, I find Admiral Crowe's words to be the most telling. I cannot understand why some consider our international alliance strong enough to conduct intense hostilities, but too fragile to hold together while we attempt a peaceful solution.

Of course, the coalition will hold together and hold the embargo in place.

Mr. President, risking lives in a war is not to be taken lightly. Almost one-quarter of the troops deployed in the Middle East right now have come from places in my home State of North Carolina. I know many of their families, and I know their living conditions, and I know their communities. I know these fighting men that have gone out from those bases to the Middle East are to be commended. They are to be respected. They are to be honored. They have moved into their positions and carried out their duties with the utmost in professionalism. They would, if summoned, serve this Nation with outstanding courage and valor.

However, I do not believe, as I see them and their wives and their children and their parents, I should vote to risk their lives until we have let the economic squeeze of the embargo run its course, because I believe it will work.

Some of the debate today has focused on whether the passage of this resolution will somehow undermine the President and will send a signal to Saddam Hussein that the United States is less than committed in forcing Iraq out of Kuwait. I do not see that reasoning as being valid at all.

The President was right to organize the international condemnation of Iraq's illegal and unwarranted invasion of Kuwait. The Congress and the American people supported those initiatives. The President was right and brilliant in his quick deployment of American forces. From August 7 through today, the President was right to organize the United Nations behind the sanctions against Iraq.
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But the President will be wrong if he takes offensive military action right now without playing out the alternative of the embargo. The challenge that the President made to Saddam was a sensible strategy. It might have worked. I hope it yet does work.

This resolution will not in any way affect that. But that it did not work should not drive us to war, a war that does not need to be fought. We do not need now to save face. We are too strong to submit to that vanity. This is the United States of America. We do not deal in face saving. We have far more important things and principles to save than face.

We do can what we ought to do. We do not need to play that kind of a game. Moreover, in saying to the President, as this resolution does, that Congress has not ruled out going to war, that Congress authorizes the use of military force to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq, to defend Saudi Arabia from additional attack, to protect America's forces in the region, it says that Congress will fully support increasing economic and diplomatic pressure against Iraq. It says that Congress will act expeditiously to consider any future Presidential requests for a declaration of war.

Congress has expressed strong support for what the President has done so far and giving the sanctions more time to weaken Iraq's military power. This resolution leaves the United States as committed as it has ever been since August to the goal of removing Iraq from Kuwait.

Mr. President, let us stand tall and strong and firm. Let us not take the quick and easy way. Future generations will praise the wisdom of President Bush, for he can make the decision that gives us the great opportunity for building a more peaceful world. I think we could do much better in improving our energy independence. But we are not at that point now. So the President had no choice except to act.

As one who served in the U.S. Army in Vietnam, I do not want us to go to war. It is my strongest feeling that had President Bush not acted, Iraq, led by Saddam Hussein, would have taken over not only Kuwait but also Saudi Arabia, and that would have made us vulnerable in terms of the supply of energy.

I think it is our own fault that we have not become energy independent. I have been an advocate of gasohol and a number of other oil alternatives over the years. I think we could do much better in improving our energy independence. But we are not at that point now. So the President had no choice except to act.

I was one member of a group of Senators who visited King Fahd, of Saudi Arabia, and the Foreign Minister respectively, were somewhat...
stumbled at the directness of the visiting Senators in demanding that more money be paid to help the United States. I think our State Department is sometimes a bit timid and overly polite. I personally go to the meetings in our home State, and I had just come from a listening meeting in my State of South Dakota. How outraged our citizens were that the United States was paying the bill alone, that we were going it alone, so to speak. We need more help from other countries. We need more help from Saudi Arabia, from Japan, and from Europe. The United Nations needs to have troops there. Indeed, I believe the end of the tunnel would be to have our troops replaced by U.N. troops.

I say all of these things to point out that I have not agreed with every step of the President's policy along the way. I have said so on the floor of this U.S. Senate. But tonight we are near the climax of the President's negotiating effort. To take away from him his only really lever in the negotiations at this time, for our country, for the West, for our cause, and it would be a great victory for Saddam Hussein.

I have mentioned that I am very concerned about the failure or refusal of other nations to defray more of our expenses for Operation Desert Shield. I have mentioned the resolution that Senator D'Amato and I introduced last Friday calling on the President to request Saudi Arabia to use its windfall oil revenue gain to pay for the cost of Operation Desert Shield, among other things. So there are aspects of our current policy about which I am concerned.

I hope we do not have war with Iraq. I was disappointed at the inflexible attitude displayed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz in his meeting with Secretary of State Baker the other day. I called on a number of Senators who believe we should stick with the policy of economic sanctions indefinitely. But it seems to me the resolution requested by the President should be adopted for the following reasons:

First, it makes the threat of force more credible to Iraq's leaders, thus enhancing the possibility that they will withdraw their 500,000 troops. If this Congress passes the Mitchell resolution, the President no longer has any real negotiating strength, Saddam Hussein would laugh in our face, and I hope that all those who vote for it will think of that.

Second, the resolution requested by the President should be adopted for this reason: It does not undercut diplomatic efforts or economic sanctions as the other resolution would do. In fact, passage of this resolution should strengthen the chances for a diplomatic solution.

Third, it does not assure that United States offensive action against Iraqi forces in Kuwait will occur. It simply preserves that option while demonstrating the United States and determination to Iraqi leaders as well as our own allies.

In conclusion, Mr. President, we are not today deciding on a resolution to go to war. This is not a declaration of war resolution. We are deciding whether or not to adopt a resolution that would strengthen the chances for a peaceful resolution of this crisis.

I am personally convinced that the best path to peace, the best way to avoid war, is to defeat the Mitchell resolution and pass the Dole resolution, which supports the U.N. resolution. In some areas of the media, and elsewhere, it is being portrayed almost as if this were a declaration of war. This is not the case. I disagree with the implication left by some that we are about to do inevitably hurls our Nation into war.

Mr. President, I have faith in President Bush's efforts to exercise restraint and to make the difficult decisions that lie ahead. Saddam Hussein's inflexible response to 5 1/2 months of diplomacy, sanctions, and threats lead me to the conclusion that he believes Congress will not support the use of force against him. He is gambling on that. We should pass the resolution authorizing force now so he cannot continue to delude himself on that point. We must make our threat credible in order to give diplomacy a chance to succeed.

Mr. President, our Nation is 50-percent dependent on foreign oil. That is a mistake. We need a national energy policy to move us away from that dependency. We need a policy of promoting conservation and energy alternatives—gasohol, solar, methanol, wind, geothermal, and many other types of energy sources. Until we have such a policy in place, we need to continue to delude himself on that point. We must make our threat credible in order to give diplomacy a chance to succeed.

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The powers are wholly independent of the War Powers Resolution, which I have always believed is unconstitutional.

Mr. BAUCUS. It is a question of what is constitutional, Mr. President, of the Founding Fathers were wise as well as authoritative on this issue. War is not just another policy decision. It asks ultimate sacrifices. It takes away from our futures, our lives of citizens. It is terribly expensive.

But can this Congress, with its Democratic majority, participate responsibly in a decision about a war? Did our Republican president and Democratic Congress authorize the immediate use of force in Iraq? I told him that I would not.

Then I said something to me that further strengthened my resolve. He said, "Max, as you know, I served in Vietnam. But there is something else that I have never told you, and it is why I worked in your first campaign for public office back in 1974. I decided to support you because as a Vietnam veteran and based upon what I saw in Vietnam I did not ever want my sons to die in an unnecessary war. I thought that was something you would probably never vote for."

Well, I intend to keep my faith with one of my very best friends, and with the people of Montana, and with the people of Montanas, and do what I think is right. I intend to vote against what I am convinced is, at this time, an unnecessary war.

I agree that Iraq should leave Kuwait. Of course, Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait, immediately. Iraq must not retract the fruits of its brutal aggression. Iraq must leave Kuwait; make no mistake about it.

But I believe, and I am not alone, that at some point, it may become clear that we can only achieve our objective with military force. That may be necessary. But I also believe that we have not yet reached that point.

Vigorous diplomacy, with the continued application of an economic strangulation, along with the clear unequivocal resolve of the world community, is the way to go. Indeed, Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait immediately. Iraq must not retract the fruits of its brutal aggression. Iraq must leave Kuwait; make no mistake about it.

Like most Americans, I also realize that at some point, it may become clear that we can only achieve our objective with military force. That may be necessary. But I also believe that we have not yet reached that point.

The sanctions that are imposed are unprecedented. They are tight, and they are working. They are crippling Iraq's economy. Foreign reserves have evaporated. Iraq's GNP has been cut in half. Saddam Hussein has been put in the position that he cannot sustain, either economically or politically.

Sanctions are also undermining Iraq's military capability. CIA Director Webster says that, because of the lack of spare parts, Iraq's Air Force will deteriorate in as few as 3 months. Sanctions may do the job peacefully.

Why is that so important? It is so important, because we must ask ourselves what is the alternative. The alternative is war, and we are not talking about Grenada or Panama. We are talking about real, honest-to-goodness war-as many as 20,000 American deaths; our sons, our daughters, our fathers, and now even our mothers, killed in war.

If history teaches us one thing about war, it is that the ultimate consequences of war are always unpredictable. Who really knows what will happen? What if Iraq attacks Israel? And what about Arab nationalism? What about that affect? What if large-scale terrorism erupts worldwide-as I think it very likely will be the first time here in the United States-as a consequence of our military action? What happens after we win? Do we occupy Iraq, and at what cost?

In the end, we may have no choice but war. But today that is far from clear. The sanctions and vigorous diplomacy just might work, and if they do, America's interests will be far better served.

I, therefore, support the conclusion in the Mitchell-Nunn resolution that "the continued application of international sanctions and diplomatic efforts are the way to go." Iraq must leave Kuwait is the wisest course at this time and should be sustained.

There is another reason why I support the resolution. As it now stands, America and American troops would bear a disproportionate burden of any military action. This is not, after all, a dispute between Iraq and the United States. It is a dispute between Iraq and the world.

A lot has been said about the international coalition arrayed against Iraq. But if you look at the front lines, you will not see much of an international coalition. Maybe 15,000 British troops, but close to a quarter-million Americans. And only a handful of token representatives from other alies. And in the background, an enthusiastic international cheering section.

The Japanese are more than twice as heavy as the American forces in Mideast oil as we are. But they have, for various reasons, sent no troops. Neither have the Germans, or many other countries with a heavy stake in the gulf.

As a result, the U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force, to paraphrase the senior Senator from Colorado, is little more than a declaration by other countries they will hold our cost for us while we fight Saddam Hussein. That is not enough.

I believe that, while we give sanctions time to work, we should build a truly international military coalition, in which the burden is shared.

As we prepare to vote, Mr. President, we face a difficult dilemma. If we authorize the immediate use of force, we probably do increase the President's short-term negotiating leverage. But we also increase, dramatically, the likelihood of war.

This is a hard, tough course. Congress should state plainly and unequivocally that all Americans are united in our objective.
Iraq must leave Kuwait. We will not shirk from that objective. There must be total, final, unconditional withdrawal. But before giving the President a blank check for war, we should go the extra mile for peace—giving the sanctions a bit more time, intensifying our diplomatic efforts, strengthening the international coalition. If that does not force Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait, then and only then should we let slip the dogs of war.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair now recognizes under the unanimous consent request the Senator from Washington.

Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, on the profound question facing each of us here as Members of this Senate, the columnist Charles Krauthammer wrote: "The choice between containment and war is agonizingly difficult. The outcome for each is highly uncertain. But choosing in contingent circumstances is the essence of polity-making."

Now that choice is ours and only ours to make. We have no more grave or consequential responsibility.

On November 28 the United Nations authorized its members, including the United States—and I quote, "to use all necessary means" to vindicate its authority and force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait on or after January 15 unless it has already done so voluntarily and in compliance with earlier resolutions of the United Nations.

The President of the United States has now asked us, under the Constitution, to grant him that precise authority. The majority leader's resolution, while lauding and supporting the goals of the President and of the United Nations, denies the President that authority and only states that the "continued military threat, and patience."

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force at some vague and unspecified future time when those proponents of a sanctions-only approach may finally be satisfied with the obvious truth of the failure of sanctions? They do not, Mr. President.

When will that future date arrive? During the Moslem month of Ramadan? During the pilgrimages of late spring and early summer? In midsummer? When desert temperatures soar to 130 degrees? On the second anniversary of the occupation of Kuwait? Next winter? When?

For all that vague and indefinite period of time, will we maintain our armed forces in Saudi Arabia? We know that to do so will at least-and I think it will certainly-be an occupation.

The Senator from Georgia believes in a policy of rotation. For an extended stay, of course, that is the only possible course of action. So in order to have a rotation, we will withdraw tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of men and women from the Middle East.

How many will stay, this Senator asks the proponents of patience; 200,000, 50,000, 20,000? Could, could not a rotation, we will withdraw tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands of men and women from the Middle East.

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Do the backers of the majority leader's resolution assert that Saddam Hussein will accede to the United Nations resolutions with that number of troops on its borders after it has faced down the threat it faces today? Will they tell us in seriousness that our forces will be withdrawn at some future time and reembark for Saudi Arabia? Be serious. We know that will never happen.

By that vague and unspecified future date, is it not almost certain that some or all of those Arab allies will have made the decision that Iraq is really not so bad after all; that the occupation of Kuwait after all took place a long time ago and very far away, and that those nations' business communities are being hurt by continuing sanctions?

Will we not long since have found that our Arab allies, those immediately threatened by Saddam Hussein, will have rightly questioned our willingness to stick to our principles? Will they not, of necessity, have been required to make the best deal possible with their powerful neighbor, Iraq? Will they not have been forced to retain a mere shadow of their sovereignty by giving Saddam Hussein control over some 60 percent of the oil of the world? Will they not have acknowledged him by that time to be the dominant factor, the leading individual in the Arab world?

Do the proponents of the majority leader's resolution believe that if we allow Saddam Hussein to succeed now, this week, that we will not face him again, that we will not have to deal with a more powerful Iraq after it dominates the Arabian Peninsula, after it has perfected chemical and biological weapons, and after it is closer than it is today to nuclear capabilities? Do they believe that by then he will have become an advocate of justice and peace and security?

Critics of the President who wish to deplore the U.N. resolutions tread on dangerous ground. They risk the destruction of a dream pursued by enlightened statesmen for centuries, the dream of a world body that can act decisively to stop aggression, a world body capable of establishing the rule of law and of making it unacceptable and unfavorable for nations to swallow other nations by force.

After World War I, that dream was embodied in the League of Nations. But in 1933, as Benito Mussolini marched into Ethiopia, the League of Nations could not agree on effective measures to counter that aggression and those it did promulgate were ignored by its members.

Much as some critics today judge Kuwait to be unworthy of our full commitment, many then in the West then judged Ethiopia to be a barbarous nation unworthy of our concern.

In 1938, with the impotence of the League of Nations and correctly judged that it could safely be ignored. He remilitarized the Rhelndel in the next year, believing correctly that no one would risk the lives of some of their soldiers to stop him. Six million Jews and 30 million other lives paid the price for that failure.

Perhaps Saddam Hussein and Iraq are not as powerful or significant a threat to world peace and order today as was Adolf Hitler or even Benito Mussolini in the late in the late 1930's. But to the people of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Iraq, Saddam Hussein poses the same threat as Hitler did to Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Belgium.

We cannot guarantee, Mr. President, that if the U.N. resolution, of which we here debate the enforcement, is respected, and that if Saddam Hussein either chooses or is forced to withdraw from Kuwait, a new world order of peace and security will be the inevitable result. But we can come close to certainty that if this historic effort on the part of the United Nations fails, the United Nations will suffer the fate of the League of Nations and that there will be no new world order with which we are comfortable.

This Senator has been convinced for some time, and has stated repeatedly, that it is almost impossible to expect any movement on the part of Iraq, as the result of the resolutions of the United Nations, any sooner than the last 48 hours or perhaps the last 24 hours before the expiration of the January 15 deadline.

Saddam Hussein is a skilled practitioner of brinksmanship. He has clearly not yet been persuaded that the United States or the United Nations are serious. He believes that we will pass a resolution like that proposed by the majority leader and that we will back away from this confrontation. He believes firmly and completely in his own ability to come out of this confrontation as a winner and as the acknowledged leader and ruler of the Arab world.

We will succeed in reaching our goals, Mr. President, without the use of our armed services in conflict, only if we act in accordance with the U.N. resolution. Only when it appears to Saddam Hussein that he is certain to lose his military power and perhaps his regime, his life, and his country, will he consider a last-minute retreat. And only through the passage of the President's resolution can that threat of military force be made believable.

There is no possibility at any time in the foreseeable future and no real argument that at any time in the immediate future, were we to pass a resolution like that of the majority leader, that it will be crowned with any kind of success in reaching our goals whatsoever.

The real choice, Mr. President, is not between sanctions and war. An honest examination of this question tells us that waiting, that depending on fruitless sanctions, is almost certainly a prescription for an even more costly war in the future, more costly in both lives and treasure to the people of the United States than anything which we can imagine during the course of the next few weeks or months.

No one can fail to agonize over the choice we must make. No one wishes for or desires war. Today's peace demonstrators and those who speak for sanctions-only in this body are every bit as sincere as men and women who demonstrated for peace in London in 1938.

The government of those citizens of London deferred to their pleas, and as a result sentenced them to a worse and more destructive war by far than the one which they were sent their constituents to the Middle East to die for cheap oil or hollow ideals or principles.

But, in fact, Mr. President, the people who lived for a short time by that slogan died with their sons and daughters and mothers and fathers in far greater numbers because of that slogan, than would have been the case had it never been invented.

The solution to the problem before us is made more difficult by an apparent paradox. The only chance for success without war is to prepare for war on Tuesday or later next week. As this Senator has already said, only the serious threat of destruction has any chance of compelling Saddam Hussein to relinquish his control over Kuwait.
January 11, 1991

It is this paradox, I believe, that makes it all the more difficult to gauge the public mind on this issue. We are all against war, asked whether or not we should wage it or stay out of it. But the debate goes on and people also support in our desire to achieve our vital objectives which, alas, requires the threat of war.

Mr. President, several Members of both this body and the other body have presented us with perhaps the most agonizing of all choices. They have asked themselves whether or not they would be willing to send their own sons and daughters into battle in this confrontation. Reaching the conclusion that they would not, they are unwilling to send any of their constituents into that situation.

Mr. President, I am one of the few Members of this body who is likely to face that choice in reality. I have a son-in-law, the father of my two grand-children, who flies A-6's off aircraft carriers for a living. He has told me that if war breaks out in the Middle East, I, as a Member of that body, would be part of it; that it is his duty and his career.

I have found it somewhat ironic, Mr. President, that most of the debate about the tactics of this war emphasized that we had best start only by air strikes, risking rather fewer in the way of lives than we might should we engage in an infantry or a tank attack. But it is exactly one of those few lives that my family will risk if we back the President in our vote tomorrow to follow those tactics.

I honor my son-in-law for that choice, and I support him in that choice, because I believe with all my heart that to back the President today will save more lives, more American lives, than it will destroy.

Mr. President, the cause of peace is not served by the majority leader's resolution. That resolution serves the cause of the ascendancy of a notion of a noble idea, and of a lawful and peaceful world order, and serves the cause of a worse war at a future date.

The approach of those who would recommend economic sanctions and patience is fatally flawed, for if we flinch now, there will be no military option in the future. But more important, those who counsel patience must realize that if the threat of extinction does not move Saddam, neither will any other threat.

We do not have the luxury of the choice between sanctions and war. To paraphrase Winston Churchill, we may choose America. We may choose neutrality, but we will have war tomorrow.

Mr. President, the true cause of peace is served by the President of the United States. The true cause of peace in this body will be served by supporting a resolution to back the policies of the President of the United States.

Mr. DECONCINI addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. As Members know, the Senate is proceeding under a unanimous-consent request entered into earlier in the evening with respect to the two resolutions before the Convenors.

Pursuant to that unanimous-consent request, the Chair now recognizes the Senator from Arizona.

THE GULF CRISIS

Mr. DECONCINI. Mr. President, I rise today to join my colleagues in debate on probably the most difficult decision that Members will ever have to face as Members of Congress.

The responsibilities of our office require us to make many difficult and painful decisions. Some of them are pure political decisions, but none so difficult or awesome, in this Senator's judgment, as the decision to commit our great country to war.

It is not a decision which any of us take lightly. Nor is it a matter for partisan wrangling.

I have enormous respect for my colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and both sides of this issue. I do not believe that any decision can be made today, on whether we are Democrats or Republicans or liberals, conservatives, moderates, or what have you. We are talking about a decision which could require men and women to make the ultimate sacrifice for their country—and for each one of us in this room, as well. No, Mr. President, party loyalties are not fueling the real passion of this debate.

It is the knowledge that we as individuals must make a decision which will profoundly affect the national security of our country and place hundreds of thousands of American lives at risk.

What are we asking ourselves to do and how do we justify asking ourselves to step up and vote on these important two resolutions that will be before us?

Our debate here today represents a choice on both sides of the aisle of the kind of democracy which wisely does not place the burden of such far reaching decisions, such as war, just with the President of the United States. Rather, it vests the power in the branch of Government which is most closely affiliated and associated with the people, and that is the Congress.

I see the people in my State and throughout this Nation wrestling with the issue, very intensely, as to what should we do under these circumstances. All of us, particularly our men and women in the armed services deserve to be assured that no decision will be taken before Congress, together with the President, have explored it thoroughly and deliberated thoroughly.

We are all agreed that Saddam Hussein and his outrageous acts of aggression cannot be allowed to stand. All of us are horrified and repulsed by the horrible atrocities he has committed against his own people during the war with Iran, as well as the citizens and those who were not citizens but legally living in Kuwait.

He must be expelled from Kuwait, and the nation of Saudi Arabia must be protected from the threat of Saddam Hussein and other neighbors as well. But what we are asking ourselves today is whether war now is the best way to achieve these particular aims and objectives that our Nation has firmly established.

Can we compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw without war? That is really the question here. I and many of my colleagues are not convinced that every alternative option to war has been exhausted as of the date we vote tomorrow, perhaps, on these resolutions.

Let there be no mistake, Mr. President. I have the greatest pride and confidence in the ability of our Armed Forces. I have no doubt that we can win and we will win, God forbid if we have to go to war. We can win an armed conflict against Iraq. Military superiority is not the solution in and of itself. Military superiority is a tool, which, if used effectively, can prevent war and preserve peace. But if used unwise­ful the military might of a nation, the greater that nation's responsibility to use that power wisely.

President Bush has at this disposal an extensive array of diplomatic, economic and military tools. He has used the former expertly so far. He has deftly and patiently worked with our allies and friends in the international community to build a united international front through the United Nations against Hussein. His astute understanding of the policy of pressure through sanctions and diplomacy backed up by a deadly and massive armed presence has sent Hussein the strongest of messages. It is my belief that the President's policy has, in fact, been so effective that I am hopeful that the continuation of this skilful application of pressure will ultimately force Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Some are arguing that unless Congress gives the President the power today to use the tool of last resort—armed force—we undercut his ability to effectively meet an international crisis.

But I would argue, Mr. President, that if Mr. Hussein does not know that Congress will not hesitate to authorize the use of force, he is badly misjudging the U.S. Congress. I know this Senator is fully ready to give President Bush the authority to use force once I am convinced that sanctions and diplomatic efforts have failed.

We must ask ourselves before we commit to war, where war will lead us? What threat of terrorism and Moslem fundamentalist radicalism, and neces­sitate a prolonged military presence
perhaps requiring even further military action.

Before we plunge into a difficult conflict which can have no simple ending—we must know—and the American people must be informed and understand what kind of solution we are seeking. The complex problems of the gulf region do not lend themselves to simple solutions. We must find a course which will enable our Arab allies to find their own way to peace in the region.

Again, I stress my support for the President's policy to date, which my distinguished colleague from Georgia, Senator Nunn, characterizes as sanctions, economic embargo. Such sanctions, Mr. President, no graver issue will ever confront this Congress than whether we commit our young people to battle, our conscience to combat and our Nation to war. Since August 2, we have struggled to define the question we should debate. Some argue congressional versus Presidential constitutional responsibilities are at stake. Others have focused on whether clear enough goals have been defined by the President to compel us into war. And still others have said that while we share the goals, the means to achieve them are the crucial matter.

This confusion of the issues is understandable given our Nation's history and tradition in supporting peaceful solutions to our problems without war.

We must remain committed to patience, to the search for a long-term solution, and avoid the needless spilling of the blood of Americans and many, many others.

The international embargo which the President has so skillfully put together is powerful and contrary to what some would have us believe. Such distinguished military experts as the former Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Crowe and former Secretary of Defense Schlesinger have urged that we give sanctions more time. Why? Because most objective standards the sanctions have been extraordinarily effective. Iraq's production has dropped to 40 percent and its main source of hard currency, oil exports, is virtually at a standstill. In fact, its entire export flow has come to a halt. I am not going to repeat the facts and figures which so many of my colleagues have cited during this debate. Suffice it to say, sanctions are working and going to repeat the facts and figures which so many of my colleagues have cited during this debate. Suffice it to say, sanctions are working and not only effective. By not agreeing to the use of force in this case, I ask unanimous consent:

This young soldier had read about the war from a young soldier from Fort Knox and heard all these protesters who say we are fighting for principle, we are fighting for principle, we are fighting for principle and hear all these protesters who say we are fighting for principle and hear all these protesters who say we are fighting for principle. * * * Are we going to be a selfish, mercenary, oil进口ing, industrial production, and simply here is homesick, lovesick and ready to go home at any time. But, we all know we are standing our guard for principle and the American way of life and will be here till our job is done.

Lieutenant Korty, I applaud you. You have sound arguments on the threat. The threat to you and to our Nation. A tyrant is on the move and 28 nations have committed troops and resources to stop him. The United Nations has passed 12 resolutions condemning the invasion and the brutal occupation must not be appeased nor accommodated as we build the post-Cold War world. As East-West tensions diminish, we have a unique opportunity and obligation to work with the Soviet Union and other countries to foster genuine, peaceful, political change, preserve the security of our friends and promote economic prosperity.
The stakes are high but our goals are clear. The Senate must now decide to grant the President the means to join the international effort to accomplish our objectives.

Before we take this step, we should ask—as many of my colleagues have done—are sanctions and diplomacy working? Iraq continues to occupy Kuwait and shows absolutely no signs of leaving anytime soon. Sanctions have been in place for over 6½ hours of talks with Secretary Aziz. He saw no flexibility and no signs of Iraqi willingness to agree to the unanimous international call for withdrawal.

While I continue to hold out hope for the Secretary General's mission this weekend—and any other effort made by members of the coalition—intensive diplomacy and sanctions have produced no results. Economic hardship alone is not likely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime threatening popular discontent in Iraq. Saddam has taken few risks. He has not been willing to put his own men at risk, who has committed unprecedented and unspeakable atrocities against his own citizens and his Arab brethren. He is personally responsible for millions of deaths. He has defied all human values, and in ways that I do not believe the human spirit will ever accept. He has demonstrated his willingness to use force to defend our troops, even if sanctions and economic hardship are not considered an additional loss of life. He is clearly counting on our loss of interest.

The President of the United States has asked this Congress to fulfill our constitutional obligation and grant him the authority to use force. No other President who has asked Congress for the authority to go to war has been refused.

As the internationally determined deadline nears, diplomacy must continue. Every member of the coalition should be encouraged. I pray for a peaceful solution to this crisis.

President Bush is our leader and the leader of an international coalition has asked us to authorize the means necessary to accomplish this goal. Voting to support the President's request is a vote of confidence in the credibility of a threat that leaders of the world have determined may produce peace and avoid war.

To refuse President Bush and reject the declared, collective will of the United Nations protects a tyrant and rewards aggression. If we refuse the President's request today, who will believe we will enforce sanctions tomorrow?

Mr. President, I, am not impatient for war. I am impatient for peace. As Lieutenant Korty knows, peace depends on the protection of principles. He has willingly assumed his responsibility. Now we must assume ours. We must grant the President of the United States the vote of confidence he has requested to use all means necessary—diplomacy and force, if need be—to expel Iraq from Kuwait.

Mr. President, I yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the unanimous-consent request, the Chair now recognizes the Senator from Florida.

THE MAKING OF THE DECISION

Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. President, few issues in any of our political careers have seemed as critical as this one. The decision that we are called upon to make tonight and tomorrow has.

