

They awarded Mr. Thorn a plaque, signed by the eight Council members and citing him for his work with Kernal Hospital, Christmas projects, and his "efforts in promoting the furtherance of brotherhood."

Mr. Thorn said he was "overwhelmed" and "filled up emotionally" by the people who came to honor him. "Today, I'm the happiest man in the world."

Mr. Thorn and his wife, Connie, had a smile and a handshake for everyone. Moved by the community's expression of love for her husband, Mrs. Thorn remarked, "I knew he had friends, but this is unbelievable."

The couple's daughter, Connie, and son, Pat Jr., expressed the same feelings and added, "He knows everyone here!"

The four representatives who planned the affair, Mr. Kelly (VFW), Mr. Murphy (Knights of Columbus), Mel Burgess (Democratic Club), and Mitt Harten (American Legion), were especially pleased with the turnout. "Everyone here is so enthused over the event," said Mr. Kelly.

One of those in attendance, Bruce Wendeheim, felt the event was "a most heartwarming experience. I'll be thrilled that other people feel this way about another human being."

Woodlawn residents who thought Mr. Thorn might curb his activities, can rest assured that he'll be back. "Why should my plans change?" he questioned. "I haven't lost anything." Just as soon as Mr. Thorn gets his artificial limb and can get around, he plans to resume his busy schedule with organizations in his favorite community.

COOKIE GILCHRIST AND THE UNITED ATHLETES COALITION OF AMERICA, INC.

HON. JACK F. KEMP

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, February 14, 1974

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Speaker, Cookie Gilchrist and I were teammates with the Buffalo Bills and I admired him as a teammate and as a great fullback, but even more as a man who wants to help other people.

Today he is actively nurturing a vision he has long held to help ease the difficult transition of athletes from the playing field to the business world of American life which many times is difficult indeed and leads to some real life tragedies.

The Colorado nonprofit corporation he has helped establish, United Athletes Coalition of America, Inc., will attack the problems created by the tremendous popularity of athletics in the United States: first, problems of their possible overemphasis and consequent distortion of values by young people; second, problems in the maintenance of personal and financial perspective by active professional athletes; and third, problems in the transition by athletes from participa-

tion in professional sports to the mainstream of American life at the conclusion of their athletic careers.

UACA will direct its efforts toward:

First. Education and guidance of athletes at the preprofessional levels by using individual present and retired athletes to express their experiences through visitations to colleges and high schools and elementary educational institutions; through financial assistance to worthy and needy athletes pursuing educational goals in nonathletic areas.

Second. Education and rehabilitation of ex-athletes by establishing information and counseling centers in key cities in order to direct ex-athletes in financial, legal, medical, psychological, and career counseling; make available direct financial assistance to appropriate ex-athletes and their families in the form of controlled grants for alleviating severe personal problems.

Third. Education and guidance of current professional athletes by (a) disseminating information regarding education and vocational training; (b) disseminating information concerning legal, financial, social problems common to professional athletes; (c) establishing in key cities local offices manned by qualified ex-athletes to give one-to-one counseling and advice regarding problems affecting all areas of life which may be particular to athletes; (d) make available professional expertise concerning personal and financial management for athletes through educational group seminars.

The objectives toward which Cookie Gilchrist and the UACA are working make it important that my colleagues become aware of this effort. The Buffalo Courier-Express recently carried an article about Cookie and the UACA which I include at this point and commend to the attention of my colleagues in the Congress:

COOKIE WORKS TO HELP OVER-THE-HILL ATHLETES

DENVER.—Fourteen years of professional football gave Cookie Gilchrist fleeting fame, a pair of bad knees and the devastating realization that he was fundamentally unprepared for life off the gridiron.

But Gilchrist survived in the real world and now is nursing a vision he hopes will make the transition easier for other athletes.

It's called the United Athletes Coalition of America and that's what Carlton Chester Gilchrist, 38, is devoting his energies to these days.

"What we're interested in is trying to rehabilitate athletes once they're finished playing. We're trying to salvage the lives of individuals," Gilchrist says, sounding more like a social worker than the 6-foot-3, 255-pound fullback who once set an AFL record with 243 yards and five touchdowns in one game.

Gilchrist wants to assemble volunteer professional counselors in such areas as finance, career planning, law, psychology, and he's not only interested in dealing with the ex-

athlete but also in educating and advising current athletes and youngsters.

Gilchrist says being a professional athlete can become essentially an ego trip, and the comedown, for too many, is hard and fast. The athlete suddenly finds he can't borrow money, people don't recognize him on the street anymore, and all the money from those huge player salaries has been squandered.

"On the field, court or whatever, an athlete is as sleek, quick, instinctive as any animal in the jungle," Gilchrist explains. "But an athlete's instincts to survive in the everyday world are dulled by adulation, acceptance, what he reads in the papers and hears on radio and TV.

