HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—*Thursday, June 19, 1986*

The House met at 10 a.m.

The Chaplain, Rev. James David Ford, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Gracious God, keep us from all prejudice that would cloud our vision of Your created world. Teach us to be restrained in judgment about our neighbor or colleague. May we not be hasty in our conclusions and see our illusions as reality, but rather let us practice honesty and forthrightness in our attitudes and know other people as members of Your divine creation.

May Your blessing be with us this day and every day, we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Pursuant to clause 1, rule I, the Journal stands approved.

Mr. RIDGE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to clause 1, rule I, I demand a vote on agreeing to the Speaker's approval of the Journal.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the Chair's approval of the Journal.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. RIDGE. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 260, nays 137, answered "present" 2, not voting 34, as follows:

[Roll No. 181]

YEAS—260

Akaka	Bonker	Cooper
Alexander	Borski	Coyne
Anderson	Bosco	Crockett
Andrews	Boucher	Daniel
Annunzio	Boxer	Darden
Applegate	Brooks	Daschle
Archer	Broomfield	de la Garza
Aspin	Brown (CA)	Dellums
Atkins	Broyhill	Derrick
AuCoin	Bruce	Dicks
Barnard	Bryant	Dixon
Bateman	Burton (CA)	Donnelly
Bates	Bustamante	Dorgan (ND)
Bedell	Byron	Dornan (CA)
Beilenson	Callahan	Duncan
Bennett	Carper	Durbin
Berman	Carr	Dwyer
Bevill	Chapman	Dymally
Biaggi	Chappell	Dyson
Boggs	Clinger	Early
Boland	Coelho	Eckart (OH)
Boner (TN)	Coleman (TX)	Eckert (NY)
Bonior (MI)	Collins	Edgar
Edwards (CA)	Leland	Rose
English	Levin (MI)	Rostenkowski
Erdreich	Levine (CA)	Rowland (GA)
Evans (IL)	Lipinski	Roybal
Fascell	Long	Rudd
Fazio	Lowry (WA)	Russo
Feighan	Lujan	Sabo
Fish	Luken	Savage
Flippo	Lundine	Scheuer
Florio	MacKay	Schulze
Foglietta	Madigan	Sharp
Foley	Manton	Shelby
Ford (MI)	Markey	Shumway
Fowler	Martin (NY)	Sisisky
Frank	Martinez	Skelton
Franklin	Matsui	Slattery
Frost	Mavroules	Smith (FL)
Gaydos	Mazzoli	Smith (IA)
Gejdenson	McCloskey	Smith (NE)
Gephardt	McCollum	Smith (NJ)
Gibbons	McDade	Solarz
Gilman	McEwen	Spence
Glickman	McHugh	Spratt
Gonzalez	Mica	St Germain
Gordon	Mikulski	Staggers
Gradison	Miller (WA)	Stallings
Gray (IL)	Mineta	Stark
Gray (PA)	Moakley	Stokes
Green	Mollohan	Stratton
Guarini	Montgomery	Studds
Hall (OH)	Moody	Swift
Hamilton	Moore	Tallon
Hammerschmidt	Morrison (CT)	Tauzin
Hartnett	Morrison (WA)	Taylor
Hatcher	Mrazek	Thomas (GA)
Hayes	Murphy	Torres
Hefner	Murtha	Torricelli
Hendon	Myers	Towns
Hertel	Natcher	Traficant
Hillis	Neal	Traxler
Horton	Nelson	Valentine
Howard	Nichols	Vento
Hoyer	Nowak	Visclosky
Hubbard	Oakar	Volkmer
Huckaby	Obey	Walgren
Hughes	Olin	Watkins
Hutto	Ortiz	Waxman
Jeffords	Packard	Weaver
Jenkins	Panetta	Weiss
Johnson	Pease	Wheat
Jones (TN)	Perkins	Whitley
Kanjorski	Pickle	Whitten
Kastenmeier	Price	Wilson
Kemp	Pursell	Wirth
Kennelly	Rahall	Wise
Kildee	Rangel	Wolpe
Kleczka	Ray	Wortley
Kolter	Regula	Wright
Kostmayer	Reid	Wyden
LaFalce	Richardson	Wylie
Lantos	Rinaldo	Yates
Leath (TX)	Robinson	Yatron
Lehman (CA)	Rodino	Young (MO)
Lehman (FL)	Roe	

NAYS—137

Armey	Conte	Gekas
Badham	Coughlin	Gingrich
Bartlett	Courter	Goodling
Barton	Craig	Gregg
Bereuter	Crane	Gunderson
Bilirakis	Daub	Hall, Ralph
Bliley	DeLay	Hansen
Boehlert	DeWine	Hawkins
Boulter	Dickinson	Henry
Brown (CO)	DioGuardi	Hiler
Burton (IN)	Dreier	Holt
Carney	Edwards (OK)	Hopkins
Chappie	Emerson	Hunter
Clay	Evans (IA)	Hyde
Coats	Fawell	Ireland
Cobey	Fiedler	Jacobs
Coble	Fields	Jones (OK)
Coleman (MO)	Frenzel	Kindness
Combest	Gallo	Kolbe
Kramer	Moorhead	Smith, Denny (OR)
Lagomarsino	Nielson	Smith, Robert (NH)
Latta	Oxley	Smith, Robert (OR)
Leach (IA)	Parris	Snowe
Lent	Pashayan	Snyder
Lewis (CA)	Penny	Solomon
Lewis (FL)	Petri	Stangeland
Lightfoot	Porter	Stenholm
Livingston	Quillen	Strang
Lloyd	Ridge	Stump
Loeffler	Ritter	Sundquist
Lott	Roberts	Swindall
Lowery (CA)	Roemer	Synar
Lungren	Rogers	Tauke
Mack	Roth	Vander Jagt
Martin (IL)	Roukema	Vucanovich
McCain	Rowland (CT)	Walker
McCandless	Saxton	Weber
McCurdy	Schaefer	Whitehurst
McGrath	Schroeder	Whittaker
McKernan	Schuette	Wolf
McMillan	Sensenbrenner	Young (AK)
Meyers	Shaw	Young (FL)
Michel	Shuster	Zschau
Miller (OH)	Sikorski	
Mitchell	Siljander	
Molinari	Skeen	
Monson	Slaughter	

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—2

Anthony	Miller (CA)

NOT VOTING—34

Ackerman	Downey	Oberstar
Barnes	Ford (TN)	Owens
Bentley	Fuqua	Pepper
Breaux	Garcia	Schneider
Campbell	Grotberg	Schumer
Chandler	Heftel	Seiberling
Cheney	Jones (NC)	Sweeney
Conyers	Kaptur	Thomas (CA)
Dannemeyer	Kasich	Udall
Davis	Marlenee	Williams
Dingell	McKinney	
Dowdy	O'Brien	

□ 1015

Mr. ECKERT of New York changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

So the Journal was approved.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Hallen, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed with an amendment in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

H.J. Res. 652. Joint resolution to provide for the temporary extension of certain programs relating to housing and community development, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a joint resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S.J. Res. 365. Joint resolution welcoming the Afghan Alliance.

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF CERTAIN PROGRAMS RELATING TO HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 652) to provide for the temporary extension of certain programs relating to housing and community development, and for other purposes," with a Senate amendment thereto, and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The Clerk read the Senate amendment, as follows:

Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. Each provision of law amended by Public Law 99-289, is amended by striking out "June 6, 1986" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "July 25, 1986".

SEC. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, competitions for grants under section 119(d)(1) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, for cities not described in the first sentence of subsection (i) of such section and urban counties, shall not be concluded, and awards granted thereunder prior to July 25, 1986, unless legislation amending the selection limitations and criteria weight of such section is enacted into law and made applicable to such competitions.

□ 1025

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I have an amendment at the desk.

The SPEAKER. An amendment is not in order at this time. An amendment is only in order in the event that there is no objection.

Is there objection to considering the Senate amendment in the House?

There was no objection.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I have an agreement with the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] that will allow me to offer an amendment.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] for the purpose of offering an amendment.

AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYLIE

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I move to concur in the Senate amendment with an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment to Senate amendment offered by Mr. Wylie: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate, insert:

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROGRAMS.

(a) TITLE I INSURANCE.—Section 2(a) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the first sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(b) GENERAL INSURANCE.—Section 217 of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(c) LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING INSURANCE.—Section 221(f) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the fifth sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(d) SECTION 235 HOMEOWNERSHIP.—

(1) ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS AUTHORITY.—Section 235(h)(1) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) INSURANCE AUTHORITY.—Section 235(m) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(3) HOUSING STIMULUS AUTHORITY.—Section 235(q)(1) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(e) CO-INSURANCE.—

(1) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—Section 244(d) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) RENTAL REHABILITATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.—Section 244(h) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(f) GRADUATED PAYMENT AND INDEXED MORTGAGE INSURANCE.—Section 245(a) of the National Housing Act is amended by strking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(g) REINSURANCE CONTRACTS.—Section 249(a) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the second sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(h) ARMED SERVICES HOUSING INSURANCE.—

(1) CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OF ARMED FORCES.—Section 809(f) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) DEFENSE HOUSING FOR IMPACTED AREAS.—Section 810(k) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(i) LAND DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE.—Section 1002(a) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(j) GROUP PRACTICE FACILITIES INSURANCE.—Section 1101(a) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

SEC. 2. LIMITATIONS ON COMMITMENTS TO INSURE LOANS AND GUARANTEE MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES.

(a) FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION FUND.—

(1) FISCAL YEAR 1986.—Notwithstanding section 531 of the National Housing Act, the applicable limitation on additional commitments to insure mortgages and loans to carry out the purposes of the National Housing Act during fiscal year 1986 is increased by an additional $57,580,000,000 of mortgage and loan principal.

(2) FISCAL YEAR 1987.—Section 531 of the National Housing Act is amended—

(A) by inserting "(a)" after the subsection designation; and

(B) by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(b) The Secretary may enter into commitments during fiscal year 1987 to insure mortgages and loans under this Act in an aggregate principal amount that does not exceed $100,000,000,000.".

(b) GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION.—Section 306(g)(2) of the National Housing Act is amended to read as follows:

"(2) The Association may enter into commitments during fiscal year 1987 to issue guarantees under this subsection in an aggregate principal amount that does not exceed $152,000,000,000.".

SEC. 3. EXTENSION OF REHABILITATION LOAN AUTHORITY.

Section 312(h) of the Housing Act of 1964 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

SEC. 4. EXTENSION OF RURAL HOUSING AUTHORITIES.

(a) RENTAL HOUSING LOAN AUTHORITY.—Section 515(b)(4) of the Housing Act of 1949 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(b) RURAL AREA CLASSIFICATION.—Section 520 of the Housing Act of 1949 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the last sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(c) MUTUAL AND SELF-HELP HOUSING GRANT AND LOAN AUTHORITY.—Section 523(f) of the Housing Act of 1949 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

SEC. 5. EXTENSION OF FLOOD AND CRIME INSURANCE PROGRAMS.

(a) FLOOD INSURANCE.—

(1) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—Section 1319 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) EMERGENCY IMPLEMENTATION.—Section 1336(a) of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(3) ESTABLISHMENT OF FLOOD-RISK ZONES.—Section 1360(a)(2) of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(b) CRIME INSURANCE.—

(1) GENERAL AUTHORITY.—Section 1201(b)(1) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) CONTINUATION OF EXISTING CONTRACTS.—Section 1201(b)(1)(A) of the National Housing Act is amended by striking "September 30, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

SEC. 6. MISCELLANEOUS EXTENSIONS.

(a) COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT BLOCK GRANT CLASSIFICATIONS.—

(1) METROPOLITAN CITY.—Section 102(a)(4) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the second sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(2) URBAN COUNTY.—Section 102(a)(6) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" in the second sentence and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(b) SECTION 202 INTEREST RATE LIMITATION.—Section 223(a)(2) of the Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

(c) HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1975.—Section 312 of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975 is amended by striking "June 6, 1986" and inserting "September 30, 1987".

Mr. WYLIE (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, to explain to the Members what is happening here, House Joint Resolution 652 was sent over to the other body with a date to extend FHA insurance to June 27. There was an inadvertence there. It was suppose to have been July 25.

Last night the other body took up House Joint Resolution 652 and added its own amendment, which made the date July 25.

Also, in the process, the other body added a provision with reference to the UDAG program.

This Member does not think that we should add other programs to the FHA extension, so I have discussed this with the gentleman from Texas. He does not think there should be other provisions with reference to the UDAG program added to this simple extension.

The day before yesterday, I introduced House Joint Resolution 656, which would extend FHA lending authority until September 30, 1987, and also increase the credit limit for this fiscal year and provide a sufficient credit limit for fiscal 1987. The gentleman from Texas has asked if I would accept an amendment which would extend the time only to September 30, 1986, and I can understand where he is coming from.

The problem with the amendment that we now have before us with reference to extending the authority for FHA is that the credit limits were exceeded as of midnight last night, so even if we extend the authority, the credit limit is not there to make further FHA loans.

People in my district have been calling since Monday saying that there are many buyers who want FHA loans and the mortgage bankers have been calling and so forth. We have a crisis situation on our hands, Mr. Speaker. So I am pleased to accept the amendment of the gentleman from Texas which would amend my House Joint Resolution 656, to September 30 of this year, and it would, at the same time, extend the credit limit to $132 billion, which HUD says they need this year because of the heavy activity in FHA loans.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WYLIE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask of the Speaker if it would be in order for me to offer an amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] in which the date September 30, 1987, is changed in each specific instance where that appears to September 30, 1986.

The SPEAKER. For what purpose does the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] rise?

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I have an amendment to the amendment offered by the gentleman which is pending.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] has an amendment pending. He has the floor. If the gentleman from Ohio will yield to the gentleman for that purpose, the gentleman may offer his amendment.

Does the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] for the purpose of offering an amendment?

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ], chairman of the Subcommittee on Housing and Community Development, for the purpose of offering an amendment to my amendment.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GONZALEZ TO THE AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYLIE

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GONZALEZ to the amendment to the Senate amendment offered by Mr. WYLIE: On page 2, line 5, strike out "September 30, 1987," and insert "September 30, 1986".

Mr. GONZALEZ (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, the thrust of this amendment is very simple. It just merely changes the dates appearing on the Wylie amendment from September 30, 1987, to September 30, 1986, in each instance in which the Wylie amendment has those dates of September 30, 1987, and changing them to September 30, 1986.

The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE] has accepted the change. I merely wish to point out that it is as the gentleman from Ohio has well said. FHA lending or credit limits have been reached. There is no question that we have again what we had last month and the month before, and that is some prospective and some actual turmoil in the mortgage credit markets.

It certainly is not the desire of anybody, I know, to do that. However, we have agreed in principle, and I wanted to engage in a colloquy with the gentleman from Ohio that the agreement would be that if this general agreement on the expiration date of September 30, 1986, is agreed upon, which it has been, that there is a commitment to further stimulate, and prod, if we can, the further consideration of the authorization bill known as H.R. 1, the Housing and Community Development Act of 1985, and it was merely for that purpose.

We certainly have never felt, at least I speak for myself here, that the proper legislative way to proceed is by holding hostage any other legislative bill, and vice versa. I know there is a difference of opinion there. But this is a very, very profound and fundamental conviction on my part, because I have always had the satisfaction that good legislation can stand the test of full debate, full consideration, full amendatory processes. In this case, of course, we are faced with an emergency.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GONZALEZ. I yield to my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Ohio, for the purpose of a reply.

Mr. WYLIE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from Texas knows, he does have my commitment to push for early passage of housing legislation. As a matter of fact, I talked with Senator GARN just this morning, the chairman of the Committee on Banking in the other body.

□ 1035

He indicated that he was going to do his level best to bring up the housing bill on the Senate floor after the Senate acts on the tax bill; which is likely to come today or tomorrow.

He is as committed as we are to pushing for housing legislation. You have my agreement, my assurance; I will go with you to the chairman of the Senate Banking Committee or the leadership of the Senate; whatever it takes to try to move that bill forward.

I think the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] made a very cogent observation, that FHA has been held hostage, as a political football, to try to get a housing bill through. I think the extension of FHA ought to go on its own merit.

We have an emergency situation; and Mr. Speaker, I commend the chairman for his willingness to try to get this bill behind us today so that

people who are in the FHA business will have some certainty, at least until September 30 of this year.

Mr. Speaker, I would move adoption of——

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I yielded to the gentleman, and I yielded to him for the purposes of a colloquy.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman withdraw his amendment?

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I wish to withdraw my amendment.

The SPEAKER. The amendment is withdrawn.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. GONZALEZ TO THE AMENDMENT TO THE SENATE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. WYLIE

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I offer an amendment.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman offers a different amendment, which the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. GONZALEZ to the amendment to the Senate amendment offered by Mr. WYLIE: Strike "1987" wherever it appears and insert "1986".

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. GONZALEZ. The reason for this amendment, Mr. Speaker, is just a mere technical correction; it has no substantive change whatsoever.

We had introduced our original amendment in improper form.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I would now move adoption of the Gonzalez amendment to my amendment.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] to the amendment to the Senate amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE].

The amendment to the amendment to the Senate amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. WYLIE].

The motion was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

Mr. WYLIE. Mr. Speaker, I move the adoption of House Joint Resolution 656, as amended by the Gonzalez amendment and the Wylie amendment.

The SPEAKER. It has already been accomplished.

Mr. WYLIE. We are finished? OK.

The SPEAKER. A motion to reconsider is laid on the table.

NATIONAL ICE CREAM MONTH, NATIONAL ICE CREAM DAY

(Mr. DE LA GARZA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, ice cream has a strange mystique about it. Research has just revealed that adults will serve ice cream to the youngsters as a reward while preferring to call their own 66 percent household consumption on indulgence.

And that's a pretty good word—indulgence. But frankly, its luxury of taste belies the reasonable price for which it sells. For $2.50 you can purchase a half-gallon of pretty good ice cream and per serving that's a fine price for the nutrition and plain good eating.

I mention this in conjunction with today's Capitol Hill ice cream party sponsored by the good people at the International Association of Ice Cream Manufacturers. And of course in July we celebrate National Ice Cream Month and National Ice Cream Day on Juy 13.

Nothing could be more important for the diet than calcium—especially as we grow older and our bones need the strengthening. And I cannot think of a more pleasant way to injest this substance than through the eating of ice cream. A dozen important vitamins and minerals lurk in the frozen dessert that has topped $8 billion in retail sales in this country.

The Roman Emperor Nero began a fad for frozen delicacies when he sent runners to the Italian mountaintops to get ice so his cooks could freeze selected fruits, their juices and honey. In 1845, Nancy Johnson of New Jersey invented a hand-cranked ice cream freezer and thus began the national love affair with ice cream.

At what point in American history did this country see the highest level of individual, per capita consumption of ice cream? 1985? No—it was in 1946. There had been a dairy rationing order during World War II, and when the war was over Americans went ice cream crazy, consuming an average of 20 quarts apiece in 1946.

Ice cream is important to America's dairy farmers. Nearly 1 of every 10 gallons of fluid milk goes into the production of ice cream and related products each year. Within the dairy processing industry, about 18,000 people are employed in the manufacture of ice cream products. So you can see how important ice cream is to our dairy farmers, ice cream manufacturers, grocery stores, and neighborhood parlors.

And speaking of parlors—I hope my colleagues have a chance to come over into the Russell Senate Courtyard for our ice cream party today and have a ceremonial scoop or cone of their favorite flavor. And one last history note: Ice cream was eaten in the dish up until 1904 when the first ice cream cone was served up at the St. Louis World's Fair. It was an accident because the vendor had done land office business and used up all of his glass dishes. A fellow vendor offering a thin, wafer-like Middle Eastern pastry at his booth gave the ice cream vendor an idea—and there you have it. The first make-do ice cream cone. How good it is.

Mr. Speaker, it is my happy privilege to invite all of our colleagues and staffs to the Russell Senate Building this afternoon, where we will have our version of Ice Cream Day, and I hope that everyone will come to enjoy the national pastime.

A man once said, "The finest things in life are the love of your fellow man in your heart, electricity and running water in your house, old dogs, little children, and watermelon ice cream."

So I hope you will join us this afternoon at the Russell Senate Building to enjoy that pastime.

PROTECTING POULTRY AND EGG PRODUCERS

(Mr. GEKAS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, today I am introducting legislation which will go a long way toward granting protection to our poultry and egg producers against unreasonable delays in payment and protection for them in the event of the bankruptcy of their purchaser.

Mr. Speaker, this protection is already accorded by present law to producers of red meat, to producers of fruits and vegetables, to producers of grains. There is no logical reason why that protection should not be extended to poultry growers and egg producers as well.

So I ask your consideration of the legislation and invite your cosponsorship.

CONGRATULATING JUDGE ANTONIN SCALIA

(Mrs. ROUKEMA asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. ROUKEMA. Mr. Speaker, I rise this morning to thank President Reagan for nominating Antonin Scalia to the Supreme Court the first Italian American to be so named, and to congratulate Judge Scalia.

And, I do so, not only by reason of ethnic pride, although proud I am.

I do so because, in choosing Judge Scalia, the President has nominated a legal scholar, a distinguished jurist, a professional of impeccable credentials—a personable consensus builder. In times when the left and right of the political spectrum are jockeying to dominate, we need men and women of brilliance to see beyond the politics of the day. I believe Judge Scalia to be such a man.

Antonin Scalia also has a family history that will bring another valuable

dimension to deliberations of the court.

The son of an immigrant—from New Jersey I might add—he treasures our precious liberties protected by the Constitution which he, as a Justice of the High Court, will work to uphold.

Indeed, he has ingrained in his very life a devotion to our constitutional history of 200 years.

For him freedom, in this land of opportunity, is a personal achievement, not an abstraction. It is his life. Through hard work, education and personal initiative, he has excelled for the benefit of our society. These are the values which guided Americans from the earliest settlers to the most recent arrivals.

Judge Scalia respects and revers a Constitution which, for 200 years, has protected the weak, promoted the strong and shielded the Republic from those who would abuse their power.

Thank you, Mr. President. Godspeed Judge Scalia.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 350, PROVIDING FOR CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT AGREEMENTS

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 479 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution as follows:

H. RES. 479

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 350) providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise, and the first reading of the concurrent resolution shall be dispensed with. All points of order against the consideration of the current resolution for failure to comply with the provisions of clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI are hereby waived. After general debate, which shall be confined to the concurrent resolution and shall continue not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the concurrent resolution shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall be in order to consider the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs now printed in the concurrent resolution as an original resolution for the purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule, and said substitute shall be considered as having been read. No amendment to the concurrent resolution or to said substitute shall be in order except the amendment set forth in section 2 of this resolution if offered by Representative Broomfield of Michigan or his designee, and said amendment shall not be subject to amendment or to a demand for a division of the question in the House or in the Committee on the Whole, but shall be debatable for not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment and a Member opposed thereto. At the conclusion of the consideration of the concurrent resolution for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the concurrent resolution to the House with such amendment as may have been adopted, and any Member may demand a separate vote in the House or any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole to the concurrent resolution or to the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the concurrent resolution and any amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

SEC. 2. Page 3, beginning in line 19, strike out "NUMERICAL" and all that follows through the end of line 20 on that page, and in lieu thereof insert "PROVISIONS."; and page 3, beginning in line 21, strike out all that follows the word "adhere" through the end of line 25 on page 3, and in lieu thereof insert "to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviets do likewise.".

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. CARPER). The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DERRICK] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, I yield the customary 30 minutes, for the purpose of debate only, to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. LOTT], and pending that I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 479 is a modified closed rule providing for consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 350, a concurrent resolution providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

The rule provides for 2 hours of general debate on the concurrent resolution as it was amended and reported from the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The time for general debate is to be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The rule makes in order one, and only one amendment. The amendment is printed in section 2 of the rule and will be in order if offered by Representative BROOMFIELD of Michigan or his designee.

The Broomfield amendment is not subject to amendment. It is debatable for up to 2 hours, with the time being equally divided and controlled by the proponent of the amendment and a Member opposed thereto.

Under this rule, therefore, no other amendments are in order and the concurrent resolution will be reported back to the House in its present form or as amended by the Broomfield amendment. The rule also provides for one motion to recommit with or without instructions.

Mr. Speaker, the one waiver contained in this rule provides a waiver of clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI. This clause of rule XI requires that a bill or resolution may not be considered in the House until 3 days following the filing in the House of the committee report on the matter. Since the Foreign Affairs Committee report on House Concurrent Resolution 350 was not filed until Tuesday of this week, this waiver is necessary if we are to consider this matter today. I should note, however, that this waiver would not be necessary if the resolution were considered tomorrow.

Mr. Speaker, with the exception of the one waiver I have noted, this is a very simple and straightforward rule providing for timely consideration of a concurrent resolution dealing with one of the most important foreign policy and defense questions we will consider this year. Full provision has been made for consideration of an amendment to be offered by the minority. Equal time has been provided on the committee proposal and the amendment. The policy options are clear, and Members will have a straight up-or-down vote on the two positions.

Mr. Speaker, the concurrent resolution which this rule makes in order contains the following directive:

The President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise, and the President shall continue to adhere to the overall numerical limit of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

While this portion of the resolution presents an unequivocal statement of the policy preference of the U.S. House of Representatives on the need for continued informal compliance with the SALT agreements, passage of this resolution will not bind the President. This is not a joint resolution, it is a concurrent resolution which is not presented to the President for his signature. It will not become public law.

To say that this resolution will not become law, however, should not imply any equivocation about the intent it expresses. It expresses the clear belief that some restraint on the arms race, while admittedly not perfect, is far better than unrestrained nuclear arms escalation.

Quite simply, Mr. Speaker, the SALT agreements serve the military interests of the United States. During the 5½ years of informal SALT II compliance, the treaty cost the United States nothing—only last year did we bump against the limits in the treaty. We have accomplished a nearly unprecedented military buildup while staying within the limits of these agreements.

The SALT agreements have far greater impact in restraining Soviet nuclear weapons development. To maintain informal compliance with

SALT, the Soviets ceased missile production when they reached the limits of the treaty, and have dismantled older missiles each time they have deployed new ones.

Mr. Speaker, beyond the simple defense weapons advantage which life under the SALT agreements has provided, the abrogation of the agreement can only frustrate our efforts in Geneva. Whatever one says about SALT II, it does provide a framework from which our negotiators can attempt to move downward. Once a post-SALT II arms race begins, present levels of armament would become a goal rather than a starting point for further reduction.

The abandonment of SALT II will also weaken our defense posture by undermining our NATO allies' confidence in our commitment to arms control.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, in a context that those who have worked closely on the last few Federal budgets will understand all too well, the abandonment of the SALT limits can only work to fuel defense budget requests and frustrate any hope of working toward a balanced Federal budget.

Mr. Speaker, I have been at a loss to understand the President's position in favor of abandoning the SALT limits. It is imperative that we send a very clear message, as the People's House, that abrogation of our informal compliance with agreements entered into between the Soviet Union and the last four Presidents of the United States is the wrong policy for this Nation and the wrong policy for mankind.

Mr. Speaker, this is a very straightforward and equitable rule which will expedite consideration of this issue in the House. I urge my colleagues to support the rule, and subsequently to vote in favor of House Concurrent Resolution 350.

□ 1045

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 479 is a modified closed rule providing for the consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 350, a sense of Congress resolution that the President should adhere to the SALT numerical limits and sublimits, so long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

The rule waives clause 2(l)(6) of rule XI, the 3-day availability requirement for committee reports. This report was filed Tuesday and only became available yesterday. The rule goes on to provide for 2 hours of general debate in the Committee of the Whole, with time equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is made in order as an original resolution for the purpose of amendment, and it is only subject to one amendment printed in the rule, and which is to be offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] or his designee.

The Broomfield amendment will not be subject to amendment but will be subject to 2 hours of debate equally divided between the proponent of the amendment and a Member opposed thereto. Finally, the rule provides that, when the Committee rises, the previous question is ordered on the resolution and any amendment to final passage without intervening motion, except one motion to recommit, with or without instructions.

Mr. Speaker, let me commend the Foreign Affairs Committee on having the good sense this time around to report a concurrent resolution instead of a joint resolution. As you may recall, in the last Congress the committee reported a joint resolution on the nuclear freeze issue even though the precedents make clear that such sense of Congress expressions should be embodied in concurrent resolutions. So this is being done properly from that standpoint.

I also want to thank the Foreign Affairs and Rules Committees for recognizing the right of the minority to offer an alternative amendment, and for preserving our right to recommit the resolution, with or without instructions.

The Broomfield amendment or substitute, if you will, is a very straightforward one. It does, I think, exactly what we should be doing. All it would do would be to say that "the President shall continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviets do likewise." Can we do otherwise?

I mean, are we going to say it is all right for the Soviets, in effect, to exceed and violate the SALT II Treaty but it is not all right for us to do it? It is a very simple, straightforward substitute that the gentleman from Michigan has.

I urge my colleagues to look at it. It is only one sentence but it is what we ought to be doing here today instead of the concurrent resolution reported by the committee.

Mr. Speaker, since I spoke strongly in favor of an open amendment process yesterday, I think I should explain my support for this less than open rule today. House Concurrent Resolution 350 is not a legislative bill that establishes national policy; instead it is a simple sense of Congress resolution that attempts to influence our strategic arms policy. The only real issues are whether you think the President and the Soviets should adhere only to the SALT numerical limits; and whether you think it is appropriate for the Congress to seem to dictate such a policy to the President.

So there aren't that many issues involved for which alternatives could be developed. Moreover, there were no other requests made to the Rules Committee for additional amendments to be made in order. So, I think in this case this modified closed rule is justified and is fair if we must have a resolution of some kind on the floor.

And I would emphasize, "if we must have a resolution." I frankly don't think this resolution is necessary or helpful, and may actually be harmful. I know this body has a long tradition of passing all manner of "sense of Congress" resolutions—even though that term, "sense of Congress" often seems to be an oxymoron when it comes to foreign policy matters. This is one of those instances.

Here we are, the House of Representatives, presuming to dictate to the President, our chief foreign policy spokesman and negotiator, that he should comply with a treaty that a Democratic President could not get ratified by a Democratic-controlled Senate as required by the Constitution. Moreover, it's a treaty the President has already certified has been violated by the Soviets.

We seem to be turning the Constitution on its head and saying, "If the U.S. Senate won't ratify SALT II, then we in the House will ram it through." That's a novel constitutional approach that's bound to set a few forefathers spinning in their graves.

Mr. Speaker, I don't want to devote more time to this than it really deserves. This resolution isn't really about forging a serious and forward-looking strategic arms policy. This is simply one more dart in the Democratic Party's campaign quiver, aimed at an administration which still enjoys enormous popularity and support from the American people. We've come to expect these little partisan dart pricks as a substitute for any substantive Democratic alternatives to administration policy. It also makes good TV filler while we're waiting around for our Budget and Appropriations Committees to report some real work back to this House.

Mr. Speaker, I'll conclude my remarks at this point before I begin to get cynical about this little exercise. I have no objection to the rule—it's fair; but the resolution it makes in order is fairly objectionable. For those of you in doubt, flip a coin and keep the change. That's the only way you'll make this whole exercise worthwhile.

Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule. I also would like to thank the Committee on Rules for placing in order the amendment that I am going to be offering.

Mr. Speaker, the Broomfield amendment is based upon a simple principle which recognizes that a significant violation of even one provision of the SALT II agreement is serious enough to call into question the entire agreement. In this way we are honest with the Soviets. We tell them straight out that we will not accept Soviet violations even if they affect only one part of the agreement.

The unratified SALT II agreement was crafted as a comprehensive, integrated package with interlocking components. These issues cannot be separated. Unfortunately, that's exactly what the authors of House Concurrent Resolution 350 are trying to do by limiting adherence to SALT II to only its numerical limits and sublimits.

I believe that my amendment is a fair amendment because it provides for continued adherence to all of the SALT II provisions by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Isn't this the least we should expect?

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. STUDDS].

Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Speaker, at a hearing 2 years ago, I asked an administration witness to name President Reagan's greatest accomplishments in the field of arms control. The witness hesitated for a few seconds and said with some enthusiasm that he could name three:

The deployment of intermediate range missiles in Europe;

Denouncing Russia for the alleged use of chemical weapons in Southeast Asia; and

Issuing a report on alleged Russian violations of existing arms control agreements; a report which the witness proudly claimed had called into question the very future of arms control.

Since that time, the list of similar administration accomplishments has grown. The State Department has developed a new legal interpretation of the ABM Treaty that could render that document meaningless; the President has rejected Soviet offers to negotiate a ban on antisatellite weapons testing; he has rejected a proposed moratorium on nuclear tests; and on May 27, he declared SALT II dead.

In his speech disposing of SALT II, the President called for mutual restraint in the arms race. He also called for 50 more MX missiles, rapid development of a small ICBM, accelerated work on the advanced cruise missile, and more money for star wars.

The good news, of course, is that the Russians are no longer violating SALT II, but that is only because there is now no SALT II to violate. It is also true, that because the Russians are no longer bound by the agreement, they may soon deploy more missiles and thousands of more warheads, and target them on America's vulnerable land-based ICMB's; they may take steps to prevent U.S. verification of their nuclear weapons activities; and they could now test-fire ICBM's in secret and without advanced notification to the United States.

For these reasons, President Reagan's decision to scrap SALT II is the greatest expression of hope and trust in Soviet intentions and restraint in the history of the nuclear age. The President has given the Russians moral and legal carte blanche to conduct their nuclear weapons policy in whatever manner they so choose.

The United States will gain nothing from this decision; but we have obtained nothing in more than 5 years from this administration's handling of arms control. We were promised peace through strength; we have been given a $200 billion deficit and nuclear anarchy.

No President can be faulted simply for failing to reach an arms control agreement with Russia. The issues are complex, and the intentions of the Soviet leadership are suspect.

But for 5 years, this administration has talked about the obstacles that exist to arms control; while doing nothing to tear them down. On the contrary, by basing America's future security on the illusion of star wars, and by preventing our negotiators from accepting major Soviet concessions in return for limits on defensive systems, we have made serious negotiations far more difficult.

Our policy toward arms control should not be driven solely by our doubts about the sincerity of the Soviet Union. Our responsibilities as a world leader demand greater imagination, and a more constructive attitude, than that.

If there is a difference between our level of commitment to peace and meaningful arms control and that of the Soviets, let us make this difference clear in every action we take. Let us challenge the Soviet Union to match our boldness, our creativity, and our determination in pursuit of equitable arms control. Let us devote our energy to breathing life into the negotiating process; not declaring dead the best efforts of earlier years.

Arms control—whether this administration believes it or not is a goal more vital than any other attainable by our Government. That is what the resolution we are considering today is all about; and that is why it should—and will—be approved in the House of Representatives today.

□ 1100

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. GEPHARDT].

Mr. GEPHARDT. Mr. Speaker, breaking out of SALT is a dangerous way for President Reagan to appease the conservative hardliners who seem to fear that arms control actually works. Once again, the administration's black-and-white view of our relationship with the Soviets has oversimplified a critical national security issue. We are disconnecting the brakes to the arms race for no useful purpose.

This administration claims to support arms control, but just look at the evidence. It has accelerated nuclear weapons tests at a time when the Soviets have declared a moratorium. It is planning star wars tests which put us on a collision course with the limits of the ABM Treaty. And now, it is abandoning SALT.

The President may think this shows strength. To me, it proves only his unwillingness or inability to confront our nuclear dilemma. His decision is an abrogation of responsibility to those fringe groups who oppose any agreements with the Soviets. He has chosen to ignore our national security in favor of more Soviet bashing.

SALT is not perfect—no agreement ever is. But, observation of this treaty improved the stability of the superpower relationship. It added predictability to a dangerous rivalry, it made future arms control agreements more feasible, and it established real limits on our growing nuclear arsenals.

The President charges the Soviets with violations of SALT. But he refuses to use the lines which already exist to resolve violations. He accuses them of partially coding the data of their missile tests—but fails to acknowledge that without SALT, they will be able to mask them all. And, no longer bound by strict numerical limits, the Russians will immediately be able to add warheads to their heavier missiles and expand their production lines. That won't enhance our security; it will impair it. He raises questions of Soviet compliance—and then kills the treaty himself.

In the wake of Chernobyl, the United States was clearly in a superior propaganda position. The Soviets tried to hide a nuclear disaster where we, at Three Mile Island, had made full disclosure. Yet barely 3 weeks later, when our position should have been unassailable, Mr. Reagan killed SALT and retreated from the high ground. In terms of international opinion, our President, and not Mr. Gorbachev, is left holding the bag.

The President has made a rash decision. If his first concern is America's security, he can still undo that decision. If he does not, he will find history a harsh judge of a choice which threw away arms control, unshackled the arms race, and moved us one giant step backward in our pursuit of national security.

I join my colleagues in urging the President to reconsider his decision.

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of a unanimous-consent request, I yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished majority leader, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

MAKING IN ORDER CONSIDERATION OF ANY RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR A CERTAIN ADJOURNMENT

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that it be in order to consider any resolution providing for an adjournment period of more than 3 calendar days during the month of July, notwithstanding any provision of Public Law 99-177.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Texas?

There was no objection.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DERRICK. Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 341, nays 74, not voting 18, as follows:

[Roll No. 182]

YEAS—341

Ackerman	Bruce	Duncan
Akaka	Bryant	Durbin
Alexander	Burton (CA)	Dwyer
Anderson	Bustamante	Dymally
Andrews	Byron	Dyson
Annunzio	Callahan	Early
Anthony	Campbell	Eckart (OH)
Applegate	Carper	Eckert (NY)
Aspin	Carr	Edgar
Atkins	Chapman	Edwards (CA)
AuCoin	Chappell	Edwards (OK)
Barnard	Chappie	Emerson
Bates	Clay	English
Bedell	Clinger	Erdreich
Beilenson	Coats	Evans (IA)
Bennett	Coelho	Evans (IL)
Bentley	Coleman (TX)	Fascell
Berman	Conte	Fawell
Bevill	Conyers	Fazio
Biaggi	Cooper	Fiedler
Bilirakis	Coughlin	Fish
Blilley	Coyne	Flippo
Boehlert	Crockett	Florio
Boggs	Daniel	Foglietta
Boland	Darden	Foley
Boner (TN)	Daschle	Ford (MI)
Bonior (MI)	Davis	Ford (TN)
Bonker	de la Garza	Fowler
Borski	Dellums	Frank
Bosco	Derrick	Franklin
Boucher	Dicks	Frenzel
Boxer	DioGuardi	Frost
Brooks	Dixon	Gallo
Broomfield	Donnelly	Gaydos
Brown (CA)	Dorgan (ND)	Gejdenson
Broyhill	Downey	Gephardt
Gibbons	McCain	Schneider
Gilman	McCloskey	Schroeder
Glickman	McCollum	Schuette
Gonzalez	McCurdy	Schulze
Goodling	McDade	Seiberling
Gordon	McEwen	Sensenbrenner
Gradison	McGrath	Sharp
Gray (IL)	McHugh	Shelby
Gray (PA)	McMillan	Sikorski
Green	Meyers	Siljander
Gregg	Mica	Sisisky
Hall (OH)	Michel	Skeen
Hamilton	Mikulski	Skelton
Hammerschmidt	Miller (OH)	Slattery
Hatcher	Miller (WA)	Smith (FL)
Hawkins	Mineta	Smith (IA)
Hayes	Mitchell	Smith (NE)
Hefner	Moakley	Smith (NJ)
Heftel	Molinari	Smith, Robert (OR)
Henry	Mollohan	Snowe
Hertel	Monson	Snyder
Hiler	Montgomery	Solarz
Hillis	Moody	Spence
Holt	Morrison (CT)	Spratt
Horton	Morrison (WA)	St Germain
Howard	Mrazek	Staggers
Hoyer	Murphy	Stallings
Hubbard	Murtha	Stangeland
Huckaby	Myers	Stark
Hughes	Natcher	Stokes
Hutto	Neal	Strang
Hyde	Nelson	Studds
Ireland	Nichols	Sundquist
Jeffords	Nielson	Sweeney
Jenkins	Nowak	Swift
Jones (NC)	Oakar	Swindall
Jones (OK)	Oberstar	Synar
Jones (TN)	Obey	Tallon
Kanjorski	Olin	Taylor
Kaptur	Ortiz	Thomas (GA)
Kasich	Owens	Torres
Kastenmeier	Oxley	Torricelli
Kennelly	Packard	Towns
Kildee	Panetta	Traficant
Kleczka	Pashayan	Traxler
Kolbe	Pease	Udall
Kolter	Penny	Valentine
Kostmayer	Pepper	Vander Jagt
LaFalce	Perkins	Vento
Lantos	Petri	Visclosky
Latta	Pickle	Volkmer
Leach (IA)	Price	Walgren
Leath (TX)	Pursell	Watkins
Lehman (CA)	Rahall	Weaver
Lehman (FL)	Rangel	Weber
Leland	Ray	Weiss
Lent	Regula	Wheat
Levin (MI)	Reid	Whitehurst
Levine (CA)	Richardson	Whitley
Lewis (FL)	Rinaldo	Whittaker
Lightfoot	Ritter	Whitten
Lipinski	Robinson	Williams
Lloyd	Rodino	Wilson
Long	Roe	Wirth
Lott	Roemer	Wise
Lowry (WA)	Rogers	Wolf
Luken	Rose	Wolpe
Lundine	Rostenkowski	Wortley
MacKay	Roth	Wright
Madigan	Roukema	Wyden
Manton	Rowland (CT)	Wylie
Markey	Rowland (GA)	Yates
Martin (IL)	Roybal	Yatron
Martin (NY)	Russo	Young (AK)
Martinez	Sabo	Young (FL)
Matsui	Savage	Young (MO)
Mavroules	Saxton	Zschau
Mazzoli	Scheuer	

NAYS—74

Archer	Courter	Hansen
Armey	Craig	Hartnett
Badham	Crane	Hendon
Bartlett	Dannemeyer	Hopkins
Barton	Daub	Hunter
Bateman	DeLay	Jacobs
Bereuter	DeWine	Johnson
Boulter	Dickinson	Kemp
Brown (CO)	Dornan (CA)	Kindness
Burton (IN)	Dreier	Kramer
Carney	Fields	Lagomarsino
Cobey	Gekas	Lewis (CA)
Coble	Gingrich	Livingston
Coleman (MO)	Gunderson	Loeffler
Combest	Hall, Ralph	Lowery (CA)
Lujan	Quillen	Solomon
Lungren	Ridge	Stenholm
Mack	Roberts	Stratton
Marlenee	Rudd	Stump
McCandless	Schaefer	Tauke
McKernan	Shaw	Tauzin
Moore	Shumway	Thomas (CA)
Moorhead	Shuster	Vucanovich
Parris	Slaughter	Walker
Porter	Smith, Robert (NH)	

NOT VOTING—18

Barnes	Feighan	O'Brien
Breaux	Fuqua	Schumer
Chandler	Garcia	Smith, Denny (OR)
Cheney	Grotberg	Waxman
Collins	Guarini	
Dingell	McKinney	
Dowdy	Miller (CA)	

□ 1125

Messrs. DORNAN of California, ROBERTS, COBLE, and SLAUGHTER, Mrs. JOHNSON, and Messrs. TAUKE, GUNDERSON, and THOMAS of California changed their votes from "yea" to "nay."

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

IN MEMORY OF LEN BIAS

(Mr. HOYER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.)

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, my community is grieving today. In a cruel twist of fate, one of the finest youths of promise from my county has been struck down in what was the happiest period of his young life. Len Bias, the star of the University of Maryland basketball team, an All American, and a graduate of Northwestern High School in Adelphi, MD, died this morning of a heart attack.

Many young athletes dream of a professional basketball career. Len Bias was about to embark on one. Two days ago, he was drafted by the Boston Celtics, the best team in basketball. In that happy time, just 48 hours ago, Len said that two of his dreams had been fulfilled. He was going to play professional basketball and he was going to play it for the Boston Celtics.

For 4 years, Len Bias led the University of Maryland basketball team. He carried the team on his broad shoulders, and he may well have been the best player in the history of the university.

As an alumna of the university, and an avid basketball fan, I came to know Len Bias. We all loved to watch Len play because of his great skill and style. And, as with everyone who knew him, I was impressed not only with his athletic ability, but with his dedication, his leadership, and his good nature.

We are not always aware of what it takes to be the best at one's chosen profession. Many who have the talent to succeed do not. Success takes more

than raw talent. It takes hard work, drive, and dedication. Len Bias had all these qualities. They set him apart from so many other young men.

Everyone in Prince Georges County was so proud of Len's achievements. One of our own had reached the pinnacle.

Mr. Speaker, it is hard for us, mere humans, to fathom a tragedy like this one. For it, there is no reason; there is no justice. A poet once expressed our feelings:

TO AN ATHLETE DYING YOUNG

The time you won your town the race
We chaired you through the marketplace;
Man and boy stood cheering by,
And home we brought you shoulder high.

Today the road all runners come,
Shoulder high we bring you home,
And set you at your threshold down,
Townsman of a stiller town.

Smart lad to slip betimes away
From fields where glory does not stay
And early though the laurel grows
It withers quicker than the rose.

Eyes the shady night has shut
Cannot see the record cut
And silence sounds no worse than cheers
After earth has stopped the ears.

Now you will not swell the rout
Of lads that wore their honors out,
Runners whom renown outran
And the name died before the man.

We will remember Len Bias, a youth of great promise, great achievement, and great character. Our hearts and our prayers are with his family and his many, many friends.

Mr. DONNELLY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HOYER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. DONNELLY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate myself with the gentleman's moving remarks. Two days ago, Len Bias became a Boston Celtic and an adopted member of the city of Boston.

I would like to extend to the Bias family on behalf of millions of Celtics fans in Massachusetts our sincere condolences over this incredible tragedy. He was an exemplary young man who spent many of his summers in Massachusetts. A man with gifted athletic ability, but as important as that, more important than that, a very fine young man.

We extend our deepest sympathies to the family and his friends and his fans. We hope that the tradition of decency and the legacy of integrity that he leaves behind him will be remembered by all of us.

Mr. HOYER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Massachusetts for his remarks.

□ 1135

PERMISSION TO INSERT IN RECORD LIST OF COSPONSORS OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 350

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that I be permitted to insert in the RECORD, at the conclusion of my opening statement during general debate on House Concurrent Resolution 350, a list of those Members who have indicated their desire to be listed as cosponsors of that resolution.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

PROVIDING FOR CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT AGREEMENTS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 479 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of House Concurrent Resolution 350.

□ 1138

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 350) providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise, with Mr. HERTEL of Michigan in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the first reading of the concurrent resolution is dispensed with.

Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] will be recognized for 1 hour and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] will be recognized for 1 hour.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

Mr. FACELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, the resolution that we bring to the floor today, House Concurrent Resolution 350, despite all the technicalities that we are going to hear in this lengthy debate, is really a question of common sense. Although I will not deny the fact that the technicalities and the equipment and other matters that will be discussed are important, I just say that once that has been done, you still get to a very simple question of common sense. That is represented in the "Resolved" clause of this resolution, as distinguished from the "Resolved" clause that will be submitted as an amendment by the distinguished gentleman from Michigan.

Amid its many words and clauses and findings is but one simple message: In this threatening age of possible nuclear annihilation an arms control agreement that constrains nuclear arms is better than no agreement at all.

It is better than the promise of something "better."

It is better than the runaway arms race we would have without it.

It is better because it protects important U.S. national security interests.

It may be imperfect—admittedly violated by the Soviets in some areas—but it is better than the vacuum of abrogation.

If I didn't believe these facts, I wouldn't be standing here today urging the passage of this resolution.

It is also abundantly obvious to me that the overwhelming majority of the American people see the common sense wisdom of abiding by SALT II as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

If more compelling reasons for preserving SALT II are needed it can be found in the unanimous position of our European NATO allies. It is their verdict, forcefully expressed, that continued adherence to SALT is in the collective security interests of the Western World.

Despite these many convincing facts we hear voices of doubt and even criticism. One assertion made repeatedly, for example, is that SALT II is being eliminated so that we can get something better.

That, like the mirage, can be an alluring argument. Unfortunately, it remains a mirage.

Certainly, everyone wants to reduce nuclear weapons. If for 1 minute I thought doing away with SALT II would accomplish that goal I would be the first to urge that action.

The tragic reality, however, is just the opposite. The evidence is undeniable. Abrogating SALT II will only add to already burgeoning stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Without SALT I, the Soviets could:

First, more than double the size of their current nuclear arsenal—from over 9,000 to 20,000 nuclear weapons;

Second, more than double the number of their current MIRV's and ICBM's—from 818 to 1,778; and

Third, add over 1,000 additional warheads to their biggest missile—the SS-18—from 3,080 to 4,212.

Maybe that's why, in response to the question as to why his administration observes the limits of SALT II, the President said:

I learned that the Soviet Union had a capacity to increase weaponry much faster than the treaty permitted, and we didn't.

How does it therefore make sense to describe as better the elusive bird

while condemning the one already in the hand?

Let us not be fooled by an illusion. Let us not go marching toward a mirage.

If reductions—truly meaningful reductions—are what we want, let them come from the already contained levels of continued adherence to SALT II.

In urging passage of House Concurrent Resolution 350, I ask you to consider the following. This resolution:

Represents a bipartisan foreign policy statement in support of arms control;

Makes continued United States adherence to SALT conditional upon Soviet adherence;

Sets forth three concrete steps to resolve Soviet noncompliance with SALT;

Demonstrates that continued Soviet compliance with SALT would force the Soviets to retire twice as many nuclear systems as the United States;

Shows that without SALT, United States verification would be more difficult and raise United States uncertainty and anxiety over enhanced Soviet nuclear warfighting capabilities.

Over the last several days we all have been besieged by the issue's often confusing numbers as well as its arcane terminology and technology. Those details are important. But overriding all of that swirl and whirl is the single but compelling reality of common sense.

If, beyond common sense, you also believe in the sense of survival, House Concurrent Resolution 350 merits your support.

I urge its passage.

I think that it would be useful to point out what the differences are between the resolution and the proposed amendment.

The resolution suggests to the President that we should continue to abide by the sublimits in SALT as long as the Soviets do so. The other matters in the SALT treaty—which was never ratified, and its term has expired—have been a matter of understanding between the superpowers to be used as a guide and within which limits we have been living.

It is also agreed that the Soviets have violated that agreement in important respects, but it is also agreed that within the sublimits, which is what this resolution addresses, neither side has violated those sublimits.

We are talking about intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles which are itemized, so that in the sublimits to which the resolution is addressed it is clear—and we have the testimony on the record—that neither side has violated the limits of intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles carrying MIRV's, or the total of all of those. It also provides for limitation on reentry vehicles.

So we are saying that if SALT has been useful up till now, despite the violations since it was signed back in 1979, and this administration agreed, despite the violations with regard to the SS-25, encryption and other matters, that it would be useful to continue to abide by those sublimits pending the outcome of negotiations at Geneva.

The amendment to be offered is simply a restatement of the President's position on May 27. And what that position says, in effect, is that the Soviets have violated an agreement which has never been ratified and whose terms having expired anyway. On that basis, the President concludes that it is no longer useful for the United States to have an informal arrangement with the Soviet Union which keeps the limit on these items which I just mentioned, and that therefore, on May 27, SALT for all intents and purposes is dead.

Well, in a technical sense it never was alive. It never got ratified, and the term of the treaty expired. What was alive was an informal understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union, with respect to the sublimits identified in that treaty. It is those sublimits to which we would continue to abide.

What House Concurrent Resolution 350 says is that we will continue to do that only as long as the Soviets abide by those sublimits. Once they break out of that, the informal arrangement is finished.

The President, however, has decided, for whatever reason, to terminate the treaty now. He says we should be up front with the Soviets. I do not know if it is that important to be that up front with the Soviets about the matter. We do not have a treaty; we just have an informal arrangement. And we are in the process at Geneva of discussing these matters. So those who are concerned about violations would have to take the position, as I see it, embodied in the amendment of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], which says that you would only abide by the terms of SALT II if there is no violation.

Having said that there are violations, then there is no SALT II, and accordingly, the amendment is meaningless, because it is just a restatement of what has been said.

What it boils down to is whether you think there is some commonsense utility to maintaining Soviet limitations on intercontinental ballistic missiles and other matters which are spelled out as sublimits until we get a better treaty. But proposed treaties have been laying on the table for years. Although I support efforts to achieve deep reductions, I have some doubt about how soon that will happen. Why, therefore, should we give away something, imperfect as it is, which in some way, if only psychologically, restrains hardware and protects us in the sense that even under an informal arrangement we would not agree to be bound by that if the Soviets in any way exceed those limitations?

As a matter of fact, I will turn it around the other way. Until we get an agreement that is locked up, it seems to me that it is absolutely in our national interest, as imperfect as all of this arrangement is, that we hang on to what we have got, as long as the Soviets are willing to stay with it.

It seems to me that it does no good to suddenly try to be honest to the world and to the Soviets and say, "Well, SALT II was just some kind of a sop, and we're going to be honest about it now. We're just going to say it's dead, we don't want any informal arrangements with the Soviet Union."

We are in the midst of negotiations. I do not think that you have to be a genius to figure the Soviet response. They have already responded. They are not going to take a chance any more than we are going to take a chance. So if our posture is that they already have a new generation of missiles and we want to get our new generation of missiles on track as fast as possible, what we are saying is that we are both going to move as rapidly as we can on one hand by expanding our nuclear capability while we are negotiating at Geneva to reduce our nuclear capability, but we are going to give up this informal arrangement to which both sides are now adhering because it puts a cap on our nuclear capability.

Well, I have a hard time following that, too. I see many of my friends shaking their heads. I cannot quite follow the logic of that either. But what it boils down to ultimately is a question of common sense.

□ 1145

Neither side trusts the other side. It is not a question of suspicion. I know that. We are not going to enter into any agreement at any time ever, and neither are the Soviets, that we think might in some way endanger our national security.

So then you have to ask the question here, having lived within these limits so far and neither side having violated them, we are going to lift those limits so we can do anything we want to on either side in terms of increasing our nuclear capability. But while we are doing that, we are going to really work in Geneva to see if we cannot reduce our nuclear capability.

What we should do is what the Congress has said in the past, which is that recognizing the dubious nature of trying to maintain an agreement with

the Soviets, who will push it to the limits in terms of interpretation or outright violation, and understanding that neither side trusts the other side, when the evidence is clear that we have an informal arrangement that holds the nuclear capability on both sides at the levels which they are right now, let us keep it that way until such time as we get something better. Our security is not endangered thereby. If it were, then we have been endangering our security the entire time. I do not think that is the case, because I know that this President is just as interested in maintaining the security of the United States as all of us are. Therefore, it does become a question of common sense.

If you adopt the proposed amendment, what you say is that because there have been violations of SALT II, there is no SALT II, therefore there is no more adherence under this informal arrangement to SALT II. Ergo, it is a restatement of the President's position on May 27, which is, SALT II is dead.

So just to restate that once again, in a technical sense, yes, SALT II is dead because it was never ratified. The term within which the treaty itself was supposed to run has expired, but that is not the point.

The point is we have been living under an informal arrangement. SALT II has just been the paperwork guideline and it has been useful for that purpose.

This House has gone on record twice before in saying we should maintain that limitation. As imperfect as it is, it has worked so far, and while we strive to do better with the Soviet Union, and I applaud as we all do all the efforts being made to reduce tensions and to get in hand nuclear capability, we still have a way to go.

We need some guidelines, even if it is an informal arrangement, until we get there.

The bottom line is, why give up something that is imperfect, that people may not like for one reason or another, because "it is doing business with the Soviets, you can't trust them."

Why give up that imperfect relationship right now for something that does not exist?

So I would urge my colleagues to think about the fact that under the sublimits of the SALT agreement, which we now observe through an informal understanding with the Soviet Union, we limit to 820 the intercontinental ballistic missiles carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles. We limit 1,200 ICBM's and submarine-launched ballistic missiles carrying MIRV's or 1,320 ICBM's carrying MIRV's, plus the submarine-launched missiles carrying MIRV's, plus heavy bombers equipped for air-launched cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

Now, let us follow the argument that is being made that, well, we ought to just abolish those limitations, let the Soviets grab their best hold, we will grab our best hold and we will just have a nice good old-fashioned arms race and go just as hard and as fast as we can in order to prove our nuclear capability. As Winston Churchill said, "We have got so much capability"—even in those days—"that any additional will be simply for the purpose of making the rubble bounce."

Well, making the rubble bounce might attract some people. I must tell you, it does not attract me. The cost is phenomenal. The danger is incredible, and we all know what it means; but in a very short period of time the Soviets could more than double their MIRV'd ICBM's without this informal limitation. They could more than double their ICBM's and SLBM's in combination and they could more than double the three in just a very short period of time, and as you know, if the Soviets perceive any danger, they will pay any price, just as we would.

The difference is that they have the hot production line capability to do it in a short period of time, and we would be playing catch up. I do not think that is a good posture.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would hope that we would support the resolution and vote against the amendment. What the resolution says is let us continue within the informal arrangement of the sublimits that we now have been working with; the amendment, on the other hand, just says SALT II limits are dead, let us, therefore, go for a big arms race.

Mr. Chairman, I include the following list of cosponsors of House Concurrent Resolution 350:

COSPONSORS OF HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 350

Daniel B. Fascell, Gary Ackerman, Bill Alexander, Michael Andrews, Les Aspin, Chester Atkins, Les AuCoin, Michael Barnes, Berkley Bedell, Anthony Beilenson, Charles Bennett, Howard Berman.

Sherwood Boehlert, Edward Boland, David Bonior, Don Bonker, Robert Borski, Douglas Bosco, George Brown, Terry Bruce, Albert Bustamante, Beverly Byron, Tony Coelho.

Jim Cooper, Lawrence Coughlin, George Crockett, Norman Dicks, Thomas Downey, Mervyn Dymally, Lane Evans, Walter Fauntroy, Vic Fazio, Hamilton Fish, Thomas Foglietta, Thomas Foley, William Ford, Barney Frank.

Bill Frenzel, Robert Garcia, Sam Gejdenson, Richard Gephardt, Bart Gordon, Bill Green, Tony Hall, Lee Hamilton, Cecil Heftel, James Howard, Frank Horton, William Hughes, James Jeffords.

Nancy Johnson, Walter Jones, Paul Kanjorski, Robert Kastenmeier, Barbara Kennelly, Dale Kildee, Gerald Kleczka, Peter Kostmayer, Tom Lantos, Jim Leach, Richard Lehman, Mickey Leland, Sander Levin, Mel Levine.

Cathy Long, Mike Lowry, Matthew McHugh, Stewart McKinney, Thomas Manton, Matthew Martinez, Robert Matsui, Nicholas Mavroules, Dan Mica, Barbara Mikulski, Norman Mineta, Joe Moakley, Jim Moody.

Robert Mrazek, Stephen Neal, Henry Nowak, Mary Rose Oakar, James Oberstar, John Edward Porter, Nick Rahall, Martin Olav Sabo, James Scheuer, Claudine Schneider, Patricia Schroeder, Charles Schumer, John Seiberling.

Lawrence Smith, Stephen Solarz, John Spratt, Gerry Studds, Esteban Edward Torres, Bob Traxler, Morris Udall, James Weaver, Pat Williams, Timothy Wirth, Jim Wright, Gus Yatron.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, once again the House is legislating arms control positions. Not content to let the President conduct his own negotiations with the Soviet Union, the House is again placing us in the untenable position of negotiating with ourselves on what an appropriate American arms control position should be.

But then this is not surprising. President Reagan has shocked the arms control world by having the nerve to say that he will not force our Nation to abide by an arms control agreement that the Soviet Union is breaking. For some reason this appears to be a tough pill for some of my colleagues to swallow. In fact, I can hardly wait to hear the supporters of this resolution explain to us how the Soviet Union isn't really violating the Salt II agreement, and even if it is, these violations aren't important. I would like to see them apply the same logic to Chernobyl.

The Soviet Union's new and clearly prohibited, second ICBM, the SS-25, is strictly forbidden by the SALT II agreement. Yet the Soviet Union has already deployed over 70 of them. And the SS-25 is a state of the art, mobile missile that is a serious breach of Soviet SALT II commitments.

Another major example of Soviet noncompliance is continued Soviet encryption of missile test data. This too is a serious, militarily significant violation of the SALT II agreement. The ability to accurately read key elements of Soviet test data is an indispensable part of the treaty's verification provision, and the inability to do so compounds the difficulty of identifying other potential violations by the Soviet Union.

It seems to me that the President is being criticized simply for having the nerve to tell the Soviets that we will not continue to adhere to an arms control treaty that they seem bent on breaking. Some of my colleagues who support this resolution seem to think that unless the Soviets violate every provision of the agreement, we should continue to adhere to it and ignore things like the SS-25 and encryption.

Arms control positions like this seriously undermine the credibility of those of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle who claim they are in favor of equitable, verifiable arms control reductions. Paying lip service to these terms is simply not enough.

There is no doubt that the President's action ups the arms control ante. But as far as I am concerned, he is doing it with kid gloves. He has told the Congress, the Soviets, and the American people, that the United States is providing the Soviet Union with a "window of opportunity" in which to either do something about its SALT II violations or get serious at the arms reduction talks in Geneva. Frankly, I think most Americans expect the Soviet Union to back up their public relations statements with concrete actions. Now is the time for the Soviets to do it. I think we would all agree with President Reagan that we should have nuclear arms reductions below SALT II ceilings.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution is unnecessary and sends confusing signals to both the American people and our negotiators in Geneva. The only people who will get the real message are the Soviets, and the message will be that arms control in the United States is a bitterly partisan issue with Congress and the President moving in opposite directions. Unfortunately, I am afraid that people watching us today can only sit back and wonder why Congress seems bent on forcing the President to adhere to an expired agreement which Congress itself failed to ratify and the Soviets continue to violate.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I want to first of all thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] and the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. MCCAIN] for letting me speak first, after our ranking member on Foreign Affairs, because I want to take this time to set up a framework for the rest of this debate.

I am just finishing a paper analyzing the March debate on Nicaragua, which is entitled, "Left Wing Ideology and the Soviet Threat to America," that is illustrated by the House of Representatives March debate on Nicaragua. That 76-page analysis looks at the underlying intellectual and psychological basis of the McGovern-Carter-Mondale foreign policy world view.

Today's debate is a continuation of that remarkably inaccurate and misinformed left wing assault on President Reagan and the roots of American national security.

That may suggest, and I direct this at both the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the chairman of Armed Services Committee, I find it amazing that the Democratic leadership would bring to the House floor a resolution which says on page 3:

(6) the Administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT agreements that do not deal with numerical sublimits by taking such steps as deploying more than one new type of ICBM, exceeding the limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and excessively encrypting telemetry;

And I would ask either the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee or the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, are you willing to tell this House that Soviet violations of SALT II are only contentions? Are you willing to say, I say to either of these gentleman, are you willing to stand up and say to this House, the Soviets have not violated SALT II, it is only a contention, because I hear all sorts of my activists on the left who walk in and say to me, "Oh, that's an allegation."

So I challenge you, are you willing to say it is only an allegation that the Soviets have violated encryption?

Are you willing to say it is only an allegation that the Soviets have built an extra large radar system in Siberia?

Are you willing to say it is only an allegation that there is a new missile system, or a citation from ACDA Report in December:

While the SNDV aggregate varied from near 2,504 to approximately 2,540 during the last year, the best U.S. estimate of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles is approximately 2,520.

Now, would the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee later on like to report to us that is not true? Because let us get to the heart of what the American left is doing here.

The fact is the Soviets are systematically violating SALT II on the grounds that matter to them.

The American left, which has lost two Presidential elections on foreign policy, the Carter-Mondale world view, which last time carried one State, still controls the House, still dominates the key committee and as a result brings to the floor an act of government, not a student resolution at a university, but an act of government.

□ 1200

What does that act of government say? It says that even if the Soviets violate the treaty, we will legally constrain the American Government. We will say basically that Gorbachev, who we cannot restrain, can selectively do that which he wants to; but Reagan, who we can constrain, we will stop.

First of all, it violates all of Jimmy Carter's promises, and Lord knows, Jimmy Carter was hardly the strongest President we ever had, but Carter did promise again and again in 1979 that, "The Soviets know that if we ever detect any violation of the SALT agreement that that would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in its entirety." This is Jimmy Carter.

A violation of this part of the agreement which we would quickly detect would be just as serious as a violation of the limits on strategic weapons themselves.

When your President who set a model for modern weakness in foreign policy, when your President promised that if the Russians violated SALT II we would do something, and you move to legally block the President of the United States, do you not think it sort of comes across as being even systematically weaker than James Earl Carter? Does that not bother you a little bit?

Let me carry you a stage further, because I find the drafting of this remarkable.

You say on the cover of your resolution:

Providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

I would beg you: How can you possibly structure this debate taking only the parts the Russians do not cheat on, ignoring the parts the Russians cheat on, and then punishing the American Government for responding to Soviet cheating? How can you possibly design an entire resolution around crippling the American argument while not dealing with the Soviet problem, because the difficulty the American left faces is simple: The only arms that we can control in the House of Representatives are those of the United States. We have no capacity in the House of Representatives to control Soviet armament or Soviet weapons or Soviet buildup.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

So, Mr. Chairman, I would say to my friends on the left, ask yourself what you are teaching. Several of you got up and were very angry when the French showed weakness over Libya. You spoke strongly about how the French should have courage; yet your very own report suggests that European timidity over the Russians is grounds for America to do nothing. The very weakness which you cheerfully yelled at when the American public was outraged about Qadhafi you now encourage by saying to the Europeans, "Prove that you are timid and we will be weak."

The American left teaches the Soviet leadership that to cheat selectively is smart because somebody in America will always only select out those things which the Soviets do not

do badly. The American left is teaching our European allies that any act of strength by America will be undermined, attacked, and sometimes legally destroyed by the American left.

Finally, I would say to my colleagues, this is not a game. This is the Government of the United States of America. This is not a simple resolution of piety at some college. This is the serious business of legislation. I would urge every American citizen to read in context this debate, to ask yourself, why did the left systematically select only those areas the Soviets did not cheat on? Why is the left systematically crippling America's ability to respond? Why does the left have a world view in which somehow Gorbachev is reasonable and Reagan unreasonable, in which somehow the KGB can be explained away but the CIA is dangerous.

I would close by quoting Anatoly Shcharansky:

> No amount of bargaining, of give and take, of mutual concessions, can take the place of trust. Experience has taught the Jews of the Soviet Union, has taught me while I was in the camps struggling against the KGB, that lesser demands and fewer expectations lead to a situation where our aggressors feel that they should be rewarded for cosmetic concessions.

To vote for this resolution is to vote for cosmetic concessions to the Soviet Empire.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would inquire of the Chair as to how much time we have consumed thus far.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman for Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 48 minutes remaining.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. MCCAIN], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution and I must first of all express my admiration for the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, who has done such an outstanding job as chairman.

However, I paid very careful attention to his opening statement and I find his logic extremely curious. The chairman made the assertion that neither nation's security is endangered while there is adherence to this treaty.

How in the world, Mr. Chairman, can anyone's security be assured when there are continued violations of an agreement, selectively choosing one part of an agreement that is an adherence by the Soviet Union and, therefore, forcing this Nation to adhere to all parts?

Let us make one thing perfectly clear here: The United States up to this time has not violated SALT II. It is the Soviet Union that has violated SALT II, not the United States of America. It is curious logic to assume that when one portion of a treaty is adhered to that, therefore, we can ignore all other aspects of it. I do not believe that this treaty was negotiated or agreed to, at least in principle, with only one part of it being operative; nor would any of the negotiators either at that time or now agree that selective violations are acceptable.

There is no doubt even among supporters of the resolution that the Soviets are violating the treaty commitments. In an interview earlier this year, Chairman ASPIN of the Committee on Armed Services, when asked if the case the administration had been making for these Soviet violations is a good one, he responded, and I quote: "They have got a case."

He then went on to say:

> The compliance issues are a real concern. I think Soviet behavior is responsible to a large extent for the failure of arms control to work in the way that people wanted it to work.

Last April, when asked whether the Soviet SS-25 missile violated SALT II, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated:

> The Soviets say it is variant of the SS-13. Well, it is not. The U.S. Government, and I agree, believe it to be a new design.

It is obviously a new missile:

Congressman SOLARZ and others were sufficiently concerned about Soviet IBM violations and encryption violations for missile testing last year to write to Secretary Gorbachev. Remember him? He is the candid, progressive guy who is going to tell us all about Chernobyl some day. In the letter that Congressman SOLARZ signed it told Mr. Gorbachev that "adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order for future agreements to be possible."

What should our response be to these violations? Some say we should take the problem to the Standing Consultative Commission. Remember, you will be hearing a lot about that body during this debate. It is the bilateral body in which both sides agree to provide, on a voluntary basis, such information as either party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed, meaning the SALT treaty.

There have been a dozen SCC meetings since President Reagan came to office. In a dozen meetings, each lasting between 4 weeks and 4 months, the Soviets have failed to provide the information necessary to allay the fears of the administration, Harold Brown, and a large number of Congressman. You will hear the "Take it to the SCC" refrain many times today; in fact, it is part of the resolution you are asked to pass. It is a siren song, "We will be asked to continue to negotiate while the Soviets continue to violate."

We know from experience that raising Soviet violations at the SCC is not the answer. Unable to resolve these violations with the Soviets, should we pursue a policy of proportionate response? Would that not take us over the treaty limits? The answer is "no."

The Joint Chiefs of Staff considered a fully funded strategic modernization program by itself to be an appropriate and a proportionate response. As we all know, Congress has consistently refused to fully fund that program. Last year, the House fought tooth and nail over 50 MX missiles, a fraction of the number President Carter proposed to deploy. This year we will go through our perennial denunciation of star wars research and we will probably cut its funding by some 40 percent. In short, Congress has denied the administration this simple response to Soviet violations. Other methods have been tried to end violations, including direct, personal appeals to Soviet leaders. I mentioned the letter that 23 of our Democratic colleagues sent to Secretary Gorbachev regarding Soviet violations.

□ 1210

They told Mr. Gorbachev that if the problem were not resolved, "It will have serious consequences for the future of arms control."

Let me tell you the response that they got from that letter, just one paragraph from it, to indicate the dedication that the Soviets have to resolving these violations.

Let me quote from the response to the letter sent by the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] and our Democratic colleagues. The Soviet spokesman said:

> The Soviet Union strictly complies with its international obligations, including those assumed under the agreement with the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Violation of the letter and spirit of the agreements reached, attempts to circumvent or undermine them by new military programs, refusal to ratify the agreements already signed. This is, as is known, not our policy.

Of course, then, the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] answered by saying:

> The reply merely rehashes existing Soviet positions and does not appear to open any new ground. I am not content with this reply. Clearly, the Soviets still avoid coming to grips with the problem.

So how are we coming to grips with the problem today; by basically endorsing Soviet violations.

The authors of this resolution have also avoided coming to grips with the problem of Soviet violations.

The "numerical limits" and "sublimits" in the resolution are the fruits of that search. If you vote for this resolution, you are saying that despite two overwhelming votes of confidence in President Reagan, he should continue to abide by elements of a treaty he has consistently called "fatally flawed," that a year ago, in June, he warned

the Soviets of the consequences of further Soviet violations.

Despite a Democratic President's failure to persuade a Democratic Senate to ratify the treaty, the United States is asked to continue to adhere to a portion of it. Your vote would come in spite of President Carter's statement that "the Soviets know that if we ever detect any violation of the SALT agreement, it would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in its entirety." You would vote for the resolution despite the fact that while the United States has strictly observed SALT II's letter and spirit, Moscow has violated it again and again.

We should ask ourselves this simple question: Have the Soviets violated the treaty? If your answer is yes, you should at least support the Broomfield amendment which, despite the characterization of the chairman, is that the United States will adhere to the treaty in its entirety as long as the Soviet Union adheres to it in its entirety.

I find nothing wrong nor objectionable about that. I think the United States should adhere to the SALT treaty, but it has to be in the entirety, and not selected parts.

Let me repeat: You will be accepting Soviet cheating.

In closing, I ask those who accept that cheating, how many new Soviet missiles, how many new Soviet IBM's, how much Soviet encryption will it take before you allow the United States to respond?

Let me ask, finally, if we are not allowed to respond effectively to Soviet violation, how can we be expected to meaningfully negotiate and sign another arms control treaty?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, before we can have this debate today, it is important to define this debate. No one comes to this floor suggesting that the Soviets have not pushed this treaty to its limits. Indeed, I do not come to the floor suggesting that the Soviets have not pushed this treaty beyond its limits.

The notion has entered this Chamber that arms control is a gift to the Soviet Union, a concession to the Soviets, something that we have bestowed upon them. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth.

Arms control, this treaty, and the sublimits of this treaty are of mutual advantage. For all of its flaws, for all of our disappointment in not getting real reductions, the fact remains that there have been real benefits.

We have avoided allowing the Soviets to get into a position of a first-strike capability. Through all the tensions we have seen real dismantling of Soviet weapons.

These reasons I know you have heard before. These are not new. The basic argument remains, beyond mutual benefits, beyond real reductions, the principal reason for adhering to this treaty, for keeping to the sublimits is another point, not addressed here yet today, and it is the national security of our country.

Renounce this treaty and one nation will have the ability to break away. One nation will have the ability for dramatic expansion of its forces to obtain real advantage in the short term. That nation is not the United States.

The danger to our country today is not merely the weapons that the Soviet Union possesses, but their ability for a dramatic expansion of weapons in the future.

End this treaty, and the Soviets have the ability to build three times as many submarines in the decade ahead; twice as many bombers; indeed, the ability to enter into production more ICBM's of newer varieties than our country.

That is the sad reality. So, my friends, unless you are prepared to unleash a new giant, lifted of all restraints, a dangerous and powerful adversary of the United States into the world arena with no restraints, no limits upon their forces, then preserve these sublimits.

The choice, I would suggest to you, is simple: Vote to preserve these sublimits or come to this floor and tell us what new systems you are prepared to build and how you would pay for them.

For all of its failings the SALT treaty is a treaty within a treaty. We are left with sublimits that mean less Soviet forces in the future, and not more.

I ask that we adhere to those sublimits. Deny the Soviets the ability to use their production capacity. Deny them the arms that they can bring to this confrontation or come here and suggest what arms you will bring to a new arms spiral and how you would pay for them.

I thank the gentleman for yielding me the time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished ranking Member for yielding time, and I rise in the strongest possible support of the President of the United States of America, for the Broomfield substitute, and against this resolution.

The argument that a failed, flawed, violated, unratified, and expired treaty should now become an object of veneration—the shrine at which the devotees of arms control fetishes must bow—is conspicuous proof, in and of itself, of the intellectual bankruptcy to which the pathological critics of the Reagan administration have been reduced.

The political implications underlying this resolution are too trivial to warrant discussion on the floor of the House, except to point out that this resolution makes no reference to the fact that the SALT process has failed to restrain the nuclear arms race. This resolution makes no mention of Soviet violations of both SALT I and SALT II, and, finally, this resolution completely ignores the problem of verification, or more particularly, the reality of Soviet duplicity—a fact of life we were reminded about at Chernobyl a few weeks ago.

But in a larger sense, Mr. Chairman, the real problem I have with this resolution is that it is part and parcel of an ongoing effort that seeks to make arms control, for its own sake, the overriding issue on the United States-Soviet agenda.

I would remind the members of a brilliant memorandum on arms control that was composed by Bernard Baruch in 1961. Listen to these words: "There is no more dangerous conception than this which misconstrues the arms race as the cause rather than a symptom of the tensions and divisions which threaten nuclear war. If the history of the past 50 years teaches us anything, it is that peace does not follow disarmament—disarmament follows peace."

Mr. Chairman, this resolution leads us straight into the kind of illusory thinking and muddled policies that Bernard Baruch warned us against. Its implicit premise is that American strategic planning should be made dependent on Soviet compliance with SALT II. Never mind the repeated violations the Soviets have committed in the past—the restraint they can now be expected to demonstrate is to be the principal criterion for determining America's strategy for survival.

I would suggest that if the Soviets are truly interested in demonstrating the kind of restraint on which a meaningful arms reduction agreement could be based—if they are truly interested in reducing the kinds of tensions and divisions that Bernard Baruch was talking about—they can begin inside their own empire. Why not ask the Soviets to show a little retraint in their indiscriminate obliteration of the people of Afghanistan? Why not ask the Soviets to show a little restraint in their colonizing of Ethiopia, the most impoverished country in Africa? Why not ask the Soviets to show a little retraint in their treatment of Andrei Sakharov?

No, this resolution would rather play a numbers game. But a sham agreement can only produce a sham peace. We can talk with the Eastern Europeans about sham peace. They well remember how the Soviets enslaved them while we disarmed in the 1940's. We can talk with people in Asia and Africa whom the Soviets enslaved while we disarmed in the 1970's.

Mr. Chairman, a legitimate arms control process cannot exist in a vacuum, despite what this resolution would have us believe. Arms control negotiations must be seen against the full context of United States-Soviet relations and the serious issues that divide us.

This resolution is a free-floating and ill-conceived attempt to influence those negotiations by ignoring the larger realities of today's world.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], a member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as well as the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the real issue here is when you have an international agreement on life-and-death issues and one side massively violates the agreement, what do you do to try and enforce discipline? What incentives do you employ because the ink on the agreement clearly is not enough?

We have here an unratified, expired, massively violated nontreaty which has failed to constrain the Soviets in any particular where they did not want to be constrained.

The notion that treaties or agreements restrain the Soviets is superstition, dear to the hearts of the so-called arms control intellectuals, of which not a few in this body claim membership.

May I parenthetically comment on the remarks of the last speaker. It is an interesting treadline. You cut defense, you cut defense, and then you say, "My God, we have got to appease the Soviets. We cannot keep up. We cannot build submarines like they can."

Cut the defense budget and then plead impotence! That is their formula.

The successors of Woodrow Wilson, of which there are many spiritual descendants here, thought the League of Nations was the answer to world wars, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the United Nations, let us try world federalism, Yalta, Helsinki, SALT I, the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, and now the preferred paper document—I will not elevate this to the dignity of "paper tiger," I will say SALT II is a paper pussycat—have in their minds helped to keep the peace.

□ 1220

This is a myth, a superstition, and one more confirmation, really, that the capacity of the left in this Chamber for self-deception is infinite.

The bottom line in arms control ought to be missile warheads. They do the damage; they pose a first strike threat, but SALT II, that sacred document which we are enshrining today and lighting votive lights before, does not even address warheads. It only limited launchers.

How has SALT II constrained the Soviets? Their force has grown from 5,000 warheads to 9,000 warheads today. In years to come under SALT II, they could load another 5,000 warheads on permitted launchers. Some constraint.

So Russia has nearly doubled their missile warhead total under SALT II, and they can reach 180 percent of their 1979 total. Can a treaty, even if it was observed faithfully, which permits such a Soviets buildup be worth anything? We need to jettison SALT and negotiate a new treaty that reduced warheads and provides for verification.

In Geneva we are trying to do this; while here the arms control intellectuals are shouting "To the rear, march!"

