

the United States in the International Development Association. There is a limitation of 4 hours for the debate thereon, with a limitation on any amendment in the first degree of 1 hour. There is also a time limitation on amendments in the second degree, debatable motions, and appeals. Rollcall votes will begin to run at 4 p.m. on amendments or other matters related thereto, to be followed by a rollcall vote on final passage of the bill.

During the day, conference reports may be called up, as well as other matters on the legislative calendar that have been cleared for action, and yea-and-nay votes can occur thereon.

It is anticipated that there will be rollcall votes daily next week, Tuesday through Friday.

**ADJOURNMENT TO TUESDAY,
MAY 28, 1974**

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, pursuant to the provisions of House Concurrent Resolution 501, as amended, that

the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 noon on Tuesday, May 28, 1974.

The motion was agreed to; and at 6:18 p.m. the Senate adjourned until Tuesday, May 28, 1974, at 12 noon.

NOMINATIONS

Executive nominations received by the Senate May 22, 1974:

IN THE AIR FORCE

The following officer to be placed on the retired list in the grade indicated under the provisions of section 8962, title 10 of the United States Code:

To be general

Gen. John C. Meyer, [REDACTED] FR (major general, regular Air Force) U.S. Air Force.

The following officer under the provisions of title 10, United States Code, section 8066, to be assigned to a position of importance and responsibility designated by the President under subsection (a) of section 8066, in grade as follows:

To be general

Lt. Gen. Louis T. Seith, [REDACTED] FR (major general, regular Air Force) U.S. Air Force.

CONFIRMATIONS

Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 22, 1974:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Joseph W. Twinam, of Tennessee, a Foreign Service officer of class 4, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the State of Bahrain.

Michael Sterner, of New York, a Foreign Service officer of class 2, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to the United Arab Emirates.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

William C. Turner, of Arizona, to be Representative of the United States of America to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, with the rank of Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Frederick L. Webber, of Virginia, to be a Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury.

(The above nominations were approved subject to the nominees' commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Wednesday, May 22, 1974

The House met at 12 o'clock noon. The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch, D.D., offered the following prayer:

From everlasting to everlasting, Thou art God.—Psalms 90: 2.

O God, our Father, in the quiet of this moment be real to us and throughout the hours of this day keep us aware of Thy presence. Living with Thee, may we become good enough to make this a good day with good work well done for the good of our people.

In all the fields of our human endeavors, in all the complicated conditions of our civilization, in all the mad movements for power and wealth which mark our day, help us to remember that Thou art God, that this is Thy world, and that if we are to be delivered from danger or even disaster, it will be only through our loyalty to Thee and our obedience to Thy laws which govern this universe in which we live.

Therefore, we pray Thee, help us to increase our faith in Thee and make us responsive to Thy spirit that right and truth may prevail in us and in the lives of our leaders who control the direction and the destiny of our Republic; for Thine is the kingdom, and the power, and the glory forever. Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The SPEAKER. The Chair has examined the Journal of the last day's proceedings and announces to the House his approval thereof.

Without objection, the Journal stands approved.

There was no objection.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced

that the Senate had passed with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 11864. An act to provide for the early commercial demonstration of the technology of solar heating by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards, the National Science Foundation, the General Services Administration, and other Federal agencies, and for the early development and commercial demonstration of technology for combined solar heating and cooling;

H.R. 12670. An act to amend section 301 of title 37, United States Code, relating to incentive pay, to attract and retain volunteers for aviation crew member duties, and for other purposes; and

H.R. 14354. An act to amend the National School Lunch Act, to authorize the use of certain funds to purchase agricultural commodities for distribution to schools, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendment to the bill (H.R. 14354) entitled "An act to amend the National School Lunch Act, to authorize the use of certain funds to purchase agricultural commodities for distribution to schools, and for other purposes," disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. TALMADGE, Mr. McGOVERN, Mr. ALLEN, Mr. CLARK, Mr. YOUNG, Mr. DOLE, and Mr. BELLMON to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

The message also announced that the Senate agrees to the amendments of the House with an amendment to a bill of the Senate of the following title:

S. 3398. An act to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide a 10-year delimiting period for the pursuit of educational programs by veterans, wives, and widows.

The message also announced that the Senate had receded from its amendment to a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 12920. An act to authorize additional appropriations to carry out the Peace Corps Act, and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed bills of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 1018. An act to create a National Commission on the Olympic Games to review the question of U.S. participation in the Olympic games and to evaluate and formulate recommendations concerning such participation; and

S. 3458. An act to amend the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, the Food Stamp Act of 1964, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS OVER MEMORIAL DAY HOLIDAY

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I offer a privileged concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 501) and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the concurrent resolution, as follows:

H. CON. RES. 501

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That when the two Houses adjourn on Thursday, May 23, 1974, they stand adjourned until 12 o'clock noon on Tuesday, May 28, 1974, or until 12 o'clock noon on the second day after their respective Members are notified to reassemble in accordance with section 2 of this resolution, whichever event first occurs.

Sec. 2. The Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall notify the Members of the House and the Senate, respectively, to reassemble whenever in their opinion the public interest shall warrant it or whenever the majority leader of the House and the majority leader of the Senate, acting jointly, or the minority leader of the House and the

minority leader of the Senate, acting jointly, file a written request with the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate that the Congress reassemble for the consideration of legislation.

Mr. McFALL (during the reading). I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the concurrent resolution be dispensed with and that it be printed in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, reserving the right to object, I should like to ask the gentleman from California what emergency we are looking at that requires all of this delegated power to certain Members of Congress to call the House and Senate back into session or is that a new ritual we now go through without any particular reason?

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield, I would give my own opinion. This section is added to every recess resolution that we have from now on in order to take care of any problems that might come up during the time of recess. It has been, I think, the opinion of Members on both sides of the aisle that this kind of authority should be put in all recess resolutions to take care of any emergency. I would not anticipate over the short recess that is called for in this resolution that we would have such an emergency, and I am sure the gentleman from Iowa would not anticipate such a thing, but it is a routine matter that is put in to take care of any eventuality.

Mr. GROSS. I would not expect a session on Saturday, Sunday, or Monday. Of course, that leaves only Friday as an exception. However, I thank the gentleman for his explanation.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

The concurrent resolution was agreed to.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

AUTHORIZING CLERK TO RECEIVE MESSAGES FROM THE SENATE, AND THE SPEAKER TO SIGN ENROLLED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS NOTWITHSTANDING ADJOURNMENT

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that notwithstanding any adjournment of the House until Tuesday, May 28, 1974, the Clerk be authorized to receive messages from the Senate and that the Speaker be authorized to sign any enrolled bills and joint resolutions duly passed by the two Houses and found truly enrolled.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

CHANGE IN LEGISLATIVE PROGRAM

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I would like to announce that the Community Services Act, H.R. 14449, which has been scheduled for consideration tomorrow, will not be taken up on tomorrow.

JOHN F. GRINER WAS TIRELESS LEADER OF U.S. EMPLOYEES

(Mr. DULSKI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, the American labor movement, and Federal employees in particular, have lost a tireless and beloved leader in the passing of John F. Griner, president emeritus of the American Federation of Government Employees.

For 10 years, until 1972, he led the AFGE in a period of its greatest progress in behalf of its membership—and, indeed, in behalf of all Federal employees.

The mark of the successful employee leader is the rapport he achieves in his representations. In the case of Federal employees, this means rapport with the Congress and various Government agencies. In this area, John Griner excelled.

As chairman of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, I had a close personal association with Mr. Griner. My door always was open to him and this was in recognition of the fact that he was a reasonable and respectful leader at the same time that he pressed vigorously his legislative views and beliefs.

We did not always agree, of course. But he respected my legislative responsibility to examine each proposal with care in the overall public interest. Differences of opinion and view are needed to produce the best end result.

John Griner enjoyed a fine relationship with many Members of Congress. Members of my committee expressed their esteem in the memorial resolution adopted unanimously on May 16. The text follows:

RESOLUTION ON THE DEATH OF JOHN F. GRINER

Whereas, John F. Griner did serve with extreme distinction as President of the American Federation of Government Employees from 1962 to 1972; and

Whereas, during this period his leadership resulted in numerous legislative accomplishments designed to improve the lives and working conditions of all Federal employees; and

Whereas, there had developed between the Members of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee and John F. Griner strong bonds of esteem, respect, and affections; and

Whereas, the Committee, both individually and collectively are deeply appreciative of his many fine contributions to its deliberations and to the entire Civil Service: It is hereby

Resolved by the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service in regular session, That it has learned with profound sorrow of the death of John F. Griner and that it extends its deepest sympathy to his family and associates in the American Federation of Government Employees.

THADDEUS J. DULSKI,

Chairman.

DAVID N. HENDERSON,

Vice Chairman.

H. R. GROSS,

Ranking Minority Member.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I wish to join with my colleagues on the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee and in the House of Representatives in expressing my sense of loss in the death of Mr. John F. Griner, former president of the American Federation of Government Employees.

As a member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee for more than 25 years, I knew John Griner before he became president of the AFGE as well as during his tenure of office.

Both as a worker in the ranks and as president of his organization, John fought hard for what he believed to be the best interests of the members he served. While we did not always agree in matters of legislation, he was always fair in his representations.

John Griner served the American Federation of Government Employees well and the Nation is better for his having lived and worked among us.

Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, John Griner was a unique individual. In my 14 years of congressional service, I have dealt with a great many people who, in the broad sense, could be called "lobbyist" in that they represented a particular point of view and tried to influence that point of view.

Using that definition, John was a "lobbyist," but he was more than that. When he called on me to urge my support of a particular measure, he always understood my position. When I agreed with him, he was appreciative. When I did not, he was understanding. He never sought personal gain or a personal favor. Always his interest was in the rank and file Federal employees who comprised the membership of the American Federation of Government Employees.

In many ways, John was more like the president of a local than your typical picture of a national president. He used to stroll casually into my office unannounced. He placed calls to me himself on the telephone, instead of having his secretary do it for him. He did not hesitate to ask for me to meet him off the House floor when he had a matter he felt should have my prompt attention.

A totally honest, forthright, and dependable man, John never asked for or would he settle for less than he considered to be justly due the hundreds of thousands of people he represented.

John Griner was a man I respected; a man I liked; a man with whom I could always reach a reasonable understanding. The American Federation of Government Employees and the cause of employee associations generally are the poorer for his loss.

I will miss him.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks on the passing of John F. Griner.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

POOR SOLUTION TO VETERANS EDUCATION PROBLEMS

(Mr. BIAGGI asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding there will be a request to bring up under unanimous consent a

bill providing for a 30-day extension of eligibility for veterans education benefits—it is my intention to object.

This is a shabby solution to a difficult problem. Are we going to continue to play roulette with the lives and futures of the more than 300,000 veterans who will have their benefits cut off May 31?

If a 30-day provision is passed it is very unlikely any veteran will be able to take advantage of the education benefits for summer school. There is no guarantee that he will have the funds to complete his summer school. If he is cut off June 30, he will face a difficult, if not impossible, job market. Many veterans have already indicated to me that they will have to apply for welfare if benefits are not continued. Unemployment among veterans is already scandalously high.

Last week when I raised this issue, I urged that the House approve the 2-year extension provision contained in both the House and Senate veterans benefits packages. I delayed action at the request of the leadership to permit one more try at getting the Senate to accept the House bill as passed. This they have not done.

I say once again, in the absence of any agreement between this body and the other body on the full package, the only fair solution is passage of my 2-year extension bill. Considering the problems that will be generated by a 30-day extension, I don't see how the Congress can continue to play power politics with the futures of these men.

In the event that my bill, H.R. 14464, is not taken up today, I will file a discharge petition at the Speaker's desk and urge my colleagues to sign it. We only have 1 week in which to act. I hope the concern for our Vietnam-era veterans so often expressed by my colleagues here will be demonstrated once more by signing the discharge petition.

DEMOCRATIC CAUCUS FOOLS NO ONE

(Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska. Mr. Speaker, for 15 months the Select Committee on Committees worked hard to produce a plan to reorganize the House committee structure to enable the House to deal more effectively and efficiently with the problems that confront our Nation in this decade, the 1980's and 1990's and beyond.

Regrettably that effort was seriously undercut, probably killed outright, by the action of the Democratic caucus when by secret ballot it voted to send the legislation, House Resolution 988, to a caucus committee.

On reflection, if there is any encouragement to be found in the wake of the action of the Democratic caucus it is that nobody seems to have been fooled a bit by what the caucus did. The details are not known because it was a closed meeting, but the message that the reform package has been scuttled for political expediency came across loud and clear.

Various Members of the House have

criticized that action. There has been adverse press comment about this development. Interest groups and individuals have expressed dismay and disgust. And that is just the beginning. There will be more.

Our citizens and our institutions simply will not accept the political machinations as are being attempted by the Democratic caucus.

REDUCING PAPERWORK BURDEN ON SMALL BUSINESS

(Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Speaker, on Monday I cosponsored a bill designed to reduce the paperwork burden placed on small businesses by the Federal Government. This bill could save small businesses up to \$235 million a year in clerical and accounting costs without causing any lost tax revenue.

The bill simply reduces the number of times a year employers must report employee withholding for Federal benefits.

Small businesses are the least able to stand the financial burden placed by Government redtape. Needless paperwork imposed on a business can only result in higher prices for the consumer. Every additional Government form that is required must have another highly paid Government bureaucrat to move it from one file to another.

TERMINATION OF VETERANS EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS

(Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, 9 days from today, educational benefits for 300,000 of our Nation's veterans will be terminated—benefits they have earned through service to their country—benefits that in all probability would be continued without question under other circumstances, after any other war.

But these young men and women had the misfortune of serving during the tragic Vietnam conflict. So now they stand to lose their benefits, even though they have not finished school.

They are the victims, I regret to say, of an apathetic Congress, which has allowed the simple extension of their eligibility to be held hostage as the House and Senate maneuver in an effort to force each other into accepting their particular version of other veteran education legislation.

Consumed with policy difference, the Congress has allowed the May 31 termination date to drift closer and closer. Both Houses agree that a 2-year extension is justified—yet it has not been passed.

The Senate yesterday adopted a 30-day extension, so that the program can continue while other differences are being worked out.

The House must pass the extension, S. 3398, immediately. We can delay on this

no longer. Our veterans must know if they are going to be able to continue their schooling.

The House already has passed the extension and a higher rate of benefits—twice. This will mean nothing if we allow the benefits to expire in 9 days.

For those who are simply opposed to continuing the program in the name of fiscal conservatism, I would remind them that there is no better investment of this Nation's resources than in the education of its citizens.

If hundreds of thousands of veterans are forced to quit school, many will be added to our already-bloated unemployment rolls. I cannot believe that any Member of Congress feels that welfare payments are a better investment of our resources than the GI bill.

FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENTAL PERSECUTION

(Mr. RONCALLO of New York asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RONCALLO of New York. Mr. Speaker, I take this time to announce to the membership that when we go into the Committee of the Whole today I will request permission to speak out of order on a matter which affects the relationship of the legislative and executive branches and the right of every citizen to be free from governmental persecution. I respectfully urge my colleagues to remain on the floor, if at all possible.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that when I address the Committee of the Whole I be permitted to revise and extend my remarks and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

RELEASE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION DURING IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY

(Mr. COCHRAN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COCHRAN. Mr. Speaker, I know I am only one of many Members of this House who is very disappointed in the continued biased discussion by some of the zealots of the Judiciary Committee of confidential committee evidence obtained in the impeachment inquiry. It is becoming more and more obvious that rather than being a constitutional or legal process, some Members are transforming the impeachment inquiry into a selfish political escapade which brings discredit on the Congress. The people of this great country deserve more responsible conduct.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, the announcement by the Government of India that it has constructed and exploded a powerful nuclear weapon in its north-west desert area is almost beyond belief.

While this may satisfy the ego of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and officials of her impoverished government, the staggering costs of this venture will take food from the mouths of the 75 percent of India's children already suffering from malnutrition, and compound the poverty of millions of adult Indians.

Only recently the United States canceled some \$2 billion of the debt owed to it by India, but the pending administration budget calls for more than \$100 million in foreign aid.

It will be intolerable if Congress approves another dollar for aid to an Indian Government whose priority is nuclear weaponry rather than its starved, poverty-stricken millions.

EXTENSION OF EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS FOR VIETNAM VETERANS

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, a number of Members have this morning spoken to the question concerning the extension of educational benefits for Vietnam veterans. It is important that we realize again that the date of May 31 is the deadline for extension of benefits for some 300,000 veterans.

If we do not act, 300,000 veterans will be denied further educational benefits.

The Senate has passed a 30-day extension. I do not like this 30-day extension, but, by the same token, I think we must act within this time period. Otherwise these veterans will be denied the right to extend their education.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge the House to give immediate consideration to the 30-day extension.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLFF. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to join with the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF) and say that the House must take action on this matter to extend educational benefits and other benefits to the Vietnam veterans, who are facing a major problem in this country today.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

PROPOSED REDUCTION OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAXES

(Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, I wish to take this opportunity to inform the Members that I am sending a "Dear Colleague" letter to all those Members of the House who have not co-sponsored my bill to reduce social security taxes.

More than 125 Members have already cosponsored this bill, and the Committee on Ways and Means is presently engaged in holding public hearings on the proposed tax reforms.

If we are going to give the working men and women of this Nation any relief whatsoever, the social security tax must be reduced to a realistic figure.

CALL OF THE HOUSE

Mr. WYDLER. Mr. Speaker, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Speaker, I move a call of the House.

A call of the House was ordered.

The call was taken by electronic device, and the following Members failed to respond:

[Roll No. 236]

Arends	Helstoski	Roncallo, N.Y.
Brown, Ohio	Hogan	Rooney, N.Y.
Buchanan	Hollifield	Runnels
Burke, Calif.	Johnson, Pa.	Shuster
Carey, N.Y.	Jones, Okla.	Smith, N.Y.
Chappell	Kemp	Stanton,
Clark	Kluczynski	James V.
Clawson, Del	Litton	Steiger, Wis.
Clay	Lott	Stephens
Conyers	Macdonald	Stubblefield
Daniel, Dan	Maraziti	Stuckey
Davis, Ga.	Matsunaga	Teague
Derwinski	Morgan	Thompson, N.J.
Diggs	Mosher	Traxler
Drinan	Nix	Udall
Evans, Colo.	Rangel	Ullman
Fish	Rees	Wiggins
Ford	Reid	Williams
Gray	Rhodes	Wyatt
Heinz	Riegle	

The SPEAKER. On this rollcall 375 Members have recorded their presence by electronic device, a quorum.

By unanimous consent, further proceedings under the call were dispensed with.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION, 1975

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes.

The motion was agreed to.

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H.R. 14592, with Mr. ROSTENKOWSKI in the Chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee rose on Monday, May 20, 1974, the

Committee had agreed that title I, ending on page 3, line 3 of the bill, would be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

Are there any amendments to title I?

Mr. RONCALLO of New York. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. RONCALLO) of New York was allowed to speak out of order and to proceed for 15 additional minutes.)

FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENTAL PERSECUTION

Mr. RONCALLO of New York. Mr. Chairman, justice has prevailed. I come before my colleagues and speak from the well of the House having been acquitted by a jury of my peers and exonerated of all charges against me. After 3 months of horror I am once again free to do the job for which the fine people of the Third District of New York have elected me. But I can never be free; no Member of Congress can be free; and certainly no private citizen can be free until the prostitution and perversion of the office of the U.S. district attorney for the Eastern District of New York as exemplified by events surrounding my case are driven from our midst.

What I have to say today should be of vital interest to every Member because the procedures followed by the U.S. attorney's office could affect both the relationship between the executive and legislative branches and also the right of every citizen to be free from unjust persecution at the hands of his government.

I am grateful the jury was able to recognize my innocence but I am also fearful and angry—fearful because if as a body we take no action we serve notice to the Department of Justice that it can act with impunity to attack any Member of the Congress for its own political ends no matter which side of the aisle he sits on, and I am angry because I should never have been prosecuted at all.

No one in the U.S. attorney's office ever believed I was guilty of anything. The prosecution, or rather persecution, was born of the political ambitions of the acting U.S. attorney, and his Gestapo tactics have debased the office to which he was appointed.

I would like to review for the Members the illegal actions which have taken place since the beginning of January, but first let me establish a little history which I believe is in order.

After the tragic death last December of the distinguished U.S. attorney for the Eastern District Robert A. Morse, his assistant, 31-year-old Edward John Boyd V assumed the post in an acting capacity. Mr. Boyd V was not recommended for the permanent position, and in a fit of pique he attempted to punish those responsible for his nonselection. He first launched an attack against the chief assistant district attorney of Nassau County, Edward Margolin, whose name had been suggested for the post, and against Margolin's superior, District Attorney William Cahn. Mr. Boyd called Margolin before the Federal grand jury, but filed no charges. The political assassination was effective, however, and Margolin's name was withdrawn.

This is where I came into the picture. Mr. Boyd had been trying to make a case against New York State Assemblyman Joseph Margiotta, who as Republican leader of Nassau County was one of those responsible for not recommending Boyd for the U.S. attorney's post. When Boyd failed to come up with anything against Margiotta, he decided to hold me hostage to his own political ambitions.

The first inkling I had of all this was on January 12 of this year, when reporter Brian Quinn stated on CBS radio news in New York that informed sources had indicated that the Justice Department had initiated an investigation of a number of public officials on Long Island including Cahn, Margiotta, and myself, and that indictments were expected. Nearly a month then went by with still no contact by Mr. Boyd.

On February 7 at the request of the U.S. attorney's office I voluntarily appeared before the grand jury without an attorney to testify as to what I knew about the Cahn-Margiotta case. Instead, however, I was asked seemingly innocuous questions on subjects regarding my own personal activities. I was later requested to return the following week for an informal meeting with Assistant U.S. Attorneys Peter Schlam and Robert Katzberg.

I went as requested, and took my law partner Leonard Weber along because of the antagonistic attitude of the U.S. attorney's office at the grand jury hearing. I have here a deposition by Mr. Weber, testifying as to what transpired at that February 14 meeting, which will prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that there never was a case against me; that I was not the intended victim; and that they would not hesitate to try to ruin me if I would not help advance their political aims.

In brief, 29-year-old Schlam said he did not think I deserved to be prosecuted, but that I would be if I refused to give programmed testimony against Cahn and Margiotta. He threatened that the indictment alone would be enough to ruin my political career. Conviction was not his object. His object was political assassination. He refused my request to answer specific questions under oath before the grand jury, saying he had no specifics, but that, and I quote: "You've got to come aboard our ship" and cooperate all the way, or I would be indicted. If I played along there would be no indictment, and I would walk away free. If I did not agree to become a coconspirator in his scheme by the following Wednesday, he would send the indictment forward.

This offer of lack of prosecution and avoidance of embarrassment was an outright form of bribery. The bribe had been offered, but not taken. I refused then, as I would now, to perjure myself and make up a story out of whole cloth. In other words, the prosecutor asked for programmed testimony in return for not bringing an indictment against a man he acknowledged to be innocent. This is intimidation in its most blatant form.

As a matter of fact, no information against me had as yet been presented to the grand jury. Schlam did not call wit-

nesses until the following day—after I refused to be bought off.

I consulted an attorney, who asked the prosecutors for a week's delay to finish a pending case. This was refused, effectively denying me the original counsel of my choice. I eventually engaged counsel, but his request for only a few days to read into the case was similarly refused by the U.S. attorney's office.

The deadline of Wednesday came and went, as I had no knowledge of wrongdoing by any person. The next word I heard about my case was 7:30 Thursday morning, February 21. As I was leaving my house to fly to Washington for the session that day, I was greeted by a reporter from a local daily who asked me to comment on the indictment. How could I comment? The indictment had not even been handed down yet.

I did not even know for sure if I would be indicted, let alone know the allegations against me. At the airport I purchased a copy of *Newsday*, which said the indictment was imminent.

I would like to show everyone a copy of that paper, which was printed some 10 hours before the formal indictment was released by the Justice Department.

I have always been under the impression that grand jury proceedings were inviolate, and that for a U.S. attorney to reveal its actions before an indictment is handed down is a serious criminal offense. The article, quoting "sources close to the investigation," could only have come from a deliberate leak in the U.S. attorney's office, an illegal action which shows at the very least a healthy disrespect for the law and the civil rights of the defendants. This is one of several unethical acts which I plan to lay before the Bar Association Ethics Committee.

In fact, the leak was premature. As it happens, *Newsday* had been given earlier information that the indictments were to be handed down the previous day and already had set the story in type. Look at this galley proof for Thursday morning screaming that I had already been indicted. The headline reads "Federal Jury Indicts Roncallo and Burke." It was set Wednesday night, but had to be ripped up and replaced by this one, reading "Indictments of Roncallo, Burke Are Expected Soon," when the indictment was not signed in time.

I left for Washington, and my office started getting calls from newspapers and wire services as early as 9:30 a.m.

There was still no word from the U.S. attorney's office or from the Justice Department itself. At noon, I went to the floor, just missing a *Washington Star* reporter who called from the Justice Department Press Room. He had just been handed a lengthy press release announcing indictments in great detail and including statements from Attorney General Saxbe.

Up to this point, it seems that I was the only one the Justice Department had not seen fit to inform that the indictments had actually been handed down. I was not given the common courtesy which any citizen should have a right to expect.

Instead, I was left hanging, unable to

answer the questions of the reporters, not even knowing the specific charges against me. Instead of being told of the indictment, I had to send my staff begging to the Justice Department for the information. The indictment was finally confirmed over the phone, and at 12:45 p.m., nearly an hour after the rest of the world, I received the details from the Department over the telecopier. There can only be one reason for this breach of courtesy: To embarrass me as much as possible by preventing me from giving an immediate statement to the press in my defense. I believe this was a deliberate attempt on the part of the executive to discredit the Congress at every available opportunity.

As further evidence that the indictment was not based on fact, here is what the supposed "victim," William F. Cosulich, told *Newsday* when the indictment was announced:

If this indictment is based upon my testimony, I just don't understand it. I'm shocked, I just hope it goes to a speedy trial. These men are innocent. It's incredible that people can be menaced like this.

I appeared for arraignment on March 1 and asked for an immediate trial in order to clear my name, to be able to devote my full energies to representing my constituents in Congress, and to stop this slander at the earliest possible date from preventing the voters of my district from being able to choose their representative next fall on the issues, rather than on this extraneous matter. Assistant U.S. Attorney Schlam told District Court Judge Edward Neaher that the Government would be "ready to proceed to trial as soon as the defense says that it is ready."

On March 11, the date set for pre-trial motions, Assistant U.S. Attorney Schlam came into court and had the audacity to ask Judge Neaher to delay the trial for 1 month. This was the same man who earlier had denied my counsel time to study the charges against me. I have here the following day's *Newsday* report of the proceedings. Judge Neaher's comments are particularly enlightening, and I quote:

We have a high public official here charged with a serious crime. He must stand for re-election. This makes it reasonable why a speedy trial is desirable. . . . I certainly acted on the understanding that the Government itself was anxious to proceed.

Mr. Schlam had never before voiced any objection to a speedy trial. Why he then chose to delay is no mystery. He did not have a case against me; he never had a case against me; and he never intended that I should be allowed to clear my name so quickly. There is no question that they were trying to push the proceedings as close as possible to the elections. Remember, they were not out to convict a Congressman, just to ruin him.

Twice more, during the trial itself, the U.S. attorney's office tried to drag out the case. First, they made up a story which would have a hard time getting itself sold as a 10-cent pulp novel. Supposedly, Assistant U.S. Attorney Schlam fell ill from an overdose of barbiturates during the course of the trial. Let me

read you this description of what I would call a "smeller-drama" from *Newsday*:

Federal marshals are guarding assistant U. S. Attorney Peter R. Schlam, the chief prosecutor in the trial of Representative Angelo D. Roncallo, acting U. S. Attorney Edward Boyd said yesterday. The New York Times quoted sources close to the investigation as saying the investigators were proceeding in the belief that someone had drugged the prosecutor. The Times quoted Schlam's mother as saying that the matter has been "very frightening" and "I hope nobody is ever going to get near him again."

There was a twofold purpose in this slander by innuendo. One was to give the impression that I was responsible for a gangland style attack on Schlam. Boyd was actually quoted by the Long Island Press as saying that the overdose was "involuntary." I have written to Attorney General Saxe, requesting a Washington-based investigation of the whole matter and suggesting that it can easily be cleared up if Mr. Schlam would be willing to submit to a lie detector test.

Of course, no charges were ever filed. However, Boyd V used this as an excuse for a prosecution motion to interrupt the trial for a week so that still another assistant U.S. attorney, Thomas Puccio, could familiarize himself with the case. Fortunately, the motion was denied and Puccio proceeded to show that he was all too familiar with the shenanigans being pulled by his cohorts.

When Mr. Puccio started abusing a character witness, a judge of the second highest court in my State, the New York Times described Judge Neaher's reaction as follows:

Judge Neaher quickly leaned forward at the bench and shouted to the prosecutor: "Do you want a mistrial? Is that what you're seeking? Then you'd better desist."

You see, a mistrial is exactly what they wanted. Either I would be left with no verdict and a cloud still hanging over my name, or a new trial would have to take place, extending the proceedings even closer to the elections. Isn't it strange? Usually it is the defendant who seeks the delays, who tries for the mistrials, in the hope of avoiding his inevitable conviction or in the hope of escaping entirely in the confusion. In my case, it was the prosecution that was trying to confuse the matter. Throughout the whole affair I demanded my constitutional right to a speedy trial, something that did not suit the purposes of Messrs. Boyd, Schlam, and Puccio.

The actual conduct of the trial also bears looking into. Six of the seven witnesses testified under immunity for various crimes against the United States. According to press reports, the district attorney is looking into many portions of the trial transcript where the testimony of these witnesses is in direct conflict with statements made before the Nassau County grand jury. Other lapses of proper procedure on the part of the U.S. attorney's office are also evident in the transcript.

In addition to illegally leaking grand jury information to the press, another public statement of Mr. Boyd proved beyond a shadow of a doubt that he had embarked on a political vendetta, not a judicial inquest, and that he was at-

tempting to bring me into public ridicule and contempt regardless of the outcome, rather than seeking that justice be done.

On the day the indictments were handed down, Mr. Boyd made the following statement which I quote from *Newsday* of February 22:

I represent 8 million people in this area and if we catch these SOB's clean, I'm going to do my job.

Well, clean I am, but an SOB I am not. That this scurrilous statement should come from an officer of the Department of Justice is even more reprehensible and irresponsible. It tends to exacerbate the already existing troubled relationship between the executive and legislative branches of our Government. When an executive branch functionary, acting in his official capacity, calls a Member of Congress an SOB, it can only be with the express purpose of holding him and the entire Congress up to public ridicule.

A Member of Congress is not an SOB. He is entitled to respect while he serves in that capacity, and like any citizen, he is innocent until proven guilty.

Mr. Boyd has grossly violated the privilege of this Member and of the House by his calumnies, and I believe it is well within the rights of this body to demand an apology.

But let us forget about me for a minute. I then had two codefendants. What right does a man in Mr. Boyd's position have to call any man an SOB? Since he knew he could not win in court, does this give him the right to try his case in the media? In prejudicing constitutional rights of the defendants to a fair trial, Mr. Boyd has opened up still another area of unethical conduct for bar association investigation.

You might be interested to know why Mr. Boyd wanted me to deliver the information against District Attorney Cahn. During the course of my trial, Mr. Boyd, a lifelong Republican, approached the Nassau County Democratic Committee, seeking their nomination to run against Mr. Cahn in November. Of course, he was refused, but this shows what kind of a man he is. Utterly unscrupulous, he would violate his oath of office, initiate and conduct an inquiry with which he had a conflict of interest, sacrifice the political futures of several elected and appointed officials, including this Member, and prostitute the office of U.S. attorney for his own political advantage.

The post-trial statements of jury members, quoted on May 18 in a *Newsday* article entitled "Jurors: Never a question of conviction," puts the government's conduct of the trial into perspective:

Thomas Ielpi, 41, a Brooklyn telephone repairman, said, "I was waiting and waiting for them to show me something, anything. But they didn't. I would have to say that some of us were wondering why they were even indicted," he said of Roncallo and Antonomoso.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, I should not have been indicted. Such an indictment was a blatant violation of Mr. Boyd's oath of office and duty to the people of the United States.

For this reason I here and now call

for Mr. Boyd's resignation from any and all offices of public trust which he might hold.