"Having been exposed to such a high, fast way of living, he sometimes finds he'll do almost anything to sustain himself. He becomes vulnerable to con men . . . who rape him of all the things he's worked hard for. Or he becomes an alcoholic, drug addict, criminal."

Gilchrist can document such cases, "I know a great back, a Hall of Famer, who is sleeping on a park bench in the same city where he was a star. Big Daddy Lipscomb died of an overdose of heroin. Lenny Ford died drunk and broke in some rundown hotel."

Gilchrist remembers Warren Wells, former Oakland wide receiver.

Wells, dogged by a police record, served out a prison term and attempted a comeback in 1972. But after a minor altercation with police, he found his parole in jeopardy last May.

"I went to Oakland and found Wells couldn't put together a sentence," Gilchrist says. "All he could talk about was that he didn't understand what they were doing to him and that he just wanted to play football. He couldn't adjust to the idea that he was no longer just Warren Wells, the football player. He's now in a psychiatric ward in Houston."

That experience is what gave birth last July to the UACA.

"I got together with Ernie Barnes, Dick Bass and other players in the L.A. area to sign an agreement that we need some kind of a system to keep from falling into a bottomless pit, to quit pretending that the world always loves us, that the world will always do things for us."

What his organization needs, he says, is "support, volunteers, money, and we need to know where athletes are that need help." Gilchrist says he has received little response from such groups as the National Football League and the NFL Players' Association but is confident he'll make in-roads.

He also firmly believes much of the billions of dollars in the sports industry is being misspent and could better be used by an organization such as UACA—for the benefit of players, owners and fans.

"The fan, in particular, should realize that this athlete entertained him for a number of years, and the man is worthy of more than outright rejection once his playing days are over," he says.

It now has been six years since Gilchrist's sometimes controversial and off-beat career ended after playing for teams in Canada and for Buffalo, Denver and Miami. And, although he found the game dehumanizing, he feels an obligation to leave it something.

"I want to make a greater contribution than I did as a player."

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Monday, February 18, 1974

The House met at 12 o'clock noon. The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

Let us now praise famous men and our fathers that begat us; in whom the Lord showed forth His glory, His mighty power

in the days of old.—Ecclesiasticus 44: 1, 2.

O God and Father of us all, our hearts expand with pride as we think again of our first President whose birthday we celebrate today. By the example of his

life, his spirit still calls us to have courage in adversity, to be faithful in times of trouble, and to learn to pray that we may be equal to the experiences which daily attend our ways.

As we listen once more to the words

which fell from his lips, may the fact of his devotion to our country, the faith he had in Thy providential care, and the fruits of freedom he helped to ripen, stir our spirits, strengthen our souls, and send us forth into this day with new vigor and new vitality to keep the flag of liberty and justice flying in our Nation and in our world.

In the spirit of the Prince of Peace we pray. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

THE SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS

THE SPEAKER. Pursuant to the order of the House of January 30, 1974, the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi (Mr. MONTGOMERY) to read George Washington's Farewell Address.

Mr. MONTGOMERY read the farewell address as follows:

To the people of the United States.

FIENDS AND FELLOW CITIZENS: The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive government of the United States being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those, out of whom a choice is to be made.

I beg you, at the same time, to do me the justice to be assured, that this resolution has not been taken, without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that, in withdrawing the tender of service which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full conviction that the step is compatible with both.

The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in the office to which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and

critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea.

I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety; and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that in the present circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove my determination to retire.

The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust, were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust, I will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed towards the organization and administration of the government, the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious in the outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience, in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and, every day, the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe that, while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it.

In looking forward to the moment which is to terminate the career of my political life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved country, for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions, agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead amidst appearances sometimes dubious, vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging—in situations in which not unfrequently, want of success has countenanced the spirit of criticism,—the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts, and a guarantee of the plans, by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing vows that heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence—that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual—that the free constitution, which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained—that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue—that, in fine, the happiness

of the people of these states, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete by so careful a preservation, and so prudent a use of this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection and adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it.

Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which cannot end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger, natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent review, some sentiments which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warnings of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget, as an encouragement to it, your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion.

Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.

The unity of government which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence; the support of your tranquility at home; your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But, as it is easy to foresee that, from different causes and from different quarters much pains will be taken, many artifices employed, to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed; it is of infinite moment, that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustoming yourselves to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can, in any event, be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.

For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens by birth, or choice, of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have, in a common cause, fought and triumphed

together; the independence and liberty you possess, are the work of joint counsels, and joint efforts, of common dangers, sufferings and successes.

But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those which apply more immediately to your interest.—Here, every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the union of the whole.