In the last few weeks, I have had an opportunity to visit with many of the people directly affected by the decision that we will make. Five weeks ago, I was at Eglin Air Force Base in northwest Florida. This is the base center for the Air Force special operations. Many families in that community have a loved one deployed into Saudi Arabia. I met with the spouses and the children of several of those families and heard the distress, the anxiety, the separation, and of the uncertainty.

Three weeks ago, with the majority leader and others of our colleagues, I had the opportunity to visit Saudi Arabia, and to visit in the desert with some of our troops—young men and young women of great courage and bravery, well equipped, well prepared, well led, ready to assume any responsibility. But they were clearly young men and women who had a high degree of anxiety about what they would be called upon to do and what the consequences would be.

One young man, who I happened to meet as he was digging out a bunker in a complex of tents, called up to me and said that he had been an Air Force officer in fact, he had been a student at the University of Florida, and he greeted me with the "Go Gator" statement. This young man from Clearwater, FL, told me that he had dropped out of school in order to join the Army, both in terms of maturing himself in life, and economically preparing himself better to continue his education. Now he was prepared to make a sacrifice for the Nation, beyond that which he probably contemplated when he enlisted.

Finally, Mr. President, just last Sunday I was in Tallahassee in preparation for the events of the inauguration of our former colleague, Lawton Chiles, as Governor of Florida. A lady I knew for over 20 years came up to me, and I could tell she was upset. I asked her if we could step into a private room to talk, and she broke down. She told me that her youngest son, her second son had no been called to join the Army. To join an older brother who was already there on the U.S.S. Saratoga as a sailor. Her youngest son is now going to be in Saudi Arabia as an infantryman based close to the Kuwait line. She wanted to know "Are they going to kill my boy?"

Mr. President, we do not get asked questions like that very often in the issues that we are called upon to decide. I cite these personal examples to indicate the depth of humanity, the depth of personal feelings that America has invested in this issue.

Therefore, it makes the responsibility that each of us hold an especially solemn one, one in which we must try to bring the full strength of our personal experience and our capacity and judgment to bear. In doing so, Mr. President, I have felt that the present is needed to be evaluated in the context of the past and the future, almost in the way that Charles Dickens helped explain the true meaning of Christmas present by elaborating the significance of Christmas past that had passed and
I think the past of this, which I will define as that which occurred prior to the invasion of Kuwait, is unfortunately a more ignominious example of a failure of strategic vision. Some very basic things are occurring in this region of the world to which we have not been appropriately attentive. Just to cite three, an emerging fundamentalism, not just religious but cultural fundamentalism, the rejection of Western values. This movement of fundamentalism is especially troublesome, as it has attracted such a large number of younger people throughout this region. The enigmatic disparity between rich and poor, which are fueling basic animosities, and the fact that, in part, through the United States participation, the Middle East has become the parking lot for the military weapons of the world. We ended up with a relatively small nation of 15 million people with a 1.3 million army, with 5,700 tanks and over 700 combat aircraft, enormous disproportion of military strength, and incredible need for those weapons.

I suggest, if we think that what we are dealing with is one man—Saddam Hussein. I see Saddam Hussein not as the cause of those fundamental events, but rather as the guileful person who has taken advantage of those and other fundamental factors occurring in this region.

We also, domestically, have contributed to the past. We have accommodated, one of the most successful post-cold-war eras, accommodated in terms of covertly assisting them in the war in Iran, within the shadow of the invasion of Kuwait, continuing to extend substantial economic assistance to Iraq. We made a basic mistake, I suggest, by our failure to have a sustained commitment to a rational national energy policy, failure which has made us increasingly hostage to the circumstances in the Middle East and the personalities of today's and tomorrow's Saddam Husseins.

Looking to the future, I would suggest that as we attempt to assess how we should respond to the current crisis today we should ask ourselves what do we want to have as some of the consequences not just of the next 30 or 60 days but over the next decade in this region and what do they say about U.S. policy around the world in this new post-cold-war era.

First, I would suggest that it is imperative that we develop some new national security arrangement. It may not be and will not mean precisely what NATO has been in Europe for the last 45 years, but I believe the NATO example of the most successful political and military alliances in the history of Western civilization, has some instructive lessons.

Second, within our own constitutional system we need to reexamine the relationships between the President and the Congress. I am not going to have a debate today on whether a declaration of war is required in these circumstances. I happen to think it is. But I think the reality of the circumstances in which we find ourselves tonight is that any effective participation of Congress as the representatives of the people in shaping policy has been rendered impossible by the occurrence of the last several months, at least since November 8 when the level of U.S. military in the region moved from defensive to an offensive posture.

Our capacity to sustain that level of military commitment when our ability to have a rational rotation policy was terminated. Effectively we were on a path accelerated by a U.N. resolution with a January 15 date that has led us inexcusably to where we are tonight.

I believe that we need to reexamine this relationship between the executive and Congress, and I would suggest we attempt as a Congress to play a role of strategic adviser setting forth in advance what are going to be the standards which the United States will consider its vital interests to have been affected and where those vital interests justify the sacrifice of American lives for their protection. That decision should be made prior to, not after or during a crisis as it is being done now.

Third, we need to play an even more constructive role in bringing peace with dignity and respect into a region which since biblical times has been racked with war and hatred and dissen­sion, extremely difficult task, a task that has eluded man over the millennia, the one to which we must in the aftermath of this crisis recommit ourselves.

We must also look for how we can play a more effective role in eliminating or moderating, mitigating these economic sanctions which so long as they exist are going to be fueling discontent and creating the tenor for a Middle Eastern populist demagog to inflame.

Finally, and in brief summary of just some of the time that will be on the post-crisis agenda, enormous conflict is on the horizon over natural resources in this region, particularly water. Here the United States in my judgment could play a particularly important role in applying some of its technological capability as well as its political good offices to try to shape a constructive role in bringing peace to the core of yet another set of conflicts in this region.

With that said about the past and the future, Mr. President, I would like to talk about today. This has been a rollercoaster week, it has been the core of yet another set of conflicts in this region.

I think it is a very constructive contribution to the debate and to the resolution of this process. It set out some important principles, one of which was that the Nation is united behind that proposition that Saddam Hussein's aggression will not be allowed to stand. That, I think, is a message which, whatever surface division may be read into the debate of the last several days, I believe, should be no misunderstanding that the Nation is united behind that principle that his aggression will not be rewarded, that we authorize the use of force in these specific important areas, that we stated that we felt diplomacy and economic sanctions were the wisest course and should be pursued, but recognize the possibility they might not be able to accomplish our objectives and therefore set up an expedited procedure in which the President could ask for authority to commit American forces to the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

At least two significant events have occurred since last Thursday and Friday. The second occurred in London on Tuesday. The President requested the authority to use force. I have been asking the President to make such a request for several weeks. Upon our return from Saudi Arabia, on the 20th of December, when with colleagues I met with the President, when it was my opportunity to make some comments I used my time to emphasize the importance that I attached to the President going to the Nation and explaining why the U.S. vital interests were at stake and then at the conclusion of that education of the American people asking their representatives for authority to commit force. I am very pleased that the President has done so.

The second significant event occurred a few hours later on Wednesday with the breakdown of the meeting between the United States Secretary of State and the Iraqi Foreign Minister. Not only did that tend to crush optimism over the second round of the talks which we would achieve our objective because the discussions failed, but the style of failure was so dispiriting.
It would have been hard to have scripted the press conference of Foreign Minister Aziz in a way more calculated to inflame, to raise fundamental questions as to intelligence and validity of our objectives, and particularly among the citizens of our country than the performance that he gave Wednesday night in Geneva. It raised basic questions as to whether diplomacy could reach our objective and whether the economic sanctions were having their intended effect of moving Iraq toward a policy of greater openness.

Now in this rollercoaster week we come to the end. The end unfortunately is going to be handled with sharp differences, I say unfortunately. There are some positive signs. Clearly, it is a strength of our democracy that we can have the kind of debate that we have experienced since Wednesday.

There are few places in the world which would have the consideration of war and peace so openly and with such passion debated. That is a great strength of our democracy.

However, Mr. President, I regret that I believe at the conclusion of this process we are going to have a very divided Congress. A matter of a handful of votes here and in the House of Representatives will determine the course of action the Congress will permit.

I believe that that narrow division is not going to contribute to the sense of unity of the Nation, to the strength of the message to Saddam Hussein, nor to the capacity of the President, should he assume the role of Commander in Chief, to effectively carry out his responsibilities.

It has been my hope, and I have spent some time over the last 2 days toward this end, that we might be able to shape a position that would not command unanimous support—that is impossible—but would command a sufficient majority that we could say yes, there is a unity within the Nation for a course of action.

I still have faint hopes that that might happen, but I fear that our choices are going to be those that are before us in the two resolutions.

With that said, I am going to support the resolution which will give the President of the United States the authority to use force. I am going to do so because I believe that the President of the United States deserves to have a presumption of correctness of his actions, and that he especially deserves to have a presumption of correctness as it relates to matters of our national security and relations with other nations.

I am reluctant to draw universal conclusions from a short visit to the Middle East, but that reluctance will be overcome to this extent: that I came away with the sense that this was an extremely complex fabric of interrelated and divergent issues, factors, personalities, history, and culture that we were dealing with in this crisis. It is not just the simple issue of a large and powerful state invading, pillaging, and occupying a weak neighbor. And that has caused me concern about the institution of the Presidency, such as the failure to go effectively to the American people over the last several months, as Franklin Roosevelt did in the months before World War II and explained why we were about to undergo this very bloody war, I still believe that the President continues to warrant our support. I am prepared to invest my confidence in the judgment of the President.

I hope the decision that we make will be a wise one. I pray that the actions that we take contribute to peace; contribute to the peace of the two sons of God; that we will help to contribute to world peace for the sons and grandsons of that mother in Tallahassee, so that we will be able to discharge our responsibility to our Creator for peace on Earth, and so that we can have hope for a world without mothers' tears.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair now, under the unanimous-consent agreement, recognizes the Senator from Alaska.

THE AUTHORITY TO ACT

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, our President, George Bush, must have the authority to deal effectively with Saddam Hussein. This is, really, Mr. President, the question before us. It is not a question whether sanctions will or will not get Iraq out of Kuwait.

Without the authority to act on the United Nations resolution, the President will be in effect one arm tied behind his back. We must give the President the authority that he needs to work toward a resolution of the Persian Gulf situation and to bring an end to Saddam Hussein's brutal occupation of Kuwait.

This is truly an historic moment in this body. This is a time for statesmanship. But, above all, it is a time for doing one's duty. And the duty of Congress is to give the American people, the President, and indeed the world, and especially Saddam Hussein, a clear answer to the request for that Presidential authority. This is not a partisan issue. We are not here to make debating points or to elaborate about any number of unknown contingencies. Our duty is to vote to give the President the authority he seeks or to vote against his request.

As a State legislator recently stated, "The problem with Congress is that it forgets that its job is to write the music, not to conduct the orchestra."

Let us be sure we write and not conduct.

Listening to the extended debate, I feel a sense of pride in the intelligence and perspective which has been displayed. There is a fair amount of discussion that really has nothing to do with the central issue that is before us: Whether we will exercise congressional authority to either grant or deny the President's request. Using our authority does not mean giving the President a convoluted and unworkable answer, such as I see in the Mitchell resolution, the indecision of which has to give Saddam Hussein some degree of comfort.

Supporting the President at this time does not mean that we must have war. The President has the responsibility to exhaust all alternatives before using force to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. And, Mr. President, our President Bush does not take that responsibility lightly. He personally knows war and knows firsthand of its consequences.

I have personally met with the President, as well as Secretary of State Baker and Secretary of Defense Cheney. I have every confidence that the President will do all in his power short of war to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Iraq's brutal, uncompromised aggression against Kuwait has been broadly condemned both here and abroad. Twelve U.N. Security Council resolutions are a powerful testimony to the outrage felt around the world, and Members of this body have been eloquent in their condemnation of Saddam Hussein's actions. Senators are unanimous in their determination to achieve Iraq's speedy and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait, and Members praise the skill with which President Bush has assembled an international coalition to achieve that objective.

In the 5 months since the invasion, the international community, led by the United States, has imposed an unprecedented land and sea embargo on Iraq. Never before have such comprehensive economic sanctions been imposed and never before has enforcement been so universally effective. All Members of Congress have hoped, and still hope, that the combined diplomatic and economic pressures, supplemented by massive military deployments, will persuade Saddam Hussein once and for all that he must withdraw.

The vast majority of Alaskans who have contacted me share this view. At the same time, Alaskans show overwhelming support for the President. Of course, it was with deep disappointment that we learned that the diplomatic effort Wednesday in Geneva met with no success. Iraq continues to defy international law while proceeding with its bloody demolition of the nation of Kuwait.
It is particularly ironic that officials involved in the ruthless aggression in Kuwait today have the temerity to deliver President Bush’s letter to Saddam Hussein because, we were told, it was not polite enough.

Earlier today, we had a disruption in this Chamber, with demonstrating and shouting in Arabic. Mr. President, as an Alaskan Senator, I firmly believe that the United States has become too dependent on foreign sources of energy. We have not done enough and must clearly do more to solve our domestic energy needs at home.

A full debate on energy dependence and alternatives, such as exploring for oil in Alaska’s Arctic, must await another day. For now, let there be no mistake that blood that has already tragically been shed for oil in the Mideast.

In a graphic report which I have before me, Mr. President, Amnesty International describes torture and death suffered by Kuwaitis at the hands of Iraq’s occupation army. This list, Mr. President, of some 38 methods of torture and brutality include such practices as beatings designed to systematically break one bone after another, beatings administered while the victim is suspended from a ceiling fan, gouging out of eyes, castration, cutting off tongues and ears, rape, denying incubators to hundreds of premature babies, and every brutality that sick minds can devise. This, Mr. President, is happening in Kuwait today.

I ask unanimous consent that a summary of these gross human rights atrocities, as indicated by the Amnesty International report, be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. (See exhibit 1.)

Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. President, on January 8 of this year, President Bush specifically requested that Congress support the use of all necessary means to remove Saddam Hussein from this illegal situation. In the opinion of the Senator from Alaska, the pending Mitchell resolution provides the President only partial and conditional support and denies what he has requested. It only authorizes force in response to a declaration to this effect.

In the opinion of the Senator from Alaska, the pending Mitchell resolution provides the President only partial and conditional support and denies what he has requested. It only authorizes force in response to a declaration to this effect. To enforce the embargo, to defend Saudi Arabia, and to protect American troops. It pledges full support for the continuation of increasing economic and diplomatic pressures against Iraq; it reaffirms the Congress and the President’s policy of declare war; and, finally, it sets forth a fairly frank procedure to expedite consideration of a request by the President to declare war.

The Mitchell resolution will not give the President the strength he needs to convince our allied nations that military power is a real threat. Why? Because if we adopt this resolution, Saddam Hussein will then surely be convinced that the President’s threat of military force was and is hollow.

Also troubling are the procedural provisions of the Mitchell resolution, which requires the President to seek a declaration of war that will be considered on a fast-track basis. I fear, Mr. President, that under the procedures in the pending resolution, we may be unintentionally giving Saddam Hussein the time, the inclination, perhaps, to launch a preemptive strike against our forces or against others in the region, including the United States. We include in it that he cannot be in a position in this modern age of warfare to telegraph our military signals to our adversary.

Mr. President, a resolution that both responds to the President’s request and preserves a proper constitutional balance between the executive and legislative branches will be introduced in the Senate. I am an original co-sponsor of this joint bipartisan resolution, which gives our President the direct authorization to enforce the U.N. resolution. It also requires that he make a determination before using force that he has used, indeed, all the appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain Iraqi compliance with the U.N. resolution. This determination must be given to the Speaker of the House under the resolution as well as the President pro tempore of the Senate.

The resolution further authorizes the President to use force to provide periodic reports to Congress on the President’s attempts to obtain Iraqi compliance. Implicit in the joint resolution is the urging by Congress that the White House, the President, through all means, short of war, to move Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. The resolution, however, does not bind our President’s hands. It explicitly grants the President what he seeks and what needs to be done before the 15th of January.

Mr. President, the Congress can respond to this request in three ways: First, we can deny the President’s request and destroy the President’s ability to act effectively as leader of the international community, which has become so effective.

Second, we could provide partial and conditional support, as the Senate majority leader proposes. The result, in the opinion of the Senator from Alaska, will be a weakened Commander in Chief whose ability to lead will truly be jeopardized. The Senate would signal Saddam Hussein that his effort to split the international coalition arrayed against him was succeeding at the very heart, Mr. President, of the U.S. Congress.

If this is a serious, this would also send a message to the men and women of the Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf that they were being asked to risk their lives for a cause that Congress did not fully or conditionally support. I shudder to think of sending this message to those brave men and women soldiers in the field.

The third and only responsible action is to provide President Bush the support that he has requested, and, by doing so, we are not expressing a preference for a military action. We will be giving our Commander in Chief the ability to credibly threaten armed forces as the best hope of persuading Saddam Hussein to withdraw peacefully from Kuwait. But if the President determines force must be used, he will then have the authority to act.

Mr. President, I believe sanctions will help to secure our country in a specific element of our strategy. As a former businessman, I have a keen appreciation of the powerful consequences that result when the income of an enterprise is cut off. The Iraqi economy is almost entirely dependent on one product, and that is oil. It accounts for 95 percent of Iraq’s foreign exchange earnings. The sanctions have now completely stopped Iraq’s oil export of some 8 million barrels a day, representing a cash flow of at least $200 million a day to Iraq.

Saddam Hussein has tried to justify his invasion on the ground that Kuwait was strangling Iraq by opposing an increase in the OPEC oil price. What Kuwait was allegedly doing cannot be compared to what the sanctions are doing. This is, indeed, real strangulation.

Iraq’s financial assets abroad have been frozen and remain so despite vigorous attempts by the Iraqi Government to gain access to those accounts. Iraq’s foreign exchange reserves are, of course, nearly depleted. Imports are already being reduced to a large extent for lack of dollars and dollars of Iraq’s food supply, key weapons systems, military spare parts, critical manufacturing products, like ball bearings, are all important.

Mr. President, as vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, I have reviewed the best information available concerning the effect of these sanctions. That information is, to some extent, incomplete and ambiguous because of the difficult sources of information. In some respects, it is certain, may have honest differences of opinion over what efforts sanctions will have in a particular timeframe. But let us recognize that so far sanctions are, indeed, doing what they were specifically designed to do, and that is to stop Iraq’s oil exports and to dry up Iraq’s cash flow.

It is clear that sanctions are having a major impact which will grow with
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the passage of time. By the fall of this year, we can expect the impact to be debilitating across almost the entire spectrum of the Iraqi economy. Will that be enough to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait? It is the view of this Senator from Alaska that no one really knows that answer. Hussein himself may not even know. But we know one thing, that the threat has not caused him to back down over the 5 months that the sanctions have been in effect. While sanctions may at some point ultimately force a collapse of Iraq's economy, they probably will not, standing alone, drive out the ground forces that Saddam Hussein has already deployed in Kuwait.

This is our and our President's immediate dilemma. Since August, Iraq has only met one of the four conditions for a peaceful settlement, and that is the fortunate release of the hostages. Saddam Hussein does not appear to have withdrawn his troops or restored the Government of Kuwait to its rightful place or contributed to any peace or stability in the region. Ironically, such reliance on extended sanctions may actually undermine sanctions as a viable alternative.

Mr. President, without giving our President the authority to act, Saddam Hussein, sometime shortly after January 15 will, in the mind of this Senator, proclaim to the world that he has stood up and defied the United Nations, the United States, and this Congress. His reward for naked aggression will be the continued rape and pillage of Kuwait and its people, as we stand by and wait for extended sanctions to bring him down.

What kind of a message will be sent to the fragile coalition of Arab States who now support the U.N. resolutions and who have courageously condemned Saddam Hussein's tactics? If we tell them that our sanctions will not be effective unless the Arab States support them, we may think we have assured the Arab States to the election's military needs, my responsibility is to use the power to enforce the U.N. resolutions.

Mr. President, I have not come to this conclusion without considerable thought. I have met with and heard from hundreds of Alaskans in the months since Iraq's aggression in August 1990. Alaskans' sons and daughters are now serving in the Mideast and their courage is a constant reminder to me of the burden I face in casting my vote.

As a father of six children, all at an age and capability of serving our Nation's military needs, my responsibility is a very personal one. Alaskans share a special bond with our military, yet Alaskans never want our military personnel to be used irresponsibly.

None of us in this body want that result either. By our debate the past few days and by our upcoming votes, we must demonstrate to Saddam Hussein and to our citizens at home that we understand this is a most solemn and serious moment in our history and the history of this body. We stand united with one voice and that voice is to stop aggression.

Mr. President, yesterday, as this historical debate in Congress began in earnest, a young man from our State Capitol, Juneau, AK, dropped into my office. He wanted to know of my views on the debate, where I stood on authorizing the use of force in the Persian Gulf. We explained to him the position that I have outlined and shared with you, that we hope and pray to God that a peaceful resolution is found to this crisis, but that the President and our troops in the gulf must be fully supported.

Mr. President, too many of our people have died in the horrors of war. I had the privilege to serve as a combat chief of staff during the Vietnam War, now over 2 decades ago, and I cannot even begin to imagine the pain that is caused by loved ones who cannot and will not come home. To those people, I offer my prayers and deepest respect.

Then he offered his view on the debate. He said he was in the U.S. Air Force and was being sent to the gulf on Wednesday next. He said he went willingly and proudly to defend American freedom. He asked solemnly and emphatically that I vote in this body to support his mission and that of his fellow troops already in the gulf states. He asked that we in Congress do our part to support them as they serve in the gulf at President Bush. Mr. President, that is what I intend to do. I yield the floor.

EXHIBIT

IRAQ: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL URGES END TO TORTURE AND KILLINGS; MAJOR REPORT DETAILS WIDESPREAD HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C.—Amnesty International has called on the Iraqi government to stop the release of hundreds of Western nationals by ending the imprisonment, torture and killing of scores of thousands of people in the country.

In its first comprehensive report on human rights violations in Kuwait since the invasion on August 2, Amnesty International described how the Iraqi forces have tortured and killed many hundreds of victims, taken several thousand prisoners and left more than 300 premature babies to die after looting hospitals from at least three of Kuwait City's main hospitals. The report catalogues 38 methods of torture used by the Iraqi military, including cutting off people's tongues and ears, shooting them in the limbs, applying electric shocks to their bodies, and raping them.

"The Iraqi forces' brutality in Kuwait has shocked many people in the past four months," Amnesty International said, "but such abuses have been the norm for people in Iraq for more than a decade."

Amnesty International said it welcomed the release of the Western nationals, but feared that the plight of thousands of victims of gross human rights violations in Kuwait and Iraq might now be forgotten.

The organization called on governments to apply pressure on Iraq to stop the gross human rights violations.

Most of the abuses detailed in the report took place in the first three months after the invasion, when dissent among Kuwaitis and other nationals was widespread and its suppression ruthless. Reports of violations continued to reach Amnesty International almost daily, although the severity of the early suppression appears to have crushed much of the opposition that led to arrest, torture and killing.

"The organization said it has collected compelling evidence supporting earlier reports of the killing of premature babies by Iraqi soldiers. "We heard rumors of these deaths as early as August," the organization said, "but only recently has there been substantial information on the extent of the killings."

The organization's investigation team interviewed several doctors and nurses who worked in the hospitals where the babies were born and some of them had been tortured and a doctor had even helped to bury 72 of them in a cemetery near the hospital. In some hospitals, unofficial records were kept of the names of people who had been killed, including the babies.

Amnesty International's report—released Tuesday—was submitted to all members of the United Nations Security Council, which has requested information on the human
The Iraqi government to allow the International rights situation in Kuwait, and to the Iraqi more than International investigators have traveled to Bahrain and people who were arrested, but believes the countries. International said. have his relatives identify him, and then soldiers loot medical equipment or while trying to take the victim to his family's doorstep, some of which are supported by medical evidence and photographic material

The team collected the names of some 1,000 people who had been arrested in their homes or elsewhere in the country. Most of these arrested were Iraqis, although from many other Middle Eastern, Asian, European and North American countries were also held. The team collected the names of some 1,000 people who were arrested, but believes the true figure to be much higher. Thousands of people seen being tortured, followed by deprivation of the necessary medical treatment.

The following are details of allegations of torture and ill-treatment which have been made to Amnesty International since 2 August, some of which are supported by medical evidence and photographic material [see Appendices C and D]. These reports are entirely consistent with methods of torture and ill-treatment known to have been used in the past, and some of which are also supported by medical evidence [see in particular Amnesty International's report entitled "Torture in Iraq 1983-1994", published in April 1985, and the organization's annual reports.]

It should be noted that not all of the methods listed below are said to have been widely used since 2 August. Those methods which have been alleged only in a few cases brought to Amnesty International's attention are marked with an asterisk (*)

1. Beating on all parts of the body, involving punching, slapping, delivering Karate-style blows and kicking with heavy army boots. Methods used for beating include canes, metal rods, whips, steel cables, hosepipes, rubber truncheons and rifle butts.

2. Pulga: prolonged beating on the soles of the feet. Sometimes the detainee is then forced to walk or run.

3. Suspending the detainee by the feet, or by his hands tied behind the back.

4. Beating the detainee while suspended from a rotating fan in the ceiling.

5. Breaking of the arms, legs or ribs; dislocation of elbow and shoulder joints.

6. Lifting the detainee high up in the air and then dropping him, sometimes resulting in the fracturing of bones.

7. Applying pressure to the fingers with a clamp-like instrument.

8. Slashing the face, arms or legs with knives.

9. Extracting finger and toenails. "Time and again, we told that the most common way soldiers killed people was to take the victim to his family's doorstep, have his relatives identify him, and then shots to the head," Amnesty International said.

Some people were killed because they resisted the "Iraqization" of their country by carrying Kuwaiti money or refusing to pledge allegiance to Saddam Hussein. Others were killed simply for refusing to help soldiers load the equipment or while trying to flee the country.

The investigators also talked to scores of people who had been arrested in their homes or elsewhere in the country. Most of these arrested were Iraqis, although from many other Middle Eastern, Asian, European and North American countries were also held. The team collected the names of some 1,000 people who were arrested, but believes the true figure to be much higher. Thousands of people seen being tortured, followed by deprivation of the necessary medical treatment.

10. Boring a hole in the leg, apparently with a typewriter stylus.

11. Cutting off of the tongue and ear.

12. Gouging out of the eyes.

13. Castigation.

14. Hammering nails into the hands.*

15. Piercing the skin with pins or staplers.

16. Shooting the detainee in the arm or leg at point blank range, followed by deprivation of the necessary medical treatment.

17. Rape of women (including virgins) and young men.

18. Inserting bottle necks, sometimes when broken, into the rectum.

19. Tying a string around the penis and pulling it tightly.*

20. Pumping air using a pipe through the anus, particularly of young boys.*

21. Applying electricity to sensitive parts of the body, including the ears, lips, tongue, fingers, toes and genitals. Sometimes the detainee is doused with water prior to the administration of electricity. The electrical instruments used include electric batons as well as wires fitted with clips (like those used to recharge car batteries but smaller in size).

22. Burning various parts of the body, including the genitals, with domestic appliances such as electric irons, with heated metal rods, or with a naked flame.

23. Extinguishing cigarettes on the eyeballs or on various parts of the body, including the genitals, armpits, chest and hands.

24. Pouring hot and cold water alternately over the detainee.

25. Placing the detainee in a cold, air-conditioned room for several hours, and then immediately into a heated room.

26. Pouring an acid-like substance onto the skin.*

27. Pouring caustic substances onto the eyes, causing blindness.

28. Plucking facial hair, particularly the beard, with pincers or pliers.

29. Placing heavy weights on the detainee's body.

30. Splitting into the detainee's mouth.

31. Exposing the detainee to the sun for several hours at a stretch without water.

32. Subjecting the detainee to mock execution. This includes holding the head below water to cause asphyxiation; subjecting the detainee through the motions of execution by firing squad; and holding a gun to the head or in the mouth and pulling the trigger.

33. Forcing the detainee to watch others being tortured, or to hear their screams.

34. Raping or torturing the detainee's relatives in his or her presence; threatening the detainee with such acts.

35. Threatening the detainee with torture methods such as the electric chair [al-Kursi al-Rajjai], or with death by immersion in an acid bath.


37. Deprivation of sleep, food, water, fresh air and toilet facilities.

38. Degrading the detainee by using obscene language or insults.

39. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KERRY). The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. SASSER] is recognized.