Mr. Chairman, I am today writing to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary calling for an investigation into the statements and actions of Mr. Boyd, Mr. Schlam, Mr. Puccio, and other officials of the U.S. attorney's office. I do not seek any personal gain from this, as I have already been exonerated. I take this action to prevent this situation from ever happening again. If officials of the Justice Department take this as a precedent, they will continue to use threats of political assassination to terrorize Members of Congress in the future. No Member is safe, because you need not have done anything to be vulnerable to indictment.

Even more importantly, it is the little man, the average private citizen, for whom I fear. How can he, completely innocent, enmeshed in a web not of his own making, protect himself? How can he raise the tens of thousands of dollars this has cost me to defend myself? Perhaps we ought to consider reimbursing the innocent defendant for the costs of his defense. Perhaps the accused citizen should have a right to counsel before the grand jury and the right to present evidence to answer the charges of the U.S. attorney.

I therefore request the Committee on the Judiciary or an appropriate joint committee to proceed without delay: First, to investigate the U.S. attorney's office for the eastern district of New York to determine if the constitutional privilege of the House or of this Member has been violated by one or more officers of the United States, to determine what illegal acts may have been committed by them, and to report the committee's findings to the House. Second, I urge the committee to consider appropriate legislation to prevent these Gestapo-like tactics from ever again being used against any citizen of our great country.

In the meantime, I recall the words of my father during my ordeal. He reminded me that he had come to the United States from his native Italy to escape from fascism only to find traces of it here once again. We must keep faith with him and with the very essence of America by insuring that no man can be indicted and, God forbid, sent to jail, at the political whim of a Federal prosecutor.

Mr. Chairman, justice has won out, and the verdict of the jury has enabled me to show the voters of my district that their confidence in me has not been misplaced. I am also very grateful for the opportunity to show that the many courtesies which the Speaker and my colleagues have extended to me throughout my first term in Congress, and especially during this trying ordeal, have been given to one who has never in his life acted in any manner which would bring discredit to this body. But I will not rest. I will not be silent, until every citizen is safe from governmental persecution. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, under the leave granted me when we were in the House, I include at this point in the RECORD, the following materials:

My letter to Chairman RODINO.

A letter to me from James J. Maune, who has served on a Federal grand jury.

"Behind the News" political analysis column, Massapequa, N.Y., Post, February 21, 1974.

"Dear Friends:" political analysis column, Syosset, N.Y., Tribune, February 28, 1974.

"Behind the News," Massapequa, N.Y., Post, March 14, 1974.

Article, "A Really New Name For U.S. Attorney," Newsday, March 22, 1974.

Article, "Jurors: Never a Question of Conviction," Newsday, May 18, 1974.

The material follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C., May 22, 1974.

Hon. PETER W. RODINO, Jr.,
Chairman,
House Judiciary Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As I stated on the Floor this afternoon, I respectfully request the Committee to conduct an immediate investigation into the statements and actions of Assistant United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, Edward John Boyd 5th, presently serving as Acting U.S. Attorney, Assistant U.S. Attorneys Peter Schlam and Robert Katzberg, and other officials of the U.S. Attorney's office. I believe that such an investigation by the Committee or its staff will show the need for full hearings on the improper and illegal events surrounding the recent trial at which I and my co-defendant were exonerated of any and all wrongdoing.

During the course of its investigation, I would hope that the Committee would proceed with these thoughts in mind: to determine if the Constitutional privilege of the House or of me as a Member has been violated; to determine what illegal acts have been committed by officials of the U.S. Attorney's office; and to report such findings to the House. I would also urge the Committee to consider appropriate legislation to revise the Federal grand jury system so that the improper tactics used in my case will never again be visited upon any citizen.

I am enclosing a copy of the prepared text I used on the Floor and the other documentation to which I made reference. You might also find of interest the enclosed letter from a constituent who served on a grand jury. I am of course happy to cooperate with the Committee in its investigation and to furnish other documentation upon request.

Thank you very much for your courtesy and interest.

Sincerely,

ANGELO D. RONCALLO,
Member of Congress.

PLAINVIEW, N.Y., May 18, 1974.

Hon. ANGELO D. RONCALLO,
U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN RONCALLO: I would first wish to offer my congratulations on your victory in the District Court and express my support for your re-election in November.

I would further wish to express my opinion on the Federal Grand Jury system as I observed the system as a Grand Juror in August, 1971.

I served on a Grand Jury prior to entering Law School, and even as a newcomer to the judicial process I was disturbed by the conduct of the Assistant U.S. Attorneys in presenting criminal cases. Some specific examples are as follows:

The U.S. Attorney would request the recorder to leave this "off the record" and then present a prejudiced discourse on the defendant.

The U.S. Attorney would request that the jurors not question the witness.

The U.S. Attorney would request that Jurors questions be kept "off the record".

Indictments which could not be sustained at law were obtained for use as bargaining "chips" to obtain testimony.

As secretary of the Grand Jury I requested instructions in the event the Jury voted "no true bill" and was told not to worry—it never happens.

At that time I was left with the impression that the U.S. Attorney could get whatever he wanted from the Grand Jury and is therefore left with a great deal of power which he can abuse at his discretion.

I feel that your recent experience would cause your views to be in accord with my observations. I also feel that you now have the motive to stimulate congressional action to place limits on the power of U.S. Attorneys, or at least attempt to create a system of better informed and more independent Grand Juries.

With best wishes

JAMES J. MAUNE.

[From the Massapequa (N.Y.) Post,
February 21, 1974]

BEHIND THE NEWS

(By Ira L. Cahn)

Obviously, the big news this week is the indictment of Congressman Angelo Roncallo, Town Supervisor John Burke, Town Attorney John Conroy and several others. The whole thing staggers the imagination . . . It's too fantastic to believe.

Naturally, this office has spent the major part of our pre-press time tracking down statements, talking to Washington, to Oyster Bay and to Brooklyn, plus trying in vain to reach Acting U.S. Attorney Edward Boyd, etc., etc.

Those who read this column regularly respect the integrity that has been earned over the years. They expect me to investigate study, probe, analyze and THEN report what I have been able to uncover and conclude.

That's exactly what I intend to do. It'll take me a few days to do the digging I have to do, maybe even longer. When I do come up with whatever I find, you'll know that I have made every human effort to get you the facts.

It is in this vein that I suggest to my readers that they take the same attitude in their own thinking and in their conversations with others. Give Angie and the rest of the men caught up in the same web the sort of break you would want if you were hit by a similar set of circumstances.

I have come up with a few odds and ends in the past few hours that I should pass along to you . . .

There is the very blatant leak from the federal attorney's office. Newsday had the story of the imminent indictments early enough to make Thursday's papers, distributed before the indictments were handed down. This information could only have come from the prosecutor's office. (I don't blame Newsday for using the story—if I had had it, I would have used it.)

Along the same line, the Dept. of Justice had prepared a press release and had distributed it to the media in Washington before Roncallo, Burke or anyone else had been advised they had been indicted. This sort of thing smacks of persecution rather than prosecution!

The way I get the basic story—and it wasn't easy to piece this thing together under the pressure of press time—a consulting engineer by the name of William Cosulich had been doing some work for the Town of Oyster Bay. One day he asked Roncallo to protect him from the numerous requests (?) he was getting for political contributions from all kinds of clubs, committees, fund raisers, etc.

Roncallo, GOP town leader at the time, suggested that one contribution to the town

committee would suffice but stressed that no contribution was necessary. Cosulich insisted that he wanted to contribute, but that there is a limit.

He handed Ange a check for \$1,000 (already made out to Roncallo). It was immediately endorsed over to the town committee and never even went through Roncallo's bank account.

Well, that's the way I was able to piece together one part of the story. It needs a heck of a lot more checking, of course, but you are entitled to know what I know at this time. . . . More on this whole mess next week.

[From the Syosset (N.Y.) Tribune,
Feb. 28, 1974]

DEAR FRIENDS:

As you know, our coverage of Town Hall activities is done by a professional writer, Ms Janet Gosnell, who has done an excellent and impartial job of covering both Town and County Board meetings for us for the past few years. Ms Gosnell's coverage of this particular TOB Board meeting appears in this issue.

As to our own feelings in regard to the federal grand jury indictments issued against TOB Supervisor John W. Burke and TOB Attorney John M. Conroy, naturally we were shocked, which we shouldn't have been, when we consider the recent indictments against such a man as Perry Duryea. However, this seems a political "way of life", these days and we are quite sure that, along with Congressman Angelo Roncallo and others so indicated, these matters will be cleared up in due time, according to law. Naturally we believe in the innocence of these fine public servants, and deplore the hurt to them and to their families. Being lawyers, they too must be sure that they will be vindicated. But who can remove the political hurt accomplished by these indictments? In the final analysis our country will suffer on all political levels, when such harassment reaches the heights it has today. Those who are extremely well equipped to serve us as public servants will stay in or return to the private sector, where they can make much more money. Consequently we will end up with those far less capable attempting to serve us on many political levels.

Our opinion of these proceedings coincides exactly with that of William F. Cosulich of Syosset, head of a Plainview environmental engineering firm that allegedly was forced to kick back five per cent of the money it received in contracts from Oyster Bay Town to the Town Republican treasury. This man, who was portrayed in federal indictments as the principal extortion victim of Oyster Bay Republicans said in an article in a Nassau County daily newspaper, that he was "shocked" by the indictments and believes the defendants are innocent. "John Burke and John Conroy are two of the finest men I know," Cosulich said. "If this (the indictments) is based on my testimony, I just don't understand it. I'm shocked. I just hope that it goes to a speedy trial. These men are innocent. It's incredible that people can be menaced like this." We say "Amen" to this man's honest opinions. And we hope that all who are being so hurt in these unfortunate proceedings, will not be discouraged from serving us as they have done in the past. I'm sure that there are many who read this column who will disagree with me, as there are many who agree. Time alone will tell, on all political levels, who is right . . . who is wrong . . . and who is actually hurting our country most by their actions.

In the meantime, let us all, in spite of these legal diversions, which must be followed to their conclusion, do all we can to serve, on whatever level and in whatever capacity, is ours at present. For in a democracy, we will serve.

That's all for this week. Stay well... don't waste a day. And re-read and give careful thought to Kipling's immortal poem, "IF."

[From the Massapequa (N.Y.) Post,
Mar. 14, 1974]
BEHIND THE NEWS
(By Ira L. Cahn)

It looks like the case against Roncallo and the rest of the town of Oyster Bay indictees is blowing up in the prosecutor's face. There can be no other reason, from what I have been able to learn, for the federal attorney to refuse to go to trial on Monday as scheduled.

The usual procedure in most major trials is for the defense to use delaying tactics of every sort. The longer the delay, the better off is the defense, according to attorneys wise in the ways of such forensic maneuvering. This way, they say, memories get hazy, witnesses get hostile because of the numerous inconveniences, prosecutors lose their initial nerve.

But Roncallo, Burke, Conroy and the others are demanding speedy trials. They want this sword off their necks, they want to get back to the business of government and they don't want this clouding the forthcoming campaigns.

They are screaming they are innocent of any wrong doing and they want their names cleared... Certainly that is the least that they can expect.

But not with Edward Boyd V conducting the prosecution. How can a prosecutor claim he's not ready to go to trial? It's unbelievable! If he had enough evidence and good enough witnesses to persuade a grand jury to hand up an indictment, then this evidence and these witnesses should be ready for presentation in a court where everybody and everything can be examined in public.

In refusing to go to trial, the prosecutor is saying one of two things: (1) he really doesn't have a case but he hopes he will be able to dig up some corroborating evidence or some willing witness or (2) he wants to drag this thing out as long as possible, make life miserable for the accused men and their families and destroy their careers with daily "leaks" to the press.

Either way, he looks like a real mumbler.

All this has nothing to do with whether Roncallo and the others are innocent or guilty. Naturally, I am in Angie's corner; I make no bones about it. (In fact, most people I've spoken to—Democrats and Republicans alike—hope that this whole thing works out okay)... The main thing involved here is plain, simple justice!

By the time you read this, Federal Judge Edward Neaher may have reached a decision as to whether to allow the trial to be postponed or if he will reject the prosecutor's request... I hope he forces it to trial since "justice delayed is justice denied."

A REALLY NEW NAME FOR U.S. ATTORNEY
(By James Bernstein)

David Trager, asked about reports that his name had been submitted for U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District, said last night: "This is very amusing. Let me stop you, I've been getting calls like this all night."

This Trager is a 24-year-old Fordham Law School student. But speculation about who will succeed the late Robert Morse as U.S. Attorney is intense. When state Republican sources said yesterday that a David Trager would get the post, they triggered 10 or 15 calls to the student's Bronx apartment, Trager said.

The calls "came mostly from people who knew me. Some of them were people from law school who thought it must have been me. It was just amusing. It was cute," he said. "My parents' friends thought I was the person" who had been appointed. "They

called and said, 'did you know Robert Morse? Are you going to be the one?'"

There is, however, another David Trager. Young Trager said the appointment of David G. Trager, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, had been "discussed all day" among professors and students at Fordham, where Trager is a senior.

Trager, the professor, who has been an assistant U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District, is the latest potential candidate to succeed Morse, who committed suicide in December. State Sen. John Marchi (R-Staten Island) said yesterday that he had heard Trager's name mentioned as a successor a week ago. "I recall it because it was a name I didn't know," Marchi said.

The choice of a successor has touched off a political squabble among Republicans. The job is being held temporarily by Edward Boyd V of Garden City. But since he took over, Boyd has initiated a series of investigations of Republican office holders and angered party members. The candidacy of Nassau chief assistant district attorney Edward Margolin collapsed when his boss, District Attorney Cahn, and Nassau GOP chairman Joseph Margiotta were reported as targets of a federal investigation. Another potential candidate for the post is Huntington attorney Edward Thompson, Jr., but U.S. Sens. Jacob Javits and James Buckley reportedly feel that he lacks experience.

JURORS: NEVER A QUESTION OF CONVICTION
(By Manny Topol)

Westbury—The overnight delay in reaching a verdict in the trial of Rep. Angelo Roncallo was caused by indecision on the part of some jurors rather than any holdout vote for conviction.

Three votes were taken during the deliberations but not one of the six men and six women ever voted for conviction, jurors said yesterday. The first vote was taken shortly after 9 PM Thursday, at the outset of deliberations, and eight of the jurors immediately voted for acquittal. Four others said they were not that sure and wanted more time. After an hour and a half of discussion, a second vote was taken and 11 voted for acquittal. One of the male jurors said that he wanted time "to sleep on it."

At 9:30 AM yesterday, they all voted to exonerate Roncallo and his codefendant, Frank Antetomaso, of the extortion and conspiracy charges. The total time taken to reach a verdict was two hours and 20 minutes.

One of the jurors said he thought the prosecution presented an exceptionally weak case. Thomas Ielpi, 41, a Brooklyn telephone repairman, said, "I was waiting and waiting for them to show me something. Anything. But they didn't. I would have to say that some of us were wondering why they were even indicted," he said of Roncallo and Antetomaso.

"It looked like the prosecution witnesses became the defense witnesses. I had a very hard time believing them," he said. Ielpi said that many of the jurors thought that the summation by assistant U.S. Attorney Peter Schlam was "brilliant." "It was dynamite," he said. "It really shook everybody up."

Another juror, William J. Reilly, 51, of East Meadow, an operations manager with the Burns International Security Services Corp., said "The evidence was not beyond a reasonable doubt. The government didn't show us that it was." He said that he was one of the four who were undecided at the start of deliberations.

Diane Zaslawsky of Flushing, Queens, said, "The government failed to prove its case. We voted for acquittal because of a lack of evidence."

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to say to the members of the committee that I have asked for this time in order that I may explain to the Members what I hope will be the procedure we will follow here today. As the Members know, on yesterday we were supposed to have had the entire day to address ourselves to the amendments that are to be offered on this bill.

Unfortunately, the bills considered under suspension of the rules took up all afternoon, and I did not desire to start unless I was able to finish.

Today I have every intention of staying here until the entire bill is disposed of and all amendments are either adopted or rejected. It is in this area that I would like to address myself to the Members of the House.

I believe you all know the pressures that the chairman gets to questions like "How long will you run, how long will you stay, and what hour will you quit?" People tell me they have this and that engagement. I am very sympathetic to the individual needs of the individual Members. However, I have the responsibility of performing a job here, and that job is to see that this bill is properly disposed of. Therefore, I ask that I may have the cooperation of the Members of this House in every way.

Everybody knows the amendments that will be offered because they have been offered every time this bill comes before the House and they have been debated for hours on end. Today they will be offered again and the voices will be the same and the rhetoric will be the same.

The vast majority of the Members know exactly what their ultimate vote will be. I ask those who want to talk and talk and talk to take into consideration the feelings of their colleagues who have other engagements and who do want to get away from here as early as possible, as I do.

Again, I say I will not ask for a time limit on any amendment. Everybody may talk as long as he wants to under the rules of the House. I will stay here until we have finished all the procedures. However, again I urge those who want to talk on ad infinitum to respect the feelings of those Members who have business elsewhere and who have made previous commitments based on the thought that this bill would be passed yesterday. I ask for your cooperation and assure you that you will have my cooperation.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: Page 2, line 14: Delete "\$3,539,100,000" and insert in its place, "\$3,072,300,000".

Page 2, line 15: Delete "\$1,166,800,000" and insert in its place, "\$700,000,000".

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, slightly out of order, I would like to say that I want to acknowledge the fact that our distinguished colleague from New York (Mr. RONCALLO), who just made his presentation on the floor, received a standing ovation from the Members present of the House of Representatives.

I believe that bargaining initiated by Federal prosecutors should be brought to a speedy termination.

Mr. Chairman, the amendments that we are going to offer here today are not as voluminous, perhaps, as the RECORD might indicate. We have a great number of items that could be offered; we could have offered a number of quorum calls when we had the debate on this bill on Monday. We had 4 hours in which to debate it then, but we only took 2 hours and 48 minutes on Monday. Out of that period of time only 17 minutes were consumed by those who generally support the bill but who have objections, perhaps, to 5 percent of the total amount involved.

Our amendments today generally relate to only about 5 percent of this total bill.

Mr. Chairman, I support this bill; I will support it in whatever fashion it comes out of the House. I have supported every defense bill that has come before this House, and I do not think we need to get into all sorts of rhetoric respecting the amendments.

The Appropriations Committee and the other body do get into extensive debate respecting the merits of various and sundry procurement items, such as research and development items, foreign assistance, and military assistance.

There is no reason why this body cannot do the same thing. We could offer similar amendments to the DD-963 program. I am not going to do that. I do not believe there will be an amendment offered to that program, but we are supplying another \$475 million which we are appropriating now for that program, and therefore that we are totally authorizing appropriations for the program of a 30-ship program, and not one ship yet has been built. So we are cutting ourselves off from any control whatsoever in that program.

In the LHA program we have no authority on the landing helicopter assault ships that are being built down at Litton. We do not expect those ships to be serviceable for several years. There are five of them involved in all at a \$1 billion expenditure.

Then on counterforce there is no amendment. Similarly, with Safeguard, there is no amendment to be offered. The same with site defense, there is no amendment to be offered.

Similarly, I do not intend to offer amendments on any percentage reduction of research and development.

The amendment that I have just offered relates exclusively to the Trident program. The purpose of this amendment is to reduce the 1975 Trident program from two ships to one ship. As I understand it, this will be the only amendment to this title. The amendment reduces the amount of money available for the Trident program from \$1,166.8 million to \$700 million, a \$466 million reduction.

As the Members will recall, this is a 10-ship program. Two years ago the Navy wanted to buy one ship the first year and three ships per year for each of the 3 succeeding years.

The Committee on Appropriations, which examines these programs very closely, did not buy this massive acceleration over the original program, and ordered it slowed down. And what did the Committee on Appropriations say just a month ago? The Committee requested \$24.8 million to accelerate the Trident submarine construction from one ship per year as recommended by Congress in fiscal year 1974 to two ships per year, and gave the reasons for that. Now the Navy is coming to us with a request to buy two ships per year for each of the next 4 years. I think we ought to consider a little bit what we are doing. It is the equivalent of buying two aircraft carriers per year. We have never done that. I think that it deserves some attention by the other body and by this House, rather than just a peripheral discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. BROWN of California, and by unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from California for the additional time.

The purpose of this amendment is to reduce the fiscal year 1975 Trident buy from two ships to one. It does so by reducing the amount of money available for the Trident submarine from \$1,166.8 million to \$700 million, which is last year's \$627.8 million one-ship program plus a generous inflation allowance.

As you may recall, this is a 10-ship program. Two years ago the Navy wanted to buy one ship the first year—fiscal year 1974—and three ships per year for each of the 3 succeeding years. The Appropriations Committee, which examines these programs very closely, did not buy this massive acceleration over the original program, and ordered it slowed down. Now the Navy is coming to us with a request to buy two ships per year for each of the next 4 years, plus one ship in the final year, in addition to the one ship we authorized last year. This would have all 10 ships delivered by about 1982, if all goes well.

My amendment will slow the buy to one ship in this, the second year. I believe we should then look forward to a buy of one ship per year over the subsequent 8 years, with acceleration toward the end only in circumstances give us concrete reason to regard it as both feasible and desirable. The SALT agreement will not allow the construction of 10 Tridents before 1980 unless we deactivate some very capable \$300 million late Poseidon models.

My amendment does not affect the Trident missile program, nor does it affect research and development on the ship.

In the past, I have introduced amendments to reduce programs because I considered them undesirable or expensive bargaining chips. This is not the case today. I favor the Trident program; in fact, I regard it as possibly our most important program. That is why it must be decelerated.

The first thing to understand is that, no matter how the vote goes on the amendment, the odds are one ship per year is all we are going to get anyway. There are only three private shipyards in the country theoretically capable of producing nuclear submarines. Litton in Mississippi is in such hot water on their current projects, and is suffering from such a radical labor shortage, that nobody seriously considers giving them additional work. Newport News in Virginia is currently building three nuclear aircraft carriers—of which the first is 18 months behind schedule—five nuclear frigates, and five 688-class nuclear-attack submarines; they are so overloaded that, when they had the opportunity last year to bid on four more 688 subs, they submitted an unrealistically high bid, indicating they do not want the work and a SSBN overhaul was recently removed from that yard.

The Navy then turned to Electric Boat in Connecticut, which was building 14 688 subs, and Electric Boat said they could take on the four additional ships only if the Navy understood it would take 6 years to build them, rather than the usual 4. So they are overloaded too. They are talking about expanding their plant, but there is no way they can expand their labor in 1 or 2 years.

In short, our private shipbuilding capability is already stretched beyond all reason. This year they will have over \$6 billion worth of work—a 100 percent increase over 2 years ago. We can pass all the legislation in the world, and it would not get those ships built any faster. What it will do is give the Navy the money and take away our practical control over how many ships are built.

But what if the ships could be built at an accelerated rate? We still should not do it.

Let us consider the four reasons usually given for acceleration:

First, it is said it will be cheaper. The Navy claims the stretchout I propose will increase the cost about one-half billion dollars: perhaps 4 percent of the program. This will be true only if the acceleration does not in itself produce cost overruns far in excess of 4 percent. The probability of acceleration-induced overruns is high. The Comptroller General has told our committee the major reasons for cost overruns on procurement are rapid acceleration and concurrency of research and development with procurement. This program has both, in spades.

Last year, you will remember I described the LHA shipbuilding program as one of the worst disasters in the history of American military procurement. I said it was averaging 2 years behind schedule, and the program should be cut. The committee and the House thought otherwise, and today I can report the program is no longer 2 years behind; it is almost 2½ years behind, with massive cost overruns just over the horizon. We can afford failure on the LHA, which is a ship we may not need. We cannot afford it on Trident.

The second reason for accelerating the Trident is its use as a bargaining chip. This argument can be rejected on its face. There are two requirements for a

bargaining chip: You must have the capability of building it, and you must be able and willing to bargain it away. We will meet the first requirement by proceeding with research and development, and by demonstrating our capability to build the first ship. But the more we construct before the SALT II treaty is concluded, the less we will have to bargain with. You cannot bargain away ships recently built at a multibillion dollar expense.

We should learn from our disastrous experience with the Safeguard ABM as a bargaining chip. We blew a total of eight billion of the taxpayers' dollars just to achieve a treaty we could have attained without cutting a single piece of metal. Now we're stuck with a \$160 million per year system in North Dakota that we will operate simply because it would be too embarrassing to close it down.

The third reason given for accelerating Trident is that our present ships are allegedly wearing out. This is a serious question; submarines do wear out, but not that quickly. If anyone doubts this, consider the fact that until fiscal year 1973 the Navy was proposing a Trident schedule much like that which I propose. Do you think their instant acceleration in fiscal year 1973 stemmed from a sudden discovery that our present ships were wearing out faster than expected? Not likely; they have made no attempt to claim anything of the kind. On the contrary, their claims of submarines wearing out are based entirely on the assumption that submarines wear out after 20 years and the 20-year figure has no particular validity other than the fact that it is a nice round number.

A reasonable consideration of the wear question leads us to the opposite conclusion: It suggests deceleration rather than acceleration. Tridents are going to wear out too, and with the system costing perhaps \$13 billion we had better prolong its life as much as we can. We have a new type of steel under development, called HY130. It will last considerably longer than the present steel, and also allow the submarines to dive deeper. It is not ready yet, but presumably it will be ready in a few years. Every ship we build with current steel will be limited in performance and shorter in life. The more we slow the program at this point, the larger the proportion of the 10 ships we will be able to build with the superior steel.

Moreover, if we charge ahead and buy the ships within 6 years of each other, and if we do not wait for the HY-130 steel, it is obvious that they will all wear out within 6 years of each other. This block obsolescence runs counter to the basic principles of sound military procurement and national security policy.

Fourth, finally, and most importantly, there is the question of the threat to our existing Polaris-Poseidon missile submarines. This is the real reason for the existence of the Trident concept; otherwise, we would simply build more Polaris-Poseidons.

I will discuss the threat in two parts: First, what I call the "Madison Avenue" threat, and then the real threat.

The "Madison Avenue" threat is the Soviet missile submarine program. It is the question of whether their SSBN's and SLBM's are superior or inferior to ours. I call this the "Madison Avenue" threat because it is meaningful only in terms of the public-relations question of "who's No. 1?" Since the missile submarines of one side are incapable of threatening or interfering with the missile submarines of the other side, this question is of no military significance. But since it seems to fascinate so many of us, let us consider it briefly.

Last year's committee report says:

The Trident submarine with the Trident I missile system, when it enters the fleet in 1978, will then give the United States equivalent of what the Soviets presently have; a deployed 4,000-mile sea-launched ballistic missile. This capability allows the Soviets to target locations in the United States from areas where the U.S. Navy has a diminished ability to detect and track their submarines.

This year's report adds:

The U.S. Navy has had no new design fleet ballistic missile submarine since 1963. In the meanwhile the Soviets have commissioned at least three classes of new missile submarines. The Soviet Union has a force of over 30 Yankee submarines which are, with their 16-missile launch tubes, comparable to our 31 Poseidon submarines. The Soviets are currently deploying even larger ballistic missile carrying submarines which carry a new missile with a range comparable to the Trident I missile.

From these statements, one might conclude that Soviet missile submarines are more advanced than ours, that they already have a Trident missile while we lag far behind, that their new submarines carry 16 missiles each with 4,000-mile range, and that our submarines, limited by the 2,800-mile range of their missiles, can be detected and tracked by the Soviet Navy.

Every one of these inferences would be wrong.

Regardless of whether the Soviets have introduced 3, 30, or 300 new classes of submarines, they are all a full generation behind our earliest Polaris. They are noisier and their navigation and evasion equipment is primitive in comparison with ours. Moreover, the ships appear to have severe reliability problems, as demonstrated by their very low deployment rate which contrast with our practice of keeping our ships at sea virtually 100 percent of the time except during overhauls.

The Soviet ships with the 4,000-mile missile carry only 12 missiles each, not 16.

Their new missile has a 4,000-mile range, but it also has a small single warhead and low accuracy. Our Poseidon carries 10 warheads plus weight and space for penetration aids, as will Trident I. If we want to give Poseidon a 4,000-mile range, all we have to do is to reduce the load from 10 warheads down to one or two; we will then have the range of the Russian missile, with better accuracy and reliability. Trident I will not be "the equivalent of what the Soviets presently have;" its multiple warhead will make it the equivalent of 10 Soviet missiles, and it will still be more accurate and reliable.

We have chosen to give Poseidon payload rather than range precisely because the Soviets cannot detect and track our submarines; at this time we don't need the added survivability of a 4,000-mile missile.

Now let us consider the real threat. Can the Soviets locate and destroy our missile submarines before they can launch their missiles? Admiral Kauffman and Admiral Smith, who are in charge of the program, say they cannot. So does the Secretary of Defense.

But we must hedge against the possibility of a future threat. So we have designed the Trident to be faster and quieter. But the system's most significant improvement is not in the ship but in the missile. By replacing the 2,800-mile Poseidon with the 4,000-mile Trident I missile, we radically increase the volume of water in which the ship can operate while remaining in range of major Soviet targets, and we radically increase the submarine's ability to evade Soviet countermeasures. Another radical improvement will come with the Trident II missile, which has a 6,000-mile range and can reach many Soviet targets from any port in the United States, or for that matter from Australia.

Here is the problem: At this point, an effective threat to Polaris-Poseidon is so far off we can only guess what form it may take. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the present Trident design will be inappropriate to meet the threat if and when it appears. The longer we wait, the higher the probability that we will be able to buy the right ship rather than the wrong ship.

In the short run, it will be prudent to deploy the 4,000-mile missile with reasonable speed. But this missile can go into our present Poseidon ships. For a while the Navy was reluctant to do this because it would take away one of their main arguments for acceleration of Trident, but congressional pressure has brought them around. They now plan to retrofit Trident I into the Poseidon ships, and this program does indeed destroy whatever case there may have been for Trident acceleration.

Note that my amendment does not affect the Navy's ability to deploy the Trident I missile.

It is true that the 6,000-mile Trident II missile requires the Trident submarine. But this missile will not be available for many years, and thus is not affected by my amendment. Even under a one-ship-per-year program, we will have Trident ships before we have Trident II missiles.

In summary, quicker is not always better. This is a very important system, probably the most important in the entire military establishment. The Navy's accelerated program is like trying to run along a tightrope. We will be safer if we walk.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to ask the gentleman from California if the gentleman has any fig-

ures or information with regard to the increase cost of the construction of one-ship-a-year program, and whether this would give us a viable submarine building program, by reducing what the Navy says it would require to meet our requirements defensively against the Russians.

Mr. LEGGETT. This is a very good question.

One might ask the question: How do we build the second submarine? Where are we going to build it? There are only three yards in the United States today that are currently constructing nuclear ships, and they are the Litton yard, which is now chockablock down in Mississippi—which has 4,000 men below what they need, and there is no way they can build that up, according to the Department of the Navy. They have got now some 18,500 personnel in that yard.

How about the Newport News yard? The Newport News yard in Virginia is currently building three nuclear aircraft carriers at a cost of about \$4 billion. They are 18 months behind schedule on one of those. They are building five nuclear frigates at at least a half billion dollars apiece. They are building five 688 class nuclear attack submarines at at least a half billion dollars apiece, outfitted this year, and they made a bid the other day on some 688 quiet submarines at such a high figure that they obviously indicated they do not want to build them. They lost an overhaul job the other day that was transferred out to the west coast because they just could not build that program.

If we are going to build a second simultaneous Trident submarine, we are going to have to go to Electric Boat, the Groton yard in Connecticut. They currently are building 14 688 class submarines at about \$7 billion—not all ship-yard costs, but that is the total cost of the program.

And they may take on the four 688 class submarines that we authorized in a previous bill but they are overloaded and they are currently building a new plant and it is very questionable whether or not they can build a second submarine simultaneously. So I think if we are looking for places to maybe reduce the Pentagon bill, this is a very important area that I think we can look at. It is substantial. I do not think, as a practical matter, it is going to affect our building program too much because I do not think they can start a new submarine until the next fiscal year.

Of course, as the gentleman knows, under the SALT agreement we are limited to having 710 deployed missiles at sea, and we have 710 missiles, including the 54 Titans that we currently have available, so there is no real need to change that program.

The real question here is how fast do we want to proliferate that 710 missile program. There is no doubt about it that extending the program will cost some money, but on the other hand slowing the program down will make the program better. We have found that when you slow a program down you do not have as much concurrency as you might otherwise have, so that you do save money.

One of the problems with these ships is a very simple one, that is, if we build them all in a very short period of time we will have to replace them in a very short period of time.