This resolution is an attempt to bring the dead to life. This is Easter. SALT was murdered by the Soviets when they developed the SS-25, when they encrypted their telemetry, and in case we just did not get the message—some of us are slow learners—they buried the ABM Treaty at Krasnoyarsk.

Who was the object of the collective outrage of the left? Ronald Reagan, not Mikhail Gorbachev. The Russians have shredded the treaty; we today are in compliance, and the "blame America firsters" are directing their wrath at Ronald Reagan. One is tempted to say "So what else is new?"

The President said a year ago we would "go the extra mile." And with what result? 72 SS-25's, continued encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar—goes on and on, and many more.

When do you people on the left propose that we stop being patsies for Gorbachev? European reaction—God, that terrifies you. They are still mad about Grenada and Libya. They are always mad at us except on D-day.

Now to those who insist that all that stands between us and an all-out arms race, "my God they can gear up their assembly line"—what happened to your argument on redundancy? Why, I have heard the chairman of this committee, whom I admire so much, say "We can bomb them off the globe 10 times over—they can bomb us. So what do we care if they are going to pour their scarce resources into redundant weapons?" It just does not add up.

The unassailable fact is, the vast buildup of Soviet forces predicted by some in the absence of SALT is already occurring under SALT.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 additional minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.

Now who is serious about arms control? That is a phrase that has rung in my ears since I first came into this Chamber. "The President isn't serious about arms control." But which of us wants to gloss over massive violations of existing agreements? If you are serious about arms control, you ought to re-read President Carter's words in his press conference in 1979 when he said, "Any violation would entitle us to reject the whole treaty."

Why do you now move to the left of Jimmy Carter? That takes some maneuvering, I must say.

Serious arms control means serious responses to serious violations of treaty obligations. Today we ratify the dubious title we earned yesterday. Never let serious legislation get in the way of raw partisan politics.

Now, this resolution is not responsible; it sure is not accurate, and it is not constructive. We are talking about an unratified, expired, massively violated nontreaty that deals only with sub limits and numerical limits. Why not qualitative limitations? Why do you gloss over the fact that they have introduced a brand new intercontinental ballistic missile which violates the SALT treaty? You do not talk about that.

As a matter of fact, it killed you to even mention that they violated the treaty, because you disassociate yourself from those charges. You say "the administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of SALT." God knows, you do not contend it. You would not touch that with a 20-foot pole.

The administration, the hated administration.

Why do you deceive people? In your paragraph 5 you say, among the great accomplishments of the SALT treaty that the Soviets have been required to dismantle 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile carrying submarines. Well, you do not mention that some of those have been reconfigured as attack or long-range cruise missile submarines. Why do you not mention that?

You do talk about the United States and the Soviet Union having not undercut numerical sub limits of the SALT agreement. Big deal.

What about the qualitative violations? Well, you could go on and on with this resolution. It is an effort to kibbitz, at our arms control meetings in Geneva, it is looking over our negotiator's shoulders; it is a restraint on the flexibility and the freedom the President needs to get serious about arms control. This is not a serious resolution. It is raw politics. It is inaccurate; it is misleading, and it is harmful to the defense of our country.

I say that, never questioning the motives of my friends; only their infinite capacity for self-deception.

Now, I yield to my friend, one of the great defense intellectuals, the gentleman from Washington, NORMAN DICKS.

Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the gentleman for not being too inaccurate, Mr. Chairman.

There is one point I would like to make. The gentleman said that there is no limitation on warheads in this agreement. That is not correct. Under

SALT II, there is a limitation of 10 warheads on MIRV'd systems. Plus there is a limitation on the number of MIRV'd systems which has an indirect relationship to the number of warheads that can be deployed.

Mr. HYDE. The gentleman agrees that they have increased—just a moment, now, it is my time, and I will yield to you at my pleasure—do you agree that they have gone from 5,000 to 9,000 warheads under SALT and they can go another 5,000?

Mr. DICKS. Yes, but without SALT——

Mr. HYDE. You said yes?

Mr. DICKS. Without SALT——

Mr. HYDE. Did you say yes.

Mr. DICKS. They can go up 8,000-plus warheads——

Mr. HYDE. But, sir, redundancy!

Mr. DICKS. And that is why we are here today, because the military absurdity of taking off these limits which have always been supported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff up to this last event.

Mr. HYDE. If I may recapture my time, Mr. DICKS, are you not one of the advocates of the "We can bomb them off the face of the Earth already. They can bomb us, so why do we need any more?" Is not that your school of thought?

Mr. DICKS. No, I do not belong to that club.

Mr. HYDE. You do not. Do you reject that?

Mr. DICKS. Not necessarily, but I do not belong to that club.

Mr. HYDE. Thank you. Thank you for your contribution.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend from Long Island.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think one of the points that needs to be stressed is that under SALT II, the Soviet warhead number could grow; there is no question about that. Without the SALT II——

Mr. HYDE. And has.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. And has, and without the SALT II constraints, it can grow even more dramatically. Let me give you some of the numbers.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HYDE. Will the gentleman yield me an additional 30 seconds?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 additional seconds to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I would appeal to those of you who really are serious about arms control, and understand what is at stake, that you would consider Mr. BROOMFIELD's substitute, which looks at the treaty in its totality and says, "as long as they adhere to it we will adhere to it."

That is a new word for you on the left, it is called reciprocity. I wish you would think about it, because it is intellectually honest. It is not serious arms control to permit the Soviets to pick and choose what provisions they will obey and what they will not obey.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will state that the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] has 40 minutes remaining and the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO] has 29½ minutes remaining.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 13 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] the chairman of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 350 providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

This resolution sends an important signal to our own Government as well as to the Soviet Union about the importance of maintaining and strengthening arms control agreements. It signals our concern about the necessity of resolving together with the Soviets our differences on critical compliance issues.

Mr. Chairman, there are several reasons why the United States should continue to adhere to the terms of SALT II.

First, the Soviets have been significantly restrained by the SALT agreements. SALT II establishes equal limits on total numbers of United States and Soviet launchers with multiple warheads and strategic bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles. It freezes the number of allowed warheads per missile. It establishes restrictive sublimits on Soviet multiwarhead missiles, those which concern the United States the most. Every time the Soviets introduce a new missile, they are obligated under SALT II to retire one as well. If ratified, the treaty also would have established an equal, overall limit on the total number of United States and Soviet strategic bombers and missile launchers.

Second, the Soviets are in a much better position than the United States to increase rapidly the size and megatonnage of their nuclear arsenal. SALT II is in the United States interest because Soviet missile production lines remain open. According to open testimony by the CIA, the Soviets could add 12,000 new warheads by the mid-1990's. They could more than double the size of their present force if they break out of SALT II. Over time, the Soviets could also put up to 20 or 30 warheads on each of their heavy missiles. This would give them a much greater capacity to attack U.S. targets. It is unlikely that the United States could keep pace with such a Soviet buildup without enormous, further increases in defense spending. Abandoning SALT II will lead to a renewed arms race between the two superpowers. The structure of strategic arms control supported by four Presidents over 15 years, will be destroyed.

Third, the end of SALT II and a renewed arms race means that a space-based missile defense cannot work. Regardless of present assessments of its feasibility, a missile defense cannot work if you don't limit the number of missiles. This is the judgment of the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment and several experts, including former and present Reagan administration Defense Department officials. The Reagan administration implicitly acknowledges this conclusion when it proposes deep missile cuts in Geneva as part of its proposal for an unrestricted strategic defense initiative [SDI]. Without missile limits, SDI cannot work. Without SALT II there would be no limits.

Fourth, a world without SALT would make U.S. monitoring and verification more difficult. The end of SALT II would free the Soviets from the obligation not to conceal activities relating to SALT II provisions from U.S. national technical means, which monitor Soviet military activities. The Soviets could adopt camouflage and reception techniques now prohibited by the treaty. They could cover over their missile silos or actively conceal the locations of their mobile ICMB's. If we no longer require the Soviets to give advance notification of tests and to avoid concealment activities, the threat of a surprise Soviet attack will increase. Our knowledge of Soviet overall deployments will be reduced. United States uncertainty and anxiety over Soviet nuclear warfighting capabilities will grow.

Fifth, there are likely to be serious political consequences if SALT II is abandoned. The Geneva talks will suffer a big setback. So will the broader United States-Soviet relationship, which the administration has spent the past 2½ years trying to improve. The end of SALT II will be deeply divisive in Congress, and will lead to serious differences within NATO, playing into the hands of Soviet efforts to split the alliance.

COMPLIANCE ISSUES

Mr. Chairman, there are also questions about Soviet treaty violations. They deserve serious scrutiny when cited by the President as his justification for terminating U.S. compliance with SALT II limits.

I wish to focus here on the three key cases—the encryption of ballistic missile telemetry, the SS-25 missile, and the Krasnoyarsk radar—which, in the President's words, are "particularly disturbing." A close look reveals that they continue to be the subject of debate both within and outside the ad-

ministration, and that they are not the clear violations that the President and some of his advisers suggest.

ENCRYPTION OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TESTS

The SALT II Treaty prohibits the encoding of ballistic missile test data in situations where it "impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the treaty." Encryption in other instances is specifically permitted, and the treaty spells out no criteria for determining when encryption impedes the verification of compliance.

The administration charges that the Soviets have engaged in extensive encryption of missile test signals. It alleges that by doing so they have violated SALT II because the practice prevents the United States from verifying the critical performance characteristics of Soviet missiles as governed by the treaty. The Soviets, in fact, engaged in encryption of telemetry prior to signing of SALT II, but have increased the level of encryption since that time.

The Soviets have denied that they have encrypted signals that are essential to verification, and have said they will supply the data needed by the United States if the administration will only state precisely which signals it needs to analyze Soviet missiles. The United States has rejected this offer, noting that to do so would reveal too much about U.S. intelligence collection capabilities.

We do not want to indicate to the Soviets what our intelligence capabilities are. But in refusing their request, we deny them the information they say they need to comply with the terms of the treaty. While we have reached a diplomatic impasse in the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC] created for resolving treaty disputes, charging the Soviets with a clear violation should not be our response. What we have is not an open and shut case of Soviet noncompliance. Instead, it is a case where treaty language is not as precise as it should be.

One must also question the administration's assessment that encryption "impedes" our verification of SALT II when the President simultaneously charges the Soviets with other violations of the treaty such as the SS-25. The encryption problem does not call for heated public diplomacy, but for resolving the issue through the procedures set forth in the treaty, via the SCC, to correct the obvious ambiguities in treaty language.

THE SS-25 MISSILE

As to the SS-25, SALT II limited both the United States and the Soviets to only one "new type" of light intercontinental ballistic missile [ICBM]. The 10-warhead MX and SS-24 were designated as the new type of permitted missile by the United States and Soviets respectively.

The treaty also barred the testing or deployment of any ICBM whose reentry vehicle [RV] weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-weight of the missile itself. This treaty provision was designed to prevent the rapid addition of warheads to existing single warhead missiles.

First, the administration charges that the Soviets' testing and deployment of the SS-25 single warhead ICBM violates the new type rule contained in SALT II because its throw-weight exceeds that of its claimed predecessor, the SS-13, by more than the 5 percent permitted in the treaty.

Second, the administration charges that the SS-25 violates the SALT provision prohibiting an ICBM whose RV is less than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight.

The Soviets claim that the SS-25 is not a new missile, but a permitted modernization of the SS-13—A single-warhead ICBM deployed since 1969. They charge, in the case of the 5 percent rule, that the United States has understated the throw-weight of the SS-13, and overstated the throw-weight of the SS-25, thereby incorrectly making the SS-25 appear heavier than the SS-13 by more than the permitted 5 percent. The Soviets contend that the SS-13 includes a guidance system and penetration aids on its third stage which the United States has failed to include in its estimates.

The Soviets also state that the administration has incorrectly included in its calculation of SS-25 throw-weight equipment which is used only in test flights and is not present in the normal SS-25 deployment, thus making the throw-weight appear larger than it is in the operational missile.

If the underestimate of the SS-13 and overestimate of the SS-25 are taken into account, the Soviets claim that the SS-25 is within the permitted 5 percent variation. Moreover, if the test equipment is not included in the SS-25, they maintain that the weight of SS-25 reentry vehicle is more than 50 percent of the missile's throw-weight and therefore is not a SALT II violation.

The SALT II Treaty's provisions which define a "new" ICBM are complicated and at times ambiguous. They are subject to differing interpretation. Even Secretary Shultz, while calling the SS-25 a new type, admitted that the United States might not have a solid case when he stated:

> There are questions about whether in a purely technical sense it fits within treaty language as might be interpreted by a lawyer.

The administration has a tough call here, but in my view, it does not reasonably add up to an unequivocal violation. The treaty is just not as clear as we would like on what constitutes a new missile under SALT II. Instead of acknowledging that we have some tough differences to resolve regarding the throw-weight of the SS-25 and its relationship to that of SS-13, the administration has chosen to charge the Soviets again with a clear violation. I believe there is still room for substantive discussion in the SCC to try and resolve these differences.

THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR

Even though the Krasnoyarsk compliance issue relates to the ABM Treaty, the President has chosen to use it as one of his justifications for scuttling SALT II. This radar, the President maintains, is just further evidence of a pattern of Soviet arms control violations. It too is an issue that has generated considerable controversy among experts.

Large phased-array radars are essential components of antiballistic missile [ABM] systems. They can perform sophisticated tracking with great accuracy at ranges of several thousand miles. The ABM Treaty prohibits the construction of these radars for nationwide ABM purposes or for ICM early warning except at locations along the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward. Phased-array radars are permitted for space tracking and intelligence gathering purposes.

The United States charges that the Krasnoyarsk radar's location 800 miles inland and its outward orientation over northeastern Siberia constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. The Soviets insist that the radar's purpose is for space tracking and verification purposes, not early warning or ABM defense as the United States suggests. The United States does not accept this argument.

Experts are in disagreement over whether the Krasnoyarsk radar is intended for use as part of a nationwide ABM system. Those who think it is not for that use cite its capabilities and lack of defenses as evidence of their view. Other experts believe that while the radar may not be for ABM purposes, it can serve as an ICBM early warning radar and therefore is a technical violation since it is too far inland and oriented over the Soviet landmass.

Controversy over this facility arises because the United States cannot be certain what the Soviets will use the radar for. While the treaty permits large phased-array radars for some purposes and not for others, it spells out no clear criteria for distinguishing between them. Thus, because the ABM Treaty did not delineate fully how these large radars were to be identified and regulated, we are faced with some ambiguity as to how these radars are to be verified under the treaty.

Recent Soviet offers and statements by United States officials suggest that

both sides may be moving closer to a window for resolving this issue if we seize the opportunity. Ambassador Nitze recently stated that he felt the Krasnoyarsk facility was an early warning radar. While it would still be a technical treaty violation if this is true, its military significance vis-a-vis the ABM Treaty would be greatly diminished.

The Soviets for their part also appear to recognize that Krasnoyarsk is a political liability they could do without. Their recent offers to clear up ambiguities in the ABM Treaty and to halt construction at Krasnoyarsk if the United States does likewise at two of its phased-array radar sites in Greenland and the United Kingdom shows, at the very least, some flexibility in their previous positions. Diplomacy should exploit these recent developments, and the SCC should be given the mandate to press ahead for common ground to resolve this dispute.

CONCLUSION

These charges of treaty violations by the administration are serious matters. The question we must answer is whether the evidence warrants an abandoment of SALT numerical limits and verification procedures that benefit U.S. security. I believe the answer to this question is no.

The evidence is not clear that the Soviets are engaged in a methodical, well-planned breakout of SALT II or any other treaty. Many actions have been taken by the U.S.S.R. to comply with SALT. The administration itself admits that many of the compliance issues identified by the President hold little if any military significance.

The evidence is also not clear that the Soviets are violating every bedrock arms control provision negotiated, or that they are engaged in a premediated pattern of violations. In a report on Soviet noncompliance Mr. Kenneth Adelman notes: "* * * the Soviets have adhered to many if not most provisions of the treaties to which they are a party."

Rather, we are faced with selected instances in which the Soviets have chosen to push to the limit ambiguous or lenient provisions in their interpretation of arms control treaties.

There is no doubt the United States intends to do or is doing the same in some areas.

The real lesson these issues teach us is that we must be exceedingly careful in drafting future agreements. We must not let important details of verification provisions be left until the final hours of a negotiation before they are addressed.

Resolving compliance issues requires a serious, balanced approach in the SCC accompanied by a desire to resolve the issue in question. The administration has not shown that it is pursuing this course. Compliance issues must be handled with accuracy and care because, if exaggerated, they will destroy any prospects for a new agreement and undermine all existing agreements. Morever, without SALT II in place we can no longer raise SALT II compliance issues of concern to us. The Defense Department has said that the President's May 27 decision removes SALT II compliance issues from the SCC agenda.

I believe that sticking with SALT II serves U.S. interests. SALT II preserves important constraints on Soviet weapons, improves our ability to resolve questions about Soviet compliance, and increases prospects for future arms agreements at Geneva. Without SALT II, we are likely to experience an accelerated arms race, greater uncertainty about Soviet intentions, and an escalation of tension between the superpowers. We will be less secure.

The President has now declared the SALT treaties dead, and says that he favors instead a "reduction" in arms. There is no evidence, however, that any kind of new agreement is going to be reached. The choice before us is between SALT II or no treaty, between some limits or no limits. It is not between SALT II and another treaty calling for reductions. Abrogation of SALT II will make it less likely that a new agreement can be reached. We must not throw away an arms agreement we have in hand—however imperfect—for the hope of an arms agreement which remains beyond our grasp.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for this resolution.

□ 1230

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I am always amazed at my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, particularly today my colleague from Indiana, because they continue to give the benefit of the doubt and choose to listen to the Soviet Union and their excuses instead of the President of the United States, whom the American people believe in.

In the last poll in this country over 70 percent of the people believe President Reagan is an honorable man, doing an honorable job and he is honest. Yet the gentleman in the well prior to me indicated that there is doubt about the Soviets violating the encryption of their missiles, there is doubt about the Soviet Union violating the SALT II Treaty with the deployment of SS-25's, there is doubt about them violating the ABM Treaty with the new radar facility in Siberia. Who do you believe? Do you believe the President of the United States, or do you believe the Soviet Union? I choose to believe the President of the United States, as do the American people.

Why is it that you continue to make excuses for the Soviet Union when they violate these treaties?

This report, which was sent to us by the President, whom I believe, says they are violating the Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons Treaty of 1972, and it spells out why; it says they are violating the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and it spells out why; it says they are violating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and it spells out why; it says they are violating the Helsinki Final Act, and it spells out why. This says they are violating the SALT II, and it spells out why, and yet you come to this well and continue to make excuse after excuse for the Soviet Union.

If you look back at treaties that have been made after the Korean war, the 1973 Paris peace accords, agreement after agreement, the Communist bloc violates those treaties.

□ 1245

Yet my colleagues, many of whom I admire, on the other side of the aisle continue to make excuses for the Soviet Union and the Communist bloc. My question is: Why do you do that?

Now a logical alternative to this legislation is what the ranking Republican Member, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], has proposed. If the Soviets live up to the provisions of SALT II, we will live up to them; if they do not, we will not.

As the gentleman from Illinois so eloquently stated a while ago, that is called reciprocity, and there is nothing wrong with that. My colleagues, it is time to put confidence in the President of the United States and this administration, instead of trusting blindly the Soviet Union. It is time to have reciprocity.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds.

Mr. Chairman, I would just say I hope the time has arrived in this debate when we can stop using words like "deception" and "fraud" and a "Communist," or by some way stating the facts that we are less desirable.

I am ready to contend that all the gentlemen on that side are true red blooded Americans.

Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. VENTO].

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, which calls for the United States to continue to adhere to the terms of SALT II as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

President Reagan's recent announcement that the United States will end its 7-year-old policy of informal compliance with the terms of the unratified SALT II Treaty is a major dis-

appointment to millions of Americans and to our NATO allies. Predictably, the Soviet Union has announced that if the United States exceeds the SALT II limits later this year, it will do so as well. The President's announced decision thus sets the stage for a new acceleration in the arms race between the two superpowers.

While SALT II has not been a perfect vehicle for stopping the arms race and while there have been a number of alleged Soviet violations of the treaty, the fact remains that as long as both the United States and Soviet Union informally complied with most of the provisions of the treaty we have been able to avoid a totally unrestrained arms race.

It is totally uncharacteristic of American policy under any recent administration—either Democratic or Republican—for the United States to walk away from an agreement which has been in our national interest. It is disturbing to contemplate that this policy has been pronounced by an American President who in more than 5½ years now has not come close to successfully negotiating even one new arms control agreement. Indeed, the President implores Congress to support a new and unprecedented arms buildup.

What does the President offer instead of continued compliance with SALT II? He says that he not only wants to limit nuclear weapons but wants an agreement with the Soviets to actually abolish existing weapons systems. The President is looking for what he calls "a better deal."

Mr. Chairman, who doesn't want a better deal? Who wouldn't prefer an agreement which actually abolished existing weapons on both sides rather than just limiting the numbers of new weapons which could be built in the future? The fact is that we are not even close to concluding any agreement with the Soviet Union which would achieve these desirable objectives. Abandoning SALT II does not lead to the President's goal of arms reductions but instead sets the stage for an unrestrained arms buildup by both sides.

Has informal compliance with SALT II been in our national interest? The answer is undoubtedly "yes." Let's look at the facts.

Since 1973, the SALT accords have led the Soviet Union to dismantle 541 missiles and bombers, while requiring the United States to dismantle only 48 missiles. Between now and the end of 1987, SALT II compliance would compel the Soviet Union to dismantle 316 additional missiles and bombers, while requiring the United States to dismantle 32 missiles. By 1994, the Soviet Union would be limited to about 14,200 nuclear warheads under SALT II, compared with about 13,700 for the United States. If the treaty is abandoned, however, both sides may feel compelled to double their nuclear arsenals with the Soviets holding an incredible 27,700 nuclear warheads and the United States an incredible estimate of 26,200 warheads. Over the next 10 years, continued observance of SALT would lead the Soviets to retire some 1,200 launchers with 4,000 warheads—over twice the number of United States launchers. Clearly, the number of existing warheads on both sides is far too high. But setting limitations on how many new systems and warheads can be built as well as some minimal reductions in existing systems is an essential condition which results in actual reductions and works toward even further reduction and delivery systems.

Mr. Chairman, our differences with the Soviet Union are deep and profound. But the essential fact remains that we must live together on this planet. We must not give up the initiative which our Nation has always eagerly assumed to search for ways to live in peace with those who would be our adversaries. The American people, in every opinion poll which has ever been conducted on the subject, support the proposition that effective arms control is a goal worth pursuing.

I've joined with our colleague, Congressman NORM DICKS, and others, in sponsoring H.R. 4919, a bill which would prevent outlays for weapons deployments which would exceed the SALT II limits as long as the Soviets abide by these limits. The President and his advisers must understand just how strongly the American people feel about this most important matter. Arms control is a goal worth pursuing. There is really no viable alternative to SALT II compliance that make sense in today's world.

I hope that the President will reconsider his decision to abandon SALT II. Abandoning even informal compliance with the only effective strategic arms control agreement we have with the Soviet Union will not lead to a safer world and is certainly not in the best interest of our national security.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentlewoman from Maryland [Mrs. BYRON].

Mrs. BYRON. Mr. Chairman, today, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350 which urges the President to continue to adhere to the SALT limits.

As Chairman of the House Armed Services Panel on Arms Control, I have always been and will continue to be a strong supporter of President Reagan's effort to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and his effort to bring about a mutual and verifiable arms reduction agreement with the Soviets. I truly believe that this administration is committed to arms control and to achieving success in Geneva. When we discuss arms control and deterrence, we are not talking about two mutually exclusive concepts. In fact, the pursuit of arms control and the task of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent are integral components of national security. Neither total reliance on arms control alone, as some would argue, nor abandoning arms control in favor of a strategic buildup as others propose, can exclusively be the foundation of our national security. The pursuit of arms control and the need for a necessary and credible nuclear deterrent must constantly be brought into balance, and that is really what the focus of our debate on this resolution is—balance.

I will be the first to admit that SALT has proven to be an imperfect process and as chairman of the House Armed Services Arms Control Panel I won't make excuses or apologies for Soviet violations. They are wrong. However, it is my firm belief that abandoning interim restraint at this time will only endanger our ability to maintain an effective deterrent by jeopardizing the gains we have made in strategic modernization over the last 5 years—something which I have supported and I think that this administration should be proud of. I have made the point from time to time to my liberal colleagues that they cannot allow themselves to operate within a vacuum of arms control. It is critical to measure how an arms control treaty impacts our ability to deter. Ironically, in the case of the administration's decision to abandon interim restraint, it is they who are operating within this vacuum by not carefully measuring what the impact of scrapping SALT will do to the ability of our strategic forces to deter the Soviets.

If we abandon SALT limits, it is not Soviet security which suffers—it will be American security. According to our own intelligence, in the absence of SALT the Soviets could place over 14,000 warheads on existing ICBM's. That's without deploying a single new missile. And what occurs if the Soviets decide to accelerate their strategic programs far beyond the SALT limits? In the near term, the Soviets have more than double the ability to escalate their existing production lines. Furthermore, what would be the constraints on the Soviets not to add additional systems to their arsenals, which are now forbidden under SALT?

Let me remind some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle about the difficulties we have had in getting systems such as MX, Trident, and B-1 through Congress. I know, because I have been with you in those battles to get the funding for these important and necessary programs. With Gramm-Rudman hanging over our heads do you really think it's going to be easier? Right now, we are working on a defense bill which is below last year's funding level and quite frankly, I don't see much growth, if any, in the near future. The Soviets unfortunately don't have to worry about domestic programs, stretched defense dollars, or deficit reduction. These are problems of democracies and not totalitarian regimes. Giving the Soviets the incentive to accelerate the arms race will be a far costlier proposition to us than it will be to them.

In addition, the SALT agreements have required the Soviets to dismantle around 500 operational launchers, which include 14 Yankee class submarines, and in the next 2 years, the Soviets will be required to dismantle two times as many launchers as the United States. I know that some of you would argue that these systems would be replaced without SALT anyway because of their marginal military value. But

before you say it, I would urge you to look at the Secretary of Defense's 1986 posture statement and the DOD publication which is released every year on Soviet military power. They indicate that these Soviet systems still pose a credible threat to the United States. They are listed in those publications along with more modern Soviet systems. There are no asterisks which indicate that these systems are of "little military value."

I believe that this President is committed to arms control and I do support the efforts of our negotiators in Geneva. The President's decision to agree with the Soviets to abide by the SALT limits has been to our advantage and I believe that this decision demonstrates that the President is sincere about wanting to obtain a real arms reduction agreement. After 2 days of hearings which I chaired before the House Armed Services Arms Control Panel on this important issue, I would be reluctant to say that SALT is dead. I believe that the administration is maintaining some flexibility on this issue and it would not surprise me to see us remain within the SALT limits until this time next year if the President decides to retire one of two Poseidons which are scheduled to be retired in the fall. And that is why I think that this resolution is timely and needs our support. Congress has an obligation to let the President know where it stands on this important issue before any final action is taken. As someone who has backed the President on many arms control issues in the past, I feel that it is particularly important to give him some friendly advice. Let's maintain that balance between the need for a viable arms control objective and credible nuclear deterrent which together provide a foundation for our national security. Don't scrap SALT.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs seems to think someone was questioning patriotism.

Let me make this very clear. Patriots can be wrong. Patriots can be misinformed. Patriots can just plain be dumb.

Stanley Baldwin was a patriot; he was wrong. Neville Chamberlain was a patriot; he was wrong.

Mr. Chairman, it is the gentleman's committee that uses "contends" to describe the administration's serious statements about the Soviet Union. It is the gentleman's party's Intelligence Committee's chairman who just read a long list of explanations and excuses for Soviet behavior.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. GREEN].

Mr. GREEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for yielding this time to me.

I rise in support of the resolution, and I do so for one reason only. I believe that it is in the best interests of the United States of America.

□ 1455

I think that for all their imperfections, the SALT II agreement has served us well. It has caused the Soviets to dismantle far more in the way of weaponry than it has caused the United States to dismantle. If we abandon SALT II, the Soviets will almost certainly be able to add weaponry far faster than we can.

Let me deal with the problem of the violation of SALT II, and it is a serious problem. As we know, that issue centers around the Soviet effort now in process to deploy a Midgetman and the attendant related violations, particularly dealing with the encryption of data primarily in the testing of the Midgetman.

I would consider that a most serious violation if it were not for the fact that since 3 years ago, the spring of 1983, it has been firm United States policy to commit an identical violation. From the point where the President accepted the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission, and when this Congress inferentially did so by its actions on the MX, we have said that we are going to produce a mobile missile, our Midgetman, in addition to the MX, and that thus we shall have two missiles, two new missiles, not one new missile, exactly the same thing that the Soviets are doing with respect to their Midgetman, the SS-25, in addition to the solid fueled SS-24.

So it seems to me that if that and the related violations that the Soviets have engaged in, in order to lend an air of plausibility to the Midgetman as not being a violation of the SALT II agreements, if that is our problem, then it seems to me the way to deal with that problem is to engage in consultation with the Soviet Union as specifically called for by these agreements and negotiate an arrangement where they can have their Midgetman and we can have our Midgetman without a SALT violation, because we want one just as they want one.

Again, I would say, Mr. Chairman, there is one reason and one reason only for supporting this resolution. It is not because anyone here wants to forgive the Soviet Union, it is not because anyone here wants to be nice to Gorbachev, it is not because we have any sympathy for their regime. It is for one reason and one reason only, and that is that it has been in the best interest of the United States to have this limitation on the numbers of weapons, and it will continue to be in the interest of the United States to have that limitation. It is, therefore, an act of folly for us to repudiate those limitations, and we shall pay very dearly for it if that repudiation sticks.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER], a member of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. COURTER. I have been listening to some of this debate, and I think the message if this resolution is passed is just a remarkable message to the Soviet Union. What it says to the Soviet Union and their negotiators in Geneva now is the fact that the House of Representatives is not concerned about violations of arms control agreements.

A number of speakers on one side of the aisle, the proponents of the resolution, admit the fact that the Soviet Union has violated SALT II, has violated arms control agreements, all at the same time we are negotiating a new arms control agreement.

If, therefore, it is OK for the Soviets to violate this one while the United States complies with this one, the message in Geneva is as you are negotiating strategic arms reduction talks, as you are negotiating intermediate nuclear range reduction talks or space and other types of weapons and strategic defense, it will be OK if you violate that one because you violated this one and we did nothing ourselves.

I think if you believe in arms control, that is precisely the wrong message to give to the Soviet Union today.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

As an arms control observer to those talks, I think the gentleman's comments are right on target. This resolution we have before us today, about which I have serious reservations, ties the President's hands and, I think, to that extent, the negotiators' hands in Geneva, in such a way that there is no incentive for the Soviets to bargain with us in good faith. That restraint I think will be put on if this resolution passes, and I think that that is a very important factor for all of us to consider as we vote on this thing. It sounds good, the lingo sounds good, but we are going into a very sensitive time in those negotiations, and this just may play havoc with them.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

If you are really serious about getting some sort of progress in Geneva with regard to strategic arms, the message you have to give the Soviet Union is the fact that compliance and verifi-

cation and both sides sticking to an agreement is important.

This is the absolute and wrong message. The simple message by the House of Representatives, if this resolution passes, is that cheating is not important, we do not care if the Soviet Union cheats, we are not going to do anything about it, we are not going to be able to modernize differently, we have to comply with the treaty that they are violating. I think it is important to give the message that cheating is important, it is significant and it affects things. We cannot be unilaterally required to comply with an agreement that the Soviet Union is snubbing its nose at. It is as simple as that.

And, also, let us look at SALT II. First of all, SALT II I think everybody recognizes in this Chamber is a nonagreement; it was never ratified by the Senate; it was never passed by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Before the invasion of Afghanistan, the other body's Armed Services Committee voted on whether to ratify SALT II, and the answer was 11 noes and zero yeas.

A treaty that was never ratified, No. 1; a treaty that had been ratified would have expired, No. 2; and a treaty in which the Soviets are not complying with the agreement. They are violating this. And yet we are saying that irrespective of the fact that it was never ratified, irrespective of the fact that if ratified it would be expired, irrespective of the fact that they are not complying with the terms of that agreement, they are cheating, it does not make any difference to us, we do not care, we are going to go along with it and sacrifice is going to be our own security.

Finally, the issue of Soviet violations. I suppose if you really do not believe the Soviet Union has violated any of these term—and some in this body do, I clearly know that most do not—maybe you could take the arguments that we should comply with the agreement even though not ratified and even though it would have been expired. But for those people who know deep in their hearts that the Krasnoyarsk radar in the ABM Treaty, even using the Soviet definition of what it is, and the Soviets are saying it is not a violation because it is an early warning radar, but early warning radars have to be on the periphery of the Soviet Union, facing outward, not inward, facing the Soviet Union, so by their very own definition, the Krasnoyarsk radar is an important and terrible violation of ABM and SALT II. But irrespective of that, this resolution says the United States has to comply. I think that is absolutely wrong.

Just a couple other violations. The SS-16 was not mentioned. We believe it is a violation. At the present time, the Soviets are in violation of the threshold on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. The treaty said 2,500, to be reduced in 1981 to 2,250. They have over 2,500. We have 1,900-plus. Violation after violation after violation. Let us not give the message that cheating is not important to the House of Representatives.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. YOUNG].

Mr. YOUNG of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, a resolution expressing the sense of Congress that the United States continue to adhere to the weapons limitations of the SALT agreements.

In the past few weeks, we have been hearing conflicting signals from the administration that there may be a shift in U.S. arms control policy. Such a shift would have immense military, budgetary, and diplomatic implications for the United States.

No one contends that the SALT documents are perfect. But for the time being, it is the only constraint at all on the arms race. Since 1972, the Soviets have removed over 1,000 land-based ballistic missiles and over 240 submarine-based missiles on 14 Yankee-class submarines earlier than they would have without SALT. By 1990, they will be required to remove another 500 to 600 ballistic missiles.

On the U.S. side, we have removed from service 320 land-based missiles, over 500 submarine-based missiles, and 11 ballistic missile submarines to comply with the SALT agreements.

Abandoning the SALT agreements will undoubtedly trigger a new and dangerous arms race that will be extremely costly for both sides. Additionally, the impact on the United States budget would be enormous in attempting to match any increase in Soviet nuclear forces above the current spending levels.

As billions are spent on new weapons, Congress would be faced with the choice of adding even more to the deficit, making further reductions in domestic programs, seeking additional revenues—or a combination of all three—to pay for the dramatic increase in defense spending.

Whatever mix of new weapons the United States would have to build, it is clear that abandoning the SALT documents would lead to a massive renewed nuclear arms race between the two superpowers that I am sure both countries would not want to pay for.

Without SALT, by the mid-1990's both sides could more than double their strategic nuclear arsenals. Currently, the Soviets have more active production lines for strategic forces. They are producing eight major new strategic systems, including two new ICBM's, two new bombers, two new SSBN's—ballistic-missile submarines—and two new SLBM's—sea-launched ballistic missiles.

In contrast, the United States is only producing three such systems—one new ICBM [MX], one new bomber and one new submarine. Without SALT, Soviet deployment of strategic weapons could grow by 65 percent by the end of 1989 compared with a United States growth of only 45 percent thus placing the United States at a serious military disadvantage for nearly a decade.

Furthermore, if SALT II is abandoned, the Soviets would rapidly be able to place many more warheads on their existing missiles—by 1989 they could add nearly 7,000 ICBM warheads without deploying a single additional missile. This would more than double their current force of 6,690 warheads.

However, if SALT II remains in force, the total warheads on each side would increase slightly over the next decade, and would remain roughly equal in number.

Finally, terminating SALT would have extremely detrimental consequences in the international community.

The announcement by the administration of ceasing adherence to the SALT II treaty has elicited negative reaction among our allies. The statement has already increased anti-American feelings in Europe over nuclear issues, and should the administration follow through with the decision, many experts believe that it would profoundly harm the NATO alliance.

Mr. Chairman, the people in my district, like people throughout the country, are concern as never before over the threat of a nuclear war. The concern in our country over this issue was recognized when over 200 Members of Congress and 53 Senators, of both political parties, urged the President to continue to abide by the SALT agreements.

Clearly, the voice of Congress should be heard on this pivotal issue. I urge passage of this vital resolution.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, the very existence of this debate today is a measure of our Government's failure to provide the American people with the substantive arms control progress they so clearly desire, and so clearly deserve.

Three years after this body passed a resolution calling for a complete halt to the nuclear arms race followed by deep reductions in nuclear arsenals, and 7 years after the numerical limits of SALT II were agreed to in Vienna, we are reduced to debating whether even these modest limitations on the

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growth of nuclear arsenals should be maintained.

What is going on here? In surveying this administration's arms control record, I am reminded of the words of the historian Tacitus, who said of the conquering Roman legions, "They made a desert, and called it peace."

Time and again this administration accelerates the arms race, and calls it arms control.

This Orwellian equation has been resorted to so often over the past 6 years that President Reagan apparently can no longer tell the difference between the two.

How else can one explain the administration's cynical attempt to tie the recent Soviet offer in Geneva—many months in the making—to the President's surprise announcement of his intent to break the bounds of the SALT II limits?

Judging from his remarks at his last news conference, President Reagan apparently believes that his arms buildup has, for the first time, frightened the Russians into proposing reductions.

According to President Reagan:

Now we have the first Soviet leader to my knowledge that has ever voluntarily spoken of reducing nuclear weapons, and we want to follow up on that.

If President Reagan really believes this, then he has wasted 6 years of his Presidency. The truth of the matter is that 7 years ago yesterday, President Carter and Chairman Brezhnev signed a "joint statement of principles and basic guidelines" for subsequent negotiations.

I commend this document to some of my more conservative colleagues. In it the two leaders committed their nations to pursue "significant and substantial reductions in the numbers of strategic offensive arms." That, I repeat, was 7 years ago.

The irony in this administration's fervent characterization of SALT II as "fatally flawed," for its failure to reduce nuclear weapons, is that this alleged defect could have been remedied simply and quickly along the lines endorsed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee during the ratification debate in 1979—namely; steady percentage annual reductions in the limits and sublimits of SALT II, including the ceiling of 308 on Soviet heavy missiles.

In fact, if President Reagan had done this in 1981, he would already be well on the way to achieving his announced objective of deep reductions in the nuclear missile forces on both sides. For example, a 7-percent annual reduction in the SALT limits would cut in half the Soviet strategic missile force in 10 years.

In fact, this result could have been achieved without further extensive negotiation, because it relies upon the already agreed SALT II framework.

Now, having wasted 6 years in fruitless negotiation to generate a new strategic framework on which to base reductions, the administration proposes to compound that failure by destroying what remains of the old framework.

It seems as though some in this administration regard perpetuation of the SALT II limits as a kind of continuing testimonial to their own failure to produce something better—hence their unseemly haste to dump SALT on the ash heap of history.

The nominal explanation for this behavior is said to be Soviet "violations" of the SALT II treaty.

On the one hand, the administration says that preserving the limits of a treaty which the Soviets are only partly observing represents "partial adherance to a contract," which is said to be "unacceptable."

On the other hand, the administration argues that SALT II is just an invalid expired treaty that was never ratified, and therefore, the President's plan to exceed the limits would not violate any existing contractual agreement with the Russians.

Not only is this now-you-see-it, now-you-don't attitude toward SALT II astoundingly hypocritical, but it is also irrelevant. Let us stipulate that the SALT II treaty was never ratified and that the date of its expiration has passed. All the arguments that we have been hearing along those lines are completely beside the point.

The issue is this: The administration has failed completely to negotiate any limitations whatsoever on qualitative improvements in the Soviet nuclear arsenal. That failure alone has increased the danger of preemptive and accidental war, and resulted in a grothesque expenditure of funds for the development of new nuclear weapons which nobody wants.

Will this body now permit the administration to compound its error by removing the last remaining restraints on the quantitative arms race, driving our national budget further and further into the red as we respond to the inevitable political demands for equality with increases in Soviet nuclear forces.

A decade ago, when I joined this body, the very officials who are now telling us that Soviet numerical superiority in a no-SALT world won't matter they blanketed the land with shrill warnings that Soviet superiority in all sorts of arcane measures of strategic power could be the cause of national catastrophe.

Moreover, while I am not a believer in SDI, for those of my conservative colleagues that are, I would only note that the administration's decision to free the Soviets from the SALT II limits would permit a massive proliferation of missiles and warheads which would undercut whatever feeble effectiveness a first generation SDI system might attain.

If the debate in recent weeks has shown anything, it has shown that this administration has a rotating wardrobe of strategic rationales which puts Imelda Marcos to shame.

To draw an analogy from my own experience, the administration's explanation of its SALT policy as a response to peripheral Soviet "violations" makes about as much sense as the NRC Commissioners someday appearing before my subcommittee and explaining that because a few nuclear powerplants have experienced minor radiation leaks, they have decided that reactor containment domes are no longer effective and should be abolished.

I urge my colleagues to vote for this resolution, and to cosponsor the binding legislation on this same issue offered by our colleague from the State of Washington, NORM DICKS.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER].

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, in large part, we are engaged in a debate today about a specific and yet a generality, because in part what we are asking is: Shall this House take control of U.S. foreign policy?

Additionally, what we are asking is: Shall the President be rendered impotent in the implementation of foreign policy?

If you take what happened yesterday and look at what is happening today, that is literally what we have decided to do on the House floor. Think about the last 2 days. Yesterday we passed the most extreme leftwing position on South Africa that we could possibly pass, and we now have the left wing in this Congress glowing in that passage. And let us understand what that did. Let us understand that one of the things that that particular position did was enforce South African censorship of the press, because under the bill that we passed yesterday, the press of this country is not going to be permitted to operate in South Africa.

□ 1310

Imagine that. That is what we passed as the foreign policy of this country yesterday as imposed by this House. Today, today we bring another example of extreme leftwing positions to the floor. The argument thus far on this resolution has contained large doses of the "blame America first" rhetoric: The Soviets cheat and we blame ourselves. The Soviets cheat so we ignore that cheating and demand that the United States unilaterally adhere to a failed treaty.

What a joke that makes of the mutual verification that we have often heard about on this House floor as being the position of the Congress.

What a joke. When we discover that they are cheating, we try to find ways to explain away that cheating.

This resolution does just that, and in this debate, we have had proponents of the resolution coming to the floor to do just that. Let us understand what this resolution would impose upon the United States as our foreign policy toward the Soviet Union. They arm; we are alarmed. They squeeze; we appease. They cheat; we retreat.

That is a recipe for disaster. That is a recipe for permitting the totalitarians who run the Soviet Union to have free reign in the world. That is a recipe for a future that a free people can never accept.

Turn down this sincere but sincerely wrong resolution.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I just cannot resist commenting on the gentleman's recipe for disaster. I just thought I would never be in this House long enough to ever hear him admit that.

I suppose if you live long enough, you can hear anything.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH].

Mr. LEACH of Iowa. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, it has never been difficult to list the flaws of SALT. But reciprocity as a principle is no substitute for substantive, legally binding agreements. It is a prescription for suspicion, for unraveling the currently existing arms control regime.

All of us should understand that to abandon SALT is to forsake what little nuclear restraint the superpowers have observed in the last decade.

Here, the distinction we must be concerned with is that between parity and security. We can have parity at current levels of armaments, at higher, or at lower. The question is where we can best have security.

There is growing consensus in America, led by President Reagan on the right and arms control activists on the left, that greater security rests at lower levels of parity.

But the problem of abandoning SALT is that it gives rise to the prospect of a new arms race. Without SALT limits, or successful negotiation of a new treaty, parity can only be assured at higher levels of armaments.

The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the Soviets can double the number of warheads by 1992. The administration itself has admitted that without SALT II limits, as many as 5,000 new warheads would be likely to enter the Soviet arsenal by 1994.

How, opponents of this resolution must ask, Does this increase our national security?

Mr. Chairman, one of the most naive notions in the current arms control debate is that the next treaty will be far removed from SALT II. Anyone with any experience in arms control understands that, while a new approach may go beyond SALT II, it will have to include most of the ingredients of that agreement. SALT II is imperfect, but it is better than nothing and, more importantly, is an essential building block for more comprehensive agreements. SALT II may have ambiguities, but let us not lose sight of the fact that its definitions as well as its limits are in final measure pluses, not minuses. They represent the beginnings of rational man's efforts to control irrational forces.

It is time to shelve the destabilizing rhetoric of recent Presidential campaigns and get down to the serious business of serious arms control.

Throwing pepper on SALT simply has the effect of spicing up international relations. Instability becomes an even greater hallmark of the nuclear age.

Finally, a word about Chernobyl. All Americans recognize Soviet handling of this particular tragedy reflects poorly on the Soviet state. Yet, it should give us little solace. If there is any lesson we ought to draw in this debate, it is that accidents can happen. There is no perfect control of the nuclear beast. How can we possibly be more secure if we by our actions give the Soviets license to develop more missiles aimed at us and deprive them of incentives to reduce their current levels of armaments? In an accident-prone age, the issue isn't simply parity; it's safety.

Nothing could be more tragic than if we allow SALT to represent a respite of the arms race. SALT should be understood as the beginning of the end of the arms race, not a footnote to the ending of civilized discourse, to the jeopardy of life itself.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I want to place in the RECORD at this point something that I contributed to the House back in December 1982, that is, a compilation of 67 Soviet violations up through December 1982. This is more than 3½ years ago.

I took this list to our National Security Adviser to the President, who was then Bill Clark. I asked him to sanitize it even though most of it was extracted from Senate and House records and the Washington Post and the New York Times and Los Angeles Times. I wanted to make sure that I was not releaking something that should not be there. All the information was culled from the public record. It took 3 days for the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State to sanitize it. Then I put it into the RECORD on December 16, 1982.

It was not commented upon much because I know some people think the arms control process is inviolate at all costs no matter how much the other side lies or cheats or obfuscates or encrypts. I just want to make this point and I will make it again later in the debate.

The point is that in the Senate, in 1979, prior to the Afghan genocide and slaughter, the Senate bragged that they had a breakthrough, a major breakthrough that they made the Soviets sign an agreement that it was a serious violation to encrypt missile test data. Then comes this new ICBM and they begin encrypting, coding, cheating on their technology as they tested it. Now that there is clear evidence of Soviet violation of this provision, the Senate, which had said that provision alone was worthy of dumping the treaty, the liberals in the Senate and this House are saying, "Oh, it is not that important."

You cannot have it both ways. Men and women, children are still having their hands and limbs blown off with weapons designed like toys in Afghanistan which we must recall is the main reason this treaty was never ratified.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to resubmit my old list of 67 Soviet violations of all the treaties over our recent lifetime.

[From the Congressional Record, Dec. 16, 1982]

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE DEBATE

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I find myself in the closing days of the 97th Congress again in a very frustrating situation because of the last hour and so many of my distinguished colleagues on the House floor desiring to pay respect to some of my hard-working colleagues who are retiring from distinguished service here. I should take the full 60 minutes of this special order because of the critical nature of the subject, the value or feasibility of a nuclear freeze, and past Soviet arms control behavior.

Instead I will endeavor to go speedily through information that I would like to make available to the Members and include an open letter that I wrote to one of the more talented actors in the America firmament of film stars, not our great President, but that fine citizen of Connecticut and California, Mr. Paul Newman. In my letter to Paul I enclosed 67 instances of Soviet violations and deceptions of arms control treaties that are not generally known by even our brightest citizens. The nuclear freeze this summer and fall was based on so much misguided idealism, bad information augmented by deliberate disinformation by citizens not of the United States, that I cannot fault Mr. Newman and other concerned Americans who operate virtually in the blind. The freeze was defeated in Arizona and the vote was close only in California because of the efforts to get the truth out to

the American public by well-informed private citizens such as Mr. Martin Coleman from Pacific Palisades. So here are the facts, folks. No more claims of naivete will be accepted.

Mr. Speaker, the nuclear freeze issue and movie star Paul Newman's naive claims on Soviet treaty compliance prompted me to direct my staff to study Soviet arms control behavior. This research led to an open letter to Mr. Newman which includes a documented partial list of Soviet violations, deceptions, and other measures to circumvent arms control agreements, tonight, this information is being submitted to the RECORD.

U.S. Government policy has been to either deny or accept these constant Soviet efforts to evade arms control limitations. I am urging President Reagan to release any information of Soviet arms control "violations" that will not compromise our intelligence-gathering procedures. It is my belief that if the American people are given the facts, they can informatively evaluate the Soviet past as a guide to help determine the future course of U.S. foreign policy.

America should have realistic expectations about the value of arms control in meeting U.S. national security requirements. Arms Control has three main objectives for the United States: First, lower the chance of war; second, reduce the devastation of war; and third, reduce military budgets. Unfortunately, these objectives can conflict with each other. Giving away a needed system in an arms control agreement may reduce the military budget, but increase the chance of war due to unpreparedness. Agreeing to build a defensive system may lower the chance of war and devastation of war, but it can increase the military budget.

The United States has increased defense needs due to the documented massive Soviet military buildup. This can be countered by reducing Soviet offensive threats and/or by increasing U.S. defenses. Arms control attempts to reduce U.S. defense needs by reducing the Soviet threat. If the Soviets have no desire to reduce their military threat to the United States, a good arms control agreement will be difficult to negotiate and have limited utility. Arms control is only possible in areas where both sides are interested. Limiting the possiblities of accidental war is in both nation's interest and hence agreements in this area are attainable and useful.

The Reagan administration's attempts to achieve worthwhile arms control agreements show good faith and our willingness to reduce—not merely freeze—the defense needs of both sides. Unfortunately, if you look at past Soviet arms control behavior, the possibilities for many mutually beneficial agreements appear remote.

The Soviets have different objectives in arms control than the United States. Rather than use the process to allow for reductions on both sides, the Soviets see arms control as a way to obtain unilateral advantage. Talks are often used as a trap to delay or retard American counters to Soviet actions. Talks can be a stalling tactic. Promising an agreement can help the anitdefense groups in the United States.

The Soviets attempt to reduce those categories of arms where the United States has the advantage.

Agreements are signed with every intention of cheating where possible and using all carefully worded loopholes to the utmost advantage.

An agreement may be reached with the United States to stop our momentum in a certain area, luring us into a false sense of security, with every intention of breaking out of the agreement when it appears they can catch up or pass us in doing so. The Soviets did this when they broke the moratorium on testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere in September 1961.

Another reason for arms control, in the Soviet view, is for information gathering. The Soviets never issued a data base in the SALT I process. A data base is simply a fair statement of what armaments they have. The Soviets learned what we thought they had be negotiating on the basis of U.S. figures.

The point is, it is difficult to get a worthwhile agreement under these circumstances. A good, verifiable, enforceable agreement is desirable. An agreement that lacks any one of these three key elements is not worth the paper it is written on. The naive belief that a nuclear freeze with the U.S.S.R. would make the world safer is not based on these realities but on wishful thinking. A nuclear freeze that is not based on equality lacks all three elements essential for a desirable agreement.

Let us briefly analyze the problem of verifying a freeze.

To put it simply, it is easier to hide than to find—deception, camouflage, mobility, a closed society, the small size of nuclear weapons, and the ability to store components of a nuclear weapon—which could be quickly assembled for a launch—makes adequate verification by national technical means extremely difficult.

An immediate freeze agreement, even if it was verifiable and enforceable, would not be a good idea because of the adverse military imbalance.

Soviet missile advantages are actually understated. So-called experts look only at deployed, SALT-counted launchers. The Soviets have thousands of additional nondeployed ICBM's that could attack the United States.

The point is, although deployed Soviet ICBM numbers appear to remain constant—only the deployed missiles are remaining constant. Nondeployed missiles can be fired and the Soviets are building 200 ICBM's every year. We are building none.

Comparing U.S. static numbers to U.S.S.R. static numbers is also misleading because Soviet ICBM's are generally larger and more capable—that is, more warheads—than U.S. ICBM's.

Although most people do not see the SS-20 ICBM as a threat to the United States, this missile has the capability to hit America, according to former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird. There are 340 SS-20 launchers deployed with 3 warheads each and at least 1 reload per launcher.

The limited antiballistic missile defense capability around Moscow further increases the Soviet missile advantage. Soviet ABM (antiballistic missle) capable SAM's—surface to air missiles—also reduce U.S. missile penetration capability. Remember, the United States has no ABM's. None.

First strike advantage: Most if not all U.S. ICBM's can today be destroyed by only 25 percent of the deployed Soviet ICBM force. Hence if a war started, the Soviets would have a lot more power than appears on the surface—and the United States would have much less.

Mr. Speaker, Soviet submarine missile strength is also underestimated. The United States has 520 SLBM's (submarine launched ballistic missiles) in the active fleet. The U.S.S.R. is only allowed 950 SLBM's under SALT but actually has more because older SLBM's of the U.S.S.R. are not counted.

The U.S.S.R. also has 50 nuclear-powered and 20 diesel-powered subs that carry cruise missiles. That's right, Mr. Speaker, cruise missiles. Most of these are nuclear capable and could be used against the territory of the United States, but are not considered strategic and are ignored in SALT agreements.

The majority of Soviet SLBM's (SS-N-8 and SS-N-18's) have ranges that allow the subs to launch from protected waters so that it is nearly impossible for U.S. ASW (antisubmarine warfare) to neutralize or destroy them.

The Soviets have over 80 ballistic missile carrying subs and over 150 subs that carry some kind of ballistic missile or cruise missile. The United States has less than 100 nuclear- and diesel-powered attack submarines to hunt down those Soviet subs.

The United States has only 32 ballistic missile carrying subs and no, repeat no, cruise missile subs capable of attacking the Soviet Union. Only 19 of our ballistic missile subs may be out of port at any one time—to be hunted down by over 190 Soviet attack submarines.

Contrary to popular beliefs, the Soviets also have a bomber advantage.

U.S.S.R.: 150 long-range Bear and Bison strategic bombers; 180-plus long-range Backfire strategic bombers (the Soviet B-1); 80-plus other Bear and Bison long-range aircraft; and 740-plus Badger and Blinder medium-range bombers.

United States: 213 B-52's armed for nuclear strategic missions (only some 60 are actually on ground alert with a chance to survive a first strike) and 6 FB-111 medium-range fighter-bombers, actually designed as an all-purpose tactical air command fighter.

What could have been:

B-1 PROCUREMENT PROGRAM, AIR FORCE ESTIMATE

	Buy	Deliveries
Fiscal year:		
1977	3	
1978	5	
1979	13	1
1980	27	4
1981	42	15
1982	48	40
1983	48	48
1984	48	48
1985	6	48
1986		36
Total	240	240

The Soviet bomber advantage is even greater than these numbers because of the asymmetry in air defense. We cannot stop most of their bombers although our Air National Guard and Air Reserve pilots are top notch, as good as active duty pilots. There are simply not enough fighter jocks to go "up and at 'em."

In the 3 years following ratification of the ABM Treaty in 1972, the United States phased out the bulk of its continental air defenses. The Department of Defense stated that with only limited ABM deployment allowed, the utility of air defense in a major attack on the United States is restricted. Our SAM defenses were deactivated years ago and only a token force of 6 USAF squadrons, 108 obsolescent F-106 interceptors, plus some 200 Air National Guard and Canadian aircraft, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said, to "insure the sovereignty of our air space in peacetime." The last SAM site dedicated to the defense of

the continental United States was withdrawn from Florida in 1979, just when Cuba was increasing its capability to threaten the southern United States with its new Mig-27 fighter bombers.

The point is hundreds of Soviet bombers are a serious threat to the United States and our allies. The bombers would be essentially unopposed in the United States. It has been estimated that, God forbid it, if war were to strike, almost one-half of the radioactive contamination of the United States would result because the United States has abandoned its air defenses and most Soviet bombers could penetrate unopposed to their targets. Restoration of even a rudimentary air defense would eliminate most of this potential contamination.

In contrast, there are some 10,000-plus SAM launchers and 2,500 interceptor aircraft deployed in the U.S.S.R. These air defenses are continually being modernized.

The effectiveness of the U.S. bomber force depends upon how it is designed to penetrate these Soviet defenses. Because the B-52 has a declining expectancy of penetrating the Soviet air defenses, the B-1 Peacemaker II was specifically designed for this penetration mission. A problem, of course, is that since President Carter killed the B-1, we will not have a new bomber, the B-1B until 1986. While the B-52 must carry us through this decade of vulnerability, the young crews have told me personally that it would be suicide to go into combat in a B-52, virtual U.S. kamikaze missions. Now a brief look at the asymmetry in civil defense.

The importance the Soviets attach to this program is indicated not only by the amount of resources devoted to it, but by the appointment of a Deputy Minister of Defense to head the program. And that was some 10 years ago.

The scope of the civil defense program is such that a very high Soviet official said:

"In our country, there is not one economic branch or area of social endeavor that is not in one way or another associated with civil defense."

The source for this quote is the "Civil Defense Review" hearings by the civil defense panel of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services (U.S. House of Representatives, 1976, p. 191).

The Soviets protect 10 to 15 percent of their people in cities of over 25,000 population with blast shelters. The Soviets plan to evacuate and disperse their unprotected population that is in potential target areas. The evacuees will live in their assigned resettlement area where they will be fed and either provided with a fallout shelter or put to work building an expedient one. Contrary to Soviet propaganda which claims a war is not survivable, translated Soviet civil defense manuals say that this evacuation and dispersal of people can reduce deaths in a nuclear war to 3 to 4 percent of the population.

The Soviets also plan to take strong measures to better protect their industry. Boeing Aircraft Co. ran tests of these measures from translated Soviet civil defense manuals. Boeing found that packing critical machinery in sandbags would be fully adequate for Soviet factories since it would protect against fire, debris, and anything but a direct nuclear explosion—up to 80 psi in that awful nuclear effects lingo.

As far as the recovery asymmetry, it was calculated that the Soviets could recover from a nuclear war, war initiated by the Soviets after taking these civil defense measures, in 2 to 4 years—it would take the United States 3 to 6 times longer to recover.

The casualty asymmetry is also frightening. The United States would lose 10 to 30 times as many people in such a Soviet initiated war as the U.S.S.R. The exact difference is unknown but there is no doubt though that the Soviets would have millions less die than the United States because they have a civil defense program and we do not, even though they start with a current population of 267½ million citizens to our current 232½ million—35 million more citizens than the United States.

The main point of all this comparison between the United States and U.S.S.R. is too show that the United States which had parity with the U.S.S.R. if not superiority when the SALT process began—has fallen behind. The SALT I "freeze" did not prevent the Soviet buildup. The SALT II call for equal levels of "strategic nulcear delivery vehicles" or launchers did not and could not stop or even slow the Soviet buildup across the whole range of conventional and nuclear weapons.

Mr. Speaker, the arms control approach of the past that compared forces on the basis of launchers is fatally flawed as candidate Reagan said in the 1980 Presidential race. The number of launchers on both sides is meaningless. Counting 318 heavy Soviet ICBM launchers such as the SS-18 as equal to 318 U.S. Minuteman launchers is like having a naval agreement and allowing the Soviets 318 aircraft carriers and allowing the United States 318 coastal PT boats.

This whole arms control approach fails to recognize the dynamics of the offense versus the defense, ignores the fact that the Soviets do not keep these agreements very well, and has limited the ability of the United States to defend itself in the ABM Treaty.

Yes, the United States should do everything possible to attempt to reduce or take away the Soviet military threat—through negotiations—but the threat is real and growing every day. We must act to reduce the threat by maintaining an adequate defense, as we talk, talk, talk, honestly and vigorously in attempts to reduce the threat.

Mr. Speaker, history is our only guide to the future and those who ignore history are condemned to relive it, especially painful and bloody history. The record shows arms control as practiced by the United States over the last 10 years failed to check the ongoing awesome Soviet military buildup. The well-intentioned freeze advocates remind me of Neville Chamberlain's naive offer of the Sudetenland to Hitler in 1938. "Peace for our time" was proclaimed, followed shortly by World War II. "Peace through strength" can be the only way to insure survival of the free world as we move through the unchartered and incredibly dangerous times ahead.

I recommend to my colleagues that they read my letter to Mr. Newman including the partial list of Soviet violations included in my remarks at this point.

OPEN LETTER TO PAUL NEWMAN

Dear Paul, while most people realize that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted to keep arms control agreements, it is understandable why you feel the Soviets abide by treaties. If one were to look only at official U.S. statements on Soviet violations, it may appear that the U.S.S.R. has a good track record in complying with arms control agreements. There are three main reasons why this false impression has persisted and why people of good will such as yourself have been taken for a ride.

First, in order to obtain Soviet agreement on a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) for airing alleged SALT violations, the U.S. had to agree that the proceedings would be "confidential." Hence, open official U.S. disclosure of Soviet SALT violations is rare.

Second, U.S. intelligence agencies often feel that it is best not to "go public" with successfully determined information of Soviet military activities. Announcing our knowledge of those activities may lead to changes in Soviet camouflage, concealment, and deception (CCD) procedures which could reduce our ability to ferret out such activities in the future.

Third, if an administration supports an arms control agreement, an announcement of Soviet violations would be an admission of a failure in its arms control policy, and hence call into question the success of its overall foreign policy. This leads administrations, Republican or Democratic, toward a policy of ignoring or, much worse, explaining away Soviet violations. For example, according to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Soviets proposed and the U.S. accepted a "Mistakes Understanding" concerning any violations of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. The understanding was that "one or two slight, unintended breaches per year" are not to be considered violations.

For these three reasons, there are few official and public U.S. Government documentations of Soviet arms control violations. One does not need to look very hard though, to find numerous reports of Soviet violations, deceptions, and calculated measures to circumvent arms control limitations. Soviet activities have been uncovered by many officials, both in and out of our government. So that debate on the value of arms control can be based on reality and not on naive misperceptions, I am enclosing a partial list of Soviet "violations" that have been reported publicly. In addition, there are many violations that are known only by intelligence officials. And obviously, there are additional violations that are unknown even to Allied intelligence officials, i.e. cases where the Soviets have cheated so cleverly that they have not been caught. After all, our intelligence forces are not perfect.

The following list gives a short description of Soviet Violations, Deceptions, and calculated measures to Circumvent arms control limitations (VDC's) and lists sources that report or discuss the specific Soviet action and/or capability. For more information on a particular Soviet VDC, see the relevant arms control agreement and the sources.

The list is organized as follows: Soviet VDC's are presented; then VDC's of other arms control agreements are outlined.

Note that each VDC is numbered for reference purposes only. The numbers represent different types of VDC's, not the total quantity of all VDC's. For example, violation number one mentions the illegal deployment of 18 SS-9 ICBM's. Each SS-9 was a separate violation, for a total of 18 violations.

SALT

Violation: (1) SS-9: illegal deployment of 18 SS-9 heavy ICMBs at Tyuratam test range during SALT I. This violated the SALT I limitation on ICBM launchers.

Source: David S. Sullivan, Soviet SALT Deception, Coalition of Peace Through Strength, 1979, p. 7; Senator Jake Garn, "The Suppression of Information Concerning Soviet SALT Violations by the U.S. Gov-

ernment," Policy Review, No. 9, Summer 1979, p. 23; Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification," International Security Review, v. 5, Spring 1980, p. 4; "Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements," National Security Record, No. 45, May 1982, The Heritage Foundation, p. 2; Senator Steven Symms, Congressional Record, May 27, 1982, p. S 6357.

Violation: (2) SS-11: deployment of this missile at a SS-4 Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) site is an instance of attempted deception and is a violation of the SALT I Treaty.

Source: Humphrey, p. 6; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Sullivan, p. 7.

Violation: (3) SS-16: deployment of 40-220 of these mobile ICBMs violates SALT II Provisions banning mobile ICBMs and violates SALT II limits on Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDV's).

Source: Humphrey, pp. 5, 7, 12; Sullivan, Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; David Sullivan "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," Strategic Review, v. 7, Fall 1979, p. 32, David Sullivan, "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," International Security Review, Vol. VI, No. III, Fall 1981, pp. 362, 368; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Garn, p. 31; Michael Getler, "Government Experts Challenge Reports of Soviet SALT Violations," Washington Post, April 9, 1982; Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "SALT ONE: Compliance," The Department of State Selected Documents, No. 7, February 1978, p. 10; "Soviets Violate SALT II," Human Events, April 17, 1982, p. 3.

Violation: (4) SS-17: this ICBM was one of the heavy missile replacements for the light SS-11 ICBM. The SS-17 carries four times the warheads of a SS-11 and three to four times the throw weight. These replacements violate SALT I provisions prohibiting replacement of light ICBM launchers with heavies.

Source: "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 365; Lawrence K. Orr, "Soviet Violations of SALT I," Issues in Brief, November 16, 1979, pp. 2, 3, 4; Michael B. Donley, ed., The SALT Handbook, The Heritage Foundation, 1979 p. 62; M. Stanton Evans, "How We Ignore Moscow's Treaty Violations," Human Events, June 19, 1982, p. 7; Garn, pp. 14-20; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 3; Humphrey, p. 7.

Violation: (5) SS-18: encoding of telemetry for this missile violates the agreements in both SALT I and SALT II to refrain from interfering with national technical means of verification.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Violation: (6) SS-18: Rapid reload and refire exercises for the SS-18 have been reported; these exercises violate SALT II provisions prohibiting rapid reloads for ICBM's.

Source: Symms, p. S 6357; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviet SALT Violations Feared," Aviation Week, September 22, 1980.

Violation: (7) SS-19: this ICBM was one of the heavy replacements for the light SS-11 ICBM. The SS-19 carries six times the warheads and three to five times the throw weight of a SS-11. Deployment of the SS-19 violates SALT I provisions prohibiting replacement of light ICBM launchers with heavies.

Source: Donley, p. 62; Orr, pp. 2-4; "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III." p. 361; Evans; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Vance, p. 5; Robert J. Einhorn, "Treaty Compliance," Foreign Policy, Winter 1981-82, p. 30; Geoffrey Levitt, "Problems in the Verification and Enforcement of SALT Agreements in Light of the Record of Soviet Compliance With SALT I," Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 385-386; Garn, pp. 14-20; Soviet SALT Deception, pp. 1-3, 5; Humphrey, pp. 3, 4, 7, 8, 14.

Violation: (8) reintroduction of ICBM equipment to deactivated complexes: these measures violate dismantling or destruction requirements of the SALT Treaties.

Source: Humphrey, p. 13; Air Force magazine, January 1979, p. 18; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Violation: (9) SS-NX-19: this sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) has had its telemetry encoded during tests which violates the agreements in both SALT I and SALT II forbiding interference with the national technical means of verification of the other party.

Source: Symms, p. S 6357; David S. Sullivan, The Bitter Fruit of SALT: A Record of Soviet Duplicity, Texas Policy Institute, (reprinted in the Congressional Record; May 13, 1982, p. S 5178.)

Violation: (10) SS-NX-20: encoding of telemetry for this sea launched ballistic missile (SLBM) violates both the SALT I and SALT II accords on non-interference with national technical means of verification.

Source: "Soviet Violations Feared;" Daniel Southerland, "Are Soviets Violating SALT II Guidelines?" Christian Science Monitor, May 12, 1982, p. 1; Symms, p. S 6357.

Violation: (11) excess old ICBM launchers were not dismantled as required with additional deployments of new SLBM launchers. In 1976 the Soviets admitted they were over the SALT I freeze limit and acted to rectify the situation after much delay. This violation consisted of going over the SALT I freeze limit by 41 launchers.

Source: Orr, pp. 2, 6; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, pp. 4-13; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Garn, p. 21; Levitt, p. 390; Vance, p. 7.

Violation: (12) III X launch control silos: the Soviets built 150-200 of these silos in violation of the SALT I freeze on ICBM launchers.

Source: Vance, pp. 4-5; Levitt, p. 386; Clarence A. Robinson, "Soviet Violations Detected," Aviation Week, October 21, 1974; Colin Gray, "SALT I Aftermath: Have the Soviets Been Cheating?" Air Force magazine, November 1975; Garn, p. 22; Humphrey, p. 8; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Orr, pp. 2-3.

Violation: (13) over SALT I limits on nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs): the Soviet violated the SALT I limit of 62 SSBNs. Some sources say the Soviets have more than 68 strategic submarines.

Source: Orr, pp. 2, 6; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 7; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4.

Violation: (14) SS-N-12: deployment of this sea launched cruise missile (SLCM) violates the protocol to the SALT II Treaty which prohibits deployment of SLCMs with ranges over 600 kilometers.

Source: The Military Balance 1982-1983, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1982, lists two range figures for this SLCM: 550 kilometers and 1,000 kilometers; perhaps there are two versions of this SLCM.

Violation: (15) SS-N-3: deployment of this SLCM violates the protocol to the SALT II Treaty which prohibits deployment of SLCMs with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers.

Source: The range of this SLCM is 840 kilometers according to Donley, p. 132.

Violation: (16) development of a tactical ABM has violated the ABM Treaty.

Source: Humphrey, p. 2.

Violation: (17) ABM radars on Kamchatka: this 1975 deployment violated the ABM Treaty of 1972. The Soviet Union merely informed the U.S. that Kamchatka had always been an ABM test site, and deployment of ABM radars at ABM tests sites was allowed. The problem here was that the Soviet Union did not tell the U.S. that Kamchatka was an ABM site when the ABM Treaty was signed.

Source: Garn, p. 25; Vance, p. 6; Orr, p. 10; Levitt, p. 383; Humphrey, p. 3; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 5; William R. Van Cleave, "SALT on the Eagle's Tail," Strategic Review, Spring 1976, p. 50.

Violation: (18) blinding U.S. satellites with ground based lasers: this violates the SALT provisions that prohibit interference with national technical means of verification.

Source: Levitt, p. 388; Vance, pp. 9-10; Orr, pp. 5, 12; Philip J. Klass, "Anti-Satellite Laser Use Suspected," Aviation Week, December 8, 1975, p. 12.

Violation: (19) SA-2: tests of this surface to air missile (SAM) in an ABM mode has violated the ABM Treaty.

Source: Garn, p. 26; Melvin Laird, "Arms Control: The Russians are Cheating," Reader's Digest, December 1977. (Laird was Nixon's first Secretary of Defense.)

Violation: (20) failure to dismantle excess ABM test range launchers as required by the SCC violated the ABM Treaty.

Source: Soviet SALT deception, p. 7; Humphrey, p. 2; Levitt, pp. 389-390; Vance, p. 6.

Violation: (21) testing a movable ABM: these tests violate the ABM Treaty.

Source: Garn, p. 25; Vance, p. 10; Orr, p. 9; Laird, p. 4; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 2; Van Cleave, p. 50.

Violation: (22) deployment of ABM battle management radars: introduction of these radars violates the ABM Treaty.

Source: Orr, p. 9; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 2.

Violation: (23) SA-5: tests of this SAM in an ABM mode has violated the ABM Treaty.

Source: Humphrey, p. 2; Soviet SALT Violations Feared;" Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Levitt, p. 381; Orr, pp. 8-9; John D. Lofton, "Top Military Man at SALT Calls it Quits," Battle Line, July 1979; Robert Hotz, "The Case Against Kissinger," Aviation Week, December 8, 1975; Vance, p. 10; Einhorn, p. 30; Garn, p. 26; Laird.

Violation: (24) SA-10: tests of this SAM in an ABM mode has violated the ABM Treaty.

Source: Humphrey, p. 2.

Violation: (25) Backfire: this bomber (which is not counted as a heavy bomber in the SALT II Treaty) has carried the AS-6 strategic (range over 600 kilometers) air launched cruise missile (ALCM); this violates the SALT II provision that prohibits non-heavy bombers from carrying strategic ALCMs.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 3; "Soviet SALT Violations Feared," Getler; Donley, p. 123.

Deception: (26) SS-11: deployment of this missile at a SS-4 MRBM site is an instance of attempted deception.

Source: Humphrey, p. 6; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7.

Deception: (27) SS-16: this mobile ICBM was tested at night (in 1976) for deception purposes. Tests of the SS-16 have occurred above the arctic circle (not a common practice) to conceal information from U.S. monitors.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; Garn, p. 31; Getler; "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," p. 32; Southerland, pp. 1, 14; "Soviets Violate SALT II," p. 3; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," Foreign Report, published by the Economist newspaper limited, London, March 5, 1981, p. 3; "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," pp. 362, 368; Orr, p. 12.

Deception: (28) encoded telemetry: many Soviet missile tests have used this illegal (according to SALT) deception to make it difficult to determine the size number, and type of warheads.

Source: for reports of encoding (or encryption) of telemetry for the SS-18, SS-NX-19 and SS-NX-20 see Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Symms, p. S 6357; The Bitter Fruit of SALT: A Record of Soviet Duplicity, (in the Congressional Record, May 13, 1982, p. S 5178); Southerland, p. 1; "Soviet Violations Feared."

Deception: (29) the Soviet Union falsified the number of SSBNs and SLBMs deployed and under construction at the time of the SALT I freeze.

Source: Humphrey, p. 4; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 3; "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," pp. 31-32; "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 362.

Deception: (30) AS-3 and AS-6: Under SALT II, bombers that carry strategic ALCMs must be counted under Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicles (MIRV) limits. The Soviets deceptively made the claim that none of their ALCMs had strategic range, so none of their bombers are counted as MIRVed. This claim is false since the AS-3 and AS-6 ALCMs are both strategic.

Source: Donley, p. 126; Soviet Military Power, the Department of Defense, p. 61; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 3.

Deception: (31) Bear: 105 of these heavy bombers are configured to carry the AS-3 strategic ALMC. The Soviets deceptively claimed no MIRVed heavy bombers in the SALT II data exchange.

Source: Sullivan, in the Congressional Record, May 13, 1982, p. S5179; Symms, p. S6357.

Deception: (32) concealment of missiles as they leave production plants: this deception circumvents SALT I and SALT II provisions that prohibit certain deliberate concealment measures.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 5; "How Russia Hides its Missiles," p. 3.

Deception: other measures to interfere with national technical means of verification include:

Deception: (33) dummy roads, facilities, equipment, and lauch sites.

Source: Orr, p. 10; Jack Anderson, "Soviet Subterfuge a SALT Concern," Washington Post, May 23, 1979; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 2.

Deception: (34) restriction of electronic emissions for air defense radars to prevent interception of data.

Source: Anderson; Orr, p. 10.

Deception: (35) covered submarines with tarps to conceal the SLBM launcher count.

Source: Orr, p. 10; Evans; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," pp. 2-3; Levitt, p. 389; Humphrey, p. 5; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Deception: (36) tunnels to conceal over 20 submarines.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; Humphrey, p. 5; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 2.

Deception: (37) camouflaged factories producing missile and submarine components.

Sources: Orr, p. 10; Garn, p. 30; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 3; Levitt, p. 388; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Hiding Submarine Work," Aviation Week, November 11, 1974; Humphrey, p. 5; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Deception: (38) camouflaged missile launching sites.

Source: Levitt, p. 388; Vance, pp. 7-8; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 2; Garn, p. 30; Orr, p. 10.

Deception: (39) construction of dummy submarines.

Source: Garn, p. 30; Evans; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 5; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Deception: (40) in addition to sending encoded telemetry back from their missiles, (see number 28) the Soviets may have sent deceptive uncoded telemetry.

Source: Edward J. Epstein, "Soviet Missiles Can Fool Monitors," Wall Street Journal, October 18, 1982.

Deception: (41) refusal to give data in SALT I: this deceptive uncooperative behavior allowed the Soviets to later argue that some alleged violations were based on "faulty" U.S. data. (e.g. see number 17).

Source: according to national security advisor Henry Kissinger's White House press briefing on SALT I, June 15, 1972, "the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers . . ." see SALT I Reconsidered, Institute of American Relations, 1979, p. 77 for these remarks.

Deception: (42) SSBN geographical asymmetry farce: the Soviet Union demanded and was granted the right to build more SSBNs than the U.S. during the SALT I freeze on total ICBM and SLBM launchers. This demand was accepted on the basis of a deceptive claim. The U.S. based some SSBNs overseas. The Soviets claim they should be given more submarines since U.S. submarines could hit Soviet targets while near their bases and Soviet submarines could not hit U.S. territory while near their bases. Soon after the SALT Treaty, the Soviets began testing a new long range SLBM which allows them to hit the U.S. while near home bases. Since the U.S. subsequently withdrew its submarines from overseas bases, the geographical asymmetry is actually the other way.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, pp. 3-4; "Lessons From SALT I and SALT II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 362; "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," p. 32; Donley, p. 83; the U.S. no longer has overseas home basing of SSBNs according to Senior Chief Riccio, Office of Naval research.

Deception: (43) Backfire: the Soviet Union has been deceptive in describing this bomber as medium range, in its claims that the Backfire does not have and will not be given the capability to strike targets in the U.S., and in the production rate. There is no doubt that the Backfire bomber (which can be refueled inflight) can attack targets in the U.S.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Humphrey, p. 6; SALT II Reference Guide, The White House, Spring 1979; "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," pp. 364, 368; "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," p. 37.

Deception: (44) camouflage, concealment, and deception of ABM deactivization: these measures violate the SALT provisions that prohibit interference with national technical means of verification.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Humphrey, p. 2; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

Circumvention: (45) SS-7: large numbers of old SS-7 heavy missiles at an unidentified installation circumvents the SALT I provisions requiring destruction or dismantling of old systems as they are replaced.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Air Force magazine, September 1979, p. 24; Humphrey, p. 6.

Circumvention: (46) SS-16: tests of this mobile ICBM circumvented Brezhnev's pledge to Nixon that the Soviet Union would not deploy a mobile ICBM.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 4; Garn, p. 31; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles," p. 2; "A SALT Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," p. 32; "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 362; Getler; Orr, p. 12; Garn, p. 31; Humphrey, p. 5.

Circumvention: (47) SS-18: simulated tests of this missile with more than ten warheads circumvents the SALT II limit of ten warheads on an ICBM.

Source: William E. Jackson, Jr., quoted by Southerland, p. 14.

Circumvention: (48) SS-20: the Soviets have circumvented the SALT agreements with this missile which is called an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) but which has ICBM range. The range of this missile (over 5,500 kilometers) should qualify it as an ICBM under SALT definitions. Encryption of the telemetry data in tests of this missile also circumvents the SALT agreements.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 5; Symms, p. S 6357; Levitt, p. 387; Vance, p. 10; Orr, p. 5; Laird.

Circumvention: (49) extra missiles have been stored: when the Soviet Union has replaced old missiles, it has kept them as a strategic reserve. This circumvents the stipulations of the SALT agreements which call for dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers when replaced by new SLBM launchers.

Source: "Lessons Learned From SALT I and II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 368; "Whither Arms Control?-II," Wall Street Journal, May 20, 1982, p. 26; Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Humphrey, p. 5; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; see also the Harold Brown Department of Defense Reports which mention these extra missiles.

Circumvention: (50) Hotel SSBN: these submarines circumvented the SALT I Treaty; although equipped with SLBMs, these submarines were not counted under SALT limits.

Source: for a description of these submarines see Donley, pp. 93-101; the Military Balance 1982-83; or Jane's Fighting Ships.

