

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Wednesday, February 3, 1988

The House met at 10 a.m. The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

We pray, O God, that we will be the people we ought to be and do those good things that bring peace to every person. Give us the wisdom to do justice, love, mercy, and walk humbly with You. Free every person from any selfish spirit that causes suspicion or undue pride and open our eyes to the spirit of light and truth so that Your will is done on Earth as it is in heaven. In Your name, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1, rule I, I demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the Chair's approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 275, nays 118, answered "present" 2, not voting 38, as follows:

[Roll No. 5]
YEAS—275

Ackerman	Borski	Cooper
Akaka	Bosco	Coyne
Alexander	Boucher	Crockett
Anderson	Boxer	Darden
Andrews	Brennan	Davis (MI)
Annunzio	Brooks	de la Garza
Anthony	Brown (CA)	DeFazio
Applegate	Bruce	Derrick
Archer	Bryant	Dicks
Aspin	Bustamante	Dingell
Atkins	Byron	Donnelly
AuCoin	Campbell	Dorgan (ND)
Barnard	Cardin	Downey
Bartlett	Carper	Duncan
Bateman	Carr	Durbin
Bates	Chapman	Dwyer
Bennett	Clarke	Dymally
Berman	Clement	Dyson
Bevill	Coelho	Early
Billbray	Coleman (TX)	Eckart
Boggs	Collins	Edwards (CA)
Boland	Combest	English
Bonior	Conte	Erdreich

Evans	Lent	Richardson
Fascell	Levin (MI)	Rinaldo
Fazio	Levine (CA)	Ritter
Feighan	Lewis (GA)	Robinson
Florio	Lipinski	Rodino
Foglietta	Livingston	Roe
Foley	Lloyd	Rose
Ford (MI)	Lowry (WA)	Rostenkowski
Ford (TN)	Luken, Thomas	Rowland (GA)
Frank	MacKay	Russo
Frenzel	Manton	Sabo
Frost	Markey	Saiki
Garcia	Martin (NY)	Savage
Gejdenson	Martinez	Sawyer
Gephardt	Matsui	Scheuer
Gibbons	Mavroules	Schneider
Gilman	Mazzoli	Schulze
Glickman	McCloskey	Schumer
Gonzalez	McCurdy	Sharp
Gordon	McDade	Shaw
Grandy	McHugh	Shumway
Grant	McMillan (NC)	Shuster
Gray (IL)	McMillen (MD)	Sisisky
Green	Meyers	Skaggs
Guarini	Mfume	Skelton
Gunderson	Mica	Slattery
Hall (OH)	Miller (CA)	Slaughter (NY)
Hall (TX)	Miller (WA)	Smith (FL)
Hamilton	Mineta	Smith (IA)
Harris	Moakley	Smith (NE)
Hatcher	Mollohan	Smith (NJ)
Hawkins	Montgomery	Smith (TX)
Hayes (IL)	Morella	Solarz
Hayes (LA)	Morrison (CT)	Spratt
Hefner	Morrison (WA)	St Germain
Hertel	Mrazek	Stagers
Hochbrueckner	Murtha	Stallings
Hopkins	Myers	Stark
Horton	Nagle	Stenholm
Houghton	Natcher	Stokes
Howard	Neal	Stratton
Hoyer	Nelson	Studds
Hubbard	Nichols	Sweeney
Huckaby	Nielsen	Swift
Hughes	Nowak	Synar
Hutto	Oakar	Tallon
Jeffords	Oberstar	Tauzin
Jenkins	Obey	Thomas (GA)
Johnson (CT)	Olin	Torres
Johnson (SD)	Ortiz	Torricelli
Jones (NC)	Owens (NY)	Trafficant
Jontz	Owens (UT)	Traxler
Kanjorski	Panetta	Udall
Kaptur	Parris	Valentine
Kasich	Patterson	Vento
Kastenmeier	Pease	Viscosky
Kennedy	Pelosi	Volkmer
Kennelly	Perkins	Watkins
Kildee	Petri	Waxman
Kleccka	Pickett	Weiss
Kolter	Pickle	Whitten
Kostmayer	Price (IL)	Wise
LaFalce	Price (NC)	Wolpe
Lancaster	Pursell	Wortley
Lantos	Quillen	Wyden
Leath (TX)	Rahall	Wylie
Lehman (CA)	Rangel	Yates
Lehman (FL)	Raven	Yatron
Leland	Raven	

NAYS—118

Armyey	Callahan	DeWine
Baker	Chandler	Dickinson
Ballenger	Cheney	DioGuardi
Barton	Clinger	Dornan (CA)
Bentley	Coats	Dreier
Bereuter	Coble	Edwards (OK)
Bilirakis	Coleman (MO)	Emerson
Billie	Coughlin	Fawell
Boehlert	Courter	Fields
Broomfield	Craig	Fish
Brown (CO)	Dannemeyer	Gallegly
Buechner	Daub	Gallo
Bunning	Davis (IL)	Gekas
Burton	DeLay	Gingrich

Goodling	Madigan	Sikorski
Gradison	Marlenee	Skeen
Gregg	Martin (IL)	Slaughter (VA)
Hammerschmidt	McCandless	Smith, Denny
Hansen	McCollum	(OR)
Hastert	McGrath	Smith, Robert
Hefley	Michel	(NH)
Henry	Miller (OH)	Smith, Robert
Hiler	Molinari	(OR)
Holloway	Moorhead	Snowe
Hunter	Murphy	Solomon
Inhofe	Pashayan	Spence
Jacobs	Penny	Stangeland
Kolbe	Regula	Stump
Konnyu	Rhodes	Tauke
Kyl	Ridge	Taylor
Lagomarsino	Roberts	Thomas (CA)
Latta	Rogers	Upton
Leach (IA)	Roth	Vander Jagt
Lewis (CA)	Roukema	Vucanovich
Lewis (FL)	Rowland (CT)	Walker
Lott	Saxton	Weldon
Lowery (CA)	Schaefer	Wheat
Lujan	Schroeder	Whittaker
Lukens, Donald	Schuetter	Wolf
Lungren	Sensenbrenner	
Mack	Shays	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2

Bonker Roybal

NOT VOTING—38

Badham	Flippo	Pepper
Beilenson	Gaydos	Porter
Biaggi	Gray (PA)	Roemer
Boulter	Herger	Sundquist
Chappell	Hyde	Swindall
Clay	Ireland	Towns
Conyers	Jones (TN)	Waigren
Crane	Kemp	Weber
Dellums	Lightfoot	Williams
Dixon	McEwen	Wilson
Dowdy	Moody	Young (AK)
Espy	Oxley	Young (FL)
Flake	Packard	

□ 1015

So the Journal was approved. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make an announcement that the business in order today is the consideration of House Joint Resolution 444, and the Chair will not recognize Members for 1-minute speeches until the end of business today. We have a 10-hour timeframe and will seek to devote our energies and attentions to the consideration of House Joint Resolution 444.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Hallen, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 3884. An act to rescind certain budget authority recommended in Public Law 100-202.

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

Matter set in this typeface indicates words inserted or appended, rather than spoken, by a Member of the House on the floor.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendment to the bill (H.R. 2470) "An act to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide protection against catastrophic medical expenses under the Medicare Program, and for other purposes," disagreed to by the House, and agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. BENTSEN, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. DOLE, Mr. CHAFEE, Mr. HEINZ, and Mr. DURENBERGER to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 2022. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize reductions under certain circumstances in the down-payments required for loans made by the Veterans' Administration to finance the sales of properties acquired by the Veterans' Administration as the result of foreclosures and to clarify the calculation of available guaranty entitlement and make other technical and conforming amendments.

□ 1030

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. BEREUTER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Speaker, I was unaware that the JEC committee room in the Longworth Building had no light and buzzer system. I was meeting with constituents in that room, was unaware of votes being called at that time, and accordingly I missed two votes on the floor.

Had I been present I would have voted "aye" on both H.R. 2875 and H.R. 3884.

PERMISSION FOR MEMBERS TO INCLUDE EXTRANEIOUS MATTER DURING DEBATE ON HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 444, APPROVING PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR CONTRA AID

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may include extraneous matter in the course of debate today on House Joint Resolution 444.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

APPROVING THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST FOR CONTRA AID

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 111(j)(10) of Public Law 100-202, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of House Joint Resolution 444, joint resolution

relating to Central America pursuant to House Joint Resolution 395 of the 100th Congress.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY].

The motion was agreed to.

□ 1033

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution, H.J. Res. 444, with Mr. KILDEE in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 111(k)(2) of Public Law 100-202, the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY] will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] will be recognized for 5 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY].

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is appropriate for those supporting the proposal to open debate.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. EDWARDS OF Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, may I ask whether my understanding is correct that I will also have the opportunity to close the debate?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, this begins a long day of some 10 hours of debate on a subject that many of us in this Chamber have addressed before, and that is the question of what our policy should be in Central America. I cannot think of a more important issue for us to discuss at this time or of a more important vote that we will be faced with in this session of the Congress.

Mr. Chairman, the proposal that is before us has been crafted after a great deal of consultation with many Members of this body, and it is in fact truly a bipartisan package. Not only is it sponsored and supported by many of us in the minority who are supporters of the President, but it is also supported by many distinguished Members on the majority side of the aisle, including such notables as the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA], and one of the deans of the

House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER], chairman of the Rules Committee.

The package the President has put together does in fact support the peace process, and I would like to begin the debate today by reviewing the specifics of what is in the proposal. I would remind my colleagues that specifically the total aid authorization in the package is some \$36,250,000, and 90 percent of that is nonlethal consisting of food, medicine, clothing, transportation, and so forth. Only 10 percent of it, \$3.6 million, constitutes so-called lethal assistance, and the lethal assistance specifically consists of ammunition and some surface-to-air missiles.

It does not constitute an escalation of the level of effort in Central America and in Nicaragua and specifically it is designed to maintain the current level of effort. It is indeed a barebones package.

More important perhaps, Mr. Chairman, than the specific details of what is included in the package are the terms and conditions under which the President proposes to provide this assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Specifically, none of the assistance in the package, either the humanitarian, nonmilitary or the military assistance would be available until March 1. On that date the President would be authorized to move forward with the provision of nonlethal assistance.

The lethal portion of the package would not be available under any circumstances prior to March 31. In other words, the President proposes that we provide at least a month's moratorium, the entire month of March, to let the peace process work in Central America before we would release any additional military assistance.

Furthermore, the President indicates, and it is a part of the resolution that is before us today, that no military assistance would go forward unless he is able to certify to the Congress three specific things. First of all, that a cease-fire has not been agreed to. Second, that the Sandinistas, the Nicaraguan Government, have not bargained in good faith, and third, that the democratic resistance, the so-called Contras, have bargained in good faith.

Beyond that, in a speech last night to the Nation and in a letter to be sent to the leadership this morning, the President has provided for two additional conditions prior to the release of any military assistance from this package to the Contras. The letter provides as follows, that before he certifies for the release of military assistance he will personally consult with the Presidents of the Central American democracies, and second, before

he releases any military assistance he will notify the Congress of the United States 10 days in advance in order to allow the Congress to express its will on that subject. If Congress during that 10-day period of time by a simple concurrent resolution, that is a simple sense of the Congress resolution, determines that the Nicaraguan Government, the Sandinistas, are in fact in compliance with the peace accords, then he will abide by that decision of the Congress and he will not release additional military assistance.

Think about that. I think that is an extremely generous proposition that goes a long way toward addressing the concerns of many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle who wanted to be certain that there would be an opportunity for a second vote on the question of whether or not the President would provide military assistance to the Contras. Frankly, I cannot imagine why anyone would vote no on this proposal, because it specifically ties the question of military assistance directly to the proposition of whether or not the Government of Nicaragua is in compliance with the peace process. If they are in compliance with the peace process there will be no military assistance provided out of this package to the Contras in Nicaragua.

Secondly, the determination of whether or not they are in compliance with the peace process is up to those of us in this body. We will have the opportunity for 10 days to consider the question, the proposition of whether or not that aid and assistance should go forward.

I think it is indeed a very generous proposition. During the course of the debate today we will hark back many times I am sure and hear a lot of emotion and a lot of rhetoric about the proposition before us, but it strikes me that there are really only two reasons to vote against this proposal. One is if my colleagues do not want to insist that the Sandinistas comply with the peace process, and second if the proposition before us is not really at the heart of the debate today but rather what we have is simply an effort to embarrass the President and try to score another political victory. I hope that is not the case.

I think the package itself is wise policy, that it is based on sound principles, that it supports the peace process, that it does allow a second vote before the President releases any military assistance. It gives the Congress the opportunity to share in that decision on a bipartisan basis, and I believe it merits support.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 hour to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] is recognized for 1 hour, and without objec-

tion, the gentleman from Wisconsin shall be allowed to yield time.

There was no objection.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], the leader of our task force on this subject.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, for nearly 6 years Members of this body have come to the well and warned of the folly of the Contra war. The case against Contra aid has been overwhelming. The Contras' horrendous record on human rights, the squandering of our Nation's prestige on a policy that is a flagrant violation of international law, the deceit, the corruption, the contempt for Congress and the American people of the Iran-Contra scandal, these issues remain as compelling today as in the past. But today is different, for never before have the prospects for peace been so promising. Never before have we had the opportunity to contribute so much to democratic openings within Nicaragua.

For over 6 years this administration has funded the Contras by hook and by crook. And all this policy has produced is more suffering for the innocent victims of Contra attacks and a greater assault on democratic values by the Sandinistas.

But today can be different. The determined and courageous efforts of the five Central American Presidents have offered us an opportunity that is quite rare in a lifetime, an opportunity to contribute to a firm and a lasting peace, an opportunity to see true progress toward democracy in Nicaragua.

At their meeting in San Jose, the Central American Presidents called for an end to all insurgent groups such as the Contras saying that this was an indispensable part of the peace process and indispensable to peace itself. At the same time, they extracted new concessions from Nicaragua. They lifted the state of emergency. They put an end to special tribunals. They made a commitment to do something the Sandinistas had held out and firmly resisted—they agreed to talk directly with the Contras. This, on top of the concessions they made earlier on in August by lifting press censorship for La Prensa, by opening up Radio Catolica, by issuing 14 additional permits for additional radio stations, by allowing the opposition parties to congregate, to hold rallies, by agreeing to municipal elections, and on top of that what they agreed to 2 weeks ago in San Jose.

□ 1045

And now they have agreed to talk directly with the Contras. They have begun that process and will continue it next week.

Those talks have begun and the Catholic bishops have expressed optimism about the possibilities for a cease-fire. Yet what has this administration's response been? They have requested military and logistical aid to the Contras that will kill this peace process and wipe out all the gains we have made in 6 short months.

The President had said in his request that he will provide an insurance policy for peace. In reality, it is a death warrant, not an insurance policy.

The President has told us this is a moderate request of only \$36 million. But in reality this request contains an additional \$20 million for indemnification of aircraft and an unspecified amount for electronic countermeasures. This request provides a minimum, a minimum of \$60 million for a 4-month period. On a monthly rate, this is the largest aid request the President has ever made, the largest aid request the President has ever made on a monthly basis.

The President has said military aid will be limited to \$3.6 million. But in fact this request would unleash the delivery of vast quantities of stockpiled weapons to the Contras. The President has told us that the request is only 10 percent military aid. But in fact the vast majority of the so-called non-lethal aid requested in this package will be spent for logistical aid such as leasing, operation and maintenance of aircraft, command and control, military training, passive air defense, and propaganda. Listen to this, only \$7.3 million is designated for true humanitarian items such as food, clothing, and medicine, out of a package of over \$60 million.

The President and his supporters have told Members of this body that the Presidents of the Central American peace process secretly support his package. Well, nothing could be further from the truth. President Arias, upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, stated that Contra aid is the problem, not the solution. President Cerezo of Guatemala recently said that he did not support, and I quote, "any aid to the Nicaraguan Contras" because this approach "pushes Central America toward war."

The Guatemalan Ambassador in a letter to the Washington Times has been critical of efforts to misrepresent his country's position.

Last night in an 11th-hour effort to try to win votes, President Reagan offered Congress a nonbinding procedural gimmick as a substitute for a concrete role in fashioning policy. I hope my colleagues will see this offer for what it is, a cynical ploy to win additional votes.

You know, we have heard such last minute promises before. We were promised progress toward negotia-

tions; but when the vote was won the promise was forgotten. We were promised progress on human rights by the Contras; but when the vote was won, the killing of innocent civilians continued.

We were promised full accounting of the funds; but we ended up having to search Swiss bank accounts and the arms caches of the Ayatollahs to try to find where our tax dollars were spent.

Ladies and gentlemen, today we have an opportunity to put this policy behind us. We have a chance to vote not just to end a war, but to help make a lasting peace.

When we say "no" to this package today we will not turn our backs to the region. Instead we will inaugurate a new era, an era when we will work, not in isolation, but in a true partnership with the countries of the region; an era in which we can build a true consensus at home and true commitment to democracy abroad.

The Presidents of Central America have issued us a challenge, Mr. Chairman, and despite their great differences and the tremendous pressures placed on them by this administration, they have dared to speak up for peace. How can we in this body refuse, how can we refuse to hear their call and to meet that challenge?

Mr. Chairman, keep the process alive, vote "no" on this package and let us get together as Democrats and Republicans, as moderates, conservatives, and liberals, and fashion a package that is compatible with the Central American peace process and that moves this process forward with dignity, which will bring democracy to the region and a lasting peace for the people of that very torn and beleaguered area.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON].

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Skelton-Edwards resolution.

This is an extremely difficult vote and I think that both sides, whether pro or con, have very good arguments to back their respective positions. I hope that both sides take the high ground in the course of this debate—that we stick to the facts—and the issues, rather than pointing fingers or questioning the motives of other Members. The American people are not only watching what will be the final outcome of this debate, they are watching how we, as representatives of the "people's House" conduct ourselves during the course of this debate.

I know that many of you have made up your minds on how you will vote today. Therefore, I would like to address myself to the dozen or so of you who remain undecided.

First, let me put this debate into what I think is a proper perspective because I think that is extremely important. This debate is not—I repeat, it is not, a debate on whether you are for or against the Central American peace initiative. There is no one that is not for peace in Central America. We are all for a political rather than military settlement to end the turmoil that afflicts that region. The debate today is, rather, a question of whether we trust the Sandinistas in ensuring that democracy moves forward in Nicaragua. That's the crux of the debate—because without democracy in Nicaragua, there will be no peace in Central America.

I went to Nicaragua this past weekend. I met with auxiliary Bishop Bosco Vivas who is a member of the mediation team monitoring the direct negotiations between the Sandinistas and the Contras. He was at the head table in Costa Rica. Representatives from the Government, members of the independent labor unions, members of the internal opposition, members of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights, Violetta Chamorro of *La Prensa*, an independent paper just back on the newsstands, and finally the January 22 Mothers of Political Prisoners. There is genuine hope in Nicaragua from all sectors that peace will come, yes all sectors, but there is also a healthy degree of skepticism about why the Sandinistas are at this particular time making concessions and whether these concessions will be permanent. There should not be any doubt why the Sandinistas are at the peace table and the reason is simply the presence of the Contras.

If we fail to continue to support the Contras today, the Nicaragua of tomorrow will have very little hope of achieving democracy. Perhaps the Sandinistas will not pull back on the concessions they have made so far for the next month or two—but what about 6 months from now or next year? Are those of you who intend to vote against this package today saying that you trust the Nicaraguan Government to comply with the accord? I don't believe that I need to remind you that you have been burned by the Nicaraguan Government before. It was said by some of those who we met this weekend that if we vote this package down that there will be no hope for the people of Nicaragua or for the peace process.

Let me give you an example of why I remain somewhat skeptical of the Nicaraguan Government. When our delegation met with officials of the Government this Saturday, we were told that there were no political prisoners in Nicaragua—I repeat—no political prisoners in Nicaragua. After we met with the Government officials, we met with the January 22 mothers of the political prisoners. Well, Mr. Chair-

man, there are political prisoners in Nicaragua because the sons of these mothers, the husbands, the brothers, languish in Nicaraguan jails for months and years. These mothers continue to speak out for their children, despite intimidation by the Government, despite the threats of the Turbas, who incidentally, taunt the mothers on a regular basis. The mothers will continue to speak out because they have no other choice. But if we vote down this resolution, we leave those mothers and their children without any hope. We leave thousands of Nicaraguans without any hope. I find it interesting to note that although the Government said that there were no political prisoners, the mothers we met with named the 14 prisons where their loved ones are held. All of them full. When the Sandinistas went to power 9 years ago, there were only two prisons.

Finally, let me specifically address the issue of another vote on an alternative package. How many of you believe that voting on this issue a month from now is going to be any less difficult than it is today? I can answer that—it won't be. If a consensus package could have been achieved between all the various factions in Congress, along with the consent of the administration, don't you think that would have already been done? I don't like voting on this issue time after time and I doubt that many of you do either, but that is exactly what those who are pushing for an alternative package are asking us to do. This is a very controversial issue and there is no comfort zone in which we can make a stand. We must make the hard choice now. All of us are concerned about the degree of cynicism by which the American public views Congress. If the rationale used to defeat this resolution is to defer the tough decisions for another day, then the American public has a right to be cynical about this institution as do our allies and friends throughout the world.

I intend to support this package; it is by no means perfect, but it is the best chance we have in applying pressure to the Sandinistas. I cannot look into the eyes of those mothers, the young children we saw at Eastey Market and the men and women who have been held in prison, the 14 leaders of the 14 opposition parties and say we failed to keep the pressure on just when we have been seeing some modest results. This package is the best chance by which we can eventually bring democracy and peace to a troubled region, and that is something that we all want. I hope that those of you who are still undecided will support the Skelton-Edwards resolution and give democracy and peace a fighting chance in Nicaragua.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES].

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution. Others will lay out the pros and cons of U.S. policy. I feel I can best contribute to the debate by providing some comments and judgments on the nature of the President's request. My remarks are founded in the Intelligence Committee's close monitoring and regular auditing of Contra aid, and particularly on information derived from the latest of frequent committee trips to Central America. The committee also carefully reviews intelligence reporting on Central American issues. Finally, our committee has thoroughly analyzed the details underlying the President's request.

The administration says that \$36.2 million would support the Contra forces for 4½ months at what is described as an "austere/minimum essential" level.

However, an in-depth examination of the President's request reveals that this level of funding would both enhance and increase the Contras' capabilities. The administration plans to provide:

- More intelligence collection;
- More communications and better command and control capability;
- More aircraft with substantially greater airlift capacity;
- Better logistics support facilities;
- More U.S. advisers; and
- More propaganda activities.

In addition, it should be made clear that the Contra forces have increased during the period of non-lethal funding. Further, not counting what may have already been cached inside Nicaragua, arms purchased in fiscal year 1987 armed those forces and could substantially continue to arm them for several months after the February 29 cutoff. That is why the lethal portion of the Contra package is only \$3.6 million. All that the administration needs to do is fill in its arms inventory here and there to ensure a high level of military operations inside Nicaragua. That is why the President's newest offer—to defer the \$3.6 million in lethal purchases—won't mean an end to military deliveries or military activity.

In fact, \$36.2 million will pay for an even higher level of military activity than before. This is doubly striking when it is noted that combat levels during October, November, and December were higher than at any time in fiscal year 1987. That is because the Contras fielded more troops inside Nicaragua during that period and because the administration dropped more arms to them than it ever had before. Now, the plan is to surge to even higher levels of combat—all on

the basis of this so-called austere request.

Now, what about the 1-month hiatus in lethal deliveries promised by the administration? There will be no hiatus in lethal activity, only in lethal delivery. And that lethal activity—combat—could also increase above previous high levels because the delivery of arms to the Contras in February will be beyond even the high delivery rates of the past. The hiatus will be no hiatus at all. Lethal purchases and stockpiling will continue. Armed conflict will continue. And even if there were to be a down turn in combat activity, this simply ensures a stretch-out in the Contra war, since the authority to deliver arms and other supplies to the Contras will continue until the last penny is spent.

A last comment on the administration request—will it work? The administration says the Sandinistas are on the ropes economically. They say the Contras have seized the military initiative and are conducting ever more effective operations in the field. They say, politically, the Sandinistas are increasingly unpopular.

The unspoken message here is that a Contra military victory is nearly within reach. It once again un masks the administration's constant and singleminded desire to force a military solution to the problems in Central America. The President does believe what he says when he calls the Sandinistas Communists and reminds us that Communists never negotiate away power. Therefore, negotiations inevitably will fail. And the Contras don't have to defeat the Sandinistas' tanks and helicopters. All they have to do is bleed the Sandinistas until they collapse. On its merits, this says two things about the policy that underlies Contra aid:

The Central American peace negotiations can frustrate a Contra victory but can never ensure democracy; and

Unless the administration is right and a Sandinista collapse is imminent, Contra aid will have to continue for the many years it will take to successfully conclude a long, bloody guerrilla war.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the defeat of the resolution.

□ 1100

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time.

I am sure, as a colleague of my distinguished friend, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES] on the Intelligence Committee, he would not want to leave a misimpression with respect to what is at stake here. This Congress authorized in continuing resolutions and previously in the package in 1987

over \$100 million in assistance to the Contras, part of that military assistance. That is what currently is being delivered. That is what will be delivered through the end of February.

I am certain the gentleman would not want to leave the impression that the \$36.2 million that is before us includes any lethal assistance, specifically ammunition and weapons, other than the \$3.6 million which is what we have talked about previously and is what the President has promised not to deliver until there is a follow-on vote by the Congress based on the proposition of whether or not the Sandinistas are in compliance.

The bottom line is that what is before us today in this package does not involve any lethal assistance, weapons or ammunition, that would go forward until Congress has a separate vote. The only question at that point will be whether or not Congress believes the Sandinistas have come into compliance.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE].

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

We are voting today on nothing less than the future of Central America. We are voting on whether the United States will allow the Arias peace plan to succeed, or risk killing it once and for all and consigning Central America to more war, more poverty, and more human misery.

Mr. Chairman, this issue is shrouded in misperceptions and misunderstandings. Let us examine a few of the misperceptions before we vote on this request.

Misperception No. 1: This aid represents a scaling back of the Contra war. False. The administration's request triples the amount of aid going to the Contras on a monthly basis, from \$2.6 to \$8 million. If this request is approved, the administration can come back with a new request in 4 months, making this by extrapolation the first segment of a \$108 million appropriation, a larger yearly figure than has ever before been approved for the Contras. In other words, this aid package represents a massive escalation of the war, at a time when the region is moving fitfully toward a negotiated peace.

Misperception No. 2: This aid is needed to ensure Nicaragua's compliance with the Arias plan. False. In the past 6 months the Arias plan has done more to bring democracy to Nicaragua than 6 years of the administration's Contra war. The Central American Presidents have called for full compliance with the Arias plan immediately.

Aid to the Contras will undermine the plan, not support it.

Misperception No. 3: This aid does not violate the peace plan because it is all nonlethal, humanitarian aid with the exception of \$3.6 million to be held in escrow until March 31. This is perhaps the biggest misperception of all. There is no such thing as humanitarian aid to the Contras, or to any other fighting force. By definition, Mr. Chairman, humanitarian aid may only be given to noncombatants. And as for nonlethal, is a helicopter nonlethal? A jeep? A plane used for CIA airdrops inside Nicaragua? All of these items are included as nonlethal aid in this package. The term, nonlethal, is designed to deceive us in this Chamber into thinking that we are not really involved in a war in Nicaragua. We are in a war, and every dollar we send to the Contras drags us in farther, toward the day when American soldiers will be sent in to fight and die to avoid the Contras' inevitable defeat.

Misperception No. 4: This plan is designed to achieve peace in Nicaragua. Sadly, this is false, too. This administration has dedicated itself since 1981 to the military overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua. No amount of hedging from the White House can obscure that fact. This administration has gone so far as to threaten the leaders of the democratic nations in the region with reductions in economic aid if they should dare to express their opposition to administration policy. So obsessed has the administration become with ousting the Sandinistas that Contra aid is no longer a means to an end, but an end in itself, before which all other considerations are cast aside.

One reading of the Iran-Contra report is all it takes to see the administration's Contra policy for what is truly is—an obsession with military solutions to problems which emanate primarily from political repression and economic exploitation. This obsession has led the administration to mislead Congress, threaten its democratic allies in Central America, incur the international condemnation of our policy and defy the will of the American people.

The Central American Presidents and people await our judgment. Will we give them the chance to achieve peace in their region? Or will we go down in history as the Congress which ended the period of hope brought about by President Arias and his colleagues?

I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to join me in supporting the Arias peace plan and opposing this aid.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. CHANDLER].

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I think it is important starting from the beginning that we make it clear what the record really is.

In regard to the last speaker, I think it is important to point out that President Arias himself endorsed the nonlethal plan that we had in at least one of the last two CR's. In fact, President Cerezo just came out in favor of Contra aid. To come out and to say that the Presidents of Central America do not support this is simply a distortion of reality. It is not proper as we are going to debate this today to not be fully accurate in what we say.

Furthermore, the first speaker pointed out that the Sandinistas had somehow complied with this agreement. I want to quote Oscar Arias on January 15 who said:

They have not complied with the amnesty, democratization, free elections, lifting of the state of emergency and all the rest, without even excuses that would serve as a pretext for not complying with the peace plan.

That is Oscar Arias who says the Sandinistas have not complied. People should recognize that fact.

I appreciate the gentleman yielding. I think it is important that we correct these arguments early on in the debate. We can debate as to what further action we should take, but there should be no debate as to what the record of compliance by the Sandinistas has been since we started this process.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this resolution. We must not destroy the first real hope for peace and democracy in Central America by ending the one source of pressure that has helped bring concessions from the Sandinista government.

If we vote down this request, President Ortega will know that in spite of all his statements against democracy, in spite of all of his actions to minimize the effects of the concessions he has made to date, he does not have to comply with the Guatemala accord. But most important, if we vote down this request, we virtually wipe out the Contras.

The theme of the opposition is "take a risk for peace." Well, that should be our theme, too—because there has never been a better time to take a risk for peace, by supporting this aid. Without it, peace doesn't have a chance in Nicaragua.

Nicaragua's ruling Sandinistas have proved that should the Contra threat be eliminated, they will consolidate their power, and crush the internal opposition. They have also pledged to build an army six times larger than

the combined forces of their Central American neighbors.

The eventual result of this development of "a second Cuba," as Costa Rican President Oscar Arias calls it, is the further destabilization of the region, possibly requiring direct intervention of U.S. troops. This would be a devastating mistake and a terrible tragedy, but likely if the Communist Sandinista regime consolidates its power.

Funding the Contras has brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table and forced them to make some concessions. As the Washington Post said today.

The record of the last six months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces on one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan.

Last December, the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON] and I authored an amendment to the foreign aid authorization bill for fiscal year 1988. It establishes 33 important standards for evaluating democracy in Nicaragua under the Guatemala peace accord. Among them are the rights of opposition parties to meet and organize, and full freedom of the press. Our overwhelming victory of 346 to 58 sent a clear message that the House of Representatives would not accept a facade of democracy to cover the infrastructure of dictatorship. We need to keep the message clear.

Since then, the Sandinistas have made no significant progress in any of the 33 areas. In fact, they have made only marginal progress on 14 points.

For example, the suspension of the state of emergency, was followed by the arrest of more than a dozen major opposition leaders under the maintenance of public order and security law, which makes it a crime to speak against the revolution.

A few days later, a presidential decree was issued that allows nonlawyers to be appointed to judgeships. This act opens the door to the appointment of state security magistrates who ruled the state of emergency tribunals.

The net result is that almost nothing has changed in the Sandinista legal system, although the appearance of reform is maintained.

About 1,000 prisoners were released in November by the Sandinistas. But according to Alejandro Bendana, Secretary General of the Sandinista Exterior Ministry, "there are no political prisoners. Just about 2,000 Guardia and 1,800 captured Contras."

This differs considerably from the claim of the independent Permanent Commission on Human Rights [CPDH] in Nicaragua, which claims about 8,200 political prisoners remain

in prison. Most of the 1,000 already released by the Sandinistas were either common criminals or political prisoners whose sentences were completed, but were held anyway.

President Daniel Ortega's most recent amnesty plan, tragically calls for the exile of 3,000 political prisoners to the United States. This is reminiscent of the Cuban boat lift, where political prisoners were expelled from their country. The dignity of the Nicaraguan people makes this offer completely unacceptable.

A member of my staff was in Central America last week and met with dozens of opposition leaders and government officials. The message of the democratic opposition was clear: Don't end Contra aid, it is the only factor forcing Ortega to negotiate.

One journalist at La Prensa said that if the aid was passed, his paper would probably be shut down, but still have hope of opening again. If it wasn't, he said, they would stay open for a while and then be "crushed forever."

Even international aid officials are beginning to speak out in private. One high ranking official requested anonymity because his own views are against those of the organization he represents. He applauded the Sandinistas for the progress they have made. "I never believed they could come so far," he said. But he added that "If you do not fund the Contras, they will take it all back." He went on: "I know Borges, I know the Ortegas. Without the pressure that only the Contras bring, the peace process is doomed."

Don't doom the peace process. Support this reasonable package. Then, we will have nearly 2 months to observe the effect of its threat, without one dime of lethal aid being given to the Contras. Don't betray the peace process. Vote for this package and "take a risk for peace."

□ 1115

Mr. Chairman, I think that we stand a very real possibility today of dooming the peace process. Support for this reasonable package is essential.

I have heard Members tell me that there will be an alternative package. I want to ask those Members some important questions.

When will that alternative package pass, and will there be any Contras left in the field when it does?

Who will support that package? Will it be the gentleman from Michigan? Will it be the gentleman from Wisconsin? Will it be the Massachusetts delegation?

Mr. Chairman, this is it. Failure today is failure forever.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to something that was said by

the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

The gentleman from Wyoming had indicated that he wanted to make sure that the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES] was not suggesting that the administration was doing anything illegal in terms of the delivery rates for military equipment that are occurring at this point.

That certainly was not the intention of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES] to convey that they were doing anything illegal. The point of the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio was simply that the delivery rates for military equipment during the period before the so-called suspension, because of the so-called escrow decision of the President delivery rates for military equipment during that time period before the so-called suspension will be well above delivery rates of either last year or the previous 3 months.

The point that the gentleman from Ohio was trying to make is simply that the administration made the decision on delivery rates consciously after they had decided to tell the world that they were going to be providing for a 1-month pause in delivery, but that in fact that gap will be bridged by heavy deliveries before that so-called suspension actually begins. In essence there may be an escrow in delivery, but there will be no escrow in terms of actual material at hand.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point since he used my name?

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I prefer to yield on the time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman talked specifically about me and I would ask him to yield.

Mr. OBEY. Very briefly.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important here to understand that the delivery capability that the Government will have between now and the end of February is fixed. There is nothing in this package that affects that. There is no new money in here for delivery during that period of time prior to March 1.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I am not suggesting that there is.

Mr. CHENEY. And the current delivery capability has been reduced by the loss of the DC-6 aircraft on January 22. The notion that there will be this massive injection of new weapons flowing into Nicaragua for the Contras before March 1 simply is not a valid one.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, if I might take back my time, I would simply suggest that no one has suggested that the military fleet of airplanes has been increased during this time, but what the Congress has been told by the administration is very clear. And it is very clear that the amount of those

deliveries that will constitute military equipment will be much larger than it was in the previous period.

We are not suggesting there is anything illegal about it, but people do need to know about it if they are going to assess whether or not there really is going to be any danger of the Contras running out of military equipment.

There is about as much danger of the Contras running out of military equipment as there is of the House Chamber running out of talk.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, the final point that ought to be made as to whether we will flood the Contras with a supply of military equipment. This is a guerrilla force, very mobile, and they do not have transportation other than what they can carry on their backs and on a few mules. They do not have the capacity to carry with them while operating inside Nicaragua large quantities of military supplies and military equipment. We are dealing within a fairly finite spectrum here.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, I resent the proposition that somehow the administration is trying to pull a sneaky move here and that they are saying one thing and doing something else. The President made a very generous offer and the Congress ought to accept it.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds to again assert very clearly that no one is suggesting that the administration is doing anything sneaky. What we are suggesting, however, in this instance is that the administration very clearly is increasing the rate of military delivery and that fact is unquestionable.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHEUER].

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, this is a very complicated question. We are very closely split on it. I respect my colleagues who feel that the presence of the Contras helps to concentrate some minds among the Sandinistas. I wish to assure my colleague from the State of Washington, Mr. CHANDLER, that no one in this House wants to accept the facade of democracy masking the infrastructure of dictatorship. On that there is total agreement. I do not think there is a Member of this House on either side of the aisle who supports that nasty dictatorship in Nicaragua.

I have been there, I have seen those prisoners, and I have talked to the mothers. I have met with Cardinal Obando y Bravo before he was offered his present eminent and critical leadership role. I met with Violetta Chamorro before she got her newspaper

back. Everything that the Sandinista government stands for is an affront to every tenet of democracy, of decency, and of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, the question is not whether we support the Sandinistas but whether we support peace instead of war, and how we can best reach the state of peace and civilized democracy in that pitiful, beleaguered country that has been ripped apart and ravaged by war, suffering, and death.

That is the question.

My colleagues can make a good case, I believe, for keeping the Contra presence going. I respect my colleagues who believe that.

What decides this for me is the fact that the author of the peace plan, President Arias, who stands head and shoulders above the herd down there and is providing enormous leadership in the movement toward peace, feels very strongly that at this time it would be destructive of the peace effort to aid the Contras. I feel that the time has long since come whereby we ought to let Central Americans and Latin Americans decide their own destiny. We ought to empower them to make the decisions affecting their own future.

We have had enough of the image of the colossus of the North imposing answers, imposing solutions, and imposing programs on Latin America.

We have had enough of illegally bombing harbors, we have had enough of walking away from the tenets and precepts and the judgments of the International Court of Justice, and we have had enough of our country having the status of an international outlaw that is utterly unseemly and an unfit role for us to play. Rather, I think the time has come where on a closely divided question like this we ought to look to the leaders of the process down there and I suggest that we ought to respect President Arias and let us give that process a chance.

If we find in the future that there is no response or very little response from the Sandinistas, there is always an opportunity then, after consultation with Central America's four democratically elected presidents, to begin to think about fortifying the Contra posture.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, if we do not give humanitarian aid to the Contras, and if they die on the vine, who are we going to support in the future? Who are we going to give aid to make the Sandinistas live up to their commitments if they do not now?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, that is a very good question. I do not think the Contras are going to die on the

vine. As we heard from our colleague, the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY], they are a guerrilla force. They travel light. To some extent they live on the land and they swim to some extent with the fishes around them, although not enough, frankly, to indicate that they have real support from the people. But they will survive and they will be a presence there so that in 3, 4, or 6 months, if the peace process that President Arias is heading up seems to be faltering or is fatally flawed, there is always time to rebuild the Contra presence. But it seems to me that since there is a clear signal from President Arias that funding the Contras now would be destructive of the peace process and would substitute peace for more war, for more destruction, for more starvation, and for more misery, we ought to give President Arias and the peace process a further chance.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, freedom has never been free. There is a price to be paid for liberty. More than 1 million Americans have paid the ultimate price to protect the liberty of our Nation and its allies and millions more have risked their lives because freedom is worth defending. We must not pretend that other people do not share the aspirations for liberty which we so dearly cherish.

I quote from Will and Ariel Durant's book "The Lessons of History":

War is one of the constants of history, and has not diminished with civilization or democracy. In the last 3,441 years of recorded history only 268 have seen no war.

Peace is an unstable equilibrium, which can be preserved only by acknowledged supremacy or equal power.

The real issue before our Congress and our country today is not the Contras, it is communism in Central America. I sincerely believe that peace in the world can only be preserved by a strong America, freely and willingly, accepting the responsibility of leadership in the protection of Western civilization from external danger, namely communism. America's ability to support and defend democracy and freedom throughout the world has largely been the product of a lack of external threats on our own borders. The Monroe Doctrine for over 160 years has clearly articulated our Nation's fundamental security interest in keeping hostile powers out of our hemisphere.

It appears that some in this body might want to reassess that traditional strategy, reminding me of Winston Churchill's comments that Neville Chamberlain "had an all-pervading hope to go down in history as the Great Peacemaker; and for this he was prepared to strive continually in the

face of facts, and face great risks for himself and his country. Unhappily, he ran into tides the force of which he could not measure, and met hurricanes from which he did not flinch, but with which he could not cope." I earnestly hope that the 100th Congress does not reject Contra aid and earn a similar place in history.

I truly believe the issue of Contra aid is a matter of strategy. It certainly is more than a battle for partisan political advantage. Many of you in this House unfortunately are prepared to accept almost any internal political result in Nicaragua if we only stop arming the Contras. I sincerely hope you do not win this vote today, but if you do—I hope you are prepared to accept the responsibility that goes with your vote. Because if you win, you will effectively pull the plug on the democratic Nicaraguan resistance. Pulling the plug on the Contras today can be likened to opening the floodgates of an old dam to release a small quantity of water. Sometimes the pressure can be overwhelming and it cannot be shut, thus draining the lake. Do you really want to pull the plug on those who are willing to fight their battle against communism and for liberty? If you win this vote, how will you avoid draining the lake? Some hold out for the possibility of a second vote on the issue. With 165 Members of the House strongly opposed to Contra aid, I would contend it is unlikely that such a vote will ever occur and the possibility of peace and success for the Arias plan will go completely down the drain.

If Lafayette, whom we honor in this Chamber, would have been of your mind he would never have bought his own ship to sail to America to fight for liberty against England. Wounded in battle, he later returned to France to persuade his government to aid the American colonists. Victory at Yorktown, the decisive battle in our fight for freedom, would have been very difficult—if not impossible—without the French fleet blockading Cornwallis and the 7,800 French troops fighting alongside 8,800 American troops.

The fundamental issue of today's vote on Contra aid is how best to stop the communists from consolidating their military might in Nicaragua. President John F. Kennedy said—January 20, 1961—that, "Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated." This Congress must today reenforce President Kennedy's commitment in a clear and strong way. We cannot deceive ourselves and think that it is possible to deliver humanitarian aid without providing the military means to receive it. The Contra aid package before us today is reasonable. Its short-term nature, limited nonesalutatory quantity, commitment to consultations with

the Central American Presidents and the Congress, and the President's willingness to abide by a sense of Congress resolution insure that this aid package will reinforce and support the other factors contributing to the success of the peace plan.

Just as Lafayette convinced the French Government to help us help ourselves, so we should also help Nicaraguan freedom fighters to help themselves. There is much agreement today, even by those who have previously opposed Contra aid, that the Sandinistas are more likely to respond positively if they conclude that they are not assured of a free ride and must meet high standards of compliance to get the Contras off their backs.

If you vote no on Contra aid you are ignoring all the lessons of history and all the nature of man that history records. Some conflicts are too fundamental to be resolved by negotiations alone because if history is our guide, during prolonged negotiations, subversion will go on. Revelations by the Nicaraguan defector, Roger Miranda, as confirmed by the Sandinistas, make it clear that subversion was and is going on as negotiations continue. Peace through strength is the only hope for lasting peace. In the true spirit of Lafayette, whom we honor in this Chamber as a true hero, vote yes to help those Nicaraguans who want to help themselves and secure liberty for themselves and their posterity.

□ 1130

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman I yield 1 additional hour to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] is recognized for 1 additional hour and, without objection, the gentleman from Wisconsin will be permitted to yield time.

There was no objection.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is fortuitous that I have the opportunity to follow the presentation by my good friend, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM]. I listened very carefully to what he had to say. And I will certainly agree with much that he had to say. I would observe from the gentleman's presentation that people see the issue of what to do about the Sandinistas differently. Like two artists that paint the same object, what they portray on canvas will appear differently to those who observe their work.

Just before Christmas I had the opportunity to travel to Costa Rica with several of my colleagues, the Speaker included. During the visit I met privately with the President of Costa

Rica, President Oscar Arias. Costa Rica is about the size of the State of Arkansas with a few less people. Costa Rica has no army. I asked President Arias if the Sandinistas are a threat to the security of Costa Rica. The President observed that the Sandinistas are not a threat to the security of Costa Rica. Seeing the issue differently, our President and others see it differently. They see the Sandinistas as a threat to the security of the United States.

The United States maintains the most powerful army on Earth. Our borders are about a thousand miles away from Nicaragua, yet our President and many in this Chamber see the Sandinistas as a threat to national security. On the other hand a tiny nation, one of the smallest on Earth, without any army, does not perceive a threat to its national security. I want to make the point that the United States has the option, virtually at will, to destroy Nicaragua. We can launch air strikes from my home district in Arkansas, from Texas, and Florida, and Louisiana, and Mississippi, and Arizona, and New Mexico, and California, not to mention the number of air bases in the Midwest and the Northeast.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Texas. I referred to the gentleman from Texas, so I feel obligated to yield to him.

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I will make one quick observation. The gentleman is totally correct in his observations about our power. The only difference is that requires our young men and women. The proposal before us today requires Nicaraguans to do the work for themselves as they wish to do.

Mr. ALEXANDER. But underlying President Reagan's policy which is supported by the gentleman from Texas and the gentleman from Indiana is the assumption that the Sandinistas are a threat to the national security of the United States. That is simply not so. It is a false assumption.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALEXANDER. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman quoted the President of Costa Rica saying the Sandinistas pose no danger to his country. On January 29, in an editorial in *La Nacion*, Costa Rica's most prestigious newspaper, they said, and let me just read this:

*** what is at stake is the fate of the nations that border on Nicaragua. Because if the Resistance is weakened or disappears the Sandinista regime will direct all its energy, with ample Soviet aid, to its confessed objective of exporting its revolution.

So the leading newspaper in Costa Rica disagrees with President Arias on that point.

Mr. ALEXANDER. The gentleman's statement supports my point. We have a difference of opinion. The security of the United States is not threatened by Nicaragua, or its Communist regime.

The President of Costa Rica has a difference of opinion with the President of the United States. My point is that a tiny nation in Central America, without an army, is not threatened by the Sandinistas, is not threatened by the Communists in Nicaragua.

I first went to Nicaragua in 1971. I observed the widespread discontent with the political, economic and social conditions that finally resulted in a political upheaval. And I traveled back to Nicaragua in 1979 following the revolution.

I am convinced that a military strategy in Central America is not the solution. I believe Oscar Arias, the President of Costa Rica, when he told me, that United States support of the Contras provides an excuse to the Sandinistas for the failure of communism, and that so long as we send money and guns and we support the Somocistas, who in the eyes of many people in Central America is just a continuation of the dictatorship in Nicaragua, then it is going to furnish the Marxists with an excuse for the failure of their revolution.

What is needed is political, economic and social reform to be accompanied by a political solution that is outlined in the peace process, that is led by the great leader, President Arias, in Central America.

Mr. Reagan's policy of intimidation has failed to produce one concession from the Sandinistas. Today, the Reagan policy will likely be disapproved by the House of Representatives. If not today, it will be rejected in the near future as ill-conceived and counterproductive. Then, alternatives will be considered.

I append to my remarks a copy of a speech I delivered to the Latin American Studies School at Stanford University in April 1985 which presents some ideas for political and economic reform as an alternative to war in Central America. I submit this for the purpose of discussing a prospective policy as an alternative to the Reagan policy.

Finally, the gentleman from Texas referenced to history arguing that we should look to history for a lesson. I will turn from the portrait Lafayette pointed to by the gentleman from Texas, and refer instead to George Washington, whose portrait hangs on the other side of the Chamber, because he was the guiding light of a great Latin leader, Simon Bolivar, a disciple of democracy. And Simon Bolivar said of U.S. policy in Latin Amer-

ica during his era in the 19th century to U.S. policy today:

The United States appears to be destined to plague the Americas, with misery in the name of liberty.

Yes, it is time to learn from history and to address the causes of problems in Central America, instead of dooming the region to a policy of repetition of the past.

Address at Stanford University: alternative to war in Central America.

U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA: AN ALTERNATIVE TO WAR

(Address by Hon. William Alexander)

Dr. Wirth, Ladies and Gentlemen, before the end of the month, Congress will vote on a request by President Reagan for \$14 million in aid for the guerrilla army fighting to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. While the amount of the aid request may seem relatively insignificant, this vote is in reality a vote on the overall direction of American foreign policy in Latin America for well into the next decade.

During a recent trip to Central America, I had dinner with one of Mr. Reagan's most ideological ambassadors. At one point I asked him what Latin America would look like if the Reagan Administration were 100 percent successful in pursuing its foreign policy objectives. What kind of society . . . what kind of economy . . . what kind of government would we see in that part of the world if Mr. Reagan's vision became a reality.

The Ambassador through for a moment—almost as if he had never even considered the question—and he said, "Congressman, it would be like things were down here in the 1950's—commerce was flourishing, the people loved and respected Americans, and there was a general sense of contentment with things."

After spending most of my daily life in or around politics, I am not astounded at anything very often. But this response was astounding.

To me it seems that it was the social and economic condition in Latin America in the 1950's that gave rise to the political upheaval of the 1960's and 1970's. The vestiges of that period are still having their impact today. The 50's were years marked by extraordinary repression and deprivation for most Latin peoples. There was rampant poverty and disease for most, while economic prosperity and political power resided in the hands of a relative handful of fortunate families.

The governments of these nations could be described variously as "tin horn dictatorships" and "banana republics . . ." most bought and paid for through outside forces—mostly in the United States.

For many years, we in this country enjoyed a comfortable, paternalistic relationship with these nations. However, slowly we began to see a threat to that relationship spawned by a growing restlessness. We Americans saw a threat to our security in Latin America—and we focused our fears on the appearance of Marxism.

It would be easy to let the story end there. It would be far more simple to adopt the view—as has been adopted by the Reagan Administration—that Marxism is the cause of all evil in Central and South America . . . and if we could just contain that movement all would be right again.

That is a convenient view but not one firmly rooted in reality.

Latin America—and especially those nations in Central America—is a series of unique nations undergoing an inevitable transition. In every one of those countries there is a process underway in which an old order is failing, and a new order is coming to power.

In Central America the symbol of this process of transition is Nicaragua. Somoza and his loyalists stayed well beyond their time, lost touch with the public, undercut the moderate opposition, allowed the center to be destroyed, and created conditions that permitted revolution by extremists to dominate the opposition. When Somoza ultimately fled, there was no popular-based moderate force to fill the void.

Other nations in Central America are undergoing a similar process of change. The traditional alliances between the landed oligarchy, political elites and military commanders are encountering greater and greater difficulty in controlling events.

The questions are what new alliances and systems will take over, whether they will be consistent with the interests and values of the United States, and what policies will best serve those interests and values under these conditions of change.

Basically, the nations of Central America are members of the Western rather than the Eastern world, and should be more open to Western than Eastern models. There is no reason that the United States cannot successfully help these nations along this course.

The challenge faced by the United States is to develop policies which carefully define and effectively protect U.S. national interests in the long term, and work comprehensively to support pluralistic and stable new structures in Central America.

Given the strategic and psychological importance of Central America to the United States, we must clearly define these goals and objectives.

The essential institutional requirements will differ somewhat from one nation to another, but will include:

1. Development of respect for the rule of law and human rights.
2. Creation of political institutions that allow and encourage citizen participation.
3. Emphasis on building up human resources through education, training and other means.
4. Development of region-wide cooperation.

The most practical way to achieve U.S. objectives is to help Central American nations deal with one another, and to help them solve internal problems through negotiations rather than militarism and violence. We should support change through democratization and peace through diplomacy, seeking a region-wide system of economic cooperation and open trading markets.

Progressive policy-makers in this country must realize that monolithic communism in Latin America has failed. Cuba is a virtual economic client state of the Eastern bloc countries.

The real enemies of the United States' interests in Latin America are disease, hunger and poverty. These are the forces that could well defeat our most well-intentioned initiative.

Last Thursday afternoon, President Reagan was doing what he does best as he stood before a national television audience and attempted to sell a peace plan. The President argued his case for increasing aid to the guerrillas in Nicaragua by conjuring up a world view completely at odds with re-

ality. He recast the situation in Central America in such a way as to argue that—in Orwell's words—"war is peace."

Mr. Reagan reiterated his support for peace and democracy in Central America. He repeated his opposition to the spread of communism . . . and I speak for all in my party when I applaud these goals.

Unfortunately, we cannot support the means by which the President hopes to achieve these goals. His thinking is rooted deep in the world of the 1950's. Instead of providing an incentive for peace, his proposal is an invitation to greater violence and a further step away from the processes of change taking place in Latin America today.

There is nothing new in what the President said last week. The essential realities remain the same. The President wants Congress to give its approval to his war against the Nicaraguan government. It is a new face on an old horror.

This new proposal for negotiations is a very sophisticated subterfuge. Do not be fooled . . . it is a ploy . . . a ploy designed to give Mr. Reagan what he wants, and that is official sanction from Congress to fight a war in Nicaragua.

Mr. Reagan wants Congress to approve \$14 million for the "Reaganistas," which he says will only be used initially for "humanitarian support." The leadership of the House has been advised that the Administration defines "humanitarian" as inclusive of trucks, uniforms and other logistical support short of actual guns and bullets.

Mr. Reagan says that only if the negotiations break down will he convert the so-called "humanitarian aid" to military assistance.

This proposal insults the intelligence of Members of Congress and the American people—under the Reagan plan, the Reaganistas are guaranteed \$14 million if they walk away from the negotiating table! They have no incentive to try to achieve some sort of settlement. Clearly, Mr. Reagan developed this plan as a round-about way of getting his aid request through Congress—a request he was told by leaders of his own party on Wednesday ". . . was dead in the water."

Mr. Reagan would have Americans take their eyes off the ball. He would divert our attention away from the real issues. Mr. Reagan does not want a peaceful solution in Nicaragua. He will not tolerate the presence of the Sandinistas in a government there. He is using a suggestion of peace to induce support for a policy of war.

The real question here is "Why is the United States involved militarily in Nicaragua in the first place?" Mr. Reagan has given us the answer time and time again—we are there to overthrow the Sandinista Government. Mr. Reagan has repeatedly said that he will not tolerate "another Cuba" in Latin America. On several occasions, including his speech last Thursday, he referred to the Sandinistas as thugs or murderers. Are we to believe that he has changed his position? That he is now willing to tolerate their continued presence there?

Mr. Reagan—in that speech last week—tried to pass himself off as the compassionate peacemaker in a war which he has helped create. The Reaganistas army exists largely because Mr. Reagan has provided it with the means to fight a war of bedevilment against the Sandinista government. The Reaganistas are essentially an American mercenary army—and Mr. Reagan is asking the Congress and the American

people to give their official support to that cause.

Mr. Reagan and his supporters suggest that gunboat diplomacy will bring democracy to Latin America. However, history does not support that conclusion. Instead, history demonstrates that democracy in Latin America has taken hold only when democratic structures offered real hope for coming to terms with poverty, disease and despair that plagues Latin societies. Mr. Reagan should understand that no amount of military aid, that no increase in arms will be big enough to make democracy work in Latin America. Our foreign policy in Latin America will only succeed when we align our objectives with those of the people of the region. Then there can be hope. Then there can be true progress.

Contrary to the claims of the President, U.S. policy in Central America is out of control—lacking in direction and substance. We are wasting millions upon millions of dollars, while needlessly placing at risk the lives of brave American soldiers along with countless other Latin civilians.

Mr. Reagan is transfixed by an antiquated view of Latin America, wholly inconsistent with modern realities. His policies make it more likely that we Americans will repeat the mistakes of the past than to learn from them. Gunboat diplomacy did not work in the 1950's—it is not likely to succeed today.

Is the United States going to fulfill the fear of Simon Bolivar, the George Washington of Latin America, who worried that:

"Los Estados Unidos paracen destinados . . . plagiar a las Americas de miseria e nombre de la libertad.

"The United States appears destined . . . to plague the Americas with misery in the name of freedom."

Or, are we going to provide the leadership which is the mark of a great nation?

I urge those in my party to look at the constructive, positive alternatives available to our nation. Mr. Reagan would have us resort to a policy which substitutes military action for diplomacy. I cannot endorse that. The opportunities for a comprehensive diplomatic settlement in Central America are real and available. Let us offer words of hope rather than threats of war.

To achieve a long term settlement in this region, I suggest the following:

1. The full force and power of the United States should be placed in support of the Contradora negotiations. There should remain no doubt in the minds of the leaders of the Contradora nations, and others throughout Latin America that the United States is taking every possible step and using all possible leverage in support of an end to the bloodshed through the use of diplomacy.

The example of President Bellisario Betancur of Colombia is important. Through diplomatic leadership, personal courage and good faith, President Bettancur has begun to bring peace to Colombia by negotiating with his opponents. The United States should fully support his efforts and other similar efforts, to negotiate an end to the region-wide violence.

2. The Administration should work with Congress in a bi-partisan effort to devise a significant foreign assistance program, directed toward the following objectives:

a. To support the creation or improvement of institutions designed to strengthen the administration of justice and the democratic process.

b. To improve education and training programs including projects within Central

American nations and student exchange programs between those nations and the United States.

c. To improve local infrastructure (e.g., transportation) as an aid to economic development.

d. To improve local health care.

e. To support economic cooperation projects, movements toward inter-American economic integration, and a more open regional trading system.

f. To support local agricultural projects, and to promote export of American agricultural products.

g. To improve training of armed forces, respect for human rights by military personnel, and defensive military capabilities.

3. The Administration might approach friends and allies in Latin America and Europe to propose that the above program involve joint funding as part of an international "democratic initiative."

The policy stated above could be implemented by taking the following steps:

1. The United States should put its full force and power behind the Contradora initiative undertaken by Mexico, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela.

2. The United States should offer to support, promote, or organize a general hemispheric peace conference, which would focus on the major disputed questions of the Americas, should the Contadora heads of state conclude that such a conference would contribute to the search for peace.

3. The United States should express a willingness to work with any nation, through Contadora, a hemispheric peace conference, or any other appropriate forum that professes an interest in pursuing non-violent solutions to the crises in Central America. The United States, working with and through the Contadora nations, should test the sincerity of claims by Cuban President Fidel Castro that he will take strong action in support of the Contadora process. U.S. policy towards Cuba should avoid the mistaken extremes of naive optimism or blind paranoia and instead should offer a willingness to pursue careful, realistic and tough-minded diplomacy in search of gradual lessening of U.S.-Cuban tensions.

In 1945 the Soviet Union emerged from World War II as a superpower in sole competition with the United States for influence among the developing nations. The Soviets were eager to demonstrate the merits of communism as an economic system. During the forty years that have elapsed, Marxism is failing and has succeeded only as a process of distribution, unable to compete with capitalism in production. Committed Marxists continue to flirt with the U.S. and the Western World.

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) turned to the West in 1978, adapting capitalistic methods in order to increase productivity;

Cuba's Fidel Castro, a disciple of Marxism, describes the "China Model" as a goal for future Cuban-U.S. relations;

North Korea hints a coming to terms with South Korea in exchange for economic ties with the U.S. and Japan;

Vietnam increases its cooperation with the U.S. to discover and return MIA's lost in the conflict;

Ethiopia turns to the U.S. and Europe for food to relieve famine;

And, Mozambique and Angola look to the U.S. to broker deals with South Africa.

Indeed, the United States has a unique opportunity to lure Third World States away from the influence of the Soviet Union to

the capitalist orbit. But, we must seize the initiative to take advantage of the opportunity that exists at this time of generational change within the Kremlin.

Democratic capitalism can compete ideologically in the Third World with Marxist Communism. Militaristic competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. appears inevitable; however, armed conflict need not be a solution when dealing with Soviet client states. The success of capitalism as a superior system of productivity demonstrates that the Marxist ideology of the Soviet Union is not, per se, a threat to the United States.

The triumph of capitalism continues simultaneously with the tragic lessons learned by the failure of militarism. This week marks the tenth year of the defeat of militarism as a policy in Vietnam. We must develop a policy that is not rooted in the brute force of militarism but instead builds upon the success of capitalism.

"To live bravely by convictions in which the free peoples of this world can take heart, the American people must put their faith in stable, long range policies—political, economic, and military—programs that will not be heated and cooled with the brightening and waning of tension.

"The United States has matured to world leadership; it is time we steered by the stars, not by the lights of each passing ship." (General Omar Bradley, 1945)

President Reagan's position on Central America is not a policy—it is a tactic. Moreover, it is outmoded because of the heavy reliance upon militarism.

Most knowledgeable observers agree that militarism is not a solution in Central America inasmuch as it does not address the problems of poverty, disease, malnutrition, social injustice and political corruption.

A long-term solution requires a long-term policy that addresses the aspirations of the people of the Central American region. A return to the military dictatorships of the past ignores the problems and prolongs the conflict. And, a U.S. policy is bound to fail which violates American traditions and values.

"In the great struggle against Communism, we must find our strength by developing and applying our own principles, not in abandoning them." (Walter Lippmann, 1962)

It is time to stop squandering billions of dollars; needlessly wasting lives, and alienating our allies; and to gain control of U.S. foreign policy in a positive and meaningful way that serves America's best interest—peace through Democracy.

Thank you.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of a 3-part peace process for lasting peace in Central America, support for the Arias peace plan, support for dialog between our country and the Nicaraguan Government and support for aid for the resistance.

Over the next several hours, Mr. Chairman, this body and the American people will hear a lot of rhetoric, a lot of individuals who purport to have all of the answers and who will outline

their formula for peace in Central America. With this in mind, I would ask my colleagues and the American people to keep several things in mind. First of all, no one has the inside track on information from Nicaragua.

□ 1145

None of us are residents. All the information provided that we are using is thirdhand or based upon our own observations.

Second, individual cases will be presented as examples; each and every one of those cases that criticizes the Contras can be equally countered with individual cases of ravage and abuse by the Sandinistas.

Third, emotional appeals will be made to elicit compassion in all of us as Americans. Shallow slogans like "Stop the killing," "Give peace a chance" and "Save the children and mothers" will be uttered time and time again by our colleagues.

Let us set the record straight from the outset. No one in this body wants to promote killing and to subvert the peace process.

As a compassionate father of five young children I see peace as my top priority. Therefore, let us get beyond the rhetoric and let us debate the facts. Let us not kid ourselves into thinking that any one of us has the magic solution to the situation.

As a freshman I have kept by mind open. I have listened to all sides. I have had over 100 meetings in my first year in office on this issue. I have met with all groups including the government.

My views are based upon what I have heard, what I have seen, and what I have read.

This past weekend I traveled in Nicaragua and had 13 meetings in 2 days with a broad cross-section of Nicaraguan citizens.

We asked every one of these people "what about the package that we are voting on today" and these are the responses in quotes from those people.

Bishop Bosco Vivas, No. 2 in the Catholic Church, in speaking about the Sandinistas, "In the mouth of a liar, the truth becomes very doubtful. Without outside and internal pressure the government, through its own, will not change." Jaime Chamorro, one of the founders of the revolution, "The Sandinistas signed the treaty with only one purpose in mind, get rid of the Contras. Miranda was totally correct. The temporary improvements are for appearance sake only. Ortega will return to his original plan of expansionism and totalitarianism."

Violetta Chamorro, husband of slain leader Pedro Chamorro, "La Prensa will be finished with the aid. But without the aid La Prensa will not have hope of staying open for the long-haul. Democracy is the only thing that

can end the war and in this country they don't want democracy."

Alvin Guthrie, a labor leader who for 5 years was in the Sandinista legislature, "If the Contras disappear the labor unions will be the next target of the Sandinistas."

A mother of a political prisoner, "If the Contras did not exist we would all be dead today."

Luis Hernandez, chairman of the Independent Nicaraguan Human Rights Commission: "There has been no fundamental change within the government up until this point in time."

Even American church leaders whom we met, five of them led by Rev. Bill Ritchie from Washington State, working in the highlands, say that we need to support this process and this effort today.

The feeling was unanimous, Mr. Chairman, church, La Prensa, labor, political, and citizens.

We cannot trust the Sandinistas. We need the insurance policy.

And remember the Sandinista leadership is not made up of poor, backward politicians. They have learned well from the Soviets and Cubans as exemplified by the \$500,000 public relations package to promote the effort from a New York City public relations firm.

They have learned well as evidenced by their recent release of Mr. Dendy this past weekend. The Sandinistas could have released him to five U.S. Congressmen representing both political parties, but instead chose to release him to a candidate for the U.S. Senate in the upcoming November election.

But even so, the peace offers hope. We need to support it, but we need insurance. This is not a Reagan package, this is not a partisan package; it has bipartisan support and it is acknowledgment that we must hold the Sandinistas accountable.

We have Members of both parties supporting this effort in both bodies.

Former Gov. Chuck Robb of Virginia supports this process; the Miami Herald and the Washington Post have both supported it by changing their positions.

Today we vote on humanitarian aid alone; yes or no, until a Sandinista commitment is found to be real.

It is unfortunate the Soviet people cannot vote today on continuing \$4 billion of aid, most of it military, to that same area of the world.

The easy vote politically today, Mr. Chairman, is to vote "no," but it is not the right vote.

As a freshman Republican who has oftentimes not supported the President—52 percent rating in my first year of office—I am going to take the tough choice today because I know that what is the right vote. The right vote is to vote "yes" and I will be there

with my vote and I ask my colleagues to join with me.

I yield back the remainder of my time.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, last night the White House was shocked that the television networks did not want to carry the President's appeal for Contra aid.

Well, Mr. President, the fairness doctrine was designed to protect the public interest and give fair access to the media for ethnic and political minorities, like the small political minority that supports Contra aid.

Last night the White House criticized the networks' "incredibly narrow interpretation of their public service responsibilities."

But that is the same White House that last week repeated its support for the elimination of the fairness doctrine, protection for those who truly need aid in gaining access to our Nation's media.

You cannot have your cake and eat it too, Mr. President. You cannot say there is no public responsibility one week and lament the lack of it the next week. And you cannot have it both ways on Contra aid. Mr. President, you cannot say you support the Arias peace plan and then turn around and ask for Contra aid.

Why do you not listen to President Arias who opposes this Contra aid? The Contras are not the solution in Central America; the Contras are the problem. Funding the Contras and supporting the peace accord is like taking a six-pack to an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting.

We have to make a choice: The policy of Contra aid which is a failure, or the policy of the peace plan which is a success.

Today we vote. The choice has never been clearer: The Contra war or the Guatemalan peace accord. A policy of success or a policy of failure?

We can stay mired in the mistakes of the past or we can move forward into the future. There is only one choice. Let us defeat Contra aid and move forward for peace and for reform in Central America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of Contra aid. There is no question in my mind that our Government's support for the freedom fighters has brought the Sandinistas to the peace table.

The President's plan seems very reasonable to me. The military aid will be held in escrow until March 31 and the President said last night he will not re-

lease the funds until we have passed a sense of the Congress resolution to give him the authority to do so.

You have received letters from the national commanders of the VFW and the American Legion—whose combined membership is more than 5 million veterans. The leaders of these veterans groups have been to Central America and to Nicaragua a number of times. They both point out that no Communist government has ever negotiated itself out of power—so why do we think today that Daniel Ortega is going to permit a democracy in Nicaragua?

I think we had better be careful here. If we defeat Contra aid and then Nicaragua doesn't live up to the Costa Rican Peace Plan, the Congress is going to be embarrassed and this President can say, "I told you so."

I am not sure things will work even if Congress approves Contra aid, but this small amount is not going to torpedo the peace process if the Sandinistas are really serious.

I don't trust Daniel Ortega. He is a Marxist who lived in the jungle for years waiting for his time. He is in charge now. Why in the world would he want to give up his power?

I urge a "yes" vote for Contra aid. Let us keep the pressure on the Sandinistas.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS].

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Chairman, last night our friend, Howard Baker chastised the networks. He said for substituting their judgment for the President's judgment about which of the President's speeches was news.

Now I am very fond of Mr. Baker. I just hope he has not been hanging around with the leader of Russia, Gorbachev too much, because certainly in the Soviet Union the politicians decide whether their speeches are news or not. The news people follow suit.

Nonetheless, I must say the President has convinced me. First of all, the President says he wants no new Federal spending. Consequently I must cast my district's vote against this new Federal spending.

Second, the President describes the Contras as the freedom fighters. Now when you consider the fact that the supreme military commander of the Contras is one Enrique Bermudez, a top military officer of the Somoza dictatorship, you might think the President misses the mark, slightly, by calling his organization freedom fighters. But you just do not understand the term.

In fact, the Somoza national guard has been fighting freedom for decades. Therefore, I do not fault the President for calling them freedom fighters.

I hear it said that the Washington Post favors this legislation. I hear it said that the Miami Herald favors this

legislation. Whoopee. Now let us see who is against this legislation. The American public by more than a 2-to-1 margin. And why? Because they know that the history of the U.S. intervention in other people's countries and other people's civil wars is all about the same, it follows suit also. First the guns and then the sons.

And always the pledge, when the fuse is lighted that it will not reach the dynamite, that young men will not have to go.

Why do the young men go in every case? And then we decide later what a blunder the Spanish-American War was, what a blunder Vietnam was; the very notion that the tip of the Asian tail could wag the world. What foolishness. Or as Barbara Tuchman has put it so eloquently in the title of her great volume, "What Folly".

The answer is rather subtle to the American public I think. It is because the officials in Washington, particularly those enshrined in the White House, acquire an egoistic interest in the position, the erroneous position they had taken before.

The French learned their lesson and Mr. Johnson did not learn their lesson. Mr. Johnson learned his lesson and Mr. Nixon did not learn Mr. Johnson's lesson.

The ego "pride goeth before the fall," not of the President but of 18-year-old kids dying an unspeakable horror in jungles and in marshes.

Will Rogers said it about the very country we are talking about now. He said of Nicaragua "The United States will send in the Marines to any country where we can get 10 people to invite us."

Finally, the President has made a concession in his speech last night. He has proposed that the Congress can share the complete power the Constitution gives the Congress in the first place to decide about military action in other countries, to declare war, which we have in effect, if actions speak louder than words, done in the case of Nicaragua.

He says that later the Congress can vote on whether the Sandinistas are good guys, whether the Sandinistas have achieved at least the level of a democracy where a White House aide threatens the news people of this country if they will not do what the politicians say in terms of interpreting what the news is.

Now how many people in this House are going to want to cast a vote to say the Sandinistas are good guys? How many people in this House think the Sandinistas are good guys? How many think they are not Marxists? That is one of the slickest things a Hollywood writer ever thought of yet.

Nobody will vote that way, nobody thinks the Sandinistas are good guys. Nobody thinks Castro is a good guy. Nobody thinks Gorbachev and his

outfit are good guys. And there are a couple of us or more in the House, including my friend Mr. BURTON from Indiana and myself who do not think Communist Chinese are good guys, not at least good enough to violate a United States statute and receive from this country nuclear technology without agreeing at least to what would happen to the plutonium waste which can be made into military weapons. The President wanted to do that; Mr. BURTON did not want to do that, I did not want to do that and I am happy to say others voted against that.

So the question is, Are we going to repeat the same folly of the past? The answer I hope will be "no."

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of Florida. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Resolution 444 to approve the President's request for aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.

I firmly believe that if there ever was a time to vote "yes", a "yes" vote on the Contra aid, then the time is now; here today in this place, in this hallowed Chamber, a symbol of a free people.

My colleagues, in the 10 hours that are allocated to debate this measure, I am sure that every aspect of this issue will be thoroughly and exhaustively debated.

□ 1200

However, I do not want us to be so consumed in the details of this important subject as to miss the overall picture. So allow me to offer a broader perspective.

When discussing United States aid to the Nicaraguan Contras, we often hear opponents of this assistance use this phrase: "Give peace a chance." Well, we here in Congress need to fully understand that peace is not merely the absence of war; true peace can only be enjoyed in a land where freedom and liberty abound.

Our Founding Fathers clearly understood this and were willing to risk all that they had in pursuit of freedom from tyranny. Having just celebrated the bicentennial of our Constitution last year, I am amazed at how many Members here today seem to have forgotten this inescapable fact. What we should be pursuing in Central America is freedom, for where there is freedom, peace will also be present. Therefore, I say, give freedom a chance and vote to support aid to the Contras.

Let me say to my colleagues that over 210 years ago in a little country called the United States there was a cry from the halls in Philadelphia saying, "Give me liberty or give me death."

I do not want us, a country of free people, to forsake the Contras. I want them to have the ability to become a free people and let liberty abound in Central America. What we are doing when we are doing this, we are providing ourselves the protection of the freedoms that you and I take for granted each and every day.

Mr. Chairman, I say again and again, give freedom a chance. Do not forsake the Contras. They need our help, just like we needed help in 1776.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, it is getting deep down here again. After all the array of tricks, sometimes you just do not know what to believe.

Last year the Contra army's own soldiers compared their leaders to the Three Stooges. Now, this year President Reagan said that has all changed, those days are over, and the Three Stooges have evolved into the "Magnificent Seven." I say it is just my little opinion that I believe that Larry, Moe, and Curly are still operating and doing business as "the Contras" in Central America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. No. I do not have much time, and I will yield when I am finished.

One thing that is for sure, this is the same old program. It is funding time for the Contras, and it is story time for the Congress. Here is how that works. The President every so often cries "wolf," and the Congress, like a bunch of lambs, they put their tails between their legs and they ship more money to Central America. In fact, the new American password is "Contra," and I literally believe here is how it is going to work: One of these moments in this 10-hour debate we are spending again on the Contras, while we spend very little time on the budget and other matters, I firmly believe somebody is going to say, "Contra," and Groucho's duck is going to fall from that giant eagle in the ceiling and maybe resolve this whole issue and dilemma.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I will yield when I am through. I will be glad to yield then.

But here is the way it is. You can smirk about it, but it usually ends up that the Contras get the money, they ride the elevator, and the American taxpayer gets the shaft. It is just another day at the office down here.

Let us look at some facts here. The Philadelphia Inquirer sent a crew for 6 weeks to Nicaragua so they could report to their readers what really was happening. Here is what they said: While they were there, "the Contras did not engage the Sandinistas at all."

They said, "They hiked to within an hour of their expected target, but when they found out there were Sandinistas in the area, they put their tails between their legs and got out." That is one case.

What they said is that all these big accomplishments they have been writing about recently, they said their initial foray, which took 31 days, was really next to nothing. Despite all their weapons, the Contras ended up "running again at the first whiff of the Sandinista army."

They do not stop there. They conclude by saying that the "Contra units sometimes wander aimlessly in the jungle; they exaggerate their successes," because, I say, what they want is money; they are not looking for victory.

But it does not stop there. We have to look at both sides. Everybody would agree that Robert Owen, the assistant to Oliver North—remember Ollie?—is the strongest supporter for Reagan's Contra policy. Here is what he said: "They are not first-rate people," these Contras. "In fact, they are liars. They are not the people to rebuild a new Nicaragua."

That was written in a memorandum to Oliver North, supposedly confidential and secret.

Let me go on. He said, "I have never been more discouraged" with this group. He said that they are an "army in name only." He said, "There is more and more fluff being added, but there is no substance."

But he does not stop there. He said to Oliver North, in his own writing, "This war has become a business" in Central America. He said, "If more money is approved, it will be like pouring money down a sink hole."

Let me get on with this. Let me make my own little statement here. There is no question that we have a problem in Central America. We are not afraid about Ortega. We are not afraid about that creep, and we know it. We are concerned about the Soviet Union establishing a military presence, and I think if we are going to get serious, it is time to steal a page out of the chapter on John Kennedy. It is time to tell the Soviets, "Stay out of Nicaragua. If you continue to send over goods and military equipment, we will attack those shipments."

Do we want to get serious? Then let us support President Arias, and instead of trying to do everything for everybody, let the Central American nations do something for themselves. Let us let somebody help themselves instead of doing it for them, because our taxpayers are going broke. What really bothers me is, we should be talking about soybeans and jobs today, not these Sandinistas again.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I am not ready to yield yet.

Mr. Chairman, I have lost 55,000 manufacturing related jobs in last 10 years. I say our economic policies down here suck, and I think we had better start discussing the issues of this country before we find that we do not have a free country. Let's take care of America first.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT] has expired.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Ohio is very good at using humor, and he is very good at calling people the "Three Stooges," people who are fighting and risking their lives, people who were imprisoned under Somoza.

I will say to the gentleman that there is a time for humor and there is a time for seriousness.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I will not yield.

I do not know whether the Philadelphia Inquirer said they turned and ran but read the Washington Post, read the New York Times, the stories about the Contras involved in combat and then you tell the young men and women who are dying and fighting for freedom that they are the "Three Stooges."

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield now?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I will not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will remind all persons in the gallery that they are here as guests of the House, and any manifestation of approval or disapproval is contrary to the rules of the House.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, let me say to the Members of the House, place your bets. Those who will vote "no" against Contra aid are gambling that the peace plan is really to be executed properly by Ortega and the Sandinistas. Those of us who want to vote in favor of Contra aid are gambling that the Contra political and military force will be able to apply such pressure as necessary on the Sandinistas as to make the peace plan work.

Either way it is a gamble, but there is an element of this gamble down the line which should decide for us constructively one way or another what position to take. It is the very symptom that the last speaker on the floor of the House was describing, that is, a possible attack by the United States,

which he foresees on Nicaragua to stop that Sandinista spread of Marxism and communism. That is the gamble that we must take.

How do we prevent that from occurring? If we do not support Contra aid, then we are hoping and praying that Ortega under his good will, will be able to democratize Nicaragua, and then if that does not occur, then the gentleman's prediction is going to come true and the President of the United States, whoever he may be in the future, may have to order an attack.

Those who vote for Contra aid are placing their bet that to keep that force viable politically and militarily prevents the possibility or forestalls the possibility of a future President having to order an attack on Nicaragua.

How shall we gamble? We cannot be certain of the outcome, but for me and for many of us who want to prevent that attack on Nicaragua, who want the Nicaraguans to determine peace for Nicaragua, we would support aid for the Contras to keep that pressure on.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER].

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, decisions that are made by us as public officials should be made with our heads and our hearts, and I think we saw a little bit of the hearts before on both sides of the aisle.

On this Contra issue, it is clear to me that my head and my heart come to the same conclusion, and that conclusion is no on Contra aid. My head tells me that since peace is the goal of the President and the Congress, we should follow the explicit advice of the one who got the peace process started, President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica, who states that we should not vote for Contra aid today.

How can we seriously tell anyone that we are for peace while going against the recommendation of Oscar Arias and at the same time telling him that we are doing what we are doing because we really have the answer for peace and he does not? That is a little bit like seeing an elderly lady on the corner and grabbing her and making her go across the street when all the while she is saying to you, "I don't want to go." How patronizing that is and how wrong that is.

Now, my head also tells me that in 6 years of a very bloody Contra war we have seen no Democratic process in Nicaragua. The stated purpose of the Contra war is to bring democracy to Nicaragua. Yet nothing happened until the peace process began to move. So when the President says we need pressure to change the Sandinistas, I say the very best pressure is the pres-

sure from the region, from the Latin American countries, and they say this is the wrong time for Contra aid.

Those countries will put the pressure on the Sandinistas through the peace process, and if it does not work—and there is no guarantee that it will work—if it does not work and the Sandinistas do not follow through, there will not be any inhibition on their part to isolate the Sandinistas and develop a policy that we can play a true role in shaping.

My head also tells me that we have far better ways to spend this money. It is interesting, I say to my colleagues, that today in the Armed Services Committee we received a reprogramming from the administration. In other words, in order to pay for this Contra aid, we are cutting certain military programs from missiles to ships. I find this rather incredible. After 7 years of telling us there was not one way we could save 1 dollar from the military, the Reagan administration had no trouble at all in finding \$56 million worth of cuts to pay for the Contra aid package.

We may ask, why \$56 million when the package is for \$36 million?

Well, just as anything else in this area, this is not clear either. It turns out that we need an additional \$20 million for insurance, for the planes that will be delivering the supplies.

□ 1215

So \$56 million must be set aside for this program, not \$36 million.

May I propose that we can do some other things with this \$50 million. First, we could cut the deficit. Now, a lot of you out there who support these dollars today wish to do that. We could do that.

Then we could house a lot of homeless, if we did not want to cut the deficit, or maybe what we want to do is give 10,000 college scholarships to needy American students with the understanding that upon their graduation they would join a Latin American peace corps for a year and do what Americans do best, help out our fellow human beings on this planet with health care and literacy and economic development. That is the way to make America a leader and to have other nations throughout the world following our lead, rather than turning to other powers.

So my head tells me that contra aid has not worked, that the peace process does, that we should listen to the Latin American democracies, and there are better ways to spend these dollars here at home.

Now, my last argument has to do with issues of the heart. My heart tells me that this is an immoral request to continue the killing and the maiming and the bruising of innocent people.

My heart tells me that we have no right to sit in the comfort of our

homes enjoying our children while other little children become orphans every hour on the hour and are deprived of their mothers and their fathers.

If it is true, as the President says, that the Sandinistas only have 15-percent support within the country, if that is true, why have they not embraced the Contras? Why have they not risen up the way they did in the Philippines? If it is true, my friends, that is what should have happened.

What we are doing is we are funding a war, make no mistake about it, at no sacrifice to our own children and our own people. I find that very immoral.

In my heart I say this insurance policy has too high a premium. The peace process is a far better insurance policy and those preeminent means are moral and they are ethical and they are correct.

Central America is our neighbor. To end aid to the Contras is not to end our involvement there. We must be involved. We must help our neighbors get to the roots of their problem, the poverty and the misery. We must expect that they will respect their own people. Vote no on this package and start a new policy.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. WOLF].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHANDLER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Let me make two short points in rebuttal to what the gentlewoman just said.

No. 1, her statement that we can rely on other nations to pressure the Sandinistas is not realistic. Mr. Duarte used some heavy rhetoric against the Sandinistas. His daughter was kidnapped.

Colombia just had their attorney general assassinated because—

Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I am not going to yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California has the floor. The gentleman may proceed.

Mr. HUNTER. The attorney general of Colombia was assassinated by the drug people. Colombia cannot even control the drug problem.

The Central American nations are scared of the Sandinistas and unable to control them.

The gentlewoman said that Contra aid is not working and cannot bring peace. Miguel D'Escoto, the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, when asked, "Are you complying with the peace accords in order to cut off Contra aid?" He said very clearly, "Yes, that is why we are complying."

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I have been in Nicaragua twice, and to those people who applauded in the gallery, I just want them to know that I have been in the Contra camps whereby we saw young Contras, freedom fighters, aged 14, 15, and 16, without arms, without legs, with burns on their bodies and things like that. I welcome anybody in the gallery or the gentleman from Ohio, who I consider a good friend to join me—

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would ask Members not to address the gentlemen and the ladies in the gallery, but address the Chair only. That is the rule of the House.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I would welcome anyone to join me and go back down and go into a Contra camp or hospital ward and talk to some of those young people.

I did want to read the Washington Post today in its editorial entitled "Contra Aid."

It says:

Much has changed since Central American diplomacy became a factor last summer. The record of the last six months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on that basis we support the president's request.

In the Miami Herald it went on to say:

To cripple the Contras—or, worse, to disband them—would be to forfeit Nicaragua to Marxism.

And in the Baltimore Sun it says:

The United States should not throw away its key bargaining chip—the Contras.

The last comment I wanted to make, I wanted to say something during this debate hopefully to change, to move one person. I think the real key is how will we feel, not tomorrow when this vote is over, but how will we feel 10 years from now or 20 years from now when most of us will no longer be in Congress and we will be sitting in a rocking chair somewhere listening to the world news; were we there when it really mattered?

I think a "no" vote, Mr. Chairman, is a vote that says we trust Daniel Ortega.

I think a "yes" vote, Mr. Chairman, is a vote that will do more to ensure and bring about peace and freedom, so I would urge those on both sides, because this is a bipartisan issue or a nonpartisan issue, to really think very, very carefully, and hopefully when the time comes will vote "yes," whereby we can support this package and bring about peace and freedom in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, I include the full editorials in the Washington Post, Miami Herald, and Baltimore Sun as follows:

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1987]

CONTRA AID

The Contra aid votes today and tomorrow in Congress can help advance Nicaragua toward peace and democracy. The Sandinistas, their economy devastated and their people divided, have already offered to let the resistance stay constituted and armed in a cease-fire and to continue (direct) cease-fire talks even if aid is approved. The contras have stopped demanding that the Sandinistas pay in heavy political concessions just for a cease-fire. President Reagan has reduced his aid request to dimensions that make conservatives fear he is undercutting the great strategic stakes he insists are in the balance.

Sen. Chris Dodd makes the case against aid on the opposite page today. He does not make the claim some others do that the contras are CIA stooges, mercenaries, terrorists and Somocistas—labels that have become increasingly inapplicable as the contras have sought to clean up their act and earn support in the countryside. His main argument is the widely heard plea to "give peace a chance."

Some part of this plea arises from a legitimate concern that contra aid and the impetus it gives to continued battle could sink Central America's plan for peace and democracy. Another part appears to arise out of the current, furious debate over whether the Sandinistas' partial steps toward a political opening result exclusively from Central American diplomacy or from the peace plan and contra pressure. Mr. Dodd and like-minded Democrats say contra aid has not helped, it's hurt, and it will keep hurting. This is an arguable claim, but we think the evidence finally goes the other way. Much has changed since Central American diplomacy became a factor last summer. The record of the last six months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on that basis we support the president's request.

It remains a gamble whether a Marxist party can move back toward democracy—in a country and region with pitifully little democratic experience. But it is a gamble worth taking: the Sandinistas have yet to consolidate their power, and their neighbors have a paramount interest in urging democracy upon them.

The Arias plan has two inseparable and equally vital parts: democratization and the establishment of peace. In tandem with Nicaragua, but not on its own, this country should be moving to fulfill its part of the obligation.

[From the Miami Herald, Jan. 19, 1987]

SANDINISTAS' SHAM

Just whom do the Sandinistas think they're kidding? For five months now, they've hemmed and hawed and made a sham of complying with the Arias Peace Plan. Their purported moves toward compliance over the weekend were more of the same: stall, stall, stall.

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega promised the other four Central American presidents at their meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, that his regime immediately

would institute an amnesty and free its political prisoners. Catch: They'll be freed if President Reagan will give them asylum in the United States.

Mr. Ortega also promised to begin direct talks with the contra rebels. Catch: The Sandinista delegation will include one Nicaraguan official and two foreign advisers. They'll discuss only a cease-fire, not other substantive matters. This is calculated sham.

It becomes clearer by the day that the Sandinistas have no intention of complying with the Arias Plan. Rather, they hope merely to prevent a renewal of U.S. military aid to the contras and to wait out the final year of the Reagan Administration. If they succeed, they may achieve their ambition of using Soviet help to turn Nicaragua into a Marxist fortress with a 600,000-man army and the capacity to sow revolutionary chaos in Central America.

That must not be permitted to happen. The stakes are too great—for Central America, for the hemisphere, for the United States' vital interests. On the global stage, the United States should take this escalation of arms to the peace preacher in Moscow, from whose wells it springs. More immediately, the Administration and Congress, in a bipartisan rejection of Mr. Ortega's insult to President Arias's Nobel Prize-winning effort, should rebuff the latest stall from Managua. Washington should react instead to the reality that President Ortega has not matched Salvadoran President Duarte's courageous compliance with the peace-plan deadlines. If President Ortega is bluffing, his bluff should be called. And if he's not, then the peace plan's demise is on his hands.

Absent U.S. willingness to commit American forces to thwart the Sandinistas, only one force exists that can do so in the short term—and is, in fact, doing so right now. That force is the contras.

Until today, the Herald has opposed military aid to the contras for several reasons. Their past leadership's commitment to democracy was less than clear. The presence of former Somocistas in the contras' military high command was—and remains—of deep concern. The misappropriation of previous U.S. aid fostered concerns that future aid, in greater amounts, might be squandered too. And the illegal activities of Lt. Col. Oliver North and his cabal further beluded the contras' legitimacy.

Granted, the contras are an imperfect instrument for achieving democracy in Nicaragua and preserving it elsewhere in Central America. Nevertheless, there is no other instrument at hand.

To cripple the contras—or, worse, to disband them—would be to forfeit Nicaragua to Marxism. In time it would imperil the region's democracies via Sandinista subversion. Continued U.S. military aid, in installments and tightly monitored by Washington, is essential to permit the contras to sever the Sandinistas' Marxist tentacles one by one.

[From the Baltimore Sun, Jan. 20, 1988]

ORTEGA'S CONCESSIONS

President Daniel Ortega has finally promised to make political concessions that could bring Nicaragua into compliance with the Central American plan for peace and democracy. His pledge to end the six-year-old state of emergency in his war-torn country and open direct talks with contra rebels has breathed new life into the plan, devised and

pushed forward by Costa Rica President Oscar Arias. But Mr. Ortega's concessions were slow in coming, his motives are suspect in the current circumstances and there is reason to question his commitment to keeping his word.

The Arias plan was signed five months ago by Mr. Ortega and four other Central American leaders. Yet the Nicaraguan president waited until his back was against the wall last weekend to take action. His pledge to end the state of siege, release political prisoners and negotiate with the contras came on the final day of a tough session with the other Central American leaders, who had charged his Sandinista government with acting in bad faith. Mr. Ortega was facing hostility from his neighbors, rising discontent at home, economic ruin and a growing civil war.

He also was facing a vote in Congress in early February on millions of dollars in new military aid to the contras. His promise last weekend was surely made with the hope of influencing that vote. Indeed, the Nicaraguan leader has apparently been advised by sympathetic congressmen that concessions were necessary to defeat the Reagan administration's request for contra aid. After the concessions were announced, the official Sandinista newspaper said, "There is no longer any pretext for the approval of more funds."

There is reason enough to suspect Mr. Ortega's promise was a maneuver aimed at crippling the contras. There is also reason to wonder what the Sandinistas' next move would be if the contras were weakened to the point where they could no longer apply the kind of pressure that contributed to Mr. Ortega's decision to comply with the Arias plan. Repressive measures can be reinstated as quickly as they can be stopped in an atmosphere where the commitment to democracy is not genuine; the Sandinista commitment remains questionable at best.

The United States should not throw away its key bargaining chip—the contras—before it is clear whether Mr. Ortega is merely playing for votes on Capitol Hill. Congress should support continued contra aid as the best way to keep the heat on Mr. Ortega. At the same time, U.S. policymakers have an obligation to give the peace plan a chance. Since the Central American leaders have accomplished the unexpected feat of reviving the plan, President Reagan should encourage these leaders to try to make it work.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to the gentleman from Illinois, but before I do that, I would like to take one moment to make a comment on some of the last speeches before the House.

I have to say that I, too, am bothered, and I share some of the concerns of the gentleman from Virginia. I am bothered by the degree to which our strong feelings on this issue have on some occasions almost degenerated into hatred. I just have to say that it is difficult for me to hate either the Sandinistas or the Contras, because frankly, I know too many of them on both sides. I have met at one time or another almost all the people at the top levels in the Nicaraguan Government, and I have certainly met, at one time or another, almost all the Contra leaders.

I think we have to keep something in perspective. The Contras and the Sandinistas, I think, share one quality. You have all kinds of people in the Contra movement, just as you have all kinds of people in the Sandinista movement. Some of them are brutal, some of them are murderers, some of them are haters, and some of them are just regular people trying to do what they think is best for their country.

I have seen, as the gentleman from Virginia has seen, I have seen stories in the New York Times of 11- and 12-year-old kids in Nicaragua suffering through agonizing pain because they have no access to medicine, which is what this war is giving them, the wondrous gift of this war to the kids in the Nicaraguan hospitals, and I have seen 17- and 18-year-old young men in the Contra camps with their guts blown out and their faces blown away; so I would say there is plenty of misery on both sides.

I think that there are decent people on both sides, just as there are devils on both sides.

The question is not whether we like the Sandinistas or whether we like the Contras or whether we dislike the Sandinistas or dislike the Contras. What all of us ought to keep in mind during this debate is what is in the overall best interests of the region and what is in the overall best interests of the United States? I think if we keep that in mind as we go through this debate, we can get through this day without disliking each other, and also we can do a credit to the House by remembering that from time to time there is a little bit of truth on both sides of the issue.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES].

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 444. Logic tells me that the thing to do would be to make a motion or a unanimous consent request to close debate and vote on this issue, but I know that cannot happen. We have to have some time to orchestrate our positions, particularly in light of the fact that we have television to play before.

The lines are already tightly drawn and the vote is close, there is no question about it.

We are talking about 3 million-plus people on an island in Central America. If we would have spent some of the bucks that we have been spending now for the past 6 years beforehand, we might not have been in the position we are in there now. Much of the money, and I would like to know in total bucks how much has been sent down to Nicaragua over the past 6 years under the guise of fighting against the current regime that is in power.

None of us are willing to get up here and say that the Somoza regime was a citadel of democracy, and Lord knows what those people need down there—and I do not consider myself to be an expert, either. I have been there once, spent 3 days. I did not stay in the town. I went out in the countryside where a lot of the poor people live. I saw a desire on the part of people to move up into the 20th century. I saw people washing clothes in a community wash basin where running water was available. I also had an opportunity to witness people trying to cook on a community basis on cement stoves that were made and donated by other countries. These people are desirous of a change in this way of living. If we really are going to spend our bucks, then we ought to think about it in that direction.

Reality tells me that some people in this country did not learn too much from the Poindexter-North deal, who make an awful lot of money off the sale of arms, and they do not really care who they sell them to.

We need to think about humanitarian aid to people here in America. We have got kids who are suffering from malnutrition here in this country. Our educational system needs reform. It needs revision and it needs help, but we do not have the money. We oftentimes pit this money against helping our own people.

When we talk about freedom fighters, we ought to stop kidding ourselves. The real freedom fighters in this world today are the black people in South Africa. We would not think, not in the least part, of sending them arms to overthrow the Botha regime. We would not do that, but this is what we need to think in the direction of.

I do not agree with the approach of sending arms anywhere in the world as a means of trying to achieve peace. If we use arms, use them as a matter of self-defense, not to destroy human beings, as is happening today in Israel and in South Africa. We do not seem to concern ourselves with it, but we need to. We cannot differentiate between terrorism sometimes and communism. If we really want to combat communism, we have to hit it at its source, and poverty is one of the main bastions that create a desire in people to change a system. This is what we need to do and we need to think in this direction.

□ 1230

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield? Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Illinois for yielding, because his impassioned words describe accurately

the horror in Latin America. But it is not just politicians' problems to do that. The ABC television network filmed the Miss Universe contest in the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador in 1975 instead of going off into the barrios looking for poverty. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES] was an eye witness to my 4-hour conversation with Daniel Ortega where he lied to us and said that he had 2,800 prisoners when in fact he had 10,000. How are we going to liberate those people suffering torture?

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California for his remarks.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Nevada [Mrs. VUCANOVICH].

Mrs. VUCANOVICH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Contra aid package we are considering here today. Simply stated, without pressure from the Contras, Mr. Ortega and the Sandinistas will take no more steps to implement the Guatemala peace accord and will make no effort to democratize Nicaragua. I as my colleagues here today, without continued aid to the Contras, what assurances do we have that the Sandinistas will adhere to the peace plan? Are we to rely on the word of Mr. Ortega?

The plan President Reagan has proposed takes into account the concerns of the Congress. He has reduced his aid request to \$36 million, just enough to keep the Contras alive into the summer. The \$3.6 million in lethal aid will be held in escrow account, pending certification by the President that a negotiated cease-fire is not in place. In addition, the President has said he would abide by a sense-of-the-Congress resolution on whether this lethal aid should be released.

As many have mentioned today, the Miami Herald, the Washington Post, and the Baltimore Sun all support the package. These are publications which have opposed Contra aid in the past but who now realize that the most recent round of Sandinista promises, made in the face of the near collapse of the Central American peace plan last month, is no guarantee of freedom in Nicaragua or peace in the region. They realize that the Sandinistas hope to prevent a renewal of U.S. aid to the Contras and to wait out the final year of the Reagan administration. There is simply no reason to think that, absent pressure from the Contras, the Sandinistas will live up to these latest promises any better than the others they have made and violated.

Mr. Chairman, without some continued aid to the Contras, the negotiation process will come to a screeching halt and the Sandinistas will regroup with their Cuban and Soviet friends to continue the destabilization of the region. If the Sandinistas agree to reforms

leading to real democracy and regional peace, then no further military aid will be necessary. Until we see proof of genuine movement in this area, we must keep up the pressure on Mr. Ortega and approve this package.

I urge my colleagues to vote in support of the Contra aid package.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, the administration's case for continuing to pay people to kill other people in Nicaragua has two aspects; One, the argument that we should be preventing armed interference by one country into the affairs of another, and that is fairly universally agreed to in this Congress. In the case of Afghanistan where we have aggression by the Soviet Union against that nation, a much larger amount of funds than has ever been contemplated for Nicaragua on a virtually unanimous basis has gone into effect year after year, and may be producing results. Where we have the clear-cut case of aggression there is no disagreement or partisanship here in the Congress.

In addition, in Central America there was a consensus at one point until the administration broke it. The first of the many Boland amendments offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND] was one which said that we may use American money to prevent Nicaragua from sending arms and men to cause revolution elsewhere, and a policy which says that the United States will cooperate in the region to prevent the armed attacks directly or indirectly by any one nation against another would continue to enjoy a broad consensus, but the administration chose to break that.

It chose instead, for ideological reasons, to go to a new goal, that of overthrowing the Nicaraguan regime. Their argument was that we have a right to do that not simply because of international aggression, and there would be, I want to repeat, as there is in the case of Afghanistan virtual unanimity in this Chamber, I think in the whole building, to prevent by armed support and other means aggression of that sort.

It is ironic that we make that point when we have helped turn Nicaragua's neighbors into bases for armed attack on them. We have invalidated our ability to make that argument.

I would like to get back to that.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I would inquire, is the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] aware that Major Miranda, after he defected, made it crystal clear that the

Communist Sandinista government had been exporting revolution and revolutionary supplies into El Salvador and Honduras and Costa Rica?

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I would take back my time, as I said, it was a policy which was aimed at preventing that that would have been a virtually unanimous one. We had that at one time.

The problem is that the administration compromises that and we have an administration that has pressured Nicaragua's neighbors into being bases for attacks on Nicaragua which is not the best possible situation to be in to object to reciprocal activity. We should be in a position of being opposed to that.

I want to address the other part of the argument, and the one that the President makes most often, that somehow he is the international 911 number for the Civil Liberties Union because Nicaragua does not conform to democratic principles, and it does not and I regret that and we should be critical of that, but that then he says we have the right to armed attack. Ronald Reagan is not in a position, nor this Congress, nor this Government, to claim that we are consistently going to be sending Armed Forces because of lack of internal democracy. A lack of internal democracy should be criticized, and ought to be the subject of international attention whether it is in South Africa, Chile, or elsewhere, but the fact is that this President claimed with great enthusiasm as one of his accomplishments legitimately so the closer ties with the People's Republic of China. Mr. Chairman, I would not want to run the opposition newspaper in Managua, but I would rather run it there than in Peking. This administration had to be dragged from the bedside of the regime of Ferdinand Marcos, and it is not remotely possible for them to argue that they are so appalled by the lack of democracy in Nicaragua that they are going to send people to shoot other people to enforce that doctrine.

Mr. Chairman, a policy of using American money to encourage resistance to armed aggression was the policy of this Congress without much disagreement. The administration broke it because with total inconsistency the administration that had been very reluctant to react in any way to the situation in Africa, but befriended dictatorships elsewhere becomes now in the case of Nicaragua a burning zealot for free speech. It will not wash.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from California if he promises not to talk about the beauty pageant in El Salvador because I did not understand that one.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, ABC did not point out the poverty in El Salvador.

Mr. FRANK. But that is off the subject here.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] is a scholar of the Brezhnev doctrine, which is what is Communist remains Communist forever, and the rest of the world is up for grabs.

I would ask the gentleman from Massachusetts, does he not feel that if there were a secret vote on giving this massive classified figure of money to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the seven different freedom fighter groups in Afghanistan, that there would be at least 100 Members on his side of the aisle, if we had a secret ballot, who would vote against it? One was just in the well.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, I will take my time back, and I will say absolutely not. I reject the suggestion of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] that there are secret sympathizers here with the Russian aggression in Afghanistan.

As far as the Brezhnev doctrine is concerned, I am prepared to say to the extent it is still there, Brezhnev is dead. Ronald Reagan has met with Brezhnev's successor, and Ronald Reagan has told us he does not see any success or subscribe to that doctrine.

Mr. Chairman, a policy of America opposing aggression by Nicaragua or against it would get a lot of support. But pretending to be the force of democracy makes no sense.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FAWELL].

Mr. FAWELL. Mr. Chairman, we all want peace in Nicaragua. But peace, to be enduring, must be based on liberty and democracy. Peace alone is not enough if there is no liberty. Even people in jail have peace.

When I first met President Oscar Arias last February, he admitted that he was "not optimistic" that the Sandinistas would ever accept "free elections or democratization." And this was only 1 day after the four Central American democracies first accepted the Arias plan. At that meeting, President Arias also said that if the Sandinistas did sign the agreement but did not fulfill it:

The whole world will know that they are not sincere. * * * If I can do that, fine, at least I shall have done something.

Should I now believe that the Sandinistas will be sincere about living up to the provisions of the Arias peace plan when the author himself had, at best, grave doubts that the Sandinistas would ever fulfill its provisions?

Since signing the peace plan on August 7 Daniel Ortega and his brother Humberto, the Minister of Defense,

covertly approved a new military plan to expand and modernize their military to 600,000 men, and equip it with a squadron of Soviet Mig-21's, self-propelled artillery, 6 more tank battalions, 400-ton warships, and other offensive armaments.

This is the same Daniel Ortega who talks of peace while the Sandinistas continue to train Salvadoran and Honduran guerrillas, who have their headquarters in Managua.

This is the same Daniel Ortega who thinks "amnesty" is the equivalent of foreign exile for the thousands of political prisoners still languishing in the jails of Managua, prisoners whom not even the International Red Cross has been able to reach. The same Daniel Ortega who, until this vote in Congress drew near, defined freedom of the press to be the restricted right of one newspaper—La Prensa—to print and one radio station—Radio Católica—to guardedly use the air waves.

He is the same Daniel Ortega who, along with other members of the Sandinista directorate, is stealing the meager resources of Nicaragua and sending them abroad to personal bank accounts.

These are the same Sandinistas who have failed to keep any of their promises to the Organization of American States for pluralism and democracy and nonalignment with either East or West. The same Sandinistas who have said that "what we gained through the force of arms we will never give up except through the force of arms."

Even their recent lifting of the state of emergency is, in the words of Maj. Roger Miranda, "a farce, because Nicaragua's political system is so repressive that when a person's human rights are violated there is no course of action. * * * The Sandinistas control the judiciary, the law apparatus, all * * * the organizations for controlling the mass population. * * * Citizens have no protection * * * although they say they have lifted the state of emergency, it still exists."

Mr. Chairman, there is a legitimate counterrevolution going on in Nicaragua. In the frantic search for peace in Nicaragua—at almost any price—we forget the lesson that history constantly teaches us—that liberty is the quid pro quo for enduring peace. Even our own revered Constitution's failure to grant liberty to blacks led eventually to a devastating Civil War. It is not only peace we seek in Central America so much as it is the foundations for peace—individual liberty and democracy—as rare as those commodities are in that land.

I am not saying that the Contras are necessarily a guarantee of ultimate democracy in Nicaragua. I am saying I do not trust the Sandinistas to unilaterally live up to their promises of democracy now any more than before.

If Congress cuts off aid to the armed resistance, we shall succeed in proving to the world what President Arias saw as a probable outcome of his peace plan 1 year ago—that "the Sandinistas are not sincere."

But, regrettably, we shall have done much more. We shall have eliminated the armed resistance as a viable force in Nicaragua. All this in return for modest and easily retrievable concessions from the Sandinistas. It is naive to place this peace plan in the hands of the Sandinistas. We shall prove that the Sandinistas are not sincere about democracy. But who will defend Central America from the Sandinistas?

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, for 7 long years we have watched—sometimes in shock, sometimes in disbelief—as the Reagan administration waged cruel and incessant war on the people of Nicaragua. In pursuit of an ideological obsession, spurred on by radical right wing fanatics, the President, his top Cabinet-level officers and their underlings, have engaged in every immoral, unethical, and illegal activity imaginable. They lied to Congress, to the American people, and to the world. They created, trained, advised, funded, and directed an insurgent armed force which behaved as terrorists against the defenseless men, women, and children of Nicaragua.

In furtherance of its determined effort to militarily overthrow the Government of Nicaragua—a country with which to this very day we have full diplomatic relations—the Reagan administration bought or bullied other nations in the region to allow use of their territories from which the Contras could wage war and be resupplied. And whenever a proposal or possibility for peace emerged, the administration willfully and deliberately sabotaged its prospects.

All of this has been done in the name of the people of the United States, but in the face of their clearly stated opposition from the very outset.

The American people know that the United States does not have the right to overthrow other sovereign governments simply because we disagree with their form of government or with their ideology.

Now, finally, is the time to end it. Today we can stop funding the killing and the carnage. Today we can begin to repair the damage to America's honor.

The Reagan administration's new request for Contra aid will ensure only one thing—an end to a historic opportunity for peace in Central America.

Let us not be deceived by administration claims that the request has been "scaled down." The \$32 million in

nonlethal aid alone is three times the current monthly rate. If one adds in the \$20 million to ensure helicopters and the \$4 million for electronic equipment, the total is almost \$60 million for just 4 months. At that rate, the request is as large as the \$270 million for 18 months originally proposed by President Reagan.

The administration claims that the request is primarily for nonlethal aid. But the administration defines nonlethal aid as anything but "weapons, weapons systems and ammunition." This would include the leasing and operation of aircraft and helicopters, and the purchase of spare parts. Nonlethal aid simply means more money for more war.

Sending money for more war now would derail the Central American peace process at its most critical moment.

Since the signing of the Guatemala accord last August, the Sandinistas have taken encouraging steps toward compliance. La Prensa and Radio Catolica have been allowed to reopen. The state of emergency has been lifted. The Sandinistas are engaged in direct negotiations with the armed Contras. In a recent letter to President Reagan, Ortega offered to reduce the size of the Nicaraguan Army, prohibit the establishment of any foreign military bases, expel all Soviet and Cuban military advisors and relinquish power if the Sandinistas lose in an election.

There is no guarantee that the Sandinistas will not renege on their promises. But they have repeatedly insisted that they will no longer abide by the accord if Contra aid continues. It is only in the context of a regional peace agreement that the Sandinistas have ever agreed to make democratic reforms. Seven years of Contra war could not get them to make such commitments.

The five Central American leaders want Contra aid to end. They explicitly prohibited outside aid to insurgent groups in the Guatemala accord. On January 15, the International Verification and Followup Commission reaffirmed that desire. They declared:

In spite of the exhortation of the Central American presidents, the Government of the United States of America maintains its policy and practice of providing assistance, military in particular, to the irregular forces operating against the Government of Nicaragua. The definitive cessation of this assistance continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts and of this procedure as a whole.

Mr. Chairman, the Central American people want peace, not more war. And the American people want an end to United States support of the Contras. It is time for the Congress and the administration to listen to the people. No matter how temporary the achievements of the peace process, the United States cannot continue a policy which not only violates international

law but runs counter to our most fundamental principles as a nation and as a people.

This may be the last opportunity to support peace in Central America. Let us break the cycle of violence in that troubled region. I urge my colleagues to vote for an end to the war in Nicaragua now, while there still is a chance for peace. Vote "no" on the President's request.

□ 1245

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to take time today to address my comments not only to those people on the Republican side who have consistently voted for Contra aid, and certainly not to those on the Democrat side who have on every occasion opposed Contra aid, but rather I would like to talk to those people who have been undecided, the people on both sides of the aisle who have been spending weeks agonizing over what to do on this vote. And I understand that. I think everybody in the Congress understands what it's like when you face an issue and just want to reach deep down inside and try to figure out what to do. There are a number on both sides of the aisle who are undecided, and believe me, Mr. Chairman, if just a few of these people vote for this package today it will pass. It is just that close.

For those who are undecided and for those who have been agonizing, you are all agonizing because you seek the facts the way most of us who support this package seek the facts. And what are those facts?

The Sandinistas came in in 1979. We gave them aid. Jimmy Carter cut it off. We have watched them since Ronald Reagan has been in the White House, and everybody, everybody on both sides are almost to the point of total disillusionment with these Sandinistas.

We heard about freedom of the press. Come on, everybody knows that is a joke. There are only two areas in Nicaragua where there is any freedom, and Mrs. Chamorro is scared all of the time about whether they are going to march in and shut her presses down. Radio Catolica is another, but nothing else has been sanctioned, nothing else has been sanctioned in Nicaragua. There is no free speech. We have divine mobs. If somebody wants to come in and protest against the government, we have divine mobs in there threatening these people, putting signs in their front yards, calling them enemies of the people.

I want to talk about the political prisoners in Nicaragua, I visited a camp in Honduras where Nicaraguans themselves had gone to escape from Nicaragua because, No. 1, they were

either being tortured or their 13-, 14-year-old kids were being forced into the military.

It is a disaster as to what is going on in Nicaragua, and the Sandinistas are responsible for it. So many of my friends on the Democrat side sat in that bone-chilling testimony by Major Miranda who talked about the fact that the Sandinistas were not only threatening individual liberties and individual rights within Nicaragua, but they in fact posed a definite threat to their neighbors, including the Government of Costa Rica. It was bone-chilling testimony.

If you still sit on the fence and you are still nervous, what do you do? What have we been doing for the last couple of years? This Government, this President, this Congress has been providing aid in the most constructive way as possible.

The fact is that the President and JIM WRIGHT have sat down, they have tried to put some constructive things together. We have had a policy that has been constructive in nature.

The Central American Presidents met in January. What did they say? They said the Sandinistas are not complying, but let us give them a little bit more time. We cannot walk away from the process.

The one thing we have learned since 1981 is peace through strength works. This package is not controversial. This package stresses humanitarian aid, nonlethal aid, something even Arias said he favored. The military aid is released after we jump through 50 hoops.

For those who are undecided, please do not walk away from this. There will not be another package. In my opinion, we are not going to have a consensus of opinion, this is probably the last chance for those who are on the fence and undecided to pursue the reasonable United States policy in Central America. The reasonable policy in Central America is to support this package and to encourage the peace process at the same time.

Let us remember that Ronald Reagan's philosophy of peace through strength works, with the best intentions by this country to bring peace, a lasting peace, in Central America.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHUMER].

Mr. SCHUMER. Mr. Chairman, many speakers on the other side of the aisle have focused on the failings of the Sandinista government, and I agree. The Sandinistas have failed in many ways. The freedoms that the gentlemen speak about are not there as they should be. Mr. Ortega has declared he is a Marxist-Leninist. That is abhorrent to me.

But I would say to you ladies and gentlemen of this House that is not

the issue. The issue is: Are the Contras the preferable way to change Nicaragua from a land of dictatorship into a land of democracy, and I would argue no.

It is a tenet, a well known tenet, that this country has learned in bloody war after bloody war that we have either participated in or watched that guerrilla warfare cannot win unless it has the support of the people. And despite what we might want to call the Contras, most of the military wing of the Contras are holdovers from the old Somoza regime. They still are. And, that is the emblem that they are to the Nicaraguan people.

It is a hard fact to face, ladies and gentlemen, but my guess is that, if an election, a free and fair election, were held tomorrow and the Nicaraguan people were given a choice between the Sandinistas and the Contras, they would reluctantly choose the Sandinistas.

Mr. President, it is not that we like the Sandinistas any more than you do. It is that we like the Contras less than you do. In fact, Mr. President, I cringe, I literally cringe, when you call the Contras freedom fighters and compare them to the patriots of the American Revolution. Was George Washington accused of embezzling funds from the Revolutionary Army? Was John Adams an alleged drug dealer? The Contras are not some valiant force of freedom fighters. In fact, in the words of our own administration, the battlefield memos Rob Owen wrote to Ollie North, he said, "Calero is the strong man and the only one who counts in the FDN. He is the creation of the U.S. Government, and so he is the horse we choose to ride." Or how about this, again written by Mr. Owen to Ollie North on the Contras: "These are not first-rate people; in fact they are liars and greed and power motivated. They are not the people to rebuild a new Nicaragua."

We do not have many good choices in this area. The policies of the past, of previous Presidents who supported Somoza, has condemned us to series of choices that are not very good and are not very palatable. But I would argue to you, gentleman and ladies, on purely pragmatic terms because one person's morality may be another person's immorality, that if you want to change the Sandinista government, if you want to bring democracy to Nicaragua, that the Contras are the last way to do it, and the peace process is the greatest hope of doing it.

Contra aid is contra-diplomacy, contra-peace and contra-America.

Mr. Chairman, 30,000 people have died. A billion dollars has been spent, and as a result a nation lies in ruin, and we are no closer to our goal of achieving democracy today than we were 6 years ago.

Ronald Reagan wants to add \$36 million and another generation of misery to the victims of this equation. I say no more.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. CHANDLER].

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, in response to the previous speaker I would just like to point out that in November 1987 half of the 147 senior staff and field commanders of the Nicaraguan resistance forces were civilian professionals or urban employees, farmers or peasants. One-third had served in the Sandinista army or militias before joining the resistance. Only 25 men had served previously as officers or soldiers in the national guard.

I have been there. I have seen them. This is a peasant army fighting for its freedom.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHUGH].

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution providing additional aid to the Nicaraguan Contras and I urge its defeat.

There is no escaping the deep and fundamental differences that exist here and around the country over the utility of aid to the Contras. But they are differences of strategy, not of goals. On the question of American interests in Central America, I believe there is rather broad agreement.

We all agree that our goal in this region is peace and stability, and that the attainment of that goal requires reconciliation, economic development, and the growth of democracy for the people who live there. The legitimate aspirations of our Central American neighbors are no different than our own for the region. Our real disagreement is over the best means to advance those aspirations, and specifically whether further aid to the Contras will promote our common goals.

In debating this issue, we should begin by acknowledging the good intentions on both sides. That's not easy given what has gone before, but it's important that we try. Those of us who question the utility of Contra aid should accept the President's assertion that his purpose is to make the peace plan work, and not to impose a permanent state of war on the region. By the same token, the advocates of aid should accept the fact that those of us in opposition are not seeking to defend a Marxist regime or ignoring the potential threat to American interests in the region. Only by rejecting these red herrings can we make an objective assessment of what will truly serve our interests at this critical juncture.

I believe that an objective assessment must begin with the Central American peace agreement, an agreement we all claim to support. If fully implemented, that agreement will

achieve our common goals: An end to the conflict in the region, amnesty for all combatants, and concrete steps to secure pluralism and democracy for the people of Central America. It is an agreement signed by all five Presidents, each of whom has publicly pledged to themselves, to their constituents, and to the world to fulfill its express terms. The agreement is still alive and still represents the best hope for peace and democracy in the region. If the leaders of Central America have confidence in that agreement, surely we should give it our support by our actions as well as our words.

The President has said he supports the agreement, but, given his profound distrust of Sandinista intentions, he argues that Contra aid is a necessary insurance policy, the only real pressure that will guarantee compliance by the Sandinistas with the peace agreement. This argument has a certain appeal, for there are times when military pressure is useful in advancing a peaceful settlement. But this is not one of those times. In these circumstances, it is much more likely that military pressure will prolong the conflict and torpedo the best chance for peace. Why is this so?

First, the peace agreement itself expressly calls for a termination of Contra aid. We cannot credibly say we support the agreement and then act in direct contradiction to its terms. How can we expect the Sandinistas to take the myriad steps required of them when we refuse to do the one thing asked of us? Rather than serve as an insurance policy for compliance, additional aid will almost certainly guarantee noncompliance.

The Sandinistas have made clear that they cannot proceed with internal reforms in the face of Contra attacks. Are they bluffing? One need only examine the record. The Contras have been engaged since 1981. Have the Sandinistas liberalized their rule in response to that pressure? To the contrary—they have tightened up, citing the escalating war as their justification. Only the collective political initiative of the Central American Presidents brought some concrete steps toward democratization, and only the moral and political pressure of that agreement has a chance of persuading the Sandinistas to complete the job.

Despite the President's best intentions, Contra aid will mean more war, not peace and democracy. And what are the implications of more war? Can the Contras overthrow the Sandinistas? Not according to our own military experts and our friends in the region. As President Arias has said, for every dollar the United States gives the Contras the Sandinistas will get five from the Soviets for their defense.

Even if the Contras succeed in overthrowing the Sandinistas, isn't it likely that the Sandinistas would then take to the hills and conduct their own guerrilla war? Is that what we want? How much longer do we think the American people will tolerate support for the Contras? A clear majority of our people have been opposed to this policy for some time. In a democracy like ours, government cannot long sustain a policy without public support.

And what about the suffering and death associated with this war? Forty thousand Nicaraguans have already died. It's relatively easy for us to fund a continuing conflict. Our wives and children aren't being maimed and killed. I don't question anyone's motives, but unfortunately the probable result of more Contra aid is more war, and the people of Central America are paying the price.

Finally, we have to consider the effect of an escalating war on the fragile democracies of the region. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras courageous leaders are struggling to enhance civilian control over the military. But we all know that the military establishments in those countries are still a dominant influence. War in the region will only enhance the power of the military to the detriment of civilian rule, a result none of us wants to see. Undoubtedly, this was one of the strongest motivations of the five Presidents in taking their political initiative and in signing the peace agreement.