A SOMBER MOMENT FOR THE SENATE

Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, the issue that we are discussing and debating this evening is the most important issue to come before the Senate in the 15 years that I have served here. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the issue we are addressing this evening is one of war or peace for this country and, more profoundly, the life or death for perhaps thousands of our countrymen in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. So this is, indeed, a somber moment for the Senate and a somber moment for the American people.

My mind goes back to a time 6 or 7 years ago and the location was a rural county in my native State of Tennessee. It was a gray, wintry afternoon, and I was attending the funeral of a young marine sergeant who had been killed in Beirut, Lebanon. The little chapel was filled to overflowing. Following the services, I followed the funeral procession out to a small family cemetery set in the trees on the edge of a cornfield on what I took to be the family farm. Back in Tennessee and other areas of the South, we call such farms "the home place.

The small soldiers were said and the honor guard of Marines had departed, I lingered at the edge of the little plot among the trees, and looked back. And there were four figures left standing, and the oldest one was about 8 years old, I would say. They were looking across that open grave, and out into the distance. And I shall never forget that scene because when all of the bands quit playing, and all of the speeches were made, that was the face of war brought home. That was the face of terrorism haunting the rural county in middle Tennessee some years ago.

I suspect that some would be moved by this story, and I was moved that afternoon. But they might also say that we have to be clear and hard-headed, and not softhearted when it comes to the vital interests of our country.

I was interested to hear the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee this morning. Senator Nunn addressed the issue most eloquently of what constitutes the vital interests of the United States. And the speech of the distinguished Senator from Georgia was well reasoned, it was knowledgeable, and it was typically convincing. He wisely delineated the differences between a vital interest and what is an important concern. And while listening to him, that surely in hindsight what happened in Beirut, Lebanon, a few years ago was not something that affected the vital interests of the United States. I reflected back on all of the other military conflicts of recent years, perhaps the most significant is Vietnam. We were told that was in our vital interests as a nation, that if South Vietnam fell, all of Southeast Asia would be sub-

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jected to communism; that the neighboring countries would fall one by one pursuant to the domino theory.

But now, 25 years later, and after tens of thousands of young Americans have perished, and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese, would anybody dare to come on the floor of this Chamber and argue that South Vietnam and its sovereignty and independence was absolutely necessary to our vital interests as a nation? Indeed, that it was worth the cost? I think not.

But there is a different situation because we need the oil in the Middle East to fuel our industry and to fuel our economy. I would simply reply that there is plenty of oil without that of Kuwait and without that of Iraq.

Our friends in Saudi Arabia and the other gulf emirates are making up the difference. And in so doing, they are increasing their profits dramatically as a result. In the first two months, our friends in the Saudis, alone have increased their profits to the tune of $15 billion over what they were before the invasion of Kuwait, a total of $15 billion in additional profits since August alone.

So what is the hurry? Why the rush to war? That is what it is all about. The administration to its credit was worth the cost? I think not. What about our friends the Japanese, with their powerful $3 trillion economy that allows them now to be the bankers of the world? This powerful economy depends on Middle Eastern oil for 66 percent of their oil imports. What have they done? They sent a small group of physicians to the Persian Gulf earlier, but now this team has gone back home. Our friends the Japanese and all their allies are running out of foreign exchange.

How about our friends the Japanese, who are interested in liquidating. We do not want to weaken our foe to the fullest extent? Why this rush to “get it over with,” as some are saying?

Actually, that this attitude is certainly not shared by the field commander, General Schwarzkopf. He has so stated publicly that time is on our side.

Well, some would admonish us that we have to carry out the U.N. resolution to use force after January 15. If we do not, we will lose the opportunity. If it is not done, we are told that it will show a lack of resolve on the part of the United States, and the coalition will simply fall apart. Well, one might ask if perhaps they could even sell some of their overseas assets so they might contribute more. Well, not so, says the governor of the Central Bank of Kuwait from abroad. He says, “We are not interested in liquidating. We do
not think we need extra funds for the period."
So, clearly, there is not much that is equitable about this arrangement. Our share of the cost and burden simply do not match, I submit, our share of the international risk.

I say that, fundamentally, we are in the process of embarking on a course of preserving, at great cost to the United States, a stable world order for others to take advantage of. We may be unwittingly accelerating the decline of our own country vis-a-vis those other nations that are competitors and trading adversaries around the world. And while we are fighting off the threats to the new world order, at a cost of untold billions of dollars and perhaps thousands of American lives, the rest of the industrial world will be marshaling their resources to pursue new markets and to strengthen their economies.

The irony here is almost overwhelming in that it is a trade we make the world safe for other countries to thrive and prosper in. Sometimes I wonder if some of our allies have seen further into the future consequence of the war than we have been able to see ourselves, because we are too wrapped up in the confrontation. Perhaps they see the consequences clearer than we do, in human terms, in economic terms, in geopolitical terms.

At the very least, we owe it to ourselves, and we owe it to our constituents, to take a careful and unflinching look at what war might bring us. By all estimates, the cost in American lives of war with Iraq will not be trivial.

I have seen few reliable analyses that estimate American casualties at less than 5,000, and that is for a so-called quick victory scenario. For an engagement that extends to several weeks and perhaps months, the Center for Defense Information projects American casualties as high as 45,000. Sourced at the Department of Defense have been quoted by the Washington Post and the New York Times as forecasting casualties in the 10,000 to 30,000 range.

Of course, the cost of deploying troops and material of this magnitude 9,000 miles from home will resonate through this economy for many years to come.

Certainly, no one doubts that budgetary issues, fiscal issues are much less important than the lives of our young men and women. But I do believe that we have an obligation in this Congress to also examine the economic consequences of our policy.

In just a few weeks, the Pentagon will be here asking for a supplemental appropriation of $20 billion for Operation Desert Shield. That is a sum that will wipe out half of the deficit reduction that we achieved at such great cost and with such great anguish in the difficult budget agreement last fall.

Half of it is gone already. While that is a sobering loss indeed, a full-scale shooting war will cost us from $1 billion to $2 billion a day, and that means just 20 days of warfare will completely wipe out of the deficit reduction we have achieved this year.

By the way, while I hear all this talk about what we must do in this area, and how it is so vital to do this or do that, I have heard no one propose steps to pay for this war effort. When the President's Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers asked about the cost and how to defray it, he responded, I thought quite honestly, well, the plans were to temporarily borrow the money.

So simply put, the direct impact on Federal revenues and outlays in terms of the operation itself and the long-term economic consequences could be staggering. Add that impact to the recession we are already experiencing, add that to the weakness of our financial system, and I am not sure we have any way of predicting what a shooting war could mean for this Nation's economic future.

Finally, Mr. President, before we proceed militarily in this very tense and unpredictable region, I think we ought to consider the geopolitical implications of what we are about to do. When it comes to war in perhaps the most volatile region of the world, winning a military victory is only the beginning. What do you do after you win that victory?

If we reduce Iraq to rubble, we may very well set loose forces in that region that no subsequent diplomacy will have a hope of controlling, forces that could create a complex web of commitments and responsibilities that we cannot yet imagine or even calculate.

About the only certainty is that we are not going to be hailed as heroes or liberators in many corners of the Arab world. And moreover, we may very well create a power vacuum that a fundamentalist Iran or a terrorist Syria will be only too happy to fill. The precarious balance, or should I say imbalance, that prevails between Israel and the Arab States will almost certainly be upset.

Well, the President has spent much time putting in place a force structure sufficient to defend Saudi Arabia, and I applaud his efforts in that regard, in defending Saudi Arabia. Much time has been spent calculating how to arrest the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. But have we really considered the aftermath of war? Have we really stopped to consider the shape and the velocity of the myriad forces that we could very well be unleashing? A chorus of experts say we have not.

Again, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger told the Senate Armed Services Committee in late November:

I believe that the direct cost of combat, including that of a probable scorched-Earth policy in Kuwait, will be the lesser part of the total cost. The Middle East would never be the same. It is a fragile, inflammable, and unpredictable region. The noncombat costs of a recourse to war are likely to be substantial.

James Webb, former Secretary of the Navy, posed this question to that same committee: "Are we prepared for the inevitability of yet another Arab-Israeli war, and the immediate shifting of alliances that would accompany it, with our troops at risk?"

Mr. President, President Bush has said repeatedly that he wants a "stable and secure Gulf." We all want that. The terrible irony is that all of our efforts and all of our sacrifices at the conclusion of a military conflict may very well be profoundly destabilizing, and may bring everything to this region except security and stability.

Indeed, victory through armed conflict may instead be setting a seething and long-lasting hostility in the Middle East toward the United States and toward our interests in the region.

There are many consequences of war, and there are many costs to war. There are grave human costs, extensive economic and fiscal consequences, and as yet unknown geopolitical factors.

But the fact is for the American people all of these prospectives are best served by a peaceful, diplomatic solution; a solution that could perhaps be driven by the work of these economic sanctions. If we do not give them time, how will we ever know if they could work?

Mr. President, in the past 5 months my office has been inundated with letters from the families and friends of our young soldiers in the gulf. I know I am not alone among my colleagues in this.

Recently, I received a letter from a woman in Lenoir City, TN, who said she had three brothers who served in World War Two, a son who served in Vietnam, and now she has her grandson in Saudi Arabia. This woman has seen three generations of her family serve this country honorably. She is well acquainted with the wrenching emotions, and the deep sorrow that war brings to families.

And yet, she made a point of saying to me that "this is my first protest letter." She is not a complainer—there is a record of service in her family that we all should admire. And yet, her Nation's response to the crisis at hand has moved her to write her "first protest letter."

She went on to say to me:

"I love my country, but I love my grandson more, please, do all you can possibly do to get him and all the others home and out of danger."

And she enclosed a letter written to her from her grandson in the Saudi Desert. It's a letter full of courage, pride, and honesty.
He writes:  
Most of the time everyone tries not to think too much about what is going on and trust our leadership. We just do our job and talk about going home.  
I pray that this courageous young man will live and that his leadership is well placed. I hope that we have the wisdom not to let him down.  
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?  
Mr. SASSER. I am pleased to yield to the Senator from Maryland.  
Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I commend the very able Senator from Tennessee for a very powerfully reasoned and cogently argued statement. It was a very strong and powerful eloquent address. I simply thank the Senator for his contribution to this debate.  
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his very kind remarks and comments.  
Mr. FORD addressed the Chair.  
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky, the distinguished majority whip.  
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, on behalf of the leadership, I ask unanimous consent that the placing on the list of speakers occupied by Senators COHEN, MACK, and SIMPSON be replaced by Senators MACK, SIMPSON, and SMITH, respectively.  
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.  
Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I might observe that the distinguished Senator from Illinois [Mr. DIXON] has been eliminated from the list for this evening.  
The PRESIDING OFFICER. I thank the distinguished majority whip, and according to the unanimous-consent request, the Senator from Florida [Mr. MACK] is recognized.  
THE PERSIAN GULF CRISIS  
Mr. MACK. Mr. President, hundreds of thousands of young American men's lives are placed on the line in Saudi Arabia today. The thought that thousands of lives could be lost, thousands of lives could be lost in action, is staggering to the emotions. I know that all of the Members of the Senate on both sides of this issue must feel that emotional pressure.  
During the day, I had the opportunity to take several calls from constituents around the State of Florida. One father telling me of a conversation that his son had with some of his fellow students at school; one indicating that if the draft, for example, were ever reintroduced, that he would take his own life as opposed to running to Canada. He would take his own life, he said, to make a statement. I do not happen to believe that anybody is seriously considering reinstating the draft. But it is a sign of the kinds of emotional turmoil this debate is causing.  
I had another call from an individual who referred to himself as a hawk, who said that in his heart he wanted to avoid conflict but that he knew that it was necessary if after the 15th of January there were still Iraqi troops in Kuwait, that 6 months would have to be used. Another individual had said to me: You tell the President and you tell the military leaders and you tell your colleagues in the Senate that if war comes about, do not tie the hands of our soldiers behind their backs. Give them the flexibility to win.  
So there are strong emotions. During the day I also had the opportunity to read a letter that was sent to me by one of my constituents. She had been asked by a group to write letters to our favorite president to be addressed to anyone in particular. The letter ended up being assigned to one of our airmen to write back. It is a rather lengthy letter. I just want to read a portion of it.  
As an airman in service to my country for the past six years, I would ask that you let your Congressmen and your Senators know of your support for us here in the desert. In response to the letter, I must say that I have been very touched by the letters we have received from the people. So, if Congress tries to vote, then vote yes with the President. There is nothing worse for us than the attitude that we will fight to lose, or just to a draw, i.e., Korea, Vietnam. If we fight, it must be to win and to win totally; i.e., World War I, World War II.  
The people must understand that there are no civilians in a war. You are either front line soldiers, sailors, Marines, or airmen of the rear support personnel, the doctors, the lawyers, the bankers, the cooks, the mechanics and so forth. I am going to try to answer at least one of the 'Any Soldier!' letters per day to show our thanks for your support. No need for you to answer this letter unless you wish to. I have plenty of family and friends that I will be hearing from. I just wanted you to know that your card reached someone and that someone wants to say thank you.  
The airman is not the only one who thought that it was important that he be heard. He would take his own life if he fails to withdraw. The more we are heard, the better chance there is that he will withdraw. As one observer said earlier, it is not U.S. firepower that Saddam questions, it is U.S. willpower.  
The central thrust of the argument against giving the President authorization to use force is that we ought to let sanctions work, we ought to give them time to work, this would take a year to work. I must say that the idea of waiting for sanctions to work is an appealing one to those who would do anything, in many cases almost do everything, to avoid conflict, because it allows them to rationalize that they have a plan to solve the problem. But the reality is that waiting a year for sanctions to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait just will not work. There is absolutely no evidence that sanctions would work. Those who take that position do so based strictly on hope. I am going to take just a couple of moments to read several statements from a letter from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Director Webster, because there has been a lot said during the debate today about sanctions. For example, we heard just a few minutes ago that Iraq's economy is devastated; 50 percent in less than 6 months. I would not disagree with that statement about a 50-percent reduction in that 6 months. But the key question is whether they are having an economic impact. The key question is will those sanctions in fact Saddam Hussein to withdraw his troops from Kuwait? And the answer that we get over and over and again from the Central Intelligence Agency is: No, it will not. It will not do it now. It will not do it 6 months from now. It will not do it 1 year from now.  
In his letter to LES ASPIN, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the House, several comments. First: I observed that the sanctions were effective technically and that they were being felt internationally. It would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that the sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior, and that there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.  
Another comment: but disruptions in most sectors of the economy are not serious yet.  
Further on:  
The ability of Iraqi ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be substantially eroded over the next 6 to 12 months, even if effective sanctions can be maintained. This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period.  
I want to restate that last point: "This is especially true if Iraq does not believe a coalition attack is likely during this period."  
What he is saying there is that Saddam Hussein could easily and clearly and correctly conclude, if the Congress denies the President the authority to use force, and he will conclude that the United States is prepared at least a
year to wait for sanctions to work. Therefore, he will not have to respond. He will not have to keep his troops at high alert. And the suggested impact of the sanctions would in fact be lessened.

The letter goes on to say:

On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.

The ability of the Iraq ground forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is Iraq's Air Force and air defenses. So the area where it will have its greatest impact is Iraq's Air Force and air defenses. So again the letter refers to that:

Iraq's Air Force and air defenses are likely to be hit far more severely than its Army, if effective sanctions are maintained for another 6 to 12 months. It would have only a marginal impact on Saddam's ability to hold Kuwait and southern Iraq. The Iraq Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait.

So the area where it will have its greatest impact, that is with the Air Force and air defenses, is an area in which we think we can be the weakest, and we believe that we can overcome those forces in a very short period of time. I do not think that many dispute that point.

Again, further on in the letter:

Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to substantially erode over the next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions can be enforced. So the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat by sanctions, but the number of important Iraqi armored and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training activities.

Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies, however, which will ameliorate the impact of these problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Director's letter be printed in the RECORD at this time.

There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Hon. Les Aspin,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

Mr. Chairman: This is in response to your letter of January 9, 1991, in which you ask for an updated assessment of the impact of sanctions in Iraq and on the policies of Saddam Hussein subsequent to my testimony before your committee in December.

In that testimony, as you accurately noted, I observed that the sanctions were effective technically and that they were being felt economically and eventually would be felt militarily in some areas. I also testified that there was no evidence that sanctions would mandate a change in Saddam Hussein's behavior and that, to date, there was no evidence when or even if they would force him out of Kuwait.

You now ask me to: (1) address the impact of the sanctions on the economy and populace of Iraq on the operational effectiveness of its military if left in place for another six to 12 months; (2) address the question of how Iraq's defensive abilities might be affected by the sanctions on the one hand and by having additional time to prepare on the other if sanctions continued for another six to 12 months; and (3) address the likelihood that sanctions, again if left in place for another six to 12 months, could induce Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

UN sanctions have shut off nearly all Iraq's trade and financial activity and weakened its economy, but disruptions in most sectors are not serious yet. The impact of sanctions has varied by sector. The most serious impact has been in the petroleum sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve foreign exchange and maintain crude oil exports. For the economic sector, the like impact would be more profound as a result of sanctions. Iraq can easily maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of its infantry and artillery units and can produce virtually all of the ammunition for these forces domestically.

Moreover, these will have additional opportunities to improve and reinforce fortifications along the Saudi border, thereby increasing their defensive strength. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces will be degraded somewhat by sanctions, but the number of important Iraqi armored and other vehicles will grow gradually and the readiness of their crews will decline as Baghdad is forced to curb its training activities.

Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies, however, which will ameliorate the impact of these problems. On balance, the marginal decline of combat power in Baghdad's armored units probably would be offset by the simultaneous improvement of its defensive fortifications.

In December, during my appearance before the House Armed Services Committee, I noted that while we can look ahead several months and predict the gradual deterioration of the Iraqi economy, it is more difficult to assess how or when these conditions will cause Saddam to modify his behavior. Our judgment remains that, even if sanctions continued for another 6 to 12 months, economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait. If economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait, then economic hardship alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait.

In other words, we could go ahead and try this 6- to 12-month extension of time without really having to worry there is not any risk. All we are trying to do now is wait and see if it would work, no risk attached. I disagree with that, and I would like to raise several points to make my case.

The first consequence is that there will be other international decisions, or other decisions on international foreign policy that this Nation will have to make, and our decisions will be affected by our attempts to keep the coalition together. I would use several examples to indicate that that already has occurred.

The United States has not risk attached. I disagree with that.

Second point: The United States has not risk related to it.

A second point: The United States would go ahead and try this 6- to 12-month extension of time without really having to worry there is not any risk. All we are trying to do now is wait and see if it would work, no risk attached. I disagree with that, and I would like to raise several points to make my case.

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the Soviets during this period of time have been somewhat tempered because of our attempt to keep the coalition together.

So the first point to indicate that waiting for sanctions to take place does have risk is that we are going to be forced to make during this next year major decisions with respect to foreign policy that we might make differently because of our attempt to keep that coalition together. There is risk in waiting.

Second, America will be seen as a paper tiger. Some might hear that comment and say, "So what? Who cares whether America is looked at as a paper tiger?"

I suggest it would be much more difficult for us in the years ahead to try to put together any plan, to try to encourage any allies to participate with the United States if we fail today to carry forward on the plan that the President has proposed, that the international community has suggested and the U.N. resolution supported.

Or to say it another way, let me just read again from another article. This is an op-ed piece by former President Richard Nixon.

Mr. Nixon is in getting Mr. Hussein out of Kuwait in accordance with the U.N. resolution and eliminating his capacity to wage war in the future, we will have the credibility to deter aggression elsewhere without sending American forces. The world will take seriously U.S. warnings against aggression.

The third point I would make where there is risk is potential aggressors around the world would conclude it was safe to use aggression to reach their foreign policy objectives because the message that the United States and the coalition is not prepared to use the force would encourage them, other leaders, who may feel they can get away with aggressive action, to use those tactics to meet their foreign policy objectives.

A fourth point: Israel will find itself facing an international conference on the Middle East tying directly the Palestinian issue with that of Iraq and Kuwait, a position we say we will not accept. I suggest if that were to occur as a result of the unraveling of the coalition, as we wait for sanctions to work, that will create a difficult problem in the Middle East. It will be bad for Israel; it will be bad for the Middle East; it will be bad for the United States.

Think about the leaders who have taken key roles in the establishment of the coalition, who have worked with the United States and the United Nations in the adoption of these resolutions. If we now tell them that we are not going to support their efforts, not only will it be a long time before we can convince other leaders to work with us, but I suggest at the same time we may see those leaders facing a great deal of instability in their own countries.

Most everyone believes that if you do not deal with Saddam now, you are going to have to deal with him later. I do not think that is a valid argument. We are all concerned today about biological and chemical weapons. Many fear that before too long, we will have to deal with the issue from a nuclear perspective as well.

So waiting for sanctions to work clearly has risks associated with it.

Mr. President, I will conclude and reiterate that no one wants war. The thought of thousands of Americans being killed in the desert is staggering. Our hearts tell us to avoid war, but our minds and history tell us that appeasement, concession, and weakness bring on war. The central point is that to make the world safe for true peace, we must stand up to aggression today. To tell those who would contemplate aggression that they would fail, we must stand up against aggression today.

Mr. President, before I vote to vote against the Mitchell-Nunn resolution and to support the President, I thank the Chair.

Mr. CONRAD addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER, The Senator from North Dakota.

WAR MUST BE A LAST RESORT

Mr. CONRAD. Mr. President, the question we face in this body is the most somber of all. The question before us is, how do we conduct the President of the United States to take the Nation to war? Before I vote to send American men and women into battle, I must be firm in the conviction that we have exhausted all other possibilities, pursued all other avenues and have no other options. War must be a last resort.

There is clearly broad support in the country for the President's position that Saddam Hussein must leave Kuwait. Mr. President, the question is how best to accomplish that goal. The decision we make has profound implications for the future of our country.

Each of us has a constitutional responsibility as a Senator, to be the great auctioneer. We are charged to analyze the options open to us. Do we authorize the use of force now or do we give the economic sanctions and the international blockade more time to work? If we go to war, make no mistake, it will be an American war. It is estimated that U.S. troops would suffer 90 percent of the casualties.

I noted with interest the article in the Philadelphia Inquirer about the body bags that have been ordered for Desert Shield: 16,099. When one considers the number of casualties we might hear that "So what? Who cares whether America is looked at as a paper tiger?"

Indeed, Zbigniew Brzezinski painted a grim picture of the postwar possibilities for the testifying, the United States might not be able to extricate itself from the Middle East caldron—especially if in the meantime, the Arab masses have become radicalized, and hostile to the Arab regimes that endorse the U.S. military action.

How will that affect the U.S. global position? I would think it likely that the United States embroiled in the Middle East mess for years to come, Europe and Japan, both free to promote their own agendas, will pursue the enhancement of their economic power.

In the region itself, it is probable that fundamentalist Iran will become the dominant regional power. The successor of Saddam Hussein, who may feel they can get away with aggressive action, to use those tactics to meet their foreign policy objectives.

What happens when the war is over? Have we enhanced the peace and stability of the region? Have we furthered our own political and economic interests? What nation becomes the dominant power in the Middle East?

Will it be Iran, the country that considers the United States to be the great Satan? Will it be Syria? Assad, the leader of Syria, our ally of convenience today, is the tyrant responsible for murdering our marines in Lebanon, the man who ordered the brutal killing of thousands of his own people in the small town of Hamma.

Mr. President, I will conclude and reiterate that no one wants war. The thought of thousands of Americans being killed in the desert is staggering. Our hearts tell us to avoid war, but our minds and history tell us that appeasement, concession, and weakness bring on war. The central point is that to make the world safe for true peace, we must stand up to aggression today. To tell those who would contemplate aggression that they would fail, we must stand up against aggression today. Indeed, Zbigniew Brzezinski painted a grim picture of the postwar possibilities for the testifying, the United States might not be able to extricate itself from the Middle East caldron—especially if in the meantime, the Arab masses have become radicalized, and hostile to the Arab regimes that endorse the U.S. military action.

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So at the cost of a terrible loss of life and untold billions in military expedi­

The nations of the Middle East even more unstable and a weakened global power.
position for the United States? Will we be called upon to serve as the world’s policeman in a hostile and unstable region?

Let us not forget that 45 years after World War II, the United States maintained a large presence in Europe and 50,000 Americans remain stationed there to keep the peace.

Do we want the same thing to happen in the Middle East? Will we have to maintain a large occupying force in the Persian Gulf? In the new world order, with the United States becoming an unpaid mercenary force expected to keep the peace while other nations consolidate their economic strength, a dangerous path has already been set.

The Japanese and the Europeans are far more dependent on Middle East oil than we. Yet American troops stand at the front lines. Our allies cheer us on as we go off to war.

Not only do they risk American lives but we pick up the tab. We pay billions for the military deployment while our allies have failed to deliver even the minimal financial support they promised. What is worse, we continue to pay the full cost of military deployment while our allies have failed to deliver even the minimal financial support they promised.

I do not believe that war is our only remaining option. I do not believe the American people see it as the only course of action. If there is one thing we have learned in this century, it is that we do not succeed when the country is divided. The cohesion and solidarity of purpose that led our Nation to victory in World War I and World War II was not present in our less successful effort in Vietnam. And this issue has already divided our people.

I understand there are misgivings. Some say this is simply a fight over oil. And indeed 67 percent of the world’s known reserves are in the Persian Gulf. We must ask if those oil fields were fig fields would we have sent six carrier battle groups, 1,200 warplanes, and 400,000 troops?

At the same time our people question this commitment, they also understand that we must take some action. They understand that Hussein’s aggression cannot go unpunished and unchecked. But they are weary of war.

We tell them today that there is no other option than war, that we have exhausted all alternatives to a peaceful solution. I do not think so. In the past 2 months I have had literally dozens of meetings on this crisis all across my State.

The message I have received in every town and city has been simple and clear. Consider war a policy of last resort. Be patient and give sanctions a chance.

I am concerned that the speed and size of our military buildup is pushing us toward war. We are setting artificial deadlines, artificially increasing the tensions in the gulf, and creating an artificial momentum for war.

General Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a native of my home State of North Dakota, issued a well-founded warning in November. He said “My main concern with this latest scheduled reinforce­ment is not that we might choose to fight, but rather that the deployment might cause us to fight prematurely and perhaps unnecessarily.”

General Jones is right. We must not think that simply because the troops are ready to fight that we must fight. We must resist the momentum and retain our ability to choose the right time to fight if we must fight at all.

There are still good alternatives. There is still time. I support the continuing use of the economic sanctions that the President has announced after the invasion of Kuwait. We must continue to provide a defensive shield to protect Saudi Arabia, and we must continue a strong military threat and, most importantly, we must give the international sanctions a real chance to work.

Iraq provides a textbook case of a country where sanctions should work. It is landlocked. It is surrounded by hostile neighbors. And it is dependent on a single export, oil, and is heavily dependent on the imports of spare parts and military equipment to keep its war machine going.

We already have solid proof that sanctions are beginning to bite. The Iraqi economy has already been cut in half. This afternoon we were told that in 6 months the Iraqi economy would be reduced by 65 to 70 percent. That is stunning in light of the pain that is being caused by a 3-percent downturn in this country.

Indeed, the experts tell us this is the most successful peacetime blockade ever imposed. Former CIA Director Webster testified in early December that in the few months the embargo has been in place all sectors of the Iraqi economy have felt the pinch of sanctions and many industries have largely shut down.

More than 90 percent of imports and 90 percent of exports have been shut off. The cutoff of Iraq’s oil exports and the success of sanctions have also choked off Iraq’s financial resources. Recent reports indicate that the export situation has worsened for Iraq with over 95 percent of exports stopped.

What will the coming months bring? Again, according to Director Webster’s testimony, Iraq will have depleted all of its foreign currency reserves by spring. * * * Iraq’s eco­

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in our position. We are a great Nation, with great power. We know we can win this war, if it must be fought. But there are alternatives to war still open to us. We should pursue them.

Now is the time for patience, persistence, and a recognition of the steady strength of real leadership.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent for certain attachments to be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the materials to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[FROM THE BISMARCK TRIBUNE, JAN. 11, 1991]

U.S. BETTER OFF WITH BLOCKADE THAN WITH WAR

Sen. Kent Conrad and Rep. Byron Dorgan have both taken the hard line against Saddam Hussein and his invasion of Kuwait.

The two North Dakota Democrats say Saddam must pull back to Iraq and stay put.

That is not to say either man endorses the use of force. The past week has made clear that Saddam's only interest is oil. But we cannot allow Saddam to use his conquest as a pretext for further aggression.