The *north*, in an unrestrained intercourse with the *south*, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter, great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise, and precious materials of manufacturing industry.—The *south* in the same intercourse, benefiting by the same agency of the *north*, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the *north*, it finds its particular navigation invigorated; and while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is unequally adapted. The *east*, in a like intercourse with the *west*, already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The *west* derives from the *east* supplies requisite to its growth and comfort—and what is perhaps of still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the *secure* enjoyment of indispensable *outlets* for its own productions, to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the Union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as *one nation*. Any other tenure by which the *west* can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength; or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.

While then every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union, all the parts combined cannot fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts, greater strength, greater resource, proportionally greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from union, an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied together by the same government; which their own rivalship alone would be sufficient to produce, but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues, would stimulate and embitter.—Hence likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments, which under any form of government are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is, that your union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love

of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other.

These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind and exhibit the continuance of the union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to weaken its hands.

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by *geographical* discrimination,—*nothern* and *southern*—*Atlantic* and *western*; whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is a real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You cannot shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heart burnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head: they have seen, in the negotiation by the executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the senate of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at the event throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the general government and in the Atlantic states, unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi. They have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties, that with Great Britain and that with Spain, which secure to them everything they could desire, in respect to our foreign relations, towards confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were procured? will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such they are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens?

To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute: they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances, in all times, have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a constitution of government, better calculated than your former, for an intimate

union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This government, the offspring of our own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment, has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government.—But the constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish government, presuppose the duty of every individual to obey the established government.

All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations and action of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency.—They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans digested by common councils, and modified by mutual interests.

However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men, will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Towards the preservation of your government and the permanency of your present happy state it is requisite, not only, that you steadily discountenance irregular opposition to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the constitution, alterations which will impair the energy of the system; and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments, as of other human institutions:—that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country:—that facility in changes, upon the credit of mere hypothesis and

opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion: and remember, especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular references to the founding them on geographical discrimination. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind.—It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled, or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual; and, sooner or later, the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purpose of his own elevation on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind, (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight) the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils, and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foments occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which finds a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This within certain limits is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popu-

lar character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent it bursting into a flame, lest instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions of the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern: some of them in our country and under our own eyes.—To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be in any particular wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the constitution designates.—But let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance in permanent evil any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked, where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation *desert* the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect, that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to every species

of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it should be enlightened.

As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but remembering, also, that timely disbursements, to prepare for danger, frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions, in time of peace, to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinions should co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should practically bear in mind, that towards the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the proper object (which is always a choice of difficulties,) ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue, which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct, and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt but, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it; can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and

its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts through passion what reason would reject; at other times, it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty of nations, has been the victim.

So likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest; in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducements or justifications. It leads also to concessions, to the favorite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions, by unnecessary parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens who devote themselves to the favorite nation, facility to betray or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils!—Such an attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter.

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence, (I conjure you to believe me fellow citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake; since history and experience prove, that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike for another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other.

Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests.

The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little *political* connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith:—Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation, when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony, and a liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gentle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable the government to support them, conventional

rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be from time to time abandoned or varied as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay with a portion of its independence for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance, it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect, or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations, but if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue, to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have been dictated.

How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself, the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have, at least, believed myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both houses of congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound, in duty and interest, to take a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it with moderation, perseverance and firmness.

The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all.

The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without any thing more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to main-

tain inviolate the relations of peace and amity towards other nations.

The inducements of interest for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress, without interruption, to that degree of strength, and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am nevertheless too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and that, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service, with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.

Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations; I anticipate with pleasing expectation that retreat in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in the midst of my fellow citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government—the ever favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors and dangers.

GEO. WASHINGTON.

UNITED STATES,
17th September, 1796.

A WORD OF THANKS TO KISSINGER

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, the successful conclusion of the International Energy Conference, with 12 energy-consuming nations agreeing on a common U.S.-sponsored course of action in spite of bitter French obstructionism, is a further tribute to the remarkable negotiating skills of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Add this to the recent Middle East settlement which he almost single-handedly piloted through the stormy waves of ancient hatreds, and we begin to sense the true measure of this gifted and almost indefatigable public servant.

While our relations with Russia and China still are not exactly cuddly, there is a definite and undeniable thaw in the ice which remained solidly frozen for 25 years. At least we are talking with one another—and listening to one another—like mature and sensible people. Much of the credit for this rightfully belongs to Dr. Henry Kissinger and his tireless, and often thankless labors behind the scenes.

Those of us on the Democratic side of this Chamber sometimes are quick to point up the failures of the present administration. Only last week I stressed the ways in which I feel the water pollu-

tion abatement program is being poorly administered. We ought to be as quick to emphasize administrative successes, and to rejoice in them—particularly when, as in the present case, they represent successes for the Nation.