I urge my colleagues to give that peace agreement a fighting chance. It's virtually certain that the peace initiative will fail if Contra aid is approved. It's true that the Sandinistas might renege on that agreement if aid is terminated, but it's far from certain. They would run some significant risks if they did so. Deprived of the Contras as an excuse for noncompliance, they would be faced with universal opposition in this country and abroad. Their isolation in the region would severely handicap any real chance for economic recovery and stability. To have any prospect for survival in the mid-to-long term, the Sandinistas must address the pressing needs of their people and for that they need the cooperation of their neighbors and the United States. Their economic salvation does not rest with the Soviet Union or Cuba, which have serious problems of their own. Therefore, while the Sandinistas might prefer to walk away from the peace agreement and go their own way, there would be substantial costs in their doing so. We should not assume that ending Contra aid will necessarily have that result.

For all of these reasons, I urge my colleagues to terminate Contra aid and give our wholehearted support to the Central American peace agreement.

□ 1300

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. FIELDS].

Mr. FIELDS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, today we in this body are faced with what I think is a very fundamental decision and I think it is a sad commentary on this body that this issue has become highly emotional and politicized. Last night on "Nightline" it was reported that the Sandinistas felt that their future was in our hands, that their destiny would be affected by the vote that we are going to cast later tonight.

Well, I think we should remove politics and emotion and view the Contras' future and our ability to influence that future as contrasted with their past and their present.

So I think we have to look at some facts and I think we have to begin by just admitting that the Sandinistas are not Boy Scouts. They closed the radio station, they closed and later censored the newspaper, there have not been free elections. And if you go to the direct statement by Daniel Ortega, he publicly stated that in the event the Sandinistas lost the election, they would never concede power.

Sandinista Interior Minister Tomas Borge said, "We are not going to lose at the polls what we have won through arms."

So to me this indicates they will never relinquish power through any democratic means.

Commandante Ortega also indicated that the Sandinistas give weapons, ammunition and training to Communist guerrillas and terrorist organizations in El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica. And the point that I am driving to, Mr. Chairman, is what Mr. Ortega has said, that theirs is a revolution without borders.

And for my constituents in Houston, TX, I think this whole debate should be framed and focused around the concept of refugees.

One hundred million people live in Central America and Mexico. History shows that when a Marxist-Leninist regime comes to power, 10 percent to 20 percent of that population will attempt to leave.

Thus if there are revolutionary regimes in that region, 10 million to 20 million people as refugees, as free people, will come to the United States.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FIELDS. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from California, Mr. DORNAN.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, we are trying to stay factually accurate today. When misstatements are made, with all due respect to the other side, we are trying to correct them.

The preceding speaker, preceding the gentleman presently in the well, knows that I admire and consider him a friend; but he said was it not likely that the Sandinistas would take to the hills if their roles were reversed? He must study this conflict to realize that the Sandinistas are city boys. Those nine Communist commandantes are upper middle class. The hills are denied to them forever. That is where the campesinos are, who hate them.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, this country boy yields 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY].

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

Last night, I heard this Contra aid package being called an insurance policy for Central America. Mr. Chairman, I was born and raised in Hartford, CT—the insurance capitol of the world. I know insurance when I see it. I must respectfully correct the President. This is not an insurance policy but an insurgence policy.

However, in all seriousness, we've debated this issue many times and yet the question never becomes less serious. And so I join today's debate, addressing the new caveat—the Arias peace plan.

While it's obvious that the ongoing debate on this question has polarized us, the outcome of this vote will prove neither side totally correct. If Contra aid is turned down and the war stops, Nicaragua will not become a benign Costa Rica in 6 months. In the same vein, if Contra aid is continued by this vote, the Sandinistas will not be overthrown with immediate democratization bursting forth in all its glory.

But we must look at the Arias peace plan; while progress on and adherence to the peace agreement has not been achieved as quickly as some had originally hoped, some progress is being made. To jeopardize the peace process by providing additional aid at this time would not only be foolhardy, it could be tragic. Passage of this request would undermine the peace process, contribute to the increasing militarization of the region, and further jeopardize our relations with the people and nations of Central America. Let's not even mention world opinion.

Progress on compliance with the peace agreement, however slow, is the most encouraging development in Central America in this decade. The legitimate long-term interests of the United States are best served by addressing the long-term social and economic needs of the region—problems which additional Contra aid does nothing to alleviate.

This is a difficult and complicated situation. Both sides have tarnished track records. But February 3 is a day marking the opportunity for the United States to step aside for a

moment and let the Central American countries work together at giving peace a chance. We, as a nation, have a new opportunity to be a stabilizing force in Central America at this pivotal time. We should seize this opportunity and vote "no."

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, when I first joined the committee charged with the duty of overseeing issues in Central America, the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, in 1981 I made my first trip down there to five troubled countries. I was denied entrance into Nicaragua, at the airport, on Good Friday 1981, but I visited the other four countries and found them in chaos except for Costa Rica. They were all very nervous. For the first time in the history of this Nation, a direct attack with a bomb had been made on our U.S. Marine guards. A time bomb in Costa Rica blew nails into a Marine van as it was traveling from the Marine house to the Embassy. That was in San Jose, the capital of Costa Rica. In all these intervening years I have been down in Central America 15 times, more times than any other Member of either of these distinguished bodies.

When it comes down to just 2 minutes, after 7 years of effort and work, as hard work as I have put in on any district issue or any other foreign issue, as an arms control adviser, or an observer, anything, I have never worked as hard as I have on this issue of freedom in Central America.

□ 1315

What do you say in 2 minutes to turn the minds and the hearts of that small group of moderates who are still undecided? I guess I have to focus in on what one of the prior speakers said, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SCHUMER], that between these two choices, he finds the Contras worse.

I was in two small beat-up old farms in Honduras a couple of weeks ago looking at the young men and women who had lost arms and legs fighting with the democratic resistance, the so-called Contras. They were learning to read and write and type. They all said they would gladly give their limbs again to get rid of communism in Managua.

Now, the reason those of us on this side quote Roger Miranda, the field officer, the highest rallyer we have ever had from the other side—I hate to use the word, "defector," because you do not defect from alcoholism or adultery; you rally to freedom. Well, Major Miranda wants to know what is the Democrats' alternative in the event that the peace plan fails. Invasion, air strikes or a naval blockade? Opponents

of Contra aid must be specific about what their alternate proposal entails. It appears that Democrats are the ones most likely to spill American blood in Nicaragua.

I urge a "yes" vote on this aid package to support the Contras and to support the peace plan.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, let me ask the gentleman if I may have an additional 30 seconds.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I am sorry, but I must say to the gentleman that I do not have the time.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I will take a 1-hour special order tonight. A postmortem will be in order, win or lose, on this vote. Please listen to that 1-hour special order tonight. And I apologize to the staff in advance for keeping them an extra hour tonight.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for giving me the opportunity to speak on this matter.

Mr. Chairman, just this last weekend I was in Managua, Nicaragua, and met with a number of groups. The archbishop of the Catholic Church, the internal opposition, the labor unions, the human rights groups, and others. I have just been handed a paper here that says that one of the people I met with has been arrested because of being outspoken last weekend.

I cannot understand, Mr. Chairman, why the message of those people representing hundreds of thousands of people is not getting out to us, and it makes me believe that perhaps the article in the Wall Street Journal, which recently reported that the Sandinista government has employed the public relations firm in New York City of Rykler, Applebaum & Whitman at a cost of \$1 billion cordobas a month (\$20,000 in American money) is true. If so, perhaps this is the reason that the information that gets to some of our well-intentioned Members is rather slanted, from the reports given by the people last week to me.

Mr. Chairman, we are all after the peace process. We hope it will work. We want this vote to give us a 5-month window where the people of Nicaragua can stand up and be heard; perhaps they can have free elections which will come about as promised if the peace process is complied with. However, we do not have much confidence, Mr. Chairman, that the Sandinista government is doing to let this happen.

As we get into this debate today, I believe it might be helpful and in my opinion is necessary to remind our colleagues on both sides of this debate just who the Sandinista inner circle of

government is. Therefore, I will insert into the RECORD today the biographical backgrounds of 60 of the members of the Sandinista government's inner circle for everyone to read. That will give everyone who takes the time to read these backgrounds clue as to the philosophies, beliefs, and intents of this inner circle.

Mr. Chairman, I want to read the Sandinista creed also imprinted in the information which they are all bound by is the oath they have to take before they can be a part of that government. It goes as follows:

I believe in the doctrines and struggles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Che Guevara, the great teachers and guides of the working class, which is the protective force and driving force of the class struggle. I believe in the building of the Marxist-Leninist society.

Mr. Chairman, I want to help the Central American countries to make this peace process work. I believe the vote today will give them 5 months of additional leverage, which will encourage the Sandinista government to meet all of its promises which are in the agreement.

Mr. Chairman, I include the biographies to which I referred, as follows:

THE INNER CIRCLE

Arce Castano, Bayardo, FSLN National Directorate member. Vice Coordinator of the FSLN Executive Commission. Commander of the Revolution. Born in Managua in 1950. Joined the FSLN as a student and *La Prensa* reporter in 1969. Active in the FSLN's student front, the FER. Responsible for the rural logistical network in the northern highlands, 1974-76. Named in Havana to represent Borge's GPP faction on the unified FSLN National Directorate in March 1979. Key link between the FSLN and the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas, for whom he coordinated negotiations for military training and arms deliveries in 1980. In May 1980, became president of the Council of State after the Sandinistas packed it with their supporters. In September 1980, became coordinator of the FSLN's Political Committee and its National Secretariat. Played a lead role in managing the November 1984 elections. A leading party theorist and an ideological hardliner. Arce is widely known for his then-secret May 1984 speech before the Moscow-line communist PSN in which he made clear the FSLN's goal of creating a one-party state. His brother, Gerardo Arce Castano, is a Sandinista Army captain against whom numerous human rights complaints have been documented. Directorate, the FSLN Executive Commission, and the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Commander of the Revolution. Born in Managua on August 13, 1930. Enrolled in law school at the UNAN in Leon in 1954. Joined Moscow-line communist PSN with Fonseca and Silvio Mayorga in 1955. Jailed after the assassination of Somoza Garcia in September 1956. Escaped from house arrest in 1959 and traveled to Costa Rica for military training. Traveled to Cuba in 1960 to seek additional training and support from Fidel Castro. Founded the FSLN with Fonseca and Mayorga in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, in July 1961. Received extensive military training in Cuba with Fonseca and other early Sandinistas before returning as

a leader of the Rio Coco guerrilla campaign of 1963. Director of the Republican Mobilization's newspaper in the joint PSN/FSLN 1965-66 attempt at above-ground organizing. Returned to armed tactics at Pancasan in 1967, fleeing subsequently to Costa Rica where he was arrested in January 1969. Lived in Cuba and Peru and may have visited the PLO in Lebanon. Accused of rape while in Cuba. Reentered Nicaragua from Mexico as a simple militant. Directed the training of FSLN recruits during the mid-1970s, but never again led forces in combat. Captured in Managua in February 1976 and severely tortured in prison. Freed by the Pastora-led National Palace takeover of August 1978, he flew to Panama and then Cuba. Leader and spokesman for the Prolonged Popular War faction. Named to the reunified National Directorate announced in March 1979 in Havana. His first wife Yelba was killed in June 1979 by the National Guard. In July 1979, became Minister of Interior. Succeeded Luis Carrion Cruz as the FSLN National Directorate member in charge of the Atlantic Coast. Has traveled to the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Libya as well as Cuba.

Cabezas Lacayo, Omar. MINT Brigade Commander. Vice Minister of Interior and Chief of its office responsible for political indoctrination and enforcement. Member of the FSLN Assembly and the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Born in Leon in 1950. Joined the FSLN through the FER in 1968 while a student at UNAN in Leon with Bayardo Arce and Doris Tijerino. Never finished law school, becoming a combatant with Borge's GPP faction in 1974. On the general staff of the FSLN's Northern Front during the final offensive. An FSLN representative on the Council of State after Somoza's fall. Instrumental in establishing the new Sandinista education system and literacy campaigns along Marxist lines. Since coming to the Interior Ministry, has served as Chief of the Political Directorate and was involved in early Atlantic Coast autonomy talks. Author of successful book, *Fire from the Mountain*, portraying guerrilla activity in and around Leon.

Carrion Cruz, Luis F. Member of the FSLN National Directorate and of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. First Vice Minister of Interior since April 1980. Commander of the Revolution. Born in 1952 in Managua into one of Nicaragua's wealthiest families. His father, Luis Carrion Montoya, a banker, was one of the largest stockholders and owners of BANIC, a financial group which dominated much of the Nicaraguan economy before 1979. Primary education at Catholic schools in Nicaragua. High school at the Jesuit-run Centro America in Granada, the most prestigious prep school in the nation. Transferred to the Phillips Exeter Academy in New Hampshire for his senior year, graduating in June 1970. Attended Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute for 1 year before dropping out. An early friend of Jaime Wheelock. One of the original members of Father Uriel Molina's MCR that worked to politically organize the Managua barrios in 1972. Formed the first FSLN Christian cell with Joaquin Cuadra and Alvaro Baltodano in 1974. Purged from the FSLN with Wheelock and the urban "Marxist-Leninist Proletariat Tendency" (faction) for "sectarianism and insubordination" in October 1975. (Wheelock and Carrion advocated a "traditional" Marxist approach to power through the urban proletariat, and had therefore come into conflict with the rural guerrilla warfare strategy in-

fluenced by the Chinese and Vietnamese then being pushed by the GPP.) Named to the reunified FSLN National Directorate announced in Havana in March 1979. Led the Carlos Roberto Huembes Eastern Front in Chontales during the final offensive. Vice Minister of Defense from December 1979 until April 1980. Attended the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi in December 1986 with Olga Aviles. Upon his return he noted, "the solidarity between our peoples [the Nicaraguan and the Vietnamese] fundamentally expresses itself on the political plane, in respect to the causes which we defend and in the interchange of the revolutionary experiences of our two countries." His brother Carlos is Political Secretary of the FSLN and headed the Sandinista Youth (JS-J19) from 1979 until 1985; his sister Gloria was General Secretary of AMNLAE, the Sandinista Women's Association. A nephew of Arturo Cruz, he is also a cousin of Javier Carrion McDonough.

Cerna Juarez, Lenin. MINT Brigade Commander. Director of State Security in the Interior Ministry. Member of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission and the FSLN Assembly. Born on September 29, 1946, in Leon. Son of a Moscow-line communist PSN activist. Joined an FSLN military squad in 1963 and brought his neighborhood friends, the Ortega brothers, into the FSLN. Participated in guerrilla training, sabotage, and bank robberies. Imprisoned from December 1968 until freed and flown to Cuba after the 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. Received military training in Cuba. Briefly led the Rigoberto Lopez Perez Western Front inside Nicaragua but left the country again after being wounded. After the fall of Somoza, he was assigned to the Nicaraguan Embassy in Honduras, where he directed assassinations of regime opponents in exile, among them former National Guard Capt. Pablo Emilio Salazar ("Comandante Bravo," the effective and professional leader of the Guard's efforts against Eden Pastora's Southern Front), murdered in October 1979 in Tegucigalpa. As chief of the Secret Police, Cerna has been instrumental in the coordination of Cuban, East German, and Soviet training of members of the state security apparatus. Widely believed to have personally tortured civil opposition activists, including Sofonias Cisneros, President of the Union of Christian School Parents, in May 1985. Brother of Engels Cerna.

Cuadra Lacayo, Joaquin. Army Major General. Vice Minister of Defense and EPS Chief of Staff. Member of the FSLN Assembly and of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Guerrilla commander. Born about 1952. While studying law at UCA in the early 1970s, became involved in the FER's political prisoner protests and the MCR's *barrio* organizing. Received military training under Oscar Turcios on the Carrion family estate. Squad leader in the FSLN's December 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. Returned from exile in Cuba and elsewhere to participate in the Tercerista's Northern Front campaign of October 1977. Served on the Internal Front Command with Carols Nunez and Moises Hassan during the June 1979 battle of Managua. With the Sandinistas' rise to power, became Army Chief of Staff and Commander of Operations in Managua. Appointed Vice Minister of Defense in 1980. Since 1979, has traveled to the United States as well as to the Soviet Union, Poland, and Bulgaria. With his long-time friend, Col. Alvaro Baltodano, he is said to have been involved in the 1980

assassination of Jorge Salazar. Also involved with directing the FSLN's assistance to the FMLN rebels in El Salvador and to other Marxist guerrilla groups in Latin America. Son of Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro. His cousin and brother-in-law, Oswaldo Lacayo, is his deputy. His two sisters are divorced from FSLN National Directorate member Carlos Nunez and Hugo Torres, Chief of the Political Section of the EPS General Staff.

Montero Corrales, Renan. Former Cuban intelligence case officer for the FSLN when he was with the Americas Department of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party; now MINT Lt. Col. and member of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Chief of Directorate V (Foreign Intelligence and Clandestine Activities Abroad), Ministry of Interior since June 1983. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born Andres Barahona Lopez in Cuba in the late 1930s, he reportedly fought with Che Guevara in Cuba and Bolivia, and may have been among the Cubans sent back to Cuba after El Chaparral in 1959. While a member of Cuban intelligence, he joined the FSLN in the 1960s, specializing in weapons smuggling; his job was to "keep the FSLN in line in the cities." After the FSLN came to power, he was given Nicaraguan citizenship at the request of Fidel Castro. Helped Borge set up the security services, serving as first chief of the DGSE in 1979. Today, Montero is responsible for external intelligence, operations, propaganda, and support for other Latin American revolutionary groups. Travels regularly to Cuba, Panama, and Costa Rica.

Murillo Zambrana de Ortega, Rosario Maria. Wife of Daniel Ortega, President of Nicaragua. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Secretary General of the Sandinista Association of Cultural Workers, an FSLN mass organization. Born on June 22, 1951, in Managua. Educated in Switzerland. A secret member of the FSLN during her years as the personal secretary of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro at La Prensa from 1971 until his death in 1978. Murillo's first husband, also an FSLN militant, was killed in the war against Somoza.

Nunez Tellez, Carlos. FSLN National Directorate member. President of the National Assembly. Commander of the Revolution. Coordinator of the FSLN mass organizations. Born on July 26, 1951, in Leon. Son of a Leon artisan and a street vendor. Through the FER and Olga Aviles, he joined the FSLN in 1969 with his brother Rene. Involved in political organizing in Leon and in Managua after he moved there in 1974. Came under the direction of Eduardo Contreras in Managua. After Contreras led the December 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking, Nunez came under the direction of Carlos Roberto Huembes. Helped Huembes, Jaime Wheelock, and Luis Carrion secretly reenter Nicaragua. Became a member of the FSLN Political Commission after the death of Huembes in November 1976. Director of the FER and the Christian Revolutionary Movement (MCR) in 1977. Went abroad for foreign military and guerrilla training. Chief of Staff of Wheelock's Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Tendency. Joined the reunified FSLN National Directorate announced in Havana in March 1979. Coordinator of the Internal Front along with Joaquin Cuadra and William Ramirez. Led the Internal Front during the Battle of Managua and the retreat to Masaya in June 1979. Replaced Bayardo Arce as president of the Council of State until 1984, when it was replaced by the National Assembly, of which

he became President. At one point National Directorate member responsible for the FSLN's Department of Propaganda and Political Education. Since the Sandinista rise to power, has traveled to the United States, Western Europe as well as numerous times to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Eastern Europe. Divorced from Berta Cuadra, daughter of Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro and sister of Army Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo. Brother of Rene Nunez Tellez.

Ortega Saavedra, Daniel Jose. FSLN National Directorate member. President of Nicaragua. Coordinator of the FSLN Executive Commission and Chairman of the FSLN National Planning Council. Commander of the Revolution. Born on November 11, 1945, in La Libertad, Chontales. His father was an accountant for a mining concern. Moved to Juigalpa and later to Managua where his father ran a small import-export business. Studied at private and church schools, including the Christian Brothers' Pedagogic Institute of Managua, where Jaime Wheelock Roman was also a student. Briefly studied for the priesthood in a Salesian seminary in El Salvador where one of his teachers was Miguel Obando y Bravo. Joined JPN in 1960. Arrested after JPN youths tried to seize a National Guard barracks. Under the direction of Adolfo Jose Evertz Velez (then head of the communist PSN's paramilitary operations), entered his first terrorist cell in mid-1960, with Edmundo Avilez and Francisco Moreno, both of whom later followed Ortega into the FSLN and were killed at Pancasan in 1967. The cell placed small bombs at the *Cine Tropical* movie house and the homes of pro-Somoza politicians. Arrested in 1961 for fire-bombing vehicles at the U.S. Embassy. Recruited into the FSLN in 1963 by Lenin Cerna and became active in the student protest movement. Briefly attended law school at UCA before becoming a leader of the Managua underground. Arrested in Guatemala in 1964, turned over to Nicaraguan authorities. His torture on that occasion is said to have led him to participate in a four-man FSLN squad that in October 1967 shot to death Sgt. Gonzalo Lacayo of the National Guard's Office of National Security (OSN), notorious for his ruthlessness against the Sandinistas and reputation as a torturer. Imprisoned a month later on bank robbery charges, convicted, and sentenced to 8 years in jail. Acted as an enforcer of ideological discipline in the Sandinista cell block in Carcel Modelo prison. Freed from prison after 7 years by the Christmas party hostage-taking in 1974 and flew to Cuba. Joined the FSLN National Directorate and collaborated with his brother Humberto in the formation of the Tercerista insurreccional strategy. Returned from Cuba in 1976. One of the leaders of the Northern Front during the October 1977 and February 1978 offensives. Served as liaison between the Southern Front and the FSLN National Directorate in 1978-79. Joined the reunified National Directorate in March 1979. After the war, emerged as a member of the governing Junta (and hence implicitly Borge's superior) and its chief international representative. Junta Coordinator, 1979-84. Traveled to Hanoi, Vietnam, where he was received by Premier Pham Van Dong on March 10, 1981. In Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on March 19, 1981, he declared, "If you permit us, we are ready to struggle by your side, with weapons in hands, against the Beijing expansionists. In the political and military fields the Nicaraguan revolution is always

by the side of the Kampuchean [Cambodian] Revolution and wholeheartedly supports it." Between 1981 and 1986, Ortega made at least six public visits to the U.S.S.R.—including three for the funerals of Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko. Elected president for a 6-year term in November 1984; took office January 10, 1985.

Ortega Saavedra, Humberto. FSLN National Directorate member. Member of the FSLN Executive Commission and FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Minister of Defense and EPS Commander in Chief. General of the Army (the only "four star" in the Army; Borge has three). Commander of the Revolution. Brother of President Daniel Ortega. Born circa 1947. Taught Catholic catechism classes in Managua as a youth before his repudiation of Christianity. After leading the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth (JPN) in 1962 he founded the "Sandinista Brigades." Formally joined the FSLN in 1965. He and Brigade members were suspended from the FSLN for 8 months for "ultra-leftist tendencies," among them unauthorized military actions. During the government crackdown after Pancasan (1967), fled to Cuba, where he received military training. Lost the use of his right arm from wounds received in an unsuccessful attempt to free Carlos Fonseca from a Costa Rican jail in December 1969. Released from jail with Fonseca in October 1970 as a result of the hijacking of an airliner by an FSLN squad under the command of Carlos Aguero. Fonseca and Ortega flew to Havana for a hero's welcome. From Havana, Ortega went to the Soviet Union for a year, where he worked on rehabilitating his arm and developing his contacts with the Soviets. He then returned to Cuba. Received General Staff military training in North Korea in 1971 as a member of an FSLN delegation which also included Carlos Fonseca, Rufo Marin, and Carlos Aguero. Reportedly trained in PLO military camps in the mid-East in the mid-1970s. Returned and joined the FSLN National Directorate. In a major FSLN split over strategy, he was expelled from the FSLN along with his brother Daniel and Victor Tirado in 1977. Under the guiding hand of Fidel Castro, the three were named to the reorganized National Directorate as leaders of the Tercerista faction in March 1979. The major theorist behind the Tercerista's "insurreccional" strategy, which advocated immediate violence in the framework of a broad tactical alliance with all anti-Somoza sectors of Nicaraguan society. Directed the 1977-79 war from Costa Rica. Named Commander-in-Chief of the EPS in October 1979. Minister of Defense since January 1980. The EPS, the Sandinista Navy, the Sandinista Air Force and Air Defense, and the Sandinista Militia all fall under his command. Since the Sandinistas' rise to power, has traveled regularly to Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Algeria, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea, Cambodia, and Panama. Advocate of hard-line security policies, including closer ties to the Soviet Union. Married to Carlos Aguero's widow.

Ramirez Mercado, Sergio. Vice President of Nicaragua since November 1984. Member of the FSLN Assembly and of the FSLN National Planning Council. Novelist and author. Appointed in August 1987 to the Government's National Commission on Reconciliation. Born on August 5, 1942, in Masatepe, Masaya. His father was a small-scale coffee planter who belonged to Somoza's Liberal Party and was Mayor of Masaya; his mother was the director of the Escuela

Normal, the "Instituto General Anastasio Somoza Garcia." In his youth, Sergio Ramirez directed the magazine *Poliedro*, a publication that fervently defended the Somoza regime. As a reward for his propaganda services to the dictatorship, Somoza financed his education, including studies in West Germany. Studied at the University of Kansas at Lawrence. Studied law at UNAN from 1959 to 1964. Participated in the July 1959 student protests. Helped found the FER with Carlos Fonseca in 1961. Became established as a major Nicaraguan literary figure and leftist intellectual as editor of *Ventana*. Raised a family in Costa Rica while serving as secretary-general of the Central American Superior Council of Universities. Lived in Berlin in 1973-75. Formally joined the FSLN in 1975. Helped recruit the Group of 12 in 1977 as part of the Tercerista broad front alliance strategy. Served as spokesman for the Group of 12 and negotiator in October 1978 mediation. Served on the Junta from June 1979 until 1984. Visited Iran, noting on August 26, 1987, that the Sandinistas' strategic ties with Iran were "very deep, sincere and brotherly." His brother, Rogelio, is an FSLN delegate to the National Assembly, director of its Foreign Relations Committee, and member of the FSLN Assembly. His sister, Marcia, is the Chief of Administration for the Social Security Institute (INSSBI).

Ramos Arguello, Julio Cesar, Army Colonel. Member of FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Commander, EPS Military Region III (Managua and environs) since 1985. Member of the FSLN Regional Directorate for Region III. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born about 1951, he studied medicine at UNAN in Leon in the early 1970s. Joined the FSLN while in school in 1973, participating in a series of bank robberies. Joined Borge's GPP guerrilla faction in the northern mountains in 1977. Became Army Intelligence and Communications Chief in 1979. Replaced by Ricardo Wheelock Roman as head of the Military Intelligence Directorate, a central point of contact for foreign revolutionaries seeking military training (and sometimes action) in Nicaragua. Said to be heavily assisted in his duties by a large contingent of Cuban military advisers.

Ruiz Hernandez, Henry Il-defonso. Member of the FSLN National Directorate. Member of FSLN National Planning Council. Minister of Foreign Cooperation. Commander of the Revolution. Born in 1940. From a modest Jinotepe family. As a child, won the national elementary school award for best student, awarded by Luis Somoza Debayle. A Moscow-line communist PSN youth cadre, he attended Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University on a Cuban passport in 1966 but did not complete his studies (he opposed the official Soviet line against guerrilla warfare as the appropriate path to power in Latin America). Went to Cuba for guerrilla training, then joined the FSLN after the Pancasan disaster of 1967. Participated in the 1968 meetings in Costa Rica that laid the groundwork for the Prolonged Peoples' War doctrine adopted as official FSLN strategy after 1969. Deported from Nicaragua, he received military training with the PLO and traveled to North Vietnam. He returned to Nicaragua in 1971, devoting himself to organizing guerrillas in rural areas. After the deaths of Fonseca and Carlos Aguero, he became the foremost guerrilla commander in the GPP, remaining in the mountains with the "Pablo Ubeda" Column until 1978. Named to the reunified

National Directorate announced in Havana in March 1979. Three weeks after the victory over Somoza, he went to Moscow, Bulgaria, Libya, and Algeria "to conclude technical agreements." Minister of Planning from 1979 until stepping down in 1985 to become Minister of Foreign Cooperation. In charge of the Miskito Indian resettlement program in the early 1980s. Half-brother of fellow Directorate member Jaime Wheelock. A leading advocate of Soviet positions on the FSLN National Directorate.

Tirado Lopez, Victor Manuel. FSLN National Directorate member. Commander of the Revolution. Born July 19, 1940, in El Rosario, Mexico. First came into contact with Sandinistas in Mexico in 1961, where he was a member of the Communist Party of Mexico during the early and mid-1960s. Joined the FSLN and fought on the Rio Coco in Nicaragua in 1963. Fled to Cuba in 1967 after the Sandinistas defeat at Pancasan. Returned to Nicaragua in 1971 to become a leader of the GPP mountain guerrillas. A leader of the Northern Front column in the October 1977 offensive. Joined the FSLN National Directorate in March 1979. Became a Nicaraguan citizen in September 1979. Served as a member of the FSLN National Directorate's Executive Commission and as chairman of the State Committee of the FSLN National Secretariat until 1980, when he took over labor activities within the FSLN's Department of Mass Organization. Has traveled extensively, visiting Algeria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Syria, Poland, East Germany, Vietnam, and the United States.

Torres Jimenez, Hugo. Army Colonel. Chief of the Political Directorate of the Sandinistas Army (EPS). Member of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Guerrilla commander. Born on April 25, 1948. Son of a National Guard lieutenant from Leon. Joined the FSLN in 1971. Worked in barrio mobilization in the early 1970s. A squad leader under Eduardo Contreras in the 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. "Commandante Uno" (Pastora's second-in-command) during the August 1978 assault on the National Palace. Worked in logistics in Honduras for the FSLN's Northern Front. After 1979, he served as Vice Minister of Interior and Chief of State Security under Tomas Borge, before being moved to the Defense Ministry, where he was the EPS delegate to the Council of State. Has traveled to the Soviet Union to visit Nicaraguan students attending the Frunze Military Academy. Divorced from Cristina Cuadra (sister of Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, Army Chief of Staff, who then married Oswaldo Lacayo, a longtime FSLN militant serving as Army Deputy Chief of Staff).

Vivas Lugo, Rene. Vice Minister of Ministry of the Interior since April 1981. Member of the FSLN Defense and Security Commission. Brigade Commander. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born in 1949 into a wealthy family aligned with the Conservative Party. Joined the FSLN in Europe in 1970. Received military training in East Germany and guerrilla training with the PLO in Lebanon and Jordan. Acted as Henry Ruiz's second in command. Led the GPP's "Pablo Ubeda" Column after Ruiz left the mountains in 1978. Led the seizure of the mining areas (e.g., Siuna, Bonanza) of Zelaya Department in June 1979. Later served as National Director of the Sandinista Police. By the end of 1979, the training of police recruits by Panama (which had provided material, money, safehaven, and

even a 300-man internationalist brigade to the struggle against Somoza) stopped, and the Panamanians were replaced with Cubans and East Europeans. Vivas also has served on the Sandinista government's official human rights commission.

Wheelock Roman, Jaime Stanley. FSLN National Directorate member. Minister of Agriculture, Livestock Development, and Land Reform. Member of both the FSLN Executive Commission and the FSLN National Planning Council. Commander of the Revolution. Born on May 30, 1947, in Managua. Son of wealthy landed family from Jinotepe, Carazo. Joined the FSLN in 1969 and briefly worked in the Leon organization. Accused of killing a National Guard officer in 1970, he fled to Chile, where he studied politics, sociology, and agricultural law. Studied in Germany from 1972 to 1973. Wrote several books of Marxist historical analysis. Returned to Nicaragua in 1975. Advanced a theoretical critique of the Maoist-oriented GPP strategy from an orthodox Marxist (i.e., urban proletariat-centered) perspective. Tomas Borge and the GPP-dominated FSLN National Directorate purged Wheelock and his "Marxist-Leninist Proletarian Tendency" (TP) for "sectarianism and insubordination" in October 1975. According to Shirley Christian, "The antagonism toward Wheelock was so great among some Sandinistas that they sent a squad to kill him, but a priest gave Wheelock a hiding place." Led the TP's labor organizing efforts until it reunited with the FSLN in March 1979. Best theoretically trained Marxist of the FSLN National Directorate. His wife, Vanessa Castro Cardenal, is now Chief of the FSLN's Political Education Department and a member of the FSLN Assembly.

SANDINISTA CADRE

Aguirre Solis, Danilo. FSLN militant who, as Deputy Director, enforces the Sandinista party line at the ostensibly independent newspaper *El Nuevo Diario*. FSLN Representative in the National Assembly; member of the Commission for Legal Parliamentary Affairs and Human Rights. Educated as a lawyer.

Astorga Gadea, Nora Josefina. Ambassador to the United Nations since March 1986. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born in Managua in 1949. Daughter of a landowner. Went to Catholic schools and became involved in church-sponsored social work. Attended private schools in Washington, D.C., and Rome, then returned to Managua in 1969 to enter the UCA law school and become an FSLN collaborator. Visited Cuba in the early 1970s. Employed as a lawyer and head of personnel for the Somoza-controlled SOVIPE construction company. In March 1978, lured National Guard G-2 Gen. Reynaldo "Perro" Perez Vega to her apartment, where three FSLN militants assassinated him. Fled to Costa Rica where she announced her FSLN membership and was assigned to the Southern Front as a political officer. From October 1979 until February 1981, she was chief prosecutor in the special political tribunals which tried (often summarily) National Guardsmen and other political opponents. Subsequently became one of three Vice Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

Atha Rodriguez, Paul Stanley. MINT Captain. Assistant for "Special Projects" to Minister of Interior, Tomas Borge. Son of a Nicaraguan mother and a U.S. Marine who remained when the marines withdrew in 1932. Minister of Domestic Commerce from December 1979 until April 1980. Serving since 1980 as Borge's black-market business agent and confidant, Atha has set up a

number of holding companies and front companies in Panama and elsewhere in the region. The largest of these is the "Holding Management and Investment Corporation" (or "H&M"), sometimes referred to as "Heroes and Martyrs of the Revolution, S.A." (or HYMSA). H&M was created as a Ministry of the Interior Department in 1984, replacing the Department of Business. Under Atha it has turned the management of confiscated properties into a series of trading companies and domestic businesses—including factories, restaurants, bakeries, laundries, motels, and hotels—providing money for the FSLN party leadership. H&M operating capital comes from outside the official budget; profits are not reported to tax authorities. Subsidiaries are provided hard currency at favorable exchange rates and can obtain scarce commodities abroad for use by high-ranking Sandinista officials.

Aviles Lopez, Olga. Ambassador to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born November 1, 1941, in Managua. Joined the FSLN in the 1960s. Underwent guerrilla warfare and special explosives training in Cuba. Participated in a number of FSLN armed actions. After the Sandinista rise to power, worked briefly in the International Relations Directorate of the FSLN before moving to the international relations division of the FSLN's trade union federation. In March of 1980, named "Guerrilla Commander," in Tomas Borge's Interior Ministry for her role as a member of the FSLN squad which conducted the December 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. Traveled to Bulgaria in October 1980 as the head of an FSLN trade union delegation which met with the official communist-controlled unions. Traveled to Hungary in April 1981 as the head of a similar delegation. In February 1983 she replaced Doris Tijerino (now head of the Sandinista Police) as president of the FSLN's Nicaraguan Peace Commission (CONIPAZ). (CONIPAZ, a member organization of the Easter bloc's World Peace Council, is the Sandinista counterpart to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's Society of Friendship With the Peoples). In October 1985, she attended the Fifth Congress of the Kampuchean [Cambodian] Peoples' Revolutionary Party (KPRP) in Phnom Penh at the invitation of Premier Heng Samrin. With FSLN Directorate member Luis Carrion, she attended the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in Hanoi in December 1986. Has traveled numerous times to the Soviet Union, Cuba, and North Korea.

Baez, Gladys. Member, FSLN Assembly. Directorate Member, FSLN Region II. Born in 1941 in Juigalpa, Chontales. Left school after the third grade. Became a Moscow-line communist PSN militant in 1956. Represented the party at the 1960 Moscow Women's Congress and helped organize its women's organization. Left the PSN in the mid-1960s. Joined the FSLN. One of the few survivors of Silvio Mayorga's column at Pancasan in 1967. Said to be the first woman fighter to join the FSLN combatants in the mountains. Arrested in November 1967. After years of inactivity and illness, she joined the FSLN's Western Front in Leon and Chinandega. Later became manager of an agricultural cooperative in Leon.

Baldizon Aviles, Alvaro. Former FSLN militant and sublieutenant in the Interior Ministry who defected in June 1985. Born about 1959. Served as clandestine courier for the FSLN while working as a truck driver during the war against Somoza. Joined Sandinista police in April 1980.

Became Chief of Police at Station 15 in the Managua suburb of Ciudad Sandino. In September 1980, Baldizon was sent to the Soviet Union, where he attended a 10-month course in criminology in Volgograd. Upon his return to Nicaragua in July 1981, he joined the Ministry of Interior. In December 1982, Tomas Borge appointed him to the ministry's new Special Investigations Commission. His job was to investigate reports of Sandinista human rights abuses and develop plausible cover stories for international propaganda purposes. During his investigations, Baldizon learned about abuses and coverups involving such high-ranking government figures as Interior Minister Tomas Borge and Vice Minister Luis Carrion Cruz. He also discovered that murder and torture were regularly employed and approved methods to control the internal opposition. After 5 years as an official of the internal security apparatus, he fled to Honduras. His account of what the Sandinistas called "the standardization of the application of special measures against elements of the enemy potential and criminal potential throughout the national territory" was published in "Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective," Department of State, February 1986.

Baltodano Cantarero, Alvaro. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Combat Readiness Chief, Army General Staff. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Joined the FSLN in 1973 with Luis Carrion, Oswaldo Lacayo, and Joaquin Cuadra through the influence of Father Uriel Molina and the MCR. Military training under Oscar Turcios. Took part in the unsuccessful October 1977 FSLN Tercerista attack on Masaya. Fled to Mexico, but returned to fight in the final stages of the war. Since 1979, Baltodano has served as regional commander for several military regions and as chief of EPS Irregular Warfare and Training. Key figure (with EPS Captain Alejandro Guevara) in the entrapment and murder of charismatic COSEP leader Jorge Salazar in November 1980. In the court trial against eight Salazar associates who survived, Baltodano testified to being a DGSE plant who used past friendship to lure Salazar into the fatal plot. Baltodano was the one military officer to travel with Humberto Ortega to Cambodia in March 1981, where he praised "the heroic Kampuchean [Cambodian] Army." Traveled to East Germany in 1986 in pursuit of increased military scholarships and assistance. Brother of Emilio Baltodano Cantarero.

Baltodano Cantarero, Emilio. Member of the FSLN National Planning Council. Minister of Industry. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born September 7, 1950, in Managua. Served as secretary to the Junta before assuming his present position. Son of wealthy businessman Emilio Baltodano Palais, who serves as Comptroller General of the Republic. Brother of Alvaro Baltodano Cantarero.

Baltodano Marcenaro, Monica Salvadora. Vice Minister in the Ministry of the Presidency. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Holds the rank of Guerrilla Commander. Born August 14, 1954, in Leon. Went to Catholic schools where she became active in the campaign to free FSLN prisoners in 1970. Adopted Marxism at the University of Managua and joined the FSLN in 1973 via the MCR and FER. Captured and imprisoned from July 1977 to April 1978. One of the field commanders for the Managua Internal Front during the final offensive, she later served as a coordinator in the FSLN Secretariat of Mass Organizations. Married

to Julio Lopez Campos, Director of the FSLN's International Relations Department. Her mother Zulema was appointed head of the Sandinista mass organization "Mothers of the Heroes and Martyrs" and to the Sandinista Human Rights Commission.

Bendana Rodriguez, Alejandro. Secretary General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Born August 22, 1950, in Managua, BA and MA in history from Louisiana State University. PhD in history from Harvard University. Deputy Chief of Nicaragua's UN Mission, 1979-82. Returned to Nicaragua in 1982. Controls the CNPPDH, ensuring that its reports on human rights follow the FSLN line. Often serves as the translator for Daniel Ortega or as a spokesman for the Sandinistas on American television.

Blandon, Nelba Cecilia. MINT Captain. Chief of the Censorship Department of the Ministry of Interior, as well as its Chief of Public and International Department. The principal implementer of censorship of media, political parties, religious organizations, and other civic groups. In 1984, Blandon attempted to justify censorship of the independent newspaper *La Prensa*, arguing that "They accused us of suppressing freedom of expression. This was a lie and we could not let them publish it."

Blandon, Ubeda, Jesus Miguel. Director of Radio Sandino, the official radio station of the FSLN. Director of Segovia, the official political-military magazine of the FSLN, published by the Sandinista Army's Political Directorate. Born December 13, 1940, in Matagalpa. Radio Sandino is one of the main news outlets in a society that relies heavily on radio for its news and information. "Chuno" Blandon is also a comedian and author of several books, including *Entre Sandino y Fonesca Amador*. Has traveled extensively to Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union.

Bolanos Hunter, Miguel. Former FSLN militant and urban guerilla commander. Member of the DSGE General Directorate who defected in May 1983. A Sandinista since 1978, Bolanos worked for 4 years in the F-7 (Mass Organizations) and F-2 (Foreign Diplomats) sections of the DGSE. Bolanos described Sandinista logistics support for the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas, who maintain their primary command and control headquarters in the Managua suburbs. According to Bolanos, members of the FSLN Directorate, the Directorate's Department of International Relations, the Fifth Directorate, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Sandinista armed forces all participate in channeling weapons and other Cuban and Soviet support to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Later convicted and jailed in the United States on drug-related charges.

Brenes Sanchez, Carlos. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Commander, EPS Military Region II. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born in the Indian barrio of Monimbo, Masaya, in 1956. An FSLN supporter in Masaya from 1973, he received extensive military training in Cuba. Worked in the Southern Front smuggling arms and men from 1976-78. Participated in the September 13, 1978, Sandinista attack on Sapoa. In an attempt to exploit his Indian heritage, the Sandinistas assigned him as Military Chief of Military Region V (Northern Zelaya) after the fall of Somoza. However, in an early turning point that cemented Atlantic Coast communities' opposition to Sandinista policies, Brenes led the violent suppression of the February 1980 Puerto Cabezas protests and riots. Replaced in June 1980 by Manuel Calderon, he

traveled abroad again for additional training. Traveled to North Korea in April 1984. Has also served as Chief of the Armored tank Brigade, and as second in command in Military Region III (Managua).

Calderon, Manuel. Guerrilla Commander. Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of the Interior. Member of the FSLN Assembly. FLSN Commander in Puerto Cabezas immediately after the fall of Somoza. After 6 months of training in Cuba, Calderon replaced Carlos Brenes as EPS and Interior Ministry Security Chief of northern Zelaya in June 1980. In February 1981 Calderon was responsible for the arrest of Marcos Bello Misurasata labor leader at the La Rosita mines, on charges of "agitation." Responsible for directing many Sandinista military actions against the Indian populations in 1981 and 1982. Calderon was later replaced by William Ramirez and sent abroad for additional military training. He later returned to take over again from Ramirez, controlling the Indian populations with less brute force and more subtle means. A former Deputy Chief on the Political Directorate of the Interior Ministry, he replaced Omar Cabezas as Chief in October 1985.

Calderon Meza, Roberto. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Commander of EPS Military Region V (Chontales, Rio San Juan). Member of the FSLN Assembly and of the FSLN Regional Directorate for Region V. Born September 14, 1950, in Managua. Was imprisoned for his participation in FSLN actions under Somoza.

Campbell Hooker, Lumberto. Army Captain. Minister of the Atlantic Coast Institute. Minister-Delegate of the president and member of the FSLN Regional Directorate for Special Zone II (Bluefields and the Southern Atlantic Coast). Born February 3, 1949, in Bluefields. Known as "El Negro," he is the only Creole to hold the FSLN honorary title of "Guerrilla Commander." He was a military commander on the Atlantic Coast after the fall of Somoza, then Vice Minister of the Atlantic Coast Institute before becoming Minister.

Cardenal Martinez, Ernesto. Minister of Culture. Jesuit priest barred from performing sacraments for refusing to obey Roman Catholic canon law and leave his government post. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born January 20, 1925, in Granada. Son of a wealthy Conservative family from Granada. Studied literature at Columbia University from 1947 to 1949. Participated in the abortive 1954 Conservative coup. Established his reputation as a poet with "*Hora Cero*" [Zero Hour], an epic poem about Sandino. Underwent a religious conversion in 1956. Entered Thomas Merton's Trappist monastery at Gethsemane, Kentucky, in 1957, but soon left for health reasons. Studied for the priesthood in Cernavaca, Mexico, under the liberation theologian Archbishop Sergio Mendez Arceo, and in Colombia. Ordained in Managua in 1965, and established a lay contemplative community on the Solentiname islands in Lake Nicaragua. Returned from a visit to Cuba in 1970 committed to revolutionary activism as a means of fulfilling the Gospel. Joined the FSLN in 1973, working first with Eduardo Contreras and later with Tomas Borge, Daniel Ortega, and Bayardo Arce. Solentiname became a clandestine training site for FSLN guerrillas, especially those of the Benjamin Zeledon Southern Front. After the October 1977 FSLN attack on San Carlos by combatants trained at Solentiname, Cardenal traveled to San Jose, Costa Rica, and proclaimed

himself an FSLN militant. The National Guard destroyed Solentiname in retaliation, stripping its armaments supplies. Then served as a foreign representative for the FSLN until Somoza's fall. The most prestigious member of the Sandinista government, Cardenal is a key figure in the ideological convergence of Sandinismo and revolutionary Christianity. Cardenal has said that "in order to be authentically Christian, one must become a Marxist." Has gained an international reputation for his efforts to cause liberation theology to unify mystic Christianity and revolutionary Marxism. Brother of Fernando (next entry) and Rodrigo Cardenal, FSLN Ambassador to East Germany.

Cardenal Martinez, Fernando. Minister of Education. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born January 26, 1934, in Granada. Ordained as a priest in the Jesuit order. Taught at the Colegio Centroamerica and the University of Central America in Managua. Took his first pastoral assignment in 1967 as spiritual director of church youth movements in Managua—Jornadas de Vida Cristiana and the *curtillos* movement. Participated in the student occupation of the National Cathedral on December 22, 1972, and other protests against the holding of political prisoners. Involved in the international publicity campaign against the Somoza regime in the mid-1970s. Member of the Group of 12. Vice Minister of Education and National Coordinator of the 1980 Literacy Crusade before becoming a leader of the Sandinista Youth (JS-19J). Sanctioned by the Vatican and removed from Jesuit order in 1985 for refusing to remove himself from political office. Brother of Ernesto and Rodrigo Cardenal.

Carrion McDonough, Javier Alfonso. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Army Deputy Chief of Staff since August 1985. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Guerrilla Commander. Born November 21, 1954, in Managua. Completed secondary school in 1972. Joined the FSLN through the Christian left in 1973 while a medical student at UNAN in Leon. He was a driver for Pedro Arauz Palacios and a member of an FSLN clandestine intelligence group in Leon. Went completely underground in September 1974, collecting weapons in Managua and Granada. Became a member of the "Juan Jose Quezada" Command which undertook the 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. In 1975, received military and ideological training in Cuba. From there, Carrion went to Europe, Mexico, and Honduras, assisting in the establishment of solidarity committees and arms pipelines. Returned secretly to Leon where he recruited students through the FER and prepared combatants for the Pablo Ubeda Column. Captured by the National Guard on March 8, 1976. He spent 2½ years in prison, until freed by the August 1978 National Palace takeover operation led by Eden Pastora. In the final stages of the revolution, he served as second in command to German Pomares in the Oscar Turcios Column of the Northern Front, assuming command after Pomares died in May 1979. Led the column during the battles for Jinotega, Boaco, and Matagalpa, before leading the troops into Managua, June-July 1979. After the fall of Somoza, served the newly constituted EPS as a member of the General Staff and then as Commander of Military Region VI. He has also served as Chief of Military Region III and Chief of the Artillery. Was Commander of the Operations Group of the EPS General Staff (since dismantled as a failure) in charge of conducting all EPS op-

erations against the Resistance. One of his trips to the Soviet Union was to the 27th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1986. He also has traveled to Eastern Europe and North Korea. A member of the Sandinista military elite, he attended a special command and staff course taught by the Cubans in Managua. Awarded the Carlos Fonseca Order on November 11, 1986, for "distinguished militancy." Son of a U.S. citizen mother and a successful Nicaraguan lawyer, he is a cousin of the Carrion Cruz family.

Castillo Bellido, Marisol. Army Captain. Chief of Personnel for the EPS. Joined the FSLN after it killed her father, Jose Maria "Chema" Castillo Quant, the host of the December 1974 Christmas party raided by the FSLN. Married FSLN militant, Edgard Lang, brother of Emmett Lang. After 2 years as a GPP guerrilla, Edgard was arrested in November 1977, freed by the National Palace attack of August 1978, then killed in a National Guard attack on his Leon safe-house in April 1979. The rest of her family has fled into exile.

Castillo Martinez, Ernesto. Ambassador of Nicaragua to the Soviet Union and the Republic of Mongolia; former Minister of Justice. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born June 12, 1939, in Granada. Former law professor at UNAN. Secret FSLN member while a member of the Group of 12. Intellectual leader of the radicalization of the Christian youth movement since 1967. Friend and protégé of Felipe Mantica Abaunza, the wealthy businessman active in church and charitable causes who joined the Group of 12 but broke with the FSLN before the July 1979 victory over Somoza.

Castro Cardenal, Vanessa. Chief of the FSLN's Political Education Department. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Wife of FSLN National Directorate member (and Minister of Agrarian Reform and Agricultural and Cattle Development) Jaime Wheelock. Also related to Minister of Culture Ernesto Cardenal.

Chamorro Barrios, Carlos Fernando. Director of Barricada, the FSLN party newspaper which took over the physical plant of the Somoza's propaganda organ, *Novedades*. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Chief of the FSLN's Agitation and Propaganda Department, in charge of publicity and information for the FSLN. Handled publicity for Daniel Ortega's presidential campaign in 1984. Son of Violeta and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, his sister Claudia is Nicaraguan Ambassador to Costa Rica, while his brother Pedro Joaquin is a director of the Resistance, and his sister Cristiana is Deputy Editor of *La Prensa*.

Chamorro Tefel, Adolfo. Army Major. Deputy Chief of the Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense. An ex-National Guard captain, he attended Mexican military medical school on a National Guard scholarship. The many positions he has held since 1979 include Army Chief of Staff for Military Region III and Chief of Communications. Also served as Chief of Staff of the EPS Operations Group in Matagalpa (since disbanded), and EPS effort to deal more effectively with the growing insurgency.

Cranshaw, Guerra, Marta Isabel. Minister-Delegate of the president and member of FSLN Regional Directorate for Region II (Leon/Chinandega). Member of the FSLN Assembly. Came to the FSLN through Father Uriel Molina's Christian base community in Barrio Riguero. Traveled to Cambodia with Humberto Ortega in March 1981,

where they were welcomed by Premier Heng Samrin.

D'Escoto Brockman, Miguel Jeronimo. Minister of Foreign Affairs. Catholic priest. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born February 5, 1933, in Hollywood California. A godson of Somoza Garcia, who helped pay for his early education (his father was a Somoza diplomat and his mother a U.S. citizen). Joined the Maryknoll Order in 1956, and was ordained in 1961. Earned a BA and an MA under the auspices of the Maryknoll Seminary. He also received an MA in journalism from Columbia University. Missionary in Chile during part of the 1960s. Social communications director for the Maryknoll Order in the 1970s. Became an FSLN activist in 1975. Joined the Group of 12 in October 1977 and was a principal foreign representative for the FSLN during the war. Spoke at the Organization of American States (OAS) in June 1979 as a member of the Panamanian delegation. Forbidden by Vatican to exercise priestly duties because he refuses to obey canon law and rejects a papal directive for priests to leave political office.

Farach, Antonio. Former FSLN Militant who defected in 1984 after more than 10 years with the FSLN. After the revolution, worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a diplomat in both Honduras and Venezuela. Became totally disenchanted with Cuban domination of the Nicaraguan Government. Explained his decision to go into exile by saying: "I felt that we had sold our sovereignty to a foreign nation."

Ferreti Fonseca, Walter. Chief, Special Operations Directorate of the Ministry of Interior. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Guerrilla Commander. Born September 8, 1950, in Managua. A military leader of the FSLN's Managua Internal Front under Joaquin Caudra Lacayo in 1978-79. Now commands the 2,000-strong battalion of elite *Tropas Pablo Ubeda*, the Ministry of Interior's Special Forces Troops and the only military troops not under the direct control of Minister of Defense Humberto Ortega. Minister of Interior Tomas Borge has used these troops against his enemies in both cities and rural areas. Until April 1985, Ferreti was Chief of the Sandinista Police.

Garcia Cortes, Ivan. FSLN Militant and Director of Sandinista Television System (SSTV). SSTV, the only domestic television network (with two channels), is technically attached to the FSLN party, not to the Government of Nicaragua. Applications for independent TV channels have been regularly denied.

Guadamuz Portillo, Carlos Jose. Director of Voice of Nicaragua Radio since the Sandinistas' rise to power. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Joined the FSLN in the mid-1960s. Jailed in the late 1960s for hijacking a Lanica (national airlines) passenger plane to Cuba. Captured when the plane landed in the Cayman Islands, where a large sign announcing (in Spanish) "Welcome to Cuba" had been hastily erected. Spent several years in prison, where he developed close ties to Daniel Ortega. Freed from jail by the 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking.

Guido Lopez, Lea. Founder in 1977 of AM-PRONAC, the women's and human rights organization which survives today as AMNLAE (the Luisa Amanda Espinoza Association of Nicaraguan Women), the FSLN's women's mass organization. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Former Sandinista Minister of Health. Daughter of Armando Guido, Somocista party (PLN) deputy in the National Congress. As godfather at her

lavish 1972 wedding to Julio Lopez Campos. Somoza gave the newlyweds a brand new four-door Daihatsu Ranchero automobile as a wedding present.

Guzman Cuadra, Alvaro, Senior MINT officer. Chief of the Penitentiary System in the Ministry of Interior; in charge of the public prison system only, not the detention centers and prisons of the DGSE, such as Managua's EL Chipote, that are closed to international human rights observers. Appointed Vice Minister of Foreign Commerce in 1979, then Vice Minister of the Institute of Mines and Hydro-Carbons in August 1981, then Chief of the Interior Ministry's General Staff. Has traveled extensively in the Soviet bloc: East Germany, North Korea, Bulgaria, Cuba, Hungary, Soviet Union, and Poland. The Guzman Cuadra family is from Granada's famous Atavezaba Street, home to many of the nation's wealthiest members of the aristocracy. Nephew of Central Bank president Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro. Brother Fernando is Ambassador to Argentina.

Hassan Morales, Moises. Mayor of Managua. Member of the FSLN Regional Directorate for Region III (Managua). Born on May 4, 1942, in Managua. Son of Palestinian immigrants from the Gaza Strip. Graduated in chemical engineering from UNAN and nuclear physics from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. As a physics professor at UNAN he became associated with the GPP-aligned FER. Served as director of the United Peoples' Movement (composed of 20 pro-FSLN organizations plus the 2 other Moscow-line political parties, the PSN and the PCdeN) after July 1978. Headed the leftwing National Patriotic Front formed in January 1979 to support the FSLN against the FAO. As president of the Association of Professors at UNAN in 1979, he headed the political commission of the Internal Front during the June 1979 battle of Managua. Member of the first five-person post-Somoza junta from June 1979 until March 1981. With FSLN comandantes Tomas Borge, Henry Ruiz, and Humberto Ortega, Hassan attended the March 1980 signing of the party-to-party agreement between the FSLN and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow. Signed less than 3 months after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the joint public statement read in part: "The Soviet Union and Nicaragua resolutely condemn the campaign that the imperialist and reactionary forces have launched of building up international tension in connection with the events of Afghanistan, a campaign aimed at subverting the inalienable right of the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and other peoples of the world to follow the path of progressive transformation." Minister of Construction until becoming a Vice Minister of Interior in May 1983. Brother of Rosario Murillo's first husband.

Herrera Sanchez, Leticia. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Guerrilla Commander. First Vice President of the National Assembly. National Director of the Sandinista Defense Committees since late 1980. Member of the FSLN Assembly. One of the leaders of the *turbas divinas* [divine mobs]. Born in 1950. Daughter of an exiled anti-Somoza activist with ties to the FSLN and a Costa Rican mother. Joined the FER through the student protest movement in high school. Bore a child by Daniel Ortega. Went to Moscow on a scholarship in 1968 where she met members of the FSLN and received training. Returned to Nicaragua in 1970 to join the FSLN military underground. Participated in

the 1974 Christmas party hostage-taking. A field commander for the Rigoberto Lopez Perez Western Front in Leon during the 1979 final offensive. Replaced Doris Tellez as Council of State First Vice President in May 1983.

Hurtado Vega, Pedro. General Coordinator, Sandinista Youth-July 19 Movement (JS-19J), the teenage-youth recruiting arm of the FSLN. Born December 26, 1957, in Granada. Among his trips to the Eastern bloc, he headed the FSLN youth delegation to Czechoslovakia in July 1986. (JS-19J is not to be confused with the Sandinista Children's Association, which is responsible for political education and indoctrination beginning at the age of 6.)

Jimenez Guzman, Lucio. Secretary General of the Sandinista Worker's Union, Jose Benito Escobar since 1981. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Addressed the 18th Congress of Soviet Trade Unions in February 1987.

Lacayo Gabuardi, Oswaldo. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Army Deputy Chief of Staff since May 1980. Member of the FSLN Assembly. A leading architect of the government's counterinsurgency policy. Educated as a civil engineer, he joined Father Molina's Christian Revolutionary Movement in 1971-72 along with several other current leaders of the EPS (such as Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, Javier Carrion McDonough, and Alvaro Baltodano). Joined the FSLN in 1973. Married the sister of his boss, Army Chief of Staff Joaquin Cuadra Lacayo, after she divorced long-time FSLN leader Hugo Torres. His sister is married to FLSN National Directorate member Luis Carrion. His brother Roberto is Vice Minister of Housing and Human Services.

Lang Salmeron, Emmett. FSLN militant. Army Lieutenant Colonel. Chief of EPS High Command Reserve Units since March 1987. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born about 1948. Son of Federico Lang, owner of the largest hardware store chain in Nicaragua. Joined the FSLN in 1969. Jailed for his role as a member of Leonel Rugama's urban commando and bank robbery squad (his brother-in-law, EPS Col. Leopoldo Rivas Alfaro, was also a member of Rugama's bank robbery team). A leader in May 1979 of the failed "Jacinto Hernandez Column" in Nueva Segovia, Zelaya. Became an EPS subcommander and militia organizer after Somoza's ouster. Served from 1985 until February 1987 as Chief of the Sandinista Air Force and Air Defense. His brother, Edgard, also an FSLN militant, was killed in a National Guard attack on a Leon safe-house in April 1979.

Lopez Arguello, Federico. Minister-Delegate of the president and member of the FSLN Regional Directorate for Region IV. Member of the FLSN Assembly. Former head of FSLN Agitation and Propaganda Department and Chief of Prisons, where he was involved in the executions of a number of prisoners.

Lopez Campos, Julio. Chief of the FSLN's Department of International Relations since September 1980. As such he is responsible for FSLN external relations and propaganda, affiliations with foreign solidarity groups and Communist parties. Member of the FSLN Assembly. Born about 1946. Joined the FSLN in 1967, when he was known as a bit of a hoodlum, along with Lenin Cerna. Studied political science in Lausanne, Switzerland, where he became the head of the Latin American Division of the (Trotskyite) Fourth International, a position he held from 1968-73. Former chief of

FSLN propaganda and political education and UNAN professor. Member of Borge and Arce's hardline GPP faction. His family (evangelical Christians) has fled Nicaragua since the revolution. He is divorced from Lea Guido, former Minister of Health.

Loza, Oscar, MINT Captain. DGSE Chief of Operations since August 1983. Trained as a lawyer. Directed the October 15, 1985, raid closing the Office of Pastoral Social Services of the Archdiocese of Managua. Said to have personally murdered regime opponents and to have participated in the 1980 plot against Jorge Salazar.

Marengo Gutierrez, Dionisio. Head of the Planning Secretariat (within the Ministry of the Presidency) since July 1985. Member of the FSLN Assembly. One of the few senior Sandinista leaders with any technical training or background. President of the UCA student body, 1966-67, he was also an FER supporter and active in a number of student strikes and protests. Received MBA from Harvard-affiliated INCAE. Contacted Tomas Borge in 1974 and started an FSLN cell among business professionals at the Chinandega sugar mill where he worked as an engineer. Moved to just outside Managua during 1975. Became a member of Leonel Poveda's military cell of professionals. Pastora used his isolated home as the launching point for the August 1978 takeover of the National Palace. Marengo and his wife Daisy Zamora (who later became a Vice Minister of Culture) fought with a Tercerista FSLN faction squadron during the September 1978 insurrection in Managua. Escaping via the Honduran Embassy, he later worked with the Benjamin Zeledon Southern Front operating out of Costa Rica. After the Sandinistas came to power, he headed the Ministries of Domestic Commerce and Transportation.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. INHOFE].

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, in 1941, Winston Churchill's message to the United States was "give us the tools, and we will finish the job."

In the 1980's, the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is sending the same message: "Give us the tools, and we will apply the pressure necessary to force the Sandinistas to accept the fundamental changes required for a truly free and democratic Nicaraguan society."

We know the Resistance has succeeded in pressuring the Sandinistas to make some movement toward fulfilling their commitment to democratize. But continued pressure is necessary.

The Communist Sandinistas are trying to do just enough to make it appear that they are participating in the peace process. They say they will grant amnesty to political prisoners. But their so-called amnesty applies to only 3,300 of the estimated 9,000 political prisoners, and they will be released only if another country will take them. That's deportation, not amnesty.

The state of emergency has been lifted, but officially legal peaceful demonstrations have been broken up

by Sandinista mobs. The Sandinistas' police just stand by and watch.

Despite the lifting of the state of emergency, prominent opposition members have been arrested, held in 3- by 3-foot cells, and interrogated. All during the peace process.

After signing the Arias peace plan and during the peace process, the Sandinistas signed two military accords with the Soviets and Cubans. They provide for a continued military buildup into the 1990's that includes a 600,000-man military force and a squadron of MIG's. This is in addition to the \$2.6 billion in military equipment that the Soviet bloc has already poured into Nicaragua.

The Sandinistas have said that they would relinquish the government if Nicaraguans were crazy enough to vote them out, but they would never relinquish the power. That is directly contradictory to any concept of a democratic process.

It's incredible that this Congress has approved over \$650 million for the Afghan freedom fighters who don't even advocate democracy and who are half way around the world, with little or no opposition. Yet efforts to provide \$36.2 million to freedom fighters on our own continent causes a great outcry. It just doesn't make sense.

Some of our colleagues suggest that aid should be denied to the Nicaraguan Resistance because of human rights abuses. There have been abuses by some individuals, but the Resistance has organized efforts to educate its fighters and punish offenders. The Sandinistas, on the other hand, have shown a systemized pattern of abuse and torture. Lino Hernandez, executive director of the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, personally told me that the Commission received 18 complaints against the Contras in 1986, and 1,400 against the Sandinistas.

The Sandinistas have made limited reforms that can be easily reversed if they succeed in influencing this Congress to vote against helping the democratic resistance. These reforms have only been made in the face of increased effectiveness of the resistance and with the aim of defeating continued U.S. aid.

Without the continued pressure of the Resistance, the Sandinistas will be free to continue its military buildup and pursue subversive, destabilizing activities in neighboring democracies. This is a serious threat to our national security and the security of the Panama Canal. Only last week, a Colombian stressed to me his conviction that what is at stake in Nicaragua is the future peace and security of Central America and of his own country.

Many of us in this chamber have been to Nicaragua. We have our stories to tell. I don't believe there's one person in Congress who has been to

the hospital tent in the major Contra camp who will vote against this modest aid package.

In that tent, there were about 40 hospital beds surrounding the operating table. I talked to the young freedom warriors in their own tongue and heard their stories.

One was a 19-year-old girl who was there for the third time. She has been fighting for freedom since she was 13 years old. I asked her why she kept going back. Now keep in mind that this young girl has no preconceived prejudices. She probably doesn't know what the word "Communist" means. She has no affiliation with any foreign influence. Just a 19-year-old campesino who has lost her freedom. She looked up from her hospital bed and answered my question:

We fight because the Sandinistas have taken our homes, our human rights and our country. They have taken everything we have.

This young girl will not be returning to the battlefield again. They had to amputate her leg this time.

The next day, I talked to a young Tulsan whom I met in Honduras, Capt. Ted Westhausen. Ted asked me to take a message back to Congress and to his hometown. He said, tell them if it's not the Nicaraguan Resistance fighting now, it'll be me fighting later. His hometown agrees. A majority want the United States to support the Nicaraguan Resistance now rather than have to send troops in later.

And this is not the exclusive belief of Capt. Ted Westhausen. The leaders of the other Central American countries believe it, too. In El Salvador, President Napoleon Duarte told me that if the democratic resistance fails, "los Estados Unidos mandará los Marines." The United States will have to send in the marines.

The vote today is not just to stop the spread of communism on our continent. It is a message to free people around the world. We cannot abandon them now.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, during my last trip to Nicaragua I met with mothers and wives of political prisoners, and one of the wives of the 8,000-plus political prisoners came up to me and said she had been promised that her husband was going to be released. Instead, he had been tortured and punished in the prisons beyond anything imaginable.

She told me she demonstrated along with other wives and mothers of political prisoners, and the "divine mobs" beat up on them, and they tore her top off her and left her exposed from the waist up before all the people who

were watching. They beat her and tore her clothes off of her.

Mr. Chairman, I met with President Azcona of Honduras who said if not full compliance by Nicaragua of the peace plan or if the Contras are destroyed or not fully funded, 50,000 American troops and \$250 million in U.S. military aid will be needed to support fledgling democracies in Central America.

Sandinista Interior Minister Tomas Borge was asked the following question, "Will you respond to the remark that Nicaragua is the first domino in Latin America, that since the revolution triumphed in Nicaragua, it will be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico? Borge responded, "that is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true!"

Daniel Ortega was quoted this past November as saying "What I would really like to be doing is what Che [Guevara] did—going onto other lands to struggle."

We in Congress must be honest with ourselves—would the Soviets be discussing the terms of their withdrawal from Afghanistan without pressure from the Afghan freedom fighters? Would Communist Angola be talking about the removal of 40,000 Cuban troops without the pressure from the UNITA freedom fighters?

If we do not aid the freedom fighters in Nicaragua, yes, there will be peace. But not a peace as the American people know it, but rather a peace that the people of Poland know, the people of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, Vietnam, North Korea, Cuba, and others know as well.

There are those who say give peace a chance. Well Communist style peace was given a chance in the countries I just mentioned. Ask the people who live there how they like the peace they have in their countries. Soviet style peace means a loss of freedom and complete government control. Give peace a chance? How about giving freedom a chance?

I would like to close with a quote from a freedom fighter broadcasting from a radio station in Budapest, Hungary, on November 4, 1956, when he cried out to the conscience of the world:

Their tanks and guns are roaring over Hungarian soil * * * people of the world, listen to our call. Help us—not with advice, not with words, but with action. * * * Please do not forget this wild attack of Bolshevism will not stop. You may be the next victim. Save us—S.O.S.—civilized people of the world, in the name of liberty and solidarity, we are asking you to help. The shadows grow darker from hour to hour. Listen to our cry. Start moving. Extend to us brotherly hands * * * people of the world save us—S.O.S. Help, help, help * * * God be with you and with us * * *.

After that there was only silence. Is this what we want for Central America?

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I yield briefly to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

This vote is for humanitarian aid. If we must insure that the negotiating process continues. If we are to achieve a peaceful solution to the problem, a solution that benefits "the people" of Nicaragua, then the peace process must continue.

The Sandinistas must have an incentive to continue in the peace process. Without that incentive the process will break down.

There is another issue that we in the House must consider. It's the issue of immigration. Without freedom, without opposition parties, without amnesty, the United States will relocate the freedom fighters and their families. Translated that means that additional thousands will end up in Florida, Texas, California, and all the other States.

We are told that the next vote will be a vote for refugee assistance.

This House cannot advocate thousands upon thousands more into the United States and the situation will become more severe. Why? No one ever flees to communism, they all flee from it.

Do we have the will to do the job as it must be done? Our vote today will tell.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON].

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, how many times are we going to debate whether it is truly in the best interest of the United States to stand up for democracy and freedom?

The answer, of course, is: As many times as it takes to prevail. Some Members in this Chamber might wish otherwise, but this issue is not going to go away, no matter what the outcome of this debate is.

Many of you can turn your backs, you can close your eyes, and you can close your minds and your hearts to the pleas of decent, valiant, Nicaraguan citizens for freedom and democracy, just as a few short years ago many of you, many of the same people here today, fought to withhold aid from El Salvador as it struggled to emerge as a fledgling democracy after hundreds of years of military rule. But just as you would have consigned the people of El Salvador to the tyranny and oppression of the Communist fascists seeking to take over that country by force, so do you now try to pull the wool over the eyes of the American people and prevent our Nation from

helping those few valiant people who are fighting for freedom in Nicaragua.

I hope you are not successful. I hope that enough of our Members will realize the importance of what we do here today. I hope that a majority of the House today and of the Senate tomorrow will express their anger and frustration at the broken promises of freedom, the repression of speech, of assembly, of trade unionism, and of religion worship, and the lack of respect for human dignity that so callously and blatantly is demonstrated on a daily basis by the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.

I hope that you will realize that this paltry \$35 million is only a small step toward containing the \$450 million annual inflow of Soviet arms and the \$350 million in Soviet economic aid, as well as the technical assistance from Russians, Cubans, North Vietnamese, Iranians, Bulgarians, East Germans, the PLO, and other sources from the Iron Curtain.

I hope you will reject the terror tactics, the mob rule, the unjustified imprisonment, the torture, and the state-sanctioned murder at the hands of the Sandinistas, and I hope you will cast a vote in favor of aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.

But if you do not, if you pretend that Nicaragua is not of this planet, if you pretend that communism is a benevolent force with which we can live in harmony and peace, then do not be surprised if within a year or two, we have this identical debate about the survival of El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, or Guatemala.

□ 1330

Do not be surprised by the refugees who flee to your districts by the tens of thousands to escape Communist oppression in Central America, just as they have fled from Vietnam or Cambodia.

Do not be surprised when we begin debating the withdrawal of thousands of United States troops from Western Europe and Korea so that they can be stationed in some unforeseen desolate front in Central America or Mexico; and do not be surprised when the draft is reinstated and when some of your sons and your grandsons or those of your friends and constituents are called to defend a last ditch stand for freedom and security of United States citizens; and do not be surprised when you are looking for someone to blame, the American people say to you, "Why didn't you support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters when you had a chance?"

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE].

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Chairman, I speak as one of those who has been somewhat ambivalent on this issue of aid to the Contras. I was one of those who

voted to support the Sandinista government when it came to power back in 1979 because they were throwing out a corrupt dictator.

Then I voted for aid to the Contras in the first instance because I thought Mr. Ortega had gone back on his word to us.

Then I did not think we were getting a very good accounting of what was happening to the money and whether it was being used wisely. I was invited to the White House before the second vote on aid to the Contras. Even after that visit I still thought there needed to be a better accounting as to where the money was going. So, I voted against that \$100 million aid package, and it failed.

Right after the vote, Mr. Ortega flew to Moscow and threw his arms around Mr. Gorbachev for a photo opportunity in a display of victory, not a very good public relations stunt on his part.

But on the third time around, the President called me and said, "I remember that you didn't think that we had a very good accounting mechanism in place," and I did not think we did, either. "We have a lot better one now." The President described it in rather vivid detail.

The next package had aid in it for our allies, the governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, and so I voted for it. It was a different package.

But it has been a very difficult issue for me, and that is reflected by polls which are taken in my district. It comes out about 50 percent for and 50 percent against.

This time I thought I might want to err on the side of caution. The President feels very strongly about this issue and he may just be right. He has come a long way toward a compromise. Ninety percent of the \$36 million is for humanitarian aid, for food and clothing; \$3.6 million is for lethal aid which would not be usable until March 31, and then only after it was decided by Congress in a sense-of-Congress resolution that the peace process was not moving forward adequately.

There seems to be some indication that maybe the Sandinistas are willing to come to the peace table now and to try to make some effort to comply with the Arias peace plan. What we are looking for is a democracy in Nicaragua. I think the people of Nicaragua would vote for democracy if they were given the opportunity to vote.

I think that right now if we do not vote aid, we are indicating another vacillation on our part. We should support our commitment for aid to the Contras. This is a bad time to withdraw our support when it seems we are so very close to peace.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the

gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time.

It seems to me the essence and the crux of this debate came down to the contrast between what the President said last night to the American people and what the gentleman from Indiana made as his conclusions and his points when he was speaking in response.

The President said very clearly to the American people what I believe, and that is that we would not see a peace plan working or anybody at the table in Nicaragua today if it were not for the Contras.

He also said what I also deeply believe, and that is that unless the Contras stay alive, that peace plan has no chance of success. There has to be a hammer over the head of the Communists or they are going to go ahead and do what they want.

Now, in the response, the gentleman from Indiana said that he believed that the Sandinistas were not good guys, that they were Communists and so on, but in his view if we did not stop this aid to the Contras, there would be no signing of any agreements on the part of the Sandinistas and that stopping the aid, at least the military part of it, was absolutely essential in order to get them to sign, and it was a risk worth taking.

He went on to say that if indeed they do not live up to their commitments in this case, and we know they have not in the past, then in that case the American people would be unified and we would deal with that problem. We would be facing them unified, and it was a risk, I point out, a risk, he said, worth taking.

The bottom line is, what is that risk? The risk is very simply and subtly stated. If we do not have the Contras around and they have been disbanded, there is only one choice in how we deal with them at that point, and that is with American troops and the loss of American lives.

The bottom line is that we need the Contras. They have to stay in existence if we are going to be able to successfully bring peace to that region, and peace means freedom for the people of Nicaragua and it means the security of those nations around them in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica, and it means our own national security interests.

So I urge my colleagues, think about this vote. It is too critical to miss the point. It is us, the lives of our American boys some day, or it is keeping the Contras alive to hopefully force the hand of the Sandinistas and make them live up to any agreements they make, which they otherwise simply will not do.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the

gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, Contra aid votes bring some positive and negative repercussions. First, in my opinion these continuous votes that we have had in the Congress have actually been good for the peace process, because it has brought pressure on all sides to make concessions and adjustments on behalf of peace. But these are tortuous and conscience votes nonetheless.

The negative side of all these votes is that we still do not have a bipartisan approach. The Congress and the administration still remain at odds as to how to resolve this issue.

A third observation: Many people have talked about gloom and doom, the success of the peace process, the failure of it riding on this vote. That is exaggeration—there are going to be many votes ahead. The next one probably will be in the spring or summer, so I think we have to look at this vote in perspective and not consider this vote the final and definitive congressional action on this subject.

This is not a vote that says that we trust Daniel Ortega more than President Reagan. If there was such a contest, Ronald Reagan would win hands down. Let us make that point that this vote should not be framed in this context.

Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas have made promises and some concessions, such as lifting the state of emergency, a limited amnesty, and direct negotiations with the Contras. Let us face the facts; however, the Sandinistas have made their initiative because the economy is shattered and the Soviets have refused to pay all the bills. Ortega has taken a few steps, but none of them irreversible and significant, such as separating the military from the civilian sector, such as freeing all political prisoners, such as having a complete freedom of the press, assembly, and religion.

Likewise, there are some problems with the President's policy, nonetheless, there have recently been some improvements and some movement toward supporting the peace process.

First of all, this is a modest proposal that is scaled down from \$270 million in military aid—the majority of this new package is for nonlethal aid.

The President has a better team, especially at the National Security Council. I was impressed with their briefings and their sincerity, and this administration needs substantial credibility on this issue, especially with the bias and deception and Iran-Contra schemes, in the past. I was particularly impressed with Alison Fortier, Jose Zorzano, and Ambassador Negroponte, and the NSC. I was also impressed by

the CIA representatives who presented their arguments. They all had their act together.

But the motives, once again, and the objectives of the Reagan policy are suspect. Last night, in a last minute switch the President said that the Congress will have a voice in the disposition of the escrow account on the military aid, the \$3 million for lethal equipment. Was this gesture to support the peace process, or was it just to get a handful of more votes in Congress to achieve a margin of victory.

We have all agreed that this is the time to keep the pressure on, especially on the Sandinistas to further negotiate. The issue is, how can we keep the pressure on most effectively? How can we keep the Arias peace plan alive? How can we get the Soviets and Cubans out of Nicaragua? How can we support the Central American Presidents like Arias, Azcona, Duarte, and Cerezo, all of whom have put their necks on the line.

Each one of us have our own reasons for voting the way we do. I stood here 2 years ago voting for humanitarian aid because the administration reassured me they were for the Contadora negotiations, and I got burned. They sabotaged that peace process. I can't forget that. But that doesn't mean I am not open, and trying to be fair, because it involves my country, and it is important that we rally behind the President on foreign policy.

I will be voting no today because I think it will help the peace process. I am not sure if it will. That answer will come in the months ahead—the Arias plan will be tested in the months ahead.

So my message and signals each one of us sends by our votes can be described in their own way. Here is mine.

To the President: It is not a rejection of your objective to democratize the Sandinistas through pressure. My vote is simply to give you an incentive to embrace the Arias peace process 100 percent, not 50 percent, and not when you need the votes in a close contest.

To the Sandinistas: It is not that you are being rewarded, because you have failed to comply with the peace process and I do not trust you. We need to see some irreversible steps ahead where real democratic freedoms and demilitarization. We need you to take some significant steps toward democracy. We are watching you, Sandinistas. If you continue to play games, this vote will turn around next time, and perhaps so will mine and other moderate Democrats who retain the margin of victory on this issue, as will President Arias and others interested in peace are giving you another chance, and so am I. But it could be the last time unless you clean up your act. I did it once before, and I will do it again.

To the Central American Presidents: The message is to keep trying and plugging away. We admire what you are doing, but please narrow your differences, but most importantly, do not give up.

To the Contras: The message is that you are not being abandoned. We know you can be militarily operational and adequately supplied till mid-July; in the meantime, you might consider developing a political agenda—like what do you stand for? What are your political programs for Nicaragua? The Sandinistas may not be loved in Nicaragua—but you have little support there too.

Yes; we have noticed the improvement in your leadership. But still, you have quite a ways to go.

Perhaps, most importantly, to my fellow Democrats: The message is that we need to develop an alternative. We cannot just keep on trashing Contra aid. The Speaker of the House and the Democratic leadership have pledged to seek such an alternative, such a path, I look forward to working with them to develop this alternative. Let us come up with something that supports the Arias plan that involves pressure on all sides, especially the Sandinistas. Let us come up with something that keeps the Contras with food and medicine. Let us develop a plan for economic development for the region. Poverty and starvation are also the causes for unrest—not just the East-West rivalry. Democrats, let us stand for a viable plan for a change.

□ 1345

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, a couple of years ago a liberal Member of this House from my part of the country told me just a few feet from this podium as the clock was ticking away on yet another vote on Contra aid, that notwithstanding his recorded vote against Reagan's proposal, he said wouldn't be upset at all if the money was approved.

Since the cruelty of the Communists in Managua was becoming increasingly apparent to all, I suggested that he consider changing his vote but his simple answer was that he was locked in to his anti-Contra position. I walked away deeply disappointed by that response.

I fear, Mr. Chairman, that there are at least some Members of this House who may be planning to vote against Contra and who believe in their hearts that support for this aid request is prudent, at this particular time, and represents the most effective tangible means of bringing pressure on the Sandinistas to live up to their obligations and promises for democratization and respect for human rights made in

1979 to the OAS and more recently, in signing the Arias peace plan. But they feel locked in.

Of course, there are Members like the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR], for whom I have a great deal of respect because I believe he is convinced he is pursuing the best course for peace in Central America. I disagree with him on this matter but I respect him.

But I am concerned and bothered by those who feel locked in to opposing Contra aid not necessarily by their previous opposition to Contra aid and the notion once an anti always an anti, but by a network of activist constituent groups and a perception that this is a matter of party loyalty.

I ask only that these Members who may feel locked in or feel pressured to vote in a way contrary to their true beliefs to consider the consequences of that subservience, both in personal terms and its impact on our hopes for peace and freedom in Central America.

I ask you to consider the new compelling information concerning Communist designs, aspirations, and intentions not only for Nicaragua but also for Central America. I ask you to consider the new information concerning near exponential military buildups in Nicaragua including plans for a 600,000-man fighting force bristling with Soviet armaments.

I ask you to consider pervasive use by Tomas Borge's, Minister of Interior of gestapo-type tactics to harass, intimidate, and torture the people of Nicaragua.

I ask you to listen carefully when Daniel Ortega himself says that even if the Communists lose and election at some future time, the Sandinistas would still retain power by means of military force.

I ask you to read this morning's Washington Post editorial exhorting Members to approve the aid package noting that "the record of the last 6 months demonstrates that a carrot and stick combination has moved the Sandinistas * * * [and] that with cease fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone."

I hope all Members today will fully heed their conscience—pro or con—and not act out of any fear or trepidation concerning political retribution or the possibility of bad press.

Too much is at stake today for Members of Congress to act in any other way but as statesmen. The lives, the hopes, the aspirations of millions will be positively or negatively affected by what we do.

I urge support for the President's request.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 14 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, after almost 3 hours I think it would be useful to put this debate so far in a little perspective.

Before I get into the policy implications of the request of the President, I would like to dispel some of the fiction surrounding this request. It has been suggested first of all that it is a scaled-back request and that 90 percent of it is nonlethal aid. Both of those statements are simply inaccurate.

The request before us equates to \$8 million per month for both lethal and nonlethal aid. In addition to the \$36 million requested there is \$20 million in indemnification authority and authority to provide passive air defense equipment which is worth about \$3 million.

The value of this package is about \$60 million if we include the indemnification authority and the value of that passive defense equipment, and it is for 4½ months. The request over a full-year period is not only a significant increase in overall dollars, it is an increase on the lethal side of the ledger of almost 400 percent! That is, we would be spending four times as much per month on ammunition, missiles, and mines as we did last year.

On the humanitarian side of the ledger this request is actually a decrease of about 33 percent on a monthly basis from last year. The administration says that 90 percent of the request is for nonlethal aid implying that it is humanitarian and not war related.

The fact is that the fiscal year 1988 continuing resolution strictly defined humanitarian assistance as only food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies, and payment for such items.

The request of the President opens up the definition of nonlethal assistance to include everything but weapons, weapons systems and ammunition. This allows for expenses such as air operations, communications, logistical support, civic action, intelligence operations, all to be counted as nonlethal assistance. In fact \$26 million or 80 percent of the administration's \$32 million in so-called nonlethal aid falls into the category of logistical assistance, activities which could directly support the war effort.

That is why this represents an escalation of the war, not a scaling back of the war.

Mr. Chairman, beyond those disturbing facts we have a much more important policy choice before us today. Do we want to take a risk for peace or do we want to continue a war?

Mr. Chairman, there is nothing new about this debate. It has been said by many that we have been supporting war for 6 years and have been observing negotiations for 3 months. Mr. Chairman, that is true only if we are talking about the most recent chapter in our relations with Nicaragua but

this is really a fight which has been going on for more than 65 years.

Mr. Chairman, last week I was looking over a book put out to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Rural Electrification Administration. Among the many features in that book was a biography of Senator George Norris who was one of the founders of the REA, and that personal profile gave a year-by-year chronology of his service in the U.S. Senate.

The entry for 1927 reads as follows, "Leads effort to bring back our troops from Nicaragua."

Mr. Chairman, after I saw that, I asked my staff to get me copies of some of the news stories surrounding that debate in 1927 when this country for the second time decided to follow a policy of trying to use military force to get the kind of government we wanted in Nicaragua. I invite my colleagues to read these stories because if my colleagues read them, they will see that nothing has changed except the names. The arguments are the same, the rationalization is the same, the hedging on the truth is the same. Only the names have changed.

In the 60 years since then, the arguments, as I say, have not changed. Our history has been that when Nicaragua had a government we liked, we propped it up with money or with the marines; when they had a government we did not like, we appropriated money to send in our own troops or somebody else's troops. The result of that after more than 60 years of following that policy, we still have no stability, we still have no effective policy in that region, and we find much anti-American sentiment in Central America because of our habitual reliance upon force.

In fact, Mr. Chairman, in some ways over those 60 years we have gone backward because the governments we were opposing 60 years ago may not have been to our liking but they at least were not the followers of an ideology which is foreign to our own interests. But 60 years of relying primarily upon military action or upon military servants to "keep Nicaragua tame" has simply produced the kind of hatred which has made it possible for Marxists to exploit.

So today there is still war and bloodshed in Central America. Our own country is still divided because our ideals are not being matched by our actions. We still have not learned that we can intensely dislike a country without making war against it.

American newspapers continue to tell the sad tale of young Nicaraguan kids being maimed and killed. The New York Times just last week told a terrible story, to which I referred earlier, of two young kids less than 10 years old in a Nicaraguan hospital with severe injuries, but with no access to pain-killing drugs. These are

kids being blown up by land mines left by both sides, by the Contras and the Sandinistas.

So human misery has grown. We have poured about \$5 billion in the last 8 years into Central America. This is just the latest 8 years of futility.

Now we have a different option. For the first time in history Central America has produced a combination of leaders who are saying to us to try something different.

"Use us," they say, "to put pressure on the Sandinistas to stabilize the area regionally rather than trying to impose your own will through techniques that are not working."

I say to my colleagues, it is easy for the Sandinistas to explain why the "gringos" are against them. All they have to do is cite history. What would be much harder for them to explain is why their own Central American neighbors are against them.

The Arias peace plan puts Mr. Ortega and the Sandinistas in a position where, for the first time, if they do not negotiate in good faith, they will have to answer that question to their own society, and I do not think that that answer will be very convincing.

The Arias peace plan requires much of the Sandinistas, it requires much of their neighbors, and it requires much of us. It asks us to cut off military aid to the Contras. It asks us to cut off military aid to the Contras.

The administration says that we cannot do that because the Sandinistas will lie to us and we cannot trust them.

Mr. Chairman, I have been lied to by the Sandinistas and, frankly, I expect to be lied to again by the Sandinistas. It does not surprise me.

But history has sadly shown that the Sandinistas are not the only ones who have been lying to Congress these days. Our own administration has lied and then spied on Americans who disagreed with their policy. Now the administration says they want bipartisanship and they want to cooperate with the Congress, but that cooperation is often, as many people know, a one-way street.

Let me give my colleagues a recent example. I participated in the negotiations with the administration which established the new timetable for this vote which is occurring today. I met in those meetings nose to nose with General Powell and a number of others to hammer out a procedural compromise in the appropriations bill under the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, the subcommittee which I chair. The money which is now being expended between now and February 29 is under the jurisdiction of my subcommittee, but when the staff director of that same subcommittee charged with the responsibility of knowing how the people's money is

being spent, visited Central America in his oversight capacity and tried to visit the very facilities where these operations are occurring, his access to those facilities was denied.

How can this Congress as an institution trust any administration to work in a cooperative way when the committee charged with the responsibility to oversee the expenditure of the people's money is not allowed to fulfill its responsibilities, not allowed to do that by the Director of the CIA, the same man who headed up the FBI when it engaged in its outrageous surveillance of many Americans whose only offense was to disagree with the administration's policy?

Once again we have American agencies behaving in an un-American way. We cannot afford that.

We ought to look at this vote today. Those who urge a "no" vote on the administration request say the Arias peace plan is a new hope and we are asking to give it life. We believe that it is the unified determination of the Central American Presidents which is the new element which has brought the Sandinistas to the bargaining table.

The administration says no, aid to the Contras has brought them to the bargaining table.

I would suggest to my colleagues that they forget which side of that debate they are on and simply say that whether it was the Contras or whether it was President Arias who created the conditions that made those negotiations possible, those conditions do now exist, nonetheless, and they should be responded to.

Let us by our vote today make it clear that this administration's habit of relying upon the military option while giving short shrift to their other options is a dead end. And let us substitute in these coming months a policy of hemispheric pressure to try to bring both sides to the table in search of arrangements which would assure the security of other countries in the region.

Some of my colleagues are saying, "I don't want to vote for this because we put the Contras out there in the first place and we simply cannot leave them in the jungle to rot."

As chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, let me simply say this: there are many kinds of Contras just as there are many kinds of Sandinistas. Some of them are mercenary, brutal, and corrupt, while others are simply as I indicated before, 17- and 18-year-old kids who, like those kids in the Nicaraguan hospital that I also referred to, are having their guts blown out and their faces blown away. I know because I have seen it firsthand in those Contra hospitals.

The fact is that today, regardless of how many colleagues wish to describe

it, further aid at this point kills the peace process; rejecting military escalation as this request does would keep it alive.

I never favored, and I do not now favor, continued aid to the Contras as a personal view.

□ 1400

But, as chairman of a committee trying to work through my obligations to respect all of the interests and views in this House, I do recognize as a rational human being that the Contras, regardless of our view of them, have been operating based on commitments from this administration. We may have disagreed with those commitments; they may have been debated over our opposition; but they were made nonetheless. We recognize that we cannot morally simply walk away and leave them abandoned in the jungle.

If we win this vote today we will be prepared to offer food, medicine, clothing, and other necessities of life to allow them to survive so long as they cooperate in the peace process and do not scuttle it.

I urge my colleagues to support the peace process in Central America and to vote "no" on the administration's request for Contra aid now before us, so that we can begin, after 60 years, a new chapter based on a bipartisan coalition that will utilize the strength of our allies in the region to pressure Nicaragua for peace, that will assure the security of Nicaragua's neighbors, which will attack the root problem that led people to get sucked in by ideologies such as Marxism; namely, poverty, disease, concentration of land, education, and opportunity in the hands of an elite few, and through an intelligent application of our resources, try to bring about a policy that can be sustained—not just through this administration but through a succession of administrations. We need continuity of policy. No policy is good, no matter how good it is regarded to be by policy planners here in Washington, if it cannot be sustained by the American people for a long period of time. The President's policy cannot; the other policy can, and I urge my colleagues to vote that way today.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes and 30 seconds to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. BUNNING].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for a brief comment?

Mr. BUNNING. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the last speaker was highly critical of the administration for denying access to Contra camps and where equipment is stored. I would like to point out the House Permanent Select Committee

on Intelligence has had its staff all over the place making all the audits possible, and the CIA and the administration have been most cooperative. Perhaps those in charge they will get a more objective examination from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence than from the gentleman's subcommittee.

Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Chairman, I realize it is a bit presumptuous of me to say anything in this debate. I am a freshman Member of the House and it is hard to imagine what I could say that has not already been said better than I could say it.

However, I do rise to say a few words simply because I do feel so strongly about the issue.

The situation in Nicaragua is a complex one. No one can deny that. And because it is so complex, I have made three trips to Central America this year because I wanted to know as much about it as I could so that I would be able to make the proper decisions at a time like this—when freedom and peace throughout our hemisphere stand in the balance.

And yes, when I was in Nicaragua, I saw very clearly how desperately they need peace in that country.

The economy is a shambles. The people are suffering. It is a grey and dismal place.

It is impossible to escape the fact that a good bit of those economic and social hardships are caused by the ongoing conflict there. They need peace and they need it desperately.

But it also became very clear to me that they need freedom just as desperately and that the Sandinistas are not going to negotiate away their hold on the country without the threat of military pressure.

But I realize that everyone in this body has also made up their mind on what the right path to peace is.

So, rather than to try to convince any one that I'm right and they're wrong, I would just ask each Member to stop and think for a minute what would happen if they are wrong.

If I am wrong—if it turns out that military pressure is not a positive force in the peace process—and we vote today to continue support for the Contras, we can correct that mistake in 3 months or 4 months or 6 months. If we are wrong, we can turn back.

However, what happens if those of you who want to stop aid to the Contras win today, and it turns out that you are wrong? Sure that may be peace for a time while the Contras are mopped up and the Sandinistas reestablish full control. It takes a while to build all those prisons. But once they have consolidated their power—what happens if Mr. Ortega's promises prove to be as empty as the promises he has made the past 8 years? What happens if the promises of freedom prove false?

What happens if you are wrong and the Sandinistas do turn out to be exporters of communism and use their superior military forces to destabilize Costa Rica and Honduras and El Salvador and Panama? What happens if the only alternative we eventually face is communism throughout Central America or direct intervention with United States troops instead of Contra freedom fighters?

When you look at the possible consequences of your votes today you have to recognize that if you are considering a vote against this aid package, you are considering a vote against this aid package, you are taking a very, very big gamble. Because if this aid package is rejected today, we can never turn back. We have to live with the consequences forever.

I just hope that you will all think about that. I have a son in the Air Force, so I have to think about it.

[From the Washington Post, Feb. 3, 1988]

CONTRA AID

The Contra aid votes today and tomorrow in Congress can help advance Nicaragua toward peace and democracy. The Sandinistas, their economy devastated and their people divided, have already offered to let the resistance stay constituted and armed in a cease-fire and to continue (direct) cease-fire talks even if aid is approved. The contras have stopped demanding that the Sandinistas pay in heavy political concessions just for a cease-fire. President Reagan has reduced his aid request to dimensions that make conservatives fear he is undercutting the great strategic stakes he insists are in the balance.

Sen. Chris Dodd makes the case against aid on the opposite page today. He does not make the claim some others do that the contras are CIA stooges, mercenaries, terrorists and Somocistas—labels that have become increasingly inapplicable as the contras have sought to clean up their act and earn support in the countryside. His main argument is the widely heard plea to "give peace a chance."

Some part of the plea arises from a legitimate concern that contra aid and the impetus it gives to continued battle could sink Central America's plan for peace and democracy. Another part appears to arise out of the current, furious debate over whether the Sandinistas' partial steps toward a political opening result exclusively from Central American diplomacy or from the peace plan and contra pressure. Mr. Dodd and likeminded Democrats say contra aid has not helped, it's hurt, and it will keep hurting. This is an arguable claim, but we think the evidence finally goes the other way. Much has changed since Central American diplomacy became a factor last summer. The record of the last six months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on that basis we support the president's request.

It remains a gamble whether a Marxist party can move back toward democracy—in a country and region with pitifully little democratic experience. But it is a gamble

worth taking: the Sandinistas have yet to consolidate the power, and their neighbors have a paramount interest in urging democracy upon them.

The Arias plan has two inseparable and equally vital parts: democratization and the establishment of peace. In tandem with Nicaragua, but not on its own, this country should be moving to fulfill its part of the obligation.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. SKAGGS].

Mr. SKAGGS. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the vote later today to end a failed policy in Nicaragua and enable us to set a different course—one that is true to our values, true to the views of the American people, and true to the realities of Central American politics.

Any number of arguments can be raised. Let me state a few.

First, a basic American value is honesty, and it should apply to our foreign policy. But what we've had from the President has been a steady stream of dissembling and deception. The objective of this administration has always been the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. Reagan officials admit they will never countenance a regime in which the Sandinistas are the dominant power. So let's be honest. The policy the President submits for approval is one intended to change the Government of another nation.

We are told that 90 percent of this request is for so-called humanitarian assistance. Well, let's be honest. Even taken at face value, the \$32.6 million that's requested for 4 months works out to about \$6,500 per Contra soldier per year. That's a lot of beans and rice in a country where per capita annual income is \$868. Who are we fooling?

Second, we should be true to what the people of this country want. The vast majority believe we should stop supporting the Contras. The people are 2 to 1 against it. A majority of Democrats oppose it; a majority of Independents; a majority of Republicans.

One thing this administration has not yet grasped is that in a democracy like ours it's tough to carry out a major foreign policy effort that runs counter to the views of most of the people. Consensus at home is critical to our credibility and staying power abroad. Instead of trying to work with Congress to develop that consensus, the President has insisted on having it his way, with or without legal authority from Congress, much less the popular support of the people.

What we need now is a policy toward Central America that the American people can get behind. One that reflects our basic values. One that first bets on the ability of this country to work with our friends and neighbors in the region to address their crying need for economic stability and social

justice. One that understands that the use of force should be a last resort, not a first choice. In that spirit, we should be talking about an "escrow for peace" to provide peaceful assistance to nations that comply with the Guatemala accords, not about the President's escrow for war.

Finally, we can't go it alone and expect to succeed in the political environment of Central America. One reason it's been so hard for the administration to sustain its policy is that we've been isolated, with no explicit backing and precious little tacit support from the countries in the region in whose security interests we presume to act.

Let's learn the lesson from this experience, and do what we can to encourage—not undermine—the international efforts underway since the Guatemala accords. We've got to demonstrate a clear commitment ourselves to truly regional security arrangements.

Last week the President proclaimed that he hadn't come to Washington to preside over the communization of Central America. Of course not; neither did I. The President of the United States isn't elected to preside over Central America. It's that fundamental misconception of the proper use of American power that has led this President to such fundamental error.

This country has real and legitimate interests in Central America. One of those interests is to further the cause of free institutions and democratic government. That certainly means deterring the spread of totalitarian governments—whether of the right or the left. That's the right thing for us to do; and it's in our own security interest.

In the process, however, we have to keep in touch with the old-fashioned principle that the ends don't justify the means. Too often, we've found quite the opposite: that ignoble means subvert the best of intentions. That's what the vote tonight is all about.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. DANNEMEYER].

Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, it is incomprehensible that any American, specifically Members of this body, would want to reward evil. That is what we will be doing by allowing the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua to go unchallenged. Let them have their way. We don't care.

By any standard, the Sandinistas are guilty of oppression on a massive scale. They have also had the unique ability to deceive a great share of world opinion through sheer audacity: if you're going to tell a lie, tell a whopper—some people will believe it. If anyone in this Chamber believes that there will be peace and harmony in Nicaragua were we to cut off aid to the Contras, he has been duped by a master in the art. Facts—if we are interested in

learning them—reveal a wide chasm between President Ortega's rhetoric and stark reality.

How do the Sandinistas manage the Nicaraguan economy? On April 1, 1987, they offered a 56-percent wage hike. Of course, only loyal Sandinistas could receive this increase. But apparently April Fool's Day is celebrated in Managua, because 2 days later, prices went up 150 percent on basic foods, including beef and dairy products. The inflation rate for 1987 was 800 percent. The proletariat has been well served indeed.

How do the Sandinistas preserve religious freedom? The most common method is to conduct surveillance of church leaders, accompanied by detention, beatings, military inductions, and comparable elements of democracy. Religious instruction is banned as a scholastic course. The Government demands veto power over the appointment of bishops. In July 1981, the televised Sunday mass broadcasts of Cardinal Obando y Bravo were banned. And, most sinisterly, a strategic alliance has been forged with pro-Sandinista religious leaders, especially here in the United States, who are sympathetic to Marxist solutions to world problems. Their assignment: influence public opinion here and abroad. The Holy Trinity in Nicaragua has become Marx, Engels, and Lenin.

How do the Sandinistas ensure civil rights? Largely through suppression. Over 100,000 Nicaraguans have been forcibly relocated from their homes, a hallmark achievement of all communist regimes. Over one-half of the Miskito Indian communities have been destroyed. Non-Sandinista trade unionists have suffered indignities and physical assaults. Middle class businesses have largely been destroyed. Books considered "unsuitable" have been burned. There are over 11,000 political prisoners, as opposed to 600 under the feared Anastasio Somoza. And the entire Jewish population has been forced to flee following the confiscation of Managua's only synagogue.

How do the Sandinistas promote freedom of the press? Strict censorship is the usual means by which the Government silences opponents. La Marcha, the Conservative paper, has been closed since 1985. La Prensa, the most widely recognized newspaper, was closed in June 1986. It reopened in October 1987 but is severely restricted in what it can publish. The Sandinistas tolerate no criticism.

How do the Sandinistas treat their neighbors? They promote terrorism. Ortega publicly admitted—June 25, 1987—that he has been supplying guerrillas in neighboring states, especially in El Salvador. The Sandinistas have also supplied terrorist training schools for the world's radicals, includ-

ing the Red Brigade, the Baader-Meinhof gang, and the PLO. Small wonder that two-thirds of the populations of Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Honduras approve of aid to the Contras.

How do the Sandinistas promote peace? They intend to make Nicaragua another Cuba, a Soviet satellite in Central America, from where continued violence and subversion can spread across the Western Hemisphere. Key defectors claim that the Soviet bloc has been building the Nicaraguan Armed Forces with the eventual goal of sustaining a 500,000 to 600,000 man army, 80,000 of which would be regular troops, the remainder reserve and militia.

How do the Sandinistas acquire a better human rights record than the Contras? They don't. Alleged atrocities committed by the Contras are legion in the world press and foes of Contra aid are always quick to make those charges. The independent Nicaraguan Association for Human Rights, established to monitor Contra atrocities, released a report February 1 which underscores the duplicity of this canard. About 43—to possibly 93—alleged human rights violations committed by the Contras are being investigated, including kidnaping and murder. But, lo and behold, this group found a far greater number committed by the Sandinistas; 1,143 cases are under investigation. In any war, there are inhumanities committed by all sides, partly caused by accident, emotion, or revenge. Among civilized nations, however, there are seldom instances where such acts are deliberately perpetrated. We killed hundreds of thousands of civilians when we firebombed Dresden in February of 1945, more than in the atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Were these events indicative of a basic American evilness? No, they were viewed as means—albeit drastic means—to end the war quickly and save as many American lives as possible. Indisputably, we should monitor and investigate all human rights violations on both sides. But it is clear from the evidence that the Sandinistas are far worse in this regard. Disregarding this fact is tantamount to accusing the United States of heinous actions at Mylai while overlooking the Communist murder of 2 to 3 million inhabitants of Vietnam and Cambodia. There is no comparison.

The United States has given \$182 million in direct aid to the Contras since 1981. From 1980 to 1986, United States aid to all of Central America totaled \$1.4 billion. By contrast, Soviet bloc aid to the Sandinistas amounts to \$1.6 billion over that same period. We are now discussing a pitiful \$36 million; the Sandinistas will receive more than that in 1 month from Moscow.

The regime in Managua will discuss peace; they will talk up a storm in order to convince gullible Americans that human rights will be preserved in Nicaragua, that democracy will prevail. We have heard this rhetoric before. On April 10, 1975, Congress denied President Ford's request for \$722 million in emergency military aid and \$250 million in humanitarian aid for South Vietnam. We wanted peace. The Communists in Southeast Asia promised peace. They promised respect for human rights and freedom for their own people. What they delivered were several million dead Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese. We are about to embark on this course again. Do we have the right to tell the freedom fighters that they have no right to live?

The Sandinistas, like Communists everywhere, are many things. But they are not fools. They know they can wrap a large segment of liberal public opinion around their bloody fingers by regurgitating volumes of verbal assurances. After all, we have fallen for this line before. Is it not terribly ironic that so much of our own news media and so many of our own people, especially some in this institution, are more likely to question the motives and integrity of our own Government and its leaders than they are those of enemy tyrants and murderers? Sure, we must be vigilant at home, and see to it that our freedoms are not abused. We should judge the Sandinistas by their real motives, not their duplicitous propaganda.

Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, an acknowledged murderer of 61 peasants in 1977, once declared:

We have Nicaragua, soon we will have El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Mexico. One day, tomorrow or five years or fifteen years from now, we're going to take 5 to 10 million Mexicans and they're going to have one thing on their mind—cross the border, go into Dallas, go into El Paso, go into Houston, go into New Mexico, go into San Diego, and each one has imbedded in his mind the killing of 10 Americans.

Borge knows what the stakes are. It is not for control of Nicaragua alone, nor even for Central America. It is part of a world empire which will not stop until we muster the resolve to stop it. Borge stated the real motive in 1981:

This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought (his first battle).

Mr. Chairman, the Sandinistas know what the stakes are. It is time that we do.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER].

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, Pope John Paul II and Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, both said it best when they said that "peace

cannot exist in Central America without democracy."

Now a great many of our colleagues on the Democratic side of the aisle have said that 6 years of war have not brought about this peace process. They say that it has been the Arias plan which launched the negotiations.

We have to look closely at the facts though, Mr. Chairman. The fact of the matter is that we would not have had an intermediate nuclear force agreement had the United States not deployed the Pershing II missiles to Western Europe. The Soviet Union would not today be discussing the prospect of withdrawing their 120,000 troops that have been perpetuating genocide in Afghanistan were it not for the fact that we have supported the Mujaheddin; and, as we know, the Mujaheddin are consistently victorious. We need to recognize that fact as we address the Central American peace process.

While many people have said that the pressure which the Contras have applied is not bringing the Sandinistas to the negotiation table, it is wrong. That is exactly what is doing that. We have to realize very clearly that it is in our interest to ensure that the United States of America never has to send a single U.S. combat troop to the region. Remember the four other Central American Presidents do not have that same interest that we do. We want to ensure that we never have to send a single combat troop, and the only chance to ensure that we won't is to provide support for the democratic resistance.

Many people have said, and one of my colleagues on the other side has often said, that there is not always an American solution to every world problem. He has quoted President Kennedy as saying that. We have got to realize that we are not imposing the American solution. We are Americans backing the Nicaraguan solution.

I urge support of this resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HERGER].

Mr. HERGER. Mr. Chairman, we all share the same basic goal for Nicaragua and Central America, and that goal is peace. I happen to believe that peace can only be achieved by the adoption of this resolution today. It is a reasonable proposal to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas to continue to implement the kinds of democratic reforms which offer the only genuine guarantee for peace in that troubled country.

Each of us is vividly aware of the Sandinista regime. And if we as a Congress are willing to believe the promises that they have made, why shouldn't we also be willing to believe the threats that they have made? For

example, the Sandinistas have threatened to expand their army to 600,000 troops, to export their revolution to neighboring countries, and to base Soviet Mig fighter bombers in Nicaragua, putting American cities at risk.

The Sandinistas have admitted that the concessions they have made were intended only to persuade the Congress to vote down this resolution. That's an admission that Contra aid has helped to move the peace process forward.

We are not voting today on sending lethal aid. We can make the decision in 2 months. Until then, our escrow account can, as today's Washington Post editorial so correctly notes, keep the pressure on the Marxist Communist Sandinistas to dismantle their dictatorship and to really give peace in the region a genuine chance.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Kansas [Mrs. MEYERS].

Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas. Mr. Chairman, yesterday, I sent a letter to the President asking him to consider offering a compromise proposal for aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. I specifically suggested that the \$3.6 million of military aid flow only after another vote by Congress in April.

My reasons were, as I said in the letter: First, I believed a vote by Congress for lethal aid at this time would give Ortega a reason to reverse the freedoms won thus far, and an excuse to walk away entirely from the peace process; and second, because of the deep division in this country on this issue, I believed that further lethal aid should represent a consensus, and be activated by a bipartisan vote.

I was pleased that in his speech last night, the President did modify his request, and grant a second vote to Congress on military aid, and consequently I will support this proposal.

Voting for aid to the Contras has been a difficult vote for all of us. None of us likes to support a war, or intervene in another country's revolution.

But I firmly believe that if it had not been for Contra aid in the past, that Nicaragua would not have participated in the Arias peace plan. I also believe that the Sandinistas, without pressure from within, would have been a threat to the other Central American countries, particularly El Salvador.

This vote today allows us to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas until April 1. And it allows Congress to make a consensus, bipartisan decision at that time.

□ 1415

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, how are we running on time? Are we about even?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] has 11

minutes remaining and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 27 minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Certainly in my judgment this is not the time to abandon the Contras and take the pressures off the Sandinista Government in Nicaragua. We are where we are today in Central America with democratic forces in control of most of the governments and even the Sandinistas are beginning to make some concessions toward democracy.

This has been a result, Mr. Chairman, of our steady support for democratic governments and the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. Let us not deceive ourselves, democracy needs to be supported in Nicaragua. It is true, however, the Sandinistas have made some concessions under the Central American peace plan. But their concessions are more cosmetic than real. They continue to repress the political opposition.

If the Contras lose our support it is possible that they would be forced to disband and that the only real pressure on the Sandinista government could be lost forever.

My fear is that to prevent another Cuba on the United States' southern flank, our only option might be, and I hope it never has to be, the use of direct military force.

The termination of United States support for the Contras could also threaten democracy elsewhere in Central America by sending the wrong signal. The military establishments in many Central American countries have withdrawn from government in response to strong U.S. support for democracy and security programs. If we cease to confront a Marxist-Leninist threat the militaries in other Central American countries could well decide to reenter the politics of those areas.

There can be little denying that under the Sandinistas, Nicaragua is increasingly becoming a Marxist-Leninist state with strong ties to the Soviet Union. While we debate over a small amount of assistance to sustain the freedom fighters, the Soviets and their allies continue to pour large sums of military equipment into Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan defector Roger Miranda has alerted us to the Sandinista plan to build the largest army in Central America, over half a million men in arms.

According to information provided by Miranda, the Soviet bloc has already supplied massive amounts of armaments to the Sandinistas, Miranda has also disclosed that the Sandinistas plan substantial additional acquisitions in the next 2 years. And I believe that President Reagan's overall re-

quest is certainly modest and is designed only to maintain the Contras as a viable force within Nicaragua.

As we all know, and it has been said many times today, the military assistance would become available only after March 31 if the President certified that the Sandinistas were not living up to their commitments under the peace plan, that there was no cease-fire in effect in Nicaragua and that the Contras had negotiated in good faith. President Reagan has delivered his personal assurance of continued consultation with the Central American Presidents and Congress. And I say, Mr. Chairman, what more can you ask of the President? He has demonstrated he is willing to go the extra mile for peace in that area. This is the moment of truth, not only for the democratic freedom fighters and forces in Nicaragua but also for the progress, the democratization in Nicaragua and indeed all of Central America. It is only as a result of the unrelenting pressure applied by the freedom fighters that the Sandinistas were forced to the negotiating table with their neighbors and the resistance forces in the political opposition. I say it is hypocritical for Congress to say that now is not a time to request assistance for the Contras. Under the continuing resolution, as everyone knows, which was passed last fall, the President requested renewed assistance to be considered by Congress only if it was submitted by January 27. It was therefore essential for the President not only to request renewed assistance now but to include the military component. The Congress forced the President to submit his request now. I say it rings hollow to suggest a delay. I hope my colleagues will vote to give President Reagan the support which he needs to respond to the developments in Nicaragua while the Central American peace plan is in progress.

Renewed assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance is essential to keeping the Sandinistas at the bargaining table and preventing the consolidation of a Marxist state in Central America.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, let us support our country's national security interests by supporting President Reagan today.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. PACKARD].

Mr. PACKARD. I thank the gentleman.

All day we have heard "give peace a chance." Peace has no chance without liberty. Peace without freedom will never last. Have we forgotten what motivated this country toward independence when Patrick Henry said, "Is peace so sweet and life so precious and dear as to be purchased with chains and slavery? God forbid it."

If lasting peace is ever to be in Central America it must be accompanied by liberty. There is no other peace.

Vote for the resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. SHUMWAY].

Mr. SHUMWAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

We have heard several times in the debate today and before today from those who oppose continued funding for the Contras in Nicaragua that we should vote for peace and therefore vote to end United States support for the Contras freedom fighters in that country. I suggest to you what we really need to vote for is peace and democracy. I think a vote for these twin goals would fulfill the United States policy as we have had it for the past several years.

We should make no mistake about the fact that the Sandinistas have created an expansionistic Communist regime in Nicaragua which is a threat to its neighbors.

I recall a couple of years ago when we were visited by President Duarte of El Salvador, hearing him say very clearly that as long as there is a Communist-Marxist nation in Central America he felt that there would never be peace in that part of the world. It is no secret that Nicaragua has a massive army which is well-equipped by the Soviet Union. In fact, last year the Soviets spent for military aid to the Sandinistas some \$450 million. Here today we are debating an escrowed account of only \$3.6 million in military aid.

We have heard from Major Miranda, who recently defected, that the Soviet Union will continue its buildup and massive military assistance to the Sandinistas.

The policy we pursued thus far has worked. It has brought the Sandinistas to the bargaining table. They have made concessions. They promise to make more reforms to see us stop our aid to the Contras in that country.

Now is not the time to change that policy, it is in fact time to continue it, to keep their feet to the fire, to continue to push not just for peace in Central America, but peace and democracy.

I hope that my colleagues will join me in not sending the Contras to the bargaining table empty handed.

I urge the Members to vote "yes" for peace and democracy.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RAVENEL].

Mr. RAVENEL. Mr. Chairman, I want to say just a few words to those of you who are southern—you Virginians, Carolinians, Georgians, Floridians, Alabamians, Mississippians, Louisianans, Texans, Arkansans, and

Tennesseans—you sons and daughters of Patrick Henry, Washington, Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Calhoun, Sam Houston, George Patton, and all the others of our dear southland who fought the good fight for freedom. You see them on canvas or in stone daily in this place, a temple of our liberties. What must their ghostly presence think as they hear the naysayers here today who would encourage the cause of international communism as it seeks to consolidate and spread its cancer around the very waist of our hemisphere. Robert E. Lee, certainly one of our finest, once said, "duty is the sublimest word in the English language." Today, as patriotic Americans from the Old South, our duty is to vote continued assistance for those young Nicaraguans who fight and die for freedom, not only in their country, but everywhere.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine [Mr. BRENNAN].

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask what is this vote on Contra aid all about? Well I think it is about respect for the rule of law;

It is about respect for the sovereignty of even small countries;

It is about respect for a regional peace plan;

It is concern for stopping the killing in Nicaragua;

It is about respect for the dignity of people in a country that our Government has treated shabbily for more than a century;

It is about us stopping the making of war in a country that has done nothing to my country.

Last January, I visited a refugee camp in Nicaragua and spoke with a campesino who had been displaced from his home by the Contras. He told me what President Reagan could do with his millions of dollars to fight a war in his country. That poor peasant said he hoped President Reagan would spend the Contra aid money on the poor in the United States. The Nicaraguan peasant went on to say very poignantly—

We campesinos are not animals.

Essentially, what that Nicaraguan peasant was saying, I want respect for my human dignity. Let's give that peasant and thousands like him his dignity—and stop making war in his country where too many have already died.

Reflecting on the 7-year war in Nicaragua:

When American taxpayers ask how past Contra aid funds have been spent, the respected General Accounting Office reported that the State Department could not account for over half the money granted in 1986.

When I ask our Nation's military leaders if the Contras can defeat the Sandinistas, they respond in the negative.

When I ask what the Contras' plans for governing would be should they overthrow the Sandinistas, they have none.

When I ask if the neighboring nations of Nicaragua are threatened by Nicaraguan aggression, as claimed by President Reagan and proponents of additional Contra aid, Costa Rican, Honduran, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan leaders voice support for the regional peace plan which calls for a stopping of further Contra aid.

When I ask if our allies support our actions with regard to Nicaragua, they do not.

The time has come to end America's sponsorship of war in Central America. Vote no on more Contra aid. And let's get on with addressing some other problems of this Nation: Housing, day care, plus the deficit.

□ 1430

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman suggest that the neighboring countries of Nicaragua are not threatened? If the gentleman would check the press, he would find that just last week the President of Nicaragua, Mr. Ortega, told the President of El Salvador, Mr. Duarte, when Mr. Duarte complained that Nicaragua was training guerrillas in his country, that if Mr. Duarte did not like that, the Nicaraguans would put missiles in the hands of the guerrillas in El Salvador. I, personally, called President Duarte and asked him if it was true, and he said it was.

Mr. BRENNAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. No; I will not yield.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has expired.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I believe all of us, Republicans, Democrats, Contra aid supporters and Contra aid opponents want to see a basically similar outcome in Nicaragua. We want to see the 2.8 million people of Nicaragua able to live in peace. We want to see them able to live respectable and decent lives where they have the freedoms that we enjoy in the United States. We want to see the people of Nicaragua lift themselves out of the poverty that so many of them are subjected to. In sum, we want to see them able to lead the kinds of lives that so many of us in the United States take for granted. Lives that are full of happiness not terror, freedom rather than oppression, and prosperity instead of poverty.

Our debate today then centers around how we in the United States can foster and promote these goals in

Nicaragua. During the last 7 years, the Reagan administration has tried to achieve these goals by attempting to subvert the Government of Nicaragua which they concluded long ago is incapable of providing decent and respectable lives for the Nicaraguan people. They started by funding a CIA secret war in Nicaragua. They mined the harbors of Nicaragua and secretly funneled arms into the country. Next, President Reagan with congressional approval began the Contra war which to date has cost U.S. taxpayers over \$200 million. As well as spending millions of dollars, the policy has damaged our image in many parts of the world, especially in Latin America. A World Court decision condemned us and the Iran-Contra debacle embarrassed us.

Most importantly, the Contra policy has cost lives. Thousands have died during the past 6 years of the Contra war. Civil war always brings out the worst in people. Human rights have been abused. People have been tortured. After 6 years of war Nicaraguans are not better off than they were before. The Contra war has produced death and little more.

In contrast to the 6 years of the Contra war, the 6 months of the Arias Peace Plan have begun to produce positive changes in Nicaragua. Although much still needs to be accomplished, during the past 6 months the Sandinistas have finally shown a willingness to implement much needed reforms as well as negotiate with the Contras.

The International Verification Commission in its report on compliance to the January 15 meeting of the Central American presidents concluded: "In the case of Nicaragua, the International Commission has been able to confirm that in spite of the wartime suffering it has made concrete steps toward initiating a democratic process." Specifically, the independent newspaper and the Catholic radio station have been allowed to reopen. They have released 985 political prisoners and have lifted the state of emergency that had been in effect since March of 1982. Most recently, the Sandinistas have finally shown a willingness to meet and negotiate with members of the Contra movement.