Circumvention: (51) Golf Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSB): these submarines also circumvented the SALT I limits; although these submarines carried SLBMs, they were not counted toward the Soviet limit of 62 ballistic missile submarines.

Source: for a description of these submarines see Donley, pp. 93-101; the Military Balance 1982-83, or Jane's Fighting Ships.

Circumvention: (52) Cruise Missile Submarines (SSGN and SSG): the Soviets have 50 nuclear powered and 20 diesel powered cruise missile submarines that have circumvented the SALT limits. Most of these cruise missiles are nuclear capable.

Source: Soviet Military Power, p. 40; Donley, p. 132; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 3; "Lessons Learned From SALT II: New Objectives for SALT III," p. 368.

Circumvention: (53) development of two new ICBMs: SALT II only allows the deployment of one new ICBM. These developments then circumvent the SALT Treaty. Deployment of course would violate the treaty.

Source: William E. Jackson, Jr., p. 14.

Circumvention: (54) concealment of missiles as they leave production plants: this deception circumvents SALT I and SALT II provisions that prohibit certain deliberate concealment measures.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 5; "How Russia Hides Its Missiles" p. 3.

Circumvention: (55) Anti-Satellite weapons (ASATs): these ASATs circumvent the SALT provisions that prohibit interference with national technical means of verification.

Source: Vance p. 10; Levitt, p. 388; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Push for Beam Weapon," Aviation Week, May 2, 1977.

Circumvention: (56) Bear: Navy versions of this strategic heavy bomber circumvent SALT II limitations. While these aircraft are not counted, hundreds of junked B-52s are counted.

Source: Donley, p. 109; Soviet Military Power, p. 47; *Soviet SALT Deception*, p. 10.

Circumvention: (57) testing illegal ABM radars (high powered) and developing illegal exotic technologies (e.g. beams and lasers) circumvents the ABM Treaty which prohibits the deployment of these measures.

Source: Orr, p. 8; Evans; Garn, p. 24; Henry S. Bradsher, "Soviet ABM Setup Has Pentagon Concerned," Washington Star, February 16, 1977; Levitt, p. 384; Clarence A Robinson, Jr., "Further violations of SALT Seen," Aviation Week, February 3, 1975; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Push for Beam Weapons," Humphrey, p. 2; Van Cleave, p. 50

OUTER SPACE TREATY

Circumvention: (58) Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBs): this is SS-9 heavy ICBMs at the Tyuratam test range were designed to become a FOBs upon launch. This capability circumvented the Outer Space Treaty provisions prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space.

Source: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7; Humphrey, p. 6.

ATMOSPHERIC TEST BAN MORATORIUM OF 1958

Violation: (59) over 30 Soviet tests were conducted in the atmosphere in less than two months (beginning September 1, 1961.)

Source: Kathleen Teltsch, "U.N., 87-11, Appeals to Soviet on Test," *New York Times*, October 28, 1961.

1962 CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AGREEMENT

Violation: (60) a few of the violations of the agreement which prohibits the stationing of offensive arms in Cuba are: ballistic missile submarines visiting Cienfuegos harbor; nuclear capable MIGs being given to Cuba; and a Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba.

Source: There are numerous reports of these Soviet and Cuban activities; a few of these sources are: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2; Humphrey, p. 7; *Soviet SALT Deception*, p. 8; *Air Force* magazine, September 1979, p. 22.

THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

Violation: (61) the Soviets have made many tests in violation of the 150 kiloton limit.

Source: Einhorn, p. 31; "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 1; "Soviet SALT Violations Feared;" Humphrey, p. 7; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Violations of the Test Ban?" *Washington Post*, September 1979; *Soviet SALT Deception*, p. 8.

1973 AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S.A. AND THE U.S.S.R. ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR

Violation: (62) the Soviet Union failed to consult with the U.S. concerning the Arab-Israeli 1973 War and threatened to use force against a U.S. ally (i.e. Israel); these actions were violations of this Agreement.

Source: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 2.

MUTUALLY BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS (MBFR)

Deception: (63) Soviet deception and fabrication of Warsaw Pact force levels at these negotiations is the norm.

Sources: Soviet SALT Deception, p. 7.

BREZHNEV'S SS-20 PLEDGE

Violation: (64) Brezhnev's March 1982 pledge to freeze Soviet deployments of SS-20s was nothing more than a propaganda ploy since the Soviet Union has deployed since the Soviet Union has deployed 40-50 SS-20 since that time and continues to introduce new SS-20 launchers at a rate of one every five days.

Source: Secretary of Defense Weinberger announced this in an October 1982 issue of Il Tempo, an Italian newspaper; see also the Washington Post, October 16, 1982 for this report.

GENEVA PROTOCOL

Violation: (65) Soviet use of lethal nerve gas on populations in Afghanistan violates this Treaty.

Sources: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 3; Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, U.S. Department of State; Gloria Duffy, "Chemical Warfare: The Cloud of Doubt," Christian Science Monitor, January 26, 1982, p. 23.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Violation: (66) a 1979 anthrax epidemic (fatal to thousands) in Sverdlovsk, USSR, gives evidence that this Convention has been violated. An accidental explosion at a military installation that had been a suspected biological weapons production plant caused the epidemic. The Soviets deny this, but refuse to have discussions with the U.S. concerning this violation.

Sources; Einhorn, p. 32.

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

Violation: (67) the U.S. has put before the U.N. evidence collected in Southeast Asia that lethal chemical and biological warfare toxins have been used by Soviet supplied Vietnamese troops on people in Laos and Cambodia. Use of these toxins called "yellow rain" and "white rain" violate the BWC.

Sources: "Soviet Violations of Arms Agreements," p. 3; Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, Einhorn, p. 32.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to House Concurrent Resolution 350 because it is based on faulty assumptions and does not serve our Nation's best interests.

It is important to remember that the SALT II Treaty was never ratified and would have now expired.

It is clear beyond a doubt that the Soviets have violated SALT II and other arms control agreements and are continuing to do so. Examining SALT II alone, there are at least four clear major violations. The Soviets are: producing the SS-25 ICBM; exceeding the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle limit; encrypting telemetry; and concealing the association between a missile and its launcher. Any one of these violations could be grounds for cancellation of the agreement. In 1979, President Carter stated that a violation of any important part of the agreement, as each of these noted violations are, " * * * would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in its entirety."

House Concurrent Resolution 350 cannot meaningfully restrain Soviet forces nor can it bring the Soviets back into compliance with its past commitments. It can hurt our own and our allies' national security and future arms control agreements. First, it keeps us from continuing the strategic modernization we need to maintain a credible defense against the growing, unchecked Soviet threat. Second, this legislation can send exactly the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership. If we are unwilling to maintain deterrence or take appropriate actions in response to Soviet noncompliance, our credibility at the arms negotiation table will be endangered and our ability to secure fair, equal agreements will be lessened.

Since entering office, President Reagan's message has been one of restraint and reductions. He has continuously proposed strategic arms reduction talks [START]. Despite all the flagrant Soviet violations of SALT, the President "went that extra mile" last month when he retired the two older Poseidon submarines so that a new Trident vessel would not exceed any of the SALT limits. However, the Soviets have made no policy changes and continue to improve their arsenal at our expense. The Soviets must be shown that we are serious about our defense and keeping arms control agreements mutually beneficial. The conversion of the 131st B-52 into a cruise missile launcher is scheduled for later this year. During this interim

period, the ball is in the Soviet's court. Should they decide not to seriously address our arms control concerns, we must take the measures necessary for our defense whether or not they strictly adhere to SALT II.

Poorly focused, one-sided restraint is not real arms control. The big buildup some are predicting without SALT has been going on under SALT and continues. Our willingness to counter these Soviet violations will bring them back to the negotiating table and will enhance genuine, mutual restraint.

House Concurrent Resolution 350 seeks to place unacceptable, unilateral and dangerous constraints on the United States and gives the Soviets an unchecked advantage. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to stand up for America's defensive concerns and join me in voting against this resolution.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, June 18, 1986.

DEAR MEMBER: For nearly five years, as a framework for interim restraint while negotiations proceeded on real reductions, the President promised first not to undercut the flawed SALT II Treaty if the Soviets exercised comparable restraint, and later "to go the extra mile" in the face of clear and critical Soviet violations of the treaty. In view of Soviet failure to respond, the President has finally decided that it is no longer appropriate to base our force planning on the terms of the unratified and expired SALT II agreement which the Soviet Union continues to violate.

I write to urge you to give your full support to the President's decision on Interim Restraint and SALT, and I urge you to reject, as contrary both to our national security and to our negotiations in Geneva, the proposed House Resolution that would hold the President to the SALT sublimits conditional upon future Soviet behavior.

The President's decision comes at the end of a long and sometimes rancorous national debate on the merits of the SALT accords. It also follows upon serious and lengthy efforts on the U.S. government's part to bring the Soviet Union back into compliance with its arms control obligations—efforts to which the Soviet Union has offered no constructive response. These efforts have so far proved to be largely in vain.

Throughout this debate, all Americans have been united in at least one hope: that Soviet behavior would improve. Now both sides can agree perhaps on at least one fact: no such improvement has been seen.

I strongly believe the President's decision to be the best course both for our national security and for the future of arms control. However, there have been initial objections and questions, which I would like to answer here.

(1) Will ending SALT permit a large expansion of Soviet forces beyond that already envisioned under SALT? A careful look at the evidence suggests the answer is clearly no.

The "warm production lines" that critics say would produce more missiles in the absence of SALT limitations would in fact be used to produce the SS-18 replacement and the SS-X-24 already projected under SALT, and the SS-25 in violation of SALT II.

Even under SALT, the Soviets can increase their stock of total warheads from roughly 9,000 to 12,000 by 1990. Under SALT the Soviets are already expected to build over 700 new missiles by 1990. Without SALT further increases would be marginal at most.

With Soviet defense spending running at 15% to 17% of GNP, even these increases will likely butt up against resource constraints (e.g., skilled manpower and high-grade materials).

Current projections with SALT already take into account additional warheads on replacements to the SS-17 and SS-19. Many putative increases in warheads (e.g., putting 20+ warheads on the SS-18) predicted in the absence of SALT are improbable for military and technical reasons, especially in the short run.

With our without SALT, retirements of old systems will probably continue for reasons of military efficiency and effectiveness. (For example, some new SS-X-24 missiles will be deployed in existing silos.) The Soviets may choose to retire some older systems more slowly without SALT. But the relatively small number of older, less capable systems at issue here are a minor concern when set beside the vast increases in new Soviet weapons projected, once again, with or without SALT.

There is generally much less short-term flexibility in both nations' strategic planning than the critics' worse-than-worst-case projections suggest. And there is no guarantee, given the current Soviet compliance record, that the Soviets will not violate the treaty further when it becomes expedient to do so.

A central point that critics of the President's decision seem to be missing is this: the vast buildup of Soviet forces now predicted by some in the absence of SALT is already occurring under SALT. SALT is providing no better than an illusion of restraint. Ironically, many of the disturbing projections now cited to describe Soviet behavior without SALT were originally developed assuming SALT limits would stay in place. Closing our eyes to this situation only permits the Soviet Union to redefine what is acceptable behavior under SALT. This cannot be viewed as an effective restraint except upon ourselves and the confidence we have in Soviet compliance with future agreements.

(2) Are the violations of SALT II serious and clear-cut? They are.

In 1979, treaty defenders hailed the restraints on telemetry encoding and on the second new type of ICBM as central treaty provisions. So important was the telemetry provision that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved 15–0 an understanding to the Resolution of Ratification specifying that "any practice . . . including but not limited to the failure to transmit relevant telemetric information" which impeded verification would, if raised and not resolved in the Standing Consultative Commission, be grounds for the U.S. "to exercise all other available remedies, including but not limited to the right to withdraw from the Treaty."

Obviously, the telemetry provision was taken very seriously at the time: indeed, a major selling-point of SALT II was that it would permit us to know more about Soviet forces than we could without it; that is no longer true. Now this provision is said by some to be "peripheral." We cannot accept this.

By the same token, the SS-25 accounts for a major portion of the current Soviet ICBM buildup. Its throwweight is roughly twice that of the SS-13, well beyond the treaty-permitted 5%. These violations, in combination with the Soviet violation of the overall SNDV limit, are very clear and bear on what were originally understood to be central provisions of the Treaty.

(3) Does the Administration have a workable formula for encouraging mutual restraint and serious negotiations—an alternative to unilateral compliance with a treaty that the Soviets are violating? We do.

In addition to affirming that the United States will exercise "utmost restraint" in our force decisions, the President has pledged not to increase warheads and SNDVs above the Soviet levels. This is a serious pledge. By gearing our force decisions to the reality of the Soviet threat, we are providing real costs for a Soviet buildup and real rewards for Soviet reductions and restraint. We are also providing the Soviets with an incentive to get down to serious bargaining about real reductions in weapons.

On the other hand, to continue to observe unilaterally an unratified treaty that the Soviets are seriously contravening merely reinforces the dangerous idea that Soviet violations can and will be tolerated. Such a course would entail serious costs and risks of its own: it would countenance further Soviet violations and undercut the basis for future arms control agreements.

Congressional action in opposition to the President unfortunately cannot slow the Soviet buildup. Nor can it bring the Soviet Union into compliance with existing arms control treaties.

What Congress can do is remove from the President's hands a major incentive for restraint and serious bargaining by the Soviet side. It is our profound conviction that this will be the consequence of the Resolution now before the House.

Free and vigorous debate over public policy issues is a democracy's life-blood. But the moment eventually comes—especially in foreign policy—when a decision must at last be made, when democracy's chorus must speak firmly with one voice. Now is such a moment. It is critical in facing and negotiating with the Soviet Union that this nation be able to present a strong, united front. It is impossible that every detail of every policy satisfy every citizen. And in dealing with a foreign adversary, the time comes when we must set aside our long and bitter differences on this issue and stand together behind the President.

Sincerely,

KENNETH L. ADELMAN.

□ 1320

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. JEFFORDS].

Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution. I do not think that anyone here seriously wants anyone to be in noncompliance. The question is: How do we bring the Soviets into compliance? What will bring them there?

In my mind, the best way to do that is to focus the world's attention on their noncompliance and our compliance. By doing that we will, in my mind, because the Soviets are so much more concerned about world opinion than they perhaps are negotiating with us as to what their image is in regard to this issue.

Withdrawing our compliance with SALT II is like telling the world that the United States talks a good line about peace and arms control but is not really serious about it.

We run a serious risk, especially with the Third World countries and Europe, which the Soviets have eagerly been courting and want on their side on this issue. By abandoning SALT II, we are playing right into the Soviets' hands.

And let us face it, compliance with SALT II is more difficult for them, and has been more difficult for them, than it is for us.

In addition to that, their production lines are warm, and they are ready to produce. We are not in that situation.

So it seems to me on all sides of the issue that the best decision that we have to bring about compliance is to harp on their noncompliance and to continue to bring ourselves and keep ourselves in compliance.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I think that it is important to take a quick look at what has happened since we signed SALT II. The Soviets since 1979 have deployed two new ICBM's and one mod, the SS-19, and have deployed two new missiles, the 24 and the 25. They have deployed three new classes of ballistic-missile submarines, two new bombers, and what is more important than all of that is that the growth of their warheads has gone from 5,200 to 9,200.

When we talk about first-strike capability, which always seems to be a point of contention on this House floor, they have predominantly developed first-strike capability in the growth of these warheads, which have gone from 5,200 to 9,200.

In addition to developing 3 new types of ICBM's, 3 new classes of ballistic-missile submarines, 2 new bombers, and having the incredible warhead growth from 5,200 to 9,200, and having the capability even under SALT II to grow all the way to 12,000 to 14,000 warheads, they cheat. On top of all of this, they want to cheat.

Let us take a look at a couple of the violations. The SS-25: There are very, very few experts anywhere in the world who will argue that the SS-25 is not a clear violation of SALT II, that in fact the SS-25 is without question a new missile system.

Encryption: What does encryption mean? It means our ability to be able to determine what the Soviets are doing with our national technical means. When they block our ability to observe what they are doing, then we cannot tell the kind of systems that they are developing. Somebody argued that they could put another few warheads on the SS-18; because we limit it to 10 under the treaty, they could expand it to 13 or 14. If we cannot read their systems, we cannot even determine whether they are in fact violating just the 10-warhead limit in the SALT II Treaty.

The Krasnoyarsk radar: Everybody hears Gorbachev make a big deal about our SDI Program. The Krasnoyarsk radar is located in the middle of that country in clear violation of our SALT I agreement. There is not an expert that I know anywhere in the world who dismisses the fact that this is a clear violation and is designed to give them a nationwide ABM system.

So, you have all of this incredible Soviet growth, the capability to go from 9,200 warheads to 14,000 warheads under the provisions of SALT II, and on top of that they are building a new missile that violates the agreement, they are deploying radars that are a clear violation of SALT I, they are encrypting their signals so we cannot tell other things that they are doing to cheat, and on top of it, they have exceeded the overall strategic delivery vehicle limits of SALT II.

I understand when this resolution was initially drafted, it essentially said, "We'll pay attention to the treaty if they'll pay attention to the treaty within the numerical limits." But you see, that had to be changed. Why? Because the Soviets have exceeded the numerical limits under SALT II. They have gone from about 2,504 nuclear delivery vehicles to 2,520.

What we have here is a resolution that cannot even speak to the integrity of the overall treaty, because the Soviets have violated that. So we have to resort to sublimits, even though they violate the total number of nuclear delivery vehicles permitted under SALT II.

What does the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] want to do? He says that we will adhere to the treaty. What does the President want to do? We will abide by the treaty if the Soviets stop cheating. Even though this will not achieve a significant slowing of the arms race, we are still going to adhere to the treaty if the Soviets will stop cheating. And then, at the same time we will negotiate at Geneva on our START proposal, so that we can reduce the number of nuclear weapons.

To conclude: SALT II was designed to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. It has not done it. We need to have an arms control agreement that can be verified, that we can determine that the Soviets are not cheating, and that reduces the number of nuclear weapons. At least let us vote for the amendment of BILL BROOMFIELD, because it says that we will abide by SALT II, we will be fair, as long as the Soviets are, and if they are going to cheat, my goodness, what does that say about our ability to do anything in this world with our adversary?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY].

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of this resolution urging the President to abide by the SALT II limitations.

I recognize that we can't honor an arms control agreement that does not protect the security of our Nation. I understand that a misstep in negotiations can have dire consequences. I know that our dealings with the Soviet Union are made more difficult by bitter years of enmity and distrust. Yet, even accepting these facts, progress toward arms control in the past 6 years has been abysmally slow. Not one new arms agreement has been signed; none appears to be in the offing.

I agree the SALT Treaty is not a perfect treaty. It does not actually reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons or bar progress toward new and even more destructive weapons. But it does cap the numbers of nuclear weapons; it does limit the development of new types of nuclear weapons; it attempts to add a degree of certainty in our dealings with the Soviet Union.

Now, the administration proposes scrapping SALT II, arguing that the treaty is flawed and that the Soviets may have violated it. As Robert McNamara has pointed out, "Responding to Soviet violations by scrapping SALT is tantamount to reacting to an increase in the crime rate by abolishing the criminal code." That action would ensure more crime, not less. Scrapping SALT would ensure more missiles, not fewer.

The administration says SALT is not adequate—that it wants more ambitious arms reductions. I agree. But in the meantime, let's keep the controls we already have.

SALT, like any treaty, works two ways. Tossing away its limitations frees us to build weapons with which to threaten our enemies. But so too does it free them to build weapons with which to threaten us. We already have many times more weapons than we need to destroy each other, and perhaps all life on this planet. We add nothing to our security when we add to our nuclear stockpile; we detract from our security when we dispense with our treaties. I urge my colleagues to remember this, and to support this resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. COATS].

Mr. COATS. Mr. Chairman, there have been some fairly technical terms and arguments thrown about the floor today, but I think that when you boil this argument down to its most basic elements, the decision ought to be clear.

SALT II was negotiated in the late seventies, when it was pretty well understood that the United States was negotiating from a position of weakness in terms of military strength. Anybody involved in negotiating or bargaining knows that when you walk in the room from a position of weakness, usually you get taken to the cleaners, and I think in this instance we did.

For that reason SALT II was not ratified when it came before the U.S. Senate for ratification.

□ 1330

Nevertheless, the United States made a decision to abide by the terms of SALT II and we have done that for several years; however, in the face of growing evidence of cheating on the part of the Soviets and violations of the treaty that we did not even agree to, the President announced that at some point in the future he was going to withdraw his support for SALT II and abide by the terms of SALT II.

So what we have here is a situation where the Soviets are not honoring something they agreed to and the United States is honoring something they did not agree to and finally someone is calling the bluff. Someone is saying that enough is enough.

The point has been raised that it is in the best interests of both countries to honor this treaty. If it is in the best interests of both our countries, why are the Soviets violating the treaty?

Anybody involved in labor negotiations, anybody worth his salt in representing a union or representing management or negotiating on behalf of anyone else would not dare go back to their people and say, "Look, I'm asking you to ratify a contract that you did not agree to and on which the other guys are cheating." That is precisely what this resolution asks this House to do, ratify or abide by something that you did not agree when you have clear and unmistakable evidence that the other guys are cheating. I do not think that is a wise policy for us to follow and I would hope we would reject this resolution.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. STOKES].

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350.

Mr. Chairman, this is an important resolution. It expresses the sentiment of the House that the President should continue to adhere to SALT numerical limits that have benefited U.S. national security since 1979.

The President has used as a primary justification for backing out of the SALT II limits supposed Soviet violations of arms control agreements. Two of these cases—the encryption of ballistic missile telemetry and the SS-25 missile—involve areas of significant dispute among experts. They deserve a critical look by the Congress when placed in the context of justifying the President's decision to abandon SALT weapons limits.

In the case of the SS-25 missile, the administration charges that the Soviets are deploying a new ICBM prohibited by the SALT II Treaty. They also charge that the missile violates treaty restrictions on ICBM's whose reentry vehicle weight is less than 50 percent of the weight of the missile itself.

The Soviets have argued that the United States is miscalculating the throw-weight of the SS-25 and that it is not in violation of the treaty. They cite differences in the way the two nations compute throw-weight, and claim that in each of the two instances identified by the administration, they are in compliance with SALT II.

While the SS-25 is of concern, it seems premature to label it a clear violation as the President has done. There are very real ambiguities in the SALT provisions that govern new ICBM's, and experts outside the administration have noted that the treaty's definition of throw-weight leaves considerable room for interpretation.

Similar ambiguities exist with the issue of telemetry encryption. The treaty restricts the practice of encryption in situations where it impedes verification of compliance. The United States has charged that Soviet encryption practices are increasing and that they are interfering with our ability to verify the critical performance characteristics of Soviet missiles governed by SALT II.

The Soviets argue that they are not impeding United States verification, and that if the administration will designate the information it wants, the Soviets will provide it. The United States has refused, presumably to protect intelligence collection capabilities.

Increasing Soviet encryption practices are a serious intelligence concern, but their standing as a SALT II Treaty violation is less apparent. It does not take a seasoned international lawyer to recognize that there are inherent ambiguities in SALT II's provisions dealing with encryption.

Rather than a clear violation as the President suggests, what we may have here is a situation where treaty language is not as tight as it should have been, and the Soviets decided to take advantage of it. A resolution of the issue should take place in the Standing Consultative Commission, the designated body for resolving treaty disputes. Rather than tearing up the treaty, the administration ought to be trying to make it work.

Mr. Chairman, a careful examination of these compliance cases shows that we do indeed have some serious issues of concern. It also shows, however, that they involve areas of disagreement between the treaty parties that require extended and careful negotiation before public charges of noncompliance should be levied. The SCC served this purpose well in previous administrations. We should give it the mandate to work in this one as well.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues to support House Concurrent Resolution 350. The compliance issues identified by the President, while serious, do not justify a wholesale departure from an arms control process that has benefited overall U.S. security.

The President argues that he is abandoning SALT in order to seek dramatic future reductions in strategic nuclear forces. With no new arms control agreement on the horizon, the President's decision to dump the useful restraints provided by SALT II is hardly worth gamble.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, to conclude our debate on this side, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, this resolution is a very, very flawed document. If SALT was a flawed arms control treaty, House Concurrent Resolution 350 is a disaster.

There are three things that are terminal as far as I am concerned. The first is that the resolution misleads. It gives the Soviets credit for dismantling weapons systems it has not dismantled and it is so wrong. "Fourteen Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines," it claims; they have not dismantled 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines. They reconfigured them as attack or long-range cruise missile submarines.

My citation is page 30 of "Soviet Military Power," 1986.

Now, the wimpishness, if such a word exists; if it does not, I have just coined it—the wimpishness of paragraph 6—you fellows do not dare point a finger at the Soviets and say, "Hey, you violated the agreement!"

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. In good time, and I do have time, so I will get to the gentleman. I am looking forward to it.

Mr. AUCOIN. But on this point.

Mr. HYDE. Yes, at this point, but let me make my point and then the gentleman can attack it.

This resolution is so wimpish, that is the only word I can think to describe it, that it will not point the finger at the Soviet Union and say, "You violated the SALT Treaty."

It says "the Administration," those guys on Pennsylvania Avenue, those fellows over in the Pentagon contend that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT agreements.

Oh, what a courageous stand. How bold of you to stand up and say the Soviets—well, no, you would not quite

say that, you will say that the administraton says that. You did not have even that in the resolution until we had hearings and some of us said, "My God, don't you even advert to the fact that the Soviets have some obligations under SALT?"

So that is the second terminal flaw; but the thing that is irretrievable, the thing that makes this absolutely beyond redemption is the bottom line. You are asking the President, meaning this country, to adhere to the numerical sublimits as long as the Soviet Union does likewise and to adhere to the overall numerical limit; another afterthought, I might add, of the SALT agreement, as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

Are not qualitative restrictions important? Is not the fact that they have brought forward a new SS-25, which is in violation of the SALT II agreements, is that not significant?

If they bring on an SS-26 and an SS-27, that is not important according to this block buster of a resolution that is going to really give backbone to the arms control process?

This just says we are going to adhere to the numerical limits. Why bother? Why waste the paper? Numerical limits, not qualitative limits?

This is an embarrassment. I really mean it. It is an embarrassment.

I want to yield to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCoin], another defense intellectual from the great west coast.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the intellectual in the well yielding to me.

Mr. HYDE. The gentleman appreciates what? I did not hear him.

Mr. AuCOIN. I appreciate the intellectual in the well yielding to me.

Mr. HYDE. Oh, I reject that notion. I am not an intellectual. I am just a fellow from Chicago trying to understand you fellows and how you stand up to the Russians.

Mr. AuCOIN. The gentleman indicated earlier in his remarks that he would at the proper moment recognize me so I could attack him. I am not really rising to attack the gentleman.

Mr. HYDE. Oh, not me, no, I would not accuse the gentleman of attacking me.

Mr. AuCOIN. Or attacking his arguments.

Mr. HYDE. Just these ideas, the verities.

Mr. AuCOIN. I want to ask the gentleman if he really means that the Soviets, really means it when he said that the Soviets did not dismantle the requisite number of submarines? Is it not true that they dismantled 13 submarines? Has not the gentleman seen the photographs of the dismantling, and was not one reconfigured to comply with SALT II? Is that not the truth? Why does the gentleman not state the facts?

Mr. HYDE. Are we all through now?

Mr. AuCOIN. I am through.

Mr. HYDE. Can we pause for a breath?

Mr. AuCOIN. Yes.

Mr. HYDE. Does the gentleman not think that it would have been intellectually honest to say in here that 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile carrying submarines, some have been reconfigured as attack or long-range missile cruise submarines?

Mr. AuCOIN. One of them.

Mr. HYDE. Well, "some" is the information I have, and it is at page 30 of the Soviet military power book put out by the Pentagon.

Mr. AuCOIN. The gentleman would shred the entire SALT Treaty.

Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Certainly.

Mr. AuCOIN. The gentleman would shred the entire SALT Treaty over a minuscule point of that kind?

Mr. HYDE. The SS-25 is not a minuscule point.

Mr. AuCOIN. Even reconfiguration along with the dismantling conforms with SALT II, and the gentleman knows it.

Mr. HYDE. Well, now, if the gentleman will yield back for a moment, the SS-25 is not a minuscule point and if the gentleman thinks it is, then we are talking on two different planets.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, it is interesting to note, and I respect the knowledge of the gentleman from Oregon in defense, but I remember during the MX debate the gentleman was the strongest opponent of first-strike weapons.

What have the Soviets done? They have expanded the number of warheads that they have from 5,200 to 9,200. And do you know where they put those warheads? On first-strike weapons. They put those warheads on weapons that pose the greatest threat to this country and cause the greatest amount of instability.

Now, we can also talk about what they have done with submarines, because they have deployed three new ballistic missile submarines; but first-strike weapons are what is most dangerous and they have 4,000 new warheads on first-strike weapons with three new systems. I must tell the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], they can go to 14,000, that is an additional 5,000 first-strike weapons that the Soviets can go to under this treaty, and they are violating SALT II on top of it.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Seiberling].

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution.

The administration's announcement that it no longer intends to comply with the SALT II limitations on nuclear weapons has been handled in such a confusing manner that neither the reasons behind it nor the exact nature of the administration's position is clear. However, one thing is clear: If the administration maintains its position and no new arms control agreement is worked out in the very near future, the result will be a disaster for the national security of the American people.

The pretext for President Reagan's announcement that the United States intends to violate the SALT II limitations later this year was, in the President's words, that the Soviets have followed "a general pattern of * * * noncompliance with major arms-control commitments." Yet according to many of the experts, this charge is simply untrue. Nevertheless, the speakers on the other side continue to repeat this charge.

In an article printed in the Akron Beacon Journal of June 1, 1986, James McCartney, senior Washington correspondent for Knight-Ridder Newspapers, quotes the principal negotiator of the SALT II Treaty, Mr. Paul Warnke, as saying President Reagan's charge is not even plausible. Mr. Warnke said, "The Soviets have stuck by the central elements of SALT II." He went on to say that while there are legitimate questions about some of the tangential aspects of the treaty—matters that he said are on the periphery, its most important aspects, which involve numerical limits on weapons, have been faithfully observed. Mr. McCartney points out that other experts share this view. For example, he quotes a lengthy study by the Arms Control Association which observed that the administration has sent three reports to Congress on Soviet violations but that "none of these reports have noted that the Soviet Union has generally adhered to the provisions of the SALT treaties on offensive weaponry or that the Soviet Union has taken numerous actions since 1972 to remain in compliance with those treaties." Among Soviet actions the administration failed to mention in its reports were the removal of: 1,077 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 233 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 13 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines.

In an article by Edwin M. Yoder, Jr., in the Washington Post of June 8, Mr. Yoder refers to the declared excuse for the breakout of SALT II as a "remarkably hackneyed one." Mr. Yoder notes that "even if the violations are substantial, and resistant to the usual consultative procedures, they need balancing against the treaty provisions

that are observed." Mr. Yoder goes on to point out that the SALT limits have worked and still are working to the advantage of the United States and to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. Specifically, he says:

Those limits are still working. SALT II sets missile ceilings that the United States has been able to build up to, while the Soviets were forced to build down to them. The 'counting rules' make the Soviet arsenal easier to verify. And the limitation on the numbers of missiles that can be "MIRVed" (armed with multiple warheads) is advantageous, as is the limitation of "MIRVed" missiles to 10 warheads. (U.S. experts believe the Soviet monster missiles are capable of carrying more than 10. That's part of what the throw-weight debate has been about.)

In another article in the same issue of the Washington Post, David Ignatius, an editor of the Post, sets forth the Government's own statistics, supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, that show that with a roughly equal military budget the Soviets have been able to produce much more military hardware than the United States.

Mr. Ignatius also quotes from a study prepared by our colleague, LES ASPIN, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, that indicates that because the Soviets have more production lines in operation, the Soviet strategic forces could grow by 65 percent by 1989, compared to only 45-percent growth by the United States, if SALT is scuttled. Mr. ASPIN notes also that the SALT Treaty forces the Soviets to retire more than twice as many missile launchers as the United States, something they would not have to do if the treaty is no longer followed.

Mr. Chairman, it seems clear that the answer to the question of whether the United States would be more secure with the SALT limitations or without them, is an unambiguous "no."

The text of the three articles referred to follows these remarks:

SOVIET ARMS-CONTROL "VIOLATIONS" MAY BE IMAGINARY

(By James McCartney)

WASHINGTON.—In announcing that the United States intends to violate the 1979 SALT II treaty later this year, President Reagan accused the Soviets of "a general pattern of . . . non-compliance with major arms-control commitments."

He cited Soviet treaty violations, in fact, as the single most significant factor in his decision to exceed treaty weapons limitations by continuing to deploy air-launched cruise missiles on B-52 bombers.

But there is substantial question about the degree of Soviet "violations."

Many arms-control specialists, including former American negotiators, do not believe that the Soviets have committed significant violations.

The principal negotiator of the SALT II treaty, for example, Paul Warnke, said after Reagan's announcement: "I don't think there is a plausible question about it. The Soviets have stuck by the central elements of SALT II."

He said there are legitimate questions about some of the "tangential" aspects of the treaty—matters that he said are on the "periphery"—but that its most important aspects, which involve numerical limits on weapons, have been faithfully observed.

Warnke is not alone in this view.

Gloria Duffy, director of the Project on Compliance and the Future of Arms Control at Stanford University, said she agrees.

According to Ms. Duffy it would probably not be an exaggeration to say that most arms-control specialists outside the administration believe the Soviets have been in substantial compliance.

How, then, to explain the administration's tough charges?

Not long ago, the privately supported Arms Control Association, which lists many former negotiators among its members, published a 68-page study of issues involved in efforts to preserve SALT II. The study examined the compliance issue in detail.

It noted that both countries had accused each other of treaty violations and made this summary of its findings:

"None of these charges are clear-cut, and all relate to complex treaty provisions that are subject to differing interpretations. While these problems should be vigorously pursued to maintain the integrity of the treaty, they cannot be resolved by public accusations that only harden positions. . . ."

The Arms Control Association study observed that the administration has sent three exports to Congress on Soviet violations, but that "none of these reports have noted that the Soviet Union has generally adhered to the provisions of the SALT treaties on offensive weaponry or that the Soviet Union has taken numerous actions since 1972 to remain in compliance with those treaties."

Among Soviet actions the administration failed to mention in its reports were the removal of:

1,007 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

233 submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

13 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines.

The two most significant areas of possible Soviet violations of the SALT II treaty involve the deployment of a new missile, called the SS-25, in a category supposedly forbidden, and what is called the "encryption of telemetry"—an electronic technique for monitoring missile test flights.

The Soviets deny violations.

Warnke, the treaty's American negotiator, says the issues are "debatable" because of some vague treaty wording, but that in any case the alleged violations do not involve the heart of the treaty—its numerical limitations.

Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms Control Association, who was both a SALT II negotiator and a Reagan administration arms-control negotiator, examined the administration's charges and made this observation:

"The administration has a political if not legal responsibility to establish beyond a resonable doubt the validity of its accusations . . . . The administration's case is not convincing."

A DIPLOMATIC BLUNDER

(By Edwin M. Yoder Jr.)

The Reagan administration's capacity for borrowing nuclear trouble has been exercised once again in the threat to dispense later this year with the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty.

The timing is horrible—as if some gremlins in Caspar Weinberger's shop could hardly bear the sight of the Russians stewing on the nuclear griddle after Chernobyl and had jumped to seize the spotlight for us.

Every NATO ally is alarmed and annoyed. Yet with truly sublime obtuseness, Secretary of State George Shultz dismisses this fraternal unrest as having more to do with "imagery" than with "content."

Depending on what one means by "imagery," Shultz's distinction falls somewhere between absurd and untenable. Nuclear policy, especially in matters relating to deterrence, is 80 percent a question of impressions—or "imagery," if you perfer. Despite the occasional burst of madcap talk about the feasibility of successful nuclear war, nuclear weapons exist only to prevent their own use. In that connection, "imagery" is all-important.

For Europeans, the primary value of the SALT II treaty likewise has less to do with the esoteric technical limits it imposes than with what it symbolizes. In European eyes, arms control agreements betoken that the United States and the Soviet Union, with their globe-busting arsenals, can observe modest regimes of restraint.

The untimely U.S. threat to renounce the SALT II limits seems to be the byproduct of a struggle in the administration. After strenous debate, President Reagan recently decided to observe the limits by scrapping two old nuclear submarines as the latest Trident begins seatrials. The anti-arms-control faction wanted the two Poseidons mothballed. It would appear that they extracted a presidental vow that this would be the last gesture of self-restraint—that the United States will jump the fence next December when bombers armed with new cruise missiles will enter the fleet and push total U.S. "launchers" through the SALT ceilings.

The declared excuse for a breakout, however, is a remarkably hackneyed one—Soviet "violations" of SALT II of which Perle, Weinberger & Co. have been complaining for years. One compliance issue is a Soviet missile that we call the SS-25. We claim that it is a second new heavy missile, violating SALT restraints. The Russians insist it's a remodeled SS-13.

But even if the violations are substantial, and resistant to the usual consultative procedures, they need balancing against the treaty provisions that are observed.

In the 1980 campaign, Reagan denounced SALT II as "fatally flawed." But by May 1982, he had been persuaded that it included limits of genuine value to the United States—even in the view of hard-headed military and intelligence professionals.

Those limits are still working. SALT II sets missile ceilings that the United States has been able to build up to, while the Soviets were forced to build down to them. The "counting rules" makes the Soviet arsenal easier to verify. And the limitation on the numbers of missiles that can be "MIRVed" (armed with multiple warheads) is advantageous, as is the limitation of "MIRVed" missiles to 10 warheads. (U.S. experts believe the Soviet monster missiles are capable of carrying more than 10. That's part of what the throw-weight debate has been about.)

In the event of a breakout from the SALT II limits, the Russians could more easily and quickly augment their missile-strike power. Even if this merely stacked redundancy upon redundancy, in the usual Soviet fash-

ion, it would not be reassuring to those who gauge nuclear dangers in quantitative terms.

But again, the greater danger is political. The embers of unilateralism in Europe are there to be fanned by abrupt and ill-considered changes of U.S. policy. European discontent could express itself in jeopardy to the strongly pro-NATO governments in Britain and West Germany, both of which face elections next year.

Thus the "imagery" that Shultz dismisses is terribly important. We can revoke this serious dipomatic blunder now, or pay the price for it later.

[From The Washington Post, June 8, 1986]

WITHOUT SALT, THE RACE IS ON—AND THE SOVIET UNION LOOKS LIKE THE WINNER, GOING AWAY

(By David Ignatius)

Who will fare best in a world without the constraints of the SALT II treaty? Will the United States be able to build weapons more quickly and efficiently than the Soviet Union? Or will we be running free in an arms race that we may lose?

President Reagan apparently is convinced that America can win this race and achieve greater security without SALT and its limits. Thus his surprise announcement two weeks ago that the U.S. will no longer feel bound by the "standards contained in the SALT structure" and will instead respond to the "threat posed by Soviet strategic forces."

A gloomier view of our prospects in the arms race emerges from statistics gathered by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. This data, summarized in the accompanying tables, shows that with a roughly equal military budget, the Soviets have been able to produce much more military hardware than the United States.

Moscow, in other words, is likely to get more bang for the buck in the arms race that many analysts predict will follow abandonment of SALT II.

This military analysis of life after SALT offers an alternative to the moralizing, pro and con, that tends to dominate the arms-control debate. And it helps answer the one question of overriding importance in the SALT debate. Will the United States be more secure with the treaty, or without it?

Consider the CIA and DIA data, which was presented three months ago in testimony to the Joint Economic Committee. The statistics show that with slightly greater defense spending from 1974 to 1985 the Soviets were able to produce a vastly larger volume of weapons.

The adjourning table marked "Output" documents this startling gap between U.S. and Soviet arms production. From 1974 to 1985, the Soviets produced more than three times as many strategic missiles; nearly 10 times as many surface-to-air missiles; 50 times as many bombers; nearly twice as many fighters; more than three times as many helicopters; more than twice as many submarines; three times as many tanks, and 10 times as many artillery pieces.

There are many reasons for this disparity: Pentagon mismanagement, congressional meddling, the military's enthusiasm for "gold-plated" state-of-the art weapons that can only be purchased in small quantities, and the Soviet push during the 1970s to match U.S. force levels.

But the reasons for the gap matter less than the fact that it exists—and may get worse in a post-SALT era. That's because the superpower tensions that drive Soviet weapons spending may lead a skittish U.S. Congress to cut our defense budget in an effort to slow the arms race. There are already signs that President's Reagan's decision to abandon SALT may have precisely that effect. Indeed, only days after his announcement that the U.S. wouldn't feel bound any longer by SALT limits, Reagan was appealing to Congress not to cut spending for the nation's nuclear forces.

OUTPUT—U.S. & SOVIET PROCUREMENT OF MAJOR WEAPONS SYSTEMS, 1974–85 [1]

System	U.S	U.S.S.R.
ICBM's & SLBM's	1,050	3,500
Surface-to-Air missiles [2]	11,700	105,000
Long & Intermediate range bombers	8	400
Fighters	4,050	7,800
Helicopters	2,050	6,500
Submarines	44	110
Major surface combatants	98	90
Tanks	8,400	27,000
Field artillery	2,200	22,000

[1] These numbers represent gross additions to weapons inventories and do not reflect retirements because of obsolescence or SALT restraints.
[2] Does not include naval or portable SAMs.

THE FUTURE—SOVIET PROCUREMENT OF SELECTED WEAPON CLASSES

Weapon class	Estimated 1981–85	Possible 1986–90
ICBM's & SLBM's	800	[1] 700
Submarines	40	50
Tanks	12,500	18,000
Fighter Aircraft	2,400	[1] 2,000
Helicopters	2,500	[1] 2,100
Strategic Bombers	200	210

[1] Although projections suggest lower overall numbers in these categories, the missiles fighters, and helicopters the Soviets will procure during 1986–90 are more complex, capable, and costly than those purchased during 1981–85

Source. CIA & DIA.

The CIA and DIA data make clear that the Soviets are well-positioned for the new arms race. "Most Soviet weapons expected to be delivered to the Soviet forces through 1990 will be manufactured in plants already built and operating," the agencies said in their congressional testimony.

The future imbalance in U.S. and Soviet military procurement is suggested by the accompanying table labelled "The Future," which was prepared by the CIA and DIA before the administration announced its decision to abandon the SALT limits. The table projected that over the next five years, the Soviets would outproduce their already high procurement levels of the past five years in submarines, tanks and strategic bombers. They would produce only slightly fewer strategic missiles, fighters and helicopters, the intelligence agencies noted.

The picture becomes even gloomier when you assumed that both sides have abandoned SALT entirely. A report prepared last March by Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, does just that.

Intelligence data cited by Aspin show that, in his words, "the Soviets have two inherent advantages that would allow them to spurt forward with force increases faster than we if SALT were undercut."

These Soviet advantages include greater "throw-weight" for their missiles, which would allow them to carry more warheads with their existing arsenal of rockets, and "hot production lines" for strategic weapons. The Soviets, for example, are already producing eight major new strategic systems—two new ICBMs, two new strategic bombers, two new missile-carrying submarines and two new missiles for these subs. The U.S., in contrast, has only three such "hot production lines."

Aspin estimates that because of the production-line disparity alone, Soviet strategic forces could grow by 65 percent by 1989, compared to only 45 percent growth for the U.S., if SALT is scuttled.

The post-SALT danger to the U.S. won't come just from the new weapons the Soviets can build, but from the older ones they don't have to retire. Aspin notes that continued observance of the SALT treaty would force the Soviets to retire more than twice as many missile launchers as the U.S.

Military comparisons like these help explain why the Joint Chiefs of Staff, until recently, were skeptical—on military grounds—about the wisdom of abandoning the SALT II restraints.

The danger for the Reagan administration is that in abandoning SALT II, it could get the worst of all possible outcomes. The administration's announcement could frighten the Congress into cutting U.S. strategic programs; and it could frighten the Kremlin into stepping up Soviet arms spending. In such a world, even the Reaganites might pine for the good old days of SALT.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentleman from Ohio [Mr. PEASE].

Mr. PEASE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the resolution before us to continue U.S. compliance with the unratified SALT II Treaty.

Some may argue that the SALT II compliance question is none of Congress' business. Under the U.S. Constitution, the conduct of foreign policy is clearly the responsibility of the President, and he is Commander in Chief of the armed services.

Respectful of the President's constitutional prerogatives, most of us in Congress still would assert our right to participate in the SALT II compliance debate.

Terminating U.S. compliance would raise the gravest questions about possible nuclear war and the survival of our Nation and, indeed, the world. That alone justifies congressional participation in the debate.

Beyond that elemental, cosmic question, there are very practical budget considerations of the sort Congress must wrestle with constantly. This very month, a conference committee is searching for a compromise on the Federal budget for fiscal year 1987.

On the matter of defense spending, there is a $35 billion difference between what President Reagan wants to spend on defense next year and what the House of Representatives is inclined to allow him to spend. If the Gramm-Rudman law kicks in next October, defense spending is likely to be $50 billion below what President Reagan feels is necessary.

An end to U.S. compliance with SALT II nuclear weapon limitations would almost surely set off an unrestrained nuclear arms race between

the United States and the Soviet Union.

In turn, the requirement for U.S. military spending would grow rapidly as each side added missile launchers and nuclear warheads to its arsenal. The Pentagon would constantly warn of the dangers of the United States falling behind in this deadly race.

But where would the money come from?

From further cuts in domestic programs? The American public seems clearly to oppose further cuts in most domestic programs. Still, some cuts would undoubtedly have to be made.

From new taxes? Americans plainly don't want higher taxes.

By borrowing the money and again creating $200 billion-plus deficits? That would be the easy, but wrong, way out.

I am again reminded of President Dwight Eisenhower's eloquent statement that—

> Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.

Our existing nuclear arsenal is already large enough to destroy the world many times over. The same is true of the Soviet Union's arsenal. If the United States and the U.S.S.R. discard the nuclear arms limits imposed by SALT II, every new missile launcher and warhead built beyond the former limits will constitute a theft from domestic programs, from our hopes for a balanced Federal budget, from our desires to avoid higher taxes.

And a theft, I might add, from our aspirations for a safe and sane world.

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, before we can decide upon the proper response to treaty compliance problems, we should think about why the Soviets may be engaging in these activities and about what political and military risks they present to the West. What is the military significance of confirmed and suspected noncompliance, and can we discern a broad military strategy into which all these pieces fit? What are the less tangible political purposes and effects? Are the Soviets deliberately manipulating the arms control process in a cynical way? Should we alter our expectations about the future contribution of arms control or approach arms in a different way? Our goal must be to deny intended Soviet gains and maintain western security. Only after addressing these issues, therefore, can we determine the correct or "proportionate" response.

Yet far from examining these questions in a serious and objective manner, most individuals have cavalierly dismissed the military significance of possible and proven violations without offering a plausible Soviet motivation for breaking treaties.

For example, let us consider the SS–25 missile issue. Some people have falsely claimed that there is uncertainty over whether this missile is an illegal "new" missile under SALT II. But even if for purposes of argument we assume it is not, the SS–25 is still a violation, because it is incompatible with separate clauses governing the characteristics of permitted "modernizations." In short, you can't get away from the fact that it's a violation, one way or another. Both the clauses in question are designed to limit the "throw-weight," or payload-carrying capacity, of future missiles.

This continues a long history of Soviet attempts to expand the throw-weight advantages it enjoys over the United States, regardless of treaty intent. In the early 1970's, a primary United States motivation for seeking a SALT I Treaty was to limit the size and payload capability of Soviet missiles. The Soviets had deployed giant SS–18's posing a first strike capability against United States targets, and the United States sought to ban deployment of additional large missiles. United States negotiators swore they had succeeded in this endeavor, but when the Soviets immediately began testing the SS–19, United States officials backed down from their previous assurances to Congress that such an action would be a violation; they said that, in retrospect, the Soviets had successfully blocked the needed precision in the treaty language and negotiating record. For this and other reasons, SALT II was justified as a means to "rectify the inequities of SALT I." During SALT II, the United States eventually accepted the SS–19 as a fait accompli and codified the large Soviet throw-weight advantage as well. But they sought to prevent further expansion of that advantage by insisting, despite Soviet objections, on very strict and detailed rules governing characteristics of new and modernized missiles. These were considered a major triumph of U.S. diplomacy and a primary reason why SALT II was a much better treaty than SALT I. It is those rules which the Soviets now are violating. And we are now beginning the cycle all over again, since equal and strict limitations on throw-weight have from the outset been central to the Reagan administration's proposals for a START agreement.

Why do many consider throw-weight to be the most important tangible measure of an arms balance? Why do the Soviets persist in their drive for throw-weight advantages? Throw-weight is critical to how many warheads a missile can carry and how large these warheads may be. Thus it is a major determinant of the size and character of the threat; a dangerous inequity can develop even if the number of launchers or missiles or even warheads are equal, if one side has much more powerful missiles capable of carrying more numerous or larger warheads. Equally important, excess or unused throw-weight gives a nation the ability to "sneak out" or suddenly and overtly "break out" of treaty limits on warheads.

Indeed, it is ironic that critics questioning the significance of the SS–25 violation have nontheless indirectly trumpeted the importance of throw-weight limitations. They have done so by arguing that the United States dare not renounce SALT II in response to Soviet violations, because the Soviets could rapidly reply by adding warheads to the SS–18 missiles, the very missile which 15 years ago sparked the first United States attempts to limit throw-weight. The irony, in terms of both history and logic, is supreme. And on its own terms this is an amazing argument—the contention that the United States should not respond strongly to the SS–25 violation because if it does so, they have positioned themselves quickly to achieve superiority, in part by adding warheads illegal under SALT II. In other words, the Soviets have maneuvered us into indefinite vulnerability to blackmail. We must be careful, because if we offend the bully by fighting back, the bully will threaten us with murder, not just with a beating.

As the critics' own arguments demonstrate, this persistent Soviet drive for throw-weight advantages is very worrisome indeed. We have good cause to wonder if arms limitations are being used to deceive the United States while the Soviets amass disproportionate offensive advantages. The SS–25 violation is significant in itself because it might allow the Soviets to put more than one warhead on the highly survivable missile. But it is even more ominous as a portent of other possible violations. Many new Soviet missiles, including replacements for their largest SS–18's and SS–19's, are in development. The Soviets added throw-weight to the mobile SS–25 even though they could pay a penalty in terms of speed and maneuverability. Such penalties would not apply to silo-based missiles. Therefore, if, as it appears, the Soviet goal is to amass still further throw-weight advantages, some of the missiles on which they might most logically do so have yet to be flight tested.

Other problems with SALT II reinforce these worries. Soviet encryption practices, insofar as they deny knowledge about a missile's capabilities and the warheads it carries, enhance the U.S.S.R.'s ability to violate various limitations undetected, and in particular to disguise and exploit illegal throw-weight capability. Two other violations of SALT I and II obligations also relate to concealment and deception regarding the SS–25. Concealment of test preparation activity also may degrade U.S. ability to collect information on the missile. Soviet deployment of SS–25 ICBM's at sites where silo-based ICBM's previously were deployed could degrade our ability to count Soviet missile deployments; this violation therefore could further enhance the possibilities for cheating which have been presented by the introduction of mobile missiles.

The Soviet drive for throw-weight advantages in the offensive missile area is matched by the finding that they "may be" preparing "a base for territorial defense," thereby violating the fundamental raison d'etre of the 1972 ABM Treaty. The importance of the Krasnoyarsk radar and five others like it is that they may be intended to back up the rapidly deployable, conventional ABM system which the Soviets have been perfecting for decades. In addition, or as an alternative to an overt or covert ABM deployment, the Soviets may be able to use thousands of deployed surface-to-air missiles [SAM's], normally used against aircraft, against missiles as well. We cannot be sure whether SAM's have been illegally tested in this role over the years since the ABM Treaty was signed in 1972. Nor are we certain whether conventional ABM components violate SALT in that they are "mobile;" But we do know that clause was intended partially to

prevent a capability to "break out" the treaty quickly, and that the Soviets now might be able to field an ABM much more rapidly than they could before, whether or not lawyers consider these new components demonstrably "mobile." Taken together, these developments are judged to indicate that the Soviets may be preparing rapidly to deploy an ABM defense of its territory.

If the Soviets do so, or even if they can credibly threaten to do so, the ABM Treaty may have delivered the coup de grace to the balance of power instead of enhancing Western security. Given Soviet advantages and breakout capability on the offensive side, a credible unilateral threat on the defensive side could be the decisive tilt in the balance of power which would deflate allied resistance to Soviet demands for additional privileges. If the timid even now arguing that we can do little about blatant Soviet violations because they have acquired too many offensive advantages, what will they be saying if the Soviets in addition threaten quickly to deploy an ABM, or if we discover that they have already begun to do so?

The potential impact of Soviet biological weapons [BW] violations has also been largely ignored. For as serious as the SALT and ABM problems are, they may pale in comparison to these. Genetic engineering may allow development of weapons with "tailor made" effects so the Soviets, for example, might destroy or temporarily incapacitate the enemy without impeding their own ability subsequently to occupy the area and seize the economy intact. Moreover, BW might be used selectively without betraying the identity of the perpetrator and even without the victims' knowledge that they are under attack rather than afflicted with some strange new naturally occurring disease. These weapons, therefore, unlike nuclear weapons, may be eminently usable. The potential implications are horrifying. Perhaps precisely because no methods are readily conceived to deter the use of such weapons or to cope with their potential effects, we have largely closed our eyes to this problem. But to continue this way could mean the undoing of our civilization. And again we must stand back to take stock of arms control: What kind of motives attend the illegal development of such weapons? What kind of nation are we dealing with, and how can we prudently manage United States-Soviet relations?

Given these facts and these potential threats, how should the United States respond? Many Members of Congress have a particular definition of what is "proportionate": The Soviets develop the SS–25, so we develop the Midgetman; the Soviets encrypt their telemetry so we encrypt ours. Normally they draw the line at SDI, however, criticizing even a futuristic United States program although the Soviets are developing an option to deploy in the near term. "Proportionate response" is assumed to mean a delayed tit-for-tat, clause-by-clause reaction, a reaction focusing on selected proven violations but disregarding other known violations as well as the many activities falling under the category of possible but unproven violations. Critics of the President's decision also say the United States should not renounce violated treaties. The allies would revolt, weakening the West politically, and a spiralling arms race would develop, a race which we will lose because the Soviets have positioned themselves so they can quickly deploy many more weapons than we. Above all, the critics say, the United States should not endanger prospects for the next summit, because that summit might produce our ultimate response—another arms control agreement, one without "loopholes," one truly delivering salvation.

In reply, I would ask them to weigh several general considerations as they debate this issue:

Is it true that the Soviets are able greatly to outproduce the United States in strategic offensive weaponry? If so, is such a surge in deployment required according to their targetting doctrine and warfighting strategy? In these terms, would it be worth the economic sacrifices involved?

If we are now in a position such that the Soviets can blackmail us into ignoring treaty violations because they have developed an offensive and even a defensive breakout capability, was it arms control that got us into this mess? If so, what does that say about the past worth and future prospects of arms control? If we decide to react only minimally to possible and proven violations, will our relative power position likely deteriorate more in the future? How do we plan to improve that position?

What will be the worldwide political effects of an implicit U.S. decision that no effective and safe response is available to us? What will be the effect on our bargaining position in ongoing arms control talks? What will be the effect on the worldwide perception of the balance of power and of general United States willingness to stand up to the Soviets?

Should we respond when we confront growing military risks but we do not have the evidence definitively to prove a violation, or when some argue that treaty language may present a technical "loophole" for the Soviets? Should the existence and nature of a U.S. response be predicated primarily on legal and symbolic criteria—definitive proof of a violation under U.S. court standards, reaction largely for the sake of "doing something"—or on the military risks which such developments present for us? Can we legitimately promise future treaties without "loopholes?"

Will U.S. risks be well managed and future violations deterred if we engage in strickly tit-for-tat responses? Must "restorative" measures be accompanied by "punitive" measures so that the Soviets are worse off after they have violated treaties than they would have been if they had kept them? How does it alleviate the worsening verification problem; for example, if we retaliate by encrypting U.S. telemetry when we have nothing to hide and the information on U.S. missile characteristics probably will be published eventually anyway?

Does it destroy our credibility with the Soviets and others if we become ever more determined to negotiate additional arms control agreements after the Soviets engage in increasingly serious and blatant violations of existing accords?

These are the issues the United States faces—these are the issues which should evoke the institutional energies of Congress. For my part, I am greatly relieved that at long last there is a debate on the response problem; it is now my hope that it proceed soberly and judiciously. Response policy probably is one of the most serious issues this Congress will ever face. It should not be exploited for political purposes. Our duty is to ascertain the facts and discuss their meaning, not to engage in baseless charges and irresponsible election-year politics. Our duty is to educate our constituents and elicit their reaction, not to play on their fears and ignorance. May we discharge these obligations well.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, President Reagan's decision to repudiate the limits on nuclear weapons contained in the SALT agreements does not further the cause of arms control.

On this, the most important issue of our time, the Congress has a responsibility to make its position clear. House Concurrent Resolution 350 expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should continue to adhere to the numerical limitations contained in the SALT agreements, as long as the Soviets do likewise. That is a position with which I believe most Americans agree, and it is a position which I support.

The history of the world since 1945 offers convincing evidence that the United States and the Soviet Union are much better at producing nuclear arms, than at producing agreements to control nuclear arms. Against that bleak landscape of nonaccomplishment stand the SALT agreements. As imperfect as they are, they represent the only meaningful limits on nuclear weapons that we have. In my judgment, a decision by the United States to no longer be bound by those limits could only be justified if Soviet SALT violations were so serious as to threaten our security, or if it were no longer in our interest to observe the SALT ceilings. Neither of those justifications exist. There have been Soviet violations and they must not be excused.

However, we have the ability to respond in kind to those violations without disturbing the central element of SALT, the limits on weapons. Those limits work to our advantage. They have allowed us to maintain a numerical advantage over the Soviets in strategic weapons, and they have permitted us to modernize our forces without having those improvements negated by an unrestrained Soviet nulcear buildup. Repudiating the SALT agreements will inevitably result in an acceleration of the nuclear arms race, a situation that will clearly favor the Soviets. It is hard to see how our security would be enhanced by trying to match an expanded Soviet warhead construction program, and it will certainly not be enhanced when we have to address the consequences of that program.

I agree with the President that arms reduction must be our ultimate goal. But, is it more likely that we will get an agreement to reduce arms from the restricted ceilings provided by SALT, or the unrestricted ceilings that would exist in an environment without SALT? It seems clear to me that once we develop the mind-set of escalation that will result if SALT is repudiated, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate arms reduction. SALT is not, hopefully, our last arms control agreement, but it provides a logical point of departure for

achieving the next one. We can do better than SALT, but not by turning our backs on it.

I hope that the passage of House Concurrent Resolution 350 will cause the administration to rethink its stand on SALT and to redouble its efforts in Geneva. The American people want progress on arms control, not the regression that would be signaled by a repudiation of SALT.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, it is clear that numerous officials in this administration have, since 1981, been engaged in a calculated campaign to undermine the arms control process and dismantle the existing arms control regime. Mr. Perle, Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Ikle, and others have never valued arms control in any form. They have worked unceasingly to persuade the public and the President to abandon the process of negotiations with the Soviets, and to race ahead with new weapons deployments in an effort to establish an illusory nuclear superiority. The decision to scrap SALT II is a triumph for these men.

The tactics used have been shrewd and insidious. This faction of arms control opponents has known that the most effective means of poisoning the arms control process is to paint the Soviets as being determined and consistent cheaters who cannot be trusted in any way. No one likes a cheater. Indeed, there can hardly be a more damning aspersion. With this fully in mind, Mr. Perle and his cohorts have created a constant flow of accusations that the Soviets have cheated on every treaty they have ever signed.

But nearly all the charges leveled against the Soviets have been groundless. Many have been completely unsubstantiated and based on misleading information. Others have rested on ambiguous or disputed treaty provisions, and simply cannot be treated as smoking gun examples of Soviet duplicity. As officials of the intelligence communities have confirmed, the Soviets have, by and large, honored the bulk of their treaty obligations. As others in this debate have explained, the Soviets have taken extensive actions to remain in compliance with existing treaties.

In the few areas where disputes about treaty violations persist, it seems entirely within reach to find solutions to such activities. But rather than trying to resolve these issues through private diplomacy, the administration has gone public with this information in an attempt to weaken popular support for the entire arms control process.

It appears that the last thing some officials in this administration want is for the Soviets to actually stop the actions which are publicized as treaty violations. This is the only explanation for why the administration has failed to make proper use of the Standing Consultative Commission [SCC].

The SCC was established in 1972 as the forum for resolving disputes over treaty compliance. It meets privately, twice a year, and has successfully worked out many cases of alleged treaty violations. According to a 1982 State Department booklet, in every case which the United States has raised within the SCC, "the Soviet activity in question has either ceased or additional information has allayed U.S. concern."

But the administration has simply failed in recent years, to use the SCC in an attempt to resolve compliance disputes. The current Commissioner of the SCC, Richard Ellis, has been discouraged by the administration from attempting to resolve cases such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, Soviet encryption, and the SS-25—the three charges being used to label the Soviets as cheaters.

The outstanding cases where the Soviets have not clearly conformed with existing arms control treaties have served a vital purpose for Mr. Perle, Mr. Weinberger, and others of their ilk. These cases are absolutely essential to their campaign against arms control in general, and against the SALT II and ABM treaties in particular.

The administration's decision to scrap SALT shows that the views of this radical group within the Pentagon have spread throughout the administration. Yet such views represent a threat to arms control, to U.S. national security, and to the future of United States-Soviet relations. They are sinister in their purpose, and should be rejected. The Fascell resolution provides us with an opportunity to do just that. I urge my colleagues to support the measure, thereby denouncing those who have been conspiring against the entire arms control process.

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Chairman, Soviet violations of SALT II have been well documented in numerous reports. This means that we are continuing our unilateral disarmament of the previous Presidential administration. Our continued adherence of SALT II legitimized Soviet failure to comply with the treaty. It freezes the United States into permanent strategic nuclear inferiority.

SALT II also represents a growing inconsistency with U.S. strategic force requirements determined by the bipartisan Scowcroft Commission. One example is the Midgetman, scheduled for deployment in the early 1990's. SALT II would prevent its deployment, a program that has been approved by Congress.

Some supporters of arms control say we must hold to SALT II to prevent Moscow from doubling or tripling its strategic nuclear forces. This assumes that arms control has had a restraining effect on Moscow—but in fact, it has not. I might also ask why the Soviets would want to expand their strategic forces if they are so interested in arms control.

We should choose here today, an option that will best serve the desire for peace by all Americans—that will bring lasting peace between the Soviet Union and the United States. Our most realistic option would allow the United States to restore the nuclear balance while reducing any political, military, or negotiating complications. This can be done by reconsidering SALT II and requiring strict Soviet compliance.

This approach places full compliance as a precondition for a U.S. no undercut policy. It also places the responsibility for the future of SALT II squarely on Moscow. It will be their choice to honor existing agreements. If they do not, then there essentially is no SALT II.

My colleagues here in the House, if we continue to comply to SALT II, we are only fooling ourselves, not the Soviets. This legislation before us today will only help the Soviets gain even more advantage.

Mr. SABO. Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my colleagues in the House of Representatives to join me in supporting House Concurrent Resolution 350, calling on President Reagan to continue adhering to the SALT limitations as long as the Soviet Union does the same. Few issues we will consider this year will approach the importance of this one.

The President's decision to abandon the SALT II treaty—the only existing constraints on strategic nuclear weapons—is dead wrong. It will seriously weaken the entire system of arms control, carefully crafted over 15 years by four Presidents of both parties. And it threatens to unleash a new round in the dangerous arms race.

Will Congress stand for such a harmful gutting of arms control? I think not. I am optimistic that the House will adopt this resolution today, urging the President to continue to honor SALT II. And a similar measure has been introduced in the Senate.

But if this approach doesn't work, if this strong expression of Congress' concern and support for arms control fails to get the President's attention, many of us are ready to push binding legislation prohibiting deployment of weapons that breach SALT II's limits.

For 7 years the United States and the Soviet Union have observed a policy of abiding by the limitations contained in the treaty. The agreement limits the number of strategic nuclear missiles and delivery systems, such as bombers and submarines, each side can have. It also restricts the testing and deployment of new intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM's] and the number of warheads that can be placed on these missiles.

The SALT structure is not perfect, but it has put a cap on the nuclear arms race. To comply with the treaties, the Soviet Union has dismantled nearly 1,400 missiles and 14 submarines. The United States has dismantled 564 missiles and 11 submarines.

Continued adherence to the treaty is clearly in the security interests of the United States. It is the only constraint on the Soviet nuclear arsenal. If we abandon the treaty the Soviet Union will do the same.

The Soviets are in a better position to exploit the removal of all restraints from our arsenals. They could expand their nuclear forces much more rapidly than we can. For one thing, they have more production lines that could be accelerated. They also can more than double the number of warheads on their massive ICBM's—those most feared by the Pentagon—without building one more additional missile.

Scrapping the treaty is not in our political interests. No other country endorses the President's decision. Our NATO allies unanimously condemn it. It adds fuel to the Soviet propaganda machine that maintains that Washington is not serious about arms control. It threatens the already fragile Geneva talks and could scuttle the prospects for a second summit meeting this year.

Abandoning the treaty also is not in our economic interest; its a potential budget buster. It will accelerate a costly arms race that no one can win. Congress, and the American people, no longer have the appetite for unrestrained military spending at a time when

we are striving to get the budget deficit under control.

President Reagan justifies his decision by charging the Soviet Union with violating the treaty. While there may be merit to these charges, Moscow is observing SALT's numerical ceilings and it is questionable whether the alleged violations are of serious military significance.

Concerns about Soviet noncompliance should be addressed through existing diplomatic channels and the consideration of proportional responses. The answer is not to throw out the whole structure of arms control. As former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara put it, "Responding to Soviet violations by scrapping SALT is tantamount to reacting to an increase in the crime rate by abolishing the criminal code."

President Reagan's record on arms control is the worst of any president since the arms race began, having failed in more than 5 years to negotiate any new agreement. Now he has unilaterally decided to remove the only constraint on our nuclear arsenals and let loose an all-out competition.

The President says his goal is to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear weapons. He credits Mikhail Gorbachev with wanting the same thing. Instead of risking an intensified arms race that will be harmful to our military, political, and economic interests, let's keep the lid on the United States-Soviet competition while we pursue the deep reductions both sides say they want.

Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr Chairman, I rise in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, which expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should continue to adhere to the weapons limitations of the SALT treaties. I am an original cosponsor to this important resolution because it enhances vital United States national security and precludes an opportunity for the Soviet Union to increase its nuclear arsenal.

The SALT agreements have placed meaningful restrictions on increases in the nuclear stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1972, the Soviets have dismantled over 1,000 ICBM's, 200 SLBM's, and 13 missile-firing submarines because of the restrictions of the SALT I and SALT II treaties. If President Reagan's decision to abandon the SALT agreements is implemented, those limits will be swept aside. The entire structure of strategic arms control, carefully laid over a period of 15 years by four Presidents—Lyndon B. Johnson, Richard Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, and Jimmy Carter—would be ended.

The Soviets could increase their nuclear arsenal much faster than the United States if SALT II limits are removed. Although the United States would be able to catch up to the Soviets eventually, it would take some years, during which the United States would be considerably threatened by Soviet nuclear arms, and a tremendous cost. If SALT II remains in force, however, the Soviets will continue to be required to adhere to its ban on increases in strategic nuclear forces and restrictions on modernization.

President Reagan contends that Soviet violations of key provisions of the SALT II and 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile [ABM] Treaty justify his decision to abandon the SALT treaty limitations on nuclear weapons. The President claims that the Soviets have clearly violated the SALT II treaty by deploying a new ICBM, the SS-25, and by encrypting data during missile tests so that the United States could not obtain precise information on Soviet compliance with treaty limitations. The administration also contends that the construction of a new phased radar facility at Krasnoyarsk violates the restrictions of the 1972 ABM treaty.

According to arms control experts, this is just not the case. In fact, after reviewing the evidence regarding the President's allegations, the experts agree that there is insufficient evidence to support these claims. Many analysts also agree that the differences between the SS-25 missile and an earlier version are not great enough to qualify as a new missile that violates SALT II. In addition, arms control experts also maintain that encryption has not been so extensive as to prevent United States monitoring of Soviet compliance of SALT II. While some experts agree that the phased array radar at Krasnoyarsk may be a violation of the ABM treaty, they have indicated that the evidence on this matter is not clear or overwhelming.

The issue of treaty violations is obviously a complicated one. The United States and the Soviet Union have both accused each other of such actions. The administration should utilize diplomatic channels to resolve these disputes. Abandoning SALT II would simply undermine talks already underway in Geneva, and result in serious diplomatic, military, and budgetary problems for the United States. Therefore, every effort should be made by both supperpowers to avoid such a development now and in the future.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to support this important resolution. Abandoning the SALT agreements would undoubtedly trigger a new and dangerous arms race that will be extremely costly for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States would need to spend billions of dollars on new weapons, and Congress would be faced with the choice of adding even more to the deficit. At the same time, Congress would be pressured to sacrifice vital domestic and education programs to pay for the drastic increase in Pentagon spending.

Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution to recommend our Nation's continued adherence to the weapons limitations of the SALT agreements.

Few would deny the success of the SALT agreements in restraining the nuclear arms race between our Nation and the Soviet Union—an extremely costly and dangerous race that neither side can ultimately win. The President says he wants to abandon SLAT II to work for a better treaty. This is certainly a commendable goal, but on reason to jettison SALT II before a new agreement can be developed.

Although there have been allegations that the Soviet Union has violated some technical provisions of SALT II, most of our arms control experts tell us that there is no clear evidence of any serious violation that would pose a threat to United States security. Rather, adherence to SALT II has resulted in the Soviet's dismantling 1,077 ICBM's, 245 SLBM's, and 14 nuclear submarines, while the United States, by comparison, has removed 320 ICBM's, 544 SLBM's and 11 nuclear submarines from serivce. The resolution we are now considering addresses the few issues of Soviet noncompliance by encouraging the use of the SALT Standing Consultative Commission, which has been successful in settling similar disputes under three previous administrations.

Without SALT II, we face the prospect of a new arms race that would have profoundly serious military, diplomatic, and budgetary consequences. In just a few years, and without adding a single nuclear missile, the Soviets would be able to increase the number of warheads on their existing missiles by 7,000. The United States, we are told, would probably not be able to catch up until the mid-1990's, leaving us at a serious military disadvantage for nearly a decade.

And we all know what the price of playing catch-up would be: billions would be spent on new weapons while we choose between adding to the deficit, devastating domestic programs, or raising taxes in order to cover the expense.

We would also pay a dear price in terms of our credibility as a nation of peace, for why would a nation that desires peaceful relations between the superpowers take action that is certain to trigger an increase in nuclear arms? Our NATO allies have already voiced their opposition to the abandonment of the SALT agreements; insistence on such action will surely place tremendous strains on our relations with our friends around the world.

Continued adherence to the SALT agreements is clearly in our Nation's best interests. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, the House of Representatives has debated some curious and misguided legislation in its time, but never have I seem anything so perplexing as the resolution now before us and that's why I voted against the rule.

Here is a bill that would instruct the President to observe the limits of an expired treaty that the Senate refused to ratify. What does this mean? It seems to me that the Members of this Chamber should have greater respect for the Constitution's allocation of powers.

President Reagan has declared that the SALT II Treaty limits no longer exist. He has said that our future strategic force decisions will be based upon our strategic requirements, rather than upon the provisions of an unequal and unverifiable agreement. Most importantly, he has cautioned that "we cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance, and, in effect, unilateral disarmament."

Mr. Chairman, whatever fancy explanations this bill's sponsors might make, the fact is that this bill would force the United States to be bound by a treaty that the Soviets are violating. And that is unilateral disarmament, plain and simple.

On June 10 of last year, the decision was made to cut up the U.S.S. *Sam Rayburn* when we first bumped up against the SALT II MIRV ceilings. At that time, the President announced that he was "going the extra mile" to encourage the Soviets to bring their actions

into compliance with existing treaties, to end their offensive military buildup, and to enter into sincere arms control negotiations.

Unfortunately, the Soviet Union has failed to meet any one of these three conditions—Soviet arms control violations mount, its unprecedented military buildup continues, and Gorbachev has been more interested in grandstanding on Western airwaves and the pages of the New York Times and Die Zeit than in serious negotiations at Geneva.

Just the same, the sponsors of this bill would have us go yet another extra mile to encourage the Soviets to modify their behavior.

I wonder just how many extra miles they want us to go in complying with unratified agreements before they finally notice that we're getting nowhere. The SALT II treaty was rejected because it was inequitable and unverifiable. By its terms, the SALT II agreement expired in December of last year. We never ratified it—we never even came close. President Reagan rejected it as "fatally flawed" and the Senate Armed Services Committee declared that it was not in the national security interests of the United States. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan silenced efforts to bring it to a vote. The passage of time has not improved the treaty's glaring flaws; it has only sustained the arguments of those who were against the agreement from the start.

Even so, the President decided, as a matter of Executive policy, that we would continue to adhere to SALT II's provisions "so long as the Soviets demonstrated equal restraints." After 3 Presidential reports to Congress and some 15 documented Soviet arms control violations, evidence of Soviet "equal restraint" is nowhere to be found. No one disputes that the Soviets are not honoring their part of the bargain.

Continuing to abide by SALT II does not promote beneficial arms control; it impedes its advancement. The Soviets will never have any incentive to negotiate stabilizing, equitable agreements if the unequal, unverifiable old arms control regime continues to give them an advantage. Nor will they have any incentive to correct their violations if our compliance is unilateral and we do not respond militarily to their violations.

Some have said that, whatever else we may do in response to Soviet violations, we should continue to observe SALT limits because without SALT II the Soviets could "break out" into a vastly expanded arms race. This is nonsense.

First, the Soviets would be hard pressed to engage in any major increase in force expansion: They are already expanding at a peak rate. Second, their record of violations indicates that they've never felt especially constrained by arms control agreements that conflict with their force requirements. Finally, a far more serious problem for our national security arises if we continue to be constrained by the limits of an agreement that the Soviets feel free to violate.

Just since we cut up the first Poseidon in deference to SALT, two new major Soviet violations have come to light: The deployment of the road-mobile SS-24 and—what may prove to be the most egregious violation yet—the reported testing of a follow-on SS-18—the current version of which exceeds in MIRV's and throwweight anything now existing or planned in the future for the United States. And intelligence estimates indicate clearly more violations to come—whether or not we're abiding by SALT.

Instead of clinging to the false promises of a treaty the Soviets abandoned long ago, we should stand with the President to help him meet our defense requirements and advance a positive arms control agenda.

There is much more at stake here than the question of scrapping submarines. Present plans for Midgetman development and deployment, potential modification of the MX, overall numbers of cruise missiles and cruise carriers, and other vital strategic programs are being constrained under the guidance of interim restraint, while the threat continues to grow. In addition, our reluctance to break with SALT II has adverse implications for the President's SDI, where the real promise of effective defense depends at a minimum upon some modification of the ABM Treaty—which the Soviets are also violating with impunity.

In my opinion, these artificial and unilateral arms control limits are unacceptable. We should be planning our strategic programs from the standpoint of what we need to consolidate our deterrent capability, to ensure strategic stability, and with the advent of SDI to protect the United States and its allies.

The President made the right decision. He deserves our support, not our constitutionally suspect dissent. The time has come to consign SALT II to the history books, and get on with meeting our defense requirements.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Chairman, on May 27 the President opened a new chapter in United States/Soviet arms negotiations when he announced that the United States would no longer be bound by the SALT II nuclear arms limitation treaty. This chapter is different from others, and frought with more danger, because it involves a denial of the long-held American belief that we ought to do whatever we can to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be utilized.

It was a dangerous decision; one that ignores pertinent facts of nuclear arms control; it is a decision which must be reversed.

The President cites Soviet violations as the primary reason for deciding to abandon SALT II. The administration alleges that the Soviets have deployed a new ICBM despite SALT II prohibitions on deploying more than one new strategic missile; they claim the Soviets have encoded data during missile tests so the United States could not obtain precise information on Soviet compliance with treaty limitations. In addition, the administration contends that construction of a new phased radar facility at Krasnoyarsk violates the restrictions of the 1972 ABM Treaty on such radars.

On the surface, these appear to be substantive claims. But when we delve deeper, we find that there really isn't much substance to any of those allegations.

Arms control experts outside the administration generally believe that the administration does not have a strong case with regard to the deployment and encoding accusations. Many informed U.S. arms experts contend that the differences between the ICBM missile and an earlier version are not great enough to qualify the ICBM as a "new" missile that violates the SALT II prohibition on the introduction of such weapons.

SALT II states that the radio signals sent out by missiles—their telemetry—should not be encrypted so as to impede verification of the relevant characteristics of the missile (number of warheads, throw-weight, etc.). The administration contends the Soviets have encoded almost all of their telemetry and that this impedes verification efforts, thereby violating the treaty. The Soviets argue the United States is able to monitor all these relevant missile characteristics and have asked the United States what information it is lacking. The administration, perhaps with good cause, has not supplied this information for fear of revealing U.S. surveillance capabilities. Independent experts express concern over encryption but suggest the amount of telemetry that must be freely transmitted is not clearly stated in the treaty. Paul Warnke, our chief SALT II negotiator, observes that "while the encryption language needs work, it is still fixable."

If the President's announced intention to abandon SALT II at some as yet unspecified future date is a decision based strictly on the argument of Soviet violations, then the President has failed to thoroughly ascertain the facts of his accusations.

If, on the other hand, his decision is based on the hope that a better treaty is possible, then why abandon this treaty before a new one can be agreed upon?

The President's decision is understandable only when measured against his arms control track record. After 6 years in office the President has not negotiated a single arms control agreement—the worst arms control record of any President since the nuclear arms race began; the only President not to achieve an arms control agreement.

And now he wants us to believe that noncompliance with SALT II will lead the way to a new and better arms agreement. That is a risk that we—that humanity—cannot afford to take.

A study conducted by the House Armed Services Committee revealed that the Soviets could increase their nuclear arsenal much faster than the United States if SALT II limits are removed. The Soviets have a higher capacity to produce weapons—currently two new ICBM's, two new bombers, two new ballistic submarines and two new SLBM's, are being produced. The United States, on the other hand, is producing only three such systems—one ICBM, one new bomber and one new submarine.

If we focus instead on the positive accomplishments of SALT II, we see that it has had a positive impact on our ultimate goal of controlling the arms race. The Soviets have demobilized more nuclear weapons than we have: they have withdrawn or converted 798 land-based ICBM's, 21 SSBN submarines and 233 submarine-based ballistic missiles since 1972; they have dismantled 281 ICBM's, 245 SLBM's and 15 bombers and 13 Yankee-class ballistic missile weapons that were added to the Soviet inventory, for a total of 1,360. The United States has withdrawn or converted 320 ICBM's, 400 SLBM's, and 2 SSBN's; we have

dismantled 176 SLBM's and 11 SSBN's, for a total of 909.