The reason for that is simple. Hulls rust. They rust whether or not they are painted every few years or not.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. LEGGETT. What happens when hulls rust is that the hulls pit, and they get thinner. When they get thinner, the submarines cannot dive so deep, and that restricts very substantially the operational capability of our submarines. With the old diesel submarines that did not go so deep, we could keep them in the water for many, many, many years. We now find that 20 or 25 years is kind of the outer limits. We have got some things coming along, one of which is heavy-duty steel thicker than what we call HY 80 steel, which we currently use in our nuclear submarines. I am talking about HY 130 steel. That will give us a very thick hull. We are doing the R. & D. on that today and this perhaps will allow us to keep our submarines for maybe 30, or 40, or 50 years in an operational capability.

But at this time we do not have this steel developed. The Department of the Navy admits that there are lots of R. & D. items that they need to exhaust before we have what we call the perfect submarine.

We have got to get quieter submarines. We have got to get better acoustical capability. We have got to get a better sonar capability; so that the submarines that we have today—the Trident that is on the drawing board up at Electric Boat—are not necessarily the ultimate in design.

When we built the Polaris fleet, we built it quickly but when we were building the Polaris, I can testify from practical experience on the exact same class of ship, we had many times 10,000 change orders difference between the ship constructed on one coast as compared to the ship constructed on the other coast; so that as of today every single one of our 41 Polaris submarines is measurably and substantially different from the other.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) has expired.

(On request of Mr. BROWN of California, and by unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. BROWN).

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I wish to commend the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) for offering this amendment and more particularly for the statesmanlike attitude which he has taken toward the national defense commitment of this country. I would like to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks. He has stressed his concern that this Nation maintain a strong

defense posture. But, as he points out so well, a strong defense posture requires that we get the maximum benefit from every dollar spent for defense. He has consistently used his position on the Armed Services Committee to scrutinize every Pentagon program from the standpoint of how effectively it contributes to the national defense, and to the total national welfare. I believe that his amendment, which would reduce the rate at which we procure additional Trident submarines, would actually insure that we have the most effective possible deterrent force. I support his amendment and urge its adoption.

Mr. LEGGETT. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. BROWN).

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROUSSELOT).

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman be more willing to support this program if we built this at Mare Island?

Mr. LEGGETT. We cannot build it at Mare Island. It is a 42-foot beam and we can hardly get it into San Francisco Bay.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the weapon we are discussing here at this moment is the most important weapon in our American arsenal. This is so because both those who want this country to be strong and those who want to be strong to preserve world peace can come together on this particular weapon, because it is the greatest deterrent against aggression in our entire arsenal. It makes absolutely certain that no opponent of the United States could wisely and soundly undertake a substantial war against us without realizing that a great penalty would have to be paid. This is so because this particular weapon is one which can hide and people do not know where it is. It has a great range and can go in all areas of the world. It has a great range in the sense that its weapons can go to many places in the world at great distances. It is a quiet submarine. It is a swift submarine. It is a weapon which really gives us the best hope for preserving peace in this world in the immediate future.

Actually there is no substantial opposition to this weapon. Nobody I know of really opposes this weapon. The gentleman who just preceded me does not oppose this weapon. He does not say anything I have now said is not true. All he says is that the rate of production, he thinks, is too fast.

The rate of production as authorized by this Congress when this matter first came before us was three of these weapons per year. That was cut last year to a rate of two a year.

That cut did a number of rather interesting and sad things.

It cost a half-billion plus \$50 million to make that cut from three to two a year.

Another thing that it did was to give some heart to some people who do not want our country to be strong and do not want our deterrents to be credible.

Those are two very negative things. The gentleman has referred to a num-

ber of things about this submarine. He has pointed out that submarines get old, as do Congressmen, and some submarines get pitted and some rust away. There are other things that happen to submarines. There are some things, particularly, that happen to the Polaris/Poseidon submarine, although it was the best submarine ever built. It is also the most actively used ship that has ever been built because it has two crews.

It is so perfectly designed it can go without refueling. So it has two entirely separate crews. It goes all the time. Just as in the case of Congressmen, so the Trident submarines and ships get tired, in addition to getting rusty.

Now, there are some other things that happen. Not everybody knows exactly what all these things are, but there are faults which develop in the metal which has nothing to do with rust. There is a lagging at the seams, an opening up where people thought they were perfectly sealed and welded. All these things happen to a ship that gets old.

Suppose we have the two per year that we are asking for. This merely means that when our present submarines will be 20 years of age when these are supplied as substitutes. The gentleman has already said it is dangerous to go beyond that period of time. We have to have something to take the place of these Polaris/Poseidon ships that we now have when they reach 20 years of age.

If we go to one a year, the Polaris/Poseidons to be replaced will be 25 years old. This means that not only will they not be used at their best possible functions, but we will be endangering the lives of the young men who are on these ships which have to go to great depths and have great difficulties in what they do.

Now, if we take the advice of the gentleman from California, not only will we lose this \$500 million, we will add another \$550 million to this program if we adopt the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from California made a wide-ranging statement on shipyards. It is exactly because of the situations he cites that the Seapower Subcommittee will hold more shipyard hearings this session.

I insert in the RECORD at this point a letter dated May 20, 1974, from Admiral Rickover on the nuclear navy:

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
NAVAL SHIP SYSTEMS COMMAND,
Washington, D.C., May 20, 1974.
Hon. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The purpose of this letter is to respond to your request that I provide my personal and professional views in answer to your questions furnished to me by your staff on 17 May 1974. I understand that you need this information by today for your consideration in relation to issues which may arise during debate on the FY 1975 Military Procurement Authorization Bill, H.R. 14592.

Question: The United States national strategic deterrent includes our nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. Many believe this is the least vulnerable arm of our triad of strategic deterrent forces. For the past several years Congress has appropriated funds for the conversion of a total

of 31 of our 41 Polaris-firing submarines to be able to fire the Poseidon missile. Last year Congress authorized construction of the first Trident submarine, the first ballistic missile submarine authorized for construction in ten years.

Over the past five years how much has been appropriated in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account for these national strategic deterrent submarines?

Answer: The SCN appropriations for FY 1970-1974 have included \$2.5 billion for ballistic missile submarine conversions and construction of the first Trident submarine.

Question: As you well remember, the nuclear submarine program was initiated by the Congress over twenty years ago when it added funds to the Atomic Energy Commission budget for the nuclear power plants for the first two nuclear submarines, the *Nutilus* and the *Seawolf*, because the Department of Defense and the Navy would not budget the funds. Congress finally persuaded the Department of Defense to request only nuclear-powered attack submarines subsequent to the fiscal year 1956 shipbuilding program. But, in 1968 the Department of Defense long-range plan presented to the Congress called for the termination of the building program for nuclear attack submarines after fiscal year 1970. The Congress overturned the Department of Defense plan, insisted that they go forward with the design of higher speed attack submarines of the SSN 688 Class, and has subsequently authorized 23 ships of this class.

How much has been appropriated in the SCN account for nuclear attack submarines in the past five years?

Answer: The SCN appropriations for FY 1970-1974 have included \$4.2 billion for construction of nuclear attack submarines.

Question: I know that you are intimately familiar with the long fight the Congress had to endure to get the Department of Defense to provide nuclear propulsion for aircraft carriers and for frigates to accompany them. These ships are, of course, the heart of our surface naval striking forces.

How much has been appropriated in the SCN account in the past five years for these ships, and what fraction is this of the SCN funds appropriated in the same period for surface ships for general purpose forces?

Answer: The SCN appropriations for FY 1970-1974 have included \$7.6 billion for surface ships for the general purpose forces, of which \$2.5 billion, or 33%, was for the construction or conversion of nuclear aircraft carriers and frigates.

Question: The Chief of Naval Operations has stated: "We have evaluated both nuclear and conventionally powered frigates equipped with the AEGIS surface-to-air missile system. A lead nuclear powered ship is estimated to cost \$860M while a lead conventionally powered ship would cost \$580M, both in FY 1976 dollars escalated . . . I would like to point out that the two ships do not have the same capability."

How do the weapons systems assumed for these two ships compare? How much of the difference in cost is due to nuclear propulsion and how much is due to the difference in weapons systems assumed for the two ships? How does the cost estimated for the lead nuclear frigate with AEGIS compare to the estimated cost of another DLGN 38 Class nuclear frigate to follow the DLGN 42?

Answer: In the comparison you cite, the DLGN (AEGIS) has military characteristics far superior to those of the conventional DG, as well as having all the advantages of nuclear propulsion. This is because the people making the study made the decision—with which I agree—that once the cost of nuclear propulsion is invested in a guided missile ship it should be given anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and anti-air warfare (AAW) weapons systems commensurate with the investment. In this manner the nuclear frig-

ates will have sufficient AAW and ASW capability to support a nuclear carrier with a minimum number of escorts and be better able to defend themselves when assigned to independent missions. After studying eight different configurations the study group selected a weapons suite for the nuclear frigate which compares to that stipulated for the conventional DG as follows:

Two guided missile launchers and magazines vice one, giving the nuclear frigate twice the missile ammunition and twice the launching arms. This is particularly important when you consider that the same missile launchers and magazines are used for AAW missiles, HARPOON surface-to-surface missiles, and anti-submarine rockets (ASROC).

Four slaved illuminators vice two, giving the nuclear frigate a 50% greater rate of missile fire.

A superior sonar giving the nuclear frigate about double the sonar range—a range great enough to warrant using ASROC missiles.

Two LAMPS helicopters vice one, giving the nuclear frigate greater assurance of providing its own helicopter capability.

Unit commander capability for the nuclear frigate which the conventional DG does not have.

Initial nuclear cores which will provide at least 10 years of normal operations vice the conventional DG fuel capacity which is much less than that of the latest conventional frigates now in the Fleet.

In order to keep the size and cost of the conventional DG to a minimum the range has been restricted to a value substantially less than the range derived in the 1967 Supplement on Endurance of the Major Fleet Escort Force Level Study as the range corresponding to a minimum overall cost in a non-nuclear major fleet escort. In this regard it should be borne in mind that all of the calculations in that study were based on a maximum predicted speed for Soviet submarines much less than the speed of the nuclear submarines now in the Soviet fleet. The Supplement on Endurance pointed out that if actual Soviet submarine speeds were higher, "increasing task force speed becomes very advantageous." This would indicate that if the calculations in the Supplement on Endurance were redone today using the actual Soviet submarine speeds we could expect the results to show that the range of conventional escorts yielding minimum overall cost should be even greater than the range advocated by the Supplement on Endurance. To provide this range would, of course, significantly increase the size and acquisition cost of the conventional DG.

The propulsion plant planned for the AEGIS nuclear frigate is the same as that now used in nuclear frigates of the VIRGINIA, DLGN 38, Class. We are now building a prototype of a nuclear core which will provide at least 15 years of normal operation of a nuclear frigate. Cores of this design may well be available by the time the first AEGIS ship is built.

The difference in estimated cost between the lead nuclear and conventional AEGIS ships is \$280M. Of this amount about half is due to the difference in weapons systems and about half is due to nuclear propulsion including the initial nuclear fuel. In this regard it should be borne in mind that the cost of buying and delivering oil is not included in the SCN cost of the conventional ship.

The estimated cost of another DLGN 38 Class nuclear frigate to follow the DLGN 42 is \$330M in FY 1976 dollars escalated. Since such a ship would have the same nuclear propulsion plant as the DLGN (AEGIS), this cost would include all of the acquisition cost of nuclear power including a ten year supply of nuclear fuel. The additional \$530M estimated for a lead DLGN (AEGIS) is due to: \$310M higher cost of the weapons systems

of which about \$250M are one time costs and include items such as a land based weapons system test site.

\$100M ship design cost, of which about \$90M are one time costs, most of which is brought about by the change in combat systems.

\$35M increased shipbuilder cost due to weapons systems complexity of which about \$20M is a one time cost.

\$85M increased shipbuilder cost due to the lead DLGN (AEGIS) being compared to the sixth ship of the DLGN 38 Class.

Question: If we continue to build more nuclear powered ships will the Navy be able to attract enough qualified personnel to operate them? Will this put a serious drain on the Navy's ability to get men into other programs requiring high quality personnel? What has been the record since 1970 in this regard?

Answer: When we only had 5 nuclear ships some in the Navy argued that we should not build more because we would not be able to man them and that providing men who could meet the standards of the nuclear power program would interfere with the Navy manning its other technically demanding programs. Today we have 107 nuclear ships, yet the argument continues.

The truth is that we are getting enough people and we can continue to do so. It requires a concerted effort on the part of the recruiters but it can be done.

It should be borne in mind that when a young man enlists into the nuclear field program he does so for that specific purpose. He is attracted to the Navy because he can get nuclear power training. If nuclear power training were not available most of these men would not enlist in the Navy—they would find employment elsewhere. This means that the nuclear power program is not drawing talent away from any other Navy program. In fact, the opposite is true. We take into the nuclear program at the recruit level about 5,000 men per year. Because of the demanding nature of our program about half of these 5,000 do not complete their nuclear training. Those who do not qualify for nuclear power are used in the other high quality programs of the Navy.

The record since 1970 bears out the above comments. In the last four years (1970-1973) the Navy enlisted a total of 348,631 recruits. Of that number 141,125 or 40.5% were in the top two mental groups. It is from these groups that the so-called "high quality" programs, such as nuclear power and electronics, are manned. The nuclear program obtained 24,903 of these and 20,912 went into electronics for a total of 45,815. Both programs represent 32.5% of those eligible and the nuclear program represents only 17.6%. Thus, had the need existed, more could have been put into both those programs.

During the past four years the nuclear power program has been able to meet its enlistment requirements and we have every reason to believe we will continue to do so.

We do have a problem in retaining our people after they have completed their 6 year obligation. However, with the aid of the recently passed special bonus pay legislation we feel this situation will be improved.

Question: Is there sufficient shipbuilding capacity to build the nuclear powered warships included in the Navy's present five-year construction program including those in the President's FY 1975 budget request?

Answer: Yes.

The present five-year Navy program for nuclear warships starting in FY 1975 includes the DLGN's 41 and 42 in FY 1975 and FY 1976 respectively, to be followed by a new class of nuclear frigates with the AEGIS weapon system starting in FY 1978 or later; two Trident submarines per year for the next few years; and five SSN 688 Class attack

submarines every two years starting with three in FY 1975.

As you know, the Navy is working on the design of a new class of aircraft carriers called the CVX to replace the Forrestal Class of attack carriers. However, the present "design to cost" goals for the CVX stipulated by the Department of Defense would preclude nuclear power for this class of ship.

The Navy is also working on the design of the conventionally powered DG to carry AEGIS. The present program is based on the assumption that carriers of the new CVX Class will not be nuclear powered and that only enough nuclear frigates with AEGIS will be built to complete the escorts required for the four nuclear carriers now authorized, the *Enterprise*, *Nimitz*, *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, and *Carl Vinson*.

In the past we have had as many as seven shipyards—two naval and five private—build nuclear warships. All seven built nuclear submarines; three built nuclear frigates; and one, *Newport News*, has and does build nuclear carriers. At the peak of the nuclear warship building program in the early 1960's fourteen nuclear ships were authorized per year.

However, the decline in the number of nuclear ships authorized each year and the desire to build each one for as little cost as possible, has caused us to concentrate our present nuclear warship construction in two yards, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation in Groton, Connecticut and the *Newport News* Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company in *Newport News*, Virginia which is owned by Tenneco Incorporated, of Houston, Texas.

The Electric Boat shipyard currently has contracts for the construction of nineteen nuclear attack submarines. The yard is proceeding with a major facilities expansion and modernization program. Electric Boat future planning is based on building an average of 1½ TRIDENT submarines and 3 SSN 688 Class submarines per year. However, the new construction facility could accommodate 2 TRIDENT submarines per year in the event *Newport News* is not a successful bidder in the Trident program.

Newport News construction plans include building three nuclear carriers, four nuclear frigates, and seven nuclear submarines currently under contract, and the two nuclear frigates, DLGN's 41 and 42, included in present contract options. In addition, Mr. J. P. Diesel, President and Chief Executive Officer of *Newport News*, has repeatedly stated that *Newport News* plans to submit proposals for construction of additional SSN 688 Class submarines and Trident submarines. He has also stated that if additional aircraft carriers and escorts are included in naval shipbuilding programs, *Newport News* wants to bid on these ships.

Newport News currently employs about 25,000 people. This represents almost 40% more than were employed by *Newport News* three years ago. Mr. Diesel has stated that *Newport News* considers that *Newport News* can and will build up to and sustain a level of about 30,000 people provided the projected commercial and naval workload will support the need for sustained effort at that level.

A few years ago *Newport News* was concerned that their naval business would decline, so they decided to expand their yard to handle commercial shipbuilding. This has caused concern that we may not have sufficient capacity remaining to build nuclear ships. However, both Tenneco and *Newport News* officials have repeatedly assured the Navy that they "will not allow performance of work on non-Navy contracts to interfere with the performance of work necessary to meet *Newport News* commitments on Navy contracts."

As I testified to your Seapower Subcommittee a few weeks ago, the question of building capacity is a chicken and egg proposition. Our problem is we don't have a firm nuclear shipbuilding program. If we can get a firm long range program we can get any additional capacity we may need to produce it, but you cannot expect shipbuilders and component suppliers to gear up to do a lot of work when they cannot be sure of the future work.

Today the annual investment by electric utilities in nuclear power equipment for central station power plants is far greater than the Navy's annual investment in naval nuclear propulsion plants. Further, whereas ten years ago annual naval shipbuilding contracts exceeded U.S. commercial shipbuilding contracts by a factor of three, today the dollar value of annual commercial shipbuilding exceeds the dollar value of annual naval shipbuilding contracts. Both of these factors add to the urgency of establishing a firm long range nuclear warship building program so that we are in a good position to compete for the necessary industrial capacity.

I would like to make a specific comment on the importance of retaining three SSN 688 Class submarines in the FY 1975 shipbuilding program. The Navy currently plans to award the shipbuilding contract for these three submarines in January 1975 based on bids to be submitted by *Newport News* and Electric Boat. Since these are repeat submarines all procurement documentation is available; the successful bidder(s) for these ships will immediately place purchase orders for material. The actual start of construction occurs when the shipbuilder has received sufficient material to permit and sustain an orderly flow of work, normally a year or so after contract award. However, with the extreme increases in lead time currently being experienced in all industries for material procurement, additional time for material may be needed. If these ships are awarded to *Newport News*, they expect to have both manpower and facilities available to start construction as soon as sufficient material is available, since their last submarine was awarded in the FY 1972 program. If these ships are awarded to Electric Boat, they might be constrained on the first two ships by the availability of shipways due to the eleven ships awarded to them in the FY 1973 and 1974 programs. However, if sufficient material is available before the shipways are available, prefabrication can be started off the shipways. Starting all three ships in FY 1975 will result in the least cost to the Government and the earliest possible deliveries.

Question: Do you consider that additional study is needed before making a decision that the new class of carriers being designed to replace attack carriers of the FORRESTAL Class and the AEGIS escort ships being designed for carrier task forces should be nuclear powered?

Answer: I do not consider additional study is needed before deciding to provide nuclear propulsion for future aircraft carriers and their escorts.

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, as well as the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, each have been furnished by the Department of Defense over the years with classified documents on the subject of naval nuclear propulsion which if stacked on top of each other would make a pile over 10 feet high. These documents include memoranda and letters from the Chiefs of Naval Operations, Secretaries of the Navy, Secretaries and Deputy Secretaries of Defense, Directors of Defense Research and Engineering, and other officials including myself, and voluminous analytical studies of the relative cost and effectiveness of nuclear and conventional warships conducted by the Navy and

the Department of Defense. Every aspect of the advantages and cost of nuclear surface warships has been exhaustively studied in minute detail by hordes of analysts, civilian and military.

These studies have brought out time and again that a nuclear surface warship has a higher initial investment cost than its conventional counterpart, but that when overall costs are taken into consideration, the nuclear ships are not much more expensive and provide greatly increased military capabilities.

For many years opponents of nuclear propulsion have advocated that the acquisition money be used instead to buy a larger number of cheaper conventional warships. The desire for small, light, cheap weapons systems has been with us for a long time. Experience in wartime, however, indicates that the essential ingredients of a successful seaborne weapons system—reliability and redundancy, speed and endurance, versatility, firepower—are often lacking in such developments. These lessons have been lost on generation after generation of our leaders and must be periodically relearned at potentially enormous cost and loss of life when we are faced with actual wartime situations.

Further, in wartime we can improvise the support ships if we have to. We can take merchant hulls and fill them with machine tools to make tenders. We can take tankers and make them into oilers. We can improvise weapons systems. We cannot create nuclear carriers and frigates overnight.

Central to the opposition to nuclear powered ships has been the precept that we should not go to nuclear power until we can show it is no more expensive than conventional power. But why should we expect to get all the advantages of nuclear power at no additional cost? The cost of all other weapons has gone up as their capabilities have improved. For example, the M-16 rifle costs three times as much as the World War II M-1 cost; a modern machine gun costs nine times more than one from World War II; a C-5 transport plane is over 300 times as expensive as the World War II C-47; the airplanes the Navy flies today cost 20 to 25 times as much as World War II aircraft. Does that mean we should have only four or five planes on our carriers instead of 100?

Even so, the additional cost of nuclear powered warships is minimal when all factors are considered. First, nuclear powered ships are built to higher standards than conventional ships and have proved to be more reliable in the operation of their propulsion plants. These first line ships carry the most modern and complex weapons systems and have increased operational capabilities over their conventional counterparts—all of which naturally contribute to their higher initial cost. In addition, the construction cost of nuclear ships includes nuclear fuel for over ten to thirteen years of operation, whereas the initial cost of a conventional powered ship does not include the cost for oil.

Recently, oil costs have risen dramatically. It now costs close to \$25 a barrel to buy and deliver oil to Navy ships. At that rate, it would cost almost \$270 million to provide the amount of oil for a conventionally powered carrier equivalent to the nuclear fuel in the NIMITZ. That is almost three times the cost of the nuclear fuel for this ship.

Nuclear and conventional ship costs should be compared on a lifetime basis. For example, compare lifetime costs for a nuclear carrier task group with those of a conventional task group. The nuclear carrier increases the task group cost about two percent. Each nuclear escort increases the overall task

group cost one percent, so that four nuclear escorts increase the task group cost four percent. Therefore, the lifetime cost for a complete nuclear task group, consisting of a nuclear carrier and its four nuclear escorts, is six percent greater than that of a conventional carrier accompanied by four conventional escorts.

This is merely the peacetime cost. It does not take into account any of the advantages of nuclear power.

Nuclear powered task forces are far less dependent on logistic support. When logistic supply lines are attacked during a real war the decrease in the requirement for ships' fuel for the strike forces will have a compounding beneficial effect. The surviving fuel transportation and storage facilities can then be concentrated on getting fuel for aircraft and other military vehicles to the forward areas. The escorts that would otherwise be required for the tankers which carry ships' fuel could then be assigned to assuring the safety of other supplies.

Each time a nuclear ship is substituted for a conventional ship in a task group the military capability of the whole force is increased, with the greatest increase realized when the all-nuclear group is achieved. For example, a nuclear carrier with four conventional escorts has twice the range of a conventional carrier with the same four conventional escorts. If two of the escorts are made nuclear the range of the task group is again doubled. When all of the ships are nuclear the group as a whole has essentially unlimited high speed endurance. The studies have also shown that it takes fewer nuclear ships to do the same job as conventional ships.

Two years ago I furnished your Seapower Subcommittee and the Military Applications Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy a chronological summary of the history of nuclear surface warships over the past quarter century. This chronology was subsequently published in a Joint Committee print entitled "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Warships, Hearing and Subsequent Inquiry of the Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, May 5, 1971—September 30, 1972" (pages 123-277). References to the major studies of this subject are noted in the appropriate places in that chronology.

Lengthy though it is the chronological summary merely scratches the surface of the tremendous amount of effort that has gone into documenting and analyzing the advantages, value and costs of nuclear propulsion in surface warships. In the chronology I barely touched on the extensive analyses of cost and effectiveness and the voluminous documentation of actual examples reported by Fleet Commanders where nuclear powered surface warships have been able to perform important missions in the Atlantic, Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Oceans which conventionally powered ships either couldn't do at all or would have had great difficulty doing under war conditions.

The studies that have been made of this issue have cost millions of dollars and countless man-years of effort including that of many high level people. I do not believe that further studies could produce any more facts.

Despite the fact that Congress has repeatedly taken the position that we need to build more nuclear-powered surface warships, after 25 years of studying the issue we have only five nuclear surface ships in operation and seven more under construction. This is a very slow rate of transition to nuclear power for the greatest maritime power in the world—an island nation dependent on the strength of its Navy for its own security.

It should be borne in mind that decisions

made today concerning nuclear propulsion for these ships will not have their effect in the Fleet until a decade from now. We would be deluding ourselves if we did not recognize that in the intervening years the Soviets will introduce major improvements in their naval weapons systems. As they continue to try out new technological advances in their fleet we can expect them to incorporate the lessons learned into their new designs. They have demonstrated time and again that they are willing to invest large amounts in new concepts each time they develop one.

We must also bear in mind that there is no way we can match the Soviets in numbers of submarines and surface warships. The only way we have any possibility of our naval striking forces penetrating and countering the Soviet naval threat is for our forces to be of superior quality. If our Navy does not build the kinds of warships that can stand up to the Soviet naval threat then the U.S. will not have a credible capability to conduct overseas military operations by any of the Services in any areas where the Soviets choose to exercise their naval power. In my opinion, in the 1980's and beyond in any area where the Soviets employ their best naval forces we will need all-nuclear carrier task forces to be able to conduct sustained offensive operations.

In a real combat situation against a sophisticated naval threat the enemy would make a determined effort with nuclear submarines and other forces to interrupt our supply lines and sink our replenishment ships. Under such circumstances, the ability of nuclear warships to retire at high speeds from the areas of highest threat in order to replenish combat consumables in areas of lower threat and then return to the strike area at high speed could mean the difference between victory and defeat in the strike area.

The new aircraft carriers and AEGIS escorts are planned as our most capable surface warships to be built. Because these ships will be expensive, regardless of their means of propulsion, they will never be built in large numbers. In a naval war against an enemy employing sophisticated weapons all of these ships would be needed in the areas of highest threat. It is under just such circumstances that the advantages of nuclear propulsion are most sorely needed.

Another consideration is that to have a credible nuclear powered surface warship capability in both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets it is necessary to build a reasonable number of nuclear warships so that some are available for immediate deployment at all times in both oceans. The Navy presently plans a total of 24 AEGIS ships, and 8 CVX Class carriers will eventually be needed to replace the FORRESTAL Class. These ships would be built over a period of many years. It is my opinion that the Fleet Commanders of the future will consider this to be a minimum number of nuclear warships to supplement those already authorized considering the problems we can easily foresee will be facing them.

I know that with today's budget problems facing the Congress, it is extremely difficult to make major investments for the future. However, if such investments had not been made in the past we might not have survived as long as we have. If the investment for our future needs is not made now, there may be no future.

If the problem is that the Nation's financial managers are not willing to provide enough money to insure our future defense, then our people must be informed of the stark reality they face. We must not do what we have done so many times in the past; namely, fail to provide adequate defenses using the

sugarcoated philosophy that they are not needed, only to soon find ourselves in a war which costs many times the funds "saved." In World War II we got away with it because our Allies took the brunt of the fighting while we rearmed. In Korea we got away with it because we were able to reactivate quickly large amounts of World War II ships and equipment which had just been put in reserve. In the Vietnam war we managed to sustain ourselves by using up a great deal of material, drawing down our reserve stocks, wearing out much equipment, and because our real opponents did not fight us with their first team.

Most people do not realize how badly our naval forces have been allowed to deteriorate by the hiatus in naval ship construction in the 1960's and the reduction in fleet readiness accepted to make funds, material, resources, and personnel available for the Vietnam war.

Historically the United States has relied on the quality of its weapons and the ability to manufacture them in large quantities to win its battles, rather than on large numbers of men. The American people do not appear to be willing to support large numbers of men under arms. Further, the complexity of modern weapons and the rapidity with which major wars can now be started preclude relying on wartime production capacity to furnish our weapons; we must plan on fighting a major war with the weapons we have at its outbreak. I believe we would be following a shortsighted path if we do not provide our first line striking forces with the best weapons our technology can produce.

For the foreseeable future the aircraft carrier will be the principal offensive striking arm of the Navy in a non-nuclear war. No other weapon system under development can replace the long-range, sustained, concentrated firepower of the carrier air wing. Torpedo firing nuclear submarines, cruise missile firing nuclear submarines, nuclear frigates and anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities, all are needed to supplement and augment the capabilities of the nuclear carrier.

The number of overseas air bases available to us is rapidly declining. It must be clearly understood that there is no known alternative to carriers for providing tactical air power beyond the range of provisioned and protected land bases. There is no viable plan for overseas military operations of the Army, Air Force, or Navy that does not depend on the Navy to protect the seaborne flow of supplies, material, and petroleum products necessary to sustain modern military operations. Ninety-six percent of the supplies for Vietnam went by sea. If an opponent is successful in developing weapons that can sink large numbers of our carriers and we are not successful in developing sufficient counterweapons—or if we simply do not build sufficient modern carriers to protect our sealanes—the United States will have to change its national objectives to be consistent with our inability to conduct overseas military operations.

There are those who dismiss as unrealistic the possibility of a direct confrontation between American and Soviet naval power. I think events may well show they are wrong unless we build naval ships which can clearly counter the best Soviet naval forces.

In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis the United States with *superior naval power and superior nuclear weapons power* was willing to confront the Soviets with both. But in the last decade the Soviets have achieved at least equal, if not superior, nuclear weapons capability and numerically superior naval forces. In addition to their

rapidly expanding fleet of heavily armed surface warships, their nuclear submarine fleet is now almost 20% larger than ours, and they are building three times as many nuclear submarines per year as we are. If we also allow them to attain qualitatively superior naval forces why should we assume that they will not confront us with their naval power to obtain their objectives in areas where they consider we will not be willing to risk our own annihilation? Thus, in short, failure on our part to provide naval forces which can stand up to the best naval forces the Soviets develop could lead to our having to give in on all issues for which we are not willing to go to nuclear war.

There are events in a nation's history that, to use Thomas Jefferson's phrase, are like "a fire bell in the night." The recent conflict in the Mid-East was such an event. For the first time, we were in a situation where the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean outnumbered the United States Sixth Fleet.

Had the Soviet Mediterranean Fleet been ordered to challenge the Sixth Fleet who would have won? From the limited information available to me, I do not think the answer is entirely clear. Would such a question have been seriously asked ten years ago? Perhaps this thought will give you an inkling of the change that has taken place in the balance of naval power over the past decade.

This change underscores the urgent need we, as an island nation, have to build a Navy strong enough to protect our national interests, and our economic and political survival. To me, it is clear that the striking force ships we build for such a Navy must have nuclear power.

Mr. Chairman, I deeply appreciate your courtesy in giving me this opportunity to express my views.

Respectfully,

H. G. RICKOVER.

Mr. ROBERT W. DANIEL, JR. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished chairman of the subcommittee has already pointed out that we have sustained an increase in the program cost of over one-half billion dollars as a result of the reduction of the production rate of Trident submarines from three to two per year.

The amendment before us, if passed, would further create a cost increase in the program of another one-half billion dollars, or an increase of about \$50 million per ship.

As a second point, the chairman pointed out that submarines do wear out, and that at a Trident production rate of two a year acquisition the older submarines, the first of which were operational in the early 1960's, would be replaced at the end of their design lives of 20 years; but at an acquisition rate of one a year these submarines would be 24 and 25 years old as they are replaced.

If I may inject a personal note, I have a son who is 10 years old and who will be of an appropriate age to serve on these submarines when they become operational, should he choose to join the Navy. I do not want him and other young men in this country and their chiefs and their officers going out in submarines as our first-class deterrent in hulls that are weakened and which

are less than desirable to operate in the 1980's.

I urge the House to turn down the amendment so that our action today will not create that condition.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I think that it is very important for the House to consider the fact that there has been virtually no slippage and no cost overruns in connection with the Trident. That is a very remarkable achievement that seldom can be said about an important new weapons system. This has been a well planned, well managed program.

Now we are planning to build two submarines a year. The Russians are building one new nuclear-powered missile-firing submarine a month—one a month. They are building a new submarine which is larger and quieter than anything we have now, not as big as the Trident, but bigger than anything we have now; it is their Delta class submarine. It carries more tubes for launching missiles than their previous submarines. The Russians are developing new, more powerful guided missiles, with ranges greater than those we now have.

They can fire off our coasts at American targets. This gives them an added advantage. We have to fire across land masses to strike meaningful targets.