While many have been critical of this record of compliance, I believe it is a step in the right direction and must be supported by the United States through a policy of negotiation and nonintervention. We should accede to the wishes of President Arias—the architect of the peace plan and the winner of the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize—and halt the aid to the Contras. To do otherwise would be to violate the letter and spirit of the Guatemala peace accords. Surely, we do not want to be the body responsible for killing the peace plan. By approv-

ing Contras aid we run the high risk of doing just that.

Enough lives have been lost. The Nicaraguan people cannot afford to lose any more. By approving further aid we will assure further loss of life. Costa Rican President Arias says if we approve more aid today, 20,000 to 30,000 Nicaraguans would die in the next year. Let's prevent that from happening. Let's reassess our posture. Let's give peace a chance and in doing so put our stamp of endorsement on the Central American initiative. We gave President Reagan's approach over 6 years to produce results. So now at the request of our Central American neighbors let's at least give their new approach more than the 6 short months it has had thus far.

Let us also reject the myopic vision and self-serving view of world geography and history. In a world with 50,000 nuclear weapons, offered by the President last night, a tiny, mostly illiterate, economically depressed nation of 3 million people 1,000 miles from our shores poses little threat to our survival.

Further it is a self-evident double standard to suggest that political repression and authoritarian government are reprehensible and worthy of military intervention in Nicaragua but not in Chile or South Africa. This contradiction, this hypocrisy, may not be apparent to the President or the State Department, but everyone else on is fully aware of it.

In fact our present policy is not really guided by a desire to make life better in Nicaragua, we've had decades to do that, and have not. Our policy is governed by a misguided appraisal of our self-interest. Surely, there are other more beneficial causes in which we can invest our constituents hard-earned money.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. KYL].

Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, I would like to focus just for a moment on what unites us here today. I think all of us in this body, as my colleague just said, favor peace and democracy in Central America. The question is how to achieve it.

Some say that a combined carrot-and-stick approach is needed, that is to say both diplomatic pressure and military pressure by the democratic resistance. Others believe that only the carrot is needed.

I would like to draw upon an analogy. We all favor peace in the world and a secure United States. Throughout our history there has been a national consensus that only by providing for the defense of this country will we never be put in the position of having to defend against an attack—in other words, peace through strength. We engage in diplomacy, to be sure, but we also recognize the need for the

stick as well; that is, a strong military defense of America.

We wish this were not so, but reality shows us that it is. The same thing is true in Nicaragua. We wish for peace and freedom. We wish for it to be attained without further fighting, through diplomacy only. But the fact is and the reality is that we need both the carrot and the stick. The moment democracy has been irreversibly established, our aid to the democratic resistance can be withdrawn, the stick withdrawn. Until then, like the dollars for our own defense, this aid for the democratic resistance represents the best hope for the establishment of peace and freedom.

This is not just the opinion of a Republican. It is the growing consensus of considered opinion in the United States, including editorial writers.

It is not often that we find a Republican quoting from the Washington Post, but I do want to quote from today's edition. The lead editorial stated this:

Mr. Dodd and like-minded Democrats say contra aid has not helped, it's hurt, and it will keep hurting. This is an arguable claim, but we think the evidence finally goes the other way.

The Washington Post editorial goes on to say:

Much has changed since Central American diplomacy became a factor last summer. The record of the last 6 months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on that basis we support the President's request.

Mr. Chairman, Democrats and Republicans can agree on this, and I urge my colleagues to vote yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to state that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] has 4 minutes remaining.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield my remaining 4 minutes to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL], with whom I almost always agree.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding this time to me, since I am rising in strong support of the request that is now pending before the Congress and the American people.

I want to say that my purpose up here is simply to put my opinion on the record. My position is taken as a result of what I consider to be common sense. Like the gentleman, I have watched this process from the very beginning, when the United States first put out its hand to the Sandinista government and tried to es-

establish a new basis for friendly relationship with that government.

We did not do that on our own. We worked with a lot of people in the hemisphere, and with a lot of people within Nicaragua who were part of the revolution and have a legitimate right to express their opinion and to have in participation in what that government is going to do. I do not believe, based on my opinion and knowledge and experience, that it is just the Directorate of that country that has the right to say what will happen just because they are in power. There were other legitimate elements of the revolution against Somoza that have something to say about the future of the people of Nicaragua. Those people have a right, an absolute right, for participating in the determination of their future—in processes that include political participation and freedom of the press and of religion, all of which are promised under the Arias peace plan, which is the first major change since the Contras came in as a force in the political process. So the Arias peace plan has been useful. It put political pressure on everyone in the hemisphere, including the Sandinistas and the United States Government.

But I can assure the Members that we would not have even had that if it had not been for the fact that there was a legitimate difference of opinion existing in Nicaragua, backed up by the force of arms and supported by the political, economic, and military commitment of the United States.

We terminated our program of assistance to the Sandinista government because they failed to live up to their promises—the promises that clearly were made as to the future that the people of Nicaragua would enjoy.

Now, you may fool me once and it may be because you are smart, but if you fool me twice, it is because I am stupid. I do not want to go down that road. It is not a question of who you believe or who you disbelieve; it is a question of human nature, common sense, and history. What we have here is pure and simple political power. It is that people in power want to stay in power. They will do the minimal that is required under existing pressure, whether it comes from us, or internally, or from the surrounding countries. They will get away with whatever it is they can get away with.

We talk about whether the United States can just fold up and roll over and not be in this process; whether we should get out and stop the Contras. Well, the Sandinistas have had it in their power from the day they signed the agreement, from the day they signed this last agreement, the Arias peace plan, to simply implement what they agreed to under that plan. And we know that if they had done that, we would not be here discussing this matter today.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this reasonable and modest request which is more political than military.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] has expired.

The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] has expired. The gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY] has 3 hours remaining, and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 3 hours and 15 minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY].

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 hour to the distinguished gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] may be allowed to yield time.

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, as this debate on Contra aid continues, I have a strange sense of *deja vu*. We have been here before, but I am possessed by an eerie awareness. That it is a place where we should not be.

It is administration's untenable Central American initiative that thrusts Congress into the awkward position of trying to achieve through legislation what the administration does not seek through negotiation.

The administration argues that, without the Contras, the Sandinistas would never be moving toward democracy. I cannot agree.

It is the Arias peace plan that has achieved what both illegal and approved aid to the Contras have not: the easing of social and political restrictions in Nicaragua.

This administration's actions continue to contravene the Guatemala accord.

The President's additional aid requests are an affront to the American people and an insult to Mr. Arias, the other Central American presidents, and their collective efforts to bring peace to their home region.

If the democratic leaders of Central America can live with a Nicaragua abiding by the peace accords, why can't President Reagan? I hope his presumption is not that he possesses a greater sensitivity to the dynamics of the region.

Rather than this debate occurring through the unimpeded vision of historical awareness, it is obstructed by an ideological blindspot. This is the same dogmatic approach that has so frequently guided this administration's decisionmaking.

I say decisionmaking—and I emphasize that it not be confused with policymaking.

What is occurring in Central America is not policy. It is a series of visceral responses. Flawed, rigid, and underscored by our past actions.

What we must provide is not military aid but moral leadership in Central America.

Since 1981, Congress has approved almost \$200 million in Contra funding. At the same time we have witnessed the death and suffering of 40,000 people.

The Reagan administration's Contra obsession has produced the outrage of the Iran-Contra scandal—and our humiliation worldwide.

Just today a new embarrassment is materializing: the FBI surveillance of American citizens opposed to the administration's Central American policy. Nuns, college students, church groups, and the Knights of Columbus involved in subversive activities? A new "enemies list"?

While this administration remains transfixed by the conflict's theoretical geopolitical machinations, it ignores the human elements of the situation.

Through supporting the peace process, we can rebuild our Nation's moral authority to promote democratic reform. We must spread democracy by example not imposition.

This administration does not trust Daniel Ortega. And they may be right on that count. But why does this administration so fear giving Mr. Ortega a chance to prove them right?

Let us call Mr. Ortega's bluff.

If he proves the administration right, then we act accordingly; the President can request additional aid from Congress at any time. If Mr. Ortega proves them wrong, then the administration should be willing to sacrifice their pride for peace. A small price to pay in my estimation.

Six years of military aid have only brought more war, yet only 6 months of negotiations are beginning to bring peace.

The reopening of *La Prensa*, the lifting of the state of siege, and the beginning of direct communication between the Sandinistas and the Contras should bring hope—not more guns to Central America.

This administration cites the disclosures of Nicaraguan military exile Major Miranda to substantiate its position. Major Miranda has tried to convince us that Nicaragua plans to threaten the security of the region with a 500,000-man army. However, like most of the arguments made on the behalf of Contra funding, it is laden with half-truths and incomplete information.

A careful examination of the Miranda disclosures reveals that such a buildup, should it occur, would guard

against a feared U.S. invasion. Additionally, such an army would consist largely of a poorly trained and ill-equipped citizens militia, inadequate for offensive operations. This is a country that fears a U.S. invasion not plans one.

Speaking of half-truths, let's define terms for the American people. The President is requesting the bulk of his funds for nonlethal aid. Mr. Reagan, tell the American people that less than 5 percent of the \$36 million request would be used for humanitarian purposes.

Amid today's rhetoric, I challenge my colleagues to heed the echoes of Teddy Roosevelt's call "to dare greatly." Today we must dare greatly on the side of peace rather than on the side of war.

It has been said that violence is, essentially, a confession of ultimate inarticulateness, let our message today be clear and simple: "Just say no" to more Contra aid.

□ 1445

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. NIELSON].

Mr. NIELSON of Utah. Mr. Chairman, the lessons of the Korean and the Vietnam wars have hit me hard in the last few months and I think we should take a look at the lessons we have learned in those two wars and apply them to the Nicaraguan situation.

In Korea, we made a commitment, we had an agreement, we made a commitment to stay and defend that area. We have done that. Korea has become very aggressive, has become a very fine democracy and has done very well, economic miracles have occurred in that area.

In Vietnam, we had a situation also where we had an agreement. In fact, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger received a Nobel Prize for that agreement in Vietnam, but we walked away. Congress pulled out the rug and we walked away. Now Vietnam, both North and South, plus Laos and Cambodia, are communistic.

Nicaragua is similar. We have a situation there where we are trying to establish peace, but if we withdraw on our side, if we walk away, Nicaragua will fall to the Communists, as will Costa Rica, El Salvador, possibly Honduras and Guatemala as well.

The key word to me is commitment. In South Korea we remained and continue to remain committed to democracy, whereas in Vietnam we abandoned our commitment. That proves to me that if we want to insure a democratic Central America, we must maintain our commitment to the Contras. If the Sandinistas know the United States has no intention of living up to its commitments, they have no reason to live up to the prom-

ise of the peace accords. If we pull out now, I have no doubt that other countries will be overrun, as I have stated.

We have already seen how a show of commitment in Central America is working to pressure the Sandinistas to make good on their promises. By the November 7 deadline of the Guatemala peace accords, the Sandinistas had only begun to make superficial compliance. Then at the January summit in Costa Rica, which was meant as a final review, they asked for an extension of the deadline to begin to implement changes. It was only the refusal by other Central American nations to allow such an extension and the threat of continued U.S. aid that forced the Sandinistas to make some immediate changes.

Mr. Chairman, I urge support for the resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BOULTER].

Mr. BOULTER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the President's request for aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters.

My colleagues, I've heard many of you saying today, "Let's give the Arias peace plan a chance." But I want to ask, what does it mean to give the Arias peace plan a chance? I was in San Jose, Costa Rica, in early September and talked to President Arias, and we've all heard President Arias, and here's what he himself says, and I'm quoting:

We must call things by their name. If there is no pluralism; if there are no free elections; if there are no individual rights in all the countries; if there is no freedom of the press, as there is here in Costa Rica—then you can call it what you like, but it cannot be termed a democratic regime. I think that without democracy, which, as I have said many times, is the heart of the peace plan, a lasting peace cannot be achieved in the region.

Mr. Chairman, the peace plan was signed on August 7. It laid out several steps for all of the Central American countries to take within 90 days. But when the 90 days expired November 5, no action had been taken.

The Sandinistas have been promising democracy since 1979, and they've broken all their promises. The Sandinista Communists are liars. While they talk about peace, they are announcing their plans to build up their troop strength to 600,000 personnel. After Gorbachev left Washington for the INF talks, they admitted that they had made a deal with the Soviets to receive hundreds of millions of dollars of military hardware and sophisticated Mig jets.

Freedom in this hemisphere and our own national security interests are threatened. And the real issue is whether the Soviet Union is going to be allowed to set up a second forward military base in our hemisphere. The resistance are the freedom fighters,

the Contras, coupled with the moral commitment of the United States to stand up for freedom and democracy. And if we do not reaffirm that commitment today, then it may well be that the Contras will perish. And many of my colleagues will be glad, but militant communism will again be on the march in our hemisphere.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO].

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, in all the hours of debate on Contra aid over the years, and today the critics always seem to rely on the same arguments. Opponents of aid to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua always claim: The Contras are the obstacle to peace and democracy in Nicaragua. They also tend to portray the Contras as a band of paid mercenaries who are the creation of the United States.

There must be no doubt about one very specific reality in Nicaragua. The United States didn't create the Contras; the Communist Sandinistas created the Contras.

Since it came to power in July 1979, the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has deliberately and systematically oppressed the people of Nicaragua. It has created a military regime unmatched in Central America, and it has continued to support armed efforts to overthrow the democratic governments of its neighbors.

Opponents of Contra aid seem fond of saying United States support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is immoral and contrary to international law. Yet, since July 1979, when they took power, the Sandinistas have been engaged in an armed attack on their neighboring countries and primarily targeting El Salvador. The Sandinista's support for armed guerrillas in neighboring countries forced President Carter to cut off aid to the Sandinista regime. In both the NATO Treaty and the Rio Treaty it is provided that an armed attack on one member is an armed attack on all, and the allied countries have a duty to respond that translates: send in the marines. The continued Sandinista support for armed attack against its neighbors prompted a response from the United States, a response that was appropriate under our treaty obligations under international law and a response that is morally right. That response was to help Nicaraguans betrayed by the Marxist-Leninist comandantes leading the Sandinista regime.

Many of the Nicaraguans who now form the leadership of the Nicaraguan resistance were once prominent members of the Sandinista government. They expected the Sandinistas to fulfill the commitments they made to the OAS in 1979 for democracy, human

rights and nonalignment. They were betrayed. They expected the Sandinistas to fulfill those same commitments when they signed the Arias peace plan in Guatemala in August 1987. But the Sandinistas stalled. And finally, 2 weeks ago, the Sandinistas announced their willingness to start keeping their promises.

And what was the argument used by Contra aid opponents to convince the Sandinistas to make an effort to comply with their promises? The threat of more aid to the Contras. It worked. Doesn't that say it all?

After 8 years of promises and betrayal, can we really expect the Sandinistas to fulfill their obligations if we stop giving aid to the Nicaraguan resistance? Do we force unilateral disarmament in Central America? Do we cut off the element that has been the single most effective counter to the Sandinistas' intention to establish a totalitarian Communist state on the North American Continent? Without the Contras, where are the checks and balances in the Nicaraguan system to ensure democracy? Without the Contras, where are the checks and balances in Central America to confront the overwhelming Sandinista military machine?

If the past year has taught us anything, it is the effect of the Nicaraguan resistance on bringing the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. If we want to give peace and democracy a chance in Central America, the Contras are not the obstacle, they are the insurance policy.

And, Mr. Chairman, today is not a vote to provide lethal assistance to the democratic resistance. That vote, if it occurs, will be sometime in April and then only if the President, after consultation with the four Central American Democratic Presidents and the Congress, finds a cease-fire is not in effect due to the Sandinistas. Even then no military assistance will go forward if Congress adopts a resolution.

For Members of Congress, there are few issues of greater concern than how we should view the Central American peace initiative put forward by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and signed in Guatemala City on August 7. The results of the January meeting in Costa Rica of the five Central American leaders demonstrate the problems we face in trying to figure out how to achieve peace in the region. Only after severe pressure was exerted on him, including a warning by congressional Democrats that Contra aid would be approved if he didn't, did Daniel Ortega offer hope for compliance with the peace process and for democratic steps in Nicaragua.

After the Guatemala peace accord was signed, I said I was cautiously optimistic that the agreement, if it were to be fully implemented, would lead to peace in the region. Now, after the

startling revelations last December of the Sandinistas' intentions to build a 600,000-man army and Mig jets with the Soviet Union and Cuba sponsoring a major military buildup in Nicaragua, I do not believe the Arias peace initiative—by itself—can produce peace and democracy in the region. Those December revelations came from Major Miranda, a close aide to Defense Minister Humberto Ortega. Ortega himself confirmed that what Miranda said was true. What I find particularly dismaying about the Sandinista plans for their massive military expansion is the fact they concluded their agreement with the Soviet Union and Cuba in September after signing the Arias peace plan in August.

I talked with Miranda and I was shocked, but not surprised, by his account of the extent of the Soviet commitment to building up the Sandinista army complete with missiles and Mig aircraft. I am also concerned about the sincerity of the Sandinistas in complying with the Arias peace plan based on a statement made by Daniel Ortega on December 13, 1987. He said, "In the hypothetical case that the Sandinista front lost an election, the Sandinista front would hand over Government not power."

As you know, President Arias was named this year's recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to negotiate a peace agreement in Central America, and rightly so. I cosponsored and managed for the Republicans a House resolution commending him. It is important to emphasize that his initiative is as much a democracy initiative as it is a peace initiative but not that much attention has been given to this by the national news media.

As President Arias said, "Without democracy, there can be no peace in Central America—and, there is no democracy in Nicaragua." For this reason, all eyes have been on Nicaragua to see if the Sandinistas would sincerely and fully comply with the commitments contained in the Guatemala accord to which they agreed and on which Ortega shook the hand of my friend Salvadoran President Napoleon Duarte, not once but three times.

The Guatemala peace accord placed as much emphasis on the requirements for democratic institutions and the protection of personal liberties as it does on ending the actual fighting between sides.

The Arias plan made clear that all elements are equal and indivisible. Quoting from the peace agreement, signed by all the Central American leaders, including Daniel Ortega: "The points included in this document form part of a harmonious and indivisible whole. The signing—of the document—incurs an obligation, accepted in good faith, to simultaneously comply with the agreement in the establishment of periods."

It was said of this Arias peace plan that it is not a menu from which to choose those courses each President liked. It was a total document obligating each Government to adhere to all the principles to which they committed themselves by agreeing to sign the peace accord.

The unfortunate fact is that the Sandinistas signed the Guatemala plan in August, and then unilaterally issued a second proposal in November which completely contradicted their commitments to the Arias peace plan. And then in January, Daniel Ortega announced new measures, once again, appearing to conform with the peace plan while, at the same time, the Sandinistas were making it clear their objective was to influence the vote on Contra aid. Based on their proposals in November and January, it is clear the Sandinistas no longer agree to the elements of simultaneity of the Arias plan, but now require the surrender of the opposition before they agree to carry out democratization.

President Reagan supported the Guatemala accord even though it lacked the verification and enforcement procedures he believed necessary to make it successful. I, too, believed it was vital that the United States not appear to be an obstacle to the peace process, that we must at least give it a chance, and that if it were going to fail that it not fail because of any perceived interference from the United States.

I believe the United States gave the peace process in Central America an honest chance, and in return the Sandinistas cynically concluded an agreement with the Soviet Union and Cuba to double the size of the Nicaraguan Army and to import Mig jets from Russia. Since the signing of the Arias peace plan, other information has come to light as well. Salvadoran President Duarte disclosed that the location of the headquarters of Marxist guerrillas fighting his government is in Managua, as well as the clandestine radio transmitters and propaganda publishing house. President Duarte knows well the Sandinista connection with the Salvadoran guerrillas. It was those guerrillas who kidnaped his daughter. The negotiations to free her required a great deal of contact through Managua.

Critics of the President's policies in Central America have never accepted the principle that United States support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua—the Contras—has been for the purpose of forcing the Sandinistas to honor their commitments made to the OAS in 1979 for democracy, economic pluralism, respect for human rights and nonalignment. Supporting the Contras has been necessary as a means of getting the Sandinistas to negotiate in good faith; it has not been

for the specific purpose of overthrowing by military force the Sandinista government.

As the Contras began fulfilling their objective and became successful in putting pressure on the Sandinistas, Nicaraguan Leader Daniel Ortega signed the Arias peace initiative. That would have put Nicaragua on the road to democracy if the Sandinistas would comply with all the requirements of the Arias plan. Critics of the President would never admit that is the reason the Sandinistas signed the peace proposal, but there can be no question that it is the very success of the Contras that caused the Sandinistas to sign an agreement that would have forced them to make real reforms in their government—if they would live up to the provisions of the agreement they've signed.

That's the point of debate for Members of Congress now. How do we ensure that the Sandinistas comply with the obligations of allowing a free press, radio and television, unions to organize, opposition parties to function, disaffected citizens to demonstrate, political prisoners to be set free? They have never lived up to their promises before, who should believe they will now? To be perfectly frank, while I would hope I am mistaken, I do not believe them now. And a colleague of mine who recently had a very frank discussion with Cardinal Obando y Bravo told me that the cardinal said, "The Sandinistas are Marxist-Leninists who cannot be trusted." The cardinal is right.

On December 16, the Wall Street Journal published an editorial entitled "The Ortega Doctrine." As the editorial states,

The real nature of the Sandinista regime has been perfectly obvious for years.

No one should have been surprised at the revelations of Sandinista intentions to build a 600,000-man army and to import Soviet missiles and Mig fighters. The editorial speaks of the Ortega doctrine, which if allowed to go unchallenged will make a mockery of the Monroe Doctrine. I don't doubt there are some who would be pleased to see that happen, but I know the majority of the American people will not accept the expansion of Communist power in this hemisphere.

How do we keep that from happening and how do we ensure that pressure is kept on the Sandinistas to continue the peace process and carry out the democratic reforms required by the Arias peace plan? I believe the answer remains U.S. assistance for the Contras. When military aid for the Contras expired on September 30, I believe the Congress was correct in not approving new military assistance in order to give the peace process a chance. I asked the President to wait. Now that we have seen the hypocritical nature of the Sandinistas, I believe

we must approve military aid for the Contras to provide the only pressure they seem to respond to—military force.

I also believe that the Sandinistas have gravely miscalculated the strength of the Contras. All along the Sandinistas have characterized the Contras as simply a mercenary band of ex-Somoza followers who are being paid by the United States to fight. The truth is the Contras are a true democratic resistance force of dedicated Nicaraguans who feel the Sandinistas betrayed their revolution when Somoza was thrown out in 1979. Their strength doesn't come from aid given by the United States, it comes from the belief in their cause that democracy must be brought to Nicaragua and repression and misery imposed by the Communist Sandinista regime must be removed.

On October 21, the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs—on which I serve as vice chairman—held a hearing on the peace process. At that hearing, we heard testimony from Ms. Leslie Hunter, a representative of Central American Peace and Democracy Watch, a bipartisan group which includes both those who support and those who oppose aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. Ex-Governor Robb of Virginia, L.B.J.'s son-in-law, is a member of that group, for example. Ms. Hunter had just returned from a 3-week mission in Nicaragua where she interviewed more than 80 people, including members of the Sandinista government, the civic opposition, the press, labor and professional organizations plus representatives from the church and human rights groups.

I would like to share with you some of the things she told our subcommittee. She said:

The Sandinista government has lost all credibility in the eyes of the Nicaraguan people.

I found that the Nicaraguan people blame the government, not the Contras, for the economic disaster, the shortages, the ubiquitous long lines * * *.

On amnesty: The government's concept of amnesty is surrender of the armed resistance.

When asked whether the human rights climate had improved since the signing of the [Guatemala peace] accords, many people told me it had actually gotten worse.

Perhaps, most importantly of all, Ms. Hunter said:

The consensus of the civic opposition and others in Nicaragua is that the Sandinista main goals are to disarm the resistance, to remain in power with their state structures intact, and to comply in a minimal way with the peace accords while deriving the maximum propaganda benefit from it.

Ms. Hunter, in her testimony before our subcommittee, emphasized:

The only way that the FSLN [the Sandinistas] will comply with the accords is if the United States, Latin America and other

Western democracies insist that they will not be party to a fraud.

I do not believe the American people are ready to let the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua pursue its goal of expanding its military power. We're not going to sit back and make our backyards safe for communism.

I believe military pressure by the Contras remains essential to force the Sandinistas to seek peace in Central America. The time has come to recognize that before Americans need to fight to protect American interests in Central America, there are Nicaraguans who are already giving their lives to protect their interests and ours.

Let us help them.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. VENTO].

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, today I rise in strong opposition to the resolution before the Congress. I hope that we resoundingly do vote no on this particular measure or resolution.

Mr. Chairman, this reminds me of a debate in which advocates of Contra arms aid say that "words have the meaning that we say they have." That is what the debate is about today on this floor.

Here in my hand I hold a copy of the Arias peace plan, and what does it call for? It calls for national reconciliation, a recognition of unarmed, internal political opposition groups, in Nicaragua. Do we have that today? Has that particular condition been satisfied by the Contra forces in terms of the peace plan? Let there be no doubt—this condition hasn't been met by the Contras.

The National Reconciliation Commission, has the goals of amnesty, cease-fire, democratization and free elections.

Look at the provisions of this particular peace plan and you will find, I am sorry to say, that there has not been a good faith effort in terms of compliance with this.

Of course, on the side of Honduras, on the side of the United States, the provisions that deal with the nonuse of territory to invade other states, has that particular condition been complied with?

The five countries which signed this document reaffirm their commitment, and I quote:

The five countries which signed this document reaffirm their commitment to prevent the use of their own territory and to neither render or permit military or logistical support to persons, organizations, or groups attempting to de-stabilize the governments of the other Central American countries.

The provision or clause dealing with the cessation of assistance to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements, once again, and I read from this document:

The governments of the five Central American states shall request the governments of the region and the extra-regional governments which openly or covertly provide military, logistical, financial, propagandistic aid in manpower, armaments, munitions and equipment to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements to cease this aid as an indispensable—

Indispensable, and I repeat—

element for achieving a stable and lasting peace in this region.

This is what the document says, and yet today we have Members rising on this floor asking us to vote on a \$60 million, 4-month package of funding, for both lethal and nonlethal aid to assist the Contras.

In other words, are we willing to cease and permit the peace plan to have a chance to work?

Have we as Americans pursued a policy that would permit this plan to work? I think the answer is pretty clear, that we have not.

Immediately upon the agreement to this Arias peace plan with those five Central American governments, I submit not only that we did not cooperate, but in many instances I think functioned in bad faith. That is why one of the chief negotiators that we had in that region, Mr. Philip Habib, withdrew from that particular role, because I believe, and I do not know that he said that, but I believe that he withdrew because he perceived, I think properly, that there was not a role for a negotiator in terms of our present U.S. policy and administration intentions. Our role has been not to negotiate directly with the Nicaraguan Government. We maintain an embassy there, but I guess we are not going to talk to them about this particular problem. Maybe that is as it should be, I do not know, but it certainly is not the role of someone, a country that is trying to pursue a peaceful policy.

We can negotiate. This country can negotiate. We have demonstrated that, I think reluctantly and maybe belatedly in terms of the INF agreement dealing with Gorbachev, dealing with the Soviet Union. We can deal with the People's Republic of China to establish trade ties, and that is good, and that is as it should be; but yet when it comes to Central America in dealing with the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, somehow we do not seek or explore a political settlement in that tiny Central American nation. Surely that is what the United States needs is a political settlement. We have had 8 years of military stalemate in Central America. The leading military experts that have been appointed to top military posts in Central America, General Gorman and General Galvin, and have in congressional testimony pointed out the impracticality of the military situation and that the Contras cannot win a military solution; so I think it is time that we say no to this aid today and give peace a chance to work.

Today the U.S. House of Representatives will cast the first clear vote of the 100th Congress on whether to provide funding for more than \$60 million in direct aid to the Nicaraguan Contra rebels. Rehashed arguments are being made for further aid. Conspicuously lacking is a cohesive U.S. policy plan that would help Central American countries transcend and escape the morass of bloody revolution.

We all understand that Communist nations and communism leaders evoke strong feelings in this United States. But if we can negotiate an Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with the Soviet Union and open trade with the Communist People's Republic of China, why not support a truce in Central America where communism has competed with democracy for decades.

President Reagan has set the Central American policy agenda by repeatedly requesting the Congress to finance the proxy war against Nicaragua. It has now become a routine. The President cries that "We must support the Contras" or else the sky will fall. Then the congressional leadership and majorities in both parties rush to make some sort of accommodation with the President and the obsession with Nicaragua.

Look at the script we have been following. Delay voting on any new aid. Send aid. Suspend aid. Create an escrow account for lethal Contra aid to be released on some future contingency. Ultimately, we end up right back where we started—obsessed with Nicaragua and the Contras while ignoring the future of all of Central America.

What happened during these past 6 years as we spent hundreds of millions of dollars directly and indirectly to prop up the Contras? Nicaragua's Government imposed a state of emergency, suspended civil and political rights, and became dependent upon the Soviet Union and Cuba for hundreds of millions of dollars a year in aid. What has happened during the past 6 months since the leaders of Central America pursued the Arias peace plan? Nicaragua has lifted its state of emergency, proposed direct talks with the Contras, restored some civil and political rights, and released some of its political prisoners with promises to release more.

This United States obsession with Nicaragua has meant that we have not dealt properly with the causes of unrest in the region: poverty, injustice, and huge foreign debts. Mexico has 80 million people or more than 23 times the population of Nicaragua, a tiny country with fewer people than the State of Minnesota. Mexico is much closer and more vital to our country. Yet no workable, comprehensive Reagan administration policy for addressing Mexico's debt and development problems exists. The policy pursued by the administration is first to send bombs rather than books and military helicopters rather than health care workers to the developing countries of Central America.

What happens if Congress goes along with Contra aid once more?

First, Nicaragua will most likely abandon further democratic reforms. Second, the Soviet Union will continue its support for the Sandinistas. Third, a bloody conflict which almost no one believes the Contras can win will be

prolonged indefinitely. Fourth, we will deal a death blow to the best peace plan on the table in 8 long years. Finally, we will signal the leaders and people of Central America yet again that we have no confidence in their ability to control their own destiny. Such a message would have profound implications throughout all of Central America.

The approval of more Contra aid at this time would be a green light for more spending. The United States has already made major investments to build military bases and send equipment to Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other countries for support of the Contras' war effort against the Government of Nicaragua. More Contra aid to Nicaragua would undoubtedly mean more helicopters for Honduras and more guns for Guatemala. The options seem clear. The United States can pursue a political settlement or a military stalemate.

Supporting democracy means accepting the reality that the future of Nicaragua and Central America will not be determined by the Reagan administration or the U.S. Congress, but by the people of Central America. It is, after all, their future that is at stake. It's time for Congress once and for all to just say "no" to Contra aid. It's time to develop a sound bipartisan policy which addresses the urgent humanitarian needs of all of the people of Central America.

The actual peace plan procedure agreed to by the five Central American governments in the region should be part of this debate.

The peace plan procedure follows:

PROCEDURE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STRONG AND LASTING PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

The Governments of the Republic of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, determined to achieve the objectives and to develop the principles established in the United Nations Charter and the Charter of the Organization of the American States, the Document of Objectives, the Caraballeda Message for Peace, Security and Democracy in Central America, the Guatemala Declaration, the Punta del Este Communique, the Declaration of Panama, the Esquipulas Declaration, and the Contadora Treaty Proposal for Peace and Cooperation in Central America of July 6, 1986, have agreed on the following procedure for establishing a firm and lasting peace in Central America.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

IALOGUE

To urgently carry out, in those cases where deep divisions have resulted within society, steps for national reconciliation which would allow for popular participation with full guarantees in authentic political processes of a democratic nature based on justice, freedom and democracy. Towards this end to create those mechanisms which, in accordance with the law, would allow for dialogue with opposition groups. For this purpose, the corresponding Governments will initiate a dialogue with all unarmed internal political opposition groups and with those who have availed themselves of amnesty.

AMNESTY

In each Central American country, except those where the International Commission

of Verification and Follow-Up determines that such a measure is not necessary, an Amnesty decree will be issued containing all the provisions for the guarantee of the inviolability of life, as well as freedom in all its forms, property and the security of the persons to whom these decrees apply. Simultaneous with the issuing of the amnesty decree by the Government the irregular forces of the respective country will place in freedom all persons in their power.

NATIONAL RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

In order to verify the compliance with the commitments that the five Central American Governments subscribed to by the signing of this document concerning amnesty, cease-fire, democratization, and free elections a National Reconciliation Commission will be established whose duties will be to verify the actual carrying out in practice of the national reconciliation process, as well as the full exercise of all civil and political rights of Central American citizens guaranteed in this document. The National Reconciliation Commission will be comprised of a delegate and an alternate delegate from the executive branch, a bishop delegate and an alternate bishop delegate recommended by the Episcopal Conference, and chosen by the Government from a list of three candidates which should be presented by the conference within a period of 15 days upon receipt of a formal invitation. This invitation will be made by the Governments within five working days from the signing of this document.

The same procedure will be used to select a delegate and alternate delegate from the legally registered political opposition parties. The said list of three (candidates) should be presented within the same above mentioned period.

In addition, each Central American Government will choose an outstanding citizen, outside of public office and not pertaining to the party in power, and his respective alternate, to be part of this commission.

The decree, which puts into effect the agreements for the nomination of the members of the respective national commissions, shall be communicated immediately to the other Central American Governments.

EXHORTATION FOR THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES

The Governments make a vehement appeal so that in the States of the area, currently suffering from the activity of irregular or insurgent groups, a cessation of hostilities be arranged. The Governments of these states commit themselves to undertake all the necessary steps for achieving an effective cease-fire within the constitutional framework.

NEGOTIATIONS ON MATTERS RELATING TO SECURITY, VERIFICATION, CONTROL AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS

The Governments of the five Central American states, with the participation of the Contadora group in exercise of its role as mediator, will continue negotiations on the points still pending in the Contadora Treaty Proposal for Peace and Cooperation in Central America concerning security, verification and control.

In addition, these negotiations will entail measures for the disarmament of the irregular forces who are willing to accept the amnesty decrees.

REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

The Governments of Central America commit themselves to give urgent attention to the groups of refugees and displaced per-

sons brought about by the regional crisis through protection and assistance, particularly in areas of education, health, work and security, and whenever voluntary and individually expressed, to facilitate in the repatriation, resettlement and relocation of these persons]. They also commit themselves to request assistance for Central American refugees and displaced persons from the international community, both directly through bilateral or multilateral agreements, as well as through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other organizations and agencies.

COOPERATION, DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT

In the climate of freedom guaranteed by democracy, the Central American countries will adopt agreements permitting for the intensification of development in order to achieve more egalitarian and poverty-free societies. Consolidation of democracy presupposes the creation of a system of economic and social justice and well-being. To achieve these objectives the Governments will jointly seek special economic support from the international community.

FREE ELECTIONS

Once the conditions inherent to every democracy are established, free, pluralist and honest elections shall be held as a joint expression of the Central American states to seek reconciliation and lasting peace for its peoples. Elections will be held for a Central American parliament, whose founding was proposed in the Esquipulas Declaration of May 25, 1986. In pursuit of the above mentioned objectives, the leaders expressed their will to progress in the formation of this parliament and agreed that the Preparatory Commission of the Central American Parliament shall conclude its deliberations and submit to the Central American Presidents the respective treaty proposal within 150 days.

These elections will take place simultaneously in all the countries throughout Central America in the first half of 1988 on a date mutually agreed to by the Presidents of the Central American states. These elections will be subject to vigilance by the appropriate electoral bodies. The respective governments commit themselves to extend an invitation to the Organization of American States and to the United Nations as well as to governments of third states to send observers who shall bear witness that the electoral processes have been held in accordance with the strictest norms of equality, of access of all political parties to the media, as well as full guarantees for public demonstrations and other kinds of proselytizing propaganda.

The appropriate founding treaty shall be submitted for approval or ratification in the five countries so that the elections for the Central American parliament can be held within the period indicated in this paragraph. After the elections for the Central American parliament have been held equally free and democratic elections shall be held with international observers and the same guarantees in each country to name popular representatives to municipalities, congresses and legislative assemblies and the presidencies of the republics. These elections will be held according to the proposed calendars and within the periods established in the current political Constitu-

CESSATION OF ASSISTANCE TO IRREGULAR FORCES OR INSURRECTIONIST MOVEMENTS

The Governments of the five Central American states shall request the Governments of the region and the extra-regional governments which openly or covertly provide military, logistical, financial, propagandistic aid in manpower, armaments, munitions and equipment to irregular forces or insurrectionist movements to cease this aid, as an indispensable element for achieving a stable and lasting peace in the region.

The above does not include assistance for repatriation or in lieu thereof the reassigning of the assistance necessary for those persons having belonged to these groups or forces to become reintegrated into normal life. Likewise the irregular forces or insurgent groups who operate in Central America will be asked to abstain, in yearnings for a true Latin American spirit from receiving such assistance.

These petitions will be made in accordance with the provisions of the Document of Objectives regarding the elimination of arms traffic, whether it be inter-regional or extra-regional, intended for persons, organizations or groups attempting to destabilize the governments of the Central American countries.

THE NON-USE OF TERRITORY TO INVADE OTHER STATES

The five countries which signed this document reaffirm their commitment to prevent the use of their own territory and to neither render or permit military or logistical support to persons, organizations, or groups attempting to destabilize the governments of the Central American countries.

DEMOCRATIZATION

The Governments commit themselves to promote an authentic democratic pluralist and participatory process that includes the promotion of social justice respect for human rights, [state] sovereignty the territorial integrity of states and the right of all nations to freely determine without outside interference of any kind its economic, political, and social model and to carry out in a verifiable manner those measures leading to the establishment or in their instances, the improvement of representative and pluralist democratic systems which would provide guarantees for the organization of political parties effective popular participation in the decision making process and to ensure free access to different currents of opinion to honest electoral processes and newspapers based on the full exercise of citizens rights.

For the purpose of verifying the good faith in the development of this democratization process, it will be understood that there shall exist complete freedom of press, television and radio. This complete freedom will include the opening and maintaining in operations of communications media for all ideological groups, and the operation of this media without prior censorship.

Complete political pluralism should be manifest. In this regard, political groupings shall have broad access to communications media, full exercise of the right of association and the right to manifest publicly the exercise of their right to free speech, be it oral, written or televised, as well as freedom of movement by members of political parties in order to proselytize.

Likewise those Governments of Central America, which have in effect a state of exception siege, or emergency [law] shall ter-

minate that state and re-establish the full exercise of all constitutional guarantees.

INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION AND FOLLOW-UP
COMMISSION

An international verification and follow up commission will be established comprised of the Secretary Generals of the Organization of American States and the United Nations or their representatives, as well as the Foreign Ministers of Central America, of the Contadora Group and the Support Group. This commission will have the duties of verifying and following up the compliance with the commitments undertaken in this document, as well as the support and facilities given to the mechanisms for reconciliation and verification and follow up. In order to strengthen the efforts of the International Commission of Verification and Follow-Up, the Governments of the five Central American states shall issue declarations of support for [the commission's] work. All nations interested in promoting the cause of freedom, democracy, and peace in Central America can adhere to these declarations.

The five Governments shall offer all the necessary facilities for full compliance with the duties of verification and follow-up of the National Reconciliation Commission of each country and of the International Commission of Verification and Follow-Up.

CALENDAR FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
AGREEMENTS

Within a period of 15 days from the signing of this document, the Foreign Ministers of Central America will meet as the Executive Committee to regulate, promote and make feasible compliance with the agreements contained herein and to organize the working commissions so that, henceforth, the processes leading to compliance with the contracted commitments may be initiated within the stipulated periods by means of consultations, undertakings and other mechanisms deemed necessary. Ninety days from the signing of this document the commitments pertaining to Amnesty, Cease-Fire, Democratization, Cessation of Assistance to Irregular Forces or Insurrectionist Movements, and the Non-Use of Territory to Invade Other States, will enter into force simultaneously and publicly as defined herein.

One-hundred-twenty days from the signing of this document, the International Commission for Verification and Follow-Up will analyze the progress [made] in the compliance with the agreements provided for herein.

After 150 days, the five Central American Presidents will meet and receive a report from the International Commission of Verification and Follow-Up and they will make the pertinent decisions.

FINAL PROVISIONS

The points included in this document form part of a harmonious and indivisible whole. The signing of [the document] incurs an obligation accepted in good faith, to simultaneously comply with the agreement in the established periods.

We the Presidents of the five States of Central America, with the political will to respond to the longings for peace of our peoples sign [this document] in the City of Guatemala, on the seventh day of August of 1987.

OSCAR ARIAS SANCHEZ.
JOSE NAPOLEON DUARTE.
VINICIO CEREZO AREVALO.
JOSE AZCONA HOYO.

DANIEL ORTEGA SAAVEDRA.

Indeed, words have specific meaning, we as the U.S. House of Representatives can help fulfill one key element of this process by voting no today and stopping the outside armed assistance from the United States that is destroying the ability of these small nations to achieve their goal of peace.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BILIRAKIS].

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Chairman, in the past few weeks we have been hearing that we should give Daniel Ortega a chance to prove himself, and that we should do all we can to further the peace process in Central America.

I believe that Daniel Ortega has proven himself, and I desire nothing less for Central America than a strong and lasting peace with freedom. That is why I will support authorizing additional aid to the Contras today.

I believe that we should trust more in the many promises Daniel Ortega has broken rather than those yet unproven that he has made in the last few weeks.

Before there was U.S. aid to the Contras—before the Contras existed—Daniel Ortega promised the Organization of American States to hold free and open elections, and to promote a pluralistic political system.

The opposition in Nicaragua developed because of what really happened: The Sandinistas seized total power and the only election to date was a sham that saw opposition parties excluded from the process.

Daniel Ortega then promised the Nicaraguan people a better life. However, he has given them massive food shortages and an 1,800 percent inflation rate while he ruthlessly finances his destabilizing military forces with Soviet money.

In 1983, Daniel Ortega's government signed the Contadora objectives document, signifying acceptance of all 21 objectives, and 6 weeks later he broke it.

Last summer, Daniel Ortega promised to abide by the Arias peace plan which calls for both, I repeat both, peace and democracy, and already he has broken that promise. All these and many other promises have been broken by the Sandinistas.

The question we face here today is whether to put our trust in the proof of history or in Daniel Ortega. I believe that to abandon the Contras now is to abandon our shared hope for peace and liberty in Central America even as we are in sight of achieving it.

□ 1500

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON].

Mr. GEJDENSON. Mr. Chairman, this is about the 37th vote we are going to be having on the issue of Contra aid and the whole issue con-

cerning Central America. It seems that one thing has been clear from the very beginning: the President may have been able to get a majority of this House and the Senate from time to time, but he has never been able to sustain a majority of the American people. What that has led to is a bifurcated policy that is one that has been on again and off again.

Several months ago the President came to the Speaker and he wanted the Reagan-Wright peace plan for Central America.

When, to the administration's shock, a version of that in the Arias peace plan was accepted, the administration started to do everything within its power to undo that peace process. For that reason I think more than any other the President comes to this Congress today without a majority. In the House and the Senate, I believe the President's proposal will be rejected later this evening. What does that do for America's policy? America's policy from here, and starting tomorrow, has to be one of trying the peace process. We can sit here and try to review the history of the failure of the United States and particularly this government in the last 7 years to establish a policy to adequately represent our interests in Central America, 6 years of losing a war is not a good policy for the United States, 6 years of financing the death of Nicaraguan civilians, children, and women is not a policy that makes the United States proud. What we need to do is to take the United States and put it back in the kind of leadership position in the peace process with economic reform and support for democratic governments in the region that the democratic governments in Central America have asked us to do.

We look today to the democratic governments in Central America and they say to us, "Test the peace process. Do not pass more money for war today."

Mr. Chairman, let us look at what the President has done. The President has come to us with the legislative equivalent of gerrymandering. He has created a law that if passed will be re-passed at a later date by the Congress if certain provisions have or have not been met.

What do we need a gerrymandering version of legislation here for when this Congress is in session from now until at least October 1? If the President finds a time where he thinks he can pass this legislation without all the sweeteners and directly address the issue, let him bring it to the U.S. Congress then. If he thinks he can convince a majority of the American people and the Congress of the United States that the peace process has failed and that military assistance is

necessary, let him come then with that proposal to the Congress.

Today we ought to be supporting the Arias peace plan and the democratic governments of Central America, and to put Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas on the spot. Negotiations are now in progress, they are face to face, the democratic governments want them to succeed and we ought not to be the nation that undoes the peace process.

I asked Secretary Shultz the other day before the Committee on Foreign Affairs for concrete examples of what we have done other than apply military pressure. Mr. Chairman, when we talk about pushing people or trying to cajole people to your position we talk about pressure, we talk about the carrot, we talk about the stick. Where is the carrot in this process? If we have them at the peace table, if we have gotten face-to-face negotiations, do we not believe that for just one moment we can stop the military assistance and give the peace process a chance, I believe my colleagues will do that tonight, and I hope that the governments of Central America read it as the message it is intended to be, that we want the peace process to succeed. We want to see an end to the violence throughout Central America. We want to see democratic reforms for all the countries in Central America and not dealing just with the political process, but with the economic rights of the people of that region.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, we have been told that there may be great personal political risks in the votes we cast here today. But these risks pale beside those faced by President Arias, by the other Central American Presidents and by the Nicaraguan people.

President Arias has staked his nation's future on the proposition that peace and democracy can be the norm in Central America, and not just a brief pause between Communist or Fascist dictatorships. The Nicaraguan people have staked their lives on the proposition that democracy is not just an elitist theory, but that a free society is their birthright.

Mr. Chairman, the Nicaraguan people are closer to peace and democracy now than they were 1 or 2 years ago. What accounts for this progress? A combination of factors: President Arias' brilliant diplomatic initiative, the Soviet's war-weariness, insistent pressure from the political opposition and yes, the effective military opposition of the democratic resistance.

Because of all these factors, President Ortega is spending this winter at the negotiating table instead of in Moscow.

These are all crucial factors in the complex effort to bring democratic reform to Nicaragua and peace to Central America. Without the support of the Nicaraguan people, the peasant resistance army I saw last year could turn into just another mercenary force. Without the Arias plan, there could be just another seemingly endless guerrilla war in Central America. And remember this, without the military pressure from the democratic resistance, the Arias plan could become yet another empty diplomatic gesture.

This vital balance could mean a democratic Nicaragua and peace in Central America. President Arias recognized this when he made simultaneity the crucial factor in his peace plan. What does simultaneity mean? It means when the Sandinistas promise democratic reforms, the resistance promises to lay down their arms and we promise to end our assistance. And when the Sandinistas actually take steps toward democracy, the resistance takes steps toward deescalation and we take steps to reduce our military assistance.

So far, so good. Promises have been made and steps taken by both sides. The Sandinistas have taken small steps toward democracy and the administration has reduced its proposed aid package from \$270 million in military assistance to \$36 million of almost all nonlethal aid. The very delicate multitrack peace process has begun.

But we are still at the beginning of this process, not the end. The end of our assistance should only come when irrevocable democratic reform comes into Nicaragua. The end—the goal—is free political activity in Nicaragua. Certainly this goal serves our own strategic interests. A democratic Nicaragua will not accept billions of dollars in Soviet military aid, nor will it seek to destabilize its neighbors. But a democratic Nicaragua will also signal the beginning of a lasting peace in Central America and that serves everyone's interests.

We cannot abandon this effort at the very moment it signals success.

Instead, we should use the recent INF negotiations as a guide. The Soviets signed this historic agreement because we were steadfast in our resolve, we negotiated from a position of strength, and we did not make unilateral concessions. Mr. Chairman, this strategy works with the Soviet Union and it will work with a Soviet client state. This client state has accepted \$1 billion in Soviet aid, that's \$1 billion versus \$36 million. Think about it.

One final note. I am disturbed to hear the comments of some that if the resistance falters, and the Sandinistas renege on their promises, we can always use American troops to get back on the right track. This is wrong. I strongly oppose such a fall back option. The choice before us is not

credulous withdrawal or send in the Marines. This is a simplistic, dangerous and wrong choice.

The only choice today is support both the Nicaraguan farmers and laborers who fight for their freedom in the resistance and President Arias who understands that Central America peace cannot be without Central America democracy. The only choice is support the opposition political leaders who pleaded with this Congressman last February in Managua "do not forget us." Mr. Chairman, our only choice is to support the Nicaraguan people in their quest for peace and freedom.

The largest daily newspaper in my State, the Seattle Times recently editorialized in favor of this choice. I'd like to insert that editorial into the RECORD at this time.

U.S. SHOULD SUPPORT PEACE PLAN AND CONTRAS

With a crucial vote in Congress on aid to the Nicaraguan contras coming up next week, the Reagan administration and the Sandinista regime have been doing some fast footwork to influence the outcome.

As a result, both sides are moving in the right direction: toward a middle ground on this unfortunately polarized issue.

To his credit, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega has continued to make concessions toward greater compliance with the Central American peace plan. The latest encouraging example; The Sandinistas announced this week that seven radio programs could go back on the air and six publications could resume printing. All had been censored since 1982 under the national-emergency law that Ortega lifted last week.

Meanwhile, the administration has wisely scaled down its request to Congress for contra aid, from the \$270 million figure floated last fall to the \$36.25 million package that Reagan offered this week.

Only 10 percent, or \$3.6 million, is for military hardware. That would be held in escrow and released only if the contras and Sandinistas failed to reach a cease-fire agreement during talks that began today in Costa Rica.

Before releasing any lethal aid, however, the administration pledged to meet with the four other Central American presidents and seek their counsel, which is absolutely essential. Congress also should have a stronger role in that decision, perhaps through a congressional-resolution process.

Furthermore, if Congress approves the contra-aid request, Secretary of State George Shultz will go to Central America for the first direct U.S.-Nicaraguan talks in three years. That's exactly the diplomatic approach that many administration critics long have recommended.

Ideally, the United States should give strong bipartisan support both to the peace plan and the contra resistance, while Ortega's recent (but easily reversed) concessions are put to the test of time.

As Fernando Volio, president of Costa Rica's Legislative Assembly, said recently: "Without military pressure, the Sandinistas will never change. . . . Reagan is right. Without the contras, the Sandinistas will grow stronger."

Clearly a combination of regional diplomacy and pressure from the contras has brought progress toward democracy in Nicaragua. There's no reason to abandon that effective approach now that it's finally working.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. CALLAHAN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.

The Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeepers will do their duty and restore order in the Gallery. Demonstrators will be removed from the Gallery.

The Chair reminds all guests in the Gallery that they are guests of the House. We welcome their presence here, but any manifestation of approval or disapproval is a violation of the rules of the House.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY].

Mr. FOLEY. The Chairman has just admonished those of the guests of the House in the Gallery about the rules of the House, and I would just like to say that those rules are designed to permit the orderly debate and discussion of issues by Members of the House without the interference of approval or disapproval signs, but it is also true, I think, that demonstrations of the kind we have just seen do no good in support of the cause that, unfortunately, some people believe they will help by such demonstrations, and they have a contrary effect to that intended by those who demonstrate.

I hope we will have seen the last such example during the course of debate today.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would ask the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] the amount of time that has been yielded to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. CALLAHAN]?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I have yielded 1½ minutes to the gentleman for Alabama.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized for 1½ minutes.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman from Alabama yield?

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I would only like to point out to my colleagues in the Chamber that the people we are talking about, the citizens of Nicaragua, would love to live in a country where they have the opportunity to demonstrate like this, to live in a country where they had an opportunity to speak and be heard.

Mr. CALLAHAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this effort today to provide the Nicaraguan free-

dom fighters with a \$36.2 million aid package as requested by the President.

This resolution upholds America's support of the freedom fighters' efforts to establish peace, freedom, and democratic institutions for the people of their own land. At the same time, it most assuredly provides an incentive for the Sandinistas to abide by the important peace accords reached by the five central American countries last August.

Many arguments are made in opposition to this aid request. Some contend that adoption of the package will hinder the Central American peace plan; some simply do not like the Contras. But we cannot discount the irrefutable evidence of a Soviet presence in Nicaragua. That is the issue: The Soviet Union, through the Sandinista Government, is seeking expanded influence in North America. It is our obligation to block that expansionism.

As a representative of a gulf coast community, my congressional district has a keen sense of its closeness to Central America. Because the Port of Mobile regularly receives cargo from Central America, the interrelationship of our countries can be visualized and the ramifications for the United States of Communist control of that region are very frightening.

I honestly believe that failure to approve this resolution will have disastrous consequences for the cause of democracy and our national security. Once again, I urge my colleagues to support this resolution for what it really is. Recognize that it is United States support for the peace process in Central America and democracy in Nicaragua. Vote "aye" on the resolution.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CROCKETT].

Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to any assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras.

After 7 years and close to \$300 million United States dollars in assistance, Nicaragua is no closer to peace and democracy today than it was in 1981 when the CIA created the Contras. In fact, the Contras have served as the justification for the very behavior of the Nicaraguan Government that the peace process is now changing.

Mr. Chairman, the Guatemala agreement, signed by the five Central American Presidents on August 7, 1987, started a process for peace. While the United States is not a signatory, the agreement leaves no room for doubt as to what our Central American allies expect of us. Article V of the agreement calls upon "governments outside the region"—a clear reference to the United States—"which are providing *** military, logistical, financial, and *** humanitarian aid

*** to insurgent movements"—a clear reference to the Contras—"to stop such aid as an indispensable element to achieving a lasting and stable peace in the region."

Last week, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, the author of the Guatemala agreement, called on the United States administration to stop all aid to the Contras, including so-called humanitarian and nonlethal assistance. Indeed, he took the unusual step of suggesting that the Congress should defy the administration and refuse to approve any such request.

Mr. Chairman, our Central American allies have set up their own verification commission to investigate compliance with the Guatemala peace accord. The commission's determinations were reported to the five Central American Presidents on January 15. The commission's assessment was that:

In the case of Nicaragua, *** in spite of wartime suffering, it has made concrete steps toward initiating a democratic process.

The Guatemala procedure sets forth a broad scheme for democratization, difficult to achieve in scarcely 5 months in a region characterized by a turbulent history.

The goals *** have not been completely achieved as of this date. The fact that peace has not been attained does not detract from the validity of the Guatemala procedure. It makes a lasting political will for overcoming these obstacles even more imperative.

In evaluating the progress *** it is important to understand, that, just as its name implies, this procedure is a continuing process of on-going actions. For this reason, 150 days after the signing of the accord it would be as untrue to deny progress as it would be to claim success.

Moreover, the verification commission's report takes the Reagan administration—and this Congress—to task for ignoring the agreement when it states:

In spite of the exhortation of the Central American Presidents, the Government of the United States of America maintains its policy and practice of providing assistance, military in particular, to the irregular forces operating against the Government of Nicaragua. The definitive cessation of this assistance continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts and of this procedure as a whole.

A vote by this Congress for further aid to the Contras, at a time when we are being called upon by the governments of Central America to do exactly the opposite, would be a direct slap in the face to the peace process and to our allies in Central America who are struggling to implement this agreement.

Mr. Chairman, the countries throughout the Western Hemisphere—and most of our friends and allies outside the region—are actively lending their support to the Guatemala peace process. The administration

and its supporters in the Congress are the only governmental group still talking about Contra aid.

Yesterday, a copy of the communique adopted by the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries on January 29, 1988, was hand delivered to our Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. The nonaligned movement is composed of 100 nations. Their communique reads in part as follows:

The Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held an urgent meeting in New York on January 29, 1988 to review the situation in Central America and the serious threat posed to the peace process in the region as a result of the decision of the U.S. administration to seek the renewal of aid to the mercenary Contra forces trying to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

The Bureau was deeply concerned that the U.S. administration had refused to heed the appeal made by the Central American Presidents at the San Jose summit by proceeding to seek the renewal of funding for the mercenary Contra forces for the purpose of overthrowing the legitimate Government of Nicaragua. The Bureau deplored the continuation of this policy of the U.S. administration, which seriously jeopardizes the peace efforts in the region and impedes the implementation of the Guatemala procedure as a whole.

The Bureau once again called up the U.S. administration to cooperate in the implementation of the Guatemala peace accords by stopping its support for the mercenary Contra forces that are destabilizing Nicaragua.

In 1928, following the occupation of Nicaragua by the U.S. Marines, Franklin D. Roosevelt said:

The net result of our policy in Nicaragua is that never before have we had less friends in the Western Hemisphere.

Those words are just as true today. In fact, with regard to our policy toward Nicaragua, I would argue that we don't have a friend in the world today.

Mr. Chairman, the United States stands alone against our friends and allies around the world regarding the issue of assistance to the Contras. I hope that today this Congress will heed the call of the international community and terminate all aid to the Contra forces.

□ 1515

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute and 40 seconds to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. EMERSON].

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, 40 years ago another Missourian confronted the same problem we are facing today. A small country was threatened by Communists, and many Americans were asking why we should care.

Harry Truman told us that the issue was not just the future of Greece, though that was important. The real question was whether or not the

United States would accept its obligations as the leader of the free world in opposing Soviet expansion.

Back then some said that we should leave everything to the United Nations, just as their descendants now ask us to abdicate our foreign policy to the opinions of other countries. Harry Truman said the United Nations was important, but it was not a substitute for our own judgment.

In 1948 the left wing of Harry Truman's own party said the Soviet Union was not a threat to the West. Henry Wallace claimed that Stalin could be trusted, just as his heirs ask that we trust Daniel Ortega one more time. Harry Truman knew better, and so should we.

When the people of Greece appealed to the United States for help, they did not want or need American troops to fight their war for them. They only asked that they be given the opportunity and the means to defend themselves. The Nicaraguan people are asking for nothing more.

The verdict of history is that the Truman doctrine saved the West from Soviet expansion. Our vote today could have the same importance for our own hemisphere. I urge all my colleagues to vote for the resolution.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WORTLEY].

Mr. WORTLEY. Mr. Chairman, what is going to happen if we turn our backs on the Nicaraguan resistance? The small amount of aid we are debating today is of tremendous importance as we look to the future. The security of this hemisphere and the material and spiritual well-being of Nicaraguans is hanging in the balance. If we do not stand four-square in support of peace with freedom and justice, Central America's political problems will only multiply down the line.

We cannot isolate this debate from the fact that the Sandinistas have already established an army that is larger than any Central American army in history; a Russian-Cuban sponsored military force that is unprecedented and unjustified. Nicaraguan Armed Forces already exceed 75,000 troops, and they have promised to follow through on their intention to expand this to 600,000. This is one promise I think we can count on the Sandinistas to keep.

Even as we have been talking about peace, Eastern bloc aid has been steadily fueling the Sandinista's effort to consolidate their Marxist-Leninist revolution. We should not let Daniel Ortega and his allies dictate to us whether we will keep the opposition to this totalitarian attempt alive and in the field.

We must not turn our backs on the Contras. They are opposing a power which threatens the freedom and sta-

bility of the rest of Central America. We must support the cause of freedom in Nicaragua because the freedom of all of Central America depends on it. We need to use every option available to us so that we never are faced with the prospect of sending American troops to fight widespread Communist aggression and oppression in Central America.

The Contras are willing to fight for the right to live in a free Nicaragua. These are individuals who have left everything they have to fight for the freedom of their homeland. Many of these same individuals took part in the revolution against Somoza and now have had their revolution stolen from them. It is our moral duty to support them as they seek to bring freedom to their homeland.

Even though the Sandinistas have officially lifted the state of emergency, they still are using their power to keep the opposition oppressed. As a leader of the Social Christian Party recently said, "we've gone from a state of emergency to a state of terror."

The opposition leaders who were briefly jailed at the same time the Sandinistas were making "concessions" are a clear example to the rest of Nicaragua not to take their "freedom" too seriously. If you take Ortega at his word, you could end up in jail. The opposition parties do not have the freedom to organize and campaign because at any time they may be attacked by Government-sponsored terror.

These are the Sandinistas on their best behavior as they try to court United States opinion to undermine Contra aid. What can we expect from them once the Contras have been disarmed? We must continue to aid the Contras until we have guarantees that actions such as this will not be used to ensure the endurance of a Sandinista one-party state.

The Contras have demonstrated that they are the engine that is running the peace process. Without the Contras the Sandinistas will never negotiate away their power. We must keep this chance for a negotiated solution alive with continued aid to the freedom fighters. In this case, a vote against aid is a vote against freedom, and against the peace process.

It has been suggested that we should just "give peace a chance" in Nicaragua. Well, the peace that is being proposed by some is easy to achieve because all it takes is for one side to lay down their arms and give up. This is the option that is being proposed by ending aid to the Contras. By denying them the aid which would allow them to remain a viable force, we are telling them to give up and go home to face the Sandinistas unarmed.

We want to see a true peace established in Central America. A ceasefire

and negotiated settlement will yield good results only if we do not leave the Contras dependent on the good will of the Sandinistas.

If we cut off aid to the Contras, we would weaken them just at the point when they are engaged in face-to-face talks with the Sandinistas. These talks may establish democracy in Nicaragua, but they will not succeed if the Contras are hung out to dry. This is no time to run up the white flag of unconditional surrender. We should send the Sandinistas a clear message: give democracy a chance.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. COATS].

Mr. COATS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, those who oppose Contra aid say peace can be achieved by ending aid to the Contras and thus removing them as a threat to the Sandinista Government. They claim that reliance on the Arias peace accords will bring peace and democracy to Central America. Those in support of aid to the Contras, of which I am one, say that only the presence and pressure of the Contras have brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table, and it is that pressure that is accountable for the recent concessions made by the Sandinistas. I believe there is enough evidence before each Member of this body of Congress today for us to conclude that once the Contra pressure has been eliminated, the Sandinistas will resume their consolidation of totalitarian power, continue their buildup in Nicaragua, and resume their efforts to spread revolution throughout Central America.

I hope and I pray that my assessment is wrong. I hope and pray that your assessment is correct. But I think the question we have to ask ourselves is what do we do if the Arias peace plan fails and we have effectively by this vote today removed the Contras as a viable option to deal with what is happening in Central America. We then face a regime dedicated to spreading revolution throughout Central America, with grave future consequences for the United States.

I asked President Arias this directly when I visited him in Costa Rica.

Mr. President, what do we do if the Contras are no longer there and the Sandinistas do not live up to the peace accords?

He said,

Then you have no option but to send in the U.S. Marines.

Is that the option we want to be left with in this country? Do we by removing the Contras move the United States not away from but rather ever closer to direct U.S. involvement? I ask my colleagues to consider not only the immediate consequences of this vote, but consider the long-term implications of what we do this evening.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5½ minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Ms. OAKAR].

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, in the last few weeks, we have all heard the political arguments for and against further Contra aid. In the press of these articulate arguments, I would like to focus on a more personal and telling truth.

American aid to continue the Nicaraguan war has a crippling human cost.

The clergy of Central America who work with the poorest and most forgotten in this terrible war, know the cost of our aid. They speak eloquently of the toll in lost lives and limbs that the men, women, and children of Central America pay for each additional day of war.

Let me share their testimony with you.

Nancy Sylvester, of the Sisters Servants of the Immaculate Heart, visited Nicaragua in 1986:

It was right after the U.S. Congress had voted \$100 million in aid to the Contras. During that visit one question was asked of me repeatedly—"Why don't you stop your government from supporting the war?" It was a question asked not by Sandinista supporters, but by women—older women, women who have lost husbands, sons, daughters in the war. * * *

Patricia Johnson of the Dominican Sisters continues:

On December 23, two days before Christmas, I received a telephone call from our sisters in Managua. The elder son of another woman in the cooperative had been killed the day before. At the time of his death, Mauricio was building houses in a resettlement area in the north. In this attack by the Contras, numerous unarmed civilians were killed, including a baby and a small child. This young man was buried on Christmas Eve.

Sandra Price, Sister of Notre Dame, has seen the agricultural cooperatives after Contra attacks. She has seen the destruction of homes, the burned, the maimed, and the dead; she saw the destruction of the December 20 attack on Siuna that left 16 civilians dead and 53 wounded. And she has herself been kidnaped by the Contras.

Sister Mary Brendan Conlon, an Ursuline of Louisville, tells us how American money is being spent to keep the sights and smells of death before the people of Nicaragua:

Even with this little taste of death and dying, I've seen enough, and these people have seen far too much. Padre Enrique says he has buried 70 or 80 victims of violent deaths from Condega in his few years here.

Sister Louise Aherns of the Maryknolls concludes:

The Maryknoll Sisters have been in Nicaragua since 1944—we are neither neophytes nor naive. * * * While members of Congress sat here debating the issue of Contra aid on the Sunday before Christmas, the people of Rosita prepared for the traditional day of celebration for the sick and elderly—gifts, a church liturgy, and provisions to take home. * * * But according to one of our Sisters

who was there, the Contras arrived at dawn. (In outlying areas,) once again young men were kidnaped and forced to join the ranks of the Contras, babies were killed and maimed. * * * The hospitals were filled with wounded and dying. The Christmas feast became a memorial for the dead.

Those of us who have battled against every request for Contra aid know that the political maneuvering can be intense. On the seven direct votes we have had on Contra aid, I voted against the funding every time. Since 1985, when we first publicly began providing any kind of support for the Contras, I have voted against supporting the Contras 12 times. In the 7 years back to 1981, when the President set us on his policy toward war, I fought repeatedly to end covert aid to the Contras.

As always, I oppose this request for Contra aid. And I urge all my colleagues to vote "no" as well. More aid will destroy the prospects for peace.

Now we must give peace a chance. Now America must stop this deadly aid to signal our support for peace.

It has been a long fight.

Almost exactly 7 years ago, just before Christmas, four American churchwomen in El Salvador were raped and killed. Two of them were from Cleveland. Their deaths brought home to me, in a very personal way, just what the war in Central America means.

These churchwomen were shot and strangled and raped because they tried to bring human rights to Central America. Their deaths were perhaps the most visible sacrifice in the long, quiet fight that clergymen and clergywomen have waged for peace and human rights throughout the region.

The deaths and maimings in Nicaragua do not receive the daily coverage that atrocities against Americans can bring. But the suffering is just as real. And in a terrible way, our responsibility—as Americans—is greater for the deaths and maimings of civilians at the hands of the Contras.

My friends, peace is coming to Central America. The voices of the victims of our war must now be heard. With this vote, we must reaffirm our commitment to ending the suffering. We know from personal experience that we must focus on what it really means to deliver more guns and bombs. Then we can stop the killing. Defeat the plan and give peace a chance.

□ 1530

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. MACK].

Mr. MACK. Mr. Chairman, 25 years ago John F. Kennedy was faced with a decision during the Cuban missile crisis, a decision of peace or freedom.

I was struck as I listened to the two speeches last night that things really have not changed, that during the

President's speech he used the term "freedom" 10 times and it was not heard once in the Democratic response.

Mr. Chairman, 90 miles off the coast of Florida sits the tiny island of Cuba. The Cuban people live under the harsh and absolute domination of a Communist tyrant. There are many who say that because there is no open hostility or no armed hostility in Cuba today that the Cuban people are at peace. But certainly they are not free.

My generation of Americans, like all generations of Americans before, understand how precious freedom is, that in fact freedom is the core of all human progress. There were those who argued today that if we were to continue to aid those fighting for freedom in Nicaragua that we would bring an end to the peace process. Well, that argument does not hold up under scrutiny.

If that were the case, Daniel Ortega never would have agreed to direct negotiation on a cease-fire with the Contras. He never would have lifted the state of emergency after we passed additional military aid in the continuing resolution in December.

To renege today on aiding those who are fighting for freedom will, in fact, impose on the people of Nicaragua the peace of Cuba and not give them the opportunity to experience the freedom of Grenada.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. COLEMAN].

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I assume we are going through this exercise today because we are trying to convince a handful of our colleagues who are supposedly undecided to decide in favor of the way we speak.

Let me give two reasons why an undecided Member of Congress ought to vote for aid to the Contras this evening. First, aid to the Contras is working. We see that it has brought to the bargaining table something they said they would never do, negotiate directly with the Contras.

The Sandinistas have also made some modest, albeit modest attempts to make some changes in their society.

Why are they doing that? Not out of the goodness of their heart, but because the pressure that the Contra forces are putting on them is forcing them to do that.

The second reason is without aid to the Contras there is absolutely no reason for them to continue to negotiate. There is no reason for the Sandinistas to try to deliver on the promises that they for 8 years now have failed to perform and live up to, since 1979, to the people of Nicaragua.

I say we must negotiate from a position of strength. And the only way that we can negotiate from a position of strength is to continue to have an

escrow account there available for lethal aid.

How can anybody who has heard Major Miranda, who was a very high assistant to Ortega, the Defense Minister, who has defected to this country and has stated that he knows that these people do not want democracy, he knows what the Sandinista leadership stands for and he knows the reasons that all of this window dressing and so-called democratization is going on is for the purpose of cutting off aid to the Contras, that their audience is the 435 Members of the House of Representatives.

This is a person who was in a high command. Why will we not listen to him? Why will we not heed his warnings?

We had a bipartisan hearing the other day regarding this issue and Mr. Miranda spelled out all the reasons why Members of this House ought to be voting for aid to the Contras this afternoon.

We hear a lot about giving peace a chance. My colleague from Florida just said give peace a chance. You know, the same kind of peace that they have today in Cuba; they are not at war, they are at peace.

I say give democracy a chance. The only way to give democracy a chance is to go ahead and support aid to the Contras with an escrow account as the President has offered us to do today.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out something that occurred last night that I think may surprise you.

Between the hours of 5 and 11 on KOMO-TV in Seattle, Seattle the sister city of Managua, I might point out, there was a telepoll on that ABC affiliate. The question was: "How do you want your elected representative to vote on Contra aid?" Thirty-four thousand one hundred twenty-nine people responded. Fifty-four point two percent said vote for the aid.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES].

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to join with my colleagues who oppose the President's request for additional Contra aid.

I have been to the region. I have met with the leaders of the Central American countries, the leaders of the opposition groups, the leaders of the church and the trade unions. As many of you have, I have seen firsthand the conditions under which the people must live in these countries. And you know that a vote for Contra aid will only bring more misery, more poverty, more war to the people of Central America.

The American people have expressed their sentiments for the initiative taken by the peoples of Central America and their leaders. Under the lead-

ership efforts of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias, they have set their own peace agenda. It is not the administration's plan. It is not the Soviet Union's plan. It is a plan written and signed by the leaders of the region who are working to set their own destiny. The Central American Presidents are taking a major risk for peace, and we must support them.

That is a point that the administration just doesn't seem to understand: That Central Americans are capable of taking charge of Central America. Instead, the administration seeks to prolong the war and frustrate the peace process. The military focus of the administration only makes more difficult the task of the Central American Presidents. Providing additional Contra aid now will destroy their efforts.

President Arias talks about the need for measures to promote democracy and peace through dialog and negotiation. "Democracy," he says, "cannot be achieved by bullets but only by ballots." His peace plan reflects this position.

And what does the administration offer as an alternative to the Arias peace plan? There is no evidence that the administration even has a sustained and coherent policy for Central America. Many slogans have been used—peace, freedom fighters, U.S. security interests—but none of these catchwords appear as an integrated element of an overall strategy.

The President's policy response is to throw more money at the problem. He is now asking Congress to approve a \$36.2 million Contra aid package, a package that is touted as being relatively modest. But let's take a closer look at the numbers. His request is for \$3.6 million in lethal military aid and \$32.6 million for so-called nonlethal assistance. The President tells us that this amounts to 90 percent nonlethal and 10 percent lethal aid. However, the measure that we are voting on today also includes \$20 million for an aircraft replacement fund, and an estimated \$12 million for electronic and radar equipment for surveillance. Furthermore, the amount of true humanitarian aid in his package, that is aid for food, shelter, clothing, and medicine, only amounts to \$7.2 million. This brings the total cost of the package to \$68.2 million for a 4-month period. That is an annual total of \$204.6 million, more than the Contras have ever gotten before.

The administration wants all this money, but they have not presented any plan for achieving specific objectives in Central America. We have heard about peace, freedom, and democracy for Nicaragua. We have heard feverish statements about threats to our national security. Peace and freedom for Nicaragua and protection of

United States security interests are not incompatible goals. But to achieve them, there must be a clear, coherent definition of objectives and carefully designed plans of action tailored to each specific objective.

The Central American leaders have legitimate fears for the integrity of their borders and the safety of their citizenry. All five leaders in Central America are willing to make commitments on these fundamental matters of national security. These issues have been addressed in both the Contadora process and the Esquipulas peace plan. The leaders are willing to draft terms for the withdrawal of foreign troops and advisers. They are willing to establish limits on arms and troops, reducing their numbers if necessary. They are willing to abstain from any action that may constitute a threat or use of force against any state. Any state. That means countries beyond the Central American borders, including the United States. Furthermore, the Central American leaders are willing to declare these obligations legally binding.

I believe that these are all things the administration wants. Yet, they continue to oppose a regional accord that addresses these issues. Their only call is for continued Contra aid, because, as U.S. officials tell us, we cannot trust the Communists—they lie. We have also heard arguments about verification problems with the peace plan. Yet we have recently witnessed the signing of a historic arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. The administration would have us believe that it is the Latin Communists who are the ones who lie; that while we trust our capability for verification in the vast Soviet Union, we are helpless with respect to tiny Nicaragua.

Nobel Peace Prize recipient President Arias has said, "While one man can start a war, peace is a slow process and the product of the effort of many." I would like to add, if we have given the Contra effort 7 years, the peace plan certainly deserves more than 6 months. I am confident that the House will make the right decision today, to cut off Contra aid and join the Central American leaders in giving both peace and democracy a chance in Central America.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I think it is important we not have misinformation in the House as we debate this issue. It is emotional enough already without having comments made that frankly do not reflect the structure of the package that is before us. The package, I will reiterate again, is \$36,250,000 that will ultimately go to the Contras, \$3.6 million in ammunition, the rest of it in food, logistical support, transportation, et cetera, but only \$3.6 million military.

The \$20 million that the gentleman referred to is money that is set aside in escrow by the Department of Defense in the event of loss of aircraft, to indemnify the aircraft. If no aircraft are lost, the money goes back into the account from which it was taken in the Defense Department.

The ECM material to be provided by the Defense Department is a concept that was approved by this very House just a few weeks ago when we passed the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1988. We embodied that exact same concept that passed this House by a majority vote at that time.

□ 1545

That is the arrangement that is currently in force. So I come back again to the basic proposition. The President has said there will be no lethal assistance, no ammunition, until Congress has the opportunity to vote. It is a good package, and it ought to be accepted.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. COUGHLIN].

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, most Americans believe that "preventing a Soviet and Cuban military presence in Nicaragua is sufficiently important to the United States to warrant continued financial assistance to the resistance there." A poll of my constituents that I undertook supported this view by a 60-to-40 margin.

The United States has sought—through two administrations, one Democrat and one Republican—to accomplish by regional negotiation the goal of a free, pluralistic, and non-aligned Nicaragua.

Instead, the regime of Daniel Ortega, his brother Humberto Ortega, hardline, repressive Interior Minister Tomas Borge and top Sandinista ideologue Bayardo Arce has over the years imposed continuously antidemocratic measures. Indeed, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega recently outlined Nicaragua's plan to expand its military and realize hegemony throughout Central America.

Meanwhile, many of the original Sandinistas and their allies have fled and are now part of the resistance to the Sandinista quadrumvirate. The United States has supported this resistance as a means of pressing for the goals of a free, pluralistic, and non-aligned Nicaragua.

The Arias peace plan signed by the five Central American Presidents, including Ortega, calls for both an end to foreign military assistance and true democracy in Nicaragua. Pope John Paul recently told President Ortega that peace in Nicaragua must include true democracy.

Yet the encompassing control that Daniel Ortega exercises over life in Nicaragua makes it hard to envision any semblance of power-sharing

absent the continued pressure of the resistance. From the indoctrinating education of children, to the ubiquitous secret police, block committees, and Sandinista "turbas," to the preferred treatment of party members, to the overblown Army, Ortega's government is a classic Leninist regime, rooted in anti-Americanism from the start.

Absent the pressure of the United States-supported resistance, there is precious little to suggest it will reform.

Let's be clear just exactly what the vote today is about. The President's package would provide \$36.2 million in direct aid to the resistance. Of this total, only \$3.6 million would be for weapons and ammunition, releasable only with the Congress' consent. And in fact, none of the funds in the package necessarily have to be expended, so long as the Sandinistas come into compliance with the Arias plan.

Opponents of aid to the resistance say, "Let the Sandinistas go, and if they become a threat we will intervene militarily." But in a dictatorship of the kind the Sandinistas have sought to impose—unlike the situation in a democracy—covert operations are easily concealed. And it is hard to envision the same opponents of aid to the resistance today ever supporting American military intervention, under any circumstances, tomorrow.

Are we such innocents that we do not realize we are in a struggle between freedom and dictatorship in Nicaragua and the world?

Are we so gullible as to believe at this point that Daniel Ortega is not a child of Moscow and Havana and an instrument of instability in Central America?

Are we such shrinking violets that we are unable to stand up for freedom and support resistance even at our own borders?

Are we such gutless wonders that we will abandon those we have supported when they are on the verge of accomplishing the objectives of both the Arias plan and the United States?

Are we such bleeding hearts that we believe goodness and justice and compassion are all on the other side—that we must always blame America first?

If we are all of these, then God help us, because we are unwilling to help ourselves.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. CARPER].

Mr. CARPER. Mr. Chairman, I do not judge the administration's proposal before us today as harshly as some of our colleagues do. It is a more constructive plan than the trial balloon floated last fall by Secretary Shultz. The President's 11th-hour decision to seek a sense of the Congress resolution before releasing this package's lethal aid is another positive step. I believe

that we have witnessed a narrowing of our differences in recent weeks. Not a total elimination of them, but a discernible narrowing nonetheless. I, for one, welcome that movement.

Having said that, there are several legitimate concerns still being voiced with regard to this Contra aid package. I won't dwell on them, but I want to mention them. The package is both bigger and less humanitarian than it appears to be. Neither we, nor the Central American governments, have a satisfactory way of ensuring that lethal aid is not somehow mixed in with the nonlethal aid. We are asked, instead, to trust the CIA, Elliot Abrams, and others. Multilateral talks between the United States and all five Central American nations on important security issues are not part of the package. And, finally, it appears to me that a sense of Congress resolution affirming a month or two from now that Nicaragua actually has complied with the Arias peace plan could be filibustered in the U.S. Senate, eventually enabling the President to release lethal aid even if a majority of us, in truth, were opposed at that time.

Last month, I was afforded a rare opportunity. I went to Costa Rica with a five-member delegation to observe the summit held by the five Central American Presidents. I went not so much to observe or monitor the talks, but to gain firsthand the knowledge and insight that would enable me to cast an informed vote today.

Those talks opened on January 15 with low expectations. To most observers, the peace plan of Oscar Arias appeared to be dead in the water. All that was left to do was perform the last rites and to pull the plug. To my surprise—to almost everyone's surprise—Lazarus figuratively rose from the dead. When the summit concluded on January 16, Daniel Ortega agreed to a number of concessions that I personally did not believe he would ever make.

He promised to lift the 6-year-old state of emergency throughout Nicaragua upon his return to that country. He promised to continue broadening the tenuous freedoms of speech, assembly, dissent, and press that began to emerge last August. He promised to immediately release a dozen Nicaraguan opposition leaders who had been arrested following their meeting with the Contras in Guatemala earlier in the week. He promised to close the so-called people's tribunals in his country. And, he promised to name a team of Sandinista officials to begin meeting at once with Contra leaders to negotiate a cease-fire and amnesty.

In return, I told Mr. Ortega that if he kept his word, I would not support a Contra aid package of this nature. On the other hand, if he failed to keep his word, Contra aid would likely continue with my support.

Since returning to this country from Costa Rica, I have followed developments in Nicaragua and Central America on a daily basis. To date, President Ortega has kept faith with the commitments he made to us last month. Now, I intend to keep the commitment I made to him.

Most of us gathered here today have made up our minds on how we intend to vote on this particular proposal. Some of our colleagues have not. If you are one of those undecided members, I'd like for you to consider the following points. First, What is our Government's policy in Nicaragua? Is it what we say it is—to compel the Sandinistas to comply with the Arias peace plan and with the original promise of their revolution—namely a more democratic society and a mixed or pluralist economy? Or is the objective really to bring down the Sandinista Government, largely through military means?

For those who would embrace the latter, let me remind you that a military victory by the Contras, even if it were possible, would cause the Sandinistas and their tens of thousands of supporters to essentially change places with the Contras. The Sandinistas would again become the guerrilla insurgents, armed with 300,000 AK-47's, and wreak havoc on a successor government in Nicaragua, much as the leftist guerrillas are doing in neighboring El Salvador to the government of Napoleon Duarte.

I, personally, believe that our policy is to bring a combination of economic, military and diplomatic pressure on the Sandinistas until they start living up to the original promise of their revolution.

For several years, the Sandinistas have said they would lift their state of emergency and restore the basic freedoms guaranteed by the Nicaraguan constitution after we halted aid to the Contras. The United States, in turn, has said we will halt Contra aid only after the Sandinistas have acted first. Part of the beauty of President Arias' peace plan is that it doesn't require either the United States or the Sandinistas to go through the door first. We basically go through it together, at the same time.

In his speech last night, President Reagan suggested that after the United States and the Sandinistas had gone through that door together, it somehow closes and locks on us, freezing the U.S. position in place. Daniel Ortega, on the other hand, could renege on his promises and walk right back out that same door leaving us on the other side.

The President's implication is just plain wrong. The door remains open for either of us to turn around and retrace our steps. If Ortega reimposes the state of emergency next week or next month, after we have acted in

good faith, Congress could and very likely would, restore Contra aid faster than you can say "Managua." Any such duplicity by Ortega would effectively compel the other Latin nations, along with Canada and many western European nations, to join us in isolating Nicaragua economically, thus tightening our own economic embargo of that country. The Nicaraguan economy is a basket case. Already suffering from staggering runaway inflation, a decimated infrastructure, and shortages of gasoline, water, and electricity, it verges today on the brink of collapse.

Obviously, these are ample and compelling reasons for the Sandinistas to continue on the course they have begun. The threat of reimposed Contra aid is but one of those reasons.

Let us be clear, however, on what a "no" vote on this package does or does not mean. It does not mean that we are about to hang the Contras out to dry. We have a moral obligation to ensure that they are fed and clothed and remain a viable fighting force if the Sandinistas do not act in good faith, or until a cease-fire is in place and amnesty has been granted to the Contras.

If this administration proposal is defeated tonight, we will have an opportunity later this month to vote on the following kind of alternative plan: purely humanitarian aid—roughly \$10 million over a 3-month period—triggered by a commitment from this administration to participate in multilateral discussions with all the Central American nations, including Nicaragua. This assistance must be monitored to effectively ensure that the aid is truly humanitarian. In other words, we must ensure that no grenades get mixed in with the cupcakes.

Most of us in this Chamber have already decided how we are going to vote this evening. Several have not. They are still faced with the question: What should we, the representatives of the citizens of the United States, do?

I say we should not undermine with our votes today the real progress toward peace and democracy that began on August 7 with the signing of the Arias peace plan. We should promptly fashion and enact an alternative package that effectively holds the feet of both the Sandinistas and the Contras to the fire as they continue their dialog. The United States should begin participating now with all five Central American nations on a broad range of security issues to remove foreign military advisors from Nicaragua, ban the establishment of foreign bases there, and reduce the size of the armies in the region.

In short, we should respond to good faith steps with similar steps of our own. And finally, we should turn down

this particular proposal before us tonight and walk through an open door with the people of Central America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. CARPER. Let me just conclude this, if I may.

What should we do? I would suggest that today we should not undermine the progress that has been made. I would suggest today that we hold the feet of both the Sandinistas and the Contras to the fire to continue the progress that has begun. I suggest that we should broaden the dialog in the weeks ahead to include the United States for the first time in the discussions with the Central American countries, that we should respond in good faith to the Nicaraguan Government, and that, finally, we should walk through that door that has been opened for us today.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. CARPER] has expired.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

First, do I understand the gentleman to be saying that his side now has a plan put together and he has the details of it? If so, let me say that I know that everybody in this Chamber was very distressed when Mr. Nixon said he had a secret plan and nobody could see the secret plan. I wonder if perhaps the Members of the House could see this secret plan.

Mr. CARPER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. CARPER].

Mr. CARPER. Mr. Chairman, the outlines of the plan that I have just described have been suggested to leadership, and my hope is that if this plan is defeated today, the gentleman and his colleagues will join with a majority of us in implementing the plan.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important to point out to the gentleman from Delaware that the day the Washington Post ran headlines that the Sandinistas were lifting the state of emergency, they arrested five people who dared to enter Nicaragua and have a protest against the government. The Sandinista newspaper printed, and I quote from that paper: "The recent restoration of civil rights should not be misinterpreted as a blank check for irresponsibility and subversion."

So again I say to the gentleman from Delaware that he should remember that Ortega lied to him the very day he made a promise.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE].

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, the Contras are literally the grease that allows the wheels of the peace process to turn. It is not a question of being either in favor of the peace process or aid to the Contras. Rather, we are in favor of aid to the Contras because that will help the peace process.

The whole question boils down to this: What do we perceive the Sandinista regime to be? Do we think they are going to be affected by world opinion? Do we think that when we take away the military pressure, when we take away that small amount of money that is going to be placed in escrow, that they are going to automatically come to the bargaining table and negotiate away the things they say they have won in their revolution? Of course they are not. They are hardcore Marxist-Leninist Communists. They are not going to give up anything. If we take away that pressure, what we are going to see is that they are going to act in their own perceived self-interest. Every regime does that, and we have to understand the nature of this regime.

Mr. Chairman, I ask the Members to vote for the peace process and vote to put this money in escrow.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Guam [Mr. BLAZ].

Mr. BLAZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Let me say to my colleagues, as they know, I am one of those few Americans in this body who is not given the privilege of voting today. The temptation not to be here, the temptation not to speak was almost overwhelming, but not to come down here and speak would put me in that category of people who are not accounted for, and I could not live with that, because these are only fleeting moments in our service here when we are faced with such a momentous occasion and momentous time to cast our vote, and so not to do so would be unforgivable.

As they say in Spanish, *este es momento de verdad*—it is the moment of truth.

What you do today is going to affect generations of Americans. We have enjoyed 100 years of tranquillity and prosperity in our land because we have fought all of our wars across the seas, from the shores of Asia and the shores of Europe. In the last quarter of a century, however, something has happened. There is now fighting in our territory, on our shores, on our continent.

If there is one thing that bothers a soldier, it is not the enemy before him but the possibility that he would be abandoned by the main body behind him. There is no despair greater than can descend on a soldier than to know that he has been deserted. Let me say to my friends, I am telling them that

if the cancer down in the southern part of this hemisphere is not stopped, it is going to go north, and the sword will be cut by a Red machete, and the only thing that is going to stop it is not an ocean but a river—the river Rio Grande. And if that river is ever crossed, you would have to change its name and call it the River of No Return.

Mr. Chairman, I am asking the Members to support the Contras. I am asking the Members to support the President. If I had a vote, I would vote for it strongly. To those of you who are undecided, I ask them to help me. I fought in three wars for this country. I ask that they vote for me for a change.

□ 1600

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Guam has expired.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Guam.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BLAZ. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman said something very interesting, I say to General Blaz. The general has talked about a soldier and how it feels when the people backing him are not there.

Does the gentleman recall April 17, 1961, at the Bay of Pigs when we had some brave people that we trained and we armed and we said, "Hit the beach. We're behind you, get in there and recapture your country from the communist Castro."

Then when the moment of truth came and they were in there fighting, the air cover was not there because our Government decided to pull it back and they were left to be cut to ribbons and those who survived are still in jail in Havana. Does the gentleman remember that?

Mr. BLAZ. Of course I do.

Mr. HYDE. Does the gentleman remember April 25, 1975, when the last helicopter took off from the roof of the embassy in Saigon with thousands of people left behind who trusted us, believed in us, fought with us, worked with us, and now we were leaving them behind to "give peace a chance?"

Does the gentleman remember when our helicopters took off, and those people we left behind are now either at the bottom of the South China Sea or they are in refugee camps or they are dead.

Is that not so, I ask the general?

Mr. BLAZ. Yes, it is.

Mr. HYDE. So here we are again, there are freedom fighters in Nicaragua, we have trained them, we have given them some weapons, some beans, some bandages, and now we are going to turn and cut and run out on them

again, are we not? That is called "playing with people's lives." Those are not my words. Those are the words of Governor Robb of Virginia.

Mr. BLAZ. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I have kept silent until now, because free and open debate is healthful for the democratic process, but now I rise to strongly support the administration's request for renewed assistance to the Contras.

It is well known that the Sandinistas have made important promises regarding the Central American peace plan such as agreeing to negotiate directly with the Contras, lifting the emergency decree, and announcing they would permit an international commission to monitor their guarantee of full political rights for the Contras should they lay down their arms; but these cannot be taken at face value—not just yet.

It is no secret that the Sandinistas have agreed to these concessions in order to influence the decision to be made here today. The test comes if they can follow through on these early gains when they know that the United States is serious in seeing the peace plan succeed. The President's proposal by its very nature is meant to allow for the peace process to unfold. It delays the implementation of the lethal aid component by placing the funds in escrow for 31 days, funds that will not be released unless the Sandinistas do not live up to their previous commitments, there is no cease-fire in effect, and finally that the Contras all the while have been negotiating in good faith. The Sandinistas will have time to act; to prove their sincerity with actions; to back up in substance what they have to say. As a soldier I know it is the epitome of foolishness and irresponsibility to show up for a battle unarmed. So in negotiation, it is foolhardy and naive to think we can come to the bargaining table and wrest concessions by merely pleading and making arguments based on what is morally right. We would like that to be so, but we are smart enough to know otherwise. Just as our resolve to maintain SDI brought the Soviets to the table and produced an INF treaty, so too our resolve to support those who fight for freedom and democracy will compel the peace process in Central America. Perception of strength is important in negotiations. But perceptions must be based on substance in order to be effective. That substance is our continued support of the Contras. The Sandinistas and the rest of the world must know that we will not falter in our resolve for peace and democracy in Central America.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, during World War II, Guam was occupied by the enemy. I knew what it was like to be deprived of my liberty, my freedom, my dignity. I know what it felt like to be deprived of my right to make my own decisions, to have my life controlled by the barrel of a gun. But even during those difficult days, those of us held captive knew for certain that the leader of the free world, the United States, would not forget us. And one of the reasons I am speaking before you today on the floor of the House of Representatives is because the United States stayed the course.

A few years later in Korea, I fought as a United States soldier in defense of liberty. Then, the United States and the free world resolved that the Korean people had just as much a right to freedom and liberty that I and they enjoyed. We followed through and backed our words and principles with action and stopped the aggressions of a totalitarian regime.

But then came Vietnam. As an officer there I discovered how it felt to be abandoned by my own country. I felt the frustration, the humiliation, and the pain of America losing its resolve to defend freedom and liberty. But I had a country to return to. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese who fought for these ideals did not. We watched as Saigon fell due not to a lack of Vietnamese resolve but a lack of American resolve.

Can we again abandon those who truly thirst for freedom? I think not. We must not ever again abandon the cause of freedom and liberty anywhere in the world. You may vote today to strengthen the Sandinistas' cause, but history will record that vote with timidity and chagrin.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. WOLPE].

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to oppose the President's most recent request for additional Contra aid.

In judging the last 7 years of United States involvement in Nicaragua there is only one word that comes to mind: failure.

Our policy has failed to bring peace and stability to a troubled region. Instead we have subsidized a tremendous amount of human suffering and death.

Our policy has failed to promote democracy in Nicaragua. Indeed, Contra aid has provided the Sandinistas with an ideal excuse to suppress civil liberties.

Our policy has failed to limit the expansion of Communist influence in Central America. If anything, we have driven the Nicaraguans closer to the Soviet Union by driving them away from the United States. And now our Central American friends are warning us that a continuation of the war in Nicaragua could well lead to greater instability throughout the region and to new opportunities for Communist penetration in their own countries.

Our policy has failed to create a credible opposition force in the Contras. Let's face the truth squarely. The Contras are an American invention: created, financed, and trained by the Central Intelligence Agency. And they have often behaved more like repressive somocistas than like democratic freedom fighters. They continue to kidnap, maim, and kill unarmed Nicaraguan civilians. And we wonder why they have failed to win over the Nicaraguan people and remain totally dependent on the CIA for air drops of food, weaponry, and even cash.

Finally, our policy has failed to attract the support of the American

people. On no issue has the administration invested more time and energy and resources than on their Contra Aid Program. Yet Americans remain steadfastly opposed to it. Poll after poll has revealed that two-thirds of the American people want Contra aid to end. Indeed, a January 1988 New York Times/CBS poll indicates that even those who consider themselves Republicans or conservatives oppose Contra aid by more than a 10-percent margin.

The Reagan administration has ignored the failure of its policy for too long. When it failed to convince the American people and the Congress to endorse it, the administration simply chose to ignore the rule of law, to take its support for the Contras underground and to develop covert operations.

Indeed, this past week we have learned that in pursuit of their policy administration ideologues have gone so far as to infringe on the constitutional rights of innocent American citizens. In an extraordinary reversion to an earlier era, the FBI appears to have conducted a wholesale spy operation on members of Central American peace groups.

The lesson of the recent past is clear: Now is the time to return to legality in our foreign policy and civility in our domestic affairs. The corruption of the Contra policy extends not only to the upheaval in Central America but to the perversion of our own institutions of government.

Statutes of Congress were unilaterally set aside in the blind pursuit of support for the Contras. Secrecy replaced public policy. Lies replaced truth. The Presidency itself was shaken, crippling the trust of our people, our allies in the American Government.

Also at stake is the viability of the efforts of the Central American democracies themselves. They are on the front lines of freedom. They are determined to wage peace with Nicaragua—and we have to help them.

Now is the time to demonstrate support for the peace plan forged by Nobel Prize winner Oscar Arias and the four other Central American leaders. The Guatemala plan has created the promise of lasting peace. It has opened the doors of La Prensa. It has pressured Ortega to free 1,000 political prisoners. And it has provided an opportunity for more open political debate inside Nicaragua. The peace plan has done more in 7 months than U.S. military aid to the Contras has done in 7 years.

Now is the time to demonstrate respect for our neighbors to the south, to show that we have finally learned from our mistakes and are ready to try to make the peace process work.

Now is the time to work with the Central American nations, and the

other leading democracies of Latin America and the world. Now is the time to use the combined diplomatic and economic means at our disposal to keep the pressure on Nicaragua to support democracy, to respect human rights and to be a responsible neighbor to us all.

In the words of President Arias, "the hour of peace has arrived." It presents the United States with a dramatic choice: we can follow down our current path of military involvement, which portends eventual military intervention, or we can take the more promising route of compliance with the Guatemala plan.

Let anyone who is still undecided in this matter consider the words of Mexican writer Carlos Fuentes: "the great weakness of the Soviet Union is that it is surrounded by satellites and not by friends." Let this never be said of the United States. Let us use our tremendous influence and power to foster not war, but peace and democracy in Central America.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. If I have time, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate my friend yielding.

The gentleman talked about prisoners and that they released 1,000. I am informed by very reliable sources, Father Callahan of the Quixote Center, that there are 9,000 political prisoners in Nicaragua. I know as a fact that the International Red Cross and Amnesty International, is not permitted to even visit them. Does the gentleman not think they ought to let them visit the prisoners?

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I compliment the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] for the magnificent contribution the gentleman has made to this important issue.

I rise in opposition to the present proposals.

Mr. Chairman, once again today we are being asked to vote on a resolution to provide aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. For 7 years we have been considering these requests from the Reagan administration to fund an army whose sole purpose is to overthrow the government of a sovereign nation.

I am voting against Contra aid today, as I have in the past, because I do not believe that the United States can impose democracy on Nicaragua through support for a military force which has little popular support among the Nicaraguan people.

The issue we are debating today is not whether we approve of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Clearly, we do not. Rather, the issue is whether the United States should be adding to the instability of the Central American region by funding a civil war in Nicaragua.

The answer to this question is "no." There are more constructive ways of encouraging Nicaragua to democratize than through military force, and it is time for us to begin pursuing them.

How do we do that? First and most important, we support the Arias peace plan, the regional peace process that is being conducted under the leadership of five Central American Presidents. As a result of the Arias agreement, these nations are beginning to implement democratic reforms.

In Nicaragua, President Ortega has agreed to lift the nationwide state of emergency, grant amnesty to approximately 3,300 political prisoners, and permit the opening of newspapers and radio stations.

Also, the Sandinistas have begun to hold cease-fire talks with the Contras. So already a process of negotiation among Central American leaders begun in August 1987 has accomplished more to bring about democratic reforms than 7 years of U.S. funding for the Contras.

With results like that one would think that the United States would want to do all it can to ensure the success of this peace process. However, even though the Central American Presidents have asked the United States to stop funding the Contras, the Reagan administration is going ahead with a request which is a major escalation of the Contra war effort.

Thus, the Reagan administration is trying to persuade us that it knows better than five Central American Presidents what is best for Central America. This is both arrogant and wrong.

Another effective way of encouraging the Sandinista government to implement democratic reforms is through a combination of economic sanctions and economic assistance. If democratic reforms are not forthcoming in Nicaragua, then we should continue with our economic sanctions.

This policy will continue to have an impact on the Sandinista government which is already trying to deal with a very unstable economy. After all, this is our traditional way of putting pressure on nations which consistently ignore basic human rights.

However, when there is movement toward democratic reforms, we should use economic assistance to positively recognize this progress. The United States has a long history of helping other democratic nations develop economically because we understand that a sound economy is necessary for a stable democracy. The promise of economic assistance is certainly a more positive incentive for democratic reform than continued military intervention, and it is a policy we should pursue with Nicaragua.

Finally, the United States can and should use diplomatic pressure and public condemnation on the Sandinista regime. Contrary to what many foreign leaders may state publicly, governments are always concerned about how they are perceived in the world community. However, any diplomatic entreaties we make toward the Nicaraguans are undercut by the fact that we are funding a civil war in their country. Only when we abandon our militaristic approach to the problems in Central America can we expect the Nicaraguan people to take our call for diplomatic solutions seriously.

Thus, the Reagan administration has had many opportunities through the regional peace plan, economic sanctions, and diplomatic pressure to play a positive role in encouraging the Sandinista government to implement democratic reforms. Instead, the United States currently finds itself supporting a rebel force which has little popular support in Nicaragua and cannot hold any territory within the country's borders.

And now, the Reagan administration is asking us to approve more aid for the Contras even though administration officials have failed to deal honestly with Congress in the past. After all, we cannot forget that Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams admitted giving misleading testimony before Congress during the Iran-Contra hearings.

And now, we are considering a request from the Reagan administration which contains disturbing hidden costs: an additional \$20 million to replace damaged aircraft; between \$4 million and \$12 million for electronic equipment; a definition of nonlethal aid that includes anything which is not lethal and would include such things as aircraft, helicopters, and portable bridges. This does not sound like true humanitarian aid to me.

A key provision of this legislation calls for the \$3.6 million in lethal aid to be released by the President after March 31, 1988 if he certifies that there is no cease-fire in place, Nicaragua has not met its obligation under the peace plan, and the Contras have negotiated in good faith. Congress would play no role at all in determining the release of this aid.

On January 19, the President certified that no progress had been made toward a cease-fire in Nicaragua despite the fact that the Sandinistas had already stated their commitment to negotiate with the Contras. If the President was willing on January 19 to make a finding in favor of Contra aid, despite evidence to the contrary, is there any doubt what his finding will be on March 31?

We are faced today not with a choice between supporting or not supporting democracy in Nicaragua. Rather, the choice is whether we will begin to support the Central Americans in their quest for democracy through peaceful, constructive cooperation with their leaders, or whether we will continue to fund a war that the Central Americans do not want.

Today we can end the failed military policy of the past 7 years by voting against this measure. This vote can mark the beginning of a more peaceful and realistic U.S. policy aimed at encouraging the establishment of democracy in Central America. I am voting for that new policy.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HAYES].

Mr. HAYES of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. Chairman, back in 1857, President James Buchanan declared that the United States would eventually take over Nicaragua through the natural expansion of the white race. In 1984, Ronald Reagan declared that he only wanted aid to the Contras until the Sandinistas "cry uncle." Sometimes, the more things change, the more things stay the same.

Ignorance of century-old American history is not unusual, but President Reagan's ignorance of recent American history is remarkable. The President claims that it is the Contras who have brought the Nicaraguan Government to the bargaining table. The reality is that the combined political and regional pressure of the Central American Presidents who signed the Arias peace plan has brought more positive change in Nicaragua in the last 6 months than in 6 years of Contra war. During the President's State of the Union Address, he once again referred to the terrorist Contras as "freedom fighters." Yet in his entire speech, while he outlined his view of freedom fighters all over the world, he ignored the cause of the millions of freedom fighters in racist South Africa. And in light of the arms-for-hostages scandal, we would be wise to question whether the President can even tell the difference between a freedom fighter and a terrorist.

The Central American peace process is at a very fragile stage and the United States Congress has a chance to place our Nation on the same side as the other democratic nations in our hemisphere. By rejecting the President's call for military and material supplies for the Contras we can give the Central American peace process an opportunity to succeed. Peace is possible, and no one wants peace any more than the people of Central America. If, in 1988, we miss this chance, it will not only be history who will be our judge. It will be our friends.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLETTA].

Mr. FOGLETTA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this aid request.

Mr. Chairman, the notion that we should fund a war to achieve peace in Central America, is absurd. Yet, that is the twisted logic the White House is using to obtain additional funding for the Contras. The administration argues that the triumph of peace is won through the efforts of the Contras, who are notorious for killing peasants, burning hospitals, and laying waste to farmlands. President Reagan really believes that it is the death and destruction in Nicaragua that will secure a democratic regime in Managua. However, nothing could be further from the truth. The fact remains that the only result of more arms to the Contras, is more war. I know that, Members of this body know that, the American people know that and even the White House knows that. The time has come for us to end this charade of supporting an immoral war, and instead pursue the call for peace.

Last August, the five Central American Presidents came together to build a new future for the region. They did this by drafting a peace plan, which among other things, requires the cessation of all outside aid to rebel forces. The five Presidents stood firm on this issue, and have reiterated their opposition to any such aid. Yet, despite their ardent pleas, the Reagan administra-

tion has turned a deaf ear. By submitting this Contra aid request, President Reagan has demonstrated that he will accept nothing short of a military solution in Nicaragua. This is not only foolhardy but, it goes against the strong sentiment in Latin America, for a political settlement in the region.

Never before have we faced such a clear-cut choice between peace and war in Central America. The Arias peace plan offers the best hope to end the hostilities which have plagued the area for over a decade. This opportunity must not be squandered away. Congress must take the first step and vote down Contra aid to stem the violence which has disrupted the life of all Nicaraguan citizens. The denial of assistance will also signal confidence in our Central American colleagues' efforts to deal with the conflict.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support a new direction for Central America and cease all aid to the Contra rebels.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, it has been said that there are liars, darn liars, and statisticians. One might as you listen to this debate today suggest that often around here we have liars, darn liars, and historians.

I have heard a lot about a failed policy on the floor today, a policy that is designed in terms of historical reflection that is convenient for whoever is speaking.

The fact is that Central America has been a place of great desperation for a long, long time. The Somozas dominated Nicaragua for 40 years. America conveniently extended support at times when indeed we should have been pressuring for change. That did not come through Democratic and Republican administrations over too many years.

In my first session in 1979, that debate was raging and America had made a decision to push the Somozas out in order to provide hope, freedom and opportunity, economic growth and change, and suddenly after that crisis we began to give money in sizable form to a new government and that new government suddenly we found was not the one we expected. The business people of Nicaragua had gone back to work. Others forgot about the crisis and the Communists of Nicaragua took over and the very people who came to this floor and pled to give freedom a chance, peace a chance, suddenly found the Sandinista Communists to be OK. Suddenly they are saying those people who are continuing their fight for freedom somehow

are antipeace, somehow antifreedom, opportunity and hope.

I cannot imagine how one has made that emotional as well as intellectual transition.

The fact is finally because of the pressure, the Sandinistas are back at the bargaining table and that pressure is the only chance today for peace and freedom.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, these Sandinistas are hardcore Communists and to talk of putting them to the test is really embarrassingly naive. These Sandino-Communists are not just Marxists. They are Leninists, the engines of history, and they hate the Yankee imperialists. Their revolution is for real, and what has been won by the gun can only be taken away by the gun. That is what they say and that is their theology.

Now, we have heard from the opposition to this proposition that more aid drives the Sandinistas into the arms of the Soviets. I heard it this morning on National Public Radio from the gentleman who is now managing the bill. We give them aid, we drive them into the Soviets' arms.

Well, when Foreign Minister and Father Miguel D'Escoto accepted his Lenin prize in Moscow on June 10, he said, and I quote:

This prize brings us even closer to Lenin, that passionate champion of peace.

Then we have Thomas Borge, who in *Playboy*, something I do not read very often, but I read this in September 1983.

□ 1615

Thomas Borge in the September 1983 issue of *Playboy* magazine said:

I have always been a Communist. I told my mother that her gentility would not dissuade me. I am a Communist.

It reminds me of Fidel Castro's interview with Barbara Walters in May 1977 when he said:

I was a Communist in law school in the 1940's.

There is a strange arrogance, a hubris about people who say we make people become Communists, as though these people do not become Communists on their own, that they need us to energize them and motivate them into that belief.

If my colleagues would read the writings, and read the speeches, from out of Sandinista-land, they would know that they are hard-line, hardcore Marxist-Leninist Communists.

Put them to the test? If we disperse the Contras what are we going to do if the Sandino-Communists flunk the test? Do we give them an F on their report card?

No, I recall what earlier speakers said we are going to do, we are going

to "mobilize world opinion." Boy, that sure freed the Captive Nations, did it not? That is wonderful. Mobilize world opinion, that will bring them to their knees.

We may even have a resolution here condemning what they do.

That is utter nonsense.

In 1975 we cut off all aid to Angola's freedom fighters. I was here, and I have saved the copy of the debate. People were saying, "We are going to drive these Angolans into the arms of the Soviets if we help UNITA, and this guy Savimbi."

We cut him off for 10 years.

What happened? The Soviets shoveled it in, \$2 billion in military aid, including tanks, trucks, and the rest. Finally we wised up and we started to give aid to UNITA.

What happened? Yesterday Angola announced that they are going to send the Cubans home.

Pressure pays. That is Newton's first law of motion.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot understand, I confess, some of the strange arguments that I have heard, but I think of a quote that fits them beautifully. It is by Saul Bellow.

He said, "A great deal of intelligence can be invested in ignorance where the need for illusion is great."

That is just what we have here, a need for illusion.

Another hummer that we get from the other side is to "take some risks for peace." I can just hear some campesino in the mountains of Nicaragua saying, "No, you take the risk of betting on Ortega for peace, I am risking enough already."

We heard that slogan before, "give peace a chance," and so have a lot of people now at the bottom of the South China Sea.

I also will announce to the pacifist clergy that I believe there are some things worth fighting for. Those people who shy away from the use of force I suggest look at this Frenchman Lafayette whose portrait is over here, who came to this country to help us win our freedom. Nobody handed it to us. We had to fight for it. There are some things worth fighting for, and among them are freedom. We should be grateful our forefathers believed so passionately in freedom.

Another argument is that Contra aid will kill the peace process. If my colleagues will remember that we deployed Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, and the Soviets said, "We are walking out. You do that, and that is the end of the peace process."

And the President did flaunt the nuclear freeze, urged by some of these same voices of reason and moderation. If we had swallowed that, we would have never deployed the Pershing II's or the ground-launched cruise missiles,

and we would not have an INF Treaty today.

Mr. Chairman, they came back. They came back.

Mr. Chairman, I will just tell my colleagues this much, if negotiation was the way out of this struggle, I do not know why Contadora failed. They had years to work on that. It just never worked because the military pressure was not there. The peace process depends on pressure. It depends on economic, political, and military pressure.

The use of pressure is so fundamental that it seems to me the only people who deny it, have a "need for illusion."

This proposal is so anemic that it is a very small insurance policy, and term insurance at that. The military is fenced off, Congress has the final say, and there is no logical reason for turning it down except, and I hate to pronounce the word, politics, the prospect of a Reagan defeat.

Henry Jackson said that in matters of national security the best politics is no politics. How odd that sounds in this Chamber today.

It is a tragic time to cut off aid. The patient is sitting up, color is returning to his cheeks, and there are those who can't wait to cut the oxygen hose. The Sandino Communist treaty compliance is a scam. Managua has been described as a city without the energy of desperation—but with the Contra successes, they are beginning to have hope. Don't strangle that fragile hope—support the Contras.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak after my distinguished colleague from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], who I think has made the ultimate argument in support of aid to the Contras, and that is because of this enormous fear of a group of people that we refer to as Marxist-Leninist Communists.

Query: Who are the most powerful Communists on the face of the Earth?

The Soviet Union. But I do not hear any of my colleagues, at least my rational colleagues, who want to advocate going to war or aiding Contras to overthrow the Soviet Union, because rational minds in this body know that the ultimate result of that would bring a level of human destruction on this planet that would not allow us to emerge as a civilized group of people throughout eons of time.

Who are the second most powerful group of these Marxist-Leninist Communists?

The Chinese. But I find it fascinating that at this point we are interested in selling them Calvin Klein jeans and Cadillacs because we have a trade deficit. Ideological differences that exist between us and China are no longer a big deal when our economic interests

are involved. So we are not talking about aiding Contras to overthrow the Chinese. We are busy trying to sell them these things.

Who are the third most powerful group of these Marxist-Leninist Communists?

They are in East Germany. But I hear no one saying that we should aid Contras to overthrow East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, et cetera. No rational mind in this body would advocate that.

So where do we choose to attack these dangerous Marxist-Leninist Communists, Mr. Chairman?

It is fascinating. It is in countries where the black and the brown and the red and the yellow, where they are dying from the work of death squads, from oligarchies, and military juntas, and dying from poverty and hunger and disease. So where are the dangerous Communists, Mr. Chairman?

Not in the Soviet Union. Not in China. Not in East Germany. Not in Czechoslovakia. But they seem to be in Third World countries. So when we choose to become brave and powerful and macho and talk about war, we say, "where is Daniel Ortega? That is a Communist that I can challenge."

Where are the Communists in Africa and Asia and Central America?

So being a simple human being, I have come to the conclusion, Mr. Chairman, that there must be two kinds of Communists on the face of the Earth, because we sure have different attitudes. There must be good Communists and bad Communists. The good Communists must be the ones that have a big enough bomb to bomb us back. Maybe the bad Communists are where we strap on the holster, Mr. Chairman, where we aid Contras. That is where the countries are where people are dying of starvation and malnutrition and hunger, where instead of being anticommunist we ought to be antipoverty, antihunger, antidisease, and antideath squads, and anti-violation of human rights.

Mr. Chairman, therein lies the fundamental contradiction and, I would assert, the hypocrisy of that argument.

If it was purely anticommunism, then why are we not bombing the Soviet Union?

Most of us here are not fools. We understand. So when we want to get tough, we want to get tough with Ortega.

Mr. Chairman, we are about to lose a generation of our children. I live every day on the principle that this generation has a responsibility to turn over to our children a better world than the one we inherited. Our responsibility, Mr. Chairman, is not to give our children another generation of the insanity of war, and myopic perspectives, but to guarantee our children a

generation of peace, and I say let it start in Central America. Peace is not simply the absence of war, Mr. Chairman. Peace is the alternative to war.

In Central America we have an alternative to war. We can sit down peacefully and democratically and bring in all parties together to begin to negotiate beyond the insanity of war. If the human spirit could get beyond the notion that we could sell other human beings as chattel, if the human spirit could get beyond the notion of the divine right of kings, then the human spirit can get beyond the notion of the insanity of war. Mr. Chairman, in Central America we have a responsibility to engage in a generation of peace. Peace is more than the absence of war, peace is the absence of conditions that give rise to war.

Mr. Chairman, the only way we are going to remove the conditions of war is by sitting down and beginning to negotiate. We are not waging war on the Government of Nicaragua, we are destroying the people of Nicaragua with our economic insanity and our aid to the Contras to maim, kill, torture and harm human beings in the countryside of Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the kind of world that we should turn over to our children. We have to begin to deal with peace and that is what ought to drive us to not only challenge this proposal but every proposal that comes before us in the name of war.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma for yielding me this time.

I would like to say by way of commentary on the always interesting rhetoric of the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS], the place to start fighting for peace is Afghanistan, Afghanistan where 115,000 Soviet troops are fighting and killing poor people in Afghanistan, and our country is helping the resistance. I do not know if the gentleman from California supports that effort but I would suggest that this country is helping fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

This country is helping to fight the Soviet-supported Vietnamese in Kampuchea, and if the gentleman from California does not think this country has not made more billions of dollars available to those brown people and those red people and those Third World people, the gentleman from California has not been paying attention.

Mr. Chairman, communism is the sworn enemy of the human spirit. We have one Communist base in this hemisphere, and that is Cuba. We do not need another Cuba on the land bridge between Texas and the Panama Canal. We have a country down there, Colombia, that is almost in a state of

anarchy. We have Panama, and the Panama Canal being run by a corrupt unstable government. It does not seem to bother the gentleman that the Soviets would have another base in our hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, I say to my colleagues, Nicaragua is an occupied country. What are Bulgarians doing there? What are the PLO doing there? What are East Germans doing there? What are North Koreans doing there? What are the Soviets doing there?

Is it the water? Is it the beaches? I suggest to the gentleman that he has a vastly different view of what is right and what is wrong in the world than I do, but so be it.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], knows that I am willing to debate him anytime, any place, anywhere in any circumstances on the issue of war and peace, and he knows I am prepared to do that.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, peace does not come through the barrel of a gun or through the bombay doors. Peace becomes reality when one is committed to democratic principles and committed to alleviate the conditions that give rise to war. The world is crying out for peace. Yes, it is crying out for peace in Afghanistan, it is crying out for peace in Central America, it is crying out for peace in southern Africa, and it cries out for peace in the ghettos and the barrios of America. We have to begin to deal with that. Let the national security policies include those conditions, and we will have turned over to the children a much better world than the one we inherited.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] would have us believe that it is because the people of Nicaragua are dark skinned that we have raised this issue.

I say to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] that I hope he will not leave the floor.

Mr. DELLUMS. I am listening to the gentleman.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I just came back from Managua and I met with a lot of people down there who are dark skinned, and who want the right to vote, who want the right to have a free press, who want the right to live without fear of being imprisoned and tortured by their government, and I will say to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] that while I was down there with two people from your side of the aisle, a very fine young dark-skinned lady, fighting for freedom against the Sandinista government,

told us she was frightened and I want to tell my colleagues that since we left, she has been arrested.

I say to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] that if he believes in freedom, freedom knows no color and the people of Nicaragua are as entitled to freedom as the people of the United States.

□ 1630

Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, a "yes" vote today is not a happy vote, a pleasant vote or an easy vote, but a "yes" vote today is a necessary vote.

Why have good Democrats like Chuck Robb of Virginia, Senator BOREN of Oklahoma, and Senator BENTSEN of Texas advocated a "yes" vote? Not because Robb, BOREN, and BENTSEN are warmongers, not because Robb, BOREN, and BENTSEN are simple-minded anti-Communists. These three distinguished Democrats have looked at the facts and they have reluctantly concluded that a "yes" vote is the only reasonable factually based vote.

Why has the Miami Herald announced it was wrong in opposing aid to the Contras and urge a "yes" vote? Because it looked at the facts. Why has the Washington Post as late as this morning advocated a "yes" vote? Because it looked at the facts.

What do those who are going to vote no offer us? Like Richard Nixon in 1968 they have a secret plan. They will soon propose what vote they would bring to the floor. We now have a secret plan peace vote. But what is that secret plan?

If you are going to send humanitarian aid to the freedom fighters without a cease-fire, how are you going to protect it? Who is going to lead the first convoy, or are you saying we will set up a gulag in Central America, we will let the freedom fighters and their families hide in one refugee camp, but we will at least give them food in their misery? Is that your solution?

Before any partisan person in this House votes no they should ask themselves two questions. First, why if there is a secret plan there is no one in the leadership offering it? Why are there no people willing to stand forward? Why are we faced with a Nixon-like secret proposal but no clear-cut, specific plan to be voted on today? And second, if there is a massacre, if the morale collapses, if there are thousands of refugees, if freedom fails, what then is your plan? The U.S. Marines? What then do you propose if your way fails? What then do you offer?

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on each side?

The CHAIRMAN. By segments, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 31 minutes remaining in this segment and 2 hours and 31 minutes at the end of this segment and the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] has 9½ minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLO].

Mr. GALLO. Mr. Chairman, I don't often say this, but I agree with the Washington Post's editorial stand on this critical question of aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Aid to the Contras must continue.

As the Post editorial states:

The record of the last 6 months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on the basis we support the President's request.

The Arias plan—signed on August 7, 1987—called for free and fair elections, not political persecution.

It called for freedom of speech and association, not broadcast restrictions and the arrest of political opponents.

It called for a good faith effort to restore peace and democracy, not a secret agreement with the Soviets to build a 600,000-man army.

It called for full compliance by a certain date—the first date was November 7—then it was pushed back to January 15, now who knows when Ortega will comply.

Mr. Chairman, I am not optimistic. As Mr. Ortega has said—he has no plans to give up power.