To introduce a calm and civil dialog and at least a modicum of reasoned restraint into the chaotic scene of boiling world pressures is almost, as someone said, like trying to change a tire on a speeding car. Henry Kissinger, who chose this country in his youth after witnessing the Nazi tyranny, has done this perhaps as well as any person could have done it. The Nation owes him its thanks.

BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STUDY ON RESERVE FORCES

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Speaker, the current agitation to reduce Reserve Forces strength, which is the subject of widespread discussion in military circles, was sparked in part by a study issued by the Brookings Institution. The study is entitled "The U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior."

Undoubtedly the Reserves have problems. In particular there is the problem of maintaining present strength levels. Congress must accept its responsibility to provide new incentives for service in the Organized Reserves to help overcome this.

The problem of a mandatory strength reduction should not be a live topic. At a time when the costs of defense are constantly increasing and the principal item of cost increase is manpower, it is only logical to assume that we shall have greater need for Organized Reserves rather than less. The lowest cost item in the defense budget could well be the personnel in the Organized Reserves.

The Association of the U.S. Army has prepared a position paper which treats in detail with the Brookings Institution study. It should receive careful consideration by Members of Congress. The concluding paragraph of the AUSA position paper states:

Frankly, this study is a disappointment. It is shallow, negative and counterproductive. Criticism is undoubtedly warranted in many areas of our Reserve program. Hopefully, the on-going DOD study will identify those areas, so that our full effort can turn again to improving the strength, readiness and training of our Reserve Components.

I submit the AUSA response for printing in the RECORD in detail:

A RESPONSE TO THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STUDY ON THE U.S. RESERVE FORCES

The Brookings Institution has recently issued the fifth in a group of studies on defense policy. This one is entitled "The U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior." The study has been prepared by Martin Binkin, a retired Air Force colonel and a senior fellow in the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies Group. He also served formerly in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis. The study was funded by money made available by the Ford Foundation.

Basically the study calls for a re-examination and restudy of our whole Reserve forces program. Binkin maintains that, if this were done, at least some of the following of his recommendations could be adopted:

I. Reduce size of Reserve Components:
A. Eliminate non-essential and marginally effective Army units;

B. Merge the headquarters, training and recruiting facilities of the Army's Guard and Reserve;

C. Reduce to cadre status the equivalent of four Army National Guard divisions (including associated support elements) and augment them with Reservists from IRR or standby Reserves on mobilization;

D. Integrate selective elements of Army Reserve Components into five active Army divisions, thus reducing requirement for active manpower;

E. Reduce number of individual Reservists in Naval Reserve and use some on assignment to Naval vessels undergoing overhaul to reduce active forces; and

F. Merge Air National Guard and Reserve headquarters, training and recruiting facilities. Limited integration of Reserve crews into strategic bomber and tanker forces.

II. Eliminate the need for Reserve forces recruiting bonuses by reducing Reserve manpower requirements.

III. Revise Reserve retirement compensation to eliminate the "recomp" feature which bases amount of pay on pay scales in effect at retirees age 60 rather than the date he retires.

Binkin estimates these steps would reduce active military manpower by 60,000, Reserve manpower by 310,000 and, when fully effective, would yield average annual savings of about \$1.4 billion in constant FY74 prices.

The study contains sufficient errors in fact, and an apparent lack of knowledge of some of the key features of our Reserve Component program, as well as on-going actions in the study area, to warrant a reply at least in sufficient depth to clarify the record. Additionally, a great many serious students of national defense would disagree with some of the basic philosophy on which Binkin bases his views and his recommendations.

While the study purportedly covers all the services, by far the greatest weight of his comments and suggestions are directed solely at the Army. It is these to which we will respond.

Binkin does not appear to be aware of the great amount of time, energy and manpower that has been consistently devoted for the past twenty-five years to the examination, re-examination and restructuring of the Reserve forces, as well as their role in our total force structure. It is quite possible that these components have been more studied, reorganized, realigned and otherwise harassed than any segment or system that has been part of our defense structure. He obviously either was not aware of or chose to overlook the current arbitrary 48,000 man cut in the Army's Reserve Components force structure which DOD directed earlier this year.

He also failed to mention the latest of many major studies of the Guard and Reserve which was directed by the Secretary of Defense on 23 August 1973. Included in this study's objectives are considerations of the availability, force mix, limitations and potential of these components in a national emergency. This study is underway now, to be completed by fall of 1974.

Early in his paper, he states that "a detailed rationale for Reserve forces has remained outside the range of debate." An examination of the Congressional Record or a casual inquiry to the service force planners, the Section 5 Committee, any Army Readiness Region Commander or, for that matter, senior Reserve Component commander would have clarified that error of assumption.