On the contrary, both Conrad and Dorgan say the U.S. and our allies should continue the efforts to enforce the embargo on Iraq. They say— and we agree—that the U.S. has Saddam by the throat. Keep up the economic pressure of the blockade and sanctions, and there is every reason to believe he'll collapse.

It will take time and require patience, a quality we Americans are notoriously lacking. But it is infinitely preferable to any other alternative to war.

Most analysts seem to think a war with Iraq will be relatively short. No war in history has ever been expected to be long. "Home by Christmas" has been the expectation of American GIs from Lincoln's 90-day volunteers to the Green Berets who first went to the aid of South Vietnam.

And when we win, what then? Everyone can go home, except us. We'll have to stay behind to maintain this manufactured peace, accepting many years of Arab resentment, and whatever that may mean in the continuation of the refugee problem. Have we forgotten our Marines in Beirut?

No thanks. Let's keep up the struggle, and if Saddam ceases, his or his people follow, and we go home, except us. We'll have peace.

[From the Grand Forks Herald, Dec. 30, 1990]

BUSH HAS TO KNOW THAT COMPROMISE IS BETTER THAN A WAR

George Bush cannot be serious when he says that there can be no compromises with Saddam Hussein. Such a position leaves no room for negotiation and little hope of a peaceful solution to the standoff in the Persian Gulf. It also means war, and that means casualties, probably numbering tens of thousands of American dead.

The sand that Saddam wants, and the oil under it, are not worth the sacrifice.

And there should be no mistake: The oil is what the war is about.

The sovereignty of Kuwait is a secondary issue. The Iraqi threat to Kuwait, at least in the short run, can restore Kuwait independence.

Freedom, at least as Americans understand it, is not an issue in the Gulf. Americans serving there are there not to observe their religious holidays nor enjoy their favorite beverages.

Saddam has been as stubborn as President Bush, of course. The world is waiting for a signal of flexibility from him. As the U.N. imposed deadline approaches, the danger of war increases, and so does the necessity of a reasonable, negotiated solution.

This is a time that calls for a calm assessment of options.

A negotiated settlement, including some territorial concessions, is a preferable alternative to war.

The areas that Saddam most covets are uninhabited. If there were no oil in the desert, there would be no people, either. The type of oil that Saddam is after is in the hands of Saddam. Saddam did not make up the dispute as a pretext for his invasion.

Other territories that could be included in a compromise are two uninhabited islands. They are worthless to Kuwait, but they would allow Iraq access to the sea. An Iraqi port could help stabilize the situation in the Middle East by giving Iraq an opportunity to compete with other Gulf oil producers.

The need to preserve a balance of power in the Middle East is a compelling reason to avoid war. Without Iraq, the path from Tehran to Jerusalem is open—unless President Bush is prepared to leave an army of occupation in the Persian Gulf.

I listened to Bush's repeated commitment that the United States should not undertake. In that direction lies another option of who controls the oil is an old one. Saddam Hussein has been given an opportunity to come home, except us. We'll have to stay.

The list of those who still supports Saddam is long. Because he could turn against the United Nations, the United States, the United Kingdom, but probably most of the nations of the world. And then we had Grenada, a success...
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that I have supported with my own personal funds for some years because of what I think they do, and do so well.

Take a look at that, and then see how profoundly they regard human life, something that I really do care about in these United States. Apparently, they really do not care about it, no matter how much they talk about their babies and the people who will starve, and the things that will happen with the embargo. In some respects, the embargo is working. However, it will not work to drive Iraq out of Kuwait. It will bring, economically, the country to its knees, but it will not take the army out of Kuwait. And that is a critical fact of this situation.

I happen to have met with Saddam Hussein in April of last year, along with four other of my colleagues, and I spent about 3½ hours with him. I spent a lot of time with Aziz and Assad, their Ambassador Al-Mashat. Ours was perhaps a naive mission. We thought that peace was breaking out all over the rest of the world and we ought to encourage it to come here.

So we talked with Assad and Mubarak, King Hussein, and the representatives of the Government of Israel, which was in some turmoil then. We all came away with a very clear view that Saddam Hussein is one tough, unblinking-eyed cookie. He sat there in his beautifully tailored suit and his silk foulard and beautiful leather shoes, and never really said very much. I and others said to him "If you really are not doing all these things, why do you not let the Western media in here to look around?"

Then I said some things about the Western media, which I would not retract one whit of, which put me in bad with the Western media. I said, "They are arrogant and cynical, and all of them think of themselves as 'wizards' in this area of the world, but you have to let them in and let them look around."

He did not think that was necessary. We were in Mosul. I said, "Let them look around this Kurdish area where you have been doing things that were reported to the world." Of course, he would not have any of that.

After spending time with Hussein and the Iraqi Ambassador, when we returned, we felt like we had been lied to through the teeth. We were lied to not only as to what they were going to do regarding the world, but even as to the specific we asked Hussein about.

So, I urged him to let the media in, but you will not see any media there. You will not see the real story for anyone to know what is going on in Kuwait except what comes out of the documented testimony of those who have been available to Amnesty International. No one will know all the horrors that have gone on in that country, except we do know of some which have been documented like the looting, and the murder, and the rape, and the torture. Those are not my imagination. They are real clearly documented by others. It was not my comment, but I remember it was several years ago in this thing called the Gulf War, and was a rather startling thing. He said there are some things in the world that are worse than war, which is really quite a disturbing statement. He then went on to say, that things worse than war are all things that are called slavery, torture, bondage, loss of freedom. You might want to take a look at that Amnesty International report because that is what happened to the people of Kuwait who did not agree with this particular man. We have the shop, and if you run him, you are gone. It is a very effective way to govern. You challenge and you disappear. So there are not going to be many voices of dissent. Do not look for a new regime there. Those are some of the things that we all think about this.

And then I thought of another one. I always enjoyed the alliteration of it. "Those who cry 'appease, appease' are jailed by those they seek to please." And that has happened all thorough the world and it is in the past.

So here we are. A tough, tough decision. I am a legislator. I have no desire to seek any higher post. I love to legislate. I love to try to resolve tough legislative problems—the kind of which, I say are filled with emotion, fear, guilt, and racism. I love to try to bring some reason to them. This is the toughest decision I have ever been involved in in 25 years of legislating. But this is it. The ball is in the court.

So we hear the old refrain of "maybe the lion and the lamb will lay down together," it reminded me of a story about the zookeeper in another country. He called the National Zoo in Washington and said, "We have the most extraordinary thing to show you. We have a lion and a lamb that are in a cage together and they live together in there, and it is the most extraordinary thing." The guy at the National Zoo said, "I am flying over to see it immediately." He went over there, and the lion and the lamb certainly were in the cage together. He said, "I cannot believe this. How does this happen? Can you explain it to me?" He said, "Yes, we just replace the lamb every hour."

And we will be doing that in the world every year if we leave Saddam Hussein in the saddle.

He is watching right now, but I just say to him, as I should have said had we known all the great panoply of human events that were to take place: "The world is aligned against you. It is a rather odd alliance, but it is there. Saddam Hussein knows that the world is aligned against him. This choice is all his to make, nobody else, period."

Mr. President, it is a matter of crucial importance to this Nation and to the world that the resolution of the majority leader and Senator Nunn and others be defeated—that it not be received by the world or by Saddam Hussein that it represents the will of Congress.

Although the supporters of the resolution offered by the majority leader have said that they support the goals of our involvement in the Persian Gulf, that is, that they agree that Saddam Hussein must withdraw completely from Kuwait, the clear fact is that passage of the Mitchell/Nunn resolution would have precisely the opposite effect.

The Mitchell resolution says that it does not rule out the authorization for use of force if sanctions do not bring about the result of getting Iraq out of Kuwait.

The effect of that language, however, is to encourage Saddam Hussein to stay right where he is, because he will believe that the United States does not have the political will or the moral courage to resort to the use of force.

We, as the Congress of the United States of America, are speaking clearly on this point, and Saddam Hussein must hear that we support our President and that force may be used against him if he does not comply with the will of the world.

Let us be clear at the outset that we are not talking about going to war when we speak of authorizing the President to use U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 668.

As my colleague the senior Senator from Wyoming has so carefully observed one has only to look at the case of Israel and the Arab countries to see that a declaration of a state of war does not necessarily mean open conflict. Most of Israel's neighbors are in a state of war against Israel, and yet there is no fighting.

We are talking about making sure that Saddam Hussein knows that the President has the backing of the Congress and that Americans are united with the civilized world community in our
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resolve that his blatant and blood-thirsty aggression against his neighbor will not be tolerated.

What dangers do we face if we do not support the President and send a strong message to Saddam Hussein? Saddam Hussein will draw encouragement and succor from that fact, and he will be able to take his troops off the high ground that they have maintained.

The international coalition arrayed against Saddam, now standing shoulder-to-shoulder with the United States, will begin to crumble.

It is human nature to side with the victor, the hero, the strong man. It is safer that way. And read the Amnesty International report to see what happens to those who disagree with Saddam. And if Saddam Hussein is perceived that way by the people of the region, it will become more politically difficult for our allies in the region to maintain the opposition to Saddam.

We must realize what we do here will in every way affect Saddam Hussein.

If he sees that we will not authorize the use of force to get him out of Kuwait, he will certainly remain.

Sanctions alone will not affect that decisionmaking. They will not affect military preparedness for many, many months, if ever.

They will hurt the Iraqi people—there is no doubt about that. And they are an important element of our approach. But they are not sufficient to affect how Saddam Hussein makes his decisions.

If, however, Saddam Hussein sees that we are serious, that the American Congress stands with the American President in saying that Saddam Hussein will be removed from Kuwait by force of arms if necessary, then we may still avoid war.

It is ironic, but I feel deeply and sincerely that only by authorizing the use of force can we avoid it.

Supporters of the Mitchell-Nunn resolution say they support our goals, but our policy has three essential parts: diplomatic/political initiatives, economic sanctions, and the credible threat of force. The Mitchell-Nunn resolution removes the third prong of that policy, and renders it thereby ineffective.

President Bush has done one superb job of handling the crisis precipitated when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2.

He has worked diligently with and in consultation with other world leaders and used the venue of the United Nations to consolidate international response.

He has approached the unquestionable goal of securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait by undertaking a three-pronged approach which involves the use of economic sanctions to isolate Iraq and weaken it; diplomatic initiatives to solidify world opinion and undertake to convince Saddam Hussein of the resolve of the world community; and the credible threat of the use of force to enforce the will of the civilized nations of the world.

But this is not just a matter of supporting our President. We all support his stated goals. It is a matter of assuring that Saddam Hussein gets out of Kuwait, a matter that is going to ever happen is that he believes, deeply and sincerely, that force is a real and credible option for use against him.

The U.N. Security Council has adopted 12 resolutions since the Iraqi invasion in what must surely be an unprecedented show of united world response to brutality, aggression, and lack of respect for the rule of law.

Our forces went to Saudi Arabia to act as a deterrent and to provide defense if necessary. Those forces have been joined by a multinational force which includes troops from 28 nations. We must now be very clear that those forces may be used against Saddam Hussein.

The multinational force includes troops from Britain, Egypt, Syria, Morocco, and France. Other countries providing military support or assistance include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Gulf Cooperation Council, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Niger, Norway, Pakistan, Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, Spain, Turkey, and West Germany.

There is already broad support for containing Iraqi aggression, and reversing its takeover of Kuwait.

In short, world opinion is united in condemning Saddam Hussein's actions. I daresay it is unprecedented to have as united a response as we have seen to this naked aggression.

Now we are faced with a very sobering prospect. The United Nations has authorized the use of all necessary means to bring about the withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait if that has not occurred by January 15.

By endorsing that option—the use of force—we would be telling Saddam Hussein, in no uncertain terms, that legal and immoral invasion of Kuwait is a very real and substantial threat to him.

We would not be ensuring that that option would be used. But we want to be certain that Saddam Hussein understands that it is an option and that we will not hesitate to resort to it.

Unless Saddam Hussein understands that he faces the military might of the assembled international force and that it can be used against him, I fear that he will believe that his invasion of Kuwait will stand.

Saddam Hussein precipitated a crisis. The world community has come together to oppose him. World leaders are consulting together and working together to defuse the situation.

We cannot respond to Iraq with unilateral actions, however dearly we might wish. World opinion would assuredly then turn on us.

Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and the assurance of peace and stability in the region are crucial.

Economic sanctions are but one aspect of the international community's response, which also includes diplomatic isolation of the aggressor and the credible threat of use of force.

Healthy debate about our goals and how to achieve them must take place, but it must not undermine or be perceived to undermine the international coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression.

We must be clear that debate about how to achieve our ends must not appease Saddam Hussein's aggression, and it must not lead him to believe that the international coalition will hesitate to use force if he fails to comply with the U.N. resolutions.

Conflict is not inevitable at this point. But the credible threat of the use of force must be a part of our strategy. If it is not, and if the Mitchell-Nunn resolution passes, conflict becomes even more assured.

The President has continued to pursue diplomatic options and to seek all possible means of assuring peace. James Baker has met with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz for 6½ hours, and he saw no signs of flexibility in the Iraqi position.

The United Nations, he also does not appear that Saddam Hussein will awaken to the realities of his situation until he knows that the international coalition will move against him militarily if necessary.

And he will not know that until this Congress puts itself squarely on the record that the president is authorized to carry out U.N. Security Council Resolution 678.

The United Nations was set up and conceived to function just as it has in this crisis—to be a forum for international debate and enforcement of international law.

That body has functioned with unprecedented speed, near-unanimity, and force in condemning Iraq's actions and in authorizing concerted international action in response.

Having met with further Iraqi intransigence, we must focus our attention as a legislative body and as a nation on
endorse, supporting, and encouraging the actions of the United Nations. The United Nations has authorized the use of force if Iraq does not comply with its resolutions by January 15. It has mandated such force, nor has it made the use of force inevitable.

Support for the President and for the United Nations is not an assurance that war will occur. In fact, it is the best chance ever we have to assure that war does not occur.

Let's not tie the President's hands, give encouragement to Saddam Hussein, and undermine the functioning of the United Nations.

I trust that we, as the Congress of the United States, will be able to stand firmly by the President of the United States and the world community and say to Saddam Hussein, "You must behave as a civilized member of the international community or face the consequences." And he must know that the consequences will be grave and he will pay dearly.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Michigan.

ORDER OF PROCEDURE

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as if in morning business I ask unanimous consent that resolutions by Senators DOLE and BRADLEY be in order for introduction today.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMENDING THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. SIMPSON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to proceed to the immediate consideration of a Senate resolution submitted earlier today by Senators DOLE, PELL, and MITCHELL to commend the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 11) to commend the Secretary General of the United Nations.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Wyoming?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

PÉREZ DE CUÉLLAR: MISSION OF PEACE

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am pleased to submit this resolution, commending U.N. Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar for his 11th hour mission to Iraq.

We all want peace. And we all support every reasonable effort to achieve our goals—the goals the United Nations has endorsed on a dozen occasions—by peaceful means.

That is why President Bush has gone the extra mile, and then done it again, and again—to search out avenues to achieve our goals without war.

That is why Secretary Baker went to Geneva, where he was stiffed by Iraqi Foreign Minister Aziz.

Secretary General De Cuéllar will make one more trip. He committed earlier today by Mr. BRADLEY, for himself, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. DOLE, Mr. PELL, Mr. HELMS, Mr. D'AMATO, Mr. KROH, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. DIXON, Mr. WARNER, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. SIMON, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. DODD, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. MSTEZENBAUM, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. MACK, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. BRYAN, and Mr. SARBANES.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The resolution will be stated by title.

The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 11) calling upon President Gorbachev to refrain from further use of force against the democratically elected Government of Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Wyoming?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution.

RESOLUTION ON THE USE OF FORCE IN THE BALTICS

Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, the Senate, and indeed the entire Nation, is engaged in a debate over America's role in defending a small nation in the Persian Gulf that is fighting for independence and resisting the aggression of its brutal neighbor.

I would like to take a moment to address a similar situation that has long existed in Soviet relations with its Baltic neighbors and has now reached a critical point.

The democratic aspirations of the people of the republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are no less important than the sovereign rights of the Emirate of Kuwait.

These nations have been fighting for their freedom since Stalin's invasion more than 50 years ago. Gorbachev's moves toward democratization and decentralization seemed to offer the prospect of righting this grievous wrong. Now, by deploying troops in the Baltic republics and threatening to use them to replace a democratically elected government with rule by Presidential decree, Gorbachev has taken steps in the opposite direction. These same threats and coercive political tactics have been applied to other Soviet republics that have made progress toward democracy and market economies such as Moldavia and the Ukraine.

President Gorbachev's threat is directed not only at the republics, but at all democratic reformers in the Soviet Union. We are seeing the fulfillment of Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's warning that "dictatorship is gaining ground" in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev's message to...
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Lithuania uses language reminiscent of his Stalinist predecessors, warning the democratic governments not to "reestablish a bourgeois regime and order," and the message inflames otherwise minor grievances to create a pretext for aggression.

Faced with this ultimatum, the democratically elected Government of Lithuania has turned to us pleading for a "firm, concrete and determined response of the democratic countries" to protect their small nation's advances toward freedom. In appealing to all free nations yesterday, they warned of offensive action by "Soviet troops, KGB, and ultra-conservative pro-Moscow organizations" against Lithuania's free press as well as its government. Just this morning, I heard the first reports of actual shooting and casualties from this Soviet-instigated strife. Now that this attack has begun, we must respond to this appeal.

Particularly disturbing is the coincidence of dramatically heightened pressure on Lithuania and the escalating tension in the gulf. President Gorbachev is counting on the world's preoccupation with the crisis in the gulf to muzzle the world's outrage over his aggression. As I said yesterday regarding the use of force in the gulf, it would be a sad irony if the price of Soviet support for freeing Kuwait turns out to be American acquiescence in Soviet aggression against other small, illegal claims.

The resolution I am submitting today calls on President Gorbachev to refrain from the further use of coercive tactics in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

I urge my colleagues to give the people of Lithuania their wholehearted support.

I ask unanimous consent that President Gorbachev's ultimatum to Lithuania be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the matter is ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

TEXT OF PRESIDENT GORBACHEV'S ULTIMATUM TO LITHUANIA

The situation which has developed in the Republic, and its sharp aggravation during the past few days forces me, as the President of the USSR, to appeal directly to the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR.

It is necessary to face the truth and to see the real reasons of the current situation. They are conditioned by flagrant violations and deviations from the constitutions of the USSR and of the Lithuanian SSR, by violations of the people's civil and social rights, and by hiding behind the mask of democracy and democratic nations.

They are conditioned by flagrant violations and deviations from the constitutions of the people's civil and social rights, and by hiding behind the mask of democracy and democratic nations.

The responsibility for this lies with the Republic's Supreme Soviet, who, in ignoring constitutional laws, resolutions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies, and decrees and appeals of the President of the USSR, crushes the interests of the people.

Essentially, the situation has reached a dead-end. The need to find a way out of the situation requires taking speedy steps to transform the present authoritarian system. They appeal from social political organizations, manufacturing collectives, and citizens of all nationalities. People are demanding that constitutional order be re-established, and that their security and living conditions be properly guaranteed. They have lost faith in the protection of the present authorities. They demand that Presidential rule be established.

I propose to the Supreme Soviet to immediately restore the validity of the USSR constitution and of the constitution of the Lithuanian SSR, and to revoke the anti-constitutional acts adopted earlier.

TEXT OF LITHUANIA'S APPEAL TO THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONS

We appeal to you with an urgent request—help the Lithuanian people to defend democracy and freedom in the Republic of Lithuania. Following Soviet President Gorbachev's ultimatum of January 10, 1991, Soviet troops, KGB, and ultra-conservative pro-Moscow organizations have begun a large scale offensive against our freely elected, legitimate administration, government buildings, offices, and radio-TV. A real threat exists that Soviet troops will attack Lithuanian Parliament and other strategic objects in this country. Lithuania's wholehearted appeal made by Lithuania's authorities by gathering in large numbers around the principal squares of the Parliament.

Only a firm, concrete and determined response of the democratic countries could safeguard the independence and democracy in Lithuania, Latvia, and the other Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia.

RESOLUTION OPPOSING THE USE OF FORCE IN THE BALTIQUE STATES

Mr. MACK. Mr. President, I would like to commend the Senator from New Jersey and the Senator from Kansas, the Republican leader, for sponsoring the resolution before us, which urges the Soviet Government to refrain from the further use of force to suppress democracy in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

It is critical that the United States send a crystal clear signal to President Gorbachev: If he crushes democracy in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, he will lose his honeymoon in the Baltics. No more cozy relationship. No more aid. No more loans. No more détente. No more business as usual.

Now is the time for Congress and the administration to make absolutely clear what the consequences of crackdown will be—before it happens and to prevent it from happening. Because I believe that if President Gorbachev has to choose between his relationship with the Western and crushing democracy in the Baltics, he will choose not to use further force against those elected governments.

Let no one delude themselves into thinking that this issue will be "help Gorbachev" or avoid a takeover by "hardliners" in the Soviet Union. Our job is not to sustain President Gorbachev, even if that were possible. Our job is to stand up for freedom and democracy, whether it is threatened by Gorbachev himself or his successor.

Whoever is in charge of the Soviet Union must know that the United States will never approve of the current warm relationship with any Soviet Government that crushes the democratically elected governments in the Baltic States.

Yes, we are preoccupied with the crisis in the gulf. But we are so preoccupied that we will ignore a bloody crackdown in the Soviet Union. Our message to the Soviet Union is this: the day of the dictator is over. The time for democracy is now. The cause of freedom will prevail.

RESOLUTION CONDEMNING THE USE OF FORCE IN LITHUANIA

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the attention of the world is focused upon the situation in the Persian Gulf. There have been hours of debate in this Chamber regarding the appropriate response to Iraq's aggressive act. The United States is this: the day of the dictator is over. The time for democracy is now. The cause of freedom will prevail.

The tragic confirmation follows reports from the Associated press indicating that tear gas has also been used against these civilians and that the Soviet military has closed the Vilnius airport and seized the radio and television towers. Last night, Lithuanian press reported that four Lithuanian young men were rounded up by Soviet paratroopers for refusing to serve in the Soviet occupation army.

Just as the U.S. Government refused to ignore the destruction of Kuwait's independence, we must now not ignore the Lithuanians' attempts to snuff out Lithuanian independence.

For this reason, I am pleased that the Senate is considering and agreeing to this resolution which calls upon Gorbachev to refrain from using coercive tactics against the people of Lithuania. I am proud to be an original cosponsor of this resolution.

President Landsbergis has attempted to reach Mikhail Gorbachev and the Communist leadership in Moscow. My understanding is that no official in Moscow will even take his calls, much less respond to his appeals for negotiation and peace. Some telephone lines have been cut to prevent Lithuania from appealing for Western help.

Beginning this coming Monday, or perhaps earlier, the elite paratroopers sent by General Yagov of the Red Army, no doubt on orders from Gorbachev, are expected to hunt down more young Lithuanian boys who
Gorbachev's desire to remove the elected governments in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania from power.

On January 3, 1991 the Department of State issued a statement illustrating how dangerous the situation has become for the survival of democratic and independent nations of the Baltic region. Specifically, Deputy Press Secretary Richard Boucher deplored the seizure of Latvia's main printing plant and the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee building.

Furthermore, the world listened in dismay as Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said recently that the Soviet Union is moving toward a "dictatorship" of some kind. To support the gravity of his statement, KGB chief Vladimir Kryuchkov announced that he will "use all means at his disposal" to combat "anti-communist" forces in the Soviet Union and abroad.

These are serious deviations from the path of democratic restructuring in the Soviet Union—deviations that can only hurt our improved relationship with the Soviet Union. Therefore we urge you to warn President Gorbachev that if aggression continues in the Baltic countries United States-Soviet relations will suffer.

Finally, we hope that the actions the Soviet central authorities have taken in response to the peaceful and democratic Baltic independence move will be the beginning, not the end, of a new era of improved relationship between the United States and Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR.

GLOBE WATCH ON THE U.S.S.R.

MR. DOLE. Mr. President, I rise in support of the resolution being offered regarding the rapidly worsening situation in Lithuania. For the last few months, the primary focus of the United States and the world undoubtedly has been on developments in the Persian Gulf. And, since the Congress has returned, it seems that there has been little discussion of anything other than Iraq.

It seems to me that there are those who think that the Congress is not paying attention to events outside the Persian Gulf. This impression runs the risk of sending a very dangerous signal to foreign governments that they can get away with taking aggressive actions against their populations without any reaction from the United States and from the U.S. Congress.

Mr. President, I am here today to say that this perception is absolutely misplaced. Senator Moynihan and I hope there are many others—is closely watching events outside the gulf. And this Senator expects the United States—the executive branch and certainly the Congress—to react to those events as necessary.

At the top of my list of concerns beyond the Persian Gulf is the situation in the Soviet Union. Developments over the past month have become increasingly worrisome to those who want to see a peaceful and democratic and economic reform come to the Soviet Union.

Despite the deepening crisis in the Middle East, Mr. President, I did not miss the announcement early this week by the Soviet defense ministry that Soviet troops would be sent to the Persian Gulf. It should be noted that troops are being sent to Estonia, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and the Ukraine. Yesterday, I did not fail to notice the reports of the arrival of troop enforcements in Lithuania and Latvia, which like the other former Soviet republics I mentioned, already have a strong Soviet military presence within their territory. And, I am fully aware of Gorbachev's message to the Lithuanian Parliament which threatened Presidential rule if the Lithuanian Government did not back down from its declaration of independence, as well as Gorbachev's threats of military actions against Estonia and Latvia in the event that Soviet draft laws are not complied with.

Mr. President, to date the United States has firmly supported President Gorbachev and his policies of reform. But, this support is not and cannot be continued if the result is deterioration and economic reform in the Soviet Union; yes, we want glasnost. But, political oppression and military aggression such as we have seen in the last few weeks do not represent reform or glasnost, but abandonment of that path, and regression into the Soviet Union of the past, the Soviet Union that Gorbachev claims to have rejected.

Mr. President, I am also extremely concerned by something I learned first hand from a meeting with the Prime Minister of the Republic of Moldova 2 days ago. Prime Minister Druc told me that the only republics that will receive grain and feed purchased with the $1 billion in credits from the United States are those republics that agree to sign the Union Treaty. In other words, Gorbachev and his policies of reform to blackmail Moldova, the Baltic republics and any other republic that does not agree to sign the Union Treaty. In other words, Gorbachev has offered the people of these republics two options: sign or starve.

Mr. President, the United States must not be a party to oppression and blackmail. And, in my view, we must do more than just issue statements and demarches to the Soviet Government. We need to let the Soviet Union know that just as there are tangible benefits to be gained from relations with the United States if there is real economic and political progress, that there are also costs; and, Latvia, Lithuania, Soviet Union if it reverts to the policies of the past.

So, I believe that unless Gorbachev puts an immediate end to the threats, blackmail and aggression, that the United States should not deal with him in a business-as-usual manner. Moreover, it is my view that the United
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United States needs to develop policy options—other than the usual public statements—which result in real costs to the Soviet Union if it continues these repressive policies. And, while I have been a strong advocate of the recent decision to provide $1 billion in grain credits to the Soviet Union, I believe that we should suspend grain credits to the Soviet Union until we receive concrete assurances from Gorbachev that we can purchase with our assistance will not be used as a means of coercion, rather that it will go to the hungry people in all the republics, as it was originally intended.

Mr. President, the crisis in the gulf looms large, but we must not overlook crises in other parts of the world, especially in the Soviet Union. If we do, we could inadvertently end up on the wrong side, against political and economic reform and human rights.

The PRESIDING OFFICER.

The question is on agreeing to the resolution.

The resolution (S. Res. 12) was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution with its preamble is, as follows:

S. Res. 12

Whereas President Gorbachev has deployed Soviet troops to Lithuania and begun to use force to impose his rule in place of the support of our troops in the gulf, unilateral United States action is the wisest way to achieve that very annexation of another small nation, Kuwait, acceptable among the community of democracies.

Whereas Gorbachev has deployed Soviet troops to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union.

Whereas the United States has never recognized the forcible annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union.

Whereas the government of Lithuania has responded with an urgent appeal for the immediate support of all democratic countries to protect the independence and democracy of Lithuania and the Baltic States.

Whereas President Gorbachev has not yet been at the forefront of economic reform and real democratization among the people of the Soviet Union;

Whereas the United States has never recognized the forcible annexation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union; and

Whereas the concurrent and immediate support of all democratic countries is in the forefront of economic reform and real democratization among the people of the Soviet Union;

Resolved, that the Senate calls on President Gorbachev to refrain from further use of coercive tactics against the democratically elected government of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The preamble was agreed to.