I am also tired of promises. I believe that actions speak louder than words.

In 1979, the Sandinistas made a promise to the OAS that their government would be "truly democratic" with respect for "fundamental liberties."

Almost 10 years later, the Nicaraguan people are still waiting for democracy.

Mr. Chairman, this is no time to weaken the freedom fighters.

As indicated by the Post, a vote against aid removes the carrot and stick approach that has brought Ortega to the negotiating table.

We must not take the pressure off the Sandinistas just as the negotiations are getting serious.

Support democracy—support the freedom fighters.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. RINALDO].

Mr. RINALDO. Mr. Chairman, this is a tough vote. It requires a lot of soul searching. No one wants to harm the prospects for peace in Nicaragua.

I believe the peace proposal put forth by Costa Rican President Arias can bring peace to Central America, but only if all of the participants are sincere in their desire to implement the democratic reforms that were agreed to in Guatemala last summer.

I have been encouraged by the recent steps which have been taken by the Sandinistas. The lifting of the national emergency, the release of some political prisoners, and the reopening of the independent newspaper and radio station are all positive signs.

The correlation between recent concessions made by the Sandinistas and this vote on additional Contra aid is obvious. The Sandinistas were slow to comply with the peace plan until after the date for this vote was set by Congress shortly before Christmas. The purpose of this additional aid is clear—to continue to apply pressure on the Sandinistas to implement and maintain democratic reforms.

It is a request that, while applying pressure, does not alter the balance of power in Nicaragua. All but 10 percent of this aid will be nonlethal or humanitarian aid. The remaining \$3.6 million will be military assistance that will be held in escrow until the end of March. At that time, the Congress will determine whether the Sandinistas have complied with the peace process. If they have complied, as I hope they will, no military aid will be released.

Pressure, or leverage if you will, can produce positive results. The recently signed INF Treaty is an example of this. A few years ago millions of Americans were strongly opposed to the introduction of Pershing missiles into Western Europe for fear that it would escalate the arms race. However, the Soviets already had similar missiles in place. How many of us believe that the Soviets would have unilaterally agreed to dismantle all of their intermediate range missiles? They did so because it was in their own best interest once similar weapons were targeted against them.

A major concern of mine is the mixed signals we are receiving from Managua. The Sandinistas tell us that they are no threat to the other nations in the region, and that they have no interest in spreading revolution. But the record indicates otherwise. Soviet military aid continues to arrive in Nicaragua at the same high level it has in recent years. In addition, Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega has publicly stated that he plans to increase the size of the Nicaraguan Army to 600,000 within the next 10 years, regardless of the outcome of the peace negotiations. This would be a force far larger than is needed for defensive purposes.

He also indicated that Nicaragua plans to acquire additional Soviet weapons, such as Mig jet fighters, which would be of little use in the Nic-

araguan jungle. Obtaining an offensive military capability is totally inconsistent with the Arias peace plan and would be a threat to the democracies of Central America.

The largest city in my district, Elizabeth, is the home of thousands of individuals who have firsthand knowledge of what the people of Nicaragua are experiencing. These refugees from Castro's Communist Cuba are adamantly opposed to trusting the Sandinistas. They are opposed because it is all too familiar to them: The restrictions on human rights; the buildup of the armed forces; and a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union are things that they too have experienced. Cutting off aid to the Contras now, in their judgment, would amount to another Bay of Pigs when we left the Cuban freedom fighters stranded on the beaches. These Cuban-Americans claim that we should continue aiding the Contras until Fidel Castro and the Soviets stop sending weapons and withdraw their military advisers from Nicaragua. Mr. Chairman, I share this belief, and I am going to vote in favor of the additional aid.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. LIPINSKI].

Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this aid package because I believe that if we are going to have peace, freedom, democracy, and justice in Nicaragua and all of Central America, we must keep the pressure on the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista regime. The Contras are not the freedom fighters we would like them to be, but I believe they are a great deal better for the people of Nicaragua, Central America, and the United States than the Communists who now rule Nicaragua. The best way to bring democracy to Nicaragua is the full and complete implementation of the Arias peace plan, and I believe the only way that will be accomplished is by the military pressure of the Contras.

If the Sandinistas were sincere about peace in Central America, they would stop the military buildup that will put, according to the Nicaraguan Defense Minister himself, 600,000 Nicaraguans under arms by 1995. They would stop aiding Communist insurgent groups in El Salvador and end the vast flow of military hardware received in recent years from the Soviet Union, Cuba, Libya and other Communist/terrorist regimes. In addition, they would allow total freedom of assembly, speech, and the opportunity to hold free and fair elections.

The Contras are the main obstacle standing in the Sandinistas' way of complete control. There are now between 12,000 and 16,000 Contras fighting against them. They are now operating in two-thirds of Nicaragua's ter-

ritory and their improved military performance indicates they are receiving significant support from various segments of the population.

It makes no sense to withdraw support from the Nicaraguan resistance just as they have entered into direct negotiations with the Sandinistas. Every important concession that the Sandinistas have made is reversible. The Contras need continued United States support if they are to negotiate a successful cease-fire which will fully allow them to take part in the democratic process in Nicaragua.

Continued aid to the Contras is, therefore, necessary to extract further democratic concessions from the Sandinistas. Aid is necessary to implement the provisions for democracy so that the armed resistance can exchange bullets for ballots in a truly democratic Nicaragua. Without military aid, the Contras will be forced to choose between surrender on terms dictated by the Sandinistas or permanent exile.

The Central American peace plan is worthy of continued United States support. Its strong emphasis on democratization reflects our values and addresses our security interests. Continued Contra aid is not only compatible with the peace plan, it is also absolutely necessary to achieve its goals. Because the Sandinistas do not advocate the principles of democracy, pressure from the Contras is necessary to oblige them to implement the provisions of the peace plan.

If the United States abandons the Contras, it will be an open invitation for the Soviets, who have already supplied the Ortega regime with massive amounts of military aid, to have a free hand in Nicaragua. Failure on our part to assist in the democratic resistance will allow the Soviet-backed Sandinistas to build a second beachhead on the North American Continent.

Congress must decide now whether it will combat communism in Central America or let it spread like a cancer through the fragile democracies of Latin America. Unfortunately, there can be no self-determination in Nicaragua today so long as the Soviet Union retains paramount influence there. If we choose to deny these friends of democracy a real chance at self-determination, we will be condemning the Nicaraguan people and very possibly our Latin American neighbors to a turbulent period of Communist aggression that someday may reach our shores.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, in spite of 8 years of repression, torture and murder by the Communists in Nicaragua, in spite of the fact that the last 8 years have been littered with the bones of promises broken by these Communist dictators, here in this house of freedom, in literally this last bastion of world de-

mocracy, today some are saying that we should trust these charlatans once again. It is said that, in the name of peace, this modest amount of aid must be prevented from reaching the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. Of course, it isn't peace, but peace with freedom that is truly at risk here today. There is no one here who does not want peace. I want it. You want it. The Nicaraguan people want it.

But the Nicaraguan people want—and are entitled to—more than just peace. They want the right to live in liberty. They want their children not just to live in peace, but to have the right to free speech, to free assembly, to freedom of worship, to freedom of travel, to freedom of enterprise—all of the simple and yet tremendous freedoms that have made this Nation of ours great. And, just as important, they want the freedom not to be harnessed to the ever-growing Communist military machine in Nicaragua—a killing machine that will inevitably destroy the lives of their children through indoctrination and militarism, and sooner or later, the conquest of their democratic neighbors in Central America.

And so, once again, let us be frank, it is not the question of peace that lies before us today here in this great House. It is the freedom of the Nicaraguan people that is in our hands, and the future of their children.

Before we cast our votes, before we decide the fate of the Nicaraguan people, before we sacrifice their freedom on the altar of Communist promises, I ask my colleagues to listen to the words of Father Peter D'Abele, an American Roman Catholic priest who has lived and preached in Santo Tomas, Nicaragua, for more than 5 years—a priest who is still there today and who knows both the Nicaraguan people's desire for freedom and the ways that their Communist rulers continue to deny it.

Father D'Abele says that in the town of Santo Tomas in the heart of Nicaragua, only 10 percent of the residents support the Communist regime—only 10 percent. Ten percent of the residents are actively working to help the freedom fighters overthrow that regime. And what does he say about the remaining 80 percent? They are fighting the Communists by not cooperating with their regime.

Here is how Father D'Abele expressed the feelings of the people of Santo Tomas—not the feelings of international sympathizers who have made pilgrimages to Managua—but the feelings of real, average Nicaraguans in the middle of a civil war:

If you have spoken to the people, they say they would rather not be in the army . . . they would rather be out milking their cows. When they're not left alone . . . when they are forced into one way or another, they would rather go with the Contras, because the Sandinistas have attacked family life and they've attacked the church.

Father D'Abele says that the Sandinistas are so bad that the freedom fighters are the only option left to the Nicaraguan people. He also indicates that the aid we gave the resistance last year had provided hope to the people of Santo Tomas that something could be done to win their freedom. Listen to what he says about the attack the freedom fighters carried out on Santo Tomas last October and what the town's residents really thought about it:

I think, by and large, apart from being scared—everyone was—I think it impressed them. Because no one really believed that Santo Tomas would ever be attacked by the Contras. It was too large. It has always been a military base. There's a fuel depot down below. There's a helicopter pad up above. It's always been kind of a center of operations, and the fact that they had the audacity to attack it and to get as far as they did, I think, impressed a lot of people.

In speaking about the question of more American aid for the resistance, Father D'Abele said that the residents of Santo Tomas weigh the risk of a longer civil war with the risk that their hopes of democracy are going to be snuffed out by one shot—a vote against that aid by the House today. He says:

If they don't vote this aid, then you have to accept that Nicaragua is going to become a Cuban satellite.

Once again, let me stress that this American priest has been in Nicaragua for over 5 years and is still there today. He has not gone on a 2-week tour of farm cooperatives sponsored by the regime. He's had the guts to speak out on this issue and we ought to listen.

By the way, let's end this delusion that the Communists have suddenly become Democrats under the peace plan. According to the "MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour" reporter who interviewed Father D'Abele, he was not only followed and harassed by the Communist secret police while he was in Santo Tomas, but he was sent back to Managua once they realized what Father D'Abele and others were telling him. This reporter noted that, despite the regime's talk of restored freedoms, the army and police in Santo Tomas had yet to hear of it.

Mr. Chairman, I thank God that we here in America can still hear the voices of freedom. That we can still hear the voices of Santo Tomas. But where is our conviction to freedom? Why has our support for the freedom fighters been so grudging and miserly? Why was the President of this great democracy prevented from addressing the American people directly on this issue of freedom last night? Why do Members of this great body insist that we disarm the freedom fighters and trust the Nicaraguan Communists yet again? The Sandinistas have never kept their promises and they probably never will!

Mr. Chairman, we're trying to get Daniel Ortega to do something he doesn't want to do, and that's honor the promises he made in 1979. How in God's name are we going to do that unless we hold the Contras over his head?

A lot of American boys died because when Adolf Hitler announced his plans to dominate the world, we weren't listening. So now, when the Ortegas announce their plans to spread Marxist tyranny all over Central America, I, for one, plan to take them seriously.

A denial of aid at this time will say that just when democracy started to bloom all over Central America, it was stomped out by the United States refusal to help the Contras. It will say that just when the Contras became a viable fighting force and increasingly popular in Nicaragua, we disarmed them.

What will happen? We will give the Ortigas and their Soviet masters a blank check to spread subversion right in our front yard. And we'll have to get ready for Soviet bases on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of this hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, to point out the difference between communism and democracy and to point out the difference between hopelessness and hope, let me describe an event that took place not long ago when I had an opportunity to visit a city called Hanoi in a place called Vietnam, and there I had to negotiate with a Communist regime for the release of live POW's and the remains of fallen soldiers. That is the only philosophy in the history of the political world that has ever withheld prisoners of war and even the remains of dead soldiers and that is the same political philosophy that exists in Nicaragua today.

While I was there I had a chance to observe the faces of people shackled with international expansionist communism. Ladies and gentleman, there was no hope on the faces of those people, no jobs, no economy, no anything. Yes, that was communism at work, just like in Nicaragua.

I left there and I went to a place called Thailand. I had an opportunity to visit 125,000 refugees displaced by that expansionist communism. Those poor people, as I began to fly in there and then ride over a 50-mile stretch of dirt road, those people began to gather by the side of the road, little people, 5 years old, 20 years old, 80 years old, and they carried signs that said, "U.S.A., you are No. 1. America, we love you."

□ 1645

But there was one great big sign, the sign that said "America, please take us home." Mr. Chairman, they did not mean "Take us home to America," they meant "Make it possible for us to go back to their home, to be free, to live under democracy the way we do." There was hope on their faces and we Americans were their only hope. Mr. Chairman, we are the only hope of freedom loving Nicaraguans.

Mr. Chairman, communism has never been unshackled from the backs of people without outside help, never in the history of world politics. That is, until we did it in Grenada and are doing it in Afghanistan right now.

For God's sake, let us not abandon the people of Nicaragua, let us give them a chance at what we have here in this country, because in doing so you may just be insuring your own freedom in this world.

For God's sake, please support this legislation.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER].

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, much has changed since the last vote a number of months ago. During the first half of last year, about 14,000 armed Nicaraguan resistance fighters have penetrated their country. In the first half of 1987 alone, the resistance has engaged the Sandinista army over 1,800 times. That has changed. A lot of people in this body were saying the resistance had no military sustainability. Towns and villages have been occupied briefly, critical roads have been shut off, Soviet helicopter gunships have been downed.

I remember, as you all do, during the Iran hearings that the witnesses articulated well that in Central America the Communist Sandinistas have helicopter gunships, the best in the Americas.

Right now the Communists in Central America have helicopter gunships that are better than our own, that are better than those, in fact, we have in the United States of America. The central and eastern provinces particularly of Nicaragua are hospitable to the democratic resistance, indeed much has changed.

All this has been done, of course, with very modest outlays of American expenses.

The Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact countries, Cuba, Bulgaria, the PLO, if you add up the type of funding, the type of money that they have sent to the Americas it totals to \$2.6 billion. And yet we are tripping all over ourselves in this debate to determine whether we should send \$3.6 million of weapons to the Democrats in Central America; all the while the Soviet Union and her allies are funding the Communists in our own hemisphere by the sum of \$2.6 billion. There are some that will say that if we withhold assistance to the resistance then Daniel Ortega will not ask assistance from Moscow. But I remind this body that in April 1985, and again in January 1986 when this body rejected giving the Democrats their assistance, Daniel Ortega took that opportunity, went to Moscow for additional equipment, additional gunships, and additional supplies.

He right now is negotiating as to whether he is going to get Mig fighter planes, aircraft, in Central America. Managua's friends say they are not serious. Daniel Ortega says he is serious.

If we do nothing, if we do not apply the pressure then Central America will be receiving Communist Mig airplanes. Their pilots, the Sandinista pilots are being trained such that they can fly them today.

The Sandinistas started out with about 12,000 troops. Then it built up to 20,000, then 30,000, then 50,000, then 60,000, and now there are 80,000

troops in Central America, in Nicaragua.

Daniel Ortega, the Communists are saying that even if we establish good relations with the United States they want to build that up to 600,000. Mr. Chairman, give real peace a chance, make sure that the Declaration of Independence stands for true democracy in Central America, not only North America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HOLLOWAY].

Mr. HOLLOWAY. Mr. Chairman, not very often do I rise to speak on this floor unless it is something that is very, very, very important to me. I guess you would try to wonder how you say something different that has not already been said. But maybe we look at it from the regions of the country, the South, the Southeast, the Southwest, the people that really have the refugees that flow into their part of the country, the people that are fleeing communism to come to America. And you look at it and you talk with them and you see the need.

Maybe we will be the first part of the country affected, but our plea is to the rest of the country that you support us, that you see we are closest to the problem, that we understand what is going on in Central America, that we are worried about Communists coming through Mexico, that we are worried about refugees flowing into the bayous of south Louisiana or the refugees going into Florida or Arizona or California.

Maybe we do not believe what our forefathers believed and that is that freedom is something that we have to give a lot to accomplish, but I still believe that.

I hope that a majority of the people on this floor believe that we must obtain freedom and support freedom at whatever the cost may be, whether it be in Asia, Africa, but particularly in our own hemisphere where the Monroe Doctrine was designed to try to protect us and the Americas.

I ask you today to please support the South, support the Southwest, where we feel the greatest fear and where the people understand where the problem comes from and vote for the aid to the Contras today.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, the Contras that we are dealing with here are real people, men and women who want freedom, who thought they were getting it under the Sandinistas but not under Ortega. These are the people that the President calls freedom fighters. They are outnumbered with the military strength of the San-

dinistas but they are still fighting for freedom. I wonder why we have become so sophisticated that we cannot recognize it, that it was freedom fighters who made our own United States possible. Have we gone so far from our roots that we have forgotten the men and women who created this great country of ours? What about these Americans who dumped tea into Boston Harbor in defiance of the British rulers? What of those who fought and died at Saratoga and at Valley Forge? These were no fancy military experts, but they knew if they could get their freedom, they had to fight for it and that is what the Contras are doing, the individuals that we are proposing to cut off with this legislation.

What a travesty that so many Members of this body should be opposing the men and women who seek freedom and who hate a cruel and ruthless dictatorship. Have we forgotten how our country was built? The brave men and women who crossed the River Delaware with General Washington to put to rout the British enemy whom they had opposed? They were also Contras; they were contra England.

How can we justify a vote in opposition to these Nicaraguan freedom fighters? How can we turn our backs to those who seek freedom, who are even willing to give their lives in freedom? Let us remember that Nicaragua is in desperate straits. Its inflation rate is at an astounding 13,000 percent. And as the eloquent columnist of the Washington Post, Mr. Krauthammer said, if the United States stops helping the Contras, she will have managed the most extraordinary self-inflicted, strategic surrender in memory. "Our decline will be well earned."

Certainly, no red-blooded American would want to be present at that consummation.

This afternoon we are debating the future of the Contras. But the basic issue in this debate is what America itself is all about: The opportunity of freedom. Over the years America has stood for freedom, and thousands of people from other lands have come to America because they hated oppression.

One of the very first actions of the new United States of America was a proposal sponsored by our fourth President, James Monroe—the Monroe Doctrine—and its impact was sweeping: That we would not permit any foreign government to establish itself in our hemisphere. We wanted only governments that were free, as we in America.

The issue before this free American Congress today is freedom itself.

The Nicaraguan Government, as everybody knows, has violated that Monroe Doctrine. A native, leftwing group—the Sandinistas—forcefully

took over the Somoza government. But they only did so by promising the Organization of American States that they would establish a free democratic government that would include other parties, that free elections would be held, and that would include persons representing all groups in the nation.

But those promises were quickly shoved aside, and the government of the Ortega boys promptly forgot their promises to the Nicaraguan people—about freedom. Within a short time Nicaragua has become a totalitarian, Communist regime—a total violation of the Monroe Doctrine.

In a continent reserved especially for freedom the leader of Nicaragua forced a Soviet, Communist, Marxist government within 2 driving days of the United States of America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DONALD E. LUKENS].

Mr. DONALD E. LUKENS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, it is a very difficult decision for everybody in the House today. I want it known that although I really do hate communism, I do not hate Communists.

I am saddened by the fact that we in this body probably were split philosophically to begin with, but, after nine trips in 14 months to Central America, I am more convinced than ever that the regime in Nicaragua is a Communist dictatorship, and they intend to stay Communist and will never give up their power over the army.

It is the only country in the world, that I know of, where a political party has an army. The army does not belong to the people of Nicaragua, it does not belong to the Government of Nicaragua, it belongs to the Sandinista political party.

That is rather unusual that a party would want an army, but that is the power that Ortega says, graphically, he will not give up.

We met three times now with the Permanent Commission on Human Rights in Nicaragua and all the executive committee of that permanent commission now says that they have documentary evidence of 12,400 prisoners, some of whom have not been allowed to see anybody for 7 years.

I think a country whose government has such a sad record in human rights, on that basis alone, should be subject to some kind of pressure.

Thousands of people that eight of us marched with in Leon 6 weeks ago—and I revisited just this last weekend, 3 days ago—literally hundreds of them, came to me on their own and said that we would not be marching today if it were not for the Contras; we would not have any freedom to assemble; there would be no freedom of

religion, certainly no freedom of press or speech if it were not for the military pressure in addition to the economic and political pressure.

I would hope that this House today would see fit, in its wisdom and vision for America, to vote for peace and freedom.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, like the cartoon says, the Sandinistas want peace in Central America—and then a piece of Costa Rica, a piece of El Salvador and a piece of Honduras.

We hear the slick phrase, "Give peace a chance." But let's remember to give freedom a chance.

Does anyone really believe the Sandinistas were giving freedom a chance when they accepted \$450 million in military aid from the Soviets last year?

If America does not stand up for freedom in our own hemisphere, 2 hours by air from our border, then when will we support freedom?

Last summer our family visited the Statue of Liberty. On its base is etched a quote by José Martí, the father of Cuban independence. It says, "Liberty costs a great price, and one must either resign himself to live without it or decide to pay its price."

Freedom is never free, Mr. Chairman, and I urge my colleagues to recognize that and then vote in favor of the President's request.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 6 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this request for aid to the Contras. I think that it is useful in reviewing this proposal to put it to two tests.

The first test is: Does the policy work on the ground in Nicaragua? And is it likely to succeed? This is a military action by soldiers that we are supporting and I think that as we think about whether or not they could militarily succeed, putting aside the CIA reports and even our own defense reports that say they are unlikely to overthrow the Sandinistas, it is important to review a little history of our involvement in Nicaragua.

The United States has invaded Nicaragua 12 times in history. If you go back to the CONGRESSIONAL RECORDS of the 1920's and 1930's it sounds an awful lot like the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of today, and if you look at the old newspapers from those periods you will see that the headlines remind you of the headlines of today. So to the people of Nicaragua, the people that were involved in those times, this is nothing new.

□ 1700

I think a second fact we must recognize is that in the late 1970's, when this country underwent a revolution,

50,000 Nicaraguans lost their lives. This is a country of about 3.3 million, and if we remember, in the Vietnam conflict we lost about 50,000 people. On almost any day you can drive by the Vietnam Memorial here and get a sense of what that conflict and that loss of life meant in this country. So we can imagine what that meant in Nicaragua when we begin thinking about whether or not a military solution to the problem is something that can work on the ground in Nicaragua.

So I simply submit, on the basis of that anecdotal evidence and the evidence we see from our own military and our own Central Intelligence Agency, that having a military policy and a military solution to our problems is not likely to succeed.

I think the next thing we should look at is this: Does the policy reach the goals and the vital interests of the United States. On this point I think there has been some confusion, because we have many different goals that are enunciated by the administration. I think we should try to better articulate what our goals are. I think there are two. I think we have two vital interests in Nicaragua. The first is to reduce the foreign military influences in that country, certainly Soviet, Cuban, Libyan, whatever foreign military influence is in this country, and the second is to keep the Sandinistas from interfering with their neighbors, with many of whom we have treaties and obligations. If we put this policy against that test—what are our goals, and are we reaching them?—I think Members would agree with me that we are not.

Previous speakers on the other side have said that we just cannot negotiate with Communists. Certainly there are people in our country who have that view. I do not think the President has that view. If he did have that view, he would not be negotiating with Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. If he did have that view, he would not be negotiating with the Chinese on a variety of subjects. And I believe that the President has even said that the Contras are in the field in order to put pressure on the Sandinistas so that we can get to negotiations to resolve and reconcile our vital interests.

Mr. Chairman, if that is our goal, then what are the people in the region who are leading the effort and working to make this effort come about saying about Contra aid? President Arias, who is the author of the live and viable plan of the moment, said, when he received his Nobel Peace Prize, that President Reagan knows very well—and I quote—“that the Contras are the problem and not the solution.” And yesterday the people who have been active in the Contadora process said this:

We urgently call upon the countries with ties or interests in the region to halt unconditionally, unilaterally, and immediately any actions aimed at destabilization or any type of aid to irregular forces, as is established in the San Jose Declaration for the Attainment of Peace and Democracy in Central America.

In conclusion, I would say, let us give peace a chance. Let us give the people in the region a chance. We have been trying the military solution for 6 years now. Let us give the other way a chance. Let us give life to the words of a great American uttered about his brother when he said, “We see wrong and try to right it, we see suffering and try to heal it, and we see war and try to stop it.”

Mr. Chairman, we have tried the military solution. Let us try something else. Let us give peace a chance. Let us not give this aid to the Contras.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, in regard to the gentleman from Missouri's point about negotiating with the Communist Sandinistas, I would like to ask the gentleman, when in the history of the 20th century have we negotiated with Communists—whether they be Soviet Communists or Chinese Communists—from a position of weakness?

We are in a position of weakness if we pull the rug out from the precise force that has brought us to the present state in Nicaragua today.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RITTER. I will yield in a moment.

I think it is highly unrealistic for a candidate for the Presidency of the United States to talk about negotiating with a known Communist regime in Nicaragua from a position of weakness. I yield now to the gentleman on this question.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, reluctantly, I yield myself 1 additional minute.

Mr. Chairman, let me say to the gentleman that I think it is ridiculous to say that we do not negotiate with the Sandinistas from a position of strength. It is a country of 3 million people, close to the American border. It has very few troops. Its economy is in a shambles. It is in absolute disorder and disarray from every viewpoint we can look at, and to say that the United States does not negotiate with this country from a position of strength is to misunderstand every fact of modern life.

We negotiated with the Soviets and we did it from a position of strength, and we negotiate with the Sandinistas from a position of strength. To say

otherwise is simply not to be in touch with reality.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to point out that Cuba was a very small country, and that we certainly were in a position of strength 60 miles from Cuba. However, Cuba had built the largest military force in this hemisphere, with Soviet assistance. And, Cuba continues to conduct surveillance up and down the east coast of the United States.

Nicaragua would do the same. We were never able to deal with Cuba. When the Soviets brought in a brigade and President Carter had some objection, we simply dropped the issue. We have not been able to deal with the Cubans at all.

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RITTER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. CHANDLER].

Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding.

I think the point here is that if the Contras are gone, it is our troops that will create that strength. I think our friends on the other side of the aisle ought to clarify that. Is that what they are saying that that ought to be the final strength here?

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I would say to the gentleman that I believe that is exactly what the gentleman from Missouri is saying.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. HUCKABY].

Mr. HUCKABY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I must respectfully disagree with my friend and colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, on this issue. He spoke about the history and what has happened in the world. I would like to review some of the lessons of history.

If we go back to the Bolshevik revolution, the Communists did not immediately seize power then. There was a struggle for a number of years between the Red army and the White army, the Red army eventually winning out. If we look at the years since then, not a single country that has gone Communist chose to do so in free elections. The choice has always been by force. If we look at the success of these Communist countries, we cannot point to one that has been an economic success. They are all economic failures, and these economic failures are scattered here and there throughout the world.

The choice today is not between peace and war. We all want peace regardless of what side of this issue we are on. We all want peace. The choice is what we want in Nicaragua, what the people in Nicaragua want, and what that country will look like in the year 2000 and beyond.

As has been pointed out, the Sandinistas are making concessions today, but why are they making concessions? They are making concessions out of necessity. They are making concessions as a result of the Contras and as a result of our aid in the past few years. We need to see this process through. Now is not the time to abandon the Contras. We need to evolve to a situation where the people in Nicaragua have a true choice. There have been no suggestions made by Ortega yet that he is willing to have free elections throughout the country for a parliament or a congress supervised by the United Nations or that he is willing to have free elections throughout the country for a President chosen by the people.

Today we are engaged in discussions with the Soviets regarding Afghanistan, about them pulling their troops and their military support out of that country in return for us giving up our support to the Afghan rebels. Can we not expect that we can see at least that much here in our own hemisphere?

Mr. Chairman, I think we should vote yes on this issue. We should demand that.

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentlewoman from New York [Ms. SLAUGHTER].

Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to again address the issue of continued aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.

In the past few days alone, my office has been swamped with letters, telegrams, petitions, and phone calls from constituents and other citizens from all over the country who want to give the peace process a chance. People who feel as strongly as I do that our policies in Central America have been wrong. Every congressional office has received a copy of a letter, which I have asked to be included in the Extensions of Remarks from today's debate, signed by over 381 members of the clergy who represent every major denomination in the country. The message of the spiritual leaders of our Nation is clear: Support the peace process; vote no on continued aid to the Contras.

Not since Vietnam has an issue sparked such an outpouring from the American people.

The President's zeal to aid the Contras has led the United States to pursue illegal activities in violation of our own laws and in violation of international laws.

How can we purport to be advancing the cause of democracy when our own administration's policies have shown such disrespect for the democratic process. We should be setting a better example.

For years we have meddled in the affairs of Central America. Isn't it time to allow the people of the region the freedom to determine their own future? The peace plan developed by President Oscar Arias, for which he received the Nobel Peace Prize, calls for an end to all outside interference—from the United States, from the Soviet Union, from Cuba. It represents the wishes of the Central American people and we should abide by it.

The people of the United States have made their views clear. The people of Central America have made their views clear. In the true spirit of democracy, it is time for us to listen.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to submit for inclusion in the RECORD from today's debate the following letter which has been signed by members of the clergy from every major denomination in the United States.

FEBRUARY 1, 1988.

A STATEMENT ON CONTRA AID

We, the undersigned religious leaders, urge Congress to defeat any proposed new aid to the armed Nicaraguan opposition known as the Contras.

As men and women of faith who have leadership responsibilities within our religious bodies, we seek United States policies in Central America that are consistent with a deep sense of morality and justice, policies that rely upon diplomacy rather than the force of arms. We support the Guatemala peace accords and the ongoing peace process in the region. Sending additional aid to the Contras in any form or any amount would violate the Central American peace plan and contravene the expressed wishes of President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica. The immoral Contra war policy must finally be ended.

We ask all Senators and Representatives to vote against the request for new aid to the Contras on February 3 and 4.

AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES, USA

Dr. Chester J. Jump, Jr., Interim General Secretary, American Baptist Churches, USA.

Dr. William K. Cober, Executive Director, National Ministries.

Dr. Donald G. Taylor, Executive Director, International Ministries.

Dr. Daniel E. Weiss, Executive Director, Educational Ministries.

Dr. Dean R. Wright, Executive Director, Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board.

Rev. Kathryn W. Baker, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of the Niagara Frontier.

Dr. J. Ralph Beaty, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of the Great Rivers Region.

Rev. Helen Louise Bowser, Minister of Church and Ministry, American Baptist Churches of Rhode Island.

Rev. Donald H. Crosby, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Rhode Island.

Dr. Telfer L. Epp, Executive Minister, Mid-American Baptist Churches (Iowa & Minnesota).

Rev. Robert A. Fisher, Executive Minister, Ohio Baptist Convention.

Rev. Carl E. Flemister, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Metropolitan New York.

Dr. Heinz H. Grabia, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Nebraska.

Rev. Sumner M. Grant, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of New York State.

Dr. Carlton B. Goodwin, Executive Minister, The Pittsburgh Baptist Association.

Rev. Pedro Hernandez, Executive Minister, Baptist Churches of Puerto Rico.

Dr. Paul T. Losh, Executive Minister, Vermont Baptist State Convention.

Dr. Calvin L. Moon, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Maine.

Dr. Walter Parrish, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of the South.

Dr. Robert D. Rasmussen, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of the West.

Dr. Robert H. Roberts, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Connecticut.

Rev. Carrol A. Turner, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of Monroe Association.

Rev. Larry K. Waltz, Executive Minister, Philadelphia Baptist Association.

Rev. George D. Younger, Executive Minister, American Baptist Churches of New Jersey.

CHURCH OF THE BRETHREN

William A. Hayes, Moderator.

Donald E. Miller, General Secretary.

Elaine Sollenberger, Moderator Elect.

Ronald D. Beachley, Executive, District of Western Pennsylvania.

Donald R. Booz, Executive, District of Florida and Puerto Rico.

Gordon W. Bucher, Executive, District of Northern Ohio.

Helen Constable, Associate Executive, District of Western Pennsylvania.

Janice M. Eller, Executive, District of Oregon and Washington.

Warren M. Eshbach, Executive District of Southern Pennsylvania.

Pamela T. Farrell, Associate Executive Mid-Atlantic District.

Ronald D. Finney, Associate Executive District of Northern Indiana.

Sylvus D. Flora, Executive, District of West Marva.

Martin A. Gauby, Executive, District of Idaho.

Larry W. Glick, Associate Executive, District of Shenandoah.

Terry Hatfield, Associate Executive, District of Northern Indiana.

Robert D. Kettering, Associate Executive, Atlanta Northeast District.

James L. Kinsey, Executive, District of Michigan.

Joseph M. Mason, Executive, District of Southern Ohio.

James E. Miller, Executive, District of Northern Plains.

Carl E. Myers, Executive, District of Illinois and Wisconsin.

Carroll M. Petry, Executive, District of South/Central Indiana.

Ronald D. Petry, Executive, Mid-Atlantic District.

Doris M. Quarles, Associate Executive, District of Virginia.

Merlin G. Shull, Executive, District of Shenandoah.

Ronald and Shirley Spire, Co-Executives, Southeastern District.

Irven and Pattie Stern, Co-Executives, District of Pacific Southwest.

Owen G. Stultz, Executive, District of Virginia.

James E. Tomlinson, Executive, District of Southern Missouri and Arkansas.

John D. Tomlinson, Executive, District of Western Plains.

Randall L. Yoder, Executive, District of Middle Pennsylvania.

Herbert D. Zeiler, Executive, District of Southern Plains.

Earl K. Ziegler, Executive, Atlantic Northeast District.

EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AMERICA
Bishop Herbert Chilstrom, Evangelical Lutheran Church in America.

Bishop John Adam, Slovak Zion Synod.

Bishop Harry S. Anderson, Northern Wisconsin-Upper Michigan Synod.

Bishop Dennis A. Anderson, Nebraska Synod.

Bishop J. Roger Anderson, Southern California.

Bishop James S. Aull, South Carolina Synod.

Bishop Darold H. Beekman, Southwestern Minnesota Synod.

Bishop L. David Brown, Northeastern Iowa Synod.

Bishop Guy S. Edmiston, Jr., Lower Susquehanna Synod.

Bishop Lowell O. Erdahl, East Metropolitan Minnesota Synod.

Bishop Lavern G. Franzen, Florida Synod.

Bishop Stefan T. Guttormsson, Southwestern Wisconsin Synod.

Bishop Lawrence L. Hand, Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod.

Bishop Wesley N. Haugen, Eastern North Dakota Synod.

Bishop Mark B. Herbener, Northern Texas-Northern Louisiana Synod.

Bishop Reginald H. Holle, Western Michigan Synod.

Bishop Robert L. Isaksen, New England Synod.

Bishop E. Harold Jansen, Metropolitan Washington Synod.

Bishop Herluf M. Jensen, New Jersey Synod.

Bishop John P. Kaitschuk, Central/Southern Illinois Synod.

Bishop Robert W. Kelly, Northeastern Ohio Synod.

Bishop Ralph A. Kempinski, Indiana-Kentucky Synod.

Bishop Gerhard I. Knutson, West-Central Wisconsin Synod.

Bishop Charles H. Maahs, Missouri-Kansas Synod.

Bishop A. Donald Main, Upper Susquehanna Synod.

Bishop Rafael Malpica-Padilla, Caribbean Synod.

Bishop Lowell H. Mays, South Central Wisconsin Synod.

Bishop Curtis H. Miller, Western Iowa Synod.

Bishop Milton R. Reisen, Eastern Michigan Synod.

Bishop Peter Rogness, Southeastern Wisconsin Synod.

Bishop Robert H. Studtmann, Arkansas-Oklahoma Synod.

Bishop Paul R. Swanson, Oregon Synod.

Bishop Sherman Hicks, Metropolitan Chicago Synod.

Bishop Harold S. Weiss, Northeastern Pennsylvania Synod.

Bishop Wayne E. Weissenbuehler, Rocky Mountain Synod.

Bishop Paul M. Werger, Southeastern Iowa Synod.

Bishop David C. Wold, Southeastern Washington Synod.

Bishop Morris Zumbrun, Maryland Synod.

PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.)

The Rev. James E. Andrews, Stated Clerk of the General Assembly.

The Rev. Frederick J. Beebe, Synod Executive, Synod of Southern California and Hawaii.

The Rev. Robert L. Brashear, Chair, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

The Rev. Linda B. Brebner, Associate Executive, Synod of Lincoln Trails.

Mildred M. Brown, Associate, Women's Unit.

The Rev. Vernon S. Broyles III, Director, Church and Public Issues.

The Rev. Tom Castlen, Executive, Presbytery of the Cascades.

The Rev. Clarence L. Cave, Associate for Racial Justice and Black Mission Development.

The Rev. George A. Chauncey, Deputy Director, Washington Office.

The Rev. Robert E. Coleman, Associate Executive, Synod of the Trinity.

The Rev. Robert T. Cuthill, Synod Executive, Synod of Lakes and Prairies.

The Rev. Gary Demarest, Member, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

Mary B. Diboll, Associate, Women's Unit.

Dorothy J. Doherty, Chair, Presbyterian Peacemaking Committee (Middle Tennessee).

The Rev. William J. Fogleman, Synod Executive, Synod of the Sun.

Ollie Gannaway, Associate, Presbyterian Peacemaking Program.

Carole Goodspeed, Staff Executive, Committee on Women's Concerns.

The Rev. Benjamin F. Gutierrez, Associate for South America.

The Rev. Dieter T. Hessel, Director, Committee on Social Witness Policy.

The Rev. Elenora Giddings Ivory, Chair, Committee on Social Witness Policy.

The Rev. Brad Kent, Chair, Synod of Mid-America Committee for Peacemaking.

The Rev. Richard Killmer, Director, Presbyterian Peacemaking Program.

Pam Laing, Moderator, Synod of the Sun.

The Rev. Lewis H. Lancaster, Jr., Associate Director, Global Mission Ministry Unit.

The Rev. Jorge Lara-Braud, Member, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

The Rev. John B. Lindner, Coordinator, New York Liaison Office.

Mary Ann Lundy, Director, Women's Unit.

The Rev. John D. MacLeod, Jr., Administrator, Raleigh Office for Synod D.

Dr. Belle Miller McMaster, Director, Social Justice & Peacemaking Unit.

The Rev. Bernadine McRipley, Executive, Newark Presbytery, Synod of the Northwest.

Jeanne C. Marshall, National President, Presbyterian Women.

The Rev. Robert D. Miller, Director, Education and Congregational Nurture Unit.

Margaret R. Montgomery, Interim Associate for World Service.

Clara Morgan, Scioto Valley Presbytery Women's Unit.

The Rev. George P. Morgan, Synod Executive, Synod of the Covenant.

Harriet Nelson, Member, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

Alice Nishi, Associate, Women's Unit.

The Rev. Kent Organ, Member, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

Mary Jane Patterson, Director, Washington Office.

Patricia M. Roach, Director, Evangelism and Church Development.

Dr. Isabel Rogers, Presbyterian School of Christian Education.

The Rev. Janet Schlerke, Associate, Synod of Rocky Mountains.

The Rev. Robert F. Smylie, Director, United Nations Office.

S. David Stoner, Executive Director, General Assembly Council.

The Rev. Charles A. Summers, Member, 1987-88 Presbyterian Task Force on Central America.

The Rev. David Tomlinson, Synod Executive, Synod of the Rocky Mountains.

The Rev. Eugene G. Turner, Synod Executive, Synod of the Northeast.

The Rev. Otis Turner, Coordinator, Black Justice.

Patricia Gill-Turner, Associate, Committee for Women of Color.

Elizabeth H. Verdesi, Associate for Council on Women and the Church.

The Rev. James Watkins, Associate Director, Presbyterian Peacemaking Program.

The Rev. Robert H. White, Associate for Presbytery Services, Synod of Mid-America.

The Rev. John L. William, Synod Executive, Synod of Mid-America.

The Rev. Sylvia Wilson, Associate, Racial Ethnic Unit.

The Rev. David L. Zuverink, Associate, Human Services.

United Methodist Church.

Edsel A. Ammons, Bishop, the West Ohio Area.

James M. Ault, Bishop, the Pittsburgh Area.

Edwin C. Boulton, Bishop, the Dakotas Area.

Roy C. Clark, Bishop, the South Carolina Area.

Judith Craig, Bishop, the Michigan Area.

Jessee R. Dewitt, Bishop, the Chicago Area.

Ernest T. Dixon, Jr., Bishop, the San Antonio Area.

R. Kern Eutsler, Bishop, the Holston Area.

Elias G. Galvan, Bishop, the Phoenix Area.

William B. Grove, Bishop, the West Virginia Area.

Joyce Hamlin, Executive Secretary for Public Policy Women's Division.

W. T. Handy, Jr., Bishop, the Missouri Area.

Pat Callbeck Harper, Chair, Section of Christian Social Relations.

J. Woodrow A. Hearn, Bishop, the Nebraska Area.

Kenneth W. Hicks, Bishop, the Kansas Area.

Leroy C. Hodapp, Bishop, the Indiana Area.

Earl G. Hunt, Jr., Bishop, the Florida Area.

Neil L. Irons, Bishop, the New Jersey Area.

Ed Iwamoto, Superintendent, the Vancouver (WA) District, Chair, Department of Peace and World Order, General Board of Church and Society.

Reuben P. Job, Bishop, the Iowa Area.

L. Bevel Jones, III, Bishop, the Charlotte Area.

Leontine T.C. Kelly, Bishop, the San Francisco Area.

J. Lloyd Knox, Bishop, the Birmingham Area.

David J. Lawson, Bishop, the Wisconsin Area.

Carolyn Marshall, President, Women's Division.

Calvin D. McConnell, Bishop, the Portland Area.

C.P. Minnick, Jr., Bishop, the Raleigh Area.

Robert C. Morgan, Bishop, the Jackson Area.

Donna Morton Stout, Associate General Secretary, General Board of Church and Society.

Roy I. Sano, Bishop, the Denver Area.

F. Herbert Skeete, Bishop, the Philadelphia Area.

Forrest C. Stith, Bishop, the New York Area.

Melvin G. Talbert, Bishop, the Seattle Area.

James S. Thomas, Bishop, the Ohio East Area.

Jack Tuell, Bishop, the Los Angeles Area.

C. Dale White, Bishop, the New York Area.

Woodie W. White, Bishop, the Illinois Area.

Joseph H. Yeakel, Bishop, the Washington Area.

UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST

Rev. Avery D. Post, President, UCC/New York.

Ms. Marilyn M. Breitling, Coordinator, UCC/Coordinating Center for Women.

Rev. Carol Joyce Brun, Secretary, UCC/New York.

Ms. Beverly Chain, Director, UCC/Office of Communication.

Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Executive Director, UCC/Commission for Racial Justice.

Rev. Yvonne V. Delk, Executive Director, UCC/Office for Church in Society.

Rev. Scott S. Libbey, Executive Vice President, UCC/United Church Board for World Ministries.

Rev. Jay Lintner, Director, Washington Office.

Mr. Charles H. Lockyear, Director of Finance and Treasurer.

Mr. Charles Shelby Rooks, Executive Vice President, UCC/United Church Board for Homeland Ministries.

Ms. Patricia J. Rumer, Regional Secretary Latin America/Caribbean.

Rev. Reuben A. Sheares II, Executive Director, UCC/Office for Church Life and Leadership.

Rev. Robert Sherard, Moderator, UCC/Jamaica.

Rev. Jaime, Rivera Soler, Executive Secretary, United Evangelical Church of Puerto Rico.

Rev. Martha Ann Baumer, Conference Minister, Illinois South Conference.

Rev. Charles L. Burns, Conference Minister, Florida Conference.

Rev. Carole C. Carlson, Conference Minister, New Hampshire Conference.

Rev. W. Sterling Cary, Conference Minister, Illinois Conference.

Rev. William Delke, Associate Conference Minister, Maine Conference.

Rev. Thomas E. Dipko, Conference Minister, Ohio Conference.

Rev. Peter B. Doghramji, Conference Minister, Pennsylvania Southeast Conference.

Rev. A. Gayle Engel, Conference Minister, Kansas-Oklahoma Conference.

Rev. Robert D. Fiske, Conference Minister, New Hampshire Conference.

Rev. Donald A. Gall, Conference Minister, Iowa Conference.

Rev. W. James Halfaker, Conference Minister, Washington North Idaho Conference.

Rev. H. Daehler Hayes, Conference Minister, Rhode Island Conference.

Rev. Clarence M. Higgins, Jr., Conference Minister, Nebraska Conference.

Rev. David Jamieson, Conference Minister, Northern California Conference.

Rev. Carroll E. Kann, Conference Minister, Connecticut Conference.

Rev. Teruo Kawata, Conference Minister, Hawaii Conference.

Rev. Carole G. Keim, Conference Minister, Southwest Conference.

Rev. Zoltan Kiraly, Bishop, Calvin Synod.

Rev. Rueben P. Koehler, Conference Minister, Missouri Conference.

Rev. Ron Kurtz, Conference Minister, New York Conference.

Rev. Murdale C. Leysath, Conference Minister, Minnesota Conference.

Rev. Philip Joseph Mayher, Conference Minister, New Hampshire Conference.

Rev. Edwin Mehlhaff, Conference Minister, South Dakota Conference.

Rev. Clyde H. Miller, Jr., Conference Minister, Rocky Mountain Conference.

Rev. D. Curtis Minter, Conference Minister, Vermont Conference.

Rev. Donald E. Overlook, Conference Minister, Penn Northeast Conference.

Rev. Ralph C. Quellhorst, Conference Minister, Indiana-Kentucky Conference.

Rev. Fred P. Register, Conference Minister, Southern California Conference.

Rev. Marwood E. Retting, Conference Minister, North Dakota Conference.

Rev. Paul B. Robinson, Associate for Justice, Southwest Conference.

Rev. Eugene Rose, Associate Conference Minister, Central Pacific Conference.

Rev. Rollin O. Russell, Conference Minister, Southern Conference.

Rev. John M. Schaeffer, Conference Minister, Montana-Northern Wyoming Conference.

Rev. Donald J. Severson, Conference Minister, Central Pacific Conference.

Rev. Horace Sills, Interim Conference Minister, Southeast Conference.

Rev. James Tomasek, Conference Minister, South Central Conference.

Rev. Frederick R. Trost, Conference Minister, Wisconsin Conference.

Rev. Lyle J. Weible, Conference Minister, Penn Central Conference.

Rev. Alfred E. Williams, Jr., Conference Minister, Massachusetts Conference.

Rev. Don Yungclas, Conference Minister, Michigan Conference.

Rev. Bernie Zerkel, Interim Conference Minister, Central Atlantic Conference.

ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Most Reverend Raymond G. Hunthausen, Archbishop of Seattle.

Most Reverend John J. Fitzpatrick, Bishop of Brownsville.

Most Reverend Joseph L. Imesch, Bishop of Joliet.

Most Reverend Raymond A. Lucker, Bishop of New Ulm.

Most Reverend Albert H. Ottenweller, Bishop of Steubenville.

Most Reverend John P. Snyder, Bishop of St. Augustine.

Most Reverend Walter F. Sullivan, Bishop of Richmond.

Most Reverend Donald Pelotte, S.S.S. Co-adjutor, Bishop of Gallop.

Most Reverend Dale J. Melczek, Auxiliary Bishop of Detroit.

Most Reverend P. Francis Murphy, Auxiliary Bishop of Baltimore.

Most Reverend Peter A. Rosazza, Auxiliary Bishop of Hartford.

Most Reverend Nicholas D'Antonio, Vicar General, Archdiocese of New Orleans.

Most Reverend Thomas J. Gumbleton, Archdiocese of Detroit.

Most Reverend Charles A. Buswell, Bishop of Pueblo, ret.

Sr. Ann Carville, OSF, Executive Director, Franciscan Federation of the Brothers and Sisters of the United States.

Sr. Margaret Byrne, CSJP, General Superior, Congregation of St. Joseph of Peace.

Sr. Anne O'Neil, RSCJ, Provincial Superior, Society of the Sacred Heart, St. Louis, MO.

Sr. Margaret Nulty, SC, Associate Director Leadership Conference of Women Religions.

The Provincial Council of the School Sisters of Notre Dame, Baltimore Province.

Reverend Steven Tutas, President, Conference of Major Superiors of Men.

Reverend Walter L. Farrell, SJ, President, Jesuit Conference.

Reverend Alan McCoy, OFM, Executive Director, Franciscan Conference.

Reverend Howard Grey, SJ, Vice-President, Conference of Major Superiors of Men.

Reverend Roland Faley, Executive Director, Conference of Major Superiors of Men.

Luise Ahrens, MM, President of Maryknoll Sisters, Maryknoll, NY.

Patricia Johnson, OP, Overseas Prioress, Adrian Dominican Sisters, Michigan.

Barbara Karl, SND, Sisters of Notre Dame de Namur, Maryland Province.

Miriam Therese Larkin, CSJ, President, Sisters of St. Joseph of Carondelet, St. Louis, MO.

Sheila McGinnis, SCMM, Sector Superior, Medical Mission Sisters, Philadelphia, PA.

Margaret O'Shea, IHM, Provincial Councilor, Sisters Servants of the Immaculate Heart of Mary, Monroe, MI.

Janet Marie Peterworth, OSU, General Councilor of the Ursuline Sisters of the Immaculate Conception, Louisville, KY.

CHRISTIAN CHURCH (DISCIPLES OF CHRIST)

Dr. John O. Humbert, General Minister and President, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Indianapolis, IN.

Rev. Claudia E. Grant, Deputy General Minister and President, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Indianapolis, IN.

Dr. William J. Nottingham, President, Division of Overseas Ministries, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Indianapolis, IN.

Rev. David C. Downing, Regional Minister/President, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ), Greater Kansas City.

Rev. A. Guy Waldrop, General Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Kentucky.

Rev. Charles E. Crank, Jr., Regional Minister Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in West Virginia.

Rev. Stephen V. Cranford, Regional Minister Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) of Mid-America, Inc.

Dr. Nathan S. Smith, Regional Minister and President, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Illinois and Wisconsin.

Dr. Mark K. Reid, Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Oregon.

Rev. David A. Vargas, Executive Secretary, Latin America and the Caribbean Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Rev. Carl R. Flock, Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Alabama-Northwest Florida.

Dr. Margaret Owen Clark, Regional Pastor, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) of the Pacific Southwest Region.

Rev. Cathy Hopkins, Moderator, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) of the Pacific Southwest Region.

Dr. Eugene N. Frazier, Executive Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Oklahoma.

Rev. Bruce L. Jones, Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Arizona.

Rev. William Chris Hobgood, Executive Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Arkansas.

Dr. Howard B. Goodrich Jr., Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Indiana.

Rev. James C. Suggs, Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in the Southwest.

Dr. Robert K. Welsh, Vice President, Council on Christian Unity, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Rev. Dwight L. French, General Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) in Pennsylvania.

Rev. Frank C. Mabee, Coastal Plains Area Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Rev. Charles F. Lamb, Regional Minister, Northeastern Region, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Dr. Jimmie L. Gentle, Regional Minister, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

Rev. Ralph L. Smith, Regional Minister/President, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ) Kansas.

Rev. Rolland G. Pfile, Executive for Church in Society, Division of Homeland Ministries, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

UNITARIAN UNIVERSALIST ASSOCIATION OF CHURCHES IN NORTH AMERICA

Rev. Dr. William F. Schulz, President.

Natalie W. Gulbrandsen, Moderator.

Rev. Dr. Eugene Pickett, President International Association for Religious Freedom.

Rev. Dr. James Luther Adams, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University.

Rev. Dr. F. Forrester Church, New York, NY.

Rev. Dr. Kenneth T. MacLean, Trustee.

Rev. Arie R. Brouwer, General Secretary, National Council of Churches of Christ.

Dr. Jane Cary Peck, Vice-President, National Council of Churches of Christ.

The Rev. Leonid Kishkovsky, Ecumenical Office, The Orthodox Church in America.

The Most Rev. Metropolitan Philip Saliba, Archbishop Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America.

Dr. Edwin G. Mulder, General Secretary, Reformed Church in America.

The Rev. J. Ralph Shotwell, Executive Director, International Council of Community Churches.

Rev. Dale Bard, Conference Executive, Arkansas Conference of Churches and Synagogues.

Mr. Charles L. Jones, Executive Director, Southern California Ecumenical Council.

The Rev. John Moyer, Executive Director, Northern California Ecumenical Council.

Ms. Janine Chagoya, Program Director, Northern California Ecumenical Council.

Rev. Gilbert Horn, Executive Director, Colorado Council of Churches.

Rev. Stephen J. Sidorak, Jr., Executive Director, Christian Conference of Connecticut.

Rev. Donald E. Leiter, Executive Director, Georgia Christian Council.

Rev. James P. Ebberts, Executive Secretary, Illinois Conference of Churches.

Dr. P. Boyd Mather, Executive Coordinator, Iowa Interfaith Forum.

Ms. Roz Ostendorf, Program Coordinator, Iowa Inter-Church Agency for Peace and Justice.

Rev. Suzanne Peterson, Program Coordinator, Iowa Inter-Church Agency for Peace and Justice.

Mr. Paul Stanfield, Program Coordinator, Iowa Inter-Church Agency for Peace and Justice.

Ms. Dorothy G. Berry, Executive Coordinator, Kansas Ecumenical Ministries.

Rev. James L. Stovall, Executive Director, Louisiana Interchurch Conference.

Rev. Thomas C. Ewell, Executive Director, Maine Council of Churches.

Rev. Dr. James A. Nash, Executive Director, Massachusetts Council of Churches.

Rev. Diane C. Kessler, Associate Director, Massachusetts Council of Churches.

Rev. Dr. Gustav Kopka, Jr., Executive Director, Michigan Ecumenical Forum.

Rev. Charles W. Rawlings, Executive Director, New Jersey Council of Churches.

Rev. Dr. Wallace Ford, Executive Secretary, New Mexico Conference of Churches.

Rev. Collins Kilburn, Executive Director, North Carolina Council of Churches.

Rev. Carlton N. Weber, Executive Director, Ohio Council of Churches.

Rev. Rodney Page, Executive Director, Ecumenical Ministries of Oregon.

Rev. Dr. Richard C. Brown, Executive Director, Rhode Island State Council of Churches.

Rev. Frank H. Dietz, Executive Director, Texas Conference of Churches.

Rev. Loren Arnett, Executive Director, Washington Association of Churches.

Rev. Dr. William B. Cate, Executive Director, Churches Council of Greater Seattle.

Rev. John F. Price, Executive Director, West Virginia Council of Churches.

Rev. John D. Fischer, Executive Director, Wisconsin Conference of Churches.

Rev. Joan Campbell, Executive Director, U.S. Office, World Council of Churches.

Rev. J. Graley Taylor, Executive Director, Religious Broadcasting Commission.

Rev. John Magnuson, Campus Pastor, Covenant House, University of Washington.

Fr. Elias Stephanopoulos, Representative of Bishop Greek Orthodox Church.

The Rev. Richard G. Cunningham, Minister, University Christian Church.

Ms. Mary Walton, General Secretary, Friends General Conference.

Stephen G. Gary, Chairperson, American Friends Service Committee.

Edward Snyder, Executive Secretary, Friends Committee on National Legislation.

Winifred Walker-Jones, Presiding Clerk, Baltimore/Washington Yearly Meeting.

Ruth G. Crutchley, Executive Secretary, (Acting), Baltimore/Washington Yearly Meeting.

Richard W. Taylor, Clerk, Lake Erie Yearly Meeting.

William B. Kriebel, Presiding Clerk, New England Yearly Meeting.

Mary Foster Cadbury, Clerk, New England Yearly Meeting.

Samuel D. Caldwell, General Secretary, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting.

Rev. Jim Wallis, Sojourners Ministry Editor, Sojourners Magazine.

Rabbi Eugene Lipman, President, Central Conference of American Rabbis.

Rabbi Joseph Glaser, Executive Vice President, Central Conference of American Rabbis.

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

Al Vorspan, Vice President, Union of American Hebrew Congregations.

Rabbi David Saperstein, Director, Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism.

Eleanor Schwartz, Executive Director, National Federation of Temple Sisterhoods.

The Most Reverend Edmond L. Browning, Presiding Bishop and Primate, The Episcopal Church.

The Right Rev. John T. Walker, Bishop of Washington, The Episcopal Church.

Diana Paulsen, Executive Director, Reformed Church Women, Reformed Church in America.

Rev. Elizabeth Lunz, Associate for Women's Ministry Unit, Presbyterian Church USA.

Doris Anne Younger, General Director, Church Women United.

Sylvia Talbot, President, Church Women United.

Jean Miller, Associate Director of Women's Unit, Presbyterian Church USA.

Babette L. Hart, Executive Secretary, Moravian Church in North America.

Cornelia Swain, Cumberland Presbyterian Church.

Betty Gordon, Vice President of the Women's Division, Board of Global Ministries, United Methodist Church.

Marilyn M. Britting, Executive Director, Center for Women in Church and Society, United Church of Christ.

Janice R. Newborn, Department of Church Women, Christian Church (Disciples of Christ).

C. J. Malloy, Jr., General Secretary, Progressive National Baptist Convention.

J. Alfred Smith, Sr., President, Progressive National Baptist Convention.

Gordon Sommers, President, Provincial Elders Conference of Northern Province, Moravian Church in North America.

Howard Housman, Chairperson, Board of World Mission, Moravian Church in North America.

Theodore Wilde, Executive Director, Board of World Mission, Moravian Church in North America.

William Gramley, Executive Director, Board of Christian Education, Southern Province, Moravian Church in North America.

John Hurst Adams, Presiding Bishop, Second Episcopal District, African Methodist Episcopal Church.

Clinton R. Coleman, Presiding Bishop, Fifth Episcopal District, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.

Earl R. Johnson, General Secretary, African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church.

Mr. FOLEY, Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BUSTAMANTE].

Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. Chairman, I rise before my distinguished colleagues to speak in opposition to additional funding for the Nicaraguan resistance known as the Contras. I was one of those that supported the hundred million back in 1985. Before I go on, let me visit some of those figures as far as the enemy is concerned.

□ 1715

The enemy is supposed to be Nicaragua, a country of less than 3 million people, with 50 percent of that population under 15 years of age. The average per capita income in that country is \$500. That is the so-called enemy. Those are the people who we are supposedly fighting against. That is why we are helping the Contras.

The reason I bring you those figures is simply to tell you that for 6 years we have been fighting this country of less than 3 million people—6 years. I grant you that I have been one of those who has supported that effort.

We have given the Contras money and moral support and every opportunity to bring peace and democracy to Nicaragua.

By the way, those of you who talk about democracy, when you talk about free elections, do you want them like we have in Paraguay, or do you want them like we have in Chile, or do you want them like we have in Mexico where we know two years before the elections are held who the winner is going to be? Is that the type of election reform that we want in Central America, in Nicaragua?

Now, let us really give peace a chance. Let us support the Arias peace plan. Let us get behind the five Central American Presidents who have worked out a plan to bring order and peace to their own countries.

We must no longer act as a patron toward the leadership of these countries. Would we treat our European or Asian allies with such a domineering and paternalistic attitude? I believe we would not.

Let us no longer treat our friends and allies in Central America as banana republics. Let us end once and for all our patron attitude toward Central America. Let us give the leadership in these countries the dignity that they deserve and recognize their efforts to achieve peace. They have been good friends to the United States and if we allow them to determine the course of action in their own countries, they will continue to be strong and loyal supporters of this Nation.

I have been to these countries. I have talked with the leadership and the people. I have seen the misery in Nicaragua and that misery is shared by all of Central and South American countries. The people of these nations want the same things that people everywhere want. They want peace, prosperity, and the opportunity to arrive at their own solutions to their problems.

To continue the patron system is wrong. Let us no longer impose this way of life on our neighbors to the south. We must allow them the opportunity to determine their own destiny.

Let the peace process continue to move forward. Let us try a new respectful approach in our dealings with

the leadership of Central America. Let us no longer support the strong-arm militaristic tactics that have embodied our relationship with Central America. Banana republics no longer exist. Latin American countries deserve the same respect we accord Europe and other nations around the world. It is time to allow the leadership of Central America to come to a peaceful solution, and to give them the respect they deserve by supporting their efforts to bring peace and democracy to Central America.

Vote no on the Contra package.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that there remains 3 hours and 59 minutes of debate, divided in this fashion:

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY] has 1 hour and 56 minutes remaining.

The gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 2 hours and 3 minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time.

Mr. Chairman, something very disturbing has crept into this debate in the last few minutes, and that is we have heard talk all day about the Arias peace plan, which all of us feel is an important part of what is happening in Central America, but a lot of us know from conversations with President Arias that the implementation of the Rio Pact is a part of what he talks about when he talks about the possibility of failure of the situation in Central America under that peace plan. All of us know that the implementation of the Rio Pact means the introduction of American troops.

A few moments ago we heard one of the Presidential candidates of the Democratic Party come to this floor and talk about negotiating from strength based upon the use of our troops.

Now, I fear that we are now beginning to hear very distinctly what is being said in this Chamber by the opponents of this Contra aid package, that once the Contras are gone, if this whole thing does not work out the way they say it is going to work and if Ortega breaks the trust that they are now putting in him, American forces are the alternative in Central America. That is the unacceptable alternative.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH].

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, this is an epochal moment, a difficult day for all of us. The administration has made a good faith effort to reach a bipartisan accommodation with Congress yet this Member feels compelled to vote against further aid to the Con-

tras because the policies put in place neither conform to contemporary law nor historical American values.

From a legal perspective, the United States is not justified under any reasonable interpretation of international law to conduct a proxy war against a duly recognized government on the principle of tit-for-tatism. Terrorist acts against Nicaragua cannot be justified simply because the Sandinistas sponsor analogous acts against El Salvador.

The policy of symmetry of reciprocal anarchy—has the effect not only of lowering us into the policy gutter with our enemies but of driving a stake into the heart of international law.

History has shown time and again in Latin America that rightist intervention is neither a legal nor effective antidote to leftist radicalism. Simply put, it is counterproductive. The most profound base of popular support the Sandinistas currently maintain is their opposition to foreign intervention and their will to defend the sovereignty of the state against the anarchistic tactics of the Contras. The inescapable and ugly reality is that the hearts and minds of a repressed people will not be won by priest killers and crop burners. People power, as Cory Aquino has found, is more effectively advanced from within, not without; by citizens rubbed raw with personal grievances, not by armchair Rambos concerned more with the politics of their own society, than the social concerns of the developing world.

In 18th-century Europe it was taken for granted that kings were empowered not only to declare war but to grant Letters of Marque to privateers to harass enemies of the state. Believing such authority was too powerful to concentrate exclusively in the executive branch, our Founding Fathers stipulated in article 1 of the Constitution that the power to declare war is reserved to the people's body, Congress. And, in the only parallel to the modern day usage of proxy forces, they also determined that the power to "grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal" belonged exclusively to the Congress, not the executive.

Under our constitutional form of government the power to make war and its derivatives such as the power of reprisal were defined to be public rather than private functions. Statutory recognition of this phenomenon was reflected in the Neutrality Act, which dates back to 1794. Over the centuries, a large body of international law has been built up, to which the United States formally ascribes, prohibiting the initiation of hostile expeditions not only by governmental forces but by private persons within its territory against other nations.

Administration spokespeople have defended our policy in Central Amer-

ica by noting nothing in statutes like the Boland amendment curtailed the President's constitutional authorities as Commander in Chief. This is true, but it is also true that the amendment did not transfer to the White House powers reserved by the Constitution to the Congress. Designed as a constraint on executive authority, the Boland amendment stands as a kind of Gulf of Tonkin resolution in reverse, a congressional refusal to give the executive a blank check on policy in Central America.

There would be no congressional-executive confrontation today if there had been no stretching of the law yesterday.

Our republic was designed as a constitutional form of government, where even the chief executive can not authorize private citizens to break the law.

In the Contra situation, counterfeit "Letters of Marque" have been granted private citizens who in some cases appear to have spent more time and effort profiteering from friends than pillaging enemies. It's time for Congress to exercise its pursestring authority and cease supporting these modern day Hessians.

For decades there has been debate about whether the United States should play the role of policeman for the world, with some arguing that it is a chore for which we lack either a moral imprimatur or adequate resources to undertake. But a new dimension to this debate has been provided in Central America.

By its policies, the administration is suggesting that not only are we entitled to play the role of world policeman, but rather than enforcing the law, the interventionist cops American taxpayers are encouraged to support are themselves above the law.

So embarrassingly illegal have our policies become that our Government has been coerced into withdrawing from the jurisdiction of the World Court on this and similar political disputes, thus backtracking on an almost century-old U.S. commitment to utilization of an international tribunal for dispute resolution.

Liberals may have erred by believing the Sandinistas wouldn't opt in the direction of police state controls. Nevertheless, our country has an obligation to stand by the side of law and a constitutionalist foreign policy, with the understanding that not only do procedural concerns matter but that adherence to proper rules in the long run is more likely to produce proper results.

As the premier lawmaking assembly of our time, Congress has a particular obligation not to undercut the worth of law itself. It is the rule of law and the constitutional process, not a particular policy, which is on trial today.

The only conservative, the only constitutionalist option the House has

today is to cease providing illegal assistance to illegal groups advancing an illegal foreign policy.

The time has come to just say no to the drug war—not out of naively misplaced respect for the Sandinistas, but out of a realpolitick understanding of our own history and values.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RHODES].

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, we hear many themes recounted and recalled during the course of the debate on this aid, and one of them is, "Remember the lessons of Vietnam." This is a lesson which I sincerely agree that we should remember.

Unfortunately, those who continually recall Vietnam are those who would vote against this aid package and guarantee another Vietnam.

I approach the fear of repeating Vietnam from a different perspective than that of most Members, since I am one of the very few Members of this House who served in that war, in the country, on the ground, as an adviser to the South Vietnamese Army.

To me, the Vietnamese were real people, with names and jobs and families. They were friends.

In 1974, the 93d Congress cut off military assistance to South Vietnam. In 1975, peace came to South Vietnam. It was the peace of repression, of poverty, of imprisonment, of death, of slavery. Yes, peace came to Vietnam, and the 93d Congress paid a large and vital role in establishing that peace.

You do not remember Huynh Ngoc Son or Vo Dinh Loi, but I do. One of them was my interpreter, the other my military counterpart, and both were my friends. They worked for me, they worked for Americans, and they are either slaves or dead.

The lesson of Vietnam is that we can bring peace to Nicaragua and Central America, just as we did to Vietnam and Southeast Asia. All we have to do is cut off aid to the resistance, and the peace of Vietnam will settle over the region.

Do not let the 100th Congress repeat the mistakes of the 93d. Learn and remember the lesson of Vietnam. Let us not deliver to the people of Central America the peace of Southeast Asia.

Vote "yes" on the aid package.
Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HUGHES].

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, this House must once again take a stand on a matter of vital importance, not just for our Nation. But for the millions of people of this hemisphere whose lives will be affected by our actions. I believe the decision we make today on providing more arms for the Contras could very well, for good or ill, mark a historic turning point in our relations with our Central American neighbors.

The proponents of military aid to the Contras seek to cast the issue as a referendum on good against evil—either you vote for Ronald Reagan and freedom or you vote for Daniel Ortega and communism. But it is obvious to most of us, as it is obvious to the majority of the American people, that that is not the real choice facing us here. The real choice is whether to fully support a process at the negotiating table that, although imperfect, has brought Central America closer to peace, or to continue a course whose central theme relies on a military solution that is only likely to bring more war, grief, and misery to that beleaguered region.

The fact is that the Arias peace plan has brought the goal of peace within reach, something that seemed impossible just 6 months ago. Let's not kid ourselves—Nicaragua is not on anyone's list of pluralist democracies, and it has a long way to go to before it can be considered in full compliance with the Arias peace plan, as do Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. But the steps taken by the Government of Nicaragua have been substantial. The state of emergency and the ban on political demonstrations have been lifted; the opposition press has reopened; and the Sandinistas recently have dropped their adamant opposition and agreed to direct negotiations with the armed Contras.

Proponents of arms for the Contras argued for additional weaponry as an "insurance policy" for continued democratization by the Sandinistas. This proposal is not an insurance policy—but it could be a death warrant for the Arias peace plan. And the last-ditch offer by the administration to withhold the money for ammunition and weapons, if Congress passes a resolution finding Nicaragua in full compliance with the peace agreement, changes nothing; the so-called non-lethal aid in this resolution would still provide the Contras with over 25 million in aircraft, training, and communications. Together with money already in the pipeline, this would allow the Contras to continue waging war, and would be in direct violation of the terms agreed upon by the five Central American presidents, which we purport to encourage.

The contrast between 6 months under the Arias plan and 6 years of administration policies in Central America could not be clearer. The administration's policies have squandered a quarter of a billion dollars, and have produced 6 years of death and casualties, mostly for innocent Nicaraguan civilians. At home, their pursuit has produced a legacy of secret policies, shifting public rationales, and gross distortions and falsehoods. During the brief time since the signing of the Arias agreement last August, we have

witnessed an unprecedented and encouraging movement toward cooperation and amity in that region. Undoubtedly the flame of peace that has been kindled is still flickering, but we risk extinguishing that flame completely if we ignore the wishes of the Central American people and authorize military aid to the Contras today.

The sooner the administration recognizes that the Contras cannot single handedly bring peace to Central America, the sooner this country can begin addressing its legitimate security concerns in a realistic manner. If the main threat posed by Nicaragua to the United States is its potential use by the Soviets as a military base, then we should be confronting the Soviets directly with our concerns. Obviously, it is they, not the Sandinistas, who will decide whether or not to attempt so provocative an action. If the Soviets are really convinced that such a foolhardy course is in their national interest, who is prepared to argue that this package of aid for the Contras would persuade them to reconsider?

To approve further military aid to the Contras at this time would only give Daniel Ortega a reason to abandon the Arias plan, crack down on political dissent, and further militarize Nicaraguan society. To approve this proposal could also encourage the Contra leadership to obstruct the cease-fire negotiations now underway, in order to trigger the future release of additional aid. I say, let's hold the negotiator's feet to the fire and continue on the path that has been endorsed by President Arias and the governments of the Central American nations.

Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote against this resolution, and I hope that my colleagues will have the wisdom to do likewise. But if we reject this proposal, it will be our responsibility to make sure that the Contras are not simply abandoned. Like it or not, the Contras are largely the creation of the U.S. Government, are almost fully funded by the U.S. Government, and are under the ultimate control of the U.S. Government. To simply discard them without proper provision for their future integration into civilian life would be an unconscionable dereliction of our duty. I am frankly disappointed that we will not be allowed the opportunity to vote today on a package of short-term, humanitarian aid to the Contras. I believe that we in the Congress can do no less than to authorize true humanitarian aid, consisting of food, clothing, shelter, and medicine, and channeled through reputable international organizations.

And so, looking forward to the date in the near future when we can provide that humanitarian aid, I will cast my vote against the policies of protracted war, and in favor of sending a clear message to the world that we

want to give the Arias plan every opportunity to succeed. I urge this House to follow its conscience, and I remind my colleagues that a vote against arms for the Contras is not the end of freedom in Central America. It is, rather, the beginning of a new era based on cooperation and mutual respect for the legitimate interests of all the nations of the hemisphere.

□ 1730

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER], and I ask the gentleman first to yield briefly to me.

Mr. RITTER. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I would just say in response to the previous speaker that that is the whole point. We do not have another package here. We have one package and some sort of wistful idea that if we just hold off maybe something else will come to the floor.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to address my colleagues on the issue of support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

I get the sense that Democratic opponents of aid to the resistance demand absolute certainty, if not outright verbal declarations by the Sandinistas, of ill will. Somehow, if the Sandinistas say they are working for the betterment of the Nicaraguan people, almost anything they do is excusable. We keep waiting for promises to be fulfilled, but we've been waiting since 1979. Their rhetoric mirrors the rhetoric of totalitarian people's republics everywhere. They've had good teachers in Soviet, Cuban, and other East bloc backers.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes Members of Congress are accused of not listening when people are speaking. I think we have a case of that here today.

Why do we not listen to Daniel Ortega when he says " * * * in the hypothetical case that Sandinista Front lost an election, the Sandinista Front would hand over government, not power." (New York Times, Dec. 13, 1987.) Isn't he really saying that there is no such thing as a peace process, as some in this body envision it?

Why do we not listen when Tomas Borge—Nicaragua's Minister of Interior and member of the FSLN National Directorate, the Commander of the Revolution—when he says "This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought [his first battle]" (July 19, 1981 [at a military ceremony broadcast on Managua domestic service, as reported by FBIS, on July 21, 1981].)

Why do we not listen when Maj. Roger Miranda Begeocha—Chief of the Secretariat of the Nicaraguan Ministry of Defense and member of

the Sandinista Assembly—Central Committee—comes to the United States, a member of the Sandinista inner circle, an avowed Marxist-Leninist, the highest ranking official ever to defect from the Sandinistas, and tells us that he became disillusioned with what was happening to his country. The revolutionary dream had for him become a totalitarian nightmare.

From Miranda's eyes we have had a chance to look straight into the heart of the Sandinista government, and we have seen darkness.

Why can't we believe Major Miranda when he tells us that during the time the Arias peace plan was in effect, secret protocols were being signed between the Soviet Union and the Sandinista military? Why can't we believe him when he says:

"The Nicaraguan resistance (forces) are the legitimate representatives of the interests and hopes of the Nicaraguan people."

The Sandinistas intend to build an army and militia totaling 500,000 men.

The Soviet Union has promised to give the Sandinistas high-performance fighter aircraft, Mig-21's and additional Mi-25 HIND-D helicopter gunships.

The Sandinistas are expecting delivery of or may have already received many more armored personnel carriers, self-propelled howitzers, antitank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and anti-aircraft guns.

That the Sandinistas have no intention of complying with the Guatemala peace accords.

And the list goes on and on. Miranda offers a view of Sandinista actions and intentions that radically differs from their rhetoric.

Although the opposition has sought to discredit him because his case against them is devastating, the intelligence community, after checking and rechecking, has verified that his information is indeed genuine. He is the real article. He is speaking the truth.

If only all U.S. policymakers could react to Roger Miranda's information with the speed and certainty with which Humberto Ortega acted. Ortega knew what Miranda had seen, and he, in a move that could only be called self-destructive, felt compelled to admit to a massive Soviet-backed Sandinista military buildup, the size of which was heretofore considered fantasy.

Why do we not listen to our Costa Rican friends who in an editorial have said, " * * * what is at stake is the fate of the nations that border Nicaragua. Because if the resistance is weakened or disappears the Sandinista regime will direct all its energy, with ample Soviet aid, to its confessed objective of exporting its revolution" (Editorial, Jan. 29, 1988, La Nacion).

If the Communists in Nicaragua democratize, if they send home the Sovi-

ets, there is no need for aid to those who oppose them. The insurance policy for peace in the region and security for our Nation lies in democracy. Without free expression and dissent, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of mobility, free trade unions, and the list goes on, there's no real peace, only the "peace" of submission.

War by the Sandinistas against their people will continue even if things appear quiet. That's the nature of communism. The tortured in the Sandinista political prisons, where record numbers are held, don't get to hold press conferences with the New York Times. Without such democratization, we are threatened by a Soviet base in Nicaragua, like Cuba—but connected to fledgling democracies with porous borders—and vast numbers of refugees who can only vote with their feet.

The facts are before us, I urge my colleagues to consider the degree to which they are ignoring Sandinista wrongs and take a new look at their position in regards to support for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. MRAZEK].

Mr. MRAZEK. Mr. Chairman, tonight as we debate this issue the men will be coming out of the hills, and out of the mountains in Central America, to blow up things. They will be blowing up electrification facilities, they will be blowing up schools, they will be blowing up hospitals. They will be doing it in El Salvador, and some will call them terrorists for doing it. They will be doing it in Nicaragua tonight and some people will call them freedom fighters for doing it there.

Mr. Chairman, I ask some of my colleagues to imagine for a moment that through an accident of birth they were not blessed with the opportunity to be born in the United States of America and grew up to be Members of the U.S. Congress. But, instead through an accident of birth they were born campesinos, living in either El Salvador or Nicaragua. Imagine for a moment what they might have in the library inside their hut. It might come as a surprise to some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, but they do not have Marx in their library, Karl Marx or Groucho Marx. They do not have "Conscience of a Conservative" by Barry Goldwater. The reason they do not have a library is because they cannot read or write. Their parents could not read or write, and their grandparents could not read or write. This is because they were kept from those basic hopes by a succession of military dictatorships in Central America who knew that they could keep their people docile if they were not allowed to be educated.

How can we bring hope? How can we bring an end to the cycle of poverty

and violence that has made this region a killing ground for decades?

I submit to my colleagues that when we watch the Contra leaders strutting around the halls of Congress with their Rolex watches and their silk suits talking about restoring democracy to Nicaragua, they are not talking about democracy that will provide hope for those campesinos in their huts, because they never have in the past. It will be democracy—Somoza style—all over again.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is time for us to recognize that our neighbors to the south have come of age. They do not need us to impose some superior moral insight on their lives.

Mr. Chairman, the five Central American Presidents came together and reached an agreement. It is an agreement that was accepted by all five governments.

We have listened today invariably to discussion about Nicaragua. We have not listened to any discussion about El Salvador or Guatemala where revolutions continue to take place and where there has not been a great deal of progress. Some might say the progress has not been as great in El Salvador as it has been in Nicaragua, but hopefully the peace we bring about through efforts that we make will alleviate that situation.

Mr. Chairman, let us hope that the peace that we can bring about through men and women of good will in this body is a peace that is going to strengthen the emerging democracies in that region. It is going to be a peace in which if one is a Roman Catholic archbishop of El Salvador, you will be murdered while offering mass simply because you had the courage to speak out against a military junta.

It will be a peace in the future which will mean that another 60,000 people will not be taken out and left in the killing fields of El Plajon in El Salvador, tortured and murdered by El Salvadoran death squads. It will be a peace in which children can grow up with the hope that they will have a chance for an education and it will not be an indoctrinated education in any one of those countries, a chance for them to learn freely the principles of democracy as we understand them.

It is hard for them to learn about democracy before they have a chance to learn to read or write.

Yes; those nations are coming of age and the five Central American Presidents have come to a conclusion that it is time to end the killing in that region. They think they have a plan to do that. The support that I think we should be providing to them is support that will help them through economic development, the kind of support and assistance that will help to build stable democracies, the kind of support that is worthy of us as the great democracy that we aspire to be.

It is all too easy for us to sit here in Washington and talk about things like leverage.

It is a lot harder for those kids who live in the huts by the roadside, as every one of us has seen who have driven into cities like Managua or San Salvador to understand leverage.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I point out to the gentleman from New York [Mr. MRAZEK] that it is really easy for us to stay here in Washington and surrender other people's freedoms for them, too.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON].

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I had sought to ask the preceding speaker a question, but as his time did not allow it, I want to comment on his remarks. I agree with him that the nations of Central America are coming of age and I agree that we want the solution to their problems to come from them. The strength of the Arias plan is that it is the first plan that they have developed without the influence of the nations outside the region.

However, what happened 2 weeks ago in Central America is very instructive and demonstrates that the gentleman's colleagues intervened decisively to affect the course of events.

When the five Presidents got together to look at the issue of compliance with the Arias plan, Mr. Ortega arrived representing a nation under tremendous economic pressure and consequently in desperate need of resolution of their problem with the Contras and within the region.

The Central American Presidents put tremendous diplomatic pressure on Ortega to take some further action to demonstrate his willingness to comply with the Arias peace accords, but it was only, frankly, when my colleagues, the Democrats from the House, went down there and intervened and sat with him eyeball to eyeball and said, "Listen, Daniel, if you don't sit down and negotiate to make political space for your opposition parties, you are going to face military opposition."

It was your intervention that added the pressure of possible military aid to the economic and diplomatic pressure Mr. Ortega felt to force him into negotiations. So we must foster adherence to the Arias peace plan and recognize our responsibility to be part of the solution by not defeating this plan and abandoning the Contras and the negotiating process.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. PORTER].

Mr. PORTER. Mr. Chairman, when the five Central American Presidents

signed the Arias peace plan, there was hope we would finally move toward democracy and peace. The Nicaraguan Government pledged it would release political prisoners, restore fundamental human rights, and negotiate with its internal opposition.

As with past promises, the pledges made by the Nicaraguan junta have not been honored. Over 9,000 political prisoners remain incarcerated. Radio Catolica is still prohibited from reporting economic and military news. The recent testimony of Sandinista Maj. Roger Miranda demonstrates that Nicaraguan dictator Daniel Ortega continues to secure his Marxist-Leninist regime from the barrel of a gun.

As the former chief of the Nicaraguan Defense Ministry's Secretariat, Miranda provided irrefutable evidence that the Sandinistas plan an enormous military buildup over the next 8 years. They already command forces larger than all of the other Central American armies combined. The new plan demonstrates that the Sandinista dictatorship does not believe that their current overwhelming military superiority is enough.

With the help of their allies in Havana and Moscow, the Sandinista army will grow to become almost as large as the United States Army. The Nicaraguan Armed Forces will be equipped with the most advanced armaments in the region, including Mig-21's, self-propelled artillery, and additional tank battalions.

We should entertain no delusions that this massive body of armed force will remain at rest. During the last 9 years, Nicaraguan leaders have repeatedly stated that their revolution is one "without borders." The Nicaraguan Government's continued training of leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and Honduras confirms this belief.

I have consistently supported the President's program to aid the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. They have provided the pressure which has finally produced a string of Nicaraguan concessions. The Sandinistas said that they would not lift the emergency decree giving them dictatorial powers until the Contras were defeated. They have lifted that decree. They said they would have to close down the independent newspaper, *La Prensa*, indefinitely. It is now open. They said they would never negotiate with the Contras. Last month, they began negotiations.

Anyone who thinks that these concessions would have been forthcoming had we allowed the Contras to fade away is just plain wrong.

The lesson of strength must be repeated over and over. Only a few years ago, the Soviets said that if we deployed Pershing and cruise missiles in Europe, no arms control was possible. We deployed. Then they said that no deal was possible without the end to

our SDI program. We moved forward with SDI. After showing strength and resolve, the Soviets finally realized we meant business and negotiated an equitable solution to the nuclear buildup in Europe. In a few months, the Soviets will remove thousands of nuclear warheads from Europe in a deal that would never have happened if we had not hung tough.

The Soviets and their allies are also retreating from Afghanistan and Angola. Against the steadfast resistance of the Afghan Freedom Fighters and UNITA, the Soviets and their surrogates are attempting to find ways to save face and withdraw their battered armies.

Mr. Chairman, the ignorance of appeasement is not acceptable. As the leader of the free world, it is our duty to aid those who are struggling for freedom. The President's request can provide the necessary pressure on the Sandinistas to restore Central American peace and freedom.

By allowing the President to place 10 percent of the requested amount in escrow, the pressure on the Sandinistas will continue. At the end of March, the administration, in consultation with the Central American Presidents and Congress, can decide the disposition of these funds based on the acts, not words, of the Sandinistas.

The pressures on the Sandinistas provided by the Contras are not only military. The Nicaraguan economy is in a shambles, with inflation last year at 1800 percent, expected to reach 13,000 percent this year. Twenty-Cordoba notes which had been warehoused because they were essentially worthless, have been reissued, but only after the bank added three zeros to make a 20 read 20,000.

Cutting off Contra aid will snatch defeat from the jaws of victory. Continued support for the Contras will send a signal to Communist countries around the world that the United States is determined to support the struggle for democracy. I urge my colleagues to support the President's request.

□ 1745

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Wisconsin will be recognized for 30 minutes, and, without objection, the gentleman from Wisconsin will be permitted to yield time to others.

There was no objection.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. DEFAZIO].

Mr. DEFAZIO. Mr. Chairman—

Two roads diverged in a yellow wood,
And sorry I could not travel both
And be one traveler, long I stood
And looked down one as far as I could
To where it bent in the undergrowth.

Mr. Chairman, this is not the first time that this Congress and this Nation have reached a crossroads on this issue. In 1984 we had the Contadora plan, a plan to bring peace to the region, a plan that was endorsed one day by our State Department and the next after the Nicaraguans surprisingly agreed to the provisions in that plan which would have brought peace to the region we pressured our allies in that area and we ourselves found it on the next day to be totally objectionable.

Now hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars later, thousands of deaths later, we are not one whit closer to peace in that area. We are once again at a crossroads with the Arias plan. We have the well-worn path of this administration. They want to dump more money down the Contra rathole, \$36 million in direct aid, \$20 million to \$30 million in insurance and electronic support, replacement policies for the Contra planes that will be flown into a war zone. Our airlines would like to have such a subsidy from the taxpayers of the United States, \$36.2 million which presumably will be carefully spent and accounted for.

Remember the humanitarian aid 2 years ago? Remember the missing \$13.1 million that has never been accounted for? The Contras are either bad accountants or they are clever embezzlers with secret bank accounts.

Face it, the Contras are not nice, and they are not going to use the money for humanitarian purposes. Let us hear from some real humanitarians.

Two doctors from my State of Oregon, Susan Cooksan and Tim Takaro have been living in Nicaragua, working to provide genuine humanitarian assistance. They state, and I quote:

JINOTEGA, NICARAGUA,
January 21, 1988.

Greetings from the mountains of northern Nicaragua. We hope that the winter snows have been at least a little enjoyable for you. For us it remains warm in temperature but hotter than usual with respect to the war.

As described in our Dec. 7 and Jan. 10 newsletters, difficulties with life in general and health work in particular have dramatically increased over the past months. As you know, Congress will soon make a critical decision regarding the future of this impoverished but proud country. When we spoke with you in D.C. last fall, we described from our own experiences war crimes of the Contras including violations of medical neutrality and atrocities against civilians. We also related how the terror perpetrated by the Contras disrupts nearly all aspects of normal life in the north and how it is slowly strangling the society, retarding recent advances in health and other social services.

It is clear since our time in the States that the Contras have not changed in their behavior. We will briefly cite several newly reported incidents in our region which we have confirmed with Witness for Peace and the Catholic Church. Two more health

posts have been attacked. On Oct. 9, the health center in Mancotal was robbed during a contra attack, it had been completely burned in the May attack. On Jan. 5, the health clinic near Pancasan was ransacked, riddled with bullets and partially burned. A 14 year old girl was kidnapped during that attack. This brings to ten the number of health centers subject to deliberate attacks in the last 12 months in our health region. A 23 year old nurse from Yali died this winter after being in a coma for more than a month from injuries received in one of several random mortar attacks on northern municipalities. Since November 1st, 3 ambulances have been attacked, 2 in our region. In the Dec. 20 attack, both the patient and attending physician, Dr. Eric Pineda, died. Though the administration may want the contras to change, they remain the brutal terrorists that they have always been, with wanton disregard for medical and civilian neutrality. We hope this information will be helpful, please relate it to Rep. DeFazio. As medical personnel working to promote life, this policy of death is abhorrent. Its criminal manifestations violate the ideals of America.

Thank you for your concern.

Sincerely,

SUSAN COOKSAN, M.D.
TIM TAKARO, M.D., M.P.H.
JINOTECA, NICARAGUA

Mr. Chairman, we have a choice here again today. We can choose the road well trod by this administration, the road to more bombs and bullets, the road to more money wasted, the road to more death and destruction, or we can demonstrate our commitment to peace and to human dignity. We have it in our power to stop this war and give the Central American presidents a chance to work out their own destiny.

Deny the President his war. Vote "no" on this request.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. SLAUGHTER].

Mr. SLAUGHTER of Virginia. Mr. Chairman today we are called upon to make a momentous decision.

What is at stake is whether or not the United States will tolerate a second Communist base in the Americas—a base from which the leadership of the Nicaraguan Sandinistas say they will export their revolution—a Communist revolution. The question is, what do we do about it?

If we fail in our support of the Contras, they will fail, and the Communist-dominated Sandinista Government will have its bases in Central America. It will use them to attack their neighbors—as the Sandinista leaders have told the world.

That is a serious threat to the security interests of the United States.

And what will happen to the people of Nicaragua?

If a free and fair election, free of intimidation by any faction, were held in Nicaragua, the people would reject the Sandinistas and choose to stay with

the West. They would not choose to become a part of the Soviet bloc.

We should support the Contras by passing this legislation.

Let us use our influence to allow the people of Nicaragua to have the opportunity to make their decision.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN].

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, we are not usually asked to decide questions of war and peace as directly as we are today. It is often an indirect decision that we leave to the President or his agents, but not today. Today we have the choice to decide whether the war will continue or we will have peace.

I pray for peace.

Two hundred years ago the authors of the Constitution debated who should ultimately commit our people to war. They invested this solemn responsibility in the hands of the people's branch. They felt, as many of us do today, that the executive branch was too quick to fight, to call a nation to arms when other more reasonable paths to resolve disputes existed. Sadly, the Congress has allowed, for 7 years, this responsibility to lapse. Our indecision has allowed an administration quick to fight with weapons to keep an illegal and immoral war alive in Nicaragua.

The President has had one goal these 7 years: the forced removal of the present government of Nicaragua. While this first principle has never changed, like a con artist, it has worn many disguises. The Presidential instrument of violent removal, the Contras, is a sorry and unfortunate collection of men and boys whose personal histories and motivations are as varied and sordid as the tactics they have used to fulfill their master's will. Financed by United States tax dollars their initial role was that of a side show; to interdict the flow of arms to rebels in El Salvador. This poor excuse for a justification worked successfully in Congress for months until Contra brutality against women and children in the countryside of Nicaragua became unsupportable to even the most avid administration apologist. We are now asked to believe that the Contras' new role is only to pressure the Sandinistas to move toward a more democratic form of government.

There is an aphorism that is appropriate here: "Fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me." There is much shame attendant with a policy that has seen our Government illegally mine Nicaraguan harbors, produce a death manual for the Contras on how to murder innocent people, and then unlawfully divert money from an "arms-for-hostages" deal to keep this war going. The incredible deceit of this policy must stop. The President has forfeited his credibility in pursuit of this policy.

The issue is not whether we countenance communism in our hemisphere. Surely there is no better way for it to spread than for us to

continue to finance the Contras and drive the Sandinistas into the reluctant embrace of the U.S.S.R. The issue is not about U.S. influence in the rest of the world. The richest, freest, most powerful Nation to inhabit this planet has more important problems than this mindless Presidential preoccupation with Nicaragua. Only by ignoring the smoking fires in the Middle East and enormous suffering in Africa will our influence suffer.

Americans believe in the rule of law. We celebrate and cherish it at home. We must have the courage to follow it abroad. The rule of law, the sanctity of contracts are the instruments of peace. These principles are being acted on in Central America as we debate continuing an illegal war in Washington. We can stop the war today and end this sorry chapter in American history. We have no other choice.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, it is easy to stand here wearing suits and having lunch today, talking about guns and war. It is a different matter for the victims of war in Nicaragua. They include the victims of the Sandinistas, and there are plenty of victims of the Sandinistas, and the victims of the Contras. While we cannot prevent Sandinista violence, the victims of the Contras are victims of bullets we buy for the Contra soldiers, bullets that I would like to stop sending to the Contra soldiers.

Hear the voices of just two Contra victims. Marlin Antonio Martinez, a victim, a 20-month-old baby who is not alive today. His mother, Aurora, was hiding in a ditch behind their village when 100 Contra soldiers stormed that village. For an hour they lay in that ditch, quiet, tense, frightened.

The Contra soldiers shot a bullet into that ditch. It went through Marlin Antonio's head, killed him instantly and wounded his mother. With blood dripping from her chest, she carried her dead child back to the village.

It is not just Marlin Antonio Martinez. It is Aurora Heralda Martinez in El Justo, Nicaragua, hiding in a ditch with a Contra soldier regiment attacking. She hid for about 2 hours, and finally when the shooting stopped from the Contras' attack she got out and started walking back toward the village and she saw two Contra soldiers walking toward her, and they cursed at her, and she turned and ran. But she could not run as fast as a machine-gun bullet. It ripped through her back, through her intestines and through her 3-month-old baby's leg. She lived. Of course her baby's leg is now amputated, and a 3-month-old is now without a leg in Nicaragua.

I know there are horror stories on both sides. I have been there, and many of my colleagues have been there, and heard firsthand from the villagers about the victims of this war. I abhor violence and abuses perpetrated by both sides.

But I am saying we can do something about the victims of Contra soldiers because the Contra soldiers are the soldiers we have funded in Central America. I think it is wrong. This country has a responsibility to work for peace, not promote more war.

There is a peace plan underway in Central America today that we have a responsibility to support with every fiber of our body. That ought to be our mission today. I support the Arias peace plan because it has brought us closer to peace and democracy in 6 months than 6 years of Contra aid have done.

I know some people want to divide this Chamber into warhawks and peace-niks. It is not that simple. What we are talking about is a value system and a morality of who we are and what we do to help our neighbors. Our neighbors want peace, not more war. We can help them achieve that peace if we support the Arias peace plan and use every opportunity we can to make that peace plan work for the victims of that region.

I urge my colleagues to oppose more Contra aid.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. BUECHNER].

Mr. BUECHNER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma for yielding me this time.

I have heard so many stories told about individuals, people who have died, people who have been wounded on both sides, and this is war, it is a civil war. In war people are injured and economies are stilted, and people from the outside sometimes come in and help. The Russians have helped the Sandinistas, the United States has helped the Contras.

I do not know the individuals who have been injured. I do not know the individuals who are fighting, but I do know this person, this Member visited Nicaragua, went down and went into Matagalpa and into Managua, and as I was visiting I took a picture of a building. There was a sign in front of the Ministry of the Interior that said, "We are the sentinels of the people's happiness." I thought it was kind of Orwellian and I wanted a picture of it, and as I took the picture I saw people moving toward me. There were four Sandinista soldiers that were going to take me in for taking a picture.

Maybe that is not as eloquent a testimony as the depiction of someone with blood, someone missing a limb, but it says more about the Sandinista government than any portrayals of people who are injured, because the Sandinistas are not nice people. They are Fascists. They are holding power by rule of force, and they do not want dissension. The argument that someone taking a picture of the Ministry of the Interior is jeopardizing their secu-

rity is to say their security is to deny freedom.

If that freedom is acquired only by force, then we have to take a look at the overall picture.

It is interesting to me that in this debate that the denial of liberty seems to be low on priority.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. VOLKMER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VOLKMER. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in vigorous opposition to the resolution before us and to the policy which we have unsuccessfully and tragically pursued in Nicaragua over the past 6 years. The policy is wrong not only because it is not successful, although it is unquestionably a failure.

That policy is wrong, not only because it is predicated on terrorism—although it has resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Nicaraguans—the equivalent of 6 million deaths in the United States—100 times our losses in Vietnam.

That policy is wrong, not only because it is ruining the chances through the Arias plan for the democratization of Central America, but also because it undermines our democracy here at home as well.

This policy is wrong predominantly because it is premised on an archaic and simplistic view of our diplomatic relations and military responsibilities in this hemisphere.

It perpetuates the notion that we alone have the ultimate authority to determine what is right and wrong, what is in the best interests of foreign people, and what government best serves them.

It is wrong because it betrays our own history and demeans the political principles of self-determination by which we live, and for which hundreds of thousands of young Americans have given their lives in defense of this country.

President Reagan, in the Newspeak by which he defines political issues, likes to call the Contras freedom fighters, and the equivalent of our Founding Fathers, a blasphemy for which the Organization of American Historians already has chastised him.

Would Jefferson have abducted and murdered Javier Antonio Salina Rocha, an unarmed farmer? The Contras did.

Would Washington have ambushed and murdered five people, including a nurse? The Contras did.

Would Madison have killed children, burned peasants' houses, assassinated a farm cooperative president, kidnapped and raped women, and ambushed unarmed civilian vehicles? Of course not.

But the Contras do commit all of these horrors because they are not like our Founding Fathers, they are terrorists, bought and paid for with the tax dollars of hardworking American men and women—most of whom have little idea of the tragedies our money and Government are financing in Nicaragua.

As one who has been deeply involved in this debate for 6 years and who has visited the leaders who have signed the Arias accord, I also know that this policy does great harm to our relations with our Central American neighbors.

Despite threats from admitted liars like Elliott Abrams, despite warnings of aid cutoffs from U.S. Cabinet officers, the signatories are now saying publicly what they have told us for years: Aid to the Contras strengthens the hand of the Sandinistas and provides the rationale for domestic repression and militarization which worries Nicaragua's neighbors.

The continuation of the United States boycott increases the dependence of the Sandinistas on the Soviet Union, although it should also be noted that many of our strongest allies in Europe are major trading partners with Managua.

The military acts of the United States—from mining Nicaragua's harbors to funding the Contras—violate international law, undermine the Arias peace process, and undermine respect for our Nation throughout the developing world.

Now, there are those in this chamber who say, "It's only \$36-million," and, "It's only \$3.6-million for military aid." But we know that's not true.

In fact, the supporting documents which accompanied this presidential request show that the true cost is at least \$43 million, and perhaps as high as \$63 million, because hidden in that request is authorization for "passive air defense equipment," and other unspecified costs related to military supplies.

Whenever I hear someone say, "It's only \$36 million" I think, maybe they've been around here too long. Because \$36 million is not a small amount of money. And funding terrorism in Central America is unquestionably not the highest use of that money for the taxpayers of the United States.

In a nation like ours, where one in four children is poor, where one in six has no health insurance, one in seven is at risk of dropping out of school, and one in four will spend part of his childhood on welfare—I think there are far better investments we can make with our money:

For the \$36 million the President wants to give the Contras, we could provide 66,000 pregnant women and infants with nutrition assistance through the WIC program, which today only reaches 35 percent of the eligible population. And that would mean fewer low birthweight babies, less medical care, and fewer disabilities.

For the same \$36 million, we could fully immunize a million children against preventable childhood diseases, saving 10 times that amount in long-term health care costs.

Or we could provide nearly 70,000 children with compensatory education; only about half the eligible children receive chapter I services today.

Or we could enroll an additional 15,000 children in the Head Start Program, which today reaches only 16 percent of the eligible children.

I certainly know that few regard this vote today as a test of our commitment to children and families. But we in this chamber love to

talk about how tough it is to choose priorities, to decide where to spend our limited money. And I say that in a choice between the children of America and the Contra terrorists in Nicaragua, I vote for our children.

To those who argue that our military support for the Contras is all that has brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table, let me make two observations.

First, suppose that is true. Should it be the policy of this Nation to encourage negotiations between foreign governments through the funding of terror, or through use of our diplomatic capabilities?

And second, why is it that for the 6 years we funded the Contras, the Sandinistas did not come to the bargaining table, but once the Congress pared down military support, the Arias plan gained momentum?

Of course, as is apparent to President Arias and other knowledgeable observers, our policy of arming the Contras is not what has brought the Sandinistas to the table.

Rather, the salient factor in promoting the negotiations is the decision of the Central American leaders themselves to end the war which is devastating their region—not just the insurrection in Nicaragua, but the United States military buildup in Honduras, the guerrilla war in Guatemala, and the continuing bloodbath in El Salvador.

And perhaps there is no more tragic aspect of the administration's policy than the fact that it ignores this democratic coming-of-age in Central America and presumes that Uncle Sam knows best how to resolve internal political divisions throughout this hemisphere.

There are some in this Chamber who, with the best of intentions, are troubled by the continuation of a mindless policy which stains each of our hands with the blood of Nicaraguan men, women, and children. But, they ask, how can we back down without appearing defeated, and without giving the impression of weakness and a lack of resolve?

My colleagues, those rationalizations have been used to justify the perpetuation of unwise and self-defeating policies since long before the birth of Christ.

Are we stronger, are we safer, are we better respected or even more feared because, against the advice of our allies and even those whom we claim to assist, we pursue a policy of failure, of hypocrisy, and of death?

This is a foreign policy wholly consistent with the "March of Folly" described by Barbara Tuchman, a misguided policy pursued notwithstanding adequate warnings and explanations that it is a failure.

Whether the case of the Trojan Horse or the Renaissance Popes, the American Revolution or Vietnam, well-intentioned, highly educated, and politically skillful leaders over the centuries have demonstrated the capacity—even the tendency—to remain obstinately tied to a policy which is not only doomed, but which is widely perceived as irrational even while it is being defended.

Aren't we sinking into the second great military folly of our generation?

No one in the world community believes the Contra policy will succeed in bringing down the Sandinistas.

No one in Central America prefers a continuation of the war to a commitment to the Peace Process.

No one who signed the Arias accord believes aid to the Contras is consistent with that agreement—not even those countries allegedly threatened by the Sandinistas; not even President Duarte, whose country is entirely dependent on U.S. military and economic aid, is willing to endorse Contra aid.

Indeed, it is painfully evident that the Contra aid package before us today is really designed not to rescue the Contras from the Sandinistas, but rather to rescue the Reagan administration from its own folly.

Can we seriously believe that if the President thought that funding the Contras was as urgent as he pretends, he would seek only \$3.5 million and deposit it in an escrow account for 2 months?

Of course not.

He'd forcefully come before this House, as he had frequently done in the past on so many issues, and lay out a compelling case and demand adequate funding immediately. But he cannot make that case, because the facts are against him and against his foolish policy.

Three months ago, President Arias of Costa Rica came to this Chamber and asked us to "give peace a chance." Do we, in the House of Representatives, really intend to respond to that historic challenge by perpetuating a pointless, unwinable, unjust, and undemocratic war—simply to save the face of the authors of folly?

Is this Reagan policy so right, so unassailable, so urgent that we must dismiss the entreaties of those whom we presume to assist—the fledgling democracies of Central and South America—and instead perpetuate this war?

Let us use this opportunity not only to stop this senseless war, but to do something constructive as well—to write not the last chapter in two centuries of big brotherism and intervention in Central America, but the first chapter in an era of cooperation, economic development, political pluralism, and democracy which will provide our hemisphere with far greater security and hope than the Contras and the war they perpetuate.

Let those in this Chamber who are concerned that they are voting against the President or against our military role find comfort instead in voting for the integrity of the Arias plan, for allowing the promising negotiations to continue, and for a hope for genuine peace through unity rather than rancor through war.

That is the opportunity that faces us today—not an abandonment of our proper hemispheric role, but a recognition of it; not a continuation of a paternal relationship with our neighbors, but the beginning of one which respects their political integrity and the wisdom of their own leadership.

Let us have the courage to believe that democracy and negotiations can achieve peace.

And then, today's vote will be historic, not for what we have ended, but for what we have begun.

Mr. VOLKMER. Mr. Chairman, the leaders and the people of Central American countries of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and

Guatemala are presently engaged in a process that holds out the only hope for peace in Central America. Last month I, along with other members of this House, visited El Salvador and met with President Duarte, who in answer to a direct question from a member of the delegation stated that he was opposed to further military aid to the Contras. President Arias has said the same thing. Why is it that our leaders do not listen to the leaders of the countries involved? Is it because our leaders are superior or know more than those directly involved? Isn't it time that we started listening to the leaders of Central America and yes, "Give peace a chance" and defeat this ill-conceived proposal today?

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VOLKMER. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will vote against the President's plan to provide military aid to the Contras. In fairness, I do believe that a combination of facts, including the vision and leadership the Central American Presidents as well as economic and military pressure faced by the Sandinista regime, have led to the current peace process. But I oppose the aid because our commitment in Central America is not to the Contras, but to peace, democracy and freedom in Central America. If that commitment is going to succeed, we must keep faith with those presidents who have asked us not to provide the military aid. We always reserve other options if the Sandinista regime is not cooperative, thus causing the peace process to fail. But continuing Contra aid right now would snatch the defeat of a continuing war from the jaws of a successful peace arrangement.

□ 1800

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, [Mr. NICHOLS].

Mr. NICHOLS. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the debate on both sides of this issue and I am persuaded that every Member in this body is genuinely seeking an answer to the controversial Contra aid question which would result in a peaceful settlement in this war ravaged Central America country. Where we differ, Mr. Chairman, is in the matter of how to achieve that peace, and after considerable soul searching and having personally visited with groups in countries who supported the Sandinista government and others who support the Contra group, and having several years ago visited, along with other members of the delegation from the House Armed Services Committee, with Mr. Ortega, I am persuaded

ed that the best course to reach that peace is in support of the proposal which would provide some \$36 million, 90 percent of which is programmed for humanitarian aid.

Mr. Chairman, I genuinely want to believe that the Sandinista government is committed to the provisions of the Arias peace plan supported by Honduras, Costa Rica, Salvador, and Guatemala. I want to think that they are ready to seek a compromise of a sort with the Contra group which would lead to a more Democratic government and the provisions in this legislation are abundantly clear—if passed by both Houses of Congress, it would hold in abeyance that portion of moneys—\$3.6 million—earmarked for ammunition until the end of March when this administration would consult with the four Central America countries and if the consensus at that time was the Sandinistas were indeed complying with the peace plan, then the moneys would not be necessary and would not be released.

I think this makes good sense. We must insist that President Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua keeps his promises. The United States has important security concerns in this region, and his promises to limit his army, to withdraw foreign military advisers and to prohibit foreign bases are extremely important both to the peace effort in country as well as in the long-term defense posture of this important region in Central America. It is to our interest and I would emphatically add to the interest of peace that until the four Central America countries involved agree that there is a clear unmistakable cease-fire and that Mr. Ortega is living up to his promises, we should hold these moneys and I am hopeful that such will be the case, and they will never have to be released.

The big issue as I see it, Mr. Chairman, and in which history may well record as an extremely important vote in our relationship with Central America is, whether we, as a Congress, are willing to stand by and see Nicaragua become a Communist country or whether we support democracy in the Americas.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FLAKE].

Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my opposition to additional United States military and nonlethal aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. I strongly urge my colleagues to vote against the President's aid request.

Money is a fungible resource, a resource which can be expended to free other forms of financial assistance and other resources. Assistance to the Contras can be compared to a personal budget. Bills must be paid. If a person is given money for his rent, he is then able to use his funds to purchase other

goods. In the case of the Contras, what will these additional funds accomplish? They will free up other funds and resources for the purchase of weapons. Furthering aid at this time will only serve to extend a bloody war and place the resolution of this conflict further away from the eager grasp of the Nicaraguan people.

During my years as a minister, I have worked hard to rebuild my community, to take a piece of land and to raise a building out of rubble, to restore commerce to areas where businesses were afraid to locate and to instill faith in people to believe in themselves, their community, and their country. Coming from that environment, it is difficult for me, as a member of Congress, to understand an administration that favors a policy which destroys the communities of a nation, destabilizes its economy, and murders its people.

During the time the United States has aided the Contras there have been over 50,000 casualties. This is what we as a nation have to show for the \$276 million in assistance that we have given to the Contras. Money is a finite resource, especially in these times of budgetary restraint, a resource which we have squandered on a bloody and misguided policy. For \$276 million, in my community and across the Nation, we could have built low-income housing, helped families to receive health care, and helped to educate our children. Having said this, I must ask, which is a better allocation of our resources? In which example has our country been better served? We must question the intensity and focus placed by the administration on a failing Central American policy, when that same administration's economic policies are in a shambles.

The issue of funding to the Contras brings to mind several fundamental issues. Are we really a "peaceful" nation, devoted to self-determination and the rule of law or are we a nation that seeks to oust governments that we disagree with instead of encouraging democratization. If our goal is to establish democracy, why do we then not make the same efforts in Chile, Paraguay, South Africa, or in Haiti that we have made in Central America.

If our goal is to block a Soviet base in Central America, why doesn't President Reagan negotiate directly with the Soviets, as Gorbachev recently indicated he is prepared to do, or open a dialog with the Cubans or the Sandinistas?

For the past 7 years our country has been sponsoring an insurgent force which has limited popular support. What government would willingly negotiate away its power or authority to a small violent minority? I do not believe that the Contras are interested

in participating with the Sandinistas in the political process.

The greatest threat to our democracy does not come from Communist nations to the south but from within our own borders. The greatest danger our country faces comes not from an economically ravished, war torn Central American country, but from cities and towns across this Nation where a generation is coming to see drug trafficking as their only hope for economic enfranchisement, a country where the poor go hungry and have no shelter, people are inadequately educated, and businesses cannot prosper. These are the forces that will tear this country apart, not the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

This most recent administration aid request helps to provide a framework for the destruction of the Central American peace plan. By granting additional military aid to the Contras we are fueling opportunities and reasons for the Sandinistas to reject the Central American peace plan with which they are earnestly trying to comply. Any aid that helps to keep an army in the field is ultimately lethal, regardless of administration claims to the contrary. The use of any United States-supplied goods ultimately assists in killing Nicaraguans.

I believe that the administration's goal is to help the Contras to achieve an unreasonable solution to an internal conflict. The Congress will ensure the continuation of the war and the slaughter if we approve additional aid for the Contras today.

Let us today set upon a road toward stopping the violence and death the Contra war brings to Nicaragua. Let us work toward honoring the agreements made by the Central American peace accords. Let us respect our allies in Central America as equals. Vote "no" on the President's aid request.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. JOHNSON].

Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, the genius of the Arias peace plan is that it requires that simultaneously nations open up their political process and guarantee the right of political opposition and, simultaneously, close off the opportunity or the right for military opposition.

The negotiations now going on between the Sandinistas and the Contras are all about opening up and guaranteeing the right of political opposition to the Nicaraguan opposition parties and, by extension, to the Contras when they return to their native land. The policy that we adopt here today should be the policy that best supports these negotiations. To determine what that policy ought to be, we should look very concretely at the

facts that resulted in the birth of those negotiations.

What is it that caused those negotiations to be amended? We will recall that 2 weeks ago the five Presidents of the Central American nations met to determine the level of compliance of each of those nations. President Ortega came to those talks under enormous economic pressure. When he got there he was put under tremendous diplomatic pressure by his colleagues because there was broad dissatisfaction with Nicaragua's efforts to comply with the Arias peace plan.

Though he was under tremendous diplomatic pressure, though he was under tremendous economic pressure, he did not agree to take new steps toward compliance.

So what happened? A very important event took place. Democrats from this body flew in and eyeball to eyeball said to Mr. Ortega, "Look, you don't open up the political option, you will be faced with the military option; you don't allow political opposition, you are going to face military opposition." So given that stark choice, Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, chose to negotiate to open up his system of government to political opposition. And that is what he is doing today. Since that time about 2 weeks ago he has taken new steps and I congratulate him for that. But in fact he could have taken any one of those steps any time in the preceding 4 or 5 months. He chose not to. He chose not to until economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, and military pressure all converged to force him to make a clear specific choice between allowing real practical opposition and falling continued military opposition.

The policy we adopt here today must keep in place those three pressures on that negotiating team and the package we consider here today does not. By keeping the military aid in escrow we keep the possibility of the military option open and so keep that constellation of forces in place.

If, on the other hand, we choose abandonment rather than this package of humanitarian aid and military aid in escrow, then we have to face the consequences of this new policy of abandonment for there will be no new package. Promises of that are empty, because if they were serious, that package would be known today and part of this debate.

Abandonment will have serious emergencies. It will strengthen the rightists, the militarists, in all of the other nations of the region and some of these nations over the next year or so will very likely revert to military dictatorships as they are today very fragile democracies. Second, it will abandon the Contras and by stretching out the negotiations while the Contras are forced to disperse for lack of supplies, the Nicaraguans will avoid

having to negotiate an agreement to guarantee political rights of their people and thereby a check on their policy of funding the subversion of other governments.

Let us support the peace process by keeping the three forces in place that birthed these recent hopeful negotiations. Without new success, the Arias peace plan is doomed. With their success, democracy and so peace can be possible for all of Central America.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. MORRISON].

Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, I rise in adamant opposition to further funding of the war in Nicaragua which for too many years with the support of the Government here in Washington has visited death and destruction on poor people in the Nicaraguan countryside without doing one single thing to bring us to the goals that the President has said under this policy.

We as a nation are not more secure than we were before this war policy was enacted.

We, in fact, have brought more and more Soviet and Cuban involvement into Nicaragua as a result of our policy. We are no nearer to peace as a result of this war policy, no nearer to the respect for human rights, and no nearer to democratic government in Central America as a result of making war on the people of Nicaragua.

This is a failed policy. This is a policy that does not lead in the direction that the interests of the United States go. But we have a great opportunity before us now and it is because of the initiative of the Central American countries themselves and the formulation of the Arias peace plan. That chance is not a perfect chance; it could fail. But it has a chance to bring about peace and economic development and the nurturing of democracy over a period of time in Central America.

It is our last best hope for a resolution of the problems in Central America using the initiatives of the Central Americans themselves. It is the last best hope for an end to a failed policy of making war instead of peace.

The Congress faces a momentous decision tonight. This House has the opportunity to close the book on a failed policy before any more lives are wasted in support of that policy.

Then together, after that decision, Democrat and Republican Senators and Members of the House together can come together in support of actions by this Government which support the peace process, which support economic development, which really support democracy, because democracy will not be achieved by a Contra victory even if that could be achieved. The Contras are not democrats; they never were and they never will be. They merely want to impose a differ-

ent totalitarian rule on the people of Nicaragua. The people of Nicaragua have suffered without a choice long enough. We can give them a democratic choice if we will support the peace process.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. GUNDERSON].

Mr. GUNDERSON. Mr. Chairman and Members, I am one of those who struggle on this very difficult question of what our policy ought to be in Central America, Nicaragua in particular. It was not until 1986 that I first voted for military aid to the Contras. But I have to deal with the question before us today and suggest to many of my colleagues that the question is not give peace a chance; the question before us is are we willing to give peace, freedom and democracy a chance in Central America today? There are those who suggest that if we vote for this resolution we will somehow end the peace process. I would suggest to you that is not the case at all. First of all, look at the resolution in front of us. Ninety percent of that aid is humanitarian, the other 10 percent which is military cannot be released until this Congress votes to say whether or not Nicaragua has complied with the Arias peace plan.

Second, I would call upon my colleagues who still have not yet resolved this issue to take a look not at what President Reagan has said but rather what Mr. Ortega himself said recently in Oslo, Norway, on January 31 of this year when he said we must continue the peace process even if Congress approves the aid.

□ 1815

In Rome, on February 2 of this year, Mr. Ortega said:

The talks will proceed because we intend to carry out what is envisioned under the peace accords with or without the funds.

Let us not suggest that a vote for this resolution somehow ends the peace process because even Mr. Ortega has said that is not the case. Then the vote today is really this: Do we believe we ought to maintain the existence of a political opposition within Nicaragua, and do we believe that we ought to have just the goal of unilateral peace at any price, or do we believe our goal ought to be peace, freedom, and democracy? If Members do believe that, they will vote yes on the resolution before us.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Montana [Mr. WILLIAMS].

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I suppose almost everything has been said that can be said in this debate. In that respect, it

is a little bit like that war down there. Almost everything has been done now that can be done, and we now know the results. We know the results of our military action: failure.

The President has won vote after vote in this Chamber to continue to send dollar after American taxpayer dollar of military aid down to Nicaragua—\$277 million. To what end? Well, the President's goal was to change governments down there. I remember that he said, "We want to make them say uncle."

It has not worked. It is not going to work. This amount of \$277 million is not the total of what we have spent in Central America in military assistance. We have spent \$1 billion in Central America. Lest we think that is for other countries and has nothing to do with the Contras, I ask the Members to recall that in the 30 years before Ronald Reagan took office, this country spent a total of \$170 million in military aid for Central America, and just since Ronald Reagan has taken office we have spent \$1 billion in aid for Central America.

The goal was to change the government in Nicaragua. The goal, according to the President, again was to make them say uncle.

I kept this old yellow newspaper, this addition of the Washington Post dated August 9, 1986, and on the front page of this newspaper appeared this headline: *Contras See Aid Bringing Victory This Year.*" The year was 1986. Let me read this to the Members:

Nicaraguan rebel leaders say the \$100 million in aid that the United States will send down will cripple the leftist Sandinista Government within a year.

And Aldofo Calero was quoted as saying there is light at the end of the tunnel.

Mr. Chairman, it did not work. It is time to stop.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WELDON].

Mr. WELDON. Mr. Chairman, the issue at hand today is one of trust. The issue is whether we can trust the Sandinistas.

Let me give the Members one case in point that we just learned about less than 2 hours ago.

I traveled to Nicaragua this past weekend with 2 of my colleagues from this side of the aisle and one colleague from my side of the aisle, the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS]. While we were there, we met with the mothers of political prisoners whose photographs which I took are here blown up for all the Members of this body to see.

While in this meeting we met a very dynamic young lady, young Yvette Ruiz, a 20-year-old individual whose father has been imprisoned, a man who was an ordinary gardener who

was taken into custody by the Sandinistas and deprived of all his rights. We met with Yvette on Saturday. While we were there a group of turbas, the local thugs, came by in a bus that was preceded by the local police and followed by the local police. If you look closely here, you can see the obscene gestures they are making to us as Americans and Nicaraguans on the sidewalk. They are making these gestures as they pass, and they are yelling obscenities to us for meeting with these mothers of political prisoners.

We asked these mothers whether or not they felt intimidated. They said they had in fact been beaten on January 22, their first anniversary of the January 22 movement. We were told by them that they were not afraid of being beaten, and that perhaps they would be beaten when we left.

We drove around the block. The next day we saw them again at the local rally in Managua, and once again Yvette was speaking out. We were just handed a communique 2 hours ago of which I have a copy saying that Yvette Ruiz was arrested on Monday. She was deprived of her civil rights for no reason except for a charge that she was speaking against the government when she was really attempting to deliver a letter to the five Central American Vice Presidents asking them to release her father.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WELDON. Certainly, I yield to the gentlewoman from Maryland.

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, am I to understand that since we were there on Saturday and met with this group and some of you saw them again on Sunday, she was arrested on Monday?

Mr. WELDON. She was arrested on Monday and taken in. And I have some of the comments that were made to her that I would be happy to read for the RECORD.