The Russians are taking full advantage of the concessions they gained in the SALT I talks. We had qualitative superiority; they had quantitative superiority in strategic weapons. Under the terms of SALT I, they can improve their weapons qualitatively, and they are doing so in full measure. This has been clearly substantiated. Day by day they will be gaining an advantage. The time can come when they will have both quantitative and qualitative superiority.

The Trident very likely will be the most effective deterrent in our arsenal. As the distinguished gentleman from Florida (Mr. BENNETT) has stated, it can wait beneath the seas anywhere in the world in times of trouble. That means it will be a constant warning to predator nations which want to start trouble for no targeted first strike can reach submarines hidden by the oceans of the world. The program is going forward in a very satisfactory way, and it is probably the best argument we have for a satisfactory deterrent with the Russians.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word. I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I am a little confused with respect to where we really are going, because the gentleman who just preceded us in the well from the Appropriations Committee put out a report that was unanimous, as I understand it, from the committee just a few months ago.

He stated:

All of these factors seem to mandate a prudent and cautious, but deliberate course, in the construction of Trident submarines. There must be a reasonable limit or plateau that should be achieved in spending merely for the sake of "bargaining chips." The Trident submarine construction rate of one per year as directed by Congress appears to be a sufficient demonstration that this country has the national resolve to modernize and maintain our sea-based missile deterrent in a current status technologically, without risking an escalation or renewal of the arms race.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to state to the distinguished gentleman that the Subcommittee on Defense and the Committee on Appropriations now recognize, as the result of more recent information, the need for the Trident program as proposed in this bill, and we are supporting two Trident submarines per year as carried in the Senate version of the supplemental appropriations bill.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

May I say, to inform the House as to the background and history in the subcommittee hearings on this subject matter, the effort to remove the Trident was unanimously rejected in the committee vote. The lone audible voice raised in favor was from the gentleman from California who has offered the amendment now. Every other voice was loud and clear opposed to him.

Also, to bring this up as to the language mentioned which the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) is referring to, the House conferees on the supplemental bill this morning met and finished the conference report. The Senate receded, and restored the Trident to the supplemental report. It will be in their conference report when it comes here.

I think the steps which I have described indicate in fact the feeling of this House.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, just one word of addenda before we vote.

The leading authority on this kind of weapon, the Trident, in this country and in the world, is Rear Admiral Rickover. He testified before our Sea Power Committee on which I am privileged to serve as a ranking member, that the Trident is a necessity; not one a year, but two a year, for this reason:

Right now, at this moment, the nuclear-powered submarines of the Russians can move just a short distance out into the North Sea. The tubes of these submarines have a range of 4,000 miles. Think of it—they can hit our eastern shores from their home ports.

On the other hand our country's undersea craft is limited today to a range of 2,500 miles. We should think well before we cast our vote. Remember it will be 1978 before our submarines will have a range equal to the range of 4,000 miles. This amendment should be defeated.

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to sound a warning note before this body because of the perilous course

ahead of us if we succumb to the many pressures to reduce the Trident submarine building rate. Such a move reflects a reckless disregard of real world happenings and their impact on our national security. Foremost among the pertinent world events of the day are the vigorous Soviet programs which are aimed at eclipsing our strategic systems with their own modern forces.

We have had military and civilian leaders for the Department of Defense describe in detail these developments in Soviet military capability, of major concern to me is the breadth of the ongoing Soviet military effort in strategic missile forces encompassing both land-based and sea-based systems. The scope of this effort is evident from their development programs for four new ICBM's and multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles—MIRV's. This broad development effort was accompanied by the deployment of a new class of submarines, the Delta, carrying a new missile capable of hitting targets at very long ranges. It is interesting to note that we will not have a comparable range capability until our Trident missile is deployed in 1978. The extensive Soviet shipbuilding and industrial facilities enable them to turn out ships and missiles in large numbers once a production decision is made.

In the face of the continuing massive development and production effort by the Soviets it would be sheer folly for us to reduce further the Trident submarine building program. Building two ships a year represents a very realistic and necessary undertaking—a slowdown to one ship a year would represent a very timid and indecisive approach that would undercut our already tenuous negotiating position in the current strategic arms limitations negotiations.

I submit that our fond hopes for a world peace should not blind us to the reality of the aggressive Soviet improvements in their strategic missile forces. It is imperative that we respond in a positive manner to these developments by supporting the Trident program as presented by the Department of Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will read. The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE II—RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION

Sec. 201. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1975 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for research, development, test, and evaluation, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

For the Army, \$1,878,397,000;

For the Navy (including the Marine Corps), \$3,153,006,000, of which \$57,500,000 shall be available only for application to surface naval gunnery (excluding the Close-In Weapon System), including gun fire control systems, gun mounts, unguided and guided ordnance, and fuzing;

For the Air Force, \$3,459,760,000; and

For the defense agencies, \$510,500,000, of which \$25,000,000 is authorized for the ac-

tivities of the Director of Test and Evaluation Defense.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title II of the bill be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. PIKE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. PIKE: Page 4, line 14, after Air Force, strike out "\$3,459,760,000 and insert "\$2,960,760,000, none of which shall be expended for the B-1 bomber program."

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that in happier days the President of the United States used to say that the principal cause of inflation was the fact that we were spending huge chunks of money more than we were taking in. I was one of those people who agreed with him.

I think perhaps one of the poorest things that we can do in this Nation is to spend money we do not have for things we do not need. But even worse than spending money we do not have for things we do not need is spending money we do not have for things we do not need and then not getting them.

Mr. Chairman, that is the story of the B-1 bomber. We are spending money we do not have for a project that we do not need, and we are not getting it.

One year ago—it is not even 1 year ago; it was last July 31—we were told on this floor that that plane was going to fly in April of this year. Have you seen anything in the newspapers about that plane flying? That first flight in the course of 10 months had slipped by 7 months. The program has slipped by 15 months. This program has slipped in time, and it has slipped very badly in content. This plane does not do the things which we paid for it to do.

Mr. Chairman, there was a very comprehensive report—I will not say it was an objective report, because it was commissioned by the Air Force—but the Air Force asked a commission to investigate this aircraft and report back on what the plane could do. The commission reported back in November of last year. This is the so-called Bisplinghoff report. They said that the weight of the plane had increased by 19 percent. Its range had decreased by 18 percent. Its takeoff distance had increased by 15 percent, and today it needs 7,500 feet to get it off the ground over a 50-foot obstacle. Its altitude has decreased by 15 percent.

Mr. Chairman, these are not minor changes. In fact, they are so major that they say—and now I am reading from page 6 of this Bisplinghoff report—that what they have to do with it is as follows:

Redesign of the development aircraft will be significant in order to meet producible and acceptable unit cost of the production versions. . . . These redesign activities will

have a significant impact on both the cost and schedule of the production aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, what has happened to the cost already? In the last year the cost of this program has increased by \$3,700,000, more than \$300 million a month in the increase of the cost on the program.

Mr. Chairman, the cost of the program has gone from \$11.276 billion, when we were here 1 year ago, to \$15 billion as of today. Essentially, when we get a figure like \$15 billion following a figure like \$11.276 billion, we know that is just a round number. They do not have the slightest conception today of what this program is going to cost.

In this year's bill we are authorizing one additional research aircraft. That plane 1 year ago was supposed to cost \$70 million. Today they tell us that that plane will not cost \$70 million; it will cost \$150 million, an increase of over 100 percent in 1 year.

Let there be no question that I am in favor of this program and am simply trying to slow it down. I am not in favor of this program.

This is, as I said in the very beginning, something we do not need. We are paying for it with money we do not have, and America would be a much stronger nation if we used the half billion dollars, which my amendment takes out of this bill, for other purposes, either defense purposes or other purposes.

Mr. Chairman, America will be stronger if we kill this program at the present time.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) has stated that he is in opposition to the program. In other words, he wants to eliminate it completely. In furtherance of that objective he has offered this amendment annually, both in the House and in the committee.

The determination of whether or not we need a bomber in the future was not forced upon the Congress by the Department of Defense. The Committees on Armed Services of the Congress, both on the House side and on the Senate side, have indicated their feeling that we need a bomber in the future, and we have been working toward that end for many years.

The B-1 is a very costly bomber. Some of the things that the gentleman from New York mentioned are factual. That is the reason we need research and development. That is the reason we need the funds provided in this bill, so that we can build the most effective and the most efficient bomber we can, at an economical cost, if it is possible to build an economical bomber. I just do not believe that is possible. But we can at least provide the research and development to meet and answer all the technical questions relating to the bomber, and we can try to build it at the most reasonable cost possible.

Mr. Chairman, we are not going to build a cheap bomber, not in today's economic atmosphere. However, the B-1 is considered to be economically possible. The figure is \$70 million, as the gentle-

man mentioned. I could not quarrel with any of the statistics which the gentleman has used.

But the question is: Do we need a bomber in the future? I do not think that anybody can categorically say that we are certain that we need it, but we do not know whether we will need it in 5 years, 10 years, or 20 years. However, if the time comes that we do need it and we do not have it, then we will be completely at the mercy of a potential enemy, and we have found by experience, as far as the B-1 itself and other bombers are concerned, that we cannot build them overnight.

If you do not have them when the firing starts, you will not be able to have them to bring the firing to a quick end. We do not know what the consequences will be if we do not have a bomber when we need it.

It is true that the B-1 is very expensive. In March of 1973 the Air Force reported a total program cost increase of \$1.57 billion due solely to the adoption of the escalation factor. We have had many arguments on the escalation factor. I agree with the gentleman from New York that they never used a realistic escalation factor. But escalation does add to the cost of the bomber. About a year ago the Air Force indicated a revised cost study was underway which attempted for the first time to estimate the gap between the research and development and production costs. The results of this study were forwarded to the Congress in October 1973. We are getting all of the information we asked for. We think it is an essential and necessary program and we think it will be an effective deterrent to a possible war in the future.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think the gentleman is making an excellent point which needs to be made. The point is that the purpose of a prototype bomber is to work out the kind of problems that could occur later on in the production of a weapons system and to make sure that these problems do not occur. Obviously when the Air Force finds mistakes, they move to correct them. It is better to do that now than to do it later.

The gentleman from New York wants basically to eliminate the program totally. The gentleman from Illinois has made an excellent case that this is a needed weapons system, and is needed as soon as possible. Now is the time to work the bugs out of the system and not when the bomber is flying.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. The gentleman from New York mentioned the Bisplinghoff report. This is a report that studied the construction and the whole gamut of the studies involved in the building of this bomber. The Bisplinghoff report does indicate, however, that it can be a very successful and satisfactory bomb-

er. There is nothing in that report that recommends against the building of the bomber. As a matter of fact, it would be just the reverse.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to assail a common national enemy with regard to this plane we are talking about, and that is inflation as it adversely affects the defense posture of the United States and the procurement of the Air Force B-1 strategic bomber in particular.

I have a chart before me, if you can see it, which will easily explain the problem.

The B-1 1970 procurement unit cost estimate, including inflation as estimated in 1970 dollars—\$35.4 million is 3.6/1000th percent of 1970 gross national product. The current USAF procurement unit cost estimate expressed in 1975 dollars—\$40.1 million—is 2.6/1000th percent of estimated 1975 gross national product. This is a 27.8 percent reduction in B-1 procurement unit cost, including inflation and program growth relative to gross national product.

When we compare total program unit cost which includes research, development, test, and evaluation plus procurement, including inflation and program growth on the same basis, the B-1 total program unit cost is 25.5 percent less relative to gross national product. In other words, the current B-1 cost is a smaller share of our economy than it was when the B-1 program started in 1970.

This is also a vivid example of how inflation has increased B-1 cost.

It should be no surprise to anyone who has purchased goods in a grocery store, or a tank of gasoline in today's economy, and compared these prices with 1970 prices for the same items.

I have a chart on the B-1 unit costs comparisons including inflation relative to gross national product that I would be happy to discuss in greater detail with any of my colleagues.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from Texas is making a very telling and very important point, and with the permission of the gentleman from Texas I would like to put it in a little different way:

Let us just assume that from the inception of the B-1 program that we had agreed to pay for it in beefsteak instead of in dollars. Let us also assume that the price of the beefsteak remained the same. Would not his chart say that today we would be having to pay 28 percent less in beefsteak to pay for the B-1 than when we started out in the program?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I would assume so.

Mr. Chairman, by all means, let us defy Russia's demand. There are two programs that the Russians have cited in the SALT talks that they want to do away with; one is the Trident submarine,

and the other is the B-1 bomber. The Russians think that these two weapons pose the greatest threat to their nation of any of the weaponry that we have. So, by all means let us defy Russia's demand that the B-1 be cancelled as part of the price that the United States must pay for permanent strategic arms limitations—MARV—agreements as reported in Aviation Week and Space Technology magazine of April 15, 1974.

The B-1 program must proceed despite all of the inflation-inspired verbal flak raised against it.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to say that I am absolutely intrigued with the beefsteak argument of the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER). I would only suggest to the gentleman that if we were going to measure this plane in any meaningful commodity whatsoever that it would have to be ham, and not beefsteak.

I would also like to observe that I am intrigued with the concept that the cost of any plane should go up every year in proportion to the gross national product. I do not really think that the cost of anything we contract for should go up in proportion to the growth of the gross national product. I would hope not, because if they are supposed to then obviously there is no end to inflation at any time ever.

I would like also to correct one statistic that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PRICE) threw out a little casually here when he talked about \$70 million. That was last year's figure on plane No. 4. This year's figure is \$150 million. This year's bite on this program, which is literally going nowhere, is \$499 million.

I would finally like to say that there has been some jocularity here about the same people saying the same things every year. Well, at least I have said the same things every year, whereas the arguments on the other side change each year.

Two years ago our good chairman of the full committee was saying that this program is on cost, and on schedule. And last year the gentleman from Illinois was saying that the program had no problem whatsoever. Then on Monday the gentleman from Illinois said that this is indeed a sick program, and we should admonish the Air Force.

Well, the gentleman is so gentle. I would simply say that admonishing the Air Force by hitting them with half a billion dollars is not going to be very bad, as far as the Air Force paying attention.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the chairman, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT).

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Wisconsin for yielding to me.

May I say that I think the situation resolves itself into one question: Not how can we afford to have it, but the real question is, can we afford not to have it?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I should like, in response to Mr. PIKE's question awhile ago, to address a question to him. I am just wondering if he is blaming the U.S. Air Force and the people who construct this aircraft for the inflation rate that has eaten up this increase. It has increased, but it is through no fault of theirs, as I see it. It is through the fault of the Government and we here in the Congress, to a degree, have caused this inflation. Why should we, if we are going to have a bomber, as the chairman said we needed, blame inflation costs on the cost of this aircraft that is needed?

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from California yield briefly so that I may respond?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from New York briefly.

Mr. PIKE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I should like to say I do not blame the Air Force for the inflation. I do blame the Air Force for the over \$1 billion of cost increase that has been caused by change orders. I also blame the Air Force for not telling us the truth today about the rate of inflation, thereby underestimating the future cost. The only reason they are underestimating the future cost is so this Congress will hold still for it.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. If the gentleman will yield, the increase in that cost was brought on by new equipment and asking for the fourth and fifth aircraft. This is the only aircraft that has come out of the research and development program with 3 aircraft, when most of them have used 11 aircraft.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GUBSER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. HUNT. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is very interesting to sit here and listen to someone say that we should fault the Air Force because they did not properly foresee the rate of inflation. Let me just tell the gentleman from New York that every economist in this country, and foreign countries, has underestimated the rate of inflation over the past 4 years, including that very famous economist, Milton Friedman. It behooves me to tell the true facts of the matter. We already have invested \$1.7 billion in this program. We have a mockup almost completed. We have a bomber almost ready to fly. I am sure the gentleman

from New York knows this. We are progressing with a second prototype now, and we are finally going to get this plane off the ground. It is the first bomber we have built in 20 years that will replace the outmoded B-52. It will fly better, higher, lower, and has much better equipment than any bomber developed. If it were not a good ship, I am sure Pravda would not be interested in it.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I might say to the Members that I know they are breathlessly waiting to hear what I have to say, and I will not yield further.

(By unanimous consent, at the request of Mr. PIKE, Mr. GUBSER was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I hope I do not use all the time allotted to me, but I should like to summarize this argument on the B-1. I think the real basic question that we have to decide here today in our own minds, hearts, and consciences is this: Is this still a dangerous world in which we live? Honest men can have honest differences of opinion on that subject. I might say, the very hard intelligence data which we have been privileged to view, that I happen to believe that the Soviet Union is continuing to develop its warmaking capability, including its offensive capability, at a rate faster than at any other time in its history.

I happen to think if they are doing this—and I am sure they are—they are not doing it just for the pleasure of spending money and denying their people the consumer goods which those rubles would buy. They are doing it because they too consider this a dangerous world.

I think we should do nothing less for the security of this country than maintain the military parity of this country, and I do not believe we are maintaining parity.

Let me list off some of the differences between the capabilities of existing strategic bombers and the B-1.

First of all, we will have with the B-1 much faster reaction. Secondly, we will have an increased resistance to nuclear effects. Thirdly, we will have quicker takeoff and shorter escape times by about 50 percent. We will have much longer range. We will have the ability to penetrate portions of the Soviet Union which the F-111 and the B-52 cannot penetrate. If we were to rely only on the F-111, a plane which I am strongly for, all the Soviet Union would have to do is just move back its silos containing its ICBM's and they would be immune from attack by manned bombers. The B-1 will have a much vaster greater payload. It will have higher speeds at both high and low altitudes. It will have a reduced infrared signature. It will have a decreased radar cross-section. It will have a vastly increased electronic countermeasure capability.

These are all modern developments which are essential to a good aircraft in this modern technological age. It is not enough in this dangerous world in which we live for the United States of America to go on with its head in the sand, burying itself in a technology which is now 2

decades old, and say that we will not move forward, we will let the Russians move forward by themselves.

It is just that simple. The B-1 is a better plane and it goes further than any aircraft has ever gone before in its capability.

This is a dangerous world. We cannot afford to stand still because the realities of the leadtime tell us that today we will not have the 6 or 8 months or a year to prepare and to grind up our technologic machinery to the point where it can produce. We cannot have that luxury any more. It behooves us to maintain parity and to make this a safer and more secure world. This is one way we can do it, that is by keeping the B-1 program moving.

I compliment the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) for being honest enough not to try to cut the B-1 program in half. He is against it. He wants to knock it out. I honor his opinion but I happen to disagree with him. However it would be fatal if we cut this program in half or slowed it down or decreased it and slowed down the effective date of deployment. I do think the gentleman has been honest, but I think he has been honestly wrong. The security of this country requires that we go ahead and move quickly with the development of the B-1 bomber.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I would emphasize that we are in the R. & D. phase of this project and the development requires such a long leadtime that we cannot cut this off right now and expect to develop it later as we please.

I have had very grave reservations about this overall B-1 program. It has been a program with serious problems in the past and I think if we would vote for procurement today I would vote against it. This is not procurement—it is research and development. I think we would be making a very serious error to vote against the research and development of this at this point.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman from Alabama.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE).

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 94, noes 309, not voting 30, as follows:

[Roll No. 237]

AYES—94

Abzug	Conyers	Green, Pa.
Addabbo	Corman	Griffiths
Aspin	Culver	Gude
Badillo	Dellenback	Harrington
Barrett	Dellums	Hawkins
Bergland	Drinan	Hechler, W. Va.
Bingham	Eckhardt	Holtzman
Biatnik	Edwards, Calif.	Howard
Boiling	Eilberg	Hungate
Brademas	Evans, Colo.	Jordan
Brasco	Evins, Tenn.	Kastenmeier
Bullison, Mo.	Fascell	Koch
Burton	Findley	Kyros
Carney, Ohio	Foley	Long, La.
Chisholm	Forsythe	McCloskey
Cohen	Fraser	McCormack

McKinney	Rees	Studds	Sisk	Symms	Wiggins
Metcalfe	Reuss	Thompson, N.J.	Skubitz	Talcott	Wilson, Bob
Mezvinsky	Riegle	Tiernan	Slack	Taylor, Mo.	Wilson,
Mink	Robison, N.Y.	Traxler	Smith, N.Y.	Taylor, N.C.	Charles H.,
Mitchell, Md.	Rodino	Udall	Snyder	Thomson, WIs.	Calif.
Moakley	Rosenthal	Ullman	Spence	Thone	Wilson,
Moorhead, Pa.	Royal	Van Deerlin	Staggers	Thornton	Charles, Tex.
Moss	Ryan	Vander Veen	Stanton	Towell, Nev.	Wright
Nedzi	St Germain	Vank	J. William	Vander Jagt	Treen
Obey	Sarbanes	Walde	James V.	Veysey	Wydler
O'Hara	Schroeder	Whalen	Steed	Vigorito	Wylie
Owens	Seiberling	Wolf	Steele	Waggoner	Young, Alaska
Pike	Smith, Iowa	Yates	Steelman	Walsh	Young, Fla.
Podell	Stark	Young, Ga.	Steiger, Ariz.	Wampler	Young, Ill.
Pritchard	Stokes		Steiger, WIs.	Ware	Young, S.C.
Rangel			Stephens	White	Young, Tex.

NOES—309

Abdnor	Duncan	McCollister	Arends	Gray
Adams	du Pont	McDade	Bafalis	Hansen, Wash.
Alexander	Edwards, Ala.	McEwen	Carey, N.Y.	Heilstokl
Anderson,	Erlenborn	McFall	Chappell	Johnson, Pa.
Calif.	Esch	McKay	Clark	Jones, Okla.
Anderson, Ill.	Eshelman	McSpadden	Clawson, Del	Kluczynski
Andrews, N.C.	Fish	Madden	Clay	Macdonald
N. Dak.	Fisher	Madigan	Collins, Ill.	Teague
Annunzio	Flood	Mahon	Diggs	Minshall, Ohio
Archer	Flowers	Mallary	Morgan	Williams
Armstrong	Flynt	Mann	Nix	Winn
Ashbrook	Fountain	Maraziti	Ford	Wyatt
Ashley	Frelinghuysen	Martin, Nebr.		
Baker	Frenzel	Martin, N.C.		
Bauman	Frey	Mathias, Calif.		
Beard	Froehlich	Mathis, Ga.		
Bell	Fulton	Matsunaga		
Bennett	Fuqua	Mayne		
Bevill	Gaydos	Mazzoli		
Blagg	Gettys	Meeds		
Blester	Gialmo	Melcher		
Blackburn	Gibbons	Michel		
Boggs	Gilman	Milford		
Boland	Ginn	Miller		
Broomfield	Goldwater	Mills		
Brotzman	Gonzalez	Minish		
Brown, Calif.	Goodling	Mitchell, N.Y.		
Brown, Mich.	Grasso	Mizell		
Brown, Ohio	Green, Oreg.	Mollohan		
Broyhill, N.C.	Gross	Montgomery		
Broyhill, Va.	Grover	Moorhead,		
Broomfield	Gubser	Calif.		
Brotzman	Gunter	Mosher		
Brown, Calif.	Guyer	Murphy, Ill.		
Brown, Mich.	Haley	Murphy, N.Y.		
Brown, Ohio	Hamilton	Murtha		
Broyhill, N.C.	Hammer-	Myers		
Brown, Va.	schmidt	Natcher		
Buchanan	Hanley	Neisen		
Burgener	Hanna	Nichols		
Burke, Calif.	Hanrahan	O'Brien		
Burke, Fla.	Hansen, Idaho	O'Neill		
Burke, Mass.	Harsha	Parris		
Burleson, Tex.	Hastings	Passman		
Butler	Hays	Patman		
Byron	Hebert	Patten		
Camp	Heckler, Mass.	Pepper		
Carter	Heinz	Perkins		
Casey, Tex.	Hicks	Pettis		
Cederberg	Hillis	Peyser		
Chamberlain	Hinshaw	Pickle		
Clancy	Hogan	Poage		
Clausen,	Holfield	Powell, Ohio		
Don H.	Holt	Preyer		
Cleveland	Horton	Price, Ill.		
Cochran	Hosmer	Price, Tex.		
Collier	Huber	Quie		
Collins, Tex.	Hudnut	Quillen		
Conable	Hunt	Rallsback		
Conlan	Hutchinson	Randall		
Conte	Ichord	Rarick		
Cotter	Jarman	Regula		
Coughlin	Johnson, Calif.	Rinaldo		
Crane	Johnson, Colo.	Roberts		
Crönin	Jones, Ala.	Robinson, Va.		
Daniel, Dan	Jones, N.C.	Roe		
Daniel, Robert W., Jr.	Jones, Tenn.	Rogers		
Daniels,	Karth	Roncallo, Wyo.		
Dominick V.	Kazen	Roncallo, N.Y.		
Danielson	Kemp	Rooney, Pa.		
Davis, Ga.	Ketchum	Rose		
Davis, S.C.	King	Rostenkowski		
Davis, Wis.	Kuykendall	Roush		
de la Garza	Lagomarsino	Rousselot		
Delaney	Landgrebe	Roy		
Denholm	Landrum	Ruppe		
Dennis	Latta	Ruth		
Dent	Leggett	Sandman		
Derwinski	Lehman	Sarasin		
Devine	Lent	Satterfield		
Dickinson	Litton	Scherle		
Dingell	Long, Md.	Sebelius		
Donohue	Lott	Shipley		
Dorn	Lujan	Shoup		
Downing	Luken	Shriver		
Dulski	McClory	Shuster		
		Sikes		

NOT VOTING—30

Arends	Gray	Reid
Bafalis	Hansen, Wash.	Rhodes
Carey, N.Y.	Heilstokl	Rooney, N.Y.
Chappell	Johnson, Pa.	Runnels
Clark	Jones, Okla.	Stubblefield
Clawson, Del	Kluczynski	Symington
Clay	Macdonald	Teague
Collins, Ill.	Minshall, Ohio	Williams
Diggs	Morgan	Winn
Ford	Nix	Wyatt

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MS. ABZUG

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Ms. ABZUG: Page 4, line 18, insert the following new section:

"Sec. 202. No funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this title shall be used for any of the following programs designed to build counterforce capabilities:

1. Mark 500 Warhead for Trident (Navy Evador).
2. Improved targeting of Sub-launched Ballistic Missiles.
3. Terminally Guided MARVs.
4. Improved yield on Minuteman III.
5. Increased accuracy on Minuteman III.
6. Increased MIRVs on Minuteman III.
7. Missile Performance Measurement System for Minuteman.
8. New Fixed Based ICBM.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, I am offering this amendment to eliminate authorizations for funding eight programs designed to increase nuclear counterforce capabilities. The funds allocated to these eight programs total a little over \$250 million—a small amount by Pentagon standards. But, for the first time in my memory, I find myself totally unconcerned with the financial costs of these proposed military projects. The consequences of approving these programs far transcend matters of dollars and cents; they go to the heart of our survival.

We are confronted today with a rather anomalous situation. We have been geared to judging Defense Department requests by cost-efficiency standards. The costs have been staggering, as we all know, but, except in rare instances, we have been persuaded to pay the price in the name of national security. Today, we are offered a bargain—a mere quarter of a billion dollars to increase our counterforce capabilities and assure our position as No. 1 in the field of nuclear weapons. But, alas, there is a catch—and the catch is that if we accept this proposition, we will commit this country to a policy leading not to peace and national security, but to a nuclear arms

race and a greater possibility of a disastrous nuclear war.

The United States continues to lead in numbers and sophistication of nuclear weapons. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger testified last March that, in his opinion, we now enjoy far greater operational counterforce capabilities than do the Soviets. Our present nuclear hardware is capable of reacting to any attack by targeting on enemy cities or military targets, including missile silos. Thus, we are capable right now of the type of "flexible response" that Secretary Schlesinger claims we need. Similarly, we already enjoy the strong bargaining position that many view as essential to obtaining future SALT agreements.

Just as we can direct retaliatory forces against any aggressor, the Soviets enjoy the security of knowing that they would be capable of striking back at any first strike against them. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is today capable of destroying the other's deterrent forces by a "first strike". And as long as there is that assurance that one's enemy's retaliatory forces can not be eliminated by a first strike, there is little chance of either side's taking that disastrous first step. This is the essence of our long-standing policy of nuclear deterrence. Our only concern need be ensuring the defense or security of our own retaliatory forces.

Now, however, we are being asked to give our blessings to a new policy—and we are not even given an understandable explanation of why it is necessary. The requested research and development projects would start us on the development of new nuclear hardware, the terminally guided MARV—maneuverable reentry vehicle—for example, which would give the United States almost perfect accuracy and greater yield and enable this country eventually, when these weapons are perfected, to destroy an enemy's retaliatory forces by a first strike.

Are we really naive enough to imagine that, once we embark on this new policy, the Soviets will not hasten to emulate and, if possible, overtake us in this race to blow up the world? And, even if it should take them another 10 or 20 years to catch up with us, what peacekeeping forces will restrain them in the interim? If the Soviets even suspect that the United States is capable of destroying them completely by a first strike, imagine the nervous fingers not daring to wait for that first strike to occur.

Let us not be fooled. The improved accuracy and yield of our nuclear warheads will add not one iota to nuclear deterrence or to national security or to peace. Our only deterrent goal should be to protect our retaliatory forces by insuring their survivability in case of a nuclear attack. But these proposed refinements have nothing to do with insuring this survivability. Just look at the list of projects. Each is geared to offensive strength and capability. How can anyone fail to see the significance of what we are being asked to approve today? There is a lot more involved here than a choice of weapon systems—where

we generally end up by abdicating our judgment to that of the so-called experts at the Pentagon. This is a choice of national policy—of foreign policy—of survival of our civilization. Do we really want to abandon our longstanding policy of nuclear deterrence and opt for a new and radical program that may—and probably will—lead us into a nuclear arms race? Do we want to risk a war that will mean the end of civilization? This may sound overly dramatic, but I am not exaggerating one bit the possible consequences of our action today. Our responsibility to ourselves and to our constituents requires each of us to think seriously and to consider these consequences before reaching a decision.

Unfortunately, this will be our one and only chance to vote against these projects. Once approved, they cannot—or will not—be abandoned. On the other hand, if we should vote them down now, we will have the opportunity, I am sure, to consider them again. This is not the first time that we have been asked to approve research and development programs aimed at increasing missile accuracy. In 1971, the Defense Department, in opposing counterforce amendments offered by Senator BUCKLEY stated, and I quote from its position paper at the time.

It is the position of the United States not to develop a weapons system whose deployment could reasonably be construed by the Soviets as having a first strike capability. Such a deployment might provide an incentive for the Soviets to strike first.

Thus, the issue is not whether these new targeting programs will, in fact, give the United States first strike capability but whether, in the eyes of the Soviets, they may do so.

If we allow this kind of research and development to commence, it means that we will be changing our entire nuclear policy and inviting the risk of a disastrous nuclear war. I do not believe we should allow ourselves to be responsible for that.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, an effective force to deter strategic nuclear attack is not only absolutely essential for the very survival of the United States, it is also the ultimate source of our ability to deter at lower levels. This preeminence has been acknowledged by national policy, past and present.

Deterrence is the primary purpose of our strategic forces. Specifically, our strategic deterrence objectives are:

To deter a direct attack on the United States;

To deter nuclear attacks on our allies;

To exercise a deterrent effect against massive, nonnuclear attacks on our allies;

To inhibit coercion of the United States by nuclear powers; and

To help inhibit coercion of our allies by such powers.

In addition, should deterrence fail, we must be able to respond selectively in a manner which will prevent uncontrolled escalation to a general nuclear war, and which will allow specified targets to be

destroyed with a minimum of collateral damage.

To meet these objectives, we maintain a strategic force designed to survive any type of attack and still respond effectively. This force consists of three primary elements—bombers, land-launched intercontinental ballistic missiles—ICBM's, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles—SLBM's.

To maintain the credibility of our deterrent forces and to insure the availability of flexible, selective options, it is essential that we support research and development efforts which provide the opportunity to improve the capabilities of these forces. Three such programs, which have been included in the fiscal year 1975 budget request, call for the development of improved guidance and increased yield for our current Minuteman III missiles and research into terminal guidance technology applicable to future ICBM systems. These programs will enhance deterrence and promote stability for reasons which I will now discuss.

The Soviet Union is engaged in a massive ICBM development program. In the past year, they have tested four new ICBM's, three of which have multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRV's, and all of which are designed for increased accuracy. Three of these new ICBM's will provide significant increases in "throw weight," or payload weight which can be delivered at a given distance, over those forces which they will replace. The combined effectiveness of this increased throw weight, improved accuracy, and MIRV capability—unmatched by developments of our own—would be to give the Soviets a clear advantage in counterforce capability over the United States. This fact is recognized by the Soviet Union, and it is recognized by leaders in Western Europe. As a consequence, the credibility of our nuclear deterrent could be questioned, and the Soviets would be able to use their strategic advantage for political leverage in their dealings with the United States and our allies. We can not allow this to happen. For deterrence to work, our capability and our willingness to use that capability must be perceived by world leaders. It must be perceived by potential aggressors to deter them from aggressive acts. It must be perceived by our allies to give them confidence in our strength and resolve. And it must be perceived by the uncommitted nations so that they will feel free to exercise their basic rights to determine their own destiny without interference or dominance by other nations.