If we measure the President's claim of Soviet violations against the consequences of treaty abandonment, it is clear that disassociation from SALT II is not the answer. I urge my colleagues to reject the President's decision and to continue the work begun within this body to achieve substantive arms control through negotiations with the Soviet Union, rather than abandoning the only working agreement we have.

What the President fails to acknowledge is that United States noncompliance with SALT II will be countered by Soviet noncompliance; and that result is dangerous for civilization.

Mr. BRUCE. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, the resolution calling upon the President to continue adherence to the SALT limits.

The administration's statements on its possible intention to exceed the SALT II limits signalled a major shift in U.S. arms control policy that has immense implications for our national security. If these intentions are implemented, it will reverse this administration's 5 years of arms control policy and unravel an entire structure of arms control carefully laid out over 15 years by four Presidents. The simple matter is that adherence to the numerical ceilings is in our national security interest. The key provisions of SALT II restrict growth of the Soviet nuclear arms. Lifting the limits will set off a round of escalating arms buildup projected to double the Soviet number of warheads from 9,000 to 20,000 targeted against the United States.

The resolution called for today is a responsible congressional statement on foreign policy. While the resolution is not binding, it is a clear statement in support of meaningful arms control. The resolution stipulates that continued United States adherence to the SALT agreements is conditional upon Soviet compliance. Failure on the part of the Soviets to adhere to the limits, frees the United States from further compliance. The resolution also takes note of the recent questionable Soviet noncompliance actions by requiring to redress Soviet violations through the SCC; to seek greater Soviet compliance through the Geneva Arms Control Talks; and to pursue resolution through Soviet noncompliance at the upcoming summit.

Mr. Chairman, we would all agree that the SALT II Treaty is not perfect. However it does place meaningful restrictions on both superpowers and has clearly restrained the arms race to make us all safer. If we abandon the treaty limits now, the Soviets would be in a better position to rapidly increase their nuclear arsenal. In order to respond, the United States would have to launch into a massive buying program causing adverse budgetary as well as military and diplomatic problems for the United States. Congress is not alone and we are joined by our allies in calling upon the President to continue his policy on arms control. Strong support now is critical to this country's long term safety and I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this resolution.

Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350—a bipartisan foreign policy statement in support of international arms control between the United States and the Soviet Union. As I retire from service in this esteemed legislative body, I can think of no greater purpose that we have before us than to solve the risk posed to that of our democracy and global peace than the ever-present threat of the continuing nature of the nuclear arms race. Clearly, it remains in the best national security interests of the United States to move ahead toward ending the nuclear arms race, rather than in promoting a policy that says SALT is dead.

Before today's debate, Presidential Press Secretary Larry Speakes observed that "SALT is dead." A "SALT is dead" policy only serves to encourage our adversary to adopt a similar policy. A"SALT is dead" policy does not solve the issues associated with Soviet violations of past treaty commitments but in fact encourages the Soviet Union's distrust of United States intentions at Geneva, and prods them to exploit certain advantages available to them in a non-SALT environment. A "SALT is dead" policy rests upon the faulty assumption that the only way in which to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons rests with the development and deployment of even more nuclear weapons than those currently present in the world nuclear arsenal. For each of these reasons, it seems inherently clear to me that a "SALT is dead" policy makes no sense what so ever, and that adoption of House Concurrent Resolution 350, in its present form, does represent a positive step through which to enhance United States national security interests through continued United States adherence to SALT conditional upon similar Soviet commitment to the framework of this valuable agreement.

Mr. Chairman, the opponents of House Concurrent Resolution 350 have argued most strenuously in echoing Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle's remarks that today we shall either stand with our President or with the Soviet Union in our views toward SALT. Mr. Chairman, I find remarks such as these most distressing. Those of us who support House Concurrent Resolution 350 do not question the patriotism of that of the President or Secretary Perle, nor do we question the patriotism or the rights of our colleagues who disagree with us on the merits of House Concurrent Resolution 350 to disagree with us. Rather, we are associating ourselves in our belief that SALT II continues to be in the best national security interests of the United States, and are merely urging the President to consider our view with respect to this treaty agreement.

In this regard, I would recall that candidate Reagan cited SALT II as fatally flawed during his 1976 campaign for the Presidency and yet upon reaching office, it was President Reagan who recognized the valuable role that SALT II played to U.S. national security interests and arms control efforts in announcing his intention that the United States would continue to abide by the obligations set forth in SALT II. Supporters of House Concurrent Resolution 350 are merely asking that the President reconsider his past commitment to SALT II, and use the tools available to him in past treaty commitments, as well as those outlined in House Concurrent Resolution 350 in solving the problems associated with Soviet violations and in seeking deep reductions in the world stockpile of nuclear weapons before such reductions become an impossibility because of mutual superpower fear and mistrust of one another's intention at Geneva.

The modern poet Robert Hunter in observing the many mistakes of man has observed that, "It was later than I thought, but sooner than I knew. Now I cannot share your laughter, ship of fools." Today, the world is smaller than it has ever been before. Together, the United States and the Soviet Union can destroy the ship we call Earth, many times over. As I leave Congress, I look back in fond remembrance of our bipartisan efforts to work together in seeking solutions to the many problems confronting not only the United States but all nations on Earth. I shall remember always our successes and hope that such successes will be more common in the future. I shall also hope that when future historians look upon the actions of the 99th Congress, the last in which I shall have served, that they do not look upon the words of the poet Hunter, and apply them as an epitaph to arms control through our actions today.

Clearly, the choice is ours. We can endorse the concepts of House Concurrent Resolution 350 in nudging our national security policies back on a course toward real arms control, or we can abandon the helm and deal with the consequences of our actions in the future. In my mind, a future in which a SALT environment continues to exist holds promise—the promise of reducing nuclear weapon inventories from the ceilings established in SALT II. Once underway, such reductions hold even greater promise for the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons inventories from the holds of our planet. On the other hand, a future in which there exists no SALT environment appears more grim—the frightening realities of increased and more sophisticated United States and Soviet nuclear weapons inventories dictates a future in which we shall continue to hold the world hostage to the threat of Armageddon. Mr. Chairman, let each of us vote our conscience but at the same time, let each of us vote for a future in which the elimination of nuclear weapons becomes a reality; not a future in which our children's children will wonder why we did not see the error of our ways. Let our vote today reflect a commitment to arms control and reduction; not a commitment to arms development and deployment. Mr. Chairman, let our vote today reflect a commitment to peace. For these reasons, I urge us all to vote in support of House Concurrent Resolution 350 as approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, President Lincoln, in his address at Gettysburg, made the mistake of saying, "The world will little note or long remember what we say here.* * * " Although President Lincoln's modesty is surely commendable, we should not err in thinking that the world will little note what we say and do here today.

The world, particularly our allies, is watching and waiting to see just how Americans respond to President Reagan's proposal to abandon the limits of SALT. They are concerned because they are directly in the path of Soviet missiles and they fear the devastation of a nuclear war. All reasonable people

must share their concerns because nuclear war cannot be contained to some hypothetical target area.

Remaining within the constraints of SALT does not indicate that one feels that there are no problems with the current agreement. However, staying within the constraints gives the United States the moral high ground from which to guarantee that safeguards which ensure more precise verification will be put in place. SALT is not the end of the arms limitation process but the starting point from which more reliable agreements will be negotiated. Abandoning SALT is, in essence, a decision to start again and face the delays that will inevitably accompany negotiations starting from scratch.

The world will note what we say and do today. Our allies want to be able to agree with us on arms limitations. Abandoning SALT conveys the message that we are not serious about arms limitations and we really are unconcerned that the savage rain of nuclear war may fall upon this Earth. Should the horror of nuclear weapons ever be unleashed, regretting lost opportunities to limit and eventually eliminate these weapons will be irrelevant. Let us act and affirm our commitment to nuclear arms control while we have this opportunity.

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, today we are confronted with whether we are going to allow years of bipartisan work on arms control to be thrown out the window. I am referring to arms control negotiations that began with President Lyndon Johnson, and continued through Presidents Nixon and Ford, until President Carter signed SALT II in 1979.

These four different Presidents were from both major political parties, and each saw the need for reaching arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. Now, President Reagan has announced that, beginning this fall, the United States will no longer abide by the SALT agreements.

It is said that the United States will abandon SALT because of continuing violations of the agreements on the part of the Soviet Union. And, yes, there are questions regarding Soviet actions in the areas of telemetry encryption and a second type of ICBM. But, according to experts in the field, these are close questions according to the terms of the treaty. Even those who worked on the SALT II agreement have said that certain sections of the treaty pertaining to these violations were vague. The issue facing us here today is whether we are going to take these questionable violations of vague sections of the treaty and abandon SALT altogether.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that these vague issues justify a renewed arms race. You do not throw the baby out with the bath water, and you do not scrap years of arms control negotiations over such minor and vague questions.

The important provisions of SALT are those provisions that limit deployment of additional weapons and warheads. And Soviet compliance in these areas is unquestionable.

SALT I and SALT II have required over the years that the Soviets remove more than 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles, more than 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, approximately 45 bombers, and 20 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines. In the next 5 years, SALT would require that the Soviets deactivate approximately 500 to 600 missiles and launchers.

SALT has not required the United States to make nearly as many concessions as the Soviet Union. Based on SALT I and SALT II, the United States has had to deactivate 320 ICBM's, 544 SLBM's and 11 nuclear-missile carrying submarines. In fact, SALT II provided ceilings that we could build up to, while requiring that the Soviets build down to these ceilings.

Later this year, however, the U.S. will be required by SALT to make real and genuine reductions. Either we retire about 74 Minuteman III ICBM's or we cannot continue with the ongoing conversion of B-52 bombers to carry cruise missiles. And that is what is wrong with SALT II.

It is far easier to comply with SALT when it does not require anything of us.

The decision to abandon SALT is a disastrous one, from both a military and a diplomatic perspective. The abandonment of SALT will leave the Soviets free to rapidly expand on their strategic options, as they have said that they would do. And, as President Reagan himself observed last year, the Soviet Union has a much greater capacity to increase weaponry than the United States. One estimate shows that Soviet strategic forces could grow by 65 percent by 1989, compared to only 45 percent for the United States if SALT is abandoned.

Between them, the United States and the Soviet Union already have some 50,000 nuclear warheads, including 22,000 strategic weapons. But, the Congressional Research Service estimates that each side could more than double its strategic nuclear weapons by 1992 without SALT.

We also stand to lose on the diplomatic front. Already two of our staunchest allies—Great Britain and West Germany—have voiced their disappointment with the President's decision to abandon SALT. Plans for a summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev will certainly be threatened by the President's decision to side-step SALT.

The President has said that we ought to seek a new arms control agreement. But he has rejected the Soviet offer of a mutual testing moratorium and has continued his strong support of the strategic defense initiative. Without any common ground, how can we hope for any arms control agreement?

In short, the scuttling of SALT II benefits no one, except perhaps the Soviets who have been forced to cut back more than the United States under this agreement, and are in a better position to take advantage of the removal of SALT limitations. Abandoning SALT almost certainly guarantees a renewed arms race; one that we cannot afford. And it leaves us no forum or foundation upon which to build a new arms control agreement.

By abandoning SALT, we lose strategically and we lose diplomatically. And, in the final analysis, the world loses, too. I urge my colleagues to support House Concurrent Resolution 350 and I urge the President to continue to comply with SALT.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I am a cosponsor of House Concurrent Resolution 350, which reaffirms the House's support of the numerical limits and sublimits of SALT II.

Like other sponsors, and like the President, I would prefer deep cuts in nuclear stockpiles, and I believe the Soviets must be accountable for violations in other sections of the agreement. Nevertheless, I think it is in the interests of both countries to keep a limit on nuclear weapons.

I respect the President's feelings that the agreement, ratified or not, ought to be observed in toto by both parties. I believe he is right that the U.S.S.R. should not be allowed to violate the treaty selectively, while expecting us to observe the sections it finds attractive.

So I shall vote for the Broomfield amendment because it is a clearer statement of prudent U.S. policy. I would prefer that the Soviets be put on notice clearly that we don't believe in cheating on a treaty.

I am proud, and glad, we have observed SALT II to date. I am disappointed the U.S.S.R. has not. That disappointment makes verification the No. 1 priority in any future agreement.

However, should the Broomfield amendment fail, I believe the original version is acceptable as a statement of Congress' advice to the President. It says, in effect that the limits are worthwhile and should be observed even in isolation.

The President may ignore this advice because it is a statement more easily misunderstood than the Broomfield statement, but I think it is better policy than no limits at all.

Mr. KLECZKA. Mr. Chairman, I rise as a cosponsor of House Concurrent Resolution 350, and urge the House to adopt it.

Let me begin by stating that I agree with the President on one key point. He has said that limiting strategic arms is not enough, and that his ultimate goal is strategic arms reduction. I could not agree more. As long as our nuclear stockpiles continue to grow, we continue to court nuclear disaster.

What I cannot support is the President's curious approach to achieving these reductions. SALT II, imperfect as it is, represents the state of the art in arms control, and it has afforded a critical margin of stability over the last 7 years.

Under SALT II, the Soviets have retired some 1,200 launchers with over 4,000 warheads. The treaty has permitted the verification of Soviet strategic tests and developments, and has reduced tensions between our nations. Perhaps most important, SALT II has provided a framework for the further negotiation of arms reductions. The decision to scrap SALT II destroys this climate for negotiation, and contributes nothing to our security.

The President's decision makes no sense in a military, fiscal, or diplomatic context. Militarily, the Soviets can respond to the abandonment of SALT in one of two ways. One response would be unilateral restraint, in the absence of any commitment on the part of the United States. Even a cursory understanding of Soviet history and the arms race suggests this possibility is absurd.

The second, and likely, Soviet response will be to renew the arms race. Is this in our national interest? Recent analysis released by the Arms Services Committee suggests that the Soviets could have a significant advantage

in the short term deployment of strategic arms due to their hot production facilities and excess launcher capacity. Even if America can catch up, will a doubling or tripling of our stockpiles make us more secure?

Fiscally, a new arms race would be a fiasco. A new generation of strategic weapons will cost tens of billions over the next decade. American taxpayers deserve better than a new treadmill of defense spending that contributes nothing to our defense.

Diplomatically, the President's decision is already a failure. Not a single Western ally has supported the move, and the decision is sure to add fuel to those opponents of the NATO Alliance.

Mr. Chairman, House Concurrent Resolution 350 is a fair resolution. It recognizes possible Soviet violations of SALT II, and recommends reasonable measures to resolve these issues. It recognizes that American observance of SALT II must be based on Soviet reciprocity. But it also takes a firm stand on behalf of the SALT framework, and on behalf of America's long-term security.

Mr. Chairman, the President has said he wants arms reductions, yet he has abandoned SALT, sought more money for MX, and plans new star wars tests. In 5 years of this contorted strategy, he has nothing whatsoever to show for it. Let's do the sensible thing, and preserve SALT II.

Mr. LANTOS. Mr. Chairman, on May 27 the administration announced an ill-advised and unfortunate decison. On that day the American people were told that the U.S. Government would no longer be bound by the limits established in the SALT II agreement.

The basis for that decision, according to the administration, is that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT II provisions as well as those of the ABM Treaty. Mr. Speaker, there is considerable controversy about the accusation that the Soviets have cheated on SALT. Even if the Soviets are in partial violation of the SALT agreements, that is not the crucial issue. The key question is whether the United States stands to gain more by continuing to observe the SALT agreement or whether we will lose more by abandoning it.

Arms control is not the only area in which we have continued to observe agreements despite Soviet failure to keep the agreement fully because we are better off with a partially observed agreement than with no agreement at all. The Soviets have violated the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Accords; nevertheless, we continue to observe that agreement and we continue to press the Soviet Union to observe its provisions.

If we abandon SALT, the problems that will follow may be far greater than the consequences of potential Soviet violations. Some restraint is better than none. Arms experts outside the administration are almost unanimous in agreeing that the Soviets are in far stronger position than the United States to exploit the new nuclear arms race which will result from scrapping SALT II. Although we could catch up with the Soviets eventually, it would take many years, during which time the United States would be considerably more vulnerable than we now are. Furthermore, the cost of a renewed arms race would be tremendous.

Mr.Chairman, our allies have shown a unanimous negative reaction to the administration's announcement. Not one of our Western allies has supported the administration's announcement on abandoning SALT. Members of the European Parliament are here in Washington for our regular semiannual meetings with members of that legislative body. As chairman fo the U.S. congressional delegation, I can assure you that there is indeed serious concern—across the entire European political spectrum—about the administration's statement that the United States would no longer be bound by SALT limits on nuclear arms.

The administration's announcement could not have been more ill-timed. It came shortly after the Soviet nuclear accident at Chernobyl, which had a profoundly negative impact on European public opinion. At the very time that the Soviet Union was on the defensive, the administration took the spotlight off Soviet nuclear irresponsibility at Chernobyl and revived the perception that the United States administration is irresponsible and a danger to world peace.

The decision to abandon SALT II is hardly likely to improve relations with the Soviet Union. Now is the time to improve the atmosphere and redouble our efforts to reach a new arms control agreement.

The only criterion that we should consider in deciding whether or not to continue to observe SALT agreements is whether continued observance is in our own national interest. Technical arguments about Soviet violations are not the issue. Do we have more to gain by continuing to observe SALT or do we stand to lose more by abandoning it?

Mr. Chairman, the answer is clear and unequivocal—we must continue to observe SALT. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is the greatest single threat to our planet. Our goal must be a world free of nuclear weapons. As we work toward that end, we must be willing to take the intermediate steps that will bring us to that goal.

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The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] has 30 seconds remaining.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I will just wind this up by saying that although this resolution has been attacked and disregarded and characterized in many ways, the truth of the matter is that it was worked out in a bipartisan fashion. Even the specific language that was objected to here in the well just recently was adopted by the Committee on Foreign Affairs by a vote of 29 to 11.

So, this is a bipartisan resolution which we bring to the floor, despite the criticisms, objections, reservations, characterizations, and assassinations.

The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.

Pursuant to the rule, the concurrent resolution is considered as having been read for amendment under the 5-minute rule. The amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs now printed in the concurrent resolution shall be considered as an original resolution for the purpose of amendment, which shall be considered as having been read.

No amendments to the concurrent resolution or to said substitute are in order except the amendment printed in section 2 of House Resolution 479 if offered by Representative BROOMFIELD or his designee, which shall not be subject to amendment or to a demand for a division of the question but shall be debatable for 2 hours to be equally divided and controlled by the proponent and a Member opposed thereto.

The Clerk will designate the amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is as follows:

H. CON. RES. 350

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that—

(1) the constraints on growth of Soviet nuclear forces, especially those involving numerical sublimits imposed by the SALT arms control agreements serve vital United States national security interests, especially in this time of fiscal austerity;

(2) a failure to adhere to the SALT agreements would result in a significantly increased threat to the United States by allowing the Soviet Union to increase significantly the number of warheads it could have under the SALT agreements and to substitute all of its single-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple-warhead missiles;

(3) the SALT agreements provide some important measures for monitoring Soviet nuclear force developments and for verification;

(4) the United States and the Soviet Union have not undercut the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements;

(5) although allowing for modernization under which the Soviets have removed over 800 ICBM missiles and replaced them with newer types, the SALT agreements have required the Soviet Union to dismantle over 200 ICBM launchers, over 240 SLBM launchers, and 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines;

(6) the Administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT agreements that do not deal with numerical sublimits by taking such steps as deploying more than one new type of ICBM, exceeding the limit on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, and excessively encrypting telemetry;

(7) disputes over Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements could be resolved within the Standing Consultative Commission, by the on-going negotiations at Geneva, or by other means; and

(8) our European allies have expressed their special concern over the tentative decision to discontinue United States adherence to the SALT agreements in the future.

SEC. 2. CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS AND OVERALL NUMERICAL LIMIT.

The President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise, and the President shall continue to adhere to the overall numerical limit of the

SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. BROOMFIELD

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows

Amendment offered by Mr. BROOMFIELD: Page 3, beginning in line 19, strike out "NUMERICAL" and all that follows through the end of line 20 on that page, and in lieu thereof insert "PROVISIONS."; and

Page 3, beginning in line 21, strike out all that follows the word "adhere" through the end of line 25 on page 3, and in lieu thereof insert "to the provisions of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviets do likewise.".

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is recognized for 1 hour, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 1 hour.

The gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] will be recognized for 1 hour in opposition.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment is simple and to the point It states in clear terms a basic principle which I feel has the full support of the American people. If we are going to continue to support an unratified, expired arms control agreement, the least we can do is ask that the Soviet Union do the same. One-sided attempts to compel the United States to adhere in the future to the terms of the SALT II agreement, without any attempt to address the present-day violations of this same agreement by the Soviet Union, do not contribute to arms control. Such actions undermine it.

The integrity of any arms control agreement is firmly rooted in the adherence of both parties to all the treaties' provisions, and more importantly, the willingness of a country to demand that violation of such an agreement be remedied. Failing that, the agreement should be severed. We are in such a situation today. The Soviet Union has not complied with key provisions of the SALT agreements.

The United States had repeatedly asked the Soviet Union to end these violations, emphasizing the deployment of the new SS-25 and the continued encryption of test telemetry as two key areas of concern. The Soviet Union has not responded constructively, and these violations remain unchecked.

My amendment firmly establishes the absolutely necessary link between Soviet compliance with SALT II and our own adherence to this treaty. I do so in a simple and straightforward manner by stating that the United States will adhere to the SALT provisions as long as the Soviet Union continues to do likewise. It is hard for me to understand how those of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle could be opposed to this amendment.

I would hope that none of my colleagues believes that the sole basis for our adherence to SALT II is a sense of trust that the Soviets are living up to their SALT II commitments. Our experience with the Soviet Union should teach us a different lesson. Soviet secrecy demands that we constantly remind them that we will settle for nothing less than their living up to their international agreements. Chernobyl is just the most recent example of how the Soviet Union operates by a different set of standards than we do in the Western democracies.

My amendment is based upon a simple principle which recognizes that a significant violation of even one provision of the SALT II agreement is serious enough to call into question the entire agreement. In this way we are honest with the Soviets. We tell them straight out that we will not accept Soviet violations even if they affect only one part of the agreement. The SALT II agreement was crafted as a comprehensive, integrated package with interlocking components. These issues cannot be separated.

The Soviets signed the SALT II agreement and my amendment does nothing more than call on them to live up to this commitment. I do not feel that is too much to ask.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I my consume.

Mr. Chairman, I will just take a minute here to simply say that the essence of this amendment was considered in committee. It was rejected by a bipartisan vote. What it does is maintain the status quo.

The gentleman's amendment has the clear effect of gutting the resoluton.

The President has announced that we should abandon SALT in the future because the Soviets have not fully complied with SALT.

This is despite the fact that:

First, the Soviet record of SALT compliance far outweighs its record of noncompliance;

Second, Soviet noncompliance has no military significance per the administration's own assessment; and

Third, there is nothing in place to replace the current agreed upon SALT verification enhancement provisions.

Under these conditions, abandoning SALT—which is the effect of the gentleman's amendment—is like responding to children misbehaving in school by closing down the school.

It is like responding to an increase in crime by abandoning the criminal code.

We don't want the Soviets to be free:

First, to more than double the size of their current nuclear arsenal—from over 9,000 to 20,000 nuclear weapons;

Second, to make United States verification more difficult and impede United States intelligence of Soviet nuclear activities; or

Third, to force us to spend billions more on defense spending.

That's what we would have without SALT. Not something "better" as promised by the administration but something worse.

We all endorse the President's objective of reductions in the already excessive nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

Our only difference is on how we should get there.

Should we get there:

First, by enabling the Soviets to add thousands of additional nuclear weapons?

Second, by requiring the Soviets to dismantle thousands of nuclear weapons?

Common sense tells us that you don't get reductions by acquiring more when you can get some reductions now as you strive for even more reductions in the future.

That's what we now have with SALT.

Let's not leave it until we have something "better" in hand. The promise of something "better" is dependent upon Soviet cooperation—which we now don't have—and which will take years of hard negotiation to achieve.

In short, a world with SALT means reductions now and reductions later.

A world without SALT means increases now and maybe reductions later.

Few choices are so clear cut.

Vote against the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. ASPIN].

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, we are about to do something very, very stupid if we are not careful. It would not be a wise idea to pass the Broomfield substitute. It would not be a wise idea to abandon the SALT limits, as the President has announced that he would like to do.

Let me say at the outset that I believe that the Soviet Union is clearly—clearly—violating SALT II. They are violating it in terms of building the SS-25. They are violating it in terms of encryption telemetry, and they are violating it with the Krasnoyarsk radar. I know it is a debatable point and other people feel differently, but from my reading of the evidence, no question. Absolutely true. They are violating it.

But it is also absolutely, undeniably true that they have kept within certain provisions of the SALT II accords. In particular, they have kept within those sublimits, the 820, the 12 and the 1,320 sublimits, and they have kept within those limits at a certain cost to their own forces. They have, over the last year since the signing of the SALT agreement, dismantled an awful lot more submarines, missiles, than we have. Whatever HENRY HYDE may say about what they have done with the submarines, they have moved with them 14 submarines out of the ballistic missile submarine business and they have dismantled on the order of 700 launchers to stay within those limits.

We have done very little. We have so far announced the dismantling of 3 submarines, and that is going to be about 48 launchers.

So we are talking about an enormously greater cost to the Soviet Union by sticking with the SALT agreements as they have in these areas of the sublimits.

□ 1355

Not only that, but they will continue to do so. If we project the SALT agreements out to the 1990's, the Soviets will be dismantling on the order of three times the amount of equipment, of launchers and submarines and things that we will be dismantling.

As the previous numbers imply, if SALT goes away and all stops are pulled out, the Soviets can build a lot faster than we can. They have a lot more hot production lines. They are building two new ICBM's. We are building one, the MX.

They are building two new submarines. We are building one, the Trident. They are building two new bombers. We are building one, the B-1.

They could increase their forces if SALT goes away today. They could increase their forces a lot faster than we could.

They have a second way to increase their forces. They can put more warheads on their existing missiles, on the order of 2½ times as many warheads as they have on the missiles now just because they have excess throw-weights.

So what are we doing here? What are we talking about? Why are we not afraid that all of this will happen? Because, says the administration, the Soviets are not constrained by SALT. They would have dismantled, says the administration, all those missiles anyway. And they would not build up their forces as they might because, says the administration, they have all the warheads and the launchers they need now.

Now that is an amazing point of view coming from this administration. I mean, we are not talking about the New Hampshire freeze campaign here. We are talking about the Reagan administration, the Reagan administration saying that they would dismantle these submarines and these launchers in any case and they will not build up because they already have enough.

The Reagan administration is making that kind of statement. What are we talking about? The Reagan administration is talking about it. Is all of a sudden the evil empire a bunch of good guys? What is happening here?

This unrelenting buildup, all of a sudden we have got rational force planners? What is happening? Why is the Reagan administration suddenly changing its view of the Soviet Union?

Of course, it is precisely because the Soviet Union does have an unrelenting buildup that we need to keep under SALT II. It is precisely because they never throw anything away and are constantly seeking advantage by building more numerical numbers that we ought to keep the SALT II limits.

It is precisely because the Soviet Union is an evil empire that we ought to keep the SALT II limits. We would be absolutely crazy to do away with these SALT limits, absolutely nuts.

Now, look at it from our side. If you look at it from our side, in what way is it inhibiting what we want to do? Virtually nothing. Virtually nothing. We are just starting now to bump up against the SALT II limits for the first time.

I thought SALT was a pretty good treaty back in 1979. Now, looking back, it is even better. Consider this: Even after 6 years of the Reagan buildup, we are just barely bumping up against the SALT II limits; whereas the Soviets are bumping up against it substantially and consistently all the time.

This treaty is a lot better than we thought it was. It certainly is constraining the Soviet Union a lot more than it is constraining us. Are we nuts? Are we nuts to be giving away this treaty? We have to be out of our minds.

If we are not seriously bumping up against the SALT limits and the Soviets are; if abiding by the SALT II limits is not appreciably affecting us, but it just might be. Let us just take the case that maybe they would dismantle these things. We do not really know. It just might be constraining the Soviet Union. Then does it not make sense to keep these limits in existence?

Sure, they are violating the treaty. They are absolutely violating the treaty in those three important ways. We ought not stand for that and we need a response. But we need a proportionate response.

Abandoning SALT II is not a proportionate response. It is a disproportionate response and it is one where we would be shooting ourselves, not in the foot, but in the head.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman in the well for his statement and I want to begin the discussion of Soviet cheating, and what proportional responses we might take, since it has been argued here that they have cheated.

With respect to the encryption telemetry, is it possible for the United States, if we so chose, to encrypt our own telemetry?

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I think that would be the exact appropriate response.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Is it possible also that if there is no SALT agreement, would it not be true that the Soviets could encrypt all of their telemetry, and not just that which is applicable to the agreement?

Mr. ASPIN. Absolutely.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, with respect to the entire issue of the SS-25, which we have heard now, is it possible for the United States to have a proportional response by building, for instance, the Midgetman missile?

Mr. ASPIN. I think speeding up the Midgetman would be the right proportionate response to the Soviet violations.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman, who is the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, has an opportunity to look at these issues carefully. We admit there may be cheating and there is a way to deal with the cheating, but there is something else here that the other side has not mentioned today and that is the sublimits and these other limits in the warheads aimed at the United States, 15,000 by the year 2000 under SALT, but it can be 25,000 without SALT.

I think the gentleman is saying that 25,000 is inimical to U.S. security interests.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think that what they are saying is that the Soviets are cheating in three important ways, so therefore, we have two choices. We either walk away from the cheating or we pull out of the SALT agreement altogether.

I am saying, yes, they are cheating on those three areas, but there is another choice. We do not have just two choices of ignoring it or pulling out of the SALT agreement altogether, especially when, in the other respect, the SALT agreement is in our national security interest because the Soviets are a dangerous country.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, I am not a supporter of the SDI so I do not want to be asking this question in any cute or fanciful way, but if I were a supporter of the strategic defense initiative, would I possibly be able to develop an SDI, a star wars system, if the Soviet Union was allowed an unrestrained number of warheads in which to counter?

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, there is no question that an unrestrained number of warheads on the other side makes an SDI defense very, very, much more difficult and the administration has as much as said so, that in order to have an SDI that works, they need a reduction from present warheads, and an increase would make it all that much more difficult.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. BEREUTER], a

member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, the Broomfield amendment is being offered for the first time to correct an inadvertent error, I am sure. I need to point that out.

During the course of full committee debate, I asked the question of the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ], what his reaction would be to the very change that is now in the Broomfield amendment, adding the word "provisions," dropping out "numerical sublimits." His reaction was negative, so I proceeded to another amendment which simply would have put "numerical limits" and "sublimits" in the amendment, since the Soviets are clearly over the numerical limits in toto, although they are apparently living with the numerical sublimits.

Later, by unanimous consent, that change was made after discussion by the gentleman from New York, but I do need to clarify that this provision, the Broomfield amendment, has not been offered before, nor voted upon, nor has there been a bipartisan vote cast upon it.

Now this amendment, of course, takes into account all provisions of the SALT agreement, not simply the numerical limits or the numerical sublimits. The amendment, therefore, considers qualitative violations of the SALT agreement. Apart from the numerical limits or the numerical sublimits references, the Soviets have been violating qualitative provisions of the SALT agreement, including the deployment of a second new ICBM, the SS-25, about which there is some disagreement. Certainly, there are violations readily pointed out by many sources about the encryption violations, the encryption of information related to missile testing.

Now, these two key noncompliance issues, and I am not even talking about the major radar installation, although we could well raise that issue as well, these noncompliance issues as raised by the administration, are downplayed as unimportant by some of the supporters of House Concurrent Resolution 350.

□ 1405

However, when the SALT II treaty was concluded in 1979, its supporters hailed these agreements; and those particular provisions as to the telemetry question were considered so important that the Foreign Relations Committee of the other body stated that a violation of the encryption prohibitions would by itself constitute a reason for U.S. withdrawal from the treaty.

The SALT agreements, I would like to emphasize, are together, in total, a comprehensive and integrated package with interlocking components. Numerical and qualitative provisions and encryption violations cannot and should not be separated.

The Soviets signed that SALT agreement, actually agreements; and the amendment does nothing more than call for them to live up to their commitments to all the provisions of the SALT agreements.

By focusing only on numerical limits or numerical sublimits or even both, the impression goes across the whole world that in fact the Soviets are not violating; or if there is some better knowledge and it is understood they are violating the overall limits, it appears that the United States is simply unwilling to proceed.

Now I would like to call to the attention of the body a brief excerpt from the June 7 edition of the Economist. This is, of course, a European publication. They said:

> But the main reason for saying that the current lament for SALT II is unwarranted is that what America has just done may have the effect of pushing Mr. Gorbachev towards a new and better SALT II.

There are similar, supportive statements recently in the Financial Times, which as you all know is another European publication—the issue of June 9—and a supportive editorial from the Wall Street Journal of June 13 that makes some of the same points.

In concluding my remarks today, Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that the United States has indicated, through the President's statement, and through administrative reactions, that the United States will stay in technical observance of SALT for some months, until the United States has equipped the 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage later this year.

Beyond that, the indication from the administration is that assuming no significant change in the threat we face, we would implement the Strategic Modernization Program, but the United States would not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 9 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is very interesting that so far during the course of this debate, no one has gotten up to take the position that even if the Soviet Union does adhere to all of the provisions of the SALT II agreement, we should nevertheless reject it because even in the context of Soviet compliance, the SALT II agreement is not in the national interests of the United States.

This was not always the case. There was a time a few years ago when many of my good friends on the other side of the aisle took the position that SALT II was a fatally flawed arrangement, and even if the Soviet Union adhered to literally every provision in it, it still was not in the security interests of the United States.

Today, based on the debate so far, the issue is not whether SALT II is a good agreement or a bad agreement, but whether the United States should in effect abrogate all of the treaty if we believe that the Soviet Union is violating part of the treaty.

Indeed, under the substitute which the gentleman from Michigan has offered, if the Soviets live up to all of the provisions of the SALT agreements, the President of the United States is mandated to adhere to all of the provisions of the SALT agreements; but if the Soviets should violate even a single provision of the SALT agreements under the terms of the Broomfield substitute, then the United States would be free to repudiate the entirety of the SALT agreement.

During the course of the debate, we have heard from some of our friends, particularly on the other side of the aisle, that the Soviets have in fact engaged in significant violations of the treaty. We have been told that they violated the prohibition on more than one new type of missile by building the SS-25. We have been told that they violated the prohibitions against encryption by encrypting telemetry that we need in order to verify Soviet compliance with the treaty; and we have been told that they have exceeded the overall numerical limits in SALT II by failing to put functionally relevant observable differences on 25 of their bombers that they claim they have transformed from strategic bombers into tankers, thereby putting them 25 strategic launchers over the overall limits in SALT II.

I think that we have to acknowledge that these are very serious allegations, and to the extent they are true, they clearly require a response by the United States. I have not heard anyone on this side of the aisle, throughout the course of the debate, suggest that we should ignore those putative violations, particularly should it be clearly and unequivocally established that the Soviets have in fact violated the treaty.

I would point out to my colleagues that in fact the resolution which we have under consideration today in paragraph 6 on page 3 specifically takes note of the administration's contentions that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty in these ways.

The resolution does not remain silent on that issue. We are not ignoring these putative violations of the treaty by the Soviet Union.

The resolution then goes on, in paragraph 7 on page 3, to take note of the fact that these disputes with the Soviet Union over their compliance with the treaty can potentially be resolved through the Standing Consulta-

tive Commission, which effectively enabled us to resolve comparable disputes with the Soviet Union over their compliance with SALT I in the 1970's; and if that is not a practical possibility, it indicates that we can potentially resolve these differences in the Geneva negotiations, and if that is not possible, it indicates that we can resolve the differences by other means.

What do we mean by other means? What we mean by other means is in effect that if we come to the conclusion the Soviets have violated the treaty by building more than one new type of missile, then we can build a new missile such as the Midgetman.

The Soviets are encrypting their telemetry; we can respond in a proportionate and appropriate way by encrypting our telemetry.

The resolution makes it very clear that if we believe the Soviets are violating provisions of the treaty, then we are in a position to respond in an appropriate way by not adhering to those provisions of the treaty which the Soviets are in fact violating.

The fundamental question that confronts us, therefore, is whether we should preserve parts of the agreement with respect to which the Soviets are complying simply because they are violating other provisions of the agreement.

Those of us who oppose the substitute and support the resolution believe that it is in our interests to comply with the numerical sublimits of SALT so long as the Soviets continue to do so, because so far, pursuant to those provisions, the Soviets have dismantled 541 strategic launchers while we have been obligated to dismantle only 187 strategic launchers.

Insofar as the future is concerned, the Soviets would have the potential to expand the number of warheads on their existing ICBM's by 8,492 if the numerical sublimits were abrogated, whereas we would have the potential to expand the number of warheads on our existing ICBM's if the numerical sublimits are abrogated by zero.

The reason for that is that on every one of the deployed Soviet ICBM's; the 11, the 13, the 17, the 18, the 19, and the 25, they have fewer warheads than the maximum potential which the missile will carry. Whereas on every one of our deployed ICBM's; the Titan, the Minuteman II, the Minuteman III, and the MX, we have already deployed the maximum number of warheads which the missile is capable of carrying.

□ 1415

Therefore it is very clear that, if we abrogate the numerical sublimits in SALT II, the Soviets will be able to expand their strategic forces by a substantially greater amount than we can expand our existing forces. And while nobody knows for sure whether the Soviets will do it, why take the chance? Why let them off the hook? Why give them the opportunity?

So if the substitute is adopted, in effect, the resolution will be gutted because the administration will say the Soviets are not respecting all of the provisions of the treaty, therefore we are under no obligation to comply with the provisions of the treaty, and they will abrogate the numerical sublimits.

Whereas, if the substitute is rejected and the resolution is adopted, we, in effect, will fence off that part of the SALT agreement relating to the numerical sublimits which they have been adhering to and which we have been adhering to which are in our interests, leaving ourselves free to respond in a proportionate and appropriate way to any violations of the other provisions of the treaty which we believe the Soviets may have committed.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. SMITH of New Jersey. I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Let me say first, Mr. Chairman, that I applaud the President for currently remaining within the limits set forth by the SALT II agreements by dismantling two Poseidon submarines as our newest Trident submarine begins sea trials. I also agree with the President that it is now time to reach a new arms control accords—agreements providing for real arms reductions.

I am encouraged with news that only recently the Soviets set forth a new arms proposal in Geneva which appears to be the most substantive and the greatest step toward compromise made by the Soviets in those arms talks to date. As we continue to seek an agreement, I agree with the thrust of the resolution before us today—we should practice restraint and continue to remain in compliance with the SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviets comply.

Mr. Chairman, having voted in favor of House Concurrent Resolution 350 in committee, it is plain that I agree with the essence of this legislation and I commend Chairman FASCELL for having introduced this type of legislation. At the same time, I am concerned that the language as it was reported from committee is somewhat restrictive in nature.

While I believe it is helpful for this body to send this message to the administration and the world—the message that we wish to continue to maintain SALT limits—I believe that by focusing exclusively on "numerical sublimits" we unnecessarily lock ourselves into narrowly focused policy. My colleagues, I'm sure, are aware that there are provisions of the SALT II agreements which have no numerical value which, nonetheless, are limits.

Mr. BROOMFIELD's amendment, then, broadens the scope of the resolution to include these qualitative arms control measures as well. Mr. Chairman, the SALT agreements are a comprehensive, treaty package with interlocking provisions. Numerical and qualitative provisions—and violations—should not be separated.

One of the arguments that some individuals use in insisting on the narrow phraseology is that in so doing we can effectively prohibit the Soviets from increasing their nuclear arsenal. Yet the SALT II agreement limits only launchers. The Soviets have, therefore, been able to add to their force more than 4,000 ballistic missile warheads since the signing of SALT II. Is that effective containment?

Mr. Chairman, you may know that when brought to the floor of the House I supported both the nuclear freeze resolution and the more recent comprehensive test ban resolution. I favor serious arms reduction and support measures which will move us toward that goal. In so doing, it is my belief that we should remain within compliance with SALT II as long as the Soviets are in compliance.

I support passage of House Concurrent Resolution 350 and strongly urge acceptance of the Broomfield amendment which improves it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. MCCAIN].

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, I cannot help but comment, I think this was covered by my colleague Mr. HYDE, on section 6 of the resolution, which was just used by my colleague from New York as a reason for us to agree to the resolution. Section six states "the Congress finds that the administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT agreements." I am curious why it should not read that "the Congress finds that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT treaty." All this does is say what the administration's contentions are. It is not worth the paper it is written on, obviously.

We are in a position, Mr. Chairman, that I find Orwellian and bizarre. An argument is being made that the United States of America should negotiate a treaty with the implicit understanding that, if one of the signatories, not the United States but the other signatory, violates it, then the United States should certainly not call that treaty invalid but should respond and cheat on the treaty itself.

Of course, the United States of America, we all understand, would not be the first indeed to violate the treaty, but if that treaty is violated by

the other signatory, then the United States would also violate it, but not too much, not too much, only proportionately.

We have placed ourselves in the position of asking the American people to agree to a treaty which has been consistently violated. Our response to those violations is not to say the treaty was not any good, nor that the people who are violating it are no good, but to say "Don't worry, it will be OK, American people, because we will also violate this treaty."

I do not believe that is the history of this country. I do not believe that that is what we should foist off on the American people.

I would ask my friend from Ohio, Mr. KASICH, since he is a member of the Committee on Armed Services, their allegations and agreement by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, I guess if the violation is encryption, then we should encrypt our missile tests, is that the situation?

Mr. KASICH. If the gentleman would yield, that is the argument, but it seems to me that if they are going to violate the agreement, while we are going to violate it too, that thereby we destroy the purpose of the treaty. The important thing is we do not want to set a precedent, it seems to me, where we argue it is OK to violate certain parts of the treaty but still leave it intact. It destroys the whole purpose of mutual trust between nations.

The Broomfield substitute is so eminently fair I cannot quite understand why it is not unanimously adopted in the House because it states, even though the Soviets can develop 5,000 additional first-strike warheads, all this says is, "Don't cheat. We will let you build more but just don't cheat beyond that." And they just do not seem to buy it. I do not understand it, it makes no sense to me when they encrypt and build radars and build prohibited missiles and on top of that have the capability to deploy another 5,000 first-strike warheads within the treaty.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the gentleman.

On the subject of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the United States proportionate response is apparently that we should then build an ABM radar system in violation of the treaty. Is that the proportionate response there?

Mr. KASICH. If the gentleman will yield further, what I do not understand, is, we had an argument out here during the SDI debate where the proponents of SDI said, "We don't want to break out of the ABM Treaty." We spent 2 or 3 hours on the floor of this House talking about whether or not we should break out of the ABM Treaty. Now they are saying today that, if the Soviets break out of the ABM Treaty, we ought to break out of it, too. I just do not understand that. I do not understand how they can come and oppose one day breaking out and the next day argue in fact that, if they are going to violate it, we are going to violate it, too. But that is essentially what they are doing today.

Mr. McCAIN. Well, lack of time prevents the third example. But the fact here is that we have an amendment that calls for adherence to a treaty by both signatories—not by the signatories but by both of those who have negotiated and who have adhered to the treaty all these years.

Now we are asking both to adhere to it. I think the Broomfield amendment makes eminent sense, instead of placing us in the incredible experience of saying to the Soviet Union, "It is OK for you to cheat and violate but, don't worry, we will violate, too." What kind of an agreement is that?

Mr. KASICH. If the gentleman will yield further, at Geneva we are conducting talks right now to reduce nuclear weapons. How can we have any faith in negotiations when we told the Soviets, "You can go ahead and cheat?"

All the Broomfield amendment says is, we will abide by SALT II if the Soviets do. I think 99 percent of the American people frankly agree with that position, and I hope this House will.

Mr. McCAIN. I find it hard to believe that the American people will support a treaty of that nature, that lets both sides cheat and I certainly hope we can support the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GILMAN], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], the distinguished ranking Republican on our Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Chairman, over the years Members of this House have asked the administration to exert more of an effort on arms control matters when we thought the moment was right. They have responded well. For example, 1 year ago, we asked the administration to continue its no-undercut policy by—in accordance with SALT II—dismantling a nuclear submarine when a new one was put to sea. Just this month, a similar decision was made, under which our Government will dismantle two older submarines.

Yet we have restrained ourselves notwithstanding militarily significant violations of the SALT agreements on the part of the Soviet Union. We have done so to preserve a proper atmosphere for the negotiation of new, better arms reduction agreements.

Let us recall that the President has not said he would violate the provisions of the SALT agreement. Rather, he said he would consider doing so if the Soviets continue to violate their commitments under SALT.

Today's resolution threatens to undercut the President's ability to negotiate new agreements as well as to bring about compliance with existing ones. This resolution says, in essence, that our Nation will tolerate any current or future violations by the Soviet Union of qualitative limits as long as another kind of limit is respected by them. The problem is that the violations of the kind committed by the Soviets—new missiles, telemetry encoding, and so forth—are not easily responded to by our Government except by actions such as modernizing an additional B-52. Without some kind of response, there will be no incentive to the Soviets to stop their violations and get involved in serious arms reduction talks.

Mr. Chairman, it should surprise no one that the Soviets have come to the negotiating table with what newspaper reports say are significantly improved arms reduction proposals after—I repeat, after—the President's announcement that if Soviet violations do not cease we may modernize a few additional B-52's. Most importantly, the Soviet proposals are being discussed in private, in Geneva, rather than in the newspapers.

But I predict that if the House decides to tie the hands of the President we may well face a situation in which the negotiations in Geneva once more shift into the confrontational mode which we have seen so many times in the past.

The Broomfield amendment takes into account all provisions of the SALT agreements, not simply the numerical provisions.

Accordingly, Mr. Chairman, I urge our colleagues to support the Broomfield amendment, to preserve the President's flexibility in negotiating arms control agreements.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY].

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, we are gong to pass this resolution and defeat the Broomfield amendment because the House of Representatives puts national security ahead of rightwing dogma.

For 5½ years this administration has been divided on the question of arms control, divided between those who are opposed, who believe that all arms control agreements are the ultimate sedative to American awareness, and

those who favor arms control either to appease the allies but who have been unable to achieve it. The other side sings the siren song of Soviet violations. We have addressed those Soviet violations here. They are there, they are numerous and they need to be dealt with. But they should not serve as an excuse to abandon the very important provisions of the SALT agreement that benefit U.S. security.

Without SALT, without SALT the Soviet Union can deploy 25,000 warheads by the year 2000. They can deploy 10,000 fewer with SALT. It is amazing to me that during the course of this debate we have not heard a whisper from the other side about the SS-18. Do you remember the SS-18, my conservative colleagues? You are the ones who told us that the SS-18 was the reason the SALT II agreement was fatally flawed. Indeed in Mr. Weinberger's "Soviet Military Power" in 1985 he refers to the 18, the 17, and the 19 as "the world's most modern deployed ICBM's." They are fearsome, they are awesome. And yet our colleagues on the other side want to see more of them deployed. That is crazy. We have the opportunity to reduce the risk of nuclear war, however small, by reducing and keeping a lid on Soviet first-strike warheads. Why would we want to, for goodness sake, abandon that most rational position? Why? Because there is no commitment whatsoever to arms control from this administration. What have they said on the MX missile? They told some of our colleagues who were honestly interested in working with them that, yes, we will swallow hard on that.

□ 1430

But we want Midgetman because we think that is more stabilizing, and we want you to be serious about arms control.

What did they do? The first chance they got, when they made an offer to the Soviet Union, they wanted to ban the deployment of mobile missiles, removing the opportunity to have Midgetman and have a more stabilizing deployment.

This administration's song is very simple and very clear. They see security in one way and one way only: more weapons, more weapons offensively and more weapons defensively. They ignore the possibilities that the Soviet Union is prepared, willing and able to keep up with us. Indeed, amazingly enough, they tell us now that the old weapons do not matter, and yet we do not have a plan to stop the new ones. It is the height of hypocrisy.

Yesterday the House of Representatives said to the administration, "you are wrong on South Africa." Today the House of Representatives is going to say to this administration, "you are wrong on arms control and, while we would vastly prefer to see you negotiate, it is clear that you are incapable or unwilling and we are not prepared to see American security sacrificed because of your shortsightedness."

Mr. BLOOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to point out that nobody was arguing that SALT II was flawed because of the SS-18. In fact, the SS-18 was deployed before we signed SALT II. It has been since SALT II that the Soviets have modernized the 19, the 24, and the 25.

All that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is trying to say, and I want to appeal to my friends on the other side, is that even in light of the development of Soviet strategic warheads from 5,200 to a current 9,200 all the way up to a potential 14,000 warheads that we permit the Soviets to have under SALT II, all the gentleman is trying to say is we will even permit that growth, if the Soviets will just stop cheating. If you stop cheating, we will abide by the treaty. Stop your radar, stop your new missiles, stop your encryption, and we will go right along with you and abide by SALT II.

But this administration says that we want to accomplish even more. This administration says we want reductions in nuclear weapons at the START talks, and if we do not have an agreement that shows integrity on behalf of both sides, how can we have any faith in what the Soviets are going to do when we negotiate the START agreement. Let us tell them to honor the treaty and stop their cheating.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. ZSCHAU].

Mr. ZSCHAU. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] for yielding this time to me.

This administration, despite the criticisms of many people, is on the verge of a major breakthrough, in arms control. This Congress should be supporting the negotiations in Geneva rather than trying to undermine those efforts.

I think the key issue in this debate is whether what we do here in this body is going to help arms control and the negotiations taking place or whether it will be detrimental to the progress that is being made in Geneva.

We need arms control in order to have stable deterrence. We need arms control in order to make sure that any defensive systems that are ultimately deployed are able to be effective. In my view, SALT I and SALT II have been helpful in stabilizing the situation and preventing a runaway arms race over the past several years. They also provide a good foundation for future negotiations. We are now at a critical point in the process in Geneva where proposals for deep reductions have been offered on both sides. Negotiations are moving forward. What we do here should facilitate that rather than get in the way. We do not want to by our actions undermine the arms control process.

In order for the negotiations to succeed, three elements are needed.

First, we need unambiguous agreements. We have learned from the SALT agreements that ambiguities undermine the credibility of agreements. We should be cognizant of the necessity for clarity in our future negotiations.

Second, we need good verification means. The verification protocol is extremely important, and agreeing to that protocol is a critical part of the negotiations.

But third, in order to foster the mutual confidence necessary for arms control to work, there must be a history of compliance. If there are concerns about compliance on one side or the other, those concerns should be voiced. If we are suspicious that the Soviets are violating an agreement, or if the Soviets are suspicious that we are violating the agreement, then the agreement will become ineffective.

It seems to me, therefore, that rather than passing a resolution restricting the flexibility of the President in the statements he makes or how he otherwise reacts to Soviet violations of the existing agreements, Congress should be making a strong statement that it expects and it requires bilateral compliance, not merely of some terms of the agreements, but all terms of the agreements.

That is exactly what the Broomfield amendment says. It says that we, the United States, will abide by all terms of the SALT agreements if the Soviet Union abides by all terms of the agreements. In order to have confidence in the SALT agreements, in order that they continue to provide building blocks for moving ahead for deep reductions of nuclear weapons, both sides should be adhering to all terms of the prior agreements.

We should be supporting our negotiators rather than undercutting them.

I believe that without the Broomfield amendment, the message sent to the Soviet Union is that Congress will require the United States to abide by terms of an arms control agreement even if the Soviets do not. That's the wrong message to send. If that message gets transmitted to the Soviet Union, our ability to negotiate arms reduction agreements in Geneva will be undermined. Instead, we should be

sending a strong signal of support for our arms control negotiators and make it clear that we insist on bilateral compliance of all terms of arms control treaties so both parties can have confidence in them.

I urge my colleagues to support the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZSCHAU. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to raise one question. It seems to me that the gentleman's argument is a non sequitur. On the one hand, the gentleman argues, correctly I believe, that arms control has been helpful, that arms control is important, that arms control is valuable and that, in fact, SALT, if I understood the gentleman's argument, has been helpful.

But on the other hand, the gentleman comes to the conclusion that if we do not accept this amendment, we should essentially throw the baby out with the bathwater and agree that we should walk away completely from SALT.

I guess my question it: How does that conclusion follow from these premises? If these are valuable agreements, should we not then do what we can to abide by them and maintain them?

Mr. ZSCHAU. Mr. Chairman, I believe that the President's position of saying that we are prepared to abide by the SALT agreements, the sublimits as well as the overall limits and all the terms, given that you, the Soviet Union, abide by those is the correct message to be sending at this time.

He has put them on notice, and I think properly so, that if we do not see some change in behavior, we are not going to feel restrained by the particular sublimits.

But he has not violated the treaty. He has put the Soviets on notice that we expect bilateral compliance with the agreements. I believe Congress should not be sending a different message.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire of the Chair how much time remains on both sides?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] has 35 minutes remaining and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] also has 35 minutes remaining.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the extraordinarily distinguished, well-informed, able, and beloved gentleman from Washington [Mr. DICKS].

□ 1440

Mr. DICKS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I might say to my friend from New York, it was you and I who authored a letter to Mr. Gorbachev about Soviet violations about 1 year ago, so we take second to no one about that.

Mr. Chairman, today we must decide whether to support a strategic arms control policy that is clearly in our national security interests.

It is not a new policy. It is one we have observed for 5½ years during the Reagan administration. Ronald Reagan, who opposed SALT II in the campaign of 1980, made a decision that we must not undercut that treaty, that we must live with it, and he did it for a very important military reason. And may I quote the President, from the New York Times Magazine, on October 6, 1985:

> I learned that the Soviet Union had the capability to increase weaponry much faster than the treaty permitted, and we didn't.

That is why the President decided to maintain SALT II. He must have seen this chart that shows us that without the SALT II limits, the Soviets could add 8,192 warheads to their existing force structure.

And here we are, faced with Gramm-Rudman, which the President signed, faced with the President's refusal to raise taxes, faced with a situation where we do not have the resources to match this approach by taking off these ceilings.

The Soviets have made it clear that if we violate existing numerical limitations, they will regard all the provisions of the treaty as dead. This would include not only numerical limits, but also very stabilizing provisions such as the requirement to notify the United States of planned Soviet missile tests, so as to avoid accidental nuclear war based on surprise or miscalculation.

Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Policy, testified that he was unconcerned, because it would not be cost effective for the Soviets to add nuclear forces. Richard Perle may be willing to depend on unilateral Soviet restraint, but I certainly am not, nor is the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee. It is hard to believe that Perle, the Prince of Darkness, a Russian basher of the first sort, is now saying, "Trust the Soviets, trust the same people who have deployed 170 divisions, deployed 50,000 tanks, deployed 300 attack submarines, not to deploy more strategic nuclear weapons." Now, that is really hard to believe, especially when the President wants to go forward with a strategic defense initiative. Because the easiest way to counter it is to add more warheads. I believe this is the most absurd, ridiculous mistake ever made by the President of the United States on a matter of national security.

Just look at these numbers. Look at those production lines. Ask yourselves: Why would we do away with ceilings that would stop this from happening?

Now, let me go back to another person for whom I have a great deal of respect, Gen. Bennie Davis, the former commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command, who was in charge of executing the SIOP, who said on March 6, 1985:

> If they were to break out of the treaty limits of SALT II, the disparity between the number of warheads held by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. would be significant * * * any action by the Soviets which could change the nuclear balance so dramatically could adversely affect strategic stability.

Richard Nixon, in an article in "Foreign Affairs," said:

> The Soviets could attach 30 warheads to each of its 300 giant SS-18 ICBM's rather than the 10 allowed under the treaty. This would mean an increase of 6,000 warheads in the Soviet arsenal. The United States has no missiles of this size which would allow us to match such an action by the Soviets.

When all Soviet ICBM's are considered, the number of additional warheads that could be added increases beyond 8,000 warheads. The CIA estimates total Soviet forces could exceed 21,000 warheads by 1994 without the treaty.

Richard Perle testified just 2 weeks ago:

> I rather wish they would put 30 warheads on their SS-18's.

I am not sure how many other Americans are anxious to see a near doubling of Soviet nuclear forces, particularly those forces which President Reagan has time and again said present such a great threat to the United States.

In short, as former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David C. Jones, said:

> There's not even a marginal military reason for exceeding the SALT limits.

Some argue that this will help the negotiations in Geneva. I was there when the announcement was made. It will not help those negotiations.

I hope and pray, as an observer to those talks, as an American, as a Member of Congress, that we get this arms control agreement with the Soviets. I want to see deep reductions, I want to see an INF agreement. But why would we tear up our existing arms control regime until we get that new agreement?

We would not throw out the Criminal Code when the crimes are being committed.

But as former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted:

> We need an agreed-upon baseline from which to reduce. The SALT limits provide such a baseline; an unrestricted arms race would not.

This new policy would throw out the entire structure of strategic arms control, carefully laid out over a period of 15 years by four Presidents, both

Democratic and Republican; Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter. They did not pursue arms control because they trusted the Russians or wanted to do the Kremlin a favor. They did it for only one reason, because they believed it to be in our security interests. They were joined in that belief by their Secretaries of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The administration wants a better deal. We all do. But no one is suggesting we abolish the Tax Code before we have tax reform. No one suggests we abolish the Criminal Code when the crime rate goes up. As Gen. Brent Scowcroft stated in an interview on January 21, 1985:

> There are restraints in the treaty on the Soviets, which, however modest, are better than having no restraints at all.

This is the view of our allies. Margaret Thatcher has said:

> We regard it as important that the SALT II Agreement should continue to be observed by both sides.

And West German Foreign Minister Genscher says:

> However imperfect (SALT II might be, the Federal Republic) would adhere to the agreement as long as there is no better one.

Let me now address Soviet violations. The administration has cited two violations of SALT as justification of its action. The first involves encryption of telemetry on missile tests. If in fact, they are exceeding the treaty restrictions on such encryption impeding verification, we can respond in kind.

The second major violation involves the SS-25 and whether it is a prohibited second new type ICBM. Again, assuming that the Soviets are incorrect, and it is not a permitted modernization of the SS-13, we again have a proportionate response in hand, the Midgetman missile. In my judgment, this is in our national security interests in any event.

The minority report on this resolution seeks to make a major issue out of the overall limit of 2,504 delivery vehicles. But a compilation of the Soviet SALT accountable forces included in the JCS posture statement for fiscal year 1987 yield a total of 2,477. Only when you add backfires and SS-N-5S, which are clearly not SALT accountable, do they exceed 2,504. Even if you believe ACDA, it is of minimal military significance.

The irony is that with this new policy, we no longer have to worry about violations at all. There is nothing left to violate.

This is the fatal flaw of the Broomfield amendment. It makes no distinction between a felony and a misdemeanor. Under this philosophy, we would impose the death penalty for jaywalking. It would quite clearly gut the resolution.

Let us not be foolish. We do not reject bills, because we do not like one tangential clause. We weigh the overall benefits. Let me submit that the overall policy we have followed for the last 5½ years is preferable to a leap into the unknown. We can adopt proportionate responses where violations have occurred, without abandoning our security interests. I wholeheartedly urge the adoption of the resolution and rejection of the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. GEKAS].

Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will you not come home, Max Kampelman? We do not need you in Geneva. The House of Representatives' majority has chosen to negotiate arms reduction and arms agreements. Will you not come home, Ed Rowny? What are you doing trying to execute the directions of the President of the United States? The House of Representatives does not need you. It wants to negotiate directly with the Soviet Union. Will you not come home, Paul Nitze, and abandon your responsibilities, because as an advisor to the President of the United States, you have no role to perform; it is the House of Representatives who wants to substitute for your role as advisor to the President on disarmament.

Will you not come home, negotiators, who, first of all, went to Geneva because the House of Representatives felt it necessary that we put in place a disarmament procedure that called upon the President to proceed with talks in Geneva, to proceed with direct negotiations with the Soviet Union, but now it is saying will you not come home, negotiators, will you not come home; we do not need you. We have a Committee of the Whole of 435 Members of the House who want to go to Geneva and sit down and negotiate directly with the Soviet Union. Will you not come home, negotiators?

Mr. AUCOIN. If Kampelman did come home and our negotiators come home, how would the gentleman be able to tell the difference?

Mr. GEKAS. That is a question not worthy of response, because it is you who voted in the past in many ways and in many avenues to produce a negotiating team in Geneva, and now you want to abandon it.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from North Dakota.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. The gentleman is surely not suggesting it inappropriate for the House of Representatives to offer advice to the President, is he?

Mr. GEKAS. Offering advice is one thing. To substitute for the negotiating field is another. And I deem the resolution without the Broomfield amendment as taking the role of the President of the United States and tearing it to shreds.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my very good friend and our distinguished colleague, the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE].

Mr. LEVINE of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Let me, Mr. Chairman, refer briefly to two aspects of the Broomfield amendment which I believe bear some greater scrutiny than they have received thus far. First, in terms of how realistic this amendment is, let us put together some analogies that are not in the arms control arena but which I think can help us put into context precisely how realistic this amendment might be.

By demanding Soviet compliance with all provisions all of the time, the gentleman's amendment simply sets unrealistic standards. Do we abandon, for example, the 55-mile-an-hour speed limit because some drivers abuse it? Of course not. We try to enforce it, so that we can continue to drive with reasonable safety.

Moving to another area, do we stop fishing and swimming in our lakes because some of them are polluted? Of course not. We work to reduce the pollution, so we can enjoy our lakes.

Do we close down our schools because children sometimes misbehave or do not get the kind of education that we would like in some of the schools? Of course not. We strive to teach our children to improve their behavior and we strive for the highest quality of educational excellence.

And, similarly, in arms control, Mr. Chairman, do we abandon SALT, as the gentleman's amendment effectively does, because the Soviets are violating some of its provisions while complying with most of its provisions? Of course not. Rather, we embark upon a variety of measures to make the Soviets more responsible and more accountable for their misdeeds.

Second, Mr. Chairman, let me move into the area of how our European friends and allies respond to this extraordinary important subject. I have been sitting on the floor for an hour, and I have not heard reference to the importance of this subject from the point of view of our friends and our allies in Western Europe. And yet our European allies have expressed both outrage and fear over the President's decision to abandon the SALT agreements and are deeply concerned about any type of a process such as this one which would essentially gut our commitment to SALT and begin the process of eroding the support that we have traditionally given to arms control.

This decision on May 27 to jettison SALT has badly strained U.S. relations with our European allies. The European members of NATO have been virtually unanimous in critizing the administration's announcement that it

would break away from the SALT agreements at the end of the year.

Responding to President Reagan's recent decision for example, even his close friend, Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain, said, "The SALT II Agreements should continue to be observed by both sides." And West German Chancellor Kohl has also urged the President to stay within the boundaries of the treaty.

At a recent NATO meeting of foreign ministers, allied representatives repeatedly warned that the President's decision would have serious consequences in Western Europe and strengthen the case of those arguing that the United States has no genuine interest in arms control.

The European allies, Mr. Chairman, regard the President's willingness to exceed the SALT limits as highly detrimental to their security. They fear that the President has abandoned arms control and that an all-out arms race could ensue. They fear that such an arms race increases tensions and raises the prospect of war which the Europeans fear and have good reasons to fear could be fought primarily in Western Europe. They fear that increased tensions between East and West will tend to polarize European societies, create political tensions, and undermine the necessary consensus for defense efforts. They fear that the Soviet Union, responding to an accelerated arms race, could choose to increase its intermediate range SS-20 deployments, which Europeans find particularly threatening to their security and deterrent capabilities. They fear as a consequence of abandoning SALT, the European antinuclear movement might gain new life and again directly challenge the West European and other allied governments.

In essence, Mr. Chairman, our European allies are deeply distressed by this decision, and deeply distressed they should be. This administration, we have seen, has thus far put together the most abysmal record on arms control of any administration subsequent to World War II.

This May 27 decision of the President does not serve a single American interest. It does not serve a strategic interest. It does not serve a foreign policy interest, it does not serve a security or defense interest, it does not serve a diplomatic interest. In essence, Mr. Chairman, this decision signals to the world that in the fight between the moderates in this administration and the extreme hard liners who essentially believe that any agreement that the Soviets might sign is an agreement by definition that we should not sign, it signals to the world the abandonment of any movement toward arms control and the defeat of the moderates at the hands of the extremists within the administration.

I want to commend the distinguished chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for the timeliness with which he sponsored this resolution and so expeditiously brought it before the full committee and the full House for consideration. This is an important effort, because clearly there is a crying need for Congress to do all we can to ensure U.S. compliance with SALT. House Concurrent Resolution 350 represents a major bipartisan foreign policy statement in support of meaningful arms control as part of U.S. national security policy.

Mr. Chairman, this administration has not shown an adequate commitment to arms control. In fact, its record is abysmal. It has not negotiated one arms control agreement since it took office in 1981. This is the worst record of any administration since the nuclear arms race began. This already awful record was made even worse by the May 27 announcement by the Reagan administration of its intention to abandon SALT II unless the Soviets take drastic moves to improve compliance with existing treaties.

In response to the administration's announcement, the Soviet Union warned that it would abandon the SALT II treaty and other strategic accords if the United States does not comply with them.

Clearly, there are compliance problems. Soviet encryption of telemetry, production of the SS-25, and the Krasnoyarsk radar station raise serious questions about Soviet compliance which must be properly addressed. But threats to abandon SALT will not accomplish that result. Nor will it encourage any other kind of accommodation between the two superpowers. In fact, abandoning SALT undermines our own interests for the following reasons:

First, unlike the United States, the Soviets keep open their missile production lines. This means they can quickly increase the number of their warheads and we cannot quickly increase ours.

Second, the Soviets have already deactivated or destroyed more than 1,000 missiles in order to comply with SALT. The United States has had to destroy less than 100. If both sides continue to adhere to SALT, the Soviets will have to dismantle and destroy far more launchers than will we in the next several years.

So far, we have destroyed 48 nuclear launchers and have announced the destruction of 3 nuclear submarines in order to comply with SALT II limits. The Soviets meanwhile have destroyed over 400 launchers and 14 submarines.

Third, Congress has passed the Gramm-Rudman balanced budget law, which limits U.S. spending ability. The Soviet leadership has no such constraints.

Fourth, the President's unilateral decision illustrates a disturbing tendency of this administration to make significant foreign policy and arms control decisions without adequate consultation with our allies. Not a single ally has supported the President's plan to abandon the treaty, and many have soundly and justifiably criticized this decision.

Fifth, abandonment of SALT could jeopardize a second summit between President Reagan and Soviet leader Gorbachev.

If the President carries out his intention to abandon the SALT treaty, he will also abandon the moral high ground on an issue of vital interest to the United States, our allies, and the future of the world.

Those of us in Congress who are deeply committed to arms control must do all we can to ensure U.S. compliance with SALT, notwithstanding the President's misguided decision. That is why this resolution is so important. We must go on record as strongly supporting continued compliance with SALT, and we must do all we can legislatively to ensure that goal.

I urge my colleagues to reject the Broomfield amendment and support this resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE], I would just like to say that he certainly approved of the President's incursion into Libya. Europe did not. We do not always resonate to the posturing that Europe takes on our national security interests, and I am glad we do not.

Second, the Broomfield amendment has more respect for the SALT Treaty than the amendment offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL]. All they concern themselves with are numerical limits. This amendment by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] concerns the entire document.

□ 1455

To permit, as the gentleman would do, the Soviet Union to pick and choose which provisions it will choose to respond to and which it will violate, makes the whole notion of an agreement a joke. The Broomfield amendment does not gut SALT; this reinforces SALT. Have you ever heard of substantial compliance? Have you ever heard of flexible compliance?

Why should we be obligated to obey a treaty any more stringently than the Soviet Union?

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to how much time is remaining on both sides.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] has 24 minutes remaining and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 32 minutes remaining.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LUNGREN].

Mr. LUNGREN. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me this time.

Mr. Chairman, listening to the debate leads me to believe that the President of the United States, the man who occupies the Oval Office today, must be doing everything wrong. Certainly, the words we have heard uttered in this Chamber from the other side of the aisle suggest the American people do not support this President, and certainly would not support someone who is inept, who is incompetent, who has no commitment toward peace in the world.

Yet, I read an article just yesterday in the paper that the Gallup Poll has just suggested that Ronald Reagan has the strongest sustained support of the American people of any President in the history of poll taking.

That does not suggest to me that we always take polls to find out exactly what we should do, but it does suggest to me that either Ronald Reagan is doing something right or the American people have been duped and do not understand the incompetence and the ineptitude that the distinguished Members on the other side of the aisle have been able to determine.

I am not on the Foreign Relations Committee; I do not consider myself an expert in that regard. I am on the Judiciary Committee; I have practiced law. I do understand something about contracts. I do understand something about negotiation. If you go to the table and say to the person with whom you are attempting an agreement, a contract, a treaty if you will; "We will not allow violations except if you are the ones that violate, and we will go to something called quasi-violations, miniviolations, something-alleged violations," I am not going to do a very good job serving my clients.

The President of the United States and the people he sent to negotiate are in essence those representing the U.S. interests as given to them by the Constitution. What we are doing here is not doing anything to those who have violated the treaty; what we are doing is saying to our own negotiator, our President of the United States, with his constitutional powers, "We are going to wound you before you go back to the negotiating table." In some way that is going to require the other side to stop violating the treaty. It makes no sense whatsoever.

Recently I had the privilege of accompanying Yelena Bonner back to the Soviet Union. At that time, I had to remark on the fact that as she was going back she said, "From freedom to prison." I had to remark that at that time she was going back to a setting in which her Government does not recognize her legitimate rights because her husband and she have spoken out against the violations of the Helsinki accords—remember, that is another treaty the Soviets have put their signature to—she has been taken to another part of the Soviet Union and cut off from friends and family and from participating in the society of the Soviet Union.

Their system is different than ours. They differ very much in terms of their attitudes about human values. So it seems to me that we make a mistake when we go to the negotiating table if we attempt to negotiate with others by ascribing to them the very same values that we have.

What has happened here? They have violated the treaty. This resolution, if you can call it that, does everything it can to excuse those violations; the alleged violations by this administration. It suggests that we are responsible for their alleged violations. It says that if we are only a little more giving in their violations, things will be better. That makes no sense at all.

I do not care whether you are an attorney trying to represent your client or whether you are a negotiator negotiating on the part of the United States, if what you say is you will turn a deaf ear and you will close your eyes to violations of the agreement that you have with another party, you are doing a disservice to the people that you are supposed to represent.

That is what this resolution does. What the Broomfield amendment says is, "If they will follow the treaty, we will follow the treaty." That makes eminent sense in terms of law whether it is domestic or international. We should pass it. We should pass it unanimously.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, which calls on the President to continue abiding by the numerical sublimits of the SALT II arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. I would like to commend the distinguished chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee for his important and farsighted leadership on this matter.

Mr. Chairman, there is a tendency in the kind of partisanship that seems to have evolved from the other side to look at this issue as if it were simply a question of are you for or against the President.

It seems to me that what we are really talking about is the future of humanity. It has been some 40 years now since the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Sometimes I guess it is easy to become frustrated and weary and to decide, "Well, we are just going to move forward heedless and regardless of the consequences."

However, there is no guarantee that those 40 years will extend indefinitely for 400 years or 4,000 years, or for however long humanity has on this planet. It seems to me that we have an obligation to make sure that the steps that we take in fact move toward reducing the chances of an all-out nuclear war rather than making them more likely.

What the President's posture, in walking away from the SALT II sublimitations, does is to bring us very definitely closer to the prospect of a nuclear war.

The Reagan record in regard to arms control is not that people looking at it objectively can take much satisfaction from. When he campaigned in 1980, he already had marked the SALT II agreements as being fatally flawed. Sometime in the course of his administration he had some second thoughts about it and he stated publicly, "Well, on balance, in fact it helps the United States more than it hurts the United States national security interests."

Now, all of a sudden, he seems to have flip-flopped and switched again. Is that any reason for us, as Members of Congress and the American people to follow him in the reckless rush over the precipice? The numbers that the gentleman from Washington demonstrated with his chart quite clearly indicate that in fact breaking out from SALT II flies directly in the face of America's national interests. There is just no justification on the numbers, there is just no justification on the principles or on the theories for abandoning SALT II.

The fact is that the Russians have adhered to the sublimitations on SALT II up to this point. So have we. We ought to continue to do that, not out of a sense of partisanship, but out of a sense of decent regard for the future of humanity. This is our chance to do that. If we walk away from it, nobody is going to applaud us if we, out of a sense of zeal, feel that the Russians are taking advantage of us, in fact, overstate that position and march headlong over the precipice.

I urge adoption of the resolution offered by the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL].

President Reagan's decision to scrap the SALT II agreement may well be the most dangerous blunder he has yet made. The abandonment of SALT II will not only increase tensions with the Soviet Union and seriously damage the current negotiations in Geneva, but it will likely lead to the unravelling of the entire structure of arms control as we now know it, including the SALT I and ABM Treaties. Further, the decision to scrap SALT II will drive a wedge between the United States and our NATO allies, who have been unanimous in their strong dissent from this dangerously misguided action.

The result of this decision will be a perilous new spriral of the nuclear arms race that will further drain the limited resources of both countries and inch us closer and closer to the ultimate catastrophe of nuclear war.

The arguments in favor of keeping the SALT limits are truly overwhelming. Even those who advocate a sustained military buildup in this Nation should be able to recognize that maintaining the SALT limits is indisputably in our national interest.

To comply with the two SALT treaties, the Soviet Union has dismantled or destroyed over 1,300 systems, including 1,079 ICBM's, 245 SLBM's, 15 bombers, and 21 submarines. By contrast, the United States has dismantled or destroyed 875 systems, including 320 ICBM's, 544 SLBM's and 11 submarines.

The SALT treaties have successfully slowed the nuclear arms race by forcing both sides to

retire weaponry. But this check on the arms race would swiftly disappear should we exceed the SALT limits as the President has suggested.

If we break out of SALT II, the Soviet Union will be poised to exploit the situation by drastically increasing the number of missiles deployed and by placing a far greater number of warheads on existing missiles. The chairman of the House Armed Services Committee has noted that the Soviets have eight "hot" production lines, compared to three for the United States. This means that the Soviets could increase their warhead totals 50 percent faster than the United States over the next 4 years. If SALT II limits remain in place, however, there will be no significant change in the rate of increase of warheads for the remainder of the decade.

If we break out of SALT II, the Soviets will also be able to exploit their ability to rapidly expand the number of warheads on their existing missiles. By 1989, the Soviets could add as many as 7,000 additional ICBM warheads without deploying any additional missiles. This would more than double their current number of warheads. However, if SALT II limits remain in place, the total number of warheads on each side would remain relatively equal for the next 10 years.

In other words, the President's decision to scrap SALT will not only dangerously increase the risk of nuclear conflict, but it will provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to exploit the situation to its own advantage.

By scrapping SALT II, the administration is sending a powerful signal that it is not really interested in cooperating to reduce nuclear arms. Rather, it is opening the door another protracted and fabulously expensive arms race. But neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can afford the consequences of this policy, which threatens to bankrupt both nations and dangerously reduce our security.

For these reasons, I strongly support the resolution of Chairman FASCELL, which calls on the President to continue observing both the numerical sublimits on each category of weapon and the overall limits on delivery vehicles, so long as the Soviets do likewise. I urge my colleagues to support this resolution and not the substitute, which will simply permit the administration to continue with its current misguided policy. And I further urge that this resolution be followed soon by binding restrictions on the administration's behavior should the President remain intransigent on this matter.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. WORTLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Washington. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. WORTLEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of Mr. BROOMFIELD's substitute. It recognizes what the committee bill does not. Namely, that the SALT II Treaty is a comprehensive treaty that includes more than numerical limitations.

Other key provisions of SALT II set an important limitation on the deployment of new ICBM's and ban concealment measures that deliberately impede verification of treaty compliance. The Soviet Union has violated these two provisions.

The United States has made it clear that we know about the Soviet treaty violations. We have given the Soviets time to take corrective action and show their good faith. The Soviets have not responded.

There is no doubt that the United States should continue to adhere to the SALT II Treaty as long as the Soviet Union does so. This is a reasonable and responsible position.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union has until later this year to address its treaty violations before the United States follows its lead and actually ends our compliance with SALT II limitations. This situation puts pressure on the Soviet Union to agree to a summit meeting this year to try to work out a compromise.

Unilateral compromise by the United States, as embodied in the committee's bill, simply says to the Soviets that they are free to violate whatever treaty provisions they wish because the United States will continue to adhere strictly to an unratified treaty regardless of Soviet violations.

This would make a mockery of treaties between the United States and the Soviets. It would undermine current arms reduction negotiations. And it would severely impact confidence in the effectiveness of arms limitation agreements in improving stability and security.

I urge my colleagues to approach this national security issue in a bipartisan spirit and acknowledge the importance of full treaty compliance by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Support the Broomfield substitute.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, everybody in this Chamber wants nuclear arms reductions. Everybody wants to avoid nuclear war, but there is a certain air of unreality about this debate.

Speakers earlier, on both sides of the aisle, agreed that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT II Treaty. They violated it by building and deploying a new weapon: the SS-25. They violated it with their coding. They violating it by exceeding overall numerical limits.

What the Broomfield resolution does is send a message to the Soviet Union, and the message is: "If you keep violating this treaty, we are not going to keep abiding by it. We are going to make decisions based on our national interest. If you abide by SALT II, we will abide by it."

□ 1505

Now the specific weapons decisions are still months off, months down the road. We hope that the Broomfield resolution in effect says, "Soviet Union, stop your violation, but"—says the Broomfield amendment in effect—"we were not born yesterday. The American people do not want us abiding by treaties that work one way."