Mrs. BYRON. The young girl in the photographs, the one that was a very dynamic spokesman for the mothers who were protesting the political prisoners, was arrested on Monday?

Mr. WELDON. Yes. That was Yvette Ruiz.

Mrs. BYRON. And that is the democratic peace process that is currently underway?

Mr. WELDON. Yes. And my colleague was the leader of that delegation.

The agents told Ruiz that "She should not dream that the political prisoners would be freed: They will never be released." They asserted that the Nicaraguan Sandinista Government liked to see the January 22 movement march because it was useful in terms of convincing the outside world that political pluralism exists in Nicaragua. Nonetheless, such activities

would never result in freedom for the prisoners.

Focusing on Ruiz personally, the men told her that she could have anything she wanted except for her father's freedom, if she ended her involvement in the movement. They said she could receive money, medicine, and a place in the university. The men went on to point out that in prison she would be alone, that Dr. Lino Hernandez could not help her. They said that they knew everything about the movement, and they realized that she was an activist. The agents asserted, "You know what we are going to do with you, but we can protect you from the turbas if you will cooperate with us."

This is the freedom that we are going to trust the Sandinistas with, without a positive vote on the resolution that is before us today. Mr. Chairman, I do not think that we can take that risk.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCOIN].

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. AuCOIN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. EVANS. Mr. Chairman, since Congress began funding the Contras in 1981, approximately \$490 million has been given by this country to the Contras in Nicaragua. Seven years and millions of dollars later, the American people are asking: "What good has it done?"

The Contras still hold no territory within Nicaragua, they have developed no significant base inside their nation's borders, and almost everyone agrees that they have absolutely no chance of achieving a military victory over the Sandinistas. Despite what many in this body would like to believe, the President's request will not change any of this.

Just as important, the President's proposal will quite possibly destroy the peace process, effectively undoing the encouraging advancements made by the Central American countries toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the region. The Guatemala peace agreement has produced more internal change in Nicaragua in the past 6 months than the United States-financed war has in 7 years. Let's give that process a chance. Let's put an end to Contra aid.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, my constituents have heard a lot of talk over the years from Contra supporters about bringing "representative democracy" to Nicaragua. My question tonight is: What is wrong with a little representative democracy here in the United States?

Poll after poll through the years has shown that the American public opposes Contra aid. Today it is opposed by a margin of 2 to 1.

How can the supporters of Contra aid talk about the virtues of representative democracy in Nicaragua and fail to hear and heed the voice of the

American people and let that voice prevail in this Chamber tonight?

The fact is that the American people do not support this war.

They do not want to send more foreign aid to the Contras.

They do not believe that the Contras are latter-day Thomas Jeffersons.

So I ask the supporters of Contra aid, how can you talk about "representative democracy" in Nicaragua when you are unable to represent the voice of the American people here on the floor of this House?

Moreover, my constituents would like to know why an administration which seeks bullets for the Contras in the name of bringing "freedom of speech" to Nicaragua has permitted the FBI to spy on Americans who were exercising their own freedom of speech when they demonstrated their opposition to the Reagan policy in Central America.

And at some point in this discussion, I would like to ask someone in the White House to explain how they can dare to talk about using the Contras to fight for the "rule of law" when this same administration put itself above the law by supporting the Contras when the Boland amendment said that in law they could not do so.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to let freedom ring in Central America tonight by giving the Arias peace plan a chance and to let freedom ring here in this Chamber by letting the voice of the American people be heard. And that voice says: No more aid to the Contras! No more aid to the Contras! No more aid to the Contras!

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. HALL].

Mr. HALL of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution to provide assistance for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. Some of my colleagues have voiced their opposition to this request on the grounds that it may adversely effect the current peace process in Central America. I believe it can only help the peace process by ensuring that the Sandinistas stay at the bargaining table and live up to the commitments they agreed to 6 months ago.

Mr. Chairman, I'm concerned about the direction in which President Ortega and the Sandinistas are leading Nicaragua. Nicaragua is currently engaged in a military buildup which is unparalleled in the history of Central America. Last December, Daniel Ortega announced his intention to build an army which would, including reserves, total 600,000 troops. This from a country that has a population of only 3 million people. The Sandinistas have also acquired a substantial amount of modern Soviet military hardware, including 150 tanks, 250 armored vehicles, 500 surface-to-air missiles, and a number of military aircraft

and sophisticated helicopter gunships. In fact, since 1979 the Sandinistas have received over \$2.5 billion in military assistance from the Soviet bloc. Yet today we're asking for only \$36 million to aid the freedom fighters, and only 10 percent of that can be used to purchase weapons.

Throughout his military buildup, President Ortega has explained that all he wants is peace. Mr. Chairman, his past actions, and present military strength, lead me to believe that what he really wants is piece—a piece of Honduras, a piece of El Salvador, and a piece of Costa Rica. When Ortega turns toward Costa Rica, I hope Nobel Peace Prize winner President Oscar Arias will remember coming before this Congress and bragging about his country not having a defense department—and telling the United States, "We feel free to tell you exactly what we think, even though it might not be what you want to hear." He doesn't want our advice—just our money. Perhaps he can ward off the Communist hordes by hitting them with his Nobel Peace Prize plaque.

We cannot afford an island of communism on the land of Central America. Fidel Castro's Cuba is bordered and limited by water—he cannot physically enlarge his borders. If Dictator Ortega obtains a viable foothold on the land of our hemisphere, he and communism will expand. They won't go south to South America—they will head north toward our fragile neighbor, for whom we do not do enough—Mexico. Then my sons—your children and grandchildren—will be firing the guns. They will become the freedom fighters.

Let's not fool ourselves. We aren't going to achieve freedom and democracy in Central America by closing our eyes and wishing the Sandinistas away. We need to keep the pressure on Ortega to bring about the political reforms all of us in this Chamber want to see. Let's not wait until Ortega and his Soviet friends are camped at Mount Vernon before we decide to do something about it. Let's take some action today, and continue support for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. YOUNG].

□1830

Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, throughout this debate I have heard the suggestion that we should give peace a chance, and I am for that. God knows I am for that and I think all of us are for that. When I think of giving peace a chance, I think of the peace that I enjoy as an American, the freedoms that I enjoy as an American, the liberties that I enjoy as an American; but I think, what does peace mean to someone in Latvia, Lithuania,

Estonia, who have lost their nations' identities because of the force of communism?

What does peace mean to someone in Poland, Hungary, or Czechoslovakia?

What do the people of Cuba think peace means under the Communist regime of Fidel Castro? Their peace is so great that hundreds of thousands of them have fled Cuba to come to the United States and take up residency here.

I could give a lot of other examples, but peace means a lot of different things to a lot of different people.

Now, peace in the mind of Daniel Ortega is a nation controlled by the Sandinista junta, because he has said and his junta colleagues have said that while they might have free elections and they might in fact let the people be involved, but they will never turn over the power of the Government of Nicaragua.

Now, what kind of peace is that? If we do not keep the pressure on, we will continue to have another Cuba-type establishment, a Soviet outpost in Central America. You have got to keep the pressure on.

You know, many people who oppose keeping that pressure on in Nicaragua oppose, for example, the deploying of the Pershing II missile in NATO in Europe, but do you know something, most of us applaud today the INF treaty that we are going to get rid of nuclear missiles in NATO in Europe, in the Soviet Union, intermediate range and short range.

How did we do that? We did it by keeping on the pressure by deploying the Pershing missile so the Soviets had to negotiate with us to get something done, and it is the same story in Nicaragua.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. MARTINEZ].

Mr. MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to Contra aid. Mr. Chairman, sometime tonight, hopefully, we will vote to aid or not to aid the Contras, and forget the word humanitarian, because if it were humanitarian aid it would be for both sides because in a war there are two sides and both sides are being killed, maimed, and starved. Both sides have their dying and dead. So lets just call it aid.

The question is to aid or not to aid. The arguments we have heard today are basically the same things we've been hearing for the last 6 years. The only new equation is the Arias peace plan. However, that is not enough to deter the mind set of those that see this as a struggle between two ideologies—democracy and communism. And no one with that mind set is going to admit that what this really is, is a proposition, of a small, poor Latin American country struggling with some very Latin American problems—primarily one of self-determination.

If my colleagues will indulge me, I will offer my own perspective to this debate. What we are really talking about is a policy for Nicaragua and all the dramatic and elaborate staging being demonstrated here today will not assist us in making the proper decision. A trip to Nicaragua will not help us either for those who visit Nicaragua either see and believe what they want to believe or what someone else wants them to see and believe. So I discount the stories my colleagues bring back from their so-called fact-finding missions.

What I do not discount are the lessons of history. The last humanitarian aid we sent to the Contras caused nothing but pain, suffering and orphaned children. I received a letter—maybe staged, maybe factual—but it does describe the situation in Nicaragua of the people who must face it on a day-to-day basis. This letter sent to me, but addressed to all Members of Congress said, and I quote:

We mothers do not want more tragedy. Our hearts are broken and our eyes are full of tears because of this foul and evil war.

You call it humanitarian aid and it would be if the dollars were invested to improve developing countries, to protect children the world over from dying of starvation or if it was used to build hospitals.

We, who write you, suffer the consequences of this war in our own flesh. Our sons have been victims of this so-called humanitarian aid.

Our hearts are filled with sorrow. We only ask that you to be compassionate with our people and grant that this aid be invested elsewhere; not in our killing.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that over the last 6 years thousands of people have died in Nicaragua—more than twice the number of United States combat deaths than in World War II. After 6 years of fighting with funds provided by United States taxpayers and private citizens the Contras do not hold a single town in Nicaragua. What have they accomplished and what have we gained? All I can see is that we created a permanent type of employment in Central America—"the mercenary".

And such employment is not limited to mercenaries, but also extends to well paid Contra leaders and public relations professionals. And, instead of a reduced Communist presence—the desired effect of our assistance to the Contras—we have increased Communist presence in Nicaragua. Indeed, if we had a profit and loss statement on our past policies it would definitely show us in the "red". In total, we have a net loss. Maybe, just maybe, supporting the Arias peace plan might just put us in the profit column.

In the past we have used poor judgment by supporting Somosa, Batista, and other right-wing dictators. Despite the fact that these tyrants were abusive to their own citizens, we backed them because they waved the American flag. We ignored the popular will in those countries, as well as the beginnings of revolutionary fervor. As a result, many developing countries have gone from the frying pan into the fire.

We must put an end to these situations where people like the Sandinistas provide the fire and people like the Contras provide the frying pan.

I urge my colleagues to give peace a chance in Nicaragua by ending aid to the Contras.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA].

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, all of us realize the importance of this vote. We also realize the fact that no matter how this vote goes, whether it is for or against aid to the Contras, that this is an issue that is not going to go away. We will face additional votes. We will face additional challenges and we will face the whole question of what we do about peace in Central America; but perhaps what can happen from this vote is that we can get the opportunity to perhaps develop a foreign policy in Central America that has a chance of success, that we can begin a new era of not simply fighting over Contra aid, but where both parties joining with all the nations of Central and Latin America can develop an approach together.

No policy of this Nation can succeed in a whirlwind of dissent. No policy can succeed where a majority of Americans are opposed. No policy can succeed when there is a majority of Latin and Central American nations opposed to it, where a majority of our allies are opposed to it, and where there is constant friction and distrust between the branches.

Such a policy is doomed to failure, and we either change it or we watch it become irrelevant in this hemisphere. First, the key to our policy must be an honest effort to reflect the basic principles that we stand for throughout the world. One of those principles is clearly that we advocate diplomatic, rather than military solutions, to the problems of the world. With regard to the Soviet Union, despite our great differences, we have negotiated an INF treaty. We are not saying that we ought to continue to deploy Pershing missiles because somehow we do not trust the Russians on the INF treaty.

We are negotiating today in an effort to develop a peace plan between Israel and Jordan with regard to the West Bank, and yet when it comes to Central America, diplomacy becomes the last option.

We have not implemented an effective diplomatic effort when it came to the Contadora effort and when it has come to the Guatemala peace process. Indeed, Secretary Shultz says:

If you just vote for aid, I will go there and try to negotiate with regard to peace in Central America.

The fact is Secretary Shultz should have gone a long time ago. The consequence is that our only current policy is Contra policy, and Contra policy by its very nature is military policy and it will not succeed.

Second, we are a nation committed to improving the human condition for people throughout the world. John F.

Kennedy remains one of the most popular Presidents in Latin America because he said that in this hemisphere we have to have a situation "where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and freedom."

Nothing can happen in a nation to improve human rights when it is torn by civil strife, regardless of what that government looks like.

The purpose of Contra aid is to promote civil strife, no more and no less, and for that reason it will not succeed.

Last, we stand by the principle that we will work together with the other nations of Central and Latin America in a common effort to prevent intervention, to promote social justice and to provide for peace and security.

The Guatemala Accord gives us that opportunity. The five Central American Presidents in the statement in San Jose on January 14, 1988, stated that the "definitive cessation of United States' assistance continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of peace efforts in this procedure."

President Arias says no more U.S. aid, and yet in the face of these requests we somehow say, "We know what is right. We don't have to pay attention to you. Let's do what we think is right."

My view is that we must stand by the principles that we have said we stand for throughout the world. Our Nation's effort now must be to get back to diplomacy, human rights, and multilateral solutions for peace.

Will we lose any of our options in Central America if we vote against Contra aid? No; not at all. But it does give us the chance to implement a new and perhaps more effective policy approach for peace throughout Central America.

Mr. Chairman, when the House votes on the administration's request for \$36.2 million of additional aid to Contras, the choice before us is clear: A vote for additional Contra aid is an endorsement of the administration's argument that the continued fighting of the Contra is the key to peace in Central America, and a vote against Contra aid rejects this policy in favor of the Guatemala peace accord.

Which is right? Both argue for peace—one by war, the other by negotiation.

The key to dealing with this issue rests with an analysis of what approach best implements the goals we should have for our policy in Central America.

These goals are clear: One, that it is better to find a diplomatic rather than a military solution to the problems of Central America;

Two, that all outside military intervention in the nations of this hemisphere must be stopped;

Three, that the underlying problems of Central America are best resolved with economic assistance, social justice reforms and human rights improvements; and

Four, any aid to insurgent groups should be limited to genuine humanitarian assistance controlled and approved by credible international and regional organizations and designed primarily to assist these forces in the transition from soldiers to citizens—from fire to cease-fire.

The basic question therefore is: Does the administration's request for \$36.2 million in lethal and nonlethal aid assist our Nation in achieving these goals?

The thrust of the administration's policy has been to support the Contras as a fighting force: first to interdict arms shipments, then to overthrow the Sandinistas, and now to pressure the Nicaraguan Government.

Since President Reagan took office, the United States has provided over \$1 billion in legal military aid to Central America along with hundreds of U.S. military advisers. This does not even include the millions of dollars in illegal arms diversions, private contributions and third-country donations.

This policy has largely developed by default—the failure of the administration to pursue any aggressive diplomatic effort. Their support for efforts to settle the region's conflicts have been halfhearted at best. Last August, after the signing of the peace agreement, Secretary of State Shultz said that the United States' intention was to talk to the five nations that signed the agreement.

Last fall, President Reagan spoke of his intentions to get together with Daniel Ortega and participate in multilateral negotiations to discuss our role in the peace process. Neither pursued their stated intentions. And today, the promise is to initiate a diplomatic effort by Secretary Shultz if Congress approves additional aid. This is the equivalent of diplomacy by blackmail and further undermines the administration's credibility on seeking a negotiated peace.

Our approach to protecting U.S. interests in Central America must be multilateral, favoring negotiations over an expanded war, and strengthening our democratic friends throughout Central and Latin America. Nicaragua needs peace and economic development and the Soviets and the Cubans cannot provide either one.

Nicaragua knows that Latin America, Western Europe and the United States hold those keys—and that only a viable and lasting peace can lead them to open the door. After 7 years, it is clear that there can be no effective U.S. policy toward Central America without the support of Central and Latin America.

The continuation of the Contra aid policy represents clear outside interference; just the same as we have been accusing the Soviets of doing around the globe. The administration should be pursuing Soviet leader Gorbachev's recent summit offer to simultaneously curtail outside military interference in Central America. His offer represents an excellent window of opportunity to seize such promises and move toward a diplomatic solution in Central America.

The basic problem with Contra aid is that it does not implement the common goals we all share. The peace process is the answer, not supplying the Contras with weapons and electronic radar.

For 7 years, the administration has claimed that support for the Contras is necessary to pressure the Sandinistas. And yet, the result has been to give the Nicaraguan Government every reason to continue to fight, to arm, to control and limit rights and freedoms. By contrast, the signing of the Guatemala peace plan has brought regional pressure on the countries of Central America to find common solutions and take steps toward promoting peace and human rights. We have tested the Sandinistas with arms—the time has come to test them with peace.

U.S. policy toward Central America must be centered on diplomacy and the search for negotiated political solutions to the region's conflicts, rather than on the current use of force or the quest for military victory. Our policy must include a commitment to economic development, social justice, and democracy in the region.

The lesson we have learned over the past 7 years is clear: the basis of United States policy in Central America must be to work with the other nations of Central America to obtain a diplomatic solution through the Guatemala peace process. If we want to establish in other countries in our hemisphere the democratic values we cherish, we must learn to adopt these values in our diplomacy.

When the administration speaks of humanitarian aid to the Contras, it can no longer pull the leg of the Congress and the American people when the CIA is chosen to administer a humanitarian aid package. In 1986 alone, the GAO reported that over half of the so-called humanitarian aid spent could not be accounted for. The Iran-Contra hearings sadly illustrated countless spending violations of millions of taxpayer dollars. It is high time the administration leveled with the American people and actually provided genuine humanitarian aid administered through a neutral international agency like the Red Cross to provide the Contras with food, medicine, and clothing.

It is time that the United States showed our neighbors in Central America a helping hand instead of a fist. What we need in Central America is not additional Contra aid but a partnership to restore economic development and economic opportunity; promote democracy and human rights; and ensure peace and security. A partnership to fulfill the vision of President John F. Kennedy 27 years ago of "a hemisphere where all men can hope for a suitable standard of living, and all can live out their lives in dignity and freedom."

Perhaps the greatest danger we face in Central America is turning our backs on the desire of our neighbors to improve their standard of living. It is time our Nation put forth a great effort to assist our neighbors who are poor, jobless, landless or malnourished to lead a better life.

In nations torn by civil strife, the United States should promote peace through national reconciliation, development of democratic political institutions and efforts to redress social and economic inequality. We must allow a major provision of the Guatemala peace accord to be given a chance: the five Central American countries agreed to address, with a sense of urgency, the problems of health, education, employment, security, economic and social democracy.

By agreeing to negotiate with the Contras last week, the Sandinistas have all but recognized the legitimacy of the Contras. The Sandinistas have also requested direct talks with the United States to discuss reductions in troop levels, foreign advisers, and the military force level. The administration still refuses to even sit down at the negotiating table with Nicaragua.

Neither the Sandinista government nor the administration-supported Contras can be defended as a model of democracy and human rights. What can and must be defended is an honest effort for peace in Central America. Today we are at the crossroads. We, as a nation, have two choices. We can support the fragile and workable regional peace agreement or we can remain uninvolved in peace and continue our present course of supporting the Contras.

Let us approach a new era of dealing with Central America with a renewed commitment to peace, economic assistance, social justice and human rights. The choice is clear: the United States owes its neighbors in the south the opportunity to give peace a chance. American negotiators did not bring about the Guatemala peace accord; the five Central American Presidents accomplished the agreement not imposed on them from the outside.

When the Nicaraguan chapter of our history is written, no matter what the eventual outcome of the conflict in Central America, I want future generations to say that we explored every avenue of peace, that we left no stone unturned in the quest for Central America peace. In the final analysis, is that not what this Nation stands for?

I urge my colleagues to make the sensible choice by defeating this Contra aid request and beginning a new era in Central America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LENT].

Mr. LENT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Contra package. The vote we cast today on Contra aid will determine whether or not the spark of democracy in Nicaragua will be extinguished or fanned into a flame. This vote will also determine whether the United States will succumb to being a pawn of Daniel Ortega's or a leader in bringing democracy and freedom to that troubled region. Today the Washington Post editorialized in favor of Contra aid. The editorial refers to the phrase, "give peace a chance" and points out it has been widely misused lately to support the effort to defeat Contra aid. Translated, this plea could read, "give the Communist Sandinistas a chance to consolidate their power and end any prospect for democracy in Nicaragua".

Tangible progress has been made in recent months toward securing peace in Nicaragua. However, we must not be deluded into believing that this progress has been the result of the Communist Sandinistas goodwill and cooperation. It has not. The effectiveness of the Contras, both politically and militarily, has been largely responsible for this success. A former top aide to Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega put it succinctly when he said, "as long as pressure is not exerted on

(the Sandinistas) they will never reestablish democracy in Nicaragua".

But enough of statements and speeches—after all, as we all are aware—"actions speak louder than words." Let us look then at the actions. April 23, 1985, the House turns down \$14 million in Contra aid only to watch red faced as Daniel Ortega goes to Moscow a few days later. March 20, 1986, the House defeats a Contra aid package and Mr. Ortega's army invades Honduras 3 days later. Fortunately, in both cases, the House reversed itself and voted to support the Nicaraguan resistance. It is this recognition of the need for United States support that has enabled progress to be made toward peace and freedom in Nicaragua.

Make no mistake about it, a Communist Nicaragua poses a very real threat to the security of the United States and to the stability of the region. If the dangers posed to this country by a Soviet satellite only 1,900 miles away, situated on the land bridge between Texas and the Panama Canal, doesn't concern you, then please consider the recent reports of human rights violations and repression which the Sandinistas have committed against leaders of the peaceful, democratic opposition. I urge my colleagues to cast their vote for continued progress toward peace and freedom in Nicaragua and to support the Contra aid package.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. NELSON].

Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. Chairman, when I met with Sandinista leaders nearly 6 years ago, there were signals then that Nicaragua wanted to start private discussions with the United States about a regional peace. Similar signs had been given to other American Government officials. But even now, in 1988, we are still waiting for Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega—this time to fulfill his hollow promises of compliance with the Arias peace plan.

Opponents of aid to the freedom fighters tell us that the Sandinistas want to talk about peace—but in light of their continued resistance to negotiation, can the American people truly believe they are sincere?

It is true that in past decades, the United States did not conduct an enlightened foreign policy with regard to Nicaragua—we supported the government of Somoza. When the Nicaraguan revolution succeeded we tried to establish relations with the Sandinistas. Instead, they threw dirt in our faces.

We tried to build a new relationship with Nicaragua in 1979. For 2 years America was the major source of food aid and a most important financial source. We sent millions of dollars of assistance, including thousands of tons of food to feed their people. But the Sandinista government refused to participate in a dialog with us.

I continue to believe that the United States should pursue a foreign policy of encouraging a regional peace. If the

Sandinistas would stop exporting their revolutionary communism, we could encourage mutual peace among the nations of Central America. Then, Central America could be economically revised.

But now Ortega is blatantly stalling the peace negotiations—a manipulative strategy, cloaked in the name of peace, to delay further U.S. aid to the Contras.

The United States has high stakes in the area because of our national security interests and the potential mass migration of Central Americans to America if those countries come under Communist rule.

The United States, acting in its own best interest, must keep the pressure on Nicaragua—as we can with this aid to the counterrevolutionaries—to genuinely negotiate a regional peace.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. KEMP].

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the gentleman from Oklahoma, for yielding me this 5 minutes, and congratulate him on the effort he has made on behalf of this cause.

I want to say to my colleagues, having served on the Kissinger Commission in Central America and having spent some time on this issue myself, I think it is absolutely imperative that we inform the American people to as great an extent as possible, of the stakes which have arisen with regard to the issue of aid to the democratic resistance in Central America.

An editorial in the earlier part of this year on January 29, 1988, *La Nacion*, the Costa Rican prestigious daily newspaper, said:

What is at stake is the fate of nations that border Nicaragua.

It went on to say:

Because the resistance, i.e., the Contras, are weakened, or God forbid they disappear, the Sandinista communist regime of Nicaragua, according to *La Nacion*, would direct all its energy with ample Soviet aid to its confessed objective of exporting revolution.

You see, what is at stake is not just giving peace a chance. If that is all that were at stake today, there is not a man or woman in these Chambers who would not say let us give peace a chance.

But the question is, How do you get peace with freedom? How do we get peace with democracy? How do we prevent Ortega from using peace in the Clausewitzian theory of the absence of war, engaging in war by other means?

Does anybody doubt in these Chambers that the purpose of the Sandinista Communist government is to destabilize their neighbors?

Stop and think for a moment who those neighbors are. It is not necessarily Texas or California. The neighbors are Guatemala, Honduras, El Salva-

dor, Costa Rica, and the Panama Canal.

Can you imagine what type of hemisphere this would be if there were a Communist exported revolution that threatened the Panama Canal, that gave the Soviets a Soviet base, as they have in Camranh Bay today?

Do you know the Straits of Malacca today to a certain degree are controlled by the Soviet Union? What would happen to the Straits of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz, the Straits of the Philippines, the Straits of Taiwan, what if they were under the control of the Soviet blue water navy?

But here we are in our own hemisphere today debating whether or not we are going to give some assistance to the men and women in Central America who want to stop the export of revolution to neighboring countries.

Now, let me ask my colleagues this. If we are spending \$300 billion a year to defend America and our allies in Europe and Asia against the threat of Soviet colonial empire expansionism, how is it possible that we could not spend one-hundredth, maybe it is one-thousandth. I have not quite figured out what \$36 million is of \$36 billion. Excuse the arithmetic, but can you imagine that we would not be willing to spend just an ounce, a modicum, just a tiny, tiny fraction of that \$300 billion?

If we do not care about our own hemisphere, how would anybody in Europe or anyone in Asia trust us?

The President last night talked about Maj. Roger Miranda. How about Humberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega's brother, and commandante, who said they were going to send the leaders of the 600,000 man army in Nicaragua to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany for training.

Does anybody want a Warsaw Pact country on the Isthmus of Central America?

My friends, do you really believe that a Warsaw Pact base in Central America is going to be hospitable to the cause of democracy in this hemisphere?

As Henry "Scoop" Jackson said in 1982 or 1983 when the Kissinger Commission was set up, and I supported that, imagine the pressure on Mexico. Imagine the pressure on the country of Mexico.

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KEMP. I yield very briefly to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman, is the gentleman aware that the Sandinistas continue to say that they would guarantee against any Soviet base if we would sign an agreement with them?

Mr. KEMP. Well, all right, I thank the gentleman for bringing that up, because that reminds me that in 1979 in August or June, Ortega said they

were going to democratize, allow La Prensa, the Catholic Church, the labor unions and free elections to be held. He violated those promises. The United States Congress gave, thanks to Jimmy Carter, \$100 million to the Sandinista Communists, and the gentleman's side of the aisle is telling us that we refuse to negotiate? We gave \$100 million. I was here in the Congress, voted against it, and now the gentleman is telling us to negotiate?

They will not keep their pledges unless we keep aid to the Contras. We must fight for freedom in Central America. Give aid to the freedom fighters.

In a few hours the U.S. House of Representatives will vote on President Reagan's aid request for the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. This vote is not about a million dollars in aid. It is a referendum on whether or not the United States sticks by its commitment to freedom and democracy and is willing to help reverse the spread of communism in our own hemisphere.

We have a choice. What we do today will help determine the outcome of democracy and freedom in Central America and eventually peace. If the democratic majority in Congress votes down aid to the Democratic Resistance forces, the Communist Sandinistas will be completely unopposed in consolidating their totalitarian dictatorship. The internal political resistance within Nicaragua is dependent on the military pressure of the anti-Communist Contra freedom fighters. We must not abandon the thousands of people who have stood up to Ortegas' beatings and persecution. If we abandon the cause of brave men and women in the field, we abandon all hope of stopping Soviet directed Communist subversion in Central America and eventually Mexico. To declare neutrality in Central America is the moral equivalent of selling out the anti-Communist Cuban resistance in 1961 and the anti-Communist South Vietnamese in 1975.

There should be no doubt that if we abandon our military assistance to the Democratic Resistance, the Sandinistas will solidify their tyrannical hold on the Nicaraguan people and will step up their support of militant guerilla forces against democracies in the region. If the aid request fails, the flame of freedom will be greatly endangered, there will be no peace, and we will face an expanded Soviet base for aggression.

Many of my liberal colleagues say that by rejecting the President's request we will be giving "peace a chance," but history tells us the opposite is true. Their logic does not hold because Daniel Ortega has broken every promise he has ever made. If you take a good look at Daniel Ortega's 9-year history of duplicity you see a trail of broken commitments. He promised democracy to the Organiza-

tion of American States in 1979. Again on August 7, 1987. He promised fulfillment of the Arias Plan. But he has not kept these promises; instead his brother Humberto talks of sending Sandinista officers for training in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany. We do not want another Soviet bloc state in our hemisphere.

Those who believe that a cutoff of aid to the freedom fighters will bring peace to Nicaragua ignore the history of communism, the teachings of Marxist-Leninism and the record of Daniel Ortega. Marxist-Leninist theory teaches us that you use any means, cut any deal and make any deception to assure complete victory for Marxist-Leninism.

Daniel Ortega has no intention of fulfilling any of his commitments. Maj. Roger Miranda, the former Sandinista officer, has told us that the Sandinistas view any peace plan as essentially a means to eliminate aid to the Democratic Resistance and nothing more. If Congress abandons the Contras, they will be playing into the hands of the Communist Daniel Ortega.

How many times must Daniel Ortega break his promises while he talks of "democracy"? How many times must opposition leaders be thrown in jail or beaten in the streets of Managua? How many times must one of the Ortega brothers declare that they will never give up power? How much more Soviet military aid—currently \$2 to \$3 million a day—must go to the Sandinistas before the U.S. Congress realizes that it is being used as a puppet by Ortega to crush the only hope for freedom and democracy in Nicaragua, the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance.

How can we spend nearly \$300 billion a year for our defense and yet refuse to spend one one-hundredth of that in support of democracy and in defense of a political region in our own hemisphere. As the President said last night, "The Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc countries have sent over \$4 billion in arms and military and economic aid—20 times the amount that the United States has provided the democratic freedom fighters. If Congress votes tomorrow against aid, our assistance will very quickly come to an end—but Soviet deliveries won't."

As the distinguished author Charles Krauthammer wrote in the February 8, 1988, issue of Time, "Americans still have to ask themselves the basic questions. Questions of national interest: Can the United States risk the domination of Central America by a Soviet client state?"

I ask my colleagues to vote today to save the one hope for democracy, peace and freedom. To vote today, for this tiny bit of aid to those who fight to obtain what we prize so highly.

□ 1845

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. BONKER].

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, Congress has arrived at the crossroads in our Central American policy. Down one path lies more aid to the Contras, deeper United States military involvement, and more bloodshed in Central America. Down the other path lies our best hope for peace—a process we have already begun under the Arias plan, a blueprint with very specific steps and deadlines to achieve peace in Central America.

Today the House must choose.

It is important that we see the President's request for what it is, and for what it is not. It is not humanitarian aid, as several of my colleagues have noted earlier today, because more than three-quarters of the so-called nonlethal aid would be spent on military items like trucks and jeeps and aircraft.

It is not a scaled-back request. This package would more than triple the level of support our Government has been providing the Contras over recent months.

It is not even a \$36 million aid package. The real figure is closer to \$60 or \$70 million. When you read the fine print of the President's request, you find millions of additional dollars for radar and air defense systems and up to \$20 million to replace Contra supply aircraft that may be shot down.

Beyond all these arguments, however, the time has come for Congress to draw the line on Contra aid. No matter how much money the President requests, no matter how many paper restrictions they place on it, the House should not approve a penny more in Contra aid.

If this aid is approved, it will cripple the peace process and it will lead to only more killing and bloodshed in the region. This is not the path to peace in Central America. It is an ongoing journey to more destruction.

Mr. Chairman, I urge all my colleagues to vote against more Contra aid.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McEWEN].

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, it is appropriate to ask ourselves what has happened in Central America in the last 60 months. We have seen Guatemala become a democracy. We have seen Honduras become a democracy. We have seen El Salvador become a democracy. We have seen Nicaragua end this decade as a Communist beachhead receiving hundreds of millions of dollars from the PLO, from the East Germans, from the Bulgarians, from the Soviet Union, from the Cubans, and yet today as we stand

here we know that that system is about to collapse.

Why is it that the Sandinistas are negotiating? Why is it that they are releasing political prisoners? Why is it that *La Prensa* is allowed to print today? Why is it that the peace process is underway?

It is because the United States of America and even this very Congress stood strongly behind democracy and behind freedom. There was a time when the President of the United States stood on the steps outside this Chamber and said let the world go forth that the torch has been passed to a new generation of Americans that is willing to bear any burden and to pay any price for the cause of democracy and for freedom.

The question before us tonight is will we not bear any burden, or pay any price, but will we give an eyedropper of aid to those who are willing to fight for their own freedom?

There are those of us who can on occasions like this hear the mugging going on in the street, hear the violation of the victims being drug into the alleyway and we can turn up the television and we can pull the drapes and we can pretend as though we do not hear and yet tonight there are those who are crying for our help. They do not ask blood, they do not ask troops, they just ask help, and we need to give it to them.

Mr. Chairman, Winston Churchill once compared our adversaries to a crocodile; when it opens its mouth you cannot tell whether it is trying to smile or preparing to eat you up.

Unfortunately, Daniel Ortega is doing both. He has put on his best smile by promising democratic reforms to convince this body and the American public, that the Sandinistas can be trusted to abide by the Arias peace plan. That is the bottom line. The question this body must answer is: Can Daniel Ortega be trusted?

The question is not do we want the Arias peace plan to succeed. I think we all want that. The real question is how do we go about ensuring that the Sandinistas conform to the plan that Daniel Ortega signed.

If we look to history as a guide to our decision, we will find ample examples of misplaced trust in tyrants and totalitarian governments.

In 1938, Neville Chamberlain went to Munich to appease Adolf Hitler so that he might leave other European nations alone. The British Prime Minister came back to England believing he had "secured peace in our time." Instead, by taking the word of a fascist dictator, he gave the green light to a Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia. Mr. Chamberlain failed to understand that there is no honor among tyrants.

Things have not changed much since 1938. Daniel Ortega, in signing the Guatemalan accords, has promised to stop being a Communist and democratize Nicaragua. If we cut off aid to the Contras, we are saying to Mr. Ortega, we trust you to come through on your

promises. In my opinion, that's too risky. It's wrong.

Just 2 weeks ago Maj. Roger Miranda, in referring to the Sandinistas, stated that, and I quote:

For them, democracy consists of perpetuating themselves in power. They have closed off any possibility of a democratic outcome to the civil war in Nicaragua. I know the way they think. Unless pressure is put on them, they will never re-establish democracy in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, it is time this Congress stand up and say to the Sandinistas, we are not going to let you off the hook. We don't trust you Comandante Ortega. You must abide by the peace plan and we are going to make sure you do by funding the democratic resistance.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Utah [Mr. OWENS].

Mr. OWENS of Utah. Mr. Chairman, I listened carefully to President Reagan last night, wondering what new arguments he might make to justify interfering in the peace process in Central America, in derogation of the Guatemala accords.

I heard nothing which would reverse my long held opposition to the funding of the Contra forces.

When the President spoke so warmly of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and compared them with the French resistance of World War II, I remembered that he had earlier compared them with the American revolutionary Founding Fathers. I recalled how, in fact, the Contra commander, and a large majority of the Contra military high command, are former Somozan national guardsmen, a fact the State Department has admitted. I recalled the \$18 million-plus of funds given to Contras in recent years which are still unaccounted for. The confirmed reports of individuals killed and maimed by the Contras are fresh in my mind. I recalled the numerous Contra bombings of hospitals, schools and roads, using maps and plans provided by the American CIA and I recalled the insider's description of the corrupt leadership and questionable objectives of the Contras rendered by Oliver North's former assistant, Robert Owen.

I wondered how many of the Nicaraguan peasants sympathize with these so-called freedom fighters whose brutal tactics they regularly observe. It seems clear why so few volunteer for the Contra forces and why, after 7 years of struggling, the Contras control no major area of Nicaragua and have to organize and direct forces from across the border in Honduras.

At the same time, I pondered the President's litany of agreements he thinks were broken by Ortega, and added to that my own understanding of the abuses—physical and social—visited upon these same Nicaraguan peasants by the Sandinista government;

these Sandinistas who are certainly no less brutal in tactics than are the Contras. I read daily about the disastrous economy in Nicaragua, the result of inept governance by President Ortega and his commandantes. With all that, I can understand the ambivalence and confusion of the Nicaraguan citizens, who wonder who it is they can trust. I frankly don't trust either the Contras or Mr. Ortega and his Sandinista government.

The peace process is moving forward, though, and we should be working with that process—not against it. President Ortega is weak, now; his economy is in shambles. This is the time to work with President Arias, and the other Central American Presidents, to push Ortega for further concessions; this is the time to press to democratize the Nicaraguan Government; this is the time to pressure Nicaragua to hold free elections; if, instead, we help the Contras, we give Ortega an excuse to slow down his political concessions and a reason to move back toward more repression; let us test Ortega's sincerity.

The Guatemala agreement calls for a halt to outside funding to revolutionary forces, and it is my hope that we will not risk destroying the Central American peace process by providing these funds. And, it is my hope that this Chamber today will, instead, destroy the idea of further American assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Montana [Mr. MARLENEE].

Mr. MARLENEE. Mr. Chairman, I never cease to be amazed by the profound lack of recall, perhaps purposely, by those who would throw the Monroe Doctrine out the window. This same group of apologists refuses to remember that Castro was hailed as the great reformer that American sympathizers picked coffee and harvested cane in Cuba to help the Marxists. The liberals gave Cuba to the Communists and now sadly we see Cuba as a training ground for destabilization throughout the world.

I ask my colleagues to read the periodicals of that time, the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of that time. Today's debate echoes of the capitulation, the lack of courage, and the lack of leadership that was evidenced which they gave Cuba to the Communists.

This same group of liberals refuse to remember that we built the Panama Canal, that we were the stabilizing factor, that it was built at the cost of our blood, sweat, tears, and lives. In the distorted and perverted rationale that we could contribute to the stabilization, the liberals under Jimmy Carter gave the Panama Canal away.

Does it not make you uneasy and ill that those who oppose aid refuse to re-

member the pictures of Ortega and the terrorist conclave of the Qadhafi types, established in Nicaragua? Now they want to give Central America to the Communists. They want to give Central America to the Communists because the Wright Central American death squad those who oppose freedom and the Contras, want to capitulate in the perverted sense that we are going to add to the stabilization.

The American people will not forget and I will not forget when my granddaughter asks why our troops have to be mobilized on our border.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is left on each side?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 1 hour and 20½ minutes remaining and the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY] has 1 hour 15½ minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTLETT].

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in favor of this aid package and in doing so I rise in favor of the implementation and the full implementation of the Central American peace plan.

Mr. Chairman, today I have like many of my colleagues listened carefully to the debate, and one of the key but highly inaccurate points that has been made by the opponents of this aid program is that if it is enacted it allegedly will undermine the Central American peace accords.

Those of us who support the proposal are cast erroneously as opponents of the Arias peace plan. I say to my colleagues that is exactly the reverse of the truth.

Mr. Chairman, I regret that in the debate today that those of us who favor a vote for the military aid in escrow have been too defensive on this point. I think that our approach in fact will strengthen the diplomatic efforts of Central America's democratic leaders while that of our opponents will weaken it.

To make my point I will quote from one of my colleagues, an opponent of aid to the Contras, who yesterday said:

Escrow accounts and deadlines for democracy will not work. What is more important is the trend toward reconciliation and peace. We must be realistic, Nicaragua has never known democracy. It will take years, not weeks, to achieve.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the fact of the matter is that it is the Central American leaders who signed the peace agreement last August 7 and it was those Central American leaders that set the deadlines in a matter of months and weeks for the democracy of Nicaragua, not this Congress.

The Central American leaders themselves said that it could be done and it

should be done in a finite period of time. It was they, the other Central American leaders, who set out the specific criteria which defined what democracy should include, not we.

So opponents of this proposal can of course describe it if they choose, as unrealistic, but in doing so they tell President Arias and the other Presidents of Central America that it is realistic. It is a realistic plan, the plan has been adopted and supported by the Central America Presidents.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HUTTO].

Mr. HUTTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise to speak in favor of the Contra aid request. I believe that if we cut all aid to the freedom fighters and the Communist-Sandinista government is then able to fully consolidate its position, our Nation will eventually be faced with something close to an economic and strategic nightmare.

Economically, our Nation could ultimately be faced with a tidal wave of refugees streaming across the Rio Grande into the United States. The administration has said, rightfully so, I believe, that the Sandinistas are not merely Stalinists, suggesting a totalitarian attitude, but they are also Leninists, meaning that they have an expansionist goal. If we allow the Communist-Sandinista government to establish a Cuban-style regime in our Western Hemisphere, all of Central America including Mexico, could very well fall to the Communists.

According to an estimate attributed to H. Eugene Douglas, the former U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, resettlement costs for these refugees would exceed \$40 billion a year. Additionally, an expansionist Communist influence just south of our U.S. borders would require of the American taxpayer an unacceptable financial and economic burden to fortify and garrison our southern borders.

In strategic terms, the expansion of the growing military might of Communist Nicaragua, and the ongoing threat of Cuba would pose a serious land, sea, and air danger to the vital Caribbean region. We would need to be very much concerned over the 52-mile-long Panama Canal, which handles some 11,000 ships a year, including U.S. naval vessels, that can be shut down by destroying any one of its numerous locks or sinking any large vessel in the canal.

Nearly three-fourths of America's imported oil passes through the Caribbean along with 90 percent of our strategic materials, such as titanium, chromium, and manganese used by industrial aircraft companies and other contractors for the U.S. Armed Forces. Should the Soviets be able to close the other narrow trade routes in the Caribbean, which account for nearly two-thirds of all U.S. seaborne trade, the

United States would be faced with an economic disaster.

It would seem to me that the President's request falls quite a bit short of what the freedom fighters need, but it is enough to keep the Communist-Sandinistas honest. Furthermore, it is vital that we provide continued aid for the Contras in order to continue putting pressures on the Communist-Sandinista government to negotiate an acceptable peace arrangement with the democratic forces in the area. The Nicaraguan people, who thought they were getting something better than Somoza, are suffering under the oppression of the Sandinistas. They want relief and they want freedom. Let's keep the pressure on the Sandinistas to bring this about by voting for this proposal.

□ 1900

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. ROWLAND].

Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut. Mr. Chairman, on two different occasions over the past 3 years I have voted against aid to the Contras. As a matter of fact, I joined a rather small number of Republicans on those two occasions to vote no on aid to the Contras.

At that time, many of us argued that we need to give Mr. Ortega time to negotiate, we needed to try out the process, Mr. Habib had just begun the negotiation process.

It was just 3 years ago, Mr. Chairman, that one of our colleagues from Massachusetts returned from a trip to Nicaragua and he proudly raced back to the United States and bounced into Washington, DC, and announced to the press, the American people and to the U.S. Congress that he had an important message to deliver from Mr. Ortega. He said that Mr. Ortega has made a number of commitments. He said to us at that time, which happened to be about 1½ weeks before the vote, that if we did not aid the Contras that Mr. Ortega would negotiate and work with the Contras, he would bring about Democratic reforms.

He even went a step further. He said he would reach out and work with the American Government. And if that were not enough, Mr. Ortega also agreed, if we did not aid the Contras at that time, he would get rid of Soviet and Cuban military advisers.

I had a number of arguments with my colleagues on both sides of the aisle and the administration. I was convinced that we should give Mr. Ortega an opportunity to show his good will. I did not take Mr. Ortega very long to show his true colors. Not only did he renege on his promise to meet with the Contras, not only did he renege on his promise to work with the people and the American Govern-

ment, not only did he renege on his promise to get rid of Soviet and Cuban military advisers, it only took several days before he went back to the Soviet Union for yet another shipment of supplies. It did not take too long for Mr. Ortega to repeat the same action. A few weeks before the vote, a year after that he made overtures and talked about democratic reforms and negotiations. Again we did not supply aid to the Contras. Again, it only took a few days for the Sandinista army to move into Honduras.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know how many more times we have to be duped by Mr. Ortega. He has shown us one important thing however. He does respond to pressure from our Government, he does respond to pressure from the American people, and he does respond to pressure from the Contras.

Before we vote today I hope that each and every one of us will ask ourselves a very important question, and I hope all of our friends and the American people will ask themselves one very, very important question. What is the interest of the Soviet Union in Nicaragua? What is the interest of the Soviet Union in a small country in our hemisphere? I ask my colleagues to consider that most important question before the vote.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. PRICE].

Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to renewed aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. In listening to this debate today, we can discern wide agreement as to the United States legitimate goals in Central America—the realization of democracy, respect for human rights, economic development, political stabilization, the containment of efforts to export revolution, an end to Soviet influence in the region. Where we disagree is on the means to achieve these ends. I have never felt that pumping American tax dollars into Nicaragua's civil war was a promising way of achieving these objectives, and I especially believe that today's request for renewed aid is ill-timed and counterproductive.

The most promising way of realizing our legitimate objectives is through a mutually enforced agreement among the nations in that region—an agreement toward which the peace process, despite its imperfections, seems to be moving. There has been change in Nicaragua—perhaps not as much, or as fast, as we would like—but there are concrete examples of progress—the release of thousands of political prisoner, the reopening of La Prensa, and perhaps most important, the Sandinista government's willingness to negotiate directly for a cease-fire with the Contra forces.

We should not view these changes lightly. Over the last 6 years, the Congress has appropriated over \$276 million to support the Contra forces in Nicaragua and yet it is only since the signing of the Arias peace plan that real progress toward a negotiated settlement has occurred.

I think it vitally important that the fragile Central American peace process be allowed to work. To put more money into Nicaragua's civil war at this juncture would encourage continued fighting and allow the Sandinistas a perfect excuse to turn their backs on the peace process. A vote for the President's package today would undermine, perhaps fatally, the prospects for an enduring settlement, and for that reason, I plan to vote against it.

I believe, however, that we should see this vote not as an end, but as a new beginning. Serious talk has already begun in the Congress concerning the kinds of constructive alternative steps the United States might take to move the peace process forward, to lock in the Sandinistas' concessions, and to facilitate the Contras' entry into the political life of the country. That is the direction this Congress should be taking and I urge my colleagues to join me in this endeavor and to vote "no" to the President's Contra aid package.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. PURSELL].

Mr. PURSELL. Mr. Chairman, the thrust of American policy toward Central America should not be determined solely on the basis of a yes or no vote on aid to the Nicaraguan Contras.

Engaging in such a narrowly focused debate demonstrates a serious lack of foresight. At best, it is continued crisis management.

We must, in a bipartisan fashion, pledge ourselves to the long-term goals of the Arias peace plan adopted in Guatemala and ultimately strive for a full-fledged partnership with our Central American neighbors.

The best example is the bipartisan foreign policy adopted following World War II, when the Truman administration and the Congress—led by Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan—worked together to rebuild Europe, physically, economically, and politically. The success of that policy, including the Marshall plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, remains evident today.

Likewise, political and economic stability is desperately needed in Central America and can be achieved only once a middle class is established. Yet military initiatives alone cannot create a middle class. Diplomatic and economic development initiatives are the tools needed to build this stabilizing force in Central America.

What are the vital components of an effective bipartisan foreign policy in Central America? First, we should re-establish a commission modeled after the Kissinger Commission to develop a long-term economic, political, and cultural partnership with our Central American neighbors.

Secondly, we need to expand educational opportunities that permit Central American students to study in the United States. College scholarships will provide a badly needed pool of well trained teachers, doctors, and other professionals to meet the social, economic, and education needs of the region. Such programs also effectively counter the massive soviet effort to saturate the region with graduates of Marxist institutions.

Finally, we need to improve and expand the Caribbean Basin Initiative which would go a long way toward restoring the badly damaged economies of Central American countries. CBI offers the region A program for trade, economic assistance, and tax measures to generate economic growth. It is time to resurrect CBI and make it work.

These are the building blocks for an effective bipartisan foreign policy leading to lasting peace, economic stability and democratization in Central America. I challenge the administration and the leadership on both sides to begin implementing a bipartisan foreign policy.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield all remaining time on this side to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY].

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KOSTMAYER].

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, everyone in this Chamber shares the same broad objectives: peace and democracy in Central America. We all want to promote the interests of the region, and the interests of the United States.

We have all participated in a national debate about whether or not the Contras are the best means for achieving our goals.

But Mr. Chairman, in its zealous effort to win congressional support for the Contras, the administration has been neither completely honest nor open. On the contrary, deception and misinformation have been the pillars of the administration's arguments on behalf of Contra aid.

Consider the Contra aid proposal now before us. The President's latest request was created to seem reasonable. Just \$36 million, just 10 percent military aid, just a little escrow account as an insurance policy against Sandinista backsliding they say. The administration has portrayed the package as modest, logical, and essen-

tial to the success of the Arias peace plan.

In reality it is none of these things.

The President says his request totals \$36.2 million, \$32.6 million in humanitarian aid and \$3.6 million in military aid, to be held in escrow. But that's only part of the story.

There's also \$20 million in additional assistance in case any delivery planes are shot down and need to be replaced. There's also money for an air defense system for the Contras, which the administration says will total about \$7 million over 4 months.

Add all this up, and suddenly you've got a \$63 million request, not a \$36 million request. And there's more.

The \$32.6 million in the so-called humanitarian aid portion has only \$6 million worth of what most of us consider humanitarian aid: food, clothing, and medicine. Only 20 percent of the so-called humanitarian aid package would go for truly humanitarian purposes. The remaining 80 percent—\$26.6 million—is going for trucks and helicopters and communications equipment and other devices that facilitate Contra warmaking, not humanitarian assistance.

Remember too that this request is for only 4 months; \$63 million for 4 months. That's about \$16 million per month, or more than twice what the Contras received per month in 1987. Under the President's proposal, three times more humanitarian aid would flow to the Contras per month than in 1987.

So, Mr. Chairman, this is not such a modest request. It is a request that we support the Contras' war effort, and that we do so generously.

Nor is this request as reasonable as it may seem at first.

It is not reasonable to show support for the peace plan by violating it.

It is not reasonable to ensure peace by perpetuating war.

It is not reasonable to apply the same pressure in response to good behavior and bad.

It is not reasonable to expect that the Contras will willingly negotiate a cease-fire when they are receiving more aid than ever from the United States.

And frankly, Mr. Chairman, it is not reasonable to commit \$60 million American dollars to rebels that even Oliver North's right hand man, Robert Owen, called "liars . . . greed and power motivated."

This request is old wine in a new bottle. It is as misleading as the administration's whole campaign on behalf of Contra aid has been.

In its effort to sell this failed policy, the administration has misled the Congress and the American people time and time again with exaggerated rhetoric based on more conjecture than fact.

In his effort to sway opinion on the Contras in 1985, President Reagan went so far as to say that Pope John Paul II had sent a message asking the President to continue aiding the rebels. The Pope quickly assured the President and public that he was not a Contra supporter, but the President's campaign of selective editing continued.

Take the widely touted Miranda revelations. The White House had plenty to say about Major Miranda's exclusive on the Sandinista's military plans.

What the administration does not say about Mr. Miranda's 600,000-man army, is that it is essentially a home guard. Five-sixths of the proposed army would be rural militia—peasants with 2 weeks of marksmanship training, carrying a gun over their shoulder while they plow their fields.

What the administration does not say is that Mr. Miranda outlined a plan that would actually reduce the active army in Nicaragua by 10,000 to 20,000 men.

Or take the administration's age old claim that the Nicaraguans are sending arms to the rebels in El Salvador.

What the administration does not say is that Salvador's own military intelligence officers say that support has all but dried up.

What the administration doesn't say is that their own defense attaché in Managua told a visiting Republican Senator that Nicaragua's support for Salvador's rebels was passive, not active.

The administration doesn't talk much about David McMichael, the CIA analyst who was in charge of monitoring the arms flow until he resigned to protest the administration's continual falsification of arms flow reports.

Mr. Chairman, these are but a few examples drawn from more than 6 years of administration lies about Nicaragua. The White House has nearly perfected the art of taking a kernel of truth and turning it into acres of misleading justifications. Their suggestion that this latest request is moderate, constructive, and reasonable is but the latest deception.

In reality, this request is the latest tactic in the administration's strategy to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government while feigning an interest in a negotiated settlement.

There is an alternative, and it is not cut and run. The first step is to defeat the President's request for more Contra aid. To close the chapter of deceit and lawlessness, and to begin a constructive policy toward the region.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to reject the President's request.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DELAY].

Mr. DELAY. Mr. Chairman, let me just say the gentleman from Pennsyl-

vania is absolutely wrong, the peace plan has nothing to do with and does not even speak to prohibiting aid from the Soviet Union or prohibiting the aid from the United States. What it speaks to is aid from Nicaragua to the guerrillas of El Salvador and exportation of revolution by countries that signed the pact.

But let me just say a little bit about some of the misstatements and the double speaking on this floor today by our opponents. History, Mr. Chairman, has a tough time on this floor. Our opposition tends to see history as they wish it was. They see the future as they wish it to be. If the Sandinistas were really trustworthy as their supporters claim, then Nicaragua never would have needed the peace plan in the first place.

Let us look back at history, the contadora process, the promises in 1979 for democracy and now the Arias peace plan that should have been complied with on November 7, and here we are with the Sandinistas still out of compliance.

Ladies and gentlemen, a basic tenet of Lenin's expansionist policy is that, "if you strike steel, pull back; if you strike mush, keep going." In Cuba they struck mush and kept going, and now we have a Communist Soviet military and intelligence base 90 miles off our borders. In Grenada, they struck steel and pulled back and now Grenada is working toward democracy.

We are about to pull the steel right out from under them and throw them a handful of mush and say go get it.

Mr. Chairman, we cannot do that. We must put up that steel so that the Communists and the Sandinistas will strike that steel and pull back.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. STUDDS].

Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Chairman, this debate is not about democracy; and the concern of the President of the United States in Nicaragua is not democracy. Ronald Reagan never worried himself for 1 minute about Nicaragua prior to the current government, and we would be very busy indeed in this Chamber if we were to finance invasions against every nondemocratic government in the world. We might have requests if that were the President's concern, for example, for financing invasions against maybe Saudi Arabia, or how about Brunei, governments which never had a democratic thought in all of their lives.

The gentleman who preceded me in the well said the peace accords have nothing to do with the United States. Let me read something from the Guatemala accords which this President says he wants us to support. I quote:

The five Central American governments shall request governments of the region and

governments outside the region which are providing openly or covertly military, logistical, financial, rhetorical, or other assistance in the form of humanitarian aid to irregular forces or insurgent movements to stop such aid as an indispensable element to achieving a lasting peace in the region.

Mr. Chairman, those are the words of the peace accords, and our President, unfortunately, is asking us explicitly and overtly to undo and to contradict the heart and soul of that.

The challenge of this House tonight is whether we can live up to our name, the House of Representatives. The court of world opinion has rejected this policy. The Central American countries have rejected this policy. The American people have never supported the Reagan policy in Central America, and the question now is whether the House of Representatives for once and finally on this issue can summon the courage, if not to lead the people of this country, at the very least to represent them and to say to the policy of the President of the United States, Mr. President, with all due respect, you are wrong, you are counter to the very peace process in whose name you submit this policy, and you are counter to what this Nation is supposed to stand for in the world.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the President's request for over \$50 million to support the Nicaraguan Contras.

President Reagan's policy in Nicaragua began in 1981 as a covert operation in support of Argentinian trainers building an anti-Sandinista insurgent force. Then the CIA became more ambitious, moving to organize and train the Contras themselves in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Panama.

At first the Intelligence Committees let the covert plan through, having accepted the President's claim that its sole purpose was the interdiction of arms being sent from Nicaragua to rebels in El Salvador.

When plans to divide Nicaragua in half were revealed—plans that could only be directed at the military overthrow of the Sandinista government, the Congress moved quickly to limit the President's operation.

My colleague from Massachusetts, Mr. BOLAND, introduced the first of his amendments, which stated that none of the money Congress was appropriating could be used "for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of Nicaragua." In 1982, this body supported that measure unanimously, 411 to 0.

Despite this unambiguous mandate, the President persisted. After a skeptical Congress and public succeeded in tearing away the fig leaf of arms interdiction, the administration fell back on the proposition that any Communist regime is inherently hellbent on taking over its neighbors. This argument came replete with maps showing the color red gradually spreading up and down the Central American isthmus.

The references to Communist expansionism have not become more reasoned or substantiated, nor have arguments that the Soviet Union intends to set up a military base in Nicaragua. Rather, the Reagan administration

recently shifted the terms of debate again to focus on political life within Nicaragua. And with the extraordinary joining together of the leaders of the five Central American republics to sign the Guatemala accords, the Contras have become a rather bloody insurance policy for democracy in Nicaragua. Today, we are asked to give humanitarian aid to freedom fighters who prosecute a brutal war in order to, as Secretary Shultz said yesterday, "give peace a chance."

Unfortunately for the Nicaraguan people the battle here in Washington is now less ideological than theological. The Reagan administration has devoted a full 7 years to its freedom fighters. Even if Daniel Ortega kissed the American flag and decided that Nicaragua should adopt our Constitution, you can be sure that our President would not abandon the Contras.

Nonetheless, we in the House of Representatives have an important job to do: to decide whether the President's policy is sound policy.

So let me consider briefly the President's central argument—that support for the Contras is the only way to push the Sandinista government toward democracy, to make them comply with the Guatemala accords.

The logic here is charmingly simple: give money to Contras; Contras pressure Sandinistas; Sandinistas become democratic. Take money away from the Contras and you might as well paint Central America red.

However, many of my colleagues have argued that the Contra war only pushes the Sandinista government toward greater reliance on the Soviet Union, toward repressive laws justified by the need for domestic discipline in wartime. The last time the Congress gave the Contras military aid, *La Prensa* was closed on the following day.

And the administration's commitment to democracy must seem a bit tenuous in light of its half-hearted attempts to encourage free elections in neighboring Haiti. After President Reagan made not one public statement or significant diplomatic initiative to press the Haitian junta to allow a fair plebescite, Secretary Shultz yesterday complained of the "difficulty of moving from military to democratic rule."

Mr. Chairman, consider for a moment the array of alternative means of pressing for democracy in Nicaragua. There are the pressures generated by the commitment of the Central American leaders, and their peoples, to follow through with the Guatemala peace plan. There is our own ability to negotiate, as yet untried in Central America but rather impressive when directed at arms control with the Soviet Union. There are economic incentives—real humanitarian aid and the lifting of a stifling trade embargo—for a country already subject to energy rationing and expected to experience 18,000 percent inflation during this calendar year. If the State Department spent half as much time trying to work for real democracy and human rights in Central America as it does putting out propaganda pamphlets about the Sandinista leadership we might now be seeing some real progress toward peace and democracy in the region.

Further, why have we not pursued the real opportunity presented by Secretary Gorbachev's informal proposal to President Reagan

to end Soviet military aid to the Sandinistas in exchange for a cut-off of U.S. aid to the Contras?

Mr. Chairman, yesterday a constituent of mine came to my office to tell me of her recent trip to Nicaragua. She visited a family living off on their own in an isolated valley in Chontales Province. In November the Contras descended from the hills and kidnapped their teenage son. He managed to escape, but the Contras came back and captured him again. The Contras do not like it when their recruits desert, so they decided to peel the skin off this young man's face before putting him to death.

My constituent also informed me of a recent attack by the freedom fighters on a family homestead, an attack thoroughly documented in the *Philadelphia Inquirer* in December, in which a pregnant young woman was raped at bayonet-point and then murdered, and her sister-in-law was shot in the back as she ran away clutching her baby. The sister-in-law survived, as the bullet passed right through her and took off her baby's leg.

Mr. Chairman, there is a better way. This House of Representatives has an obligation to be representative, and to end the hypocrisy of this bloody war. Then we can go to work, together, to heal the wounds of Central America.

□ 1915

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Illinois [Mrs. MARTIN] who I think thinks like me that the purpose of the United States is to stand for democracy.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I have always envied those on both sides who are so sure of their own positions, who from the beginning knew, for instance, regardless of party, that they could support no aid, that any remark against the Sandinistas was cruel and that indeed that served peace. I believe them.

I have envied those on another side who could know we should be in there, who know we should have even more aid, who felt strongly that without freedom there could be no peace.

But some of us have been more in the middle. We come from districts that do not necessarily support any foreign aid.

I come from a district that looks at foreign aid as aid to Chicago, not aid to Nicaragua. Yet at times we have to go beyond our own districts.

This time I relistened. It would be easy to support my President without thinking. There is nothing wrong with that. But it would be wrong if I just automatically agreed, if it affected the peace process. I can only tell you my conclusion.

If this is the President who is able to achieve an INF treaty by being strong, does he not deserve the courtesy of formulating a foreign policy that will again, yes, use American strength? And if the dollars we are talking about

in lethal aid are half of what we were willing to give to non-American children in a suburb of Paris, it is hardly the dollars. What it is if one side is wrong and there is no aid, and democracy dies, and freedom has no chance, however do we face any constituent we represent? I can only tell you this, it deserves the chance, give freedom a chance.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. OBERSTAR] my colleague across the bay.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, this evening we are poised on the threshold of a momentous decision for the Americas. There are few choices we make in this Chamber where peace and war hang in the balance. This 27th vote that we will cast tonight on Contra aid is that kind of vote.

The Reagan administration's policy has evolved from one of covert assistance to the Contras to overt, multimillion dollar assistance for the single purpose of overthrowing the Sandinista government, one that we diplomatically recognize, by military force.

And now they claim that aid to the Contras is needed to keep the pressure on for negotiations. But that policy ignores the new reality in Central America, that the Central American governments themselves have taken extraordinary steps toward regional self-determination by backing the Arias plan, the Guatemala peace accords, and supporting that plan for peace.

The prestige of the Nobel Prize for Peace is the driving force for peace in the region, not arms to the Contras; yet, peace and the Arias plan will never have a chance, never have a prayer unless we cut off the military aid and stop the fighting. We need to create a climate for real negotiations to take hold, negotiations by those in the region who are most affected by their outcome.

We will not achieve peace using the Contras as our agents; we will become peacemakers by supporting the one clear steady vision, the regional vision for peace: the Arias plan.

Cutting off military aid may not guarantee the success of negotiations, but continuing the military aid will assure their failure.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. TAUZIN].

Mr. TAUZIN. Mr. Chairman, the debate all day today has centered on the theme of where we have been in regard to aid to the Contras. Those who oppose aid have talked about the alleged inadequacies of the Contras as a fighting force in Nicaragua. Those who support aid have taken much solace from the fact the headlines no longer talk about the battles in El Salvador, of the imminent fall of the democratic government in El Salvador

to an insurgency sponsored from Nicaragua. Instead, the headlines talk about battles now on the home turf of that aggressive force in Nicaragua. Those who support aid to the Contras indeed take much solace from the fact that the fighting in El Salvador has given way to fighting now where that aggression emanated from in Nicaragua. The debate is not really about where we have been in regard to aid to the Contras, the debate is where we are going from here.

Where are we now and where do we go? I have heard a strange argument tonight. The argument is that we ought to let the Central Americans settle their own business, let us stay out of it. If they cannot settle it properly, if they cannot contain Daniel Ortega and the Communist Sandinistas, well then we will send the Marines in, they will mop it up and clean it up.

It is a strange argument, folks, because it ignores the fact that it is Central Americans who are dying in Nicaragua, fighting for freedom there, not Americans; it is Central Americans who are containing Daniel Ortega's aggressive tendencies in the region; it is Central Americans dying in the Contra fighting forces to keep Daniel Ortega and his alleged plan to build a 600,000 man fighting force from overtaking that region. It is Americans who have to die in place of those Central Americans if we do not support them in their efforts.

So tonight when we ask ourselves where do we go from here, we ought eminently to ask ourselves what is this Nation's best self-interest? I submit to you we ought to ask ourselves a tough question: Is it better for us, is it in our self-interest indeed to continue support for those Central Americans who are fighting for their own freedoms, who are containing that Communist force in Nicaragua, is it better for us to continue our support for them and to ensure that peace indeed can come to El Salvador and the democracies that are peaceful in the region like Honduras and Costa Rica have a chance to grow and flourish; or is it instead in our Nation's best self-interest to abandon those forces in the field and to trust Daniel Ortega to do the right thing in the peace process?

I suggest to you that if we dare make that second choice, if we abandon those forces in the field, that one day the alternative discussed in this Chamber, sending the American boys and girls in, sending our Marines in, will be the awful fateful choice that will face this Nation.

I have four young boys, two of whom are talking about military careers. I am proud of them for it. I hope one day that they pursue those careers. But I would hate today to have on my conscience that we made a decision to send those boys to their death in defense of liberty when today

we can count on the Central Americans fighting for their own liberty.

Support aid to the Contras.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Ms. PELOSI].

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Ms. PELOSI. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to aid to the Contras.

Mr. Chairman, the Sandinistas have made more progress toward democratization in the last 6 months under the Arias peace plan, than during 6 years of aid to the Contras.

If our goal is to overthrow the Sandinista regime then we should continue to fund the Contras. If our goal is to encourage peace, reduce repression and promote democracy in Nicaragua then we should support the Guatemalan accords in every way possible, including putting an end to aid that will keep the Contras fighting in the countryside.

The Sandinistas have made some important concessions in the last 6 months. It's irrelevant why they have made these concessions; what's important is how can we help sustain these concessions and encourage the Sandinistas to take further steps to protect the rights of all the citizens of Nicaragua.

It is true the Sandinistas may renege on their commitments to openness and democracy if Contra aid is stopped. But the Sandinistas will definitely renege on their commitments if Contra aid is approved.

The Reagan administration also is ignoring several valuable opportunities to address the legitimate security concerns which the United States has in the region.

Secretary Gorbachev told President Reagan during the recent summit that he was prepared to cut off Soviet military aid to Nicaragua if the United States cut off aid to the Contras. Ortega also has said that if he receives security guarantees from Washington, he would limit his army, withdraw foreign military advisers, prohibit foreign bases and prevent subversion from Nicaraguan soil.

We should seize this opportunity to test Ortega's sincerity rather than continuing to refuse to even sit down at the negotiating table with the Government of Nicaragua.

We should seize this opportunity to support the bold peace initiative of President Arias. We should seize this opportunity to reduce conflict rather than escalate it, to construct incentives for meaningful peace rather than continue to fund Mr. Reagan's military adventures in Central America.

Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Chairman, today the Members of the House have the opportunity to stop the President's policy of violence in Central America.

The question which we must answer, as individuals and as a nation, is are we going to support peace or are we going to support war?

The majority of Americans have already answered this question—they oppose the administration's violent and destructive policy.

The decision once again rests in our hands. For the 38th time in the 6 years of this policy, the business of the Congress is being tied up by the administration's pursuit of war in Central America.

In his recent lobbying for Contra aid, the President claimed that the Sandinistas' concessions have been the direct result of his policy of aiding the Contras.

He is wrong. In the 6 years that the administration has pursued this bloody policy, no progress was made in the peace process.

The progress made in the peace process so far, and it is significant, is a direct result of the peace initiative made by the Central American Presidents.

This peace process calls for a halt to the very kind of requests which this administration insists on pursuing. The administration has consistently, both covertly and overtly, tried to undermine this process.

In his speech last night, the President stated that he has sent envoys to Central America some 40 times in pursuit of peace.

Pursuing diplomacy, however, requires a single-minded devotedness to peaceful solutions to problems—the administration has not demonstrated any such devotion. Every time the President has talked about Central America, he has talked about the use of force.

During the most recent meeting of the Central American Presidents, administration representatives tried to strong-arm the Central Americans into supporting the President's policy. The message was given, loudly and clearly, that aid from the United States was dependent on their cooperation. Is this any way to promote regional self-determination and peace?

Today we, as Members of the House, can take a strong step to reorder this Nation's priorities which, over the past 7 years, have not reflected our values.

In his State of the Union address, the President spoke at some length about his Central American policy. He did not mention the serious problems facing us in health, in agriculture, or in housing or in our economy as a result of the October stock market crash.

I must ask, are we going to continue spending time and money for the sole purpose of perpetuating the killing in Central America or are we going to use our limited resources to promote peace, prosperity and democracy around the world?

The strength of our country should be measured by our adherence to values, not by our advocacy of violence. I urge my colleagues to use their vote to reaffirm the best in American values. I urge my colleagues to oppose the administration's request

and vote for peace, not war. Thank you.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentlewoman from California talked about how progress in the peace process was only due to the diplomatic initiative. There were diplomatic initiatives for years and years under Contadora that did not bear fruit. Today the Arias plan is bearing some fruit in part because of the effective military resistance of the democratic opposition in Nicaragua. Let us remember that and let us remember as we pursue the peace process, where they make promises, we made promises; they take some steps to democracy, we take some steps, as the administration has, to reduce the aid package. But let us not jump and make big unilateral concessions.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. GALLEGLY].

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to pledge my support for continued aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, the Contras. Without this gesture of United States support and allegiance to the cause of democracy, the Contras greatly risk losing their fight for the basic right of freedom. Actions by the Nicaraguan Government have clearly illustrated that consistent United States diplomatic pressure and forms of aid are the only means of achieving concessions from the Sandinistas. In spite of the concessions which Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega insists were made toward instilling democracy, his government has repeatedly stated that they will never concede power to the opposition. Additionally, any promises which were made, beginning in 1979 and up to this point, have been broken without respect for fundamental human liberties.

We must evaluate not only the question of Contra aid, but more broadly, our very obligation to democracy and freedom. When the normal democratic methods of gaining basic freedoms have been exhausted and institutional processes are no longer effective, pressure applied through forms of aid becomes the only alternative to an otherwise closed political system. The Sandinistas have closed their system by disallowing opposition opinions to be published in *La Prensa*, imprisoning political opponents and repressing most forms of political and religious expression. The Sandinistas now must be urged to open their system to the democratic process. This can be done, not by trusting the promises of President Ortega, as President Carter did a decade ago, but by making them see that our objective is a government of, by, and for the people. We will not accept anything short of this goal.

We are not alone in our belief that democracy is the only acceptable solution to years

of Soviet-backed directives and Sandinista-led repression. Leaders of four of the five Central American countries agree that a democratic government in Nicaragua is essential to ensure peace, stability, and security throughout Central America. Members of Congress such as myself, who refuse to accept anything less are only asking that the people of Nicaragua be allowed to decide for themselves, through the ballot box, upon a form of government.

After participating in a bipartisan visit to four Central American countries in 1987 and meeting with leaders from both the opposition and the parties in power, I am convinced that our continued support for the Contras is needed. My conversations with many insightful persons, including Costa Rican President and author of the Arias peace plan, Oscar Arias, were influential factors in that decision. Had I not been fully convinced, by visiting with this region's leaders, that continued aid to the Contras was successfully prodding the Sandinistas to comply with the Arias peace plan, I would not have the solid commitment to aid which I share with you today.

Therefore, today I ask that we keep the broader goal of freedom in mind as we vote for Contra aid.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BATEMAN].

Mr. BATEMAN. I thank the gentleman from Oklahoma for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, much of what I would have wanted to have said was said very well by the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. TAUZIN] just moments ago.

I commend him for his remarks and for the very astute way that he has put this issue in perspective.

Let me say to you that I do very strongly support this measure. I do so because it is my view that it presents me with an opportunity to do two things which should be of paramount importance to all of us.

First, it gives me the opportunity to support and to see a reality, a foreign policy position consistent with the national security interests of the United States which are involved in this proposition in an enormously significant manner. Not only does it allow me to do that, it allows me to do it in a cause that is so inherently a part of America's way of thinking, dealing and reacting in a troubled world; it permits me to support people who are there committed to the principles of freedom and democracy which we espouse and seek to promote because they are willing to do so and will not suffer their nation to become a part of a Marxist-Leninist tyrannical state without fighting for their freedom, if fight they must.

□1930

Mr. Chairman, I commend this resolution to the Members. I would suggest that the United States, by the act

and cooperation of this Congress, if the Members support this resolution by their votes, will have a consistent and a rational policy toward Central America. But if they defeat it, we face the consequences that the United States of America will have been deprived of any cogent, intelligible foreign policy with reference to this very vital, significant part of the world here in our Western Hemisphere.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, what we write today may be the final chapter in a sad story in which there are no heroes and little of which to be proud. Through 6 years of conflict and confusion, we have learned much about the constitutional vulnerabilities of our system, the instability of our neighbors, and the search by our adversaries for opportunity. There has been disappointment for all.

The Sandinistas were said to be liberators who shared a commitment to pluralism and a belief in human dignity. If that were ever true, there is no trace of it now. The Contras were said to be freedom fighters in the image of our own forefathers. The Swiss bank account, drug allegations, and sordid past of these new allies instruct us that this was never so.

Even among us, there have been surprises. Those with whom some of us differed, but still respected because of their strength of conviction, were found to have paid more attention to constitutional forms of government in Central America than constitutional law in America. Through it all, we find ourselves potentially writing the last words about a war, and perhaps the first about a new peace.

It's difficult to know how we got here. The Contra war almost certainly helped to compromise the very liberties in Nicaragua that some argue we must now fight to restore. The economic isolation and sabotage undoubtedly assisted in creating the Soviet and Cuban dependency that we all fear.

That brings us to today's choice: an opportunity to end a sorrowful national experience, a chance to end our policy isolation in the region and the difference that it has caused with our allies.

This isn't a final statement. It certainly holds no guarantees. All that is proposed is to end military assistance as a test of the peace process. Humanitarian aid to keep the Contras viable could continue. It would be not an end to war, but a postponement, so that the conflicts, divisions, and national contradictions in our Contra policy might be brought to a close.

It is a difficult vote. Taking a chance for peace entails an element of risk, but it is also a risk worth taking. Vote no. Put the burden on the Sandinistas. Make it clear to the world that Amer-

ica will go the extra distance to build a peace just as certainly as we would to wage war. The burden will then fall on Managua to follow.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to set the record straight. The previous speaker indicated that the United States was responsible for the dependency of the Communist Sandinistas on the Soviet Union and on Cuba. The fact of the matter is that in 1979, when they took power, Jimmy Carter offered them an olive branch. He offered them over \$100 million in economic support, but they threw it back in that Democrat President's face and they turned to the Soviet Union for military support and economic aid.

Mr. Chairman, the fact of the matter is that they may be dependent on the Soviet Union and Cuba, but it is of their own volition, not because of the United States of America.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I also wanted to comment on the tone of the last speaker, that it is a tragedy, another failed policy, another ending.

Is it not really an ending like encouraging the Hungarians to revolt for freedom and turning our backs on them because we had no choice under a Republican President? Is it not the Bay of Pigs again? Is it not again Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia? Is this one little island of Grenada going to be the only success where we bring people into democracy, other than the other little countries in that area which are successfully moving toward democracy? But with this cancer next door, what other successes can we talk about in our lifetime?

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. MOODY].

Mr. MOODY. Mr. Chairman, today we have come to a crossroads in the administration's failed policy in Central America. We can either seize, or we can reject, an historic opportunity to promote peace in Central America.

On the table is whether to send an additional \$36 million to the Nicaraguan Contras. A "no" vote will give the Central American peace process a chance to succeed. A "yes" vote will promote more bloodshed and instability in a region already ravaged by conflict.

For 6 years, we have fueled war in Nicaragua under the guise of promoting peace. We have tried to win the hearts and minds of the Nicaraguan

people—yet our United States-backed Contras have burned health clinics, attacked farm cooperatives, and destroyed schools. The administration calls for democracy in Nicaragua—but trampled it at home with the Iran-Contra affair.

So far, \$275 million has been legally spent on the Contras. What are the fruits of this policy? A trail of senseless killings.

Compare this legacy with the recent accomplishments of the Guatemala accord. The state of emergency in Nicaragua has been lifted, amnesty to some 3,000 political prisoners has been granted, municipal and local elections are promised and special courts have been abolished. The Sandinistas have entered into direct talks with the Contras, reopened La Prensa, reopened Radio Catolica, and issued 13 licenses for new radio stations. El Salvador and Guatemala have also taken important steps.

Because of these tangible real actions and the future promise of the Guatemala accord, we have reached an impasse over aid to the Contras. The United States cannot talk peace and fund war. We cannot support both the Guatemala accord and the Nicaraguan Contras.

The proposal we are considering today is not a modest request to keep food in the mouths of Contras. It is a package to keep the Contras waging war in the countryside. If we are really on the side of peace in Central America, we must reject this request.

Let me make three simple points about the President's request.

First, according to the administration, 90 percent of this aid would be for nonlethal purposes. But this nonlethal funding can be used for helicopters, military training, aircraft, spare parts, portable bridges, and intelligence operations. Not one penny of this package would have to go for food, medicine, and clothing.

Second, this aid would represent not only a continuation, but an escalation, of the war in Nicaragua. This package is worth \$300,000 a day—roughly three times the rate we recently passed—unfortunately—under the continuing resolution.

This is not the time to escalate the war. This is the time to end it.

Third, under the President's proposal, \$3.6 million in lethal aid would be held in escrow and released on March 31 if no cease-fire is in place. This would mean that if the Contras could stall cease-fire talks until March 31, they would be awarded with \$3.6 million in guns and ammunition. What possible incentive would they have to negotiate?

For 6 years the American people and the Congress were told that Contra aid would bring the Sandinistas to the bargaining table. Thanks to the cour-

age of President Arias and the other Central American Presidents, Nicaragua is at the bargaining table—and yet we're here considering a new aid request from the President.

It is now clear what the President's policy recently is. His policy is to aid the Contras because the Sandinistas are Communists—nothing more, nothing less.

That is a bankrupt, hollow and simplistic policy. A policy driven by ideology rather than pragmatism.

Led by former Somocistas, the Contras have not, and will not, win the support of the Nicaraguan people. They cannot win a significant military victory. They have been corrupt, and guilty of numerous human rights abuses. As yet, they have no program for Nicaragua and no future vision for Nicaragua except to remove the Sandinistas.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, let me say that for 6 years the administration has been telling us that its Contra policy will promote democracy and freedom in Central America. But after 6 years, all we have to show for it are thousands of dead civilians, a region torn apart by bloodshed and strife, and a deepening distrust of Americans in Central America.

True to the meaning of the word "contra," the administration's policy is contra the rule of law at home and abroad—contra the Central American peace process—contra the request of Nobel Peace Prize recipient President Arias—contra the will of the American people—and contra the real needs of a region suffering in unspeakable poverty. Mr. Speaker, this policy is contra our fundamental American respect for human rights.

Today, we can close this unfortunate chapter of American policy. We can help end the war in Nicaragua and begin a new chapter that leads us toward peace.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, we have heard the argument continuously that by voting "no" we would now create a better chance for peace. It is never explained how removing all the incentives and the pressures for the Sandinista government to move toward peace and democracy will help the pursuit of peace.

Let us give this package a chance. Let us create some pressures and incentives. Let us not just hope that peace comes through diplomacy in a vacuum. Diplomacy can work if there are some incentives and pressure with it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. TALLON].

Mr. TALLON. Mr. Chairman, one of the key points made by opponents of this aid program is that if it is enacted, it allegedly will undermine the Central American peace accords. Those of us who support the proposal are cast as opponents of the Arias plan, while those who oppose it cast themselves as champions of the Arias plan.

I regret that in our debate today those of us who favor a vote of military aid-in-escrow have been too defensive on this point. I believe that our approach in fact will strengthen the diplomatic efforts of Central America's democratic leaders.

To make my point briefly, it has been said that "escrow accounts and deadlines for democracy will not work. What is more important is the trend toward reconciliation and peace."

Nicaragua has never known democracy. It will take years, not weeks, to achieve.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that my colleagues should address these remarks to the Central American leaders who signed the peace agreement last August 7. It was they who set deadlines for the democratization of Nicaragua—not we. It was they who said it should be done in a brief and finite period of time—not we. It was they who set out specific criteria which defined what democratization should include, not we.

Opponents of our proposal have a right to describe it as unrealistic. But they must then also tell President Arias that he was unrealistic. Opponents of our proposal have a right to reject clear deadlines and standards. But then they must acknowledge that they in fact reject the fundamental premises of the Arias peace plan.

I have heard opponents of our proposal say over and over in past months that United States policy in Central America lacks clear objectives. Now the Central America Presidents have given us what we like to call clear goals and timetables. Our proposal puts teeth into their approach.

I have to confess my concern that some who speak against our proposal may in fact be uncertain in their commitment to democracy in all of Central America.

They may be willing to accept something less. They may be willing to seek a deal with the Sandinistas and their patrons: We will pull the plug on the Contras and turn the future of Nicaragua over to you, if you will give us some soothing paper promises about security matters, ending your aid to insurgent groups in neighboring countries, and the like.

If my concern is right, then this is not just a debate about how best to achieve democracy in Nicaragua, or how best to support the Arias plan. There is an underlying issue: Whether or not the essential concept of the

Arias plan is sound, and whether the United States should use its influence to make it work.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN].

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, the United States prides itself on being a country of law, but it's hard to think of any other foreign policy that has run so counter to that principle. When we consider the events of the last year, it is amazing to me that this vote could be so close.

Let's have a minute to look at just how far this administration has gone outside the law in pursuit of the Contra war policy:

In support of the Contras, the administration mined Nicaraguan harbors and violated our international treaty obligations to the United Nations and the OAS.

To keep its war going, the administration ignored the Boland prohibitions on Contra aid passed by Congress.

Then the administration proceeded to violate the Arms Export Control Act and divert its ill-gotten gain to the Contras.

All illegal acts taken to advance an already illegal and immoral foreign policy.

But it doesn't stop there. Just last week we learned of new allegations of FBI spying on those people who have opposed administration policy in the region. This latest turn makes me think that it is time to look not at what Contra aid is doing to Nicaragua, but what Contra aid is doing to the United States.

Over the years, the administration has advanced an a la carte approach to finding a rationale for aiding the Contras. Back in 1982, it was a policy designed to interdict arms. From there it grew into designs to overthrow the Sandinistas. Then, President Reagan said he'd settle for making them "cry uncle." And now the administration argues that we need to preserve the Contras to keep the Sandinistas honest. This ever-shifting approach has never succeeded in convincing the majority of the American people and it should not persuade Congress today.

Beyond the issues of illegality and the ever-shifting rationale, the administration's failure can be traced to a simpler root. The policy simply doesn't make sense. The internal logic is as slippery as the external justifications:

The administration says that the Contras have a groundswell of popular support, yet if we cut off aid, they will disappear tomorrow.

The administration says that we should support the Central American democracies, but at the same time, we

should ignore their united call for an end to Contra aid.

And when the peace plan's author says that Contra aid is the greatest obstacle to peace in the region, the administration asks for more aid. In bizarre fashion, we are asked to vote for more war to ensure peace.

The Arias peace plan represents an alternative. It has succeeded in opening a political space in Nicaragua and has wrung concessions from the Sandinistas. More aid to the Contras will be the death knell for the plan and a continuation of a proxy war that the Nicaraguan and American people simply do not want. Let's resolve today to join our allies in the region and give them the ability to build peace in the region.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. OXLEY].

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, today we are talking not so much about money, but pressure, and we found in our most recent history that pressure means something. It meant something when we put the Pershing II's in Germany and finally got the attention of the Soviets about taking out the missiles in the INF treaty.

We found out how much pressure meant when we supported the freedom fighters in Afghanistan and forced the Soviets to announce a withdrawal in Afghanistan. We have shown in the Middle East that pressure can bring about peace when we acted as we did in the 1978 Camp David accords.

So it is obvious that pressure does in fact work in foreign policy, and that kind of pressure that we can exert through the Contras is the kind of pressure that has led the Sandinistas to make some major reforms and some major concessions, but they can take them back unless we keep the pressure on.

It is going to be up to the Congress to determine whether in fact lethal aid can ultimately be released, and it seems to me a reasonable argument to make. It seems to me the Congress does have a role to play. The President has recognized that and has gone the extra mile in making that concession.

□ 1945

I say we should support that reasonable position. The Sandinistas have repeatedly offered cosmetic changes, only to turn around and take them away. They may reimpose the kind of Stalinist measures they claim to be foregoing to fill their "historic imperative," in their words, by undermining the freedom of their neighbors.

This Congress must reaffirm its commitment to freedom. We can do that very easily by approving this request and maintaining the Contras.

Mr. Chairman, there were some allegations made about FBI investigations of certain groups. Let me point out

that those were only allegations that appeared in the newspaper. The FBI has the responsibility to determine whether those kinds of activities are illegal, and they were only doing their job.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCURDY].

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, last month, I was joined by 19 Democrat colleagues in urging the President to delay his request for additional aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

I, along with many of my colleagues are convinced that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega is, for the first time in 9 years, being forced to recognize and pay more observance to the democratic principles. It is at this most critical period in the brief history of the Sandinistas that we must recognize the sensitive nature of ongoing negotiations between Ortega and rebel leaders as well as talks among the five Central American Presidents. The United States must exercise extreme care not to upset the delicate balance of these talks by providing the Nicaraguan President with the very escape hatch that he is seeking—newly approved United States aid to the Contras.

As we have all observed in recent weeks, the Sandinistas have come under intense pressure to comply with the Central American peace plan signed by the five Presidents in Guatemala City last August. The so-called Arias plan set the framework under which the other four Presidents have skillfully forced Ortega to observe critical points of the plan, such as, lifting a state of emergency and committing Nicaragua to direct negotiations with the Contras for a cease-fire and upon the cease-fire's achievement, a broad amnesty.

Additionally, Ortega faces increasing pressure internally from a deteriorating economy and the Contras.

In light of these developments, I view President Ortega's options as extremely limited. He can either obstruct the peace process and face political and military isolation or continue on the path to peace and democracy in Nicaragua. During the critical days ahead, the United States should support the process that has brought Ortega to his current dilemma. However, a congressional vote on the question of new Contra aid has the potential of allowing Ortega out of his box regardless of the outcome of the vote.

The administration was right to challenge its Democratic opposition in the Congress in 1985 with having no alternative policy to the Contras. I agreed and voted with the President. Now in 1988, there are alternatives. The Arias plan is already in place and the Democratic leadership of this House has promised its every effort to bring forward a humanitarian assist-

ance proposal later this month. These alternatives offer the best hope of forcing Sandinista compliance with the regional peace agreement.

The administration's credibility and moral authority to lead United States policy in Central America was seriously eroded by the Iran-Contra affair. This development actually provided the Central Americans the political space to determine their own destiny if they chose. The Arias plan resulted.

Unfortunately, we are not a party to the treaty, which may be its greatest weakness. The Central American accord does not take into account security concerns of the United States and our Central American allies. These include the limitation or elimination of Soviet and Soviet Bloc military and security advisers, a substantial reduction in the size of Nicaragua's armed forces and guarantees against Soviet or Cuban military bases and the introduction of new weapon systems. These issues should be addressed in direct bilateral negotiations between Nicaragua and the United States in consultation with our Central American allies.

I urge my colleagues not to "overplay our hand" by granting President Ortega an excuse to avoid compliance with the peace plan. The United States must not be the obstacle to peace in Central America.

This is not the last vote on Contra aid. Now is not the time, when substantial progress is being made toward peace and democracy in Central America, to send—or even promise to send—more military aid to the Contras. Rather than offer Daniel Ortega a convenient escape clause, let's strengthen the U.S. favorable position by challenging the Sandinistas to further concessions.

The modest amount of U.S. humanitarian aid to the Contras being contemplated by the leadership does not tilt the balance in the region or give Ortega an excuse to refuse to comply with the treaty. It sends a clear message to Nicaraguan leaders that tactics aimed at stalling the Central American peace process could be met by continued support of the Contras.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM].

Mr. STENHOLM. Mr. Chairman, I feel compelled to speak again, because this is about the fifth time today that we have heard this secret plan that is going to be coming out within the next 2 or 3 weeks that is going to do 95 percent or maybe 99 percent of what we are doing tonight. Since many of my colleagues who have been on the fence and are very close to going either way are counting on this secret plan, I felt compelled to point out that on all the key votes for Contras within this

House since we have been voting on this issue, there have only been 57 Members on my side of the aisle who have consistently voted for any kind of aid.

I must say to those who are using this as a reason and a rationale for not voting for the package tonight because of this hope that somehow, someday, those 220 Members who have never ever voted for any kind of assistance are somehow going to see the light and be persuaded to do what many of my colleagues, particularly the gentleman from Oklahoma who just spoke, hope they will do and that is vote for a Contra aid package for the first time in their congressional lives. I believe that the plan that we are voting on tonight is 99 percent of what the gentleman has advocated and worked for in the last 2 years, but that last 1 percent keeps him from being there tonight.

I am disappointed when not only the gentleman from Oklahoma, but also others of my colleagues, hold out this hope that somehow there is going to be a secret plan and that something is going to be better and we are going to pass it.

Now, you have to look at what is in that proposal that is going to be coming: additional Contra aid be limited to food, clothing, and shelter, that such aid be provided only if a cease-fire is in place, that aid provided on the latter basis not exceed 60 days. Micromanagement of foreign policy at its best.

There are so many strings attached to this, real problems associated with it, that I ask my friend and others to seriously consider whether or not tonight is not the night, whether or not there will in fact be another chance. That is the basic question that we have to answer.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. LEVIN].

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I agree with the gentleman from Oklahoma. He is emphasizing not a secret plan, but a question of open military assistance at this point.

The tumble toward continued war and carnage in Central America has been broken, not by broken bones, but by the Arias peace initiative. A peace process is underway for the first time.

Does new military aid to the Contras contribute to the peace process in Central America? It does not. It would not be viewed that way by the Central Americans as they have made clear. You do not throw fuel on the fire, in this case more lethal aid to the Contras, when the leaders of the Central America governments are trying, with some measurable results today, to put the fire out.

There has been movement by both sides in this conflict. Our Government has made itself a party to the peace process by backing the Arias initiative.

Contra and Sandinista delegations met recently, as we know, and they plan to meet again. Nicaragua has taken several tentative steps toward compliance with the Arias plan.

The Sandinistas have not suddenly changed all their stripes. The internal opposition remains justifiably cautious, but the improvements should not be dismissed. The Arias initiative has created pressure on the Sandinistas, it has created pressure on the Sandinistas to open up their society even further.

At this crucial moment, a vote against the Reagan Contra aid policy is a vote for the peace process. Approving the Reagan policy of military aid to the Contras would in the name of pressure be more likely to poison the chances for a just peace settlement.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge its defeat.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I know that we are all after the same thing, peace and democracy in all of Central America. We are just going after it in different directions.

This last weekend I went to Managua, Nicaragua, and spent 2 days visiting with more than nine different individual groups and organizations. This was the first time that I had heard some of the stories from the people of Nicaragua. I have not heard them explained to me from this side, my side of the aisle, I did not know that some of these problems existed.

Our first meeting was with Archbishop Bosco Vivas of the Cardinal's office, and his educational director, who had the ungodly name of Ortega. We met with him. We came away with the commitment that the church supported this vote here today. They told us a lot of sad stories. The cardinal of the Catholic Church since the earthquake several years ago has been trying to get a permit to restore the main cathedral which they cannot occupy because of the earthquake damage, but the Nicaraguan Government, the Sandinista government, says that church would be too large and allow too large of a public gathering, so the cardinal has to hold his church meetings in a smaller church.

We met with representatives of labor unions, and it was interesting to note that the AFL-CIO supports over 100,000 Members of labor groups who met with us down in Nicaragua. These 3 labor organizations support this vote today for Contra aid and said there would not be an on-going peace conference today if it were not for Contra aid, and the pressure of today's vote.

The labor leader reported that he had been ordered to become a neighborhood block captain and to attend two weekly meetings at night. When he refused and pleaded that he was

too busy the Sandinistas told him, "We didn't ask you to consider it—We told you to do it." When he refused again, they put a sign in his yard that said, "This is an enemy of the people," and marked him for death.

We met with the January 22 Group of Mothers of Political Prisoners. Eighteen poor women who have sons dying in political prisons, who told us when Somoza, who they did not like, or support, was deposed from office, there was just one prison. Today, there are 14 prisons which they knew by name and numerous secret holding cells on military bases. The secretary of that organization, a mother of about 65 years old, said her son, a doctor, had his clinic confiscated and was put in jail simply for being rebellious and objecting to repressive policy—and was dying in prison. She was told that if she did not watch herself—she herself would be put in prison.

This group, Mr. Chairman, was beat up at their last meeting prior to this meeting by the Divine Mob of the Turbers, the equivalent to the young Red Guard of the Soviet Union. When we left this meeting on Saturday afternoon, January 30, one of those women was apprehended and put in jail for speaking out and protesting the imprisonment of political prisoners.

We met with Mrs. Violeta Charmorro, the editor of the La Prensa newspaper, and her brother-in-law, Hiemie Charmorro, who told us that their paper was open and free and could print as long as they did not print an editorial of any kind which criticized the Government. She predicted that the paper would be shut down completely, in the event of such an editorial. She told us that she supported the Contras, and Contra aid, that there would be no peace accord if there was not a threat of Contra aid.

We met with the internal opposition of 14 political parties who had come together under 1 group to field candidates for local and national elections if there ever are free elections in the country, which some found doubtful. They told us that 10 of their members had been in Costa Rica during recent conferences and testified at a press conference against the Sandinista 600. When they returned to Nicaragua, nine of them were jailed, and one prominent individual was sent to the front to fight because of speaking out against the Government.

The Permanent Commission on Human Rights, whose credibility, in my opinion, cannot be disputed. These people complained that now that they could have so-called free and open meetings, the Turbers, or the mob harassed and pressured the meetings and demonstrations of complaints to the Government resulted in a reply that

the people were objecting and there was nothing they could do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia has expired.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield another 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia.

□ 2000

Mr. RAY. So, the Permanent Commission on Human Rights reported that the Government tells people, sure, you can have an open meeting, you can demonstrate in the streets, but when you do we cannot protect you from the people—meaning the divine mobs, or the turbers.

My colleagues, we attended a demonstration of several hundreds of citizens which included members of the internal opposition who shouted slogans, "Sandinistas leave."

These reports are from the citizens of Managua, Nicaragua of about 1 million people.

I was somewhat surprised to hear this strong opposition to the Sandinista government, because their voices are seldom heard in this Congress or this country.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. WYDEN].

Mr. WYDEN. Mr. Chairman, this debate has gone on for hours and hours, and one point to me is particularly striking right now and that is that the real democrats in Central America say that military aid to the Contras is the problem not the solution.

I think at this point as we move to a vote, we ought to listen to the leadership of Costa Rica and Guatemala and other democratic nations, and those are countries that are telling us that the military route, providing military aid to the Contras is the wrong way to go and not a step forward.

Mr. Chairman, if we go that route, the route of aiding the Contras, it is a go-it-alone strategy for the United States in Central America. Our allies are not with it. It is clear they do not support that route, and in fact many of them have spoken out against it.

Mr. Chairman, I think tonight we ought to do as the citizens of Oregon have suggested for days and days, to step back away from a military solution to the civil war being fought in Nicaragua. It is a loser and we ought to reject it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. ROEMER].

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I say to my colleagues for years now we have struggled to aid the Contras knowing full well they were our best hope to restore democracy in Nicaragua.

Either support the Contras or send our own men in, somewhere, some-

time, someplace. Who in his right mind wants to do that?

I confess that in supporting the Contras all these years and keeping them barely alive our goal was not just peace but rather was freedom in Nicaragua, regional peace in Central America and fundamental democratic prosperity in our hemisphere. Before the Contras, our chances to achieve any of these goals was zero. Now as minimal as our aid has been, the chances for real peace and freedom in Nicaragua are much improved over the past 7 years. This progress is the result of many factors, the economic collapse within Nicaragua, the cooperation of regional presidents in a series of peace initiatives, the situation existent between the Soviet Union and the United States, the courageous showing of Jose Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador, and the Contras, and more than anything else the Contras. The Contras have forced the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. The Contras have forced the Sandinistas to bend their dictatorship, however temporarily. The Contras have forced the Sandinistas to turn inward rather than outward in their revolutionary salesmanship. The Contras have forced Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas to stop visiting Moscow and start visiting the Vatican.

As the Contras have grown in strength the Sandinistas have grown in negotiating fervor. Thus, it works in the real world. We need the Contras. If our objective is real peace with real freedom in the region, we need the Contras.

Some have opposed this critical premise from day one, and they will do so again tonight. Logic and history show very clearly that they are wrong, in my opinion, but it is not to them that I seek an alliance on this issue. It is with those of my colleagues in the middle that I seek the strength of partnership, those of my colleagues who felt strongly both ways, those of my colleagues who see some truth in that we do not need guns to negotiate strategy and yet those of my colleagues who read history and believe there are no negotiations at all without strength.

I am asking those of my colleagues to give peace and freedom a real chance in a real tough world. Let us keep the Contras prepared to fight for freedom in case the Sandinistas are prepared to lie again. There are no guarantees. All options have risks. Let us join the President and keep the fight for freedom alive.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. LOWRY].

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I compliment the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] for his continued leadership for peace in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, I have spoken many times on this floor on this particular issue and I apologize for again speaking.

We are not negotiating from a position of strength today as the United States on this issue. We are negotiating from a position of weakness because we have given away with the support of the Contras what makes America great. We have given away those things that make this country great, and I find it very disturbing that people have continually all day long on this floor equated strength with military power and then tried to lay history on to that, because anybody that looks at history at all knows the nations that relied upon the military for their main strength always failed. The strength of America is not the Maginot Line of supporting a military approach to foreign policy. The strength of America is the principles upon what this country was born and lives on, the strength of America is the support of other countries' right to self-determination.

The thing that is wrong and that has put us in a negotiating position of weakness in Central America is the support of a Contra policy based on overthrowing another government and its right to self-determination.

How in the world can we stand on this floor and say the strength of America is based on supporting the Contra military overthrow of another government?

That is exactly against the strength of America. The strength of America is leading for democracy by example. Leading for peace by example.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to defeat the Contra aid package and return America to strength.

Mr. Chairman, I hear four main arguments for Contra aid today and they are all flawed.

First. The first is that Contra aid will help the people of Nicaragua, either by making the Sandinistas negotiate faster or by replacing them with a new regime, the Contras.

In reality, Contra aid will get more of the people of Nicaragua killed. International diplomatic pressure, such as that which has been so expertly exerted by President Arias of Costa Rica, will speed the negotiations. From what we know of the Contra leadership, they would be no clear bargain as a new government for Nicaragua.

Second. The second argument is that Contra aid will help the United States by making us more secure. I have not seen evidence that the Soviets are establishing a military beachhead in Nicaragua—and even the administration's Nicaraguan defector, Roger Miranda, says that has not been discussed. As former CIA Chief William Colby pointed out in the Atlanta Con-

stitution, if the Soviets were doing so, it would be talks between the United States and the Soviet Union that would put a stop to it, not pressure from the Contras.

Third. The third argument is that Contra aid will help the other Central American countries by stopping Sandinista aggression or support for guerrilla movements in other countries. I know that a lot of Members haven't been in Congress long enough to remember that the Reagan administration once came up and told us that there was evidence that the Sandinistas were arming the Salvadoran rebels and they had found some people who were interested in being hired by the United States to interdict those arms and keep them out of El Salvador.

The people they hired to do that job are now, of course, the Contras. Since then, the Sandinistas have found plenty of Americans smuggling arms to guerrillas in their country, but the Contras were never able to turn up a boat load, plane load, or mule load of arms leaving Nicaragua for any other country. Instead, the Contras have used our aid and pursued the armed overthrow of the Government of Nicaragua, specializing in hitting civilian and economic targets.

The administration's policy of helping the Contras establish bases and supply lines in Honduras has created a justification for Nicaragua to be an aggressor. But Nicaragua has not taken out these bases. And Nicaragua's neighbors, its frontline states, do not want us to fund the Contras. I think they know what they're talking about.

Fourth. And, finally, a fourth argument is that Contra aid will help the Contras, that it will provide them with food and blankets, that it will help them keep body and soul together while the peace talks finish up so they can go home or, presumably, choose to return to the fight if the talks don't go well.

That is not what this money will do. This is not money to wind down the war and repatriate the Contras. This money—the humanitarian part of it—is for radios, for military training, for aircraft leasing, for command and control, for communications equipment, for air defense, for propaganda. It is not for beans and penicillin and it is not to help the Contra troops and their families. It is to help the war effort.

Mr. Chairman, the administration policy in Nicaragua has been riddled with lies from start to finish. The Contras weren't there to interdict arms. Walkie-talkies and jeeps are not humanitarian aid. The Sandinistas are not the devil incarnate and the Contras are not the equivalent of our Founding Fathers.

Today we end the Reagan policy. Today we stop acting as though recruiting a band of armed men to kill thousands of Nicaraguans is the best

way to stop press censorship in Managua. Today we stop acting like a country which has so few diplomatic and economic tools at its disposal that it has to hire an irregular army in order to have any influence on a tiny, impoverished country.

Tomorrow, I hope that my colleagues on both sides of the aisle will join in working out a proposal that supports the Arias plan. We are not isolationists. We do not believe that Central America's problems will all be solved by stopping United States funding of the war in Nicaragua. There is much to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will remind all persons in the Gallery that they are here as guests of the House, and any sign or manifestation of approval or disapproval is contrary to the rules of the House.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. BADHAM].

Mr. BADHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of aid to the freedom fighters.

Mr. Chairman, the opponents of U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters say they oppose it because they want to give the peace process a chance. I rise in support of this aid for the same reason. Clearly, the only reason the peace process has come as far as it has is because of the little stick—it's certainly not a big stick when compared with the huge amount of aid the Soviets have pumped into Nicaragua—the little stick that we have provided to the freedom fighters during the past few years.

The opposition said that we could not give President Reagan the authority to certify whether a cease fire has been accomplished and release the very small amount of military aid that he has requested. Despite the fact that he was elected by the American people twice to make exactly that kind of determination, he has agreed to let us vote on that question. This is a dramatic concession and it shows us the strength of the feelings within the administration that the humanitarian aid is necessary.

Many of my colleagues are under intense pressure from both sides on this issue, but I would advise them to look to history for guidance. Recent history shows we have a poor record of defending democracy. We were duped by Castro, and by the time we realized the atrocities of his regime, it was too late to do anything about it. If you have read any of the recent literature on life and death for political prisoners in Cuban prisons, you realize what a tragic mistake we made there, just 90 miles from our coast.

We betrayed democracy in Vietnam. Historians will debate forever how we could have saved the Vietnamese from the terrible conditions they now suffer, but the fact remains that if we had possessed the political will, we could have saved that nation.

Mr. Speaker, fellow colleagues, don't let this happen a third time. Right

now, the Communists in Nicaragua are trying to convert their military opposition into political opposition. The problem with this is that in Communist societies, political opposition almost always disappears unless it has the backing of military force. In an economically backward nation such as Nicaragua, this is inevitable.

Finally, if you won't support the freedom fighters for the sake of the Nicaraguan people, support them for our own interests. You all know the arguments against another Soviet base in this hemisphere. If the Contras fail to bring democracy, that's what we'll have. And that responsibility will rest on the shoulders of each member of this body who votes against helping the freedom fighters.

The people of Nicaragua are being oppressed. Aid to the Contras provides the only incentive to the Sandinistas to stop the oppression. Aid to the freedom fighters is in the interests of the Nicaraguan people. Aid to the freedom fighters is in the interests of the United States. Aid to the freedom fighters is in the interests of peace and democracy.

Mr. Chairman, I have two brief articles here that I would recommend to any of my colleagues who are still having questions about this issue and I will insert them into the RECORD and I would also like to invite any member wanting to see them before the vote to see me as soon as possible.

THE SUBTLE UNDERMINING OF A NATION— PART I

(By William O'Neil, Chairman)

(I realize this subject is very controversial and there are many different views and opinions on the issue. However, the following facts should be carefully considered since they might affect the future of this country.)

In October 1987, Major Roger Miranda, top aide to Defense Minister Umberto Ortega and chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of Defense since 1982, defected from Nicaragua's Sandinista government. Major Miranda testified before Congress and reporters in December and gave Congress detailed first-hand evidence of the Sandinista communist government's plans for a massive military buildup in Nicaragua.

Most of the enormous arms expansion is scheduled to occur after Washington stops funding the Contras or after the Contras are otherwise eliminated in the next two years.

Major Miranda brought with him a 45-page preliminary contract between the Sandinistas and the Soviet Union listing all the weapons the Soviets are to supply Nicaragua between 1988 and 1995. An absolutely crucial point is that the agreement was secretly negotiated with the Russians one month after Daniel Ortega, leader of the Sandinistas, signed the Central American peace accord promising his government's peaceful intentions.

SOVIET WEAPONS BUILDUP

Among the Soviet items to be provided the Sandinistas are: A squadron of MiG-21 fighters, ground-to-air missiles, more MI 24 attack-helicopters, weapons to build a 600,000-man army (20% of Nicaragua's pop-

ulation), four 400-ton naval ships, gas warfare equipment, flame throwers, upgrading to heavier artillery and a new air defense system. All weapons damaged or lost in battle are to be "instantly re-supplied by the Soviet Union" to maintain maximum fighting strength.

The Sandinista Marxist-government further agreed to continue operating its terrorist training base inside Nicaragua for "exporting revolution" into neighboring countries of El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and Costa Rica. In the event of future American intervention, the Soviet- and Cuban-backed Sandinistas also have contingency plans to send terrorists into neighboring countries to take American citizens hostage and to bomb unarmed Costa Rica.

The Sandinista government has not fulfilled any of its numerous promises for democratic freedoms made since 1979. Its latest deception in professing peace and then secretly negotiating a gigantic arms increase indicates it definitely cannot be trusted. They are in reality preparing for serious war; not sincere peace.

There is no match for any of these powerful, advanced Soviet weapons anywhere in Central America. Unbelievably, this immense military escalation was openly acknowledged and confirmed in a press release from the number two leader of Nicaragua's government, Defense Minister Umberto Ortega, Daniel Ortega's brother. An original translated copy of the contract was sent to me by a deeply concerned member of Congress. If you want a copy, I will send it to you.

Congress will vote Feb. 3 on the question of continued aid for the Contra rebels who are trying to halt the spread of communism in Central America. The presidents of El Salvador and Honduras have told the United States that the only thing that drove the Nicaraguan Sandinista government to the negotiating table was the presence of the Contra resistance.

President Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz, plus other key members of the administration, strongly feel Congress must keep constant pressure on the Sandinistas as it is our "only guarantee" or insurance policy that they will have any incentive to fulfill their promises of freedom and democracy in Nicaragua.

If our Congress does not continue Contra aid, what is the alternative? All Americans will have to accept the fact of a consolidated Soviet- and Cuban-style military base permanently established on our mainland.

If this happens, the question will then be asked: "Who allowed it to happen?" The press has handled the Nicaraguan subject very poorly. The national media has not given the facts to the American people. The combined power of a Democratic-controlled Congress and a heavily Democratic national news media (more than 9 out of 10 journalists are Democrats, based on several surveys) have jointly contributed to the unwitting, unintended and subtle undermining of future U.S. national defense and security. Some CBS reporters stationed in Managua apparently seem to maintain close relations with top members of the Communist government. This results in the communist government's point of view being continually presented and given equal or sometimes better news coverage.

While presenting the Sandinistas' side, the national media never refers to the Sandinistas as a communist government, which is what they are, but refers to them only as the government, or the leftist government

(a more polite and forgiving term). This confuses the issue for the public. No coverage has been given whatsoever on the subject of why a permanent Soviet and Cuban communist military base in Nicaragua might pose a possible risk to America's future national defense or security.

THE SUBTLE UNDERMINING OF A NATION— PART II

(By William O'Neil, Chairman)

How could a permanent Soviet-Cuban military base (a second Cuba) in Nicaragua pose a potential risk to America's future national defense or security?

1. The Panama Canal could be easily sabotaged and rendered useless in the event of hostilities.

2. Mexico and other countries are prime targets for future subversion.

3. Russian submarines operating out of El Bluff port on the Caribbean coast and Pacific Ocean ports such as Corinto, together with their base in Cuba, could enable the Soviet Union in the future to surround the United States with nuclear submarines operating along the East and West Coasts and the Gulf of Mexico. Since the Soviets recently acquired technology to operate quiet, undetected submarines off our shores, this would create a serious strategic threat.

4. Russian reconnaissance planes and Bear Bombers operating out of Punta Huete's new 10,000-foot-long airstrip could fly surveillance off our entire West Coast and listen to West Coast phone calls.

5. Fifty percent of our oil imports pass through gulf waters between Cuba and Nicaragua.

6. Soviet advisers are now present in Nicaragua and have flown their reconnaissance planes. Six thousand, five hundred Cubans are in every position of the Sandinista government as well as in the Nicaraguan military. Cubans also fly some of the Russian attack helicopters, have helped build 11 airfields and 40 new military bases since 1980, and serve as prison guards and torturers in Sandinista prisons. The Sandinistas now have more tanks and armored vehicles than Mexico.

But what about the interests of the Nicaraguan people? After eight years of communist Sandinista rule:

1. The economy is in shambles. The currency has virtually no value, with inflation at 1,500% a year. There are shortages of everything, particularly food, as commonly occurs in communist societies.

2. Gary Moore, a free-lance reporter who just returned from Nicaragua, said he found most of the people in southern Nicaragua constantly fearing and fleeing from Sandinista government troops. Land reform he indicated, was widely perceived as fake reform. People had their farms confiscated and converted to government-owned communal farms.

3. The Contras now have a base of good support in the countryside. The Nicaraguan people in large cities, however, are tightly controlled by the communist bloc system. They are issued ration cards that are taken from them, and jobs are withheld if they don't do what they are told or don't vote as suggested. The previous election was controlled through this mechanism as well as by attacks on the opposition by Sandinista government mobs.

4. P.J. O'Rourke just returned from Nicaragua and wrote his observations in an article on "Sandinistaland" in the December 3, 1987, issue of Rolling Stone, a very liberal

publication. If you want a copy, I'll send it to you.

Why wasn't our President able to get his message out about Nicaragua, when he gave speeches on the subject and our State Department provided dozens of printed documents such as "The Sandinista Military Buildup" and "Inside the Sandinista Regime: A Special Investigator's Perspective" (devastating testimony from Alvaro Baldizon, an earlier top Sandinista defector)?

1. Our national news media never used the material, never told the American people about it. They concentrated on questioning and running down the Contras. Vital facts were unwittingly suppressed and withheld from the American public. At times, our national media has quoted U.S.-based, pro-Soviet, pro-Cuban, and pro-Sandinista human rights or think-tank studies as valid documentation in news articles.

2. Pierce opposition from the liberal wing of the Democratic party in Congress.

If Congress lacks the courage to continue supporting people fighting the spread of communism in their own country and on our continent, it is possible many voters might begin to view Congress as one of the more incompetent bodies in the United States. The Democratic party could also be making a serious mistake adopting as part of their platform the support of a communist government's positions and agenda, and failing to support those willing to fight for their own freedom and democracy. This could even be construed by some voters that the party might not be competent to manage either the government or foreign policy at the national level. It could even mean possible defeat at the national elections in 1988. The party should not be placed in the position of appearing to be either soft on communism or naive and weak in the foreign policy area.

The Arias Peace Plan is good, but Daniel Ortega's proven record is bad. The answer is: Vote for continued Contra aid to keep the Sandinistas "feet to the fire," but hold back half of the military items for 30 days, and the other half of lethal assistance for another 30 days pending later review by the President and Secretary Shultz's State Department on the Sandinistas' complete compliance with their professed, but suspicious, promises.

The Afghan rebels did not fall for the phony peace offered by the Soviets, and now the Soviets are trying to find a graceful way to leave Afghanistan. If Congress and Central Americans let themselves be duped with cosmetic subterfuge, they could become the Neville Chamberlains of today.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SHAW].

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, we are at this late hour looking to a couple of more hours of debate and I think that the debate has been handled very well but there are some things yet to be said.

The gentleman from Washington [Mr. LOWRY] just spoke about dealing from the high ground, dealing from principle instead of through strength. The democracy of this great country has been kept because we have been willing to put our money where our mouth is, we have been willing to keep

this country armed and strong through the process. In looking at what we are facing in Central America, if my colleagues truly believe that democracy is a companion of communism, then vote "no."

If my colleagues truly believe that the peace accord is to the best interest of Ortega's Communist government, vote no.

If my colleagues truly believe that without the threat of overthrow of his government that Mr. Ortega is going to abide by the peace accord, vote no, but if my colleagues believe, as I do, that it is to the strategic interest of this country not to have a Soviet base at our back yard in Central America, vote "yes."

If my colleagues believe for the democratic process to go forward in Nicaragua, that we have an alternative, an armed alternative that is there and ready to move forward in the event that the peace process breaks down, vote yes.

If my colleagues believe as I do in the future of this hemisphere and how we can work together through the peace process, vote "yes."

I have two young sons who are presently of college age. I do not want to see them in Nicaragua. We have an opportunity of supplying the young freedom fighters in Central America and solving this problem hopefully through the peace process. All of us want the peace process to work, but we cannot trust Mr. Ortega. Please vote "yes."

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. ATKINS].

Mr. ATKINS. Mr. Chairman, this is a faceless and nameless war to most Americans. We are told this war is being waged against the Sandinistas but we know the Sandinistas are not the people being killed. The victims are civilians, old men and women, farmers, laborers, and children. A recent study by the Harvard School of Public Health shows the effects of this war on one town. Acoyapa is a town of about 8,500 people in the war zone. In Acoyapa almost one in five households had a member leave their jobs on farms because they are not safe from Contra attacks. Nearly half of the children now suffer from chronic malnutrition. Over half of the people have experienced the death of a close friend or relative from the war, and one in five had lost a member of their household.

These are not soldiers killed in battle. These are civilians killed in and around their homes.

In Acoyapa, an economically devastated community in an economically devastated Third World nation, the leading cause of death for children over 6 years of age is firearms. Those children are not Communists or Sandinistas or terrorists, nor are they

people exporting revolution into Costa Rica and El Salvador. They are being killed, however, by our surrogates with bullets we pay for and the President is asking us to cut another check to pay for more killing.

This policy is wrong. This policy has been wrong for 7 years. Our money is being used to finance a checkbook war that kills the people we are trying to save.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. STAGGERS].

Mr. STAGGERS. Mr. Chairman, today we are faced with yet another request for Contra aid. Let's look at the past 6 years and our policy. It has been a success if our goal is to inflict misery and pain on the poverty-stricken people of Nicaragua. But if our goal is to achieve peace and to create an atmosphere for democratic reforms then, clearly, the policy of providing aid to the Contras has failed.

Now it is time for the United States to listen to our allies in the region, whose fate is in much greater peril than our own, and reject aid to the Contras.

The Central American peace accord is the answer and it is supported by 13 Latin American nations. It represents the best hope to achieve peace and bring about political freedom for the people of Nicaragua.

The steps toward democratic reform already taken by the Sandinistas have been substantial and are a result of the peace plan—not of action by the Contras. Major concessions, such as the reopening of the opposition press and agreeing to direct negotiations with the Contras, have been made by the Nicaraguan Government. The peace plan is working. If we continue aid to the Contras then we will be giving the Sandinistas the perfect excuse they are looking for; the excuse to justify any repressive actions they would inflict on the people of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have no good answers to offer the Nicaraguan people for their current desperate situation, so they use the Contras as a justification. Let's not continue to provide Ortega with the perfect excuse.

It is time for us to stop sending aid to the Contras and begin sending aid to Americans. Let's trade Contra military training for education and training for the unemployed American worker. Let's trade Contra transportation funds for improving America's infrastructure. Let's trade a failed policy of killing for a promising policy of peace.

□ 2015

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. CHAPPELL].

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I ask if \$36 million is too much to ask of this great and magnificent Nation in the cause of peace in Central America. I firmly believe that the only way we can assist the peace process in Central America at this time is to keep the pressure on Nicaragua to negotiate and to keep its promises in an effort for peace. It is just \$36 million, 90 percent of which is for humanitarian aid and only 10 percent for military aid, and that 10 percent, which is \$3.6 million to be placed in an escrow account not to be used if the Sandinistas keep their word, if they do the things they promise to do.

I suggest to my colleagues very strongly that this House tonight ought to do no less than make this very small effort in the cause of peace in Central America. Our intelligence reports show us that the Sandinistas are in difficult problems in their economic processes in their country, that the people, the workers there, have lost their earning capacity, 90 percent of it since 1980, that inflation is in the several hundreds of percent per year.

Now is not the time to take the pressure off. Now is the time to keep the pressure on, and just think what is going to happen if they keep their word. That escrow money, that military aid, will never be used, but I believe this House, this Congress, in the name of the people of this country who have stood for freedom throughout the world down through the years ought to be more than willing to make this small effort in the cause of peace in Central America.

I hope that as we vote tonight we will not pull the rug from under the people who have been willing to risk their lives in the cause of peace, the cause of democracy, and the cause of freedom in the world, and I hope we will not blot from their hearts and their minds the determination to be a part of a peace process.

I hope we will pass and adopt this resolution for the Contras tonight.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. BROWN].

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong opposition to the administration's request for additional aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. In my view, this represents one of the most important votes we will cast during this session of Congress. After 7 years of spirited and often acrimonious debate, we have arrived at a point where the options presenting themselves are crystal clear in their implications for the future of Central America, and indeed, for the United States as well. It seems no exaggeration to conclude that the decision we make today will, to a large

degree, determine the fate of Central America for years to come.