The motion to lay that on the table was rejected.

Mr. LEVIN.

Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote just taken.

Mr. SIMPSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

The PRESIDING OFFICER.

The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I stand on the brink of war, a nation united in support of our troops in the gulf, united in our firm dedication to removing Iraq's aggressor armies, but divided on the contention that war at this time is the wisest way to achieve that very certain result.

The Iraq of Saddam Hussein is a nation that grows weaker every single day. Every single day that the unprecedented international embargo continues, the punch of this bully gets weaker, and he has the opportunity to sell the lives of American men and women in uniform grows as victory in battle, should it come to that, is a victory over a steadily weakening enemy. We owe it to our troops and to the success of their mission and the success and continuance of our international coalition, to pursue the course of sanctions. That is why I cosponsored S. 1, which is before us and, indeed, why I helped draft it.

Since none of us has a crystal ball, we are left with a calculation; an equation when it comes to the option of war. And the divisions we see in the opinion of our people are sharply reflected in the best military, political, and diplomatic minds of our nation. And the equation being weighed throughout our society is this: Is the awesome economic sanctions to the option of war worth the price we will surely have to pay in lives, and in billions of dollars, especially if what results is not simply the restoration of Kuwait, but also a deadly new resurgence of anti-American extremism and terrorism and such massive regional instability as to require a long-term United States presence in the region?

I think the costs at this time outweigh the benefits. All Americans are united in support of our troops, but to me that means bringing the troops home by accomplishing our goals in other ways if possible. It means not waging a war when perhaps half of our society still sees an alternative to war, an alternative that saves American lives.

One of the lessons of Vietnam is that we should not wage war without a consensus of the American public who want our military forces and to their loved ones to send them to battle and possibly to their deaths only if the American people believe the objective is worth the high price to be paid, only if achieving the objective militarily does not create a new set of worse problems in the region, and only if that objective cannot be achieved without American blood being spilled.

There is no consensus among the American people to wage a war against Iraq at this time. That proof of this is widespread. A New York Times-CBS News poll taken January 5-7 found that 47 percent of the people believe we should not start military action. A recent Washington Post-ABC News poll found that while 63 percent of the people felt that the United States should go to war with Iraq to force it out of Kuwait at some unspecified point after January 15, even that vague formulation resulted in only 44 percent favoring going to war; and an opposition "if it meant 1,000 American troops would be killed in the fighting"—surely a highly realistic possibility.

Further proof of the lack of consensus is the fact that some of the most respected military and national security figures of recent history, free of political constraints because they are not part of the current administration, urge us to continue to pursue economic sanctions as the wisest and best way to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. President Reagan's former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. William Crowe, said in testimony on November 29, 1990, that—

"The embargo is hitting heavily ** it is dead wrong to say that Baghdad is not being hurt; it is being damaged severely. That goes for the Iraqi military as well, which depends on credits to the Soviet Union..."

Granted that the embargo is not working as badly as many would prefer but if we wanted results in two or three months, clearly ask quarantine was the wrong way to go about it. Most experts believe that it will work with time. Estimates range in the neighborhood of twelve to eighteen months. In other words, the issue is not whether an embargo will work but whether we have the patience to let it take effect.

Former Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci said that "war possibly would create more problems that it would solve."

It is not just former Secretaries of Defense and former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs who feel this way and whose statements so clearly show the lack of an existing consensus to initiate an early offensive. Listen to the statements of the current commander of our forces in the Persian Gulf, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, relative to the merits of pursuing economic sanctions versus initiating an early military attack:

"If the alternative to dying is sitting out the sun for another summer, then that's not a bad alternative. (L.A. Times, November 29, 1990)"

And he further said:

"At the present time, I think time is on the side of the world coalition. I really don't think there's ever going to come a time when time is on the side of Iraq, as long as the sanctions are in effect, and as long as the United Nations coalition is in effect. (L.A. Times, November 29, 1990).

One of the clearest proofs of a lack of consensus in our country will be our vote—for unless two-thirds or more of this body gives the green light to initiate an attack, the consensus which should exist before war is waged will not be present.

If 57 of us, for instance, were to vote tomorrow to authorize the President to wage war now and 43 vote to pursue economic sanctions for a longer time,
the President would then have congressional authority to wage war, but he could not claim that a consensus would exist to wage such war.

Why is there this lack of consensus to wage war now, both throughout the country and in this Chamber? Because the costs of waging war at this time outweigh the benefits.

The first cost is human—the casualties. The Pentagon claims it cannot give a range of casualties. If they cannot, how can the President have considered the costs and benefits of initiating a military offensive?

The Pentagon may perceive a gain in public support for the "wage war now" option by refusing to even estimate the number of casualties, but that gain is likely to be short-lived. If significant casualties occur—and hundreds of casualties would be considered significant in my view—the support for waging war now will disintegrate and the President would be in a position where he is without the necessary public support to conclude the enterprise after it has begun.

The second reason for a lack of consensus is the short- and long-term economic costs. While it is difficult to estimate the economic costs of waging war versus the costs of maintaining economic sanctions, it is clear that the cost of the former is greater than the cost of the latter.

Even a short war could be followed by the cost of occupying territory in the gulf. Maintaining the peace in Europe—with few guerrilla or violent actions against us—still costs us more than five times what it might cost to wage war now.

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Before we unleash that mad Middle East genie from its bottle, we should stay longer on our original course, tightening the noose of economic sanctions net until Saddam Hussein sees he has nothing to gain and everything to lose from staying in Kuwait.

Saddam Hussein will lose either way. Our way, though, holds out the hope that Saddam Hussein does not take the entire Middle East and thousands of Americans down with him.

Mr. President, I yield the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BRYAN). Who seeks recognition? The Chair recognizes the Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I yield.

STAR PRINT—SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I have been asked by the majority leader to indicate to my colleagues that the text of Senate Joint Resolution 1 has been changed due to a printing error at the Government Printing Office. The error is on page 3, lines 20 to 21, where the term "majority leader" is incorrectly indicated instead of "minority leader" that was correctly included in the text filed at the desk yesterday. Correctly printed copies of the text will be available tomorrow, which I assume now means today.

I thank my friend and I thank the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH].

THE GULF CRISIS

Mr. SMITH. Mr. President, this is my maiden speech on the floor of the U.S. Senate after having served 6 years in the House of Representatives. There is little that I would not do for the opportunity to make these remarks under his glorious command. And I hope we agree there must be no reward for aggression. And I hope we agree there must be no reward for aggression. And I hope we agree there must be no reward for aggression. And I hope we agree there must be no reward for aggression.

Both sides in this Senate debate have shared the same goal. We agree Saddam Hussein must be expelled. But it now appears that the choice will come down to either pursuing economic sanctions for a longer period with waging war as a last resort or waging war shortly after January 15.

Congress must weigh the costs and the benefits, both short term and long term of the wage-war-now option.

Congress must do what the administration has not done: Estimate the range of the American casualties that would result.

Congress must do what the administration has not adequately done: Look at the uncertainties of war. Contrast the 5-day war claims of some spokesmen with the more sober assessments of our military leaders. Gen. Schwarzkopf said that "war could last a long, long time," and that "the most dangerous thing a commander could do, or that a country could do, in planning for battle, is assume away the capabilities of the enemy." Gen. William Odum, Director of the National Security Agency, and his boss, President Reagan, has said that, "We have no military precedents against which to judge what is actually required to defeat the Iraqi forces" and that the "Arab-Israeli wars will look small by comparison.

Congress can do what has not been done by the administration: Take to heart the words of our own commander of our own forces in the Persian Gulf, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf. I quoted his words earlier and I do so again because he says in one line what I have taken far longer to say less well:

If the alternative to dying is sitting in the Sun for another summer, then that's not a bad alternative.

Only 2 of the 556 Members of Congress have agreed to send U.S. forces in the Gulf. One is Representative JERRY COSTELLO of Illinois. In yesterday's paper he reminded each of us of the stakes involved:

I can tell you this, that if every member of Congress had a son or daughter in the Middle East, if the President had his son or his daughter in the Middle East in combat now, it might change their attitude to some extent when it comes to the issue of either war or pursuing options that take patience and time.

Mr. President, the 400,000-plus sons and daughters, fathers and husbands, and mothers and wives, who are poised to wage war in the Gulf, are our family. The issue we face is how best to protect our Nation and those who serve it so courageously. Pursuing economic sanctions, while keeping the waging of war as a last resort, is the wiser course for those whose lives are on the line, and even more importantly, for the Nation that they serve and love.

Both sides in this Senate debate agree on one thing. We agree Saddam Hussein must be expelled. But it now appears that the choice will come down to either pursuing economic sanctions for a longer period with waging war as a last resort or waging war shortly after January 15.

I have concluded that the relentless imposition of economic sanctions for a longer period is the wiser way to achieve the desired result. It would avoid the casualties of war, and the costs of war and the postwar period. It would avoid the uncertainties that would follow military victory, uncertainties which could lead to an avalanche of fundamentalism, radicalism, and terrorism that would engulf the region we seek to stabilize.

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one in American who wants war. I certainly do not. The President does not. Nobody in America wants war. Yet we have heard today on this floor that President Bush is leading us into war. Wrong. Saddam Hussein is leading us into war.

President Bush got us into this position, it was said. Did President Bush invade Kuwait? Why is President Bush not about a declaration of war? It is about preserving the military option for the Commander in Chief—preserving, not necessarily using, the military option.

Nobody who has fought in a war would make or take the commitment of U.S. troops in combat lightly. It is interesting, as I have talked to people today on both sides of the aisle, my colleagues, those who have been involved in war seem to be even more sensitive than those who have not. I served in Vietnam in the United States Navy. I can assure you that I approach this debate as my other colleagues do with the realization that we may never make that important decision than the one we are facing tonight.

I agonized a long time over how I was going to vote, and I also agonized over the ramifications of this vote.

I personally, in my own involvement in Vietnam—my mother was widowed at the end of World War II, like thousands of other women, and I did not have a father due to a war—watched my brother crying in the arms of my mother when he went to war, and I watched my mother cry when I went. So I know a little bit about the separation of power and what it means.

There are two sons in New Hampshire who have already given their lives in the Persian Gulf, and we still are not at war. Captain Michael Chinberg of Durham, NH, died last Tuesday, when a helicopter he was piloting crashed during a night training mission. Captain Chinberg has been married only 4 months. But, as he said, he lived a lifetime in those 4 months. We certainly all extend our condolences to his wife and family.

Last October, Gary Dillon, a Marine helicopter pilot from Concord, NH, gave his life for his country when his helicopter disappeared over the ocean during a training flight.

They were tragic deaths to young men, young men who understand the risks they were facing and willingly took those risks because of the great cause in which they felt they were involved.

I would like to read from a newspaper clip on Captain Chinberg. His father said, “My son loved what he was doing. He was doing what he wanted to do. He was a patriotic guy.” That is from his father, Dale Chinberg, of Durham.

Captain Chinberg was a patriotic family man who believed in duty, honor, and country. Despite the family’s personal tragedy, Mr. Chinberg supports President Bush’s policy in the gulf. Listen carefully to what he says. “I don’t have much good to say about what is happening over there. I think Hussein should be dealt with, and I support Bush’s stand and I think we have to do that sort of thing.”

I believe that the American people also understand the truth. They also understand sacrifices. But we do not conduct foreign policy by polls. We have had polls quoted all day and yesterday.

In this morning’s Washington Post column Charles Krauthammer discusses the fact that 6 months before Pearl Harbor 79 percent of Americans opposed entering World War II. Today there are few Americans who would not concede that World War II was inevitable as we look back.

Furthermore, if the United States had moved earlier and more decisively to confront Hitler, it is likely that many American lives could have been saved. How many lives? We will never know. How many lives were lost because we waited as long as we did?

Sometimes, maybe most times, the only way to avoid war is to be prepared for it. I did not say fight it. I said be prepared for it; to be prepared to fight.

This rule is particularly true when the world is confronting a madman. Saddam must know that we are prepared, that we have the resolve, that we have the will. We are not showing him that tonight if we part ways with the President at this hour, at this time.

I think we need to look a little bit at Saddam Hussein. Frankly, as most Americans, I am sick of hearing the man’s name. I wish he would go away. But let us find out who he is. Let us find out what makes him tick. We have not heard a lot about him in terms of what he is.

He is a nasty man; that is not disputable. He is a man who waged a genocidal war which resulted in the deaths of millions of his own people. That is pretty much inflicted. If Iraq were the size of the United States geographically and demographically, that would be the equivalent of 15 million Americans dead.

Here is a man whose troops have been cited by Amnesty International for atrocities ranging from castration to eye gouging and other tortures, murder of babies, old men, women, and children.

That is Amnesty International. It is documented. It has been cited here tonight in other remarks. I will not go any further.

Here is a man who repeatedly purged the highest ranks of his military, his trusted advisers, by mass murders of his own senior officers. Does that sound familiar? Do you remember Stalin, Hitler? And where necessary, he, like Hitler and Stalin, covered up these murders by contrived mishaps. In most cases, the only transgression of these men was their convenience as scapegoats for Saddam Hussein’s inability to achieve his impossible goals.

Here is a man who has at his disposal, at his fingertips, as we speak, chemical and biological weapons. Many countries have them in their arsenals. He has used them. He used them against Iran, and he used them against his own people.

Here is a man who is attempting to secure nuclear weapons, and may indeed have the ingredients to make them now, and probably would have them made now, had it not been for the fact that in 1981, Israel conducted a preemptive raid. I believe, and I think I am not the only one, if he had nuclear weapons, he would use them probably against Israel or anybody else that he could reach with them. He has repeatedly threatened his neighbors, including the United States.

If he will use chemical and biological weapons, why not nuclear? Against such a ruthless character, normal means of diplomatic persuasion lose their effectiveness. History should have taught us that the only way to stop a man such as this is to confront him with a show of force which he cannot ignore.

The issue we are debating tonight as we speak, again, is not war. The issue we are deciding is will economic sanctions standing alone, economic sanctions standing alone, stop Saddam Hussein without the threat of force coupled with it? That is the issue that we are debating tonight. We should not be off on a tangent about a declaration of war, and body bags, and all of those horrible things. That is not what we are talking about tonight.

One last word—again I repeat—will we give the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, the option to couple threat of military force with economic sanctions to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait? That is the issue.

Let us look at history. I am a history teacher. I read a lot of history, and I have read a lot of history. On March 2, 1938, when Adolf Hitler was meeting with the Chancellor of Austria to prepare for the elimination of Austria from the face of the Earth, the Prime Minister of Great Britain rose on the floor of the House of Commons to make the following statement:

What happened was merely that two statesmen had agreed upon certain measures for the improvement of relations between their two countries.**

When Hitler postponed his invasion of Czechoslovakia to meet with Prime Minister Chamberlain, he was applauded by the House of Commons, in the words of Howard MacMillan, “burst into a roar of cheer-
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ing, since they knew that this might mean peace.” Throughout the House Chamber, dissidents were urged to “Get up. Get up,” with shouts of “Thank God for the Prime Minister.”

And then following the Munich agreement, Bonn decided to send Czechoslovakia to Hitler’s troops. Chamberlain, in a speech which, in view of history, has proved to be something less than prophetic, predicted that “Now that we have got past (the obstacle of Czechoslovakia), I feel that it may be possible to make further progress along the road to sanity.”

As the crowds cheered the latest concessions, Chamberlain predicted, quite erroneously, that he had achieved “peace in our time.”

How many people died after he achieved “peace in our time”?

The point is that sometimes the best way to achieve peace is to prepare for war, to prepare for war sometimes actions which with good intentions purport to favor peace only make war bloodier and more inevitable.

John F. Kennedy, in 1962, in a high-stakes game, can “instruct” Khrushchev’s missiles to be taken out of Cuba. He did what he had to do. Many of us lived through it. We know what it felt like.

It may be that Saddam Hussein will opt for peace if he is confronted with the near certainty of defeat. But he is not going to be confronted with the near certainty of defeat if we decouple sanctions from military options. World equivocation may encourage him to continue.

More important than the specifics of any legislation being debated on the floor today is the importance of sending Hussein a message, a united message, that the United States is not divided; that it is united behind its Commander in Chief, and prepared to do whatever it takes to achieve a real and lasting peace.

The point is that sometimes the best way to achieve peace is to prepare for war.

The Mitchell resolution is one more blun-
Can you imagine in World War II, if that had happened? It was unheard of. Announcements by American generals concerning the readiness or nonreadiness of American forces; that is unheard of. And now this, the Mitchell resolution, which says, Saddam, do not worry, we are going to put the sanctions and leave them on, unlimited. Take your time. You have all the time in the world. We are not going to attack you.

A man who is aiming guns and poison at American troops should not be spoonfed information concerning our troop dispositions, intentions, and limitations. This is why at this time a resolution of the Republican leader, Senator Dole, and Mr. Warner and others, including Senator Robb, represents the only legislative alternative for protecting American interests and American troops and pursuing the No. 1 goal, ousting Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

This resolution allows the President of the United States to continue economic sanctions as long as it appears they could have an effect. It does not tell the President he cannot put on sanctions. It does not tell the President to take them off. Nothing of the kind. The President may decide to leave them on, but only he knows it, or perhaps he shares it with Congress in confidence out of the public debate. But Saddam does not know it. It does not tell him when.

The President could continue to rely on sanctions for a day, a week, a month, or a year. By making it clear that the United States retains a broad range of options, the Dole language increases the likelihood that sanctions will achieve their goal, and that peace would be attained without further loss of American lives.

This resolution does not forfeit the ability of the Commander in Chief to protect American troops from direct and indirect threats. Again, it does not broadcast to Saddam Hussein our battle plan, our options. It retains our military option. I would like to quote from today's Washington Post, which I do not like to refer to:

"It is no longer seriously disputed that Saddam Hussein is a menace to regional peace and global order and had best be reined in sooner so that he does not become an even greater menace later. This is what the American government has attempted to do. Now comes the squeeze. Can there be any question the President will oust Hussein with or without the support of our sons and our daughters in the Persian Gulf. Do not give Saddam a reason to doubt our resolve. Stand together. Let us discard Saddam Hussein on the garbage heap of history along with the others despots like Khrushchev, Stalin, and Hitler. That is where he belongs, and that is where we are going to put him sooner or later."

A final quote, David Broder: "Through the strain, the aggravation and gloom one principle stands clear: The president, speaking for an international coalition and armed with the authority of the United Nations, has laid the groundwork for his case that, backed by international support, he has the right to use military force to carry out his foreign policy, a policy that he believes will improve the terrible alternative he faces."

And then the United States must be prepared to pay the price world leadership requires.

In conclusion, to our Commander in Chief, the President of the United States, George Bush, I say God bless you for the heavy burden that you are carrying as we speak. I deeply regret, and I am somewhat outraged frankly, that some in this body have chosen to make you the target of their emotion and frustration, while other Members of Congress who are in the know. He knows that. Public advertisements of troop movements, good or bad, are wrong.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order the Senator from Alabama [Mr. Hefflin].

Mr. HEFFLIN. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Minnesota [Mr. Durenberger].

TRIBUTE TO SENATOR SMITH

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, I recall when I made my maiden speech on the floor of the Senate I did not realize there was such a thing as a maiden speech, and I also did not realize that by staying at 1:30 in the morning I would be waiting to introduce an opposition new colleague to the junior Senator from New Hampshire.

I want to take a minute to congratulate BOB SMITH. I do not know where he is putting it but he has a lot of feeling. Mr. President, I grew up as the son of a coach, and Bob Smith is that, I know his background, and that is where the feeling comes from.

He comes from a State that was once represented by Daniel Webster, who has the original desk still in the Chamber. I guess what we heard here this morning was the kind of oration that would do honor to Daniel Webster.

He succeeds in this place a very, very close friend of mine, Gordon Humphrey. And when it comes to principle, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment, and when it comes to personal commitment.

Mr. SMITH. I thank my colleague.

Mr. DURENBERGER. I yield the floor.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alabama [Mr. Hefflin].

RESOLUTIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. HEFFLIN. Mr. President, I believe that the President and the vast majority of the American people, as well as the Members of the Senate and House Representatives, hope and pray that a solution to the Iraq-Kuwait issue can be reached without war. I was disappointed but not surprised that the
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Geneva diplomatic endeavor failed to resolve these issues. However, I am still hopeful that Iraq will withdraw from Kuwait either because of their fear of the mass destruction of their country and/or as a result of diplomatic efforts.

The upcoming votes are grave and important responsibilities and I will not be swayed by any partisan arguments. This is not a Republican or Democrat decision. When men and women's lives are at stake, the decision is a moral one, and we should be guided only by our conscience.

These times weigh heavily on the minds of all Americans. Neither the President nor any Member of Congress takes this grave responsibility lightly. No one can suggest that the decision to approve the use of force is an easy one, but in my judgment we must present a united front in support of President Bush, just as our allies have remained united behind economic sanctions and have endorsed the use of force to stop this aggression by Saddam Hussein.

I guess that Saddam Hussein's state of mind is such that he will not reach a settlement with American diplomats. That does not mean, however, that agreement cannot be achieved by diplomats of other nations if Hussein realizes the consequences that can result to his country from war with the United States and its allies.

There are many efforts still under way to bring about a peaceful solution to this Middle East crisis. A number of other nations, including Arab nations, are directly or indirectly pursuing efforts toward peaceful solutions at this time.

If Congress were to declare war at this time, it would mean that all efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution would immediately terminate and war would be certain. By declaring our support for the President, we leave open the possibility of resolution of this conflict. Further, if a declaration of war were to be enacted by Congress, a major military tactic—the element of surprise—would be lost.

In addition, I think that it is reasonable to expect that a declaration of war would cause Iraq to immediately go on the offensive. This declaration could cause American forces substantial problems. Saddam Hussein could scatter future battlefield areas with chemical and biological destruction, which could linger for a long period of time. I do not think that Saddam Hussein would hesitate to fire numerous missiles at Middle East areas which could cause incredible death and destruction as it is highly improbable that our allies and allies.

I am a firm believer that the Constitution provides Congress the authority to declare war. However, Congress has recognized that a war declaration should not necessitate a formal declaration of war when hostilities exist, or where circumstances indicate our imminent involvement in hostilities.

This recognition was formalized in the War Powers Resolution. There were numerous reasons for the passage of this resolution but it was to show that Congress does not require a formal declaration of war for every military action.

In my judgment, it would be a mistake for Congress to formally declare war at this time under the existing circumstances even if there were no hope for a peaceful settlement. For the same reasons, it would probably also be a mistake to formally declare war at a later date, if force has not then been used.

President Bush has approached this matter in a rational and intelligent manner. My opinion would be different if the United States had been the sole country to take a stand against Hussein. Rather, wisely, I think, the President engaged the nations of the world to form a coalition and, importantly, the consensus on what needs to be done about Hussein's naked aggression against a member nation.

The U.N. Security Council in the adoption of Resolution 678 has brought tremendous pressure upon Iraq. It is designed to exert every pressure for peace. It is a carefully drafted resolution that reflects the view that war should only be undertaken as a last resort. The passage of such resolution was indeed a remarkable event and should not be taken lightly by Saddam Hussein or the Congress of the United States.

The nations of the world passed this resolution because they realized that we cannot allow Saddam Hussein to continue to run roughshod over the Middle East. These countries recognized the danger which Hussein represents to this region and decided that they must act now.

World attention is now on the U.S. Congress. The adoption of a resolution which fails to give the President the power to use force at this time will be construed as a weakness, not only by Saddam Hussein but also our allies. In my judgment, it would be a tragic mistake for the Congress to show a lack of resolve. I do not think there is any question that Saddam Hussein would consider it a victory and would adopt a position that would become destructive of any possibility of a peaceful solution. He would become a hero immediately among many Moslems and his position would be strengthened. Delay would be his ally.

It is important to think of the consequences if Congress denies our Commander in Chief the authority to use force. This denial could damage the chance for a peaceful solution, as well as affect our ability to achieve the goal of removing Iraqi troops from Kuwait. I will not list all the other possible consequences at this time, but numerous Senators, in their speeches, have made reference to many of them.

On the other hand, a congressional approval of force will affect Saddam Hussein's state of mind. If peace is to be achieved without war, then we must generate in the mind of Saddam Hussein and the people of Iraq every possible fear of the consequences of war involving the United States. The Iraqis must realize the terrible destruction they will face if invaded. They must realize that it will be far different from the Iran-Iraq war. In that light, I wish that CNN would display to the Iraqis the vivid pictures of destruction that occurred to many of the cities of Germany in World War II. If Saddam Hussein were to see films showing the horrible death of Mussolini, I believe he would begin to spend many sleepless nights. Every effort to show the devastation of war on his country if invaded by American forces must clearly be brought home to Saddam Hussein and his people.

I have confidence that the President wants a peaceful settlement and does not want any Americans killed. I believe he will use the threat of war as a means to achieve peace. But if a peaceful solution cannot be obtained, the immediate future is the time to act. Delay will bring much more harmful consequences. I would much rather America's Commander in Chief has the element of surprise as a tactical weapon instead of Saddam Hussein.

I will vote to authorize every possible action including the use of force to resolve the Iraq-Kuwait issue. I hope and pray that it can be resolved without a war.

I must add one more remark. I have been contacted by a number of Alabamians asking, "If war occurs, will it be another Vietnam?"

If efforts for a peaceful solution fail, and we do come to war, let us not condemn Saddam Hussein. I pledge my support for giving our military complete authority to fight to win as quickly as possible with "no arms tied behind our backs." The undeniable lessons of Vietnam are clear—we must never again be armed conflict unless we as a people and as a nation are prepared to win and win completely. To settle for less would be a betrayal of the faith the American people place in their Government and their elected representatives. I therefore urge that we support the President regarding his initiatives to enforce U.N. Resolution 678, and pray that in the face of a unified international community, Saddam Hussein will rethink his position and withdraw his military forces from Kuwait.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair notes under the unanimous-consent agreement the distinguished Senator from Utah, Mr. Hatch is next. The Chair notes his absence from the floor.
The Senator from Minnesota [Mr. DURENBERGER] appears next on the list. The Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Minnesota.

A SOLEMN MOMENT OF CHOICE

Mr. DURENBERGER. Mr. President, there has never been a time in my service here in the U.S. Senate when I felt a heavier burden of decision than I do at this time. The issue before us can be plainly stated. Shall we in the Congress authorize the President to use military force to achieve the objective of expelling the forces of Iraq from Kuwait? The consequences of how we decide will be as historic as war and peace, and as personal as a man or a woman in our Armed Forces coming home alive or dead.

This is a solemn moment of choice, one for which few of us on either side of this debate can say: I am sure I am right. But we must choose.

No matter how long we study this issue, consult with experts or debate on this floor, it will all boil down to a single word, yes or no. And then we will each live a lifetime with the consequences.

As a part of the historical record of this debate and for my constituents in Minnesota to hear today or read at some point in the future, I want to be clear why this U.S. Senator chose as he did: To give the President of the United States the authorization to use force.

It should be clear what we are dealing with in this debate. War is hell. It destroys lives and it destroys values. And it perpetuates its own destruction.

We are here on this floor, not to debate how the United States should go to war, but how best to avoid prolonging the war we are already in with Saddam Hussein and Iraq. And there are no objective observers here on this floor, nor any iron-clad analysis on either side of the issue. Those of us on whom the burden of decision rests are not judges, we are objective observers here on this floor, we are elected to listen, to learn and to use the best information available to us.

My third major point is that we need to consider the opposite of each live a lifetime with the consequences. Aggression resisted today is aggression encouraged.

The principle behind the nation Iraq and the nation Kuwait is far more important than those two countries are. And the future consequences far more important than the present circumstances. Aggression resisted today is aggression prevented tomorrow.

Just as the family is the building block of all society so the sovereignty of nations is the foundation of an orderly global community. I would not hold Kuwait up as a shining example of what a nation should be. But there can be absolutely no question that they have a right to be returned to their seat in the family of nations.

The resolutions before this body represent two alternative strategies: The Mitchell-Byrd-Boren resolution supports a strategy with the following elements: a defensive posture with respect to Iraq; continuation of economic sanctions; and pursuit of settlement options in whatever diplomatic forums become available.

I would say that that is much the same posture the President of the United States was in prior to November 8. The Mitchell-Byrd-Boren resolution supports a strategy with the following elements: a defensive posture with respect to Iraq; continuation of economic sanctions; and pursuit of settlement options in whatever diplomatic forums become available.