The programs which have been proposed to improve the accuracy and increase the yield of our ICBM's will do much to provide a counter to the Soviet program and thus maintain a perceived balance. To achieve a desired level of damage on a given target, several warheads sometimes are allocated to a single target for various reasons, including the degree of weapon accuracy and the hardness of the target. Improving the accuracy of our Minuteman III mis-

siles will tend to reduce the number of warheads required to achieve the desired damage on a target. Thus it will serve to increase the overall effectiveness of our ICBM force. Moreover, the increased accuracy combined with the smaller number of warheads required against a single target will reduce significantly the collateral damage that would occur in a limited response. The more precise delivery of fewer warheads also provides a greater likelihood that such a limited response will be recognized for what it is—a limited response—instead of being mistaken for an all-out attack. This, in turn, increases the credibility of such a limited response and therefore enhances deterrence.

The companion program to increase the yield of the Minuteman III warheads will provide similar benefits to our deterrent posture. Against targets that currently require the allocation of several warheads, an increase in yield would enable fewer warheads to accomplish the desired result. The combination of improved accuracy and increased yield will provide a significant increase in the effectiveness of the individual Minuteman III missiles, particularly against hard military targets. This increased effectiveness together with the selectivity and flexibility provided by these features will be clearly perceived by world leaders, and deterrence will be strengthened.

The technology effort on terminal guidance will provide insight into the feasibility of concepts for highly accurate ICBM delivery. This effort is necessary to allow us the option for development of such systems as a mobile ICBM or other ICBM systems of the future. As a technology investigation, it will also alert us to the degree of effectiveness and the possible limitations of terminal guidance. In the event that the Soviet Union should develop terminal guidance, we would be in a better position to counter that development.

It has been suggested that these programs for improved accuracy and increased yield would be destabilizing and would give the appearance of a first strike intent. This clearly is not the case. Even if the programs I have discussed were carried to the point of deployment in our ICBM's the total U.S. strategic offensive force would not be sufficient to deprive the Soviets of the ability to inflict a high level of damage in retaliation, using surviving elements of their strategic offensive Triad.

The development of improved accuracy and increased yield for Minuteman III does not adversely affect strategic stability. Rather—within the environment of major Soviet advances in accuracy, throw weight, and MIRV capability—it actually enhances stability by virtue of the fact that those missiles which survive an enemy first strike would be more effective and thus further assure our retaliatory capability. Also, it increases our ability to respond in a controlled way, making the likelihood of nuclear response more credible, thereby making deterrence more effective and the initial use of nuclear weapons by a potential aggressor less likely. I urge your

support of these programs for ICBM improvements.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, along with many of our colleagues, I have struggled to appreciate our evolving concepts of nuclear strategic policy. Our policy of massive deterrence has stood us well in the past. Today, with the proliferation of nuclear arms, many seek an alternative to this policy and its consequences if implemented.

Alternatives are available but only if we are demonstrably capable of the precise application of force to selected targets. The credibility of such a policy is enhanced if this can be exercised using our essentially invulnerable sea-based forces.

Defense witnesses have testified that while the accuracy of our current FBM missiles is sufficient for the assured destruction of urban and industrial targets, there is no assurance that the accuracy of these systems will support a more limited application of force. We need to know more precisely the capability of our forces today and the feasibility of improving these and future weapons systems. This will be particularly important when we consider the implications of limiting the size of land- and sea-based strategic forces as well as conditions under which we develop new weapons systems.

The Navy's FBM systems accuracy improvement program has as its objective developing the means to assess, under operational conditions, the accuracy of sea-based missile systems and the feasibility of upgrading the accuracy of present and future systems. I believe the program is timely and that we need to proceed now if we are to have the option of upgrading the accuracy of FBM missiles in the 1980's.

Mr. Chairman, I cannot conscientiously conceive of any one supporting this amendment. By the very wording of the amendment itself, it should be defeated because it says that no funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to this title shall be used for any of the following programs designed to build counterforce capabilities. In other words, the amendment itself contradicts itself because in essence it says that we are to be deprived of R. & D. capabilities and those improvements because we might use them more accurately in defending our Nation. This is the inference I get from it because it says "counterforce capabilities."

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think it must be agreed that the thrust of the amendment of the gentleman from New York would require that we fight the next war with the weapons of the last war; without regard for the fact that the enemy would be in position to continue to develop modern weapons almost without restriction; a very dangerous prospect for our country.

Mr. HUNT. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Are we to go back to the bow and arrow?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I might say the facts show that Russia has spent over \$30 billion this last year in its budget to build their so-called systems, to destroy the United States. How can anyone prudently watch a country spend \$30 billion to try to annihilate this country and say that we are going to stand by and watch them build up their new SSX-19's, SS-11's, and SS-13's and stand here and not build anything? I think it is completely suicidal to suggest such a thing.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. GIAIMO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I agree with the gentleman insofar as he is opposed to this amendment. I, too, shall oppose this amendment. But in all fairness to the debate here and to what the gentlewoman from New York is trying to say by the use of the word "counterforce," it has a very real meaning in that it does not mean to go back to bows and arrows, or not to develop regular counterforce type weapons, as the gentleman well knows. Counterforce has to do with the question of targeting nuclear weapons, whether they would be against Soviet, or, rather enemy nuclear missiles, or against population centers. It has a very real meaning, and I do not think it should be taken out of context.

Mr. HUNT. I thank the gentleman. I did not take it out of context. I am simply pointing out to the gentleman that the word "counter" means against. According to Webster's Dictionary, the word "counter" is taken in the context of being against, and this amendment is a counterforce deterrent.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, essentially what the amendment would do would be to limit the power of the Pentagon to make expenditures of some \$25 million to increase the yield of Minuteman warheads, \$32 million for maneuvering reentry vehicles, and \$20 million for advanced research on terminal guidance.

One might ask, "Why do we not do that?" Essentially the reason is that the only purpose for developing this new capability is to create what we call small, clean nukes. With these small nukes, what we have in mind doing is taking out hard targets in enemy territory.

The main enemy that we have is the people who were visiting us yesterday and today in the interparliamentary exchange.

What we are interested in taking out with these new capabilities is not the steel factories and things like that. As I have mentioned in my supplemental views, we can take those out with our existing capability. We are going after their missiles. That is the only hard target they have in the Soviet Union that we cannot take out with our existing capability.

Why would we want to take out their missiles? We say to retaliate, so they cannot shoot their missiles back at us. But if they know we are conducting this research and development which we are talking about today, they can only conclude in a few years that we have this capability, so therefore if they see anything coming toward them, if they see us launching anything toward their silos, they have to conclude that we have the capability to take out that silo, and as a result when that particular reentry vehicle approaches the silo it will be empty, because it will already have fired its missile toward the United States.

This is rather complicated talk, I know, for the floor of the Congress, but this was a sufficiently serious matter for the other body's Research and Development Committee to recommend that these items be deleted from their bill. It was restored in the main committee. But the argument is not at all superficial and it is not beside the point. It is a very important thing and probably one of the most escalatory things we can do.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, we both know as members of the Research and Development Committee how the Russians have increased their capability and they have built some 8 to 14 new missile silos above and beyond what was in the SALT agreement. Is the gentleman saying it is all right to increase their capability and all right for them to continue their research and development for their missiles but it is not all right for us to do it?

Mr. LEGGETT. Their improvements will do them no good, and these programs will do us no good. Those silos we can see and we can photograph and we can bargain for them to be taken away, but accuracy is something we cannot photograph and we cannot tell whether or not they have it until they have done a little bit of testing. It is something that further precludes any future SALT agreement such as Secretary Kissinger and the President have negotiated in the past.

So the idea is to maintain some of the bargaining chips so that we do not throw them away.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, would not the Russians still have a secondary strike force, even if we were targeting their silos, their submarines and so on?

Mr. LEGGETT. I think under any circumstances they probably would.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Would it not still be true that the enemy need not panic and throw everything it had at us merely because it thought we were about to fire at the weaponry?

Mr. LEGGETT. Certainly.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Then what is all the concern about?

Mr. LEGGETT. You are right. These new warheads are nuclear. The United States has adopted the posture that we would just as soon let the other side strike and we will take our damage, and we will have enough capability to make a strike against any opponent which would just not be acceptable to them. With the capability that gives a theoretical first strike capability, where you can substantially knock out the other side, then you can no longer assume that posture which the United States has.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will continue this colloquy, cannot the enemy then, if we develop this, move more and more toward the kind of weapons that cannot be hit in a first strike by our weaponry?

Mr. LEGGETT. Exactly. Theoretically, if we make better and more accurate weapons, they are going to be moving their weapons into mobile silos and things like that, so all really we do is escalate and it does not add anything real to our security.

No matter what we do the other side could retaliate. Several years ago when we were talking about the Soviet Union having a first strike at the United States some were saying they could make a fast strike and leave the United States.

I never did believe that. I have always believed we have had the capability to inflict unacceptable losses on any enemy.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. That is going to continue to be true. Is it not true that either side can always be expected to do its level best to develop the best weaponry to defend itself to hit the other side with maximum efficacy?

Can we be expected to pull our punches on this any more than we can expect the enemy to pull its punches?

Mr. LEGGETT. After you have the ability to blow the other guy's head off, additional punch isn't too useful.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Can we achieve peace by unilateral action? Does not a real stable situation have to come about through agreement by both sides and not by our just deciding to slow down our development.

Mr. LEGGETT. Exactly. What we are trying to do is reach an international détente, so that we have a balance of power.

In the opinion of many experts, what this does is to act in a destabilizing capacity. It makes détente more difficult to achieve.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. It seems to me the only way to avoid both sides blowing themselves up is by both sides getting together in an international disarmament agreement, not by a unilateral slowdown on our part.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I wish to associate myself with the gentlewoman from New York. I yield my time to the gentlewoman from New York.

Ms. ABZUG. I would like before we conclude this discussion to emphasize one other point. When we first began developing the MIRV, the Soviet Union did not have any MIRV's. They do have some now. We have some 7,000 to their 1,500 or 1,900 warheads.

I am not a member of the Committee on Armed Services, but I am concerned with the peace of the world.

We do have a superiority that is quite extensive. It seems to me that it is quite ridiculous to suggest that because we are opposed to the development of this new nuclear targeting strategy, we are weakening our present policy of nuclear deterrence. Our deterrent has been based upon a wholly different strategy and that has been the inability of either side to destroy completely the retaliatory forces of the other side.

The purpose of the proposed new strategy—of increasing targeting accuracy—is obviously to strike in a way that will dispose of the enemy's retaliatory forces, making it impossible for the other side to strike back. We do not need that for our defense. We do not need that for bargaining at the SALT talks. We need to make certain that the so-called deterrents do not deter peace, which has been the stated policy of our country, and do not go off the deep end. If we vote for this today, \$300 million for R. & D., or \$200 million for R. & D., it will only be the beginning of a program that may well prove disastrous.

It is ridiculous to suggest that those who are concerned about the peace of this country and the peace of the world and are therefore opposed to starting a nuclear arms race are somehow unconcerned about maintaining our country's security.

This particular counterforce weaponry is not being developed because we are threatened with anything similar that the Soviet Union possesses. There is nothing "defensive" about these proposed new weapons. They are purely "offensive." And they are being developed because there are those in the Pentagon and elsewhere who want to change the nature of our nuclear capacity. We have managed through our present policy to deter any kind of nuclear threat. We are on the threshold of developing peaceful relations with the Soviet Union and with China and with other nations. This is not the moment to start to beat the drums for new kinds of offensive nuclear weapons for ourselves and for the world.

I urge you to give this matter your very serious consideration. Disapproving these programs will not mean that we will be disarming ourselves. Far from it. I wish to heaven that we were at that stage where we could talk about an international disarmament agreement whereby all parties would settle their disputes peacefully. This is the only ultimate solution for this country and for the world. Some day I hope we will reach that. Until then, however, it is foolhardy to suggest that we will secure peace by making war or by developing better and more sophisticated and more deadly weapons for war.

I do not think that we should look upon this amendment or this discussion as if it were just more foolish talk. It is not. It is serious, gravely serious. A vote for these research and development projects will be the beginning of a new stage of nuclear policy, which we do not have the right to approve without further discussion at the very least.

MR. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will my colleague from California yield?

MR. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

MR. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to the gentlewoman from New York, the unlogic of her argument is the fact that it is applying bipolar arguments to a multipolar world.

MR. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the amendment of the gentlelady from New York to eliminate the funds for research and development for strategic missile counterforce programs.

The amendment would delete from the bill some \$250 million to increase the yield of nuclear warheads, improve their accuracy, and conduct advanced research on warhead terminal guidance. These programs are all designed to increase the capability of our strategic missiles to destroy so-called "hard targets" such as Soviet missile silos. They are the means of implementing a new strategic doctrine announced a few months ago by Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. This new doctrine is supposed to provide the United States with greater flexibility in the potential uses of our strategic nuclear forces by targeting our missiles at protected military targets, as well as at cities, industrial facilities, and troop concentrations.

The implications of this doctrine are staggering, and it should not be put into effect without full understanding of its implications and a broad-scale national debate.

For almost 30 years, the doctrine of "mutually assured destruction," whereby each superpower can destroy the other even after a first strike, has been an effective deterrent to war even when tensions ran high. The United States has concentrated on having the ability to retaliate effectively with our own nuclear weapons even after undergoing a first-strike by the Soviets. This capability was intended to, and did, make nuclear warfare unthinkable. Secretary Schlesinger's new doctrine, and the research needed to implement it in this bill, would reverse this basic policy by making nuclear warfare a realistic possibility through selec-

tive nuclear strikes. Nuclear warfare, which was once unthinkable, is now apparently to be considered a feasible option. Mr. Chairman, I cannot support such a radical and dangerous proposal.

Moreover, these new R. & D. programs are completely unnecessary. We already target military facilities and ICBM sites, and we have the capability of aiming our missiles at them with great accuracy. The Center for Defense Information has estimated that the United States has 1,000 intercontinental ballistic missiles with penetration aids and onboard computers for guidance, while the Soviets have no such operational missiles. What possible justification can there be for the proposed refinement and sophistication of our nuclear threat when our present capabilities are already highly sophisticated and superior to the Russians?

This new doctrine and the R. & D. to carry it out will only serve to escalate the strategic arms race by persuading the Russians that the United States intends to develop a first strike capability. At best, the Russians might then logically decide to establish a policy of "launch on warning" whenever their radars detect what they think is a U.S. incoming missile attack, since they would have to believe that our missiles were capable of destroying even their hardest missile silos. At worst, their fears might lead the Russians to develop, and consider using, a first strike capability of their own.

The Department of Defense would apparently have us believe that these new missile developments might be used as another bargaining chip at the SALT talks, and that the United States might trade off these technological improvements in return for comparable reductions by the Soviet Union. I find this argument is dangerous nonsense, since the Russians could not possibly tell whether or not the United States had, in fact, ceased such research and development or whether the weapons had, in fact, been deployed. Once the Congress has authorized the funds, the Russians will have to assume that we will develop these capabilities and be able to use them at will. The net effect will be to destabilize the current standoff and increase crisis instability by a quantum jump.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would point out to my colleagues that the \$250 million for these R. & D. programs is only the tip of the iceberg, and, as others have said, this is one iceberg we should not pull out of the water. The implementation of this technology will cost billions of dollars, and once underway will be impossible to stop.

I urge the House to adopt the amendment and reject the terrifying proposition that we have to move closer to nuclear warfare. Of all the amendments expected to be proposed, I believe this one is, from the long-range point of view, the most important.

THE CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentlewoman from New York (Ms. ABZUG).

RECORDED VOTE

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 34, noes 370, not voting 29, as follows:

[Roll No. 238]

AYES—34

Abzug	Eckhardt	Rees
Aspin	Edwards, Calif.	Rosenthal
Badillo	Fascell	Roybal
Barrett	Fraser	Schroeder
Bingham	Green, Pa.	Selberling
Brown, Calif.	Harrington	Stark
Burke, Calif.	Hechler, W. Va.	Stokes
Burton	Holtzman	Studs
Chisholm	Kastenmeier	Walde
Conyers	Leggett	Young, Ga.
Dellums	Mink	
Drinan	Mitchell, Md.	

NOES—370

Abdnor	Davis, S.C.	Howard
Adams	Davis, Wis.	Huber
Addabbo	de la Garza	Hudnut
Anderson,	Delaney	Hungate
Calif.	Dellenback	Hunt
Anderson, Ill.	Denholm	Hutchinson
Andrews, N.C.	Dennis	Ichord
Andrews, N. Dak.	Dent	Jarman
Annunzio	Derwinski	Johnson, Calif.
Archer	Devine	Johnson, Colo.
Armstrong	Dickinson	Jones, Ala.
Ashbrook	Dingell	Jones, N.C.
Ashley	Donohue	Jones, Tenn.
Bafalis	Dorn	Jordan
Baker	Downing	Karth
Bauman	Dulski	Kazen
Beard	Duncan	Kemp
Bell	du Pont	Ketchum
Bennett	Edwards, Ala.	King
Bergland	Ellberg	Koch
Bevill	Erlenborn	Kyros
Blaggi	Esch	Lagomarsino
Blester	Eshleman	Landgrebe
Blackburn	Evans, Colo.	Landrum
Blatnik	Evens, Tenn.	Latta
Boggs	Findley	Lehman
Boland	Fish	Lent
Bolling	Fisher	Litton
Bowen	Flood	Long, La.
Brademas	Flowers	Long, Md.
Brasco	Flynt	Lott
Bray	Foley	Lujan
Breaux	Fountain	McClory
Breckinridge	Freilinghuysen	McCloskey
Brinkley	Frenzel	McCollister
Brooks	Frey	McCormack
Broomfield	Froehlich	McDade
Brotzman	Fulton	McEwen
Brown, Mich.	Fuqua	McFall
Brown, Ohio	Gaydos	McKay
Broyhill, N.C.	Gettys	McKinney
Broyhill, Va.	Giaimo	McSpadden
Buchanan	Gibbons	Macdonald
Burgener	Gilman	Madden
Burke, Fla.	Ginn	Madigan
Burke, Mass.	Goldwater	Mahon
Burleson, Tex.	Gonzalez	Mallary
Burlison, Mo.	Goodling	Mann
Butler	Grasso	Maraziti
Byron	Green, Oreg.	Martin, Nebr.
Camp	Griffiths	Martin, N.C.
Carney, Ohio	Gross	Mathias, Calif.
Carter	Grover	Mathis, Ga.
Casey, Tex.	Gubser	Matsunaga
Cederberg	Gude	Mayne
Chamberlain	Gunter	Mazzoli
Clancy	Guyer	Meeds
Clausen,	Haley	Melcher
Don H.	Hamilton	Mezvinsky
Cleveland	Hammer-	Michel
Cochran	schmidt	Milford
Cohen	Hanley	Miller
Collier	Hanahan	Mills
Collins, Tex.	Hansen, Idaho	Minish
Conable	Hansen, Wash.	Minshall, Ohio
Conlan	Harsha	Mitchell, N.Y.
Conte	Hastings	Mizell
Corman	Hays	Moakley
Cotter	Hébert	Mollohan
Coughlin	Heckler, Mass.	Montgomery
Crane	Heinz	Moorhead,
Cronin	Henderson	Calif.
Culver	Hicks	Moorhead, Pa.
Daniel, Dan	Hillis	Mosher
Daniel, Robert	Hinshaw	Moss
W., Jr.	Hogan	Murphy, Ill.
Daniels,	Holfeld	Murphy, N.Y.
Dominick V.	Holt	Murtha
Danielson	Horton	Myers
Davis, Ga.	Hosmer	Natcher

Nedzi	Rousselot	Thornton
Nelsen	Roy	Tiernan
Nichols	Ruppe	Towell, Nev.
Obey	Ruth	Traxler
O'Brien	Ryan	Treen
O'Hara	St Germain	Udall
O'Neill	Sandman	Ulman
Owens	Sarasin	Van Deerlin
Parris	Sarbanes	Vander Jagt
Passman	Satterfield	Vander Veen
Patman	Scherle	Vanik
Patten	Schneebell	Veysey
Pepper	Sebelius	Vigorito
Perkins	Shipley	Waggoner
Pettis	Shoup	Walsh
Peyser	Shriver	Wampler
Pickle	Shuster	Ware
Pike	Sikes	Whalen
Poage	Sisk	White
Podell	Skubitz	Whitehurst
Powell, Ohio	Slack	Witten
Preyer	Smith, Iowa	Widnall
Price, Ill.	Smith, N.Y.	Wiggins
Price, Tex.	Snyder	Wilson, Bob
Pritchard	Spence	Wilson, Charles H., Calif.
Quie	Staggers	Wilson, Charles, Tex.
Quillen	Stanton	Winn
Rallsback	J. William	Wolf
Randall	Stanton	Wright
Rangel	James V.	Wydler
Rarick	Steed	Wylie
Regula	Steele	Wyman
Reuss	Steelman	Yates
Riegle	Steiger, Ariz.	Yatron
Rinaldo	Steiger, Wis.	Young, Alaska
Roberts	Stephens	Young, Fla.
Robinson, Va.	Stratton	Young, Ill.
Robison, N.Y.	Stuckey	Young, S.C.
Rodino	Sullivan	Young, Tex.
Roe	Symington	Zablocki
Rogers	Symms	Zion
Roncallo, Wyo.	Taichert	Thompson, N.J. Zwach
Roncallo, N.Y.	Taylor, Mo.	Thomson, Wis.
Rooney, Pa.	Taylor, N.C.	Thone
Rose	Thompson, N.J.	
Rostenkowski	Zwach	
Roush		

NOT VOTING—29

Alexander	Gray	Nix
Arends	Hanna	Reid
Carey, N.Y.	Hawkins	Rhodes
Chappell	Helstoski	Rooney, N.Y.
Clark	Johnson, Pa.	Runnels
Clawson, Del	Jones, Okla.	Stubblefield
Clay	Kluczynski	Teague
Collins, Ill.	Kuykendall	Williams
Diggs	Metcalfe	Wyatt
Ford	Morgan	

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further amendments to title II? If not, the Clerk will read.

TITLE III—ACTIVE FORCES

SEC. 301. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an end strength for active duty personnel as follows:

- (1) The Army, 785,000;
- (2) The Navy, 540,380;
- (3) The Marine Corps, 196,398;
- (4) The Air Force, 627,535.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title III may be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. DELLUMS: On page 5, immediately after line 2, insert the following new sentence: "No funds author-

ized to be appropriated by this title may be used after June 30, 1975, for the purpose of maintaining more than 1,951,213 active duty personnel, and no funds authorized to be appropriated by this title may be used after June 30, 1975, for the purpose of maintaining more than 293,900 military personnel assigned on a permanent basis outside the United States or its possessions."

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, there are three important aspects to my amendment. First, the amount: I ask that 198,000 troops, close to half of our overseas presence, be returned home. Second, the place: My amendment mandates that these troops all come from overseas. Finally, the effect: By my amendment, final end-strength authorizations are lowered, which means that the men who return from overseas will be demobilized. This insures a substantial savings.

For years, Congress has approved manpower levels—including overseas manpower levels—without even questioning basic rationale for overall levels, or for the various specific commitments on which they are based. The inevitable result of this neglect has been that key policy determinants are now bureaucratic inertia and special interest needs.

Events of the past few years show us that this neglect cannot continue. Our military presence is no longer a tool of foreign policy—instead, policy is more and more determined by the needs of our military presence. My basic point is that our troop commitments were not arrived at by constitutional processes of congressional control; in fact, they represent abdication of control—over to not only the Executive, but to foreign countries as well.

I believe that my colleagues will be surprised, as I was when I began to study this issue seriously, at the sheer extent of our overseas presence, and the lack of any serious justification for the specific levels. I believe this is always the case when a bureaucracy feels that it will never have to account for its actions to an outside group—that is, when the Pentagon feels that the political responsibility of Congress has been abdicated.

Can anyone here seriously argue that substantial reductions could not be made simply by eliminating the waste and inefficiency?

That top-heavy headquarters, wasteful support-to-combat ratios, and disruptive rotation policies could be ended without the slightest loss of combat preparedness?

Can any one here tell me why we have 40,000 troops in South Korea, adding negligible strength to one of the most combat-hardened experienced armies in the world?

How many people here are aware—much less are able to give a rationale—for the 2,000 troops in Bermuda? The 10,000 troops in Spain? The 1,000 troops in Morocco? The 55,000 troops in Japan? And these are just a few examples of our worldwide military presence.

Can any one here maintain that there is a military justification for the high level of troops in Europe?

That we have a credible conventional capability, when we keep such an enormously high number of tactical nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe?

Just how many days can we expect the NATO conventional forces to hold on—without using nuclear weapons—to the east side of the Rhine against a full-scale Soviet attack?

Are there really any sound political reasons for tying our hands in regard to overseas troops and continuing to allow the Pentagon bureaucracy to live in the style to which it has become accustomed—that is, without too many nosy questions from Congress?

Does the present deadlock at the mutual force reduction talks represent progress?

Is there anything in the legislative history of the Jackson-Nunn amendment that says it should be construed as an excuse for inaction on the troop question? In fact, its legislative history shows just the reverse. Does not our willingness to remove troops unless we receive financial assistance show our awareness of the fact that the present level of troops is not necessary to Europe's survival?

These are the questions we should ask. I have asked them, and I have received no adequate answer. The time for reform has come. The longer we delay, the more damage we will do when we are forced by the realities to act. I urge my colleagues to assert our congressional responsibilities by passing this amendment.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard during the course of this debate reference made to balance of power, and things of that kind. When we are speaking of manpower numbers, we might do well to remind ourselves that during the same period of time that the U.S. military forces have been cut, reduced from 3.6 million down to 2.1 million, the uniformed troops in the Soviet Union have more than doubled. Yet we have people today who come to the floor of the House when we have measures of this kind seeking to further undermine and virtually destroy the effective capacity of our national defense establishment to provide the security that is required for America today.

Mr. Chairman, this same issue was debated last year. The same gentleman who offered it a year ago—practically the same—has offered it again today. It was thoroughly debated a year ago. I see no point in belaboring the issue. Last year on a record vote in support of his amendment he got 67 votes. In opposition to it there were registered 339 votes. Mr. Chairman, I ask for a vote.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. O'NEILL TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. DELLUMS

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. O'NEILL to the amendment offered by Mr. DELLUMS: Strike out "funds authorized to be appropriated by this title may be used after June 30, 1975, for the purpose of maintaining more than 1,951,213 active duty personnel, and no funds authorized to be appropriated by this title may be used after June 30, 1975, for the purpose of maintaining more than 293,900 military personnel assigned on a permanent basis outside the United States or its possessions."

Strike out "June 30" the second time it appears therein and insert in lieu thereof "December 31".

Strike out "293,900" and insert in lieu thereof "335,000".

Strike out "assigned on a permanent basis outside the United States or its possessions" and insert in lieu thereof the following: "permanently or temporarily assigned at land bases outside the United States or its possessions. The Secretary of Defense shall determine the appropriate worldwide overseas areas from which the phased reduction of military personnel shall be made."

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, may I in my opening remarks say I rise in strong support of substantially reducing our commitment of land-based troops overseas on foreign soil, and I speak just as any other Member of this Congress, with the same rights on the floor. In other words, I am not representing the leadership; I am representing my thoughts on this matter as a Member of the Congress.

May I say according to the Department of Defense's figures of December 31, 1973, there were 523,000 troops stationed outside of the United States. My amendment differs in three parts from the amendment as offered by the gentleman from California. He would cut the troops overseas 198,000. My amendment cuts them 100,000. His date would be June 30 of 1975; my date would be December 30 of 1975. In other words, his is 1 year, mine is 18 months.

Third, he mandates demobilization while I say that the Secretary of Defense shall have that right. But I do feel that because of the fact that we have a quota at the present time of some 535,000 overseas, that certainly 100,000 men coming back from overseas we should not keep in the Army; that is, unless the voluntary Army that we are now under does not meet the requirements for the number of men that are needed in the armed services.

It cost us last year, as I understand it, about \$18 billion for our troops overseas. In the last year we have had an inflation rate of 7½ percent. In the first 3 months of this year we have had an inflation rate of 11 percent. So I anticipate that the cost of our overseas troops next year will be approximately \$22 billion. That is \$22 billion.

It is interesting. Some people have said that troops overseas mean jobs. It is estimated if we spend \$1 billion on troops overseas it means 69,000 jobs in America, but if we spend \$1 billion on work, on employment in America, it means 110,000 jobs. So that argument is itself a false argument.

The Department of Defense estimates that to pay for the upkeep and health care and individual related costs, it takes \$12,000 for each man we have overseas. If we return 100,000 we will save \$1.2 billion.

I sincerely believe, after speaking to numerous military officials around the world and personally having visited their activities and having been recently in Taiwan and Korea and Spain and in various other countries, that a reduction of 100,000 of the land-based troops from foreign soil would not impinge upon the

United States as a free and independent nation and would not threaten our fundamental institutions and would not affect the security of the other nations who rest on our defense posture.

My amendment leaves it to the Secretary of Defense to determine the appropriate areas of withdrawal. I am not mandating a cut from any part of the world. That is up to the Secretary himself. This is left completely to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. I would suspect there are a number of different possibilities available for withdrawing troops and I am sure the chairman of this committee could tell us right now offhand at least three withdrawals that are going to take place, and I believe this will be in the vicinity of better than 25,000.

Then we have the argument: why do we say 100,000 should come back when the Department of Defense is going to move troops back? I say the Department is not moving the men back fast enough and I say we should mandate it as Members of Congress, mandate the Department to bring back 100,000 troops from overseas.

I understand it takes six back-up men for every man who carries a gun. Every military man I have talked to about it has said it is a ridiculous waste. It should be only three or four men at the most. I see no reason whatsoever why we should be expending about \$22 billion overseas. We will be keeping faith with our allies around the world. It is my opinion we should immediately invoke this amendment and bring 100,000 of our troops back.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly support substantially reducing our commitment of land-based troops overseas on foreign soil.

According to the Department of Defense figures of December 31, 1973, there were 523,000 troops stationed outside of the United States. Of these 523,000 troops 492,000 are stationed on foreign soil and 31,000 are in U.S. territories and possessions. Of the 492,000 in foreign countries 57,000 are "afloat" leaving a base figure of 435,000 land-based troops stationed on foreign soil. My amendment affects only these 435,000 troops, it does not affect the personnel afloat or the personnel stationed in U.S. territories and possessions. Furthermore the Secretary of Defense would determine the areas from which the reduction would be made.

Immediate financial savings begin from not having to pay the overseas operation and maintenance costs, you save by bringing home large numbers of dependents with the 100,000 troops—average of two per trooper—you save by avoiding the high cost of transportation and logistics supply in foreign countries.

The DOD cost estimate per man for pay, upkeep, health care, and individual related costs is \$12,000. Thus, if 100,000 troops were returned from overseas and subsequently demobilized the savings would be \$12,000 times 100,000 or \$1.2 billion. With the present state of the U.S. economy it does not make any sense to me to continue to waste this money to maintain land-based troops abroad

which do not contribute commensurately price-wise to the security of the country where the troops are stationed nor to our own national security. Whatever possibilities may exist for mutual troop reduction, they should not inhibit our efforts in the Congress to unilaterally trim excessive military involvement throughout the world.

I am talking about reduction not withdrawal, I am talking about reassertion of congressional control over our overseas military presence, I am talking about Congress fulfilling its constitutional obligations to determine where and how the taxpayer's money will or will not be spent. For far too long now we in the Congress have routinely approved manpower levels fed to us by officials in the Pentagon. For over 20 years the commitment and level of troops abroad has determined our policy rather than our policy determining the level of U.S. land-based forces stationed in foreign countries.

It is important to note that my amendment leaves it to the Secretary of Defense to determine the appropriate areas of withdrawal. I am not mandating a cut from any one specific area or areas—this is left completely to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. As you would suspect there are a number of different possibilities available for withdrawing 100,000 land-based troops home.

I sincerely believe, after speaking to numerous military officials around the world and personally viewing their activities, that a reduction of 100,000 of land-based troops on foreign soil will not impinge upon the United States as a free and independent nation, will not threaten our fundamental institutions and values, and will not affect the security of other nations with whom our defense posture rests.