It is not a bad message, it is a pretty good message. That is why we should support the Broomfield resolution on SALT II.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quroum is not present.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

[Roll No. 183]

Ackerman	Dellums	Howard
Akaka	Derrick	Hoyer
Alexander	DeWine	Hubbard
Anderson	Dickinson	Huckaby
Andrews	Dicks	Hughes
Annunzio	DioGuardi	Hunter
Anthony	Dixon	Hutto
Armey	Donnelly	Hyde
AuCoin	Dorgan (ND)	Ireland
Barnard	Dornan (CA)	Jacobs
Barnes	Dowdy	Jeffords
Bartlett	Downey	Jenkins
Bates	Dreier	Johnson
Bedell	Duncan	Jones (NC)
Beilenson	Durbin	Jones (OK)
Bennett	Dwyer	Jones (TN)
Bentley	Dymally	Kanjorski
Bereuter	Dyson	Kaptur
Berman	Early	Kasich
Bevill	Eckart (OH)	Kemp
Biaggi	Eckert (NY)	Kennelly
Bilirakis	Edgar	Kildee
Bliley	Edwards (CA)	Kleczka
Boehlert	Edwards (OK)	Kolbe
Boggs	Emerson	Kolter
Boland	English	Kostmayer
Boner (TN)	Erdreich	Kramer
Bonior (MI)	Evans (IA)	LaFalce
Bonker	Evans (IL)	Lagomarsino
Borski	Fascell	Lantos
Bosco	Fawell	Latta
Boucher	Fazio	Leach (IA)
Boulter	Feighan	Leath (TX)
Boxer	Fiedler	Lehman (FL)
Brooks	Fields	Leland
Broomfield	Flippo	Lent
Brown (CA)	Florio	Levin (MI)
Brown (CO)	Foglietta	Levine (CA)
Broyhill	Foley	Lewis (CA)
Bruce	Ford (TN)	Lewis (FL)
Bryant	Fowler	Lightfoot
Burton (CA)	Franklin	Lipinski
Burton (IN)	Frenzel	Livingston
Bustamante	Gallo	Lloyd
Byron	Garcia	Loeffler
Callahan	Gaydos	Long
Carney	Gejdenson	Lott
Carper	Gekas	Lowery (CA)
Carr	Gephardt	Lowry (WA)
Chapman	Gibbons	Lujan
Chappell	Gilman	Luken
Chappie	Gingrich	Lundine
Clay	Glickman	Lungren
Clinger	Gonzalez	Mack
Coats	Goodling	MacKay
Cobey	Gordon	Madigan
Coble	Gradison	Manton
Coelho	Gray (IL)	Marlenee
Coleman (MO)	Gray (PA)	Martin (IL)
Collins	Green	Martinez
Combest	Gregg	Matsui
Conte	Gunderson	Mavroules
Conyers	Hall (OH)	Mazzoli
Cooper	Hall, Ralph	McCain
Coughlin	Hamilton	McCandless
Courter	Hammerschmidt	McCloskey
Coyne	Hansen	McCollum
Craig	Hawkins	McCurdy
Crane	Hayes	McDade
Crockett	Hefner	McEwen
Daniel	Heftel	McGrath
Dannemeyer	Hendon	McHugh
Darden	Henry	McKernan
Daschle	Hertel	McMillan
Daub	Hiler	Meyers
de la Garza	Holt	Mica
DeLay	Hopkins	Michel

Miller (CA)	Roberts	Stenholm
Miller (OH)	Robinson	Stokes
Miller (WA)	Roe	Strang
Mineta	Roemer	Stratton
Mitchell	Rogers	Studds
Moakley	Rose	Stump
Molinari	Roth	Sundquist
Mollohan	Roukema	Sweeney
Monson	Rowland (CT)	Swift
Montgomery	Rowland (GA)	Swindall
Moody	Roybal	Synar
Moore	Rudd	Tallon
Moorhead	Russo	Tauke
Morrison (CT)	Sabo	Tauzin
Morrison (WA)	Savage	Taylor
Mrazek	Saxton	Thomas (CA)
Murtha	Schaefer	Thomas (GA)
Myers	Schroeder	Torres
Natcher	Schuette	Torricelli
Neal	Schulze	Towns
Nelson	Schumer	Traficant
Nichols	Seiberling	Traxler
Nielson	Sensenbrenner	Valentine
Nowak	Sharp	Vento
Oakar	Shaw	Visclosky
Oberstar	Shelby	Volkmer
Obey	Shumway	Vucanovich
Olin	Sikorski	Walgren
Ortiz	Siljander	Walker
Owens	Sisisky	Watkins
Oxley	Skeen	Weaver
Packard	Skelton	Weiss
Panetta	Slattery	Wheat
Parris	Slaughter	Whitehurst
Pashayan	Smith (IA)	Whitley
Pease	Smith (NE)	Whittaker
Penny	Smith (NJ)	Whitten
Pepper	Smith, Denny (OR)	Wilson
Perkins	Smith, Robert (NH)	Wirth
Petri	Smith, Robert (OR)	Wise
Pickle	Snowe	Wolf
Porter	Snyder	Wolpe
Price	Solarz	Wortley
Pursell	Solomon	Wright
Quillen	Spence	Wyden
Rahall	Spratt	Wylie
Ray	St Germain	Yates
Regula	Staggers	Yatron
Reid	Stallings	Young (FL)
Richardson	Stangeland	Young (MO)
Ridge		Zschau
Rinaldo		
Ritter		

□ 1515

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred eighty-five Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO].

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, as one who has worked with this administration to fulfill the Skowcroft Commision report recommendations, I rise in strong support of the committee resolution.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard many compelling arguments today based on national security to support this resolution and oppose this substitute.

Our present SALT limits are the only thing standing between us and an unrestricted nuclear arms race, and yet the men of this administration are all aligned against continuing within the limits set forth in SALT II.

This is the only administration in the past 25 years that has failed to make legitimate progress on arms control.

Look at the record:

Mr. Reagan's favorite president to invoke, John F. Kennedy reached an agreement in 1963 on the famous hot line between the United States and the Soviet Union and the far-reaching Limited Test Ban Treaty.

President Johnson brought us in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty, and the following year the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

And under President Richard Nixon, we signed the SALT I agreement and the ABM Treaty in 1972, and in 1974 we signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

President Gerald Ford's administration produced the Vladivostok Agreement in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty in 1976.

And the Carter administration signed the SALT II accords in June 1979.

What a contrast this administration's record is compared with those who have gone before. Those in charge of policy can present us voluminous amounts of proposals and arms control initiatives but can produce not a single agreement.

Republican and Democratic Presidents, Republican and Democratic Secretaries of Defense, Republican and Democratic National Security Advisors all saw the wisdom of reaching arms accords with the Soviets yet the people in charge today see things differently.

When reasoned argument does not sway a mind, when the facts marshalled point to an opposite conclusion, and when commonsense itself is absent, you know you are dealing with an ideologue.

And this administration has more than its fair share.

What do these ideologues believe:

Nuclear superiority is achievable and once achieved it can be put to use.

A counterforce, that is, a first strike capability, is needed and does not destabilize the strategic balance.

Arms control is nothing more than a public relations gambit whose main purpose is to manipulate the public, the Congress, and our allies.

In short, the ideologues believe that when it comes to arms control, a little is bad, but none is better.

We have heard today that SALT and arms control in general has accomplished little or nothing. Let us put that canard to rest.

The reality is arms agreements have accomplished many important goals:

Both sides have firm limits set on the number of offensive missiles that can be deployed.

Both sides have firm limits on the number of destabilizing MIRV'd ICBM's that can be deployed.

Both sides are forbidden from deploying an extensive, destabilizing, defensive system.

Both sides no longer poison the air with surface nuclear tests.

The ideologues have led us to this debate today. They have led us through a series of FITS and START's and all are leading nowhere. Their narrow, one-sided views have triumphed at every turn. The pragmatists aren't heard, in fact now they aren't even around to be heard.

There is a possible solution to the domination of policy by the ideologues. I plan to introduce shortly legislation which upgrades the General Advisory Committee, which is now an adjunct to ACDA. Under this administration, the existing Commission has become an inquisition for any ideas remotely smacking of arms control accords. Its members are in stark contract to prior administration appointees who have been centrist, bipartisan, and distinguished in their fields.

An independent Commission, composed of some of the best minds in America, focused on our strategic relationship with the Soviets will provide the much needed continuity to our policy from administration to administration.

For right now I urge my colleagues to support this resolution which sends a very clear message to the administration that the peoples' representatives will not support a run away arms race.

America desperately deserves the restoration of the bipartisan spirit that has guided our arms control and military weapons policy since the Second World War. As one who has joined with the administration in the past to find common ground, I speak out of frustration and disappointment for a clear rejection of their initiative to end compliance with SALT II.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. BONKER].

Mr. BONKER. Mr. Chairman, the prospects for strategic arms control are dreadfully bleak. The Geneva negotiations are stalemated. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty [ABM], the keystone of the arms control framework created over 24 years by five Presidents, faces increasing jeopardy. And last month, the President repudiated the unratified SALT II Treaty in announcing his decision to violate its limits this year.

If there were any illusions remaining about the administration's arms control policy, they should be completely dispelled by now. President Reagan's decision on SALT II culminates a 5-year effort to dismantle a strategic arms control framework which was painstakingly built by the past five administrations. As of May 27, 14 years and 1 day after the SALT I Treaty was signed in Mosow, we are back to square 1 in our efforts to make the world a little bit safer from the threat of nuclear weapons.

The bitter irony lies in the administration's assertion that SALT II must be abandoned because of Soviet reluctance to join in a "framework of truly mutual restraint." Yet when faced with an adversary which the administration claims has been engaged in the greatest military buildup in history, the President has now determined that it is in our interest to remove the only remaining constraints on an unlimited Soviet buildup.

And there is no doubt that SALT II has constrained a Soviet strategic buildup. Since the signing of SALT II in 1979, the United States has maintained a constant level of about 1,000 strategic weapons above that of the Soviets. SALT II has forced the Soviets to remove more than 1,000 land-based missiles, 250 sea-based missiles, and a dozen submarines from its strategic arsenal while we have had to destroy less than 100.

What is more curious about the administration's decision is that abandoning SALT II will probably hurt us more than the Russians and endanger both nations. To begin with, the

Soviet Union, with its eight hot production lines and its greater throw weight advantages is in a position to quickly deploy much larger numbers of warheads than we are. Second, if both countries continue to abide by the treaty, the Soviets will have to dismantle and destroy far more launchers than we will in the next several years.

Some have argued that an arms race would break the Soviet economy. It is easy to forget, however, that the Soviet leadership need not build a political consensus to assign their military budget top priority. We, on the other hand, must deal with fiscal constraints that have forced us to cut back on important social programs to fund an unprecedented military buildup. As instances of waste, fraud, and abuse within the military establishment have come to light, growing numbers of Americans have questioned the wisdom of our defense policy.

In making the decision to break out of SALT, the administration has also blatantly ignored the advice of our NATO allies and the U.S. Congress where 221 members and 53 Senators asked the President to continue abiding by SALT. Such a step undermines confidence in the superpowers ability to restrain the arms race in even the most limited ways and makes a lie of our professed desire to end the arms race.

Finally, the decision to scrap SALT II is based on what may be a tragic miscalculation of the Soviets' probable response. Instead of correcting their violations to the treaty, the Soviets may see the lifting of the SALT II limitations in combination with an aggressive American effort to build a missile defense system as a signal to build offensive weapons as quickly as possible.

There is no question that we must respond to Soviet violations of SALT II, but the issue of treaty violations is a complex one. Both we and the Russians have accused the other of such actions. While some of the administration's claims appear to be justified, none of the alleged violations are of major military significance. The correct response, and the one taken by the four previous Presidents, is making full use of diplomatic channels to resolve disputes. If necessary we should make proportional responses that leave the substantial sections of the treaty intact while sending a message of displeasure to the Soviets concerning their violations.

This administration, however, seems more interested in challenging the Soviets to an arms race than in settling real disputes. Some of the President's key advisers seem to genuinely believe that the basic character and motivation of the Soviet regime make it impossible to work out a practical compromise.

In this view, arms control only serves to constrain us while allowing the Soviets to edge ahead of us in an escalating arms race. The ABM treaty could well be the next victim of this ideology. SALT II didn't stand in the way of a single American program and it was scrapped. The ABM Treaty stands in the way of the President's star wars pipedream—destabilizing, untested proposal that could be the most costly American program in the history of the arms race.

The strategic defense initiative [SDI] is just the latest and most extreme example of this administration's propensity to focus on nuclear superiority as a measure of America's strength. I am concerned that SDI supporters have come to see the program as a way for the United States to exploit its technological superiority over the Soviet Union and to spend our superpower rival into submission. Not only does this attitude preclude the possibility for meaningful negotiations with the Soviets, but the illusory search for superiority fuels an arms race that allienates our allies and undermines the health of our Nation.

During the past 6 years, we as a Nation have engaged in an unprecedented military buildup that has cost the Nation $1.5 trillion, more than double the defense spending total for the previous 6 years. Defense spending went up 45.8 percent after inflation from fiscal year 1979 to fiscal year 1986. At the same time, our Nation's deficit has almost tripled, rising from $73.8 billion to more than $200 billion in 1986 and the proportion of the Federal budget devoted to nondefense descretionary spending has dropped from 24.5 percent in 1980 to 17 percent in 1986.

Yet even in the face of these numbers, the administration wants to embark on a $1 trillion star wars program in the coming years. At a time when one out of every five of America's children is living in poverty such excess is shameful.

It is time to remind ourselves that we are a strong and powerful nation not just because we are able to build weapons of mass destruction. We are strong because of our commitment to democracy, to "Government of the people, by the people and for the people," as President Abraham Lincoln told his listeners in his Gettysburg Address. When we let our children suffer the indignity of poverty, ill-health and poor education, we steal not only their futures but the future of America.

I am a strong supporter of House Concurrent Resolution 350 which represents a major bipartisan foreign policy statement in support of meaningful arms control as part of our national security policy. The resolution stipulates that continued U.S. adherence to the SALT agreements is conditional upon Soviet adherence. I am also a cosponsor of legislation that would limit the deployment and maintenance of our strategic nuclear weapons consistent with existing arms limitation agreements. Both pieces of legislation explicitly reject the administration's strategic arms control policy.

The administration argues that the arms control limits imposed by SALT II chain us to agreements which are counter to our national security needs. In reality, such limits are tenuous threads which prevent an unconstrained arms race. The President's decision on SALT II has brought our arms contol policy to the foreground of the national debate. It should also force us to reexamine our definition of national security. Are we further from nuclear war then we were 6 years and $1.5 trillion ago? Are we closer to a real arms control agreement?

In the past, we have equated military spending with security. Now we must expand our definition of national security to include policies which address our educational, social and international needs. We must work for mutually beneficial arms control agreements that limit and ultimately reduce our nuclear arsenals. We must strengthen our social and educational programs so that our children can appreciate and utilize our democratic system. We must seek solutions to the crisis in the developing world so that those nations choose the West as their model. Instead of abandoning the few existing agreements we share with the Soviets, we should expand on them, seeking always to end the threat of war.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. BERMAN].

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Chairman, it is high time my colleagues across the aisle asked the President and asked themselves what is the true nature of national security. I fear they have forgotten it.

The President's decision to dump the SALT Treaty is self-defeating in the extreme. It could be considered ludicrous if its consequences were not so dangerous. Letting the Soviet Union out of its obligation to keep its nuclear forces below certain levels only unties its hands. The numbers speak for themselves.

If the SALT limits were in force, the United States would be obligated to dismantle 74 Minuteman III ICBM's when it converts some of its B-52's to carry air-launched cruise missiles later this year. If, instead of dismantling the 74 ICBM's, the United States disregards the numerical limits in SALT II and keeps the missiles, the United States will gain 222 warheads—that's a 2-percent increase in the size of the U.S. strategic arsenal.

And what will the decision do for Soviet national security and Soviet force posture? Quite a lot as it happens. For starters, the U.S.S.R. has the ability immediately to convert one of its heavy ICBM's—the SS-18—from a 10-warhead missile to a 14-warhead missile. With 308 of these behemoths already deployed, that's an additional 1,232 warheads—or a 13-percent increase in strategic warheads. The new deployments represent by themselves a 7 to 1 Soviet advantage in warheads, a 9 to 1 Soviet advantage in megatonnage, and a 20 to 1 Soviet advantage in hard target kill capability. And that is just the short-term cost of this new policy. Where is the national security advantage in that, Mr. President?

Abiding by the numerical limits in SALT II as long as the Soviets will do likewise makes strategic sense—and many of our Nation's most respected military officers have told us so. Gen. Bennie Davis, commander in chief of the Strategic Air Command in March 1985, told the Congress:

"The Soviet Union, due to its production base, has an enormous capability to field systems. If they were to break out of the treaty limits of SALT II, the disparity between the number of warheads held by the Soviet Union and the United States would be significant * * *. Any action by the Soviet Union which would change the nuclear balance so dramatically could adversely affect strategic stability * * *. I have made the assessment privately today that we should abide by the SALT II limitations."

Circumstances have not changed since General Davis made that statement.

The President says the Soviets have violated certain provisions of the SALT II Treaty. And so they have. But the President proposes

that the United States scrap not those provisions, and not other provisions which might give the United States a strategic advantage, but he would give up limits in those very areas where we are least likely in the near term to compete successfully with the Soviet Union and where the consequences of such a competition promise to pose the greatest threat to strategic stability. I think the Nation is owed an explanation of the strategic rationale behind this imprudent decision.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN].

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, in considering the fate of the SALT II, I believe two critical issues must be addressed. The first is, are we more secure with the SALT limits than without? The second is, what will be the impact of abandoning the SALT limits on the U.S. position in the world and within the NATO Alliance? I think it is clear that the answers to both those questions require that we maintain our adherence to the SALT II Treaty.

To the issue of U.S. security, I echo the sentiments of many of my colleagues who have spoken today. We are more secure—dramatically more secure—with SALT than without. The SALT Treaty sets important limits on the number and type of strategic nuclear systems that each side may possess. The Soviets are far more able to break out of those limits than we are. Their missile production lines are constantly operative. Ours are not. They are unconcerned by domestic opinion. We are guided by it.

If we abandon SALT II, the Soviets surely will break out of the limits of production. And they will do so with the newest, and most destabilizing weapons in their arsenal. In testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee on which I sit, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency testified last week that, unconstrained by SALT, the Soviets could add 5,000 more warheads to their arsenal in the next 8 years than they would be allowed under SALT.

I need not point out that the United States, both budgetary constraints and public opinion demands of us restraint, not growth, in defense spending. A new arms race fueled by a sudden absence of control is simply not compatible with those demands—or with our national security.

On the second question, that of our position in NATO, I am greatly troubled by the prospect of turning our back on the SALT Treaty. Indeed, we may have already handed the propaganda advantage to the Soviets.

Instead of capitalizing on world discontent over the Soviets' handling of the Chernobyl disaster, President Reagan chose to announce—over the vehement protest of every one of our allies—that the SALT II Treaty is dead. There is no more divisive issue in Europe than the arms race. While we sit securely at one end of that race, our allies are caught squarely in the middle of it.

But instead of considering the impact of our allies of a precipitous decision to abandon SALT II, we ignored it. European opinion must not be so easily set-aside. In many ways, it affects our security as dramatically as any actions taken by the Soviets.

Prime Minister Thatcher, the President's staunchest ally in Europe, faces an opposition in the next British election that favors removing all American nuclear missiles from British soil: A decision which would have a clear and negative impact on our security and the alliance. If we continue to convey the impression that we are not committed to the alliance, not committed to arms control, that we prefer as one British official stated, "to believe that SALT is bad, and military build-up is good," we risk losing critical support among pro-American leaders in Europe—something that cannot help the NATO Alliance, nor the security of Europe or the United States.

American national security is made up of important components. Stability in the arms race and our international position with respect to the Soviets are among the most important of those considerations. Abandoning SALT II cannot enhance those considerations and risks crippling them. It is irresponsible to American security to declare an end to SALT II as a way to retaliate for suggested Soviet violations. Such a precipitous decision will in the end make us all less secure.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KOSTMAYER].

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. BLILEY].

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to House Concurrent Resolution 350. Although nonbinding on the President, House Concurrent Resolution 350 is an unwarranted and unjustified attempt to usurp the constitutionally mandated Presidential prerogative in foreign policy matters.

Arms control treaties and possible arms reduction treaties are within the purview of the President to negotiate and forward to the Senate for ratification if an agreement is reached. In this case we have the House of Representatives attempting to require the President to limit his requests for defense programs to stay within the restraints of an unratified treaty that would have expired in 1984 if it had ever been ratified and which the Soviet Union has violated since the day that it was signed.

The SALT II treaty was a poor effort to limit the incessant strategic buildup of the Soviet Union over the preceding 15 years. I believe that the provisions of that treaty were flawed from the start and never should have been agreed to by our negotiators or signed by President Carter. The Senate agreed with this assessment of SALT II by its failure to ratify the treaty in 1979.

Instead of limiting the breakneck speed of the Soviet build-up SALT II has allowed that nation to proceed with its aim of achieving strategic superiority over the free world and to put itself into a position to rapidly expand its arsenal at any moment. The verification section of SALT II was possibly the worst part of the entire document. Even the most fanatic advocate of arms treaties now agrees that the Soviets have and continue to violate several parts of the SALT II Treaty and we have been unable to even get them to admit this fact in over 5 years of negotiations at the committee set up to adjudicate complaints and violations.

The Soviets flaunt their ability to violate treaties and then to stonewall us when we complain. Our own negotiate at any price advocates would have us believe that Soviet violations are unimportant and do not threaten our security. This is such a bunch of nonsense that I will not even address it except to say that the Soviets know they are violating the treaty and they are not fools enough to risk being caught if they did not think that the potential gains from their violations were more than worth the risk. The result of the violations may not be instantly threatening or apparent, but the reality of the Soviet actions puts them several years ahead of us in developing a new generation of missiles and a new concept of missile defense.

If the United States were to dedicate itself today to catching up to the Soviet Union in strategic systems we would have to strain our budget for 10 years to do so. That is the result of SALT II and our blind acceptance of that flawed treaty's provisions while allowing the Soviets to violate it with impunity.

Mr. Chairman, SALT II is dead. It is not dead because of anything that this Congress or our President has done. It is dead because of the Soviet Union's constant and continuing refusal to live up to the terms of any treaty that it signs. Even though I believe that SALT II was not a good deal I would still be willing to abide by its restrictions if the Soviets would, too. They have not. They will not. And we cannot allow ourselves to be put in jeopardy because of adherence to a document that our adversaries are not adhering to and which put us at a disadvantage from the start.

The United States has not violated a single provision of SALT II at this time. We will not possibly exceed any limitations until late this year. The Congress has the power of the purse strings and can stop any action of the President that it wants to if enough Members disagree with the President. There is no need for the Congress to attempt this irresponsible action of presumptively second-guessing the President before any action has even taken place.

There is more than enough time for the Soviet Union to begin to negotiate in earnest and in good faith toward true arms reduction. I want arms reduction. President Reagan wants real arms reduction. General Secretary Gorbachev says that he wants real arms reduction. Now is the time and here is the opportunity. The carrot of a new and verifiable treaty is waiting for the Soviets in Geneva. The stick of a dead SALT II Treaty has now been put forth as an incentive to move forward with dispatch.

Mr. Chairman, I will not support any effort to undermine the President's authority to conduct foreign policy and negotiations with other countries. I believe that the result of passing House Concurrent Resolution 350 as it is now written would do serious harm to our constitutional form of government and lessen our chances for success at Geneva. Let us leave the mistakes of the past in the past and let us move together into a future of fewer nuclear

weapons and true verifiability so that all the peoples of the world can be more secure and less threatened by a nation which has shown contempt for anything less than a strong and united front of opposition to its uninterrupted push for power and expansion.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEHMAN].

Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, as we discuss the issue of abandoning a very important Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, we are forced to imagine a world without restrictions on the development, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons. We are facing a decision today of scrapping a treaty that the United States and the Soviet Union have chosen to comply with since 1979. The SALT II Treaty has kept a lid on an arms race with the Soviets. By abandoning the SALT II agreements, we are destroying the only strategic offensive weapons agreements we have with the Soviet Union and closing the door on maintaining some semblance of strategic arms control.

For 15 years, Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter carefully laid out a plan for controlling a competition in strategic missiles and bombers. It is important to remember that along with restrictions on the number of offensive weapons, President Nixon managed to persuade the Soviets to sign an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty which strictly limits the deployment of a defensive system. If we are worried about a nuclear arms buildup by the Soviets, why would we want to destroy the only constraints placed on them to not open up their production lines?

The decision by the administration to toss aside the treaty was based on Soviet violations which, incidentally, officials in the administration do not feel are militarily significant. However, by abandoning the treaty, we remove the only vehicle we have to check on further violations of the treaty or track Soviet activities in the development and deployment of new strategic forces. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, said that—

Responding to Soviet violations by scrapping SALT is tantamount to reacting to an increase in the crime rate by abolishing the criminal code.

The SALT II Treaty has forced the Soviets to dismantle some 50,000 nuclear warheads, including 22,000 strategic weapons. If we tell the Soviets that we will no longer want this treaty, what will prevent them from creating new weapons without dismantling existing ones? Let's not let SALT II die and give birth to an intensifying arms race in strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Instead, let's keep the one strategic arms control agreement in existence on the books and strive for a spirit of arms reduction.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. FOGLIETTA].

Mr. FOGLIETTA. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of House Concurrent Resolution 350, the Fascell resolution in support of SALT II.

Mr. Chairman, too many times in the history of this administration we have been confronted by acts which defy rational explanation. The President's announcement that SALT II is finished is only the latest of those acts. Instead of taking the high ground in international affairs and adhering to SALT despite possible Soviet violations, the administration has chosen to try and out-do them. Rather than recognize that it is the United States which benefits from maintaining the SALT limits, not the Soviets, the administration has chosen to throw out our own national security so that it could smack the Russians on the wrist.

It is the Soviets who are ready to escalate the arms race, not the United States. It is the Soviets who will reap the propaganda advantage from the American decision to kill SALT, not the United States. By abandoning SALT, we diminish the significance of the Soviet violations which the administration claims led them to their decision. By abandoning SALT, we leave the impression that it is the Soviets, not the United States, who are truly interested in arms control. Sadly, there appears to be some truth in that impression.

The administration has caved in to the hardliners who oppose arms control simply for the sake of opposing it. By giving over the reins of policymaking to the radical right, the administration has taken an action which makes us less, not more secure. The Fascell resolution is an important first step toward restoration of some sense in U.S. policymaking. I urge every Member of the House to support it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. CARNEY].

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, throughout the debate Members have referred to the "treaty" as a treaty. We have referred to the SALT II Treaty as a treaty. I would just like to remind the American public that indeed we do not have a treaty because when the agreement was made between the President of the United States and the Soviet Union, it was submitted to the Senate and the Senate never ratified the agreement, so we do not have a treaty.

Indeed, the President, then Jimmy Carter, withdrew the SALT II Treaty, so we do not have the treaty that we have referred to time and time again.

A couple of years ago the President had agreed in order to maintain some type of continuity to follow the protocols of the SALT II agreement of 1979 in order to prevent runaway arms buildups between the United States and the Soviet Union while the two nations negotiated reductions of arms through the START negotiations.

We agreed that we would hold to the numerical limitations and at that time it was sensible to do so, but we also said that the Soviet Union must comply.

□ 1530

Obviously, they have not. They have violated that agreement on at least three different occasions. We have not. I find it awfully difficult to go back to my constituents and say to them that we should continue to adhere to this agreement while the Soviets violate it.

It is not in the interest of our national defense to do such a thing. But more than that, it is not in the interest of our negotiating team to do that. It is a sign of weakness that our negotiating team will not be able to overcome, if we are going to continue to conform to this informal agreement while the Soviet Union violates it constantly.

So I would urge my colleagues to reject the resolution and support the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AUCOIN].

Mr. AUCOIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, let me address my colleagues who may be thinking of voting against SALT. In 1960, John Kennedy was sent to the White House in part because he tagged a Republican administration with creating a missile gap. It turns out that gap did not exist, but let me tell my colleagues something today: If we kill SALT II, my friends, by 1988 there will be a real missile gap, a gap between the Soviets actually in 1988 and what they would have had if we as Americans would have stood with SALT II.

Let me tell my colleagues about that 1988 missile gap. If we break out of SALT II, by 1988 the most it can do for us is give us 74 Minuteman missiles, which we then would not have to retire. That is only 222 warheads.

But for the Soviets, the least that the Broomfield amendment would do is let them raise their heavy ICBM warheads from 10 to 14. This will give them about 1,200 new Soviet warheads against the approximately 200 additional United States warheads by 1988.

So a "no" SALT vote will help the Soviet Union six times as much as it helps us, and those Soviet warheads, my friends, those Broomfield Republican warheads, the SS-18 warheads, are the absolute best in the Soviet arsenal, the most lethal in the Soviet arsenal and the most accurate warheads the Soviets have ever made.

If we also look at the megatonnage that the Broomfield amendment helps the Soviet SS-18's, the Soviets then get 13 times as much out of this killing of the SALT policy as we do.

Dropping SALT would be one of the bonehead plays of all time. We would shoot ourselves in the foot like no nation in history has ever done before. Compared to dropping SALT, the building of the Maginot Line was an act of military genius.

Let us not create a Republican missile gap. Let us not create any missile gap. Let us face reality. We are better off from a security standpoint with SALT II than without it. Let us protect American security by preserving arms control and passing this reduction.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE].

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, in lieu of the nonyielding of my friend over there, if we break out of SALT, does the gentleman not know that the Soviets have broken out a long time ago? They have a rash of breakouts, the SS-25, encryption.

Why is the gentleman only concerned about our restraint and totally ignores their nonrestraint?

Second, the gentleman talks about a Republican missile gap. There is a missile gap. The Soviets have 308 SS-18's. We have yet to see an MX on the ground. They have 72 SS-25's. That is a brand new missile, in massive violation of SALT.

So the question of redundancy never occurs to the gentleman. They can outproduce us with more missiles. I thought we already both had enough to blow each other up.

So the gentleman's arguments are sound and fury, signifying nothing.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON].

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I apologize to my colleagues for my voice.

Mr. Chairman, I frankly do not have the vaguest idea why we are here. I understand the issue, and I do not know why this House is considering it at this time. This issue was considered at length, in full debate, according to the constitutional prerogatives of the U.S. Senate and they decided not to ratify this treaty.

Now what are we doing? Years later we are coming right here on the floor of the House of Representatives, way beyond our constitutional mandate, and we are considering that we should unilaterally abide by a treaty that was rejected by the other body and we should do so in the face of flagrant violations of the Soviet Union of that same treaty which they engaged in.

Let us get some credibility here. Let us get our feet on the ground. Let us understand that we are unilaterally tying our hands behind our back, notwithstanding the fact that the Krasnoyarsk radar, the SS-25's, are violations by the Soviet Union of this treaty, notwithstanding the fact that we are going to go ahead and not worry about the Soviet Union's violations, the same country that pledged free access in and out of Berlin and then built the Berlin Wall, notwithstanding the fact that that is a country that said it would not put offensive missiles in Cuba and then turned around and tried to 25 years ago.

It is the same country that signed treaties of friendship with Hungary and Czechoslovakia and then invaded those countries. It is the same country that invaded Afghanistan and signed the Helsinki accords and proceeded since to crush human rights at home and deny thousands of their own citizens to emigrate. It is the same country that lied to us about flight 007 and lied to us about the Chernobyl disaster and expects us to believe that they have the best intentions in the world of complying with the SALT accords.

I just want to sum up by saying that we have well-intentioned people who come before this House and say, "Well, we should abide by the SALT Treaty because otherwise we are going to have nuclear proliferation." Ladies and gentlemen, we have nuclear proliferation. We have it on the other side. We do not have the MX yet. We do not have any of the missiles that we are entitled to build because the same people who are advancing this misbegotten cause today are the ones who keep us from building and keeping up with our prerogatives under the SALT Treaty.

Let us not tie our hands. Let us not unilaterally abandon the mandate that we have under the Constitution to represent our people and keep this Nation free. Let us vote down this bill today.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 20 minutes remaining and the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] has 16½ minutes remaining.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

□ 1540

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, earlier in general debate, I resubmitted for our current perusal and for scholars of the future, something that I worked on for most of 1981 and 1982, my third term in this Chamber, violations by the Soviet Union of SALT I, ABM, SALT II.

I went to, with my staff aide, Senate records, House speeches, extensions of remarks, floor remarks, to glean from the public record every violation of some significance that I could possibly find. I took this document, and it had 57 violations on it, I called the Pentagon and I called my friend, then the National Security Adviser, Bill Clarke, and I asked him to look over these 57 violations to see if inadvertently I would be releaking something that should not have been put in the Senate RECORD or spoken on the Senate floor or this House Chamber that really would hurt any of our intelligence activities, to see if all of this was truly in the public record.

After 3 or 4 days, the military people at the Pentagon called me and Bill Clarke called me down to the White House, gave me back the research and said, "There is nothing in here that the American people should not know about."

Now this debate revolving around arms control in that year, building up to the nuclear freeze debate which took place in this Chamber, that I was not to be part of, reached the height of public awareness in the most unusual way. The liberals in this country, cheered on by the liberals in this House, somehow or other picked as their champion an actor, Paul Newman. That is fair; we had an actor with a pretty good career who was President of the United States then.

Our side ended up with a very decent American, another superstar, Charleton Heston. On an ABC coast-to-coast program, Charleton Heston, in a debate with Paul Newman, and all the critics on both sides said that Newman had not done his homework and that Charleton Heston had, Charleton Heston hands to actor, Paul Newman, my list of 67 violations. He said, "Paul, I think you ought to take a look at these." Paul Newman says, "Where did you get these? Mickey Mouse? There are only six or seven violations; half of them are ours, and they have all been resolved in secret in the standing consultive committee."

Now that was wrong, what Mr. Newman said. There were not 6 or 7 violations, he might have said 8, there were 67 in the public record. I certainly had not found all of them and there were lots more involving the Krasnoyarsk radar at Abalakova, which was then top secret, and other parts of telemetry encryption that was then secret.

So obviously, there were lots of violations and lots of cheating going on by the Soviet Union and here we are now, 3½ years later. I have submitted for the RECORD the original 67 violations that were put in the RECORD that I will ask in full House go into today's debate and I will catch up the gap sometime in the next month and put in 3½ years of further violations and those that have been declassified.

I ask my friends on the other side of this issue on both sides of the aisle, is there not the aspect here of a rabbit trapped in the middle of the road by the headlights of an oncoming car? Or worse yet, a rabbit trapped by a cobra, where once the cobra has fixed its gaze on the frightened little rabbit, it will do anything. It will freeze itself; it will accept any amount of terror from the other side from that cobra. I am

afraid there is no way we are going to satisfy some people in this House with blatant obvious cheating and violations by the Soviet side. But some of you are going to have to realize the merits of the Broomfield amendment.

Vote with us today. Some Republicans are going to have to come home and pass something that is meaningful here today, the Broomfield amendment, which I support.

The CHAIRMAN. The time now stands at 16½ minutes for the gentleman from Florida [Mr. FASCELL] and 16 minutes for the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from Connecticut.

Mrs. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and in support of the resolution.

I think it would be unwise to abandon the limit that SALT II provides for the United States and the Soviet Union. Although numerical limits are inadequate to the demands of today's world, they are the only parameters now set on nuclear weapons growth.

And they are the one way in which the SALT II agreement has succeeded in serving us. We have ample evidence that the Soviet Union, as the United States, has taken out planes to bring more modern planes into service, has decommissioned subs, and decommissioned missiles in order to stay within those SALT II limits.

Now, that is not to say that their violations are not serious, that their extensive encryption of information has not moved us into a very much more unstable environment than we have enjoyed in previous years. The violations of the SALT II agreement are important and must be dealt with, but I believe they should be dealt with in a proportional way and that eliminating the limits, the numerical limits of SALT II, is not the appropriate course for the Nation to take.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MAVROULES].

Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in strong support of House Joint Resolution 350, calling for continued adherence to the SALT Treaties. While I think we may all agree that the SALT treaties are not perfect, they have placed meaningful restrictions on the most destabilizing weapons systems, as well as establishing a number of critical verification provisions. Thus, they have provided a well understood framework for future negotiations and agreements.

In the words of Former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown:

> This treaty and the process which produced it are extremely valuable contributions to our strategic deterrent position • • • our defenses are clearly better served with SALT II than without it.

The Soviets have traditionally relied on larger missiles and more of them to offset American technological and operational advantages. SALT is basically a series of quantitative limits, favoring U.S. qualitative advantages while restricting Soviet penchant for mass and quantity. Abandoning the SALT agreements now will undoubtedly trigger a new arms race, ultimately increasing the risk of an all-out nuclear war.

Since 1979, the Soviets have been forced to dismantle or destroy over 1,300 systems. They now have only 8 more ICBM's, 24 more strategic bombers, and 6 less SLBM's than they had in 1979, before the signing of SALT II.

Abandoning SALT would be extremely costly to both sides. However, the Soviets currently have the ability to produce 50 percent more nuclear weapons by 1989, than they now have. It would then take the United States until the mid-1990's to catch up with such a massive arms escalation.

The impact of this continued arms race on the U.S. budget would be enormous. As billions of dollars were spent on new weapons, Congress would be faced with the decision to add to the Federal deficit, or cut back further in domestic spending, or raise taxes. I do not believe that the American public is willing to financially support a new strategic arms race with the Soviets at this time.

In contention are three possible Soviet violations: the production of the SS-25, the encryption of telemetry during missile testing, and the Krasnoyarsk radar system. While we can debate all day about whether enough evidence exists to substantiate the administration's claim that the Soviets have engaged in clear violations of the treaties, we should remember the warning of General Brent Scowcroft:

> There is no question that the Soviets test the limits of any agreement • • • the most serious part is knowing what to do about it • • • they're not really significant enough in themselves to renounce a treaty • • • there are restraints in the treaty (SALT II) on the Soviets which, however modest, are better than no restraints at all.

By abandoning these treaties, it would appear that the President has lost sight of his primary "dream"—the dream of a world in which offensive weapons will be replaced by defensive weapons as the mainstay of deterrence—the dream of a "protective shield" as provided by the strategic defense initiative.

A breakout of the SALT limitations is wholly incompatible with the stated objectives of the President's SDI program—which requires limits and reductions in offensive weapons if it is to have any hope of success. It is also a contradiction of the U.S. position in Geneva where our negotiators are calling for major reductions in offensive weapons systems.

Even James Abrahamson, Director of the SDIO, told Congress that negotiated limits restricting the number of Soviet offensive weapons is necessary if the SDI defensive system is to have a chance of working.

In June 1984, the other body voted overwhelmingly to pass a resolution urging the President to continue with his policy of "no undercut" with respect to the SALT and other arms agreements. At that time, the other body found that:

> • • • it would be detrimental to the security interest of the United States and its allies and to the international peace and stability, for the last remaining limitations on strategic offensive weapons to breakdown, or lapse before replacement by a new arms control agreements.

The administration is allowing itself to become trapped by its own rhetoric. Although it has repeatedly condemned the SALT treaties, it has been unable in its almost 6 years in office to produce a replacement. This is the worst record of any administration since the nuclear arms race began.

I urge my colleagues to join with me today in support of this bill, and to reject the administration's ill-founded attempt to scrap current arms agreements.

□ 1550

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I think the real tragedy with this proposal is that it implies somehow that the Soviets have not broken the SALT agreement; and I have not met a Member of the House—maybe I have not talked to the right Member—but I have not met a Member of the House on either side who contends that the Soviets have not violated the treaty in building the 25 and the encryption of telemetry.

I read the Democrat proposal that states: The administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty. Is there any Member in the House who does not agree with that contention? That the Soviet Union has violated the SALT Treaty?

I do not think there is, and if that is the case, my question is: Why do not we, as a party that is charged by the Constitution with defending this country, make that statement? We do a tremendous disservice, no matter which side you are on; liberal, conservative, Democrat, Republican, to the defense of this country if we as a Congress that has access to all of the classified information that substantiates these violations, we do not declare to the world, to the Soviet Union and to our own constituents that yes, the Soviet Union has violated this treaty.

We are not some type of a third party, a commentator that is refereeing a battle between the President of

the United States and the Soviet Union; we are charged with defending America. Nowhere in this proposal is there any statement to the fact that in fact the Soviet Union has violated the SALT agreement. That is why we have to make it a piecemeal agreement and say: "Well, even though perhaps the administration contends they violated it, we should still stick with the sublimitations, with the sub totals."

I think it is just an absolute disgrace that this Congress cannot own up to the fact that the Soviet Union has violated this treaty, and apprise their own constituents in the Soviet Union that we cannot accept that type of activity.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN].

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, I do not come here with any special credentials, but we have 300 neighbors in our soil in North Dakota; 300 Minuteman ICBM's with sophisticated Mark XII warheads, so we know something about nuclear weapons.

I can tell you that the constituents in North Dakota, and I think around the Midwest, believe that the arms race between this country and the Soviets is sheer lunacy; and if we and the Soviets survive this arms race, one day we are going to end up first in nuclear warheads and second in everything else in this world.

What we have to do is change the way we think. "The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything save our modes of thinking." Never is that more clearly demonstrated than in this type of debate. We still have people who come to the floor of this House as tank commanders saying, "We have this many tanks, they have that many tanks, if we can destroy some of them and still survive, we win."

But with nuclear weapons, both sides lose. That's one lesson we still must learn from Dr. Einstein.

My guess is that if, God forbid, we should ever have a nuclear war that destroys this world, in the final moments we will have folks muttering: "If only we had more nuclear warheads." What we need is more restraint and more arms control. That is what is necessary.

Now the question we face today is, Is SALT II useful or useless? Well, SALT II is not perfect; it has allowed for a buildup. And we should vigorously press for total Soviet compliance. However, the fact is, it also does impose some restraints on the nuclear arms race. So the question is, Is some restraint better than no restraint?

The answer ought to be, for every single man and woman in this House, a clear and resounding and loud "Yes." You bet. Some restraint is better than no restraint—especially when the Soviets will be restrained much more than the United States. We do not want this President to abandon SALT II. That is what this debate is about on the floor of the House today—not about undercutting the President or our START negotiators—and why I support the committee bill. On balance, I believe the military benefits of abiding by the SALT II limits strengthen national security.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I find it fascinating, in listening carefully to my good friend from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN], and I agree with him, in part.

The ironic thing is, if you look carefully at his side's amendment, it is his side that breaks down the SALT agreement into this many of this and this many of that. If you will, to use your words, change the way you think for just a moment and look at what Broomfield tries to accomplish.

Broomfield says purely and simply, "We should be for something like the SALT agreement. We should encourage the United States Government and the Soviet Union to adhere to something like the SALT agreement," but it also says when there are Soviet violations we should be free to react in a way which is the most effective in enforcing the arms control process.

I think there are two things that our friends on the left have to consider. First, yesterday this House heard powerful words about the impact our actions have on other governments. Yesterday it was the South African Government.

I think this House also has an impact on the Soviet Government. I suspect the Soviet Government has people watching this debate on C-SPAN.

If we set up the precedent that we are willing to divide the treaty despite Jimmy Carter's promises, that we are willing to divide the treaty into little bits and pieces in which we enforce the parts that we want to enforce, but we allow the Russians to break the parts they want to break, I think we send a very powerful signal to Gorbachev and the Soviet Government.

Second, if for the moderate, concerned American who really believes both in national security and in arms talks, they come to the conclusion that arms talks always mean giving away the store. Arms talks always mean one more excuse for Soviet behavior. Arms talks always mean "We're impotent, we're ineffective, we're incapable."

Then I fear that the average, reasonable American who cares about national security will come to the conclusion that in fact arms talks as handled by this Congress is a very dangerous game.

So I would just say on behalf of the Broomfield amendment, it allows everyone who wants to vote for the process of SALT to vote "yes," we want to continue the process; it allows everyone who wants to reinforce the concept that this administration should be for arms limitations to vote "yes"; but it also says if the Soviets are determined to violate the treaty, we will not allow them to pick and choose the parts that they win by, and we will not cripple the American Government in its capacity to respond.

Now in terms of both a national security argument and a serious, systematic, deliberate effort to go to arms control, I do not see how a reasonable person could vote against the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GINGRICH. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Does the gentleman agree that those who are leading the fight to abandon SALT II are those who never supported SALT II in the first place?

Mr. GINGRICH. I would say that those who have led the fight to force us to confront Soviet violations; I would say to my good friend, those who used to work for Senator Jackson, a Democrat from Washington State, who were most worried with Senator Jackson about Soviet violations under SALT II are those who have been most active in making us confront what, for your friends on the left, is a very unpalatable truth; which is that the Soviet Union has been systematically and deliberately violating the treaty.

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. If the gentleman will yield further, the answer to that is yes; yes, those who lead the fight to abandon SALT II are those who never supported that SALT agreement in the first place.

Mr. GINGRICH. As I said on this floor earlier to my good friend, it is amazing to me that those on the left cannot hear literally the words I just said.

Those who have been consistently frightened that the Russians would cheat report that the Russians are cheating.

Mr. CARNEY. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GINGRICH. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CARNEY. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the gentleman if he is in support of the Broomfield amendment?

Mr. GINGRICH. Absolutely.

Mr. CARNEY. The Broomfield amendment reads: The President shall continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT agreement as long as the Soviets do.

The gentleman is saying we should continue to adhere to the SALT agreement, in toto.

Mr. GINGRICH. As long as the Soviets do.

Mr. CARNEY. I congratulate the gentleman.

Mr. GINGRICH. Thank you.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, even though the matter supposedly has been resolved in a debate between Charlton Heston and Paul Newman, I would like to, as a Member of Congress, offer my 2 cents, being a new Member, and seeing these developments over a period of time.

Without question, allegations of violations of SALT II by the Soviets is a valid concern of the opposing party, but continuous attacks on those of us on this side who take exception to the President's position as being aiding and abetting the Soviets is untrue.

It is understood that any agreement we would make with the Soviet Union we should have some grave concerns due to their regime and their past experience. However, there are two great nations involved that have the nuclear capability of blowing up this planet 10 times over. Ladies and gentlemen, this is not the time to be macho.

□ 1600

We have got to come to terms with the Soviets. We have got to learn to live with the Soviets, and we should adhere to SALT II and levy the international pressure from other nations on this very public-relations-minded administration in the Soviet Union, to make the Soviets adhere as well and give our negotiators a chance to work out a potential reprieve from some holocaust. So let us not throw out the baby with the bath water. As they say in an old statement from Ohio, "One bird in the hand is a lot better than two in the bush."

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I yield to the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Ms. OAKAR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the resolution and in support of the arms control process. Nuclear weapons are a unique phenomenon in history. They constitute the potential tools of our own destruction, for if they were to be used in the numbers and in the manner envisioned by strategic planners, they would change the nature of our planet in ways we can only imagine; no human would remain to observe the consequences. It is vitally important that we harness the impulse toward war and promote a process that controls the production and deployment of these horrible weapons that serve no useful purpose, yet loom so large. SALT I and SALT II have been far from perfect, but they constitute steps in the right direction and we should continue to adhere to their provisions.

The SALT II Treaty was signed in 1979. Although the treaty was never ratified, it has provided the framework for arms control. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have observed the numerical limits placed on missiles and delivery systems and have, in fact, dismantled more than 2,000 land- and submarine-based missiles. I agree with those who point out that the limits on weapons established in SALT II are very high. I think weapons limits should be significantly lower. Unfortunately, we are now at the point where the deployment of a single submarine exceeds the limits established by SALT II. To reach those limits, we have had to invest an enormous proportion of our resources that could have been invested in productive activities—education, medical research, the alleviation of suffering.

Every President since Lyndon Johnson has participated in the arms control process. SALT I, SALT II, the ABM Treaty and others have helped to make the arms race manageable. The SALT II Treaty, the most recent treaty negotiated, constitutes a foundation on which we must craft further arms control initiatives. The Geneva Summit was a promising sign.

We must not negotiate arms limitation agreements blindly or naively. The Soviets are a formidable adversary. Treaties must be mutual and verifiable. The SALT II Treaty includes provisions for verification and has provisions for addressing charges of treaty violations.

Arms control is in our national interest. It is in the world interest. That is why our allies have been unanimous in their support for continuing adherence to SALT II and why they have expressed such alarm over the prospect of our rejection of the treaty. They know that scrapping of the SALT II Treaty would invite the Soviets to engage in an unrestrained arms race. This would likely result in new, even more destructive Soviet nuclear system. We would have to match them, piling cost on top of instability.

Since the end of World War II, the world community has spent between $3 and $4 trillion on a nuclear arsenal that must not be used. I urge adoption of this resolution to send the signal that our country believes in arms control and wants to invest its resources in productive activities. The arms control process began before the current administration took office and must continue into the forseeable future, if we are to have a future. We must do our part for the sake of the future by expressing our support for a framework to harness the destructive power of nuclear arms. I urge adoption of the resolution.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I appreciate the statement of the gentlewoman from Ohio.

Mr. Chairman, I, too, support the chairman of the committee and his resolution and oppose the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. KASICH].

Mr. McGRATH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KASICH. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. McGRATH. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Broomfield substitute, and I question the need for this entire debate at this particular point in time. I do think that White House statements in recent days have been careless and unnecessarily belligerent. In spite of those badly timed and poorly chosen comments, the underlying policy of abandoning SALT II by the end of the year is sound. We have not yet exceeded the limits set by the treaty, and plenty of time remains for serious negotiations with the Soviets.

I believe that we should give the President our full support at this point in time in the hope that his strong stand will lead to serious negotiation. The Soviets are clearly in no better position than we are economically or otherwise to pursue an all-out Arms race. We have no other opportunity on the horizon to push them toward a stronger treaty and full compliance. I cannot agree that adhering to an unratified Treaty repeatedly and openly violated by our adversaries is an option that is in our national interests.

I hope we will not have to exceed the SALT II limits in the coming months, however, I will not support a nonbinding and therefore meaningless attempt to force the President's hand. The Soviets are masters of negotiation by press release. No op-ed pages are found in Pravada and for reasons that I cannot understand, many of our citizens are reluctant to challenge official Government statements, which fall to even cursory examination. I am not going to be stampeded by their public bluster and empty promises, and I hope my colleagues will join me by supporting the Broomfield substitute.

In reviewing the information provided on SALT II over the last several weeks, I was particularly struck by a statement in support of the resolution put forward by the distinguished chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The first substantive paragraph concisely summarized significant violations of SALT II. They have built a new missile prohibited by SALT II. They have deliberately prevented verification of missile tests and their aircraft design. The next paragraph quickly dismisses those blatant violations, and informs us that our national interest is best protected by the treaty's numerical limits. Looking at the history of Soviet compliance with treaties of every type, I do not think that our national interest is protected by any treaty with the Soviet Government unless we can see first

hand whether or not the Soviets are going to adhere strictly to its terms.

Are we to come to the floor in the fall or winter and plead with the President to cling to SALT II in spite of more violations? Where do we draw the line?

The Soviets can continue to expand their strategic arsenal qualitatively and quantitatively with the limits of SALT II, and I have no doubt that they will continue to do so regardless of our intentions.

Mr. KASICH. Mr. Chairman, I think it is very important that we are abundantly clear in what we are trying to do in the Broomfield substitute. Essentially, what we say is that we will live within the SALT II agreement if the Soviets will stop cheating. That is the bottom line. I think everybody in this chamber can vote that the Soviets ought to have integrity, that they ought to have honesty, and that they ought not to cheat on this agreement. As to whether this has been a restraining influence on the Soviets, I think that is open to debate. Why do I say that? Since we signed SALT II, the Soviets have increased the number of warheads by 4,000 and have the potential under SALT to increase it by another 5,000.

So since 1979 the Soviets will increase the number of warheads in hard target kill capable systems by 9,000 warheads. Is that restraining them? It is hard for me to make an argument that it is.

Nevertheless, we are willing to live within SALT II if and only if the Soviets stop their cheating.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of the time on this side to conclude the debate to the distinguished majority leader, the beloved gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT].

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the distinguished majority leader of 7½ minutes.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Broomfield amendment and in favor of the resolution. Let us understand clearly, this amendment would vitiate the resolution, render it null and void. It would say, in effect, that the technical violation of a minor provision of the treaty, of which both sides have been on occasion guilty, should nullify the treaty's important numerical weapons limitations which have been observed by both sides and on which the security of the United States and the peace of the world depend.

For the United States to doom this treaty by our unilateral decision, a course that the President has announced, and that this Broomfield amendment would encourage, would be a major foreign policy blunder and a major blow to our own national security.

It would give to the Soviet Union which, in observing the present limits, has dismantled many more weapons than we have, an excuse and a presumptive right to double the size of its current nuclear arsenal which it can do, adding as many as 10,000 more nuclear weapons to the destabilization of the world's fragile tranquillity.

Surely we do not want to do that.

And as that nuclear arms race inevitably spiralled up, it would force us then to spend many billion dollars more that we do not have on additional weapons which we presently do not need and which, in our desperate budgetary situation, we manifestly cannot afford.

So for all those reasons, it is clearly in our national interest to reject the Broomfield substitute and adopt this resolution in the hope that by doing so we can encourage the keeping of those limits by both parties that are written into the SALT agreement.

Now the President says that he is hostile to the SALT agreement, that is his word, "hostile," to the SALT agreement because he says it merely limits weapons and does not reduce them. Now does it not make sense that before we are to reduce weapons at least we have to stop increasing their number? Is that not sensible? The SALT Treaty at least is in the process of doing that.

The President says he wants to work for a better treaty. Well, that is fine, more power to him. But is that any reason to abandon a treaty that both sides have been observing before we have another one to put in its place? Something is clearly better than nothing.

Mr. Reagan says that he does not trust the Russians. Perhaps not. Is that not all the more reason to maintain some verifiable limits? If this treaty is abandoned, then we lose our existing powers of verification. It is only with those whom you trust implicitly that you do not need any agreement, any contract, any treaty. With seven Presidents of both political parties going back to Dwight D. Eisenhower, who said that the great regret of his Presidency was that he had not been able to negotiate a binding nuclear weapons limitation agreement, I have consistently supported a bipartisan role of Congress and legitimate rights of the Chief Executive in foreign policy; I still support those rights.

But the Constitution also gave specific rights and duties to the Congress of the United States. This President seems either oblivious or contemptuous of these congressional responsibilities. He spurns our friendly entreaties, he ignores our letters and petitions, he scorns our formal resolutions in the face of our bipartisan and bicameral pleas to maintain the nuclear test ban, to resubmit the SALT II Treaty for ratification, to acknowledge the budgetary impass brought about in major part by his repeated insistence on throwing more and more money at the Pentagon while building up more and more debt for our children to pay. In each of these things the President has flaunted his universal exercise of power in direct contravention of the requests of Congress.

Now, we do not seek any confrontation with the President even today. It is not our wish to embarrass him. We hope it will not be necessary to vote a formal limitation. But the President must be brought to understand the awesome gravity of this situation. This is not anything to play with.

The President must be made to understand that in the age of Gramm-Rudman, with $1 trillion already added in the last 5 years to the national debt upon the backs of our children, doubled in this administration, with a Congress that already has given to the President and the Nation more than a $1 trillion military buildup in the last 5 years, with several times more nuclear warheads already in the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union than would be enough to guarantee our mutual total annihilation; the Congress of the United States solemnly charged by the Constitution to protect the public's interests in exercising the power of the purse, is loath to start a new and ever more costly round in the leapfrogging race of nuclear weapons.

That is our message to the President today. We call upon our President, instead, to exercise his fine talents in the cause of peace, not war, to promote conciliation, not confrontation, to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, not argumentation; and to do these things in the interest of the United States and in the interest of the human race.

That is what we say in this resolution. This amendment would nullify that message. It would send the opposite message to the world, that we are ready to abandon all hope of limiting nuclear arms. And I do not think we are.

This Congress has the responsibility to say whether we are or not. This is our opportunity to say clearly, forcefully, and unmistakably that we are ready for an end to the nuclear arms race.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, before I call on the minority leader to wind up the debate on our side, I would like to make a parliamentary inquiry.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, under House Concurrent Resolution 350, following the vote on the Broomfield amendment, would I have an opportunity under a motion to recommit

to have 5 minutes to explain that motion with instructions?

The CHAIRMAN. Only by unanimous consent. This is a concurrent resolution under consideration and a motion to recommit would not be debatable in the House. The gentleman would need unanimous consent to have 5 minutes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. And that motion would have to be made following the vote, is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman mean in the Committee of the Whole or in the House?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make it now if the Chair would agree to it. I only want 2 minutes following the vote on the Broomfield amendment to indicate what the motion to recommit would be.

Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, why does not the gentleman do that now?

Mr. DICKS. Reserving the right to object, Mr. Chairman, would there be 2 minutes on this side to respond?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Absolutely, absolutely.

Mr. DICKS. Then why does not the gentleman do it now on his own time? He could explain it right now.

Mr. Chairman, I feel constrained to object.

The CHAIRMAN. Objection is heard.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, in view of that, I do want to indicate to the Members that it will be my intention to offer a motion to recommit with instructions.

Mr. Chairman, my motion to recommit asks the Committee on Foreign Affairs to reconsider House Concurrent Resolution 350 and add language expressing the support of Congress for our negotiators in Geneva in their efforts to negotiate a strategic arms reduction agreement which will reduce strategic nuclear weapons below SALT II levels. I am very concerned that House Concurrent Resolution 350 appears to legitimize Soviet noncompliance and thus undermines the credibility of meaningful arms reduction agreements in the future.

I cannot help but feel that this will directly harm the position of our negotiators in Geneva. Since I hope this is not the intent of the sponsors of this resolution, I think it is very important that we clear up this confusion on the implications of our action today by expressing our full support for our negotiating team in Geneva.

Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the Republican leader to conclude the debate on this side, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL].

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by Mr. BROOMFIELD.

The essential difference between the Broomfield amendment and the resolution is that the Broomfield amendment adheres to the principle that all parts of a treaty are to be complied with.

The resolution, on the other hand, allows the Russians to pick and choose which part of the SALT II restrictions they can violate with impunity.

Qualitative violations are to be ignored only quantitative violations count.

I hope this sort of thing doesn't spread. If it does, we'll soon have preachers telling congregations: "OK, you can ignore commandments 4, 6, and 10 so long as you comply with the rest.

The President in 1985 said he would go the extra mile for SALT II. But the sponsors of the base resolution appear ready to go not only an extra mile, but to run a marathon before they will do what he has quite correctly done—tell the world the United States is not going to continue abiding by treaties the Soviets break. We live within the letter of the law while they break the back of the law.

There is a principle involved in the President's decision—the principle of compliance and the penalties that noncompliance brings.

Contrary to what the majority leader contends relative to both sides living up to limits of SALT II, the SS-25 of the Soviets is in violation of the prohibition on a second new, land-based ICBM. The Soviet encryption of telemetry is in violation. The Soviets have also exceeded the limit on missile launchers.

These aren't minor violations, nor are they the only violations.

Some of you might say: "But in each one of those cases, there is disagreement as to the seriousness or the extent of the violation."

I am convinced the violations are important and undeniable.

But even if there were ambiguities concerning these incidents, isn't it wiser to judge then against the highest standards of treaty compliance than to wink and walk away hoping they won't happen again?

Last week a Member of the other body was quoted in the newspapers as saying that advisers to the President were—and I quote—"seeking to use militarily insignificant treaty violations" to "destroy the entire strategic framework" of the interim agreement.

"Militarily insignificant?"

A violation of a treaty is a violation. Its "significance" lies in the very fact it has happened. You need no further criteria to judge its importance. Its significance needs no qualifiers like "militarily" or "politically."

Treaty-breaking is in the Soviet Union's interest only so long as it is risk-free. They will never enter into an arms reduction treaty if they are reinforced in their current treaty-breaking behavior by American acquiesence in their blatant violations of already existing agreements.

The safety and security of the United States and its allies should not be held hostage to the fervent wishes of those who believe violated arms control treaties are better than no treaties at all.

The principle of 50-percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries is at the very heart of President Reagan's effort to reduce arms while still protecting our national security.

That principle is threatened by allowing the Soviet Union to violate the SALT II restrictions.

If we keep on giving them every benefit of every doubt then the word "violation" loses its meaning.

The President's decision to tell the Soviets we won't tolerate violations of the interim arms agreement is not a blow against the principle of arms control—it is one of the most serious statements about the integrity of that principle ever made by an American President.

This isn't a question of those who want arms control versus those who don't want arms control.

It is a question of whether arms control treaties for the sake of arms control treaties is going to be the primary goal of our strategic nuclear policy or whether arms control is going to be a means—one among many including force modernization—by which we seek to meet our Nation's security needs.

Arms control as one means among many toward the goal of secure freedom is desirable and necessary. But arms control as an end in itself is a false idol—and it's about time its worshippers in the House realize how false it is.

We hear much about our NATO allies' criticisms of the President's decisions.

Americans from the beginning have had a "decent respect for the opinions of mankind." But there is a growing and, in my view, troubling trend in this country to be concerned more about what other countries say of our Nation's policies than of what the policies themselves seek to acomplish.

Abe Lincoln once said:

> If the end brings me out all right what is said against me won't amount to anything. If the end brings me out wrong 10 angels swearing I was right would make no difference.

Why don't we get back to that standard? Why be so concerned what others say about us but what is the right thing to do.

We in the House disagree as to what the right thing is in this as in many issues. We quite properly are debating the issue.

That is what democracy means. But let's not try to prejudge this issue because friends or foes support or are critical of a given policy.

Let's judge each policy on its merits, not on whether our Nation is going to win or lose the Miss Congeniality Award in geopolitical affairs.

Arms control by itself is not going to solve our international problems. Neither is force modernization. Neither is mutual and balanced conventional force reduction. Neither are the START talks, neither is any single all-purpose panacea for the world's ills.

What we need—and what President Reagan is providing—is a policy involving all of these and more, sometimes emphasizing one part, sometimes another.

But there is one important point here—each part has to have its own integrity, its own rules.

If these rules are broken, and we do nothing, the corrupted component of our over-all strategy becomes contaminated and it begins to infect our entire foreign policy.

So it is in everyone's interest to see to it that the SALT restrictions are bilateral in nature.

The President has pledged we won't increase launchers or warheads above Soviet levels.

The Soviets therefore have every reason to follow our lead of restraint.

But we cannot continue to hope for progress within the already-violated boundaries of SALT II.

What we need is the courage to act on violations and the good judgment to do what we have to do to protect peace and freedom.

The President's decision has provided us with both of these.

Mr. BROOMFIELD'S AMENDMENT, ADHERING AS IT DOES TO THE PRINCIPLE OF comprehensive compliance deserves our support. I urge you to join with me in voting for it.

□ 1615

The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.

The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 187, noes 222, not voting 24, as follows:

[Roll No. 184]

AYES—187

Archer	Hiler	Ray
Armey	Holt	Regula
Barnard	Hopkins	Ridge
Bartlett	Hubbard	Rinaldo
Bateman	Hunter	Ritter
Bentley	Hutto	Roberts
Bereuter	Hyde	Roemer
Bilirakis	Ireland	Rogers
Bliley	Jenkins	Roth
Boulter	Kasich	Rowland (CT)
Broomfield	Kemp	Rowland (GA)
Brown (CO)	Kindness	Saxton
Broyhill	Kolbe	Schaefer
Burton (IN)	Kramer	Schuette
Callahan	Lagomarsino	Schulze
Carney	Latta	Sensenbrenner
Chappell	Leath (TX)	Shaw
Chappie	Lent	Shelby
Clinger	Lewis (FL)	Shumway
Coats	Lightfoot	Shuster
Cobey	Lipinski	Siljander
Coble	Livingston	Sisisky
Coleman (MO)	Lloyd	Skeen
Combest	Loeffler	Skelton
Courter	Lott	Slaughter
Craig	Lowery (CA)	Smith (NE)
Crane	Lujan	Smith (NJ)
Daniel	Lungren	Smith, Denny (OR)
Dannemeyer	Mack	Smith, Robert (NH)
Darden	Madigan	Smith, Robert (OR)
Daub	Marlenee	Snyder
DeLay	Martin (IL)	Solomon
DeWine	Mazzoli	Spence
Dickinson	McCain	Stallings
DioGuardi	McCandless	Stangeland
Dornan (CA)	McCollum	Stenholm
Dreier	McDade	Strang
Duncan	McEwen	Stratton
Dyson	McGrath	Stump
Eckert (NY)	McMillan	Sundquist
Edwards (OK)	Meyers	Sweeney
Emerson	Michel	Swindall
English	Miller (OH)	Tallon
Erdreich	Miller (WA)	Tauzin
Evans (IA)	Molinari	Taylor
Fawell	Monson	Thomas (GA)
Fiedler	Montgomery	Valentine
Fields	Moore	Vander Jagt
Flippo	Moorhead	Vucanovich
Franklin	Morrison (WA)	Walker
Frenzel	Murtha	Weber
Gallo	Myers	Whitehurst
Gaydos	Nelson	Whittaker
Gekas	Nichols	Wolf
Gilman	Nielson	Wortley
Gingrich	Oxley	Wylie
Goodling	Packard	Young (AK)
Gradison	Parris	Young (FL)
Gregg	Pashayan	Zschau
Gunderson	Petri	
Hall, Ralph	Pickle	
Hammerschmidt	Porter	
Hansen	Pursell	
Hendon	Quillen	

NOES—222

Ackerman	Boucher	Dingell
Akaka	Boxer	Dixon
Alexander	Brooks	Donnelly
Anderson	Brown (CA)	Dorgan (ND)
Andrews	Bruce	Dowdy
Annunzio	Bryant	Downey
Applegate	Bustamante	Durbin
Aspin	Byron	Dwyer
Atkins	Carper	Dymally
AuCoin	Carr	Early
Barnes	Chapman	Eckart (OH)
Bates	Clay	Edgar
Bedell	Coelho	Edwards (CA)
Beilenson	Coleman (TX)	Evans (IL)
Bennett	Collins	Fascell
Berman	Conte	Fazio
Bevill	Conyers	Feighan
Biaggi	Cooper	Fish
Boehlert	Coughlin	Florio
Boggs	Coyne	Foglietta
Boland	Crockett	Foley
Boner (TN)	Daschle	Ford (MI)
Bonior (MI)	de la Garza	Ford (TN)
Bonker	Dellums	Fowler
Borski	Derrick	Frank
Bosco	Dicks	Frost
Garcia	MacKay	Schneider
Gejdenson	Manton	Schroeder
Gephardt	Markey	Schumer
Gibbons	Martinez	Seiberling
Glickman	Matsui	Sharp
Gonzalez	Mavroules	Sikorski
Gordon	McCloskey	Slattery
Gray (IL)	McCurdy	Smith (FL)
Gray (PA)	McHugh	Smith (IA)
Green	McKernan	Snowe
Guarini	Mica	Solarz
Hall (OH)	Mikulski	Spratt
Hamilton	Miller (CA)	St Germain
Hawkins	Mineta	Staggers
Hayes	Mitchell	Stark
Hefner	Moakley	Stokes
Heftel	Mollohan	Studds
Henry	Moody	Swift
Hertel	Morrison (CT)	Synar
Howard	Mrazek	Tauke
Hoyer	Murphy	Thomas (CA)
Hughes	Natcher	Torres
Jacobs	Neal	Torricelli
Jeffords	Nowak	Towns
Johnson	Oakar	Traficant
Jones (NC)	Oberstar	Traxler
Jones (OK)	Obey	Udall
Jones (TN)	Olin	Vento
Kanjorski	Ortiz	Visclosky
Kaptur	Owens	Volkmer
Kastenmeier	Panetta	Walgren
Kennelly	Pease	Watkins
Kildee	Penny	Waxman
Kleczka	Pepper	Weaver
Kolter	Perkins	Weiss
Kostmayer	Price	Wheat
LaFalce	Rahall	Whitley
Lantos	Reid	Whitten
Leach (IA)	Richardson	Williams
Lehman (CA)	Robinson	Wilson
Lehman (FL)	Roe	Wirth
Leland	Rose	Wise
Levin (MI)	Roukema	Wolpe
Levine (CA)	Roybal	Wright
Long	Russo	Wyden
Lowry (WA)	Sabo	Yates
Luken	Savage	Yatron
Lundine	Scheuer	Young (MO)

NOT VOTING—24

Anthony	Davis	Lewis (CA)
Badham	Fuqua	Martin (NY)
Barton	Grotberg	McKinney
Breaux	Hartnett	O'Brien
Burton (CA)	Hatcher	Rangel
Campbell	Hillis	Rodino
Chandler	Horton	Rostenkowski
Cheney	Huckaby	Rudd

□ 1635

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Horton for, with Mr. Rangel against.

Mr. Cheney for, with Mrs. Burton of California against.

Mr. Martin of New York for, with Mr. Anthony against.

Mr. Badham for, with Mr. Rodino against.

Mr. Campbell for, with Mr. Huckaby against.

Mr. Hartnett for, with Mr. McKinney against.

Mr. BEVILL and Mr. SABO changed their votes from "aye" to "no."

Mr. KOLBE and Mr. SKELTON changed their votes from "no" to "aye."

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute.

The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 350) providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise, pursuant to House Resolution 479, he reported the concurrent resolution back to the House with an amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the committee amendment.

The committee amendment was agreed to.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. BROOMFIELD

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the concurrent resolution?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. BROOMFIELD moves to recommit the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 350) to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to report back the same forthwith with the following amendment:

Amendment: Page 3, after line 25, insert the following new section:

SEC. 3. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES NEGOTIATORS IN GENEVA.

The Congress expresses its firm support for the efforts of the United States negotiators engaged in the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva to reduce strategic nuclear weapons below SALT II limits.

The SPEAKER. The motion is not debatable.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state his parliamentary inquiry.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I could not hear the Clerk in the reading of the motion to recommit, but do I understand—from what I heard—that this motion to recommit adds a new section to the bill, and does not strike out any language of the pending resolution? Is that correct?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. That is correct.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, in that case I withdraw my inquiry and say that we are happy to accept the language of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD].

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to the provisions of clause 5 of rule XV, the Chair announces that he will reduce to a minimum of 5 minutes the period of time within which a vote by electronic device, if ordered, will be taken on the question of agreeing to the concurrent resolution.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 406, noes 0, not voting 27, as follows:

[Roll No. 185]

AYES—406

Ackerman	Cooper	Gephardt
Akaka	Coughlin	Gibbons
Alexander	Courter	Gilman
Anderson	Coyne	Gingrich
Andrews	Craig	Glickman
Annunzio	Crane	Gonzalez
Applegate	Crockett	Goodling
Archer	Daniel	Gordon
Armey	Dannemeyer	Gradison
Aspin	Darden	Gray (IL)
Atkins	Daschle	Gray (PA)
AuCoin	Daub	Green
Barnard	de la Garza	Gregg
Barnes	DeLay	Guarini
Bartlett	Dellums	Gunderson
Bateman	DeWine	Hall (OH)
Bates	Dickinson	Hall, Ralph
Bedell	Dicks	Hamilton
Beilenson	Dingell	Hammerschmidt
Bennett	DioGuardi	Hansen
Bentley	Dixon	Hawkins
Bereuter	Donnelly	Hayes
Berman	Dorgan (ND)	Hefner
Bevill	Dornan (CA)	Heftel
Biaggi	Dowdy	Hendon
Bilirakis	Downey	Henry
Bliley	Dreier	Hertel
Boehlert	Duncan	Hiler
Boggs	Durbin	Holt
Boland	Dwyer	Hopkins
Boner (TN)	Dymally	Howard
Bonior (MI)	Dyson	Hoyer
Bonker	Early	Hubbard
Borski	Eckart (OH)	Hughes
Bosco	Eckert (NY)	Hunter
Boucher	Edgar	Hutto
Boulter	Edwards (CA)	Hyde
Boxer	Edwards (OK)	Ireland
Brooks	Emerson	Jacobs
Broomfield	English	Jeffords
Brown (CA)	Erdreich	Jenkins
Brown (CO)	Evans (IA)	Johnson
Broyhill	Evans (IL)	Jones (NC)
Bruce	Fascell	Jones (OK)
Bryant	Fawell	Jones (TN)
Burton (IN)	Fazio	Kanjorski
Byron	Feighan	Kaptur
Callahan	Fiedler	Kasich
Carney	Fields	Kastenmeier
Carper	Fish	Kemp
Carr	Flippo	Kennelly
Chapman	Florio	Kildee
Chappell	Foglietta	Kindness
Chappie	Foley	Kleczka
Clay	Ford (MI)	Kolbe
Clinger	Ford (TN)	Kolter
Coats	Fowler	Kostmayer
Cobey	Frank	Kramer
Coble	Franklin	LaFalce
Coelho	Frenzel	Lagomarsino
Coleman (MO)	Frost	Lantos
Coleman (TX)	Gallo	Latta
Collins	Garcia	Leach (IA)
Combest	Gaydos	Leath (TX)
Conte	Gejdenson	Lehman (CA)
Conyers	Gekas	Lehman (FL)
Leland	Olin	Snowe
Lent	Ortiz	Snyder
Levin (MI)	Owens	Solarz
Levine (CA)	Oxley	Solomon
Lewis (FL)	Packard	Spence
Lightfoot	Panetta	Spratt
Lipinski	Parris	St Germain
Livingston	Pashayan	Staggers
Lloyd	Pease	Stallings
Loeffler	Penny	Stangeland
Long	Pepper	Stark
Lott	Perkins	Stenholm
Lowery (CA)	Petri	Stokes
Lowry (WA)	Pickle	Strang
Lujan	Porter	Stratton
Luken	Price	Studds
Lungren	Pursell	Stump
Mack	Quillen	Sundquist
MacKay	Rahall	Sweeney
Madigan	Ray	Swift
Manton	Regula	Swindall
Markey	Reid	Synar
Marlenee	Richardson	Tallon
Martin (IL)	Ridge	Tauke
Martinez	Rinaldo	Tauzin
Matsui	Ritter	Taylor
Mavroules	Roberts	Thomas (CA)
Mazzoli	Robinson	Thomas (GA)
McCain	Roe	Torres
McCandless	Roemer	Torricelli
McCloskey	Rogers	Towns
McCollum	Rose	Traficant
McCurdy	Roth	Traxler
McDade	Roukema	Udall
McEwen	Rowland (CT)	Valentine
McGrath	Rowland (GA)	Vander Jagt
McHugh	Roybal	Vento
McKernan	Russo	Visclosky
McMillan	Sabo	Volkmer
Meyers	Savage	Vucanovich
Mica	Saxton	Walgren
Michel	Schaefer	Walker
Mikulski	Scheuer	Watkins
Miller (CA)	Schneider	Waxman
Miller (OH)	Schroeder	Weaver
Miller (WA)	Schuette	Weber
Mineta	Schulze	Weiss
Mitchell	Schumer	Wheat
Moakley	Seiberling	Whitehurst
Molinari	Sensenbrenner	Whitley
Mollohan	Sharp	Whittaker
Monson	Shaw	Whitten
Montgomery	Shelby	Williams
Moody	Shumway	Wilson
Moore	Shuster	Wirth
Moorhead	Sikorski	Wise
Morrison (CT)	Siljander	Wolf
Morrison (WA)	Sisisky	Wolpe
Mrazek	Skeen	Wortley
Murphy	Skelton	Wright
Murtha	Slattery	Wyden
Myers	Slaughter	Wylie
Natcher	Smith (FL)	Yates
Neal	Smith (IA)	Yatron
Nelson	Smith (NE)	Young (AK)
Nichols	Smith (NJ)	Young (FL)
Nielson	Smith, Denny (OR)	Young (MO)
Nowak	Smith, Robert (NH)	Zschau
Oakar	Smith, Robert (OR)	
Oberstar		
Obey		

NOT VOTING—27

Anthony	Davis	Lewis (CA)
Badham	Derrick	Lundine
Barton	Fuqua	Martin (NY)
Breaux	Grotberg	McKinney
Burton (CA)	Hartnett	O'Brien
Bustamante	Hatcher	Rangel
Campbell	Hillis	Rodino
Chandler	Horton	Rostenkowski
Cheney	Huckaby	Rudd

□ 1700

So the motion to recommit was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I have a parliamentary inquiry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, under the motion to recommit with instructions which just passed, we added a new section 3, as I understand it, but we did not in any way change the prior existing section 2 which requires the President to continue to adhere to numerical sublimits on the SALT agreements as long as the Soviets do likewise; is that correct? That section in SALT II is unchanged and is still in the bill?

The SPEAKER. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House, I report the concurrent resolution, House Concurrent Resolution 350, back to the House with an amendment.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment: Page 3, after line 25, insert the following new section:

SEC. 3. SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA.

The Congress expresses its firm support for the efforts of the United States negotiators engaged in the arms reduction negotiations in Geneva to reduce strategic nuclear weapons below SALT II limits.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the amendment.

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the concurrent resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The Chair will remind Members that this is a 5-minute vote.

This vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 256, noes 145, not voting 32, as follows:

[Roll No. 186]

AYES—256

Ackerman	Boucher	Dicks
Akaka	Boxer	Dingell
Alexander	Brooks	DioGuardi
Anderson	Brown (CA)	Dixon
Andrews	Brown (CO)	Donnelly
Annunzio	Bruce	Dorgan (ND)
Applegate	Bryant	Dowdy
Aspin	Byron	Downey
Atkins	Carper	Durbin
AuCoin	Carr	Dwyer
Barnard	Chapman	Dymally
Barnes	Chappell	Early
Bates	Clay	Eckart (OH)
Bedell	Clinger	Edgar
Beilenson	Coelho	Edwards (CA)
Bennett	Coleman (TX)	English
Berman	Collins	Erdreich
Bevill	Conte	Evans (IA)
Biaggi	Conyers	Evans (IL)
Boehlert	Cooper	Fascell
Boggs	Coughlin	Fawell
Boland	Coyne	Fazio
Boner (TN)	Darden	Feighan
Bonior (MI)	Daschle	Fish
Bonker	de la Garza	Flippo
Borski	Dellums	Florio
Bosco	Derrick	Foglietta
Foley	Long	Savage
Ford (MI)	Lowry (WA)	Saxton
Ford (TN)	Luken	Scheuer
Fowler	MacKay	Schneider
Frank	Manton	Schroeder
Frenzel	Markey	Schulze
Frost	Martinez	Schumer
Garcia	Matsui	Seiberling
Gaydos	Mavroules	Sharp
Gejdenson	McCloskey	Sikorski
Gephardt	McCurdy	Sisisky
Gibbons	McDade	Slattery
Glickman	McHugh	Smith (FL)
Gonzalez	McKernan	Smith (IA)
Goodling	Meyers	Smith (NJ)
Gordon	Mica	Snowe
Gray (IL)	Mikulski	Solarz
Green	Miller (CA)	Spratt
Guarini	Mineta	St Germain
Gunderson	Mitchell	Staggers
Hall (OH)	Moakley	Stangeland
Hamilton	Mollohan	Stark
Hawkins	Moody	Stokes
Hayes	Morrison (CT)	Studds
Hefner	Mrazek	Swift
Heftel	Murphy	Synar
Henry	Murtha	Tallon
Hertel	Natcher	Tauke
Howard	Neal	Thomas (GA)
Hoyer	Nelson	Torres
Hubbard	Nowak	Torricelli
Hughes	Oakar	Towns
Jacobs	Oberstar	Traficant
Jeffords	Obey	Traxler
Jenkins	Olin	Udall
Johnson	Ortiz	Vento
Jones (NC)	Owens	Visclosky
Jones (OK)	Panetta	Volkmer
Jones (TN)	Pease	Walgren
Kanjorski	Penny	Watkins
Kaptur	Pepper	Waxman
Kastenmeier	Perkins	Weiss
Kennelly	Pickle	Wheat
Kildee	Porter	Whitley
Kleczka	Price	Whitten
Kolbe	Pursell	Williams
Kolter	Rahall	Wilson
Kostmayer	Regula	Wirth
LaFalce	Reid	Wise
Lantos	Richardson	Wolpe
Leach (IA)	Ridge	Wright
Leath (TX)	Rinaldo	Wyden
Lehman (CA)	Robinson	Wylie
Lehman (FL)	Roe	Yates
Leland	Rose	Yatron
Levin (MI)	Roukema	Young (MO)
Levine (CA)	Rowland (GA)	Zschau
Lightfoot	Russo	
Lipinski	Sabo	

NOES—145

Archer	Edwards (OK)	Lowery (CA)
Armey	Emerson	Lujan
Bartlett	Fiedler	Lungren
Bateman	Fields	Mack
Bentley	Franklin	Madigan
Bereuter	Gallo	Marlenee
Bilirakis	Gekas	Martin (IL)
Bliley	Gilman	Mazzoli
Boulter	Gingrich	McCain
Broomfield	Gradison	McCandless
Broyhill	Gregg	McCollum
Burton (IN)	Hall, Ralph	McEwen
Callahan	Hammerschmidt	McGrath
Carney	Hansen	McMillan
Chappie	Hendon	Michel
Coats	Hiler	Miller (OH)
Cobey	Holt	Miller (WA)
Coble	Hopkins	Molinari
Coleman (MO)	Hunter	Montgomery
Combest	Hutto	Moore
Courter	Hyde	Moorhead
Craig	Ireland	Morrison (WA)
Crane	Kasich	Myers
Daniel	Kemp	Nichols
Dannemeyer	Kindness	Nielson
Daub	Kramer	Oxley
DeLay	Lagomarsino	Packard
DeWine	Latta	Parris
Dickinson	Lent	Pashayan
Dornan (CA)	Lewis (FL)	Petri
Dreier	Livingston	Quillen
Duncan	Lloyd	Ray
Dyson	Loeffler	Ritter
Eckert (NY)	Lott	Roberts
Roemer	Smith, Denny (OR)	Tauzin
Rogers	Smith, Robert (NH)	Taylor
Roth	Smith, Robert (OR)	Thomas (CA)
Rowland (CT)	Snyder	Valentine
Schaefer	Solomon	Vander Jagt
Schuette	Spence	Vucanovich
Sensenbrenner	Stallings	Walker
Shaw	Stenholm	Weber
Shelby	Strang	Whitehurst
Shumway	Stratton	Whittaker
Shuster	Stump	Wolf
Siljander	Sundquist	Wortley
Skeen	Swindall	Young (AK)
Skelton		Young (FL)
Slaughter		
Smith (NE)		

NOT VOTING—32

Anthony	Fuqua	McKinney
Badham	Gray (PA)	Monson
Barton	Grotberg	O'Brien
Breaux	Hartnett	Rangel
Burton (CA)	Hatcher	Rodino
Bustamante	Hillis	Rostenkowski
Campbell	Horton	Roybal
Chandler	Huckaby	Rudd
Cheney	Lewis (CA)	Sweeney
Crockett	Lundine	Weaver
Davis	Martin (NY)	

□ 1710

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Rangel for, with Mr. Lewis of California against.