At the outset, he makes a sweeping premise that starts the whole study on the wrong path when he says that the "precise role of

the Reserve Components in current national security planning remains unclear." It is now and always has been. This is what the Total Force Concept is all about. It has been clearly stated on numerous occasions that our national defense posture is based on a one and one-half war strategy in which "NATO First" is a key element. The Army's contribution to this strategy is the 21 division force structure with the supporting elements.

In the Army, the Reserve Component portion is usually referred to as the 711,000 TO&E structure and includes all those elements which are considered essential to make the 21 division force viable and supportable. So there is a very clear cut rationale and understanding, not only of what units are needed, but why they are. As with any worthwhile plan, changes are required from time to time, but the basic plan remains intact. This fluctuation, particularly among smaller units, takes place with frequency.

Several times in this study, Binkin refers in a derogatory manner to the fact that the Reserve Components played no major role in Vietnam. On page 1, for example, he says, ". . . their failure to be used in Vietnam—the longest and most difficult war in U.S. history—cast strong doubts on their value and raises serious questions about their future role in national security." Again on page 40, "Vietnam experience cast a stigma on Reserve forces that will be difficult to erase." Nowhere in this study does he indicate that the decision not to mobilize more Reserve forces for Vietnam was a purely political decision made by President Johnson over the strongest objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Service Secretaries. History has shown it to be a bad decision and one that had a devastating effect on the active establishment. It was not a decision made by the Reserve Components and there is no evidence of any reluctance on their part to serve playing any part in the decision.

Later in the paper, the author cites a GAO report to point up that those Army units which were called up were disappointing. All three of the points he cites have to do with individual training and equipment and personnel shortages. He does admit these units were undergoing reorganization at the time they were called up. He fails to point out that during the six months or so before callup, they were flooded with untrained people that even a trained cadre couldn't digest. Surely he would not hold these units responsible for equipment shortages over which they had no control. These allegations make an invalid basis for judging "value" or "future role in national security."

One other basic point that obviously colors Binkin's thinking needs to be clarified before going on to address some of his specifics. On page 19, he states the view that "The basic rationale for maintaining Reserve forces rests on economic grounds." This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of our historic aversion to overly large standing forces and our traditional reliance on the citizen-soldier concept that is part of our constitutional heritage.

One would gather from the tenor of this study that Binkin sides with the adherents of the short war policy who believe, a) that Europe is probably the only place we would fight again, and b) that would be all over so swiftly that the Reserve Components would not get involved in time to make a significant contribution.

The record of the past twenty-five years would seem to refute adequately the idea that the United States would not respond anywhere in the world where our basic interests were seriously challenged.

The concept of short wars has long been the Lorraine of military philosophers and, more significantly, political leaders. Geoffrey Blainey, in his excellent new book, *The*

Causes of War, points out that one of the most recurrent clues illuminating the causes of war and so of peace is the optimism with which most wars were commenced. He goes on to document the point in great detail, using, among others as prime examples, World Wars I & II, the Soviets in Finland, North Korea's attack on the South, Anglo-French Campaign in the Suez and the fantastic case of India and China in 1962.

Moving on now to an examination of specific points in the Binkin study, let us examine these in more or less chronological order for ease of checking.

On the credit side, the author is quick to acknowledge that in the absence of the draft, "the Reserves have become the primary option available to the President for quickly expanding military forces in a national emergency." He could have been more precise by saying the *only* option available.

He suggests that hard choices await national security planners, who are faced with fitting maximum defense capabilities "within more limited defense resources." Successive Secretaries of Defense, as well as the President of the United States, have been at considerable pains to point out that our national priorities *have already been reordered* through the massive cuts which have already been made in our defense establishment and that what we are working at now is increased efficiency and effectiveness on what may be a *modestly rising* scale of defense expenditures. We have had occasion in the past to quote from the President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress three years ago. Perhaps it is pertinent to repeat: "It needs to be understood with total clarity . . . that defense programs are not infinitely adjustable . . . there is an absolute point below which our security forces must not be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or at that level, our defense forces protect national security adequately. Below that level is one vast undifferentiated area of no security at all. For it serves no useful purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost strong enough."

Binkin goes on to discuss some of the problems incident to mobilization. He rightly points out that it does take a longer time to deploy Reserve Component units than those in the active establishment. He doesn't acknowledge the very active efforts to reduce the administrative work loads involved in mobilization and to get the maximum amount done prior to call-up. Nor is it clear, as it should be, in his remarks that deployment schedules take into account that our equipment pipeline and transportation system limitations make it evident that all units cannot be digested at once. In the order of priority, Reserve Component units are worked into the schedule at realistic intervals which take into account these problems. The fact remains, however, that readiness and deployment goals are being shortened as rapidly as conditions permit and should soon be substantially better than his estimate indicates. Certainly the active Army views this as a manageable problem.