Therefore, in conclusion, I ask my colleagues from both sides of the aisle to vote in support of my amendment to reduce the land-based troops overseas by 100,000. To support this amendment is to support an improved balance of payments for the Nation. To support this amendment is to reassert the rightful and constitutional role of the Congress in the making of foreign policy. The passage of this amendment, in my opinion, will send a twofold signal to the American people, first, the duly elected Members of the U.S. House of Representatives are carefully scrutinizing all executive department requests to insure the constitutional authority of the Congress is not abrogated and secondly to insure that the taxpayers hard earned money is not being wasted on an outdated policy in some foreign country.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL).

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished majority leader has offered an amendment which on its face has a certain appeal but which upon examination appears to be extremely dangerous. It contains implications which I am confident the gentleman from Massachusetts would not upon reflection want to embrace.

Let us examine what is involved for just a moment. The amendment calls for the withdrawal to the United States of 100,000 military personnel from assignment somewhere overseas. Neither the amendment nor its author identifies the forces that would be affected. That is left to the Secretary of Defense. Therefore we are left to speculate. The gentleman, however, undoubtedly has certain troops in mind since before he offered the amendment he must have deliberated upon which troops could be spared from existing stations without damaging our defense posture.

I am sure the gentleman would not propose a major amendment of this sort by pulling the figures for his proposal out of thin air. With that in mind, we are left to wonder where the gentleman's amendment would strike. Is he speaking of Thailand? If so, our military personnel are and will continue to be in a process of withdrawal. More than half of the 36,000 remaining are scheduled to be brought home this year; so I would assume the gentleman is not aiming his guns at Thailand.

Or is the gentleman drawing a bead on the several thousand Americans stationed in a half dozen different countries who direct our global communications network, including the satellites and other space programs?

Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I yield to the distinguished Speaker.

Mr. ALBERT. Is it the thrust of these amendments that we are going to spread the cuts wherever we have troops all the way from Central Europe to Japan, or are we going to take them all out of Asia or what? I think we ought to know the implications of taking them out all over the world or out of separate areas. This bothers me.

The proposal before us here would reduce the ground forces we station overseas by 100,000 by December 31, 1975. As of December 31, 1973, our total overseas ground force strength totaled 438,000. The proposal would, therefore, reduce this number by about 22 percent. I am fearful of the implications of such a reduction.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that this proposal is approved. How might we implement it? If I understand the situation correctly, we would have three possible ways of doing so: We might execute the entire reduction in Asia and the Western Pacific; or, we might effect the entire cut in Western Europe; or, we could withdraw part of the stipulated number from both areas.

Let us consider the first alternative: Making the entire proposed cut in Asia and the Western Pacific. Our current ground strength in that area is approximately 151,000. The proposed reduction would leave us with approximately 51,000 ground troops for the entire area. We could execute it only by withdrawing all our troops in Asia and reducing our Japanese commitment by 4,000. Such action on our part might further strain our relations with Japan—who is our major ally in the Western Pacific. In addition, it would destabilize the delicate

balance now existing in Korea—imperfect, to be sure, but hard-won only by virtue of the United States' steady and visible presence in Northeast Asia over the years. Finally, it would place the United States' own front line of defense back in the mid-Pacific after 30 years of effort to build a strategic crescent of defenses in the western portions of that ocean. I do not see many advantages to this Nation in such a proposal.

On the other hand, might we make the entire cut in Western Europe? We are now authorized a total of 290,000 ground troops there. The reduction of 100,000 now proposed would reduce that commitment by more than a third. I am fearful that such action on our part would seriously affect the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, and that it might eliminate any hopes we might have entertained for reciprocal reductions by the Warsaw Pact. It seems to me that such a policy on our part would be interpreted by both the Soviet Union and the NATO Allies as a massive reversal of U.S. attitude toward Europe and a drastic downgrading of our concern with European security. We have worked hard and long to build up NATO's forces and have succeeded at last in building a well-equipped, competent armed force. It seems to me to be in the national interest of the United States to maintain this force under present circumstances.

Now suppose that we divide the reduction and implementation part of it in Europe and the rest in Asia? That sounds logical, but is it really? If we withdrew half the proposed cut, or 50,000 troops, from Asia and the Western Pacific, we could maintain our crucial commitments to Japan and to South Korea, but we would have to evacuate our important bases in the Philippines and Thailand. Alternately, we might maintain our deployments in Japan, the Philippines, and Thailand, but we would have to eliminate our presence in Korea.

And, meanwhile, our withdrawal of the other half of the stipulated cuts from Western Europe would work as much havoc as withdrawal of the entire amount. It is an inescapable fact that the NATO Allies' extreme sensitivity to the issue of unilateral troop reductions would cause any significant withdrawal on our part to undermine their confidence and resolve in the face of pressures from the East. It could also do serious injury to the MBFR talks to which we have devoted so much effort and perseverance over the years. I trust that we will not seek to force such major changes in policy at this time.

Mr. FISHER. I think the Speaker is talking about something that needs to be talked about, something that needs to be recognized by all the Members.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. Just a moment, let me finish.

Or is the gentleman drawing a bead on the several thousand Americans stationed in a half dozen different countries who direct our global communications network, including the satellites and other space programs?

His amendment does not rule that out. Or does the gentleman from Massachusetts have in mind pulling our military forces out of the Philippines? He did not rule it out in his amendment. If so, several thousand who support our vast Pacific naval operations at Subic Bay and elsewhere could, of course, be brought home.

What about Guantanamo Bay in Cuba with 3,000 servicemen? I feel confident the gentleman is not gunning for that billion-dollar plant. But by closing it, 3,000 Americans could be brought home. What a wonderful thing it would be to have them at home.

One might say, "How about Korea?" For some reason, the gentleman from Massachusetts appears unwilling to disturb our commitment in Korea. On a recent trip there he was asked by the press in response to a question, saying as follows:

When you return to America what recommendations would you make . . . regarding stationing of U.S. troops in Korea?

To which the distinguished majority leader responded:

Well, at the particular time I am free to report that there is no idea of removing American troops from Korea at this time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

(At the request of Mr. O'NEILL and by unanimous consent Mr. FISHER was allowed to proceed for an additional 2 minutes.)

(At the further request of Mr. DAN DANIEL and by unanimous consent Mr. FISHER was allowed to proceed for an additional 5 minutes.)

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. Let me finish the quotation first. I have been trying for quite a while. I created quite a little disturbance here when I started quoting my friend, the gentleman from Massachusetts, in response to the question of what he wanted to do about the troops in Korea.

The gentleman from Massachusetts is quoted as saying the following:

Well, at the particular time I'm free to report that there is no idea of removing American troops from Korea at this time.

Therefore, by this process of elimination about all that remains for the gentleman to get his teeth into is NATO.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. Very briefly.

Mr. O'NEILL. The gentleman is getting into a very technical matter. Of course, when I made the statement like that, I had been briefed on the subject by everybody. The gentleman knows, and the gentlemen on the committee know what will happen to Korea. I do not think we should be diverted at a time like this. I am amazed that the gentleman brings it up.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, let me respond to the gentleman by saying that I did not refer to Korea except to quote what the gentleman said, in the public press.

Mr. O'NEILL. My amendment calls for 18 months at that particular time.

Mr. FISHER. I am talking about the gentleman's quotation about Korea.

Mr. O'NEILL. I am amazed at the gentleman, a member of the Armed Services Committee, getting up and making a statement like that when he knows as well as I do, as chairman, what is going to happen in Korea. That should not be brought up at this particular time.

Mr. FISHER. Let me respond to the gentleman by saying that I am amazed at him now raising any question about the quotation in the paper.

Mr. O'NEILL. Of course, the quotation is correct, but we had 18 months, and the gentleman knows what is going to happen and I know what is going to happen.

Mr. FISHER. I was pleased to know that the distinguished majority leader agrees that I quoted him correctly. I think I was in order in telling what I read in the newspaper. That is all it was, and it created quite a stir around here.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I think the comment of the gentleman from Texas in reading that newspaper report about Mr. O'NEILL is very revealing, and it answers the very question raised by our distinguished Speaker a moment ago; because what the gentleman from Texas has just said is that, if we are going to take 100,000 troops from our overseas stations and if we are also going to assure the Koreans that the 38,000 troops over there are not going to be removed, then we cannot remove 100,000 without taking at least 30,000 or 40,000 away from NATO.

So, this O'Neill amendment is basically an amendment that would undercut NATO; is that not correct?

Mr. FISHER. Correct. I am coming to that right now.

By this process of elimination, about all that is left for the gentleman from Massachusetts to get his teeth into is NATO. That alliance has been under attack by the isolationists and critics of our foreign policy as it relates to NATO for a long time. Certainly, beyond any doubt, a unilateral pullback of upwards of 100,000 American troops from Europe at this time without any consultation with our allies in that alliance, without regard to the ongoing sensitive negotiations for mutual troop pullbacks with the Soviets and the Warsaw countries, would in all likelihood spell the doom of NATO.

To argue otherwise is to dispute reality. We can always argue the point that there has been plenty of time, but then they never do anything. And, we all tend to get impatient. But, this is a thing that does not lend itself to rush acts, and I suppose a few years do not matter so much when we are dealing with an alliance, the sole purpose of which is to prevent a global war and advance the cause of peace in this world.

Certainly, we would all like to pull out of Europe, but at what price? Now is not the time. Troop reductions by each mem-

ber of the alliance is a matter of negotiation, not of arbitrary meat ax whacking by any one member. That is, unless we want to downgrade NATO.

Moreover, for the Congress to order massive troop withdrawals from Europe at this time would play squarely into the hands of the Soviets. As the Members know, the Russians have been insisting that we do this for a long time.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has again expired.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, about half of my time has been consumed by others.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. FISHER was allowed to proceed for an additional 3 minutes.)

Mr. FISHER. But, our negotiators have insisted that the Russians and their partners do some reciprocating withdrawal themselves. Some progress in negotiations has been reported, but the Soviets would much rather have it handed to them on a silver platter.

Now, they talk of the money that would be saved by the redeployment of 100,000 troops. The gentleman from Massachusetts—maybe he will correct his remarks when he reads them—said it costs \$12,500 per year for each person in uniform overseas, and that this entire amount would be saved if they are brought home.

Mr. Chairman, if they are not going to be discharged when they are brought home, they are still going to cost the \$12,500.

Actually, if we have in mind conserving any semblance of an alliance with our allies, the net savings by stationing a man at home rather than abroad would be relatively little. If the Members need details on that, our staff will be glad to accommodate them.

Mr. Chairman, even this would, of course, involve the serious degradation of our military capability because forward deployment is a key in our security posture, and I assume that those who sponsor this amendment have in mind maintaining an airlift capability to support our possible missions, whatever they may be, in lieu of overseas deployment.

To maintain such a sealift and airlift capacity would not only result in additional billions in cost but would also result in more billions for acquisition of such equipment, to say nothing of additional manpower requirements and effort to sustain such capacity. In other words, what I am saying is that whatever is saved, in my opinion, would be more than overcome by costs of additional equipment and manpower; that is, unless we want to disarm and forget about our military posture in this world.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment should be defeated.

The gentleman from Massachusetts, despite his good intentions, is operating on very tenuous grounds in pressing this proposal at this time. This is no time to rock the boat.

Considering the situation as it exists in Europe today, let this matter be fought out inside the NATO Council and negotiated from across the table with the Russians.

The adoption of this amendment, Mr. Chairman, would not be in the interest of national security.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has again expired.

(On request of Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts and by unanimous consent, Mr. FISHER was allowed to proceed for 3 additional minutes.)

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FISHER. I will yield to the gentleman for a question.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to remind the gentleman that he is talking about the meat ax cut.

Mr. FISHER. Yes.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, the Defense Department has closed all the installations in the Northeast section of this country. They placed the entire North Atlantic Fleet in jeopardy, and they did not exercise 2 minutes thought about it. If this threat worldwide is as bad as the gentleman says, how can we justify the cuts made up here in the Northeast, including the laying off of 35,000 people from their jobs and pulling out of Massachusetts and Rhode Island the naval installations?

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman can see any relationship between closing some bases in the Northeastern part of the United States and the destruction of NATO, then he is welcome to it.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment to the amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader. Over the years, the gentleman (Mr. O'NEILL) has been consistent in his advocacy of a 100,000 land-based overseas troop cut, and those of us who believe such an action would be unwise and counterproductive have been no less consistent in our response: Where will these cuts be made? In times past, the gentleman has further demonstrated his regard for consistency by failing to provide a satisfactory answer each time the amendment has been offered. I must observe that that record remains untarnished today.

Mr. Chairman, the heart of the matter is simply that the arithmetic of U.S. overseas forces makes this amendment thoroughly unrealistic, not to say quixotic. To be successfully implemented, it would require a 65-percent cut in our land-based forces stationed everywhere in the world other than Western Europe. I fully acknowledge and strongly support the phased retrenchment we are now undertaking regarding the perhaps excessive commitments made during the peak of the cold war period. But a 65-percent cut in our presence throughout the world outside of the NATO area would not spell retrenchment; it would signal headlong retreat.

Mr. Chairman, we now have roughly 520,000 troops stationed outside of the United States. As the gentleman has undoubtedly learned from his constituents near the Boston Naval Yard, the 57,000 forces afloat among this number play an indispensable role in protecting our national security, and have therefore been exempted from the amendment. I also doubt whether the gentleman would urge the removal or reduction of the 31,000 forces stationed in various U.S. overseas possessions and territories. So for all practical purposes this amendment targets in on the 432,000 land-based troops deployed on foreign soil.

But nearly two-thirds of those forces—277,000—are located in Western Europe and related areas. I hardly need remind this body that two highly sensitive East-West negotiations are now in progress regarding just that area of the world, and that the governments of three of our major European allies have fallen in the last 6 months. I do not have to point out that the deep economic tensions induced by the energy crisis have worn the ligaments of the NATO alliance dangerously thin. I do not need to elaborate upon the delicate East-West balance of power that undergirds the tenuous but steady movement toward a lasting solution in the Middle East.

All of these things are obvious. All of them point toward maintaining, at least for the present, the status quo in Europe. Perhaps when the new governments have become established and settled, when there is some clear conclusion to the MBFR negotiations, and when a firmer foundation for peace has been laid in the Middle East, the time will come when we can reconsider our force commitment in Europe. But for the present, a substantial unilateral cut would be destabilizing in the extreme.

Mr. Chairman, it is thus clear that the O'Neill amendment is simply not responsible or viable: It would require that we precipitously ship home 100,000 of the 155,000 land-based troops located outside of the NATO area.

But would anyone advocate, for example, the immediate removal of 23,000 of our 36,000 troops stationed in South Korea? Yet that is what this amendment would in effect require. Can it reasonably be concluded that by cutting our force commitment there from 64,000 as recently as 1971 to 13,000 by the end of this year that the halting steps toward rapprochement between the two Koreas would be encouraged?

The situation is little different regarding the other major concentration of our land-based forces in Japan-Okinawa. Can we just uproot 36,000 of the 55,000 troops stationed there and expect no adverse repercussions? For better or worse, we have already successively administered a "dollar shock," a "China shock," and a "soybean shock," to our Japanese ally. The Arabs have now complemented those diplomatic seismic waves with an "oil shock" of their own. While Mr. Tanaka has not yet joined company with Messrs. Trudeau, Heath, and Brandt, the tenure of his government is highly uncertain. In light of the attitude of the Japanese opposition parties toward the

United States, it seems to me that the overriding objective of our foreign policy ought to be to bolster rather than hasten the demise of its current government.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear that the national security and foreign policy objectives of this Nation would be ill-served by the unilateral force cuts envisioned in the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts. There are those, of course, who recognize these considerations but nevertheless urge a cut in order to reduce the defense budget and bolster the U.S. balance of payments.

I do not think the trade-off is warranted. While the debate over the defense budget will never be resolved, the balance of payments argument is, in my view, a tenuous one indeed.

It has been said today that the temporary improvement registered last year will be totally washed away by skyrocketing costs of energy import unless offsetting savings are made elsewhere. But I would remind my colleagues that the negative outflow on the military account last year was \$2.8 billion; it was also \$2.8 billion in 1971, \$2.9 billion in 1966, \$2.8 billion in 1960 and \$2.8 billion in 1956. In short, balance of payments cost of our overseas military activities has been stable for decades while the overall balance of payments has fluctuated enormously. Therefore, to pretend that the cost of maintaining overseas troops is either the cause or solution to our current problem is the worst kind of sophistry. The amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts should be defeated soundly, as it has been in the past.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the statement which was just made by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my opposition to amendments calling for a drastic cut in our troop commitments around the world. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I have consistently called for certain reductions in our overseas forces. But the proposals before us today go beyond the bounds of good reason. The fact is, we have made, and are making right now, considerable reductions in troop strength overseas. The figures for U.S. troops in foreign territories between the years 1968 and 1973 speak for themselves on this issue. In 1968 we had nearly 1.1 million troops on foreign land. Each year since then the number has declined until it reached 438,000 as of December 31, 1973. This is a dramatic reduction of over half our overseas troop commitments in just 5 years. In my work as ranking minority member of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, I have observed the steady decline of troop commitments in that area of the world.

Insofar as our troops in East Asia are concerned, there have—as everyone knows—been very great reductions since the American role in the Vietnam war began to wind down in 1969. The bulk of the reductions have been from Viet-

nam itself, but the gradual decrease of U.S. forces from other countries of East Asia should not be overlooked. In early 1969, apart from Vietnam we had approximately 226,000 military personnel stationed in Japan, Okinawa, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines. At the beginning of this year the comparable figure was approximately 152,000. This represents the withdrawal of one combat division from Korea, a reduction of about 26,000 personnel from Okinawa and Japan, and the pullout of forces from the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand that had been built up to support the fighting in Indochina.

A further reduction of 10,000 military personnel spaces from Thailand was announced last month. It is expected that other adjustments in our military strength in Asia can be made as tensions in that area decrease, and both the major outside powers and the countries of the Pacific basin themselves recognize that an environment of cooperative economic development, growing trade, and the peaceful resolution of disputes, serves the interests of all.

The reductions in U.S. troops that have occurred in Asia since 1969 illustrate, and are based upon, two important principles guiding American relations in that area. One is the doctrine that America will help its allies carry the burden of their regional defense—beyond the protection of our nuclear umbrella—but will not take over the task from them, as we tended too often to do in the past. This is the so-called Nixon doctrine, announced by the President in June 1969 at Guam. It does not mean that our withdrawals will be precipitate, or that we will not keep our security commitments in Asia, or elsewhere. We still have interests in these areas, and our global involvement and our commitment to peace remain. But our obligations are more likely to take the form of military and security assistance than of Americans serving in, or fighting for, the many friendly and allied nations we support.

The other major principle that has governed the course of our relations with Asia in the recent past has been détente. We have revised the basis of our dealings with the world's most populous country, the People's Republic of China, and have sought to gain our security objectives in Asia through diplomacy and understanding as well as through the forward deployment of military forces to deter aggression. We have not seen an immediate disappearance of tensions, but we have seen them begin to decline.

The most important security problems in Asia have not gone away—there is still a miserable war in Cambodia, fighting continues in Vietnam, and there remains a potentially dangerous confrontation in Korea, to name the most obvious examples—but there is considerable hope that, with a beginning already made, ways short of war can be found to resolve the old tensions and keep disputes from developing into new hostilities.

Some would ask why, the trend running in our favor in Asia, in view of the growing costs of keeping U.S. forces

abroad, and of the pressures from this Chamber and elsewhere for withdrawing from our remaining overseas commitments, we should continue to base U.S. troops in Asia and elsewhere.

With further U.S. troop cuts likely, and with no conclusions possible at this point about the ultimate equilibrium of force in Asia, the principle question should rather be the manner of U.S. troop reductions. The gains from détente, in Europe as well as the Pacific, have come because we dealt with our adversaries from positions of considerable strength. Reductions in our overseas force levels are the result, not the cause, of the resolution of tensions.

If the nations of the Pacific that now rely on our security guarantees, backed up by the tangible presence of Americans in uniform, can—from positions of strength—make further progress in establishing a structure of peace in that region, and in securing their own defenses, we can make further reductions in the confidence that they will not be destabilizing. But if we abandon the orderly progress that has characterized our drawdowns up to now, and bring American units back to the United States in response not to regional evolution but to budgetary and emotional pressures, we will seriously risk the gains we have made to date. What impulse would there be for the potential aggressor in Asia—North Korea, for example—to seek a peaceful accommodation when it believes we might upset the balance next month, or next year, by unilateral troop cuts on the Korean peninsula? We have no "MBFR" in Asia, but a similar process may be tacitly at work there.

On the premise that American forces abroad, at this point in history, have great diplomatic and political value beyond their capacity to resist attack and defend specific security commitments, it would be folly to destroy such value by giving in to the pressures of the moment for a hasty, immediate pullout.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, in further discussion on this issue, I would like to remind the Members that it seems very strange to me that, considering those Members who complain about their bases being cut in New England, the votes will show in many instances that these are the same Members who vote against the military requirements for this country.

There is also another fact I would like to bring out. The Members will recall, during the war between Israel and Egypt, when the Russians were having the airborne alert, they were getting ready to put seven airborne divisions into Egypt. And how many troop divisions could we raise and send over there?

Mr. Chairman, when we say we want to cut out the troops, it seems a little ridiculous to me.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Texas. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I want to point out to the gentleman that I have supported military expenditures down through the

years when they were justified. I am saying that the Department of Defense in this case has not justified the meat-ax cuts that they made up in New England when they moved all of those naval installations out, and when they pulled the entire fleet out and cut out the bases in New England. The entire North Atlantic Fleet was weakened. No one on the House Armed Services Committee spoke about the threat of Soviet Russia. Whether this was a political decision made by some of those in the White House who had compiled an enemy list is not known. However, it is a fact that close to 90 percent of the over 35,000 persons who lost their jobs, came from two States, Massachusetts and Rhode Island. This particular area has the highest unemployment rate in the United States.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. RANDALL was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) for 10 minutes.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate myself with the remarks which were made by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER) and I would like to add just one other thought.

Either our overseas military commitments are tied to our foreign policy objectives—or they are not. If there is a direct relationship—and it is generally conceded by a majority in and out of this body—then an examination of these commitments is in order, and a public restatement of our new objectives should be made.

If there is no relationship between foreign policy and overseas troop commitments, then we have need for little more than token forces.

We are indulging in hypocrisy if we assert our authority by mandating arbitrary reductions, while at the same time shirking our responsibilities by placing the decision as to where these cuts are made on someone else.

With this amendment, we are putting the cart before the horse.

Mr. RANDALL. I thank the gentleman from Virginia for his contribution. He is a respected and valued member of the Armed Services Committee.

A few years ago, Mr. Chairman, we had here in the House some Members from the South who delighted to come—and some of them came—into the well to tell a little story about the fisherman sitting on the bank who had a way of talking to the fish. He would say, "Go ahead, little fish, and take that bait; take that hook, it will not hurt you. Just go ahead and take it." The fisherman would laugh and say to himself—"Go ahead, little fish, swallow the bait, there's a hook in there that will tear your throat to pieces."

There's a parallel to the amendment before us today. It looks innocent and it

sounds innocent but beneath the bait there is something very evil. The author of the amendment makes it sound mighty good when he says leave it to the Secretary of Defense as to the area from which troops are to be withdrawn. But no matter how we slice it, or no matter how simple it seems as to where the troops are coming from, the big commitment for overseas troops is in NATO. So let us call it the NATO amendment, because that is what it is.

We went around this track last year. It was a little later last year than it is this year. Last year we were debating some things that were going to happen. This year we are debating U.S. policy. Last year we were just debating some things that were not yet firm or fixed. This year our policy is clearly established. Last year there was no Jackson-Nunn. You know what that means. It is the law of the land. Jackson-Nunn is our law. It is our own commitment. Last year there was no mutual bilateral force-reduction conference.

We worked hard to get that conference convened. Now it is in session. A former Secretary of the Army is our Ambassador. I can report to you when we visited Vienna for 2 or 3 days early in March we were encouraged by the evidence that the Russians were not dragging their feet. They have indicated at several different times that they want to cooperate. Then there is a unity among our allies that has never been exhibited before. There is complete harmony among all of our allies. That is the difference between a troop withdrawal amendment last year and this year. The MBFR conference is proceeding with unexpected success.

Now let me take a few moments to read from a report which was rendered under the mandate of the House due to an amendment by the gentleman from New York (Mr. PEYSER) passed in July 1973 which called for submission by April 1 of this year. The two or three concluding paragraphs of the report are a good summary of its findings and conclusions. Let me read a few lines: "A great power does not act capriciously." This is the committee speaking. "We recommend against any reduction of forces in Western Europe," which is what we are talking about—NATO—because of three things. In the first place, we said to our allies that if you will improve your forces in Western Europe, we will improve ours. We have improved ours and they have improved theirs. That is a commitment and a covenant and a promise. We should not waver on it. We will break our promise if we pass this O'Neill amendment.

The second thing is Jackson-Nunn. We are not talking about a figment of someone's imagination. We are talking about the law of the land: Jackson-Nunn is law. We said in effect that we know you have not been bearing your part of the burden and you should bear more of it. We have a balance of payments deficit, and so we will give you 1 year plus 6 months to relieve us of deficit of balance payments. If you do not do it in that time, that is, 18 months, then by the percentage you have not made it up, say

make up 95 percent, then we will pull back that 5 percent of our troops. That is an offer we made. It was made in good faith. It has been accepted.

The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office have indicated to our committee that our allies will be able to comply with Jackson-Nunn's provisions.

What kind of business is it then to renege on a law which we passed and which was signed into law? That is what we are talking about here today. That is the central issue.

Now, getting back again to the reference to the mutual balanced force reduction, let us not forget we asked for that conference. We worked hard to get it. It started last October. We have been surprised at the cooperation we have received from behind the Iron Curtain. What happens to a thing like this when we simply announce to the world very suddenly that we are going to make a unilateral reduction even when things are going our way?

Then let us not forget we signed an agreement here just about a week or two ago, with Germany. The biggest one that was ever negotiated. They give us concessionary loans. We are having to pay only 2 or 3 percent interest, something like that, less than 3 percent—while the going rate is about 7 percent. Moreover, they bought the largest amount of military equipment of any order that has ever been placed in the history of our relations. It was \$2.2 billion. It was a 2-year agreement, with \$1.1 billion a year for each of 2 years.

We are on the way to solving the balance-of-payment deficit. Everybody thinks Jackson-Nunn will be complied with.

Well, then what are we going to do? Shall we pull the rug out from under our negotiators in Vienna, and say that we do not mean what we have said; when we asked for the conference. Shall we say now to our allies that Jackson-Nunn means nothing, even though they are complying with their part? Shall we say we do not want them to improve their troops? Actually they are doing a lot of good things. They are building shelters for aircraft and depots for supplies.

I can cite a list of other things that they have done such as Hawk protection for rear echelon depots, so these will not be destroyed by hostile aircraft.

Are we going to unilaterally tell our allies their efforts mean nothing? If we do, believe me, laughter will ring out in the halls of the Kremlin.

Mr. MILFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. MILFORD. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I would like to pose a question to the gentleman from Missouri on something that has not been discussed in the committee. It has to do with our troops assigned to NATO. We have some 300,000 of our troops assigned there, as I understand it.

Mr. Chairman, let me say that in my 10 years of military service I was taught one very important basic principle. That is never deploy troops unless you have sufficient quantities of them to do the job you intend doing.

I think the gentleman in the well and I can both agree that 300,000 troops are not sufficient to do any kind of a job in Europe. Hence, they would appear to be a sacrifice force. There is no way in which we could resupply or support them in a combat role.

But, surely the Russians should know of this also. So I cannot see the logic contained in the gentleman's argument wherein he contends that our forces are a deterrent.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, let me assure the gentleman our NATO forces are much more than a trip wire. They could give a good account of themselves. Oh yes, they are a strong deterrent.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I have asked the gentleman to yield so that I might answer the inquiry of the gentleman from Texas concerning the 300,000 troops that we have serving in NATO.

It is true we do need extra troops, but they are being supplied by other NATO forces. We are not the only people in the NATO agreement.

If we were to examine the entire troop structure of NATO, we would find that there are closer to 720,000 than to 300,000. That is the reason why we have a sufficient force there, and a force which is enough to meet our commitment.

Mr. RANDALL. Of course the answer to the inquiry of the gentleman from Texas is that other NATO forces have contributed their part. They are contributing, their part. Our allies supply the vast majority of the troops, most of the troops in NATO belong to our allies, not ours.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RANDALL. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman from Missouri has made a very sound and effective argument. The troops are there because they are needed for world security, and for world peace. But has anyone thought what the cost will be of 300,000 people being turned loose on the unemployment lines? Has anyone thought what that is going to do to this country at this time?

Now, if we need the troops here, that is another thing, but what about the unemployment situation that would arise if these 300,000 troops were placed in the unemployment lines; what about the cost to the Nation, especially in the northeastern part of our country, and elsewhere?

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Florida has made a very strong point, and that is, that the gentleman from Massachusetts has not clearly indicated whether these troops, when they are brought back, will be deacti-

vated or demobilized. Let me say that if the troops are brought back to this country it will require an additional expense of over \$1.5 billion to build facilities to house them and another \$2.5 billion to pay for enough new airlift to redeploy them to western Europe when the balloon goes up.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has indicated that we will have a savings of \$10 million a year, but in comparison to the other costs that are involved it will take 400 years at \$10 million a year to make up for the new out-of-pocket costs of \$4 billion, made up of \$1.2 plus \$2.5 billion as shown a moment ago unless he intends to demobilize the troops once they are on U.S. soil.

If we cave in—and that is what this adds up to—if we cave in unilaterally to withdraw troops just about when Jackson-Nunn is beginning to work, just about when our MBFR talks are beginning to show promise, when there are all the indications that something will come out of the MBFR negotiations—Then it will indeed be a tragic day.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(On request of Mr. GUBSER, and by unanimous consent, Mr. RANDALL was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. RANDALL. You remember the Russian parliamentarians, were here a day or 2 ago. Maybe they have not left our shores—but if we pass this amendment—they are going to leave shaking their heads. They will see that we are not only acting capriciously, but are acting irresponsibly, and acting short-sightedly. Maybe they are going to think of their counterparts as possibly a little weak-minded.

This I say to our Members: If we approve these amendments today, the word will be flashed all across the world. The entire world will be shaking its head. They will say "these amendments defy understanding." Let us not deserve this appraisal by the entire world. Let us not act capriciously or irresponsibly. Let us act like the great power we are. Let us keep our commitments. Let us defeat this amendment.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I almost wish that I could have made this very brief statement prior to the remarks of the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL), but I must make them afterward.

I do hope sincerely that everyone in this Chamber listened intently, because they have just listened to the man who knows more about NATO, in my opinion, than any other person in this Congress. I was privileged year before last to serve on his NATO Subcommittee. As we carried on a grueling schedule, I was totally amazed at the capacity for work which the gentleman from Missouri has, and the depth, and the thoroughness with which he went into this subject.

It is my personal view that when he entered into consideration of the subject, he had not made up his mind. He made up his mind and came to the views

which he presently holds because of the facts which he observed personally.

I was not privileged, due to personal commitments, to serve on that subcommittee this year, but I do want the Members to realize that this man speaks from knowledge and from sincerity.

I only want to make one point in my own behalf. Reference was made to the number of NATO forces committed to the NATO Alliance.

Along the Elbe River where the Warsaw Pact countries stand eyeball-to-eyeball with the NATO countries. The West Germans have 168,000 men stationed as compared to our 72,000, and I am speaking of division strength figures.

So do not get the idea that the United States is carrying this load alone, and do not get the idea that the other members of the NATO Alliance do not realize full well that they must do more, and they are going to do more, and that we will on a gradual basis be able to withdraw our commitment, or at least diminish it, so that they will carry a larger share of the load.

I think existing law insures that.

All I urge of this committee is, please listen to the man who knows what he is talking about because he has been there. He has studied it first-hand. He knows what he is talking about.

I agree with the gentleman from Missouri that it would be a disaster to this country if we were to gut NATO. As much as I love the author of this amendment, I believe the end result would be to gut NATO.

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the attack that we have just heard on the proposition of reducing our NATO forces unilaterally is not properly an attack on this amendment. I am not in favor of substantial unilateral reductions in our NATO forces in Europe for a number of reasons. Yet I am in strong support of the amendment proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts. The amendment can be put into effect without making any cuts from our forces in Europe.