I was fortunate to have the opportunity to visit Iraq 16 months ago on a private trip through several developing nations in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. I spent a considerable amount of time with Foreign Minister Aziz and even more time with his deputy, Mr. Nizar Hamdoon, and several other members of the Iraqi leadership as well. I came away from those meetings knowing that each of them believed, as Saddam Hussein believed, and with some justification, that American policies changed with the direction of the wind. They saw us as being incapable of concerted, consistent action of any kind; the offer of friendship was traditionally from an unreliable dependable friend. It is that calculation which encouraged them to invade Kuwait, and which keeps them there today. They began to unlearn their lessons about the United States of the 1990's when George Bush dispatched tens of thousands of troops to the gulf. Each day that goes by helps convince them that we do mean business. But we cannot afford to let the message to world leadership be our national purpose at any cost. The world looks to us, and we should be proud that they do.

My third major point is that we need to choose the strategy that has the best chance of avoiding war and achieving our national purpose at an appropriate cost. I do not hear anyone saying that Saddam Hussein should be ignored. I do not hear any critics of the initial deployment of United States troops which halted his aggression at the Kuwait border. The rub of this debate is how do we accomplish what we all desire; and that is that he withdraw from Kuwait as soon as possible.

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of us here in the Senate put together. His judgment is the same as mine: the Iraqi's expect us to be distracted or to lose our resolve and give in. We simply cannot allow them room for such a further miscalculation.

We need to understand what we are prepared to do, and, just as importantly, when we plan to do it. As long as Saddam Hussein has any reason to believe that we will vacillate or delay using force and that we will timidly make a decision. If we want Saddam to decide to leave Kuwait, we need to put him in a room with only one exit.

Mr. President, as I speak, the Sun is up in Baghdad. It is just about 10 in the morning. It is also 3 days before January 15.

I say to my friend Nizar Hamdoon and Tariq Aziz, this is not the United States you spoke of. This is a truly United States.

Our strategy has not been without its failures. A policy which is designed explicitly to send a message and to raise Saddam Hussein's anxiety level to the breaking point cannot help but undermine the morale of people in the process. That is a reality, and that is why we see some division on this floor. Many Members of this body, this Senator among them, have questioned the timing, size, purpose and effect of the November 8 augmentation of U.S. forces. As legitimate as these questions are, raised by the Senator from Georgia and others, we simply cannot undo that decision here on this floor, Mr. President, without undoing the strategy of the international community. That is too high a cost to pay.

The issue of the proper strategy for dealing with the Iraqis boils down to this: should we get in line with the community of nations behind a strategy designed to force Saddam to decide to get out himself? Or do we abandon that course in favor of a defensive, indefinite alternative?

Would we rather see Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar in Baghdad today with solid international backing or with a U.N. resolution with a gapping hole in it?

The choice at this time boils down to this: should we get in line with the community of nations behind a strategy designed to force Saddam to decide to get out himself? Or do we abandon that course in favor of a defensive, indefinite alternative?

Would we rather credibility threaten the use of force now or allow Saddam Hussein to dictate a timetable which can only benefit him?

Mr. President, I believe we are on the verge of a New World order.

I believe our national purposes in the gulf promote a safer world for today and especially for tomorrow.

And I believe we need to approach Saddam as a genuinely United States and a United Nations.

The only way we can do that is to defeat the resolution before us and then ask every Member of this body to endorse an alternative like Warner-Dole.

I received a petition this morning from 52 young people in St. Paul, MN. It begins with a very articulate statement about their concern for misplaced priorities, and the need to "stop spending billions on war and redirect money toward health care, education and the environment." It continues, "We the youth who would be sent to war, believe that human life is more important than a full tank of gas. We refuse to take orders to kill the youth of other countries. They have families, mothers, fathers, young women, and children who are safe behind the lines. The U.S. Government can set a positive example by withdrawing troops from Saudi Arabia and stop the current war for oil and power in the Middle East." They appeal to war and support meeting basic human needs.

As I said earlier, defeating this resolution and supporting the President does put American lives at greater risk. They have been at risk since we made the decision to defend原则 and the people of the gulf from Saddam Hussein's aggression. But in the alternative to Nunn-Byrd-Boren has the potential to free many more lives in the future from the inevitable risks of a world that rewards aggression.

About 1,000 miles from the Iraq-Kuwait border, under the spotlight of international attention, are close to 2 million Sudanese who will probably not be alive a year from now. Why? Because their government chooses not to feed them, and we were too busy to see or help. What we are trying to do is build a world where we will have the resources and the caring to value human life everywhere above everything else.

Mr. President, to the young people who wrote that letter, I must say what we are trying to do is build a world where we will all have the resources and the caring to value human life everywhere.

For the sake of the thousands of lives and futures that are at stake, I hope to God I am not wrong in my judgment today. But I conclude that a vote of "aye" to the international community and the President of the United States is the best way to end this crisis soon and without bloodshed, and to build a better world for the young of America and of all the nations of this world.

Gen. Omar Bradley said that the best way to win a war is to avoid a war. President Eisenhower believed that the United States should never start a war. We are not here to debate how we should go to war. The war started 162 days-3,888 hours-ago. We are here to find out how best to get to peace. Let's hope that in the next 72 hours Iraq and Saddam Hussein will show us how.

Mr. President, our debate today is the most important debate the Congress has undertaken in my experience and probably within the last quarter of a century. The subject and outcome of this debate is most probably a life or death matter both for the tens of thousands of young men and women in the sands of the Middle East and elsewhere who are threatened by Iraq's occupation in Kuwait and elsewhere, and for the fate of Iraqi military and economic power.

I do not know of a single Member of this body who is not approaching this task with some anxiety and no little deep concern, Mr. President. For most of us this is the first time as legislators that we have been so starkly con-

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fronted by the reality of a major conflict and the burden of decision obvi­ously weighs upon our shoulders as well it should. So let us take one mo­ment to consider how it is we have come to pass.

I think we agree, Mr. President, on the facts of the case. Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, eradicating a sov­ereign nation, gaining control of one­fifth of the world's oil reserves, and thereby assuming his rightful place in the Persian Gulf region. This invasion came quickly on the heels of failed re­gional negotiations, negotiations that in retrospect were apparently only a facade for military actions planned long in advance by Iraq's leadership.

The realization that the subjugation of Kuwait was, in Saddam's mind, inev­i­table, should lead us to ask exactly what this conflict is about.

First, it has been argued both in Iraq and elsewhere, that Kuwait is histori­cally part of Iraq. There is some basis for this in fact, but only if we realize that none of the borders in the Persian Gulf are accurate. They are all—and this includes Iraq's borders—the result of often unwise colonial decisions taken long before most of the region's residents were even born. Indeed, if we were to look back at historical claims, we might just as easily argue for the redrawing of maps in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and even Europe and North America, including the United States.

Saddam, however, chose to press his claims through force. This, Mr. Presi­dent, has always been a dead-end: The first major attempt to resolve border disputes in the modern era was called World War I, while the most recent was the Argentine-British war over the Falklands. From Alsace-Lorraine to the Sudetenland to Biafra, and now to Kuwait, war over borders has produced nothing but death and destruction, and in the end the original issues remained unresolved.

**ECONOMIC JUSTICE**

We have also been told that the Ku­waiti Emirs tempted fate by welfare disproportional wealth and power in a region where so many are poor and dis­possessed. Well, Mr. President, who can deny that the regime in Kuwait was authoritarian? Who can deny that it, like many of the other traditional re­gimes of the region, exhibited fabulous wealth, while others went hungry? And who, Mr. President, would deny the un­derstandable anger of the have-nots when faced with the stunning opulence of the have-haves?

But here again, Mr. President, we confront a paradox. Can we honestly believe that Saddam Hussein intended to liberate the suffering masses of the Middle East from the economic grip of wealth and power? Of course not. Saddam has inflicted immense suffering throughout the region, taking more than a million lives in both Iran and Iraq in a 10-year war for treasure and glory, and now through the brutal pil­lage of a small nation whose most grievous offense was in their refusal to accede to Saddam’s territorial demands that had little to do with justice and everything to do with conquest.

**PALESTINIANS**

Finally, Mr. President, Saddam has stooped to the most cynical rationale for his invasion, namely, that he was fighting to force a negotiated settle­ment of the Palestinian issue. Of course, this was not the original ra­tionale for taking Kuwait, and his sud­den discovery of the Palestinians is an obvious diversion that I will return to in a moment. For now, suffice it to say that Saddam has butchered hundreds of Kuwaiti Palestinians without regard to their status, revealing the true hollow­ness of his professed desire to use Ku­wait as leverage for a Middle Eastern peace conference. He may speak the language of Arab internationalism, but his actions are the actions of an Iraqi nationalist aiming for regional hegemony.

**SADDAM’S TRUE MOTIVES**

If Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was not motivated by border disputes, if it was not a crusade for economic justice, if it was not undertaken on behalf of the Palestinians, then what lies behind this barbaric act?

Mr. President, it seems that there can be but one motive for Saddam Hus­sein's actions, and it is the most chilling motive there can be.

Power, Mr. President, sheer, undi­luted power. The pursuit of power for it's own sake is the hallmark of Iraqi policy, and power—not Islam, not jus­tice, not borders—is Saddam Hussein's only religion. And because the pursuit of power is by definition unlimited, Saddam's aspirations are unlimited, and this is the most chilling possibility we could face. You see, Mr. President, ideologues and fanatics at least have a creed. They have a set of goals—insane ones, per­haps, but goals nonetheless—and so therefore there is a way to commu­nicate with them.

But those who seek only power, Mr. President, are the most dangerous spe­cies of the genus tyrant. They are in­terested only in one aspect of every discussion: Does the outcome increase or decrease my power, my ability to control the lives and destinies of oth­ers? It is the growth of power for growth's sake. It is the ideology of the cancer cell, deadly and implacable.

It is here that civilised discourse breaks down. I agree, Mr. President, with Zhigigniew Brzezinski's belief that Saddam and Adolf Hitler are a poor comparison, but I disagree with his statement that Hitler was more wicked than Saddam. Hitler was a murderer with a cause. A deranged, evil, insane cause, to be sure, but a cause laid out for all to see in the pages of Mein Kampf. Saddam is far worse: His mur­ders are done for his own sake, for the greater glory of Saddam, and this makes him more dangerous than we re­alize.

It has been reported that Saddam Hussein's favorite movie is "The God­father." I can understand that, Mr. President. Like the fictitious Don, who kneels before a church altar blessing himself while his gunmen slew dozens of his enemies, so too does Saddam mouth the sacred words of Islam while his soldiers destroy the lives of any who would oppose him in the gulf. No doubt Saddam admires the Godfather's detached pursuit of power and money, buttressed by bullets and terror.

Finally, Mr. President, we must confront the reality that the lust for power means that Saddam's ambitions will make him a chronic problem. This is not the last we will hear from him.

In sum, we know the enemy. We know what he has done. We know why he has done it. But, Mr. President, we must ask a question that the American people are asking us every day: what are we doing? Why are we involved?

**AMERICAN MOTIVES**

Mr. President, I do not for a moment doubt that we all agree about why the situation in Kuwait distresses us so. Let me state it clearly, for at times in our debates it has become obscured.

First and foremost, Mr. President, the occupation of Kuwait is a moral issue. It is a moral offense of mono­mental proportions, for a world in which states are erased from the map by arms is a world based on the law of the jungle. It is a repudiation of the very basis of civilization. It does not matter that in this case that aggressor was Iraq and the victim Kuwait. It was wrong when Germany invaded Poland, when Japan invaded Manchuria, when France invaded Indochina, when China invaded Tibet, and when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. It is wrong, transcendentally wrong. To allow the world to devolve into a street fight, where the fastest gun or the sharpest knife wins.

I want to be absolutely clear about this, Mr. President. I am certain that the President, the Congress, and the American people are reacting to the in­sansion of Kuwait first and foremost out of a sense of moral outrage. This over­riding moral principle is the reason that millions live in freedom today in Korea, in France, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere.

I am painfully aware, Mr. President, that many past injustices have not been attacked as vigorously as the subjugation of Kuwait. Around the globe tyrants have managed to pro­tect their crimes from the anger of the international community. But, in this case, we were unable to respond. On others, we were, for various reasons,
unwilling. In large part, we in the West were restrained from undertaking action against international aggression due to the specter of nuclear war that haunted us during the dark days of the cold war.

But the cold war is over, Mr. President, and for the first time in modern history we have reached a point where the entire international community—and it is now a community, rather than opposing blocs—has chosen to isolate and punish an unrestrained aggressor. There is no motivation higher or more powerful that has guided us and our allies in the present crisis.

Some are concerned about access to strategic resources, and understandably so. An attempt to strangle the world economy is as blantly an act of aggression as any other, and there should be no shame in proclaiming our unwillingness to see one unprincipled dictator control the economic well-being of a large part of the world. Millions of people in the developing countries can afford such gangster-style pillaging far less than we can.

Oil is an issue for a different reason than the inconvenience or economic hardship of paying an extra 50 cents a gallon at the pump. The presence of oil in the region only adds to the danger that emanates from Iraq's unbridled appetite for power, and in the end the acquisition of such a valuable resource will serve only to fuel Saddam's ambitions to rule the Persian Gulf, and eventually the entire Middle East, to mold it in his image.

To Saddam Hussein, oil is power, and it should be clear to us now that power is the drug to which he is addicted, and the drug that induces in him the most dangerous and threatening behavior.

And so the need to confront Iraq's aggression is clear. The question is how. Our answer so far has been the imposition of sanctions. Mr. President, let us assume that sanctions are concerned. Mr. President, we must understand that we are unwilling to ignore warnings to halt.

First, let us assume that the coalition can be held together for at least a year—an extremely optimistic assumption in itself, but one we will accept for the moment. CIA Director Webster himself has testified that there will be no appreciable erosion in Iraqi military capabilities for at least—at least, Mr. President—1 year. In fact, intelligence estimates now suggest that the longer Iraq troops remain in Kuwait, the better dug in, and the more prepared to repel an attack and inflict heavier casualties, they will be.

Mr. President, this can only mean that an eventual attack to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait will prove more casualties if undertaken 6 months or a year from now than the same attack conducted soon. It would be a horrifying irony, Mr. President, if the very measures we undertake to save allied American lives in turn end up costing yet more lives. It is true that sanctions may hurt the Iraqi Air Force in the short term. But Iraqi Air power was never our primary concern. More to the point, there is no evidence that sanctions will weaken Iraqi infantry and armor forces. To quote Director Webster:

The key elements of Iraqi defenses would probably not suffer significantly as a result of sanctions.

But even if there is room for disagreement about the economic and military effectiveness of sanctions, the larger question revolves around our ability to maintain sanctions for so long. The administration, through the United Nations, has created a dynamic coalition composed of economically and culturally diverse nations, many of whom are traditional friends, many more of whom are traditional enemies. We cannot expect this remarkable group to maintain itself while diplomats wrangle and Kuwait effectively disappears.

Traditional diplomacy has not worked and will not work with a Saddam Hussein. If we are unwilling to send a message both to Saddam and our allies that we are prepared to enforce Security Council Resolution 678, then I believe the coalition will falter as well.

This is hardly an indictment of our allies, Mr. President. The embargo is, in many ways, much more painful for the international community than for Iraq. In particular, it is unreasonable to expect that the front-line states, for whom the embargo will produce the most pain and political dislocation, can hold on for a year or more. Rather than destabilize Iraq, the economic hardships imposed by the embargo will destabilize our most trusted partners in the coalition like Turkey and Egypt even sooner. One can only guess at how long countries like Iran and Syria can be relied on.

Third, while it is true that Iraq is dependent on oil exports, it is equally plain that the world is dependent on oil imports. Continuing the embargo, in my view, will do relatively little to Iraqi military potential, but much to destabilize the international economy. How long can the embargo hold, Mr. President, if oil prices on the world market rise and the economies of the developed world on the verge of recession or even depression, all because of one man?

At this point, Mr. President, I would like to point out several of the conclusions presented in Prof. Gary Hufbauer's study of sanctions that support our allies have often cited. Hufbauer himself admitted that sanctions were far more effective before the 1970s: since that time, the world has become much more economically interdependent, and thus sanctions are often as painful for those imposing them as they are for those being imposed upon. Second, Hufbauer points out that sanctions work best where aims are limited. Turning back an invasion is not a limited aim, Mr. President. And even in cases where sanctions have met with limited success, the average period of an embargo was 3 years.

Mr. President, it is not 1970. Our aims are not limited. And the international economic coalition against Iraq does not have 3 years.

Even if all these other criteria could be met, however, it is important to remember that Iraq has one more advantage over the international community where sanctions are concerned. Mr. President, we must understand that we are trying to impose sanctions on a totalitarian nation, the type of state that is best suited to weathering an embargo. Consider for a moment how sanctions work: They produce pain. When, however, the pain of sanctions, the collapse of the economy, the theory goes, outweighs the pain of giving in to the demands of the sanctioners, then the enemy will acqui-
esce, or even be overthrown by their own people. But totalitarian governments are different. Mr. President. War with Iran was worse and more destructive than any sanction. Saddam survived. And therefore the odds overwhelmingly favor that he will withstand this embargo, because he will gladly inflict pain on Kuwaiti and Iraqi civilians rather than bow to economic pressure. Ten years of war and bloodshed did not dissuade Saddam from his ways, and I fear we delude ourselves if we think a 6-month or 1-year embargo will succeed where the Ayatollah's armies failed.

Both history and common sense tell us that embargoes and sanctions work only where the leaders have some semblance of conscience, where they are not willing to feed soldiers at the expense of feeding children. Iraq, I am sorry to say, is not that kind of state. If sanctions cannot work, is there another option, between sanctions and war? Some abroad have grasped at Saddam's Middle East peace conference. Let me state for the record why I cannot support what I described earlier as a transparent and cynical conference. While it is tempting enough to dismiss this idea merely because Saddam Hussein proposed it after the fact, I have serious reservations about such a conference that I would like to share.

My greatest objection to a Middle East peace conference lies in its manipulation as a diversion. The issue before the world at this moment is the occupation of one sovereign nation by another. If Iraq wishes to negotiate about its demands on Kuwait, then let them withdraw their forces and come to the table without holding an entire nation hostage.

And if the purpose is to turn world attention from an illegal invasion to the longstanding disputes between the Arab nations and the State of Israel, then we can only respond by insisting that Kuwait, not Israel, is the issue. The United States and the world in the world to discuss and negotiate the future of the Middle East, but only after Kuwait is free and restored. We cannot and must not allow Saddam to hide international aggression behind the facade of compulsion for the Palestinians and the veil of Saddam's crocodile tears.

I hope that no one believes Saddam Hussein is committed to a genuine dialogue on Middle Eastern peace. When he calls for a conference, he is calling for a platform from which he can turn international attention to Israel, not a forum in which the disputes of all Middle Eastern States may be discussed. Would such a conference, for example, involve negotiation over Jordan's ancient claims to the holy sites of Islam in Saudi Arabia? Or the status of Lebanon, or Syria occupation of it, or any one of a dozen other troubles that have afflicted the Middle East for decades? Of course not, Mr. President, and so we must recognize Saddam's ploy for what it is, and dispose of it accordingly.

The central issue that has brought us here tonight; namely, whether to approve the President's request for authorization to use force, if necessary, to compel Iraq's expulsion from Kuwait, does indeed raise issues that are literally life and death. And this vital question has finally come to where it should finally be decided: here on the floor of the U.S. Senate.

IV. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Our deliberations here tonight are all the more painful, Mr. President, because we are so close to the fateful edge of conflict. Congress has a vital role—a role as essential as it is inevitable—to play in that decision. I believe that it is unfortunate that we shirked that responsibility for months. There is more than enough blame to go around: we in the Congress wanted to play a waiting game, and the President supported that game, since it provided him with the latitude he needed and wanted in dealing with the United Nations and with Iraq.

But we are paying the price for that irresponsibility now, for we are forced to debate the issue with an apparently imminent hostility, with nerves on edge around the dinner table of every American family. We should have been here on this floor when the first troops landed in Saudi Arabia; we should have been here when that troop strength was doubled. And we were not. And that lack of leadership and institutional courage forces upon us as a consequence a last-minute and unpredictable decision.

And look at the result. Now that we are finally where we ought to be, our debate is too little about the merits of the case against Iraq, and too much about the power of the Presidency. And to what effect?

Too often on the one side, this debate has taken on the character of a second-guessing contest, with the rule that whoever makes the first move loses. And the Congress, by not going squarely on the record, dares the President to go first. The other side in this debate has often suggested that this is a test of congressional loyalty to the President.

Well, we do not owe obedience to the President, or any of the other partisans playing games on either side of the aisle. Rather than engaging in partisan politics, we owe obedience to our conscience, and we owe our energies to the defense of our Nation's interests and the safety and security of this and future generations. To act on any other criteria, when so many lives are at stake, is wrong, and best cowardly, and at worst, criminal.

V. THE NUNN-MITCH ELL RESOLUTION

Mr. President, what are we being asked to decide in the Nunn-Mitchell resolution? In effect, this legislation says that yes, we support the policies of the administration in every aspect except the use of force. That means that we supported the buildup of troops. That means we supported the January deadline. That means that we supported the efforts to negotiate at the eleventh hour.

But after that, the resolution says nothing, except that we will then invite the President to set off another round of delay and recrimination in the future, should the use of arms then be requested. This resolution is a dodge, for it says nothing about the unity or disunity of the U.S. Government. It is a copout, with one exception, which specifically says that we would all like to argue about this again at some later date.

This is as unwise and counter-productive a course as it is dangerous. The message that such a statement would send to Saddam Hussein is the most dangerous one possible, in effect admitting that we support the buildup of troops—despite every poll to the contrary—do not support the course taken by the United States and the world community for the past 5 months.

And if we give him the encouragement, we will do what he wants. Mr. President. With the adoption of the Nunn-Mitchell resolution, we would grant him a winning hand just as he was about to contend with the stark reality that his own life was now at stake. The right vote, the vote to minimize or eliminate the risk of going to war, the vote of conscience, is to vote against Nunn-Mitchell and instead to vote to tell Saddam Hussein that we are not fooled, and that an accounting for his actions can no longer be postponed.

Once he sees that there is no profit in attempting to divide the United States, the President will likely see that we all hope can be avoided will be avoided, and that Saddam will do what all bullies finally do in the face of resolve and conscience. And to the just and legitimate demands of the world community of civilized nations.

Mr. President, I suppose you could ask what if I am wrong and Saddam Hussein refuses to yield? Well, then it should be clear to us that he was not willing to give up his ambitions under any circumstances. In that case, armed conflict will be a reality sooner or later.

An inescapable confrontation will be forced upon us, possibly when we are least prepared for it, by a ruthless and even more dangerous Saddam Hussein. And if that is the case, then the best we do what must be done before Iraq eradicates Kuwait, before Saddam digs in for a long war, before the Iraqi
missiles are well-stocked with chemical, biological, or even nuclear bombs.

And so I shall oppose Nunn-Mitchell and support the Warner-Dole resolution. I do not take this decision lightly, Mr. President. Like all of us here, my heart is heavy, and my mind is troubled. I see again and again the faces of the young soldiers I met in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf. I think of them. I pray for them and their families. But if we fail to call a halt to Saddam Hussein, then we will need to pray for all of us.

This vote may be our last chance, short of war, to accomplish this vital task. So I urge my colleagues to join with the President and the other nations of the world, to tell Saddam Hussein that we will not be divided.

Mr. President, we are not by this course of action that I urge, telling or encouraging the administration to go to war. We are giving the President the power he needs to do everything possible to avoid war. We are telling Saddam Hussein that our only objective is to defeat him and his regime. We will not allow him to attack or threaten our friends and allies. We will not allow him to use weapons of mass destruction against innocent people.

The issue is whether Congress will or should support the President's actions. The issue is whether the President's actions will be supported by the American people. I believe that the American people clearly teach us the folly of going to war without the support of the American people. A national consensus on this question is absolutely necessary, and this decision is not for leaders alone. It is for all of us, including an estimated 20,000-plus Oholans—to put their lives on the line with any lesser justification.

Let me say that I believe the United States does have strategic interests at stake in the gulf, and I have thought so for some time. Whether we like it or not, we cannot avoid the fact that our economy, and the economies of virtually every nation in the world, is largely dependent on petroleum as an energy source.

Approximately 70 percent of the world's known reserves of this vital commodity are located in the Persian Gulf. This is not merely a question of the price of oil. While we might grumble, I believe most Americans would pay more per gallon for their gasoline if that were all that would be required to avoid a war in the gulf. Perhaps our grumbling would finally result in a true national energy policy which we lacked during the last oil crisis and unfortunately still lack today.

It is of course critical that we have access to this vital commodity, and our inability to accept a situation where a tyrant hostile to U.S. interests controls that access and can manipulate it to serve his one-sided interests. This is not a coincidence. It was spelled out in unequivocal terms of vital United States national interest in the Carter doctrine of the 1970's when there was a potential Soviet threat to the region. That, too, followed a 42-year-long commitment of Bahrain-based United States naval forces in the gulf.

Other U.S. interests at stake in the gulf include the future nature of U.S. relations with the entire Moslem world. If we fail to control the spread of weapons of mass destruction, the nations that go to war, and the people must understand and support the decision if we are to avoid disasters of the past.

Central to the decision to go to war is whether the President has "had it" with Saddam Hussein, but whether the American people have had it" and will support whatever actions are undertaken thereafter to achieve our national goals. The public must understand what vital national interests are at stake, and agree that those interests are sufficiently threatened to justify a military response. We cannot ask the men and women of our Armed Forces—including an estimated 20,000-plus Oholans—to put their lives on the line with any lesser justification.

I also supported the President's November decision to double the size of the United States deployment insofar as that action enhances the security of our forces deployed in Saudi Arabia and ensures their maximum effectiveness should combat start. However, I am extremely concerned by the administration's apparent intent to use offensive military force before we have exhausted all peaceful economic and diplomatic means to achieve U.N. and U.S. objectives.

Evidence of this preference for a near-term offensive military option is headlined by the administration's increasingly pessimistic statements about the effectiveness of the economic embargo and the ability of the international coalition to hang together over the long haul.

I find it deeply distressing that there has been no concrete evidence that the embargo is not working. All indications suggest that the embargo is beginning to bite and is likely to have a much more profound effect over time than the economic costs of hard currency and its stockpiles of components and spare parts necessary for the maintenance not only of its civilian economy but also its military machine. No one can guarantee that the sanctions will achieve our objectives. But never before in modern history have we had a case that coupled a country uniquely vulnerable to economic isolation with an embargo observed by virtually the entire world community.

In making a decision about which course of action best serves our national interests, another question we must answer—and try to answer now—is the course of action that would start, but how that war will end. What will be the nature and scope of America's commitment? Will United States troops be needed or asked to occupy Iraq? Would the Americans have to decide how would that power vacuum be filled and by whom? Until we get some satisfactory answers to questions like these, it is clear to me that it will be much easier to start a war in the Middle East than it will be to end it.

Further, war in the gulf could well destroy much of the region's oil refining and pumping capacity—and would likely drive the price of petroleum through the roof. If you think the economic costs of keeping our troops waiting in the desert are high, I can assure you that they are nothing compared to the direct and indirect costs of war.

So I say lets give the sanctions a chance to work, let the censure of the world be brought to bear concretely on the Iraqi regime. I find it curious that the administration appears to believe that this unprecedented international
coalition would bear up in the face of an all out war in the gulf yet cannot persevere in the pursuit of peaceful means for resolving this crisis. Ultimately, if the sanctions do not bring about the desired result, and a decision is made that military force is necessary, the least an extended embargo will have achieved is to weaken the military capability of the opponent, sapping his will and ability to fight.

While there is no guarantee that sanctions will work, we will never know unless we let the scenario play out. As the former head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Crowe, said in a recent hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, if we were not prepared to wait, economic sanctions was the wrong policy from the outset. I do not believe it is the wrong policy, and I am not prepared to face the loved ones of any Ohioans deployed in the gulf if I cannot honestly tell them that this Nation will fully explore and complete every peaceful means for resolving this crisis.

In sum, the American people must understand and concur that vital American interests are at stake in the gulf, and that these interests are sufficiently threatened by Iraqi aggression to demand a United States response. Further the American people must understand and support whatever means this Nation elects to employ to protect those vital interests up to and including offensive military action to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait, if that is the ultimate decision. Without such public support, we cannot sustain that action.

To date I believe the American people have given their assent to our defensive deployment in Saudi Arabia, and to the imposition of the economic embargo. However they, as well as I, have grave reservations about the wisdom, and the necessity, for an offensive military action which we initiate, on January 15 or anytime thereafter, before we have exhausted all peaceful alternatives.