Mrs. Burton of California for, with Mr. Cheney against.

Mr. Anthony for, with Mr. Martin of New York against.

Mr. Rodino for, with Mr. Badham against.

Mr. Huckaby for, with Mr. Campbell against.

Mr. McKinney for, with Mr. Hartnett against.

Mr. Horton for, with Mr. Rudd against.

So the concurrent resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid upon the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the concurrent resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection.

LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

(Mr. MICHEL asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I ask to proceed for the purpose of inquiring of the distinguished majority whip the program for next week.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished Republican leader for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, this concludes the business for the week. The House will be asked to give unanimous consent when it adjourns tonight, it adjourn to meet at noon on Monday next.

On Monday we will consider 11 suspensions under the suspension rules:

S. 1073, Japanese Technical Literature Act of 1986;

H.R. 4252, Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act;

H.R. 4952, Electronic Communications Privacy Act;

H.R. 3108, amend U.S.C. title XVII re local service area of primary transmitters for low-power TV stations;

H. Con. Res. 347, sense of Congress re human rights in North Korea, and reduction of tensions on the Korean Peninsula;

H. Con. Res. 345, sense of Congress re democracy in the Republic of Korea;

S.J. Res. 361, to disinvite Chilean Tall Ship *Esmeralda* from July 4 ceremonies;

H.R. 5028, Lower Colorado River water supply bill;

H.R. 4060, Civil Service Retirement COLA, 1987;

H.R. 3006, retirement credit to National Guard technicians; and

H.R. 3559, U.S. Bicentennial Commission.

On Tuesday, June 24, the House will meet at noon. There are no bills currently scheduled under suspension of the rules, but we will take votes on suspensions ordered on Monday, June 23. Then we will consider H.R. 4210, the Export-Import Bank amendments, open rule, 1 hour of debate.

On Wednesday, and the balance of the week, the House will meet at 10 a.m. and consider an unnumbered House Resolution, military construction appropriations for fiscal year 1987.

This is the bill on which we expect the aid to the Contra issue to be debated and included in the determination of the legislation.

Also, H.R. 4613, the Futures Trading Act of 1986, open rule, 1 hour of debate; H.R. 2436, the nutrition monitoring bill, subject to a rule being granted; and H.R. 4184, the National Science Foundation authorizations for fiscal year 1987, subject to a rule being granted.

Obviously, the announcement is being made subject to the usual conditions that conference reports may be brought up and the supplemental appropriations, I might mention, is one such conference report that is expected next week.

A further program may be announced later.

It is not expected that if we complete the business I have announced that we will have a Friday session next week.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, one of the Members, I think, of the Committee on Small Business, indicated that there was a likelihood of a bill, H.R. 4620, the Small Business Innovative Research Program, that would be on the suspension calendar.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, the bill has been sequentially referred to another committee.

Mr. MICHEL. What was the gentleman's comment relative to next Thursday? Would that be the day for the supplemental?

Mr. FOLEY. If the program that I have announced is completed on Thursday, and we hope it will be, at that point, the House will not plan a Friday session next week.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MICHEL. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I am wondering what the plans are with regard to the Gramm-Rudman schedule that we are supposed to have met by the end of next week, rather than adjourn the House.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Speaker, there was a unanimous-consent request, I think, that was agreed to earlier in the day that, notwithstanding what the Gramm-Rudman bill called for with respect to the July recess, was negated by the unanimous-consent request made and agreed to earlier in the day. Am I in error?

Mr. FOLEY. I think that would be a parliamentary inquiry that I could not respond to.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, so we have now abrogated that discipline that is in Gramm-Rudman as well.

Mr. MICHEL. Yes, I think that is probably true.

ADJOURNMENT TO MONDAY, JUNE 23, 1986

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when the House adjourns today, it adjourn to meet at 12 noon on Monday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

DISPENSING WITH CALENDAR WEDNESDAY BUSINESS ON WEDNESDAY NEXT

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that business in order under the Calendar Wednesday rule be dispensed with on Wednesday next.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

REPORT ON H.R. 5052, MILITARY CONSTRUCTION APPROPRIATIONS, 1987

Mr. HEFNER, from the Committee on Appropriations, submitted a privileged report (Rept. No. 99-648) on the bill (H.R. 5052) making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1987, and for other purposes, which was referred to the Union Calendar and ordered to be printed.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma reserved all points of order on the bill.

PERMISSION TO FILE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4515, URGENT SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 1986

Mr. WHITTEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the managers may have until midnight tonight to file a conference report on the bill (H.R. 4515) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, and for other purposes.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Mississippi?

There was no objection.

APPOINTMENT OF CONFEREES ON S. 426 ELECTRIC CONSUMERS PROTECTION ACT OF 1985

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to take from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S. 426) to amend the Federal Power Act to provide for more protection to electric consumers, with the House amendment thereto, insist on the House amendment, and agree to the conference asked by the Senate.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan?

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I assume this has been cleared with the minority.

Mr. DINGELL. Mr. Speaker, that is correct.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan? The Chair hears none, and appoints the following conferees: Messrs. DINGELL, MARKEY, SWIFT, BRYANT, SHELBY, WYDEN, BROYHILL, MOORHEAD, OXLEY, and NIELSON of Utah.

□ 1720

NATIONAL SAVE AMERICAN INDUSTRY AND JOBS DAY

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 346) to designate June 21, 1986, as "National Save American Industry and Jobs Day," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but would simply like to inform the House that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, under my reservation, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. REGULA].

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, I want to congratulate the committee for passing the Senate joint resolution designating Saturday as "National Save American Industry and Jobs Day."

I think it is very important that we recognize what manufacturing has meant to this Nation. It is important to recognize that if we are to be a strong leader of the free world in the years to come, we have to have a dynamic industrial economy in this Nation, and by having this day designated, we will have an opportunity to focus on the importance of this to all Americans.

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Speaker, on Saturday, June 21, 1986, people will be gathering at meetings in over 60 cities across this great land to commemorate "National Save American Industry and Jobs Day." This day has been set aside for all to reflect upon the dire consequences that have befallen our industrial base over the past several decades.

Cities, once made prosperous by industries such as steel, automobile, milling, and manufacturing are currently reeling from the decline in our industrial base. Jobs are lost, families are devastated and communities suffer from the economic upheaval that follows when industry disappears.

As the unemployment rate continues its roller coaster climb upward, as our imports grow and our exports shrink, we are all searching for solutions. The debate is frequently emotional, while the answers remain elusive.

Congress has been preoccupied with the economic impact of our growing trade imbalance and we have moved in several directions in an effort to help "level the playing field" and, hopefully, enhance our trading position. Still, one cannot help but wonder if a part of the answer to our trade imbalance lies here in the hands of the American people. Maybe the answer lies in helping to promote domestic production and consumption by making the public more aware of American products. This is the idea that inspired "National Save American Industry and Jobs Day," to make people more conscious of what we produce and, more importantly, who produces it.

When we purchase an American-made automobile, we protect American jobs. When we use domestic coal to produce American made steel, we save vital industries and protect their workers. When we take the time to comparison shop and in turn purchase American made products instead of their foreign made counterparts, we all help fight the battle to retain and regain our industrial strength.

An old axiom tells us that what we don't use—we lose. What is true for our own talents and skills is also true for our businesses and industries. A quick tour along the waterways of Pittsburgh will drive home the painful consequences of this lesson.

I ask every Member of the House to take some time on Saturday to consider the current plight of our industrial sector and to redouble your efforts to help to recover and grow.

Mr. ECKART of Ohio. Mr. Speaker, this Saturday, June 21, our Nation will observe "Save American Jobs and Industry Day." Let us remember on this day the 4 million Americans who have lost their jobs in the last 5 years to imports. Some 40,000 workers from northeast Ohio alone have lost their jobs in recent years as a direct result of this import invasion.

The present administration's inability to establish a sound and coherent trade policy has resulted in this economic nightmare. The United States has become a debtor nation for the first time since the Great Depression and we continue to suffer from record trade deficits. Foreign products now account for 25 percent of all goods sold in the United States today—an increase of 300 percent in the last 15 years.

Just today, I was visiting with steel workers from northeast Ohio. One of the things I found most striking in talking with them was their concern for the future of their children and grandchildren. With jobs evaporating, where, they ask me, are our children going to work?

It is imperative that we take action to correct the inequalities which permeate our global trading system today and fight to retain American jobs and a standard of living second to none. The House has passed an omnibus trade bill designed to achieve this objective. The President has threatened to veto such legislation; however, the President must understand the economic and human price of vetoing legislation which will reinstate fair trade.

The economic benefits of low unemployment and the resulting vigorous economy are tremendous. Higher employment results in more taxes paid, which enables a strong educational system for our children and provides for urgent local services, such as fire and police protection. Let "Save American Jobs and Industry Day" symbolize the commitment needed to restore fair trade and make American jobs our top priority, not our top export.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution as follows:

S.J. RES. 346

Whereas the United States has been a model of economic strength throughout history;

Whereas the manufacturing industries of the United States have grown continuously, have created a high standard of living for Americans, and now generate more than $1,500,000,000,000 of the annual gross national product of the United States;

Whereas the manufacturing industries of the United States have excelled in meeting the needs of consumers in the Nation and have responded to the needs of the United States and its allies during periods of armed conflict;

Whereas the United States maintains a policy of allowing the products of foreign industry to be sold in the United States with few restrictions;

Whereas such policy has helped to improve the economies of many foreign nations, particularly the economies of underdeveloped foreign nations;

Whereas, in many cases, the retail price of imported goods is artificially low due to subsidies by foreign governments;

Whereas the purchase of imported goods by consumers in the United States is having a detrimental effect on the manufacturing industries of the United States;

Whereas the officers of many manufacturing companies in the United States are restructuring their companies at a rapid rate because of reduced demand for many of the products manufactured in the United States;

Whereas such restructuring has included the closing of many plants and the resulting loss of many jobs;

Whereas more than 8,500,000 workers in the United States are unemployed, sales of products manufactured in the United States are generally not increasing, and the rate of pay for workers who continue to be employed has become depressed;

Whereas consumers in the United States should become aware of the origin of the goods such consumers purchase and the effect of buying imported goods on the manufacturing industries of the United States; and

Whereas the accomplishments and needs of the manufacturing industries of the United States and all employees of such industries should be recognized: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That June 21, 1986, is designated "National Save American Industry and Jobs Day", and the President of the United States is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a

motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL DAY

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 188) to designate July 6, 1986, "National Air Traffic Control Day," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but would simply like to inform the House that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution as follows:

S.J. RES. 188

Whereas July 6, 1986, marks the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment, by the United States Bureau of Air Commerce, of an airways traffic control system to assure adequate spacing between airplanes flying along established air routes and to prevent congestion at airports;

Whereas the volume of traffic using the United States Airspace System has increased one hundred eighty-fold from two hundred ninety-four thousand five hundred twenty-eight enroute flight movements in 1938, to fifty-three million three hundred twenty thousand nine hundred thirty-one total air route traffic movements in 1983;

Whereas the safety, efficiency, and technical sophistication of the United States National Airspace System is now unparalleled in the world, and the preeminence of the United States in pioneering the technology of air traffic control is universally recognized, and emulated, by other nations throughout the world;

Whereas this Nation's civil and military air traffic control personnel daily guide unprecedented volumes of traffic safely and efficiently through the National Airspace System; and

Whereas in order to increase public awareness of the excellence and preeminence of the United States National Airspace System, and because the people of the United States desire to express their gratitude and respect to the pioneers of the technology of air traffic control, and the air traffic control personnel—past and present—who have dedicated their lives and careers to development, safety, and efficiency of the National Airspace System: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That July 6, 1986, is designated as "National Air Traffic Control Day". The President is requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States and upon interested associations and organizations to observe such a day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL IMMIGRANTS DAY

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 290) to designate July 4, 1986, as "National Immigrants Day," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but would simply like to inform the House that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution as follows:

S.J. RES. 290

Whereas on July 4, 1986, the restored Statue of Liberty will be unveiled at the centennial celebration of the erection and dedication of the Statue;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty has been the symbol of freedom, hope, and opportunity for millions of immigrants over the past 100 years;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty serves as a reminder to all that the United States is a Nation of immigrants, a Nation of nations;

Whereas the Statue of Liberty is a lasting memorial to the immigrants who have made America great;

Whereas millions of immigrants settled throughout the vast territory of the United States, and supported the ideals of independence and liberty;

Whereas the torch held by the Statue of Liberty serves as a beacon of freedom that lives in the soul of every American; and

Whereas it is only fitting that when the torch is relit also be a time to honor the immigrants welcomed by the burning torch of the Lady of Liberty to a land of freedom where any dream was and is achievable: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That July 4, 1986, the centennial-celebration of the Statue of Liberty, is designated as "National Immigrants Day", and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation encouraging the people of the United States to join the President and the Congress in observance of National Immigrants Day with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL LITERACY DAY

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 429) to designate July 2, 1986, as "National Literacy Day," and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but would simply like to inform the House that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. FLORIO. Mr. Speaker, I wanted to express my appreciation to my colleague ROBERT GARCIA, chairman of the Subcommittee on Census and Population, for bringing House Joint Resolution 429 to the floor for consideration and thus demonstrating his concern for the problem of illiteracy in our Nation. As I introduced House Joint Resolution 429 last October to designate July 2, 1986 as National Literacy Day, I hoped to call attention to the large numbers of Americans that cannot function in our society because they are illiterate. I am pleased to have gained the support of 222 of my colleagues and urge passage of this resolution.

Mr. Speaker, studies indicate that 27 million Americans cannot read a newspaper, cannot fill out a job application, cannot maintain a checkbook or understand the warning label on a bottle of medicine. In short, our Nation has 27 million people that form a class of functional illiterates that are uneducated, untrainable, and economically dependent. And these numbers are growing every year. The Department of Education estimates that, every year, 2 million more illiterates, including high school dropouts, unlettered passalong graduates and immigrants, are added to our society.

We are paying a high price in our Nation for this unfortunate deficiency. There is a direct correlation between the number of illiterate adults unable to perform at the standard necessary for available employment and the money that is allocated to child welfare costs and unemployment compensation. Social and economic discrimination problems are propounded because illiteracy is highest among blacks and Hispanics. The high percentage of illiterate juveniles in criminal court indicate that illiteracy fosters crime. Of concern to our Nation's strength is the fact that illiteracy directly impacts our military capability. Millions of dollars of damage is still done to expensive equipment because many men and women in

the service are unable to read and comprehend even the simplified manuals.

The total costs related to our Nation's literacy are estimated to exceed $225 billion annually. Chronic unemployment is a further problem that illiterate individuals in our Nation need to deal with. Up to 75 percent of the unemployed lack the basic skills to get a job or be trained for a job.

Disturbingly, Federal funding for literacy programs has not been sufficient to address a problem reaching mass proportions. Federal, State, municipal, and private literacy programs have only been able to reach 4 percent of the total illiterate population. The annual amount of money spent by our Federal Government for this problem amounts to $17 per person for a total of $352 million. The Department of Education estimates that only 2 million people are reached annually by these programs.

The total cost of illiteracy to our Nation cannot be measured accurately. However, our Nation is paying dearly in lost productivity and human misery. We hear of sad stories of people suffering tragedies because they could not read: The industrial worker killed because he could not read a warning sign: the mother who gave her sick child pink detergent instead of stomach medicine because she could not decipher medicine labels; the mother who thought she was signing a routine field trip permission slip for her daughter only to discover that she had relegated her daughter to a home for the retarded.

It is for these reasons that we call attention to the problem of illiteracy in our Nation by designating July 2, 1986, as National Literacy Day. We must begin to recognize this problem in order to find solutions and obliterate illiteracy. I would like to, at this point, commend the thousands of volunteers in our Nation that are working tirelessly to help illiterate individuals in their communities. Thirty-three States have formed literacy councils and activities by volunteer organizations, colleges, and schools are increasing.

I wanted to single out one individual in particular who has worked tirelessly to focus attention on this issue. Caryl Mackin-Wagner, the executive director of Focus on Literacy in Laurel Springs, NJ, has been working hard to bring House Joint Resolution 429 to the attention of the Congress and I am hopeful that our efforts will prove fruitful today. I congratulate Caryl and the countless volunteers for their work and urge my colleagues to join me in approving this resolution.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the joint resolution as follows:

H.J. RES. 429

Whereas literacy is a necessary tool for survival in our society;

Whereas 35 million Americans today read at a level which is less than necessary for full survival needs;

Whereas there are 25 million adults in the United States who cannot read, whose resources are left untapped, and who are unable to offer their full contribution to society;

Whereas the annual cost of illiteracy to society has been estimated at $6,000,000,000;

Whereas there is a direct correlation between the number of illiterate adults unable to perform at the standard necessary for available employment and the money allocated to child welfare cost and unemployment compensation;

Whereas, although the largest number of adult illiterates is comprised of whites, in proportion to population size in percentages the number is higher for blacks and Hispanics, resulting in more economic and social discrimination problems;

Whereas the prison population represents the single highest concentration of adult illiteracy;

Whereas 1,000,000 children between the ages of 12 and 17 cannot read above a 3rd grade level and 15 percent of recent graduates of urban high schools read at less than a 6th grade level;

Whereas 85 percent of the juveniles who appear in criminal court are functionally illiterate;

Whereas the 47 percent illiteracy rate among black youths is expected to increase to 50 percent by 1990;

Whereas one-half of the heads of households cannot read past the 8th grade level and one-third of mothers on welfare are functionally illiterate;

Whereas the federal, State, municipal, and private literacy programs have only been able to reach 4 percent of the total illiterate population;

Whereas it is vital to call attention to the problem of illiteracy, to help others understand the severity of this problem and its detrimental effects on our society, and to reach those who are unaware of the free service and help available for illiteracy: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That July 2, 1986, is designated as "National Literacy Day". The President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon the people of the United States to observe such day with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

NATIONAL YEAR OF THE AMERICAS

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service be discharged from further consideration of the Senate joint resolution (S.J. Res. 350) to designate 1987 as the "National Year of the Americas," and ask for its immediate consideration in the House.

The Clerk read the title of the Senate joint resolution.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I do not object, but simply would like to inform the House that the minority has no objection to the legislation now being considered.

Mr. Speaker, I withdraw my reservation of objection.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

The Clerk read the Senate joint resolution as follows:

S.J. RES. 350

Whereas the tenth Pan American games will be held in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1987;

Whereas the games will bring together more than six thousand athletes from thirty-seven national teams from the Americas to compete in twenty-seven different sports;

Whereas the games will be the largest such gathering which brings together people from Latin America, the West Indies, Canada, and the United States;

Whereas the games will symbolize both the unity and the diversity of the Americas, as well as celebrate the lasting friendship of the peoples of the Americas;

Whereas the occasion of the games provides a unique opportunity to welcome to this country the leaders and peoples of the Americas throughout the United States; and

Whereas the year 1987 can be and should be the time for a year long celebration of the peoples and cultures of the Americas: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the year 1987 is designated as "The National Year of the Americas" and the President is authorized and requested to issue a proclamation calling upon Federal, State, and local government agencies, private organizations, and the people of the United States to observe the year with appropriate programs, ceremonies, and activities.

The Senate joint resolution was ordered to be read a third time, was read the third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the various joint resolutions just passed.

Mr. SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Ohio?

There was no objection.

IS THE UNITED STATES REPEATING MISTAKES OF THE 1920'S?

(Mr. PEPPER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Speaker, on the 26th of May there appeared an article in the Palm Beach Post, in Florida, entitled, "Is United States Repeating Mistakes of the 1920's?"

This article was written by a very distinguished Floridian and American, Hon. Arthur Burck, who is quite an

eminent authority in the field of mergers and acquisitions of businesses.

In the days of the very serious depression of the thirties, Mr. Burck was a member of one of the large New York law firms, and dealt primarily with the bankruptcies that were so frequent during that time. Later he was with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and his task was to advise judges engaged in reorganizations of companies' proceedings.

He is a very knowledgeable man about the economy and about the operation of the various economic forces of our country. He sees in the present many similarities to what happened in the twenties, leading up to the terrible depression of the 1930's.

I believe it would be of great profit for every Member of the Congress and indeed the citizens of our country to read this article by Mr. Burck. I have known Mr. Burck since he flew my plane, as an Air Force pilot, over Eastern Europe in 1945.

I commend this article to the consideration of my colleagues in the Congress and the country.

The article follows:

IS UNITED STATES REPEATING MISTAKES OF THE 1920'S?

Not unlike the 1920s, America's sybaritic society, understandably smug and content after four decades of prosperity and currently euphoric over soaring stock markets and declining interest rates and oil prices, is drifting slowly into troubled economic waters, impervious to dangerous shoals that lie ahead. It should never be forgotten that during the booming 1920s there were ample warnings of similar hidden dangers but an ostrich-like stance became the norm for just about everyone—government leaders, businessmen and a complacent public.

"What is necessary for a new disaster is only for memories of the last one to fade," (John Kenneth Galbraith, Harpers, November 1969), and so it is germane to review the atmosphere and attitudes that prevailed in the 1920s. Historian Edward Robb Ellis in A Nation in Torment, (1970) summarized the "Gospel of the Twenties" as "profits, power, bigness, riches, optimism and success . . . Get ahead! Make the mark of your life! Ride the gravy train!" He noted that President Warren Harding stressed "less government in business and more business in government," and President Calvin Coolidge said "the business of America is business" and "the attitudes of the chamber of commerce very accurately reflect that of public opinion generally."

Few in my generation had a broader exposure to the sweep of the Great Depression. Going to work at the age of 16 in order to continue my education, I traveled the summers of 1930 to 1936 on sales jobs that took me to a dozen states where I saw firsthand such scenes as the misery in the coal mines of West Virginia and Kentucky, the shuttered factories of Ohio and Michigan and the dust bowls that Midwestern farm states became.

Then in 1937, as a graduate of the University of Minnesota law school, I rode the caboose on a hog train to New York where I landed a job with a prestigious Wall Street law firm that soon put me to work on bankruptcy reorganizations—where the action was during those troubled times. Some years later, I joined the Securities and Exchange Commission, where for more than a decade I served as the impartial adviser to federal judges in charge of large reorganizations. And in so rehabilitating the industrial rubble left by the Depression. I became knowledgeable in the excesses of the 1920s. I likewise have witnessed the erosion of America's postwar industrial supremacy from the vantage point of specializing in mergers and acquisitons since 1953, and since then I have worked on the top-level problems of more than a thousand businesses, big and small.

Today, despite the comforting surface prosperity enjoyed by most Americans, the hard reality is that most American manufacturing industries are in trouble. Can the nation achieve lasting prosperity built primarily upon a base of defense and service industries?

The problem is compounded by the current malaise in other endangered areas, especially agriculture, banking, energy-related businesses and countless once-thriving smaller businesses that were damaged by mergermania.

The excesses of mergermania are but the tip of the iceberg in the sea of speculation that has engulfed our business and financial communities. Today's casino-like atmosphere is reminiscent of the free and easy 1920s.

When one probes behind the facade of seeming prosperity, discovery is made that in recent decades American industry has been buffetted by a series of shocks that have left countless businesses damaged, weakened or destroyed. A brief overview follows:

VICTIMS OF FOREIGN COMPETITION

Starting in the late '50s, foreign competition undermined thousands of manufacturers, big and small, and new assaults threaten many domestic industries that are still vibrant.

The tragedy is that as early as 1960 it became clear that it was only a question of time until most manufacturers would be hit by foreign invaders. Had there been early response, the damage could have been minimized. Yet many slow-moving, huge companies, such as those in autos, steel and consumer electronics, failed to react until it was too late. The principal culprit was the unwieldy size of our giant corporations, the burgeoning bureaucracies of which were incapable of coping with lean nimble and agile foreigners.

In any event, the weakening of so many of our basic industries is a factor that could leave us vulnerable. Pertinent is the following observation concerning the 1920s by Elliott Roosevelt, The Conservators (1983). "While new industries were booming during the 1920s the more basic ones—farming, mining, textiles, lumber—suffered steady declines, eventually undermining the nation's entire economic structure . . . and boom went to bust, literally overnight."

THE PERVASIVE DAMAGE OF MERGERMANIA

During recent decades, mergermania ruined or weakened tens of thousands of acquired businesses. The giants for several decades have been beating the bushes to find the most tempting takeover targets, the cream of the crop of emerging growth companies and leading independents. In other words, we have undermined a generation of our most promising companies, the industrial future of America.

In the meantime, our huge companies are bargained and sold with the same reckless abandon as poker chips at Las Vegas. Under today's lax rules, there is no more concern given to public welfare in the takeover of a billion-dollar firm than on the sale of the corner hotdog stand.

Hostile takeovers that came into vogue in the mid-1970s caused further incalculable damage: erosion of employee morale, the preoccupation of executives in either acquiring or being acquired, the focus on short-term results instead of sound long-range programs, the creation of additional dinosaur companies and the erosion of competition resulting from excessive concentration in many industries.

When the history of our times is written, the unrestrained mergers of recent decades may well replace the debacle of the stock market of the 1920s as the cataclysm most destructive to the nation's financial and economic foundations.

Some historians view the concentration of bigness during the 1920s as a factor contributing to the Depression. Thus, in The Great Depression (1984), Robert S. McElvaine wrote: "The structure of American business itself—the crown jewel of Coolidge prosperity—was another contributing factor in bringing about a collapse of that prosperity. The idealized American economy of small, freely competing units . . . was largely a thing of the past by the 1920s . . . The booming decade of the twenties saw a new headlong rush into corporate mergers."

INABILITY TO COPE WITH RAPID CHANGES

Countless firms were unable to cope with fast-changing developments such as wild fluctuations in oil prices and interest rates or volatile real estate values.

In Texas and other states of the Southwest, plummeting oil and real estate values have created a demand for bankruptcy lawyers not experienced by any region since the 1930s.

OUR AILING FARMING INDUSTRY

It was not long ago that many viewed our agriculture ("We feed the world.") as the bulwark of American prosperity. Today the plight of many Midwestern farming areas is much the same as that of the State of Iowa, which was recently described by Iowa Congressman Jim Leach as follows: "If you put the whole state up for sale today you would find it's half as valuable as it was five years ago—and that's for everything in the state . . . Iowa faces the problems of a developing country in the Third World."

Also devastated was our once-great industry for the manufacture of farm equipment, tools and supplies. Bankruptcies are rife. In recent months I have been trying to sell or merge some once-leading makers of farm tools. It is just as difficult as it was during the Great Depression.

THE SERIOUS ILLS OF OUR BANKING INDUSTRY

Bank failures in recent years have soared to the highest levels since the 1930s, reflecting in large part the adversities that have hit borrowers in the industries reviewed above. We are nearing a crisis for many of the world's largest banks that, in lemming-like fashion, lent hundreds of billion to underdeveloped foreign countries despite the huge losses on foreign loans in the Depression, repeating the unfortunate experience of bankers going back to 14th-century Florence.

Plunging oil prices make it probable that oil-exporting countries such as Mexico and Venezuela will default. When that happens, it is likely that other big debtors such as Brazil and Argentina, already struggling

under onerous debt burdens, will have an excuse to join the other defaulters, bringing to a head a problem that has been festering for some time: the likely insolvency of many of our big banks.

Two years ago, when Continental Illinois Bank threatened to go belly-up, we found that the ripples from failure of such a large bank, then the nation's eighth largest, could determine the nation's economy, and so the government had to take over. For the same reason, we now face the possibility that many of our leading banks will face nationalization.

Although some observers believe that these foreign loans could bring on a major depression (see McElvaine, The Great Depression (1984) p. 346; and Lernoux, In Banks We Trust (1984) pp. 225-249) there is probably no need to panic over the prospects of widespread nationalization. After all, in 1981 France nationalized 95 percent of its banks without much ado. Our taxpayers could eventually make a nice profit, just as we did in the Chrysler bail-out, when private ownership is restored. However, coming at a time when the nation is already burdened by budget imbalances, it is difficult to predict just what the consequences might be.

PROBLEMS IN OUR SMALL BUSINESS SECTOR

In the decade of the 1970s we lost a generation of incipient small businesses, a void that we will really feel in the years to come when these aborted entities would otherwise be reaching florescence. How did this happen? Starved for capital because of capital gains taxes as high as 49 percent until 1979, handicapped by high interest rates or even inability to borrow, submerged in bureaucratic red tape and surrounded by the burgeoning bigness of the corporate giants, the small-business sector became a victim of the continuing upheavals, recessions and inflation since 1970.

The pervasive damage flows from the reality that our innovative small business sector has provided most of the new jobs, the technology and the growth that have fueled America's postwar prosperity. Moreover, it is increasingly apparent that America's industrial future will depend upon the innovative small-business sector and not the stagnating huge companies, where hardening of the assets has become the natural disease of aging in a world of fastmoving change.

Nevertheless, despite some betterments in the 1980s, the innovative small-business sector is still in the "Third World" when it comes to government help. Abundant tax breaks and government largess still flow to the Goliaths; the Davids don't even get cut-rate slingshots.

REVIVAL OF UNSOUND AND RISKY FINANCIAL PRACTICES

The business casualties of the Great Depression were often caused by speculative practices of the 1920s that nowadays are again rife in our financial community: excessive debt, "junk bonds" (in the 1920s they were more politely called second, third and fourth mortgage bonds), and leveraged buyouts. Just as today, the '20s also had its share of speculative new stock issues and helter-skelter mergers that enriched financial opportunists, such as the empire builders who then ravaged our public utility industry. Speculation has replaced investment to the degree that the 1936 observation of John Maynard Keynes is a timely warning: "Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation. When the capital development of a country becomes a byproduct of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done."

It should not be forgotten that the main reason for the 1929 collapse of the stock market, other than that stocks became overpriced during the euphoria of the late '20s, was the speculative overleveraging of stock purchases; i.e., stocks could be bought with little of the buyer's money, a practice that was outlawed by the "margin" requirements of the 1930's reforms.

However, in recent years the speculative practices of overleveraging and excessive debt have crept into so many sectors of our economy that some unexpected cataclysm could lead to a downward spiral of massive defaults, at a time when bank illiquidity and our national budget deficit leave little room for maneuver.

Add up all of these problems and business casualties and America faces a bleak future—unless we are able to restore financial responsibility, rehabilitate enough of our crippled businesses and propagate many new high-growth firms. These difficult tasks will require the wisdom of Solomon, the patience of Job and total dedication to the truism: "When the going gets tough, the tough get going." Those of us who struggled with the seemingly bottomless problems of the Great Depression and then the ensuing uphill challenges of World War II know that American resolve can overcome seemingly insuperable obstacles when our populace finally recognizes that there really is an emergency.

Despite our many problems, we should never forget America's towering strengths, such as our vast capital resources, our well-educated and creative labor force and, above all, our capacity to spawn and grow innovative businesses that open up new industries.

As we gird for intensified worldwide competition, we have one significant advantage over other nations: Only in America are there the overall climate and perfected techniques needed for ever-expanding entrepreneurism in both high technology areas and mundane industries. So, as our mature industries continue to lose ground to lower-cost foreign competitors, we have the innovatives means to fill the gap by expanding into new areas.

Nevertheless, because big business is still where the big money is—and big money still controls America, politically and otherwise—the thoughts and habits of America are still mired in obeisance to bigness. That is not surprising since we all grew up with the idea that bigness is as much a part of America as apple pie. And with good reason: the giant corporation served America well throughout most of our history—when we were immunized from major foreign competition by two world wars, and their recovery aftermaths, that left our industry healthy and crippled foreign competitors.

But all of that has changed in recent decades. Nevertheless, because old attitudes persist, it is understandable that the nation's compulsion for bigness had resulted in a light case of the Russian disease—i.e., the bureaucratic stagnation that is now choking the Soviet economy.

And so we continue to repeat our errors. As just one example, we encourage the big corporations to become ever bigger with the help of regressive tax laws and lax enforcement of our sieve-like antitrust laws—and the Administration is now seeking legislation that would relax further our antitrust laws.

To be sure, bigness in itself isn't bad. Many big firms are in industries where bigness is appropriate and necessary. But just as a huge truck-trailer is suitable for the New Jersey Turnpike but hardly for traversing the rush-hour traffic of downtown Manhattan, so unnecessary bigness can become a handicap in many sectors of the business world.

In view of the wreckage we now see everywhere on our industrial scene, we now have ample proof that many—perhaps most—huge industrial bureaucracies have outgrown their day of usefulness in a hotly competitive world where innovation is the name of the game.

For too long, we have worshipped gigantism and the idolatry of "economies of sale." But there are no meaningful economies of scale when products face obsolescence. In an uncertain world, the only certainty is that every product eventually will become obsolete.

The clear lesson is that in today's changed circumstances the nation is served only when there is the largest possible number of viable, independent companies engaged in vigorous competition.

Current attitudes too often ignore that in a capitalistic society as complex as ours, the free enterprise system cannot function properly without some curbs; total laissez-faire is an invitation to the morality and ethics of the jungle. We overlook that the nation has enjoyed a protracted period of economic stability because Congress in the '30s structured a remarkable wall of safeguards based on the belief that "unrestrained competition and laissez-faire had contributed heavily to the Great Depression" (Gerald Nash, The Great Depression and World War II).

However, with the passage of time, our economic "fail-safe" system has become gradually eroded by inertia and by special-interest groups raising the simplistic hue-and-cry of "deregulation." Also, regulating bureaucrats, going along with popular attitudes of the times, often become lax in enforcement (see Tolchin & Tolchin, Dismatling America: The Rush to Deregulate, 1983). Classic examples are provided by what is now happening to the banking safeguards legislated during the '30s. Loopholes galore are created by regulators at the same time that banking giants are now pressing for repeal of both federal and state laws that long have proved vital to the safety of our banking system.

Moreover, in times such as these, legislators rarely cope with new abuses that periodically surface in our free enterprise system, such as the horrendous damage of merger-mania. For example, it took Congress 20 years before it finally enacted a simple, common-sense law requiring parties merely to let the government know of larger mergers and acquisitions in advance of consummation.

The seeming helplessness of achieving any real reform in the prevailing atmosphere is reflected in my following 1984 testimony before the House Banking Committee:

"All of this could easily be stopped by Congress withdrawing the tax breaks that fuel the giant mergers. But it will not happen. I say this from having for several decades repeatedly explored the subject with government leaders and legislators, including four appearances before Senate and House groups in 1977-78. When issues collide with the power and the "deep pockets" of the corporate giants, can one blame any

legislator for tempering valor with discretion?"

HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 350

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BARTON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to House Concurrent Resolution 350—resolution on continued adherence to the SALT II treaty. I was not able to vote on the measure because I am moving my family to Texas this weekend. I wish to speak today, however, to make clear my position on this important issue.

The SALT II treaty was never ratified and would have expired at the end of last year if it had been. President Reagan has called the treaty fatally flawed and I agree with this assessment. Despite this, President Reagan has gone the extra mile to comply with the provisions of the treaty. Most recently, the President has ordered the dismantling of two Poseidon submarines to stay within the SALT limits when it launches the new Trident submarines.

The U.S. record of compliance is clear. Equally clear is the record of Soviet violations of the document. President Reagan outlined some of the more blatant transgressions in a December 1985 report. These include:

Testing and deployment of the SS-25 ICBM. This is a second type of ICBM. The SALT treaty limited each side to one new ICBM.

Encryption of electronic missile data. SALT II bans encryption because it is an important means to verify compliance.

Construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

As a result of this noncompliance, President Reagan has announced that he will no longer abide by the provisions of the Salt II treaty. I agree with this decision. We cannot stand by and allow the Soviets to flagrantly violate a treaty with which we are in compliance. This is dangerous for our own security and the world.

House Concurrent Resolution 350 states that the President shall continue compliance with the Salt II treaty. The authors of this resolution seem to feel that Soviet violations can be resolved through negotiations. It is interesting to hark back to the statements of President Jimmy Carter in a news conference on April 30, 1979. He stated:

I would not sign nor present to the Congress or the American people any treaty which in my opinion could not be adequately verified from the day it's effective * * *. But there is an element of rationality and stability, because the Soviets know that if we ever detect any violation of the Salt agreement, that that would be a basis on which to reject the treaty in it's entirety.

President Carter knew that Soviet violations would endanger our security. The Soviet record is clear and President Reagan's decision is the correct one.

I do support the Broomfield substitute. If we can verify Soviet compliance, and they do in fact cease violating the treaty, then the SALT treaty is worth complying with.

PROMPT PAYMENT OF MEDICARE CLAIMS

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. STARK] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to cosponsor with my colleague and ranking minority member the Medicare Timely Payment Amendments of 1986. The Health Care Financing Administration has intentionally delayed claims processing time under Medicare, causing significant undue hardship for the Nation's elderly beneficiaries and providers of health care. Our bill would help to insure that Medicare beneficiaries do not suffer as a result of the Federal Government's failure to pay its obligations in a timely manner.

The fiscal year 1986 budget requested by the administration for the claims processing activities carried out by Medicare contractors was seriously deficient. The Health Care Financing Administration responded to this shortfall in funding by implementing a deliberate policy to delay claims processing and building claim backlogs. Now, Medicare beneficiaries, already strained by increasing out-of-pocket expenses, must endure additional delays in the payment of their medical bills.

In April, the Committee on Ways and Means, Subcommittee on Health held a hearing on Medicare claims processing. At that hearing, a representative of the Health Care Financing Administration clearly indicated that delaying the payment of Medicare claims is a sound public policy which results in increased interest income for the Medicare trust fund. Claims processing times have been slowed by more than 70 percent over last year—from an average of 15 days at the beginning of fiscal year 1986 to 27 days now.

What does this dramatic slowdown mean to Medicare beneficiaries? When physicians refuse to accept Medicare assignment, the patient must pay their physician bills directly and wait for Medicare to reimburse them for their expenses. Delays in claims payment can cause significant financial difficulties for beneficiaries on limited incomes. Moreover, as payment delays have increased, out-of-pocket expenses have also soared—resulting in higher and higher liability for medical services.

The Medicare timely payment amendments would require that claims which are submitted properly be paid within 22 calendar days. If the claim is not paid within 22 days, interest accrue on the amount of the claim for days beyond 22 days. Hopefully, this legislation will alleviate the financial hardship that has been faced by beneficiaries, ensure predictable cash flow for providers, and encourage Medicare assignment by providing dependable payments.

Payment delays have resulted in decreased assignment and participation rates for physicians' serivces. If a physician believes that he or she can be paid more quickly if the Medicare beneficiary is billed directly, that doctor is less likely to accept assignment. If a physician's experience with the Medicare Program has taught him or her that Medicare does not pay its bills in a timely manner, that doctor is less likely to sign a participation agreement. The Congress has supported the participating physician program on both sides of the aisle. Prompt payment is an important component of our effort to enhance the program.

I am introducing a separate bill today, the Medicare Timely Payment and PIP Amendments of 1986, cosponsored by my colleague, Mr. GRADISON, which, beyond ensuring prompt payment, would also provide a new incentive for physicians to participate in the Medicare Program by allowing that regular interim payments be made to participating physicians. That way, delays in claims processing will no longer result in cash-flow problems for participating physicians. This financial incentive for participation is likely to be strong and effective.

Both of the prompt payment bills that I join Mr. GRADISON in introducing today would also ensure that interim payments, that have historically been made to qualified hospitals, would not be discontinued as planned by the administration. This payment method has served as an effective tool to protect hospitals against interruptions in cash flow and payment delays.

Delaying claims processing is not a sound policy. It is merely a method of scrambling to compensate for poor planning. The results have not gone unnoticed. The bill which I am introducing today will prevent the Health Care Financing Administration from mandating intentional processing delays, and will bring average payment time back to historical levels.

The following are quotes from the Ways and Means Health Subcommittee's April 22 hearing on Medicare contractors and payment delays. These facts help make the case for the passage of the Medicare Timely Payment Act of 1986.

Testimony of the General Accounting Office:

The latest HCFA data shows that claims backlogs and average processing times are both increasing. Because of limits on contractor funding, HCFA is permitting contractors to slow down the average time to pay claims and to increase claims backlogs. While the average time to process a Part B beneficiary claim was 12.3 days during FY 1984, it increased to 20.3 days in January 1986. Also, average backlogs increased from 7.7 million claims in FY 1984 to 13.7 million claims in January of this year * * *.

But increased backlogs create risks and costs. Intentionally letting backlogs grow is risky because it leaves no margin for unexpected problems. Also, large backlogs and slower claims payments can increase program administrative costs because they can generate more beneficiary and provider inquiries, as well as more claim resubmissions.

Testimony of Mr. Luther Carter, vice president, Travelers Insurance:

[Y]ou are really talking about probably at least 50 days are going to elapse from the time that claim is mailed until payment is received * * *. Seven of the largest contractors have done a study which shows that allowing claims to backlog for 18 days will generate a one-time savings of $5.8 million but that is going to be offset by an annualized cost of $18.2 million. So it costs a lot of money to let claims backlog.

Testimony of Dr. William R. Felts, chairman, Council on Legislation, American Medical Association:

Delays such as now are being experienced discourage acceptance of assignment on the

very claims for which assignment may most benefit the beneficiary, and may force some physicians to reexamine the number of Medicare patients that they desire in their practice * * *.

HOWARD T. HUDSON—A PEOPLE'S JUDGE

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Speaker, it is with some sadness that I inform my colleagues that Howard T. Hudson, judge of the King City-Greenfield Justice Court in Monterey County, CA, has announced his retirement after 22 years of service. Judge Hudson is one of the finest judges I know of anywhere. For many reasons, he is no ordinary judge, and his stepping down from the bench marks the end of an era.

Judge Hudson was elected to his post in 1964. At that time, he was not an attorney, he was a farmer, Indeed, he had been farming for 20 years. At that time, there was no requirement in California that judges have law degrees. It was not until 1976 that Judge Hudson, in response to a new California law requiring that judges have law degrees, completed his degree through a correspondence law course from LaSalle University in Chicago and passed the bar.

Law degree or no, Howard Hudson has always known what it takes to be a good judge—fairness, compassion, integrity, intelligence, and basic common sense. He possesses each of these qualities in abundance, and they have served him well. Rare is the individual who has passed through his court—in any capacity—and not felt that he has been treated fairly. Those who follow the court and who have participated in the court have a tremendous amount of fondness and respect for Judge Hudson.

Judge Hudson moved with his family from Arkansas to Monterey County when he was 13 years old. His father started in California as a farmworker, and eventually father and son became partners running a family farm in the Greenfield area. Judge Hudson graduated from King City High School and studied agriculture and animal husbandry at California Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo, where he was valedictorian. During World War II, he piloted C–47 cargo planes in Europe.

In 1964, after deciding that he no longer wished to farm, and noting a vacancy for the judgeship in King City, Judge Hudson ran for the spot and was successful. He has been in the post ever since.

Mr. Speaker, Howard Hudson is truly a people's judge. He came from the people, and he has continued to earn the love and respect of the people who elected him. He will be greatly missed.

THE MILITARY CHAPLAINS FAITH BALANCE ACT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. DE LA GARZA] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DE LA GARZA. Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to say a few words in support of H.R. 1785, the Military Chaplains Faith Balance Act. This bill addresses the serious imbalance in the representation of various religious faiths among chaplains of the Armed Forces of the United States. It does so by accomplishing three goals.

First, the bill would instruct the Secretary of Defense to request appropriate leaders of underrepresented faiths to meet the needs of members of the Armed Forces of those faiths. Second, it would accept clergy members of underrepresented faiths for appointment in the Armed Forces as they become available without regard to otherwise applicable numerical limitations. And third, it would consider ordering to active duty reserve members of the Armed Forces who are designated as chaplains in order to aid in alleviating the faith imbalance.

One of the keystones of our Government since the heydays of our Founding Fathers has been the right to religious freedom. In order to be free, however, there must be ministry. This bill would ensure the exercise of these religious freedoms.

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY CANNOT RESOLVE TRADE DEFICIT ALONE

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. LAFALCE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LAFALCE. Mr. Speaker, for years I have argued that the United States must adopt an industrial competitiveness strategy in order to become internationally competitive and to reduce our huge trade deficits. Some critics have urgued that this is unnecessary because the trade deficit has been caused exclusively by the overvalued dollar. Consequently, changes in exchange rate policy alone could resolve the trade problem. While I agree that exchange rate policy is critically important, it is not the entire answer. An article in the June 18, 1986, Wall Street Journal explains why this is so:

NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES THWART U.S. EXPORTERS' HOPES FROM LOW DOLLAR

(By Douglas R. Sease and Rose Gutfeld)

The falling dollar may be giving American exporters some relief from their Japanese and European competitors, but it isn't doing anything to stem the growing pressure from competitors in many of the so-called newly industrializing countries, or NICs.

The dollar has fallen about 30% against the Japanese yen and almost 22% against the West German mark since September when the Group of Five—the U.S., Germany, Japan, France and Britain—launched a concerted effort to lower the dollar's value. As a result of the G–5 agreement, products made in Japan or Europe today generally cost more for American consumers while U.S. products cost less abroad.

But some of the most eager and aggressive makers of steel, automobiles, machine tools and electronic products aren't in either Japan or Europe. They are in places like South Korea and Taiwan, whose currencies are more or less tied to the U.S. dollar. With their combination of cheaper labor and currencies that haven't strengthened against the dollar, manufacturers in those countries are enjoying an unprecedented demand for their products among American consumers. That's starting to worry the American companies that must compete against them.

"There's generally a lack of knowledge or a misinterpretation of the news that the dollar is down and therefore our competitiveness should be enhanced." says Robert A. Wendt, manager of economic studies for Bethlehem Steel Corp. "Currencies in Korea, Taiwan, Brazil and Venezuela remain in lock step with the dollar and we don't see any near-term relief for steel or any other commodities."

And it isn't just basic industry in the U.S. that is worried. Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, for example, all are pushing hard to produce increasingly sophisticated products. Korea leads the pack with such products as videocassette recorders from Samsung and Lucky-Goldstar, a spiffy small car made by Hyundai Motor Corp. and Daewoo Electronics' personal computer that rivals the capabilities of the IBM PC for hundress of dollars less.

"I've been trying to make the point to anybody who will listen" that the U.S. is beginning to fall into a trade deficit with Korea and Taiwan on electronic products, says Ralph Thomson, senior vice president for public affairs at the American Electronics Association. "I don't want to diminish the fact that G-5 has been helpful, but where's the comfort to American companies if they're still losing market share, whether it is to Japan, Korea or Lower Slobovia?"

Chrysler Corp. Chairman Lee Iacocca echoes that sentiment: "The fundamental problem of trade equilibrium doesn't get solved if American jobs get shipped to Korea instead of Japan," he says.

Concern about the industrializing countries isn't universal, however. American companies that have either located production facilities in those countries or are buying products from them are reaping big benefits. General Electric Co., for instance, buys air conditioners and consumers electronics from Korean companies for sale under its own brand. Similarly, General Motors Corp. will soon be selling a small Korean-made car and U.S. Steel Corp. plans to buy semifinished steel from Korea's big Pohang mill for further processing at one of U.S. Steel's domestic facilities.

David Munro, director of macro and international economic studies for GM, argues that products from countries like Korea are bound to grab attention, but that they are only a small part of total imports coming into the U.S. "it's certainly true that a $5,000 Hyundai automobile or a $75 Samsung black and white TV are noticeable, but they aren't a big feature of the economic landscape," he says.

MEASURES URGED

Nevertheless, the companies that are worried about these new competitors are looking for relief, mostly from the U.S. government. Stephen Cooney, an economist for the National Association of Manufacturers, contends that currencies in countries like Korea and Taiwan should be strengthened by their governments.

"We need an upward valuation to reflect the very real competitive advantages that they have gained in the past five years," he says. "The fact that they have those surpluses proves that they don't need to have their currencies at that level."

The American Electronics Association is urging the Congress and the Reagan Administration to convince government officials in

the industrializing countries to take measures to slow the rapidly rising volume of exports to the U.S., perhaps through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the nominally governing body of world trade. And Mr. Iacocca recently urged that the G-5 be expanded to a "Group of 10" or a "Group of 15" to include Taiwan, Korea and similar nations.

But there isn't much hope for any action in the foreseeable future. For one thing, it isn't likely that the Governments of these growing nations would accede to any request to strengthen their currencies against the dollar. "I've been talking to the Koreans and Taiwanese and they aren't about to jump onto a train that will take them away from their competitive advantage," concedes Mr. Thomson of the American Electronics Association.

And the U.S. government certainly hasn't any intention of pressing the point anyway. "We have no intention of interfering in those currency relationships," says Peter Allgeier, assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Asia and the Pacific. "There is no indication that . . . those governments are somehow acting in a way to maintain an unrealistic level for their currencies. Just because we have a trade deficit doesn't mean we start intervening."

DEBT A PROBLEM

One big hurdle that blocks any efforts to obtain relief for industries under pressure is the newly industrializing countries' level of international debt. Korea's debt, for example, totals nearly $50 billion and it, like other developing nations, depends on export income to service those debts. To take measures that might increase the value of their currencies and thus curb their exports would penalize them for doing what the U.S. hopes countries like Argentina and Mexico will do.

"The Mexico problem is part and parcel of this," says Robert Brusca, chief economist for the U.S. arm of Nikko Securities, the Japanese brokerage. "Those countries have to have markets to service their debts. You can't have it both ways."

Finally, even if they agreed to revalue their currencies, economists argue that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find the correct value for the currencies based on a basket of goods and services, says GM's Mr. Munro, "but you can't do that with economies just coming out of the subsistence stage of development."

He adds that as countries such as Korea become bigger factors in international markets, their currencies, most of which aren't traded in world markets, will also become more internationalized and thus subject to market forces.

BOUND TO GROW

What's more, the problem is likely to get worse. Taiwan's trade surplus with the U.S. totaled more than $13 billion last year and Korea's amounted to $4.8 billion. As products from those countries displace higher priced Japanese or European merchandise, the trade surpluses are bound to grow. Vern Lacey, American Motors Corp's. chief economist, predicts that the combined trade surplus of Korea and Taiwan with the U.S. could in the next few years reach the $50 billion level that has so worried American industry about trade with Japan.

U.S. MERCHANDISE DEFICITS

[In billions of dollars]

	1985	1984	1983	1982	1981
Korea	4.8	4.0	1.2	0.1	0.4
Taiwan	13.1	11.1	6.5	4.5	4.3
Hong Kong	6.2	5.8	3.8	3.1	3.1
Singapore	0.9	0.4	[1] 0.9	[1] 1.0	[1] 0.8

[1] Surplus.

Note.—Figures are based on Customs Service valuations for duty purposes, except 1984–1985, which include all costs, such as insurance and freight.

Source: Commerce Department.

IN HONOR OF RICK BERG

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Speaker, I rise to inform my colleagues that Rick Berg, one of the finest employees of the House of Representatives, will leave Washington at the end of this month to enter Boalt Law School at the University of California.

Rick has been an integral member of my staff since my election to office. During that time he was one of the most versatile members of my staff. The issues he handled ranged from tax law to election law to protecting the Santa Monica Bay and other sensitive parts of California's precious seashore from offshore oil drilling. In addition, he wrote speeches and helped many of my constituents sort through the confusing maze of Federal redtape which confuses many of the most intelligent men and women in our society.

Rick also played the critical role of manager of our office softball team. As such he helped put together one of the finest teams on the Hill. His playing record was equally distinguished, marred only by a collision in the field with one of his teammates which may have maimed her for life.

His enthusiasm, commitment, and talent will be almost as difficult to replace on the softballfield as it will be in my ligislative staff.

Rick also served as my office's resident movie critic. His caustic, and occasionally accurate, reviews on the latest major, and many minor, releases were an important resource for my staff and me.

Another of Rick's responsibilities was as staff advocate for the concerns of the entertainment industry—one of the most important constituencies in my district. His ability to provide me with quick and reliable information on the concerns of that industry on a variety of subjects was particularly important to me.

I have seen few people grow and develop as quickly and spectacularly as Rick. I came to rely on him a great deal for his analysis and counsel. Whenever a difficult speech or complex case needed special attention I would call on Rick.

Rick's leaving will be a great loss. There is no question that no one person can replace him on my staff. My real regrets in his leaving are personal, however. Rick is much more than simply a member of my staff. He is a valued friend. While I envy his three additional years in Berkley and know he will be a lawyer, I deeply regret this decision to leave Washington.

I ask my colleagues to join with me in thanking Rick for his service to this institution and to wish him well in his future endeavors.

KENNETH ADELMAN DISCUSSES THE FACTS ON THE IMPACT OF NO LONGER OBSERVING SALT II

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, one of the most knowledgeable analyses I have seen on the subject of SALT II was the article that was printed in the New York Times on Sunday, June 15, 1986, by Hon. Kenneth Adelman, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Unfortunately, I was unable to participate in the SALT II debate because I was chairing the markup of the Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1987.

Had I been able to join in the debate I would have hammered home the points Mr. Adelman made so clearly and sensibly.

The article referred to is included at this point:

[From the New York Times, June 15, 1986]

WHY MR. REAGAN IS RIGHT ABOUT SALT

(By Kenneth L. Adelman)

WASHINGTON.—Bertrand Russell once remarked that we often defend most passionately those opinions for which we have the least factual basis. It is difficult to find any other way to explain the torrent of emotion that has greeted the President's decision that we are no longer bound by the second strategic arms limitation accord.

Even on its face, the case against the President's decision looks dubious at best. After all, the Senate Armed Services Committee agreed unanimously in 1979 that SALT II was not in the country's "national security interests." The treaty was never ratified. It never had the force of law. It never subsequently gained the support needed for ratification. The chief prediction of its critics—that it would permit a vast modernization and expansion of Soviet strategic forces—has come true, in spades. On top of this, the Soviet Union is violating the central provisions of the agreement.

What could be more clear-cut? Why do critics say that the United States should continue to abide unilaterally by SALT II?

First, Soviet violations are alleged to be "peripheral." The President's critics would like to have it both ways. When SALT II was up for ratification in 1979, its supporters commonly cited three provisions as its main advantages: the numerical limits (on warheads-per-launcher and overall launchers); the prohibition on a second new type of land-based intercontinental missile; and the restraints on encoding test data. The Soviets are completely contravening the provisions on new missiles and encoding, and they have exceeded the limit on missile launchers. Provisions hailed as central when SALT II was being sold cannot be considered "peripheral" now that the Soviets are violating them.

Second, the Soviet violations are sometimes said to be "ambiguous" or unimportant. The new, SALT-violating SS-25 missiles is not in any sense marginal. It is one of two powerful new land-based strategic

missiles that the Soviets are now adding to their arsenal. In short, a major portion of the current Soviet buildup of land-based missiles is occurring in clear contravention of SALT II. The violation is clear since the throw-weight, or payload, of the SS-25 missile is not, as some critics continue to claim, just "slightly" greater than its alleged predecessor, the SS-13, but roughly twice that—clearly beyond the 5 percent increase permitted by the treaty. In addition, the Soviets' scrambling of their test signals is seriously impeding verification.

Third, it is sometimes claimed that the Soviets have dismantled 1,000 or more systems to comply with SALT. This is contradicted by the fact that the Soviets themselves claim to have dismantled only 540 weapons under SALT. More important, what the critics' figures really demonstrate are not the quantitative limits on the Soviet arsenal but the vast qualitative growth of the Soviet arsenal under the treaty. The Soviets dismantled more during SALT than the United States did because they built faster and modernized much more than we did. The majority of silos said by the critics to be dismantled became the homes of new, vastly more powerful missiles. The figures are less a testimony to SALT's effectiveness than a measure of what it failed to control.

Nor should we attribute the dismantling of any Soviet systems solely or even mainly to SALT. When new Soviet systems come on, old, obsolescent systems generally go. For example, 650 SS-4 and SS-5 medium-range missiles—unconstrained by any arms accord—were dismantled by the Soviets after the SS-20, a far more potent threat, came on stream. The claim that the Soviets' decisions to dismantle weapons during the period of SALT were necessarily due to SALT is a case of misplaced causality.

Fourth, critics claim that without SALT II the Soviets will vastly increase their warheads and accelerate the arms buildup. Projections of large increases in Soviet warheads—beyond the considerable increases already anticipated under SALT—are easily made on paper. In reality, such changes are neither quick nor cheap—nor necessarily even militarily useful. For example, some critics claim that the Soviets would put 20 or 30 warheads on the SS-18 missile, instead of 10. But this is likely to undermine, if not preclude, the SS-18's main mission—that is, to destroy our missiles in their silos.

The basic notion that SALT is significantly constraining the Soviet buildup now, or would do so in the future, is an illusion. It presumes future compliance with critical provisions, when we already have seen clear and major violations of key parts of the treaty. Even while adhering to terms of SALT II, the Soviets have nearly doubled their strategic warheads, from 5,000 to 9,200. Under SALT II, the number could rise further to 12,000 by 1990. With or without SALT II, we envision a 5 to 7 percent growth in Soviet strategic investment every year as far ahead as we can see. With or without SALT II, we envision an all-new Soviet land-based missile force in the next decade.

If this is constraint, it is hard to envision a lack of constraint. With their defense spending running at 15 to 17 percent of their gross national product, the Soviets already have their accelerator near or on the floor.

Ironically, many of the critics who now base so much of their argument on predicting increases in Soviet warheads beyond those envisioned by SALT II (which did not explicitly limit warheads) used to tell us that warheads don't count. Back in the 1970's, when the United States enjoyed a 3-to-1 advantage in warheads, many of these same critics were arguing that "strategic superiority" and numbers of warheads were "meaningless" and could be bargained away without risk to United States security.

Fifth, it is argued that the President's decision is bad for our alliances. Despite extensive Administration consultations with the allies, there have been some allied disagreement and some adverse effects on allied public opinion. We naturally regret this. As the reasoning for the President's decision and the facts become better known, we hope this will change. We hope our allies' concerns will be alleviated.

But short-term popularity cannot be the criterion by which we judge the wisdom of policy. Our overriding concern must remain long-term strategic safety and genuine arms control. Continued adherence to an ineffective and unratified treaty that our adversary is seriously violating is not cost of risk-free either. As the President has said, what is needed are real reductions. Only this will ultimately provide a solid basis for mutual restraint.

Sixth, it is alleged that what the Administration wants is an "all-out arms race." This is simply false. Anyone who reads the President's decision and listens to what he is saying will see that he has provided a clear new formula for restraint that will be more effective than SALT. The President pledged, for example, that we will not increase launchers or ballistic missile warheads above Soviet levels. This is a serious pledge, one that creates real costs for a Soviet buildup and provides real rewards for Soviet reductions and restraint—just as genuine arms control should do. It is verifiable and do-able. In contrast, continued unilateral observance of SALT II in the absence of Soviet compliance would merely reinforce the dangerous idea that Soviet violations can easily be tolerated. It would also likely encourage even further violations and convince the Soviets to continue their drive for military superiority.

As the President has repeatedly made clear, what we want above all are serious negotiations in Geneva leading to agreements with which the Soviets will comply—to equitable and verifiable reductions in American and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

MY ADVICE TO THE PRIVILEGED ORDERS

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, a couple of months ago, more or less, perhaps a little less, I was the only Member in the Congress on either side that I know of that protested the remarks made by the Under Secretary for Latin American Affairs of the Secretary of State, and the remarks made by the head of the Customs section who made remarks accusing the Mexican Government, and implicating the head of state of Mexico, President de la Madrid, with corruption and with being involved in the illicit drug trade that is so much besetting us on both sides of the border.

□ 1730

I cannot begin to describe the turmoil, the detrimental impact of those statements, particularly those by the Under Secretary, Elliott Abrams, because of his position. To my knowledge, it was an unprecedented remark or remarks made by an under secretary for Latin American affairs.

I explained when I got up on the House floor and suggested an apology. Well, it was not long before Mr. Reagan's administration revealed the chaotic situation that has existed from time to time on the Cabinet level when Mr. Meese, the Attorney General, who also in the Justice Department heads Customs, denied that there was any such implication or any such goings-on in Mexico. He more or less disputed and countermanded the remarks made both by the Deputy Secretary of State Abrams as well as the gentleman known as Mr. Von Raab from Customs.

Then subsequent to that, there were other remarks attributed to Cabinet and sub-Cabinet level members. In the meanwhile, the fact that the Reagan administration's actions, I will not dignify them by calling it a policy, have clearly revealed their bankruptcy, as I have stated repeatedly, with respect to Central America where, in El Salvador, we have boasted, the administration has prided itself as having been responsible for installing the regime of Gen. Napoleon Duarte, it is still far from any closer a solution that it was 5½ years ago and $4.5 billion better to our Treasury.

Now this is the smallest country in Central America, and we are no closer there to any kind of a solution to this devastating, bloody civil war that has been raging for years.

So we look at the other countries, we look at Nicaragua where the President is still insisting that we in the Congress next week appropriate and sanction $100 million while he tells us that domestically we do not even have $60 million for the homeless in America, that he can find no room in his budget recommendations for keeping alive the only shelter programs that the country has had, some for 44 years, even in a minimal way.

As a matter of fact, I believe that it is incredible that the President would insist on this continued demand, even at the time when he cannot account, none of his administrators can account for the $27 million he finagled and flummoxed the Congresss out of last year by saying that he would reduce his request to humanitarian or "nonlethal aid" in the amount of $27 million.

At this point I am including an article from the New York Times of Thursday, June 19 entitled "Who Got the $27 Million Intended for the Contras?"

WHO GOT $27 MILLION INTENDED FOR CONTRAS?

(By William Buzenberg)

WASHINGTON—Before Congress votes for more assistance to anti-Sandinista rebel forces, the Reagan Administration needs to provide answers to a number of serious questions being raised about what happened to the $27 million in tax dollars appropriated by Congress for that purpose last year.

At the request of a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, the nonpartisan General Accounting Office subpoenaed Miami bank records to follow the paper trail of the $27 million. The money, in the form of Treasury checks, was deposited into accounts of the rebels' suppliers and brokers in Miami. The G.A.O. contends that most of that money never went to Central America.

Under the State Department-administered payment plan, the money was intended to cover receipts and invoices for the rebels' food, medicine, clothing or other nonlethal assistance. Instead, the General Accounting Office found that only a fraction of the money went to the region to cover those receipts and that most of it went to private rebel bank accounts in the Caymai Islands or the Bahamas, to private individuals or coporations in the United States and to the Honduran armed forces.

By law, the funds were supposed to be used for so-called humanitarian purposes. But because much of the money appears to have been siphoned off to other accounts not related to the receipts approved by the State Department, the G.A.O. believes it could have been used illegally for weapons or to line the pockets of rebel leaders.

The General Accounting Office and some members of Congress would like to know, for example, why the commander in chief of the Honduran military received a check for cash from one account for $450,000, and why a total of $1.5 million went to the Honduran armed forces. Was that for weapons, or for some other special arrangement between the rebels and Honduras?

The Administration's response to these disclosures has been troubling. First, it opposed the G.A.O.'s effort to subpoena Miami bank accounts, then tried to keep the information confidential. Now that the information is public, the Administration has yet to respond, insisting instead that it does not really matter where the money went after Miami as long as the goods were getting to the rebels. But some rebel groups have complained they aren't getting all of their supplies, and they themselves have blamed corrupt leaders.

Perhaps the best way to find out what has happened to the money is to follow this paper trail of the Miami accounts and compare that with the delivery of actual goods in Central America. That's what the G.A.O. wanted to do, but the State Department blocked it from pursuing leads in the region.

Various news organizations that have tried to follow this trail have made inquiries at small, storefront pharmacies and groceries that supposedly had done thousands of dollars worth of business with the rebels. Yet the store owners say they've never made out receipts for that much merchandise for the simple reason that their stores have never contained that much. Some former rebels even admit they collected blank receipts and falsely billed the State Department for payment.

This seems to be a common system used to enrich rebel leaders, but apparently it doesn't bother the Administration. When officials have been asked about these potential illegalities, they say Congress is to blame because it stipulated that the money could not go through the Central Intelligence Agency. The Administration seems to be saying that if only the funds were hidden, no one would know if money was missing or went to buy guns or bribe the Honduran armed forces—as if everything would be all right if no one knew what was happening.

It is a serious matter when the Administration ignores apparent violations of law in order to continue to carry out a policy of assistance to anti-Sandinista rebels. It is equally foolish to contend, as the Administration does, that those who want to know where the money has gone are merely playing politics. If the Administration now wants a fresh infusion of funds, it has an obligation to join Congress in trying to find the answers. In Watergate, the biggest crime was the cover-up of a smaller crime; in "contragate," word "cover-up" is just now beginning to surface.

All of a sudden, President Reagan is not interested in knowing what happened to the $27 million while insisting that we add $100 million to the coterie or this amalgam of diverse individuals who lost out in Nicaragua and are trying to come back in the name of freedom but who certainly have no support in Nicaragua because they are hiding out in Honduras. They are not fighting with the Nicaragua people's support in any segment of Nicaragua nor society, whether it is the poor peasant class or the urban working classes. On the contrary, this is where they were kicked out.

So I just cannot help but reflect on the description which history gives us of the great, great powerful Emperor of Spain, Phillip II. It was said of him that no experience of the failure of his policy could shake his belief in its essential excellence.

This, I think, describes our President to a tee today. But we live in a day and in a time when it looks as if the Congress is accepting the doctrine of presidential absolutism. We fought, in the history of our Nation, in the struggle for its beginning against monarchical absolutism only to abjectly accept Presidential absolutism, where if anyone dares get up to criticize, he is immediately labeled as a disloyal American.

The President's extravagant statements, embarrassing even to those who support him in my home State of Texas, in which he recently said, "The red tide of communism from Nicaragua is about to reach Harlingen, TX," and that Harlingen, TX, was only a 2-hour drive. That was so palpably ridiculous and out landish on its face that it has made us the laughing stock everywhere, including Harlingen, TX.

So then comes the assualt on Mexico, what some columnists are now calling Mexico beating or batting. I think the time has come when we ought to realize what a horrible powder keg we are sitting on in this new world and in our country.

Mexico is no Nicaragua and certainly no Central America, if you combine all of the Central American States in one.

Our country is oblivious to what is going on south of the border. The only time we hear the alarms is when we have the great fear expressed on this floor and elsewhere about these mobs or swarms of illegal workers crossing our border. Nobody wants to consider dispassionately and in a studied method exactly what the nature of the problem is and what its extent can possibly be. Therefore, we certainly will never, never find the solution. If we do not want to admit to the causes of a problem, how can we ever correctly find the solution?

I have been asking this for 25 years, the 25 years I have been in the Congress. My first year, I was given credit or blame, depending on the point of view, for the killing off of the bracero program. I had served in the Texas State Senate 5 years before, had fought it there, had seen the insidious impact on our side of the border of that malevolent program. It was the trading of the misery in one country with the misery on our side. It led to my introducing the first minimum wage bill in the history of the Texas Legislature.

I set a minimum of 40 cents because I had gone out to the fields and had seen these foreign workers, these aliens, braceros, protected by two powerful governments, to earn no less than 50 cents an hour while Texans, native Texans who happened to be of the same ethnic descent as the alien laborers working side by side with him in the cottonfields, in the other areas, in the plucking of those white bolls and the construction of highways, in the erection of the skyscrapers, much of their sweat and much of their blood went into that construction; but here was a native Texas worker earning as little as 26 cents an hour, unprotected by any of our political entities, while the alien bracero was guaranteed 50 cents. So I thought, well, 40 cents certainly nobody would object.

I was immediately assailed. I was called a Communist, I was called that and I was accused of introducing into Texas law the worst features of the Mexican revolutionary period and as a result got nowhere. It was not until much travail, several years later, and maybe a decade later, that finally Texas accepted a minimum wage which was below the national minimum wage and certainly has become known for its farcical pretension of being a minimum wage. But we did terminate the so-called bracero program.

Now the Mexican Government also and the officials then in power on the Mexican side were looking at it from an economic situation where they felt the bracero was importing into Mexico

millions of dollars that these workers were bringing back. So they did not want the program to end. So we have a double-front war.

The reason I am bringing this out is that we must understand that these relationships, these historical developments are not simplistic. They are involved, they are complex, but we must and will pay too heavy a price for ignorance in not dedicating ourselves to unravelling the source of the problem and having the wit and will to attack the problem and overcome it before it is too late.

Frankly, I feel it is too late. The conditions in Mexico are simply horrendous. We have an unemployment rate hovering at the 50-percent level.

Now the Mexican Government is broke. It has not even been able to pay 1 cent on the principal of its foreign, or what we call exterior debt. They have rolled over interest payments because those interest payments are going to the leading U.S. banks that have been so irresponsible as to criminally, culpably overextending themselves to the point where this overhang to those nations will never pay back that debt any more than we will pay our trillion-dollar debt, they have so overledged that they are out on a limb that represents an excess in loans never to be repaid of their capital structure.

This is the reason why in 1979 I took this floor and warned, and about the only one I heard from was the then chairman of the Federal Reserve Board who called me to have a private breakfast meeting and agreed with me and then confessed sorrowfully that there was not much he could do, which astounded me because he certainly had the power under section 14(b) of the Federal Reserve Act to do something, if he felt.

□ 1745

What he was telling me was there was not much he could do against these big banks. What is true, as sad as it is to put it in the record, everyone of these gentleman, including the present Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, as well as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, go back to the payroll of these banks, principally the Chase-Manhattan, they come from there and they go back there after their so-called public service. Never once will they be willing, able, or in a position even if they were willing and able, to defend the greatest interests of the greatest number of Americans, because the public interest collides with voracious greedy appetites of these megagiant banks.

This is the issue behind the scenes with Mexico. In Latin America, and I know that the American public is generally unaware of this, our soldiers now down there in that area are called loan collectors. We are actually doing no different than what Napoleon III did when he invaded Mexico 100 and some 20 years ago.

I might say as a matter of personal note that it was my grandfather who led the charge in northern Mexico at the Battle of El Somberete that led to the defeat of that Third Imperial French Army in the northern section of Mexico, after my grandfather and his family had been forced to flee from their hometown by the invaders. He fought shoulder-to-shoulder with Benito Juarez.

Of course, history gives a lot of prominence to the battle in the south, the Battle of Pueblo. But we must never forget that the equally important Battle of El Somberete was one that decisively turned back with a rather raggedy army the great French Imperial Armies of the Third French Empire days.

We now stand in pater familia in the shoes of these colonial powers. These are the undebated issues, as in the case of the Nicaraguan revolution. It is the same thing. It is a basic economic factor.

How many Americans know? I know I have said this before in the record, that one of the leading lobbyists here for the so-called rebels or Contras, or in the unbelievable words of the President, freedom fighters, is a gentleman who, in the Somoza regime had the ownership of the Vatican bank, the Banco Ambrosiano, in Managua. Of course, they feel that unless they are restored to power and the Somoza elements are returned, they will not be made whole. So the Pope will not recognize the Nicaraguan regime, even though he has continued, and does to this day and has every day that Castro has been in power, recognized the out and out socialist regime of Fidel Castro in Cuba.

And ever since we have had a so-called Ambassador or delegate to the Vatican, Mr. Reagan has been able to wheel and deal with the Pope himself where, for exchange for information to us through the Vatican about Poland and one or two other places, he will and we will accede to having a sympathetic ear with respect to our treatment of the Nicaraguan regime.

The notion that—and the charge has been made here on this floor, I have heard some of my colleagues say so—that the Nicaraguan regime is guilty of religious persecution is so ridiculous that again we are the laughing stock of everybody else, every substantial government from Canada on down in the New World, and every government I know in the Western World.

I believe the time has come when it is important that the Congress at least finally work and base its actions on a truer perception of what this world is now in this decade, for that part of the world that we, our children, our grandchildren and great grandchildren must and are compelled by destiny to share is not the same world it was even 15 years ago, much less the world it was when President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress in 1961. We have failed to recognize that.

We have failed to recognize and, unbelievably, followed a course of action that is a complete turnback to the period of Calvin Coolidge in 1929, when the history clearly shows us that it was the alleviating policy of Franklin Roosevelt, who had probably the most brilliant Under Secretary for Latin Affairs ever, Sumner Wells, in his announcement of the good neighbor policy. He had hostility in this country. The oil barons of this country were still unforgiving because of the Mexican Government expropriation of what they said was their oil lands and properties.

But, nevertheless, when we were in the crisis of World War II, rather than having a hostile element, we had allies and we had the Mexican Government sending its Foreign Minister here to enter into agreements in which Mexico allied itself with the United States. It even sent military men, many of whom died. It gave permission to the American Government to draft Mexican nationals, who, at that time, were quite numerous in Southwestern United States.

I invite my colleagues some day to go across the border point, say in Laredo, and you will see from time to time in the cemeteries there flowers and little American flags showing where the remains of some of the Mexican nationals who were killed in World War II are buried.

But now, unbelievably, we are completely turning the clock around, and we have engendered the most widespread resistance and hatred toward our country, or at least the Government, as they say, that we have had and in Mexico we had not had, since the invasion by our Marines of Vera Cruz and Tampico in 1914.

I speak today because time is upon us. What is going to be our reaction when, because of the sustained efforts mostly made by some of our unofficial actions through the CIA, to destabilize—that is the word they use—the Mexican Government regime of Mr. De la Madrid for two reasons:

□ 1625

One, the debt situation. Two, and more basically, because Mexico will not yield to us on our Central American actions. Of course, no Mexican leader could and stay in power without a lot of trouble because Mexico, ever since the revolutionary period has had basic doctrines; self-determination. Outo determinacion they say in Mexico. No intervention. No intervencion.

Domestically, they had one no reelection in which every single political elective office holder is sunsetted on the length of the time that he can serve. These are basic things in the long struggle for freedom for democracy, if you please, in these countries.

What is more shameful, and what I think is an eternal blot on President Reagan's record is what we are doing to the only real democracy that we have had and still maintains itself despite our heavy pressures, in Costa Rica. Now, here is Costa Rica, next to El Salvador. Costa Rica has the highest literacy rate anywhere in Latin America. They have the freest elections, even freer than ours; because they have been so free, they will even accept on the ballot candidates from what they call the Communist Party. Incidentally, the two or three candidates that have been elected as representatives have been elected as representatives from where? From the United Fruit camps and factories. How far do they get? What big acceptance has communism gotten? Well, no more no less than the ones we had here that called themselves socialists three, four, five decades ago.

What is Costa Rica? It has some of the past presidents like Dr. Jose Figures, a great pro-American, who today will tell you in sadness that he is compelled to side with the Nicaraguan regime because America is wrong, and that he cannot defend America, even though he did all during his public actions as President of Costa Rica.

We have had our Ambassador in Costa Rica actually intervening in their domestic elections as they did earlier this year to try to compel the defeat of the successor who, nevertheless, and against the United States, heavy opposition, because let me tell you: The United States and the Ambassador said, "If you do not do this, we will suspend the aid."

At that particular point, with the coffee crop crises being what they have been, mostly because of United States action, they were over a barrel. Nevertheless, they elected freely, the very man that the United States Ambassador said, "If you do, you are going to suffer."

Why is it that this country, as small as it is, would have this tremendous record of democracy going back to 100 years-plus of free, compulsory education? Why is this shining light of accomplished democracy, real democracy, perhaps even more so than our own, why are we so set on doing them in? Why? Because they will not arm themselves. They will not create a standing army which they have not had since their 1948 revolution in which they threw out their petty bourgeoisie, their old, landed aristocracy and hemmed them in, but who still have a lot of power because they own the newspapers and the radio stations and TV stations. Those are the ones that the American Ambassador and our American officials are dealing with to try to restore them to power which they lost in the 1948 Revolution.

In other words, what I am saying is, that we are hypocritically saying that we want democracy in Central America or Latin America generally. What I am saying is that with respect to Mexico, we better not think that it is just another volatile people as a chairman of an important committee in the other body said in a quote in an article that I would like to include in the RECORD at this point. The article is in the Washington Post and appeared yesterday, Wednesday, June 18, 1986, and is entitled: "Mexican Chief's Election Fraudulent, Helms Says."

MEXICAN CHIEF'S ELECTION FRAUDULENT, HELMS SAYS

(By Mary Thornton and Joanne Omang)

Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) charged yesterday that Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid was fraudulently elected in 1982 and that his party falsified legislative election results last year by keeping two sets of election books, "one public, one private."

Helms said documents he obtained from secret sources in Mexico show De la Madrid received 39.8 percent of the vote in 1982, rather than the 71.3 percent he claimed, a difference of 7.4 million votes. The ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) coalition received 48 percent of the Chamber of Deputies vote last year instead of the 71.1 percent announced, or 5.9 million fewer votes, Helms said.

The Mexican Embassy immediately said the charges were "groundless and most probably are intended to confuse public opinion."

In a statement, the State Department said, "We have no reason to believe such charges and have never seen any evidence to support them."