This would have been the appropriate place for Binkin to describe and assess the really massive effort which the Army has put in motion to assist with these very problems. In a major reorganization effected by the Army early last year, training and readiness support of the Reserve Components was made the sole responsibility of the commanders of each of the three CONUS Armies which operate directly under the Army's new Forces Command. Under the CONUS Armies are nine Readiness Regions, each organized into subordinate groups and teams of experts who work shoulder to shoulder with Reservists to improve their readiness. These active Army people are doers and specialists in hands-on training, not staff supervisors. Since their mission is aimed exclusively at

improving Reserve Component training and readiness, it is unfortunate that Binkin chose to ignore this effort. It should do much to change his views on this basic problem.

Binkin states that at the beginning of FY73, about 60% of the Reserve maneuver units were without weekend training areas. This is incorrect. Only 18% are without necessary areas today. There is an on-going program to which he refers for armories and training areas that will improve this even more.

Again discussing readiness, he says that "Army National Guard units are designed to attain readiness at the company level" and "the post-mobilization training would delay division-sized deployments for perhaps four months." The company level training is a *minimum*. There is considerable training above that level that has been going on for some time. In the January 1974 issue of *Soldiers* magazine, there is a good description of the seven maneuver training commands which have been established from Army Reserve Training Division Brigades to write and organize field exercises for the active Army as well as the Reserve Components and to conduct tests from battalion to corps level.

But it would be wrong to infer that large units will ever get to the point where post-mobilization training is not required. The goal is to reduce the time. If the Reserve could be left alone for a while and the active Army's current support effort be given a chance to work, these goals can be met.

His chapter four suggests that sinister political forces are constantly plotting to maintain over-large Reserve forces to the detriment of our country's welfare.

There are political forces exercised in all segments of our society and many far more effectively than those on behalf of the Reserve Components. This will be borne out, if proof is needed, by data which those two "prosperous, united, articulate and highly active" Reserve Component lobby organizations would be willing to supply.

In the latter half of his paper, Binkin gives us his rationale which he believes could result in substantial cuts in the size and costs of our Reserve forces. He first addresses what he describes as "relatively small, obscure support units and activities." His first target is the 53 civil affairs units which he says have about 7,000 plus men. There may very well be too many of these units. But for an Army that has spent 25 years helping govern one of the world's major cities in Berlin and governed our second largest trading partner for a number of years before drafting her constitution, the civil affairs function needs a nucleus of units which are able to perform their specialty when we need them. So, while there may be more units than we need, it would be foolhardy to wipe them out as Binkin suggests.

Binkin is also of the opinion that medics, lawyers, construction workers and administrative people whose civilian skills are required need not be in units. One could apply the same logic to licensed pilots. In the first place, the President has no authority to call individuals to duty without Congressional action, so we would have to have complete mobilization before these people could be called up as individuals. But, even beyond this, to suggest that an amalgam of civilians, however talented, could be welded quickly into a functioning military unit flies in the face of all our past experience.

A minor point, Binkin raises the question as to why we still need 4,500 Army Guardsmen in Nike/Hercules units. The answer is we don't, and the slots assigned to these organizations have already been eliminated—another example of the continual up-dating of our Reserve organization.

Binkin also questions the need for the 21 separate brigades, including the special mis-

sion brigades. The answer is that all of these are specifically targeted for early deployment in our total force mobilization plan.

He assumes that of the roughly 300,000 people in the non-divisional units he's been discussing, 200,000 are of marginal use and could be eliminated. This suggestion reveals a lack of knowledge of the functioning of land forces and the diverse elements whose teamwork is required for success in combat.

Binkin next makes a pitch for another try at some sort of a merger of the Guard and Reserve. He takes cognizance of past attempts in this direction and is fairly pragmatic in his assessments of the meager chances for a success of another effort. He offers a variation with his suggestion that the Army Guard and Reserve be combined into the Guard while the air components of each be combined under the Reserve. Although he rightly says that the elimination of headquarters saves very little, he nevertheless arbitrarily assigns annual savings of \$30-\$50 million to his merger plan on the assumption that combined base operations, training and recruiting would provide such savings. This is pure crystal ball.

As a further means of saving money, Binkin next suggests that four Reserve Component divisions and their supporting elements could be reduced to cadre status, since there would be time after mobilization to assign the additional personnel required, issue equipment, etc. As we have pointed out, there is a place in our Total Force Plan for these divisions, and it calls for them to be ready far sooner than they could be under any cadre system. In-being units can obviously be whipped into top shape far faster than those requiring so much filling and training after mobilization. Units that can be deployed in the first 60 days after mobilization are more valuable than those that come along later. Finally, anyone who has ever had any exposure to a cadre operation is aware of its severe limitations. Cadre units cannot adequately maintain the unit's equipment. They are not susceptible to effective training over any extended period of time. They do not provide the basis for either leadership or team training, both of which are essential, particularly for units of the combat arms. There is no teamwork, esprit or the other essentials to a successful military unit. In short, it's a bad idea.