While I respect the President's desire for freedom and democracy in Nicaragua, I feel his tactics have quite plainly failed. The Contras have been fighting in Nicaragua for 7 years now, and have brought less freedom, less democracy, and certainly less peace. Each time the United States has continued to fund or escalate the Contra war, the Nicaraguan Government has responded with a narrowing of political freedoms and civil liberties.

In stark contrast, however, the Arias peace plan, begun scarcely 6 months ago, has already made tangible progress toward peace, as well as freedom and democracy in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have lifted the state of emergency, disbanded the special military tribunals used to try Contra supporters, held direct talks with Contra leaders, allowed the opening of opposition newspapers and radio stations, released nearly 1,000 political prisoners and agreed to release the remainder if a cease-fire agreement is reached, and permitted numerous public demonstrations and meetings.

In its compliance report to the January 15 meeting of the Central American Presidents, the International Verification Commission concluded:

In the case of Nicaragua, the International Commission has been able to confirm that in spite of the wartime suffering, it has made concrete steps toward initiating a democratic process.

In short, the peace plan has accomplished more in 6 months than the Contras have in 7 years.

The success of the Arias plan stems from its fusion of the inseparable objectives of peace, and freedom and democracy. The process initiated by the Arias peace plan is imperfect, and much remains to be accomplished. However, while it is possible that the Sandinistas will not sustain their compliance with the peace process, it is certain that they would not continue compliance if the United States continues funding the Contras.

Much of the debate today will center on the contention that the Contras have been, and will continue to be, a viable means of protecting U.S. security concerns in Central America. This question centers on the Sandinista's compliance with the Arias peace plan, and the degree to which their future intentions represent a threat to U.S. interests. While there is an urgent need for reform within Nicaragua, I am not convinced that the Sandinistas represent a threat to either the United States or our allies in Central America.

I am convinced, however, that regardless of how one views the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the Contras simply cannot be an effective tool of United States foreign policy. While we have legitimate concerns

over the Sandinista's behavior, it should not be assumed that aiding the Contras is the best means of addressing these concerns. Upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, Costa Rican President Oscar Arias himself stated that "the Contras, from my point of view, are the problem and not the solution."

Aside from exacerbating the violence and economic decline in Nicaragua, the Contras have accomplished very little. After fighting for 7 years, they have been unable to seize and hold territory or garner the support of the people of Nicaragua. In 1983 the political director of the FDN promised that "1983 is the year of victory. We will defeat the FSLN in 6 months." By the Reagan administration's own accounting, however, Contra forces have diminished by 25 percent since 1986.

We must also never forget the origin and composition of the Contra forces. In a 1986 memo to his boss Oliver North, Robert Owen stated that the United Nicaraguan Opposition:

Is a creation of the USG (United States Government) to garner support from Congress. When it was founded a year ago, the hope was it would become a viable organization. In fact almost anything it has accomplished is because the hand of the USG has been directing and manipulating.

Commenting on FDN leader Adolfo Calero and his colleagues, Owen stated bluntly that "they are not the people to rebuild a new Nicaragua." Former head of the Contras Edgar Chamorro has stated that:

We were an army controlled by the CIA. We were a proxy army, directed, funded, receiving all intelligence and suggestions, from the CIA. We had no plan for Nicaragua, we were working for American goals.

Finally after conducting on-site research on Contra human rights abuses during much of 1987, Americas Watch concluded that "their attacks on civilians have made them an outlaw force operating beyond the pale of civilized conduct." Contrary to President Reagan's claims, the Contras are clearly not the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers.

The idea of sacrificing the Arias peace plan in favor of the Contras is even more disturbing—and irrational—in light of the widely accepted belief that the Contras can never defeat the Sandinista Army. Appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee only 1 year ago, Gen. Paul Gorman, former head of the U.S. Southern Command, testified:

You're not going to knock off the Sandinistas with a conventional armed force * * * throwing money at the problem at this point in time isn't going to produce, in my view, the kind of results that are required.

Recent CIA reports agree, evaluating the Contras as posing no strategic threat to the Nicaraguan Government. Commenting on President Reagan's \$100 million Contra aid request in 1986, Robert Owen stated that:

If the \$100 million is approved and things go on as they have these last 5 years, it will be like pouring money down a sinkhole.

Scuttling the Arias peace plan to satiate the crusading ideology of America's new Republican fundamentalists would be gravest crime this body could commit.

The concerns I have outlined above do not imply a lack of awareness over America's legitimate security interests in Central America. President Reagan and House Speaker JIM WRIGHT have outlined three primary security objectives with which I concur: that no Soviet or Cuban military bases be established in Nicaragua; that Nicaragua not threaten the security of its regional allies through invasion or subversion; and, that Nicaragua respect the basic human rights of its people.

Addressing these security concerns is a valid and important goal of U.S. foreign policy in Central America. Meeting this goal, however, can, and must, be done through unqualified support for the Arias peace plan, and not through continued Contra aid. Nicaraguan President Ortega has agreed to meet these concerns if provided with sufficient security guarantees from the United States. Mikhail Gorbachev has also agreed to cut off aid to Nicaragua if the United States halts aid to the Contras. President Reagan is clearly in a position to make major strides in Central America as long as he is willing to halt aid to the Contras. The International Verification Commission established under the Arias peace plan stated explicitly that ending Contra aid "continues to be an indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts."

United States policy in Central America is in a position to make important progress if we are prepared to take advantage of the opportunities presented to us. The Arias peace plan represents a significant move toward regional autonomy and cooperation. Our allies have stated clearly that whatever insurance is needed to moderate Nicaraguan behavior can be provided by their collective moral, political, and economic pressure. The United States can and should play a part in this process. Our role must be constructive and not destructive, however. We would be foolish to reject the counsel of our allies in Central America and continue with the misguided Contra policy which has accomplished so little.

Years from now, historians may view our decision today as one which cast the die for Central America. If we pursue our interests, and those of our friends in Central America, in a rational and humane manner, history will record a steady process of economic and political growth. If we continue with counterproductive and immoral policy being pursued by this adminis-

tration, history will record only continued decline into war and repression, the effects of which will eventually come to bear on the United States. We have made this mistake before, and I implore my colleagues here today not to tread this path again. It is time to opt for freedom and democracy, and peace in Central America. It is time to halt Contra aid once and for all, and pursue our interest through the Central American peace plan.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GARCIA].

Mr. GARCIA. Mr. Chairman, I believe I took the floor for the first time in 1983 to speak out against aid for the Contras. I do so again today for many of the same reasons.

Events in Central America only serve to reinforce those reasons. I said then that I believed that the only true solution to the region's problems must come from the nations of Central America.

I have consistently maintained that we cannot impose ourselves either through the Contras or otherwise on the nations of the region and their search for peace. That does not mean that we cannot and should not be players. We must remain involved in the search for peace, but that means listening to what Central American leaders want, not simply barging ahead with the administration's concept of how peace can be achieved: through the Contras.

I also mentioned back in 1983 that we should not ignore the human element to this debate. I mean that both in terms of the suffering of the people in the region as a result of our support for the Contras, and in terms of what it could mean if this conflict escalates to the point that the administration feels compelled to involve U.S. military personnel, even as advisors. I need not remind anyone in this Chamber what a slippery slope that can become.

I suppose in some ways the prospect of the so-called Contra war escalating has a very personal side to it for me that others may not share. That is because I am Hispanic, as are all the people of Central America. And if there is, God forbid, a direct involvement of U.S. troops in the region, then I can assure you that many of the U.S. soldiers involved in such a conflict would be Hispanic. They would be forced to fight against those with whom they share a common heritage, and in some cases, but for the grace of God, a common fate.

This is not to say that everyone in this Chamber is not concerned about an escalation of the Central American conflict. It is only to say that there are those who mistakenly wish to wage peace through a proxy war, rather than through a process endorsed by

the region's leaders, including a Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Cardinal Obando y Bravo of Nicaragua, a man who is above reproach, is willing to stake his reputation in the name of peace by acting as a mediator between the Contras and the Sandinistas. We should share his courage and conviction that the peace process must be allowed to unfold without the guillotine of Contra aid decapitating it.

I would only like to add one more point for those who believe that if we do not support the Contras that communism will overtake the entire region. Our biggest enemy on that front is not the Sandinistas, but the chronic poverty that created the atmosphere under which the Sandinistas were able to assume power. It is corruption, poverty, and hopelessness that is the breeding ground for revolution. Revolution, even if it is led by middle class Marxists, cannot take hold if the people are not suffering.

You won't find much support for revolution in Sutton Place, Scarsdale, or Shaker Heights. Let's get on with the business of winning the war against communism by fighting poverty and creating opportunity. Let's not forget that even the poorest of the poor only aspire to the same goals and ideals that we do: a decent life for themselves and their families.

Let's give peace a chance by voting no on Contra aid, and beginning the job of helping the people of Central America rebuilding their lives.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, after so many hours of debate all that can be said, all the known arguments that have been stated, and some with eloquence, have been referred to.

Mr. Chairman, this is not a matter of eloquence. It is not a mere vote for or against the Nicaraguan Contras. What we are voting for today is the future of Central America, and some do not really realize that. It is far more important an issue than winning or losing the vote this evening. The issue is: What will the consequences be of the vote tonight?

In deciding on this issue we look for a standard, we look for a measure by which to judge what we do and how we cast our votes this evening.

What shall be that measure? What shall be that standard? What shall be that polestar by which we guide our decision this evening?

Mr. Chairman, in looking for the guide, the standard, we find the words from John F. Kennedy's 1961 inaugural address where he said, "Communist domination in this hemisphere can never be negotiated."

Mr. Chairman, that is our standard. Mr. Chairman, that is our measure. President Kennedy spoke then as an

advocate of freedom, of liberty, and of peace. President Kennedy knew the nature of communism and knew its goals and the ever restless tentacles and how they engulfed neighbors and along with that the loss of freedom and liberty. He knew the nature of communism. Communism does not change its goals any more than leopards change their spots.

Mr. Chairman, there are many historic votes that have been cast in this Chamber. Many of them send a signal around the world. Some are known, and some are not known until later.

This is an historic moment this evening, and let me refer to a vote that is little remembered, that back in 1939 this body voted against a \$5 million appropriation for the harbor of Guam. The Empire of Japan saw that vote and received it as signal that the United States of America would not defend its interests in the Pacific. Of course that was a wrong vote and a wrong signal. We all know what came 2 years later, and that of course was the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Chairman, it is important that we realize the historic moment that we have before us tonight. We have heard from our friends to give peace a chance. It is a good slogan. It sounds good, peace, peace.

What kind of peace are we speaking of? Are we speaking of the peace of Castro's Cuba? Ask those who fled Castro's Cuba about the freedom and peace that remain there. Ask about the freedom and peace that cause them to leave. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is one kind of peace.

The kind of peace that is in Nicaragua today is of a similar kind. The peace that is there is a peace that has press and radio censorship, a peace that has no labor strikes allowed, a peace that has political prisoners, a peace that has the fear of arbitrary police arrest and political arrest under a 1982 code, a peace where the police have the powers to try and sentence people under the codes that existed under Somoza, a peace where there is confiscation of all of the independent television stations and a peace that has the fear of the turbas, the Sandinista equivalent of the Nazi brown shirts of yesteryear.

Two years ago at this time the Contras were rather divided and they were a dispirited force politically and militarily. Their political leadership was divided into three different factions, and most of their fighters were located in refugee camps along the Honduran/Nicaraguan border. On the diplomatic front, the Contadora negotiations were stalled. Today the Nicaraguan resistance includes a political leadership that has broadened its representation and military force that is anywhere from 13,000 to 20,000 guerrillas fighting for freedom throughout Nicara-

gua. Its leadership includes many who at one time or another served with the Sandinistas. Alfredo Cesar, for instance, served in a succession of posts with the Sandinista Government and he is now a leader against it.

As for its military leadership, the resistance has a number of regional commanders who earlier were Sandinista fighters. Two of them were actually trained in Moscow and Havana. The guerrilla force of which they form a part has regained the tactical initiative and has brought the war in Nicaragua to a stalemate.

□ 2030

This is a tough peasant army with popular support in the countryside that has helped bring the Sandinista government to the negotiating table. We should understand that. They have come a long way as a result of what we did here in 1986.

In addition to the military pressure, there has also been the political pressure put on the Sandinistas by the four Central American Presidents.

Last summer the five Presidents of the Central American countries signed an accord in Guatemala City that promised to bring to an end the three civil wars in the region by promoting reconciliation and strengthening democracy in each of the five countries. At their last meeting in Costa Rica 3 weeks ago, the four Presidents of the democratic countries criticized Nicaragua for failing to live up to the August accords. They called for immediate implementation of the agreements. Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, responded in a calculated fashion. He announced three major concessions: suspension of the nationwide state of emergency, direct negotiations with the Nicaraguan resistance and amnesty for 3,300 political prisoners. His declaration was greeted by some with hope and by others with great skepticism. President Duarte placed himself among the skeptics. "It is not sufficient for me, it is a small step," he said.

Cardinal Obando y Bravo noted, "There is much further to go."

In evaluating the peace process that has been in effect since last August when the five Presidents met in Guatemala one has to compare words with deeds. As a great Democrat of yesterday, Al Smith, used to say, "Let's look at the record."

La Prensa was allowed to publish, but other newspapers closed down due to government pressure have not yet hit the streets. Yes, Radio Catolica is once again on the air and yet 20 other radio stations still remain silent.

Yes, 900 political prisoners were released in November, but this is only one-tenth of Nicaragua's unverified number of political prisoners.

While Daniel Ortega was announcing the end of the state of emergency in Costa Rica

at the conclusion of the Presidents' meeting, the government was in the process of arresting 11 members of the internal opposition after their return from a meeting in Guatemala with leaders of the Nicaraguan Resistance. Even more ominous has been the reemergence of the "Turbas"—The Sandinista equivalent of the Nazi brownshirts of the 1930s—after a dormancy of 2 years. Since the beginning of the peace process they have attacked two human rights groups, a meeting of the opposition alliance, and a La Prensa journalist.

What we see is a rather sophisticated pattern by the Sandinistas of giving with one hand, while taking back with the other.

Both military and diplomatic pressure have taken a toll on the stubbornness of the Sandinistas. What is necessary at this point is to be consistent; to help promote the opening up of Nicaragua. What we want to do is open up the political process in such a fashion so that it can't be shut down. The analogy I would use is trying to open up a clam. A knife is needed for the job, a pickax is too blunt an instrument and a plastic fork simply won't do.

Only one-tenth the package, \$3.6 million, will go for ammunition and air defense supplies; and that will be held back until the end of March. More important, Congress will have the final say on whether the lethal assistance gets delivered. If we pass such a resolution, then the President will not be able to deliver the ammunition and air defense weapons.

Military pressure must continue to help the diplomatic process. Such a strategy paid off in two milestone arms control agreements—the ABM treaty of 1972 and the INF treaty of 1987.

Good and positive agreements come as a result of strength and not of weakness. We should not have to relearn and relearn this, we should know this.

There are a number who would ask us to give peace a chance, being consistent is the right way to do it. Two newspapers that have consistently opposed aid to the Contras have changed their positions and support the package we have put together. Today, the Washington Post noted that while some say "Contra aid has not helped * * * we think the evidence finally goes the other way. Much has changed since Central American diplomacy became a factor last summer * * * a carrot and stick approach has moved the Sandinistas." On January 19 the Miami Herald said, "Until today the Herald has opposed military aid to the Contras * * *." To cripple the Contras—or, worse, to disband them—would be to forfeit Nicaragua to Marxism.

One final note. For those of you who think that this package will doom the peace process think again. Daniel Ortega, while visiting Norway said that negotiations for peace in Central

America would continue even if the U.S. Congress approved extra funds for the Contras. He said "We must continue the peace process even if Congress approved the aid."

Thus, let us vote "yes" and by doing so let us not forfeit Central America to the Marxists.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DYMALLY].

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, I come to the well of the House today to express my personal opposition to the notion that democracy and the peace process will be served by the granting of further American aid to the Contras. I come with great pride as the chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus to announce that my colleagues in that body shall speak today with a single voice and a unanimous vote in saying no to this measure.

It is seldom that a question is posed which establishes so clear an opportunity to place America on the right side of history. Not only are our foreign policy interests imperiled by the folly of continued aid, the domestic impact is irrefutable. Fiscal responsibility has been thrown to the wind. Since the President has embarked on his campaign to rid Nicaragua of the Sandinistas, American taxpayers have spent one-quarter of a million dollars—half of which has not been accounted for. Simultaneously, we have seen a dramatic increase in domestic crises—borne of massive budget cuts. How does a Member of this body explain a yes vote to our homeless, to the millions of our children mired in poverty, to the family farmer, to our ailing senior population. There is no defense.

If there was ever a time when the actions of this House must be moral, thoughtful, and deliberate—that moment is now. Let us give peace a chance and vote no.

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman would the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DYMALLY. I am most happy to yield to my friend the gentleman from Detroit.

Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding. I want to thank him for his courtesy in view of the shortage of time.

Mr. Chairman, behind this 37th vote on Contra aid lies a consideration far more important than the \$36.2 million: Whether Congress has the will to withdraw its approval of this brutal, low-intensity war prosecuted by the President with a vengeance that makes clear to all Third World countries the fate that awaits them if they dare to proceed to govern their nations as if they were their own.

All of the continuous misrepresentations, large and small, made to our own citizens and to the world cannot mask the violations of international rules of law, treaties, and Federal stat-

utes in this maniacal attempt to overthrow the Sandinista government by inflicting death, terror, and suffering upon its people. I am ashamed of what has been done in our name because it was not only unjust, it was unnecessary. We undermined the Contradora process. But by denying further Contra aid we indicate support for peace plan of President Arias. We may also salvage some of our honor and will surely have some of their lives.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2½ minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SAVAGE].

Mr. SAVAGE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this "Rambo" proposal of President Reagan, to give another \$36 million to the counterrevolutionaries of Nicaragua.

I have voted against such ill-advised aid everytime it has been proposed during the past 4 years, for two reasons:

First of all, I believe that the main argument for it is specious. The proponents in this body argue that this \$36 million more for the Contras, this violent interference in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, is justified by the essentiality of advancing democracy and turning back Communist dictatorships in Central America.

Now, every anti-Communist thrust is not prodemocracy. For instance, the anti-Communist third reich of Adolf Hilter was an anti-Communist dictatorship, and many of us risked our lives in World War II fighting that Fascist regime.

At present, the Fascist/racist regime in South Africa is one of the most anti-Communist in the world—but it is also one of the most antidemocratic.

So, you see, a foreign policy which supports whatever is anti-Communist, often ends up also supporting what is antidemocratic—and that is part of our problem in Nicaragua. The U.S. Government has backed the most brutal totalitarian rulers there for the past 100 years, financially and militarily. Moreover, the Contras are related to the last barbaric dictatorship there, the anti-Communist Somoza regime which, of course, our Government supported.

When we find ourselves supporting antidemocratic movements merely because they are anti-Communist, we are on the wrong side of history. Some other Central America and Caribbean current examples are Haiti, Guatemala, Panama, and the Dominican Republic.

In other words, the Reagan administration's policy regarding Nicaragua does not promote democracy in that region.

Now, the second reason I oppose the bill before us, to give another \$36 million to the Contras, is because our Government has already given them about \$200 million of the hard-earned tax dollars of American citizens. More

than \$200 million—that is more than \$10,000 per Contra; \$10,000 per Contra to kill his fellow citizens; men, women, and children, \$10,000 per Contra.

That is more than we pay the average senior citizen in the United States, per year; \$10,000 per Contra for killing, more than we give for healing our own indigent citizens.

And hear this. The strongest debaters for this \$10,000 per Contra are among the strongest debaters to reduce our Federal deficit. What hypocrisy.

They argue today to give the Contras more millions, but yesterday they argued that the Government was going bankrupt. They would rather give \$10,000 per Contra, rather than give it to a deserving, would-be American college student, \$10,000 per Contra, but reduced cost-of-living adjustments for American retirees, \$10,000 per Contra, taken out of American Medicare needs, \$10,000 per Contra, but not \$10,000 per unemployed American, \$10,000 per Contra, but nothing to keep an American family on its hard-earned farm or home, foreclosed by FHA.

I tell you, Mr. Chairman, charity begins at home. Take the Contras off welfare before reforming welfare at home. Let us heal our sick before we kill their healthy. First, reduce our budget deficit, our trade deficit, the stock market deficit, and our human deficit, in the United States of America.

Never will I vote for aid to the Contras of Nicaragua, when I need aid for my own district in these United States. I urge you to check your districts before you vote tonight.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Hawaii [Mr. AKAKA].

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. AKAKA. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. COLEMAN of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. Chairman, we should concentrate in this debate on what we agree on. We would all acknowledge that we could not tolerate a military buildup in Nicaragua that threatens our security. We could not tolerate efforts to promote guerrilla activity with Nicaragua's democratic neighbors. But this request, unlike the many which have preceded it from this administration, comes at a time when a peace process is underway.

When it suits the purposes of this administration, proponents of Contra aid routinely invoke respect for our democratic allies in Central America. Then, when those allies painstakingly set forth on a path toward a negotiated settlement, we tell them that they have vastly underestimated the threat posed by the Sandinistas and the effectiveness of the Contras. Those who say that "Communists never negotiate" overlook President Reagan's recent negotiation of the INF Treaty and the fact that we can do business with our

adversaries, whether in Moscow, Havana, or Managua, when it is in our interest and the interest of democratic nations to do so.

There is a risk in voting to disapprove this request. The risk is that the Sandinistas may renege on the concessions they made two weeks ago in San José. They may reimpose the state of emergency they so recently lifted; they may unilaterally violate the terms of any eventual cease fire. They may resort to the widespread imprisonment of the civilian opposition.

But the risk of ignoring the peace process is greater. We know for certain that the provision of aid—no matter how it is packaged—will cause the process to fail. What will our policy be then?

For the 6 years that the Contra war has been fought, this administration has continually declared that our goal is a democratic Nicaragua. But the prospect of real reform by the Sandinista directorate has invariably led to efforts to undermine or subvert any progress toward regional discussions of the shape of elections and the restoration of civil liberties.

We should be skeptical about the Sandinistas' concessions. They have shown every willingness to bankrupt the population of Nicaragua and to deplete the treasury with the threat of an invasion of United States troops. But we have also given our neighbors in Central America so many reasons to be skeptical about our own motives. Whatever became of the Kissinger Commission recommendations in the area of economic development? What ever happened to the initial welcoming of initiatives in the areas of education, health, housing, and literacy for the other Central American countries? Those should be the focus of our policy, not the single-minded effort to destroy the Sandinistas militarily.

The policy of aiding the Contras intermittently may have contributed to the Sandinistas' decision to make temporary concessions. Whatever the motivation, they are there. That is the important fact. But the argument that we need to "keep up the pressure" makes little sense. The "pressure," the fighting, is not an end in itself. The goal is to foster the development of a Nicaragua that we and our Central American allies can live with. This vote comes amid a new set of circumstances, which we cannot afford to ignore. I urge my colleagues to oppose this request and to work to further this opportunity for peace.

Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to passage of this joint resolution.

Mr. Chairman, House Joint Resolution 444, providing \$36 million in continued assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, would provide funds to continue the war and extinguish the Central American peace process.

Since 1981, the administration policy of Contra aid has yielded only bitter fruit, failing to bring about the intended peace, or democratic reforms in Nicaragua. Instead, the outlook for peace and democracy in Nicaragua deteriorated over the course of the civil war, and the Contra presence in Honduras and Costa Rica threatened to destabilize the entire region.

It was not until the signing of the Guatemala accords last August that steps toward peace and democratization began in Nicaragua, indeed, throughout Central America. In 6 months, the Central American presidents with their accord have brought about the possibility for peace and reconciliation. The promise of a return to the rule of constitutional law, and the hope for democracy—achievements that over \$277 million in American assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance have failed to realize.

What has American assistance to the Contras wrought? A long litany of failure: a dwindling, outmanned army that avoids direct engagement with the Sandinista forces; an army force that kills, shoots, and kidnaps innocent civilians while destroying peasant villages and farms; a resistance that cannot sustain itself, that cannot account for its expenditures, and that cannot capture and hold any strategic territory inside Nicaragua. Are these the forces we wish to entrust with the responsibility for bringing freedom and democracy to Nicaragua, and security to Central America? I think not.

The best hope for peace in Central America and the protection of the security concerns of the United States and our neighbors in this hemisphere rests with the Arias peace plan. We should resolve to encourage and seek participation in the process, and refrain from intimidating the four Central American democracies in an attempt to smother a regional, negotiated settlement.

Yesterday, while speaking in support of the administration proposal, the Secretary of State quoted a popular anthem in stating that we must give peace a chance. I agree, Mr. Secretary, but you can't get there from here, not with the President's proposal to continue the war. I urge my colleagues to defeat this resolution.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, the decision we make today will determine the fate of 5 million people and maybe the fate of all of Central America.

It will determine whether those 5 million people will be free to choose their own leaders, it will determine whether they will have a free press and political parties and trade unions and all of those freedoms which God gave, as a matter of right, not just to those of us who are white and speak English and live in North America, but to all people, including the people of Nicaragua.

This debate is partly about peace. About an end to the war in Nicaragua. About an end to the bombings and shootings. Every man and woman in this Chamber wants an end to the war

in Nicaragua. On that, there is no disagreement.

But on two matters there is disagreement. Serious disagreement. Crucial, bottom line disagreement. And it is on those issues that the Members of this Congress must take their stand and choose their side.

First, to what extent are we talking not just about peace, but about freedom. Not just about peace, but about democracy. Peace, my friends, is an easily attainable goal. If the dictators of this world were not resisted, there would be no war. There would have been no war here 200 years ago, no war in Europe in World War II, no war in Cuba against Batista and no war in Nicaragua against Somoza. It is only when people resist oppression, when they demand the right to be free, that there is war. Submit to a dictator, whether he is in your own country or crossing your borders, and you can have peace.

The agreement that was signed by the Presidents of Central America is not a peace agreement. It is a peace and democracy agreement. It calls for a cease fire and democracy—free elections, free press, the right to political expression.

The Sandinista Government of Nicaragua has not complied with those agreements. The Presidents of every democratic country in Central America have condemned Nicaragua for its failure to comply. The Catholic Church, which is serving as the mediator between the Nicaragua Government and the resistance, has stated plainly that the willingness of Nicaragua to release its political prisoners—if another country will accept them—does not comply with the agreement. As Lino Hernandez, the head of the Permanent Commission on Human Rights in Nicaragua has said, that is merely changing the punishment—from imprisonment to exile.

The second area of disagreement is over whether or not United States assistance to the Contras is helpful to the process of bringing peace and democracy to Nicaragua.

What are the facts? Not opinion, but facts.

The agreement was signed on August 7. Between that date and January 15, there was virtually no progress at all in terms of compliance by the Sandinista government. The Presidents of the Central American democracies sharply criticized the Sandinistas for failure to comply with the agreements. Their moral persuasion did no good whatsoever. Their condemnation and their criticism did no good whatsoever. It was only when opponents of aid to the Contras told President Ortega that the Congress would vote for more aid unless he did something, that he did something.

Admittedly, what the Sandinistas have done is not much. Asked to allow

democracy, they have permitted some demonstrations and prohibited others. Asked to allow a free press, they have allowed some press to operate and have denied licenses for others. Asked to release political prisoners, they have denied they have political prisoners but offered to release them into exile.

But whatever they have done they have done partly out of fear of the Contras and in response to the pressure from the Contras.

The Catholic mediators have described the Sandinistas as liars and have said they did not believe the Sandinistas would negotiate sincerely if the Contra threat was removed.

The leaders of the opposition political parties have said they would be allowed to operate if it were not for the Contras and if the Contras were removed as a threat, their parties would no longer be able to function.

The editor of *La Prensa* had said that if more aid to the Contras is approved, her newspaper will be closed by the Government—but if more aid to the Contras is not approved, the paper will be closed later—and then for good, and with no hope.

The mothers of the political prisoners look at you with tears in their eyes and say that if aid to the Contras is discontinued their sons will die in prison. And they say that as the Turbas, the Sandinista "brown shirts," the young hoods unleashed by the Government, taunt them and threaten them, and attack them.

Ask the Permanent Commission on Human Rights what it is like in Nicaragua today, after the peace accords, after the meeting of the Central America Presidents, and they will tell you that the Government still arrests those who are innocent, that the arrested are tortured in prison, and sometimes disappear. That the Government bombs small villages of peasants and forces them into relocation camps and that the government unleashes the Turbas to prey on innocent citizens with threats and beatings. This is the independent Human Rights Commission speaking, the people who led the fight against Somoza.

Ladies and gentlemen, every one of these people—the mothers of the prisoners, the priests, the human rights commission, the labor union leaders, the political opposition, the editors—every one of them tells us that if there are no Contras, there will be no freedom. And I tell you, if there is no freedom, there will be no peace. If there is no democracy, there will be no peace.

We cannot abandon these people. You cannot look into the tired and frightened and lost eyes of the mothers whose sons have been hauled off to prison for no reason, and abandon them without hope.

The dimensions of this resolution, which I have introduced for a bipartisan coalition of Republicans and Democrats, is not the issue. Ninety percent of this package is nonmilitary aid. There are no new weapons—just a resupply of ammunition for the weapons that are already there.

There are those who say "why is the vote today?" "Why can't we vote in 2 weeks or 3?" But they know, we all know, that the vote is today because the opponents of this package insisted that the vote be today and that was written into the law. And I will tell you that there is no guarantee that there will be another chance to vote on this. The real issues are simply two: first, do we get peace simply by allowing the Sandinistas to continue their military buildup, to continue their work for the Soviets and the Cubans, to continue the arrests and disappearances and tortures and beatings we protested against so strongly in El Salvador, but seem blind to in Nicaragua? Do we allow all of that to continue, or do we insist that we want both peace and freedom, both peace and democracy, as the Central Americans themselves demand?

And the second question is simply whether the Contras help that process along or hurt it? Speaker after speaker here today has said that to support the Contras is to destroy the peace process. But that is not what the Nicaraguans say. That is not what the Catholic Church, which is overseeing the negotiations, says. That is not what the labor union leaders say. That is not what the Commission on Human Rights says. That is not what the shopkeepers say. That is not what the political opposition says. That is not what the mothers of the tortured political prisoners say. That is not what the editors say.

No, the Nicaraguans, who have seen their Government walk out of the Contadora talks, who have seen their Government promise amnesty and deliver exile, who have seen their Government promise freedom and then unleash the young Turbas to threaten them and beat them, who have seen the Sandinistas smile for the United States, and then fly to Moscow, no, these people, the church, the press, the unions, the human rights monitors, they do not understand how we can fall for the same trick over and over and over again.

Once more, the Sandinistas promise they will not jerk away the football just before we kick it and leave us to fall flat on our faces. No my friends, the first two or three or five times this happened, you could plead trust. There is no excuse if we fall for it again—and the lives and freedoms of 5 million people are at stake. This is not a time for wishful thinking or for taking polls. This is a time to live up to your responsibilities as a Member of

the Congress of the Government which is the protector of democracy and liberty.

□ 2045

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DERRICK].

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Chairman, this is the deliberative body of the greatest Nation in the world, the strongest Nation in the world, a nation that has stood for democracy and for freedom for over 200 years. But I must say to the Members tonight that I think we are not acting as if we were the greatest Nation in the world, the strongest Nation in the world, that nation that has been the purveyor of democracy around the world for 200 years. We have been that nation that other people, oppressed people throughout the world, have always known that if we existed, if the United States of America existed, there was always a light, a hope for freedom. I would suggest to those who support this additional aid for the Contras that the greatest Nation in the world can afford a few months, a little time to see if peace can be brought about in the Western Hemisphere.

I cannot tell the Members as I stand here tonight that the Arias peace process is going to work. I think it is going to work. I will tell the Members that I think we are a great enough nation to try to make it work, and I ask the Members to do so. What I can say to the Members is that we are not going to bring peace to the Western Hemisphere by supporting a bunch of mercenaries in this small country of Nicaragua.

If we want to handle the affairs of Nicaragua, we are the most powerful Nation in the world, and it is within our ability to do so and do so in short order. Yet we as a nation seem to have failed to have learned over the last 40-odd years, since the Second World War, some very definite things, things about which there is no question. Guerrilla warfare cannot be won without the support of the people.

We do not have that support through our mercenaries in Nicaragua. Even our generals, the two generals of the Southern Hemisphere, tell us that regardless of how much money we send to the mercenaries in Nicaragua, they cannot effectively hold any part of it for any length of time.

Have we not seen that ourselves since probably almost \$1 billion has been transferred down to the mercenaries in Nicaragua? And what has been accomplished by it? Six years ago Nicaragua could not have beat itself out of a wet paper bag. Now that is not the case because every dollar we send down there is matched twofold.

So I say to the Members that even though \$1 billion has gone to these mercenaries, they have not brought

peace. They are not going to bring about peace.

Are we not a great enough nation to let peace exist for a few months to try to see if our Western Hemisphere can be returned to democracy? I think we are that great. I think we do represent democracy, and I ask that as many Members as possible can vote against these additional funds for the mercenaries in Nicaragua.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. ANDREWS].

Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the President's proposal, House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. Chairman, Simon Bolivar, the great South American leader of the 19th century, dreamed of making the Americas the greatest region in the world. "Greatest," he said, "not so much by virtue of her area and her wealth as by her freedom." * * *

Today, freedom is on the rise in Central America. Fragile democracies are trying to grow with a new generation of heroic leaders.

The peace plan of President Oscar Arias, of Costa Rica, offers the best hope for security and peace in the region. I believe the request of the administration for military aid at this critical time undermines this initiative and the diplomatic progress that has been made between the nations of Central America.

The administration has made the Contras the primary instrument of its policies; I believe this narrow approach is unwise. Only the broadest possible program has a chance. This program must have several parts.

First, we must support the Arias peace plan. The peace plan is not solely a means to bring peace to Central America. It is also a means to bring democracy to Nicaragua. If the Sandinistas do not give Nicaraguans basic, democratic freedoms then the peace plan has failed. Censorship of the press, repression of political opposition, and suspension of legal rights must end for the Sandinistas to be in compliance with Arias peace plan.

Second, President Reagan has offered to send the Secretary of State to negotiate directly with Nicaragua. He should follow through with this proposal. Philip Habib, who was the President's Special Envoy for Central America, unexpectedly resigned in frustration reportedly because he was unable to negotiate directly with the Sandinistas. The Secretary of State should go to Central America to encourage the peace process. He should talk directly with top Sandinista officials to prevent a Cuban or Soviet military threat from developing.

Third, we must more clearly define to Cuba and the Soviet Union our vital security interests in Central America. We must be prepared to enforce these limits with American strength. Our responses must be specific and unequivocal—not undefined strategies such as the random mining of Nicaraguan harbors.

Fourth, we need to commit ourselves to a long range partnership with the fragile democratic governments of Central America. The Kissinger Commission report, all but forgotten by this administration, should be revived and implemented. We need a kind of Marshall

plan for the economic development of Central America. Not since the Alliance for Progress in the early 1960's has any administration set clearly defined social and economic goals for the region and then aggressively worked to achieve those goals. A revitalized Peace Corps, an expanded program of surplus food distribution, and attention to the needs of Central America in health and education, all should be considered if we truly want democracy to prosper.

Fifth, we should immediately begin discussion with Mexico about trade relations and debt problems. A stable government and vital economy in Mexico is critical to our security and the development of democracy in Central America. Just as we have negotiated a comprehensive trade agreement with Canada, we need to strengthen our economic ties with Mexico with a free trade treaty. The consequences for not devoting more attention to Mexico are severe for Texas and the Southwest.

Sixth, we should give more support and credence to the opposition parties within Nicaragua. The political opposition must be strengthened to challenge the Sandinistas in elections for the popular support of Nicaraguans. They will be the vehicle for true democracy in Nicaragua.

Finally, we cannot ignore the realities of the Contras. They may well have a place in a future Nicaragua. They have had an important role in the peace process. Peace is not possible without the Contras and the Sandinistas sitting down at the negotiating table. This process has begun; we should make sure the Contras can complete it.

I support a package of humanitarian aid that will keep them at the negotiating table without disrupting the peace process—to support them while they remain in the field. This aid must be strictly humanitarian: food, clothing, and medical supplies.

But the real question that we face today is not whether we support the Contras in Nicaragua. The question is whether we support peace and democracy in Central America.

As John Foster Dulles once said: "You have to take chances for peace, just as you must take chances in war. * * * I believe that the Arias peace plan deserves this chance."

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I plead with my colleagues to vote against Contra aid and to give the Arias peace plan the chance it deserves, for that is what this vote is about today. I have often said that, although I have voted time and again against aid to the Contras, I am no fan of the Sandinistas. But then this vote is not about popularity contests.

This vote is about whether or not we are going to comply with the terms of the Arias peace plan, which says that no foreign nations will give assistance to the insurgents in the region. I hope that no one has to sell this Congress on the value of the Arias peace plan. It has in 6 months accomplished what 6 years of Contra aid has not—it has gotten the Sandinistas to agree to such democratic reforms as a lifting of the state of emergency, a general amnesty for political prisoners, face to face talks with the opposition, the opening of radio stations and newspapers, and the promise of free elections.

Proponents of Contra aid argue that the Sandinistas' motivation for these reforms comes from the Contra aid itself and that if we lift the Contra aid the Sandinistas will drop those reforms. To this argument I say that the stick in our foreign policy need not always be a gun. We have many incentives that I believe would be more effective than Contra aid and far more conscionable. It is after all, the economic disaster wrought by the civil war which has brought the Sandinistas to comply with the Arias plan, not any military victory achieved by the Contras. And we have many economic sticks at our disposal should the Sandinistas turn their back at any time on the Arias peace plan.

I ask those proponents of Contra aid, "What will we buy with some \$60 million in Contra aid if we pass this package today?" In the short term, we shall probably buy the anger of the Central American presidents who have cosigned the Arias peace plan, for the peace plan specifically bans such aid. Second, we shall probably be buying an easy exit for the Sandinistas who can then vacate the democratic reforms they have been forced to accept.

But even more ominous is the long-term prospect of Contra aid. What could we buy with a full fledged program of U.S. aid to the Contras? The best, most honest consensus is that what we would buy is a protracted guerrilla war in Nicaragua with no victors and many victims. It is a prospect that our constituencies would not accept and our consciences must not condone. It is a prospect that would bankrupt whatever is left of the United States image in Central America.

The American public—as represented by the massive outpouring of mail and phone calls we have all received—views this vote today as pivotal to the future of the region and to our place in it. If we are to come down on the side of democracy, we must vote "no" to Contra aid. If we kill the Arias peace plan, the blood will be on our hands.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, the question before the House today is relatively simple, but the overall policy of which it is a part is very complicated.

Despite the focus of national attention on funding of the Contras, it is a good idea to review the entire policy regularly, as well as the single element that we confront today.

For me the problem is especially difficult. When the Contras were presented as the whole policy, I have voted negatively. When they were integrated into a larger regional plan including economic assistance, I have voted positively.

Both proponents and opponents of Contra funding say that their vote will promote the achievement of the Arias peace plan. The administration believes that the Contras have been a vital factor in bringing the Ortega government into negotiations with the neighboring governments. And it believes that only the threat of the Contras caused Daniel Ortega to take recent steps to improve compliance with the Arias plan. Opponents believe that Contra funding will ruin the peace process, drive Nicaragua into the arms of the U.S.S.R., and continue to violate "the rule of law."

It is not hard for most of us to support freedom fighters in Afghanistan and Laos. Nicara-

gua is a more difficult choice. Many of us squirm at the thought of financing a Nicaraguan insurgency. At least I do.

In the days prior to this note, I have had more than the usual opportunities to discuss our Central American policies with administration officials. One recent positive development coming out of such discussions was the President's decision to involve Congress in the decision whether or not to go forward with the 10 percent of funding which is ammunition. Essentially the President is willing to give up his veto power if Congress disagrees that ammunition deliveries should go forward.

This modest change should not be interpreted as a wholesale revision, but it is an act of outreach which the opponents have not matched.

The opponents have talked about voting to resume humanitarian aid next month, but no proposals have been made, nor procedures guaranteed, nor dates set. Such a proposal has not been drawn, has no consensus support among anti-Contra forces, and cannot be relied upon when costing a vote today. So far the secret plan is still a figment of someone's imagination.

That makes today vote even tougher. There is no reliable backup. Those who would like the Contras preserved in a different, perhaps gentler, way are denied that alternative. At least they are denied an assured alternative.

And, even if such a proposal should come to this body, it would be, as described by a number of anti-Contra speakers today, similar to what is before us now. A pure humanitarian aid package for the Contras is not much different than the pending proposal as modified to provide congressional disapproval of lethal aid.

For those contemplating an affirmative vote, the larger policy is very important. Many anti-Contras do not believe that this administration really supports the Arias plan. Much of my recent questioning has dealt with administration goals for the region, and plans to achieve those goals. I have been persuaded that administration expects the Contras to be a factor in the achievement of the Arias plan.

The region needs our help in other ways, too. Without it, there will be difficulties in the area no matter what else happens. We need to provide more market access for all Central American countries, either through an improved CBI, or through another special market facility. Despite budget woes, we have to provide development aid as well. And, we have to stimulate U.S. investment. On all of these critical matters, the administration has had a better record than the Congress.

My own experiences have persuaded me of the intensity of anti-Contra feeling. Those feelings are genuine and must be considered carefully. American don't want to finance warfare or violence. Opponents of this bill fervently want the peace plan to work, and believe the Contras hinder that plan.

However, the Ortega government is, by most accounts, repressive, and not much given to living up to promises. It was drawn into the Arias plan discussions with difficulty, agreed to the plan reluctantly, and did not live up to its agreements. Recently it has begun to meet the obligations it accepted, but the most

recent changes were undertaken only a few days before this vote. In an effort to defeat Contra funding. It is clear that the presence of the Contras has been the major influence on improvements in Nicaragua.

The department of the Ortega government has been regularly and roundly criticized in this House. The neighbors in the emerging Central American democracies are pretty critical, too, of the recent Gallop poll, sponsored by USIA, of attitudes in Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador is to be believed. Overall, there is little on the record that would inspire confidence in the Ortega-Sandinista government.

I would be much happier if there were another option. A cheaper, exclusively humanitarian, package, as hinted at by the Speaker, has more appeal to me than the pending bill. But there is no other option. We must make a choice now.

Assuming that our goal is the full achievement of the Arias plan, and based on the performance of the Ortega government, I have reluctantly concluded that a vote for Contra funding is a better vote than one against.

The existence of the Contras, and our funding of them, has not impeded the process of peace. It seems to me that the greater risk, that of disruption and instability in the region, would be incurred if Contra funding was stopped, and, as a consequence, the Ortega-Sandinista government was relieved of pressures to meet its Arias plan obligations.

If Congress objects to the deliveries of ammunition, if and when they are requested by the President, it has only to muster a bare majority. If there is a cease-fire, and if the Ortega government is living up to its obligations, there should be no difficulty in making that majority.

If, as has been hinted by a number of speakers today, there is to be another bill coming later, I hope that its secrets can be shared on a bipartisan basis. It is long past time that this body attempts either to recreate a bipartisan foreign policy, or to at least seek consensus in these matters.

Mr. MOAKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the President's Contra aid package.

If we are truly interested in peace and if we are truly interested in a more democratic Nicaragua—then Members will reject this package. History has shown that every time the United States increases aid to the Contras—the Sandinista government has responded with restricting civil liberties.

Mr. Chairman, more has been accomplished with respect to democratic reform in Nicaragua during the last 6 months as a result of the Guatemala peace accord—then in the entire 6 years of the administration's war in Nicaragua. Whether the administration likes it or not—the peace process is achieving progress in the right direction. Let's build on this progress—do not destroy it.

Mr. Chairman, I want to also urge my colleagues to refrain from calling aid to the Contras—no matter what the form—humanitarian aid.

As stipulated in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, true humanitarian aid must be made available solely on the basis of human need and not for any political purpose; it must be offered impartially to all sides in a conflict; it

must go to civilians and noncombatants; and it should be provided through independent agencies that have not taken sides.

Mr. Chairman, what we are talking about today and what we have talked about in the past regarding Contra aid simply does not pass the test of what real humanitarian aid constitutes. The bulk of what has been provided to the Contras thus far finances daily living needs of a combatant force and does not constitute what, by law, is humanitarian aid.

This is an important point. The fact is that our careless and sloppy misuse of the term humanitarian erodes the integrity of genuine humanitarian aid and puts at jeopardy the future of those in need whose lives depend upon the delivery of such assistance.

Further, providers of genuine humanitarian aid operate in conflict situations at the sufferance of warring parties. Our careless use of the term "humanitarian" here in Washington—puts these dedicated people and groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross in danger. I hope my colleagues will respect the internationally recognized definition of the term "humanitarian" and use that word carefully.

Mr. Chairman, there are people in Central America who urgently need true humanitarian aid to relieve their suffering. Our efforts today should be aimed at helping alleviate the pain of the sick, poor, and disadvantaged—and not aimed at increasing the turmoil.

Any aid to a combat force—except emergency medical aid that is provided directly to sick and wounded on both sides of the conflict—is not humanitarian aid. The package we are discussing today is in no way humanitarian aid—it is yet another attempt to sustain the war.

I urge my colleagues to defeat the Contra aid package today.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit to the RECORD an excellent letter written to Members of Congress by a distinguished group of leaders involved in various humanitarian relief efforts around the world. I urge my colleagues to read this letter carefully.

JANUARY 29, 1988.

DEAR MEMBER OF CONGRESS:

We are writing to urge congressional support for efforts to meet the urgent need for humanitarian assistance in Central America—that is, assistance to relieve human suffering of civilians and non-combatants—including repatriation and resettlement of those displaced or exiled by the war. In so doing, we wish to clarify the use of the term "humanitarian" to characterize various kinds of foreign assistance. As executives of private and voluntary organizations that have provided humanitarian relief in conflict situations for many years we are concerned that repeated misuse of the term undermines the principles that safeguard the rights of war victims and threatens the safety of humanitarian aid providers.

The right to humanitarian relief aid, in international law and custom, is recognized only for civilians and non-combatants. The aid is to be provided solely on the basis of human need, free of extraneous political objectives, and is to be offered impartially to all sides in a conflict.

Aid to the Nicaraguan armed opposition often is mistakenly characterized as "humanitarian." In recent days, the terms "humanitarian" and "non-lethal" have been

used interchangeably in news reports on the president's request for additional aid. In addition, in the FY 1988 Continuing Resolution "humanitarian" assistance to the armed opposition is defined as "food, clothing, shelter, medical services, medical supplies, and payments for such items." Assistance to any combat force, even if restricted to food, clothing, shelter and medicine does not meet the criteria of humanitarian aid and should not be labelled as such.

We know that other proposals for assistance to the region are likely to be made in the near future. We urge that proposals for humanitarian aid follow the internationally agreed upon principles described above. We urge also that any assistance offered to parties to the conflict during the period of a ceasefire be channelled through reputable international humanitarian organizations.

Our work in the region indicates that repatriation and resettlement of nearly 2 million Central American refugees is a growing concern that deserves from the international community the same urgent attention to which the Central American presidents committed themselves in the Guatemalan peace agreement. We urge your strongest support for humanitarian assistance for this purpose.

Thank you for your consideration of our views on this matter.

Sincerely,

Norman E. Barth, Executive Director, Lutheran World Relief; J. Richard Butler, Executive Director, Church World Service; John A. Lapp, Executive Secretary, Mennonite Central Committee; Richard S. Scobie, Executive Director, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee; Asia Bennett, Executive Secretary, American Friends Service Committee; John Hammock, Executive Director, Oxfam America; Robert J. McCloskey, Acting Executive Director, Catholic Relief Services.

Mr. COYNE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the President's request that Congress today approve \$36.2 million more in aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. The President's request provides that \$32.6 million would be for non-lethal purposes—\$3.6 million of the package, however, is for lethal aid, and would be held in escrow until March 31. At this time the President could release the lethal aid unless Congress were to pass a resolution finding Nicaragua in compliance with the Arias accord. Further, the President is requesting an additional \$24 to \$32 million for replacing lost supply planes and for defensive radar and electronic equipment. If this request is approved, it will mean that the Contras will have received more than \$89 million in U.S. aid since the peace process began.

The key question under debate here is: whether the threat of further aid to the Contras will pressure the Sandinistas to move closer to democracy, or whether further U.S. aid will destroy the budding peace process?

Mr. Chairman, it is my opinion that approval of the President's Contra aid request will have adverse consequences both for the Central American peace plan and for U.S. security interests.

First, consider that the President's request comes at a time when the Sandinistas have been making reasonable concessions toward democratization. On the other hand, the Contras have become increasingly rigid in their

demands in an attempt to delay the peace process. The U.S. administration, in its effort to destabilize the Sandinista government, is supporting a small guerrilla force which has little support among the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinistas, in their recent concessions, and in a personal letter to President Reagan by President Ortega, have shown that they want to end the strife in Central America. The Sandinistas want to end the war, but not if this means relinquishing power to the Contras. Further U.S. aid to the Contras, then, guarantees that the Sandinistas will continue the war.

Second, in evaluating the effect of the President's request on the peace process, consider that the Arias peace plan, while not perfect, has so far been the only effective vehicle for peace in the region. The Sandinistas have not responded to U.S. military pressure exerted via the Contras; however, they have responded to diplomatic pressure exerted by the Central American Presidents through the Arias peace plan.

Third, consider the components of the administration's request. The supposedly non-lethal aid, amounting to \$32.6 million and available through June, could be used to transport troops and supplies, as well as lease helicopters. The President is also requesting additional funds for defensive radar systems. Is this truly nonlethal aid? Analysis shows that more than 75 percent of the supposedly humanitarian component of the request would in reality be used for military purposes. The President's request directly violates the Arias peace plan, the very plan the President has said he supports. The Sandinistas have stated emphatically that if further Contra aid is approved in violation of the peace plan, then they will not consider themselves bound by the agreement. Rather than ensuring compliance, as the administration argues, we can see that the new aid will clearly lead to an escalation in the war.

I urge my colleagues to consider the options carefully. True, the Sandinistas could renege on the peace plan if aid is cut off. On the other hand, the Sandinistas will certainly renege if aid continues. In short, we must give peace a chance. Worldwide diplomatic and economic pressure on the Sandinistas not to renege is strong. The Sandinistas have recently made overtures to Western European nations for economic assistance. With the Nicaraguan economy in dire straits, the Sandinistas cannot afford an embargo on economic assistance.

Finally, we come to the Soviet question. I am very aware of the threat to United States security posed by Soviet influence in Central America. I believe, however, that further aid to the Contras will simply pressure the Sandinistas into seeking more Soviet aid, both military and economic. This would lead to a no-win situation, as further United States military assistance to the Contras will rule out any diplomatic solutions, such as an agreement with Nicaragua to ban foreign military bases. Both Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and Sandinista President Ortega have offered to halt Soviet military aid if the United States agrees to stop further Contra aid. Only the United States, through diplomatic pressures, can contain the Soviet military presence in Central America. This administration, however, refuses

to consider diplomatic solutions, and instead relies solely on military pressure.

I firmly believe that the manner by which peace can best be achieved is through a regional negotiated solution such as the Arias accord, and I do not support military aid which undermines diplomacy. I urge my colleagues to join with me in voting against the President's proposal for continued military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. I urge you instead to support alternative measures which will address the problems of economic and social development in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, I close with the words of one who successfully sought to change the world through the ways of peace and not violence. Martin Luther King, in speaking against United States involvement in Vietnam, a situation that bears frightening parallels to the present Central American conflict, once stated that:

We must find new ways to speak for peace [in Vietnam] and justice throughout the developing world—a world that borders on our doors. If we do not act we shall surely be dragged down the long dark and shameful corridors of time reserved for those who possess power without compassion, might without morality, and strength without sight.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I continue to oppose additional aid for the Contras and support the Central American peace plan.

Clearly, the peace plan offers the best hope for the restoration of peace in the region and the eventual democratization of all the countries concerned. It has the support of the five nations of the region and deserves American support also.

Additional aid, even so-called nonlethal aid, for the Contras would simply undermine this peace plan, perhaps destroy it altogether. It would prolong the killing and destruction which is afflicting the Nicaraguan people and risk spreading this war to the countries neighboring Nicaragua. Any assistance will remove all motives the Contras might have for negotiating sincerely for a cease-fire. They would know that stubbornness would mean additional aid for ammunition in the near term and the possibility of even more funding in the future.

The President's last-minute appeal for his program merely recycled old arguments. His request for additional aid would continue a failed program which is itself contributing greatly to the problems of Central America. Even giving Congress the decision over lethal aid would hold the peace process hostage.

It will take a long time to restore peace and stability and to create truly democratic systems throughout Central America. This area has longstanding economic and social problems in addition to the problems which years of war have produced. But, a necessary first step is ending the war and restoring peace.

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Chairman, last December, the House of Representatives voted on a continuing appropriations bill of over \$600 billion, which also included aid for the Contras. Under the rules which this legislation came to the House floor for action, no separate vote on the Contra assistance provisions were permitted.

Because no separate vote was taken, the will of the House of Representatives and the people of this Nation was frustrated. Today, we have the opportunity to reaffirm the posi-

tion of the House by rejecting aid to the Contras, and instead, endorsing and supporting the peace process currently underway in Central America.

The Arias peace plan has produced several positive steps by the Nicaraguan Government. President Ortega has released about 1,000 political prisoners, and the newspaper *La Prensa* has begun publishing, without prior censorship, for the first time since 1972. Direct talks between the leadership of the Contras and the Nicaraguan Government also have been scheduled. It has been this peace process, not assistance to the Contras, which has produced these conciliatory actions by the Sandinistas.

Yet administration officials still refuse to sit down at the negotiating table for direct talks with Nicaraguan leaders. Most recently, Secretary Gorbachev during the summit in Washington, DC, offered to end Soviet military aid to Nicaragua, if the United States stopped its aid to the Contras. Still, the administration's response is a military one.

We in Congress should adhere to the wishes of the five Central American Presidents, who in a joint statement after their meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, on January 15 and 16, renewed their call for an end to all military assistance to the insurgent forces in Central America. We must continue to give the Central American peace process a chance to work, instead of undermining it by seeking a military solution. Therefore, I urge my colleagues in the House of Representatives to vote against any assistance to the Contras.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Chairman, if there be any alternative to force of arms, we—as a nation and as a people—have a moral responsibility to explore such an alternative in cooperation with all people of good faith who have the same commitment.

Peace and its derivative liberties must be sought by all peaceful means possible before resorting to the raw force of arms.

For if peace is achieved by force of arms, we have started on an irreversible road of using arms as the sole arbiter of freedom. And this is neither good nor healthy for a world power, or a weak people.

Our intervention in the manner proposed today only enables the civil strife to continue—and it divides families, putting brother against brother, father against son, and only encourages a nation to be at war with itself.

My vote for now must be to abide by our responsibility to explore all peaceful means.

Mr. HALL of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 444, the resolution to approve the administration's latest request for Contra aid.

Today, we are voting on yet another installment of funding for the Contras. This specific request would provide \$36.2 million in Contra aid through June, of which \$3.6 million would be clearly lethal military aid in escrow which the President could release after March 31, 1988.

My colleagues should keep in mind that the request before us today would also allow for the expenditure of between \$24 and \$32 million in additional funds for the replacement of lost supply planes and for electronic and radar equipment. Moreover, although the core

amount of \$36.2 million is called nonlethal, the administration interprets this term to permit the purchase of trucks, the lease of helicopters, and the transportation of troops and supplies.

The total amount of this funding—a minimum of \$60 million for 4 months—is almost identical, on an installment basis, to the administration's originally projected 18-month request of \$270 million. The \$32.6 million in so-called nonlethal assistance for a 4-month period also represents a tripling in the monthly rate of \$2.65 million for nonlethal assistance approved last year.

If this request is approved by the House and Senate, the amount of direct and indirect Contra aid since the peace process began 6 months ago would total more than \$89 million. And this would come on top of the more than \$200 million of U.S. aid provided over 6 years to the Contras.

After all these expenditures, what do we have to show for our investment? The Contras have failed to rally the Nicaraguan people to their side, and they have failed to bring any significant territory under their control.

The policy of funding the Contras has yet to bring peace and democracy to Nicaragua. Instead, it has only brought killing, suffering, and hardship to the Nicaraguan people. Indeed, since 1981, over 25,000 Nicaraguans have been killed in the Contra war.

A coalition of organizations fighting Contra aid wrote in a letter to Members of Congress this week: "You cannot support both the peace process and the Contras." This certainly is true. Not only does Contra aid kill Nicaraguans, it also kills the prospects for peace.

Numerous Central American leaders have indicated that additional Contra aid would destroy the peace process. This would be a tragedy, since it is this peace process which has brought the Sandinista government to the conference table. Six years of Contra aid have not advanced the goals of peace and democracy for the Nicaraguan people; rather, it has been 6 months of the Guatemala peace accords that have done the most to advance these goals.

Last summer, at the height of the Iran-Contra hearings, Newsday made the following frank observation:

A small detail is being lost in all the telegraphic revelations coming out of the Congressional Iran-Contra hearings: The Reagan administration's policy of sending aid to the Contras makes no sense. The lying, deceit and ideological blindness that permeated the procedural disasters of the Iran-Contra affair are also at the heart of the substantive policy.

I agree that this policy makes no sense, and it is time for a clear vote from Congress against it. Let's not get so caught up in the details of this complicated aid package that we lose the basic issue.

A vote for the administration's money for the Contras not only is a misuse of the American taxpayers' dollars, it is a vote against the peace process. Support for more Contra aid at this time will undercut—if not destroy—all the work for peace of our neighbors in this region.

These nations have taken a risk for peace and, as frontline nations near Sandinista Nicaragua, they have the most to lose if the peace

initiative fails. After funding an unsuccessful 6-year-old war effort, the least the United States should do is not to scuttle our allies' 6-month-old peace effort.

Instead, let us work with them to promote democracy aac7 smith, c 2-3-88 J. 19-060 F. 957/7 A03FE7.339

Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the Reagan administration's request for \$36.25 million in Contra aid, House Joint Resolution 444.

This request for lethal and nonlethal assistance for Contra aid amounts to at least \$60 million.

I oppose this request because it will not promote peace but derail the process set in motion in Guatemala City with the Esquipulas II accord. The provision of such aid, rather than promoting democratization in the region, particularly in Nicaragua, would serve to strengthen the hand of hard-line Marxist-Leninist forces in the Sandinista leadership.

The vast majority of people in Central America want peace. We must give the Arias peace plan a chance. Let's vote against this ill-advised proposal, which would escalate the projection of the East-West conflict in the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I must comment on the hypocrisy of the administration's claim that it is concerned with the promotion of democracy in the Western Hemisphere. I believe the administration is anti-Communist, but it is not prodemocracy.

In Haiti, where democratic forces are in life-threatening peril, the Reagan administration tells us it has limited leverage and is prepared to recognize a regime installed through the brutal murder of voters and systematic state terror. The Reagan administration says it can do nothing to help; it will send the U.S. Ambassador to the inauguration of an illegitimate President of that republic on February 7, 1988. It is against economic sanctions. It has failed to utter a word of support for the courageous democratic Presidential candidates who boycotted an electoral farce on January 17, 1988. Its silence and inaction equals functional complicity in the hijacking of the Haitian people, a people which has demonstrated over and over again in the face of murderous violence, that it wants democracy. The Reagan administration's lame response is that for it to act or even speak out it needs a signal from the Haitian people. They have signaled repeatedly and courageously but the administration has been blind to that signal. Why? Well, there is no significant Marxist-Leninist presence in Haiti. Therefore, since there is no East-West dimension, Haiti is of no meaningful interest to the foreign policy decisionmakers in this administration.

Let us be clear, this is not a vote that the administration wants to promote democracy. It wants approval of this Contra package only to continue its anti-Communist crusade through military methods. It is a sterile, self-defeating approach and it will defeat the peace process.

Let's vote this package down.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, once again, we are faced with the question of what role the United States will play in the democratization of Central America.

Do we continue to support the Nicaraguan freedom fighters to keep the Sandinistas at

the negotiating table; or do we half-heartedly go along with the Arias peace plan by, once again, abandoning our support for freedom and democracy in Central America.

It seems to me that lately, our reputation for consistency in our foreign policy objectives leaves much to be desired. From wavering on arms sales to our Saudi Arabian friends, to a lukewarm commitment in the Persian Gulf.

This policy of inconsistency has been prevalent in Central America. Congress has undermined the administration's support of the democratic freedom fighters by defeating aid requests on two separate occasions. Only to turn around and support additional aid packages after Daniel Ortega accepted Soviet funding to promote the Communist agenda, and to continue the Sandinista's disregard for basic human rights in Nicaragua.

Since the Arias peace plan has been in place, the Sandinista regime has made no attempt to negotiate with the Contras, but has responded with plans to escalate the size of their military force to 600,000 soldiers.

Only recently, with the threat of a new U.S. aid package, have the Sandinistas agreed to talk directly with the Contras. It's very obvious that the Sandinistas respond to one thing, and one thing only: Pressure; the threat of a continued and consistent U.S. policy that espouses democracy and freedom.

Without this pressure, the Sandinistas have no incentive to honor the Arias peace plan, and have no intention of honoring basic human rights in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, freedom costs. Without the continued pressure from the United States, the Sandinistas will ignore the Arias plan, and will continue to disregard the Nicaraguan pleas for democracy and freedom.

Let's make the Arias plan work, support peace and democracy by keeping the pressure on the Sandinistas. Support President Reagan's aid package.

Mr. HOUGHTON. Mr. Chairman, today I am voting against legislation extending further American military aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. But I do not want Managua to misunderstand this vote.

I have voted for Contra aid in the past. This time I vote "no" for a particular reason. That reason is the Arias peace plan. I visited Nicaragua in January. I have heard and read what President Ortega has recently said. Despite reasonable evidence to the contrary, I want to believe Sandinista statements about such things as allowing La Presna and Radio Catolica to remain open, halting aid to guerrillas in other countries, giving amnesty to those who have opposed them, and permitting open, honest elections to take place. This is what I want to believe.

I also would like to do my part in preventing the United States from being party to anything which might damage the chance for a political solution to a horrible war. Conditions are different than they were even a few months ago. There now is a plan if there is a will, and quite frankly, the will now must be the Sandinistas. No matter how my colleagues vote every one in his or her heart wants peace for Nicaragua, Central America, and the United States. As a veteran of World War II, I am well aware of the costs of war. What we search for is not

just peace at any cost, but a fair, decent, and a democratic peace. This is not one shoved down the throats of citizens by a single party.

So as Mr. Ortega moves ahead in implementing his part of the Arias plan, there are more than a few of us who will be watching. If I, for one, find my trust to be misplaced, then I will feel no hesitation in reassessing my position.

I am going to hope during these next critical months that the Nicaraguan Government will somehow justify the trust which more than a few of us have placed in it.

Mr. GRADISON. Mr. Chairman, the House again has before it a request from the President to provide further assistance to the democratic resistance struggling against the government of Nicaragua. No other issue on the foreign policy agenda of the United States in this decade has so deeply divided American public opinion and the Members of this body as the question of Nicaragua and the best method to foster democracy, peace, and stability in Central America.

After carefully weighing the issues involved, I have decided to support the President's request for \$36 million in assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, including the provision of \$3.6 million in military aid held in escrow. I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the resolution.

Progress toward democracy and regional stability has admittedly been halting and uncertain. In a region where the roots of the democratic tradition generally do not run deep perhaps that is to be expected. Yet, there has been progress. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras have joined Costa Rica in the democratic experiment. These advances must be strengthened.

In their midst, however, lies a regime in Nicaragua that, by all available evidence, continues to support insurgent forces in the region and whose commitment to fulfill the democratic promise of the 1979 revolution can be legitimately called into serious question. Additionally, recent revelations by a high ranking Sandinista military officer, Maj. Roger Miranda, that Nicaragua plans an expansion of its armed forces far in excess of what would realistically be required for defense calls into serious question that government's sincerity. It is difficult, under these circumstances to ascertain the intentions of the Nicaraguan Government.

Pressure from the armed democratic resistance, the opposition inside Nicaragua, the states of the region, international public opinion, and American policy have all had a role to play in moving Managua toward concession and compromise. The question is, how real and viable are these concessions?

Following a disturbing pattern, recent moves by the Sandinista regime, including the lifting of the state of emergency and the release of some political prisoners, have come as a vote in Congress on further Contra aid was imminent. Some Nicaraguan officials, including Foreign Minister Miguel D'Escoto, have been extraordinarily candid in their contempt for the Guatemala Accord signed by the presidents of the five Central American nations on August 7, 1987.

It appears to me, Mr. Chairman, that a vote by the House to deny the President's request

would remove an important element in the pressure facing the Sandinistas and in our ability to move them toward democracy. Continuing to provide nonlethal assistance will maintain the structure of the military resistance. In my view, placing funds for lethal assistance in escrow will further the peace process by giving Managua continued incentive to agree to a cease-fire and take further and irreversible steps toward a more open political system.

In 1979, Nicaragua pledged to the Organization of American States and the Nicaraguan people that the promise of the revolution was the promise of democracy. The United States extended its hand in friendship and provided over \$100 million in direct assistance and helped to secure millions more from multilateral lending institutions. Then there were no Contras and many now in the Nicaraguan opposition were a part of the government. The democratic promise went cynically unfulfilled and the authoritarian, Marxist, and revolutionary regime which emerged genuinely threatens the stability of the region.

Pressure, in all of its forms, has compelled the Sandinista regime to begin to move toward democratic reform. Now is not the time to remove any of the incentives for the regime to change. I urge my colleagues to support House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to reaffirm my strong opposition to our government providing any aid—military or humanitarian—to the Nicaraguan Contras.

The Reagan administration has demonstrated time and time again that it believes that the goals of peace and freedom in Nicaragua are best supported through subsidies to armed resistance factions.

How ironic it is that, in this day and age, when we are all being asked to make do with less or without, our President is asking us to send millions of dollars in aid to a group of people who are working to overthrow a legitimate government.

How can we in America justify spending millions of dollars in aid to the Contras when our children cannot read or write because of an inadequate educational system; when our young people cannot go to college because of cuts in Federal financial aid programs. When we know that thousands of people go to bed hungry and homeless every night. When our neighborhoods and communities are being destroyed by the plague of drugs that are allowed to enter our country with impunity, because Federal funding for drug interdiction is being cut.

Where are our priorities?

I firmly believe that the road to peace in Central America is best paved by the people of Central America. The signers of the Guatemala accord have taken a major step toward resolving the problems which exist in their countries. The Arias peace plan has made me very hopeful about the prospect that peace and freedom will be soon in coming, not only to the people of Nicaragua, but to all the people of Central America.

I believe that aid to the Contras will kill prospects for peace. Central American leaders agree that an end to Contra aid is an "indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts." Costa Rican President Oscar

Arias himself has said that more Contra aid will result in the deaths of 20,000 to 30,000 Nicaraguans in fighting.

Some argue that aid to the Contras is necessary to ensure cooperation from the Sandinista government. However, 7 years of funding the Contras has done little or nothing to bring peace to Nicaragua. It has only been through the recent signing of the Guatemala accord that substantial moves toward peace have been made.

I continue to believe that the role of the United States in Nicaragua should be one of facilitator, helping to bring all of the people of Nicaragua together so that they, themselves, may determine a mutually agreeable and acceptable solution to their conflict.

In closing, as I reaffirm my opposition to any aid to the Contras, I also pledge my continued support for the peace process which has already begun in Central America.

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Chairman, after a great deal of thought, I have decided to vote in favor of continued assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces. Over the past several months, I have received thousands of letters and calls, which show tremendous divisiveness among my constituents. This issue is not one that can be considered solely on the basis of its popularity or lack thereof.

To the opponents of assistance, I will acknowledge that the Reagan administration has been equivocal to say the least over the last 6 years. The lack of direction does not, however, justify abandonment of the Contras. We appear to have muddled our way to a position where a combination of diplomacy and the threat of continued military aid will bring Nicaragua toward democracy and respect for its smaller and less powerful neighbors. I find it hard to believe we would have reached this stage without pressure exerted by the resistance.

President Reagan's plan is a significant departure from prior aid requests and a sincere effort to bring about a bipartisan compromise on American policy in Central America. He has included Congress in the decisionmaking process, and the majority leadership has offered no alternative to the administration plan. Those who complain that it was too late have short memories of the pace at which this body has worked on the Federal budget and other pressing matters within the last 3 months. Under the Reagan plan, the so-called lethal assistance may never be released if the Sandinistas follow through on their promises.

Daniel Ortega's slothful response to the requirements of the Arias peace plan has been a major influence in my decision to vote for the President's package. I think that recent concessions by the Sandinistas have been little more than thinly veiled public relations ploys timed to coincide with congressional action on aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

The often repeated statement that no Marxist government has ever voluntarily relinquished power is dismissed by many as harsh rhetoric, yet no one can challenge its veracity. The Sandinistas' promise to allow opposition political activity rang hollow last week in Managua when Sandinista gangs harassed an opposition party meeting and roughed up po-

litral opponents. Several protesters were also arrested at a demonstration.

Others have been victims of this tactic over the last three decades. Solidarity members in Warsaw, Soviet Jews in Moscow and Lenin-grad and Hungarian students in the streets of Budapest are but a few of the unfortunate groups which have tried to exercise political power in a totalitarian state. My concept of democracy simply does not include officially sponsored intimidation and violence directed at political opponents.

Another well-known tactic the Sandinistas have adopted from their mentors is the gift of human beings. Yes; they have released political prisoners, but the number released is only 10 percent of the total held. Nearly every member of this body has accosted the Soviets, the South Africans, Vietnam, and others for imprisonment of political opponents. Like the others, Nicaragua offers us a token of sincerity, but with 9,000 people still in jail, an opposition figure would need a great deal of courage and fortitude to speak out against the government.

We will spend over \$290 billion this year for national defense, which is primarily defense against Soviet forces. I find it inconceivable that we would simply permit the Soviets to repeat their success in Cuba. While I do not see the Sandinistas as an immediate military threat to the United States they are certainly capable of destabilizing areas south of our border where significant American interests are present. Those interests include the Panama Canal, Mexican oil reserves, and other resources vital to our national economy and the economies of every other nation in the region.

The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviets provided \$1.81 billion in military aid to the Sandinistas since 1980, with \$600 million of that total sent in 1986. Economic aid over the last 8 years has been estimated to be approximately \$1.83 billion. Nicaragua has standing armed forces numbering approximately 140,000 with support from an estimated 3,000 Cuban and 200 Soviet advisers. Smaller contingents from Eastern European nations, Libya, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization also are present.

Soviet deliveries of weapons to the Sandinistas include the following: 12 HIND helicopter gunships, 35 troop transport helicopters, 110 medium weight T-55 tanks, 30 light amphibious PT tanks, and 200 other armored vehicles. They also have a large stock of SA-14 missiles, which are the most modern surface-to-air weapons in the Soviet arsenal. To paraphrase President Reagan, I doubt that the Politburo anguished over sending these lethal supplies.

The Contras are the only internal force in Nicaragua capable of responding to future violations of the Arias plan. No one on either side of the aisle wants continued violence and bloodshed in Central America, and everyone seems to agree that we have geopolitical concerns in the region. If the peace process moves forward, as I hope it does, I am willing to support substantial economic assistance and a new trade relationship with Nicaragua. Without the resistance forces, we have no assurance whatsoever that we can reach that point. To renege on our support for the Con-

tras at this time would have serious ramifications for the struggle toward democracy in Nicaragua and throughout the world.

Mrs. COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, on Tuesday, January 26, the Reagan administration placed its latest bid to scuttle the Central American peace process. By requesting over \$36 million in aid for the Nicaraguan Contras, President Reagan once again demonstrated his unwillingness to allow the Central American nations to determine their own destinies.

On the surface, the interests of the signatories to the Central American peace treaty would seem to be diametrically opposed. Nicaragua is a Marxist state where civil liberties are at best tenuous, and has the largest land army in the region. Costa Rica, on the other hand, maintains a small police force and a longstanding policy of neutrality, while El Salvador and Honduras are American allies, the former in the midst of a civil war against the left-leaning FMLN and the latter the primary base of operations for American forces and the Nicaraguan Contras. Barring outside interference, how can a peace plan succeed among such diverse interests?

Throughout recent history Central America has been dependent on outside forces for the determination of its own destiny. During the 17th and 18th centuries, the Central American republics depended on Spain for material support and, more recently, the United States has dominated the region. It is not surprising that the Central American leaders have decided to work for peace and determine their own destinies.

The Reagan administration opposes these efforts on the premise that the Arias plan does not do enough to ensure peace. The true source of contention, however, lies not in the perceived effectiveness of the plan. Rather, self-proclaimed and deliberate efforts by White House officials to slow the peace process at the recent Central American summit stems from the realization that an independent Central America would translate into failure for the administration's hegemonic policy.

Mr. Chairman, it is time for the Reagan administration to understand that if dependency translates into war, then we must foster peace. We must always realize, as it says in the Charter of the Organization of American States, that our ultimate goal must be "to provide for the betterment of all, in independence, in equality and under law," the final objective being peace throughout the Americas. Only then can democracy and prosperity be finally achieved.

I urge my colleagues to oppose the administration's request, and to oppose any other proposals for aid for the Nicaraguan insurgency.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. The people of the United States are opposed to Contra aid because they don't want to see our country as the world's policeman. The American people know there is no threat to the United States from Central America. They know that the Mig's and missiles the President talked about last night just aren't there. Our Nation deals with Communist superpowers daily on a global scale. We sell grain to the Soviet Communists and weapons to the Chi-

nese Communists. Yet the Reagan administration remains scared of a Marxist minipower in Central America. By financing more violence, we ignore the poverty, disease, and illness that are the basis of the conflict in Nicaragua. What we need is a policy that uses our technology, our capital, and most importantly, our compassion, to fight the illness and destitution that are the real enemies of democracy in the developing world.

Oscar Arias, after accepting the Nobel Peace Prize, said "the Contras are not the solution, they are the problem." I urge my colleagues to support the Arias plan, not the Abrams plan. Vote "no" on Contra aid.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, our administration's policy of support for the Contras in Nicaragua has brought the international stature of the United States to an embarrassingly low level.

In 1962, our Government voted in favor of U.N. Resolution 1815, which stated that all nations have "the duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

This resolution was amended in 1970 by a declaration concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states. It was supported by our Government, and stated that:

Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another state.

Mr. Chairman, the Reagan administration has clearly violated these principles of international law through its assistance to the Contras. Our commitment to international peace and security has been ridiculed by the actions of administration officials. These officials have violated our laws, and have shamed our Government in the eyes of the international community.

In order to renew the commitment of our country to the principles of international law, I urge my colleagues to join me in opposition to any further assistance to the Contras. We must demonstrate our country's leadership as a defender of the international principles which we have helped to develop. A "no" vote today will show that our Government can stand behind its words not only domestically, but internationally.

Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. Chairman, I want to express my strong support for approval of the President's request for aid to the Nicaraguan resistance. This aid is the only real tool available to ensure the Sandinista government fully complies with the Central American peace agreement. United States support for regional negotiations backed by military pressure by the resistance has won concessions from the Sandinistas. This policy is working and should continue until true democracy is established in Nicaragua.

No Marxist-Leninist dictatorship has ever voluntarily shared power or created a true democracy. The Soviet Union has only begun to consider withdrawal from Afghanistan because of the increasing strength of the Afghan resistance. Communist governments only respond to diplomacy when that diplomacy is backed by military strength.

Mr. Chairman, war is a terrible and tragic event. No American willingly supports war as a solution to any international problem. Yet, if we do not support the Nicaraguans willing to fight and die to save the original ideals of their 1979 revolution, war will eventually spread to all of Central America. The Sandinistas will be free to support Communist guerrillas anywhere in the region, and if this occurs, our own young people may soon be forced to fight to defend American freedom and security.

The desire for peace and the willingness to negotiate are noble and vital principles, but alone they have not and can not bring peace to Central America. Military pressure on the Sandinistas is essential. The carrot-and-stick approach is working. However, the carrot of the Central American peace plan will be ignored by the Sandinistas if the stick of the Nicaraguan resistance is removed. I urge approval of this resolution.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, the Reagan administration is floating trial balloons on how to keep the Nicaraguan Contras alive after funding is cut off by the Congress. In recent news reports, Secretary of State Shultz has not ruled out seeking funding from third country sources.

We must put a stop to these efforts immediately. The will of the Congress should not be thwarted with these backdoor efforts by an administration who apparently will stop at nothing to see its policy implemented in Central America. The Congress has said enough, the people say enough, yet the administration seems willing to turn to questionable methods of keeping a lost cause moving.

I am prepared to introduce legislation which would deny most-favored-nation trade status to countries which provide any kind of assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras. Assistance is defined simply as any kind of help. The help could be money or goods. The assistance can be lethal or nonlethal. The Congress just will not tolerate the continuing circumvention of its clearly stated goals of no war in Nicaragua.

This administration has demonstrated the need for the Congress to take this type of action. They have gone to third parties before when Congress cut off aid. They have been willing to circumvent the law and have lied about it.

It is no good if the Congress cuts off aid to the Contras only to find the war continuing. This legislation is being proposed to make sure that if the Congress says no to war in Nicaragua, that is what happens. Let's give the peace process a chance.

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, I rise again today to urge support for the aid package before the House. The President's request grants the Sandinistas further opportunity to make constructive change in the period before March 31, and such reform would deflect additional aid for the Contras. The Sandinistas are granted still another opportunity to comply with the promises made when they signed the Esquipulas II peace accords. Civilian opposition and the military and political successes of the armed resistance—the freedom fighters—have expanded and have brought effective pressure on the Communists. For this reason, the Sandinistas have realized they must come to the peace table.

Mr. Chairman, I again encourage my colleagues to read this morning's Washington Post editorial urging Members to approve the aid package noting that—

The record of the last 6 months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, unless the Contras are supported, we have no other viable alternative as an effective pressure on the Sandinista regime.

Many of those opposing this military aid, which will be placed in escrow until March 31, seem to lack the confidence that the Sandinistas will comply with a cease-fire. Today's vote comes 6 months after the Guatemala meeting of the Central American countries—after two extensions on the date for implementation. Why should we trust the words of the Sandinistas now?

The promises made to the OAS in 1979 have so often and repeatedly been violated that we would sound like broken records if we focus on that. Nonetheless, let's look at the more recent promises made at the Guatemala meeting in August 1987. We have received fresh, first-hand intelligence information from recent Nicaraguan defector, Maj. Roger Miranda, regarding the real intentions of the Sandinistas.

As Major Miranda stated in a meeting with House Members, "At the same time as they were talking about peace under the Esquipulas II agreement, in Nicaragua training of Salvadoran guerrillas, training of Guatemalan guerrillas went on." As early as 1980, the Sandinistas had created an agency simply called the Bureau, which coordinates logistics for the various guerrilla movements in Central America. Major Miranda confirmed that as late as October 1987 when he defected, the guerrilla groups, with headquarters in Managua, were still being granted facilities and military training by the Sandinistas.

In addition, Major Miranda has confirmed and provided critical data to substantiate our fear that the Sandinistas have every intention of establishing a strong, pro-Soviet military presence in Central America. As Miranda verified:

The worst part is that in the second week of October [1987] the Sandinista Directorate approved a plan which had been drawn up in September [that was after the signing of the Peace Accords] with the Soviets and Cubans in Managua regarding the development of the Sandinista army over the next 8 years.

The Sandinistas have planned near exponential military buildups in Nicaragua including a 600,000 man fighting force bristling with Soviet armaments. Even at this time, the Sandinista military, at 75,000 strong, is the largest armed force in Central America.

What are Mr. Ortega's motives in his most recent promises? Mr. Ortega opened the January 15-17 regional peace plan review meeting with the five Central American Presidents with a request for an additional extension on the deadline for compliance. When his request was denied by the four democratic leaders, and the peace plan seemed doomed, Mr. Ortega announced his own "concessions."

The most current Sandinista promises include an end to the 6 year state of emergency, direct talks with the armed resistance, and amnesty for more political prisoners.

We mustn't overlook the process which was set in motion on August 7, 1987—almost 6 months ago to the day. The date set for implementation of the tenets of the accords was November 7—90 days after the signing. In September, 16 non-Nicaraguan prisoners were pardoned; 985 political prisoners—out of the 8,000 to 10,000 estimated by the independent Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights—were finally released on November 22. Among the mid-January list of concessions made by Mr. Ortega, his new promise for amnesty is conditional to a cease-fire, or should the United States or any non-Central American country accept the prisoners. Any conditions placed on the general amnesty is in contradiction to the peace accords.

Not until the Sandinista regime was backed up against a wall did Mr. Ortega agree to meet with the Contras in "limited" direct talks—the meeting has been set for next week. When the Sandinistas agreed to President Arias' suggestion that Cardinal Obando y Bravo—a very respectable religious leader gentleman whom I have had the honor to meet—be appointed as mediator in the negotiations, a glimmer of hope for a cease-fire was set aflame. Repeatedly the Sandinistas refused direct talks with the resistance, and insisted that the Contras lay down their arms prior to any talks.

The concessions ignore several tenets of the peace accords and are not enough to ensure the Sandinista commitment to genuine change—the steps toward democratization must be "irreversible steps." Although the peace accords committed the Central American countries to "an authentic democratic process . . . pluralistic and participatory," only 1 week after the signing, the peaceful demonstrations of the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator and the January 22 movement of Mothers of Political Prisoners were abruptly put down. The state security used electric cattle prods, sticks, and dogs to disperse the crowds and a number of individuals were arrested, including two well-known opposition leaders. Again, as recently as January 22 of this year, the offices of the internal opposition coalition, the Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator, and a peaceful demonstration of the January 22 Mothers of Political Prisoners Movement were attacked by Sandinista mobs and yet the police did not attempt to halt the attacks. At this time the state of emergency has been lifted but arrests and attacks of opposition leaders and groups have continued.

The Sandinistas have permitted one opposition newspaper, the La Prensa, to be published and one radio station, Radio Catolica, to be broadcast. This is a step in the right direction. And yet, all newspapers should be permitted to operate freely. Radio Catolica was initially prohibited from broadcasting news, and in fact, about 20 radio stations have still not been granted permission to broadcast news. As Interior Minister Tomas Borge directed the news directors, "every news medium [must] respect the desire of the revolution." In other

words, the Sandinista's activities must not be criticized.

The National Reconciliation Committee which was called for in the peace accords has been ineffective. While the committee was designed to "verify the fulfillment of the commitments undertaken by the Central American governments," and to "initiate dialog with all domestic political opposition groups," the Sandinistas have refused to discuss with internal opposition groups lasting constitutional reform and new elections. How should we be expected to believe that true democratization—with free and open elections—will be granted when Mr. Ortega makes statements such as, if the "Sandinista Front lost an election, the Sandinista Front would hand over government, not power."

Mr. Chairman, the aid to the Contras must be supported. If we fail to approve this aid based on Ortega's most recent promises and concessions, we fail to provide a safety net for ourselves, and more importantly for those forces truly committed to democracy. Let's give Mr. Ortega one more chance—until March 31—to comply, but let's have this mechanism in place should the Sandinistas fail to live up to their word. I urge my colleagues to support this aid for the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

Mr. DIXON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the President's Contra aid package and urge my colleagues to vote against House Joint Resolution 444. Again, we are faced with a difficult choice—a choice between support for the five Central American leaders in their quest for peace and democracy in the region or support for the Contras who are determined to bring down the Nicaraguan Government. There should be no mistake—any additional assistance, whether military or under the guise of "humanitarian," is not only in direct violation of the Arias peace agreement endorsed by the five Central American leaders, but risks placing our country in the center of an undeclared war in Nicaragua.

The administration says aid to the Contras is our only insurance policy for peace, and that it is only because of pressure by the Contras that the Sandinista government has made modest changes toward democracy. Can more Contra aid insure greater democracy?

I have examined the administration's Contra aid package, and cannot agree with those who are calling it an insurance policy for peace. Of the \$36.2 million, \$32 million will be used for humanitarian assistance, which would include the purchase of helicopters, logistical equipment, and spare parts; another \$20 million would be available to replace leased aircraft; and the remaining \$3.6 million for military equipment would be placed in an escrow account until the President determines a cease-fire is not likely. Are these the tools of peace? Should our country triple our aid to the Contras at a time when diplomacy is working? Should United States taxpayers' dollars be used to buy guns and bullets for the Contras and, at the same time, put at-risk the gains made inside Nicaragua over the last 6 months?

While the response of the Sandinista regime has certainly fallen short of the goals set by the peace agreement signed in August, we have seen more positive changes. The

Sandinistas have lifted the nationwide state of emergency, granted amnesty to political prisoners, agreed to hold municipal and local elections, allowed the opening of opposition radio stations, newspapers, and magazines, and more importantly, entered into a new round of direct talks with the Contra leaders.

While sharing the administration's concern for lasting peace and democracy in Nicaragua, I disagree with the steps the President has chosen to achieve that goal. We now have a chance to cast our vote in support of lasting peace and regional stability. It is the Arias process that has brought Nicaragua closer to democracy and allowed the first steps toward reconciliation in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Should our country that was founded on the principles of freedom and democracy, strike the final blow to peace in the region by further aiding the Contras? I urge my colleagues to just say no by voting against House Joint Resolution 444 and supporting the promise of peace.

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the administration's request for further aid for the Contras.

There has been a lot of discussion about the particulars of this aid request, but that seems to me beside the point. We had no business funding the Contras in the first place, and we should not believe any claims this administration makes about its lofty motives in the region. Instead, we should demonstrate a real commitment to achieving peace in the region by respecting the agreement negotiated by those parties most affected—the Central American Presidents themselves.

From the beginning, there was ample evidence that the bulk of the Contra forces were former supporters of repressive dictator Anastasio Somoza, and that they enjoyed little popular support within Nicaragua. When concerns were expressed about the wisdom of funding these renegades, we were assured that there was no intent to destabilize or overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, only to stop the Sandinistas from providing weapons to guerrilla groups in El Salvador. In reality, weapons interdiction proved to be very low on the agenda. When Congress discovered the kinds of activities for which it was providing funds—the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the publication of CIA assassination manuals, for instance—and passed the Boland amendment, other ways were found to fund the war.

Now I am receiving some very pious communications from the executive branch, trying to convince me that its main interest is in ensuring self-determination for the people of Nicaragua. This is even less believable than the weapons-interdiction claims. We have never stopped meddling in the internal affairs of Central American nations, particularly Nicaragua. Self-determination to some officials is only valid if the final result is in an image consistent with their philosophies and prejudices.

What more proof is needed than the actions of the administration with regard to a Central American peace plan? From the beginning, it has tried to belittle the peace process, and when that was unsuccessful, to derail it. There are claims that Ortega cannot be trusted. Where was the suspicion, the righteous indignation, when millions of dollars in Contra aid could not be accounted for, or when officials

lied about their activities in Central America, or when funds were diverted to secret bank accounts? Sandinista suppression of liberties is highlighted, and a parade of "victims" of the Nicaraguan Government is brought forth, but evidence of gross human rights abuses by the Contras is played down, and the death of Americans at rebel hands is ignored. Nicaragua is portrayed as a deadly threat to American security and regional stability, while its small size, its extreme poverty, its preoccupation with internal problems, and its paranoia about the possibility of invasion by American forces are all ignored. The administration claims to be promoting true democracy in Nicaragua. Why is it not promoting democracy so enthusiastically in other nations in the region?

The administration's stated goals regarding Nicaragua are not so different from my own. I do want self-determination for the Nicaraguan people. I do not want Soviet bases in Nicaragua. I do not want any country in the region to promote instability within its neighbors' borders. However, it is abundantly clear that we have not been acting in a way to achieve these goals. U.S. security interests can be protected without sponsoring the overthrow of a legitimate government. Soviet bases can be kept out of Nicaragua through negotiation, rather than military campaigns which only serve to more closely ally the Sandinistas with the U.S.S.R. As to the first goal, I have seen no evidence that self-determination for Nicaragua is anywhere on our agenda.

Instead of relying exclusively on the use of threat of military force, we should be doing everything we can to ensure success of the Arias peace agreement, and to address the conditions of poverty and injustice that cause Central America to be plagued with instability and revolution. In that way, the United States could play a tremendous role in bringing about vital reforms, true democracy, and lasting peace to the region. I urge my colleagues to vote against further funding for the Contras, and I urge careful monitoring to ensure that such aid is, in fact, terminated.

Mr. BOSCO. Mr. Chairman, today marks the first opportunity that Congress has had since June 1986 to vote on the singular issue of continued American assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, and I encourage my colleagues to join me in opposing House Joint Resolution 444, President Reagan's request for \$36.2 million in Contra aid.

Every Contra aid vote we have had in the past year-and-a-half has been camouflaged either by multibillion-dollar appropriations measures or by procedural gimmickry. Cloaking these votes on Contra aid with parliamentary ambiguity may have been politically expedient for some, but it unfortunately did great harm to the constituency which looks most urgently to us today. I am not referring to the Reagan administration, but to the millions of Central Americans for whom the Arias peace plan represents a last, desperate hope.

Mr. Chairman, the quest for peace, human rights, and democracy in Central America poses many dilemmas for American diplomacy. Yet our debate today boils down to this central issue—should the guerrilla army known as the Contras continue to be the main

instrument of American policy in Central America? Can we in Congress continue to fund a Contra army which is so unpopular that Americans oppose it by a 58- to 30-percent margin? Can this Nation's diplomacy really do no better than this?

Since the early years of this decade the Reagan administration has delivered \$276.9 million in aid to the Contras. As America learned last summer, about \$40 million of this total was collected by zealots in the National Security Council through solicitations to American citizens and third countries, and through a diversion of funds from arms sales to the Aya-tollah. Also during this period the Contra war claimed the lives of over 40,000 Nicaraguans, out of a total population of 3 million. A comparable loss in the United States would amount to 3.2 million deaths.

Yet after 7 years of the bloody Contra war, the administration explains that additional Contra aid is needed to insure the "success" of its Central American policies. Reagan administration officials have revised their ultimate goals in Central America almost monthly over these past 7 years, and now they assure us that their aim is not the overthrow of the Sandinista government but rather to insure Sandinista compliance with the Arias peace plan.

Mr. Chairman, I could not disagree more strongly with the administration's characterization of its Central American policy goals and of the ramifications of our vote today. If we reject the President's request, and if the Contra war subsequently comes to an end, we will have provided the final, sad proof that our Government has spent 7 years pursuing a fatally flawed policy in the region. After 7 years of attempting to overthrow the Sandinistas through support for the Contra guerrillas, the Sandinista government will remain. Mr. Chairman, this is not a referendum on an American foreign policy success, as the administration would have it. It is a referendum on one of the most foolish foreign policy ventures in our history.

The Reagan administration has requested a package of \$36.2 million in direct aid to the Contras and almost \$25 million in additional indirect aid and insurance, all of which will be coordinated by the CIA. One of the sweeteners offered is the guarantee that \$32 million will go toward humanitarian assistance, a canard with which we in Congress are all-too-familiar. Humanitarian aid includes trucks, the leasing of helicopters, the transportation of troops and supplies, and various logistical assistance to the forces in the field.

Under the administration's proposal, \$3.2 million in lethal assistance will be placed temporarily in a so-called escrow account, to be released only after a Presidential certification that the Sandinistas have been responsible for the failure of a cease-fire. The administration argues that this escrow account gives the Sandinistas an incentive to comply with the terms of the Arias peace plan. In fact, such an arrangement will only compel the Sandinistas to acquire additional military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union, and it will encourage the Contras themselves to contribute to the breaking of the cease-fire. What the administration has actually created is a built-in

incentive for Contra noncompliance with the Arias peace plan.

Still, Mr. Chairman, I confess that I find this escrow account concept intriguing—perhaps the United States could demonstrate its bona fide commitment to the Arias peace process by placing the administration's rhetoric of "Communist expansionism in Latin America," the CIA's network of contacts with the Contras, and Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams' entire "diplomatic" operation at Foggy Bottom into an escrow account. After all, these efforts to inflame the situation in Central America have delayed the peace process as much as our financial contributions.

President Reagan's Contra aid policy has ravaged Central America for too long. The countries of that region have agreed amongst themselves to a plan whereby each respects the others' borders and each takes distinct and verifiable steps toward peace. While no one can foretell whether this bold initiative will be successful, we can predict with certainty that further incentives toward bloodshed provided by the United States through Contra aid will only prolong human suffering and result in failure. If the countries most affected by this war have the courage to end it, we would be arrogant, contemptuous, and morally wrong to stand in their way.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Chairman, our policy in Central America must oppose the export of Marxist revolution and oppose any more delays in progress for democracy. We must protect the United States' national security interests in Central America and do what we can to bring peace and freedom to the beleaguered people of Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.

Since the signing of the Arias peace plan last August 7, we have seen significant progress toward the achievement of these goals. During these 6 months, the Nicaraguan and other governments in the region have implemented major reforms. In Nicaragua, the focus of today's debate, we have seen the reopening of the antigovernment *La Prensa* newspaper and the creation of a forum for national reconciliation, headed by a key Sandinista opponent, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo. During this time, Nicaragua's Government has also released a thousand political prisoners, lifted the state of emergency, and initiated direct cease-fire negotiations. The progress during this 6 months is in sharp contrast with the previous 6 years of Contra war, during which time Sandinista rule grew ever more restrictive.

As part of the peace process, the five Central American Presidents agreed to work for an end to outside aid to rebel groups. This means an end to Communist aid to the Salvadoran rebels and an end to United States aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. The five Presidents reiterated their opposition to such aid in a joint communique issued at the end of their meetings in mid-January. The same sentiment was echoed at that time by the International Verification Commission, composed of the Secretaries General of the U.N. and the Organization of American States, the foreign ministers of the five Central American nations, and the foreign ministers of eight Latin American nations. The Commission, set up to evaluate

compliance with the peace plan, declared that an end to U.S. Contra aid was "an indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts."

Despite the progress in Nicaragua, despite the Central American Presidents' communique, despite the Verification Commission declaration, we have before us a bill that represents not just a continuation, but, in fact, an increase in Contra aid.

The package includes \$36.25 million in direct aid to the Contras plus an additional \$23.5 million in indirect financing, including insurance to reduce the cost of leasing aircraft, and loans of air defense equipment. This aid is intended to fund the Contras for 4 months. Using only the direct aid total—the lowest estimates—the package is worth roughly \$9 million a month or \$300,000 a day—about three times the current rate of Contra aid under the continuing resolution.

Not only the amount but also the nature of this aid package represents an escalation in the Contra war, an escalation in the face of progress toward peace. The continuing resolution provided funding for humanitarian aid to the Contras. The direct aid in the package before us today includes \$3.6 million in lethal aid—guns, missiles, and ammunition, to be placed in escrow—and some \$32.6 million in so-called nonlethal aid. This so-called nonlethal aid is mostly money to press the war effort, including funds for jeeps, trucks, and troop transports. Only \$7.2 million of the package before us today is for true humanitarian aid such as food, clothing, medicine, and shelter.

The question before us tonight is how to respond to the progress toward peace and freedom, brought about by the Arias plan, that we have seen so far. Do we ignore the progress, do we ignore the five president's communique, do we ignore the International Verification Commission, and vote for this package which represents not just a continuation but in fact an increase in Contra aid? Or do we give peace a chance?

Mr. STANGELAND. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the Congress is deeply divided on the issue of further assistance to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance, known as the Contras. But, while many of my colleagues find the President's policy to bring peace and freedom to Nicaragua controversial, my support of the freedom fighters has never wavered.

During this debate one point must be remembered: That the vast majority of the American people do not believe a Communist country on the mainland of America is in the best interests of the United States, especially if that country's government is aligned with the Soviet Union and Cuba, and is intent on "sharing" its revolution with their neighbors.

So, before we cast our votes on the President's \$36 million aid request, I ask that you listen to some revealing statements. Now, these are not statements from President Reagan, the Contras, Sandinista defector Major Roger Miranda, or even ARLAN STANGELAND. No, these are statements from the Sandinistas themselves.

You cannot be a true revolutionary in Latin America without being Marxist-Lenin-

ist. (Thomas Borge, Sandinista Minister of Interior, Newsweek, December 1984.)

This Revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist * * *. (Thomas Borge, Playboy, June 1984.)

Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution, the instrument of analysis of our vanguard to understand the historical process and to create the revolution; * * * Marxism-Leninism and Sandinismo are indissolubly united and because of that our moral strength is Sandinismo and our doctrine is that of Marxism-Leninism. (Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Minister of Defense and brother of Commandante Daniel Ortega, August 1981.)

Sandinismo embodies the Marxism of Lenin, Fidel [Castro], el Che [Che Guevara], Ho Chi Minh * * *. (Carlos Fonseca, founder of the Sandinistas.)

The principles of Marxism-Leninism, wisely applied to the reality of our society, guided the revolutionary actions of the Sandinistas over the dictatorship * * *. (Hugo Torres, Sandinista Popular Army, April 1982.)

In order to be authentically Christian, one must become a Marxist. (Ernesto Cardenal, Sandinista Minister of Culture, also a Priest until defrocked by the Vatican in 1984 for refusing to obey Roman Catholic canon law.)

You boys have to understand that God does not exist, that Jesus Christ does not exist either, that God is the revolution, and Jesus Christ are you, are all the Sandinistas * * *. (Part of a Christmas Mass to Sandinista troops by Ernesto Cardenal, December 1978.)

Our relations with Cuba are friendly, fraternal, and respectful. They are relations that are unalterable and non-negotiable. They are relations sealed with the blood of Cuban internationalists who have fallen on Nicaraguan soil * * *. (Speech by President Daniel Ortega to the Third Cuban Communist Party Congress, Havana, February 1986.)

In the hypothetical case that the Sandinista National Liberation Front [FSLN] lost an election, the FSLN would hand over government, not power. (Daniel Ortega, the New York Times, December 13, 1987.)

The reason for outlining these statements is to show that the Sandinistas are firmly committed to communism. No Communist government in the history of the world has ever agreed to convert to a democratic form of government, yet that is what the Sandinistas are asking us to believe they will do now.

We should be extremely skeptical of the Sandinistas' intentions in order to protect our own national security interests, to help keep other Central American governments from being subverted by communism, and to help the people of Nicaragua who do not want to live under a Communist regime.

If the Contras are defunded and killed-off, the United States and her allies will depend upon Soviet, Cuban, and Nicaraguan goodwill. Our insurance and deterrence of further Communist expansion will no longer be the Nicaraguan resistance, but the military of the United States of America. I do not think this is wise, especially when Nicaraguans are now willing to fight their own battles.

Can the Sandinista Communists be trusted to democratize Nicaragua? Perhaps another question should be asked instead. Why did they not democratize Nicaragua when they

came to power 9 years ago when President Carter delivered economic aid to what was then billed as a free and democratic movement? The reason is that the Sandinistas deceived the world about their intentions then, and they are deceiving the world now by playing games with the Central America peace process in order to get Congress to kill aid to the freedom fighters.

Let us not play any more games with the Communists. If we want a Nicaraguan Government that offers freedom and democracy, we must pass aid to the resistance.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, the debate today is not about whether we want to fight communism. We all want to do that, and I have voted to do that many, many times. The debate today is about the most effective way to fight communism. I believe that there is a better, more effective way to fight communism than the President's latest plan.

First, it is important to look at exactly what is in the President's plan. It has changed tremendously since the first press accounts of it were written, and it has even changed in the last few hours. The nature of the plan is particularly important since, following the President's wishes, he did not want to allow Congress the chance to amend or modify his plan. He wanted a simple, yes or no, up or down, vote on the measure, and Congress agreed. The President surely knew that he was taking a very risky position when he requested this because he could win everything, or lose everything.

This is not to say that this will be the last vote on the issue. Far from it. I have already voted on Contra aid over 16 times in my 6 years in Congress. We will have another vote on it before the end of this month, and probably two or three more before the end of the Reagan administration.

When the President's plan was rumored to be a \$270 million appropriation covering a period of 18 months, it looked as if the vote was going to be one of the most important foreign policy votes of the decade. Its importance diminished, however, when the President scaled back his package to \$36 million over a period of only 4 months. It is still a key vote, but it does not set Government policy toward Central America through the end of the President's term. In fact, we'll vote again in February, June, and probably September.

It is also important to realize that nothing in the President's proposal affects the amount of aid to be delivered this month. That means that the next congressional vote on the subject will be in time to continue the aid in an uninterrupted fashion.

Looking at the President's specific package, it would almost triple the amount of aid that the Contras have been receiving every month. The past level has been between \$3 and \$4 million every month. The new level would be between \$10 and \$12 million. There is a significant dispute as to how much of this aid would be lethal, nonlethal, or strictly humanitarian but there is little doubt that a tripling of funding per month would be seen on the ground in Nicaragua as a significant escalation of the war.

I have appreciated the advice of my constituents in making up my mind about the President's package. I have met with the

American Legion—I was the only Tennessee Congressman to attend their briefing—as well as with church groups. I raised the issue in 14 recent meetings in 14 different counties. I have communicated with constituents by phone, as well as in writing. This has not been an easy decision, but I have appreciated their guidance. I wish that they had been privy to the President's most recent versions of his proposal, because I would like to have had their specific thoughts on it. I have carefully listened to the President as well, and I thought it was a terrible decision on the part of the television networks not to carry his latest speech to the Nation on the subject.

My conclusion, after all this careful thought and consultation, is that the President's package is not the most effective way to counter the Sandinista threat in Central America. The events of recent months in the region—the President Reagan/Speaker Wright peace plan, the Arias plan, the signing of a peace agreement, the pressure of the four democratic Central American Presidents against Daniel Ortega, the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Arias—the most forceful, and prodemocratic regional leader—and the making of significant Sandinista concessions—have altered the political landscape in the region. Now, for the first time, the Sandinistas have lifted the state of emergency, they are negotiating a ceasefire face-to-face with the Contras, and they promised an extensive amnesty. President Reagan should take pride in the fact that his bipartisan peace plan started this process.

Of course, I still don't trust Ortega any farther than I can throw him. We will need to watch him like a hawk to make sure that he keeps his promises. We will need to verify everything that he does, and to count his mistakes as well as his successes. He has already made some mistakes. We also need to preserve all of our options, the Contras included, in case that Ortega changes his mind or fails to live up to his promises.

I have supported humanitarian aid for the Contras in the past. I support it now. The House leadership has promised a vote on aid to the Contras by the end of this month that would keep them intact as a military force. We need to preserve this policy option.

But the President's plan limits our policy options. It risks escalating the war, in violation of the peace agreement that has been signed by the Central American nations. It would probably, in my view, ruin any future hope that a peaceful solution to the conflict could be found. While there is a real chance for a peaceful solution, I feel that most Americans want to know that all peaceful means have been exhausted before major military force is used.

Another consideration that is easy to overlook is that Ortega would love to use increased Contra aid as an excuse to stop keeping his promises, and to reimpose the state of emergency in Nicaragua. Why give Ortega this out? Right now the eyes of the world are on whether he keeps his promises. Why allow him to blame us for escalating what he alleges is an invasion into his country? For the first time in years, world attention is focused not on the abuses of the Contras,

but on the abuses of the Sandinistas, and their promises to reform.

The peace talks are doing a better job right now of unmasking the Sandinistas for what they are than anything we have done in the last several years. If he keeps all of his promises, fine. If he does not, then world opinion will be on our side for the first time, and we will still have all of our military options. In the meantime, we should enjoy watching Daniel Ortega squirm.

To sum up, I do not feel that the President's plan is the best way to battle communism in the region because, first, there is a chance for a peaceful solution, and second, whether the peace talks are successful or not, they are currently winning us more allies in our fight. In a sense, we are giving Ortega a little rope, and for that it is easy to criticize us. But he may hang himself with that rope if he fails to keep his commitments.

While we wait for the outcome of the talks, it is important to keep the Contras intact as a fighting force in case we need them. The vote at the end of February should do that. The result of such a policy is not to reduce any of our options, but to increase them, by using the peace talks to our advantage. I feel that this is the best way to oppose the Communist threat in Central America.

Mr. MOLLOHAN. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote for the President's requested aid package for the Contras.

My vote for aid today can be understood only in its proper context. This debate, unfortunately, has not reflected that context. We have reduced a tremendously complex topic—United States policy toward Nicaragua—to a false simplicity. With my vote this evening, I will be labeled "pro-Contra." My colleagues who vote against the President's package will be labeled "anti-Contra." Under the terms of this debate—across the country and in this Chamber today—those are the only options available to us. We are one or the other; we are up or down; we are yes or no; we are pro-Contra or pro-Arias peace plan. Both sides of the debate have cooperated to establish this false dichotomy, with even President Reagan last night describing today's vote as an "up-or-down" one.

Yet all of us know, or should know at any rate, that those terms are not real. This vote isn't a referendum on whether we approve of the Contras, or whether we dislike war, or how strongly we disapprove of communism. This vote answers none of those questions. This vote today is more subtle than that. It is a judgment call. All it says about us is whether we think the specific plan sent to us by the President will advance our respective goals in Nicaragua. Each of us, or course, is free to use this vote to proclaim himself "pro-Contra," but I prefer to avoid using easy labels and will discuss briefly why I think this package today serves our best interests.

Since the fall of Somoza in 1978 and the most immediate repudiation of United States overtures to the Sandinista regime, the United States has had roughly four policy options toward Nicaragua. We could give the Sandinistas very wide latitude, permitting them any domestic and foreign policy activities short of direct military attacks on the United States or our allies. The other extreme would be an un-

compromising effort to topple the Sandinista regime. The third option allows the Sandinistas to retain internal political control but forbids them from engaging in activities that threaten the stability of the Central American democracies. The fourth option allows the Sandinistas to retain immediate control over the government apparatus, but requires them to move down the road to democracy.

I reject the first option as a fairly obvious and substantial threat to the security interests of the United States as well as our moral and ideological interests in furthering the cause of democratic government. While I wouldn't be upset to see the Sandinistas fall, I reject a policy of forcing their departure on practical grounds: I don't think the Sandinistas can be ousted without direct military intervention by the United States, and our interests in Nicaragua are not sufficient to justify direct intervention. The third option is not really an option in the long-term sense. Communist dictatorships are inherently didactic and repressive and a stable peace cannot come to a repressive Nicaragua. That leaves the fourth option, which I endorse: Allowing the Sandinistas to retain immediate control over the government so long as they do not threaten the improving structure of democracy in Central America and continue to take steps toward democracy.

The package sent to us by the President advances this goal. If you do not support that goal, you are free to criticize the package: It is an antagonistic gesture against unlimited Sandinista independence on the one hand, and it is grossly insufficient to pose a serious threat to the very existence of the Sandinistas on the other hand. If, however, you support a containment policy against the Sandinistas, you will have a difficult time explaining a vote against this package.

In considering this vote, I start with two basic premises: First I believe that an unchallenged and unfettered Sandinista regime would disrupt democracies in Central America and generally cause mischief in our hemisphere. Second, and even more obvious, the Contras don't like the Sandinistas and would prefer to expel them. The goal, then, of containing the Sandinistas can be achieved only by carefully negotiating the implicit tension between my two premises: If we give nothing to the Contras they disappear as an effective opposition to the Sandinistas, who, I believe, would immediately lose their sudden interest in democratization and peace talks. If we give too much to the Contras, they, in turn, lose interest in peace talks and decide that perhaps they should go for broke, as it were.

The terms of the aid package maintain that tension. The amount is sufficient to keep the Contras together as an organized opposition, but it is not enough to give them illusions of a purely military victory or to give the Sandinistas immediate fear of a purely military defeat. The placing of the \$3.6 million in lethal aid in an escrow account is a deliberately nonprovocative act. Only with extreme disingenuousness could the Sandinistas cite \$3.6 million in escrowed military aid as a reason to pull out of the peace process.

Mr. Chairman, I am on a short list of representatives labeled "swing votes" on Contra aid. I don't much care for that appellation, but for the reasons I discussed earlier, it's better

than being called pro-Contra or anti-Contra. I am not pro-Contra and I am not anti-Contra: I simply judge each vote on its likely effects in advancing the peace process. By that standard, I must vote *yea* today.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, today we vote on the future of Central America.

The choice has never been clearer.

We can support the Guatemala peace plan, or we can support the Contras.

We can support a policy of peace, or a policy of war.

We can wallow in the failures of the past, or move ahead with hope for the future.

While Congress is looking to the future, the administration is dredging up failures from the past.

ADMINISTRATION DOUBLE-TALK

The administration has not given us much success in Nicaragua. They have given us a lot of double-talk.

The President says that the Contras have a strong support in Nicaragua. And then he says that they will disappear unless they get American money.

The President says that Nicaragua is a totalitarian dungeon, whose people yearn to throw out the Sandinistas. And then he charges that the Sandinistas are going to give guns to 600,000 people. That's a fifth of their population. That's every Nicaraguan male from 18 to 35.

So it's a totalitarian dungeon that is going to arm its inmates.

The Reagan administration says the Sandinistas are Communists. Then they say the Contras are really Sandinistas.

Remember when President Reagan solemnly assured us that the Contras were not aiming to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government—they were really kind of border patrol?

After 6 years of film-flam, Congress is getting a little skeptical.

CONTRA AID REQUEST

The administration is claiming credit for a democratic tide in Latin America. But the Reagan administration is 0 for 2 on democracy in our hemisphere.

Under Elliot Abrams, the Reagan administration has dropped the ball on democracy in Haiti. They dropped the ball on democracy in Panama. And they were in the process of losing the game in Nicaragua, until the peace plan sent them to the sidelines.

And now they're trying to tell us that they are concerned about democracy in Nicaragua, and that's what they want funding for the Contras.

To follow Henry Kissinger's criticism of this policy, where is the policy?

Is this Contra aid request part of an achievable policy, or is the administration simply asking for whatever the traffic will bear?

The lessons of the history of Central America policy are: The administration will ask for whatever it can get, and they will say whatever they have to to get it.

And if we defeat this request, history does not assure us that the Reagan administration is a good loser.

When Congress defeated Contra aid in 1985, the administration declared a national emergency and imposed an embargo on Nicaragua. When Congress defeated Contra aid in

1986, the administration declared a national emergency and sent \$20 million to Honduras, after Elliot Abrams bullied the Honduran Government into requesting it.

The Nicaraguan Government recently lifted its state of emergency. I think President Reagan ought to be big enough to do the same.

CONTRAS

Let's look at the Contras. Their bloodlines are not very good. The Contras were organized in 1981, by agents of the Argentine military dictatorship, from the leftovers of Somoza's National Guard.

The Argentine military and Somoza's National Guard were distinguished for two things: killing civilians and lining their own pockets. The marriage of the two produced the Contras.

The Contras have behaved as guerrillas just like they behaved when they ruled Nicaragua. They are better at killing civilians than at attacking military targets. They are better at lining their pockets than at getting support from the people.

The Contra front leadership has undergone ten major reforms. Arturo Cruz was in. Then he resigned. The front men come and go. But their real boss, the Contra commander in chief, has always been the same man—the old National Guard Colonel, Enrique Bermudez—the old dictator Somoza's right hand man.

The Contras change their name more often than the route sign on a bus. But Somoza's man Bermudez remains in the driver's seat.

Today, the Contras call themselves the Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance. And East Germany calls itself the German Democratic Republic. Neither has democratic credentials.

Last week, Contra aid supporters held a mock hearing. The administration produced Mr. Miranda out of their hat once again, then whisked him away before he could answer any difficult questions. For some reason, they have refused to allow him to talk to any Contra aid opponents. Not until after the vote.

At this mock hearing Alfredo Cesar, one of the supposed civilian leaders of the Contras, was asked if they had control over the military. No, he said, "we do not have 100 percent control. But we hope to strengthen civilian control."

The Contras are not credible. And they are certainly not successful. They have been a disaster for Nicaragua. They have been an embarrassment to the United States.

NONLETHAL AID

The administration argues that this request is mostly nonlethal aid.

If Napoleon were in the Reagan administration, he might say that an army travels on its nonlethal aid.

When you're funding an army in the field, bullets are not the major expense.

The Contras have plenty of ammunition, and plenty of other money to buy bullets with.

What this request says is, you give us the iceberg, and we'll wait 30 days for the tip.

When the effect is to sink the peace process, it doesn't make much difference.

President Reagan last night offered to allow Congress more involvement in lethal aid. What he said was, you give me the money, then try to keep me from spending it.

NICARAGUAN REFORMS

While the Contras have failed, the Esquipulas peace plan is working in Nicaragua.

What has the peace plan achieved?

Lifting of the state of emergency.

An end to the anti-Contra tribunals.

Amnesty for thousands of prisoners.

The lifting of censorship.

Direct talks between Sandinistas and Contras.

Negotiations for a cease-fire.

The Guatemala peace plan has been achieving everything the Contras have failed to accomplish.

But the peace plan has enemies inside Nicaragua as well as outside. Ortega has his own Richard Perles and Jesse Helmses, like hardliner Tomas Borge at the Interior Ministry. Every time Ortega makes a concession for democratic reforms, Borge send out his Interior Ministry bully-boys to arrest some opposition leaders.

If we vote lethal aid to the Contras, it's curtains for the delicate reform process starting in Nicaragua.

WHITE HOUSE AND THE PEACE PROCESS

The White House has been trying to torpedo the peace process since it started. Now they claim that the Contras will support the peace plan. What we have now is a bunch of arsonists posing as architects.

Calling the Contras an insurance policy for peace is like calling gasoline an insurance policy against house fire.

Funding the Contras to support the peace process would be like bringing a six-pack to an alcoholics anonymous meeting.

PEACE PLAN VERSUS CONTRA AID

The Guatemala peace plan has succeeded where the Contras have failed. Everything the Contras were supposed to achieve, they have failed and the peace plan has succeeded.

It's time to move from a policy of failure to a policy of success. It's time to stop bankrolling repression and corruption in the name of anticommunism.

The Guatemala peace accords will be America's future policy for progress in Central America. I wish President Reagan would join us. If not, it's a long ride into the sunset on a broken-down old warhorse.

But we must look forward, even if President Reagan looks backward.

The Contras have failed. The peace plan has succeeded.

The Contras are the past. The peace plan is the future.

As the curtain falls on a failed policy, let's move forward together for peace and reform in our hemisphere. I urge my colleagues to join me in defeating this request and moving ahead on a constructive policy for our Nation. Let's vote against the failures of the past and for hope for the future.

Mr. RAHALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this latest of President Reagan's requests for aid to the Nicaraguan Contras; aid which, no matter how he sugar-coats it, would translate into lethal aid to be used to perpetrate war in Nicaragua. My opposition is based upon a myriad of reasons, but I would like to focus on two points that I feel are of particular importance to our debate today.

Frankly, it seems unbelievable to me that we are even having this debate, in view of the

fact that the Guatemala peace agreement, which most of us have wholeheartedly supported, specifically states that aid to the Contras would be a violation of the accord. How can we expect other countries to honor the terms of this historic agreement when we in fact will not do the same? I can only believe that additional aid to the Contras at this point would severely cripple, if not destroy the peace process and lead to escalation of the war which the Nicaraguan people so desperately want to stop. Aid at this time would give the Sandinistas a perfect excuse to back out of the agreement, and should the peace process fail now, it is hard to imagine that the Sandinistas would agree again to such sweeping reforms.

In regard to this resolution before us, I must question the President's use and understanding of the term nonlethal. He is playing a deadly word game with the Congress and the people of the United States with his latest definitions. The purpose of the majority of the aid in this resolution is in fact a lethal one—it would give the Contras the means with which to continue and even escalate the war. Beyond that however, the President has defined nonlethal aid to be "anything but weapons, weapons systems, and ammunition." Clearly, under these parameters, money could be used for military purposes such as training, and equipment such as trucks and helicopters.

Further, the administration has managed to include in this request an additional \$20 million for replacing up to 10 leased aircraft, and unlimited funds for electronic surveillance equipment and radar, all needed, of course, for the continuation of the war, not to further the peace process. In fact, only a fraction of the President's request would be spent on true nonlethal aid such as food, medicine, shelter, and clothing.

Like many of my colleagues, I have traveled to Central America to get a firsthand view of the region. I came away from Nicaragua with the strong conviction that the Nicaraguan people want a peaceful settlement of the deep conflicts facing them. They are tired of living in fear and poverty, and are filled with grief over the loss of friends and family members, no matter which side of this struggle they have taken. It is far past time to seek a peaceful solution. For our part, it is imperative for the United States to advance the ongoing peace process; we must not hinder it by continuing to funnel funding to the Contras. I urge my colleagues to do their part in the peace process by opposing this aid request.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Chairman, this vote should not come today. Our timing couldn't be worse.

At the very moment when there is progress toward peace in Central America, when diplomacy is working, when the people of the region are demonstrating leadership in resolving the major differences and bloody conflict within the region, we in Congress are at it again.

If there is ever a period for patience in dealing with an issue that has divided and impatient, it is now. The old admonition, "don't just stand there, do something" does not apply.

Here, I feel, is an example of where doing nothing is better than doing something.

Why? Simply put, the Arias peace plan is moving in the right direction.

From the beginning, I have felt that the diplomatic route was the one to follow in our attempt to achieve peace, stability and, most of all, freedom and democracy in Nicaragua and El Salvador. To my way of thinking, the military option should be the last, rather than the first one exercised in pursuit of our objectives. And I have always shared the view that the initiative for a peace plan as well as the leadership for its implementation should come from the nations and people with the most at stake, the Central Americans themselves.

But our policy has taken a different path. Diplomacy was repeatedly shunted aside. Bluntly stated, we have said there's no room for reason, negotiating could not be productive. Instead, we have gone with a policy of persistently trying to forcefully overthrow the Sandinista government in Managua. That's been our game plan, a plan which has not been supported in the region or the world community. We stand alone.