One might say, Why does the amendment then not specify where the cuts are to come from, why does it give discretion to the Secretary of Defense? But if the amendment were drawn otherwise, if the amendment gave no discretion to the Secretary of Defense, then I am sure those Members who oppose the amendment would be opposing it equally strongly on the ground that it ties the hands of the Secretary of Defense?

There is good reason for giving the Secretary some flexibility here. For example, if some reduction in forces in Europe can be worked out through the MBFR negotiations, that reduction would be part of the 100,000 cut the gentleman from Massachusetts is talking about. However, that need not be the case. The reduction could be made entirely—and as far as I am concerned, unless it is mutual, it should be made entirely—from forces elsewhere in the world.

I would like to call to the attention of the Members a report which has been directed to the Congress from a group of people who know a great deal about this subject. This report, entitled "Military Policy and Budget Priorities," is submitted to us by people who have held high positions in the Department of Defense, including Roswell Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, Townsend Hookes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, several retired admirals and generals and former Assistant Secretaries, and former officials of the CIA and the National Security Council. This report states flatly:

A minimal first step Congress could take this year should be withdrawal and demobilization of 125,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Asia.

And that would be immediately. The proposition put forward by the gentleman from Massachusetts is that 100,000 be withdrawn over a period of 18 months, if I understand him correctly. So this cut could be accomplished readily from forces stationed elsewhere than in Europe.

If reductions can be made on a mutual basis in Europe through the negotiations there, then fine, they can be charged against this cut, but if no initial reductions are achieved, then so far as I am concerned the cut should be made without interfering with NATO.

How long, Mr. Chairman, how long are we going to maintain these tens and tens of thousands of forces in the far western Pacific? Have we not learned our lesson as far as that area of the world is concerned?

Let us accept the O'Neill amendment. Such a cut in overseas forces is long overdue.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who preceded us in the well, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) is the most knowledgeable man in this body on NATO today, undoubtedly. I want to add my compliments to those of the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) for the great presentation the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) has made. First he made sure exactly what we need.

By the same token through some prior discussion the gentleman from California made a remark about 2,000 troops being stationed in Bermuda. I do not want to let that thing go as a troop level. We do not have 2,000 troops in Bermuda. The Air Force moved out of there almost 2 years ago. The Navy is in there and with one patrol squadron, stationed 600 miles off the coast of Carolina. They are off that coast flying not P-3C's but flying P-8A's for our protection. We have those men in Bermuda and we are not moving them out of there. They secure our east coast against a possible enemy submarine attack. Surely no one wants to remove that squadron. Our tracking station is also at Bermuda. However, that facility is manned by civilians. I sincerely hope no one tampers with that phase of national security.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. PEYSER. Mr. Chairman, it was an unusual situation that I was in a little over a year ago when as a non-member of the Armed Services Committee I offered an amendment on the floor. An amendment calling for a study by the committee as to the impact of troop withdrawals on NATO nations. My amendment was passed by the House by a substantial majority. It seems to me it should be of the utmost importance to the Members of the House to know what this report has to say because this is truly a report of the House of Representatives. As I have said I am not a member of the Armed Services Committee and this report which I am sure many Members have seen was made by men on this committee who studied and who traveled and who talked to the top commanders and who talked to the field commanders and who talked to the NATO forces involved to find out the impact of troop withdrawal. I can tell the Members it is the unanimous conclusion that any withdrawal at this time would be disastrous.

I think that it is of great importance to understand what we are really talking about with the amendment of the majority leader is a 25-percent reduction of troop strength.

I had the occasion at one time in my career as an infantry platoon sergeant to have command of nearly 40 men and seeing that platoon get reduced in strength 25 percent and ultimately 50 percent. I can tell you the effectiveness of that platoon and its capabilities were severely affected, affected to the point that we were barely able to function.

The same thing is true if we try to effect a reduction at this time of our armed services around the world. It is just on a larger scale.

I cannot believe that we in this Congress are about to say to our military forces, "We want you to make a cut. We do not care where you make it. We are not going to tell you where, but make it, cut your strength 25 percent."

Let me say to the Congress, if we do this we are going to be striking a severe blow at the entire defenses of this country. It makes no sense. It achieves nothing, and more importantly it would reduce us as a world power.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SISK). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SISK). Permit the Chair to make the statement that the Chair is going to attempt to be fair in the recognition of Members, recognizing, of course, the members of the committee first as their presence is made known here and trying to alternate back and forth. I want to say that in order to make clear the problem that seems to have arisen.

The gentleman from California is recognized.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise this second time to try to put into perspective some of the issues that have been raised on the floor since my amendment and the O'Neill amendment to the amendment has been placed before this committee.

First of all, my colleague, the gentleman from Missouri, indicates that to make any unilateral cuts in NATO forces before the Jackson-Nunn offset is completed would be capricious. Perhaps the committee would be interested in knowing that Senator NUNN, primary author of that amendment, offered in the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee an amendment making a unilateral cut of 23,000 support troops in Europe. If he did not think a 23,000 cut was irresponsible and capricious, it seems to me the Members of the House ought to assume some responsibility also.

There have been many—almost hysterical—statements on the floor that our involvement in Europe speaks to the survivability of Europe. How do we handle that question when we also have the Jackson-Nunn amendment which says, "your-money-or-your-life"?

In this argument we are then saying: We are there because we are supposed to maintain the security of Europe, but we are willing to withdraw for a few dollars.

No one on this floor has argued effectively against that.

A second argument has concentrated on the mutual balance-of-forces reduction talks. I would like to make a flat-out statement: The MBFR talks are absolutely deadlocked and we know clearly that position papers have been written on both sides and statements made that we are in diametrically opposite positions and that we may be locked into those discussions for years. We have a responsibility to deal with that problem.

Some Members on the floor have indicated that worldwide cuts are a spurious effort to get us out of Europe only. That is absurd.

First of all, on the question of Korea my distinguished colleague, the gentleman from Illinois, pointed out, "Korea, Korea."

There are 40,000 American troops in South Korea. The mission statement there is to provide ground combat support to the South Korean Army. The South Korean Army has over 600,000 men and women under arms, most of whom are combat-hardened and experienced as a result of their involvement in Vietnam.

The North Koreans, who are ostensibly their big enemy, have less than 60,000 men and women under arms, and they have not fired a shot the last 20 years, other than a few sniper-fired bullets.

If there is any place that the Nixon doctrine will apply, it would be South Korea. They have one of the largest standing armies in the world, almost one-fourth the size of our standing army; in a microscopic nation in relation to ours. Why do we need 40,000 troops to help 600,000 combat experienced troops against 60,000 who have no combat experience?

We hear that there is no place to take troops other than Europe. There are 172,000 troops in the western Pacific. Let us look at the combat divisions, the combat forces that all these logistical and supply troops are there to aid: There are one and a half army divisions, one-half of another division, six air squadrons, and three combat ships. That is less than 30,000 troops, and yet we have almost 130,000 support troops.

We can maintain combat preparedness and yet wipe all the useless, unnecessary and wasteful support and logistical ratio to command troops without violating in any way our defense or harming our preparedness.

Why can we not take some of those troops we have providing logistical support from Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, Thailand, the Philippine Islands—in all almost 140,000 troops? We certainly can cut troops out.

It seems to me that if we place this amendment, or my amendment, in proper perspective, we certainly have the capacity to take out 100,000 or even more troops without in any way harming any combat preparedness at all.

It seems to me the hysteria that surrounds this floor, where sometimes we speak brilliantly from total ignorance on a whole range of questions, has to stop. If we stop simply glibly, talking about our commitments without giving rational approaches to the issues, we would deal with these critical problems.

Mr. WHITEHURST. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, a lot of words have been spoken here this afternoon, and many aspects of this problem have been discussed. I must confess, however, that I think the root of what most of my colleagues are thinking of is, what is going to happen to the great alliance with our allies in Western Europe. My colleague from New York (Mr. STRATTON) is going to talk about this in greater detail in a moment.

However, just let me mention a few things which have not been touched upon. I heard some people speak today who look upon the American military commitment abroad as a kind of security charity. I wonder how many Members of this body realize that we have \$30 billion directly invested in Europe, involving hundreds of thousands of American citizens?

We have been talking about Jackson-Nunn, about offsets. We are not talking this afternoon about taking all of our forces out of Europe, but if we make this cut, the Members can be sure that some of those forces are going to be cut.

Let us talk about one of the particular objections on that, because when we were in Europe in March, we learned that the F-104 is about to be replaced. That is the fighter aircraft a number of our allies have been using. We know the French want to have a French aircraft substituted for it.

I submit to the Members, the French pitch is going to be enormously enhanced if we make a cut, because they will be able to say, "The Americans are

not serious about the defense of Western Europe. They are pulling their forces out. Surely, you want a French fighter to replace the one you are using now."

If we lose those contracts, we are talking about nearly a billion dollars a year for the next 8 to 10 years.

How long do we need forces in Europe? Ambassador Don Rumsfeld raised the question. He used a parallel. He said:

One might well raise the question, how long do we need fire departments? And the answer is until we find a better way of fighting fires, we have to maintain them. Or to fight crime, how long do we need police? Until we find a better way, we need our law enforcement people.

Mr. Chairman, one other word, a word about this fat Army we have abroad and the fact that we have so many logistical and headquarters people. I wonder if the people who have been making these criticisms realize that over the past year we have reduced the headquarters and the logistical personnel in Europe. Those are some of the forces that we have cut back.

We have added four combat battalions, two of them armored, plus two attack helicopter companies, and we have done this without any additions in the overall personnel strength.

Mr. Chairman, one last statement: Before I came to this body, I was an academician rather than a politician. I taught history. And I remember the great watershed times in the history of this Republic.

Nearly 40 years ago there was a Congressman in this body named Bruce Barton. He was here at the time when we were debating whether or not we were going to fortify Guam. It was not very much money, but it was a symbol at that particular time, during the climate of those days in this body. That appropriation was lost.

Congressman Barton was a writer, and he liked slogans. He formed one. It was very popular. He shouted, "Guam, Guam with the wind."

Mr. Chairman, it made beautiful copy, but it did not show any vision.

This afternoon in this well some of the Members call for a cutback of 100,000 or 200,000. That will make great copy back home, but I submit to the Members that it shows no vision.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WHITEHURST. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, may I very humbly and respectfully suggest that after this long discussion pro and con that there is probably not one Member of the House who has not by this time determined how he will vote on this amendment. Hopefully, we could get to a vote, because I understand there are other amendments. It is just a suggestion that I believe is favored by most of the Members of the House at this point in our deliberations.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I realize the House is becoming a little restless and that Mem-

bers who are here would like to vote. I shall try not to detain the committee for very long.

I simply want to try to summarize some of the issues that have been presented here so that we will know clearly exactly what we are voting on.

First of all, let us remember that the basic amendment is the one offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) which would cut 200,000 from our overseas forces. The softening, sweetening amendment to the Dellums amendment is the O'Neill amendment, which would cut only 100,000 and would give us 18 months in which to make these cuts.

Mr. Chairman, the committee is opposed both to the sweetening amendment of the gentleman from Massachusetts, our beloved majority leader, and of course, also to the more devastating amendment of the gentleman from California.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has offered what is really a subtle amendment. This point, I think, has already been made, but I think we ought to recall it before we cast our votes. He said:

I am not zeroing on NATO. I am suggesting that they can take the troops away from anywhere in the world, and we have 500,000 around the world, so they can take these troops away somewhere else and not hurt NATO at all.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) said the same thing. He said:

We do not have to affect our negotiations with the Soviets in Vienna. We can take these troops away from somewhere else.

Well, that just is not true. By the time you take away from the overseas forces the forces afloat, numbering about 57,000 and then take away the forces now on U.S. territories that are also removed from the O'Neill amendment, you come down to 435,000 troops abroad.

Now the distinguished major leader, Mr. O'NEILL, wants to reduce that by 100,000, which gets us down to 335,000. And how many forces do we have today in NATO? 319,000. That means that with the O'Neill reductions there are only 16,000 left.

So if we take all of the 100,000 away from other places than NATO, we have only 16,000 left. That is not enough to supply marines for all the embassies around the world and still man our very vital and complex communications stations around the world, some of which are in Morocco and some of which are in Bermuda and elsewhere.

Then on top of all that, the majority leader himself told the Korean people last fall: "We are not going to take anybody away from Korea."

That is another 38,000 troops. So if the O'Neill amendment is approved, we are going to have to take at least 38,000 away from NATO to get the full 100,000 reduction.

Now, why is this bad? The gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) has already indicated to us that we had this whole issue before us last year, and the gentleman from New York (Mr. PEYSER) offered an amendment at that time which

the House overwhelmingly accepted and which in effect said, "Let us not go rushing into this. Let us appoint a committee to look into our situation in NATO and report back."

Mr. Chairman, that report has been made. How many Members have read it? I dare say, only a handful. But this is a remarkable document, and it is another star in the crown of the distinguished gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL).

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I cannot until I make my point. After that I will be glad to yield to our majority leader.

Mr. Chairman, this report says, after a detailed study of the kind which the gentleman from California (Mr. GUBSER) indicated, that we cannot take these troops away now. Why? For two reasons.

First of all, since we adopted the Peysner amendment, we have set up this policy, as the gentleman from Missouri said, of demanding that our allies come in and help us out. What deadline did we set for them to pick up our balance-of-payments deficit?

April of 1975.

So we ought to at least allow our allies the time to carry out their share of the burden which we put upon them before we tell them we are going to take our troops out.

The second point is that we also have these troops negotiations going on in Vienna; and with all due respect to the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS) I was there, along with our subcommittee. We visited those negotiations and we found that they are some of the most encouraging negotiations we have ever been engaged in.

Of course, both sides have expressed different points of view, but that is only a normal tactic in negotiations. Even the Polish delegate in Vienna admitted the other day that they could very likely get agreement there before the end of the year and, as Leonid Brezhnev promised, the Soviets could begin their withdrawals by 1975.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SISK). The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON) has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. STRATTON was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. STRATTON. Now, we have been saying all along that we ought to get negotiations going with the Soviets. We have them going. Secretary Resor, who is our negotiator, said that these talks really look as though they could produce results.

So is this House going to pull the rug out from under these negotiations, which are likely to result in the first substantial Soviet troop reduction in Europe, by passing this O'Neill amendment and thereby mandating at least a 38,000 troop reduction in NATO, if not more?

That is the problem that we are confronted with here. We certainly would look like an irresponsible body if, after all these steps have been taken in response to the action we took last year,

we now pull the rug out from under those who have tried to respond to our earlier demands.

And what is more, we also, since our last action on this matter have been confronted with a new war in the Middle East. Those NATO troops, believe me, have proved to be a deterrent force against any kind of Soviet aggression in the Middle East. We cannot afford to tamper with them until we get at least a firm disengagement agreement in the Arab-Israeli War. Surely we cannot tell now what is going to happen 18 months from now.

So let not this House of Representatives put ourselves in the position of trying to predict what the future holds.

The great poet A. E. Housman once wrote as follows: "A stranger and afraid in a world I never made."

Let us not have the House of Representatives described, if we should pass this O'Neill amendment, as "certain and serene in a world we've never seen."

Mr. DELLUMS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DELLUMS. I am certain the gentleman in no way wishes to be demagogic, but earlier in his statement he said if we make these cuts it would reduce the Marine Corps to a level where they could not even place guards around the various embassies. Does the gentleman know that we have less than 10,000 Marines serving around the world?

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly do, but there are only 16,000 troops left after the O'Neill amendment and we have more than 6,000 troops serving in communications stations around the world.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I do not want to take up your time and I apologize for rising even at this time because I know I cannot add any new arguments that have not been made. However, I just wanted to complete the record, at the suggestion of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) to read you a telegram which I received this morning.

Tracing back the history of this whole situation, you will recall last year when my devoted friend, for whom I have the deepest admiration, our majority leader, acted at that time to reduce our troops overseas, the Fraser amendment was offered which instructed that a study of the situation be made by a special committee. That was the substitute to the O'Neill amendment at that time.

As a result of that action by the House and the responsibility given to the Committee on Armed Services, I named the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL) again to chair the committee to NATO. You heard him speak and you heard him speak most eloquently. The words which he so eloquently uttered, fully justify the confidence we placed in him in putting him in charge of this committee.

So this committee, under the direction of the House, did make this trip to Europe and did make this inspection. It has reported back its most comprehen-

sive report to the House of Representatives.

I think this tells you again that this is not the time to reduce our forces. This meat ax approach, if I may use the term—and I never did believe in using an approach to anything of this nature—is spread across an area where we do not know where the cuts ought to come from except that 100,000 men will be cut.

Now, we have heard a discussion of what the gentleman from Massachusetts said about Korea. We have heard a discussion by the gentleman from California and his opinion. We have heard what the Secretary of Defense might do.

So, I rise at this time, with justification, I think, to keep the record straight and read to you the communication sent to me this morning from the one individual in the country who is the one responsible individual in the country to conduct the affairs of this country internationally. I am referring, of course, to your Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger. He is the man who knows certainly firsthand, what is going on in the world and what is necessary to maintain the peace of the world as far as he can. This morning this telegram came to me from Jerusalem, from Dr. Kissinger, and I read this to you in order to give you the benefit of his views and share with you what he thinks about what we are undertaking.

I share this with you, and I do so with the idea of throwing away all of the oratory and all of the arguments, and to rely on this one paragraph—and hear me well, because this is very specific, very all-inclusive, and very positive.

This is Dr. Kissinger's telegram to me this morning from Jerusalem:

I would also like to express my disagreement with the amendment proposed by Mr. O'Neill to the Defense Procurement Bill which would direct a 100,000-man reduction in Overseas deployments by December 31, 1975. While I do not deny that it is desirable to reduce manpower levels around the world, I do not believe this is the best method. In Europe the only way is through negotiations with the Soviet Union and its allies which, as you know, are now going on. A unilateral reduction of US troops in Europe would be useful to no one but the Soviets. If to avoid damaging our European posture we were to take the full 100,000 in Asia, we would be forced to remove virtually all of our land-based force from Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Thailand, and the Philippines, leaving us totally dependent upon the 7th Fleet to support our foreign policy interest in the Pacific.

Could I say more, or does anybody else have to say more than Dr. Kissinger?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SISK). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is a Member on the floor of this House who would not like to see all of our troops brought home if it were feasible to do so.

I want to remind the Members that perhaps we are now in a period, and the longest period, of peace that Europe has ever known. During all of that period of

peace we have had American troops in Europe.

There is nothing that succeeds like success. I do not suppose anyone ever heard of a winner in a crap game who asked for new dice.

We are winning. We are having peace in Europe, and we should not change that. Remember that strength in Europe is strength in the Middle East, and also that equally true, weakness in Europe would be a weakness in the Middle East. So before we take steps that we later regret, let us try to keep things going as they are in Europe, and that is peace. Let us not destroy that peace. Unilateral withdrawal of our troops from Europe would elevate all the chance for an agreement with the Soviet Union for a mutual withdrawal of troops.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BRAY. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts, the majority leader. I have no doubt that the gentleman means well, but the effect of the amendment he is offering would inevitably be serious, and could be disastrous.

In my opinion, Mr. Chairman, this amendment is totally irresponsible. As a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, I am deeply concerned over the effects of the amendment, not only on our military policy, but on our foreign policy.

The gentleman from Massachusetts has suggested that this might cut costs, but I think the Members of the Congress must also consider important other consequences.

If this amendment is designed to reduce international tensions, it will fail. Should these cuts be made in Europe, for example, the military and political consequences could be enormous. Whether we like it or not, we still have a crucially important role in Europe. A sudden, major unilateral withdrawal would have major consequences, almost all adverse.

We are in the middle presently of important negotiations with the Soviets to reduce forces in Europe.

A major unilateral reduction by the United States in its forces in Europe now would inevitably end those negotiations, and with no requirement or incentive for a matching reduction by the Soviet Union. The result would be an even larger disparity between United States and Soviet forces in Europe than presently exists.

The gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM) also a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, has suggested that the cuts should not be made in Europe. But let us look at the consequences of such a decision. If cuts were taken entirely out of our forces in Asia, as the Secretary of State was just quoted to have said, we would be forced to remove most or all of our land-based forces in

Korea, Okinawa, Thailand, and maybe the Philippines, leaving perhaps only the 7th Fleet.

What would be the consequences of such a removal?

The impact would all but destroy the present North-South negotiations in Korea and would certainly end any hope of a negotiated settlement of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Perhaps, most seriously, it would force a fundamental reexamination by the Japanese of their security relationship with us. The outcome of such reexamination is uncertain. It could lead to a rearmed Japan or to a neutralist Japan. In neither case will U.S. interests be served, and there is probably little we would be able to do to shape Japan's decision.

Finally, it must be emphasized that U.S. force levels abroad are not static, but have been declining dramatically since their high point in 1968 of 1,086,000. At the beginning of this year the number abroad was 438,000, for a net reduction of 648,000 over a 6-year period. And the reductions are still continuing. For example, earlier this month another 10,000-man withdrawal was announced from Thailand which is to be completed over the next few months.

It is clear that this administration is as interested as the Congress in reducing the financial and other burdens of our overseas responsibilities. However any reductions must have some relation to the political and military realities of the world in which we live, and to the basic U.S. interests that we are trying to support.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIAIMO. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. ROSENTHAL. Mr. Chairman, the question of U.S. military force levels overseas is again before the House of Representatives. Last year, after a long and complicated debate, the House decided to postpone any decision on the broad question of whether U.S. forces overseas are at the proper level, and therefore, of the subsidiary question of whether U.S. forces in Europe should be reduced or remain at the level of 320,000.

The Subcommittee on Europe, which I have the honor to chair, considered the European aspect of this important question last year in extensive hearings. At that time I supported a "substantial reduction" of these 320,000 troops by which I meant somewhere between 50,000 and 100,000. I was, and still am, convinced that our important stake in the defense of Europe can be maintained and even enhanced by a greater proportional contribution of military manpower by our NATO allies.

I still believe in that basic proposition for the reasons I will summarize below. But I do not want a reduction in our European forces because I accept the concept of linkage between defense and economic issues which has been expressed frequently, and with recent harsh statements, by the administration. I would

want, therefore, to disassociate myself explicitly from the idea that we are supplying troops in Europe in return for trade or monetary concessions given to us already by European countries or which we might try to extract from them in the future.

First. I believe that Europe's defense is in our national interest. The community of beliefs, values and history which we share with Western Europe would be gravely jeopardized if Europe should either fall under hostile control or become so threatened by such control as to render it less independent and less in control of its own destiny than it is today. Let me add immediately, that I believe the threat of such hostile action or control is remote in both military and political terms. But keeping our present close ties with Europe is the best way I know of keeping those possibilities remote.

Second. Europe is on the frontier, I believe, of important political change. Our country, in recent years especially, has become somewhat skeptical of both the possibility of European political union and of its advantage to the United States, should it occur. I believe, therefore, that we should reaffirm our earlier commitment to European growth through economic and political union. We should recall that it was the United States which urged a firm political union of Western European countries. We saw, in our own national interest, the unity of Europe as the only safeguard against future European wars.

Now that this unity is well on its way, we seem to falter. We find that the economic union of Europe has come before its political transformation. We find it distressing to deal with Europe as an economic unit with which we must compete while politically it is still divided on many important issues. Yet as a nation which itself was formed of many disparate elements we should recall our own difficulties in the period of confederation, our own Civil War and the extended process of American unification which bridged those two periods.

Third. In these first two points, I have emphasized what we must understand about Europe. But Europe must also try to understand the United States and why the pressure for reductions of U.S. forces in Europe will not be relieved without a substantial cut in those forces.

We have fought, without success, a disastrous and misconceived war in Southeast Asia. We committed, in the course of that venture, men and money and energy that we needed for urgent tasks at home. It is quite natural therefore that we are still in a process of reconsolidation of our resources. Part of that process is a serious examination of the need for the substantial conventional military forces we have in the United States and overseas. This examination reveals that by every meaningful measure—military manpower as a percentage of total population, percentage of tax revenue committed to defense, and defense costs as a percentage of

GNP—the United States is substantially ahead of all of the developed countries of Europe, that is, ahead of all of the NATO countries which are also members of the European community.

I find, therefore, an imbalance in our admitted and accepted role in defending western Europe in our own interest. We are doing more than our share; the European countries are doing less than theirs. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger clearly said this himself in our hearings last year.

In summary, I believe we must do the following:

First, reassure Europe that we will continue to support its political and economic union.

Second, reassure Europe that our manpower reductions there will in no way affect our commitment to the defense of Europe including, of course, its nuclear defense.

Third, for reasons of budgetary costs, balance-of-payments costs, fairness of burden and legitimate retrenchment of the military component in our overall budget, we should substantially reduce our forces overseas, including those in Europe.

I support, therefore, the amendment to reduce our overseas forces by 100,000 men in the hope that part of these reductions will apply in Europe and that all of these reductions will be reflected in reduced end-year strength of our Armed Forces. Rather than nibble away at the forces in Europe, which would tend to undermine European confidence in our commitment there, I would strongly prefer setting a new ceiling of forces in Europe in the area of 250,000 personnel.

Finally, I believe that such a reduction will not destroy European defense plans but will spur the Europeans to organize themselves better in a new defense arrangement in which they can work in much better partnership with us than they do today.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts. Many Members are very positive here as to the action they are going to take today, positive in the sense that they are sure that their position is right one way or another. I am not. I do not think that any American can be certain that he is right when it comes to a decision of this kind. But we live in a changing world, and one of the most difficult things for a nation, for a people, and for a government—and for a Congress—to do is to recognize the changes and to adjust accordingly.

In the past our troop commitments overseas made sense. They made much sense since World War II. They preserved the peace for 30 years under the doctrine of containment. But the world has changed significantly since then, and so has the mission of the United States.

When the United States was committed to being a policeman of the world, it made sense to have our troops scattered throughout the world as an American presence. In my opinion, it still makes

sense to do so in Europe, because of the very seriousness of the U.S. commitment to Europe.

In my opinion, the basic reason for our troop posture in Europe is not a military one but a political one because of the fear it would create in the minds of our NATO allies as to the realities of America's commitment to Europe and to the security of Europe, and, therefore, to the United States. But containment does not any longer exist as a viable American policy throughout the remainder of the world. Vietnam has proven that. We have thousands of troops—I believe it is 35,000—in Thailand. For what purpose, I submit? For what purpose? To assure the peace in Thailand and Southeast Asia as an American presence with the concomitant American threat to reenter Southeast Asia? I submit to the Members that the American people will not tolerate reentry of the United States into Southeast Asia.

And in Japan, we must ask the same question. And in Korea. At the same time we have seen changes over these last 25 years because of the nuclear age and because the present day reality of nuclear parity and equality. We are still fighting the last world war in my opinion, with the worldwide presence of troops. We must not make the mistake of fighting yesterday's war. Future conflicts will not be fought, I submit, in the manner in which they were fought in World War II. It will not depend upon the presence of American troops strategically located throughout the world, and specifically in the Southeast and the Indian Ocean and in other places.

Obviously and clearly—and I, too, have visited our troops in Europe—our troops in Europe and the NATO force together, in my opinion and in the opinion of many people, are not of sufficient magnitude and force to withstand Russian aggression in Europe.

And we all know what deters the Russians from adventurism in Europe. It is not only the presence of American troops. It is the threat of a nuclear escalation which is the real deterrence. The same concern exists insofar as the future role of Japan is concerned or roles in other parts of the world.

Let me say one thing, and I have the greatest admiration for the military. I respect them. I think they have served this Nation well at all times. But I say to the Members that unless this Congress reduces troop levels overseas we will never get the military to come in here and voluntarily tell us that they no longer need the men in the various places in the world and that they will voluntarily reduce their troops and stations. We know this from past experience and past history.

But I will say this. Reference was made that we will endanger our foreign policy. I submit that a reduction in troop deployment throughout the world is merely going in accordance with the modern, present-day American policy, and for that reason if for no other we should reduce troops throughout the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Connecticut has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. GIAIMO was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, now the argument has been made that the majority leader is being irresponsible. The charge has been made that the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts is not responsible because he does not say where we can find the troops to cut, where the troop cut should be made. I do not believe that is irresponsible. In fact, I think it is the opposite. It is extremely responsible.

We are saying to the administration, to the President and to the Department of Defense: "You know better than we do where you can safely reduce troop numbers. Do so."

We know that we do not want to take 100,000 troops out of Europe at this time, but I submit to the Members that we can find considerable support for reducing forces in Europe without threatening the NATO Alliance. We know we can find troops in Japan and we can find troops in Thailand and we can find troops in many other islands of the Pacific which have no bearing on the real security of the United States. We certainly are not prepositioning U.S. forces overseas for further American involvement in the Far East. I do not vision the United States doing that in the foreseeable future certainly. So it is a responsible amendment. It is leaving the decision as to the troop withdrawal to the Pentagon.

But the amendment does do this. It does say that the Congress and the American people want to see a reduction in our overseas establishment military-wise, that while we have supported our overseas troop presence for 25 years, we recognize this is the end of the policy of containment and it is the beginning of a new foreign policy, a foreign policy which our President himself is trying to develop with the Russians and others. It does not, I submit, depend upon the presence of troops scattered throughout the world.

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in support of the amendment offered by the distinguished majority leader, Mr. O'NEILL. This is an area in which I have worked for some time and I congratulate the gentleman for taking the leadership on this amendment. I should stress from the outset that while this amendment cuts 100,000 troops overseas, it does not mandate their deactivation. However, I believe the intent of the majority leader has been made clear; that is, that the Department of Defense will deactivate these troops once they are brought home. That intent should be stressed here today.

Mr. Chairman, it is seldom that we have an opportunity to move toward the achievement of several goals in one amendment. I would submit that this amendment offers us just such an opportunity. With its adoption we can begin to cut the fat out of our military budget and

contribute to an improved balance of payments situation, we can take a meaningful step toward the much talked about goal of reordering national priorities, and we can contribute to a worldwide détente, a détente which has the full support of this administration.

Economically, there can be no question as to the desirability of this proposal. We are faced this year with the largest peacetime military budget ever presented to Congress. After World War II, that budget was cut by \$89.5 billion, after the Korean war by \$36.8 billion. Yet following our disengagement from Vietnam that budget has been increased by some \$14 billion. Manpower costs represent 56 percent of that budget. Costs for overseas troops approach \$30 billion annually. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger himself has indicated there is room for cuts in the manpower area, citing some 20,000 support troops in Europe alone that could be reduced without significant impact on our NATO commitments.

A further economic consideration is that of our balance of payments. Although we did not witness a deficit in the first quarter of this year, the indication is that increasing oil costs will once again put us in a deficit situation. Clearly, a cut in overseas troops will help remedy that situation.

Domestically, this amendment conforms with the much needed reordering of national priorities with which so many have concerned themselves. It has been estimated by the Department of Defense that the average cost of maintaining one uniformed soldier including pay, subsistence and allowances is \$12,500. Using these figures the savings under this amendment would approach \$1.2 billion annually.

We should, of course, not fool ourselves into thinking that we are transferring this \$1.2 billion from the military budget to education, or health services, or environmental control or to any of the myriad of pressing domestic needs. Unfortunately, the Congress never has the opportunity to vote on the budget as a whole and, therefore, determines with one decision what the national priorities are to be. We can only vote one item at a time, each of us trying to be consistent with what we believe those priorities should be. This amendment offers us that opportunity.

This administration has talked a great deal about reordering national priorities, having brought our troops home from Vietnam, it has called for a conversion from a wartime to a peacetime economy. This amendment begins to answer that call.

Strategically, this amendment is fully in line with the policy this administration has embarked upon—a policy of détente and of reduction of the U.S. military presence abroad. The desire for a détente with the east has been at the core of this administration's foreign policy. It has told both the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China that in an easing of tension, rests the hope of future peace. Nowhere could the sincerity of this hope be more easily

demonstrated than by a reduction of U.S. military presence around the world, as Admiral Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pointed out before the Senate Armed Services Committee last year:

True détente requires a reduction in the underlying political and economic sources of conflict and an atmosphere free of force and the threat of force.

The administration itself has spoken in terms of troop reduction in putting forth the "Nixon doctrine." As was said in the Department of Defense manpower report for fiscal year 1975:

We shall furnish military and economic assistance when required in accordance with our treaty commitments, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for our defense.

Or as Mr. Nixon himself has said:

A more balanced and realistic American role in the world is essential if American commitments are to be sustained over the long pull . . . to insist that other nations play a role is not a retreat from responsibility, it is a sharing of responsibility. This is not a way for America to withdraw from its indispensable role in the world. It is a way, the only way, we can carry out our responsibility.