I have said that we must rally around our President at this time of crisis, and that is a powerful argument. However, in good conscience, I cannot back a policy I believe is ill-advised—when thousands of American lives hang in the balance—just for the sake of displaying a united front. As a veteran of two wars, I know combat and it is hideous. And when it comes to the 400,000 men and women we have sent to the sands of Saudi Arabia, I want to make sure that everything we do does not want not war, if war comes and this shooting starts, our Government will do whatever it takes to support and protect our people and bring them home as quickly as possible. The men and women of our Armed Forces have been my first concern since this crisis began, and they will continue to be.

Saddam Hussein will find little comfort in the Democratic proposal. Why? Because the President, the Congress, the American people, and indeed the entire world community are absolutely united on the bottom line—Iraq must get out of Kuwait. Our debate is over what means to employ and when. The Democratic proposal does not rule out the use of force. It does suggest that force be the last resort, after all other avenues have been exhausted.

For all these reasons, I intend to vote to keep sanctions in place—while keeping our military option in reserve—and against the kind of blank check that the President would view as congressional acquiescence to a quick and precipitous resort to war. If there is to be war, it is the American people who will pay for it. It is the American people who will die in it.

And it is the American people who should have a say on it.

THE CRISIS IN LITHUANIA

Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I am deeply concerned about the recent events in and concerning Lithuania. President Gorbachev has demanded that Lithuania immediately accept the authority of the central Soviet government or face direct rule from Moscow. Now Soviet troops have stormed buildings in Lithuania. The historical analogies are ominous. Lithuanian politicians have noted that Stalin gave the Lithuanians 24-hours to capitulate in World War II. But I think the more exact analogy is to 1936. The world was distracted by a crisis in the Middle East. The Soviet Union saw a chance to crush a Hungarian move toward neutrality and it took it. Zhignev Brzezinski has written in his classic work "The Soviet Bloc" that "the final Soviet decision to intervene [was] facilitated by the Anglo-French attack on Egypt. * * *

In recent testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations, Dr. Brzezinski expressed his concerns that the Soviets might again yield to the temptation to clean house while the world is preoccupied with the gulf crisis. It appears that his gloomy prediction is beginning to come true.

How tragic and ironic. President Gorbachev's Nobel Peace Prize is newly minted. It has only just reached him. I urge him to live up to the confidence with which his Nobel Peace Prize committee placed in him in bestowing this honor and reverse this misguided decision. I would also note that during the last Congress I introduced legislation to provide to Lithuania $15 million in humanitarian assistance. I argued that this aid would provide critical moral and material support for Lithuania in its negotiations with the Soviet Union. With its reserves depleted by the Soviet blockade the Lithuanians were negotiating with Soviet officials with a knife against their throat. But the Bush administration said "No", the negotiations are going well, this would upset them. Well, obviously the negotiations were not going well. President Gorbachev has turned to threats, including the implicit threat of military force. I will reintroduce my legislation in the new Congress, but I fear that aid will not reach Lithuania in time to have any affect on the current crisis.

I urge President Bush to make clear to the Soviet Union in the strongest possible terms the opposition of the United States to the use of force in negotiating with Lithuania.

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION OF CERTAIN MILITARY NOMINATIONS

Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, the Armed Services Committee has approved six military nominees related to commanders in Operation Desert Shield. I now report them favorably to the Senate, and I hope the Senate will consider them expeditiously even though the Senate received them just a few days ago.

Senator WARNER and I, and the committee wanted to accommodate the request of several of the Services to accelerate its consideration of these nominees because these nominees are commanders of major combat organizations in the Persian Gulf or are in the process of being deployed there in Operation Desert Shield. We asked the Services to ensure we covered all pending nominees in this category and these are the ones that have been identified to us.

For example, Brig. Gen. James M. Myatt, one of the nominees, is the commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, the initial ground combat element of the Marine Corps deployed in Operation Desert Shield, and one of the largest combat elements over there.

The committee's action in accelerating these nominations is not intended to reflect adversely on other pending nominees who will be considered by the committee in the regular order.

The committee prefers to consider all nominations on a list at the same time, but that was not possible given the timeframe. The committee's action does reflect my view and those of other members of the committee that our men and women in uniform who are deployed deserve our full support. In this regard, I will be joining others next Monday in introducing legislation to benefit our troops in the field, such as implementing the savings plan we introduced last year, delaying the Federal income tax filing deadline without penalty, and several other provisions. I will have more to say about these initiatives next Monday.
January 11, 1991

I have also said that should war occur, and I pray that it does not, I will vote to provide our troops with whatever they need to prevail. As far as I am concerned, there will be no cutoff for our troops if the battle starts.

Mr. President, Mr. Warner and I have asked the majority and minority leaders to expedite consideration of these nominations, and I am certain they will do so.

TRIBUTE TO JOSEPH A. GRAZIANO, WILLIAM F. MCGUIRE, AND ALLAN W. WHITCOMB

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, each year, thousands of people fall victim to the ravages of fire, including many brave men and women who risk their lives fighting fires. It is my privilege to pay special tribute to three firefighters from Massachusetts who gave their lives in 1990—Joseph A. Graziano of Braintree, William F. McGuire of Lawrence, and Allan W. Whitcomb of Assonet.

These men were dedicated members of a profession that poses the greatest risks and sometimes demands the greatest sacrifice. It is a profession that tests the limits of human emotion, endurance, commitment and courage. The following prayer, offered at services to fallen firefighters, reflect the dedication of those engaged in this extraordinary form of service to their community.

A FIREFIGHTER'S PRAYER

Give me concern, A willingness to seek out those in need Give me courage, The boldness of spirit to face and conquer fear, To share and endure the ordeal of others in need. Give me strength, Strength of heart, to bear whatever burden might be placed on me, And strength of body, Delivered, all those placed in my care. Give me wisdom to lead, The compassion to comfort, and the love to Serve unselfishly wherever you may take me.

And please Lord, throughout it all, be at my side.

I extend my deepest sympathy to the families and friends of Joseph Graziano, William McGuire, and Allan Whitcomb. I ask unanimous consent that a series of articles may be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Fall River Herald News, Aug. 24, 1990.]

ALLAN WHITCOMB, 64, DIES, WAS FIRE CHIEF IN FREETOWN

FREETOWN.—Fire Chief Allan W. Whitcomb, 64, died Wednesday after being struck while collecting rocks at a sand and gravel pit for the fire department's annual clambake.

Whitcomb, in his fifth year as chief, was transported by medical rescue to Charlton Memorial Hospital in Fall River where he died in the emergency room.

Deputy Chief Mark Haskins said Whitcomb was scheduled to retire in October, and had announced his retirement plans last week.

"We're at a loss for words," said Haskins, who served as deputy under Whitcomb for the last five years. "He was the kind of guy that everybody loved. He was just a helluva guy. He was good to me and to his men."

"He did what every firefighter dreams of—he worked his way through the ranks," Haskins added.

He said the department is planning "a full fire department funeral" on Saturday. Burial will be in the Assonet Cemetery, South Main Street.

The deputy said town flags are being flown at half-staff and will continue to be flown that way until seven days after the funeral.

Whitcomb, who lived at 78 High St., Assonet, was the husband of Anne F. (Lord) Whitcomb, 53, a native of Braintree, Mass. He was the son of Violet W. (Berglund) Doyle, formerly Whitcomb, of North Scituate, R.I., and the late Albert Whitcomb. He moved to Freetown in 1966.

He was appointed fire chief on Sept. 17, 1989 by selectmen. His appointment became effective 12 days later, the day after his predecessor, Fire Chief Richard Buttermore, retired.

He served on the town's fire department for 30 years and was a call firefighter from 1959 until 1974 when the first full-time department was formed. He was also a member of the Bristol County Fire Chiefs Association; the National and Massachusetts Fire Prevention Association; and the Freetown Firefighters' Association.

He was also a member of the Fraternal Order of Eagles, Lakeville, the King Philip Scottish Rite Bodies of Fall River; the Bristol County Fire Department; and the Bristol County Fire Chiefs Association March 15 after responding to a car accident.

He died March 23 at University Hospital without regaining consciousness.

He and three other firefighters went to the scene of an accident in which an alleged drunk driver smashed truck head-on into a car occupied by an elderly couple. The husband Arcangelo Bellino, 94, died shortly after the accident.

Firefighter Graziano worked at removing the man from the wreckage and then administered CPR to his wife Frannie.

He restored her breathing but she died two days later.

"He was the picture of health. He had passed the fire department physical with flying colors in October," said his friend Captain Richard Hull.

"But he was busting himself when he was out there. When there are people laying there and they're holier, you've got to get them out," he said.

At a funeral car slowly passed, the firefighters they snapped to attention and saluted.

 Pallbearers Deputy Chief Richard Golden, Captain Arthur Dalton, Lt. Stephen Flaherty, Officers David Linscott, John Malone and David Baker gently hoisted the flag-draped coffin up the church stairs while bearers played "Amazing Grace." Fr. William Williams called it a "very sad day."

"This past week his family softly called—wake up Joe. Wake up Joe." They kept calling his name.

The college said it is also checking on the children of Lawrence Patrolman Thomas Duggan, who died Friday, three days after he was beaten with an aluminum baseball bat in a variety of bars on Lowell Street.

"We are waiting to get all the information on how best to proceed with the Duggan family," said Brendan Donahue, Emerson's director of community and government relations.

As part of its commitment to Lawrence, Emerson College has offered to pay full tuition to academically qualified children of Lawrence police officers or firefighters killed while on the job.

The McGuire children are the first to qualify for the program. Their father died of injuries he suffered while fighting a house fire at 8 Temple St. in December 1989.

Patrolman Duggan's children are Melissa, 21, and Thomas 23, both of Lawrence, and Becky, 13, and Kelley, 12, both of Methuen. Both men were 18-year veterans of their departments.

[From the Braintree Forum and Observer, Mar. 29, 1990]

AS THE COFFIN LEFT THE CHURCH, A TAPE PLAYED "YOU ARE MY HERO"

(By Cathy Comley)

Some 400 firefighters from throughout New England lined Hawthorn Road, standing in brilliant sunshine. A dirge, like a heartbeat on a drum, could be heard in the distance.

As the sound came closer a color guard rounded the corner and began slowly marching toward St. Thomas More Church.

The fire chief's car with red lights blinking was next followed by two flower-draped fire trucks, Engine 1 and Engine 4.

Then came a procession of about 200 Braintree firefighters and police officers.

They had come to bury a fallen comrade—an officer who died in the line of duty.

Joseph A. Graziano, 45, was stricken with a heart attack at the East Braintree Fire Station March 15 after responding to a car accident.

He died March 23 at University Hospital without regaining consciousness.

He and three other firefighters went to the scene of an accident in which an alleged drunk driver smashed truck head-on into a car occupied by an elderly couple.

The husband Arcangelo Bellino, 94, died shortly after the accident.

Firefighter Graziano worked at removing the man from the wreckage and then administered CPR to his wife Frannie.

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Patrolman Duggan's children are Melissa, 21, and Thomas 23, both of Lawrence, and Becky, 13, and Kelley, 12, both of Methuen. Both men were 18-year veterans of their departments.
"Thursday Jesus called his name. And we lost a good man, a good father, a good husband, a good brother, a good son," the priest said.

Captain Hull eulogized his friend. "You have lost a husband and a father. We have lost a brother, a companion, a pal," he told the family.

He recounted an anecdote when Joe started a collection agency on Washington Street on a shoestring. "He couldn't afford a mailbox so he cut a hole in the door. "What he didn't realize was the door was hollow and all the mail was slipping inside. It was weeks before he received his first piece of mail," Captain Hull said.

Arthur Graziano also eulogized his brother. His daughters Suzanne and Mary Joe played a tape of "You are my Hero" as the casket was slowly carried out of the packed church.

An endless motorcade then went down Adams Street and up Commercial to the East Braintree Fire Station.

The motorcade then backtracked to Washington Street and passed the Central Fire Station where another fire truck paid tribute.

Then it was on to Blue Hills Cemetery.

The cortège of Braintree firemen led the mourners to the graveside service.

Firefighters William Coppen and Russell Montalto folded the flag on his coffin.

"It went from the hands of Firefighter McGuire to Joseph's widow, Rilla. He told her McGuire had been assigned to free him. "He's a great family man," they said. It left three of their own, one just 4 years old. His 4-year-old son has Down's Syndrome, but his progress has been so remarkable that psychologists at the University of Lowell are tracking him, said sister-in-law Jan Toye, when the third-floor porch and porch roof collapsed and fell on him. Pvt. McGuire, 42, was buried under a pile of wood and gravel when a third-floor porch broke loose from its supports.

He was in critical condition at Massachusetts General Hospital during the evening. The doctor estimated he may have gone without oxygen for 10 minutes while his fellow firefighters continued to search for him.

An 18-year-veteran of the fire department, Firefighter McGuire is best known for his love of children. "He and Rilla, his wife, had three of their own, one just 4 months old. His 4-year-old son has Down's Syndrome, but his progress has been so remarkable that psychologists at the University of Lowell are tracking him, said sister-in-law Jan Toye, when the third-floor porch and porch roof collapsed and fell on him."

"They called us to chase sparks and throw debris out that still might be hot. It's just a little thing, but it's the memories that come."

"Billy and I were on the second floor and he told me there was fire on the porch. We both went out there and it looked like the deck had burned away," Pvt. Toye said.

Pvt. McGuire used a hook to knock the porch railings off and two posts were all that remained to hold up the third floor porch above them.

"You're my hero," Chief Hull said.

Fire Chief Vitagliano to Joseph's widow, Rilla, he created an extended Fire Family. "Keep the prayers coming in."" (From the Eagle-Tribune, Dec. 31, 1989)
promised a new life to all who would believe in Him and live in Him. Really death does not take life away; it merely changes this troubled world of ours, for the bright, the better and the brighter life with God," Father Pikor said.

"He was kind and charitable. He did his part for his country, family, and his neighbors. He was just the man this Mass proves all of this," Father Pikor said.

"And now for his departure from this world into eternity, he performed his last act of charity and love last Sunday at the Relief Inn Christmas party for the little children which were always part of his life. He wrapped up gifts and passed them out to the children," Father Pikor said.

"The tragic end came shortly after that, making a sacrifice of his life while on active duty," Father Pikor said.

Father Pikor ended the service by reading a poem written 50 years ago by William J. Canwell Sr.

Entitled "His Last Alarm," the verses offer a tribute to departed firefighters.

They read in part:

"When duty called, he never shrank. He was fearless of all harm. His "Supreme Chief" has pulled the box. He has answered his "Last Alarm." That voice we loved is forever still. His work upon Earth is done. He has answered his duty called, he never shrank. His work upon Earth is done."

Father Pikor said.

"We were very pleased they came on a day like today, so cold, and during the holiday season," Chief Joseph said.

JOHN J. MCNALLY, JR.—A MASSACHUSETTS LEADER FOR SMALL BUSINESS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, a good friend and native son of Massachusetts, who served in various capacities in the Small Business Administration for the state of Massachusetts; he was honored by the administration of President Johnson, President Ford, and President Bush. As a lifelong advocate of small business, John McNally's impressive positions of responsibility have included director of the Economic Development Program of the Small Business Administration for New England; Chief Advocate of the Small Business Administration for the North-Eastern United States; and appointment as chairman of the first Perform ance and Standards Review Board for the SBA. Mr. McNally has also been active in community affairs. He served as president of the Webster-Dudley Chamber of Commerce, and was honored by that organization as Man of the Year in 1979.

On a more personal note, John was a valued friend of my brother, President John, whom he served as Staff Assistant and Assistant Press Secretary. John has remained a close personal friend over the years, and I salute his dedicated service to our commonwealth, to our Nation, and to small business.

TRIBUTE TO SOUTH CAROLINA SENATOR MARSHALL B. WILLIAMS

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to pay tribute to South Carolina Senator Marshall B. Williams, who recently became our Nation's longest serving State senator. He has served the State of South Carolina with dedication, ability, honor and integrity for over 39 years. We are proud of him and his lovely wife Margaret.

First elected in 1962, Senator Williams has been consecutively reelected ever since. For the past 2 years he has served with distinction as president pro tempore of the South Carolina Senate. A man of commitment, intellect and high ideals, Senator Williams is a model of excellence to generations of public servants. The Palmetto State is indeed fortunate to have as talented and honorable a man as Marshall Williams at the helm of the State senate.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an article regarding Senator Williams be printed in the RECORD at this point.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

ORANGEBURG SEN. MARSHALL WILLIAMS IS NATION’S LONGEST SERVING SENATOR

(By Tucker Lyon)

In 1969, veteran Orangeburg Sen. Marshall Williams was sworn in as president pro tempore of the Senate, an honor traditionally reserved for the state's top-ranking or longest serving senator.

Now, two years later, Williams has the added distinction of being the longest-serving senator in the nation.

"I'm the most senior senator lawmaker in the United States. I don't know about the House," Williams said. "The woman doing the federal, national legislative (handbook) said one other had served the time I was, but he was not offering for reelection . . . She said I'd be the senior one after the election."

Another state record he holds, Williams believes, is a key to his longevity.

"I went without opposition 32 years, from 1962 to 1984, longer than any person's ever been in Service. I don't know about the rest of the country." Although four others before—Sol Blatt in the House and Edgar Brown, Dember Dennis and Marlon Green of the Senate—had served longer than Williams' 39 years in the Senate, he notes that they all at times had opposition.

"That's probably why I'm still up there. If I'd had opposition during those years, I might have lost somewhere down the line," Williams said. "I guess it is the Democratic policy it's like a card game, if you play enough hands, you'll lose some."

Since his days as a college student, Williams also has the rare distinction of never having lost an election by the people.

In 1946, when he made his first bid for public office, Williams says he was "a country boy" who ran for the House as a way to make himself known outside his own neck of the woods.

"I'm sure I had it made a much harder time being elected the first time if I wasn't a veteran," Williams concedes.

Once elected to the House and again following his 1962 election to the Senate, Williams says, he carried out his intention "by making a sacrifice of his life while on active duty," Father Pikor said.

"I've put the finger on the senators. I put the finger on the gentlemen the state has put here. They should be made to perform, to offer a tribute to departed firefighters."

"We are very pleased they came on a day like today, so cold, and during the holiday season," Chief Joseph said.

"When duty called, he never shrank. He was fearless of all harm. His "Supreme Chief" has pulled the box. He has answered his "Last Alarm." That voice we loved is forever still. His work upon Earth is done."

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January 11, 1991

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE

ADDRESS

1991 INAUGURAL ADDRESS

There are no words adequate to express my appreciation for the great honor you have bestowed upon me. I want you to know I will do my best to deserve your confidence and respect.

Inauguration day is a celebration of new beginnings—a day to reflect on the past and ponder the unlimited opportunities which await us. I intend to do a little of this in a few minutes.

But this is also a day when all South Carolinians are dwelling on the present. A half world away sons and daughters of South Carolina and America are preparing for war while praying for peace.

We know that history will be written in the next week, but we do not know what it will say. We do know, however, that the current situation is unacceptable.

This morning I signed a proclamation designating the next 7 days as prayer week in South Carolina. I am asking people of all faiths to pray for God’s protection of our troops, and for God’s guidance for our President as he seeks a solution to the Persian Gulf crisis.

Now I want to share with you a letter I received from a South Carolina son, Private First Class Thomas S. Doar, the fourth from Hartsville of the 37th Engineers Battalion in Saudi Arabia.

Writing about his education in South Carolina schools, he says, quoting, “I often was spellbound in my U.S. history classes by the part South Carolinians played in not only the formation of a State, but a nation as well. From Rutledge to Calhoun to Byrnes to Thurmond, these are just a few of the historical figures who simultaneously forged and strengthened the United States of America.”

He continues, “it was the education I received in South Carolina that has caused me ... to feel like I, too, am playing an important part in our Nation’s history.”

And he concludes by writing, “For me, it is a responsibility and a privilege. So writes Pfc Thomas Doar from the sands of Saudi Arabia.

It is to this soldier and the other Americans in uniform that we dedicate this inaugural ceremony in thanksgiving for their courage and devotion. God bless America and her sons and daughters in uniform.

Four years ago I shared with you my belief that the overriding purpose of government is to help people help themselves.

A government that aggressively creates opportunities but steadfastly resists guarantees.

A government that encourages independent initiative and discourages debilitating dependency.

A government that empowers, not enslaves.

This philosophy works.

Personal income in South Carolina has grown at an average annual rate of eight-point-two percent since 1987, improving our standard of living and giving us the resources to educate children and increase services for all South Carolinians.

And not only did we avoid a general tax increase, we cut taxes on the working poor and took steps to prevent backdoor tax increases through inflation.

Two weeks ago the board of economic advisers reported that South Carolina is still adding jobs while the nation is losing them. Who would have expected the report indicated continued growth. Indeed, we have added more than 200 thousand new jobs.

South Carolina’s record setting economic expansion and job creation validate our strategy of putting more people to work instead of putting higher taxes on working people.

“The supreme end of education,” said Samuel Johnson, “is expert discernment—the power to discern which is genuine from the counterfeit, and to prefer the good and the genuine to the bad and the counterfeit.

Such is our quest for excellence in education.

Achieving excellence requires different strategies from achieving minimum standards. Centralized control must give way to local innovation.

We recognized with the target 2000 legislation the potential of skilled and on-the-job education rests right there in the classroom with the teachers and principals and parents who know their children best.

They are the potters molding the clay, the artists painting the picture. The State’s goal is to support them. Their job is to understand the needs of their children and creatively find ways to meet those needs, even if it means painting outside the numbers.

Our children will get quality education to the extent that we fund it and local educators use it to benefit the children.

In this regard 1991 presents some tough choices. The budget is tight and the needs great.

Let the special interests shout from the State house dome if they must. But let us be sensible enough not to raise taxes and wise enough not to retreat from pursuing excellence in the classroom.

A short time ago, I received a letter from a worker who had just graduated in my initiative for work force excellence. Referring to her fellow employees at a major plant, she writes, “I found them to be excited about the opportunities, the space age, will perpetuate a system that continues the education. Everyone enrolled in the program seems to have a different outlook on life.”

This is the power of education. If the leadership of South Carolina, unified in purpose, can help people capture a new outlook on life, there is no limit to what we can accomplish.

Four years ago I talked about a clean and safe environment.

And South Carolina is united behind the effort to cleanse our schools and streets of drugs.

The Safe Schools Act, which took effect nine days ago, reaffirms that schools are for building up. But there’s also a place for those who would tear down. It’s called prisons.

Just as the fight to protect our children continues, so must we continue our vigilance to protect our natural resources.

Hurricane Hugo again reminded us that our environment is fragile.

Post T. Bentong Young captured the South Carolina we all love when he wrote, “a quiet, calm and peaceful place, here each life can set its pace, with hope that time will not erase the special beauty, charm and grace so loved in South Carolina.”

We cannot afford to erase the special beauty of the wetlands. We cannot permit other priorities to thwart efforts for sensible solid waste disposal.

And we shall not allow one judicial opinion to let other States off the hook in meeting their responsibilities for hazardous waste.

In the four years not one hazardous waste facility has opened in South Carolina. We have enough capacity to meet our needs.

We have not sought, nor do we seek, to dodge our responsibility, and we will not allow other States to dodge theirs.

We in South Carolina will join with States which voluntarily signed the regional agreement on hazardous waste to honor their word and maintain their integrity. We shall pursue fair and effective coordination. But if forced, we will not duck confrontation.

But we have our own integrity to deal with in South Carolina. Revelations of corruption have hurt.

Our image has been tarnished. Public confidence has been damaged, and it isn’t over yet.

The thing that troubles me most is the effect it must have on our children. The very soul of our State is shaken if they perceive their elected leaders as dishonest.

I want to make three points.

First, I proclaim that the vast majority of legislators and other public officials are men and women of integrity who have chosen to serve with grace and dignity in the public square.

Second, all the laws in the world will not guarantee honesty. You only need to look at the Bible to see this. If certain people choose to violate the laws, we cannot expect universal conformity to man’s laws.

Third, we do not need reform to make people good. But we need reform to mirror the integrity of the good people in public life and free them to do the people’s business without a cloud of suspicion hanging over them.

There will be much debate over the substance of reform. I commend Senator Williams, Lieutenant Governor Theodore, Speaker Sheheen and Representative Wilkins for their work in setting the stage for debate.

I think I can speak for them and other legislators in promising the people that we will not quit this year until honesty and ethics have again been exalted and restored to their rightful position in the affairs of state.

Addressing ethics, however, is only a partial answer. Much of State government is not directly accountable to any elected official. We in essence have four branches of government: the executive, legislative and judicial branches, and the bureaucracy.

Failure to restructure government, failure to bring horse-and-buggy government into the space age, will perpetuate a system that answers to nobody, listens to nobody and serves nobody other than its own special interests.

Soon I will submit for the general assembly a bill designed to restructure State government.

There will be those who will measure its merits in terms of power—who gains and who loses.

Let me be clear: the only gains we should concern ourselves with are those that make government more sensible.

And the only power to fret about is the power of the people because it is their government, their taxes, their future.

I have provided a general outline of some of our accomplishments and challenges. But I do not want to end without stating my unequivocal optimism for the future of South Carolina.

I can’t help but be optimistic when one of modern history’s worst natural disasters left over people unbound.

I can’t help but be optimistic knowing how we all pulled together in that tragic time and came out stronger.

And I said, if Hugo couldn’t destroy our spirit, then recession, difficulties and even scandal do not stand a chance.
January 11, 1991

Let us look to ourselves for unity and purpose. Let us look to God for strength and assurance. Let us be confident that we can fulfill our responsibilities.

Thank you, God Bless America, our military, and all of you.

TRAGEDY AT CALHOUN, TN

Mr. SASSE. Mr. President, on December 11, 1990, the worst highway tragedy in the history of my State occurred on Interstate 75 near Calhoun, TN. Twelve persons died, and 75 were hospitalized with injuries. I am convinced that many more individuals would have died if not for the heroic actions of individual motorists and emergency personnel who acted quickly to help crash victims and to avert further tragedy.

This accident unfolded rapidly as motorists, suddenly engulfed in blinding fog, found themselves trapped in wreckage and fire. The pileup stretched a mile in both directions. Eighty-three vehicles were involved, 12 persons died, and 75 were hospitalized with injuries. I am convinced that many more individuals would have died if not for the heroic actions of individual motorists and emergency personnel who acted quickly to help crash victims and to avert further tragedy.

Emergency response teams from seven counties and medical professionals worked tirelessly to save the lives of victims on site and at area hospitals. Rescue teams worked for hours in the burning wreckage to free other survivors knowing that their own lives were in danger.

Community support in the aftermath of the tragedy was outstanding. Volunteers worked around the clock to provide adequate food and shelter, to answer phone inquiries and to contribute any support services needed by victims, rescue workers, medical professionals and others.

Mr. President, the response was phenomenal and deserves special attention. Our heart-felt sympathy goes to the families who lost loved ones. At the same time, we should express our gratitude to those who gave so much of themselves. I would like to recognize for a job well done the following agencies, organizations and individuals who participated in the response to this accident:

Alert Care Emergency Medical Services, American Red Cross, Athens Area Amateur Radio Club, Athens Community Hospital, Athens Fire Department, Athens Police Department, Athens/McMinn County Emergency Management, Athens/McMinn Hazardous Material, Bacon Construction—Cleveland, Baptist Med Flight—Knoxville, RJF Bowaters Emergency Medical Services, Bowaters Security, Bradley County Emergency Medical Services, Bradley County Emergency Management, Bradley County Hazardous Materials, Bradley County Rescue, Bradley County Sheriff's Department, Brian's Wyler—River City, Calhoun Rural Fire, Calhoun School, Calhoun Transport Service Reef Truck, Charleson Volunteer Fire Department, Chat-
	tanooga—Hamilton County Rescue, Clearwater Rural Fire, Cleveland Area Amateur Radio Club, Cleveland General Hospital, Cleveland Fire Department, Cleveland Police Department, Dallas Bay Volunteer Fire Department, Daniels Construction Co.—Cleveland, Dr. Rodney Dunham—Woods Memorial Emergency Medical Services, Dr. Jerry DeVane—Bradley Memorial Emergency Medical Services, Eastside Fire Department, Emergency Service—Knoxville, Federal Power— empathized with the spirit of perestroika and reflect a mentality we thought had ended with the cold war.

These actions by President Gorbachev do not mark the values of a Nobel Peace Prize winner. They reflect a cynical attempt to use force at a time when the world’s attention is turned to another serious crisis.