"I believe this is a scandal sufficient to impeach the legitimacy of the government," Helms said at a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, which he chairs. He urged the Mexican government "to open up the election process to international review and inspection," and said Mexico "deserves no help from the international community until this is done."

Helms has held two previous hearings in which he accused Mexican officials of fraud, corruption and links to drug trafficking. His subcommittee has jurisdiction over U.S.-Mexican relations, and Helms has expressed concern that deteriorating economic and social conditions in Mexico could lead to widespread political unrest requiring U.S. troops to be deployed along the border.

Helms' latest charges come as Mexico is completing renegotiations to ease this year's interest payments on its $97 billion foreign debt. U.S. banks and officials are heavily involved in the talks, along with the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral lending organizations.

An aide to Helms said the secret documents, which were not made public, came from within De la Madrid's government and were written in the military chief of staff's office for circulation among top PRI officials.

Helms charged that the Mexican government keeps "a double set of books, one public, one private. One set of statistics is the Mexican election results released by the Mexican Federal Election Commission. The other set is the real election results received by the presidential chief of staff of the military. Needless to say, the second set is considered top secret in Mexico."

In a statement, the Mexican government said the presidential military chief of staff "does not take any part in the Mexican electoral process" and that votes are counted with representatives of all parties present. A Mexican official said the chief of staff office only arranges presidential trips and interviews and would have had no reason to prepare any document on election results.

White House officials said there would be no comment on Helms' charges, but intelligence sources said nothing similar to them had surfaced previously. An official of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence said nothing resembling Helms' charges has come to committee members' attention.

No Mexican political parties have accused de la Madrid or the PRI of altering the vote count sufficiently to change a national election. They have charged instead that the PRI buys votes and has stolen provincial races.

Helms' figures indicated that under the allegedly secret vote tallies, both de la Madrid and the PRI won the elections anyway, but with pluralities rather than majorities. The military tally cited by Helms alleged that in 1982, de la Madrid's coalition received 9.26 million votes, 39.78 percent, the conservative opposition National Action Party (PAN) coalition got 8.1 million, 35.1 percent, and the leftist candidates' coalition received 4.7 million, 20 percent, with 5 percent of the ballots invalid.

Helms said the PRI "is to a great extent tied directly into the system of graft and corruption," and is maintained through "socialist methods of economic control to direct graft and corruption to the ruling circles." A more capitalistic system would enrich the Mexican people, render graft an ineffective control method, and the PRI could lose power, he said.

"If the situation in Mexico continues to be one of fraud, corruption and the strangling of democracy, then vast infusions of U.S. taxpayers' cash will only open up more opportunities for corruption and fraud . . . . If Mexico wants U.S. help, the Mexican people have no choice but to bring about fundamental political reform," Helms said.

William D. Rogers, a Washington attorney who served as assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs in 1974 and 1975, testified at the hearing that Helms' charges will trigger anti-American demonstrations in Mexico similar to those after U.S. Customs Commissioner William von Raab testified at a Helms hearing last month that virtually all Mexican law enforcement officials are corrupt.

"I can't think of a worse place to thrash out a [U.S.] policy than this hearing room," Rogers said. "It seems to me an attack on the Mexican presidency and its honesty and candor with the Mexican people is bound to be counterproductive . . . . It drives all Mexican officials into intoxicating nationalistic resentment."

Why is this an egregious error? The basic reason is that if we, no matter how mistakenly or no matter how much ideologically we would be impelled to, attempt to continue to desta-

bilize the Mexican regime, we will actually be throwing them to the wolves. That is what we call the leftist wolves.

The Mexican President needs our help. But the Mexican people and the Mexican Government has maintained a thorough-going independence. They have never accepted bilateral aid. They have very much multinational aid through the Inter-American Development Bank, through the World Bank, and of course, at this point, the big issue is how much more the United States is going to commit in resources in order to bail out our banks. Not to help Mexico; not to recognize what it is we can do because I might say that it even would be to our self-interest because if Mexico suffers as it has been, every single one of our border points in the 2,000-mile border from Brownsville to Mexicali, shows a consequent depressed situation which continues to give us 23 to 25 percent unemployment on our United States side. It continues to give us failing businesses, not only on their side, ours too. Inevitably those human beings who are not going to tolerate starving to death and folding over and dying.

God in Heaven knows that if there are any people that are attached to their land it has been the Mexicans. I guess you could say this also of the countries south; the Guatemalans; the Hondurans; the Nicaraguans; the Salvadorans. But, no great, mass movements in the history of our country. People do not move this way except out of sheer want and sheer necessity.

The Irish did not come during the potato famine because they wanted to leave Ireland. No other sizeable segment of immigrants to our country did otherwise. What makes this different is that we are locked in, and if our national security is really at stake, this is where it is. I think that we should not stand by in the Congress and let an ideological President sacrifice us before his false god of ideology as has been the case up to now.

There are some thinking voices on our side. There have been in the past, but with respect to Mexico, there is a strange silence. I felt rather isolated as being the only single Member of the House to speak out in protest to the tremendous assaults through these officials in our Government and through the press.

□ 1805

It actually goes back to 1982. On that occasion the Mexican President visited us here, and the day that he arrived, the columnist Jack Anderson had a column in which he was accused of being corrupt. He had barely taken office, and yet here he was.

If anything, President de la Madrid has epitomized one of the cleanest, one of the most integral of political office holders or Presidents that Mexico has had. The Mexican press has been full or was full just a couple of years ago with the derelictions and the corruption of prior individuals and regimes, but in this case, the result has been that we have let a runaway agency like the CIA dictate the policies with no accountability whatsoever.

Jack Anderson's column never documented a charge. Under Secretary of State Elliott Abrams has failed to document the insinuations and the accusations.

General Gorman was the commander of the Southern Command, and startled everybody when he came out last year and the year before, before he left the command, by saying that Nicaragua was not the problem, El Salvador was not the problem, Mexico was the problem, because of its corruption.

Well, this was considered so outlandish even though it was from the lips of one of the highly placed military in our command. I cannot conceive that he would have said that without having had the explicit consent of the Commander-in-Chief.

What was his source? Why would a Southern Commander in Panama make that statement? Well, it has all come out, just like the pamphlet or the instructions printed by the CIA on how the Contras should go about knocking out the Nicaraguan regime. It goes back to the CIA.

This is pathetic, because the consequences are going to be that if it succeeds in its destabilization of the Mexican regime, it will merely knock over a friend of the United States. President de la Madrid has been very pro-American, before he became President and since he has been President. He has not done one thing that anybody could consider to be a threat to our national interest, either in utterance or action. But his sin is according to the CIA and our ideologs, such as Elliott Abrams, who comes to power by virtue of the fact that he is the son-in-law of the Commentary editor, Norman Podhoretz. They are ideologs, all of them, beginning with the woman that brought them into the scene, Ambassador Kirkpatrick—the Iron Lady.

I believe that the time has come when the Congress has got to act out some realistic perception of the world. I do not know how optimistic I am after hearing the debate or the discussion on SALT II today, and on the various and sundry defense appropriation bills that we have had. It seems as if everybody in our country is locked into a mind-set that is totally unrealistic, as we were in the sixties with respect to other parts of the world—a mindset that has Europe, for instance, a 1948 Europe; a mindset that has Latin America back 50 or 60 years ago. That world is gone forever.

I do not know which at this point is more of a powder keg. Mexico south of the border, where on future occasions I will go into detail as to the extent and nature of the problem that Mexico's economic condition poses. I will say for the record, and I have said it repeatedly, that whenever I have criticized, it is only after I have offered some suggestions.

In September 1982 was the first Mexican financial crisis, that reverberted in such a way that it shook our Secretary of the Treasury and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board to the point where they had to suddenly find $4 billion. They still have not told us what the deal was to help Mexico through an artificial price of their oil, which we have been using, for instance, for such things as building up our reserve. But nevertheless it was at an undetermined price, because it would have brought protests from all the knowledgeable oil people because the deal was not to buy the oil, it was to find another way of giving aid to Mexico.

The net impact of that aid was to come back in the shape of interest payments of 30 and 35 percent to these biggie banks who are out on such a limb, so that again the crisis comes up. But at that time, in September, I offered a suggestion to Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan, and a suggestion to then and still Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Paul Volcker. In one case I never received quite an acknowledgment, and in the other, many weeks later, I received an acknowledgment, but it clearly indicated that no consideration had been given.

My suggestion was simply one that would have enabled us through our established resources to help the Mexican Government stabilize its currency without any additional particular outlay, but it would have meant much then. As it is now, there is chaos, provoking yet-to-be-determined dilemmas and problems that will have their repercussions on our side.

Will we then, given the direction the situation is unquestionably headed, and particularly with our pressure there, when it blows up, do the same thing that we have done in the Central American countries' cases? Will we be then talking, as we have not in 70 years, of having to go into Mexico physically?

I pray not, and I literally mean it, because I do believe in prayer, and I do pray, but I have great forebodings, because I see no evidence, either in the Congress, and much less in the White House, that there is any grasp or perception of reality with respect to the dimensions and the implications of the problem, any more than in Europe, where we are still spending over 55 percent of the $315 billion that the American people are being taxed for—for what—for defense, even though we

are now more insecure than we were before, for the so-called defense of Europe.

Even since 1958 our Presidents again have not been willing to accept reality, did not realize what was going on in Europe, any more than we do now, and that essentially is that we have a brandnew generation on the threshold of power that does not remember World War II. We have 300,000 of our military in Germany alone. Are we going to sit and wait until we are compelled to withdraw?

I have always felt that it was good—and this I think has been the hallmark of my role as a public elective official, particularly in a representative capacity, since I was on the city council—not to wait until you had a hot potato, but you prepared yourself and you anticipated and you had what I call anticipatory precautionary actions.

□ 1815

I have seen through the course of 33½ years in public office the success of such an approach and for that reason stand witness now to testify, to implore my colleagues, as I say, my advice to the privileged orders, because, my colleagues, we are privileged, of all of the privileged orders in our country, my words are just words of advice.

I have been willing all along to go on the record. I have not whispered it. I do not in retrospect say, well, now this is what I was saying, but did not say it. It is in the RECORD and that is the reason I am on the record today.

With respect to the unreality that I think we are going to, and to pay a very, very unnecessary price, hopefully only in treasure, not in blood, I would like to offer an article from the Christian Science Monitor of Monday, June 16, by Richard A. Nenamen, entitled "The United States and Mexico Must Work Together To Stem Economic Crisis," a very, very insightful article.

I see no reflection of this insightfulness in the discussions I have seen in or out of the committee, on or off the floor.

I am beseeching my colleagues, and particularly starting with the consideration next week of the President's resumption of his request that we send $100 million to a group that cannot even account yet, nor has the President indicated any interest in getting that accounting for the $27 million that was sent down there some time last year.

Mr. Speaker, I also include an article from the New York Times of Tuesday, June 17, by Alfred Stephen, entitled "Mexico Deserves Full U.S. Attention."

MEXICO DESERVES FULL U.S. ATTENTION

(By Alfred Stepan)

Events last week—the peso fell precipitously and Washington stepped in to try to help negotiate an emergency loan of some $5 billion—once again brought home the urgency of Mexico's economic crisis. The United States ought to be relieved that the crisis has as yet had almost no political repercussions, but this is no time to hide our heads in the sand.

For some weeks now, official Washington has been berating Mexico for the symptoms of its economic crisis—increases in drug traffic and illegal immigration. This is no help at all: Administration officials may have recognized this, for last week they spoke much less harshly than in the past. The emergency package will also be helpful in the short run, but it is not enough. We must begin to think more seriously about what we can do to help the Mexicans find new ways to shore up their faltering economic and political system.

From 1935 to 1981, the Mexican economy grew by some 6 percent a year. For the period from 1982 through 1986, Mexicans project zero growth—and they expect the minimum wage to fall to half of what it was before the crisis hit. The country's foreign debt is nearly $100 billion, and the Government is finding it impossible even to maintain interest payments. Oil revenues, which once generated 50 percent of the Government's revenue and 75 percent of its foreign exchange, have fallen by $6 billion, and political leaders are bracing for further economic deterioration.

So far, the political system has weathered the storm fairly well. The Institutional Revolutionary Party, known as the PRI, remains in control. Strikes, historically low by Latin American standards, are infrequent and largely nonviolent. There has been virtually no urban revolt—no food store sacking or bus burning—of the kind often seen in such crises.

How has the system held up? The PRI's political apparatus—for 60 years, the party has dominated Mexican politics through a combination of myths left over from the revolution and patronage politics—is working hard at damage control. Poor families receive a wide variety of subsidies equal to just about half the minimum wage per person. The exchange rate is now more than 600 pesos to the dollar, but the subway fare is only one peso. Beans, tortillas, domestic cooking fuel and other staples are heavily subsidized and widely available at state stores.

Yet even these mainstays of the political system are showing signs of increasing wear and tear. The subsidies are politically effective but extremely costly. The shrinkage of the Government's revenue base means that the PRI must either cut back further on patronage and subsidies or violate its agreements with the International Monetary Fund.

The economic, political and social perils facing the Mexicans are grave for them and grave for us. Yet few administration officials seem to have any idea of just how serious. They worry about symptoms—drugs and migration—but not about the underlying disease. When they respond at all, it is with short-term emergency bailouts. Nor do they seem to understand why Mexico's crisis should matter to us: many see Mexico as merely a sideshow to the Central American conflict.

This is a serious mistake. Certainly—because of our capacity for mutual destruction—the Soviet Union is the No. 1 country in the world for us to pay attention to. But Mexico should be No. 2.

The fall in oil prices now makes Mexico the most imperiled of the large debtors. Five of the largest banks in the United States may have put as much as half of their primary capital at risk in loans to Mexico. This would be reason enough to worry, but the United States and Mexico have even deeper ties of geography and common destiny.

The United States-Mexican border is the most important frontier in the world between a rich market economy and a poor one. No other developed country is as intimately linked to the poor as we are. England and Japan are islands; Scandinavia has historically been a world apart; France, West Germany and the Benelux nations are not islands, but they are well insulated from the third world.

The United States is not insulated, but we have been lucky—and Mexico's long-term stability has been an extremely important part of this. Mexico and the United States are bound by intricate financial ties; Mexican-Americans are the second largest minority in the United States; and we share a virtually uncontrollable 2,000 mile border. Imagine, then, what it would mean if Mexico erupted in turmoil of the kind we have seen in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Imagine that chaos and violence, magnified a dozen times, on our very border.

The United States simply cannot afford to stand idly by and watch Mexico take a political turn for the worse. There are things that we could be doing now that we might not be able to do later.

Militarizing the border is not the answer: that would be wildly irresponsible even if it were possible. But there is no shortage of constructive policies. In the short run, we could increase our purchases of Mexican oil—we might contract for a set amount at a fixed price to be delivered over the next year—and use it to replenish our strategic oil reserves. This would immediately relieve much of the threat of a Mexican default. In the medium run, we could lead rather than resist the voices in the developed world who urge an augmentation of World Bank and I.M.F. lending to countries like Mexico.

Finally, in the longer run, Mexico and the United States must sit down together and identify an extensive package of development projects that we could implement together to stave off the crisis that threatens us both. These should include shared water development and private sector investment projects. The United States might, for example, make a special point of promoting the Mexican cement industry. Our sharply different economic circumstances—the different mix of factors of production—would make such joint actions beneficial for both countries. Our shared destiny makes them imperative and extremely urgent

A new generation of Mexican economists and politicians is exploring such projects more seriously than ever before. We should do likewise. Whether we like it or not, we too are living under the shadow of the Mexican crisis. With a modicum of imagination and will on both sides, a solution should be within our common reach.

CONFERENCE REPORT ON H.R. 4515

Mr. WHITTEN submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 4515) for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, and for other purposes:

CONFERENCE REPORT (REPT. No. 99-649)

The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4515) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, and for other purposes, having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the Senate recede from its amendments numbered 4, 6, 26, 27, 38, 41, 76, 82, 90, 105, 106, 116, 117, 123, 124, 137, 146, 151, 161, 164, 169, 178, 181, 185, 193, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 215, 217, 219, 223, and 224.

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendments of the Senate numbered 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 12, 14, 17, 37, 43, 46, 51, 52, 53, 56, 57, 61, 62, 65, 72, 85, 89, 92, 100, 102, 110, 115, 118, 119, 121, 126, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150, 152, 157, 177, 195, 196, 197, 209, 212, 213, and 220, and agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 3:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 3, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$5,000,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 13:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 13, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert: *$2,000,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 16:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 16, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert:

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

For an additional amount for State and local payments for costs associated with the distribution of commodities by emergency feeding organizations under the temporary emergency food assistance program in accordance with section 204(c) of the Temporary Emergency Food Assistance Act of 1983 (7 U.S.C. 612c note), $2,437,000.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 19:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 19, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$11,100,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 21:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 21, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$5,000,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 47:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 47, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert *$409,000,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 49:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 49, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Notwithstanding section 15(a) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, for necessary expenses for "Counterterrorism Research and Development", $10,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1987.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 104:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 104, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following: *$30,000,000, of which $21,365,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 127:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 127, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$200,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 129:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 129, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$210,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 130:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 130, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment insert: *$29,204,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 135:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 135, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert *$201,500,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 139:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 139, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum proposed by said amendment insert *$60,719,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 145:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 145, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment insert the following:

Of the funds which remain deferred as of the date of enactment of this Act pursuant to deferral D86-6A relating to the Department of Energy, "Fossil energy research and development", the Congress disapproves the deferral of all but $2,607,000. The disapproval shall be effective upon enactment into law of this Act and the amount of the deferral disapproved herein shall be made available for obligation.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 147:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 147, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment insert the following:

Of the funds which remain deferred as of the date of enactment of this Act pursuant to deferral D86-9A relating to the Department of Energy, "Energy conservation", the Congress disapproves the deferral of all but $6,556,000. The disapproval shall be effective upon enactment into law of this Act and the amount of the deferral disapproved herein shall be made available for obligation.

And the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 156:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 156, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended as follows:

In lieu of the sum named insert: *$36,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

Amendment numbered 210:

That the House recede from its disagreement to the amendment of the Senate numbered 210, and agree to the same with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the sum named in said amendment insert: *$1,000*; and the Senate agree to the same.

The committee of conference report in disagreement amendments numbered 9, 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 48, 50, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 120, 122, 125, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 140, 143, 144, 153, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 199, 206, 207, 208, 211, 214, 216, 218, 221, and 222.

JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
EDWARD P. BOLAND,
WILLIAM H. NATCHER,
NEAL SMITH,
SIDNEY R. YATES,
DAVE OBEY,
EDWARD R. ROYBAL,
TOM BEVILL,
BILL CHAPPELL,
WILLIAM LEHMAN,
VIC FAZIO,
SILVIO O. CONTE,
(except for amendment No. 23),
JOSEPH M. McDADE,
JOHN T. MYERS,
LARRY COUGHLIN
(except for amendment No. 23),
JACK KEMP,
RALPH REGULA,
Managers on the Part of the House.
MARK O. HATFIELD,
TED STEVENS,
LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr.,
JAMES A. McCLURE,
JAKE GARN,
THAD COCHRAN,
MARKS ANDREWS,
JAMES ABDNOR
(except for amendment No. 224),

BOB KASTEN,
ALFONSE D'AMATO,
WARREN B. RUDMAN,
JOHN C. STENNIS,
ROBERT C. BYRD,
DANIEL K. INOUYE,
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
LAWTON CHILES,
J. BENNETT JOHNSTON
(except for amendment No. 223),
QUENTIN N. BURDICK,
PAT LEAHY,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONFERENCE

The managers on the part of the House and the Senate at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the bill (H.R. 4515) making urgent supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1986, and for other purposes, submit the following joint statement to the House and the Senate in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the managers and recommended in the accompanying conference report:

TITLE I

GENERAL SUPPLEMENTALS

CHAPTER I

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Amendment No. 1: Deletes chapter subheadings, as proposed by the Senate.

SOIL CONSERVATION SERVICE

WATERSHED AND FLOOD PREVENTION OPERATIONS

Amendment No. 2: Appropriates $36,700,000 for watershed and flood prevention operations of the Soil Conservation Service as proposed by the Senate instead of $25,000,000 as proposed by the House.

These funds are provided to mitigate damage caused by heavy rains in the Western United States this past winter; to restore the emergency operations account of SCS; to provide $8,000,000 for West Virginia, as described in the Senate report (S. Rept. 99-301); and to provide $6,700,00 for Mississippi for watershed protection operations activities to repair prior year storm damage in Hinds, Rankin, and Madison counties as well as the emergency operations needs identified by SCS throughout Mississippi due to excessive rainfall in 1986.

AGRICULTURAL STABILIZATION AND CONSERVATION SERVICE

EMERGENCY CONSERVATION PROGRAM

Amendment No. 3: Appropriates $5,000,000 for the emergency conservation program of the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service instead of $10,000,000 as proposed by the House. The Senate proposed to strike this provision.

AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERVICE

BUILDINGS AND FACILITIES

Amendment No. 4: Deletes Senate language appropriating $11,100,000 for construction of facilities of the Agricultural Research Service. The conferees agree to the House position on Amendment No. 19 which provides $11,100,000 for the citrus canker program and also provides that the Secretary must restore the money previously appropriated for the National Soil Tilth Center at Ames, Iowa.

Amendment No. 5: Deletes chapter subheadings, as proposed by the Senate.

FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE

Amendment No. 6: Appropriates $3,700,000 for the Food Safety and Inspection Service as proposed by the House instead of $4,500,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conference agreement also restores the House bill language describing the purposes for which the funds are appropriated.

The conferees agree that the funds appropriated will be used to continue all operations of the Food Safety and Inspection Service for the remainder of the fiscal year.

PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMINISTRATION

Amendment No. 7: Appropriates $80,000 for the Packers and Stockyards Administration as proposed by the Senate. The House bill contained no similar provision.

REPORT ON CONTAMINATED MILK AND MILK PRODUCTS

Amendment No. 8: Deletes House language, as proposed by the Senate, which provided for a study by the Department of Agriculture on the estimated losses suffered by dairy farmers and processors as a result of contaminated milk and milk products in the States of Arkansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma. The conferees agree to delete the House language since the study has already been completed by the Department of Agriculture.

DAIRY INDEMNITY PROGRAM

Amendment No. 9: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate reducing the amount appropriated for the dairy indemnity program from $10,000,000 to $9,000,000. The conference agreement also provides that $1,000,000 of the total be transferred to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service and the Food Safety and Inspection Service for contamination testing, and the remaining funds be transferred to the Commodity Credit Corporation. In addition, the Secretary is authorized to utilize the services, facilities, and authorities of the Commodity Credit Corporation for the purpose of making dairy indemnity payments.

FARMERS HOME ADMINISTRATION

FAMILY FARM HOMESTEAD PROTECTION

Regulations published by the Farmers Home Administration regarding implementation of the "Family Farm Homestead Protection" amendment to the 1985 Farm Bill (7 U.S.C.A. 2000) would restrict availability of the homestead option to only those homestead properties in FmHA inventory in which FmHA actually initiated the foreclosure procedures, and not to those instances in which some other entity initiated the foreclosure and FmHA bought the property at auction in order to protect its own financial interest. The clear intent of Congress in adopting the homestead provisions was that any property coming into FmHA inventory should be made available to the distressed farm owner, regardless of the circumstances which brought it into inventory, except in the case of borrowers who have attempted to defraud the agency on loans by improperly disposing of security property. The conferees will expect the agency to amend its regulations to comply with the intent of Congress.

RURAL HOUSING INSURANCE FUND

Amendment No. 10: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

During fiscal year 1986, and within the resources and authority available, obligations for direct loans and related advances pursuant to section 504 of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended, shall not exceed $11,335,000.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The effect of the conference agreement is to rescind $3,000,000 of section 504 low-income housing repair loans instead of $4,480,000 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 11: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

SELF-HELP HOUSING LAND DEVELOPMENT FUND

For loans for acquisition and development of building sites for mutual and self-help housing, $1,000,000.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement provides $1,000,000 for site loans for mutual and self-help housing instead of $1,500,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conference agreement also adds a separate paragraph heading to clarify that these loans are to be made from the self-help housing land development fund.

DISAPPROVAL OF DEFERRAL

Amendment No. 12: Provides a technical correction, as proposed by the Senate.

VERY LOW-INCOME HOUSING REPAIR GRANTS

Amendment No. 13: Appropriates $2,000,000 for very low-income housing repair grants for the elderly instead of $3,000,000 as proposed by the Senate. The House bill contained no similar provision.

Amendment No. 14: Deletes chapter subheadings, as proposed by the Senate.

FOOD AND NUTRITION SERVICE

FEEDING PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN (WIC)

Amendment No. 15: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

FEEDING PROGRAM FOR WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN (WIC)

For an additional amount, for the special supplemental food program as authorized by section 17 of the Child Nutrition Act of 1966 (42 U.S.C. 1786), $20,000,000, to be distributed to the States under the existing fiscal year 1986 growth formula.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement restores House language appropriating $20,000,000 for the WIC program. The conferees are aware that the Department is considering a new distribution formula for the women, infants and children program but believe it would be improper to change formulas in mid-year. Therefore, the conferees direct that these funds be distributed based on the fiscal year 1986 growth formula currently in use. Additionally, due to uncertain fiscal constraints for fiscal year 1987, the conferees will

expect the Department to advise States to be cautious with management of caseloads so as to preclude the possibility of States having to severely cut back participation in fiscal year 1987.

TEMPORARY EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Amendment No. 16: Appropriates $2,437,000 for the temporary emergency food assistance program instead of $2,440,000 as proposed by the Senate. The conference agreement deletes Senate language which would have required that the funds be transferred from existing appropriations and that the outlay reductions resulting from such transfer equal at least $1,800,000.

Amendment No. 17: Deletes chapter subheading, as proposed by the Senate.

COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

REIMBURSEMENT FOR NET REALIZED LOSSES

Amendment No. 18: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

COMMODITY CREDIT CORPORATION

REIMBURSEMENT FOR NET REALIZED LOSSES

For the operations of the Commodity Credit Corporation, not to exceed $5,300,000,000 for capital restoration, to enable the Corporation to use the authority authorized by the Charter of the Corporation and other laws to carry out programs handled by the Corporation.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement provides $5,300,000,000 for capital restoration of the Commodity Credit Corporation as proposed by the Senate. The conference agreement also deletes Senate language which would have provided that the Commodity Credit Corporation shall use not less than $4,000,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities to carry out a research and development program on external combustion engines. The conferees will expect the Department to carefully review this proposal and advise the House and Senate Appropriations Committees as to its findings on the merits of using CCC commodities for this purpose.

CITRUS CANKER

TRANSFERS OF FUNDS

Amendment No. 19: Restores House language transferring funds from the Commodity Credit Corporation to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to carry out the citrus canker program, but reduces the amount provided from $14,000,000 to $11,100,000. The conference agreement also provides that funds previously transferred to the citrus canker program from funds other than the Commodity Credit Corporation shall be immediately returned to the accounts from which transferred. The effect of the conference agreement is to restore $11,100,000 to the buildings and facilities account of the Agricultural Research Service for the construction of the National Soil Tilth Center at Ames, Iowa. The conferees concur in Senate report language regarding funds previously transferred to the citrus canker program.

COOPERATIVE STATE RESEARCH SERVICE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 20: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

COOPERATIVE STATE RESEARCH SERVICE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

The Secretary of Agriculture shall transfer $5,000,000 from the Commodity Credit Corporation to the Cooperative State Research Service to meet the matching funds requirement for development of an international trade center at Oklahoma State University.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement restores House language providing for a transfer of $5,000,000 from the Commodity Credit Corporation to the Cooperative State Research Service to meet the matching funds requirement for development of an international trade center at Oklahoma State University. The agreement also makes a technical correction to the House language by deleting several words that were unnecessary to the transfer of the funds.

AVIAN INFLUENZA

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 21: Provides for the use of not to exceed $5,000,000 for the avian influenza program from the Commodity Credit Corporation instead of $10,000,000 as proposed by the House.

DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS

Amendment No. 22: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

DEFICIENCY PAYMENTS

(a) Effective only for the 1986 crop of wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, and rice, notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Agriculture shall make deficiency payments to producers on a farm under section 107D(c)(1), 105C(c)(1), 103A(c)(1), or 101A(c)(1) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 (7 U.S.C. 1445b-3(c)(1), 1444e(c)(1), 1444-1(c)(1), or 1441-1(c)(1)), as the case may be, if the Secretary determines that—

(1) the producers on a farm are prevented from planting any portion of the acreage intended for a commodity to the commodity or other nonconserving crops because of flood, heavy rains, excessive moisture, or drought; and

(2) the farm is located in an area that the Secretary determines has been substantially affected by a natural disaster in the United States or by a major disaster or emergency designated by the President under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.).

(b) The amount of deficiency payments under subsection (a) shall be computed by multiplying—

(1) 40 percent of the projected payment rate; by

(2) the number of acres so affected but not to exceed the acreage planted to the commodity for harvest (including any acreage that the producers were prevented from planting to the commodity or other nonconserving crops in lieu of the commodity because of flood, heavy rains, excessive mositure, or drought) in the immediately preceding year; by

(3) the farm program payment yield established for the crop for the farm.

(c) Such sums shall be deducted from crop insurance indemnity payments due as a result of such disaster.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement adopts the Senate language providing that individuals who receive advance deficiency payments but are prevented from planting their crops because of flood, heavy rains, or excessive moisture may keep their advance deficiency payments. The conference agreement modifies the Senate language to expand the coverage to those who were prevented from planting because of drought. The conference agreement further provides that such sums provided shall be deducted from crop insurance indemnity payments due to producers as a result of such disaster.

The conferees will expect the Department to provide a full and complete report on this provision, including number of producers covered, types of disasters, availability of crop insurance, and payments refunded because of insurance coverage.

PREPAYMENT OF LOANS BY RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS

Amendment No. 23: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

PREPAYMENT OF LOANS BY RURAL ELECTRIFICATION AND TELEPHONE SYSTEMS

In the case of a borrower of a loan made by the Federal Financing Bank, and guaranteed by the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration, under section 306 of the Rural Electrification Act of 1936 (7 U.S.C. 936) that is outstanding on the date of enactment of this Act, the borrower may prepay the loan by payment of the outstanding principal balance due on the loan using private capital with the existing loan guarantee. No sums in addition to payment of such balance shall be charged as the result of such prepayment against the borrower, the Rural Electrification and Telephone Revolving Fund established under section 301 of such Act (7 U.S.C. 931), or the Rural Electrification Administration. To qualify for prepayment, a borrower shall certify that such prepayment will result in substantial savings to its customers or lessen the threat of bankruptcy of the borrower: Provided, That any regulations under this provision shall be issued and become effective within 30 days of enactment of this Act.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement adopts the Senate language providing that borrowers of a loan made by the Federal Financing Bank and guaranteed by the Administrator of the Rural Electrification Administration may prepay their loans without prepayment penalty. The conference agreement modifies the Senate language by providing that in order to qualify for prepayment a borrower shall certify that such prepayment will result in substantial savings to its customers or lessen the threat of bankruptcy of the borrower.

New REA guarantees for refinanced loans will continue to be backed by the "full faith and credit of the United States" and would guarantee repayment of principal and interest when due, as are the existing guarantees.

The conference agreement in no way alters existing eligibility for REA loans.

EXCLUSION OF PERMAFROST SOILS FROM DEFINITION OF "WETLAND"

Amendment No. 24: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate providing that the definition of "wetland" shall not include lands in Alaska identified as having high potential for agricultural development which have a predominance of permafrost soils.

ELDERLY FEEDING PROGRAM

Amendment No. 25: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

ELDERLY FEEDING PROGRAM

For an additional amount for reimbursement at a level of 56.76 cents per meal during fiscal year 1985 and 1986, determined under section 311(a)(4) of the Older American Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. 3030a(a)(4)), for meals served under section 311 of such Act in such fiscal years, $8,500,000, to remain available until expended.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement provides an appropriation of $8,500,000 for the elderly feeding program and sets the reimbursement at a level of 56.76 cents per meal during fiscal years 1985 and 1986. The conference agreement deletes the language which provided that the $8,500,000 be derived by transfer from funds previously appropriated and that such transfer shall reduce outlays by at least $8,000,000 during fiscal year 1986.

CHAPTER II

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Amendment No. 26: Restores the word "Including" to the heading as proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate.

Amendment No. 27: Restores language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate which earmarks certain funds available under this head in Pubic Law 99-180 for obligation to supplement funds allocated pursuant to section 108(a)(2) and section 108(a)(5) of Public Law 99-190.

Amendment No. 28: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

Upon the request of the Pike Place Market Preservation and Development Authority, Seattle, Washington, the Secretary of Commerce shall authorize the sale or lease to any person of the Fairley Group Building (project numbers 07-01-01890, as modified by 07-01-01890.01 and 07-11-02606) located in the Pike Place Market, King County, Washington, without affecting the Federal assistance provided under the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, if the transfer documents provide for the continued use of the Fairley Group Building as a public market during the expected useful life of the building: Provided, That the provisons of 13 CFR 314.4 and OMB Circular A-102 Attachment N are hereby waived so long as the Fairley Group Building remains in the control of the public authority and is used as a public market during the expected useful life of the building.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

EDA REVOLVING LOAN FUND PROJECTS

With regard to the language in the Conference Report for fiscal year 1986 (House Report 99-414) referring to EDA's Revolving Loan Fund (RLF) projects, the conferees, have no objection to such funds being distributed to previous RLF recipients in those cases where there has been successful performance of those awards, but preference should be given to first-time recipients of such assistance.

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION

OPERATIONS, RESEARCH, AND FACILITIES

Amendment No. 29: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $10,822,000 to remain available until expended, to maintain public warning and forecast services and aircraft services.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

LEGAL ACTIVITIES

Amendment No. 30: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which inserts a heading.

SALARIES AND EXPENSES, UNITED STATES MARSHALS SERVICE

Amendment No. 31: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $2,600,000 for the United States Marshals Service.

SUPPORT OF UNITED STATES PRISONERS

Amendment No. 32: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $3,000,000 for support of United States prisoners in non-Federal institutions.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

(INCLUDING RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 33: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which inserts two headings.

Amendment No. 34: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $10,000,000 to remain available until expended, for relocation of the FBI's Washington field office and rescinds funds made available for this purpose in Public Law 98-166 and Public Law 99-88.

Amendment No. 35: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which increases the limitation in Public Law 99-180 by $1,000,000 on receipts credited to the FBI's Salaries and Expenses appropriation from fees collected to process fingerprint identification records for noncriminal employment and licensing purposes.

IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Amendment No. 36: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $3,000,000 for the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Amendment No. 37: Appropriates $18,000,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of $15,500,000 as proposed by the House.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS

(RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 38: Deletes a rescission of $3,315,000 for the National Institute of Corrections proposed by the Senate. The House bill contained no provision on this matter.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 39: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which inserts a heading.

Amendment No. 40: Reported in technical disagreement. The Managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert:

Of the funds appropriated to the Department of Justice in Public Law 99-180, not to exceed $150,000 from "Fees and Expenses of Witnesses", not to exceed $150,000 from "Salaries and Expenses, Antitrust Division", not to exceed $100,000 from Emergency Assistance in "Office of Justice Programs, Justice Assistance", and not to exceed $100,000 from the Public Safety Officers' Benefits Program in "Office of Justice Programs, Justice Assistance", may be transferred to "Salaries and Expenses, General Legal Activities" to pay expenses related to the activities of any Independent Counsel appointed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 591, et. seq.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 41: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which provided that not more than $90,000 of the funds appropriated to the Department of Justice under "General Administration, Salaries and Expenses" for fiscal year 1985 in Pubic Law 99-180 would be available for travel by the Attorney General.

Amendment No. 42: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will move to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert:

NATIONAL ASSISTANCE PLAN TO HALT ROCK AND CRACK COCAINE TRAFFICKING

The Attorney General as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board is directed to convene the Board to address on an emergency basis the crisis phenomenon that cocaine freebase, "rock" and "crack"

cocaine, have caused in communities throughout the nation.

Within 60 days of enactment, the Board is directed to report to the Congress and to develop and implement a national plan of assistance to state and local governments to halt trafficking in rock and crack cocaine; to promote effective law enforcement efforts to identify, investigate, prosecute and incarcerate perpetrators engaged in enterprises involving rock and crack cocaine; and, to foster public understanding of the dangerous effects of this substance on public health and safety.

This plan of assistance shall concentrate on methods of using existing laws in such areas as conspiracy, aiding and abetting, forfeiture, possession and trafficking to address this drug with its special potency and distribution characteristics, including the use of rock or freebase houses where the cocaine freebase is processed, distributed, and smoked. The Board's plan should also address those areas where existing law should be amended to strengthen enforcement and prosecution against rock and crack cocaine.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment revises language of the Senate Amendment which would have directed the Attorney General to develop a Model State Statute to prohibit the establishment and use of freebase houses. The substitute language agreed to by the conferees directs the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to develop a national plan to assist state and local law enforcement agencies in dealing with the threat posed by the spreading use of "rock" and "crack" cocaine.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ADMINISTRATION OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Amendment No. 43: Deletes a heading proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate.

Amendment No. 44: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following: *$283,104,000), to remain available until expended*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement provides the following allowances for the components of the diplomatic security initiative:

[Amounts in thousands]

Item	Position	Amount
1. Residential Security	64	$89,248
2. Perimeter Security		68,030
3. Administration of Overseas Guards	27	10,491
4. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries	126	8,000
5. Security Training and Professionalism	97	12,000
6. Communications Security	58	32,804
7. Information Systems	53	29,899
8. Replacement of FSN's		12,000
9. Other Security Support	80	12,210
10. Technical Security	31	10,132
Subtotal	536	284,814
Undistributed reduction associated with positions		−1,710
Total		283,104

The conferees are agreed that Department of State should submit a reprogramming request to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees in accordance with said Committees' reprogramming procedures contained in Public Law 99-180 before obligating any of the funds included in the conference agreement for the alternate ADP facility.

Amendment No. 45: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

Provided, That $222,104,000 of this amount shall become available for obligation on September 30, 1986

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

ACQUISITION AND MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS ABROAD

Amendment No. 46: Deletes a heading proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate.

Amendment No. 47: Appropriates $409,000,000 instead of $454,532,000 as proposed by the House and $372,125,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The conference agreement provides 133 positions and $4,000,000 for project support.

The funds provided by the conference agreement are available for construction projects as identified in the House Report to the extent available and on a priority basis subject to the reprogramming procedures contained in Public Law 99-180.

Amendment No. 48: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which deletes House language making the funds for Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad in Amendment No. 47 available by transfer from the Department of Defense or certain foreign assistance programs, and inserts Senate language providing that such funds will become available for obligation on September 30, 1986.

COUNTERTERRORISM RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Amendment No. 49: Provides language which appropriates $10,000,000 for Counterterrorism Research and Development instead of providing such funds by transfer from the Department of Defense or certain foreign assistance programs as proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate.

GENERAL PROVISION—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM

Amendment No. 50: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

GENERAL PROVISION—DIPLOMATIC SECURITY PROGRAM

The funds made available by this chapter to the Department of State under the headings "Salaries and Expenses", "Acquisition and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad", and "Counterterrorism Research and Development" shall not be used for any purpose inconsistent with or contrary to authorizing legislation for the Diplomatic Security Program as enacted into law.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

COURTS OF APPEALS, DISTRICT COURTS, AND OTHER JUDICIAL SERVICES

SALARIES OF SUPPORTING PERSONNEL

Amendment No. 51: Deletes a heading proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate.

Amendment No. 52: Appropriates $1,200,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of $13,200,000 of which $2,000,000 was to be derived by transfer from "Salaries of Judges" and of which $10,000,000 was to be derived by transfer from "Expenses of Operation and Maintenance of the Courts" as proposed by the House.

STUDY OF CONSTRUCTION OF OFFICE BUILDING

Amendment No. 53: Appropriates $1,300,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of $2,000,000 as proposed by the House.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Amendment No. 54: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

ADMINISTRATION PROVISION

Of the funds made available in title IV of Public Law 99-180, not to exceed $8,000,000 from "Expenses of Operation and Maintenance of the Courts" may be transferred to "Salaries of Supporting Personnel" and not to exceed $500,000 from "Expenses of Operation and Maintenance of the Courts" and not to exceed $2,500,000 from "Salaries of Judges" may be transferred to "Space and Facilities".

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 55: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which adds language waiving certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, to permit part-time bankruptcy judges in the district of Oregon, the western district of Michigan and the eastern district of Oklahoma to continue to serve until December 31, 1986, or until such time as full-time bankruptcy judges for these districts are appointed, whichever is earlier.

RELATED AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

MARITIME ADMINISTRATION

OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

(DISAPPROVAL OF DEFERRAL)

Amendment No. 56: Inserts language proposed by the Senate which disapproves the proposed deferral D86-53 as set forth in the message of February 5, 1986, as revised by D86-53A as set forth in the message of March 20, 1986, instead of language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate which would have disapproved only the proposed deferral D86-53 as set forth in the message of February 5, 1986.

BOARD FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

GRANTS AND EXPENSES

Amendment No. 57: Appropriates $18,800,000 as proposed by the Senate instead of $14,500,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 58: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and

concur in the amendment of the Senate which adds language providing that notwithstanding certain provisions of Public Law 99-88 and the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973, amounts placed in reserve or which would have been placed in reserve in fiscal year 1985 shall be available to the Board for grants to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

The conferees have not included the language contained in Senate Report 99-301 concerning the proposal of the Federal Communications Commission to allocate spectrum in General Docket No. 84-1231 through a system of random selection. The conferees believe the language of the Senate is correct, but do not feel there is a need to address this issue in this conference report. The conferees urge the Commission to resolve the pending request for spectrum in General Docket No. 84-1231 as expeditiously as possible.

SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Amendment No. 59: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Section 18006(b) of the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 is amended by striking out "declared before October 1, 1985" and inserting in lieu thereof "which occurred prior to October 1, 1985, and with respect to which a disaster declaration application was submitted prior to October 1, 1985".

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 60: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $3,900,000 for "Salaries and Expenses" to be derived by transfer from "Acquisition and Construction of Radio Facilities" and adds language increasing the limitation in Public Law 99-180 by $175,000 on receipts credited to "Salaries and Expenses" from fees from English-teaching programs.

CHAPTER III

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—MILITARY

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, MARINE CORPS

Amendment No. 61: Inserts center headings as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 62: Inserts a center heading as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 63: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which amends the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 to lower the minimum floor for real property maintenance expenditures for the Marine Corps from $238,000,000 to $223,200,000.

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE, AIR FORCE

Leased C-21 Aircraft—The conferees agree to the Senate report language concerning the possible early buy of leased C-21 aircraft if sufficient savings can be demonstrated. The conferees further agree that the Air Force should provide the same opportunity for early purchase of leased C-12 aircraft as well, as long as a similar level of savings can be achieved. The Air Force is encouraged to submit reprogramming requests as soon as possible to effect early buyout of these leased aircraft, as long as early purchase would save at least ten percent over current total program estimates (procurement and operations). Acquisition of C-21A aircraft should cost no more than $176,000,000, while acquisition of C-12's should not exceed $48,000,000. The conferees consider these amounts to be achievable. However, the conferees agree that if additional amounts are necessary a reprogramming action would be considered by the Appropriations Committees.

TENTH INTERNATIONAL PAN AMERICAN GAMES

(INCLUDING RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 64: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $8,000,000 to remain available for obligation until September 30, 1987 for the Tenth International Pan American Games. The Senate amendment also rescinds $8,000,000 made available for this same purpose in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986.

PROCUREMENT

PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND TRACKED COMBAT VEHICLES, ARMY

(RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 65: Inserts a center heading as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 66: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which rescinds $34,400,000 from the Procurement of Weapons and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Army account. These funds would provide part of the necessary outlay offsets to allow for additional Philippines assistance.

SHIPBUILDING AND CONVERSION, NAVY

(RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 67: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which rescinds $40,100,000 from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account. These funds would provide part of the necessary outlay offsets to allow for additional Philippines assistance.

COASTAL DEFENSE AUGMENTATION

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 68: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which transfers $21,250,000 to the Coast Guard acquisition, construction, and improvements account for priority Coast Guard capital projects.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

Amendment No. 69: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which changes the date for completion of the air defense aircraft competition from July 1, 1986 to November 1, 1986.

The conferees agree to the Senate language which extends the legislative requirement for completion of the air defense aircraft competition to November 1, 1986. Also, the conferees agree to section 5 of amendment number 84 to remove the specific earmarking of $200,000,000 for this purpose as contained in Public Law 99-190. This action will allow the Air Force more time to evaluate contractor bids, but an expeditious pace for evaluation is encouraged. The $200,000,000 appropriated remains available to award a contract to the winner of the competition. The Air Force must submit a formal reprogramming if these funds are proposed to be used for any purpose other than the air defense aircraft competition, should contractor bids not meet Air Force requirements. Nothing in these actions precludes the Congress from considering the merit or affordability of the air defense aircraft requirement in subsequent legislation.

T-46A

The disposition of fiscal year 1986 T-46A procurement funds was addressed in the Senate version of the Military Retirement Reform bill (H.R. 4420). The conferees understand that such funds are to be withheld from obligation during the current fiscal year. This issue is to be addressed further by the conferees on the Military Retirement Reform Act.

MISSILE PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 70: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which transfers $345,400,000 to the Missile Procurement, Air Force account to initiate the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program. The funds will be used for engineering support, hardware, modifications for integrating payloads onto expendable launch vehicles, storage of existing payloads and expansion of the Eastern Space and Missile Center. Of that total, $16,000,000 will be used to fund a special classified program.

Amendments numbered 73, 78, 79 and 84 are also related to the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program.

The Senate included report language urging the maintenance of an oversight role by the Air Force in the production, assembly and launch process of the Titan 34D7 missile. This language was not contained in the House report. The conferees agree and direct the Air Force to establish and maintain an active oversight of the acceptance and assembly process for expendable launch vehicles, so that uncompromised quality is assured. This is in agreement with and in support of the findings and recommendations of the Rogers Commission report.

Section 4 of the Senate's Administrative Provisions (amendment number 79) provides that $561,900,000 of the funds made available by Section 8103 of the 1986 Department of Defense Appropriations Act would be made available for the "Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle Program". The conferees agree to the above amount, which shall be used for the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program.

Section 4 of Chapter IIIA (amendment number 84) which provides for the authorization for obligation of certain unobligated funds, allows that $1,498,686,000 may be obligated and expended for the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program.

The conference further agree that the term "Department of Defense Space Recovery Program" use in lieu of "Complementa-

ry Expendable Launch Vehicle Program" and "Expendable Launch Vehicle Program" is not intended to expand the scope of the program as described in Senate Report 99-301.

OTHER PROCUREMENT, AIR FORCE

(RESCISSION)

Amendment No. 71: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which rescinds $40,000,000 from the Other Procurement, Air Force account. These funds would provide part of the necessary outlay offsets to allow for additional Philippines assistance.

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION

RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 72: Inserts center headings as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 73: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which transfers $316,886,000 to the Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Air Force account to initiate an expanded program for the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program. The funds will be used to begin various research and development activities relating to space launching and related systems. Of that total, $28,000,000 will be used to fund a special classified program and $56,386,000 will be used for repair to the Vandenberg Air Force Base Titan Launch Facility.

REVOLVING AND MANAGEMENT FUNDS

ADP EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT FUND

(INCLUDING RECISSION)

Amendment No. 74: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $100,000,000 to remain available for obligation until expended for the ADP Equipment Management Fund. The Senate amendment also rescinds $100,000,000 made available for this same purpose in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 75: Inserts a center heading as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 76: Deletes the administrative provision proposed by the Senate which would have transferred funds from the Foreign Currency Fluctuations, Defense account to the American Battle Monuments Commisson, Salaries and Expenses account to cover exchange rate shortfalls for the Commission.

Amendment No. 77: Section 1—Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. *1. Section 8051 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, Public Law 99-190, 99 Stat. 1211, is amended by striking out "Army, Navy, and Air Force" and by striking out the proviso and inserting in lieu thereof: "Provided, That such transfers shall not exceed $678,700,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Army; $1,301,600,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Navy; $30,100,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps; $608,700,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Air Force; $24,300,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies; $19,300,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Army Reserve; $47,600,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Navy Reserve; $4,200,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Marine Corps Reserve; $14,400,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Air Force Reserve; $42,100,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard; and $35,400,000 for Operation and Maintenance, Air National Guard".*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree to the Senate provision with an amendment to transfer $24,300,000 for "Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies". The Senate had included a transfer of $82,000,000 to "Operation and Maintenance, Defense Agencies". Of the amount agreed to, $14,000,000 applies to the Defense Logistics Agency and $10,300,000 applies to the Defense Mapping Agency and may be used only for payment of mapping and charting costs to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration as directed in Senate Report 99-301.

Amendment No. 78: Section 2—Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of "Sec. 3" named in said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. 2

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment provides multiyear contract authority for the Titan 34D7 Complementary Expendable Launch Vehicle program.

Amendment No. 79: Section 3—Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. 3. Section 8103 of the fiscal year 1986 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Public Law 99-190, is amended as follows: in subsection (b) insert "the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program, the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services," directly following "and the Coastal Defense Augmentation account,"; and insert a new provision at the end of subsection (b) before the period, as follows,": Provided further, That $260,000,000 for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services shall be available without notification procedures otherwise required by this subsection".

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment amends section 8103 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 to redirect funds made available in that section to the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services and to allow the immediate availability of the $260,000,000 provided for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services.

Amendment No. 80: Section 4—Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. 4. Of the amounts available to the Department of Defense, not to exceed $5,000,000 shall be available for such claims arising from property losses caused by the explosion of Army ammunitions near Checotah, Oklahoma, on August 4, 1985, and claims determined by the Department to be bona fide shall be paid from the funds made available by this section.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 81: Section 5—Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of "Sec. 6" named in said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. 5

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment provides that of the appropriations available to the Department of the Army during fiscal year 1986, an additional $3,000,000 and ammunition as necessary may be used to conduct the 1986 National Matches at Camp Perry, Ohio.

Historically, the direct appropriation for the Civilian Marskmanship Program, entitled "National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army", has been less than $1,000,000. In addition, however, several other Army appropriation accounts have supplemented the resources of the Civilian Marksmanship Program (CMP). These additional resources have averaged $3,000,000 in recent years. Most of the additonal funding has been in support of the National Match Competition held annually at Camp Perry, Ohio. Types of support provided by other accounts include the following: ammunition, pay and allowances for civilian and military reserve personnel, travel and transportation, depot services for storage, shipping and receiving of firearms, food services, vehicle and equipment rental, fuel, medical supplies, laundry and printing. The cost of reserve personnel performing active duty training at Camp Perry during the National Matches is considered incident to their required training and would be incurred even if the matches were not held. However, many of the expenditures from other appropriation accounts are primarily in support of the Civilian Marksmanship Program.

A recent opinion of the Army's General Counsel has determined that support for the Civilian Marksmanship Program from other accounts is improper and that all expenses directly attributable to the CMP should be charged to CMP's specific appropriation. The effect of the Army's budgeting and accounting in connection with the National Matches has not reflected the federal government's total cost to support the Civilian Marksmanship Program. The action of the conferees on this amendment provides the Army with specific authority to use other appropriation accounts in support of the National Matches for 1986. However, the conferees expect that in the future, all costs associated with the Civilian Marksmanship Program (with the exception of those costs for reserve personnel active duty training) will be budgeted and funded through the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice, Army appropriation account. The Department of the Army is directed to identify all amounts in other accounts in the fiscal year 1987 budget request

devoted to the Civilian Marksmanship Program and provide this information to the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and Senate as soon as practicable.

Amendment No. 82: Deletes the administrative provision proposed by the Senate which would have extended from June 30, 1986 to August 15, 1986, the period during which obligations from the Department of Defense military personnel accounts may exceed the rates established in law for such accounts.

Amendment No. 83: Deletes the administrative provision proposed by the Senate which would have rescinded $24,600,000 for university research projects at two universities.

CHAPTER IIIA

AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS

Amendment No. 84: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

CHAPTER IIIA

AUTHORIZATION OF CERTAIN UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS

Sec. 1. Authorization of Certain Unauthorized Fiscal Year 1986 Appropriations.

Notwithstanding section 8109 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-190) and except as otherwise provided in this chapter, funds appropriated or otherwise made available to or for the use of the Department of Defense by the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in section 101(b) of Public Law 99-190), and which were not otherwise authorized by law, are authorized to be obligated and expended as provided in such Act.

Sec. 2. Unauthorized Appropriations.

The following programs and amounts provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-190) are not authorized to be obligated or expended:

Research and Development: Air Force Space Defense System, $15,066,000. Air Force MEECN communications upgrade, $15,000,000.

Operation and Maintenance: Audit/inventory report reductions not taken in the appropriations act, $29,000,000.

Sec. 3. Prohibition and Limitation on Obligation of Funds for Certain Purposes.

MARINER FUND.—Of the funds appropriated or made available by the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, none shall be available for construction of commercial type vessels, with or without military specifications, for lease to private shipping concerns under the Mariner Fund or any other program.

Sec. 4. Authorization for Obligation of Certain Unobligated Funds.

Of the funds appropriated by the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in section 101(b) of Public Law 99-190), but which may not be obligated or expended for the purposes for which appropriated by virtue of section 3 of this chapter, and of the funds made available for obligation and expenditure from prior year unobligated balances by section 8103 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, the following amounts are authorized to be obligated and expended for the stated purposes and are subject to the same notification procedures set forth in section 8103 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, except for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services:

(1) for military pay, $1,599,400,000;

(2) for military retirement accrual payments, $2,156,000,000;

(3) for Coastal Defense Augmentation, $140,000,000;

(4) for the Department of Defense Space Recovery Program, $1,498,686,000;

(5) for the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services, $260,000,000; and

(6) Any amounts remaining available from such funds are authorized to be obligated and expended and are available for readiness and for other purposes, including funds authorized for obligation and expenditure for purposes listed in clauses (1), (2), (3), (4), and (5) not otherwise required for such purposes.

Sec. 5. Revision of certain Provisions of Public Law 99-190.

(a) Air Defense Aircraft Competition.—The paragraph under the heading "Aircraft Procurement, Air Force" in title III of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in section 101(b) of Public Law 99-190), is amended by striking out ", of which $200,000,000 shall be available only to initiate the air defense aircraft competition authorized by law" in the matter preceding the first proviso;

(b) Revision of Drug Interdiction Funds.—Of funds made available in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, Public Law 99-190, $35,000,000 made available for purchase of one AC-130H aircraft and $3,000,000 made available for P-3 aircraft modifications shall be available only for the following purposes:

(1) for HC-130 tanker, $18,500,000;

(2) for Aerostat radar, $12,000,000; and

(3) for APS-138 radar system, $7,500,000;

(c) 120mm Mortar.—Of the funds appropriated in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986, for procurement of the 120mm mortar, obligations and expenditures may be incurred only in accordance with the requirements set forth in House Report 99-235 and Section 8095 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (as contained in section 101(b) of Public Law 99-190); and

(d) M72E4 Lightweight Multipurpose Weapon—From the funds appropriated in the Department of Defense appropriations Act, 1986, the Army shall complete development and operational testing of the M72E4, type classify the weapon, and acquire a technical data package.

Sec. 6. Temporary Waiver on Polygraph Examination Limitations.

In computing the number of counterintelligence polygraph examinations that may be conducted during fiscal year 1986 under section 1221 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act, 1986 (Public Law 99-145; 99 Stat. 726), there may be excluded from such computation any polygraph examination conducted during the period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on September 30, 1986, if such examination—

(1) is conducted by the Air Force under an authorization granted by the Secretary of Defense on November 24, 1981; or

(2) is conducted under an authorization granted by the Secretary of Defense on August 31, 1982, and is conducted on a person who is participating in a national program—

(A) which has as its purpose the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance;

(B) which is under the purview of the Director of Central Intelligence; and

(C) for which a polygraph examination was established on or before October 1, 1985, as a condition for participation in such program.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

AUTHORIZATION AND TRANSFER OF CERTAIN UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS

Although the total appropriated for defense in fiscal year 1986 was substantially less than the total amount authorized, a number of appropriation accounts and several line items contained appropriations in excess of the amounts authorized. To address these differences, the Fiscal Year 1986 Defense Appropriations Act included a provision, offered in the Senate, to require subsequent authorization for certain appropriated funds. Section 8109 of the Fiscal Year 1986 Defense Appropriations Act (Public Law 99-190), was designed to accomplish this objective. Since its enactment, the interpretations of Section 8109 have varied widely, ranging from application to the statutory account levels to the various line items in the respective reports accompanying the fiscal year 1986 authorization and appropriation acts.

The conference action on amendment number 84 reflects agreement on authorization for all excess appropriations and provides for the transfer of certain appropriated funds to higher priority programs reflected in the supplemental appropriations act. The conferees agree that this language is not intended to reflect a consensus on the scope and application of authorization required for appropriations. Rather, it seeks only to achieve a resolution to the fiscal year 1986 authorized appropriations issues. The recommendations contained in this act are based on a thorough review by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and Armed Services of all disputed, unauthorized appropriations by taking into account the most recent available information on defense expenditures, program priorities and fiscal realities. The effect of these adjustments is neutral on the national defense function totals for budget authority and outlays. All funds contained in Public Law 99-190 were in compliance with budget resolution ceilings.

NAVAL RESERVE ON-BOARD TRAINER

The conferees agree that $6,800,000 is authorized to be obligated and expended as provided in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L. 99-190) to procure three shipboard antisubmarine warfare training systems service test models of a modification to the AN/SQR-17A to provide onboard training capability for Naval Reserve Force ships.

CIVILIAN HEALTH AND MEDICAL PROGRAM OF THE UNIFORMED SERVICES COST OVERRUNS

The conferees agree to earmark $260,000,000 of prior year unobligated funds specified under Section 8103 of the 1986 Department of Defense Appropriations Act for maintaining operation of the Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). By providing this funding, the conferees eliminate the necessity of the CHAMPUS reprogramming

(FY 86-32PA) currently before the Committees.

The $260,000,000 is necessary due to an increase in both workload, defined as non-availability statements issued by the Services, and costs. For the first six months of fiscal year 1986 CHAMPUS has experienced a total 19.3 percent increase over the like period in 1985 in the number of non-availability statements issued by the Services. The greatest increase by service appears in the Navy, which increased its issuance of non-availability by 47 percent. The greatest increase by region appears in the Southeast, where non-availability statements increased 62 percent for January through March of fiscal year 1986 when compared to a like period in fiscal year 1985.

The conferees have been advised that $260,000,000 may not be enough to cover CHAMPUS costs through the end of fiscal year 1986. The Department should take management actions to contain costs. However, should additional funds be required, they should first be derived through offsets in Operation and Maintenance appropriations. Audit report reductions totaling $29,000,000 specified by the fiscal year 1986 Defense Authorization Act shall be reserved for potential further CHAMPUS costs as follows:

	Millions
AAFEES lease payments, Army	$1
Design costs of NAF projects, Army	1
Inventory control, Army	5
Small clubs, Navy	1
Inventory control audit, Air Force	10
Golf courses, Air Force	5
Small clubs, Defense Agencies	1
Inventory control, Defense Agencies	5

While the conferees provide this funding to ensure CHAMPUS claims will be paid, the Department leaves Congress with little choice but to consider changes in the way the medical programs are funded in fiscal year 1987. Difficult, but necessary modifications may include revising CHAMPUS budgeting mechanisms; revising copayment fees and the establishment of diagnostic related groups as the basis for funding medical programs.

DRUG INTERDICTION

The conferees agrees that $38,000,000 of previously appropriated funds are authorized to be obligated and expended to commence the implementation of a new drug interdiction program in the Department of Defense. Specifically, the Air Force and the Navy will participate in the implementation of a new program that has been approved by the Secretary of Defense and submitted to both the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees and to the Attorney General as the Chairman of the Drug Enforcement Policy Board in April. The funding approved for obligation in the conference report will allow for the initiation of important elements of this plan.

The conferees specifically approve the use of funds previously appropriated in Public Law 99-190 for the following elements of the new drug interdiction plan at DoD:

$18,500,000 for the procurement of one HC-130 tanker aircraft. This aircraft will replace any existing HC-130 aircraft that will be modified with F-15 radar for drug interdiction purposes;

$12,000,000 for the procurement of one aerostat radar surveillance system to be located in the Bahamas for drug interdiction and national security purposes;

$7,500,000 for the procurement of one APS-138, 360-degree radar system to be installed on a Navy aircraft for drug interdiction purposes and turned over to the U.S. Customs Service.

The conferees urge the Department of Defense to reprogram out of otherwise available unobligated funds, sufficient funds to procure two C-130 aircraft for use by the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command. These aircraft will serve both a national security and drug interdiction function for the Department of Defense.

The conferees anticipate favorable disposition of the Secretary of Defense's approved plan by the Drug Enforcement Policy Board in the very near future, confirming the need for this important drug interdiction program. The conferees also note that the President of the United States has recently signed a National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) that would, among other things, bring the military into the drug interdiction effort and put drug enforcement as a top national security matter. The conferees believe that the plan, as approved by the Secretary and initiated in this Act, is a compromise for the Department of Defense to assist the civilian drug enforcement effort in a responsible way and within the confines of current law, including the Posse Comitatus amendments. The conferees expect the Department to act expeditiously to implement this new plan and to complete the total drug interdiction plan over the next three fiscal years.

120MM MORTAR

The conference agreement includes bill language which restates the intention and direction of Congress concerning the procurement strategy for the 120mm mortar system. This direction was included in last year's authorization and appropriation action.

LIGHTWEIGHT MULTIPURPOSE WEAPON

The conference agreement allows the Army to proceed with its progammed procurement of the AT-4 lighweight multipupose weapon, for which $59,200,000 was appropriated in Procurement of Ammunition, Army in fiscal year 1986. The conferees recognize that this weapon is the Army's choice for a lightweight antiarmor/multipurpose weapon and there is no plan to procure any other weapon for this mission. However, the conferees believe that the Army unwisely and prematurely halted testing of the M72E4, an improved version of the current weapon which had been considered a back up to the AT-4. This was done despite instruction in the fiscal year 1986 appropriation conference report that M72E4 testing be completed and the weapon be type classified. Accordingly, the conference agreement includes bill language requiring the Army, within available funds, to complete development and operational testing, to type classify the weapon, and to acquire a technical data package. Inclusion of this provision in the law has been made necessary by the Army's disregard for last year's report language.

CHAPTER IV

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE—CIVIL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

CORPS OF ENGINEERS—CIVIL

CONSTRUCTION, GENERAL

Amendment No. 85: Changes Chapter number as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 86: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate providing that $8,200,000 of available funds be used to initiate construction of the Cooper River, South Carolina project.

FLOOD CONTROL AND COASTAL EMERGENCIES

Amendment No. 87: Reported in technical disagreement. The manager on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

For an additional amount, for "Flood Control and Coastal Emergencies", as authorized by section 5 of the Flood Control Act approved August 18, 1941, as amended, $25,000,000, to remain available until expended.

Using available funds authorized by section 5 of the Flood Control Act approved August 18, 1941, as amended, the Secretary of the Army shall, in consultation with State officials of the Great Lakes region, develop emergency contingency plans to prevent or control near term flooding along the Great Lakes. The Secretary shall report to Congress within sixty days after the date of enactment of this act on the contingency plans. The Secretary is authorized to spend up to $1,000,000 for the purposes of this provision.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Amendment No. 88: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate providing that the acquisition of buildings and facilities for the U.S. Army Engineer District, Washington, provided for in Public law 99-88, may be implemented by lease purchase contract or by any other appropriate means.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

ENERGY SUPPLY, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

(DISAPPROVAL OF DEFERRAL)

Amendment No. 89: Deletes House lauguage and inserts language proposed by the Senate disapproving deferral of $23,156,000 of the proposed deferral D86-38. The following amounts and related projects are available for obligation: Photovoltaics—$4,019,000; Wind energy—$10,240,000; Ocean energy—$1,436,000; International solar—$762,000; Electric energy systems—$1,914,000; Energy storage systems—$1,914,000; Geothermal—$2,871,000: Total—$23,156,000.

ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 90: Restores language stricken by the Senate tranferring $62,000,000 proposed by the House for the Strategic Defense Initiative. The conferees agree that $30,000,000 shall be available for obligation in FY 1986 and $32,000,000 shall be available for obligation in FY 1987 only with the prior approval of the Committees on Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Amendment No. 91: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment, as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ADMINISTRATION PROVISION

Of the funds previously appropriated or made available for research, development, test and evaluation for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1986 pursuant to Public Law 99-190, $55,600,000 shall be available only for grants or contributions to educational institutions for research activities, construction of reserach related facilities and for other related purposes as provided in House Report 99-450 accompanying House Joint Resolution 465, Public Law, 99-190, and the Secretary of Defense shall provide these grants or contributions expeditiously: Provided, That such grants or contributions are a one time obligation and expenditure and shall not interfere with or change the existing system of other competitive reserach grants or contracts.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

CHAPTER V

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 92: Inserts a new chapter heading number as proposed by the Senate.

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND IRELAND

(TRANSFERS OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 93: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR NORTHERN IRELAND AND IRELAND

(TRANSFERS OF FUNDS)

For an additional amount for the "Economic Support Fund", not less than $50,000,000, which shall be available only for the United States contribution to the International Fund established purusant to the November 15, 1985 agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland, to be derived from funds appropriated or otherwise made available by the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986 (as enacted in Public Law 99-190), as follows: $4,900,000 by transfer from Title I of such Act, $12,350,000 of funds made available by such Act for the "Economic Support Fund", $9,100,000 by transfer from Title II of such Act, excluding funds made available for the "Economic Support Fund", $20,000,000 by transfer from Title III of such Act, and $3,650,000 by transfer from Title IV of such Act.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree to provide $50,000,000 for the FY 1986 United States contribution for the International Fund for Northern Ireland and Ireland. These funds are to be provided in support of the Anglo-Irish Agreement of November 15, 1985.

The funds for the FY 1986 contribution are made available proportionately from funds in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986 (P.L 99-100) as follows:

Title I Multi-lateral Assistance	$4,900,000
Title II Bilateral Assistance:	
Economic Fund	12,350,000
Other accounts	9,100,000
Title III Military Assistance	20,000,000
Title IV Export-Import Bank	3,650,000
Total	50,000,000

The conferees agree that no single account or project should disproportionately bear the burden of these transfers and no program or account is to be eliminated. Additionally it is the intent of the bill language that direct lending for the Export-Import Bank be reduced from $1,062,270,000 to $1,058,620,000 in order to provide for $3,650,000 of appropriations to the International Fund.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 94: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides $2,739,000 for the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, to be derived by transfer from any of the funds appropriated in the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986.

ASSISTANCE FOR HAITI

Amendment No. 95: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

in Title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986 (as enacted in Public Law 99-190), subject to the notification process of the Committees on Apporpriations

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree to provide to Haiti up to $21,700,000 in existing funds under Title II of the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1986.

The conferees agree to an amendment to the Senate language that requires that prior to the obligation of funds provided in the bill for Haiti, the Administration is to provide a fifteen day notification to the Appropriations Committees. This language was included so that the Committees would be notified on how the funds made available for Haiti were being obligated and the source of the funds to be used.

HAITI: INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION PROJECTS

Amendment No. 96: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:, *or the equivalent amount in local currencies, may*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The provision was revised in order to assure that the Agency for International Development would make $1.7 million in local currencies in Haiti available to the Inter-American Foundation for projects in Haiti.

It is further the intent of the conferees that these funds be used in accordance with established procedures of the Inter-American Foundation for selection of projects and management of grants. Projects to be funded by these local currencies should be jointly agreed upon by the Inter-American Foundation and the Agency for International Development.

HAITI: MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 97: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

Notwithstanding any limitations on assistance to Haiti contained in Public Law 98-473 or Public Law 99-83, funds in the amount of $750,000 previously appropriated for the purposes of chapter 2 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, may be made available for Haiti to carry out such purposes: Provided, That none of the funds made available pursuant to this paragraph may be made available for obligation unless the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress are previously notified fifteen days in advance: Provided further, That the funds provided under this paragraph shall be made available only to provide nonlethal military assistance for Haiti.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree to release up to $750,000 in FY 1986 Military Assistance Program funds for Haiti to be used for nonlethal purposes. Although Military Assistance Program funds were provided to Haiti in FY 1986 their use was restricted to anti-narcotic and immigration purposes. It is the intent of the conferees that in lifting these restrictions the released funds be used in accordance with the following projected list, provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency:

FY 1986 Military Assistance for Haiti

Item	*Estimated Cost*
A. Mobility: ¾ Ton Trucks	$300,000
B. Communications:	
Base Stations	6,000
Handheld "Brick" radios and spare batteries	120,000
Truck Radios	60,000
C. Logistics: Vehicles Spare Parts	60,000
D. Medical: Ambulances	34,000
E. Individual equipment:	
Fatigue Field Uniforms	110,000
Combat Boots	60,000
Total	750,000

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 98: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

SPECIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE PHILIPPINES

ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND

For an additional amount for the "Economic Support Fund", $100,000,000, to remain available until March 31, 1987: Provided, That this amount shall be available only for the Philippines: Provided further, That none of these funds may be available for obligation unless the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress are previously notified fifteen days in advance.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

For an additional amount for "Military Assistance", $50,000,000, to remain available until March 31, 1987: Provided That this amount shall be available only for the Philippines: Provided further, That none of these funds may be available for obligation unless the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress are previously notified fifteen days in advance.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree to provide $100,000,000 in Economic Support Funds and $50,000,000 in Military Assistance to assist the new government of Corazon Aquino. Funding under both accounts has been made available until March, 1987 in order to allow sufficient opportunity for the United States to work with the new Government in the Philippines on specific program needs and priorities.

The conference agreement also requires that the Appropriations Committees be notified fifteen days in advance prior to the obligation of the supplemental funds for the Philippines. This provision was included due to the preliminary nature of the current planning under both accounts. The notification concerning the Economic Support Fund is to provide a full explanation of the obligations to take place under that account. The notification concerning the military account should indicate any changes that are being made from the following list of projected military expenditures provided by the Defense Security Assistance Agency.

Projected use of $50,000,000 supplemental funds for the new Armed Forces of the Philippines

[In thousands of dollars]

Items	
Field Communications Spares	3,500
Aircraft Tech Assistance Program	1,000
Publications	500
Dataphone Support	1,000
Mobile Training Teams/OJT	1,000
Phil Air Defense System	2,000
Tactical Communications	6,000
Engineer Equipment	5,000
2½ Ton Trucks	12,000
Shop Vans	925
Commando V-150 Vehicles	8,500
Mortar Fire Control Equipment	400
Combat Clothing & Indiv Equip	3,000
Medical/Dental Equip	3,175
POL	2,000
Total	50,000

The conferees agree to delete the Senate provision that proposed the deobligation of $29,355,000 in Foreign Military Credit Sales for the Government of the Philippines and the reobligation of the funds as straight grant Military Assistance. The conferees agree that this issue deserves further study and will be addressed further during consideration of the FY 1987 Foreign Assistance Appropriations bill.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK OF THE UNITED STATES

Amendment No. 99: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which extends the availability of direct loan authority provided to the Export-Import Bank. The Senate amendment provides that direct loan authority made available to the Export-Import Bank in FY 1986 be available until September 30, 1987.

CHAPTER VI

DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT

Amendment No. 100: Changes chapter number as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 101: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

HOUSING PROGRAMS

ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ASSISTED HOUSING

(RESCISSIONS)

Of the amounts of budget authority that become available during fiscal year 1986 as a result of the forgiving, pursuant to section 4(c)(1) of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, of any loan made pursuant to section 4(a) of such Act, not less than $5,250,000,000 of budget authority (and such amounts of contract authority as correspond to the amounts of budget authority) are rescinded.

Of the amounts of budget authority that become available during fiscal year 1987 as a result of the forgiving, pursuant to section 4(c)(1) of the United States Housing Act of 1937, as amended, of any loan made pursuant to section 4(a) of such Act, $6,042,000,000 of budget authority (and such amounts of contract authority as correspond to the amounts of budget authority) are rescinded on or after October 1, 1986 and before September 30, 1987.

RENT SUPPLEMENT PROGRAM

RESCISSION

The limitation otherwise applicable to the maximum payments that may be required in any fiscal year by all contracts entered into under section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 (12 U.S.C. 1701s), is reduced in fiscal year 1986 by not more than $41,390,000 in uncommitted balances of authorizations provided for this purpose in appropriations Acts.

RENTAL HOUSING ASSISTANCE

RESCISSION

The limitation otherwise applicable to the maximum payments that may be required in any fiscal year by all contracts entered into under section 236 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1715z-1), is further reduced in fiscal year 1986 by not more than $10,128,000 in uncommitted balances of authorizations provided for this purpose in appropriations Acts.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

HOUSING PROGRAMS AND COMMUNITY PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT

Amendment No. 102: Makes technical change in disapproval of deferrals language as proposed by the Senate.

This paragraph disapproves the five 1986 deferrals proposed by the President for housing and community planning and development programs. The Committee of Conference expects the Department to take steps to obligate these funds as soon as possible. With respect to annual contributions for assisted housing, the conferees direct the Department and the Office of Management and Budget to adhere to the 1986 program detailed in the following table. This table reflects the original intent of Congress as set forth in the conference agreement on the 1986 HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act (Public Law 99-160), with adjustments made for Gramm-Rudman sequestration and other technical changes reuested by HUD. The Department is expected to utilize the regular reprogramming procedure if any changes are required to the agreed upon program contained in the table.

ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ASSISTED HOUSING, FISCAL YEAR 1986—GROSS RESERVATIONS

	Units	Per unit cost	Contract authority	Term	Budget authority
Carryover	NA	NA	$85,061,924	NA	$918,498,386
Recaptures	NA	NA	23,490,000	NA	537,525,000
Rescission of recaptures	NA	NA	−23,490,000	NA	−537,525,000
New authority	NA	NA	838,803,547	NA	9,965,607,781
Sequestered authority	NA	NA	0	NA	−428,521,134
Total available	NA	NA	923,865,471	NA	10,455,585,033
Public housing:					
Public housing	4,803	$6,526	31,346,988	30	940,409,652
Indian housing	1,921	5,580	11,239,956	28	314,718,768
Amendments	NA	NA	7,758,621	29	225,000,000
Lease adjustments	NA	NA	19,200,000	1	19,200,000
Modernization	NA	NA	72,051,000	20	1,441,020,000
Subtotal, public housing	6,724	NA	141,596,565	NA	1,940,348,420
Section 8:					
Vouchers:					
Incremental vouchers	35,449	3,769	133,607,112	5	668,035,561
Section 8 opt-outs	961	3,769	3,620,803	5	18,104,015
Public housing demolitions	2,402	3,769	9,052,007	5	45,260,037
PHA fees	NA	445	17,271,320	5	86,355,221
Subtotal	38,812	NA	163,551,243	NA	817,754,834

ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS FOR ASSISTED HOUSING, FISCAL YEAR 1986—GROSS RESERVATIONS—Continued

	Units	Per unit cost	Contract authority	Term	Budget authority
Section 202:					
Units	11,508	6,736	77,653,686	20	1,553,073,715
Amendments	NA	NA	11,528,160	20	230,563,200
Subtotal	11,528	NA	89,181,846	NA	1,783,636,915
Existing:					
Regular	31,203	5,066	158,074,130	15	2,371,111,949
Moderate rehabilitation	9,660	6,116	59,081,820	15	886,227,300
Total, existing	40,863	NA	217,155,950	NA	3,257,339,249
Loan management	10,000	3,604	36,040,000	5	180,200,000
Property disposition	2,800	6,769	18,952,273	15	284,284,091
Conversions—section 23	792	3,369	2,667,737	15	40,016,059
Amendments:					
New/Sub. rehab	NA	NA	2,209,564	20	44,191,280
Existing	NA	NA	95,000,000	5	475,000,000
Loan management/reserve	NA	NA	128,637,312	7	419,264,185
Property disposition	NA	NA	2,000,000	15	30,000,000
Moderate rehabilitation	NA	NA	4,000,000	10	40,000,000
Subtotal, amendments	NA	NA	231,846,876	NA	1,008,455,465
Total, section 8	104,795	NA	759,395,924	NA	7,371,686,613
Total, public housing and section 8	111,519	NA	900,992,490	NA	10,312,035,033
Section 17 development	NA	NA	NA	NA	71,775,000
Section 17 rehabilitation	NA	NA	NA	NA	71,775,000
Unutilized authority	NA	NA	22,872,981	NA	0
Grand total all authority	111,519		923,865,471		10,455,585,033

Finally, the conferees direct the Office of Management and Budget and the Department to make available immediately section 108 loan guarantees in the full amount of $212,956,000 provided by the Congress for fiscal year 1986. The Administration's proposed supplemental reduction of $162,956,000 in the section 108 loan limitation has been rejected by both Houses. It is the clear and emphatic intent of Congress that these funds be made immediately available.

Amendment No. 103: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate increasing the 1986 limitation on Federal Housing Administration mortgage and loan insurance commitments by $57,580,000,000 and increasing the 1986 limitation on Government National Mortgage Association guarantees of mortgage-backed securities by $49,000,000,000.

Amendment Nos. 104 and 105: Transfers $30,000,000 to salaries and expenses of which $21,365,000 is from the various funds of the Federal Housing Administration and $8,635,000 is from the section 312 rehabilitation loan fund, instead of $23,701,000 of which $15,066,000 is from the various funds of the FHA and $8,635,000 is from the section 312 fund as proposed by the House and $30,000,000 from the various funds of the FHA as proposed by the Senate.

The Committee of Conference agrees with the Senate report that aggressive action in implementing and enforcing program reforms in the Federal Housing Administration program are both overdue and very necessary. In this connection, the conferees applaud the initiative taken by the Department of Housing and Urban Development in its Single Family Task Force Report. The Department is urged to implement its recommendations speedily.

While the conference committee believes that HUD is headed in the correct direction, it is concerned that an independent program monitoring capacity has not been established in the Department to ensure that the recommendations are carried out, and that further necessary actions are taken to prevent the recurrence of scandal. Given the role of the Office of Administration in providing leadership and staff resources for the Single Family Task Force Report, the conferees believe that Office should continue that role by establishing within itself the capacity to review and monitor the implementation of the report's recommendations. In addition, the Office of Administration should continue to study, review and monitor the single family program operations—including, but not necessarily limited to—current and future FHA mortgagee monitoring and review, the review of fee appraiser assignments and performance, and the review of HUD headquarters and field office implementation of other single family policy and procedures changes that are aimed at reducing the opportunity for fraud, waste and mismanagement.

The conferees further believe there is a need for an independent and objective review outside of the Office of Housing. This is not to say that the Office of Housing is not capable of monitoring itself. Rather it will provide an additional measure of assurance to the Department and the Congress that appropriate and timely steps will be taken to provide proper internal controls. The conference committee expects that the Office of Housing will cooperate fully with the Office of Administration in carrying out this difficult assignment.