Finally, bold leadership came from Central America in the form of the peace initiative advanced by President Arias of Costa Rica. And finally there were positive developments to report.

The Guatemala accord, signed by the Presidents of Costa Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua was hailed because of the bright prospects it offered.

Is it perfect? By no means. But it is a substantive document, one that gives new direction and one whose provisions should be heeded. Are they? Not completely. There is plenty of room for improvement, but after years of seemingly endless conflict which has cost thousands of lives and hundreds of millions of dollars, there is progress. Not as fast or as much as we would like, but progress.

Should we pull the rug out from under the peace plan progress by refueling the Contra military machine at this critical juncture, almost assuredly guaranteeing more of the same—bloody battles, lives lost, treasury spent, and without positive result? To me the answer is no.

From my vantage point, passage of this measure forces the Sandinista government to do just the opposite of what we want it to do, to walk away from rather than to further embrace the critical provisions of the Arias plan. To expand not contract its war effort.

The need now is to restate our support of the Arias plan. To demonstrate our conviction that diplomacy is preferable to military action in pursuit of worthy objectives in this war-torn region. To make it work. But we have to do more. The imperative now is the fashioning of a truly bipartisan redevelopment plan for Central America so that a fragile peace, once it is attained, is followed by a determined international cooperative effort to help the people help themselves so that life and liberty will not be hanging by a thread, continually threatened from within and challenged from beyond the borders.

Mr. OWENS of New York. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to President Reagan's request for funding to continue his war in Nicaragua.

So long as Members of Congress are able to declare wars but are not required to actually fight them, during debates over war and peace in this Chamber there likely will always be some cloud of unreality hanging in the air, fogging judgments and obscuring from view the true, terrible costs of violent solutions to our problems. During debates over proxy wars like the one today, that cloud of unreality inevitably grows so large and so dense that it becomes all but blinding. In proxy wars, fought by other people and other people's children in far-off places, we can safely cry out for blood, confident that we will neither ever see nor be splashed and stained by it when it is shed. In proxy wars, war is not war but a game to its patrons.

Ronald Reagan's war against the people of Nicaragua is the most unreal of unreal wars. With military commanders plotting strategy while sipping martinis around swimming pools in Miami, with bilious lies like freedom fighter dripping from the lips of administration officials, with gifts of key-shaped cakes and arms sales to "moderate" terrorists in Iran, with Ollie "Bellybutton" North buying Danskin tights with the proceeds, with Elliot Abrams hustling handouts from foreign dictators, Ronald Reagan's Nicaraguan war has been played out like a bad, somewhat stupid comic book adventure.

For the people of Nicaragua, however, the costs of Ronald Reagan's unreal war have been only too real. Over the last 7 years, the lives of 35,000 Nicaraguans have been snuffed out—10 times, proportionately, the losses our own Nation suffered in Vietnam. Unarmed civilians—women, children, even infants—have been maimed, mutilated, and murdered in countless numbers by the bandits we bankroll and embrace in the name of freedom. And after 7 years of bloodshed, 7 years of Contra atrocities each one more barbaric, more unspeakable than the one before, all we have to show for our comic book war is a stack of corpses a mile high.

The Arias peace plan, finally, represents a way out, a way through peace, not war, to reconcile international differences and provide for regional security. In its first 6 months, the Arias plan has already produced greater results than 7 years of Ronald Reagan's murder and mayhem. But still, the President insists, this horrible war must rage on, the killing must persist, the stack of corpses must grow. In the paradoxical thinking typical of unreal wars, Ronald Reagan says war not negotiation continues to be the only path to peace in Central America.

It is a time-honored, but bankrupt argument, a plea that can only be made by those for whom great distance obscures the horrors of war, by those who do not and never will suffer under the sound and fury of mortar fire or fear daily for the lives and safety of their families. It is an argument for men who wage war as a game.

Almost 20 years ago, a wise man, Dr. Martin Luther King, once counseled against following those who would seek peace through war, not only because it is the immoral way, but because it cannot and will not succeed:

The past is prophetic in that it asserts loudly that wars are poor chisels for carving

out peaceful tomorrows. One day we must come to see that peace is not merely a distant goal that we seek, but a means by which we arrive at that goal. We must pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means. How much longer must we play at deadly war games before we heed the plaintive pleas of the unnumbered dead and maimed of past wars?

Pursue peaceful ends through peaceful means in Central America; use this \$36 million to preserve life, not to destroy it. Stop the unreal war; pull the plug on Contra aid now.

Mr. STALLINGS. Mr. Chairman, it is unfortunate that Congress must vote today on Contra aid. It is not the right time. But pursuant to House Joint Resolution 395, the President is granted expedited floor consideration of his latest Contra aid proposal. Consequently, the choice is up-or-down, without amendment, on a package that contains lethal and nonlethal aid and would cost \$36.25 million, at a minimum, and closer to \$60 million if counted properly. Although I would rather delay the vote, a vote for the President's package today would be even worse.

On January 21, 1988, I joined 19 of my colleagues in sending a letter to the President asking him to delay his request on Contra aid. In my view, a vote today on Contra aid is unnecessary, arbitrary, and premature.

On December 21, 1987, Congress passed House Joint Resolution 395, the Continuing Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1988. Included in this omnibus spending bill was an agreement between the administration and Congress on Contra aid. Under the terms of the agreement, the President was required to submit a Contra aid package on January 25-27 and the House would be required to vote on that package today, February 3. That agreement was made exactly 45 days ago.

Since that time, there have been dramatic developments in Nicaragua and Central America:

The Sandinistas have lifted the state of emergency in Nicaragua and thereby disbanded the special military tribunals.

The Sandinistas and the Contras have begun direct peace negotiations.

The Sandinistas have promised to release 3,300 political prisoners.

The Sandinistas have promised the Contras freedom to participate in internal political affairs and offered to create an international commission, that could include representatives of U.S. political parties, to monitor adherence to this promise.

The Sandinistas have lifted restrictions on 13 opposition radio and print news organizations within Nicaragua.

The Sandinistas have written to the President stating that the party would turn over "the reins of government to the opposition if that is what the people wish."

In sum, in the past weeks, the Sandinistas have taken important steps to implement the Arias peace plan, which was signed last August. Believe me, I am not convinced that the Sandinistas will adhere to the promises and concessions they have recently made. They have not changed their stripes. But I am not entirely pessimistic either. And that is the problem. Nobody can possibly know today

whether the Sandinistas are sincere. We need more time before that decision can be made.

It seems utterly foolish for the United States to decide an issue so important to our national security based on a formula agreed to 45 days ago, in a highly uncertain environment, that set an arbitrary date for final resolution. The Arias peace process is still evolving and results are now beginning to show. But it is premature to gauge its ultimate success.

Unfortunately, the vote, by itself and because it will occur, will upset the peace process. Regardless of the outcome, the Sandinistas will receive a signal, and that signal has the potential of upsetting the pressures that have yielded the current, ongoing progress. In short, the vote is unnecessary and based on an arbitrary timetable that ignores the delicate state of affairs. For these reasons, I asked the President to delay the vote.

Obviously, however, the President disagreed and sent up his package on January 27. Since then, I have been working to persuade the House leadership to guarantee a second vote within the month on an humanitarian aid package for the Contras—in contrast to nonlethal aid in the President's request. It appears that the leadership has acquiesced, although the details remain to be worked out. Consequently, the choice before us is the President's proposal and, should it fail, a later vote on humanitarian aid. Given this choice, I intend to vote against the administration package.

The vote today is fraught with risk. The President is gambling that a vote for his package will not destroy the peace process. In contrast, the House leadership is gambling that the Sandinistas will keep their promises and continue the progress toward democracy in Nicaragua despite the cutoff of military aid to the Contras. At this point, I am willing to bet on the latter.

Before explaining why, let me say that the debate here is only about means. Despite the rhetoric, we do not disagree about the goals. Earlier this week, I met with the President and asked him directly whether he seeks to overthrow the Sandinista government. He said that he does not. We agreed that our goal is to bring democracy to Nicaragua so that the people of Nicaragua, in free and fair elections, can decide who should run their government. The debate here, then, is only about the best way to achieve that goal.

The President's proposal runs a great risk of destroying the peace process. In point of fact, it violates a central element of the plan to halt assistance to irregular forces, such as the Contras, in the region.

But more importantly, without the peace process, the Contras are not likely to bring democracy to Nicaragua. The Contras have been in the field since 1981. Up until August of this year when the Arias accord was signed, the Contras failed to wring a single concession from the Sandinistas. Ironically, after each vote by Congress to provide aid, the Sandinistas tightened their grip on the country. The state of emergency was imposed. The press was shut down and other liberties curtailed.

It has only been in the last 6 months, since the peace plan was agreed to, have the Sandinistas begun to make propitious conces-

sions. This fact is not to deny that the Contras have had an effect on the government. Surely, they have, although by no means the only effect. Nonetheless, it is critical to recognize that the Contras, without the peace plan, provide no hope of returning democracy to Nicaragua. Not even the administration believes that the Contras can win the war. The Contras alone merely ensure a long-term conflict that continues the death, suffering, and poverty of those people caught in the middle of the conflict.

In contrast, a vote against the President's plan is more likely to bring democracy to Nicaragua. First, a "no" vote is consistent with the Arias accord, which as I said is essential to our ultimate success. In fact, on January 14, the International Verification Commission, set up to monitor implementation of the peace plan, stated explicitly that a "definitive cessation" of Contra aid is an "indispensable requirement for the success of the peace efforts and of this procedure as a whole."

Second, a "no" vote does not abandon the Contras. I recognize that the Contras have played a role in bringing the Sandinistas to the table. But other factors are more important, particularly the peace plan itself. Another factor is the Nicaraguan economy, which is in a shambles.

In any event, I would like to keep the Contras in their bases as additional leverage. I am aware that the Contras have weeks of supplies on hand and, in fact, will continue to receive deliveries through February 29, 1988. In addition, as I said, I am willing to provide additional humanitarian assistance, such as food, clothing, and other items that must be provided by someone whether or not the Contras are in the field. These items can be distinguished from the nonlethal aid in the President's package, which by definition includes humanitarian assistance and such items as helicopters, jeeps, and radios—instruments of war. It is estimated that the President's package includes only \$7 million in humanitarian aid. In sum, the Contras are not likely to fold up their tents based on the vote today.

I should say, however, that should the Contras do so, it would confirm suspicion that they represent simply a front for the United States. I could not imagine the mujaheddin in Afghanistan or UNITA in Angola giving up their fights for freedom because United States aid was reduced. Unlike the Contras, both of these groups have significant internal support. In short, the Contras may have to overcome their own Valley Forge, just as our forces did during the Revolutionary War.

Third, a "no" vote recognizes the concessions the Sandinistas have made so far and encourages further progress. Despite the seemingly low price tag of \$36.2 million, the President's package actually escalates the war. In addition to the direct aid, the President would also provide \$20 million in indemnification, which would be used to ensure the planes and helicopters the Contras would lease with the direct aid. Thus, if leased aircraft is shot down, the indemnity funds would be used to pay off the owners. Moreover, then the President's package includes funds for passive defense systems on the leased aircraft, such as radar, that would cost another \$5 to \$10 million. In sum, then, the President's

package amounts to about \$60 million over 4 months. Extended over 1 year, the President's package equals approximately \$240 million.

In conclusion, although I would rather have delayed the vote, given the choice, I must oppose the President's package. For a long time now, I have supported a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the conflict in Nicaragua. Finally, we are starting to make progress. I would strongly urge the President to supplement the Arias peace process by initiating direct, bilateral talks with the Sandinistas. In this effort, we can ensure that the Soviets are kept out of the region. This is a must.

In any event, a vote for military aid would short circuit the progress and destroy the peace process. In that event, the Sandinistas would surely renege on the concessions offered thus far. The risk we take by opposing the President is that they will renege anyway. But I am willing to take that risk because I think that it is more promising than the violent path the President would take us down.

This is not likely to be the final vote on this issue. The Sandinistas know that. They should know we are giving them a chance. If they blow it, they will learn that there is an iron fist inside this velvet glove. At least this member promises them that.

Mr. McEWEN. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of the President's Contra aid request. I will not reiterate all of the valid arguments which my colleagues have made in support of this effort. However, I want my colleagues to know that history is riding on our shoulders.

What we do here today is being watched in every capital of the free world and in the Communist aligned governments. It is important that we rise to the occasion and demonstrate our commitment and support those people who seek peace and freedom.

Mr. Chairman, I want to share with my colleagues two important historical revelations from two of America's renowned military leaders and strategic thinkers, Adm. Thomas Moorer and Gen. Douglas MacArthur.

Adm. Thomas Moorer, who fought for freedom and democracy in World War II, and later served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was giving his assessment regarding the subject of perception and the impact of perception has had upon the decisions of our past adversaries. Let me share with you his insights from a 1982 speech before the American Enterprise Institute.

This idea of perception was brought very forcefully home to me at the end of World War II when I had an opportunity to question the Japanese leaders about why they had attacked Pearl Harbor. The answer was the same for all.

They pointed out that we had passed the draft law by only one vote, that we had failed to fortify Wake and Guam Islands, and that we had our army in Louisiana training with wooden guns.

In the general perception of the United States built up in the minds of the Japanese, we did not have the will to defend ourselves, so they made the decision to attack our sovereign territory. Never mind that this was a major mistake; it did result in a major war.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur's insights are parallel to those of Admiral Moorer. I urge my colleagues who oppose Contra aid to listen to the words and experience of this professional soldier and statesman:

The history of failure in war can be summed up in two words: too late.

Too late in comprehending the deadly purpose of a potential enemy; too late in realizing the mortal danger; too late in preparedness; too late in uniting all possible forces for resistance; too late in standing with one's friends.

Mr. Chairman, we do not have to repeat the mistakes of the past today. The President has proposed an insurance policy to protect the viability of the Contras and the peace process. It is diplomacy with pressure. It is working; let's give it a chance to continue to work.

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, 6 months ago, the five Central American Presidents signed the Guatemala peace agreement. Since then, the five nations gradually, if haltingly, have taken steps toward national reconciliation and compliance with the accords. Substantial progress has been made, but much remains to be done.

In August, the five Presidents felt that January 15 would be an appropriate deadline for compliance with the agreement, and scheduled a meeting and review for that date.

Congress, however, was operating on its own schedule. In the course of negotiations on Federal spending legislation, an agreement was reached to provide \$8 million in nonlethal assistance and then take a thorough look at a Presidential request on February 3. It was assumed that members would have the benefit of a conclusive January 15 Central American meeting and would be in a better position to decide upon a new aid request.

As each of the Central American nations struggled with the difficult realities of implementing change, the leaders realized that the January 15 date was an overly optimistic target for total compliance, and should instead be seen as a period of review and reaffirmation. The joint communique signed by the five Presidents strongly reiterated their support for the principles of the August accord, and pledged themselves to continue to work toward greater compliance and national reconciliation.

Yet, due to the constraints of the December agreement, we are forced to decide today whether to provide lethal and nonlethal assistance to the Contras. This puts Congress in a very uncomfortable and inappropriate position. The Sandinistas and the Contras have just concluded their first fact-to-face negotiating session on a note of optimism. Observers of the talks praised both parties for scaling down the verbal war and engaging in meaningful discussion. A second meeting has been scheduled for the near future. Yet today members are being asked by the administration to assume that these negotiations will not be successful.

The current discussion of formulating a House alternative to military aid to the Contras is encouraging. However, we should not repeat December's mistakes and set an arbitrary date that has no relation to the peace process. It is rather unrealistic to expect that the Sandinistas and Contras will have ironed

out their differences and solidified a cease fire agreement in the next couple weeks. I would strongly urge that another vote in the House be carefully coordinated with the peace process in an effort not only to allow Members to better evaluate its progress, but also to strengthen the peace process itself.

As we work to craft an alternative, I would hope that Members will take advantage of this opportunity to arrive at a truly bipartisan alternative. We need a resolution of the current impasse that will outline how we should proceed in our relations with Nicaragua and the Contras in the crucial months ahead.

We should begin by voting down this aid request today, and then by carefully considering an alternative—but only at a time when it will have a positive effect upon the process.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, the Central American Presidents met in Costa Rica to evaluate compliance with the regional peace plan signed in Guatemala on August 7. Their conclusion was not startling: compliance has been less than perfect. Nor was their resolution unexpected; they pledged to continue to seek full compliance "without delay or excuses."

Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, who nearly brought the whole process to the brink of disaster by implementing only partial reforms, used the President's meeting to announce further steps toward compliance. On Saturday he announced an end to the 6-year-old state of emergency in Nicaragua, and pledged direct talks with the United States backed Contras. Those talks began last week.

Of course, the peace plan is not just about Nicaragua. Honduras' performance has been less than exemplary. Frightfully slow in even setting up the required National Reconciliation Commission, President Azcona still refuses to live up to the terms of the agreement and expel the Contras from his country.

In El Salvador, President Duarte has pursued a policy of technical compliance that has won kudos from the administration but which has failed to really get at the root of his country's 7-year civil war. In declaring a national amnesty, for instance, Duarte extended the decree not only to political prisoners, but to suspected right-wing death squad killers as well. In Guatemala, some progress has been made, but a ceasefire has not been achieved.

And finally, the United States, as Costa Rican President Arias told the President's National Security Adviser, Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, has done little to enhance the peace process. Although President Arias, the architect of the peace plan, said upon the receipt of his Nobel Peace Prize, that "the Contras are the problem, not the solution," the administration, in its unique view, continues to believe just the opposite.

Thus the White House has requested another package of Contra aid. The package includes \$32.6 million in so-called humanitarian aid and \$3.6 million in lethal aid to be held in escrow until March 31, at which point it could be released if the President certifies that a Nicaraguan cease-fire has not been achieved. In addition, Secretary of State Shultz will be sent to negotiate with regional leaders—including the Sandinistas—if the aid request is approved.

Mr. Chairman, the administration argues that the Contras constitute necessary pressure on the Sandinistas—pressure to ensure that they keep negotiating and continue to move toward democratization. According to administration officials, the Contras are an "insurance policy" that will keep the peace plan from falling apart. Congress should reject the request; the administration's arguments don't hold up to scrutiny.

It's important to remember what the President's policies have accomplished so far. The record shows beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Contras in and of themselves have been counterproductive. The United States wants to see democratization in Nicaragua, and a reduction in Soviet and Cuban ties to the Sandinistas. Yet every time the Congress has provided additional Contra aid, greater repression and more Soviet and Cuban aid has followed. Before the administration took up the Contra cause Soviet aid to Nicaragua was roughly \$5 million per year. Today, after 7 years of the Contra war, the State Department estimates that Soviet assistance to Nicaragua is nearly \$500 million. It is against this backdrop that the latest request must be viewed.

The flaws in the administration's argument for more aid now are numerous. First, the administration's calculus totally ignores the negative effects further Contra aid will have. No matter how the White House tries to sell it, Contra aid violates the Arias plan. As such, continual U.S. funding for the rebels undermines the plan—just as noncompliance on the part of any of the Central American countries does. Pressure that violates the peace plan is destructive, not constructive.

Second, military pressure is only an effective tactic if there are clear conditions which, if met, will result in the lifting of the pressure. This has not been the case with the United States and Nicaragua, and there is little to suggest that anything has changed. The administration has responded to both good and bad behavior with more pressure.

In January 1981, for example, the administration informed the Sandinistas that United States economic aid was being cut off, pending a cutoff of Sandinista aid to Salvadoran guerrillas. Although the State Department's own study revealed that spring that they could no longer find evidence of such an arms flow, the limited economic aid to Nicaragua was cut off permanently. Even before waiting for the report, President Reagan has authorized \$19 million in covert aid for the Contras.

Then the administration argued that U.S. support was needed to bring the Sandinistas to the bargaining table. They came. More Contra aid was requested; according to the administration, it was needed to extract concessions. Concessions were offered. Now the President argues, Contra aid is needed to insure that the Sandinistas keep their word and concede more.

All this demonstrates that if Congress approves more Contra aid now it won't be the last package—it will only be the latest installment. And it will allow the administration to pay lip service to negotiations while pursuing its real objective, the military ouster of the Sandinistas.

This is the third flaw in the administration's claim that more Contra aid will pressure the Sandinistas into negotiating: it assumes the administration supports a negotiated settlement.

There is ample reason to doubt the administration's trust and support for negotiations. Consider, for example, the statements of Assistant Secretary of State Elliot Abrams. "It is preposterous to think we can sign a deal with the Sandinistas to meet our foreign policy concerns and expect it to be kept," he said last fall. And yet, also last fall, Secretary of State Shultz told those of us on the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Mr. Abrams had been charged with "laying the groundwork for the next stage in our diplomatic effort" on the Arias accord.

The administration resistance to negotiations is not new. In late 1984 the Contadora group completed its second draft treaty and circulated it to interested parties. Although initially Secretary Shultz told the Europeans that it was an important step forward, by October a National Security Council memorandum boasted that, "We have effectively blocked the Contadora group efforts. * * *"

There is nothing to suggest anyone in the administration has belatedly found the religion of dialog. And absent a real American commitment to negotiations, pressure on the Sandinistas has no constructive outlet.

Even the administration's offer to send Secretary Shultz to participate in regional talks that include the Sandinistas must be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. The administration told congressional leaders last fall that the United States would negotiate directly with the Sandinistas if the Sandinistas would agree to direct talks with the Contras. Now the Sandinistas are face to face with the Contras, but the White House seems to have forgotten its earlier promise.

Finally, the administration's claim that Contra aid now will have a positive effect on the peace talks ignores the calculus of the Contras themselves. So long as they can reasonably expect to win aid from the U.S. Congress, the Contras have no incentive to negotiate a cease-fire. Further aid holds open the hope, however, unrealistic, that the Contras might one day achieve a military victory in all or part of Nicaragua, thus guaranteeing themselves a share of power in the country. Through negotiations, the Contras can at best help to create a democratic opening that allows them to participate freely in elections—elections they might win or lose.

Mr. Chairman, the administration's latest arguments for Contra aid distort the past, the present, and the future. The theory that more Contra aid will serve U.S. interests is, at best, wishful thinking based on false assumptions. Sustaining the failed policy of Contra aid as an insurance policy against the possible failure of the Arias plan is an equally bankrupt idea. If the administration truly wants to insure that the Arias plan succeeds, they might try complying with it.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I don't believe that I have ever before asked the permission of the Chair, and the indulgence of the House, to read a letter from a constituent. But I wish to do so now.

MORRISTOWN, NJ, January 22, 1988.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: As a resident of the State of New Jersey I urge you, most emphatically, to support President Reagan's upcoming request for more military and humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Contra Rebels.

I urge this despite my own solid liberal background: I marched against Vietnam, I volunteered for McGovern in Massachusetts, and I voted for Jimmy Carter. But over the last six years I have been studying history and have become disturbed by what happens to a country when dominated by a Marxist-Leninist minority.

As a product of the Sixties and Seventies, the idea of having my own life controlled by an authoritarian, Leninist state is absolutely horrifying, and I think most Americans—regardless of their political affiliation—share that view. I think it nothing less than creeping racism to assume that the people of Nicaragua find this prospect in their own future any less frightening.

The only change the future generations of Nicaragua have for lives of individual freedom is if they physically resist now the control being forced upon them by Soviet, Cuban, and East European-trained cadres. But in an age of helicopter gunships and automatic weaponry it is naive to think that farmers and shopkeepers have any chance to resist sophisticated efforts to control them without help from outside. Please help the people of Nicaragua to help themselves, and please use my tax dollars to do it.

Sincerely,

DREW GIBSON.

Mr. Chairman, this letter from Mr. Gibson speaks to the struggle of the Nicaragua resistance clearly, soberly, and sympathetically. When it came in the mail a few days ago, I was prompted to recall how the authors of our Federalist papers set for themselves this task: "to refine and enlarge the public view." Surely elected officials should strive to do the same. And yet, as this letter shows, the perennial challenge to those of us sent here to Washington is to be as refined and as broad in our views as are the people we represent.

Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, today we are considering a request from the Reagan administration which would betray founding principles of our country, violate international law, and endorse a mercenary campaign of terrorism and economic sabotage against the people of Nicaragua.

Described as a request for \$36.2 million of mainly humanitarian aid to the Contras, the proposal before us would set in motion an aid package totaling up to \$68.2 million. As for how these funds would be spent, we saw all too clearly last summer that the Reagan administration's oversight of Contra aid has been woefully inadequate.

In considering this request, we must recognize that President Reagan has lost all credibility when it comes to Central America. Under his misguided leadership we have seen the illegal mining of Nicaraguan waters, the distribution of a booklet advising his so-called freedom fighters to use terrorist tactics, the sabotaging of the Contadora process, and the direct violation of the spirit—if not the letter—of the Boland amendment: all to pursue a policy which is adamantly opposed by 58 percent of the American public. What, I must ask, has this policy got to do with democracy?

The situation is rather clear. The American people do not support the Contras, and neither do the Nicaraguan people. President Reagan claims that continued funding of the Contras will support the current Central American peace process when, in fact, such funding would be in direct conflict with the plan that is the very basis of that process. The administration claims that Contra aid is necessary to protect Nicaragua's neighbors, but all five Central American presidents signed a plan that demands that Contra aid be stopped. The administration even suggests that the Contra war has brought the Sandinistas to the bargaining table, while in reality every transfer of funds to the Contras has forced Managua closer to Moscow.

Four years ago, Reagan administration policies seriously undermined the Contadora peace process and led to its eventual breakdown. But now we have another promising peace agreement, an agreement of the people of Central America, by the people of Central America, and for the people of Central America. President Reagan states that funding the Contras will help this process, but only last night Costa Rican Ambassador Guido Fernandez stated in response to this view that "the Contras are not the solution—they are the problem."

Mr. MATSUI, today we must choose either the Reagan plan for continued senseless killing or the Arias plan for peace. I urge my colleagues to choose peace.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives is now facing a moment of truth regarding Contra aid.

The key issue which we must confront today is not the amount of money that the President seeks for the Contras or whether it is in the form of military or so-called nonlethal aid or both.

The main point we, in this Chamber, must decide is the policy that the United States Government should adopt toward Nicaragua and the Arias peace plan. Our debate should really be a debate over what political and moral principles shall inspire our relations with Nicaragua and whose visions will be allowed to prevail.

The President, still clinging to the vain hope of overthrowing the Sandinista regime, is, regrettably, obsessed with the need to continue funding his rebels. But, the United States does not have the right to wage a dirty war against Nicaragua and its people simply because Mr. Reagan dislikes the Sandinistas. Mr. Reagan must learn that he cannot export the American dream by war and violence.

The Central American peace plan is slowly moving forward. If there are those who are dissatisfied with the Sandinista compliance with the terms of the peace accord, it should also be admitted that Nicaragua, engaged in a civil war, has made significant concessions to keep the peace process alive. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Reagan administration has failed to comply with the Central American peace accords by continuing to supply the Contra forces—a clear violation of the peace accord requirement that outside support for insurgencies be ended.

Mr. Chairman, one of my constituents, who is presently residing in Managua, recently wrote,

It is a dirty, dangerous business and all very well and good and easy for those who vote for continuing and escalating a war which already has this country in a stranglehold. But, there are three million people here who will have to live and die with the consequences of the vote. Tell me what they are supposed to do?

The choice we face today is clear. We can support the Contras and continue the war and the killing of innocent people in Nicaragua by voting more funds or, by cutting off all aid, we can support the Arias peace plan.

I will vote to stop all funding for the rebels and give peace a chance. Let us stop the death and destruction in Nicaragua. Let us also bring an end to the economic misery we have brought to the poor people of that country by lifting the embargo imposed by the Reagan administration.

This is the only choice open to us which is consistent with the interests of our Nation and consistent with the will of the vast majority of the American people.

It is time to begin a new era of peace and reconciliation with the people of Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, I urge a "no" vote on aid to the Contras.

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, for the last 7 years, our Government, led by the Reagan administration, has financed and directed a guerrilla war against the Government of Nicaragua.

The purpose of that war, we have been told by the President, has been to promote freedom, democracy, and human rights for the people of Central America.

Yet, what has the last 7 years of the President's Contra war actually given us? Instead of peace, we have seen increasing violence and bloodshed; instead of democracy, we have seen increasing tyranny; instead of freedom, we have seen increasing oppression; instead of security, we have seen increasing instability.

At the same time, this policy has done grievous harm to our own country and people. In carrying out this surrogate war, the Reagan administration has broken the laws of our Nation, has lied to the American people, has brought us the embarrassment of the Iran-Contra scandal, and has made a mockery of our Constitution.

Now, finally, there seems to be a way out of this morass of war and violence and hatred. The leaders of Central America have come together and agreed to implement a regional peace plan, a plan that offers the first real hope of peace and security for the people of Central America.

Right now, with the Guatemala peace accords, there is a chance for peace in Central America. This is a chance that has eluded us for the last 7 years of President Reagan's policy of war and escalation. And in only 6 months, this peace process has resulted in more positive movement toward dialog, reconciliation, democracy, and human rights for the people of Central America, than has all the years of the President's Contra war.

But rather than heeding the wishes of the Central American leaders who are seeking peace, President Reagan has chosen to sabo-

tage their hopes and their independence. The President has demanded more money for the Contras, so he can send in the CIA with more weapons, to continue the bloodshed and escalate an armed conflict in which everyone loses.

President Reagan calls this request an insurance policy. But let there be no doubt: if we send more money to the Contras now we will be harpooning the peace process and only prolonging the bloodshed in Central America. More Contra aid is no insurance policy in Central America: it is a death wish for the peace process.

If we truly want peace, and freedom, and human rights in Central America, then we have no choice but once and for all to reject the Reagan administration's policy of military escalation. If we truly want democracy, then we have no choice but to reject this latest request for more Contra aid.

It's time to put an end to this administration's senseless challenge to reason and responsibility.

It's time to get to work on a policy that will lead to more peace, not more bloodshed.

It's time to get serious about supporting President Arias and the Central American peace plan.

Most importantly, it's time to send our diplomats, and not the CIA, to Central America.

Mr. JONTZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to express my concern about the vote we are about to cast on \$36.2 million in additional aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.

Approving the President's request would bring the 6-month total of U.S. aid to the Contras to more than \$89 million. And approval of the \$36 million today also means that the stage will be set for even larger Contra aid requests to come to the floor this summer.

A question I have, which I share with many of my colleagues is what have the Contras done with all of the direct and indirect aid that our taxpayers have given them? After a good amount of investigation by our Government, we have not been able to account for tens of millions of dollars of that aid. Are we now getting ready to hand over even more money from our treasury which may or may not end up where it supposed to?

Whether you are for Contra-aid or against it, agreeing to approve this \$36 million request before we can account for the previous millions we have given the Contras in aid is a grave disservice to the taxpayers of this country who deserve to know how and where their money is being spent.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong and vigorous opposition to House Joint Resolution 444, the President's request for \$36.2 million in lethal and nonlethal aid to the Contras. In an attempt not to repeat what everyone else has said today, I will try to focus on what I believe is the hidden meaning of our 10-hour debate.

I agree with many of my colleagues that continued Contra aid will disrupt the fragile Central America peace process, that we must give the signers of the Arias accord a chance to attain peace on their own terms, and that if, indeed, the Sandinistas do not fulfill their promises of democracy, the Congress can always vote in the future to once more fund the Contras. The Washington Post reported

today that Congress has given approximately \$209 million to the Nicaraguan resistance since 1981. We have already made a very significant contribution to the Contra cause; we must now decide whether to continue this effort.

But I am struck by what my colleagues seem to be saying between the lines. Are we really spending 10 hours discussing \$36 million when we allocate equal amounts of money on other programs without hesitation? Are we really debating for 10 hours about donating funds to a military force of several thousand men, when we give more money in military assistance to nations with much larger armies? I think not. I think we are really talking about something much deeper and more profound. We are discussing the future of U.S. foreign policy after the Reagan administration. We are examining the effectiveness of American foreign policy since 1981, as exemplified by our support of the rebels in Nicaragua.

This is a crucially important topic that easily justifies at least 10 times 10 hours of debate. I hope that with this vote we will see the end of a foreign policy era—the end of the Reagan administration's covert actions, the end of our support for rebels who seek to overthrow selected governments with which our own Government happens to disagree. I am confident our vote tonight will mark the final day we turn our backs on human-rights violators, even if they are "friendly" dictators; the final day we sell arms to nations we publically denounce as terrorists; and the final day we pompously insist that we have a better plan for peace in Central America than the very Presidents of that region. I hope this vote represents a new day in foreign policy when we can examine conflicts not just as East versus West, as freedom fighters versus Communist thugs, as us versus them, but as world citizens who will stand up for peace with self-determination in every nation versus enemies of democracy, whatever their political stripe.

Our discussion of Contra aid is crucial today and vitally important for the future of peace in Central America. But just as important is what we say about the future course of American international relations. I urge my colleagues to vote no on Contra aid and yes to a more just and democratic U.S. foreign policy.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, I was deeply disappointed that President Reagan has chosen this critical juncture in the implementation of the Arias peace plan to submit another funding request for aid to the Contras. The Arias peace plan presents the most concrete opportunity to achieve a stable and lasting peace in Central America. But, the President seems to be unwilling to give this attempt at peace a chance. In fact, the President has maintained his belligerent posture toward the Sandinistas. He still calls for continued funding of the Contras so that the Sandinistas will cry "uncle." Mr. Speaker, this kind of rhetoric is not the way to achieve a diplomatic breakthrough. At this time when President Arias and the other Central American leaders are working toward a solution to that region's problems, any indication that there is an intention to subvert this process will prove counterproductive.

The Arias peace plan represents a departure from the traditional ways of solving differences in Central America. It seeks to substitute dialog for violence, and cooperation for conflict. However, for the plan to work, all those who have a stake in Central America must support it without reservation in the hope that it will work. The Arias plan is not a momentary flirtation with diplomacy. It is a new and different way of dealing with the chronic problems of Central America. However, unless the United States commits its vast influence and prestige to the success of this approach, its chance of success is slim. For it to work it must be given a chance.

The administration's most recent Contra aid request demonstrates its lack of commitment to the new course. Any military aid to the Contras flies in the face of the letter and spirit of the Arias peace plan. Our funding of the Contras would demonstrate to our citizens and the people of Central America that the United States was never serious about pursuing peace.

Contrary to the arguments made by the supporters of further aid, the Arias plan has already produced solid successes with regard to Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have released almost 1,000 political prisoners; they have allowed *La Prensa*, the main opposition newspaper, to open and publish without censorship; and they have created a reconciliation commission which includes Cardinal Bravo, the main figure in the legitimate Nicaraguan opposition movement.

Any further aid to the Contras at this time would provide Daniel Ortega with reason to question the United States' commitment to full support of the Arias peace plan. Instead, any such aid would only send another signal to Daniel Ortega that we, the United States, are not interested in seeing the Arias peace plan work and that the only solution to the Central American problem must be through continued armed conflict.

Let us respect and support the genuine and sincere efforts of the Central American leaders who are trying to bring peace and democracy to their region, by working through the Arias peace plan without placing obstacles and hurdles in their path. Let's give peace in Central America a chance.

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Chairman, after a great deal of thought, I have decided to vote in favor of continued assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces. Over the past several months, I have received thousands of letters and calls, which show tremendous divisiveness among my constituents. This issue is not one that can be considered solely on the basis of its popularity or lack thereof.

To the opponents of assistance, I will acknowledge that the Reagan administration has been equivocal to say the least over the last 6 years. The lack of direction does not, however, justify abandonment of the Contras. We appear to have muddled our way to a position where a combination of diplomacy and the threat of a continued military aid will bring Nicaragua toward democracy and respect for its smaller and less powerful neighbors. I find it hard to believe we would have reached this stage without pressure exerted by the resistance.

President Reagan's plan is a significant departure from prior aid requests and a sincere effort to bring about a bipartisan compromise on American policy in Central America. He has included Congress in the decisionmaking process, and the majority leadership has offered no alternative to the administration plan. Those who complain that it was too late have short memories of the peace at which this body has worked on the Federal budget and other pressing matters within the last 3 months. Under the Reagan plan, the so-called "lethal assistance" may never be released if the Sandinistas follow through on their promises.

Daniel Ortega's slothful response to the requirements of the Arias peace plan has been a major influence in my decision to vote for the President's package. I think that recent concessions by the Sandinistas have been little more than thinly veiled public relations ploys timed to coincide with congressional action on aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

The often repeated statement that no Marxist government has ever voluntarily relinquished power is dismissed by many as harsh rhetoric, yet no one can challenge its veracity. The Sandinista's promise to allow opposition political activity rang hollow last week in Managua when Sandinista gangs harassed an opposition party meeting and roughed up political opponents. Several protesters were also arrested at a demonstration.

Others have been victims of this tactic over the last three decades. Solidarity members in Warsaw, Soviet Jews in Moscow, and Lenin-grad, and Hungarian students in the streets of Budapest are but a few of the unfortunate groups which have tried to exercise political power in a totalitarian state. My concept of democracy simply does not include officially sponsored intimidation and violence directed at political opponents.

Another well-known tactic the Sandinistas have adopted from their mentors is the gift of human beings. Yes, they have released political prisoners, but the number released is only 10 percent of the total held. Nearly every Member of this body has accosted the Soviets, the South Africans, Vietnam, and others for imprisonment of political opponents. Like the others, Nicaragua offers us a token of sincerity, but with 9,000 people still in jail, an opposition figure would need a great deal of courage and fortitude to speak out against the government.

We will spend over \$290 billion this year for national defense, which is primarily defense against Soviet forces. I find it inconceivable that we would simply permit the Soviets to repeat their success in Cuba. While I do not see the Sandinistas as an immediate military threat to the United States they are certainly capable of destabilizing areas south of our border where significant American interests are present. Those interests include the Panama Canal, Mexican oil reserves, and other resources vital to our national economy and the economies of every other nation in the region.

The Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Soviets provided \$1.81 billion in military aid to the Sandinistas since 1980, with \$600 million of that total sent in 1986. Economic aid over the last 8 years has been esti-

mated to be approximately \$1.83 billion. Nicaragua has standing armed forces numbering approximately 140,000 with support from an estimated 3,000 Cuban and 200 Soviet "advisers." Smaller contingents from Eastern European nations, Libya, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization also are present.

Soviet deliveries of weapons to the Sandinistas include the following: 12 HIND helicopter gunships, 35 troop transport helicopters, 110 medium weight T-55 tanks, 30 light amphibious PT tanks, and 200 other armored vehicles. They also have a large stock of SA-14 missiles, which are the most modern surface-to-air weapons in the Soviet arsenal. To paraphrase President Reagan, I doubt that the Politburo anguished over sending these lethal supplies.

The Contras are the only internal force in Nicaragua capable of responding to future violations of the Arias plan. No one on either side of the aisle wants continued violence and bloodshed in Central America, and everyone seems to agree that we have geopolitical concerns in the region. If the peace process moves forward, as I hope it does, I am willing to support substantial economic assistance and a new trade relationship with Nicaragua. Without the resistance forces, we have no assurance whatsoever that we can reach that point. To renege on our support for the Contras at this time would have serious ramifications for the struggle toward democracy in Nicaragua and throughout the world.

Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, last month, I signed a letter with 19 of my colleagues urging the President to delay his request for additional aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

The President should not have asked for military assistance to the Contras at this time. But he did, and I urge my colleagues to vote against it.

It is at this critical time during these most sensitive of negotiations that utmost caution in U.S. policy must be exercised. Any new United States military aid to the resistance at this time is extremely risky and a threat to lasting peace in Central America.

Military assistance to the Contras directly violates the Arias peace plan. Costa Rican President Oscar Arias opposes military aid precisely because it subverts the peace plan. By providing aid to the Contras, we give the Nicaraguan Government a perfect escape hatch. By stopping aid, we can at least test the Nicaraguan Government's commitment to the negotiations.

The administration needs to clarify its objectives in Central America. If our goal is to get the Sandinistas to negotiate, the administration should declare victory. For the first time in 9 years, President Ortega is paying more than just lipservice to democratic principles. The Nicaraguan Government has observed critical points of the Arias plan, such as lifting the state of emergency and committing Nicaragua to direct negotiations with the Contras for a cease-fire and upon the cease-fire's achievement, a broad amnesty.

If the administration's goal, however, is to overthrow the Sandinista government, the Contras have not proven to be the viable means.

In working for peace in Central America, the United States must exhaust diplomatic solutions before continuing to pursue military avenues.

The United States, after almost 7 years of supporting war, must now concentrate its efforts on working to build a plan for peace and democracy. A vote to reject the President's package does not constitute an abandonment of the Contras nor does it signify complete trust of the Sandinista government. But at this delicate time in the peace process, the United States must not be the obstacle to peace in that region.

We must instead work together to develop a true humanitarian aid package and long-term economic aid to the region. Then and only then will we be able to promote democracy and self-determination for the people of Central America, while protecting our national security interests.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members recorded their presence:

[Roll No. 6]

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—409

Ackerman	Chandler	Edwards (CA)
Akaka	Chapman	Edwards (OK)
Alexander	Chappell	Emerson
Anderson	Cheney	English
Andrews	Clarke	Erdreich
Annunzio	Clay	Espy
Anthony	Clement	Evans
Archer	Clinger	Fascell
Army	Coats	Fawell
Atkins	Coble	Fazio
AuCoin	Coelho	Feighan
Badham	Coleman (MO)	Fields
Baker	Coleman (TX)	Fish
Ballenger	Collins	Flake
Barnard	Combest	Flippo
Bartlett	Conte	Florio
Barton	Conyers	Foglietta
Bateman	Cooper	Foley
Bates	Coughlin	Ford (MI)
Beilenson	Courter	Ford (TN)
Bennett	Coyne	Frenzel
Bentley	Craig	Galleghy
Bereuter	Crane	Gallo
Berman	Crockett	Garcia
Bevill	Dannemeyer	Gedenson
Bilbray	Darden	Gekas
Bilirakis	Daub	Gephardt
Bliley	Davis (IL)	Gibbons
Boehrlert	Davis (MI)	Gilman
Boggs	de la Garza	Gingrich
Boland	DeFazio	Glickman
Bonior	DeLay	Gonzalez
Bonker	Dellums	Goodling
Borski	Derrick	Gordon
Bosco	DeWine	Gradison
Boulter	Dickinson	Grandy
Boxer	Dicks	Grant
Brennan	Dingell	Gray (IL)
Brooks	DioGuardi	Gray (PA)
Broomfield	Dixon	Green
Brown (CA)	Dorgan (ND)	Gregg
Brown (CO)	Dornan (CA)	Guarini
Bruce	Dowdy	Gunderson
Bryant	Downey	Hall (OH)
Buechner	Dreier	Hall (TX)
Bunning	Duncan	Hamilton
Burton	Durbin	Hammerschmidt
Bustamante	Dwyer	Hansen
Byron	Dymally	Harris
Callahan	Dyson	Hastert
Campbell	Early	Hatcher
Carper	Eckart	Hawkins

Hayes (IL)	McMillan (NC)	Schuetz
Hayes (LA)	McMillen (MD)	Schulze
Hefley	Meyers	Schumer
Henry	Mfume	Sensenbrenner
Herger	Mica	Sharp
Hertel	Michel	Shaw
Hiler	Miller (CA)	Shays
Hochbrueckner	Miller (OH)	Shumway
Holloway	Miller (WA)	Sikorski
Hopkins	Mineta	Sisisky
Horton	Moakley	Skaggs
Houghton	Molinari	Skeen
Howard	Mollohan	Skelton
Hoyer	Montgomery	Slattery
Hubbard	Moody	Slaughter (NY)
Huckaby	Moorhead	Slaughter (VA)
Hughes	Morella	Smith (FL)
Hunter	Morrison (CT)	Smith (IA)
Hutto	Morrison (WA)	Smith (NE)
Hyde	Mrazek	Smith (NJ)
Inhofe	Murphy	Smith (TX)
Ireland	Murtha	Smith, Denny
Jacobs	Myers	(OR)
Jeffords	Natcher	Smith, Robert
Jenkins	Neal	(NH)
Johnson (CT)	Nelson	Smith, Robert
Johnson (SD)	Nichols	(OR)
Johnson (NC)	Nielson	Snowe
Jontz	Nowak	Solarz
Kanjorski	Oakar	Solomon
Kaptur	Oberstar	Spence
Kasich	Obey	Spratt
Kennedy	Olin	St Germain
Kennelly	Ortiz	Staggers
Kildee	Owens (NY)	Stallings
Kleczka	Owens (UT)	Stangeland
Kolbe	Oxley	Stenholm
Kolter	Packard	Stokes
Konnyu	Panetta	Stratton
Kostmayer	Parris	Studds
Kyl	Pashayan	Stump
LaFalce	Patterson	Stuntz
Lagomarsino	Pease	Sweeney
Lancaster	Pelosi	Swift
Lantos	Penny	Swindall
Latta	Pepper	Synar
Leach (IA)	Perkins	Tallon
Leath (TX)	Petri	Tauke
Lehman (CA)	Pickett	Tauzin
Lehman (FL)	Pickle	Taylor
Leland	Porter	Thomas (GA)
Lent	Price (IL)	Torres
Levin (MI)	Price (NC)	Torricelli
Levine (CA)	Pursell	Towns
Lewis (CA)	Quillen	Traficant
Lewis (FL)	Rahall	Traxler
Lewis (GA)	Rangel	Udall
Lipinski	Ravenel	Upton
Livingston	Ray	Valentine
Lloyd	Regula	Vander Jagt
Lott	Rhodes	Vento
Lowery (CA)	Richardson	Visclosky
Lowry (WA)	Ridge	Volkmer
Lujan	Rinaldo	Vucanovich
Luken, Thomas	Ritter	Walgren
Lukens, Donald	Roberts	Walker
Lungren	Robinson	Watkins
Mack	Rodino	Waxman
MacKay	Roe	Weiss
Madigan	Roemer	Weldon
Manton	Rogers	Wheat
Markey	Rose	Whittaker
Marlenee	Roth	Whitten
Martin (IL)	Roukema	Wilson
Martin (NY)	Rowland (CT)	Wise
Martinez	Rowland (GA)	Wolf
Matsui	Roybal	Wolpe
Mavroules	Russo	Wortley
Mazzoli	Sabo	Wyden
McCandless	Saiki	Wylie
McCloskey	Savage	Yates
McCurdy	Sawyer	Yatron
McDade	Saxton	Young (AK)
McEwen	Schaefer	Young (FL)
McGrath	Schneider	
McHugh	Schroeder	

□ 2100

The CHAIRMAN. Four hundred nine Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

The Chair announces that 56 minutes of debate remain.

□ 2115

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how much time is remaining on both sides?

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. OBEY] has 31 minutes remaining; and the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 25 minutes remaining.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MFUME].

Mr. MFUME. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the funding resolution under consideration.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 444 and the continuance of United States aid to the Nicaraguan Contras. The policies of the Reagan administration toward this impoverished and war-torn country are misguided, and it is time for us to establish a Central American foreign policy that promotes peace instead of bloodshed.

Last summer, the five Central American Presidents signed the Arias peace plan which was designed to gradually reduce hostilities in the region. Complete implementation would include the democratization of the existing governments, simultaneous cease-fires, the suspension of outside military aid to insurgents, the prevention of neighboring countries from being used for military or logistical support of insurgents, and the reduction of armaments by the five nations of Central America.

While the application of the Arias plan has not always gone as smoothly as we would like, substantial progress has been made toward achieving its goals. Most recently, the Sandinistas have agreed to lift the 6-year-old nationwide state of emergency, grant amnesty to thousands of political prisoners, hold municipal and local elections, permit the opening of several radio stations and newspapers, and enter into direct cease-fire talks with the Contra rebels.

I suffer no illusions about Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. His record shows that he cannot always be trusted. But we need not embrace nor violently overthrow the Sandinista government to meet our legitimate national goals. Our security interests and those of our allies in the region would be best served by full compliance with the Arias peace agreement.

Costa Rican President Oscar Arias has repeatedly pleaded that Contra aid be halted because it will lead to more war and less democracy. Explaining the devastation that additional U.S. military assistance would cause to the peace process, President Arias is quoted as saying that he "would have to go back to Oslo and return the Nobel Peace Prize."

By voting against House Joint Resolution 444, we can prevent President Arias from having to make that trip. At the same time, we would be sending the important message that we have confidence in the abilities of the Central American leaders to work through the details of the plan that they—not the people of the United States—will have to live with.

The Contra aid request which we will be voting on today is unacceptable. It represents

a deliberate attempt to thwart peace while escalating the Nicaraguan civil war.

Taking great liberties with semantics, President Reagan's nonlethal aid could include helicopters, jeeps, and other war-related equipment. In addition, the allocation of so-called humanitarian aid by the United States would enable the Contras to use their other available resources to continue the slaughter of civilians that is characteristic of this and all wars.

This week marks the 20th anniversary of the Tet offensive in Vietnam. Not forgetting the lessons and slogans of that era, I challenge President Reagan to give peace a chance. In offering the same olive branch to my colleagues, I urge them to cast their votes against House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. MAZZOLI].

Mr. MAZZOLI. Mr. Chairman, it is late at night and we have had a long debate, since 10 o'clock this morning. Very little new can be added. Let me just say this is a very difficult vote. We have friends on both sides of the issue. At times righteousness and truth appear to be on both sides of the issue, but we do have to make a decision and adding to the confusion of this decision is our respect for the President and the Presidency, and I desire not to hurt him or to in any way weaken the office, but we do have to vote and I have made a decision and my decision is to oppose the package and to urge that we move ahead with the peace process in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that if we are ever able to isolate the Sandinistas, and determine whether their intentions are pacific as they insist, or sinister as many have observed, we must reject Contra aid at this time. If there is any time that we will ever be able to isolate the Sandinistas and determine ourselves and have the world determine whether or not their intentions are pacific or sinister then we have to remove from them the one excuse which they have consistently used to delay implementation of the Arias peace plan and the excuse that they have used to deny their own countrymen the human rights and the civil rights and rights of free expression, the rights of assembly, and that excuse is that the United States is supporting the Contras, and the U.S. presence in that area.

I urge that the House defeat the bill tonight, take pause in its support for the aid to the Contras, and if then the Sandinistas fail to adhere to the peace plan, then we may if we have to, return to the fray and return to the side of the Contras, but at that time it will be at the behest of the four democratic Presidents, or at the behest of the Organization of American States, or were the worst to occur, at our own instance unilaterally.

Defeating Contra aid tonight will not injure U.S. status nor will it injure U.S. security. It may very well advance

the peace process. Tonight I would urge the House and the Congress to give peace a chance. Let us vote down this bill and give peace a chance.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. PICKLE].

Mr. PICKLE. Mr. Chairman, I support humanitarian aid to the Contras, but I am in opposition to the President's Contra aid request because it contains funds for lethal weapons.

We all know we are at a critical juncture in the Central American peace process. Concessions are being made by all parties in an effort to end the fighting. Our dedication to peace should not be measured in terms of numbers of weapons but rather in the degree of our commitment to long-term regional stability.

The regional governments are currently engaged in negotiations to implement a cease-fire. They have not asked us to rearm the Contras.

In fact, to ship arms to the Contras at this stage could sweep away incentives to seek a negotiated settlement: If the Contras are given reason to believe they can refrain from reaching any agreement for the next 30 days, then they would be in a much better position to receive additional materiel support from the United States. By the same token, if the Contras choose to negotiate with the Sandinistas then they lose their capability to wage war.

We clearly have a national interest in the Central American issue. Limited support of the Contras is justified, because they have proven to be effective in exerting pressure on the current Ortega regime and making cease-fire talks a reality. I think humanitarian assistance to these people can be justified, and I have supported nonmilitary aid in the past.

But, Mr. Chairman, more weapons will not immediately encourage a cease-fire, nor will more military aid encourage peace. We are obligated to protect the democracies of Central America from a Nicaragua which could become a Soviet outpost. The United States can and should support regional efforts against foreign intervention in the Western Hemisphere.

Our best hope right now is to have the full support of the five countries sponsoring the Arias plan. They could have as much leverage as the United States and no doubt have interests as strong as those of the United States to bring peace to Central America.

However, the United States cannot impose upon the Nicaraguan people what type of government they should have. Should the President later show a finding of fact that the Sandinistas are inhibiting progress toward peace, then the President would be expected to return to Congress for more aid to the Contras, as he sees fit. I would be willing to consider such a vote if it is found later that the Sandinistas are

scuttling the prospects for peace. At this time, however, when all parties are working hard, we hope, to end the conflict, I strongly believe that we should further the peace process and not promote further violence and bloodshed.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3½ minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. SLATTERY].

Mr. SLATTERY. Mr. Chairman, we are once again in the throes of another divisive debate on Central America. We are once again focused on the things that divide us while neglecting alternatives that would unite the American people. We should do as Truman and Vandenberg, Eisenhower and Rayburn did before us, develop a bipartisan policy that would bring freedom and peace to Central America.

The President should not have asked for military assistance at this time but he did so, and we should defeat it for several reasons.

First, it is in clear violation of the Arias peace plan which we should be strongly supporting. There is no doubt where President Arias stands on the question of military assistance to the Contras. He is against it.

Second, the United States lacks the moral justification to pursue a military solution until we have exhausted our diplomatic remedies. How can the administration convince the American people it has exhausted diplomatic remedies when it has refused for 3 long years to meet at the high levels with the Nicaraguan Government?

I do not believe it can.

The Nicaraguans want to talk to us about our national security concerns including the size of their military, and including the presence of foreign military advisers, but this administration has refused.

I do not know whether these talks would be successful, and no one in this room tonight knows whether they would succeed, but, ladies and gentleman, one thing is absolutely certain: We have a fundamental moral obligation to find out. It is not enough for us to merely oppose the President's request for military assistance.

As President Truman was fond of saying, "Any jackass can kick down a barn but it takes a carpenter to build one." Our challenge is to be carpenters building a plan for peace and democracy in all of Central America. Any suggestion that this is the final vote on the Contras is absolutely dead wrong. This issue is not going to go away regardless of what we do here this evening. A no vote on this resolution does not mean that we are abandoning the Contras. It does not mean we trust the Sandinistas either. It only means we are saying no to military assistance during this delicate time in the peace

process when such aid would clearly violate the peace process.

If the President wants to he can go to work tomorrow morning on an alternative package of humanitarian assistance that could gain and should gain broad bipartisan support.

We can and must agree on an aid package of food, shelter, clothing, and medical supplies to be delivered to the Contras within cease-fire zones in Nicaragua. Under such a plan the Contras would remain in the field pending the outcome of the peace process. So we are not abandoning the Contras with this vote, and I do not believe we should.

If we care about the future of Central America and Mexico, as we must, we better do what we can to make sure that their people have a future of hope and opportunity. The best way to do this is to support the Arias peace plan.

Let us defeat military assistance and support a bipartisan package of humanitarian aid and long-term economic assistance for the region.

Then and only then will our neighbors in Central America have a future of hope and opportunity, and then, ladies and gentlemen, will we contain the spread of communism and preserve our Nation's security.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ACKERMAN].

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the resolution.

□ 2130

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 3 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, it will be alleged in the closing moments of this debate that if you vote against the President's request we will be abandoning the Contras, they will be running out of bullets, they will not be able to defend themselves. Let me repeat what I said earlier today. The chance that the Contras have of running out of bullets is a whole lot smaller than our chance of running out of hot air on the House floor.

The administration has been piling in amounts of military equipment far in excess of monthly rates that they have been providing in the past 3 months, and that means that between now and the end of February they will be pouring in military equipment at such higher levels that even though the President has announced that there would be a hiatus in military aid, the fact is that so much will be delivered before that hiatus that it will make no difference whatsoever on the ground. The Contras will have plenty of ammunition and plenty of equipment.

It also will be alleged that the administration's plan scales back their

previous plans. My colleagues need to understand that this request is not only a significant increase, not a decrease, an increase in overall dollars, but it is an increase on the lethal side of some 400 percent. We would be spending four times as much on ammunition, missiles and mines as we did last year on the humanitarian side. The request is actually a decrease of about 33 percent.

The administration says that 90 percent of the request is for nonlethal aid. The facts are that the fiscal 1988 continuing resolution strictly defines humanitarian assistance as being only food, clothing, shelter, medical supplies and payments for such items. The President's request opens up the definition of nonlethal assistance to include everything but weapons, weapons systems and ammunition. That means it allows air operations, communications, logistic support, civic action, intelligence operations and all of the rest. That means that \$26 million or 80 percent of the \$32 million in so-called nonlethal assistance actually falls into the category of logistic assistance which will directly support a war effort. That will mean an escalation of the war, not a scaling back.

Let me make one final point. Whether my colleagues believe that the Contras' pressure or negotiations have brought the Sandinistas to the table, the fact is that there is now a chance for peace after 6 years of war and 3 months of negotiations.

People say leadership comes from military strength. You bet it does. But leadership also comes from the wisdom of knowing when to use it and when not to use it, and this is the time to test them by not using it and putting together a bipartisan policy that can be sustained through this administration and administrations for the next 10 years.

We need continuity. The President's recommendations will not give it to us. The alternative that will be produced in the next month will.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON].

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the President's request for aid to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

I believe we, as the leaders of the free world, must demonstrate to Daniel Ortega and the Soviet Union that America is serious about democracy, free elections, free speech, and free press in Central America. Pressure exerted by the freedom fighters has brought the Communist Sandinistas to the bargaining table and has forced concessions. Only continued pressure will keep them from reversing this trend.

Once the Communist Sandinistas understood that the Central American Presidents were not going to keep the peace process alive, they made convenient concessions to influence continued aid to the freedom fight-

ers. Daniel Ortega lifted the state of emergency, disbanded the revolutionary tribunals, and agreed to discuss a cease-fire. He waited to make these concessions until U.S. congressional approval for continued aid was apparent. Now, the Communist Sandinistas merely hope to prevent continued aid and wait out Reagan's final year.

The Guatemala peace proposal called for specific compliance provisions, but compliance overwhelmingly meant democratization. Does anyone actually believe that the Communist Sandinista regime, their recent concessions notwithstanding, really want democracy? I don't. The Communist Sandinistas have disregarded and abused almost every provision of the peace plan. Daniel Ortega must be judged on his actions—not his promises. The stakes are too great to risk another strategic Soviet beachhead in our hemisphere.

On August 7, 1987, Daniel Ortega and four Central American Presidents signed a peace accord committing their countries to democracy, amnesty, a cease-fire, and an end to the aid of insurgent movements in neighboring countries. Despite the 2-month extension of the 90-day deadline, the Communist Sandinistas are still blatantly in noncompliance.

The revelations of recent defector Major Miranda should not be forgotten. His intimate association with the Communist Sandinistan leadership allowed him to inform our intelligence officials of detailed military plans and valuable intelligence information. Major Miranda's testimony should leave no question in our mind that Daniel Ortega is fiercely committed to Marxism. The plan to build an army comparable to the size of the United States Army is extremely alarming; with an army of 600,000 men, one of every five Nicaraguans will be in the military.

As President Reagan said back in December "making sure the freedom fighters remain a viable force in Nicaragua is the only way to make the peace process go forward—to give peace and democracy a chance * * * ." If Daniel Ortega signed the peace plan in good faith and with serious intent, then he has nothing to fear. Please vote "yes" on the aid package. It is a vote for peace, and for freedom.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. FISH].

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this resolution as the best way to proceed with peace in this part of the world.

Mr. Chairman. I have received numerous calls and letters from constituents expressing a range of views concerning the President's aid request to the Nicaraguan resistance fighters, or Contras. Despite the diversity of views expressed, everyone shares certain basic hopes and goals. We all want peace and democracy for Central America, and we support the peace plan principally authored by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and agreed to by the five Central American Presidents, including Nicaragua's Daniel Ortega. Differences among my constituents, and throughout the Nation, center on the best way the United States can

help this process toward peace and democracy.

I believe that a reduced level of aid to the Contras is the best way to foster that process. This aid, combined with the Guatemala plan, represents an effective two-track strategy.

As the Washington Post astutely observed on February 3, the day of the congressional vote on the President's aid request, "The record of the last 6 months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further, without capsizing the peace plan, and on that basis we support the President's request."

The New York Times, in a January 31 editorial urging a delay in the Contra vote, noted: "As President Arias says, the future of aid to the Contras is in the hands of the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. That being so, the threat to continue aid, at this precise moment, could put constructive pressure on the Sandinista government to keep up its grudging movement toward peace. Congressmen who truly support the Arias plan will see that and avoid a final decision to end aid now."

Indeed, it has been Contra pressure—in the context of a deteriorating economy, hyperinflation and the war's drain on Nicaragua—that spurred Ortega to agree on August 7 to the Guatemala plan, which calls for cease-fires, national reconciliation and democratization.

It was the same pressure that spurred Ortega in mid-January to make further concessions, by agreeing that the Sandinistas would lift the state of emergency and engage in direct negotiations with Contra leaders on a cease-fire. In making these concessions, Ortega clearly was seeking to persuade the U.S. Congress to vote no on further Contra aid.

If the Sandinistas had a good track record on past promises kept, perhaps these latest promises would be enough to sway U.S. policy. But the hard fact is that the Sandinistas have been making and breaking promises since they came into power. Ortega was one of three Sandinistas on the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction [GRN], which on July 12, 1979, promised the Organization of American States that the GRN would replace the Somoza regime with a new government that would guarantee:

- A pluralistic government;
- Full observance of human rights;
- Freedom of press, religion and unions;
- Private enterprise in a mixed economy; and
- A nonaligned foreign policy.

Since then, the Sandinistas have consolidated political control, arrested political opponents, accepted Cuban military advisers, assisted leftist guerrillas in El Salvador and joined the Soviet camp. Under a state of emergency, they closed newspapers and radio and TV stations, and censored those that continued to operate. Under the same state of emergency, they enacted regulations that straitjacketed the private sector. Now that the state of emergency has been lifted, let us closely monitor the level of freedom of expression and private enterprise allowed in Nicaragua.

Both opponents and proponents of the Contras recognize the real danger of Nicaragua becoming a Soviet beachhead in Central America and of Nicaragua exporting revolution and subversion in the region. Today the Contras are fighting to keep the Sandinistas in check. But what will we do if the Sandinistas' threats become reality, and we have abandoned the Contras? We will then be left with but one response: sending U.S. Armed Forces into combat in the region. That is a possibility I want with all my heart to avoid. And it is for this reason that my conscience tells me to vote to continue support for the Contras.

We are all following developments in Nicaragua with great interest. So far, the Sandinistas have sent some disturbing signals. In August, after Ortega signed the peace accord, the Sandinistas arrested two prominent opposition figures—one was Alberto Saborio, the head of the bar association—and held them for 3 weeks. And when Ortega announced his latest concessions in mid-January, the police in Nicaragua were rounding up 11 opposition leaders, including an editor of *La Prensa*. Their crime: having talked to Contra leaders in a meeting outside Nicaragua.

The Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, Humberto Ortega, announced that the Sandinistas plan to seek sophisticated Soviet weapons and to put 600,000 men under arms by 1995.

Given this record, it would be irresponsible simply to take the Sandinistas at their word. Their words must be translated into deeds—not gestures that can be reversed overnight.

At the same time, the United States has an obligation to encourage the emerging peace process. The best way to do so is to keep the Contras alive, but to reduce the level and kind of funding. Fortunately, the President's request does just that. The total aid request of \$36.2 million represents a substantially scaled back figure. Only 10 percent, or \$3.6 million, is for lethal aid, and it is to be held, unspent, in a separate account through March. The aid can only be released if the President certifies to Congress that: First, no cease-fire is in place; second, the Sandinistas had failed to comply with their promises for democratization; and third, the Contras had acted in good faith. Moreover, the President has promised to consult with the four Central American democracies on whether to release the military aid, and he has promised to inform Congress of their recommendations. He has also stated that he will withhold the lethal aid if Congress adopts a sense of Congress resolution that the Nicaraguan Government has complied with the peace accords.

It is worth noting that the Guatemala peace accord called for cessation of aid to guerrillas to take place simultaneously with a cease-fire and democratization. Let us hope and pray that our reserve fund for lethal aid will never be released, that the Sandinistas and the Contras agree on a cease-fire. Then we will be on the road to true peace and democracy, and our assistance can go toward healing this war-torn region.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. RAY].

Mr. RAY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 444.

Mr. Chairman, earlier today I spoke on the floor and submitted for the RECORD 60 members of Daniel Ortega's inner circle of government including Daniel Ortega.

These biographical backgrounds gave the specific training, educational backgrounds, and history of each individual.

Tomorrow, every one who reads this RECORD will see that many of these people were trained or educated in such countries as Cuba, the Soviet Union, East Germany, and other Communist countries.

Mr. Chairman, I also read into the RECORD the Sandinista creed which Daniel Ortega and its inner circle took an oath to.

Mr. Chairman, since making this statement, today my telephones have been inundated with calls and I've been asked again to refer to this creed which I will do now.

THE SANDINISTA CREED

I believe in the doctrines and struggles of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Che Guevara—the great teachers, and guides of the working class which is the productive force and true driving force of the class struggle.

I believe in the building of the Marxist-Leninist Socialist Society.

Mr. Chairman, I refer to this simply to bring out the fact that when you are depending on the Communist government to set up free elections which could be a duplication of what happened in El Salvador—the establishment of a democracy—its going to be an uphill battle. Ladies and gentlemen, we need these remaining 5 months and a positive vote tonight will provide it.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] the Republican leader.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I suspect there will be several distinguished speakers on the Democratic side who will rise after me, and I know that the House will accord them the courtesy of attention. I would hope that you might accord the same privilege to those of us on this side of the aisle. It has been a long day, and I simply want to first congratulate the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] and thank him profusely for the manner in which he has conducted and managed the debate on our side of the aisle, to all of his cohorts who have acquitted themselves so well during the course of this debate. And let me turn over here to my Democratic side, too, and thank those of you who feel as we do and have talked in support of our resolution today and, yes, helped us work hard to garner votes. I am most appreciative of that effort.

I am reminded of a couple of years ago on that rostrum when I was there for only a few moments as we began a session saying there might be times when the issue would cross the aisle here, and this is one of those occasions. It is a foreign policy debate that we have been discussing today, and it

is on foreign policy, and it ought to be a bipartisan decision when finally the vote is cast.

I was here in the House when President John Kennedy spoke all those marvelous words about an Alliance for Progress in Latin America. They were very beautiful words that he uttered, but there was no followup or progress made, and his legacy left the Cuban people with a Communist state headed by Fidel Castro.

Contrast that record, if you will, with President Reagan's Central American initiative. Seven years ago there were four dictatorships and one democracy in Central America. Today, after consistent support from the United States, there is only one dictatorship in Nicaragua and four democratically elected governments surrounding it.

The record of progress cannot be disputed, and it was accomplished with both military and economic assistance for which we had to pull out all the stops to get approval over the past several years.

Now even after these successes there are those in the House who would alter the balance of power and change the dual formula that has gotten us this far in the peace process. We are told today that humanitarian aid is all that is required to support the democratic resistance in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, I want these advocates of humanitarian assistance only to tell me is the Soviet Union on the verge of pulling out of Afghanistan because of our humanitarian assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters or because of the unmentionable military assistance component?

When we came to the aid of postwar Europe we did it not only with the Marshall plan of economic assistance, but with NATO as well for security and stability.

The gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM] and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] before me turned to the left over here to the portrait of Lafayette. Of course, being the in-house Frenchman I guess I am free to make the comment that if during our Revolution the French had sent us only humanitarian aid, we would all be singing, "God Save the Queen" tonight.

The Communists in Nicaragua are saying that if we stop sending aid to the Contras at this time they really, honestly, truly, cross their hearts and hope to die promise us that democracy is going to come to Nicaragua.

I tell my colleagues that Jimmy Carter trusted the Sandinista Communists in 1979, and it actually helped to bring them to power. Congress was urged to trust them likewise and gave them \$118 million of American taxpayer dollars. Most people have forgotten that bit of history.

Now about that catchy phrase used so often in today's debate, "Let us give peace a chance." I have to ask the question: What kind of a peace are we talking about? The people in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe would undoubtedly say they are at peace, but that is not the kind of peace that I envision for truly freedom-loving people. I tell you, my friends, we give peace a chance only when we give freedom a hand.

Sometimes I wish I was not as old as I am, but I will tell you there are several advantages in recalling personal experiences of history, and I can still see that black and white Movie Tone news clip of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain stepping off that old trimotored plane at Heathrow Airport in London. He had just returned from that famed mission in Munich with Hitler with an umbrella in one hand and waving that piece of paper in the other hand saying, "Peace in our time."

What a farce. What peace. It was not worth the paper it was written on, and millions of us were called into service to straighten it all out soon thereafter.

A lasting peace grows from secure freedom, my friends. It is not the other way around.

Finally, my colleagues, this has been a contentious issue for the past 8 years now for me I guess. I could say that I am getting a bit weary of dealing with it time after time after time. I think there are some other issues out there I would like to get to, but then I have to remind myself of the typical Communist tactic of stringing us along with false hopes and promises wearing us down in the hope that in a fit of frustration we will throw in the towel.

My colleagues, we are at a very critical juncture tonight. I plead with you to vote for this well crafted, balanced package one more time. The President has really shown his flexibility to accommodate Members of the Congress on both sides of the aisle and offered us the opportunity in March to make another assessment.

The President has been very accommodating in trying to cater to both sides of the aisle, and Members who come to him in good grace and ask him for an opportunity to be heard have been heard, and the President offered us in March another assessment of whether there has been progress or not.

I guess one thing is for sure, the issue of Nicaragua and Central America is not simply going to fade away. But it seems to me if my colleagues vote this package down they had better be prepared to bear the consequences. And you folks particularly who are on the margin and I may have to say on this side of the aisle, ought not to be deluded into thinking you can make it all right by voting for

some unknown proposal several weeks down the pike as you have been apparently promised by your leadership.

There is no way you can save the democratic resistance as a meaningful force if you vote this package down. Look what you do to their morale. How do you suppose you can sustain them in the field? What recourse do they have out there on their own?

And bear in mind, those of us who are privy to some of the things that really go on and how this operation has taken place, beginning tomorrow that operation will have to begin to be phased down and closed down if this is a negative vote tonight.

As the gentleman from Texas [Mr. STENHOLM] said earlier, do not expect those of us who feel so strongly about this package, who have worked so hard for it, to simply embrace some ineffective, watered down palative to satisfy our conscience.

I would pose one final question to those of my colleagues who have so much confidence in the Sandinistas. Who among you is smart enough to predict the path Daniel Ortega will take you on?

Believe me, as for me I am taking no chance tonight. I am sticking with our President, who really does know where he wants to go, and his plan, without question, is in the best interests of the United States. I would ask for your support of our resolution.

□ 2145

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CRANE].

Mr. CRANE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, by all accounts, the success of President Reagan's aid request will be decided by a relatively small group of conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans, and given the high stakes of this vote, they could well determine the future of Central America. As these legislators finalize their positions, they must decide whether Nicaragua represents a security threat to its neighbors, and determine whether the Sandinista's can be trusted to abide by the Arias peace plan. Finally, they must decide whether the Contras are the best hope we have of ever seeing Nicaragua develop into a democracy.

Nicaragua is clearly becoming the single greatest threat to the security of Central America. A former senior official in the Nicaraguan Army, Roger Miranda, who recently defected to the United States, revealed that Nicaragua plans to develop an army of 600,000. Under this mobilization, which has been confirmed by dictator Ortega, one in every five Nicaraguans would be placed under arms. If a similar mobilization were to take place in the United States, our army would be 50 million strong. During the 1980s, the Soviet bloc has sent 8 times more military aid to Cuba and Nicaragua than the United States has sent to Central America. It has sent 10 times more economic aid than the United

States. The Soviet bloc has provided Nicaragua with \$4 billion in assistance while the United States has provided the freedom fighters with less than \$250 million.

The Sandinistas cannot be trusted to abide by the Arias peace plan. In 1979, when the Sandinistas needed the support of the Organization of American States to legitimize their regime, they promised to allow political pluralism, maintain a truly mixed economy, respect human rights, and conduct a nonaligned foreign policy. As the Communists broke these promises, purged their opponents, and started building a Marxist/Leninist state dependent on Soviet and Cuban military assistance, President Carter ceased giving them aid. In the years that followed, the Sandinistas consolidated their control over the country with a Marxist government.

Today the Sandinistas appear to be complying with some aspects of the Arias peace plan. In the last few weeks, just before the Contra vote, the Ortega regime reopened Radio Catolica, lifted its state of emergency, offered a limited amnesty to the Contras, and allowed a few opposition parties to demonstrate in public. But these "concessions" have not met all the requirements of the Arias plan. The Communists have failed to meet all of the commitments outlined in the peace accords by the November 5 deadline.

Given the unwillingness of the Sandinistas to keep their earlier promises, what assurances do we have that they will not simply abolish the few freedoms that they have granted in the future? It is only prudent for Members to question the integrity of a government which consistently breaks its promises, violates human rights, depends on Soviet and Cuban arms for control, and works to destabilize its neighbors. Members must conclude that trust must be earned and that the Sandinistas have done nothing to earn our trust.

The democratic resistance is our best hope of moving the Nicaraguan Communists toward maintaining the few freedoms they have recently granted and eventually forcing them to allow a truly pluralistic society to develop. Opponents of Contra aid would lead us to believe that we should give peace a chance and that any further aid to the freedom fighters would doom the peace process. For some strange reason, they believe that negotiation is sufficient to force the Sandinistas to see the light and change their ways. These well meaning individuals demonstrate only their keen misunderstanding about how the world works.

History teaches us that the proper response to disputes with our adversaries depends on the nature of our disagreement and the intentions of our opponents. We have always been willing to negotiate with those who respect the rule of law and the borders of their neighbors. In recent history, for example, we have consistently been able to work out our differences with Mexico and Canada over the negotiating table. But unfortunately, we have also been confronted by states that threaten the national security interests and the political integrity of our allies. These states, such as North Korea and North Vietnam, did not respect the rule of law and were intent on invading their neighbors. Hence, we were forced to use both force and negotiation in an effort to settle our disputes with them. Although we failed in Viet-

nam owing to domestic political constraints, we were successful in South Korea. Most recently, our friends in Angola and Afghanistan have been confronted with brutal, Communist regimes intent on their extermination. Our conscience required us to provide military and humanitarian assistance to these freedom fighters and they have been directly responsible for bringing their adversaries to the bargaining table.

Given the growing military might of Nicaragua, and their willingness to keep their promises and negotiate in good faith, we must support both the use of force and the power of persuasion to force the Sandinistas to moderate their policies. It is only now, after the Sandinistas have been threatened by the ravages of a war-torn economy and the might of a credible military opponent, that they have been brought to the negotiating table. Since September of 1986 when American military assistance began to flow again, 15,000 freedom fighters have infiltrated into Nicaragua. During 1987, both sides agreed that clashes averaged 300 per month. Future progress toward peace and freedom in Central America requires that the Contras continue to exert similar pressure on the Communists. We have a moral obligation to continue supporting the freedom fighters and thus we must pass the President's request for Contra aid. I urge my colleagues to support the resolution of the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND], the former chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the President's request for additional lethal and non-lethal military assistance for the Nicaraguan Contras.

We begin this session as we ended the last—debating Contra aid.

Unlike 6 weeks ago, today, we debate the issue squarely on its merits, without the presence of other important concerns that properly commanded our attention, during the deliberations on the continuing resolution.

For me, the Contra aid issue reduces itself to this question: at this critical juncture in the history of Central America, does the furtherance of the peace process require, as President Reagan maintains, furnishing the Contras with more military supplies?

I cannot conclude that it does.

In fact, I believe that the opposite is true.

If we approve this request, in my judgment the odds, against the eventual success of the Arias peace plan grow longer, rather than shorter.

There have been some helpful signs in Central America in the past 6 weeks since we last debated this issue.

The Central American presidents have met to assess the status of their peace plan.

Not surprisingly, they have found that in 6 months, it has not achieved all of its goals.

But they have also found that, some discernable progress, has been made.

The Sandinistas and the Contras have met for the first time in direct negotiations.

Cease-fire proposals have been exchanged.

Clearly, much work remains, and the road ahead is both long and uncertain.

But I believe, that more has been done to advance the cause of peace during the 6 months of the Arias peace plan, than in the 6 years of war, which preceded it.

The issue now, is how to best nurture the fragile process of negotiation, so recently begun.

President Reagan argues that Contra military pressure drove the Sandinistas to the negotiating table, and that only a continuation of such pressure will keep them there.

That, it seems to me, is a view of the current, and likely future military stature of the Contras, that, is dangerously at odds, with reality.

Let us be candid about the limitations of the Contras.

I have seen no evidence which would support a conclusion, that the Contras are the vanguard, of a popular revolution likely to topple the Sandinista government.

While Contra forces range widely across sparsely populated areas of Nicaragua, they hold no territory.

They do not have the ability to prevent the Sandinistas from acquiring Soviet bloc military equipment, in fact, they provide a continued pretense for doing so.

Neither can they establish a barrier around Nicaragua to prevent the export of Sandinista assistance to leftist guerrilla forces in Central America.

I should think, that more than 5 years of debating Contra aid, and measuring its results, we would be honest enough to acknowledge that, if the military and paramilitary activities of the Sandinistas pose a true threat, to the security of the United States, and our neighbors in this hemisphere, than we and our allies directly, not through the use of surrogates, will have to do something about it.

The Contras most certainly are, and can remain, an irritant to the Sandinistas.

They can exacerbate, an already bad economic situation in Nicaragua.

They can ensure that more Nicaraguans—combatants and noncombatants alike—will die in the weeks ahead.

I would hope, however, that the goal of our policy would be, to produce a result better than that, for the people of Nicaragua.

The peace plan, crafted by the leaders of the nations with the biggest stake, in the settlement of the conflicts in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America, offers a more hopeful alternative.

I believe, that it was that plan, that brought the Sandinistas and the Contras to the bargaining table and that it will be diplomatic pressure, exerted through the framework of that plan, that will keep them there.

To those who, discomforted by the lack of certitude that the Arias plan will live up to the expectations of its creators, would like to hedge their bets by providing just a little more aid to the Contras, while loudly proclaiming their support for negotiations, I say that it is time for a different approach.

Let us give the peace process a full, and fair chance to succeed.

I am prepared to do that by rejecting President Reagan's aid request.

I urge my colleagues to do the same.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oklahoma has 18 minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA].

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I have been listening all day to these debates and somebody just said to me, "Now, Murtha, I know you don't ever get involved in any deals, but I hear they are giving bridges out. I don't have any river, but I will take a bridge any time."

Now I have not heard a lot of new words in the debate, but I can remember in listening to some of the critics today, that some of the same people got up on the policy we were trying to follow in El Salvador. And I remember going down to El Salvador as an observer for the election and they had it fixed up so that I was supposed to go out into an area that very few Americans have been out to. They had a helicopter to fly me out there. It was kind of a dangerous type thing.

Father Hesburgh was along on that trip. He said, "Jack, if you are going out there I would like to go out there with you." I said, "Oh, this is very dangerous, Father, I don't think you would like to go." He said, "If you get killed I want to be able to give you the last rites." He got his beads out.

Now I know some people here would like to see that happen.

But we went out and they predicted, many Members of Congress predicted and many people in El Salvador predicted that the guerrillas would keep them from voting. Now this was on the constitution itself.

Eighty percent of the people in El Salvador voted even though the guerrillas said, "We are going to cut off your fingers."

I remember tears coming to our eyes as we flew over the countryside seeing these people lined up to vote in El Salvador.

Finally, after a lot of argument, and there is no question about the opposition on the floor having a lot to do with the way the final government was fashioned, but it worked out a policy and it has been very successful.

Here you have a President and El Salvador who at one time had been elected and the military threw him into jail and they were going to kill him. They broke his face. You will notice how prominent his jaws are. They broke his jaws and his face bones. The only reason he was saved is because Father Hesburgh intervened and saved his life.

But the point is the United States was involved and we have got a viable democracy, being criticized from both sides in many cases, but a viable democracy that is working in El Salvador because of the policy that was helped in the United States.

Now I remember going down to Nicaragua. This was when Ortega first took over. I was one of the people that they called a Communist when I voted for the aid that President Carter offered to Ortega. I remember people getting up on the floor and they said, "You are giving aid to Communists and this is wrong." But President Carter said, "Let me tell you, we want to help you out."

Well, you remember what happened. President Carter had to withdraw that aid because he was so concerned about some of the things that were happening, some of the violations of human rights. But we offered that type of assistance.

But I went down and I met with Comandante Ortega. I remember how vigorous he was—and I used the word "vigorous" loosely—about some of the things that I asked him. I said, for instance, "How come you are expanding that runway to 10,000 feet?" He said, "We are going to bring Mig's in there." Of course, I got a little bit hot and I jumped up and I said, "You bring the Mig's in, we are going to take them out." He jumped up and we had a big argument there in his Presidential chamber. I was kind of embarrassed that we were shouting back and forth.

But Kirk O'Donnell reminded me after the Grenada invasion, he said, "You remember what you told Ortega about taking those Mig's out." And I said, "Yes. I had forgotten all about it." But the point is in this long dissertation I am convinced if they are doing their own fighting we will avoid that type of a thing if we keep them straight. I certainly do not know which one of our positions is right. I believe, though, that you have to keep military pressure on the Sandinistas in order to keep them honest.

I am convinced we are close to peace. I admire the Speaker of the House for the chance he took with the President of the United States in order to propose a peace proposal. And I know we

disagreed on how we come about that peace. But I am convinced peace is at hand in Nicaragua and the thing that worries me, those guerrillas are out there in the mountains and jungles and there is no way they can get out of there without having some resupply of food.

Now food is the problem, the biggest problem they have in taking the 30 days when they have to start moving out of there. And if we do not resupply them in some way they are going to be caught in a crossfire and they are going to have to live off the country and that is a real mistake.

So I would ask the Members to think very carefully in their vote today and I would ask you to supply this additional aid that we need to keep the military pressure on the Sandinistas, to keep them honest so that we can have peace in Central America. Thank you very much.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished Speaker of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I think this debate has been characterized by an extraordinarily high level of sincerity. I believe it applies to both sides.

I want to congratulate those who have conducted the debate—the gentleman from Oklahoma on this side and those who have worked with the gentleman from Wisconsin on this side. I accord sincerity to both and to all. There is no one in this Chamber who wants to support a Communist society. There is no one in this Chamber who wants to encourage or support a Fascist dictatorship. None of us attributes unworthy motives to any among us.

As a matter of fact, it gives me no joy to be in opposition to the President of the United States on a foreign policy debate. I am much happier when it is possible for me to stand here and be in a supportive role in matters of international affairs. That is the ideal situation.

It has been with great pleasure that I have stood in this very place, at this very microphone in active support of the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative, in support of the recommendations of the Kissinger report, in support of the government's recommendations for support of El Salvador and that very electoral process to which my friend from Pennsylvania just referred. He and I both were present at those elections and were greatly impressed by them.

I have risen in numerous other instances involving bipartisan foreign policy objectives.

Last August I took great pleasure and some small political risk, perhaps, in standing beside the President of the United States and joining with him in

appealing to the Presidents of the Central American republics to launch an initiative for peace and democracy in the hemisphere and in their region.

They heeded our plea and within days they launched the historic Central American peace initiative which they still are actively pursuing and under which progress still is being made—too slowly, but progress nevertheless.

Having encouraged them in that effort, I think we have the responsibility to support them and to support the peace process.

One of the principles of the Esquipulas accords calls for the cessation of outside military aid to insurgent forces in Central America. Now we have the right to call upon other governments, other countries to abide by those accords. And just as we call on others to abide by them, do we not have the responsibility to comply ourselves?

□ 2200

It seems to me that we do. We tried going it alone. That did not work. For 6 long years, this Government recruited, operated, maintained, and equipped an army.

With all of that effort aimed at the overthrow of the Government in Nicaragua, we did not get anywhere. There were no concessions made on the part of the Government of Nicaragua as a result of 6 years of Contra attack. Yet in 6 months, their neighbors—pursuing the process of peace—have elicited from the Nicaraguan Government some significant concessions—not enough yet, but still significant. As a result of the pressures of the peace process, the Nicaraguan Government has permitted the opening of newspapers and radio stations; it has created a reconciliation commission and appointed as its head one of the government's most severe critics, Cardinal Obando y Bravo; and it has repealed the emergency act which had done away with some political rights and which actually created a system of military law. It has agreed to negotiate directly with the Contra forces, and it has indicated its willingness to release political prisoners, to establish limits on the size of its army and armaments, to dispense with all foreign military advisors, to prohibit any foreign military bases on Nicaraguan soil, and to prevent the use of its territory for the subversion of any other state in the region.

These are things that the Nicaraguan leaders say they are willing to negotiate to our satisfaction if we sit down and talk with them. They have made those commitments to the President's of the Central American republics and, in writing, to the President of the United States.

Under the urging of this peace process, the Nicaraguans also have agreed to conduct free and fair elections and

to abide by the results of those elections.

Let me quote from a statement written by President Ortega for publication in the New York Times. He said,

If the opposition wins the election, we will turn over the government to them. There should be no doubt or equivocation about our intentions here.

He writes,

We are prepared to become the loyal opposition if that is what the Nicaraguan people decide."

I do not know whether you can trust that or not. I am not telling you that you can, but I think you have to test it. And surely the way to test it is by sitting down at the negotiating table and following the process of peace.

Other people, too, just as we do, have pride and dignity. They must be allowed to keep their pride, and they must be permitted to negotiate in good faith as equals. Obviously, it does not do any good for us to take the position—and it is childish and ridiculous for us to take the position—that we are above talking with the Nicaraguan leaders because they are Marxists. We talk with the leaders of the Soviet Union. They are Marxist. We talk with the leaders of the People's Republic of China. For us to take the position that we are on a lofty perch and can just look down with disdain on these people in Central America sometimes leaves the unfortunate impression that we consider them to be our inferiors. I am afraid that is the difficulty we have had for so very many years throughout Latin America.

We do not object to humanitarian aid for those people whom we have recruited into battle. Surely we owe them that. If this resolution is rejected today, we shall present to the House in a very timely fashion the opportunity to continue truly humanitarian aid, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MURTHA] mentioned—clothing, shelter, medicines, and the means of their effective delivery to the Contra forces during the time when the peace agreement is being worked out.

President Reagan said something a few days ago which I think is important. In paraphrasing a statement of World War II vintage by Winston Churchill, he said, "I did not come to Washington to preside over the comunization of Central America." Well, of course he did not. He does not want that result. None of us wants that result. None of us came to Washington for that result.

But there is an important point to make, and that is that neither Mr. Reagan nor any of us came to Washington to preside over Central America in any sense. We came to Washington to preside over the United States.

I think the point I am trying to make is that the people of Central America elect their own leaders to

speaking for their own countries. The five Central American Presidents have joined together and have asked us not to send any more destructive weapons into their region. There have been enough deaths. Forty-five thousand people have died in one of their countries, and 35,000 people have died in another of their countries. They have asked us to desist from sending aid to irregular forces trying to topple and overthrow governments in their region.

Let us heed their plea. Let us accord them the respect that is due them. Let us accord them the right of local, non-violent self-determination, on which right we would insist for our country. Perhaps the people they may choose to elect to run their country may not be people of our choosing; but after all, it is not our country. Maybe the people we elect would not be people they would choose. But let us respect one another. Let us join with them—not against them—in seeking an avenue to peace and democracy and justice with dignity. Let us show by our vote that we are prepared to reembrace the good neighbor policy, and that we are prepared to give peace a chance.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair wishes to state that the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has 11 minutes remaining.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds just to make two quick points. One is that it is true that the Sandinista government did ask Obando y Bravo to fill an important role, and just last weekend Cardinal Obando y Bravo's principal deputy said to us, a bipartisan group that was meeting with him, that in fact they did not believe that the Sandinistas would negotiate in sincerity if aid to the Contras was removed.

I would also say to the Chair that the head of the human rights commission in Nicaragua said that the release of political prisoners if another country will take them—in other words, exile—is not compliance with the peace accords.

Mr. Chairman, I yield all my remaining time, to conclude the debate, to the senior statesman of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. PEPPER] is recognized for 10 and one half minutes.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, let me say to my colleagues in the House that I join my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, in paying our highest tribute to our revered and distinguished Speaker, for whom we all have such great affection for the courage and wisdom he has shown throughout in trying to find a peaceful solution to this tragic situation in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, today I am reminded of the second inaugural address of Abraham Lincoln when, in speaking of the War Between the States, he said, "Each side, thinking it supported a just cause, prayed to the same God for victory."

Today I do not see Democrats and Republicans debating an issue; I see Americans trying to determine what is the best way to achieve peace and democracy in Nicaragua, Central America, and in the Western Hemisphere. It is no different than the issues that we constantly debate here on this floor. This is not a Republican proposal; it is not a Democratic proposal; it is an American question. How can we best do it?

May I say that some of us, of course, feel a little more sensitive to this subject than others due to our location. We who live particularly in south Florida live as neighbors to at least 75,000 Nicaraguans who have been forced to flee from their country to find sanctuary and to find the freedom of America, and this House last year passed a resolution permitting them to stay in America until conditions in that country permitted their safe return. So we are concerned because we are most proximate in miles to Nicaragua and we have more association with the people.

Furthermore, we have a large part of our population who have known what persecution means in the Cuba from which they fled with our help. They had to leave their homes, their furniture, and their businesses. Most of them escaped with their lives but they lost everything else. So we are close to the problem, and we are very much concerned about how we can solve that problem.

What are the objectives? Is there any difference in our opinions on that subject? We all want peace, and we all want democracy. All we are talking about is this: What is the best way to get it?

I submit to my friends of the opposition that I believe there is a policy in that position. They are going on the assumption that if we kill the Contra aid, we will let the world know tonight when we leave this Chamber that there is at least not going to be any military aid and maybe no more humanitarian aid to the Contras, and that somehow or other will advance the peace process with which we are all concerned.

I agree with the position of the New York Times stated on January 31. It says that Congress seems "eager to support the peace plan of President Arias of Costa Rica," and that Congress "seems ready to pull the plug on the Contras."

"That risks creating a perverse result."

As President Arias says, "The future of aid to the Contras is in the hands of

the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. That being so, the threat to continue aid, at this precise moment, could put constructive pressure on the Sandinista government to keep up its grudging toward peace. Congressmen who truly support the Arias plan will see that and avoid a final decision to end aid now."

In this morning's Washington Post, I think the matter was properly stated, and this is a very brief summary of their view:

The record of the last 6 months demonstrates, we believe, that a carrot-and-stick combination has moved the Sandinistas. With cease-fire talks scheduled to resume next week, this is no time to demobilize the forces of one side alone. We think the same combination can move the Sandinistas further without capsizing the peace plan, and on the basis we support the President's request.

Why do we have to hurt the peace plan if we adopt this resolution? The President in his letter of February 3 to ROBERT MICHEL has said that he first defers the release of the \$3,600,000 worth of military aid until the end of March to see how the peace program is progressing. Then he says:

If even at that time in my opinion it is not progressing satisfactorily, I will consult with the leaders of the Congress, and then if in Congress within 10 days there is the passage of a concurrent resolution stating that the peace program is proceeding satisfactorily and I should not release the military aid, I will not do so.

□ 2215

What endangers the peace plan with a proposal like that?

On the other hand, what is going to be the effect of our decision tonight if it is against this resolution upon the Contras?

Is it not really the intention of this opposition, my beloved friends and colleagues, to let the world know we are not going to give ever any more military aid to the Contras? Is that not really what we are seeing?

Now, what is going to be the effect of that? Suppose the Contras are not able to continue their pressure. Suppose the peace plan fails with a weak Contra opposition facing the Sandinista government. Who is going to save the peace, those four weak small Central American countries? Can they do it? Do you think they would undertake it? Would they be a match for the Soviet Union helping the Sandinistas to have a 600,000-man army? Would they be able to stand against the power of Castro? Would they survive another Contra organization? What strength would there be behind the peace movement then? Would they go back and try to pick up the pieces and reconstruct the Contras, put them in the field again, let them make another contribution to another era?

I say to you, my fellow Congressmen, my dear colleagues, it is a mis-

take for us to defeat this resolution. It does not endanger the peace process. It strengthens it.

The Washington Post is right. It is a stick and a carrot. The peace plan has not done all this by itself. It had the aid of the Contras who have been winning battles lately.

Why do we want to dispense with the stick if we are willing to be careful about its use and use it only when it is consistent with the progress of the peace plan?

So, my colleagues, I beg of you, I hope and pray that the decision we make tonight will be a wise one. I hope that we will be governed, not by petty considerations or selfish interests, but by what is good for America, what is good for our beloved hemisphere and what is good for this blessed part of the globe.

I ask you, let us continue the course that has brought us to the satisfactory conclusion that we enjoy today and let us hope and pray that that decision in its wisdom will be such that down the long lane of future years will contribute to achieving those goals for which we all hope and work and pray, peace and democracy for all the nations and all the people of our beloved hemisphere.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS] has the right to close debate and has 1 minute remaining.

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The text of House Joint Resolution 444 is as follows:

H.J. RES. 444

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled. That the Congress hereby approves the additional authority and assistance for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance that the President requested pursuant to H.J. Res. 395 of the One Hundredth Congress, the Act making continuing appropriations for fiscal year 1988.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to section 111(k)(3) of Public Law 100-202, no amendments are in order; and pursuant to section 111(k)(4) of said law, the Committee does now rise.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the Chair, Mr. KILDEE, Chairman of the Committee on the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 444) relating to Central America pursuant to House Joint Resolution 395 of the 100th Congress, pursuant to section 111(k)(4) of Public Law 100-202, he reported the bill back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to section 111(k)(4) Public Law 100-202, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 211, noes 219, not voting 3, as follows:

[Roll No. 7]

AYES—211

Archer	Hammerschmidt	Pickett
Armey	Hansen	Porter
Badham	Harris	Pursell
Baker	Hastert	Quillen
Ballenger	Hatcher	Ravenel
Barnard	Hayes (LA)	Ray
Bartlett	Hefley	Regula
Barton	Berger	Rhodes
Bateman	Hiller	Ridge
Bennett	Holloway	Rinaldo
Bentley	Hopkins	Ritter
Bereuter	Hubbard	Roberts
Bevill	Huckaby	Robinson
Bilirakis	Hunter	Roemer
Billey	Hutto	Rogers
Boulter	Hyde	Roth
Broomfield	Inhofe	Roukema
Brown (CO)	Ireland	Rowland (CT)
Buechner	Jenkins	Saiki
Bunning	Johnson (CT)	Saxton
Burton	Kasich	Schaefer
Byron	Kemp	Schuetz
Callahan	Kolbe	Schulze
Chandler	Konnyu	Sensenbrenner
Chapman	Kyl	Shaw
Chappell	Lagomarsino	Shumway
Cheney	Latta	Shuster
Clinger	Leath (TX)	Sisisky
Coats	Lent	Skeen
Coble	Lewis (CA)	Skelton
Coleman (MO)	Lewis (FL)	Slaughter (VA)
Combest	Lipinski	Smith (FL)
Coughlin	Livingston	Smith (NE)
Courter	Lloyd	Smith (NJ)
Craig	Lott	Smith (TX)
Crane	Lowery (CA)	Smith, Denny
Dannemeyer	Lujan	(OR)
Darden	Lukens, Donald	Smith, Robert
Daub	Lungren	(NH)
Davis (IL)	Mack	Smith, Robert
Davis (MI)	Madigan	(OR)
DeLay	Marlenee	Snowe
DeWine	Martin (IL)	Solomon
Dickinson	Martin (NY)	Spence
DioGuardi	McCandless	Stangeland
Dornan (CA)	McCollum	Stenholm
Dowdy	McDade	Stratton
Dreier	McEwen	Stump
Duncan	McGrath	Sundquist
Edwards (OK)	McMillan (NC)	Sweeney
Emerson	Meyers	Swindall
English	Michel	Tallon
Erdreich	Miller (OH)	Tauzin
Fascell	Miller (WA)	Taylor
Fawell	Molinari	Thomas (CA)
Fields	Mollohan	Thomas (GA)
Fish	Montgomery	Upton
Flippo	Moorhead	Vander Jagt
Frenzel	Morrison (WA)	Vucanovich
Galleghy	Murtha	Walker
Gallo	Myers	Watkins
Gekas	Nelson	Weber
Gibbons	Nichols	Weldon
Gilman	Nielson	Whittaker
Gingrich	Ortiz	Wilson
Goodling	Oxley	Wolf
Gradison	Packard	Wortley
Grandy	Parris	Wylie
Grant	Pashayan	Young (AK)
Gregg	Patterson	Young (FL)
Gunderson	Pepper	
Hall (TX)	Petri	

NOES—219

Ackerman	Frost	Natcher
Akaka	Garcia	Neal
Alexander	Gaydos	Nowak
Anderson	Gejdenson	Oakar
Andrews	Gephardt	Oberstar
Anunzio	Glickman	Obey
Anthony	Gonzalez	Olin
Applegate	Gordon	Owens (NY)
Aspin	Gray (IL)	Owens (UT)
Atkins	Gray (PA)	Panetta
AuCoin	Green	Pease
Bates	Guarini	Pelosi
Beilenson	Hall (OH)	Penny
Berman	Hamilton	Perkins
Bilbray	Hawkins	Pickle
Boehrlert	Hayes (IL)	Price (IL)
Boggs	Hefner	Price (NC)
Boland	Henry	Rahall
Bonior	Hertel	Rangel
Bonker	Hochbrueckner	Richardson
Borski	Horton	Rodino
Bosco	Houghton	Roe
Boucher	Howard	Rose
Boxer	Hoyer	Rostenkowski
Brennan	Hughes	Rowland (GA)
Brooks	Jacobs	Roybal
Brown (CA)	Jeffords	Russo
Bruce	Johnson (SD)	Sabo
Bryant	Jones (NC)	Savage
Bustamante	Jontz	Sawyer
Campbell	Kanjorski	Scheuer
Cardin	Kaptur	Schneider
Carper	Kastenmeier	Schroeder
Carr	Kennedy	Schumer
Clarke	Kennelly	Sharp
Clay	Kildee	Shays
Clement	Kleczka	Sikorski
Coelho	Kolter	Skaggs
Coleman (TX)	Kostmayer	Slattery
Collins	LaFalce	Slaughter (NY)
Conte	Lancaster	Smith (IA)
Conyers	Lantos	Solarz
Cooper	Leach (IA)	Spratt
Coyne	Lehman (CA)	St Germain
Crockett	Lehman (FL)	Staggers
de la Garza	Leland	Stallings
Dellums	Levin (MI)	Stark
Derrick	Levine (CA)	Stokes
Dicks	Lewis (GA)	Studds
Dingell	Lowry (WA)	Swift
Dixon	Lukens, Thomas	Synar
Donnelly	MacKay	Tauke
Dorgan (ND)	Manton	Torres
Downey	Markey	Torricelli
Durbin	Martinez	Towns
Dwyer	Matsui	Traficant
Dymally	Mavroules	Traxler
Dyson	Mazzoli	Udall
Early	McCloskey	Valentine
Eckart	McCurdy	Vento
Edwards (CA)	McHugh	Visclosky
Espy	McMillen (MD)	Volkmer
Evans	Mfume	Walgren
Fazio	Mica	Waxman
Feighan	Miller (CA)	Weiss
Flake	Mineta	Wheat
Florio	Moakley	Whitten
Foglietta	Moody	Williams
Foley	Morella	Wise
Ford (MI)	Morrison (CT)	Wolpe
Ford (TN)	Mrazek	Wyden
Frank	Murphy	Yates
	Nagle	Yatron

NOT VOTING—3

Biaggi	Jones (TN)	Lightfoot
--------	------------	-----------

□ 2230

So the joint resolution was not passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

REQUEST FOR CONSIDERATION OF S. 1539, RAILROAD SAFETY ACT OF 1987

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Commerce be discharged from further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 1539) to amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman from Ohio comment on whether this has been cleared through either the ranking Member or the Republican leadership?

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, we understood that it was cleared with the minority. We understood it was cleared through the chairman of the Committee on Energy and Commerce with the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL].

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, further reserving the right to object, under your rule none of this is supposed to be brought up without clearance from the leadership and we are trying to run that check now. We have indication that it has not been cleared, so I will have to continue my reservation of objection until we find out if it has been cleared.

The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman is within her right.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Could the gentleman from Ohio withdraw his unanimous consent request until we are able to find out if this has been cleared? I understand the ranking member of the subcommittee knows nothing of this.

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my unanimous-consent request for the present time.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio withdraws his unanimous-consent request for the time being.

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, we thank the gentleman from Ohio for his consideration.

The SPEAKER. The gentlewoman from Illinois will be notified when the unanimous-consent request of the gentleman from Ohio is brought up again.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on

H.J. Res. 444 the joint resolution just considered.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

PROVIDING FOR ADJOURNMENT OF THE HOUSE FROM TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1988, UNTIL 12 O'CLOCK MERIDIAN, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 1988, AND ADJOURNMENT OF THE SENATE FROM THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 1988, OR FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1988, TO 12 O'CLOCK MERIDIAN, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 1988

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 242), and I ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 242

Resolved, That when the House adjourns on Tuesday, February 9, 1988, it stand adjourned until 12 o'clock meridian on Tuesday, February 16, 1988, or until 12 o'clock meridian on the second day after Members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first; and that when the Senate recesses or adjourns on Thursday, February 4, 1988 or Friday, February 5, 1988, pursuant to a motion made by the majority leader, or his designee, in accordance with this resolution, it stand adjourned until 12 o'clock meridian on Monday, February 15, 1988, or until 12 o'clock meridian on the second day after members are notified to reassemble pursuant to section 2 of this concurrent resolution, whichever occurs first.

Sec. 2. The Speaker of the House and the majority leader of the Senate, acting jointly after consultation with the minority leader of the House and the minority leader of the Senate, shall notify the Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.

□ 2245

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resolution is agreed to.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, and I will not object, but if I understand it, what we are doing is extending the recess for an extra day or two, is that correct?

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. In effect, the extension is 1 day. We would ask unanimous consent subsequent to this approval being given that when the House adjourns tomorrow it adjourn to meet at noon on Monday. We would anticipate a pro forma session Monday, a legislative session on Tuesday. We will announce a schedule subsequently.

Then, in accordance with this resolution, when the House would adjourn on Tuesday, February 9, it would adjourn to February 16. By the way, we

would intend to have business on February 16 with votes, so Members should be advised that that day would be a day not only of return but a day of legislative business.

Mr. WALKER. Further reserving the right to object, I would just ask the gentleman a question. Did the gentleman from Washington indicate there would be business on Tuesday, February 9?

Mr. FOLEY. Yes, we intend to have business on Tuesday, February 9. We will probably announce that tomorrow.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman. Is there any indication as to whether or not there would be votes that day?

Mr. FOLEY. Yes, we expect the possibility of votes that day. It will not be a heavy day, but there may be some votes on that day.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman and I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the resolution is agreed to.

There was no objection.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1988

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns on Thursday, February 4, 1988, it adjourn to meet at 12 noon on Monday, February 8, 1988.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

RAILROAD SAFETY ACT OF 1987

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Energy and Commerce be discharged from further consideration of the Senate bill (S. 1539) to amend the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, this legislation has been cleared, and we thank the gentleman from Ohio for both his courtesy and for making sure that all was well. We appreciate that on this side.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate bill, as follows:

S. 1539

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Railroad Safety Act of 1987".

AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 2. Section 214 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 444) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and

(2) by inserting immediately after subsection (c) the following:

"(d) There are authorized to be appropriated to carry out the provisions of this Act not to exceed \$40,649,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, and not to exceed \$41,868,470 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989."

INCREASED PENALTIES; LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS

Sec. 3. (a) Section 209(a) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(a)) is amended by striking "railroad" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "person (including a railroad or an individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.) as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary)".

(b) Section 209(b) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(b)) is amended by striking all after "thereof" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000, as the Secretary considers reasonable."

(c)(1) The first sentence of section 209(c) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(c)) is amended to read as follows: "Any person violating any rule, regulation, order or standard referred to in subsection (b) of this section may be assessed by the Secretary the civil penalty applicable to the rule, regulation, order or standard violated, except that any penalty may be assessed against an individual only for willful violations."

(2) The third sentence of section 209(c) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(c)) is amended by striking "occurred" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "occurred, in which the individual resides."

(3) Section 209(c) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438(c)) is amended by adding at the end the following: "For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor."

(d) Section 209 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(f) Where, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, violation by an individual of any rule, regulation, order, or standard prescribed by the Secretary under this title indicates that such individual is unfit for performance of any safety-sensitive task, the Secretary may issue an order directing that such individual be prohibited from serving in a safety-sensitive capacity in the rail industry for such period of time as the Secre-

tary considers necessary. This subsection shall not be construed to affect the Secretary's authority under section 203 of this title to take such action on an emergency basis."

QUALIFICATIONS OF OPERATORS OF TRAINS

SEC. 4. Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

"(1) The Secretary shall, within 18 months after the date of enactment of this subsection, issue rules, regulations, standards and orders concerning the minimum qualifications of the operators of trains. In issuing such rules, regulations, standards and orders, the Secretary shall consider the establishment of an engineer licensing program, uniform minimum qualification standards, and a program of review and approval of each railroad's own qualification standards.

"(2) Not later than twelve months after the date of enactment of this subsection, the Secretary shall transmit to the Congress a report on the activities of the Secretary under this subsection, together with an evaluation of the rules, regulations, standards and orders the Secretary anticipates will be issued under this subsection."

ACCESS TO THE NATIONAL DRIVER REGISTER

SEC. 5. (a) Section 206(b) of the National Driver Register Act of 1982 (23 U.S.C. 401, note) is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(5) Any individual who is employed by a railroad and who seeks employment with a railroad and who performs or would perform services covered by the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.) or other safety-sensitive functions, as determined by the Secretary, may request the chief driving licensing official of a State to transmit information regarding the individual under subsection (a) of this section to his or her employer, prospective employer, or to the Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration. The Administrator, employer or prospective employer shall make that information available to the individual, who will be given an opportunity to comment on it in writing. There shall be no access to information in the Register under this paragraph which was entered in the Register more than three years before the date of such request, unless such information relates to revocations or suspensions that are still in effect on the date of the request. Information submitted to the Register by the States under Public Law 86-660 (74 Stat. 526) or under this Act shall be subject to access for the purpose of this paragraph during the transition to the Register established under section 203(a) of this Act."

(b) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (b) of section 206 of the National Driver Register Act of 1982 (23 U.S.C. 401, note) are each amended by adding at the end the following: "Information submitted to the Register by States under Public Law 86-660 (74 Stat. 526) or under this Act shall be subject to access for the purpose of this paragraph during the transition to the Register established under section 203(a) of this Act."

PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION

SEC. 6. Section 212(c)(2) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 441(c)(2)) is amended to read as follows:

"(2) In any proceeding with respect to which a dispute, grievance or claim is brought for resolution before the Adjust-

ment Board (or any division or delegate thereof) or any other Board of Adjustment created under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. 153), such dispute, grievance or claim shall be expedited by any such Board and be resolved within 180 days after its filing. If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a form of discrimination other than discharge, suspension, or any other discrimination with respect to pay, and no other remedy is available under this subsection, the Adjustment Board (or any division or delegate thereof) or any other Board of Adjustment created under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act, may award the aggrieved employee reasonable damages, including punitive damages, not to exceed \$10,000."

NORTHEAST CORRIDOR IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

SEC. 7. Section 704(a)(1) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (45 U.S.C. 854(a)(1)) is amended by adding at the end the following: "improvements to the communication and signal systems at locations between Wilmington, Delaware, and Boston, Massachusetts, on the Northeast Corridor main line and between Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on the Harrisburg Line; improvement to the electric traction systems between Wilmington, Delaware, and Newark, New Jersey; installation of baggage rack restraints, seat back guards and seat lock devices on three hundred forty-eight passenger cars operating within the Northeast Corridor; installation of forty-four event recorders and ten electronic warning devices on locomotives operating within the Northeast Corridor; and acquisition of cab signal test boxes and installation of nine wayside loop code transmitters for use on the Northeast Corridor;"

JURISDICTION OVER HIGH SPEED RAIL SYSTEMS

SEC. 8. (a) Section 202(e) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431(e)) is amended to read as follows:

"(e) The term railroad as used in this title includes all forms of non-highway ground transportation that run on rails or electromagnetic guideways, except for rapid transit operations within an urban area that are not connected to the general railroad system of transportation. The term railroad specifically refers, but is not limited, to (1) commuter or other short-haul rail passenger service in a metropolitan or suburban area, including any commuter rail service which was operated by the Consolidated Rail Corporation as of January 1, 1979, and (2) high speed ground transportation systems that connect metropolitan areas, without regard to whether they use new technologies not associated with traditional railroads."

(b) Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is amended by striking subsections (i), (j), and (k).

ENFORCEMENT OF SUBPOENAS AND ORDERS

SEC. 9. Section 208(a) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 437(a)) is amended by striking all from the semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof the following:

"In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena, order, or directive of the Secretary issued under this subsection or under section 203 of this title by any individual, partnership, or corporation that resides, is found, or conducts business within the jurisdiction of any district court of the United States, such district court shall have jurisdiction, upon petition by the Attorney General, to issue to such individual, partnership, or corporation an order requiring immediate compliance with the Secretary's subpoena,

order, or directive. Failure to obey such court order may be punished by the court as a contempt of court."

STUDY

SEC. 10. Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation shall report to the Congress on the need and feasibility of imposing user fees as a source of funding the costs of administering the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) and all other Federal laws relating to railroad safety and railroad noise control. In preparing such report, the Secretary shall specifically consider various methodologies and means for establishing a schedule of fees to be assessed to railroads or others involved in providing rail transportation; procedures for the collection of such fees; the projected revenues that could be generated by user fees; a projected schedule for the implementation of such fees; and the impact of user fees on railroads or others who might be subject to such fees and on the Federal railroad safety and railroad noise control programs.

CONFORMING AMENDMENTS

SEC. 11. Section 202(a) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431(a)) is amended by inserting immediately after the first sentence the following: "This authority specifically includes the authority to regulate all aspects of railroad employees' safety-related behavior, as well as the safety-related behavior of the railroads themselves."

RULES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS AND ORDERS

SEC. 12. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 is amended by inserting immediately after section 202 the following new section:

"SEC. 202A. (a) Within 180 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall issue rules, regulations, standards, and orders requiring that whoever performs the required test of automatic train stop, train control, or cab signal apparatus prior to entering territory where such apparatus will be used shall certify in writing that such test was properly performed, and that such certification shall be kept and maintained in the same manner and place as the daily inspection report for that locomotive.

"(b) Within 30 days of the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall issue rules, regulations, standards, and orders requiring the use of automatic train control on all trains operating in the Northeast Corridor by not later than December 31, 1990. The Secretary shall submit a report to the Congress by January 1, 1989, on the progress of this effort, and detail in that report any proposals to modify the requirements in this subsection, and the reasons for such modification.

"(c) The Secretary shall require the installation and use of event recorders on freight trains no later than one year after the date of enactment of this section.

"(d)(1) Within 30 days after the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall establish a Northeast Corridor Safety Committee and appoint members to the Committee consisting of representatives of—

- "(A) the Secretary;
- "(B) the National Railroad Passenger Corporation;
- "(C) freight carriers;
- "(D) commuter agencies;
- "(E) railroad passengers; and
- "(F) any other persons or organizations interested in rail safety.

"(2) The Secretary shall consult with the Northeast Corridor Safety Committee on safety improvements in the Northeast Corridor.

"(3) Within 90 days following the date of enactment of this section, the Secretary shall, in accordance with section 333 of title 49, United States Code, convene a meeting of Northeast Corridor rail carriers for the purpose of reducing through freight traffic on Northeast Corridor passenger lines.

"(4) Within one year after the date of enactment of this section, and annually thereafter, the Secretary shall submit a report, including any recommendations for legislation, to the Congress on the status of efforts to improve safety in the Northeast Corridor pursuant to the provisions of this section."

MISCELLANEOUS

SEC. 13. Section 211(c) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 440(c)) is repealed.

AMENDMENTS TO SAFETY APPLIANCE ACTS

SEC. 14. The Act of March 2, 1893 (45 U.S.C. 1-7), the Act of March 2, 1903 (45 U.S.C. 8-10), and the Act of April 14, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 11-16), commonly referred to as the Safety Appliance Acts are amended as follows:

(a) The Act of March 2, 1893, is amended—

(1) in the first section (45 U.S.C. 1)—
(A) by striking "common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by";

(B) by striking "in moving interstate traffic"; and

(C) by striking "in such traffic";

(2) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 2)—
(A) by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad"; and

(B) by striking "used in moving interstate traffic";

(3) in section 3 (45 U.S.C. 3), by striking "person, firm, company, or corporation engaged in interstate commerce by";

(4) in section 4 (45 U.S.C. 4), by striking "in interstate commerce";

(5) in section 5 (45 U.S.C. 5), by striking "in interstate traffic";

(6) in section 6 (45 U.S.C. 6)—

(A) by striking all before the first semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Any such person (including a railroad or any individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary of Transportation) using any locomotive engine, running any train, or hauling or permitting to be hauled or used on its line any car in violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall be liable to a penalty in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000 per violation (with each day of a violation constituting a separate violation), as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty to be assessed by the Secretary of Transportation and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States Attorney for the judicial district in which the violation occurred, in which the individual defendant resides, or in which the defendant has its principal executive office"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following: "For purposes of this section, an individual

shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor."; and

(7) in section 8 (45 U.S.C. 7)—

(A) by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad"; and

(B) by striking "such carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "such railroad".

(b) The Act of March 2, 1903, is amended—

(1) in the first section (45 U.S.C. 8), by striking "common carriers by" and by striking "engaged in interstate commerce" the second time it appears;

(2) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 9)—

(A) by striking "common carriers engaged in interstate commerce by railroad" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroads"; and

(B) by striking "engaged in interstate commerce"; and

(3) in section 3 (45 U.S.C. 10), by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad".

(c) The Act of April 14, 1910, is amended—

(1) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 11), by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad";

(2) in section 3 (45 U.S.C. 12)—

(A) by striking "in interstate or foreign traffic" wherever it appears;

(B) by striking "common carriers" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroads"; and

(C) by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad";

(3) in section 4 (45 U.S.C. 13)—

(A) by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "person (including a railroad or any individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary of Transportation)";

(B) by striking "carrier" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "person";

(C) by striking "of not less than \$250 and not more than \$2,500 for each and every such violation," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000 per violation (with each day of a violation constituting a separate violation), as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty";

(D) by striking "and recovered" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered"; and

(E) by adding at the end the following: "For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor.";

(4) in section 5 (45 U.S.C. 14), by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad"; and

(5) by amending the first section (45 U.S.C. 16) to read as follows: "That used in this Act, the Act of March 2, 1893 (45 U.S.C. 1-7), and the Act of March 2, 1903 (45 U.S.C. 8-10), commonly known as the Safety Appliance Acts, the term 'railroad' shall have the same meaning as when used in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.)."

AMENDMENTS TO LOCOMOTIVE INSPECTION ACT

SEC. 15. The Act entitled "An Act to promote the safety of employees and travelers upon railroads by compelling common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to equip their locomotives with safe and suitable boilers and appurtenances thereto", approved February 17, 1911 (45 U.S.C. 22 et seq.), is amended—

(1) by amending the first section (45 U.S.C. 22) to read as follows: "That the term 'railroad', when used in this Act, shall have the same meaning as when used in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.).";

(2) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 23), by striking "carrier" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad";

(3) in section 5 (45 U.S.C. 28)—

(A) by striking "common carrier" and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad"; and

(B) by striking "carrier" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad";

(4) in section 6 (45 U.S.C. 29), by striking "carrier" and "carriers" wherever they appear and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad" and "railroads", respectively;

(5) in section 8 (45 U.S.C. 32), by striking "carrier" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "railroad"; and

(6) in section 9 (45 U.S.C. 34)—

(A) by striking all before the first semicolon and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "Any person (including a railroad or any individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary of Transportation) violating this Act, or any rule or regulation made under its provisions or any lawful order of any inspector shall be liable to a penalty in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000 per violation (with each day of a violation constituting a separate violation), as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty to be assessed by the Secretary of Transportation and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States Attorney for the judicial district in which the violation occurred, in which the individual defendant resides, or in which the defendant has its principal executive office"; and

(B) by adding at the end the following: "For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor.".

AMENDMENTS TO ACCIDENT REPORTS ACT

SEC. 16. The Act entitled "An Act requiring common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce to make full reports of all accidents to the Interstate Commerce Commission, and authorizing investigations thereof by said commission", approved May 6, 1910 (45 U.S.C. 38 et seq.) is amended—

(1) in the first section (45 U.S.C. 38)—

(A) by striking "common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by";

(B) by striking "carriers" and by inserting in lieu thereof "railroads"; and

(C) by adding at the end the following: "The term 'railroad', when used in this Act

shall have the same meaning as when used in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.);”;

(2) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 39)—

(A) by striking from “common carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”; and

(B) by striking the last sentence;

(3) in section 3 (45 U.S.C. 40)—

(A) by striking “common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by”; and

(B) by striking “carriers” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroads”;

(4) by amending section 7 (45 U.S.C. 43) to read as follows:

“Sec. 7. Any person (including a railroad or any individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary of Transportation) who violates this Act or any rule, regulation, order, or standard issued under this Act or the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 pertaining to accident reporting or investigations shall be liable for a penalty in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000 per violation (with each day of a violation constituting a separate violation), as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty to be assessed by the Secretary of Transportation and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States Attorney for the judicial district in which the violation occurred, in which the individual defendant resides, or in which the defendant has its principal executive office. For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor.”