The Lithuanian people and their Government present no threat to the Soviet Government. They are not shooting anyone. They simply want their freedom and their nationhood back.

The Soviet Government has already condemned the Hitler-Stalin secret protocols that turned the Baltics over to the Soviet Union. But Gorbachev appears to be returning to Stalinist policies on the Baltic States.

This is truly a set-back for United States-Soviet relations, and I believe the President should postpone the summit and send Mr. Gorbachev an urgent message telling him that we will not pursue a policy of business as usual. We must urge Mr. Gorbachev to call the troops back from Lithuania and allow the democratically elected Government of Lithuania, and the Governments of Latvia and Estonia to carry out their lawful duties.

Mr. President, I thank you and my colleagues for joining me in this public tribute. It is the least we can do for those who gave so much of themselves.

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We understand that three persons have already been wounded and that one fatality has been reported. These acts by President Gorbachev and his military are contrary to the spirit of perestroika and reflect a mentality we thought had ended with the cold war.

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I ask unanimous consent that a news release of a statement I made several days ago be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

CSCE COMMISSION CHAIRMAN HITS ADMINISTRATION CAUTION ON BALTICS

WASHINGTON.—Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.), chairman of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("Helsinki Commission"), today expressed deep concern over Moscow's reported threat to send paratroops into the Baltic States to round up draft resisters.

"It's time for the Bush Administration to back up its rhetorical support for Baltic self-determination by taking a tough stand on forced Baltic conscription into the Soviet Armed Forces," DeConcini said.

Since 1940, when the Soviet Union invaded and seized Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the United States government has considered the Baltic States occupied countries.

DeConcini said that because the 1945 Geneva Convention, which was ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union, prohibits occupying powers from compelling conscription into the armed forces, Baltic citizens should not have to serve in the Soviet Army.

The Soviet Defense Ministry's latest threat to use compelled conscription is part of an effort by the Soviet authorities to use force as a means to silence opposition, the Senator contended.

"The Soviet Defense Ministry's latest threat to use compulsion against the Baltic States caps a series of alarming events and trends," DeConcini said. "Baltic good-faith efforts to negotiate independence with President Gorbachev and the Soviet leadership have foundered because of Moscow's recalcitrance.

Statements have issued from Moscow to dissolve the duly elected parliaments of the Baltic States and to rule Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by presidential decree. Last week, spe-
cial “Black Beret” forces of the Soviet Interior Ministry took control of the press building in Riga, Latvia.

“All signs indicate that President Gorbachev has lost any inclination to work out democracy with the Baltic governments and has opted instead to force them into line,” DeConcini said. “Foreign Minister Shevardnadze’s warnings that ‘a dictator- ship is coming’ grow more convincing every day.

“Moscow’s unwillingness to negotiate seriously with the Baltic States has, unfortunately, been encouraged by a confused U.S. policy,” DeConcini added. “Since Lithuania declared the re-establishment of independence in March 1990, and Estonia and Latvia declared their intentions to proceed on the same course, the Administration has tiptoed, backtracked, and sidestepped on the issue of Baltic independence.

“The issue of forced conscription provides us with an opportunity to put some teeth into our 80-year principled stand of refusing to recognize the forcible Soviet incorporation of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. We should make clear to President Gorbachev that Soviet use of force in the Baltic States will have powerful and immediate impact on U.S.-Soviet relations and that our cooperation in other regions, including the Persian Gulf, does not mean that we have given Moscow carte blanche in the Baltic.”

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. McCathran, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(REM OVED)

REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS WITH RESPECT TO LIBYA—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 3

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs:

To the Congress of the United States:

1. I hereby report to the Congress on developments since my last report of July 13, 1990, concerning the national emergency with respect to Libya that was declared in Executive Order No. 12543 of January 7, 1986. This report is submitted pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c); section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) (“IEEPA”); and section 585(c) of the International Security and Develop-

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posals to apply economic sanctions against Libya so long as these measures are appropriate, and will continue to report periodically to the Congress on significant developments as required by law.

GEORGE BUSH


EXECUTIVE REPORTS OF COMMITTEES

The following executive reports of committees were submitted:

By Mr. NUNN from the Committee on Armed Services:

The following-named brigadier general of the U.S. Marine Corps for promotion to the permanent grade of major general, under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 624:

James M. Myatt.

I nominate the following-named captains in the U.S. Navy for promotion to the permanent grade of rear admiral (lower half), pursuant to title 10, United States Code, section 624, subject to qualifications therefor as provided by law:

UNRESTRICTED LINE OFFICER

To be rear admiral (lower half)


John J. Mazach U.S. Navy.


INTRODUCTION OF BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

The following bills and joint resolutions were introduced, read the first and second time by unanimous consent, and referred as indicated:

By Mr. WARNER (for himself, Mr. LIEBERMAN, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. ROBB, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. DOLLE, Mr. SHEPHERD, Mr. DANTZIG, Mr. WALKER, Mr. BOND, Mr. BURNS, Mr. CHAFFEE, Mr. COATS, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. COREN, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. DOMENICI, Mr. GADDI, Mr. GORTON, Mr. GRANN, Mr. HATCH, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mrs. KASBEAUN, Mr. MACK, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. McCONNELL, Mr. ROTH, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. ROTHSCHILD, Mr. SMITH, Mr. SPECER, and Mr. THURMOND):

S.J. Res. 2. Joint resolution to authorize the use of U.S. Armed Forces pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution 678, placed on the calendar.

SUBMISSION OF CONCURRENT AND SENATE RESOLUTIONS

The following concurrent resolutions and Senate resolutions were read, and referred (or acted upon), as indicated:

By Mr. DOLLE (for himself, Mr. FELL, Mr. MCCURLEY, Mr. WARNER):

S. Res. 11. Resolution to commend the Secretary General of the United Nations; considered and agreed to.
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By Mr. BRADLEY (for himself, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. DOLE, Mr. PELL, Mr. HELMS, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. KOHL, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. BILLINGS, Mr. DIXON, Mr. WARNER, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. SIMON, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. DODD, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. MACK, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. AKSA, Mr. BRYAN and Mr. SARBANES):

S. Res. 12. Resolution calling upon President Gorbachev to refrain from further use of force against the democratically elected government of Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia; considered and agreed to.

ADDITIONAL COSPONSORS

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1

At the request of Mr. KERRY, his name was added as a cosponsor of Senate Joint Resolution 1, a joint resolution regarding United States policy to reverse Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait.

SENATE RESOLUTION 11—COMMENDING THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. DOL (for himself, Mr. PELL, Mr. MITCHELL, and Mr. WARNER) submitted the following resolution, which was considered and agreed to:

S. Res. 11

Whereas it is in the interest of all parties to explore every reasonable avenue to achieve a resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis without war;

Whereas the United Nations has played a central role in efforts to achieve the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait;

Whereas the United Nations Security Council has passed 12 separate resolutions calling for the accomplishment of those goals;

Whereas the United Nations Secretary General Peres de Cuellar has announced his intention to travel to the Persian Gulf, including to Iraq, to make a last effort to convince Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to withdraw his forces from Kuwait before January 15, 1991;

Resolved, That the Senate commends the Secretary General for his initiative;

That the Senate hopes that the Secretary General’s mission will lead to a peaceful resolution of the Persian Gulf crisis, to include the total withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

SENATE RESOLUTION 12—RELATIVE TO THE USE OF FORCE IN THE BALTIC NATIONS

Mr. BRADLEY (for himself, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. DOLE, Mr. PELL, Mr. HELMS, Mr. D’AMATO, Mr. KOHL, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. GLENN, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. DIXON, Mr. WARNER, Mr. THURMOND, Mr. SIMON, Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. DODD, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. DECONCINI, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. MACK, Mr. LUGAR, Mr. AKSA, Mr. BRYAN and Mr. SARBANES) submitted the following resolution, which was considered and agreed to, as follows:

NOTICES OF HEARINGS

COMMITTEE ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY

Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I would like to announce that the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry will hold a hearing on agricultural trade and agricultural reform in the Soviet Union as they affect United States agriculture. The hearing will be held on Wednesday, January 23, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. in SR-332. For further information, please contact Lynnett Wagger of the committee staff at 224-5207.

COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

Mr. FORD. Mr. President, I wish to announce that the Committee on Rules and Administration will meet to organize on Wednesday, January 30, 1991, at 9:30 a.m. in SR-301. At this meeting the committee plans to adopt its rules of procedure and to select members for the Joint Committee on Printing and the Joint Committee of Congress on the Library.

The committee will also consider legislative and administrative items currently pending in its agenda, including an original resolution authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Rules and Administration for the 102nd Congress.

For further information regarding this meeting, please contact Carole Blessington of the Rules Committee staff on 224-0276.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

HONORING AMERICA’S BEST AIRLINE

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, those of us from the Great Lakes region have long been proud of the excellent service provided by the Milwaukee-based airline Midwest Express.

Yesterday, we learned that the secret is finally out. The January issue of Consumer Reports Travel Letter reveals to all Americans that Midwest Express is, overall—the best airline in America.

Speaking from personal experience, I say the following: Midwest Express is second to none. And I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the folks at Midwest Express for this richly deserved honor.

I ask that an article from the Milwaukee Journal on this subject be included in the RECORD at this point.

The article follows:

ON TOP: MIDWEST EXPRESS NAMED BEST AIRLINE IN UNITED STATES

(By Tim Cuprisin)

Midwest Express was rated “best US airline overall” in the January issue of Consumer Reports Travel Letter.

The monthly travel newsletter praised the Milwaukee-based airline as the only US carrier receiving “accolades on every coach ticket, including the cheapest excursion.”

The airline’s comfortable seating and premium meals earned Midwest Express an inclusion in the newsletter’s “10 Good Transportation Values.”

“However small its present market, this niche carrier is a welcome exception to the sameness of most US coach air travel,” according to the newsletter. Published in Mount Vernon, N.Y., by Consumers Union, the 65,000-circulation newsletter is aimed mostly at non-business travelers.

Midwest Express President Mr. Hoeksema said that maintaining the airline’s reputation for service was “something that we work very hard to do.”

“When I look at this thing, it just renews to me the fact that people want good service and they want good value,” Hoeksema said.

Hoeksema said the airline’s status as a “niche carrier,” which serves a specific area of the flying market, made it easier to stress service.

“We have a successful basic formula and customers like it,” Hoeksema said. “We’re small, so we’re small makes it easier to do this type of thing. It’s not all things to all people.”

Recently, Midwest became the only US carrier to offer credit card telephones in all planes.

Midwest Airline Director Barry Bateman said Midwest Express was responsible for “putting us on the map.”

“Midwest Express is awfully good for Milwaukee and awfully good for Mitchell Airports. Mr. Bateman said, "It’s very nice to be standing out in the concourse and executives will come in from Boston and New York, and they will remark about what a nice trip they’ve had. It’s a real feather in our cap that Midwest Express is here.”

Bateman said Midwest Express was one of the few airlines created after the industry was deregulated that has thrived. He said its success stemmed from its focus on Wisconsin business fliers.

Hoeksema said that the recession and higher fuel prices had forced the airline to spend the first quarter of 1991 preserving its market, rather than expanding. But he said those figures have shown little, since about 75% of the airline’s pas-
sengers were business fliers, rather than discretionary travelers.

W.B. Leonard, managing editor of the newsletter, said Midwest Express routinely scored highly in surveys of seating comfort. The airline's fleet of 15 DC-9s has only two rows of seats and an average of only 45 US airlines limit to first class seating. Most airlines have three seats in a row in coach.

HONORING CHIPPEWA SPRINGS CORP. AND LEINENKUGEL'S BREWERY

Mr. KASTEN. Mr. President, all Americans are proud of the sacrifice being made by the young men and women who are representing our country in the Persian Gulf. I rise today to applaud some of my constituents who have gone the extra mile to lighten the burden on those courageous young soldiers.

The Chippewa Springs Corp. of Chippewa Falls, WI, together with the Jacob Leinenkugel Brewing Co., has shipped 800 cases of bottled spring water to our military personnel stationed around the world.

Thanks to this important joint project, our troops will enjoy 20,000 16-ounce bottles of refreshing Wisconsin spring water. Truly can it be said of our soldiers: "Blessed are they who thirst for what is right." I therefore extend a heartfelt thanks to the generous Wisconsinites who have made this important donation.

ORDERS FOR SATURDAY

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in recess until 8 a.m. on Saturday, January 12; that following the prayer, the Journal of proceedings be deemed approved to date and the time for the two leaders be reserved for their use later in the day.

I further seek unanimous consent that immediately following the prayer on Saturday, there be 3 hours 10 minutes of debate on the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 1, the Nunn, et al., joint resolution, with the majority leader or his designee controlling 110 minutes and the Republican leader or his designee controlling 80 minutes; that at the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote without any intervening action or debate on passage of Senate Joint Resolution 1; and that upon the disposition of Senate Joint Resolution 1, the Senate proceed to the consideration of Senate Joint Resolution 2, the Doles-Warner, et al., resolution, on which there will be 2 hours 10 minutes of debate, with the Republican leader or his designee controlling 80 minutes and the majority leader or his designee controlling 50 minutes; and that at the conclusion or yielding back of time, the Senate proceed to vote without any intervening action or debate on pas-

sage of Senate Joint Resolution 2 and that with respect to the consideration of these two resolutions, no amendments or motions be in order, except for motions to reconsider and to table the passage of the resolutions.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, it is so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I want to thank my colleagues, the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin, and the Republican leader, with whom I have reached this agreement following many hours of discussion along with many colleagues on both sides who participated in those discussions.

Under this agreement, for the information therefore of Senators, to summarize, the Senate will reconvene at 8 a.m. on Saturday morning—actually now this morning, it just being after midnight now—and we will debate for 3 hours and 10 minutes on the Nunn, et al., resolution. There will then be a vote on that at 11:10 a.m. on Saturday. Assuming that will be an approximately 20-minute vote, beginning at approximately 11:30, or immediately following that vote, the Senate will then debate for 2 hours and 10 minutes on the Doles-Warner resolution, with a vote on that to occur at approximately 1:40 p.m., pursuant to this agreement. There will be no amendments to either resolution. There will be no other matters before the Senate at that time, just these two votes on the two competing resolutions.

Mr. President, if I might, I further ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution filed earlier yesterday by Senators WARNER and DOLE, et al., be considered introduced and that it be placed on the calendar.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President and Members of the Senate, that is a necessary prerequisite to having it up for consideration later today. So the matter will be concluded with rollcall votes to occur—to repeat once more—at approximately 11:10 a.m. on the Nunn resolution and at approximately 1:40 p.m. on the Warner resolution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The distinguished acting minority leader is recognized.

Mr. SIMPSON. I thank the majority leader and express to him we, too, are pleased we could compress this time and meet this schedule. But I want to say, certainly, to those on this side of the aisle that the time that will be expansively compressed in the morning hour from the time when the Senate begins its business until the approximate time of the rollcall vote the leader has just described for reasons that I understand that there is a compromise between the majority leader and the majority leader earlier in the day.

And so I would remind my colleagues that their schedule will be available to them in the morning. There are some times that we were not able to meet in the form of the full time requested. And so I am just engaging those on our side of the aisle that schedule for their remarks will be strictly adhered to in order to meet this schedule and we will continue our statements tonight.

Mr. MITCHELL. I thank my colleagues.

RECESS UNTIL 8 A.M. TODAY

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair notes there are no other Senators on the floor who are authorized to be recognized. There appears to be no other business before the body at this time.

Under the previous order the Senate will stand in recess until the hour of 8 a.m.

Thereupon, the Senate, at 2:39 a.m., recessed until Saturday, January 12, 1991, at 8 a.m.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate January 11, 1991:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JON DAVID GLASSMAN, OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, A CAREER MEMBER OF THE SENATE FOREIGN SERVICE, CLASS OF MINISTER-COUNSELOR, TO BE AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO THE REPUBLIC OF PARAGUAY.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

DONNA M. OWENS, OF OHIO, TO BE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE (NEW POSITION).

IN THE AIR FORCE

The following person for Reserve of the Air Force Appointment, in the grade indicated, under the provisions of section 80, title 15, United States Code, with a view to designation under the provisions of section 8007, title 15, United States Code, to perform the duties indicated:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

FORTUNATO T. BILEAGA, M.D.

The following persons for Reserve of the Air Force Appointment, in the grade indicated, under the provisions of section 80, title 15, United States Code, with a view to designation under the provisions of section 8007, title 15, United States Code, to perform the duties indicated:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

DONALD E. BAYLES, M.D.

BENJAMIN A. MALDONADO, M.D.

The following officer for Reserve of the Air Force Appointment, in the grade indicated, under the provisions of section 80, title 15, United States Code, with a view to designation under the provisions of section 8007, title 15, United States Code, to perform the duties indicated:

MEDICAL CORPS

To be colonel

EDWARD J. PASQUARELLA, M.D.

The following regular officers for Reserve of the Air Force appointment, in the grade indicated, under the provisions of section 80, title 15, United States Code.

MEDICAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

ROBERT L. COOPER, JR., M.D.

DENTAL CORPS

To be lieutenant colonel

JOSEPH M. HARVEY, M.D.
January 11, 1991

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE

FRANK W. YOUNG
EDWARD J. SAND "JAPAN"

IN THE ARMY

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED OFFICERS ARE APPOINTED IN THE RESERVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN THEIR ACTIVE DUTY GRADE, UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 531, 536, AND 335:

DENTAL CORPS

To be colonel

RAY D. BERNINGE, M.D., F.A.C.D.

MEDICAL CORPS

To be colonel

LOUIS R.M. DEL GUERCO, M.D., F.A.C.P.

To be major

GEORGE P. MUNOZ, M.D., F.A.C.P.

To be captain

RICHARD F. BURKE, M.D.

ARMY NURSE CORPS

To be colonel

CELIO, MARY P.

PETERSON, SANDRA D.

To be major

BOYETTE, HOWARD W.

HEIN, LINDA L.

LADURAS, ROBERT J.

ODONNELL, TAMARA L.

TUCKER, ORLAN W.

VOLK, MARJIE H.

WALST, BETTIE A.

WALTZER, RUSS S.

To be captain

DIAL, RICHARD P.

GEORGE, LINDA H.

KOTON, CHARLES M.

LUTE, CHARLES E.

MCNALL, STANLEY D.

MCGUINNESS, FRANK W.

POWERS, NELSON, R.

RAHIM, RONNIE L.

To be first lieutenant

WANLESS, HOWARD, 417-70-7179

To be second lieutenant

HOLLY, BRENDA C.

KORELICK, LINDA M.

SHEAR, TERRY S.

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS

To be major

BROWN, JERRY L.

GARBAC, THOMAS, 417-70-7179

GOLDSMITH, JONATHAN

GOPTA, RAJ

ILICH, STANLEY, 417-70-7179

MCFERRAN, DAVID, 417-70-7179

MCGINNIS, FRANK W.

POWERS, NELSON, R.

RAHIM, RONNIE L.

To be captain

ARCHIBALD, DONALD

ANTONSEN, WALTER, 417-70-7179

BATE, FRANK, 417-70-7179

BENEDICT, TRAVIS A.

BENVENUTI, ROBERT

BOEN, JAMES H.

COWLEY, ELIZABETH

COWLEY, ROBERT

CUNNINGHAM, THOMAS

DARO, THOMAS N.

FAIRLEY, DONALD

FAYH, JERRY A.

GAMBIERI, PETE

HARBAUGH, GERALD

HINES, CLAUDIA J.

HOBBS, GILDA J.

IACOVETTA, GLENN

JACKSON, DAVID B.

JONES, HERBERT

KOTCH, MICHAEL

LADD, GEORGE

LANDRAU, LORRAINE

LEWIS, MICHAEL

MARTINELLI, GERMA

MAHER, PENNY S.

MCDERMOTT, MICHAEL

McKENZIE, DAVID, 417-70-7179

MORGAN, JOHN

MOSER, ROBERT

MOSS, TIMOTHY

NAUBERG, WILLIAM

OBERLINE, WILLIAM

PANARENKO, MICHAEL

PARKER, ROBERT

PARKER, ROBERT

PETERS, JEFF

QVIST, JACOB

ROSS, GARY A.

SCHMITT, JOHN

SHERRILL, RON

WEBB, PETER A.

WILLIAMS, HARRIET, 417-70-7179

To be first lieutenant

CHAMBERLIN, CLINTON

GIFFORD, MARK B.

LATCH, DAVID

MAHR, JESSE

MULLIN, JOHN

PETERMAN, MICHAEL

SHERRY, NORAH

To be second lieutenant

GARVENS, JAY A.

HIGH, GREGORY

KELLEY, DARLENE

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IN THE ARMY
The following-named Army National Guard of the United States, under the provisions of Title 10, U.S.C., Section 3380:

ARMY PROMOTION LIST
To be colonel

ALEXANDER H. BURGIN
JAMES C. DIETRICH
CHARLES P. DAVIS
SHERWILL W. EASTWOOD
HILLY L. GODFREY
ALBERT D. GRUVER
ALLEN R. JAY
GEORGE H. JORDAN
JOHN P. KANE
ROBERT R. KARZ
FREDERICK L. LOVE
DAVID D. NEWTON
JAMES C. PICK
JAMES R. SPACKMAN
TOMMY L. WILLIAMS
GEORGE F. WISSEL

MEDICAL CORPS
To be colonel

EDGAR E. BOBO
DONALD C. WAUGH

MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS
To be colonel

EMMETT A. FREY

ARMY PROMOTION LIST
To be lieutenant colonel

JESSE L. ADAMS, II
EDWARD H. BALLAIN
LEONARD W. BIRDSONG
JAMES R. CADE
MICHAEL E. CALL
DAVID W. COTTON
DWAYNE L. DUNNELL
JAMES L. EUGHEN
TERRY L. EULERS
ALTON L. ENGLE
JULIA D. FERGUSON
LEILIA K. FORREE
JACOB J. FREEDMAN
BERT W. KEEL
RICHARD J. LAY
LEO M. MCSHANE
BRIAN N. MEYER
RICHARD D. MOORE
TIMOTHY R. MONROE
DOROTHY R. MORRIS
ALBERT E. NEWTON
JOHN P. O'NEAL
RICHARD J. PURCELL
ROBERT T. RUSSELL
SUSAN E. SHERRILL
WILLIAM S. WILSON

THE FOLLOWING-NAMED RESERVE OFFICERS' TRAINING CORPS CADETS FOR APPOINTMENT IN THE REGULAR ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, IN THE GRADE OF SECOND LIEUTENANT UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 5301, 5321, AND 5388:

Buckner, Dale E.
Collado, Michael
Colletti, Charles A.
Dondero, Salvatore
Dunn, Anthony
English, Edward A.
Broaffrey, Andrew M.

ARMY PROMOTION LIST
To be captain

Giacomin, Eugene E.
Gottfried, Morris Z.
Hearden, Robert W.
Hunt, Anthony J.
Jansen, Mark A.
Kennedy, Robert W.
Kornreich, Edward G.
Law, Leonora D.
Ogrodzinski, James A.
Scott, Shannon N.
Serota, Brenda A.
Smith, Stephen H.
Nunez, Chad M.
Vanek, Thomas B.
Webern, Steve R.
Weppel, Phillip J.

CONSOLIDATED RECORD—SENATE
January 11, 1991

IN THE NAVY
The following-named U.S. Naval Reserve Officers, to be appointed permanent captain in the line of the U.S. Navy, pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 3381:

CAPTAIN, LINE, USN, PERMANENT

WALTER M. ELLIOTT

The following-named U.S. Naval Reserve Officers, to be appointed permanent lieutenant commander in the line of the U.S. Navy, pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 3381:

COMMANDER, LINE, USN, PERMANENT

THOMAS E. CATANA

The following-named U.S. Naval Reserve Officers, to be appointed permanent lieutenant commander in the Supply Corps of the U.S. Navy, pursuant to Title 10, United States Code, Section 3381:

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, SUPPLY CORPS, USN, PERMANENT

MICHAEL K. ADAMS

The following-named U.S. Naval Reserve Officers, to be appointed permanent captain in the
January 11, 1991

CHAPLAIN CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
CAPTAIN, CHAPLAIN CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
CHARLES E. BOUNCE, JR

THE FOLLOWING NAMED U.S. NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT COMMANDERS IN THE CHAPLAIN CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
COMMANDER, CHAPLAIN CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ALFREDO S. LABARO

THE FOLLOWING NAMED CHAPLAIN Corps, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT D. JANIDES
JAMES V. ASPARRO
DANIEL D. PUTTLER
TIMOTHY D. BOTT
DAVID K. SANDERS
DAVID W. SHAEPER
CHARLES D. BRADFORD
BRADLEY R. RICKER
PHILIP L. RASMUS
LYNN M. SMITH
JAMES L. SPIRITOSANTO
ROBERT D. STRICKLAND

THE FOLLOWING NAMED LIEUTENANT COMMANDERS, CHAPLAIN CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
RAFAEL W. ARNOLD, JR
JAMES V. ASPARRO
GRANT R. BARTZ
WILLIAM C. BLAIR, JR
ERIK M. CARLSON
ERIK M. CARLSON
ROBERT J. CLARK
JAMES W. COOK
JAMES W. CRIM
WINTHROP D. DAY
DANIEL R. DEATON
WILLIAM G. DOUGLAS, III
GUY W. DRAB
THOMAS W. EDWARDS
ROBERT D. EVANS
SAM J. FERRATTI, JR
JAMES D. GANTT
JAMES A. GAY

THE FOLLOWING NAMED LIEUTENANT COMMANDERS, CIVIL ENGINEER CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
PATRICK A. HAIN
STEPHEN B. HALL
THEIS C. HOPT
RICHARD B. HUBBARD
STEPHEN A. HULSEY
EDWARD E. JACKSON
ROBERT W. JACKSON
BRIAN P. KELLY
JEROME C. KIESLLE
DONALD F. LEE
JAMES F. LOCHY
WALKER E. MARSH, JR
ROBERTT N. MAY
PETER W. MUSKOW
J. R. McLAUGHLIN
THOMAS F. MILE
JAMES J. MURPHY
JACOB R. MILTON
DAVID E. MULLIN
ARYEH B. OBERSTEIN

THE FOLLOWING NAMED COMMISSIONED OFFICERS TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT IN THE CHAPLAIN CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, CHAPLAIN CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
DAVID P. BACKMAN
JOHN D. BELANGER
ROBERT P. CALISTI

THE FOLLOWING NAMED PERMANENT CAPTAIN IN THE DENTAL CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
CAPTAIN, DENTAL CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
JOHN B. CARLSON
WINTHROP R. CARTER

THE FOLLOWING NAMED CAPTAIN IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT P. AITKEN

THE FOLLOWING NAMED U.S. NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT COMMANDERS IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
COMMANDER, NURSE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT J. BURD
WILLIAM A. WAUK, JR

THE FOLLOWING NAMED PERMANENT CAPTAIN IN THE DENTAL CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
CAPTAIN, DENTAL CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
JOHN B. CARLSON
WINTHROP R. CARTER

THE FOLLOWING NAMED CAPTAIN IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT P. AITKEN

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, NURSE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT J. BURD
WILLIAM A. WAUK, JR

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—SENATE 919

WILLIAM M. PINGBUSCA
JAMES R. PIPKIN
JAMES D. PUTTLER
SHELIA C. ROBERTSON
TIMOTHY D. BOTT
DAVID K. SANDERS
DAVID W. SHAEPER
CHARLES D. BRADFORD
BRADLEY R. RICKER
PHILIP L. RASMUS
LYNN M. SMITH
JAMES L. SPIRITOSANTO
ROBERT D. STRICKLAND

MARK L. TIND
ANTHONY M. TRAFANI
JAMES E. VARNON, JR
DOUGLAS-J. WATTS
WILLIAM Q. WAUK
JAMES D. WEAVER
GARY L. WHITMAN
CHARLES E. WILSON
KENNETH G. WINTERS
JOHN C. WOHLRABE, JR
PHILIP A. WYRICK
CHRISTOPHER XENAKIS
JAMES W. ZUHN
MICHAEF P. SIPPOLILLO

THE FOLLOWING NAMED NAMED U. S. NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT COMMANDERS IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, NURSE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT J. BURD
WILLIAM A. WAUK, JR

THE FOLLOWING NAMED U.S. NAVAL RESERVE OFFICERS TO BE APPOINTED PERMANENT COMMANDERS IN THE MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS OF THE U.S. NAVY, PURSUANT TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 531:
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER, NURSE CORPS, USN, PERMANENT
ROBERT J. BURD
WILLIAM A. WAUK, JR