He goes on to make a gratuitous comment that deserves refutation. He says: "Motivated in part by the past performance of Reserve units, and possibly by the conviction that current active forces will need but limited assistance to meet the range of likely contingencies, many defense planners appear to be counting on no more than four—and perhaps as few as two—National Guard divisions in the first six months following mobilization." He doesn't identify the planners, but that statement contradicts the testimony of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army and the Army's Chief of Staff. On the record, this statement is completely opposite from the DOD positions.

He moves on next to suggest the possible replacement of some active Army units with Reserve Component units in what he terms "hybrid" divisions. Basically, what he is suggesting is that possibly a battalion of each brigade, and a battery of each of the artillery support units could be a Reserve Component unit. The same would apply to the division base units. He would only do this in CONUS land divisions "not likely" to be needed immediately in an emergency.

There may be occasions when our active divisions will be employed *without* mobilization. Obviously the "hybrid" divisions would be at only $\frac{1}{3}$ of their strength if this took place.

There would always be a disparity in readiness between active and Reserve units which, in a "hybrid" situation, would slow the combat deployment of the total unit.

In all of his suggestions, the basic thought keeps coming through that we will face only one contingency at a time (if, in fact, we face any at all) or, if we do get committed, it will be all over in less than 90 days. Fortunately, our defense planners have a more prudent view.

The concept of leaving Reserve Component units satellited on active units for training does have merit. The Army has been experimenting with that idea for the last two years at Fort Hood in its so-called "Round Out" concept. Emerging from this experience is an "affiliation" program now being worked up which would provide for separate battalions and brigades to be attached to active Army units for training, supervision, et al. It is even contemplated that they would fight with these units as an *augmentation*.

His final suggestion for cutting costs is in chapter seven, dealing with what he calls "Compensation Efficiencies."

First, he makes a pitch for not making available recruiting bonuses for the Reserve Components. As is the case elsewhere, not all his facts are straight.

He takes the Reserve Components to task when he says, "If greater reliance were placed on attracting people with previous service, possible shortages could be alleviated." The problem is *exactly* the opposite. The Reserve Components have not been meeting their quotas of *non-prior service personnel*. They have already been relying too heavily on prior-service people and with that source drying up when the remaining draftees leave the Army this fall, they will have to rely on getting non-prior service people. This was pointed up again in an article in the January 1974 *Soldiers* magazine: "Latest figures reveal the Guard is at 95% strength, the Reserves at 90% strength. But the figures are deceiving. Both the Guard and the Reserve are hitting lows when it comes to getting non-prior service people. The Guard, for example, is getting 1,700 monthly against a 4,000 requirement. The Reserve is not faring much better."

Actually, as the foregoing quote also points up, recruiting for the Reserve Components has improved considerably, and, were the recruiting aids requested made available by the Congress, many working on the problem believe the Reserve Components could maintain their strength goals.

Binkin would reduce the recruiting problem further by the massive cuts in authorized strength he has suggested.

The author's final point is his concern that the Reserve Component retirees may be overcompensated. He advocates that Reserve retirees be paid their retirement based on the pay scales in force on the date of their retirement rather than those prevailing at their age 60, when they actually begin to draw the pay. This suggestion will undoubtedly be considered with other facets of the retirement program now being examined.

In any consideration of retirement, it is useful to have a feel for the numbers under discussion. He did not include them. In response to query, we were advised by the Department of the Army that, as of 3 November 1973, the following were considered careerists and apt to go on to retirement:

[In percent]

Army National Guard:

Officer ----- 69.8
Enlisted ----- 21.7

Army Reserve:

Officer ----- 64.8
Enlisted ----- 16.5

In one of his last chapters, Binkin presents the case for the short war which would, of course, make all mobilization plans obsolete. In his scenario, he gives no weight at all to what an adequate in-being total force defense establishment can do to prevent even a short war from starting.

Frankly, this study is a disappointment. It is shallow, negative and counterproductive. Criticism is undoubtedly warranted in many areas of our Reserve program. Hopefully, the on-going DOD study will identify those areas, so that our full effort can turn again to improving the strength, readiness and training of our Reserve Components.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, without it being considered a precedent I ask unanimous consent that all Members who desire to do so may have permission to revise and extend their remarks and to include extraneous matter in the RECORD following the reading of George Washington's Farewell Address and also in that portion of the RECORD entitled "Extensions of Remarks."