AMENDMENTS TO HOURS OF SERVICE ACT

Sec. 17. The Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), is amended—

(1) in the first section (45 U.S.C. 61)—

(A) in subsection (a), by striking “common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign commerce by”;

(B) in subsection (b)(1), by striking all after “term” and inserting in lieu thereof “‘railroad’ shall have the same meaning as when used in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.)”; and

(C) in subsection (b)(4), by striking “carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(2) in section 2 (45 U.S.C. 62), by striking “common carrier” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(3) in section 3 (45 U.S.C. 63), by striking “common carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(4) in section 3A (45 U.S.C. 63a), by striking “common carrier” and “carrier” wherever they appear and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(5) in section 4 (45 U.S.C. 64), by striking “common carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(6) in section 5 (45 U.S.C. 64a)—

(A) by amending subsection (a)(1) to read as follows:

“(a)(1) Any person (including a railroad or any officer or agent thereof, or any individual who performs service covered by this Act, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions

are determined by the Secretary of Transportation) that requires or permits any employee to go, be, or remain on duty in violation of section 2, section 3, or section 3A of this Act, or that violates any other provision of this Act, shall be liable for a penalty of up to \$1,000 per violation, as the Secretary of Transportation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty to be assessed by the Secretary of Transportation and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States Attorney for the judicial district in which the violation occurred, in which the individual defendant resides, or in which the defendant has its principal executive office. It shall be the duty of the United States Attorney to bring such an action upon satisfactory information being lodged with him. In the case of a violation of section 2 (a)(3) or (a)(4) of this Act, each day a facility is in noncompliance shall constitute a separate offense. For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor.”;

(B) in subsection (a)(2), by striking “the common carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “such person”;

(C) in subsection (c), by striking “common carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(D) in subsection (d), by striking “carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”.

AMENDMENTS TO SIGNAL INSPECTION ACT

Sec. 18. Section 26 of the Act of February 4, 1887 (49 App. U.S.C. 26) is amended—

(1) by amending subsection (a) to read as follows:

“(a) The term ‘railroad’ as used in this section shall have the same meaning as when used in the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.)”;

(2) in subsection (b), by striking “carrier” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking “carrier by”; and

(B) by striking “carrier” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(4) in subsection (d), by striking “carrier” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(5) in subsection (e), by striking “carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(6) in subsection (f), by striking “carrier” and inserting in lieu thereof “railroad”;

(7) in subsection (h)—

(A) by amending the first sentence to read as follows: “Any person (including a railroad or any individual who performs service covered under the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 61 et seq.), as in effect on the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1970, or who performs other safety-sensitive functions for a railroad, as those functions are determined by the Secretary of Transportation) which violates any provision of this section, or which fails to comply with any of the orders, rules, regulations, standards, or instructions made, prescribed, or approved hereunder shall be liable to a penalty in such amount, not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000 per violation (with each day of a violation constituting a separate violation), as the Secretary of Trans-

portation deems reasonable, except that a penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation, such penalty to be assessed by the Secretary of Transportation and, where compromise is not reached by the Secretary, recovered in a suit or suits to be brought by the United States Attorney for the judicial district in which the violation occurred, in which the individual defendant resides, or in which the defendant has its principal executive office.”;

(B) by adding at the end the following: “For purposes of this section, an individual shall be deemed not to have committed a willful violation where such individual has acted pursuant to the direct order of a railroad official or supervisor.”;

(8) by striking “Commission” wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof “Secretary of Transportation”.

MAXIMUM TRAIN SPEEDS

Sec. 19. The Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Federal Railroad Administration, shall, within six months of the enactment of this legislation, institute a rulemaking, as may be necessary, to provide for the safety of highway travelers and pedestrians who use railroad grade crossings at points where trains operate through any densely populated college campus. As determined by the Secretary to be necessary such rulemaking shall require, maximum speed limits for trains, guardrails, and warning lights at railgrade crossings located on any such campus, and intensified presentation of Operation Lifesaver educational programs on such campuses to familiarize students and other persons with the inherent dangers of such crossings.

RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE ACT AMENDMENTS

Sec. 20. (a) Section 301 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 541) is amended by striking “agency” and inserting in lieu thereof “agency, instrumentality.”;

(b) Section 303(a)(1)(E) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 543(a)(1)(E)) is amended to read as follows:

“(E) Two members selected by the preferred stockholders of the Corporation, who each shall serve for a term of one year or until their successors have been appointed.”;

(c) Section 303(d) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 543(d)) is amended by striking the third sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: “The president and other officers of the Corporation shall receive compensation at a level no higher than the general level of compensation paid officers of railroads in positions of comparable responsibility.”;

(d) Section 308(a) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 548(a)) is amended by inserting immediately after “also” in the last sentence the following: “provide all relevant information concerning any decision to pay to any officer of the Corporation compensation at a rate in excess of that prescribed for level I of the Executive Schedule under section 5312 of title 5, United States Code, and”;

(e) Section 602(i) of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 602(i)) is repealed.

(f) Subsection (b) of the first section of the Act entitled “An Act to amend the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 in order to provide financial assistance to the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and for other purposes”, approved June 22, 1972 (Public Law 92-316; 86 Stat. 227), is repealed.

PROTECTION FOR CERTAIN WORKERS

SEC. 21. (a) No employee shall be disciplined or sanctioned as a result of information discovered through access authorized by this Act to the National Driver Register, where such employee has successfully completed a rehabilitation program subsequent to the cancellation, revocation, or suspension of the motor vehicle operator's license of such person.

(b) Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431), as amended by this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following:

"(j) The Secretary shall, within one year after the date of enactment of the Railroad Safety Act of 1987, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary for the protection of maintenance-of-way employees, including standards for bridge safety equipment, such as nets, walkways, handrails, and safety lines, and requirements relating to instances when boats shall be used."

(c) Section 2 of the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 62), is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(e) As used in section 2(a)(3) of this Act, the term 'employee' shall be deemed to include an individual employed for the purpose of maintaining the right-of-way of any railroad."

(d) The Secretary of Transportation shall, within one year after the date of enactment of this Act, amend part 218 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to apply blue signal protection to on-track vehicles where rest is provided.

MOTION OFFERED BY MR. THOMAS A. LUKEN

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN moves to strike out all after the enacting clause of the Senate bill, S. 1539, and to insert in lieu thereof the provisions of H.R. 3743 as passed by the House as follows:

H.R. 3743

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the "Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1987".

SEC. 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS.

Section 214 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 444) is amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 214. AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS.

"(a) There is authorized to be appropriated to carry out this Act not to exceed \$40,649,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1988, not to exceed \$41,868,470 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1989, and not to exceed \$44,381,000 for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1990.

"(b) Sums appropriated under this section for research and development, automated track inspection, and the State safety grant program are authorized to remain available until expended."

SEC. 3. GRADE CROSSING DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS.

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 is amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"SEC. 215. GRADE CROSSING DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS.

"(a) The Federal Railroad Administration shall establish demonstration projects for the purpose of evaluating—

"(1) whether reflective markers installed on the road surface or on a signal post at grade crossings would reduce accidents involving trains;

"(2) whether a stop sign or yield sign installed at grade crossings would reduce such accidents; and

"(3) whether speed bumps or rumble strips installed on the road surface at the approach to grade crossings would reduce such accidents.

"(b) The Federal Railroad Administration shall, within two years after the date of the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1987, report to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate on the results of the demonstration projects established under subsection (a).

"(c) From sums authorized under section 214, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for improvements in grade crossing safety, \$1,000,000, to remain available until expended."

SEC. 4. LICENSING OF ENGINEERS.

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(1)(1) The Secretary shall, within 180 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary to establish a program requiring the licensing of any individual operating a train, including train engineers, after the expiration of 2 years following the establishment of such program. This requirement shall be implemented through a program of review and approval of each railroad's operator qualification standards.

"(2) The program established by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall—

"(A) include minimum training requirements,

"(B) require comprehensive knowledge of railroad operating practices and operating rules;

"(C) prohibit from holding a license any individual who, within the previous 5 years, has been denied a motor vehicle operator's license by a State for cause or whose motor vehicle operator's license has been cancelled, revoked, or suspended by a State for cause; and

"(D) prohibit from holding a license any individual who has been reported to the National Driver Register because of a conviction described under section 205(a)(3) of the National Driver Register Act of 1982 within the past 5 years.

"(3) The Secretary shall, for purposes of implementing paragraph (2)(C) and (D), have access to information contained in the National Driver Register.

"(4) An individual denied a license on the basis of the inclusion of such individual's name on the National Driver Register shall be entitled to an administrative hearing to determine whether such license has been properly denied.

"(5) No individual shall be prohibited from holding a license because of a conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol or a controlled substance, if such individual subsequent to such conviction has successfully completed a rehabilitation program established by a rail carrier or approved by the Secretary."

SEC. 5. AUTOMATIC TRAIN CONTROL SYSTEMS.

(a) Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(m)(1) All trains operating after April 1, 1990, on the main line of the Northeast Corridor between Washington, D.C., and Boston, Massachusetts, or on the feeder line referred to in section 704(a)(1)(B) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, shall be equipped with automatic train control systems designed to slow or stop a train in response to external signals.

"(2) If the Secretary finds that it is impracticable to equip all trains as required under paragraph (1) before April 1, 1990, the Secretary may extend the deadline for compliance with such requirement, but in no event shall such deadline be extended past July 1, 1990."

(b) Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431), is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(n) The Secretary, in consultation with the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, freight carriers, commuter agencies, employee representatives, railroad passengers, and rail equipment manufacturers, shall undertake a study of the advisability and feasibility of requiring automatic train control systems, including systems using advanced technology, such as transponder and satellite relay systems, on each rail corridor on which passengers or hazardous materials are carried. Such study shall include—

"(1) a specific assessment of the dangers of not requiring automatic train control systems on each such corridor, based on analysis of the number of passenger trains, persons, and freight trains traveling on such corridor daily, the frequency of train movements, mileage traveled, and the incident and accident history on such corridor;

"(2) an analysis of the cost of requiring such systems to be installed on each specific corridor; and

"(3) an investigation of alternative means of accomplishing the same safety objectives as would be achieved by requiring automatic train control systems to be installed."

SEC. 6. INCREASED PENALTIES; LIABILITY OF INDIVIDUALS.

Section 209 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 438) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a) by striking "railroad" and inserting in lieu thereof "person (including a railroad and any manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent of a railroad)";

(2) in subsection (b) by striking all after "(45 U.S.C. 39)" and inserting in lieu thereof "in an amount of not less than \$250 nor more than \$10,000, except that where a grossly negligent violation or a pattern of repeated violations has created an imminent hazard of death or injury to persons, or has caused death or injury, a penalty of not to exceed \$25,000 may be assessed."

(3) in subsection (c)—

(A) by striking the first sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "Any person violating any rule, regulation, order, or standard referred to in subsection (b) shall be assessed by the Secretary the civil penalty applicable to the standard violated. Penalties may be assessed against individuals under this subsection only for willful violations."; and

(B) by inserting ", in which the individual crosses," after "such violation occurred"; and

(4) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f) Where an individual's violation of any rule, regulation, order, or standard prescribed by the Secretary under this title is shown to make that individual unfit for the performance of safety-sensitive functions, the Secretary, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, may issue an order prohibiting such individual from performing safety-sensitive functions in the rail industry for a specified period of time or until specified conditions are met. This subsection shall not be construed to affect the Secretary's authority under section 203 to take such action on an emergency basis."

SEC. 7. TAMPERING WITH SAFETY DEVICES.

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(o)(1) The Secretary shall, within 90 days after the date of the enactment of this subsection, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary to prohibit the willful tampering with, or disabling of, specified railroad safety or operational monitoring devices.

"(2)(A) Any railroad company operating a train on which safety or operational monitoring devices are tampered with or disabled in violation of rules, regulations, orders, or standards issued by the Secretary under paragraph (1) shall be liable for a civil penalty under section 209.

"(B) Any individual tampering with or disabling safety or operational monitoring devices in violation of rules, regulations, orders, or standards issued by the Secretary under paragraph (1), or who knowingly operates or permits to be operated a train on which such devices have been tampered with or disabled by another person, shall be liable for such penalties as may be established by the Secretary, which may include fines under section 209, suspension from work, or suspension or loss of a license issued under subsection (1)."

SEC. 8. DISPATCHER TRAINING.

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(p)(1) The Secretary shall, within 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1987, conduct and complete an inquiry into whether training standards are necessary for those involved in dispatching trains.

"(2) Upon the completion of such inquiry, the Secretary shall report the results of such inquiry to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate along with the Secretary's recommendations, and if the Secretary recommends that rules, regulations, orders, or standards are necessary, the Secretary shall promptly initiate appropriate rulemaking proceedings."

SEC. 9. GRADE CROSSING SIGNAL SYSTEM SAFETY.

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(q) The Secretary shall, within 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1987, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary to ensure the safe maintenance, inspection, and testing of signal sys-

tems and devices at railroad highway grade crossings."

SEC. 10. EVENT RECORDERS.

Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(r)(1) The Secretary shall, within 180 days after the date of the enactment of the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 1987, conduct and complete an inquiry into whether to require that all trains be equipped with event recorders to enhance safety.

"(2) Upon the completion of such inquiry, the Secretary shall report the results of such inquiry to the Committee on Energy and Commerce of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate along with the Secretary's recommendations, and if the Secretary recommends that event recorders should be required, the Secretary shall promptly initiate appropriate rulemaking proceedings.

"(3) For the purposes of this subsection, the term 'event recorders' means devices that—

"(A) record train speed, hot box detection, throttle position, brake application, brake operation, and any other function the Secretary considers necessary to record to assist in monitoring the safety of train operation; and

"(B) are designed to resist tampering."

SEC. 11. PROTECTION OF EMPLOYEES AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.

(a) EXPEDITED PROCEDURES.—Section 212(c)(1) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 441(c)(1)) is amended by inserting ", and any proceeding with respect to such dispute, grievance, or claim shall be expedited by the Adjustment Board (or any division or delegate thereof) or any other board of adjustment created under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act so that such dispute, grievance, or claim is resolved within 180 days after its filing with such Adjustment Board or other board of adjustment" before the period.

(b) COMPENSATION.—Section 212(c)(2) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 441(c)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the following new sentence: "If the violation of subsection (a) or (b) is a form of discrimination other than discharge, suspension, or any other discrimination with respect to pay, and no other remedy is available under this subsection, the Adjustment Board (or any division or delegate thereof) or any other board of adjustment created under section 3 of the Railway Labor Act may award the aggrieved employee appropriate compensation up to the equivalent of 1 year's pay for such employee."

(c) DISCLOSURE OF NAMES.—Section 212 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 441) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(f)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), or with the written consent of the employee, the Secretary shall not disclose the name of any employee of a railroad who has provided information with respect to an alleged violation of this title, any other Federal railroad safety law, or any rule, regulation, order, or standard issued under this title or any other Federal railroad safety law.

"(2) The Secretary shall disclose to the Attorney General the name of any employee described in paragraph (1) who has provided information with respect to a matter being referred to the Attorney General for enforcement under this title, any other Fed-

eral railroad safety law, or any rule, regulation, order, or standard issued under this title or any other Federal railroad safety law."

SEC. 12. ACCIDENT REPORTS.

If a railroad, in reporting an accident or incident under the Accident Reports Act (15 U.S.C. 38-43), assigns human error as a cause of the accident or incident, such report shall include, at the option of each employee whose error is alleged, a statement by such employee explaining any factors the employee alleges contributed to the accident or incident.

SEC. 13. AMTRAK SAFETY PROVISIONS.

(a) The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:

"SEC. 216. UNSAFE FACILITIES.

"(a) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation (hereafter in this section referred to as 'Amtrak'), or the owner of any facility which presents a danger to the employees, passengers, or property of Amtrak, may petition the Secretary for assistance to the owner of such facility for relocation or other remedial measures to minimize or eliminate such danger under this section.

"(b) If the Secretary determines that—

"(1) a facility which is the subject of a petition under subsection (a) presents a danger of death or serious injury to any employee or passenger of Amtrak or serious damage to any property of Amtrak; and

"(2) the owner of such facility should not be expected to bear the cost of relocating or other remedial measures necessary to minimize or eliminate such danger, the Secretary shall recommend to the Congress that the Congress, as a part of its periodic reauthorizations of this Act, authorize funding, by reimbursement or otherwise, for such relocation or other remedial measures.

"(c) Petitions may be submitted under subsection (a) of this section with respect to any relocation or remedial measures undertaken on or after January 1, 1978."

(b)(1) From sums authorized under section 214 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, there is authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of Transportation for the purposes of this subsection, \$1,000,000, to remain available until expended.

(2) The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, or any owner or operator of a rail station used for the operations of such Corporation, may apply to the Secretary of Transportation for funds appropriated under this subsection for payment or reimbursement of expenses, incurred after October 1, 1987, in connection with enabling such station to comply with the requirements of any official notice received before October 1, 1987, from State or local authorities asserting that a violation of building, construction, fire, electric, sanitation, mechanical, or plumbing codes exists or is alleged to exist with respect to such station.

(c) Section 402 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 562) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(h)(1) If a rail carrier or owner of a rail line which has a contractual obligation—

"(A) to permit the Corporation to operate rail service on its line; and

"(B) to maintain such line in a condition suitable for such operation,

breaches such obligation, the Corporation may take the actions provided for in paragraph (2).

"(2) In the event of a breach under paragraph (1) the Corporation may take one or both of the following actions:

"(A) The Corporation may withhold from any payments due to such rail carrier or owner under the contract such sums as may be necessary to repair and maintain such line to the standards specified in the contract.

"(B) The Corporation may apply to the Commission for an order under subsection (d) establishing the need of the Corporation for the property at issue and requiring the conveyance thereof.

"(3) If the Corporation elects to withhold any sums under paragraph (2)(A), the Corporation shall apply such sums to the cost of performing the repair and maintenance work necessary to bring the condition of the line into conformity with the standards specified in the contract.

"(4) In ordering a conveyance under paragraph (2)(B), the Commission shall reduce the compensation due to the rail carrier or owner by the amount required to bring the condition of the line into conformity with the standards specified in the contract. The amount of such reduction shall be determined under the dispute resolution provisions of the contract, if any.

"(5) If a line to which a contractual obligation described in paragraph (1) applies is sold to a party other than the Corporation, such sale shall be made subject to the requirement that the acquiring party—

"(A) permit the corporation to operate rail service on such line; and

"(B) maintain such line in a condition suitable for such operation, in accordance with the terms of the contract between the Corporation and the original rail carrier or owner, unless the Corporation and the acquiring party otherwise agree.

"(6) The rights and remedies available to the Corporation under this subsection are in addition to any rights and remedies conferred by any other law or by contract."

SEC. 14. ENFORCEMENT OF THE SECRETARY'S ACTIONS.

Section 208(a) of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 437(a)) is amended by striking "enforce such orders" and inserting in lieu thereof "enforce any subpoena, order, or directive of the Secretary issued under this title".

SEC. 15. MAINTENANCE-OF-WAY OPERATIONS.

(a) Section 202 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 431) is further amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(s) The Secretary shall, within one year after the date of the enactment of this subsection, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary for the safety of maintenance-of-way employees, including—

"(1) standards for bridge safety equipment, such as nets, walkways, handrails, and safety lines, and requirements relating to instances when boats shall be used; and

"(2) standards for motor vehicles used by such employees which provide that the employees shall ride in a separate compartment from tools and hazardous materials carried in the vehicle."

(b) Section 2 of the Act of March 4, 1907, commonly referred to as the Hours of Service Act (45 U.S.C. 62), is amended by adding at the end the following:

"(c) As used in section 2(a)(3) of this Act, the term 'employee' shall include an individual employed for the purpose of maintaining the right-of-way of any railroad."

(c) The Secretary of Transportation shall, within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, amend part 218 of title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, to apply blue signal protection to on-track vehicles where rest is provided.

SEC. 16. FENCING OF RAIL YARDS.

The Secretary of Transportation shall, within one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, issue such rules, regulations, orders, and standards as may be necessary to require the fencing of rail yards in heavily populated areas so as to prevent or deter injury of persons not employed by the rail carrier. In carrying out this section, the Secretary shall take into consideration such factors as the number of tracks, the frequency of trains, the proximity of residential areas, the direction and purpose of pedestrian traffic movement, and the local injury and fatality experience.

SEC. 17. LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SPEED REGULATIONS.

Section 206 of the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 is amended by adding at the end the following new sub-section:

"(h) The Secretary may enforce regulations with respect to any carrier issued under this Act in regard to the speed of trains on the basis of information supplied by duly authorized agents of local government as if such information were supplied by Federal agents."

The motion was agreed to.

The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed.

The title of the Senate bill was amended so as to read: "An act to improve the safety of rail transportation, and for other purposes."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON S. 1539, RAIL SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1987

Mr. THOMAS A. LUKEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House insist on its amendments to the Senate bill (S. 1539) to amend the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970, and for other purposes, and request a conference with the Senate thereon.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Messrs. DINGELL, THOMAS A. LUKEN, SLATTERY, LENT, and WHITTAKER.

NATIONAL CHILD PASSENGER SAFETY AWARENESS WEEK

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office And Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 402) to designate the week of February 7-13, 1988, as "National Child Passenger Safety Awareness Week," and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, the minority has no objection to the legislation.

Further reserving the right to object, Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. HOWARD] who is the chief sponsor of House Joint Resolution 402.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I just take this time to express my gratitude and that of over 200 other cosponsors of this legislation for the fine and considerate work of the gentleman from California [Mr. DYMALLY] and the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. MORELLA] on this issue. I thank them both.

Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT. Mr. Speaker, the real tragedy of those thousands of children under the age of 5 years who have died in traffic accidents is that they might well have been saved.

Research shows us that the correct use of child passenger protection devices is as high as 90-percent effective in preventing fatalities and 67-percent effective in preventing injury.

Yet, only 48 percent of children under five are protected with the correct usage of these devices. That is why House Joint Resolution 402, designating February 7-13, 1988, as "National Child Passenger Safety Awareness Week," is so important and so timely.

I am pleased to be a cosponsor of this measure, which authorizes President Reagan to issue a proclamation asking Americans to spotlight the week with programs and activities that promote the correct usage of child safety belts.

It probably would surprise many people to know that motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death of children over the age of 6 months in this country. They are also the Nation's number one trauma-related cause of epilepsy, spinal cord injury, and mental retardation.

Even though all States have enacted laws requiring the use of child passenger protection systems, Americans obviously still need to be more aware of both the dangers involved and the demonstrated advantages of child safety belts. Having laws on the books serves little purpose, if compliance is inadequate.

I urge my colleagues to join in supporting this resolution, which encourages a measure of protection for this and future generations of our youngest Americans.

Mrs. MORELLA. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution, as follows:

H.J. Res. 402

Whereas motor vehicle crashes are the number one cause of death of children over the age of 6 months in the United States;

Whereas motor vehicle crashes are the number one cause of the crippling of children in the United States;

Whereas more children under the age of 5 years are killed or crippled as passengers involved in motor vehicle crashes than the total number of children killed or crippled

by the 7 most common childhood diseases: pertussis (whooping cough), tetanus, diphtheria, measles, mumps, rubella (German measles), and polio;

Whereas motor vehicle crashes are the leading trauma related cause of spinal cord injuries, epilepsy, and mental retardation in the United States;

Whereas, during the years 1978 through 1986, nearly 9,300 children under the age of 5 years were killed in traffic crashes and more than 450,000 children were injured in the United States;

Whereas an unrestrained child is less protected by padding and energy-absorbing materials than an adult in a motor vehicle crash as a result of protective devices being placed in areas more likely to benefit adults;

Whereas unrestrained children are subject to a significantly higher risk of serious head, spine, chest, and abdominal injury in motor vehicle crashes than adult passengers because the bodies of children are less developed and provide less protection;

Whereas an unrestrained child in a motor vehicle crash faces an increased danger of fatal or serious injury from ejection as well as injuries resulting from contact with the vehicle interior;

Whereas an unrestrained child in a motor vehicle not involved in a collision may be killed or injured as a result of sudden stops, turns, swerves, or falling from a moving vehicle;

Whereas all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted laws mandating the use of child passenger protection systems;

Whereas the latest national surveys show that 72 percent of children under the age of 5 are placed in child safety seats in the United States and that one-third of such seats are used incorrectly;

Whereas current nationwide studies estimate that only 48 percent of children under the age of 5 are fully protected in cars in the United States through the correct usage of child safety seats;

Whereas numerous government and private sector organizations have agreed to work in concert to achieve a minimum 70 percent correct usage of child passenger protection devices and adult safety belts by the year 1990;

Whereas research shows that the correct use of child passenger protection devices is 90 percent effective in preventing death and 67 percent effective in preventing injury; and

Whereas death and injuries may be reduced significantly through greater public awareness, information, education, and enforcement: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the week of February 7-13, 1988, is designated as "National Child Passenger Safety Awareness Week", and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such week with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities to maximize correct usage of child safety seats.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members

may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on House Joint Resolution 402, the joint resolution just passed.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

A TRIBUTE TO JAMES WELDON JOHNSON

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. CLEMENT] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CLEMENT. Mr. Speaker, during the month of February, our Nation pays tribute to the contribution of black Americans to the history of our Nation.

I would like to add my voice to the residents of Nashville who, yesterday, joined the U.S. Postal Service in issuing a new postage stamp commemorating the accomplishments of James Weldon Johnson, an educator, diplomat, lawyer, author, and lyricist.

From 1930 until his tragic death in 1939, Johnson was a professor of creative literature at Fisk University in Nashville. Before he came to Nashville, Johnson had already distinguished himself in both the creative and political worlds.

Born in 1871, Johnson graduated with a bachelor of arts and master of arts degree from Atlanta University. He began his career teaching at the Colored High School in Jacksonville, FL, his birthplace. At the same time, he studied law and became the first black attorney to be admitted to the Florida bar. He also received doctor of literature degrees from Talladega College and Howard University.

A man of immense talent, from 1901 to 1906, he collaborated with his brother on 200 songs for musical comedies and light opera. The musical team was split when Johnson went into Government service when he was appointed as U.S. Consul to Venezuela in 1906. He later served as U.S. Consul to Nicaragua. For nearly 15 years, he was secretary for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

Johnson worked to promote social, economic, and political equality. His writings, too, reflected the racial climate of the period. While known primarily for poetry, his best known book, *The Autobiography of an Ex-Colored Man*, has been praised for its analysis of race problems. The book has been described as one of the most extensive studies of the early 20th century.

Mr. Speaker, James Weldon Johnson is just one of the many individuals we pay tribute to during Black History Month. I am proud to join my colleagues in singling out some of these individuals for their contributions in making our society richer, fairer, and more equitable for all citizens.

DUELING GROUNDHOGS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLINGER] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CLINGER. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to be present yesterday because of an injured back. Had I been present, I would have informed my colleagues that Punxsutawney Phil, my most famous constituent, failed to see his shadow yesterday, signifying that spring is just around the corner. Phil is the world's original and only accurate weather-forecasting groundhog. That is why I am particularly appalled and disappointed that my colleague from Pennsylvania, Mr. WALKER, would take advantage of my unavoidable absence yesterday to try to palm off a fake groundhog on you. The fact that Mr. WALKER's spurious pretender to Phil's throne claimed to have seen a shadow when Pennsylvania was blanketed with rainstorms yesterday, speaks volumes about his groundhog's forecasting skills. Phil, however, has never made a bad prediction. It was Phil who predicted the October 19 stock market crash. And in an amazing feat of prophesy, Phil predicted that Congress would not be able to put a budget together when it was supposed to. Now Phil has confided in me who the winner of this year's Presidential race will be. I know all of my colleagues will be interested in reading Phil's latest bit of political clairvoyance which is included in the following statement I am inserting into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

GROUNDHOG'S DAY PREDICTION—1988

(With apologies to Clement Clarke Moore)

'Twas the night before Groundhog's Day,
when all through the land
Not a candidate was stirring, they were
quiet to a man;
The polls had been conducted in Iowa with
care,
In hopes that caucus voters soon would be
there;
The vote-getters were nestled all snug in
their beds,
While visions of the White House danced in
their heads;
And mamma in her 'kerchief, and I in my
cap,
Had just settled our brains for a break from
their rap.
When from the screen of the t.v. there
arose such a clatter,
I sprang from my bed to see what was the
matter.
On every channel, the news was the same,
Of a groundhog named Phil, of Punxsutaw-
ney fame.
For it seems that the world's most accurate
weather-forecasting seer,
Would be making a little more than his
usual prediction this year.
The news reports had it that by dawn's
early light
Phil would pronounce the end of winter,
and the candidate he most liked.
Well, I went back to my sleep, my head
filled with perplexion,
If Phil appointed one, would this be tanta-
mount to election?
And what of the others, would they be filled
with contention?
Would they draft a dark horse or broker the
convention?

The following morning came early and quick,
 And I turned on my t.v. set lickety-split.
 And down to Phil's burrow, the mini-cams
 they flew;
 There was Rather, and Jennings, and Tom
 Brokaw too.
 And amid all the pushing and shoving and
 noise,
 The struggle for sound bites, the complete
 lack of poise;
 There stood tall and proud, as he has every
 year,
 A groundhog named Phil—forecaster with-
 out peer.
 (Unless one includes his mentor, Willard
 Scott, this year.)
 He was dressed all in fur, from his head to
 his foot,
 Had he wore clothes, they would be covered
 with soot.
 His eyes—how they twinkled, his nose, how
 merry,
 But his teeth, large and white, I admit
 looked somewhat scary.
 His droll little mouth was drawn up in a
 smile,
 Would his prediction make the trip by so
 many, worthwhile?
 A wink of his eye and a twist of his head,
 Soon gave me to know I had nothing to
 dread;
 He spoke not a word, but went straight to
 his work,
 Looked hard for his shadow, then turned
 with a jerk,
 And laying a paw aside of his nose,
 And giving a nod, on his legs he arose.
 Electronic media, please give me your ear,
 Let me tell you something you may all want
 to hear.
 It's a hard enough job I think you'll agree,
 To predict when the winter will set us all
 free.
 The hours are great, and I like what I do,
 And it sure beats sitting around in some zoo.
 My specialty is winter, beyond a shadow of a
 doubt.
 I have never pretended to have political
 clout.
 But a prediction was expected, many folks
 say,
 On my pick of a winner on Election Day.
 So I'll make a prediction, and leave on this
 note,
 One of the following may win, but you'll all
 have to vote!
 And he whistled, and shouted, and called
 them by name;
 Now, Babbit! now, Gephardt! now, Simon
 and Hart!
 Now Jackson! now Gore and Pierre S.
 duPont!
 On, Michael Dukakis! On, supply-sider
 Kemp!
 On, Haig, Dole and Robertson,
 And the Vice President!
 And I heard him exclaim, ere he burrowed
 out of sight
 "Happy campaigning to all, and to all, a fair
 fight."

A PROCLAMATION

Hear Ye, Hear Ye, to all true believers
 here on Gobbler's Knob and around the
 World. I, James H. Means, President of the
 Punxsutawney Groundhog Club, proclaim
 that the only true weather forecaster,
 Punxsutawney Phil, has just come out from
 his official home, at precisely 7:32 a.m., to
 start his second century of accurate predic-
 tions. His majesty stood tall and proud,
 however, he has failed to see his shadow.
 The King of all Groundhogs has returned

to his burrow to celebrate. There will be an
 early Spring! That's the good news from
 Punxsutawney, Pa., the Weather Capital of
 the World.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, will the
 gentleman yield?

Mr. CLINGER. I am happy to yield
 to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Speaker, I want
 to join the gentleman from Punxsu-
 tawney. Having represented Punxsu-
 tawney Phil for so many years, there
 is no finer prognosticator of weather
 than Punxsutawney Phil, and I think
 the gentleman is absolutely right that
 his colleague from Pennsylvania would
 try to take advantage of the gentle-
 man's absence, and if I had known it I
 would certainly have been glad to take
 the gentleman's place. But I join him
 in the outrage against the gentleman
 from the center part of Pennsylvania
 trying to steal the thunder of Punxsu-
 tawney Phil.

Mr. CLINGER. I thank the gentle-
 man from Pennsylvania very sincerely.
 I know that he had the honor of rep-
 resenting Punxsutawney Phil for
 many years, and in fact was present on
 many occasions when Punxsutawney
 Phil delivered his predictions.

Mr. MURTHA. I used to get up at 5
 o'clock in the morning and drive to
 Punxsutawney. I know there is noth-
 ing the gentleman enjoys more than
 that.

Mr. CLINGER. It is one of the great
 pleasures of representing Punxsutaw-
 ney, and the gentleman will agree with
 me.

But I would just want to again vent
 my spleen on our colleague from
 Pennsylvania, and yield back the bal-
 ance of my time.

□ 2300

A POSTMORTEM ON THE CONTRA AID VOTE

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr.
 GARCIA). Under a previous order of the
 House, the gentleman from California
 [Mr. DORNAN] is recognized for 60 min-
 utes.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr.
 Speaker, when there is a death, the
 coroners of the world conduct a post-
 mortem if there is suspicion of
 murder. And this Congressman be-
 lieves liberty in our hemisphere has
 been temporarily murdered by a close
 vote in this House this evening.

Now I am not going to spend much
 time castigating anybody by name on
 the majority side of the aisle. They
 gerrymandered themselves in my
 State into a majority so that one man,
 long dead, can laugh about the results
 of this vote because in 1982 when I
 was gerrymandered out of my seat on
 my first 6-year go-around, the Con-
 gressman, long dead, who did it to me,
 said that he would change seven seats
 in California; and he did. We were 22-
 to-21 when that lame duck session

ended in December 1982 and when we
 reconvened a few weeks later, less
 than 3 weeks later, the California dele-
 gation was not 22-to-21. We picked up
 two new seats and they went to liber-
 als. The new count was 28 to 17, an 11-
 vote spread. And what did we lose this
 vote by tonight? Five votes. If they
 shifted from "no" to "yes" it would
 have been 216 to 214. And you, Mr.
 Speaker, could not have voted to break
 a tie. Five votes.

When my good friend from Califor-
 nia, Mr. BERMAN, told me this morn-
 ing, they were hoping deliciously that
 the margin of defeat would be buried
 in Republican votes, and it is. Twelve
 Republicans voted against their Presi-
 dent. One of them ate up a half hour
 in the Oval Office in the last few days
 and then had a former President,
 Gerald Ford, spend another 30 min-
 utes on the phone with him wasting
 his time, wasting Ford's time. And this
 is this gentleman's first vote against
 Contra aid.

Now when the President had tai-
 lored a package that sounded for all
 the world to me like the McCurdy plan
 named after DAVE MCCURDY, of Okla-
 homa a year ago, and when the Presi-
 dent finally moves to the McCurdy
 plan, MCCURDY moves away from it.
 Here are five Republicans that I think
 could win by 70 percent in their dis-
 trict if they change their vote because
 their district loves them and they
 would not care. Mr. BOEHLERT, who got
 Dan Mitchell's seat in upper New
 York State, Mr. AMO HOUGHTON, who
 just for the first time voted against
 the President on Contra aid, Mrs.
 CLAUDINE SCHNEIDER, of Rhode Island,
 beloved, wins with 70 percent and
 could do whatever she wants; Mr.
 TAUKE, a BUSH cochairman of Iowa. I
 am a cochairman of BUSH in Califor-
 nia so this kind of stings a little bit.
 The fifth one is PAUL HENRY who
 holds Gerald Ford's seat in Michigan
 that Ford held for 25 years.

Now there is hope, and I hope the
 Ortega brothers are not laughing in
 their designer glasses tonight, because
 at least 9 of these 12 Republicans have
 told me—I polled them on the floor
 before the vote—they told me that
 they will switch their vote in an in-
 stant if Ortega screws around with
 this peace process and does not start
 releasing these political prisoners. And
 I know at least 30 people on the other
 side of the aisle, because their careers
 are at stake, that would switch in a
 minute if Ortega tries to screw up this
 peace process.

Now let me tell you a little story
 that the great lady, who was once one
 of the shining lights of this delibera-
 tive body, the incomparable Claire
 Booth Luce told me a few years ago at
 the International Hotel off of Scott
 Circle. I said, "Is it true, Claire, that
 you told young President-elect John F.

Kennedy during the interregnum between Eisenhower's 8 years and Kennedy's brilliant moving and powerful inaugural address," the best I have ever heard in my lifetime, because I did not get to hear Abe Lincoln's two addresses; I said, "Did you tell Kennedy that the measure of his Presidency would be whether or not Castro's communism survived in the Caribbean?" She said, "Yes I did. And let me tell you something, Mr. DORNAN, I intend to tell President Reagan," who was then himself a President-elect, "that the measure of his Presidency will be determined on whether or not communism maintains its foothold in Central America and begins to spread."

Now Claire Booth Luce has gone to her eternal reward so I have no way of knowing whether she ever got to President Reagan and said to him the same thing about Nicaragua that she said to young President Kennedy at 43 years of age before he was sworn in. But I have a suspicion that she did and that is why President Reagan said the other night that he did not become the President to preside over the communization of Central America.

The irony is that you, Mr. Speaker, stood in this well and said of course he did not do that, he is here to preside over the United States.

Oh, I see; you are rewriting history, right, Jimbo? He is not the leader of the free world? He is not the Commander in Chief of our military forces that has national security obligations that go beyond our borders?

I do not fault Mr. Arias with only 10,000 police officers and security forces and no navy or army or marine corps or air force as such. I do not fault him for operating in his country's best interests. But the United States of America has a right to operate in its best interest. As the Presidents have told me to my face, as Azcona told a distinguished colleague of mine on the floor, DAN BURTON and myself on September 6 to our face, he told us that we must exercise our role of leadership as a superpower and not pay attention totally to what small little weak powers do to cover their own bets as to whether or not the Ortega brothers survive in Central America.

Now I think the best essay I came across—it violates the law of Aristotle that nobody should sit down and dare to write philosophy until they are past their 50th birthday. I do not know what his ideology is. I think one of the most fascinating philosopher essayists in our country is Charles Krauthammer. I think he started out as a liberal. But he writes this editorial in the current issue of *Time* on the back page, titled "Whose Foreign Policy Is It Anyway?" And he says that, quoting JIM WRIGHT, "If we are willing to abide by the determination of those

Central Americans themselves rather than allowing someone in the State Department simply on his whim to say who is complying, and he is not," he says, "That statement of the House Speaker about putting the Contra aid in escrow to be released depending on future Sandinista behavior, to attack that is to say that we do not have a foreign policy. And that is what, Mr. Speaker, you said here on the floor just a few minutes ago, actually."

Krauthammer says that the U.S. Congress with its vote this week, now down by a shift of five, has by default been designated to be the final judgment on Sandinista compliance, as though they had been complying. Mr. Speaker, on this floor tonight you said they have opened up papers. That is not true. One paper, the press, *La Prensa*. You said they have opened up radio stations. There are 22 licenses pending. There were 49 radio stations down there when Somoza fell. There is one radio station, Radio Catolica. And I did an interview on it just a couple of weeks ago and talked about the hidden bank accounts of the Sandinista-Ortega brothers in Switzerland. And I pointed out on that radio show that a good, idealistic Marxist-Leninist, following Frederick Engel's dialectical materialism, following in the path of that puritan Leninist, no good Communist has a secret Swiss bank account. And if they do, they had better not get caught. Well, they are caught. Roger Miranda has given us the number of the account and to the dollar value that is in Humberto Ortega's account.

And when I sponsored a 2-hour meeting with him here last Wednesday, one of the Congressmen said, "How come you know so much about the secret bank account?" And you know what Major Miranda said? He said, "Congressman, I administered the secret account of the Defense Minister Humberto Ortega." So I said to Obando y Bravo—I spent 1 hour with him just about 10 days ago all alone. His next meeting was with Ortega. As I left, he got in his car to drive—no, Ortega was coming to his house. We passed like ships in the night. The Cardinal said to me, "Yes, we will run your interview." I said, "Will it get you in trouble? I talked about their secret bank accounts, trying to put wedges between these nine Communist Sandinistas." And he said, "Probably it will get us in trouble." And I guess it ran this week. I had someone call me and tell me—the nicest compliment I have had in my life—that I am public enemy No. 1 to the Sandinistas down there. Well that is fine, because I cannot get out of my head, during this whole debate, those visits that I made with my 28-year-old son to two of the farms in Honduras where those amputated victims, young men and young women who are fighting for freedom,

fellow North Americans fighting for our freedom right here on the mainland of this continent of ours, as CLAUDE PEPPER says, our beloved part of the world. I cannot get over the fact that they said they would give up their limbs again.

My son asked them, "What do you think when Democrats get up on the House floor and say that you bayonet pregnant women?" They just shook their heads and one man said, "May I answer?" And he rolled his wheelchair forward. He had all his limbs but they were all twisted and crippled. And he said, "We are of the people. We are campesinos. The people call us *los muchachos*, the boys, the commandos." That is why it is so ironic that one of the Members from New Jersey gets up and says if we drive the Sandinistas to it they will go up in the hills. The Sandinista Communists cannot go back into the hills, because, first of all, they were city people. It was a city movement. The campesinos, the peasants that run the hills hate the guts of these Communists, these fair-skinned city boys that have betrayed their revolution.

How many interviews have we heard where the Indians along the coast, the Suma, the Rama, the Miskitos said that Somoza was a bum, "but he left us alone. He only corrupted the city of Managua and maybe Leon." How many times have we heard the *Mestizo*, the mixed bloods, what we gringos refer to as Indians from Mexico all the way down to Patagonia, how many times have we heard them say, "We are the people fighting this war?"

Let me tell you something about Roger Miranda. Some of my own colleagues did not realize what I was getting at when we had him over here in the Ollie North memorial briefing room No. 227. And I said, "What was the straw that broke your back, Major? What made you come over?" He told us he was a dedicated Communist. This is a privileged kid from Managua. He went and got his degree in economics at the University of Santiago in Chile. That is when he told me he became a Communist. Then he was privileged to go get a master's degree up at the autonomous public university in Mexico City. I said, "What turned you around more than anything else?" He said, "I went out on the battlefield along the Rama Road, the road that runs to the east near El Bluff on the coast. He said, "I looked on the faces of the dead Contras on the battlefield and I realized that all my idealism from my Communist youth was a lie. I was not saving my people as I thought from Somoza; I was slaughtering my people." I said, "Is it a fact that you can easily tell the campesinos, the hard working peasants with their sun darkened skins, the hard working people who work in

the fields, like Cardinal Obando y Bravo, by the way." And he said, "Yes, it is easy to tell."

Well that conclusion I had drawn before Miranda said this to me. That is why I asked this question, because when I was talking to the mothers and the young sisters and the wives down in these little beat-up storefronts that they are allowed to keep on one of the side streets in Managua a month ago, I remember September 6 or 7 when I was there with Mr. BURTON. I said, "DAN, did you notice that these people are peasants?" And then I asked the Embassy people, "What percentage of the 10,000 political prisoners are darker skinned peasants, not citted young Communists acting out their adolescent Marxist fantasies on their people, destroying the economy and clinging to their power with the rule of the gun and terror in these prison camps?" They said, "Oh, the political prisoners are 90 percent campesino peasants."

Then I flashed back on all of the visits that we made to the Contra camps up in Honduras, which, by the way, are gone. They are all inside Nicaragua, 14,000 of them. And I said, "My gosh, the whole force of the fighting people are dark skinned peasants." These are not the fair skinned Guardia or the fair skinned Sandinista city guys fighting to dump Somoza and betray their revolution.

Then it hit me that this was truly a peasant war, a civil war.

I had some befuddled Jesuit priest sitting in front of me over in my committee and I can talk in those terms because I may not want to characterize myself as devout—I leave that to Geraldine Ferraro—but I am loyal, and a loyal practicing Catholic. And when some Jebby sits in front of me and I have got 7 years of Jesuit education and tells me that if we had the equivalent number of people in our country in the hills, 14,000, we would have an army in the hills of 1.5 million Americans fighting against our government. I said, "Did it ever occur to you, Father, if we had one and a half million American fighting commandos in the Rocky Mountains people would call it a civil war?" And he had nothing to say.

When you have 14,000 people fighting in those hills, and it is not jungle the way it is commonly misrepresented by the press, by the fourth estate up there; it is more like the savanna or the Serengeti Plain in Africa. It is easy for helicopter gunships to hunt down these Contras who try to move in the daytime.

Now to tell you the truth, this vote is so frustrating tonight that I know there are thousands upon thousands of people taking advantage of what we call, in arms control talks, national technical means. I am trying to not violate House rules here about refer-

ring to that great expanded audience that is beyond these empty chairs here.

□ 2315

There are hundreds of thousands of frustrated Americans that want a postmortem on this vote, that want to know why all the Members on our side only got 2 minutes and the Members on their side seemed to have 6, 8, or 9 minutes. I will explain that. We had almost twice as many speakers on our side out of 175 Republicans. Two of our Members are sick. One of them just had a heart bypass. Out of their 267 Members, one of theirs is sick and another one just passed away; he was a pro-freedom-lover vote—Dan Daniel of Virginia. Although they had almost 90 more Members than we had, we had twice as many speakers. Do you know why? A lot of these Members in the majority do not want to match their vote with rhetoric and words that will come back to haunt them.

With the Republicans on this side, I am proud of my party and those who did vote with the President, because almost every one of them, with polls against them in their districts, are being called for a profile in courage, voting against a misguided public in their districts. They are willing to put their words together with their votes, and they will stand by their words in the future.

The reason they are so nervous is this: I wish the camera could have played across the faces of everybody on this side as CLAUDE PEPPER brought me to one of the dazzling moments of oratory in this House. In his mid-eighties he was speaking without a note, extemporaneously, about freedom. Red, white, and blue is this distinguished gentleman, our senior Member in years in this House. And the look on their faces was one of—"Oh, my gosh, is he going to turn votes? Is he going to turn this with his inspirational speech because he is inspired by the Cuban Americans and his southern Florida?" And they have risen as no initial first generation ever has in this country.

Do you know that the Cuban Americans in south Florida had seven Members of the Florida Assembly in Tallahassee? No group of immigrants has ever done that.

We have two great Hungarian Americans here, one Republican and one Democrat. They were sitting together watching this debate. This is pretty unusual for two people born in Hungary to make it. But we have all the great ethnic groups that make up this melting pot—my Irish, Jews, Poles, Germans, French, and they all slaved in workshops and educated the next generation, and that is where the politicians came from. The Cubans are doing it in their first generation.

When I was down in south Florida campaigning for Bush a week before last, they said to me, "Why is our country's freedom not on the agenda any longer?" They said, "We admire Bush's courage."

Ninety-eight percent of them are foreign-born, and he said, "I will not lie to you. We are not discussing Cuba's freedom, and it is not on the agenda as far as we can see."

They said, "We love him, but we want you to go to him, Congressman DORNAN, and change that. Why shouldn't we be on the agenda?"

And it is a darned good question. And who shot them down? The same CIA that trained them under President Kennedy, that confiscated over 400 of their boats and locked them up in a bayou that I flew over once in south Florida, one of those back waterways cut out of the swamp.

They took their means of fighting for their freedom away from them and shut them down, and they said, "OK, we will make it in America, but we are never going to give up. We are praying for and waiting for that moment to drive that dictator, Castro, out of Cuba."

Let me read from Krauthammer's editorial. It is just absolutely dazzling, what this man says. This is entitled "Whose Foreign Policy Is It Anyway?" Here is the line I love:

What then gives a Costa Rican more moral authority to decide the fate of Nicaragua than 14,000 Nicaraguans fighting to liberate their own country and asking only for the materials with which to do it?

I want to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON], but before I do, I want to tell something about this Maj. Roger Miranda. I said, "Roger, how many fighters did you have in Masaya?"

On CBS News last night, Dan Rather said, "Masaya, the birthplace of the revolution that toppled Somoza." It is a suburb just to the east of Managua—well, not a suburb but a separate city.

I said, "I know you were a combat hero in Masaya. Were you the commander?"

"No, I was the deputy."

"How many Sandinistas were there fighting?"

I meant in all of Nicaragua. He misunderstood me. He said, "12."

I said, "12?"

He said, "12 in Masaya, 12 of us in 1978."

By 1979, after Eden Pastora, who hates the Communists, who was their No. 1 combatant fighter, Commandante Zero—he was the only name known to the people of all the fighters. Most of the guttiest ones were killed in combat. The Ortega brothers were bankrobbers who were either in jail or in exile during the whole struggle.

But here was Roger Miranda, the deputy Commandante in Masaya with 12 men. He said, "By 1979 we had 98." I said, "Only 98?"

He said, "But this was happening in the cities. It was in the cities, not the hills over Nicaragua."

I said, "What was your Sandinista fighting force at the end?"

He said, "2,500."

The news media usually says 3,500, and so does your CIA. He said that there were 2,500 people.

How did they do it against Somoza? Well, for one thing, Jimmy Carter turned back two Israeli small freighters loaded with bullets. That is what the President was asking for tonight, just small arms to keep them as a viable fighting force, and he was going to seal it up for 2 months until March 31, depending on whether the Ortegas are going to keep the democratization process and open up more than one paper or more than one radio station and let out more than a handful of the 10,500 prisoners.

By the way, I asked Obando y Bravo, "Have you met one prisoner released of the so-called 1,000 that he released?"

And he said, "No; but, honestly, I had 4 or 5 calls, and I am so busy shuttling back and forth to San José and Santo Domingo and going to Europe to brief Ortega on what to expect from this tough anti-Communist Pope that I have not had a chance to return those calls."

I said, "Monsignor," which is the term you use in Latin countries, or "Your Excellency" or "Your Eminence" for a Cardinal, "Your Eminence, have you a list of 1,000 prisoners?" I said, "The American media is accepting Ortega's release of 1,000 prisoners."

He said, "No, no, we are still below 100."

Now, the networks say that Ortega is going to release thousands more, and we do not have a list of over 100 of the so-called 1,000 that he has released. When the Israelis released 1,100 Arabs on the northern border into Lebanon, the news cameras were there to record every single person released by name, and we do not have any 1,000 people released.

Then what I love is when he said they ended the state of emergency. Do you know what all your Embassy people tell me down there? When you have a police state as far gone as the rule of terror in Managua, what difference does it make if you end the state of emergency? Nothing changes. The peasants down there told me, "Nothing changes if he ends the state of emergency. It doesn't change any of the terror in this state."

I know the Soviets at this very moment are telegraphing to the Kremlin the results of this vote. Gorbachev has been emboldened by this

vote tonight. I hate to report that, but it is a fact. He will see that we do not have a resolve. He wonders where our resolve comes from in Afghanistan. That is another hypocritical irony of the voting patterns in this House. But this Lourdes—as they say in French, Lourdes—in Cuba is this major listening facility, the biggest in the Western Hemisphere, where they are reporting on this vote to the Kremlin tonight. I had a briefing from the new National Security Adviser yesterday; the whole Foreign Affairs Committee did, and about 10 of us showed up out of 40, and they told us there is not 11 prison camps or 12 in Nicaragua, their only growth industry, their only building program; it is now up to 16, 16 major prisons. Under the hated oligarchs of Somoza, there was one and a quarter—Tipitapa, which is now expanded to five times its size, and one little torture operation that he had behind the International Hotel that had 12 cells in it. But now they have 16 prisons, and 9 of them are devoted totally to locking up the campesinos off the coffee and cotton farms, locking up thousands of people because the comandos, the los muchachos, swim in the sea of the people.

Miranda told us the Ortega brothers have already cut a deal with the Soviet Union for asylum in the Soviet Union if all goes bad. The turning point when they realized they were in trouble was a year ago when Humberto Ortega, the defense minister—just as Raoul Castro is Fidel's brother, Humberto Ortega controls the guns and the party's army, as it was pointed out here, and the party owns the military. That is not a blue and white rondel on the side of these helicopters. That is the Sandinista party emblem. It would have been like Richard Nixon trying to take over the whole Pentagon and painting every Air Force airplane with that little dumb looking Republican elephant with its trunk down. I prefer the one with trunk in the air for victory. And then suddenly he would say, "Well, I was thinking about resigning." I wonder if the Pentagon would agree to that since the Pentagon is controlled by the national chairman of the Republican party. Imagine if Paul Kirk had say over the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. That is the situation in Nicaragua, the only country in the world to my knowledge that is in this situation. In all of the other countries, even in the Soviet Union, the army is the army of the Soviet Union, controlled in its ultimate decisions by the party which runs the Politburo, 12 men under Gorbachev but dictating to him more than he would ever let on. But you could read the diplomatic traffic if you have the top secret clearance of a Congressman and see how much they do control them at this stage.

So now let us take a look at these prison camps. Here are 9 out of the 16. Here was Somoza's only prison—Tipitapa. They like to call it modelo, the modern prison. Part of it is where they keep the women. This black area here is the old Somoza prison. It is expanded three times by physical plant and five times by real estate.

This is Esteli. This is the area where they first used Soviet helicopter gunships, flying tanks. The MI-25, the export version with a few avionics off of the MI-24 that is used in Afghanistan, was first used here on August 2, 1985. That was the first time Soviet equipment was directly killing our fellow first cousins right here, our Norte Americanos.

The mayor of Esteli was just killed in combat and they tried to act like he was a political death. He was in uniform doing his weekend warrior duty as a reserve officer.

This is La Palmera Prison. This is near the third largest city, Granada. It is a brand new prison.

This is Zona Franco, right near the airport. Every American Senator and Congressman who has gone down there flies right over this prison.

In these prisons tonight they are getting the word, because the grapevine is an amazing thing, it is like jungle drums. The word is already reaching these God-forsaken—well, God has not forsaken them—these liberty-forsaken people rotting in these prisons. They are getting the word that by a lousy shift of five votes, this Congress has destroyed their hope.

I wish I had all 16 pictures here. This is Puerto Cabezas on the coast. I got a top-secret briefing down there. I have to be careful what I say now. The Soviet Union and the Cubans have been jerry-rigging Soviet-made transports to try to shoot down these freedom fighter airlift airplanes with 57-millimeter cannons, with rockets, 3-inch rockets. They have actually fired at some of these planes coming in at night, and they are on the "cheap" down there. They do not get the high tech that we give through so-called covert programs to Afghanistan that Dan Rather loves to keep showing on the evening news. It seems like everybody around here loves the Afghanistan effort. I want to comment on that in a second. But right out of here they are building surface-to-air missile sites. They lucked out and got this DC-6, with people dying and with Colombian pilots dying for us in the cause of freedom. But Puerto Cabezas, the SAM site there, would probably have gotten one sooner or later.

This is Asuncion Prison near Jui-galpa. Look at the size of that thing. As I said, even the military installations, which are the only other building projects, are not as big as these prisons.

This is Club Hipico. Guess what? That is a former motel. When I first looked at that, I said, "Is that a Club Med?"

Somebody said, "Oh, yes." So finally I went up to Matagalpa about 5 weeks ago and met with some of the people up there. I met with the mothers in the main cathedral in the middle of Matagalpa, which again was one of the fighting places that got rid of Somoza only to have their revolution betrayed. We drove by Club Hipico, which was an old motel rebuilt and turned into another one of these vicious political prisons. This is Palo Alto, near Managua. This is not an extension of Stanford University. Look at these places. This is Chimandega, up along the coast near Corinto, where Soviet freighters are unloading. During this entire debate Soviet freighters are unloading weapons of killing. This is \$2 billion worth, as was pointed out here. When Ortega was down conning everybody at San Jose, he had just left his deputies to sign a \$294 million contract with the Soviets, with Gorbachev, just 2 weeks ago. That was while we had a congressional team down in San Jose, Costa Rica, they were advising the Communists, as it came out in the debate here.

This is Waswali Prison. Look at the size of that place. All the building materials down there are going to these Gulag-type Fascist-type concentration camps. It is unbelievable the torture stories that are now coming out from the human rights groups.

It sickens me that some of the Contras we are supporting in their fight revert to the brutality that Somoza engendered. That creates human rights violations. Many of them have been court-martialed, some of them have been executed in the field, and, yes, some of them are not serving their sentences. I have griped about that. But all the people down there that are worthy of the word "truth" tell me that the violations on the Sandinista side are 10 to 1. But we would not get that out of some of the befuddled bishops, networking nuns, and trendy ministers and vicars, to quote HENRY HYDE on this House floor. And that is exactly what they are, trendy.

And listen to this, with all these misstatements of facts here. Before I proceed, Mr. Speaker, let me ask the gentleman from Indiana if he wants to jump in at this point. If so, I will yield to the gentleman.

□ 1130

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Yes, I would like to make a couple of comments, but you are doing so well, and I can sit here and listen to you all night.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I am getting wound up for round 2.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. You are getting warmed up for round 2; all right.

The thing I would like to address is some of the arguments that have been made by the speakers and the others in the debate tonight when they said that the President of the United States should be presiding over the United States and not over Central America, and the implication was that we should be an isolationist nation. We should not be concerned about what is going on in our hemisphere.

I do not know whether they recalled the Monroe Doctrine or not, but the Monroe Doctrine is something that I revere, and many of my colleagues do, in that we do not think a foreign power from another part of the world should come in and establish a beachhead, Communist or otherwise, in our hemisphere.

Mr. DORNAN of California. You picked up on that the minute the President said that President Reagan is only to preside over the United States.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Yes, and that isolationist policy is one that will work to the detriment of this Nation.

The fact of the matter is that the Communist Sandinistas have been exporting revolution, and even though President Arias may have a different view, some of the newspapers in his own country have stated very clearly that they are exporting revolution, they have been sending supplies and they are concerned about it. In fact in an editorial of January 29 of this year, January 1988, *La Nacion*, Costa Rica's most prestigious daily, stated, "What does it state is the fate of the nations that border on Nicaragua?" Because if the resistance, the Contras, is weakened or disappears, the Sandinista regime will direct all its energy with ample Soviet aid to its confessed objective, that of exporting revolution. So they know in Costa Rica, they know in Honduras, they know in Guatemala, they know in El Salvador that there is going to be revolution exported rapidly once the Communists consolidate power, and the vote tonight that took place will lead to that kind of consolidation.

But the thing that concerns me the most—it is kind of a selfish thing with me, and I really would like to get this off my chest. This is not a speech. This is a feeling I have. I heard a number of my colleagues go to the floor, and I know you have a son who is what; about 20 or 25?

Mr. DORNAN of California. One 30 and one 28.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Well, I have a son who is going to be 13 this week, Danny Lee Burton II, and the vote we took tonight which is going to appease the Communists, and I am certain they are celebrating it tonight in Havana, and Managua and Moscow, that will ultimately lead to the consolidation of power and the rapid exportation of revolution throughout

Central America and up into Mexico because the Soviets want to put us in an untenable situation on our southern flank, and that is their objective.

Mr. DORNAN of California. It diverts attention from the Warsaw Pact countries.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That is right, and they hope we will have to withdraw support from our NATO allies and bring troops like President Azcona wants us to do if this gets out of hand. He said he was going to request 50,000 United States troops be stationed in Honduras if this peace process fails and if the Contras are no longer a viable force, so where are these troops going to come from?

So the bottom line is the Soviets would like to put us in a difficult position on the soft underbelly of America, the Mexican-American border, and the thing that concerns me the most is that 13-year-old son of mine and the sons of other Americans who are going to have to go down there and defend our southern flank, the Mexican-American border, at some point in the future. That does not mention all the millions of refugees we are going to have coming across that border.

Just think about the young American boys in 4 or 5 years that are going to have to go down there and fight to do the job we are not doing now by supporting the Contras. The only problem then is that we would not be talking about 60,000 active military personnel in Nicaragua. We will be talking about 400,000 or 500,000, and they will have allies from the Cubans and other countries if they take them over, from El Salvador, the Communist guerrillas that will expand their support base down there, and so our kids are going to have to face a viable military force down there in 5 or 6 years if this continues, if we do not reverse ourselves, and I am very concerned about that.

I hope and pray that my colleagues on the other side of the aisle and those on our side of the aisle that voted incorrectly, I believe, tonight will see the light and wake up before it is too late so we can reverse ourselves because once those Contras die on the vine, and some of them were here watching the vote, and those 4,000 people lose their military supplies and their humanitarian aid, the food and logistical equipment they need to exist, then they are going to flee. They are going to come north to Miami, they are going to go to Texas, to California, your State, and there is not going to be anybody that we can turn to down there to help fight this Communist expansionist policy.

And we are going to have to send our boys down there to do it, and I think one of our colleagues, Mr. BOLAND, tonight alluded to that fact. He said that if it gets that bad we are going to have

to do something about it, but why should we have to send our American boys in to fight what is acknowledged to be a civil war between Communists and people who want freedom when it is not necessary? But that is what we are heading for.

Mr. DORNAN of California. At the risk of sounding like Rev. Jesse Jackson I am going to read a statement here in a minute by retired Col. Larry Tracy, who did the best work in the State Department or the Defense Department in putting our books like this silver one that became our bible for 3 or 4 years. It was he who constructed the Ollie North slide show, and he now has a new one that has 60 slides, all new modern graphics, even improved. He wrote something here that I want to read. I want to "Bidenize" and pretend it is mine now. I want to attribute it to Tracy, but at the close of it he says something to you about your sons. He said that we used to be the arsenal of democracy when I was a little kid in New York at the beginning of World War II and proud of it. Pushing all the neutrality laws, Roosevelt was to help poor England which was standing alone under the great leader, Churchill. Larry Tracy says that if we send them the guns, we would not have to send our sons, and it is that simple.

Ten years from now, 8 years from now, this may come back to bite us.

Do you have a special order following mine?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Can you stay for it?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am not sure whether I can or not.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Yield to me if you have to go.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. OK; if I have to, I will.

Let me just say this. Congressman—who was this letter to earlier? One of my colleagues. Congressman COURTER of New Jersey received this letter, and I think it is so important that the people in the offices here and anyone who might be watching hears this. It is so important. This letter goes right to the heart of the problem, and it says it better than probably anybody except maybe CLAUDE PEPPER of Florida stated the problem tonight. He said:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN: As a resident of the State of New Jersey I urge you, most emphatically, to support President Reagan's upcoming request for more military and humanitarian aid to the Nicaraguan Contra Rebels.

I urge this despite my own solid liberal background: I marched against Vietnam, I volunteered for McGovern in Massachusetts, and I voted for Jimmy Carter. But over the last six years I have been studying history and have become disturbed by what happens to a country when dominated by a Marxist-Leninist minority.

As a product of the Sixties and Seventies, the idea of having my own life controlled by an authoritarian, Leninist state is absolutely horrifying, and I think most Americans—regardless of their political affiliation—share that view. I think it is nothing less than creeping racism to assume that the people of Nicaragua find this prospect in their own future any less frightening.

The only chance the future generations of Nicaragua have for lives of individual freedom is if they physically resist now the control being forced upon them by Soviet-, Cuban-, and East European-trained cadres. But in an age of helicopter gunships and automatic weaponry it is naive to think that farmers and shopkeepers have any chance to resist sophisticated efforts to control them without help from outside. Please help the people of Nicaragua to help themselves, and please use my tax dollars to do it.

This is from a fellow who was a liberal, a McGovern supporter who marched against Vietnam but who has studied history, and he knows what the Communists are up to not only in Nicaragua but elsewhere where they tyrannize the people. I hope that everybody in this country will listen and take to heart what that gentleman from Congressman COURTER's district had to say.

Mr. DORNAN of California. The sad thing is that a lot of Members of this body who also voted for McGovern, chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many babies did you kill today," became enamored with Ho Chi Minh, cried that date in September 1969 when he died and to this day will defend that brutal Communist regime in Hanoi. There is a small coterie of them in this House who are in love with the Sandinistas.

But when my good friend, JIM SCHEUER, got up and said that nobody in this House on either side of the aisle is for the Sandinistas; that is factually incorrect. Maybe he does not know that. There are four groups in this House. There are conservatives, there are liberals, and we have this. As CLAUDE PEPPER said, we are all Americans, and we have got this fundamental difference on how you surgically apply force and power and, yes, sometimes violence like George Washington gets the job done. And there are the moderates, and from my viewpoint they shift back and forth so much I do not know where there is any pride in that position.

That is what Ollie North was talking about when he said a vacillating, unpredictable, on-again, off-again Congress. He was not talking about EDDIE BOLAND, he was not talking about DANNY BURTON. He was talking about 12 people in our party and about 30 in the other party that have gone back and forth, back and forth on this issue, but there is a fourth group. I do not know any of them on our side. If there are, they keep it hidden, but there is a small group and two Democratic chairmen, one who is for Contra aid and one who is against it, and I re-

spect them both. Two of them admitted to me there is this small group that have given their hearts and their loyalty to the Sandinista Communists. They traveled down there and met with Ortega privately. One U.S. Senator from the other body did it in front of you and me, refused to take you and me in to meet Ortega, in to meet with him, after we had just taken him in to meet Azcona 2 days before.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Not only that, but he would not let anyone go in with him except his personal adviser, who was a pro-Sandinista individual.

Mr. DORNAN of California. An Army colonel who was kicked out of the Army for refusing to go to Vietnam.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. And he would not even allow anybody in the State Department to send in somebody just to be in attendance at the meeting which is in accordance with protocol. You are absolutely correct. We have people who are more than sympathetic to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and I think that is appalling, and I do not believe any of their constituents or the people across this country realize how closely tied they are.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Well, there are about 65,000 people that have cycled through groups like Witness for Peace down there in Nicaragua that have also fallen in love with that Communist regime so much so that they will stand there and tell you they are not Communists, and one thing the leadership around here is admitting on both sides of the aisle, and I think America should know this because I do not think the point can be made enough:

Roger Miranda told us last week that Miguel D'Escoto, the suspended priest that lives like a fat cat in a former banker's house with four or five Mercedes in his driveway and all the confiscated art treasures that he says he is just borrowing for a while, and he keeps gaining all this weight when he went on a so-called fast that lasted about 7 days, and he did not lose 5 pounds of that blubber, and his doctors had to take him off his so-called dedicated fast. He is not a Communist. Miranda said suspended priest D'Escoto is a frontpiece.

Sergio Ramirez, the Vice President who went to the University of Kansas at Lawrence, they said he is not a Communist. I said, "How about Victor Hugo Tinoco; hard-core Communist?"

You asked him; remember? The Deputy Foreign Minister?

You said, "Mr. Tinoco, are you a Communist?"

I will give you his answer verbatim. Tell me if I got it right.

By the way, did you see him speaking fluent English on television from

San Jose? And he had an interpreter there with us. He pretended not to speak English so he says.

He said, "I studied to be a Catholic priest once. Now I don't know if I'm a Catholic or Communist."

Don't know.

"All I know is I'm a Nicaraguan."

Remember what I said to him?

"Get off it, Vic; you know, giving us that crap."

He has got all his English-speaking American citizens, some of them with dual citizenship, down there guiding his Communist government.

Then he said to Miranda, "You were a young Marxist."

He changed the word to Communist.

"* * * the one that went to school in Santiago, Chile, and Mexico City saying he is no longer a Communist."

You know that one Communist knows another when they sit around discussing ideology and how they are pulling the wool over the eyes of Congress. Remember what they said? They hate all the Congressmen. They hate us on both sides of the aisle except for their little group of friends, four or five of them.

But they said that the Democrats are more easily manipulated.

And this airplane pilot Denby that they held 8 weeks incommunicado, a lot of it in solitary confinement, and they admitted they had no case against him. He said they feel they are at war against the Republican Party, and, if they look at this vote, well, they should be, because we are for freedom. The only people on the majority side of the aisle that mentioned freedom along with peace were the Democrats who voted for the President's very reasonable plan on what to do.

So I said to Major Miranda, "How many of the Sandinistas are acknowledged hard-core Communists; six?"

He said, "Oh, no, no, no." He said, "All nine, all nine are Communists."

Now RON DELLUMS can come down to the floor and very eloquently say that how come we only beat up on people who do not have the atomic bomb, China or the Soviet Union? No. That is an interesting point. If Ortega had two nuclear weapons, two, I believe that both sides of this aisle would meet in secret and decide to take him out before he lobbed another one of those bombs, this erratic young Communist, at Florida, or Texas or southern California.

No, it is true that we have to do something to stem the tide of Communism where we can, Grenada, Angola, Afghanistan, right here on North American soil in Nicaragua, and, yes, we have to deal with Gorbachev and the main "Mother Wart of Communism" because they have got nuclear warheads by the thousands.

China is an inward-looking people. They have taken down every single

picture of Mao in that country, and his widow is still in prison. They do not know what to do, and they are reaching out. Their motto now is, "Whatever works," so they are a hard-to-define group of Communists with 1 billion, 200 million people in China, but the Soviet Union is still one of the major exporters of terrorism around the world, and while we cut off our freedom fighters, 14,000 of them living off the land and off the air drops in Nicaragua the Soviets continue to flood supplies into those ports.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. If the gentleman will yield?

One of the things struck me in the debate tonight. I heard very infrequently, if at all, anyone talking about the continued military support that the Soviets are giving to the Nicaraguan Communists. There was a lot of talk about us cutting off aid to the freedom fighters, the \$30-some million we were talking about.

□ 2345

But the Soviets this past year sent 33,000 tons of war materials into Nicaragua, not guns and bullets, but helicopters, amphibious armored personnel carriers, sophisticated weaponry that these poor campesinos do not have, so they can crush them and control the countryside and export that revolution. We did not talk about that much tonight, but they have spent over a billion and a half dollars over the last 5 to 6 years into Nicaragua for not only controlling that country and subjugating those people down there, but also for the exportation of revolution, and here we are fighting over \$30-some million in humanitarian aid and \$3 million if they do not comply with the peace agreement that they signed.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Three million dollars.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Three million dollars, opposed to a billion and a half.

Mr. DORNAN of California. It is phenomenal. You know, out there in the popular culture, one of last year's big movies was "Top Gun." The star naval fighter aircraft in that film was an F-14 Tomcat.

Does the gentleman remember what they said that plane was worth in the film? \$30 million.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That is right.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Actually, one crashed near Tonopah, NV, a couple weeks ago, the paper said it was \$32 million.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. So we are talking about one airplane.

Mr. DORNAN of California. One airplane. Now, out in California north of Los Angeles over Independence, CA, two F-18's out of the El Toro Marine Base in BOB BADHAM's district, two F-15's, probably engaged in what I used

to do in peacetime, called air combat maneuvers, training to stay combat ready, you go in opposite directions and come back at one another. It is called bumping heads. You train for that horrible eventuality where you might have to do it for real, as a couple F-14's had to do over the Gulf of Sidra in August of 1981. These two F-18's hit one another. One pilot gave his life in peacetime, one of the 12,000 who have died since Vietnam in peacetime combat training accidents. The other, fortunately, bailed out. Both of them young fathers with lots of little kids.

These two airplanes, F-18 Hornets, were worth about \$26 million each. For one midair collision in California last week was \$52 million plus, and we quibble over \$3 million to the democratic resistance in Cambodia and \$3.25 million today.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That brings to mind something that was made a very salient point today by Congressman DUNCAN HUNTER of California. He brought out the point that at Punta Huete the airfield that is being built by the Communist Sandinistas which will accommodate Mig-21's through Mig-29 fighter bombers—

Mr. DORNAN of California. The Lucian 76's and 86's, the biggest airplanes in the Soviet arsenal.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. This is the Blackjack Bomber, the biggest airplane they have.

He said that the Soviets ultimately plan to bring this aircraft in there. He said that would be equivalent to an \$18 billion naval task force with an aircraft carrier. So if they bring in that aircraft, they are going to have a land-based aircraft carrier in effect and we are going to have to deploy a naval task force with aircraft carriers on it which would be worth \$18 billion to take care of or to watch over this one airfield at Punta Huete. That airfield, they can use those aircraft for surveillance and intelligence gathering purposes for the entire west coast of the United States and the southern part of the United States. So not only will they have Cuba for the east coast, they will have Nicaragua for the west coast, and in addition to that it is going to cost us billions of dollars even if we did not have to go to war down there to keep an eye on the aircraft that will be stationed at that base.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Listen to this statement by one of the scholars on this issue, Larry Tracy. He said that some day historians in the not too distant future are going to look back at February 3, 1988, and see it as an historic date, a date when the Congress of the United States became the guarantor of the Brezhnev doctrine, a doctrine that says once a Communist country, always a Communist country.

We became the guarantor by only a shift of 5 votes tonight.

He says that a recurring theme of the Democrats has been, "Let's give peace a chance."

Now, how many times are we going to hear this? I guess that was Neville Chamberlain's song, "Peace in our Time."

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. They should have asked, how about giving freedom a chance?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I repeat, the only ones on this side who mentioned freedom were those voting with the President. The rest just talked peace.

He said, "Do these Majority Members realize that the Sandinistas and their Cuban and Soviet patrons do not see peace as the absence of war? They see it in terms of "Mir." That is the Russian word for peace. It has a much shaded meaning over our word.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. After the war.

Mr. DORNAN of California. The Russian word "Mir" does not mean the absence of war. In the Communist lexicon it means, it has come to mean a condition that can only exist in a socialist state.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. After the goals of the revolution have been achieved.

Mr. DORNAN of California. That is what their space shuttle is called, "Mir." It is something that only exists in a socialist state.

My colleagues from the other side of the aisle may be aware—are not aware of that fact when they say they are for peace. What they are really saying in the Ortega context is that they are for "Mir."

Then we hear, "Let's take a chance for peace." How many times did we hear that today?

But who is taking the chance? Nobody in this Chamber, but many boys, your sons, I say to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON], they are the ones in their teens who may pay with their lives. They are the ones who are taking the chance through the votes of these people who are so shortsighted.

He says, "How many in this Chamber want to take a chance for peace?"

Perhaps when the body bags start coming back to their districts will they realize the magnitude of their folly with this vote tonight: however, DAVE McCURDY of Illinois says, "Don't worry. We will be voting again in 3 weeks."

I wonder who is listening, the Ortega brothers, the other seven Communist commandantes in the fascist junta down there? I hope all those networking nuns down there, and everybody down there, I hope they are all listening, because DAVE McCURDY told them that we are going to vote on it four more times this year. That is the shift

of the so-called moderates, the vacillating, unpredictable, on-again, off-again group, that tells us we are going to face this debate four more times this year.

Now, Congressman DELLUMS, my colleague from California, spoke of United States actions in Grenada, implying that it was war on people of color. He did not imply it. He came right out and said it, but he said nothing of the fact that it was a black gentleman who requested President Reagan to send in troops, Governor General Paul Scoon. I met him down there. In fact, I went by his house. I got the whole briefing that first week in November 1983.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The gentleman might mention at this point that when we went out and looked at the weapons that were stored in those two storehouses—

Mr. DORNAN of California. Whoof. Mr. BURTON of Indiana. There were over 5 million rounds of ammunition in Soviet boxes marked "food and economic aid," and right next door in the other building were thousands of AK-47 weapons and others for this little island, which is half the size of most small cities.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Lies and advertising.

What the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] also overlooks is that it was a black man, Tom Adams of Barbados, we met him, who relayed Scoon's request to all the other former British Dominion members there. He said nothing of that elegant black lady, the black lady, the Prime Minister, Eugenia Charles of Dominica, who stood with Ronald Reagan side by side in announcing the liberation of Grenada.

And finally the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] said nothing of a CBS poll a week after the liberation in which 91 percent of the people, almost every one of them black, English-speaking blacks, agreed with President Reagan and only 9 percent agreed with RON DELLUMS. Only 9 percent wished that they had Fidel Castro's rule back.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The thing that is so interesting, if the gentleman will yield further, when the gentleman and I went down there 2 or 3 days after the invasion and then Speaker Tip O'Neill had sent his delegation down there, we were kind of a truth squad, the gentleman and I, and Mark Siljander.

Mr. DORNAN of California. That delegation was led by TOM FOLEY who brought back a fair and truthful report.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Yes, but when we went down there, and the gentleman from California was with the other codel, I remember we were in jeeps going through the area and people were running up and throwing

flowers at the jeeps saying, "God bless Ronald Reagan and God bless America," and they were writing on the walls, "God bless America," because they had been liberated from the totalitarian communism and Mr. Bishop down there and his New Pearl or New Jewel movement down there. Those things the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS] should remember, because I am sure he experienced them as well when he was down there.

Mr. DORNAN of California. You know, what is amazing, the largest cruise ship ever built sailed with Jimmy Carter on it, Rosalynn Carter swung a big huge bottle of champagne against it just a week or so ago down in Miami, it is called the *Sovereign of the Seas*. It is just a magnificent, gorgeous ship, not my cup of tea, but just terrific for people who want to stay on a ship and island hop. One of the main stops on every voyage will be Grenada, to meet those people who speak English, no language problems, and tell all these retiring or honeymooning young Americans, "God bless America. Thank you for liberating us and bringing us back into the free world."

Here are Larry Tracy's last thoughts. Through the wonder of video tape, we will all have a record of the speeches made here today. There is no permanent record for people's private libraries of any of the speeches made during the Bay of Pigs in this Chamber. That is FRANK HORTON's hang-up, our friend. He voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution. That is why this fine conservative Republican votes against everything to do with any military aid to certain parts of the world. I bet if we had a vote on Afghanistan, this fine American would probably even vote against Afghanistan.

So we have got this videotape. Larry Tracy says, "I can imagine the tragicomic aspect of watching a video of our Democratic colleagues saying that cutting aid for the Contras will be the route to peace, and then they will have to watch the news develop that U.S. troops are fighting in Central America."

I remember when Senator DONN said on Nightline in early 1976—this is somebody else's quote, Mr. Speaker—he said that if diplomacy failed, perhaps we would have to use a military option, but when there are no Contras, what military option exists other than U.S. soldiers?

Then he closes with, "Let us send our guns to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, so we do not have to send our sons to Nicaragua."

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. If the gentleman will yield further, BOB MICHEL, our Republican leader, in his eloquent address to the House tonight when we were summing up, made reference to August 1938 when Lord Chamberlain

flew to Munich to cut a deal with Hitler on Czechoslovakia, so there could be peace in our time, he said, and flew back and waived that document. His popularity, if there had been a Gallup Poll, would have been 99 percent and Winston Churchill would have been a nonentity, because nobody believed that war was imminent because of that piece of paper, and the seeds of war had just been sown.

The thing that bothers me, in addition to my son and these other young men that I am scared to death perhaps have to fight an unnecessary war down there, the thing that impressed me tonight is that we may have done the same thing that Lord Chamberlain did. We may have appeased the Communist dictators in Nicaragua and Cuba and the Soviet Union to such a degree that ultimately war is imminent.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Right.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. And we are going to have to get involved in it. I hope that if there is a record of this and at some future time, maybe 20 years from now somebody looks back, I hope they have the gentleman from California and me talking and they can see that we did talk about that.

Mr. DORNAN of California. You bet.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. But we did have a message that came across tonight from this whole body and that was a message of appeasement to the Communists, to those who would take away people's freedom, not unlike what happened prior to World War II.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Something just flashed through my head about getting on the record so that you can leave a legacy to your children and grandchildren.

Something just struck me about the gentleman from Indiana. There is another massive catastrophe brewing in this country and the gentleman and I and the gentleman from California, BILL DANNEMEYER, are on tape, on the official record in sight, sound, color and motion, on AIDS. In a year and 5 months, more people will have died of AIDS than died in combat in Vietnam, figures of 58,139, like on the Wall is 47,000 in combat. We are going to pass that in a year and 5 months. I am on the record on that and I want to be on record that my sons, like me, look like they are going to be caught between the bloodshed that people have to go through for liberty, but it will be my grandkids now following the kids of the gentleman from Indiana and their kids and jeopardizing their lives, becoming combat ready, dying in peacetime or dying in a hot war, that may give my grandchildren that breather to grow up between wars. Some families have been that lucky in this country and those families are the very families that should respect the fami-

lies that get caught in the cycle, like those that did not wait to be married at 37 years of age, like my father. If my father had married at 22, like I did, I would have been fighting in World War II. There were families where some of those young veterans came home and survived the horror of 53,000 combat deaths in World War I to have their sons die in the same Flanders Fields and in the same fields of France, against the same enemy, because we did not understand between those two great wars of this century that appeasement breeds more destruction.

I want to ask the Speaker for permission to put the whole Charles Krauthammer article in, but let me read this last paragraph.

He says:

The Arias plan—

This is Charles Krauthammer writing in this week's Time—

The Arias plan has become the great totem of the current Nicaragua debate, but it is no substitute for an American foreign policy. Americans still have to ask themselves the basic questions, questions of national interest. Can the U.S. risk the domination of Central America by a Soviet client state, and questions of national purpose. Is it right for the U.S. to support a guerrilla force fighting a Leninist dictatorship? Central American answers to these questions are conflicting and cacophonous. They contradict one another regularly. In deciding its own answers, America might want to listen to various of these voices, but it is not obliged to be commanded by them.

Mr. Speaker, the full text of the article is as follows:

WHOSE FOREIGN POLICY IS IT ANYWAY?

(By Charles Krauthammer)

The Arias peace plan signed in Guatemala by five Central American Presidents has made one certain contribution to the endless debate about contra aid: a new vocabulary. All sides must now make their case in the ritual languages of the Guatemala accord. Opponents of contra aid say they are simply fulfilling the part that calls for an end to outside aid to insurgents. (Cutting off Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran insurgents is left to the appropriate Nicaraguan parliamentary committees.) The Administration, for its part, portrays contra aid as a mere "insurance policy" to save the peace plan in case the Sandinistas renege on their promises.

Neither side is impolite enough to note that the Guatemala accord has already expired. It was always more a hope than a plan. It had no enforcement mechanism. It has formally abolished its international verification commission. And three weeks ago it, in effect, abolished itself: the plan, said the communique of the five Central American Presidents gathered to assess its progress, had not been implemented, but no deadlines were extended. The U.S. Congress, with its vote this week on contra aid, has by default been designated to make the final judgment on Sandinista compliance.

But even if the Arias plan were still a going concern, a question remains: Why should the U.S. allow its interests and policies in Central America to be determined by others? House Speaker Jim Wright was asked about putting contra aid in escrow, to

be released depending on future Sandinista behavior. Perhaps, said Wright, but only "if we're willing to abide by the determination of those Central Americans themselves . . . rather than allowing someone in the State Department simply on his whim to say who is complying and who isn't."

Wright disdains the idea of leaving determinations critical to American foreign policy to "someone in the State Department"—say, the Secretary of State. The Speaker, who has of late been playing the plenipotentiary, perhaps fancies himself better suited to the role. But it is truly odd to prefer leaving such determinations to foreigners. Most countries devote enormous resources to maintaining independence of judgment in foreign policy. Only in America does the majority leader offer a foreign policy for export.

The target of Democratic affections, the man to whom Wright would most like to assign the conduct of U.S. policy in Central America, is Costa Rican President Arias. He has become the authority for what is right and what is not. With his Nobel aura, Arias has taken on the aspect of a man who has transcended mere politics and national interest.

But President Arias, no less than President Ortega, is necessarily a creature of his time and place. His northern neighbor is run by committed Leninists with announced plans for a 600,000-man military. As the President of an unarmed country whose ultimate protector, the United States, has proved itself utterly vacillating in dealing with these Leninists, Arias is hardly a free agent, let alone a philosopher king. He is less the detached Central American pondering the fate of his continent than he is "President of a defenseless principality looking to secure its future."

Given Congress's performance over the past seven years, any Central American must anticipate that the future will include a Nicaragua run by Sandinistas. To be the architect of a plan that saves the Sandinistas from the contra threat (and en passant, softens some of the rougher edges of Sandinista rule) will serve Arias and Costa Rica well in a Central America destined to be dominated by Nicaragua.

There is nothing wrong with such a calculation. "Appeasement from lack of will is a disgrace. But appeasement from lack of power is mere prudence." It is no slur on the President of Costa Rica to suggest that he is pursuing his nation's interest. What is curious is the idea widespread in Congress that it is illegitimate, a breach of good neighborliness, for the U.S. to do the same.

For the Democrats, the Arias plan came just in time. It is the new anchor for the anti-contra case, a case that is running out of the usual arguments. It was variously said that the contras could not win, had no support and even less legitimacy. Yet after one year of full U.S. funding, they have had considerable success in the field. The Sandinistas find themselves stretched and on the defensive. Most ominously, the internal opposition is taking to the contras about what the Sandinistas fear will be a "united front" of the kind they used to topple Somoza. That, for what until recently was derided as a rump Somocista army, is legitimacy. Legitimacy has come from yet another source. "By agreeing to negotiate with the contras," says Representative Lee Hamilton, a leading opponent of contra aid, "the Sandinistas have in effect recognized the legitimacy of the contras."

From which development (and other concessions wrung out of the Sandinistas by the contras) Hamilton concludes that the contras should now be cut off. Such a leap of illogic can only be achieved by appeal to the sacred text of the Arias plan. The contras have gathered support, established their legitimacy and forced open some political space. Why then destroy them? Because the "Central Americans" wish it.

Now it is doubtful whether, before Nicaragua is fully democratized and thus demilitarized, this is indeed the wish of Nicaragua's neighbors. But assume that it is. Assume further that proximity gives Central Americans greater moral cachet than North Americans to decide Nicaragua's future. What then gives a Costa Rican more moral authority to decide the fate of Nicaragua than 12,000 to 14,000, 15,000 Nicaraguans fighting to liberate their own country and asking only for the materials with which to do it?

The Arias plan has become the great totem of the current Nicaragua debate. But it is no substitute for an American foreign policy. Americans still have to ask themselves the basic question. Questions of national interest: Can the U.S. risk the domination of Central America by a Soviet client state? And questions of national purpose: Is it right for the U.S. to support a guerrilla force fighting a Leninist dictatorship? "Central American" answers to these questions are conflicting and cacophonous. In deciding its own answers, America might want to listen to various of these voices. It is not obliged to be commanded by them.

I believe, and some Democratic friends agree with me who voted against the President, that Arias commands 40 votes in this Chamber minimum.

If he would have had a press conference from Costa Rica this morning in San Jose and said, "I think that they are liars and they are hopeless, these darn Communists," 40 Members would have shifted their votes in this House.

Why should we leave our votes beholden, as nice a man as he is with his Nobel Peace Prize, but I wish every American could get from the Washington Times or other paper of record in this city, his interview, long interview on the record, that was on the front page of the Washington Times this morning.

Do you know what he says in that article? It is bizarre. He says that he learned in school how to treat Communists and evil people. Like Dracula, you hold up a cross. Can you believe that?

□ 2400

I have to ask Oscar about that myself because the first thing that struck me was one of those umpteen remade Dracula films, where he holds the cross, the vampire says, "Sorry, I am Muslim," which is a little ethnically harsh against one of the world's great religions, what he should have said is, "I am sorry, I am an atheist," and that would be factual because we are dealing with communism, and Communists who say that lying is OK.

It is OK because Lenin said all countries are pie crust, made to crumble.

Why are we putting any faith in these nine Communists?

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. The thing that puzzles me about President Arias, and I think he is well intentioned, is what he thinks is going to occur if there is no viable opposition and if the Communists do solidify their position in Nicaragua and rapidly start to export revolution and they have been exporting military supplies and trained guerrillas into Costa Rica already. That is a fact.

I wonder what he thinks will happen? It sticks in my mind that he is counting on his proximity to the Panama Canal, and that the United States would never ever let Costa Rica fall to the Communists and that we would send in the Marines and troops to stop the Communists from taking Costa Rica. That may be in the back of his mind, and he might want to speed up the process now and get it over with if the Communists do not live up to the commitment that they have made.

Unfortunately I do not like that idea because that involves American boys like my son.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Larry Tracy did me a favor, he sent for the transcript of John McLaughlin's One on One program of 2 years ago, the second anniversary, and it would be the 17th of this month. This is when Arias had just been elected on February 2 and he was not going to be sworn in until May 8. I went down with Vice President Bush and the gentleman from the other body, the then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Here is what he said just 2 weeks after his election, and that was 15 days later 2 years ago. John McLaughlin in his inimitable energetic style says, "Do you feel that they have failed in their promises, the Sandinistas?"

And Arias says in that thoughtful professional way of his, "They promised a new Nicaragua, not a second Cuba, and Costa Ricans feel they have built a second Cuba."

In the close of that interview, John McLaughlin 2 years ago says, "All right, now I have a final question on this. Isn't it true that Costa Rica has it all ways, namely this, we have the Rio Pact and we have the Organization of American States Pact, so let's say there is an armed invasion from Nicaragua down into your country, Costa Rica. You pick up the telephone and call Ronald Reagan and you say, 'I am being invaded, Mr. President', and all these countries, Panama sends 10 soldiers, Colombia sends 10 soldiers, Venezuela sends 10 soldiers, and the United States sends the 82d Airborne

Division, and that is the end of the problem, the end of the invasion problem. You really have it all ways, don't you? You don't have a defense budget, you can call us, you can call on us anytime and therefore you feel comfortable."

President-elect Arias answers, "We think it is correct that we have enough friends who will come to defend Costa Rica in case of an attack by Sandinistas or by whatever force. It is true."

The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] and I witnessed Mr. Azcona saying the same thing to us when I asked him, does Arias rely on the 82d Airborne?

He said, "I cannot speak for Arias but as for me you and I have a bilateral agreement that you will rescue us."

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA FOLLOWING THE VOTE ON CONTRA AID

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. GARCIA). Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I would first yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I was saying that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] and I were eye witnesses to this Member of the other body who would not take us in to visit Ortega a day later, but came in to meet with the President in his home where the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] tried to give him a run for his money in ping-pong, but the President of Honduras beat you badly.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. We will forget about that ping-pong.

Mr. DORNAN of California. But just the point that he said to us, "I do not care about Arias, let him speak for himself, but you have a bilateral agreement with Honduras that if we get invaded you will come to rescue us."

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. And he went further than that because I asked him specifically about a Member of the other body talking with him a couple of weeks prior about American troop commitment, and he said that if the peace process failed and if the Communists solidified their positions and there was no viable opposition in the form of Contras he was going to request 50,000 American troops to be stationed there.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Exactly.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That does not include troops for El Salvador, for example.

Mr. DORNAN of California. And the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON]

asked him to repeat it for Mr. HARKIN's benefit.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. That is correct. That did not include by the way, El Salvador, Guatemala, or Costa Rica, and that does not even have a military force except for their police department.

Mr. DORNAN of California. And that is 10,000.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. So I think the fact is that if we read between the lines, that Mr. Arias is counting on, as are the other Central American Presidents, the United States to come and stop the Communists if the peace process fails and there is no viable opposition. That is a great concern of mine because we now have in the field down there people who have been effective in dealing with the Communist government. The Communists have had reversals, and that is why they have come to negotiate. Now we have jerked the rug out from under the Contras and that leaves only one viable alternative to deal with the Communists down the road, and that is with American boys.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Exactly.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. It is so unnecessary. I just do not understand it.

Mr. DORNAN of California. One interesting facet of the debate today was that we each had on each side of the aisle a presidential candidate show up. We have a clean division on this issue in our 13 Presidential candidates. All seven of the majority party in this Chamber, from Mr. Hart down to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] who came back and spoke today, all seven say they would instantly cut off all aid to the Contras. They do not even talk about humanitarian aid. They say let the freedom fighters straggle out of the country like the Bataan Death March as they did in 1984 when all aid was precipitously cut off.

Then we have the gentleman from New York [Mr. KEMP] who spoke on our side and all six of our candidates are for helping this effort of young men and women willing to give their lives for freedom in South America.

Here is something that the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT] said that I think deserves correction. He said that United States forces have invaded Nicaragua 12 times. "Invaded," I say to my colleagues, is a very strong word even if it is an invasion of liberation like the Normandy beaches or Grenada. Here is Shirley Christian's book, "Nicaragua, Revolution and the Family" and on page 10 she writes on at least two occasions that Sandino, and that is after whom the Sandinistas are named, Augusto Sandino, who was a campesino peasant, who came down from the hills to fight the oligarchy in Managua. She says on at least two occasions that Sandino said that he would lay down his arms

if the United States military would take over the Nicaraguan Government and run it until the next election.

I have talked with liberal Democrats in this Chamber who say out of frustration to send the United States Marines to Haiti, which I visited recently, and send our Marines to Haiti to stop the Tons-Tons Macoutes from hacking people to death with machetes who are trying to exercise their franchise to vote now that they are rid of the oligarchy of Duvalier and his son.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. But they will not do anything about Central America.

Mr. DORNAN of California. No, and this is the final point that I have, if the gentleman will yield.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I have one thing that we neglected to mention today which was an amendment which I had sponsored back in 1985, the Burton amendment which dealt specifically with Nicaragua and that amendment said that we would never recognize the legitimacy of the Sandinista Government until they lived up to the commitments they made to the Organization of American States in 1979.

They have never lived up to those commitments and yet we are recognizing that government and the legitimacy of it by the action we took today and other actions we have taken in this Chamber.

Yet the law we have passed, and it is on the books now, and my amendment prohibits that. We should not recognize the legitimacy of the Communist government of Nicaragua until they live up to every single commitment that they made in writing to the Organization of American States in 1979. They have never lived up to them. They have not lived up to the commitments they made in Esquipulas in August last year, and I do not believe they will without the pressure of the Contras being placed upon them.

Mr. DORNAN of California. If the gentleman will yield, here is an exercise that I went through today all over this Chamber with various Members including some on our side of the aisle out of that 12, and on the other side, on another part of the world, and I will close on this.

I mentioned the irony and hypocrisy about Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is 12 time zones away. There are 24 time zones in the world and when one gets around to 12 time zones, you are precisely at the exact opposite point on the Earth. Afghanistan and Pakistan are 12 time zones away from the Rocky Mountains, Denver, Salt Lake City; 11 times zones away from Chicago, Chicago is the same time zone as Managua, Nicaragua. On the other side of the world, to quote our leader BOB MICHEL, we are supporting with an X figure, and we are not allowed to talk about it although CBS Television does it all the

time, but more than a half a billion dollars, we send more than a half billion dollars to the other side of the world to seven competing groups of Mujahideen freedom fighters who are not of our shared Judeo-Christian heritage. They are not North American cousins, fellow norteamericanos, and they will not necessarily establish a democracy. We have no assurance which one of these seven groups of the Mujahideen courageous freedom fighters will prevail and whether they will have an open western-style democracy, but we know in Nicaragua that none of these Contra political directorate leaders could ever turn back to some Somoza form of oligarchy with the four thriving democracies right next door once we get rid of the cancer of communism and the seedy fascists that are destroying the country down there. But on the other side of the world we give them low tech, although the Russians know all about this and tear them up with Hind helicopters, I guess I have to say it is an animal transportation program, all the way from low tech to high-tech Stingers. I can talk about that because Gunga Dan Rather keeps showing that Stinger kill, that one young man 25 years of age who has shot down nine, by now he probably has 10 Soviet aircraft shot out of the sky. That is a double jet ace from the ground helicopter and jet ace. We give them low tech, high tech, a half billion dollars, and although there are people, contrary to what the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] says, on this side of the aisle against it, three or four mentioned they do not want to send money anywhere, not to Angola or Afghanistan, but he says everybody is for it. Nobody has the guts to stand up and speak against the Afghanistan aid. I asked several people all over the Chamber, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT], for example, when I asked him about there being 58,000 people unemployed in his district in Ohio, what about the Afghanistan program? Millions of dollars are going to the other side of the world with no guarantee of democracy, going to competing groups of people who it seems are described by the networks and the popular press as ferocious people loving to fight. Is it not too bad these poor kids have to be trained to fight? They do not have gun villages all up and down the border where they can recreate any gun known to man with their own turret lathes and equipment, and stoking the fire they can create any gun. They have this heritage for hundreds of years from swords to guns. My good friend and colleague, the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT], said to me, "I have to study that issue, BOB, I do not know the facts there."

But he will argue about the price of one airplane going to our fellow coun-

ins right here in Central America, and we give millions of dollars to the other side of the world which I deeply am committed to the support of, and of course Angola is caught in the middle because they are taking money from the devil himself. As Winston Churchill said, "I will make a pact with the devil—that is Stalin—to get rid of Herr Hitler."

So Savimbi, a freedom fighter and hero in this world, says that he will make a temporary pact with South Africa to get communism out of his country and then he will handle South Africa.

The Soviets hire Cubans to fly their helicopters there.

I rescued my friend, the gentleman from California [Mr. ANDERSON], when he could not come up with a reason. I said, "Let me give you an example. The Soviet kids fly their own helicopters in Afghanistan, so that makes it easy for them. They hire Cuban mercenaries to fly in Angola although the Soviet commanders command the ground troops at the company and battalion level, and they fly the gun ships on the field and show how to make adjustments with cannons to shoot down our freedom fighter air drop carriers, but there the Cuban pilots fly." That first mission of Estelle 2 years ago, that was flown to rescue a Cuban surrounded by Contras. They killed over 100 Contras, Cuban pilots flying on North American soil with Soviet gunships, and they trained a lot of Mig pilots. When they could not get the Migs in, and they came out with this in the intelligence reports, they retrained the Nicaraguan Mig pilots to fly helicopters. So the helicopters are flown by both Nicaraguans and Cubans here, Cubans in Angola and Russians in Afghanistan, and that frees their conscience to send a half a million dollars plus to the other side of the world in a so-called covert program that Dan Rather keeps talking about, and they have no compunction that not one person, even those against it, has the guts to get up in the well and say that is wrong when they say over and over, "The duly elected government of Nicaragua," as I pointed out. The government of Afghanistan that we recognize, that has a seat in the United Nations, is another puppet government just like this government that is beholden, lock, stock and barrel, to the Soviet Union's largesse which is running out on Mr. Gorbachev, because he is facing an economic disaster.

□ 0015

There is no difference between the phony government in Managua or the phony government in Cabal in Afghanistan. Both are propped up by the Soviet Union in dollars and their armaments. So the hypocrisy of supporting Afghanistan, at least by omission,

not speaking out and crushing with a pitiful price of one F-14 Tomcat, these young, courageous peasant boys and girls in this peasant army of 14,000, this disaster.

A final, final, final thought. The gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER] got up, my dear colleague, and said why do not the people rise up in the streets? I could not get more time from MICKEY EDWARDS to answer, but I wanted to say I will tell my colleague why not. Do you not remember the people's uprising in the streets of Budapest, Hungary, and the 50,000 killed? Do you not remember the uprising in Czechoslovakia? They learned faster. They only lost 13,000 in the streets. Kids do not fare very well against tanks.

I remember when Somoza was getting his legs cut off by Jimmy Carter, and I turned to my dear friend here, Larry McDonald, who said let us go down and save Somoza, and I said no, let him die, let this go down because he is a jerk, a thief, and the same thing with Marcos. But what was the price? Out of the frying pan, into the fire. So when Carter cut off his legs and when the OAS derecognized them and Somoza saw himself going down, he got his bulldozers out at night, and he took his father's remains out of the ground, a sergeant from the peasant class, a Camposino himself whose son denied the revolution, and they fly out of the country.

Why do not 14,000 Contras do what 2,500 Sandinistas do? Because the Sandinistas were not up against Soviet flying tanks, heavy 155-millimeter artillery and an army of 75,000 people. They were up against a sleazy, debauched, diminishing Guardia Nacional, and all of the Guardia sergeants and others who did not get to Miami. The gentleman was in the room when I told Tinico could he bring the planes out from the Guardia, and that he had gotten hold of every man that he could by taking any woman who would say that he had slapped her face, and then all you are left with are young men, 17, 18, 19, no uniform, and he has them rotting for 8 years in prison, and he wants to keep them for 30.

President Reagan should tell Ortega, "Give me everybody." Get them out of prison, just as I made an offer to the Prime Minister of Vietnam in 1979 to give us our friends, our 14,000 political prisoners and we will take them off your hands. God knows what happened to them. I am for taking all of the political prisoners even if it means exile and reuniting them with their families.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I want to thank the gentleman from California for his very eloquent statement in this postmortem we are conducting tonight on one of the most unfortunately historic days that we have ever had in this Chamber.

I just would like to end myself by saying that there is peace in Budapest and there is peace in Czechoslovakia and there is peace in Vietnam, and there is peace in a lot of other Communist countries around the world, but there is no freedom.

I hope that we have not committed the people of not only Nicaragua but the other countries in Central America to a peace without freedom.

I yield back the balance of my time.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DORNAN of California) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. LUNGREN, for 60 minutes, on February 4.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. HUNTER, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. CLINGER, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GRAY of Illinois) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. CLEMENT, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. RODINO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. HUTTO, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. KLECZKA, for 60 minutes, on February 9.

Mr. KLECZKA, for 60 minutes, on February 10.

Mr. SISISKY, for 60 minutes, on February 16.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. BURTON of Indiana) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 60 minutes, February 8.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. STOKES, and to include extraneous material notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds 2 pages of the RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$2,662.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DORNAN of California) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. LENT.

Mr. GINGRICH.

Mr. SKEEN.

Mr. LIVINGSTON in two instances.

Mr. HEFLEY.

Mr. GUNDERSON.

Mr. LOWERY of California.

Mr. CLINGER.

Mr. RIDGE.

Mr. SHAW in two instances.

Mr. SOLOMON.
Mr. SHAYS.
Mr. SHUMWAY.
Mr. EMERSON.
Mr. DAUB.
Mr. FIELDS.
Mr. McCANDLESS.
Mr. DONALD E. LUKENS.
Mr. GEKAS in two instances.
Mr. SCHUETTE.
Mr. HASTERT.
Mr. McEWEN.
Mr. LAGOMARSINO.
Mr. BARTON of Texas.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.
Mr. SUNDQUIST.
Mr. GILMAN.
Mr. COURTER.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GRAY of Illinois) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GARCIA.
Mr. RODINO in two instances.
Mr. FROST in three instances.
Mr. NOWAK.
Mr. COLEMAN of Texas in two instances.
Mr. DYMALLY.
Mr. HAMILTON in two instances.
Mr. HALL of Ohio in two instances.
Mr. BERMAN.
Mr. AU COIN.
Mr. SYNAR.
Mr. VISCLOSKY.
Mr. CLAY.
Mr. SMITH of Florida in three instances.
Mr. MARKEY.
Mr. BORSKI.
Mr. FORD of Tennessee.
Ms. PELOSI.
Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota.
Mr. GORDON.
Mr. BARNARD.
Mr. BONKER in two instances.
Mr. ATKINS.
Mr. VENTO.
Mr. WILLIAMS.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to enrolled joint resolutions of the Senate of the following titles:

S.J. Res. 39. Joint resolution to provide for the designation of the 70th anniversary of the renewal of Lithuanian Independence, February 16, 1988, as "Lithuanian Independence Day."

S.J. Res. 143. Joint resolution to designate April 1988, as "Fair Housing Month."

S.J. Res. 172. Joint resolution to designate the period commencing February 21, 1988, and ending February 27, 1988, as "National Visiting Nurses Association Week."

S.J. Res. 196. Joint resolution to designate February 4, 1988, as "National Women in Sports Day."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 20 minutes

a.m.) the house adjourned until 11 a.m. today, Thursday, February 4, 1988.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2829. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, transmitting the Commission's 18th report concerning the impact of competition and on small business of the development and implementation of voluntary agreements and plans of action to carry out the provisions of the International Energy Program, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 6272(i); to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

2830. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting the fiscal year 1987 annual report on railroad financial assistance; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

2831. A letter from the Administrator, Agency for International Development, transmitting a report of the funds appropriated by the Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1988, as enacted in Public Law 100-202, for development assistance and international organizations and programs, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2413(a); to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2832. A letter from the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, transmitting a copy of the Price and Availability Report for the quarter ending 31 December 1987, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 2768; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2833. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the monthly report on imports during July, August, and September 1987, of strategic and critical materials from countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 5092(b)(2); to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means.

2834. A letter from the Secretary of Energy, transmitting the Department's 11th report entitled, "Comprehensive Program and Plan for Federal Energy Education, Extension and Information Activities", pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 7373(2); jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and Science, Space and Technology.

2835. A letter from the Secretary of Commerce, transmitting the monthly report on imports during June 1987 of strategic and critical materials from countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 5092(b)(2); jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means.

2836. A letter from the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, transmitting notification that the Bureau's portion of a study titled, "Report on the Effect of the High Cost of Living on the New York Office of the FBI and a Plan for Remedies" would be forthcoming following its review by OPM, pursuant to Public Law 100-178, section 502(b) (101 Stat. 1015); jointly, to the Committees on the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and Post Office and Civil Service.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. JONES of North Carolina: Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries. H.R. 1803. A bill to amend the Merchant Marine Act, 1920; with an amendment (Rept. 100-501). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DELAY (for himself and Mr. ARCHER):

H.R. 3895. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to waive a maximum financed amount limitation with respect to vendee home loans made for homes located in economically distressed areas; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. DYMALLY:

H.R. 3896. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to change the position of the Director of the Census Bureau to level IV from level V in the executive schedule; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FRANK (for himself, Mr. SHAW, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. CARDIN, and Mr. COBLE):

H.R. 3897. A bill to authorize the Attorney General to grant, oversee, and terminate Federal charters; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. KASICH:

H.R. 3898. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to clarify and strengthen the authority of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Ms. OAKAR:

H.R. 3899. A bill to provide financial assistance for programs for the prevention, identification, and treatment of elder abuse, neglect, and exploitation, to establish a National Center on Elder Abuse, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Committees on Education and Labor and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. DAUB (for himself and Mr. DONNELLY):

H.R. 3900. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide long-term care benefits under the Medicare Program and to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide for incentives for individuals and employers to purchase long-term care insurance; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

By Ms. OAKAR:

H.R. 3901. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to provide an optional part C insurance program to provide coverage of certain vision, hearing, and dental services and prescription drugs; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. ROBINSON:

H.R. 3902. A bill to specify the burden of proof in certain Federal civil suits relating to conditions in State penal facilities; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROTH (for himself, Mr. GUNDERSON, and Mr. PETRI):

H.R. 3903. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to exempt farmers from the requirement to capitalize preproductive costs, and to require farmers with large farming operations to use an accrual method of accounting; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mrs. SAIKI:

H.R. 3904. A bill relating to the treatment of certain ground rents for purposes of the mortgage bond rules of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. WOLPE (for himself, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. BONKER, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. DORNAN of California, and Mr. BERMAN):

H.R. 3905. A bill to require that the proposed agreement for cooperation between the United States and Japan concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy be resubmitted to the Congress; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BARNARD (for himself and Mr. PARRIS):

H.R. 3906. A bill to enhance the value of the charters of thrift institutions, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota (for himself, Mr. DAUB, Mr. MOODY, Mr. JONTZ, Mr. PENNY, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. OBEY, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. WEBER, Mr. MARLENEE, Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. OLIN, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. NAGLE, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Ms. SLAUGHTER of New York, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH, Mr. PETRI, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. EVANS, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. HENRY, and Mr. SKEEN):

H.R. 3907. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to repeal the application of the uniform capitalization rules with respect to animals produced in a farming business; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FOLEY (for himself and Mr. MICHEL):

H.J. Res. 447. Joint resolution designating March 4, 1988, as "Department of Commerce Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. RUSSO:

H.J. Res. 448. Joint resolution designating February 16, 1989, as "Lithuanian Independence Day"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. LOWERY of California (for himself and Mr. DERRICK):

H.J. Res. 449. Joint resolution designating the month of November 1988 as "National Alzheimer's Disease Month"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. MACKEY:

H.J. Res. 450. Joint resolution to designate the period commencing on September 5, 1988, and ending on September 11, 1988, as "National School Dropout Prevention Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. FOLEY:

H. Con. Res. 242. Concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the House from February 9 to February 16, 1988, and a conditional adjournment of the Senate from February 4 or 5, to February 15, 1988; considered and agreed to.

By Mr. FAUNTROY:

H. Res. 354. Resolution commending the Washington Redskins on winning Super Bowl XXII; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. DE LA GARZA (for himself and Mr. MADIGAN):

H. Res. 355. Resolution providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Agriculture in the second session of the 100th Congress; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. DIXON:

H. Res. 356. Resolution providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct in the second session of the 100th Congress, to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. FORD of Michigan (for himself and Mr. TAYLOR):

H. Res. 357. Resolution providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in the second session of the 100th Congress; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI (for himself and Mr. DUNCAN):

H. Res. 358. Resolution providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Ways and Means in the second session of the 100th Congress; to the Committee on House Administration.

By Mr. UDALL:

H. Res. 359. Resolution providing amounts from the contingent fund of the House for expenses of investigations and studies by the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the second session of the 100th Congress; to the Committee on House Administration.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. FAWELL:

H.R. 3908. A bill for the relief of Keun Sun Lee; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WYLIE:

H.R. 3909. A bill for the relief of Douglas Frederick Smith and Bonnie Smith; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 39: Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland.

H.R. 112: Mr. DUNCAN.

H.R. 190: Mr. MARTINEZ and Mr. FISH.

H.R. 245: Mr. GIBBONS.

H.R. 813: Mr. BONKER.

H.R. 958: Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. FROST, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. WOLF, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. WHITTAKER, and Mrs. JOHNSON of Connecticut.

H.R. 1002: Mr. MARKEY.

H.R. 1016: Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. FLAKE, and Mr. FORD of Michigan.

H.R. 1115: Mr. HOLLOWAY.

H.R. 1119: Mr. TORRICELLI.

H.R. 1398: Mr. MOODY.

H.R. 1481: Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. CARPER, Mr. UPTON, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, and Mr. SHAYS.

H.R. 1531: Mr. PANETTA and Mr. BROWN of Colorado.

H.R. 1583: Mr. GINGRICH.

H.R. 1597: Mr. MOAKLEY and Mr. MAUROLES.

H.R. 1699: Mr. NIELSON of Utah and Mr. TORRICELLI.

H.R. 1782: Mr. INHOFE and Mr. MILLER of Ohio.

H.R. 1786: Mr. BILBRAY, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. INHOFE, Mr. KONNYU, Mr. NELSON of Florida, Mr. BAKER, Mr. PENNY, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. ARCHER, Mr. APPEGATE, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. MFUME, and Mr. ORTIZ.

H.R. 1885: Mr. ESPY.

H.R. 1917: Mr. LELAND.

H.R. 1957: Mr. McHUGH, Mr. JEFFORDS, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. HOPKINS, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. SPRATT, Mrs. PATTERSON, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. DICKS, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. SCHAEFER, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. GALLEGLY, and Mr. PENNY.

H.R. 2051: Mr. INHOFE, Mr. GALLEGLY, and Mrs. SAIKI.

H.R. 2260: Mr. SIKORSKI.

H.R. 2383: Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. STARK, Mr. FRANK, and Mr. GONZALEZ.

H.R. 2384: Mr. MACKAY.

H.R. 2464: Mr. LaFALCE.

H.R. 2489: Mr. JEFFORDS.

H.R. 2724: Mr. PEPPER.

H.R. 2725: Ms. SNOWE.

H.R. 2848: Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. HYDE, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. FAUNTROY, and Mr. CAMPBELL.

H.R. 2925: Mr. HUGHES.

H.R. 2934: Mr. STAGGERS, Mr. INHOFE, and Mr. JOHNSON of South Dakota.

H.R. 3009: Mr. LOWRY of Washington and Mr. BARTLETT.

H.R. 3107: Mr. LEWIS of Georgia.

H.R. 3174: Mr. MARKEY and Mr. BORSKI.

H.R. 3193: Mr. BROWN of California and Mr. DWYER of New Jersey.

H.R. 3286: Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. MINETA, Mr. SUNIA, and Mr. KOLTER.

H.R. 3321: Mr. MORRISON of Washington and Mrs. BOXER.

H.R. 3336: Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. OWENS of Utah, Mr. KASICH, and Mr. EVANS.

H.R. 3359: Mr. FEIGHAN and Mr. WEISS.

H.R. 3440: Mr. LEHMAN of Florida and Mr. EVANS.

H.R. 3523: Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas and Mr. BRYANT.

H.R. 3524: Mr. GONZALEZ.

H.R. 3602: Mr. MURPHY, Mr. WEISS, Mr. NEAL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. MILLER of California, and Mr. LOWRY of Washington.

H.R. 3614: Mr. CHANDLER.

H.R. 3619: Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. LANTOS, and Mrs. ROUKEMA.

H.R. 3677: Mr. GREGG, Mr. SOLOMON, and Mr. GALLEGLY.

H.R. 3635: Mr. BUECHNER and Mr. DEFazio.

H.R. 3639: Mr. CARR, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. BALLENGER, Mr. SKELTON, and Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma.

H.R. 3651: Mr. FUSTER, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. APPELATE, Mr. CLAY, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois, Mr. COYNE, Mr. ROE, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. FRANK, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. TORRES, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. PENNY, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. NEAL, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. VENTO, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mrs. PATTERSON, Mr. WOLPE, and Mr. FISH.

H.R. 3654: Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. NEAL, Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. FAUNTROY, and Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma.

H.R. 3699: Mr. FAWELL, Mr. KLECZKA, and Mr. OBEY.

H.R. 3715: Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. MADIGAN, and Mr. PANETTA.

H.R. 3721: Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. MARTINEZ, and Mr. BUECHNER.

H.R. 3755: Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. WILSON, and Mr. BONIOR of Michigan.

H.R. 3764: Mr. FEIGHAN.

H.R. 3765: Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. KONNYU, Mr. BUECHNER, Mr. HEFLEY, and Mr. McMILLEN of Maryland.

H.R. 3830: Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut and Mr. SHUMWAY.

H.R. 3844: Mr. DUNCAN and Mr. TAUKE.

H.R. 3850: Mr. JONES of Tennessee, Mr. OLIN, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. WEBER, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. ESPY, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. REGULA, Mr. PETRI, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. WYDEN, and Mr. KOLTER.

H.R. 3856: Mr. HUTTO.

H.R. 3865: Mr. DEFazio, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. CLINGER, and Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire.

H.R. 3870: Mr. COELHO.

H.R. 3878: Mr. PERKINS and Mr. TRAFICANT.

H.R. 3893: Mr. MARLENEE, Mr. BARTON of Texas, and Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota.

H.J. Res. 50: Mr. GEUDENSON, Mrs. KENNELLY, and Mr. HALL of Texas.

H.J. Res. 359: Mr. DE LUGO.

H.J. Res. 377: Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. CONTE, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. FISH, Mr. PEPPER, and Mr. KILDEE.

H.J. Res. 380: Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. CARPER, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr.

HILER, Mr. VENTO, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. UDALL, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. BOSCO, Mr. LUNGREN, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. RITTER, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. HENRY, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. ROE, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. HOCHBRUECKNER, Mr. REGULA, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. KASICH, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. CLAY, and Mr. SCHUETTE.

H.J. Res. 386: Mr. BOSCO, Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. HILER, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. STOKES, Mr. WEISS, and Mr. WILSON.

H.J. Res. 398: Mr. ROEMER, Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, and Mr. SCHAEFER.

H.J. Res. 402: Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. ANNUNZIO, Mr. APPELATE, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. BEILENSON, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BOSCO, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. CARDIN, Mr. CHAPMAN, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. COELHO, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. CONTE, Mr. COURTER, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. DYSON, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. GALLO, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. GONZALEZ, Mr. GRANT, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. HASTERT, Mr. HAYES of Louisiana, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. UPTON, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. VISCLOSKEY, Mr. WEISS, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. DICKS, Mr. DIOGUARDI, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. DAUB, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. MFUME, Mr. BOULTER, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. ESPY, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. McDADDE, Mr. MacKAY, Mr. MANTON, Mr. MARTIN of New York, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Ms. OAKAR, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. NEAL, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. LANCASTER, Mr. LEHMAN of California, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. LELAND, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. THOMAS A. LUKE, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. McGrATH, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MINETA, Mr. MOLINARI, Mr. NAGLE, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. PETRI, Mr. PICKETT, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. RODINO, Mr. ROE, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. SABO, Mr. SKAGGS, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. SUNIA, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. NELSON of Utah, Mr. MILLER of Washing-

ton, Mr. MILLER of California, Mr. HENRY, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. HANSEN, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. HYDE, Mr. KANJORSKI, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. ROSE, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. MOODY, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. PRICE of Illinois, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. PRICE of North Carolina, Mr. MACK, Mr. McMILLAN of North Carolina, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. HOYER, Mr. HUBBARD, Mr. KENNEDY, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. RUSSO, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. REGULA, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. LENT, Mr. YATRON, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. CARPER, Mr. CLARKE, Mr. COATS, Mr. COBLE, Mr. DIXON, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. FROST, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. GREGG, Mr. HERTEL, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. LUNGREN, Mr. McCANDLESS, Mr. QUILLEN, Mr. TALLON, Mr. RHODES, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. TORRES, Mr. SPENCE, Mr. STALLINGS, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. SAWYER, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. SLAUGHTER of Virginia, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. FISH, Mr. WILSON, Mr. WELDON, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. SHAYS, Mr. YATES, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. WISE, and Mr. COLEMAN of Texas.

H.J. Res. 409: Mr. WHEAT.

H.J. Res. 413: Mr. DIOGUARDI.

H.J. Res. 438: Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. ANDERSON, Mr. WISE, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. BOSCO, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. TALLON, Mr. WOLF, Mr. DE LUGO, Mr. HEFNER, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. OLIN, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. RAVENEL, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. REGULA, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. LELAND, and Mr. BROOKS.

H. Con. Res. 126: Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. THOMAS of California, Mr. VENTO, Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. OWENS of New York, Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. OBERSTAR, and Ms. KAPTUR.

H. Con. Res. 230: Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. BERMAN, and Mr. BUSTAMANTE.

H. Con. Res. 232: Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. WORTLEY, Mr. MFUME, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. MACK.

H. Con. Res. 238: Mr. DANNEMEYER.

H. Con. Res. 241: Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, and Mr. CARPER.

H. Res. 300: Mr. CARDIN, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. FROST, and Mr. KONNYU.