AMERICAN BATTLE MONUMENTS COMMISSION

Amendment No. 106: Restores language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate appropriating $1,553,000 for salaries and expenses.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Amendment No. 107: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

CONSTRUCTION GRANTS

Of the funds appropriated in section 119 of Public Law 99-190 for necessary expenses to carry out title II of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, an additional $1,200,000,000 is hereby made available: Provided, That the allocation of the $1,200,000,000 made available by this paragraph shall be in accordance with the formula in effect on October 1, 1984.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Although the Clean Water Act has still not been reauthorized, the conferees agree to release an additional $1,200,000,000 for the Environmental Protection Agency construction grants program. Currently over 20 states have depleted their allocation of 1986 construction grant funds and many projects are facing delays.

These funds are to be made available and expended only under the formula and other statutory provisions in effect during fiscal year 1985, without earmarkings or setasides for specific projects. In addition, these funds are to be made available for all eligible projects and categories and shall not be limited to existing phased or segmented projects through the apportionment process or other means. The conferees agree not to release the remaining $600,000,000 until after the Clean Water Act has been reauthorized.

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

Amendment No. 108: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

SPACE FLIGHT, CONTROL AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS

(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

For an additional amount for "Space flight, control and data communications" $431,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1987: Provided, That, upon enactment into law of this Act, $5,000,000 shall be transferred to "Research and development": Provided further, That $100,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1988, is appropriated for fiscal year 1987 for "Space flight, control and data communications", and shall not become available for obligation until October 1, 1986: Provided

further, That funds appropriated for fiscal year 1987 in the previous proviso may not be obligated until the Administrator of NASA has certified that the recommendations of the Rogers Commission have been implemented or are being implemented, or that an alternative approach satisfies the direction of the recommendation.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The Committee of Conference has agreed to a total of $531,000,000 for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. This is an increase of $5,000,000 above the level proposed by the Senate. Language has been included providing for the transfer of the $5,000,000 to the Research and Development account for a flight telerobotic servicer for the space station. In the 1986 HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, $5,000,000 was provided for this activity. These additional funds will help to ensure that the United States will have a flight telerobotic servicer available for early testing on shuttle and operations on space station.

The conferees have also agreed to provide $100,000,000 of the $531,000,000 recommended as an appropriation for fiscal year 1987. These funds may not be used until the Administrator of NASA has certified that the recommendations of the Rogers Commission have been implemented or are being implemented, or that an alternative approach satisfies the objective of the recommendation.

The conferees further direct that NASA make available sufficient funds to study an alternative solid rocket booster design such as unitary case, single cast propellant, etc. The study should be completed by December 31, and the results forwarded to the Committees on Appropriations. The study should focus on relative safety, technical risk, cost, and availability issues. When a final design is selected, the Committee directs that a request for proposal for a "second source" be issued, if the agency determines that such an approach can be adopted from within available resources. NASA has stated that a second source of production of solid rocket boosters is in the national interest. Accordingly, the agency is urged to develop a method which will make available all data developed in booster redesign and requalification to any potential competition. This creates a parallel process that should enhance a second source capability.

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION

Amendment No. 109: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following: *not less than $25,000,000 nor more than*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree that the VA is to utilize these additional funds to maintain the 193,941 staffing level authorized in the 1986 HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations Act. If necessary, the VA is to utilize whatever additional funds are required to support that staffing level. The major construction funds to be transferred are to be taken from available unobligated balances in the working reserve, design fund and advanced planning fund.

Amendment No. 110: Inserts language proposed by the Senate providing that up to $6,000,000 is available for transfer to general operating expenses from construction, minor projects.

Amendment No. 111: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

For payments to defray the costs of training and provision of incentives to employers to hire and train certain veterans as authorized by the Veterans' Job Training Act, as amended (29 U.S.C. 1721), $35,000,000, to remain available until September 30, 1988, and to be derived by transfer from "Construction, minor projects".

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 112: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS

Retroactive to October 1, 1985, all payments for appraisals performed on a contractual basis in connection with the liquidation of housing loans guaranteed, insured, or made in conjunction with loan guarantee operations shall be charged to the VA loan guaranty revolving fund.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees agree that the additional funds made available in the general operating expenses appropriation by this provision be used for additional personnel in the loan guaranty program. This will help reduce the loan guaranty backlog caused by reduced mortgage rates.

NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT CORPORATION

Amendment No. 113: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate making an additional $250,000 of funds already appropriated available for object classes other than personnel compensation and benefits.

Amendment No. 114: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

Each provision of law amended by Public Law 99-289, is amended by striking out "June 6, 1986" wherever it appears and inserting in lieu thereof "July 25, 1986".

URBAN DEVELOPMENT ACTION GRANTS IMPROVEMENTS

(a) PROJECT QUALITY CRITERIA.—Section 119(d)(1) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended—

(1) by inserting a dash before "(A)";

(2) by indenting subparagraphs (A) and (B) in the same manner as subparagraphs (C) and (D), as inserted by this subsection;

(3) in subparagraph (a), by striking out "as the primary criterion,";

(4) by striking out "and" at the end of subparagraph (B); and

(5) by striking out subparagraph (C) and inserting in lieu thereof the following new subparagraphs:

"(C) the following other criteria:

"(i) the extent to which the grant will stimulate economic recovery by leveraging private investment;

"(ii) the number of permanent jobs to be created and their relation to the amount of grant funds requested;

"(iii) the proportion of permanent jobs accessible to lower income persons and minorities, including persons who are unemployed;

"(iv) the extent to which the project will retain jobs that will be lost without the provision of a grant under this section;

"(v) the extent to which the project will relieve the most pressing employment or residential needs of the applicant by—

"(I) reemploying workers in a skill that has recently suffered a sharp increase in unemployment locally;

"(II) retraining recently unemployed residents in new skills;

"(III) providing training to increase the local pool of skilled labor; or

"(IV) producing decent housing for low- and moderate-income persons in cases where such housing is in severe shortage in the area of the applicant, except that an application shall be considered to produce housing for low- and moderate-income persons under this clause only if such application proposes that (a) not less than 51 percent of all funds available for the project shall be used for dwelling units and related facilities; and (b) not less than 30 percent of all funds used for dwelling units and related facilities shall be used for dwelling units to be occupied by persons of low and moderate income, or not less than 20 percent of all dwelling units made available to occupancy using such funds shall be occupied by persons of low and moderate income, whichever results in the occupancy of more dwelling units by persons of low and moderate income;

"(vi) the impact of the proposed activities on the fiscal base of the city or urban county and its relation to the amount of grant funds requested;

"(vii) the extent to which State or local Government funding or special economic incentives have been committed; and

"(viii) the extent to which the project will have a substantial impact on physical and economic development of the city or urban county, the proposed activities are likely to be accomplished in a timely fashion with the grant amount available, and the city or urban county has demonstrated performance in housing and community development programs; and

"(D) additional consideration for projects with the following characteristics:

"(i) projects to be located within a city or urban county which did not receive a preliminary grant approval under this section during the 12-month period preceding the date on which applications are required to be submitted for the grant competition involved; and

"(ii) twice the amount of the additional consideration provided under clause (i) for projects to be located in cities or urban counties which did not receive a preliminary grant approval during the 24-month period preceding the date on which applications under this section are required to be submitted for the grant competition involved.

If a city or urban county has submitted and has pending more than one application, the additional consideration provided by subparagraph (D) of the preceding sentence shall be available only to the project in such city or urban county which received the highest number of points under subparagraph (C) of such sentence.".

(b) SELECTION LIMITATIONS AND CRITERIA WEIGHT.—Section 119(d) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new paragraphs:

"(3) The Secretary shall award points to each application as follows:

"(A) not more than 35 points on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph (1)(A);

"(B) not more than 35 points on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph (1)(B);

"(C) not more than 33 points on the basis of the criteria referred to in paragraph (1)(C); and

"(D)(i) 1 additional point on the basis of the criterion referred to in paragraph (1)(D)(i); or

"(ii) 2 additional points on the basis of the criterion referred to in paragraph (1)(D)(ii).

"(4) The Secretary shall distribute grant funds under this section so that to the extent practicable during each funding cycle—

"(A) 65 percent of the funds is first made available utilizing all of the criteria set forth in paragraph (1); and

"(B) 35 percent of the funds is then made available solely on the basis of the factors referred to in subparagraphs (C) and (D) of paragraph (1).

"(5)(A) For each fiscal year, the Secretary shall hold—

"(i) 3 competitions for grants under paragraph (1) for cities not described in the first sentence of subsection (i) (relating to small cities) and urban counties; and

"(ii) 3 competitions for cities described in the first sentence of subsection (i) (relating to small cities).

"(B) Each competition for grants described in any clause of subparagraph (A) shall be for an amount equal to the sum of—

"(i) approximately ⅓ of the funds available for such grants for the fiscal year;

"(ii) any funds available for such grants in any previous competition that are not awarded; and

"(iii) any funds available for such grants in any previous competition that are recaptured.".

(c) USE OF REPAID GRANT FUNDS.—Section 119(f) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "In any case in which the project proposes the repayment to the applicant of the grant funds, such funds shall be made available by the applicant for economic development activities that are eligible activities under this section or section 104. The applicant shall annually provide the Secretary with a statement of the projected receipt and use of repaid grant funds during the next year together with a report acceptable to the Secretary on the use of such funds during the most recent preceding full fiscal year of the applicant.".

(d) NONDISCRIMINATION.—Section 119(r) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is amended to read as follows:

"(r) In utilizing the discretion of the Secretary when providing assistance and applying selection criteria under this section, the Secretary may not discriminate against applications on the basis of (1) the type of activity involved, whether such activity is primarily housing, industrial, or commercial; or (2) the type of applicant, whether such applicant is a city or urban county.".

(e) REPORTS OF COMPTROLLER GENERAL.—

(1)(A) Not later than the expiration of the 6-month period following the date of enactment of this Act and every 3 years thereafter, the Comptroller General of the United States shall prepare and submit to the Congress a comprehensive report evaluating the eligibility standards and selection criteria applicable under section 119 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974.

(B) Such report shall evaluate in detail the standards and criteria specified in such section that measure the level or comparative degree of economic distress of cities and urban counties and the effect of the grants awarded on the basis of such standards and criteria on stimulating the maximum economic development activity.

(C) Such report shall also evaluate in detail the extent to which the economic and social data utilized by the Secretary in awarding grants under such section is current and accurate, and shall compare the data used by the Secretary with other available data. The Comptroller General shall make recommendations to the Congress on whether or not other data should be collected by the Federal Government in order to fairly and accurately distribute grants under such section based on the level or comparative degree of economic distress. The Comptroller General shall also make recommendations on whether or not existing data should be collected more frequently in order to ensure that timely data is used to evaluate grant applications under such section.

(2) Not later than the expiration of the 3-month period following the date of the final competition for grants for fiscal year 1986 under section 119 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, the Comptroller General of the United States shall prepare and submit to the Congress a comprehensive report describing the effect of the amendments made by this section on—

(A) the targeting of grant funds to cities and urban counties having the highest level or degree of economic distress;

(B) the distribution of grant funds among regions of the United States;

(C) the number and types of projects receiving grants;

(D) the per capita funding levels for each city, urban county, or identifiable community described in subsection (p) of such section 119, receiving assistance under such section 119; and

(E) the stimulation of the maximum economic development activity.

(f) REGULATIONS.—The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall issue such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the amendments made by this section. Such regulations shall be published for comment in the Federal Register not later than 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act. The provisions of section 119(d)(1)(D), section 119(d)(3), and section 119(d)(4) of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, shall take effect on the date of enactment of this Act.

(g) APPLICABILITY.—The amendments made by this section shall be applicable to the making of urban development action grants that have not received the preliminary approval of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development before the date on which final regulations issued by the Secretary under subsection (f) become effective. For the fiscal year in which the amendments made by this section become applicable, such amendments shall only apply with respect to the aggregate amount awarded for such grants on or after such effective date.

(h) FISCAL YEAR 1986 COMPETITIONS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall hold—

(1) 2 competitions for grants under section 119(d)(1) for cities not described in the first sentence of subsection (i) of such section and urban counties; and

(2) 1 competition for such grants for cities described in the first sentence of subsection (i) of such section,

between April 15, 1986, and October 1, 1986.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees have agreed to accept the Senate language extending FHA mortgage insurance authority to July 25, 1986, and to make basic changes in the Urban Development Action Grant formula. On June 6 the HUD Secretary's authority to issue FHA loan commitments lapsed, imposing severe hardships on thousands of families buying homes with FHA financing. The conferees are aware that several other legislative vehicles would extend the FHA program, but felt it essential to include the extension language because of the urgency of the situation and the possibility of other bills being delayed. The combination of this extension and the increased FHA loan guarantee limitation provided in amendment number 103 will assure the continued operation of the FHA program until July 25.

The conferees also agreed to the UDAG formula change proposed by the Senate, amended to drop the "additional consideration" provision which would double project merit points for certain projects for the remainder of fiscal year 1986. This formula change is very similar to the House-passed provisions in the Housing Act of 1986 (H.R. 1), including the fundamental change to reserve 35 percent of the funds for allocation based solely on project merit.

The conferees believe the basic formula changes will lead to stronger UDAG projects overall, while still giving substantial emphasis to economic development needs in severely distressed cities and urban counties. In deciding to accept the overall UDAG formula changes, the conferees agreed to drop the provision which would double the points for certain projects in cities that had not received a UDAG grant since October 15, 1984. To reward projects because they failed to be selected for funding in three consecutive past rounds would simply divert funds from other higher ranked projects.

The conferees intend that these UDAG formula changes shall be put into effect as soon as possible. Specifically, HUD is directed to take all steps necessary in order to use these formula and criteria changes in making project selections in the next large city round currently scheduled for announcement around July 1.

CHAPTER VII

Amendment No. 115: Changes the Chapter number to VII as proposed by the Senate.

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Amendment No. 116: Deletes the heading "rescission" proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 117: Defers $3,000,000 in Bureau of Land Management land acquisition funds as proposed by the House instead of a rescission of these funds as proposed by the Senate.

U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

Amendment No. 118: Provides no additional funds for Resource management as proposed by the Senate instead of $90,000 as proposed by the House.

The managers have no objection to the reprogramming of $90,000 from project savings at the Dismal Swamp NWR for payment to Humphreys County, Tennessee for road repairs. The managers agree that the Department should continue to seek reimbursement from the contractor, in accordance with the provisions of the contract.

Amendment No. 119: Deletes deferral of land acquisition funds proposed by the House. The managers agree that the Fish and Wildlife Service should either purchase the Tortuguero and Cartegena properties or assure that Puerto Rico will protect the natural resources there.

Amendment No. 120: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

For an additional amount for "Land acquisition", $2,373,000, to be derived from the Land and Water Conservation Fund, to remain available until expended.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment clarifies that the appropriation of $2,373,000 for land acquisition at Atchafalaya NWR is to be derived from the Land and Water Conservation Fund.

The managers have no objection to the reprogramming of $519,000 from funds appropriated for land acquisition for the California condor at Hudson Ranch to land acquisition at the Little White Salmon National Fish Hatchery.

The managers restate their support for maintenance and recovery of a wild California condor population and restate their support for acquisition of Hudson Ranch. The managers understand that negotiations are continuing and support efforts to reach a negotiated acquisition.

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

Amendment No. 121: Appropriates $13,470,000 for Operation of the National park system as proposed by the Senate instead of $13,900,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 122: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment appropriating $3,850,000 instead of $3,420,000 as proposed by the Senate and nothing as proposed by the House. The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The increase over the amount proposed by the Senate includes $430,000 for additional activity as a follow-on to the Reconnaissance Survey of Western Pennsylvania Roads and Sites prepared by the National Park Service in September, 1985. Included in this amount is $100,000 for resource evaluation, $180,000 for regionwide intergovernmental planning/coordination and $150,000 for a transportation corridor study.

The managers agree to a reprogramming to provide a loan of $1,435,000 to complete repairs to the Filene Center of the Wolf Trap Farm Park for the Performing Arts.

Amendment No. 123: Deletes deferral of $1,893,000 proposed by the Senate. The funds are deferred now and no separate approval is required.

The managers are concerned about the availability of funding for several urgent land acquisitions in Cuyahoga Valley National Recreation Area, Ohio. In response to those concerns, the Director of the National Park Service stated the following in a letter dated June 9, 1986: "We are pleased to advise that we will be able to provide the funding (for the Chessie System rail line) from the land acquisition account . . . Our ability to assure that funding is provided for acquisition of both the Chessie and Ohio Edison properties is dependent on both transactions being concluded before the end of this fiscal year".

Based on the Director's reassurance, the managers intend that sufficient funding be made available to cover approved appraised values for the Chessie System rail line; the Cameratta declaration of taking; the Ohio-Edison acquisition; and the Haydite and Huey acquisitions.

Amendment No. 124: Provides for the reestablishment of the Cape Cod National Seashore Advisory Commission through February 28, 1996 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 125: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides that reprogramming procedures must be used before any funds are used to drain lakes in the Delaware Water Gap National Recreation Area.

The managers are concerned, however, that this procedure may result in increased risk to life or property in cases of immediate and urgent threat, due to the amount of time required to review and act on the reprogramming proposal. The managers expect the reprogramming procedures to be followed, except that the Director shall take every action necessary to protect life and property in cases of real and immediate threats.

GEOLOGICAL SURVEY

Amendment No. 126: Appropriates $1,400,000 for surveys, investigations, and research as proposed by the Senate. No appropriation was provided by the House. The funds are for final payment of amounts due in the National Petroleum Reserve in Alaska.

MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE

Amendment No. 127: Appropriates $200,000 for leasing and royalty management instead of $800,000 proposed by the House and no funds proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 128: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, for data and information acquired in fiscal year 1986 or thereafter, by the Secretary, pursuant to section 1352(a)(1)(C)(iii) of title 43, United States Code, payment shall be made for processing costs to permittees with permits issued on or before September 30, 1985.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment clarifies that the data and information acquired by the Secretary are geologic and geophysical data acquired by permittees with permits issued prior to fiscal year 1986.

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING

Amendment No. 129: Rescinds $210,000 instead of $710,000 as proposed by the House and no rescission as proposed by the Senate.

BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS

Amendment No. 130: Appropriates $29,204,000 for the Operation of Indian programs instead of $31,368,000 as proposed by the House and $26,500,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The increase of $2,704,000 above the Senate results from applying a one percent reduction to the fiscal year 1986 appropriations for general assistance (−$671,000), Indian child welfare assistance (−$147,000), and the Solo Parent program (−$1,000); and a 4.3% reduction to Indian Child Welfare Act grants (−$379,000), and social services administrative funding (−$966,000). Therefore, the reduction in fiscal year 1986 to the social services program will total $2,164,000, rather than $4,868,000, a difference of $2,704,000. The managers agree that Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reductions are to be applied equally to each line item, unless a reprogramming is submitted to the Appropriations Committees and approved.

Amendment No. 131: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

: Provided further, That the levels established for general assistance by Public Law 99-88 (99 Stat. 388), are the maximum allowable payments

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

This amendment provides that only a ceiling, not a floor and a ceiling, has been established for the level of general assistance payments. The managers expect that the Bureau will make every effort to accurately project requirements and to request reprogrammings if severe shortfalls are forecast.

Amendment No. 132: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

CONSTRUCTION

For an additional amount for "Construction", $2,500,000, to remain available until expended.

DEFERRAL

Of the funds previously appropriated under the heading "Bureau of Indian Affairs' Construction" in Public Law 98-8 (90 Stat. 20), $2,500,000 shall not become available for obligation until October 1, 1986.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment provides $2,500,000 for the construction of the Rocky Boys school instead of $4,900,000 as proposed by the Senate. Funding for Two Eagle River is not provided.

Amendment No. 133: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which directs that a loan be made to the Zuni tribe and that a lien be secured on trust, or other funds of the tribe, in the amount of the principal and interest of the loan.

TERRITORIAL AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION

Amendment No. 134: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment, amended to read as follows:

sections 177, 122, 221, 223, 103(k), 105(c)(2), and 105(m) of

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 135: Appropriates $201,500,000 for Compact of Free Association instead of $178,750,000 as proposed by the House and $201,550,000 as proposed by the Senate.

The increase over the amount provided by the House includes $8,000,000 to establish a Prior Service Benefits Trust Fund, $9,400,000 for construction of the Federated States of Micronesia capitol, $2,600,000 for construction of the Marshall Islands capitol, and $2,750,000 for the Enjebi Community Trust Fund, established in Section 103(k) of Public Law 99-239.

The managers have not provided funds for indefinite land use payments at this time. The managers remain committed to the payment of these debts, as specified in Section 105(n) of the Compact of Free Association Act, and expect the Department of the Interior and Trust Territory Government to complete expeditiously the determination of the exact amounts required. When the amount has been determined, the managers expect the Department to submit promptly a request for appropriation of the required amount so that the payments may be made as quickly as possible.

Amendment No. 136: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate, with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

, including $8,000,000 for initial capitalization of a trust fund to fund the Prior Service Benefits portion of the Trust Territory Social Security System in accordance with section 105(m) of Public Law 99-239, and $2,750,000 for the Enjebi Community Trust Fund, as authorized in Section 103(k) of Public Law 99-239, and $9,340,000, to remain available until expended, for grants and necessary expenses to the Republic of Palau, to become available for obligation upon the enactment of S.J. Res. 325 or similar legislation

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Funding has been provided for the Palau Compact, subject to enactment of the Palau Compact legislation.

The managers have provided funds for capitalization of a Prior Service Benefits Trust Fund, and for initial funding of the Enjebi Community Trust Fund established in Section 103(k) of the Compact. The managers expect the Department to submit promptly a request to fund the balance of the $10,000,000 total for the Enjebi Trust Fund. Until that request is made and approved by Congress, funds provided in this Act shall not be distributed from the Enjebi Trust Fund. With regard to the Prior Service Benefits Trust Fund, the managers are aware that the exact amount needed to provide for these payments over time has not been determined, and that the amount provided may need to be adjusted in the future. In establishing this fund, the managers expect the Social Security Administration of the Trust Territory to determine who are the eligible participants, and then allow no further enrollment or eligibility in the program; and to establish reasonable terms and conditions for the future stream of payments, including any anticipated adjustments. The Secretary of the Interior shall approve the establishment of the Fund, prior to its initiation.

Amendment No. 137: Restores language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate and deletes language proposed by the Senate which would have provided all the Compact funding as a current appropriation, rather than establishing a permanent appropriation.

Amendment No. 138: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides a permanent appropriation for the Palau Compact funding, subject to enactment of the Palau Compact legislation.

Amendment No. 139: Provides that $60,719,000 of the fiscal year 1986 Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands appropriation shall be offset against the Compact funding, instead of $50,493,000 as proposed by the House and $62,947,000 as proposed by the Senate. Included in the offset are the annual grants to the FSM ($38,763,000), Marshall Islands ($10,940,000)), and Palau ($10,084,000), and the funds for satellite communications ($932,000).

With respect to the $250,000 provided in Public Law 99-190 in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands account for planning for a base camp on Eneu Island, the managers intend that the contractor for these funds shall be selected by the Bikini/Kili/Ejit Local Government Council subject to the approval of the Department of the Interior.

Amendment No. 140: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides that Kwajalien impact payments may be used to reimburse the Department of the Army.

RELATED AGENCIES

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FOREST SERVICE

Amendment No. 141: Appropriates $1,700,000 for construction as proposed by the Senate, instead of no funding as proposed by the House.

It is the understanding of the managers that the Forest Service has spent $949,000 for flood damage repair projects in the Monongahela NF, WV, and that $264,000 remains to be spent in fiscal year 1986. For the Parsons Laboratory, $104,000 has been spent and $162,000 remains to be spent. The managers intend funds for the remaining projects in these two areas, totalling $426,000, to be obligated during fiscal year 1986. The balance of the funds provided shall be spent for other required flood damage repair projects in the Jefferson NF and the George Washington NF, including the Brandywine Recreation Area.

The funds provided for the Parsons Laboratory are necessary for operation in fiscal year 1986, and do not imply any decision as to disposition of the laboratory in fiscal year 1987.

The Forest Service is requested to submit promptly to the Appropriations Committees a list of flood repair projects remaining to be funded in these four locations in fiscal year 1987.

Amendment No. 142: Strikes the word "bill" and inserts the word "Act" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 143: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS, FOREST SERVICE

SECTION 1. Provisions of 7 U.S.C. 147b shall apply to appropriations available to the Forest Service only to the extent that the proposed transfer is approved by the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations in compliance with the reprogramming procedures contained in House Report 97-942.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 144: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

SEC. 2. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Agriculture shall, within funds made available by this Act or any other appropriations Act, release on behalf of the United States the condition described in subsection (b) of this section with respect to the tract of land described in subsection (c) of this section: Provided, That—

(1) the State of Georgia, acting by and through the Georgia State Properties Commission, enters into an agreement with the Secretary of Agriculture stating that the State of Georgia will convey the described tract of land to Brantley County, Georgia, for consideration determined adequate by the Commission, and which consideration shall, if withdrawn from the account, be used exclusively for public purposes;

(2) the State of Georgia shall pay into the Treasury of the United States as miscellaneous receipts a sum of money which the Secretary of Agriculture deems is sufficient to reimburse the administrative costs of releasing the condition pursuant to this subsection; and

(3) the State of Georgia shall provide to the United States the fair market value of the described tract of land, as determined by the Secretary, either in cash or by exchange of lands, waters, or interest therein.

(b) The condition to be released pursuant to subsection (a) of this section is the condition found in that certain deed dated March 30, 1955, which conveys from the United States to the State of Georgia, Georgia Forestry Commission, certain real property in Ware and Brantley Counties, Georgia, and which deed was recorded on May 17, 1955, in the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Georgia, providing that the land conveyed be used for public purposes and that title to

said land revert to the United States if it is not used for public purposes.

(c) The parcel of land to which the release provided for in subsection (a) of this section is described as follows:

All that tract or parcel of land, situated, located and being in Land Lot No. 128 in the 9th Land District of Brantley County, Georgia, being 55.04 acres, more or less, and being more particularly described as follows: Beginning at the point where the centerline of the SCL Railroad tracks from Waycross to Brunswick intersects the centerline of that certain Brantley County paved road known as County Road No. 15, and thence N 08 degrees 54'00" W a distance of 97.72 feet to a point; thence, N 79 degrees 40'50" E a distance of 40.02 feet to a point; thence, N 79 degrees 40'50" E a distance of 260.03 feet to a point; thence, N 68 degrees 30'00" E a distance of 390.0 feet to a point, this point being the point or place of beginning of the tract to be released from the described condition; thence, N 13 degrees 15'00" W a distance of 701.15 feet to a point; thence, S 73 degrees 10'00" W a distance of 647.09 feet to a point; thence, N 17 degrees 13'50" W a distance of 304.91 feet to a point; thence, N 61 degrees 23'03" E a distance of 2452.76 feet to a point; thence, S 06 degrees 09'26" E a distance of 275.29 feet to a point; thence, S 07 degrees 17'36" E a distance of 442.26 feet to a point; thence, S 00 degree 30'41" E a distance of 183.67 feet to a point; thence, S 12 degrees 11'06" E a distance of 160.31 feet to a point; thence, S 05 degrees 13'46" E a distance of 390.62 feet to a point; thence, S 34 degrees 53'42" W a distance of 201.01 feet to a point; thence, S 75 degrees 01'09" W a distance of 1371.18 feet to a point; this point being the point or place of beginning of the tract.

For a more complete description of the tract, reference is hereby made to that certain plat prepared on August 4, 1985, by Harry Strickland, Brantley County Surveyor, entitled "Survey for Brantley County" which plat is on file with the Georgia State Properties Commission.

(d) Section 32(c) of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C 1011), shall not apply to the release provided for in subsection (a) of this section.

(e) The conveyance made pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall reserve to the United States all gas, oil, coal and other mineral deposits as may be found in the lands conveyed by this section.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment provides that the United States Government can clear title to 55 acres of land to be transferred to Brantley County, Georgia. The State shall provide to the United States the current fair market value, as determined by the Secretary, either in cash or by exchange of lands, water, or interest therein. The fair market value shall be determined by the Secretary through the normal appraisal process.

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Amendment No. 145: Disapproves all but $2,607,000 of a deferral of funds for fossil energy research and development not released as of the date of enactment of this Act, instead of $2,607,000 and those funds not released as of May 1, 1986 as proposed by the Senate, and $2,607,000 and those funds not released as of February 5, 1986 as proposed by the House.

The proposed language merely clarifies the managers' position that all deferred funds except for $2,607,000 are to be released as proposed originally by both the House and Senate.

Those funds remaining deferred include balances of $1,569,000 from prior year recoveries, $192,000 of unobligated balances, and $846,000 of section 515 deferrals.

NAVAL PETROLEUM AND OIL SHALE RESERVES

Amendment No. 146: Deletes approval of the deferral of $36,461,000 for the Naval petroleum and oil shale reserves which was proposed by the Senate. The House bill had no such provision. The funds are deferred now and no separate approval is required.

ENERGY CONSERVATION

Amendment No. 147: Disapproves all but $6,556,000 of a deferral of funds for energy conservation not released as of the date of enactment of this Act, instead of $6,556,000 and those funds not released as of May 1, 1986 as proposed by the Senate, and all funds not released as of March 12, 1986 as proposed by the House.

The proposed language clarifies the managers' position agreeing to the Senate position to release all funds except $6,556,000.

The funds remaining deferred are unobligated balances from fiscal year 1985.

STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE

Amendment No. 148: Strikes the word "bill" and inserts the word "Act" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 149: Disapproves the deferral of $577,534,000 for petroleum acquisition as proposed by the Senate instead of $315,000,000 as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 150: Strikes the word "bill" and inserts the word "Act" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 151: Deletes language, which was proposed by the Senate, that provides that the minimum fill rate for the Reserve be set by the fiscal year 1987 Budget Resolution.

Amendment No. 152: Deletes language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate providing a minimum fill rate of 100,000 barrels a day.

The managers agree that the Administration should fill the Reserve at a rate which will use fully the existing capacity, as well as that capacity which will be created by new leaching activity undertaken as a result of deferral disapprovals in this legislation. The managers expect the Administration to enter into oil purchase contracts taking advantage of existing low prices or to take advantage of opportunities to enter into extended contracts at low prices and at rates that will fill the capacity at a reasonable pace.

ALTERNATIVE FUELS PRODUCTION

Amendment No. 153: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which appropriates $1,020,360,322 for alternative fuels production. No appropriation was proposed by the House. The appropriation would repay notes issued by the Secretary of Energy to the Secretary of the Treasury to repay the Federal Financing Bank for the defaulted debt on the Great Plains coal gasificatoin plant. No outlay of funds is involved.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

INDIAN HEALTH SERVICES

Amendment No. 154: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

$13,500,000: Provided, That $1,530,000 shall not become available for obligation until September 30, 1986: Provided further, That funds made available to tribes and tribal organizations through grants and contracts authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975 (88 Stat. 2203; 25 U.S.C. 450), shall remain available until September 30, 1987.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The increase above the amount provided by the Senate consists of $7,700,000 for hospitals and clinics and $4,000,000 for contract health services.

The managers agree that the management fellowship program shall be developed jointly by the Indian Health Service and the Association of University Programs in Health Administration.

Amendment No. 155: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

INDIAN HEALTH FACILITIES

DEFERRAL

Of the funds previously appropriated under this head, $11,665,000 shall not become available for obligation until October 1, 1986.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The managers agree that the $2,080,000 not approved for deferral shall be reprogrammed as follows: $600,000 for Chinle, AZ housing; $600,000 for Kanakanak, AK hospital; $600,000 for Sacaton, AZ hospital; and $280,000 for Tsaile, AZ housing.

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

NATIONAL GALLERY OF ART

Amendment No. 156: Transfers $36,000 for salaries and expenses instead of $136,000 as proposed by the House and no funds as proposed by the Senate.

The amendment provides $36,000 for salaries for five curators for the balance of the fiscal year. No funds have been included for equipment.

CHAPTER VIII

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

HEALTH RESOURCES AND SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Amendment No. 157: Changes chapter number as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 158: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which inserts a new heading.

Amendment No. 159: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede

and concur in the amendment of the Senate. This amendment appropriates $2,000,000 to remain available until September 30, 1987 to support demonstration grants authorized by Section 1910 of the Public Health Service Act to improve emergency medical services for children. The House bill included no similar provision.

The conferees are agreed that all applications shall be subject to the normal peer review procedures of the Health Resources and Services Administration and that grants should be awarded competitively.

Amendment No. 160: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will move to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate. This language requires the Department of Health and Human Services to renew grants and contracts under title XV of the Public Health Service Act into FY 1987 if FY 1986 carryover balances are available. The House bill included no similar provision.

Section 124 of the FY 1986 Continuing Resolution, P.L. 99-190, prohibits the Department of Health and Human Services from terminating grants or contracts under title XV of the Public Health Service Act prior to August 15, 1986 because of a failure to reauthorize the health planning program. The language agreed to is not intended to change section 124 but clarifies that any health planning funds not expended during FY 1986 could be carried over into FY 1987 and used to fund close-out costs should the program not be reauthorized.

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH

Amendment No. 161: Appropriates $6,000,000 as proposed by the House for grants for Cancer Research Centers. The Senate bill contained no similar provision.

Amendment No. 162: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, amended to read as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert the following:

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Funds made available for fiscal year 1986 and hereafter to the Warren G. Magnuson Clinical Center of the National Institutes of Health shall be available for payment of nurses at the rates of pay and with schedule options and benefits authorized for the Veterans Administration pursuant to 38 U.S.C. 4107.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SERVICES

COMMUNITY SERVICES BLOCK GRANT

Amendment No. 163: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, amended to read as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert the following:

OFFICE OF COMMUNITY SERVICES

COMMUNITY SERVICES BLOCK GRANT

SEC. 1. (a) The Administrator of General Services shall assign the property described in subsection (e) to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for transfer of such property in accordance with this section to the District of Columbia for use as a shelter for homeless individuals in the District of Columbia.

(b) Immediately after the assignment of such property pursuant to subsection (a), the Secretary of Health and Human Services shall transfer the title to such property without cost of the District of Columbia for use as a shelter for homeless individuals.

(c) The deed of conveyance for the property described in subsection (e) shall provide that, if the District of Columbia sells, leases, or otherwise transfers such property to any other person or agency, a fraction of the proceeds of such sale, lease, or transfer (as determined under subsection (d)) may be retained by the District of Columbia for use in programs providing shelter and related services for homeless individuals in the District of Columbia and the remainder of such proceeds shall be paid to the Secretary of the Treasury and deposited as miscellaneous receipts of the United States.

Any sale, lease, or other transfer pursuant to this subsection shall be made after public advertising for bids or by other means designed to secure full and open competition.

(d) The fraction of such proceeds which may be retained by the District of Columbia for use in programs providing shelter and related services for homeless individuals in the District of Columbia shall be determined by dividing—

(1) the number of months that such property is used as a shelter for homeless individuals in the District of Columbia pursuant to this section prior to such sale, lease, or transfer; by

(2) 120,

except that such fraction shall not be greater than one.

(e) The property to which this section applies is the property located at 425 Second Street, Northwest, in the District of Columbia, more fully described as follows:

All that parcel situated in the Northwest quadrant of the City of Washington, District of Columbia, and being a portion of District of Columbia Square Number 571, containing in their entirety former lots numbered 9 through 18, inclusive, and 22 through 26, inclusive, as recorded in Liber B, Folio 160 of the Records of the Office of the Surveyor for the District of Columbia, and lots 45 through 51 inclusive, as recorded in Liber 19, Folio 118 of the Records of the Office of the Surveyor for the District of Columbia; such land now known for purposes of assessment as Lot 820, and containing 1.16 acres of land, more or less; and more particularly described in a deed between the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the United States of America, dated July 30, 1947, and recorded in Liber 8761, Folio 79 of the Land Records of the District of Columbia.

SEC. 2. For making a grant to the District of Columbia upon the completion of the conveyance to the District of Columbia of the property located at 425 Second Street, Northwest, in the District of Columbia, in accordance with section 1 and upon the submission of a request to the Office of Community Services, Department of Health and Human Services, by the District of Columbia, $1,500,000 for the repair and renovation of such property for use as a shelter for the homeless.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees have provided an additional $1,500,000 to the Office of Community Services for the shelter for the homeless in the District of Columbia which together with funds already available provide a total of $6,500,000 for the shelter. It is not the intent of the conferees that funds provided in this Act be used to replace funds that the Administration is redirecting for the shelter renovation and repair.

Along with enabling transfer of title language provided in this Act, the conferees direct that these funds be spent immediately in order that all necessary repairs be made at the facility prior to the onset of cold weather months.

The conferees are agreed that attention shall be given to providing or promoting housing needs for people as provided in the March 1986 report to the Committees on Appropriations by the Federal Emergency Management Agency pursuant to P.L. 99-88 titled "Homelessness: The Reported Condition of Street People and Other Disadvantaged People in Cities and Counties Throughout the Nation."

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

IMPACT AID

Amendment No. 164: Restores amount and language in the House bill providing $20,000,000 to remain available until expended for disaster assistance to local schools for repair or replacement of facilities damaged by natural disasters.

Amendment No. 165: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment which prevents the Department of Education from implementing new regulations after March 31, 1986, insofar as the regulations pertain to fiscal year 1986.

Amendment No. 166: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which pertains to heavily impacted school districts to ensure that calculations under section 3(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 81-874 are based on actual payments to school districts rather than entitlements.

It is the intention of the conferees that in the administration of funds under Section 3(d)(2)(B) of Public Law 81-874, payments for the fiscal year 1986 should be determined according to actual payments made to the eligible districts under sections (a) and (b) instead of the district's entitlement under basic law. The Secretary should implement this provision with all possible speed.

Amendment No. 167: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which requires the Department of Education to follow State law in counting kindergarten children for the purpose of impact aid payments.

Amendment No. 168: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert the following:

Effective on October 1, 1980, section 3(d)(3) of the Act of September 30, 1950 (Public Law 874, Eighty-first Congress) is amended by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D), and by adding after subparagraph (B) the following new subparagraph:

"(C) The local contribution rate for a local educational agency shall include current expenditures from that portion of a real property tax required to be levied, collected, and distributed to local educational agencies by country governments pursuant to state law where the remainder of such real property tax is transferred to the State."

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Amendment No. 169: Delete heading proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 170: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment which directs the Secretary of Education to accept an application from Preston County Board of Education, West Virginia, for disaster assistance.

Amendment No. 171: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment which inserts language to relieve the Hays-Lodge Pole School District No. 509 in Hays, Montana, of liability to repay to the United States interest on funds awarded to the school district for a construction project initiated in 1975.

REHABILITATION SERVICES AND HANDICAPPED RESEARCH

Amendment No. 172: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate amended to read as follows:

In lieu of matter proposed by said amendment insert the following:

REHABILITATION SERVICES AND HANDICAPPED RESEARCH

From the amounts appropriated to carry out the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, $27,945,000 shall be made available for special demonstration projects for the severely disabled under section 311: Provided, That $8,613,000 shall be used for supported employment demonstrations.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

STUDENT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 173: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment which appropriates $146,000,000 for the Pell Grant Program. The House bill includes no funds for this purpose.

RELATED AGENCIES

SOLDIERS' AND AIRMEN'S HOME

OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE

(TRANSFER OF FUNDS)

Amendment No. 174: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment which authorizes the transfer of up to $1,241,000 from the capital outlay account at the Home to the operation and maintenance account.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

Amendment No. 175: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment amended to read as follows:

Restore the matter stricken by said amendment amended to read as follows:

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR

ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISION

No Job Corps Center operating under part B of title IV of the Job Training Partnership Act shall be closed prior to July 1, 1987.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees are aware that the Labor Department has recently completed an evaluation of all 106 of the Nation's Job Corps Centers indicating wide disparities in cost and effectiveness. It is not the conferees' intent to indefinitely prohibit the closing of Job Corps Centers for any reason. The conferees recognize, however, that there may be a need to further perfect the newly developed Labor Department rating system, and therefore have recommended a temporary moratorium on the planned closing of Job Corps Centers, until at least July 1, 1987. The Employment and Training Administration is directed to continue recruitment and referral of youth to all Job Corps centers, in order to maintain average enrollments at current levels.

CHAPTER IX

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

SENATE

Amendment No. 176: Reported in technical disagreement. Inasmuch as the amendment relates solely to the Senate, and in accord with long practice under which each body determines its own housekeeping requirements and the other concurs without intervention, the managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment with an amendment as requested by the Senate conferees as follows:

"Delete the second full sentence on page 66 of the Senate engrossed amendments."

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate. The amendment is a technical correction which deletes a redundant sentence.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SALARIES, OFFICERS, AND EMPLOYEES

Amendent No. 177: Appropriates $500,000 for the Office of the Sergeant at Arms, as proposed by the Senate. These funds are for U.S. Capitol Police personnel assigned to the House rolls and are provided to avoid furloughs of current, on-board personnel and to allow existing vacancies to be filled.

CONTINGENT EXPENSES OF THE HOUSE

SPECIAL AND SELECT STANDING COMMITTEES

Amendment No. 178: Appropriates $350,000 for the House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct as proposed by the House.

JOINT ITEMS

CAPITOL POLICE

CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

Amendment No. 179: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

CAPITOL POLICE

CAPITOL POLICE BOARD

For an additional amount for the "Capitol Police Board", $13,000,000, to remain available until expended, to implement an improved security plan for the United States Capitol, after such plan shall have been approved by the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, the Senate Committee on Appropriations, the House Committee on Appropriations, the House Committee on Public Works and Transportation, and the Committee on House Administration: Provided, That upon approval of the House and Senate Committees and Appropriations, such Board is authorized to transfer to the Architect of the Capitol so much of such funds as may be necessary to enable the Architect of the Capitol to carry out appropriate projects to implement such plan, and the Architect of the Capitol is authorized to obligate and expend the funds so transferred to him to carry out contracts entered into without regard to section 3709 of the Revised Statutes, as amended: Provided further, That before any such transfer of funds to the Architect of the Capitol takes place, the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations shall review and approve detailed documentation describing the scope, cost and construction schedule of the work to be accomplished by the transfer to funds.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The funds are provided for the implementation of a plan to improve the security of the Capitol and the Senate and House office buildings, with the stipulation that these funds will not be made available for obligation until the appropriate committees of Congress have considered and approved a final plan. In presenting such plan, the Capitol Police Board is directed to arrange a schedule for Committee approvals that is compatible with the normal authorization—first, appropriation—last, sequence. The amendment contains the normal procedure for transferring project funds from the Capitol Police Board to the Architect of the Capitol to carry out appropriate projects to implement such plan, with the approval of the Committees on Appropriations.

ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

Amendment No. 180: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter reposed by said amendment, insert the following:

OFFICE OF THE ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITOL

SALARIES

For an additional amount for "Office of the Architect of the Capitol, Salaries", $250,000, to remain available until expended: Provided, That these funds shall be transferred to the appropriation "Capitol Grounds", and the Architect of the Capitol is authorized to obligate and expend funds so transferred only for the detailed design and cost estimates associated with the construction aspects of the congressional joint leadership proposal to improve security of the Capitol and the House and Senate office buildings.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The amendment provides that the funds for the design and cost estimates associated with the construction aspects of the Capitol security plan are to be transferred to the "Capitol grounds" appropriation since contractual services may be required.

WEST CENTRAL FRONT OF THE CAPITOL

Amendment No. 181: Deletes rescission proposed by the Senate.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

SALARIES AND EXPENSES

Amendment No. 182: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede

and concur in the Senate amendment with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the first sum named in said amendment, interest the following: *"$867,000"*

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The sum provided includes $500,000 to remain available until expended for the acquisition of books and other library materials, $120,000 for cataloging, $135,000 for deck attendants, and $112,000 for reading room personnel. These funds are sufficient to take care of the needs encompassed by the Senate floor amendment. The conferees direct that $247,000 of these funds be used to reopen the Library of Congress during evening and weekend hours. Since many users of Library facilities and material find it inconvenient or impossible to visit the collections during the current daytime schedule, the Librarian of Congress should arrange hours of operations to a more suitable schedule. If these funds are insufficient for that purpose the Library is directed to use other available funds.

CHAPTER X
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

COAST GUARD

OPERATING EXPENSES

Amendment No. 183: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate providing $10,400,000 by transfer.

The conference are concerned that, despite the transfer of $15,000,000 pursuant to section 1421 of the Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1986, Coast Guard personnel are not deployed as intended on Navy ships in drug interdiction areas. In fact, the number of personnel actually deployed on Navy ships ranged from 0 to 10 between March 5, 1986, and April 16, 1986. The conferees direct the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Transportation to report to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations by July 4, 1986, regarding: (1) the number of naval vessels that have been operating in drug interdiction areas since section 1421 was enacted; (2) the number of Coast Guard personnel deployed on those vessels during the past six months along with associated personnel costs; (3) plans for deploying Coast Guard personnel on naval vessels (including associated costs) for the remainder of the fiscal year; and (4) the feasibility, cost, and drug interdiction implications of deployments at the 100, 200, 300, 400, and 500 person levels for the remainder of this fiscal year.

ACQUISITION, CONSTRUCTION, AND IMPROVEMENTS

Amendment No. 184: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment, insert the following:

ACQUISITION, CONSTRUCTION, AND IMPROVEMENTS

Out of available funds, the Coast Guard shall make available not more than $750,000 for maintenance, sealing and preservation of lighthouses in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

Out of available funds, the Coast Guard is directed to make available up to $750,000 for the maintenance, sealing and preservation of the following lighthouses in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts: Minots Ledge Lighthouse, East Chop Lighthouse, Marblehead Lighthouse, Boston Lighthouse, The Graves Lighthouse, and Thachers Island (North) Lighthouse.

The conferees have agreed to the following distribution of the fiscal year 1986 Acquisition, construction, and improvements appropriation:

Vessels	$70,300,000
Aircraft	38,000,000
Command, control and communications	7,400,000
Shore facilities and navigation aids	63,850,000
Support	18,006,000
Transfer to operating expenses	10,400,000
Total	207,956,000

With available funds, the conferees direct the Coast Guard to construct and equip a single-helicopter air facility at Newport, Oregon, including construction of the facility at Newport and necessary renovation of the parent air station at Astoria, stationing of two HH-65A helicopters, aircraft sparing and initial provisioning, and ground support equipment. The conferees expect any adjustments required to provide funding for this facility to be accomplished through the normal reprogramming process.

The conferees recognize that the Coast Guard's fiscal year 1987 acquisition, construction, and improvements budget estimate assumes the availability of $190,200,000 from the fiscal year 1986 appropriation for the coastal defense augmentation fund. However, no deferral of the coastal defense augmentation fund has been requested to make these funds available for the acquisition, construction, and improvements program and there has been no indication from the Department of Defense that such a request will be proposed. Therefore, the conferees expect the Secretary of Transportation to submit a revised budget request for fiscal year 1987 acquisition, construction, and improvements spending that will meet all existing fiscal year 1987 contractual requirements. Until such a revised request is submitted, the conferees direct the Coast Guard to reserve sufficient funds to meet the agency's fiscal year 1987 contractual requirements.

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

OPERATIONS

Amendment No. 185: Conforms heading.

Amendment No. 186: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken and inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

$84,250,000, of which $2,000,000 shall be derived by transfer from "Coast Guard, Retired pay", and $2,250,000 shall be derived by transfer from "Coast Guard, Research, development, test, and evaluation": Provided, That, if by July 15, 1986, the Secretary of Transportation and the appropriate governmental authorities of Dade County, Florida, have not reached agreement on the execution of a full funding contract for the project identified in Section 320 of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, the memorandum of understanding submitted by the Metro-Dade Transportation Administration to the Urban Mass Transportation Administration on June 6, 1986, shall be deemed approved by the Secretary and shall be binding on the Department of Transportation and Metropolitan Dade County upon acceptance by the appropriate Dade County governmental authorities: Provided further, That such memorandum of understanding shall be deemed approved by the Secretary notwithstanding 42 U.S.C. Sections 4321 through 4335 inclusive, and applicable regulations

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conferees have included bill language regarding the negotiations called for in section 320 of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, on the north and south legs of the downtown component of Metrorail in Dade County, Florida. The language provides that unless agreement on the execution of a full funding contract is reached by July 15, 1986, the June 6, 1986, memorandum of understanding submitted by the Metro-Dade Transportation Administration to the Urban Mass Transportation Administration is deemed approved. The language further waives provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)—42 U.S.C. sections 4321 through 4335 inclusive—only with regard to the approval of the memorandum of understanding. This reflects the conferees' belief that approval of the memorandum of understanding does not constitute a "major federal action".

The conferees included this language because the negotiations were suspended at the end of the 90-day period specified in section 320 and no agreement has been reached. The conferees intend this limited waiver to resolve the issue raised by the Department of Transportation General Counsel in a memorandum of April 9, 1986, to the UMTA Administrator and to remove what the Department states is a principal procedural barrier to approving any agreement. It should be noted that the conferees have no intention of avoiding environmental review of the project, and that Dade County is proceeding with an environmental impact statement on an accelerated schedule.

The conferees understand that negotiations on the minimum operable segment, MOS-1, of the downtown Los Angeles to San Fernando Valley Metro Rail project are continuing. With regard to this project, the conferees reiterate the language contained in section 320 of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1986, and the accompanying statement of the managers. The conferees expect the Secretary and the Southern California Rapid Transit District to continue negotiations and to reach agreement as contemplated by section 320.

The Federal Aviation Administration is directed to implement the guidance included in Senate Report 98-570 found under the heading Federal Aviation Administration, Operations, within 90 days of enactment of this Act.

Amendment No. 187: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter inserted by said amendment, insert the following:

: Provided further, That, at a minimum, the air traffic control on-board employment level shall be 14,480 by September 30, 1986.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

In establishing a minimum air traffic control staffing level, the conferees do not intend that the FAA be limited to the 14,480 level. The conferees reiterate the language regarding air traffic controller staffing contained in House report 99-450.

RESEARCH, ENGINEERING, AND DEVELOPMENT

AIRPORT AND AIRWAY TRUST FUND

Amendment No. 188: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate providing $72,220,000 by transfer.

FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION

FEDERAL-AID HIGHWAYS

(HIGHWAY TRUST FUND)

Amendment No. 189: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate authorizing the expenditure of $5,000,000 from the Emergency Relief Fund established by section 125 of title 23 for certain activities in the State of Utah.

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION

REDEEMABLE PREFERENCE SHARES

Amendment No. 190: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate clarifying the Secretary of Transportation's authority to issue fund anticipation notes, and to expend proceeds from the sale of such notes.

URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION

FORMULA GRANTS

Amendment No. 191: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate clarifying the distribution of formula grant funds to urbanized areas that became urbanized areas for the first time under the 1980 census.

RELATED AGENCY

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

OPERATING EXPENSES

Amendment No. 192: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

Restore the matter stricken, amended to read as follows:

RELATED AGENCY

PANAMA CANAL COMMISSION

OPERATING EXPENSES

For an additional amount for "Panama Canal Commission, Operating Expenses", $18,300,000, of which $17,181,000 may be available either for operating expenses or for vessel accident claims as authorized by Public Law 99-209, and $1,119,000 shall be available for payment to the Republic of Panama, pursuant to article XIII, paragraph 4(c) of the Panama Canal Treaty of 1977.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

The conference agreement includes $18,300,000 for Panama Canal operating expenses. Of this amount, $17,181,000 may either be applied to operations requirements in excess of available appropriations, or to vessel accident claims. In the event legislation is enacted exempting the Commission from the March 1, 1986, fund sequester, the conferees expect this additional amount will only be available for audited, negotiated damage claims. In addition, $1,119,000 is available for payment to the Republic of Panama under the terms of the 1977 Treaty.

CHAPTER XI

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Amendment No. 193: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which would have rescinded $912,000 for Departmental Offices.

Amendment No. 194: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides that $6,000,000 previously appropriated to the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center for dormitory construction will remain available until expended.

Amendment No. 195: Appropriates $500,000 for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 196: Inserts the word *"SECTION"* as proposed by the Senate instead of the word "Section" as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 197: Inserts the abbreviation *"SEC."* as proposed by the Senate instead of the word "Section" as proposed by the House.

Amendment No. 198: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which mandates that the Internal Revenue Service provide certain data processing support to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.

Amendment No. 199: Reported in disagreement.

Amendment No. 200: Deletes a provision proposed by the Senate which would have amended the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 regarding certain insolvent taxpayers.

Amendment No. 201: Restores a provision inserted by the House and deleted by the Senate regarding the personnel level of the U.S. Customs Service.

Amendment No. 202: Appropriates $3,225,000 for the operation and maintenance of the air interdiction program of the U.S. Customs Service as proposed by the House.

U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

Amendment No. 203: Deletes a center heading proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 204: Deletes a provision proposed by the Senate pertaining to the naming of a Post Office building in South Carolina. The conferees are agreed, however, in urging the Postmaster General to name this post office building the "Solomon Blatt, Sr., Post Office Building" as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 205: Deletes a provision proposed by the Senate. The conferees are concerned that an action taken in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1985 raising postage rates for rural newspapers will have a devastating impact on these papers. Because of the serious adverse impact on these newspapers, the conferees urge the authorizing committees to take appropriate action at the earliest possible date to alleviate this problem.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

Amendment No. 206: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which makes available additional funding for the construction of a new Post Office and Courthouse Annex in Charleston, South Carolina.

Amendment No. 207: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate increasing the limitation on expenses of transportation audit contracts and contract administration in General Management and Administration.

Amendment No. 208: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in an Administrative provision which provides for the transfer of a certain parcel of federal land in New Mexico to the city of Santa Fe, New Mexico.

FEDERAL RETIREMENT THRIFT INVESTMENT BOARD

Amendment No. 209: Appropriates $250,000 for salaries and expenses as proposed by the Senate.

OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Amendment No. 210: Provides for official reception and representation expenses of $1,000 instead of $2,500 as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 211: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which transfers $2,000,000 from the Civil Service Retirement and Disability Fund to the Office of Personnel Management.

TITLE II

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Amendment No. 212: Deletes language proposed by the House and stricken by the Senate which would have repealed section 1013 of the Budget and Impoundment Control Act. This action is being taken based on the assurance of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget that no policy deferrals will be proposed by the Administration for the balance of the calendar year. Such action will allow the courts additional time to address this issue and for the Congress to deal with the issue in future legislation.

Amendment No. 213: Changes section number as proposed by the Senate.

Amendment No. 214: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides that the percentage reduction required for payments made from various receipt accounts by Public Law 99-177 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings) shall be the same as required for all nondefense accounts. The House-passed bill has no such provision.

The managers take this section without prejudice to court cases on the provisions of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation.

Amendment No. 215: Deletes the Senate provision directing the Secretary of the Treasury to invest moneys payable to States and other localities from programs administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior and sequestered pursuant to Section 252 of Public Law 99-177 (Gramm-Rudman-Hollings), but not cancelled under section 256(a)(2) of that Act, in interest-bearing debt instruments, such interest to be payable along with the reserved funds when such funds are released for payment.

The House-passed bill had no similar provision.

The managers agree that the sequestered funds should be released for payment within 30 days after the end of the fiscal year, so that the affected States and localities may use the funds without further delay.

INDIRECT COST OF RESEARCH

Amendment No. 216: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the Senate amendment, with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter stricken by said amendment insert the following:

SEC. 203. None of the funds in this Act, or any other Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1986, may be used to implement changes to OMB Circular A-21 made subsequent to February 11, 1986: Provided, That this provision shall expire 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

It is the conferees' intention that the OMB should work with the universities to resolve this issue within the time provided.

MEDICARE CAPITAL COSTS

Amendment No. 217: Restores language inserted by the House but deleted by the Senate which extends from September 30, 1986 until September 30, 1987 the moratorium period during which the Department of Health and Human Services is prohibited from including the cost of capital in the Medicare prospective payment system.

COMPACT OF FREE ASSOCIATION

Amendment No. 218: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate with an amendment as follows:

In lieu of the matter proposed by said amendment insert the following:

SEC. 207. Notwithstanding section 514 of Public Law 99-178, amounts appropriated by that Act for Federal financial assistance to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands shall be available, as would have been available had the Compact of Free Association Act (Public Law 99-239) not been enacted, until alternative funding is available under the terms of the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 (Public Law 99-239). Thereafter, except insofar as the Compact of Free Association Act otherwise provides, such amounts shall be available only for the Republic of Palau, but only in amounts that such Republic would have received had the Compact of Free Association Act of 1985 not been enacted.

The managers on the part of the Senate will move to concur in the amendment of the House to the amendment of the Senate.

SERVICE CONTRACT ACT

Amendment No. 219: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which would have amended section 7 of the Service Contract Act of 1965.

POWER MARKETING ADMINISTRATIONS

Amendment No. 220: Deletes language proposed by the House and inserts language proposed by the Senate restricting the soliciting of proposals, preparing or reviewing studies, or drafting proposals designed to transfer the Federal Power Marketing Administrations and the Tennessee Valley Authority out of Federal control.

COMPETITION WITH U.S. FARM PRODUCERS

GENERAL PROVISION—SEC. 209

Amendment No. 221: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate which provides bill language prohibiting the use of U.S. bilateral assistance for programs that would be in competition with U.S. farm producers.

The conferees have agreed to include Section 209 recommended by the Senate concerning commodity exports by developing countries, however the conferees agree that this language is only intended to apply to: (1) projects or activities that are specifically and principally designed to increase agricultural exports in developing countries that can reasonably be expected to cause substantial injury to the United States exporters; (2) the production of such agricultural commodities for export that are deemed to be in direct competition with U.S. agricultural exports.

Amendment No. 222: Reported in technical disagreement. The managers on the part of the House will offer a motion to recede and concur in the amendment of the Senate. The conferees agree to language proposed by the Senate dealing with the applicability of New York City Local Law 19 regulating city contractors who do business with companies that sell goods or services that originate in South Africa. The Senate amendment would allow New York City to receive its fiscal year 1986 grant awards previously approved by law. Except as to Interstate Substitute Transfer of funds for highways, the term contract shall include a contract for which the plans, specifications, or a proposed contract have been submitted for approval to the federal government by October 1, 1986.

TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE

Amendment No. 223: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which would amend the Trade Act of 1974.

Amendment No. 224: Deletes language proposed by the Senate which amends Section 3216(c) of title 39, United States Code. Despite a 1600% increase in the volume of incoming mail in recent years which has been accompanied by an approximate increase of 200% in mail sent out by the Members and Committees of Congress, the conferees note that there is concern regarding the current status of the franked mail appropriation level. While significant reductions in the real cost of operating the Legislative Branch have compensated for the increase in mail fees and volume, each body of Congress is making an effort to deal with the problem. The Senate calculated the amount remaining for Congressional mail and has made a mail allowance allocation to each Senator for the balance of fiscal year 1986. A bipartisan House leadership group has instituted a widespread and comprehensive program of voluntary restraint. By all accounts, both programs are working; postal officials indicate that outgoing mail volume has dropped significantly. In addition, the House, under the leadership of an ad hoc task force appointed by the Speaker and Minority Leader, attempted to establish additional reforms in the rules that govern volume mailing together with the supplemental appropriation necessary to make full payment of the postal fees. There is clearly willingness in both House and Senate to address the mail question. Since a feasible and constructive solution will require a bicameral, bipartisan agreement, the conferees recommend that the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House and the Majority and Minority Leaders of the Senate appoint a temporary joint committee or commission comprised of Members of each body to work in consultation with the Postal Rate Commission and the Postmaster General to develop a balanced proposal that will recognize the responsibility of Members of Congress to be responsive and informative to their constituencies as well as applying reasonable restraints on the use of franked mail. Such committee or commission should report its findings and recommendations to both Houses and to the committees of jurisdiction so that appropriate changes in the studies, rules, or regulations governing the respective bodies can be made effective with the 100th Congress.

CONFERENCE TOTAL—WITH COMPARISONS

The total new budget (obligational) authority for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987 recommended by the Committee of Conference, with comparisons to the fiscal year 1986 budget estimates, and the House and Senate bills for 1986 follow:

Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority, fiscal year 1986.[1]	$7,721,965,000
House bill, fiscal year 1986 (net)	1,679,485,000
Senate bill, fiscal year 1986 (net)	3,874,472,000
Conference agreement:	
Fiscal year 1986 (net)	1,698,120,000
Fiscal year 1987 (net)	−5,942,000,000
Consisting of:	
Appropriations for FY 1987	(100,000,000)
Rescission in FY 1987	(−6,042,000,000)
Conference agreement compared with:	
Budget estimates of new (obligational) authority: Fiscal year 1986	−6,023,845,000
House bill:	
Fiscal year 1986	+18,635,000
Fiscal year 1987	−5,942,000,000
Senate bill:	
Fiscal year 1986	−2,176,352,000
Fiscal year 1987	−5,942,000,000

[1] Includes $5,587,519,000 of budget estimates not considered by the House.

JAMIE L. WHITTEN,
EDWARD P. BOLAND,
WILLIAM H. NATCHER,
NEAL SMITH,
SIDNEY R. YATES,
DAVE OBEY,
EDWARD R. ROYBAL,
TOM BEVILL,
BILL CHAPPELL,
WILLIAM LEHMAN,
VIC FAZIO,
SILVIO O. CONTE,
(except for amendment No. 23),
JOSEPH M. MCDADE,
JOHN T. MYERS,
LARRY COUGHLIN,
(except for amendment No. 23),

JACK KEMP,
RALPH REGULA,
Managers on the Part of the House.

MARK O. HATFIELD,
TED STEVENS,
LOWELL P. WEICKER, Jr.,
JAMES A. MCCLURE,
JAKE GARN,
THAD COCHRAN,
MARK ANDREWS,
JAMES ABDNOR,
(except for amendment No. 224),
BOB KASTEN,
ALPHONSE D'AMATO,
WARREN B. RUDMAN,
JOHN C. STENNIS,
ROBERT C. BYRD,
DANIEL K. INOUYE,
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS,
LAWTON CHILES,
J. BENNETT JOHNSON,
(except for amendment No. 223),
QUENTIN N. BURDICK,
PAT LEAHY,
DENNIS DECONCINI,
Managers on the Part of the Senate.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. DENNY SMITH (at the request of Mr. MICHEL), for today from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m., on account of a necessary absence.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. LIGHTFOOT) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. BARTON of Texas, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GINGRICH, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. DANNEMEYER, for 60 minutes today, June 23, and June 24.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. RAY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. STARK, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. ANNUNZIO, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PANETTA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DE LA GARZA, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LAFALCE, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LEVINE of California, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. STRATTON, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. RAY, for 5 minutes, on June 24.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. HUGHES, at the conclusion of general debate on House Concurrent Resolution 350, in the Committee of the Whole, today.

Mr. SEIBERLING, and to include extraneous material, in three instances during debate in the Committee of the Whole, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. LIGHTFOOT) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. KOLBE in two instances.
Mr. GREEN in two instances.
Mr. GRADISON.
Mr. GUNDERSON in two instances.
Mr. PETRI.
Mr. MCCAIN.
Mr. GEKAS in two instances.
Mr. MILLER of Ohio in two instances.
Mr. GILMAN in three instances.
Mr. BROOMFIELD.
Mr. YOUNG of Alaska.
Mr. MCGRATH.
Mr. FIELDS in three instances.
Mr. LIVINGSTON.
Mr. SCHUETTE.
Mr. SMITH of New Jersey.
Mr. MCCOLLUM.
Mr. CHAPPIE.
Mr. LUJAN.
Mr. WORTLEY.
Mr. BOULTER.
Mr. PORTER.
Mr. SHAW.
Mr. HUNTER.
Mr. COATS.
Mr. LIGHTFOOT.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. GONZALEZ) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. LIPINSKI.
Mr. SMITH of Florida in five instances.
Mr. PEASE.
Mr. LEVINE of California.
Mr. STUDDS.
Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii.
Mr. YATRON.
Mr. DINGELL.
Mr. DE LA GARZA.
Mr. SABO in two instances.
Mr. KOLTER.
Mr. FLORIO.
Mr. SWIFT.
Mr. LOWRY of Washington.
Mr. RANGEL.
Mr. LEHMAN of Florida.
Mr. STOKES.
Mr. EDGAR.
Mr. COELHO.
Mr. WAXMAN.
Mr. CLAY.
Mr. BRYANT.
Mr. MATSUI in two instances.
Mr. LELAND.
Mr. WOLPE.
Mr. HUBBARD.
Mr. ROYBAL.
Mr. ECKART of Ohio.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION REFERRED

A joint resolution of the Senate of the following title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S.J. Res. 365. Joint Resolution welcoming the Afghan Alliance; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

SENATE ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 1106. An act to provide for the use and distribution of funds appropriated in satisfaction of judgments awarded to the Saginaw Chippewa Tribe of Michigan in dockets numbered 57, 59, and 13E of the Indian Claims Commission and docket numbered 13F of the U.S. Claims Court, and for other purposes.

JOINT RESOLUTION PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. ANNUNZIO, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on the following day present to the President, for his approval, a joint resolution of the House of the following title:

On June 17, 1986:

H.J. Res. 131. Joint resolution to designate the week beginning June 15, 1986, as "National Safety in the Workplace Week."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 6 o'clock and 17 minutes p.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Monday, June 23, 1986, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

3755. A communication from the President of the United States, transmitting a report containing projections and comparisons of United States and Soviet weapons dismantlements to not undercut existing strategic arms control agreements, pursuant to Public Law 99-145, section 1001(b) (99 Stat. 705); to the Committee on Armed Services.

3756. A letter from the Acting Secretary of Agriculture, transmitting a copy of draft legislation to repeal title V of the Housing Act of 1949; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

3757. A letter from the Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, transmitting the 72d annual report of the Board of Governors, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. 247; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

3758. A letter from the Secretary of Education, transmitting a copy of the Final Regulations for Bilingual Education: General Provisions; basic programs (programs of transitional bilingual education, programs of developmental bilingual education, and special alternative instructional programs); Family English Literacy Program; Special Populations Program; Program for the Development of Instructional Materials; Edu-

cational Personnel Training Program; training development, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. 1232(d)(1); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

3759. A letter from the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of Justice, transmitting the 1985 annual report describing the activities and operations of the Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 529; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. DE LA GARZA: Committee on Agriculture. H.R. 2436. A bill to establish a coordinated National Nutrition Monitoring and Related Research Program, and a comprehensive plan for the assessment of the nutritional and dietary status of the U.S. population and the nutritional quality of the U.S. food supply, with provision for the conduct of scientific research and development in support of such program and plan; with an amendment (Rept. 99-481, Pt. 2). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. KASTENMEIER: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 4952. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to the interception of certain communications, other forms of surveillance, and for other purposes; with an amendment (Rept. 99-647). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HEFNER: Committee on Appropriations. H.R. 5052. A bill making appropriations for miiitary construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1987, and for other purposes. (Rept. 99-648). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. WHITTEN: Committee of conference. Conference report on H.R. 4515 (Rept. 99-649). Ordered to be printed.

SUBSEQUENT ACTION ON REPORTED BILLS SEQUENTIALLY REFERRED

Under clause 5 of rule X, the following action was taken by the Speaker:

H.R. 4260. The Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union discharged and referred to the Committees on Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Foreign Affairs, Science and Technology, Veterans' Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, for a period ending not later than August 1, 1986, for consideration of such provisions of the bill and amendment as fall within the jurisdictions of those committees under clause 1 (c), (h), (i), (r), and (u) of rule X and rule XLVIII, respectively.

H.R. 4354. The Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union discharged, and referred to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service for a period ending not later than July 25, 1986, for consideration of such provisions of section 11 of the amendment recommended by the Committee on Science and Technology as fall within that committee's jurisdiction pursuant to clause 1(o), rule X.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. HEFNER:

H.R. 5052. A bill making appropriations for military construction for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 1987, and for other purposes.

By Mr. GRADISON (for himself, Mr. STARK, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. MOORE, Mr. DAUB, Mr. GREGG, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. THOMAS of California, Mr. PICKLE, Mr. JONES of Oklahoma, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. HILLIS, and Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia):

H.R. 5053. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to require timely payment of properly submitted Medicare claims and to retain the existing periodic-interim-payment method of reimbursing providers of services; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. STARK (for himself, Mr. GRADISON, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. COYNE, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. JACOBS, and Mr. WAXMAN):

H.R. 5054. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to require timely payment of properly submitted Medicare claims and to retain the existing periodic-interim-payment method of reimbursing providers of services; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means, and Energy and Commerce.

By Mrs. BENTLEY:

H.R. 5055. A bill to reduce narcotics smuggling; jointly, to the Committees on the Judiciary and Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. BRYANT:

H.R. 5056. A bill to permit registered public utility holding companies to own certain interests in qualifying cogeneration facilities; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. CARPER:

H.R. 5057. A bill to provide for the temporary suspension of duty on fluazifop-p-butyl for a 3-year period; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. COATS (for himself, Mr. SWIFT, Mr. NIELSON of Utah, and Mr. ECKERT of New York):

H.R. 5058. A bill to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to promote the increased availability of television programming through various distribution systems, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. DAVIS:

H.R. 5059. A bill to provide for the division, use, and distribution of judgment funds of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan pursuant to dockets Numbered 18-E, 58, 364, and 18-R before the Indian Claims Commission; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. DEWINE (for himself, Mr. FISH, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. FRANK, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. COBLE, Mr. KASTENMEIER, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. DANNEMEYER, and Mr. SENSENBRENNER):

H.R. 5060. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, with respect to penalties for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol in the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and with respect to implied consent for certain tests to determine the drug or alcohol content of blood; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. GEKAS (for himself, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. CLINGER, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. NICHOLS, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. WALKER, Mr. YATRON, Mr. MONSON, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. SCHULZE, Mr. DENNY SMITH, and Mr. RIDGE):

H.R. 5061. A bill to amend the Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, to remedy burdens on commerce in poultry, poultry products and eggs, and protect poultry sellers and growers and egg producers and suppliers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. GUNDERSON (for himself, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri, Mr. PETRI, Mr. PENNY, Mr. ROTH, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. WEBER, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. MADIGAN, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. BOULTER, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. BRUCE, and Mr. SCHUETTE):

H.R. 5062. A bill to amend the Job Training Partnership Act to encourage the delivery of services to dislocated farmers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. HARTNETT:

H.R. 5063. A bill to amend the Tariff Schedules of the United States to provide for the continuance of the suspension of any duty on menthol feedstocks; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KEMP (for himself and Mr. GRAY of Pennsylvania):

H.R. 5064. A bill to provide, through greater targeting, coordination, and structuring of services, assistance to strengthen severely economically disadvantaged individuals by providing greater opportunities for employment preparation, which can assist in promoting economic family stability; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

H.R. 5065. A bill to amend part A of title IV of the Social Security Act to promote the transition of severely economically disadvantaged individuals to unsubsidized employment; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MCCLOSKEY (for himself, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, and Mr. EVANS of Illinois):

H.R. 5066. A bill to amend title 10, United States Code, to establish certain requirements with respect to contracts with defense firms in which certain foreign governments own or control a significant interest, and to prohibit the award of engineer equipment acquisition contracts to firms in which the Libyan Government owns or controls an interest; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. REGULA:

H.R. 5067. A bill to amend the Social Security Act and the Older Americans Act of 1965 for the protection of the elderly in the institutionalized long-term care setting, and for other purposes; jointly, to the Commit-

tees on Ways and Means, Energy and Commerce, and Education and Labor.

By Mr. SWIFT (for himself, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. LELAND, and Mr. BRYANT):

H.R. 5068. A bill to require the Federal Communications Commission to repromulgate certain regulations to prohibit trafficking in station licenses; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. WAXMAN (for himself and Mr. KASTENMEIER):

H.R. 5069. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to authorize abbreviated new animal drug applications and to amend title 35, United States Code, to authorize the extension of the patents for animal drug products; jointly, to the Committees on Energy and Commerce and the Judiciary.

By Mr. DANNEMEYER (for himself, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. COBEY, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. MONSON, and Mr. SHUMWAY):

H.J. Res. 663. Joint resolution to disapprove the action of the District of Columbia Council approving the prohibition of discrimination in the provision of the Insurance Act of 1986; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois:

H.J. Res. 664. Joint resolution to designate July 3, 1986, as "Let Freedom Ring Day," and to request the President to issue a proclamation encouraging the people of the United States to ring bells on such day immediately following the relighting of the torch of the Statue of Liberty; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BOULTER (for himself, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. WEBER, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. LEWIS of California, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. STRANG, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. FRANKLIN, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. MARLENEE, Mr. DAUB, Mrs. SMITH of Nebraska, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. MONSON, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. CRAIG, and Mr. SUNDQUIST):

H. Con. Res. 360. Concurrent resolution to express the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture should exercise his authority under section 1009(e) of the Food Security Act of 1985 to accept bids from the producers of agricultural commodities for diverting acreage in return for payments in kind; to the Committee on Agriculture.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

411. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the House of Representatives of the State of Illinois, relative to the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Banks; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

H.R. 11: Mr. REID, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. MCKINNEY, and Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas.

H.R. 1059: Mr. GEKAS.

H.R. 1402: Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. GARCIA, and Mrs. BOXER.

H.R. 2436: Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii.

H.R. 2462: Mr. MCDADE, Mr. BEREUTER, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. GROTBERG, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. HENRY, Mr. BATES, Mr. WEBER, Mr. HENDON, Mr. LAFALCE, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. GALLO, and Mr. MCKERNAN.

H.R. 2902: Ms. MIKULSKI.

H.R. 3006: Mr. TRAFICANT.

H.R. 3040: Mr. DIOGUARDI.

H.R. 3042: Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. BRUCE, Mr. ATKINS, Mr. ECKART of Ohio, and Mr. GAYDOS.

H.R. 3408: Mr. SOLARZ.

H.R. 3487: Mr. COYNE.

H.R. 3610: Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. FUSTER, and Ms. MIKULSKI.

H.R. 3661: Mr. DAUB, Mr. RITTER, Mr. SHAW, and Mr. FROST.

H.R. 3756: Mr. HORTON.

H.R. 4003: Mr. WHEAT and Ms. SNOWE.

H.R. 4054: Mr. MARKEY, Mr. MONSON, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, and Mrs. SCHROEDER.

H.R. 4067: Mr. HUGHES, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. NEAL, Mr. FISH, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. SWINDALL, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. LATTA, Mr. WISE, and Mr. YOUNG of Florida.

H.R. 4197: Mr. SOLARZ.

H.R. 4247: Mr. BADHAM.

H.R.4248: Mr. CLINGER.

H.R. 4249: Mr. CLINGER.

H.R. 4250: Mr. CLINGER.

H.R. 4282: Mr. BERMAN and Mr. MARTINEZ.

H.R. 4333: Mr. HENDON.

H.R. 4368: Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. HOWARD, and Mrs. BENTLEY.

H.R. 4519: Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi.

H.R. 4520: Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi.

H.R. 4556: Mr. PACKARD.

H.R. 4564: Mr. DE LA GARZA.

H.R. 4609: Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. TAUKE, Mr. WEBER, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. FOLEY, Mr. CONYERS, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. PRICE, and Mr. LOWERY of California.

H.R. 4669: Mr. RICHARDSON.

H.R. 4682: Mr. NEAL and Mr. BOEHLERT.

H.R. 4714: Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 4783: Mr. FAZIO and Mr. MRAZEK.

H.R. 4788: Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. MCCURDY, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. BEREUTER, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, and Mr. ANTHONY.

H.R. 4838: Mrs. BOXER.

H.R. 4853: Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 4856: Mr. FAZIO and Mr. CLINGER.

H.R. 4879: Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. SHUMWAY, and Mr. NIELSON of Utah.

H.R. 4882: Mr. HOWARD and Mr. GARCIA.

H.R. 4886: Mrs. COLLINS, Mrs. BOXER, and Mr. SCHEUER.

H.R. 4945: Mr. YOUNG of Florida and Mr. KLECZKA.

H.R. 4952: Mr. BLILEY, Mr. WEISS, and Mr. SAVAGE.

H.R. 4984: Mr. THOMAS of Georgia.

H.R. 5046: Mr. MARTIN of New York, Mr. ASPIN, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. PEASE, and Mr. SABO.

H.R. 5050: Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. STOKES, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, and Mr. PASHAYAN.

H.J. Res. 379: Mr. ROEMER.

H.J. Res. 385: Mr. MAZZOLI, and Mr. PERKINS.

H.J. Res. 429: Mr. GONZALES, Mr. COLEMAN of Missouri, Mr. HUCKABY, Mr. JENKINS, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. MOORE, Mr. LENT, Mr. COBEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. BYRON, and Mr. HATCHER.

H.J. Res. 529: Mr. KOLTER, Mr. STOKES, Mr. JENKINS, Mr. PANETTA, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. HEFTEL of Hawaii, Mrs. MEYERS of Kansas, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. YATRON, Mr. HOPKINS, and Mr. KASICH.

H.J. Res. 536: Mr. MOODY, and Mr. HANSEN.

H.J. Res. 555: Mr. WALGREN, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. WILSON, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. YATRON, Mr. FISH, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. BORSKI, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. DYMALLY, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. TALLON, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. DONNELLY, and Mr. GALLO.

H.J. Res. 623: Mr. ZSCHAU, and Mr. CHAPPELL.

H.J. Res. 642: Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. BEVILL, Mrs. BOXER, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. MACK, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. MACKAY, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. STRANG, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. STOKES, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mrs. HOLT, and Mr. ROSE.

H.J. Res. 649: Mr. DANNEMEYER, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. CAMPBELL, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. HATCHER, Mr. HOYER, Mr. NIELSON of Utah, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. SKELTON, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, and Mr. DE LA GARZA.

H.J. Res. 656: Mr. COBLE, Mr. SCHUETTE, Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. LENT, Mr. COMBEST, Mr. BOULTER, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. DANNEMEYER, Mr. CLINGER, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. STANGELAND, Mr. RITTER, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. DASCHLE, Mrs. BYRON, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. LIVINGSTON, and Mr. LIGHTFOOT.

H. Con. Res. 129: Mr. HILER, Mr. MCCOLLUM, Mr. BADHAM, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. HERTEL of Michigan, Mr. RAHALL, and Mr. EVANS of Illinois.

H. Con. Res. 349: Mr. COURTER, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. MONSON, Mr. MCCAIN, Mr. PACKARD, Mr. BLILEY, and Mr. WORTLEY.

H. Con. Res. 351: Mr. ST GERMAIN, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. DOWNEY of New York, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. TRAFICANT, Mr. GALLO, Mr. KASICH, Mr. GOODLING, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. WEISS, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. ZSCHAU, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. WOLF, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. PETRI, Mr. DEWINE, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. DIOGUARDI, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. HYDE, and Mr. ROE.

H. Res. 373: Mr. RAHALL, Mr. GONZALEZ, Ms. OAKAR, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. BEILENSON, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. MINETA, and Mr. REID.

H. Res. 468: Mr. HOWARD, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mrs. BENTLEY.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

400. The SPEAKER presented a petition of the House of Representatives of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, relative to the political and military situation in Central America; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.