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mr. FORSYTHE (at the request of Mr. RHODES), for February 11 through 18, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Member (at the request of Mr. COCHRAN), to revise and extend his remarks, and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. HOSMER, today, for 5 minutes.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. DENHOLM), to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous matter:)

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DIGGS, for 10 minutes, on February 19.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

General leave granted.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DENHOLM. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 45 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, February 19, 1974, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1899. A letter from Deputy Secretary of Defense, transmitting the annual report on disposal of Government-owned communications facilities in Alaska, pursuant to 40 U.S.C. 786; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1900. A letter from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, transmitting a report showing the fiscal year 1974 country and international organization allocations for the international narcotics program, pursuant to section 653 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [22 U.S.C. 2413(a)]; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1901. A letter from the Acting Secretary of the Interior, transmitting a report on the activities of the Geological Survey outside the national domain during the 6 months ended December 31, 1973, pursuant to 43 U.S.C. 31(c); to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1902. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Public Health Service Act, the Developmental Disabilities Services and Facilities Construction Act, and the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970, to revise and extend programs of health services, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

1903. A letter from the Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, transmitting reports concerning visa petitions approved according to certain beneficiaries' third and sixth preference classification, pursuant to section 204(d) of the Immigration and Na-

tionality Act, as amended [8 U.S.C. 1154(d)]; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

1904. A letter from the Chairman, Marine Mammal Commission; transmitting the Commission's first annual report, covering calendar year 1973, pursuant to Public Law 92-522; to the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

1905. A letter from the Secretary of Transportation, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 as it relates to the conduct of charter bus operations by grantees of Federal financial assistance, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

RECEIVED FROM THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

1906. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report recommending changes in law to improve the acquisition of public building sites and to eliminate excess property exchanges by the General Services Administration; to the Committee on Government Operations.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. DEVINE:

H. Res. 869. Resolution disapproving the recommendations of the President with re-

spect to the rates of pay of Federal officials transmitted to the Congress in the budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina:

H. Res. 870. Resolution disapproving the recommendations of the President with respect to the rates of pay of Federal officials transmitted to the Congress in the budget for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

349. The SPEAKER presented a memorial of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to Federal funding of the Massachusetts unemployment compensation system; to the Committee on Appropriations.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

393. The SPEAKER presented a petition of Earl Gayhart, North Canton, Ohio, relative to redress of grievances; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

SENATE—Monday, February 18, 1974

The Senate met at 12 o'clock noon and was called to order by Hon. FLOYD K. HASKELL, a Senator from the State of Colorado.

PRAYER

The Chaplain, the Reverend Edward L. R. Elson, D.D., offered the following prayer:

We shall pray today in the words of President George Washington's prayer for his country.

Let us pray.

Almighty God: We make our earnest prayer that Thou wilt keep the United States in Thy holy protection; that Thou wilt incline the hearts of the citizens to cultivate a spirit of subordination and obedience to government; and entertain a brotherly affection and love for one another and for their fellow citizens of the United States at large. And finally that Thou wilt most graciously be pleased to dispose us all to do justice, to love mercy, and to demean ourselves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of mind which were the characteristics of the Divine Author of our blessed religion, and without a humble imitation of whose example in these things we can never hope to be a happy Nation. Grant our supplication, we beseech Thee, through Jesus Christ our Lord." Amen.

APPOINTMENT OF ACTING PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please read a communication to the Senate from the President pro tempore (Mr. EASTLAND).

The assistant legislative clerk read the following letter:

U.S. SENATE,
PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,
Washington, D.C., February 18, 1974.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate on official duties, I appoint Hon. FLOYD K. HASKELL, a Senator from the State of Colorado, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
President pro tempore.

Mr. HASKELL thereupon took the chair as Acting President pro tempore.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT—APPROVAL OF JOINT RESOLUTION

Messages in writing from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Heiting, one of his secretaries, and he announced that on February 8, 1974, the President had approved and signed the joint resolution (S.J. Res. 185) to provide for advancing the effective date of the final order of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Docket No. MC 43 (Sub-No. 2).

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session,

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore (Mr. HASKELL) laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations, which were referred to the appropriate committees.

The nominations received today are printed at the end of Senate proceedings.

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE—ENROLLED BILL SIGNED

A message from the House of Representatives by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker had affixed his signature to the enrolled bill (S. 37) to amend the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921, to require the advice and consent of the Senate for future appointments to the offices of Director and Deputy Director of the Office for Management and Budget, and for other purposes.

The enrolled bill was subsequently signed by the Acting President pro tempore (Mr. METCALF).

THE JOURNAL

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of the Journal of the proceedings of Friday, February 8, 1974, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

WAIVER OF THE CALL OF THE CALENDAR

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the call of the Legislative Calendar, under rule VIII, be dispensed with.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

COMMITTEE MEETINGS DURING SENATE SESSION

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that all committees may be authorized to meet during the session of the Senate today.