The approach we are offering in this amendment is a flexible one. It makes no attempt to dictate from where overseas troops must be taken, leaving this decision to the Pentagon. In Asia alone we see the possibility of reducing our troops levels by the 100,000 called for in this amendment. In Japan and the Ryukus Islands we maintain 55,000 troops; in the Philippines, 16,000; in South Korea, 38,000; in Thailand, 36,000; in Taiwan, 6,000.

It has been said today that we are offering a totally irresponsible amendment. Yet is it irresponsible to attempt economies on our defense budget similar to the economies we are requiring of every other agency in the Government? to the contrary. Is it irresponsible to make a positive contribution to our balance of payments? to the contrary.

Is it irresponsible to take a meaningful step toward reordering this Nation's spending priorities? to the contrary.

Is it irresponsible to leave the Pentagon with the flexibility to cut troops where they feel those cuts can best be made? to the contrary.

Is it irresponsible to demonstrate our sincere belief in détente by contributing to that détente? to the contrary.

To all these questions, gentlemen, the answer is no. Today, I am supporting a responsible amendment, one which is flexible in approach, and one which moves toward the attainment of multiple goals. I urge you to join me in this effort.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

I yield to the gentleman from Florida. Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, there is one point of inconsistency here that I would like to explore for just a moment. That is if the proponents of these troop cut amendments are so willing to recognize the wisdom and heed the advice of the Defense Department and the administration in determining where these mandated troop cuts would take place, why are they so unwilling to recognize the wisdom and heed the advice of the Defense Department and the administration when they recommend against these troop cut amendments?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

The gentleman from Michigan discussed the need of perspective, but nobody in this debate has discussed the number of our troops overseas that have actually been withdrawn. In 1968, over 1 million men were overseas. We now have about 435,000. That is a reduction of almost 650,000.

No one is arguing about the concept of reducing the number of troops overseas. What we should be concerned about is this proposal to cut by 25 percent below the present substantially reduced level in an 18-month period. I think that is totally irresponsible.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan in his remarks seemed to imply that Admiral Moorer, as our top military officer, felt there was no contradiction between troop reductions and détente. I quote Secretary Schlesinger:

There is no contradiction between détente and the maintenance of an appropriate level of military power. The second is essential to the first. If we fail to maintain a worldwide military equilibrium, the hopes for détente will be undermined.

I might say that Admiral Moorer was sitting on Secretary Schlesinger's right when he made that statement, and he made no effort in his testimony, which followed, to contradict the Secretary.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Esch) said a moment ago that there was nothing inconsistent with supporting the O'Neill amendment and our established foreign policy. Well, obviously one of the key elements of that foreign policy is to try to get an agreement with the Soviets in Vienna for a mutual force reduction of Warsaw Pact forces.

Does the gentleman from Alabama think in any realistic sense that, if the House were to mandate the O'Neill amendment today, which, as I just

pointed out, will direct a reduction of at least 40,000 of our forces in NATO, the Russians would ever agree to any measure of reduction at all?

Mr. DICKINSON. I do not, but I will be glad to yield to our distinguished majority leader after one observation.

I was in Korea about a month before the distinguished majority leader. I was briefed at CINCPAC by Admiral Guyler and by the commander in chief of our United Nations forces in Korea, General Stillwell. What the distinguished majority leader inferred earlier was contrary to what I was told while I was there. Every indication I got was that our presence there was in our national interest. I wonder if the gentleman has some secret which he could impart to us?

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DICKINSON. I yield to the distinguished majority leader.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, regardless of the statement I read, a statement that was carefully gone over by the proper authorities who normally brief us, I agree with everything the gentleman said.

The gentleman from Texas (Mr. FISHER) said that I said the troop forces were going to remain the same, and I would like my remarks to stay at that.

Just let me make this comment to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN). It is my opinion that we would still be in the Vietnam war if it had not been for the Congress of the United States. It is my idea now that it is the same; we would still have a million troops overseas if it were not for the fact that some of us on the floor have gone into matters like this. If the Members of Congress do not show some feeling and some influence, if they just go on the basis that they want reports of what the Army says or the Defense Department, they would give us exactly the same results with regard to troops which they gave us with regard to Vietnam.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, let me say in conclusion that I think we have thoroughly discussed and thoroughly exhausted the subject. I certainly hope that we would get on with it and vote now.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment is tied to some arbitrary dollar goal rather than to international security needs.

In relation to Soviet deployments, our commitments are modest.

There is much reference to 319,000 U.S. troops in Europe. Actually, that troop figure for Europe includes those afloat with the 6th Fleet. The actual number of U.S. ground troops in Western Europe committed to the NATO mission is 183,000. U.S. troops make up 10 percent of the ground forces of NATO.

By contrast, Soviet troops make up 50 percent of the Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe. The Soviets have 430,000 troops in Warsaw Pact countries.

The United States has 4½ divisions in Western Europe. The Soviets have 31 divisions in the Warsaw Pact.

The size of our Armed Forces in terms of manpower is small when compared to the Soviets or the Chinese and, therefore, sensible strategy requires forward deployments and superiority in firepower.

The United States has 13 active divisions in its entire Armed Force. The Soviets have 45 divisions on the Chinese border alone.

The Armed Forces provided for in the committee bill are 40,000 fewer than authorized in fiscal year 1974. It is 1.3 million lower than we had in fiscal year 1968 at the peak of the Vietnam war.

The Army has been making, in the last year, the effort Congress has urged for some years to increase its combat strength without increasing total manpower. The Army is going from a 13-division force at the present time, fiscal year 1974, to 14 divisions by the end of fiscal year 1975, with an increase in end strength of only 3,000. Since a U.S. division numbers approximately 18,000 to 20,000 men, you can see that this conversion involves considerable reduction of support spaces. If we make a massive reduction in the Army now, we would take away the flexibility to make these changes and destroy the incentive for better management and for increasing the combat-to-support ratio.

This amendment would determine now our overseas end strength for December 1975, some 20 months away. We would be making a determination on deployments for a time in the future long before we can predict what the requirements at that time would be.

The worst thing about this amendment is that it would signal to both allies and potential enemies that we are suffering fatigue of the spirit and unilaterally pulling back from our position of world leadership. It would remove the incentive that the Soviets have to negotiate with us for reductions in their own troops as well as ours; it would reduce the incentive for our allies to improve their own forces; and it would signal to China and the rest of the world that we would be less prepared to defend our friends in a crisis.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, probably everything has been said on this subject that can be, but it seems to me that there is one point that I have not heard made, although I have not been here all afternoon. That is, if we want to reduce troops, why do we say troops overseas? Why not offer an amendment which says that we will have 100,000 fewer troops altogether?

And then let the Pentagon decide. If we are going to bring troops home from NATO—and if this amendment passes, we are going to; I do not care what anybody else says—we are going to put them in Fort Bragg, N.C. It is going to cost more to put them in Fort Bragg, N.C., than it is to leave them in Germany. We had better discharge troops in this country instead of doing that.

If somehow or other I were to become President of the United States next week,

there is just one thing I am sure I would do, and that is that I would keep Henry Kissinger on as Secretary of State if he would stay there. What we are doing if we pass this amendment is that we are cutting his negotiating ability with the Russians by whatever troops we have to bring home. We are handing them a blank check saying, "No, you do not need to negotiate. The Congress did it for you."

Mr. Chairman, I am for bringing troops home if we can negotiate, but do not let anybody tell us, as I heard the gentleman from our side try to a few minutes ago, that the deterrent is the A-bomb, because nobody in Europe believes that. I do not believe it, and no other Member in this Chamber really believes it, because if we do not have any troops over there and the Russians move, they know, the Europeans know, and we know that we are not going to start an atomic war. Do not let anybody kid us about that.

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I will yield briefly.

Mr. O'NEILL. I would suggest that we would not start a war, but during the Israeli-Arab war there was an alert.

Mr. HAYS. There was an alert, but we had troops there, and they knew that if they started anything, we were going to move. What your amendment really does—

Mr. O'NEILL. I am merely asking the gentleman a question.

Mr. HAYS. No; you are not asking a question. You are making a statement.

Mr. O'NEILL. There was an all-out alert.

Mr. HAYS. If we are going to pass the gentleman's amendment, I would just as soon pass an amendment to send a billion dollars and 100,000 troops to the Syrians, and I do not care much for the Syrians, frankly, because that would be just about as impartial as you could get. That would signal to everybody whose side we were on, would it not? Do you think the Syrians would be negotiating? I do not think they would, and everybody knows they would not.

Mr. Chairman, I am saying that if we have to bring troops home from NATO, they are not going to negotiate after a troop withdrawal in Europe. Do not let anybody tell us they are.

I think the only sensible way to approach this matter, if we want to reduce troops, is to say to the Pentagon, "Cut them down and decide where, down at Fort Bragg or wherever." But let us not say we have to bring them home from abroad at a time like this.

Mr. Chairman, I just talked to the foreign minister of one of the NATO countries on Monday of this week. They are debating right now in their parliament what they are going to do about their commitment. He was very candid and told me that. What they do will depend on what we do here today.

Mr. Chairman, if we want to destroy NATO, if we want to force Finlandization on Western Europe—and you know what that term means to the Soviets—this is the way to do it.

What that term means is simply that the word is passed around that the United States does not care any more, and one by one those weak nations in Europe are going to come to terms on whatever conditions they can get with the Soviet Union. The conditions are not going to be good for us.

Mr. Chairman, I can argue with anybody about whether we have too many troops in Thailand or in North Korea. But as I said a year ago, and I repeat for the Members today, I got my fingers burned way back in the early part of 1950 when I voted not to defend Korea any more. It passed by two votes, and within months the North Koreans decided that we had already signaled what we were going to do, and they moved.

I considered that my vote was the vote that could have caused that war, and I lived with it, and I suffered with it. I am not going to vote today to hamstring our people at NATO at the vital time when we are trying to negotiate and when we have the best negotiator in the business working for us. I am not going to vote to pull the rug out from under him, and I hope the other Members will not either.

Mr. MATSUNAGA. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, while I realize the debate on the pending amendment has been somewhat lengthy, I am not going to give up my right to speak, after seeking to gain recognition for over an hour. Not being a member of the Committee on Armed Services, I ask my colleagues' indulgence.

Because of the lengthy debate that has gone on, we might be tending at this time to be confused as to what is before us. So let me review the situation briefly: There is the Dellums amendment, which calls for a reduction of 198,000 troops, and then there is an amendment in the nature of a substitute to the Dellums amendment, the O'Neill amendment, which calls for a reduction of American troops on foreign soil by 100,000. The cut proposed by the Dellums amendment may be too severe, but, Mr. Chairman, I think the O'Neill proposal offers a sensible compromise. Much has been said about the amendment's not indicating where the troops are to be cut, where they are to come from, and that this is irresponsible.

There are 2,000 places throughout the world where American troops are stationed on foreign lands. Certainly it is the most responsible approach on the part of our distinguished majority leader to leave it to the experts to decide from where the 100,000 troops are to be reduced.

The statement has been made that if this amendment passes, it would mean a reduction of 25,000 troops from Korea, about 56,000 troops from Japan and Okinawa, and perhaps all the troops from Thailand or the Philippines.

Under the O'Neill amendment, if the Secretary of Defense determines that troops in Asia could be cut without jeopardizing our national security or

threatening the world peace, then the Secretary of Defense may do it. If the Secretary of Defense determines that troops could be cut from NATO without jeopardy, he may do it. But the amendment does not provide that troops shall be withdrawn from Europe, notwithstanding contentions of those who oppose the amendment. The decision as to where the troops shall be cut is wisely left to the Secretary of Defense.

Certainly our distinguished majority leader would not offer an amendment which will jeopardize our national security or world peace. He is a man of peace; he is a man who stands for national security. Any statement, as was made on this floor during the past hour, that the amendment is an irresponsible move on the part of those who propose it, is, in itself, irresponsible.

Mr. Chairman, the O'Neill amendment, for the edification of those Members who have not read the amendment or heard it read, merely provides that:

No funds appropriated by Congress may be used after December 31, 1975, for the purpose of maintaining more than 335,000 military personnel permanently or temporarily assigned at land bases outside the United States and its possessions; provided further that the Secretary of Defense shall determine the appropriate worldwide overseas areas from which this phased reduction of 100,000 military personnel will be made.

In the event that the world situation should change, the Congress can immediately act to meet the situation. The world situation changes, as we all know. Today we are at peace; we have no war in Vietnam. Today we are negotiating with the Russians. We have made peace overtures to the People's Republic of China and are in the process of establishing trade and diplomatic relations with that country. In fact, a withdrawal of American troops from Asia will indicate to that one nation in Asia with which we fear we might go to war that we are trying to create a favorable impression, and that we are doing what we say we are going to do—seek every possible means to be at peace with that nation.

By adoption of the O'Neill amendment, we will prove to the peoples of the world that we are, indeed, seekers of world peace.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, there are other immediate and more pragmatic benefits to be gained from the O'Neill amendment. Reducing American troops stationed in foreign lands by 100,000 could mean a savings of more than a billion dollars a year. At a time when so many of our desirable and necessary domestic programs in education, housing, aid to the handicapped and needy, are suffering for lack of funds, this substantial amount could certainly be put to better use.

Our Nation's balance of payments, too, could be improved by the adoption of the O'Neill amendment. While it is true that NATO nations are presently required to offset payments imbalances resulting from deployment of U.S. troops in Europe, there is no comparable provision covering the 200,000 troops deployed in other areas of the world.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of the O'Neill amendment.

Mr. ANDERSON of California. Mr. Chairman, a primary cause of the record inflation we face today is the Federal Government's habit of spending more money than it collects.

And, thus, it is incumbent upon all of us in the Congress to work to reduce Federal spending, except in those areas of critical importance or need, with the goal of achieving a balanced budget.

Due to its size and cost, the Defense Department is the place to start trimming, recognizing, of course, that our Armed Services must be second to none. As the largest single Federal activity, absorbing 30 percent of our budget and 6 percent of our gross national product, the Defense Department can only be justified in terms of national security—a type of insurance policy.

And like an insurance policy, it must be adequate, but not so costly as to price food, shelter and other essentials beyond reach and out of the budget.

Our defense budget—totalling \$90 billion—can and should be cut, not to reduce our security capabilities, but rather to get more defense for our money.

Presently, almost one-third of our troops are deployed overseas, which, because of logistics, are more costly to sustain than troops here at home. And, in Europe our nearly 200,000 ground troops—which cost \$69,000 per soldier to sustain—are geared to a long, protracted conflict.

Yet, the purpose of our troops is not to defend Europe, but rather to deter aggression by showing the American flag; in effect, the presence of our troops shows any potential aggressor that to start anything in Europe is to pick a fight with America.

Thus, the question we should be asking is "how many troops are sufficient to assure a potential enemy that a strike at Europe is also a strike at America and our nuclear might?"

And, to me, it would be both proper and prudent to reduce the level of our overseas troops. A reduction of less than 25 percent of overseas troop commitments could serve as both a deterrent, and thus preserve our security, and as a money saver—allowing a \$1.2 billion savings to the taxpayer.

Mr. Chairman, we can have both security and cut spending—both of which must be accorded the highest priority.

Therefore, I strongly urge my colleagues to join me in voting for the O'Neill amendment.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the O'Neill amendment. This amendment which proposes to reduce our forces overseas by 100,000 men by December 31, 1975, is well thought out, and represents a restrained opportunity to cut out excess spending in the military without substantially impairing the strength of our national security.

Manpower expenses constitute over 50 percent of our military costs. Some Department of Defense estimates, after PX's, pensions payments and other manpower related expenses are figured to go

as high as 56 percent. Clearly, if we are to make a real effort to cut our budget, to stick within our budget ceiling and President Nixon's budget ceiling, we must cut the defense budget down to a figure proportional to our limited resources, our national security needs, and our total priority values. Reductions of land-based troops overseas is an inflation fighter.

Using the Department of Defense figures which indicate that it takes \$12,500 to maintain one uniformed soldier, it has been estimated that this amendment will produce a savings of approximately \$1.2 billion. This saving does not count the support costs, civilian employees, dependents, and other benefits to be saved. This figure does not take into account the savings which will be realized in our balance-of-payments deficit which is a factor that has become extremely important given the tremendous increase in foreign oil prices. The Department of Defense itself estimates that, in spite of progress on the Jackson-Nunn amendment, the balance-of-payments deficiencies resulting from European troop commitments alone will be \$2.1 billion in fiscal year 1974.

The cost of maintaining troops abroad could be justified if such a commitment was essential to the preservation of our national security. However, there are many areas of the world where we could cut the number of our troops while not risking the credibility of our involvement.

Europe is the area which has received the most attention. When I first came to Congress, I made an extensive study of our ground forces in Europe, and concluded that we could bring back and release 150,000 troops without endangering the nuclear shield which we were providing to Europe through NATO. Intervening events have made the case for these reductions even stronger.

In the last year we have continued to make progress in our policy of détente with Russia. SALT I is signed and SALT II is in progress. Yet despite these tension-relaxing actions our troop commitment in Europe is still 317,000 men—a figure which is well over one-half of our total troop commitment overseas. Many of these troops are stationed in Germany, apparently guarding against an overland invasion from the east. More than anything, they give Russia an excuse to keep her own troops in Central Europe.

We have been told that the Europeans have been paying us a small sum to offset our balance-of-payment deficit. The amount paid by our allies is only a fraction of what it costs to maintain our forces in Europe. I do not like having a "rent-an-army" service for others who can defend themselves and who are paying a substantially smaller portion of their GNP than we are, for their own defense. The French have been the most emphatic in demanding that our troops remain. Yet it was the French who kicked us and NATO out of France, and it is the French who are now using their defense dollars in atmospheric nuclear testing in the South Pacific.

Over 28 years after World War II, the United States still has over 55,000 troops stationed in Japan. But if you read the Department of Defense tables, the figure is only 19,000. The reason for this discrepancy is that the Department of Defense lists the 36,000 troops in the Ryukyu Islands separately. The Ryukyu Islands have been a part of Japan since the Meiji Restoration of 1871. They were occupied by the United States following World War II and they have been recently returned to Japan. I believe that the 55,000 troops stationed in Japan may be too high.

North Korea and South Korea have indicated they will reunify in the next few years. Yet we continue to have 36,000 men stationed in Korea despite the fact that the South Korean armed forces is among the largest and most modern in the world.

Thus, it is easy to see that there are a number of areas ripe for troop reductions. Moreover, this amendment provides the administration with great flexibility in that the Secretary of Defense does not have to withdraw troops from any particular area. He can pick and choose as he pleases so long as our overseas forces are reduced by 100,000 men by December 31, 1975.

Given the savings this amendment will produce in a time when we must all be concerned with the effects of inflation and the relatively minimal impact this reduction of forces will have on our national security I urge passage of this amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, it is ridiculously easy to draw up a list of 100,000 military personnel who could be brought home with no adverse effect on national security.

We have about 37,000 Air Force personnel in Thailand. What are they doing there? Our colleague Mr. REID has suggested they are flying "practice" missions with live bombs against live human insurgent targets. If this can be verified, it will, in my view, be grounds for court-martial of all responsible military officials and impeachment of all responsible civilian officials. It is illegal for them to operate in Indochina, and in these days of intercontinental bombers and missiles, we do not need men in Thailand to threaten China. So all of them could come home.

We have 198,000 ground forces in Europe. The Army claims only 40 percent or 79,000, of these men are support forces. Outside authorities such as Col. Edward King estimate true support forces at 70 percent, or 139,000 men. So all we have to do is to reduce the support forces to the number the Army says it already has, and we'll have another 60,000 men on the way home, with dependents.

There is our 100,000 right there. We can easily find more in the 40,000 in Korea, who have long outlived their usefulness.

It is argued that we should not reduce unilaterally because of the effect this would have on the MBFR talks. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to sit still and

watch these talks used as a device for preventing reductions. We should not tolerate the administration's strategy of wasting half a decade in negotiations during which unilateral reductions are prohibited, then producing a token 5 or 10 percent reduction, and thereafter prohibiting further reductions as giving away our hard-fought negotiating position.

There is only one way to reduce. Let us first bring home those fat forces from Europe and those missionless forces from Asia, neither of which have any military significance. Let us then make a small further reduction—say, 10,000 men—from Europe, and invite the Soviets to follow suit. If we want savings rather than talk, this is the only way to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL) to the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. O'NEILL. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 163, noes 240, not voting 30, as follows:

[Roll No. 239]

AYES—163

	AYES—163	NOES—240
Abzug	Gaydos	Owens
Adams	Giamo	Patten
Addabbo	Ginn	Pike
Anderson, Calif.	Grasso	Podell
Ashley	Green, Pa.	Pritchard
Aspin	Gross	Rangel
Badillo	Gude	Rarick
Barrett	Gunter	Rees
Bergland	Hamilton	Reuss
Blester	Hanley	Riegle
Bingham	Harrington	Rinaldo
Blatnik	Hawkins	Robison, N.Y.
Boland	Hechler, W. Va.	Rodino
Bowen	Heckler, Mass.	Roe
Brademas	Hicks	Roncalio, Wyo.
Brasco	Holtzman	Rose
Brown, Calif.	Howard	Rosenthal
Burke, Calif.	Hungate	Roush
Burke, Fla.	Hutchinson	Roy
Burke, Mass.	Jones, N.C.	Royal
Burlison, Mo.	Jordan	Ryan
Burton	Karth	St Germain
Carney, Ohio	Kastenmeier	Sarbanes
Carter	Koch	Schneebell
Chisholm	Kyros	Schroeder
Conte	Leggett	Seiberling
Conyers	Lehman	Skubitz
Cotter	Litton	Smith, Iowa
Coughlin	Lujan	Snyder
Cronin	Luken	Stanton, James V.
Culver	McClory	Stark
Daniels, Dominick V.	McCormack	Stokes
Dellenback	McKinney	Stuckey
Dellums	Macdonald	Studds
Denholm	Madden	Symington
Dent	Madigan	Thompson, N.J.
Diggs	Matsunaga	Thone
Dingell	Mazzoli	Tiernan
Donohue	Meeds	Udall
Drinan	Melcher	Ullman
Dulski	Mezvinsky	Van Deerlin
du Pont	Miller	Vander Veen
Edwards, Calif.	Minish	Vanik
Ellberg	Mink	Vigorito
Esch	Mitchell, Md.	Waldie
Evans, Colo.	Moakley	Whalen
Evins, Tenn.	Moorhead, Pa.	Whitten
Fascell	Mosher	Wolf
Findley	Moss	Yates
Flynt	Natcher	Yatron
Foley	Nedzi	Young, Ga.
Fraser	Obey	Zwach
Frenzel	O'Hara	
Fulton	O'Neill	
		NOT VOTING—30
	Annunzio	Heilstoski
	Arends	Hinshaw
	Carey, N.Y.	Johnson, Pa.
	Clark	Jones, Okla.
	Clawson, Del.	Kluczynski
	Clay	Latta
	Collins, Ill.	Metcalfe
	Eckhardt	Morgan
	Ford	Murphy, Ill.
	Goldwater	Nix

So the amendment to the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. DELLUMS).

The amendment was rejected.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, let me congratulate the House Committee on Armed Services for its effective and important efforts in behalf of the Reserve components. It will be noted that the bill before us provides a floor for Reserve strengths and insures that the Air National Guard shall include a force of not less than 91 flying units. The significance of this action may not be generally known simply because there are many who have not been fully alerted to the threat of reductions in the Reserve components which have been proposed by the policymakers in the Department of Defense.

The need for full strength in the Air National Guard is recognized in most areas of the defense establishment and there is very genuine support for the number of units set forth in today's bill. No cuts were proposed for the Air Reserves. The Air Reserves and the Air Guard were almost the only members of the Reserve components which had an opportunity for service during the war in Southeast Asia. They gave distinguished service and demonstrated what Reserves generally could and would have done to assist in that conflict had they been given an opportunity.

We began this year with strong hopes for new recognition of the place of the Reserves in the total force concept. Now, to the surprise and dismay of friends of the Reserve components, there is a new threat. This is the battle of the "48-K" which would reduce the Army Reserve by 48,000 spaces, along with reductions in the Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, and Marines, which may total as many as 80,000 spaces.

I am glad that Congress is alert to the problem, has had extensive hearings on the subject, and that the Reserve Officers Association and other organizations have been here with needed information and with key questions and suggestions for dealing with this new threat.

Many of us in Congress believe in the total force concept and we believe it must be followed as a powerful policy. We believe in the citizen-soldier philosophy. And if given the support, the equipment and the training which is required, the Reserves, with the active forces, can and will effectively provide the deterrent to aggression which will keep our Nation safe and secure and at peace.

Now let me tell you why it is so important to maintain strong Reserve forces. A salient fact is being overlooked. In the makeup of the Nation's defense forces, we cannot ignore the increased cost of defense and the shrinking defense budget. These work at cross-purposes with each other. We are spending a lower percentage of the national budget for defense than we have since the early 1960's.

The danger is that so little of the smaller defense dollar now goes to buy weapons and equipment. About 60 percent of our defense dollar is pay for people in and out of uniform. In Russia, pay is less than 35 percent. Very simple arithmetic tells us the Russian forces are getting twice as much equipment for a defense dollar as we do. Long ago we learned to dispense with the dream that ours is better simply because it's American. Some of our equipment is better. Some of it is not as good. The Russians have more equipment that is new and fully modern, and that is a serious matter.

This tells you why the Reserve components offer today's best bargain in defense. The Nation gets more manpower per dollar from its Reserve components. This is not to say we can dispense with the regular forces. But to get the equipment we need, we may have to cut back on the strength of the regulars and increase that of the Reserves. Whatever happens, this is not a time for excessive cuts in the Reserve components. They should be strengthened, not weakened.

As a part of this program, there must be new understanding and acceptance on the part of the Reserves that they are again a vital part of the Nation's defense. Given this goal and this responsibility, they must train as they have never trained before. They must take every step, think and work in every required moment, to be prepared for war. The Reserve forces must not let themselves be thought of as a sanctuary of any sort or to any degree. There will be no place for the "summer soldier" and the "sunshine patriot."

It may be worthy to note that the Russians do not fool around on support of Reserves. The Soviet armed forces are backed up by a reserve system that has no counterpart in the United States. The Soviets have universal military service and that means nearly every able bodied male serves for 2 years. When an individual finishes his universal military service he is "discharged into the reserves." He remains in the first category of reserves until age 35, the second category until age 45, and the third until age 50. In the Soviet Union there are at least 11,000,000 male reservists under 30 who have had military training, and additional millions in the second and third age categories. In substance Soviet active duty military forces are about 1 million larger than their reports indicate and twice as large as ours. Their active duty force is backed by reserves which are proportionately larger.

Obviously this is a time for stronger Reserve components in our forces, with incentives and modern equipment as added insurance for full effectiveness.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I offered a very simple amendment to last year's counterpart of H.R. 14592. The amendment would have placed a limit on the number of commissioned officers in our armed services. Currently Congress limits only the total personnel within each service. This

amendment would have set a limit on the number of commissioned officers in all of the services. It would have permitted the Secretary of Defense to distribute this total to the various services in any fashion which he deemed suitable or necessary.

There are several reasons why I offered the amendment. First, it would have saved, depending upon the implementation by the Secretary of Defense, up to \$450 million. In a time of great congressional concern—at least my personal concern—with a balanced budget, this savings alone should be significant. If we are going to continue to press forward with vigorous domestic initiatives and reduce our penchant for deficit spending, the military budget must be scrutinized in a reasonable fashion and reduced where possible.

The amendment would have also set a precedent for congressional oversight of the size of our professional officer corps. We have taken action in many areas of the military manpower situation, but we have not yet moved to consider this area. Our obligation to determine essential manpower questions within this body should at least include the number of officers.

However, my purposes were not limited to fiscal responsibility or the oversight obligation. I was, and am, concerned that we may be running into a problem which will seriously affect our abilities to do adequate defense planning.

The size, in relation to our total forces, and unwieldiness of our officer corps has been growing consistently. In the pre-Indochina period, a time of relative peace—1957 to 1963—similar to today's situation, the figure was 12.5 percent. At the height of our involvement in the Indochina war, 11.3 percent of our men serving were officers. In fiscal year 1974, this figure reached 14.3 percent. The projected figure will reach 15.3 percent under this budget.

The military situation in 1975 is obviously far more complex than it was 10 years ago, and our military forces must be prepared to deal with today's situation. Along with our nuclear deterrents and other armaments, we must have a select group of people, highly trained and combat ready. From this, in any prolonged conflict, we can enlarge our forces. In a volunteer army, a select group of officers is all that is needed to protect and even improve our defense posture from a manpower standpoint.

The cut which I might have proposed today is certainly not overwhelming. Any army of less than 2 million men, with a third of a million officers, could clearly stand some scrutiny. Currently there are 295,000, or 15.87 percent, in our armed services. An amendment to cut that number slightly or to hold it would be reasonable.

Some questions may arise as to what kind of an officer corps we may be creating by such an amendment. This problem has been previously dealt with by the committee and the Congress in the Officer Grade Limitations Act. This act limits the size of each grade proportion-

ately to the size of each service's individual officer corps. The cut would then be largely proportional since the upper limit to this act has already been approached in many grades.

During the debate on this issue last year, our distinguished colleague from Alabama (Mr. DICKINSON) stated that one of the problems with this amendment was that the committee did not have an opportunity to adequately study this matter. Yesterday the gentleman from Alabama, for committee, again asked that we not act in this area because the committee will shortly be dealing with legislation which will deal with the problem. The measures which they will be taking up are Department of Defense proposals which will amend the military tenure law, and permit the DOD to phase out selectively certain grades of officers. I approve of and appreciate the efforts of the Stratton subcommittee. There is no guarantee that the committee will be interested in my approach, but the fact that the subject is being considered has persuaded me not to offer my amendment this year.

In not offering my amendment at this time, I am relying on the committee to be more aggressive in supervising our officer corps. I am hopeful that it will carefully consider the matter and present a bill to the House for our consideration.

The amendment reads as follows:

In Title 3 Active Forces add Section 302 immediately following Section 301:

Notwithstanding any provision in Sections 301 or 302, for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1974 and ending June 30, 1975, the aggregate total strength for active duty commissioned officers in the Army, Navy, Marine Corps and the Air Force combined shall not exceed 260,120.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE IV—RESERVE FORCES

Sec. 401. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Selected Reserve of each reserve component of the Armed Forces will be programmed to attain an average strength of not less than the following:

- (1) The Army National Guard of the United States, 408,000;
- (2) The Army Reserve, 225,000;
- (3) The Naval Reserve, 117,000;
- (4) The Marine Corps Reserve, 38,000;
- (5) The Air National Guard of the United States, 95,000;
- (6) The Air Force Reserve, 51,319;
- (7) The Coast Guard Reserve, 11,700.

Sec. 402. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Air National Guard of the United States shall include a force of not less than 91 flying units.

Sec. 403. The average strength prescribed by section 401 of this title for the Selected Reserve of any reserve component shall be proportionately reduced by (1) the total authorized strength of units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component which are on active duty (other than for training) at any time during the fiscal year, and (2) the total number of individual members not in units organized to serve as units of the Selected Reserve of such component who are on active duty (other than for training or for unsatisfactory participation in training) without their con-

sent at any time during the fiscal year. Whenever such units of such individual members are released from active duty during any fiscal year, the average strength for such fiscal year for the Selected Reserve of such reserve component shall be proportionately increased by the total authorized strength of such units and by the total number of such individual members.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title IV be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there any amendments to title IV? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE V—CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

SEC. 501. (a) For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, the Department of Defense is authorized an end strength for civilian personnel as follows:

- (1) The Department of the Army, 358,717;
- (2) The Department of the Navy, including the Marine Corps, 323,529;
- (3) The Department of the Air Force, 269,709;
- (4) Activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the military departments), 75,372.

(b) The end strength for civilian personnel prescribed in subsection (a) of this section for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1975, shall be reduced by 15,000. Such reduction shall be apportioned among the Army, Navy, Air Force, and activities and agencies of the Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall report to Congress within sixty days after the date of enactment of this Act on the manner in which this reduction is to be apportioned among the military services and the activities and agencies of the Department of Defense. This report shall include the rationale for each reduction.

(c) In computing the authorized end strength for civilian personnel there shall be included all direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform military functions administered by the Department of Defense (other than those performed by the National Security Agency) whether in permanent or temporary positions and whether employed on a full-time, part-time, or intermittent basis, but excluding special employment categories for students and disadvantaged youth such as the stay-in-school campaign, the temporary summer aid program and the Federal junior fellowship program, and personnel participating in the worker-trainee opportunity program: *Provided*, That when a function, power, or duty or activity is transferred or assigned to a department or agency of the Department of Defense from a department or agency outside of the Department of Defense or from a department or agency within the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such transfer or assignment. Whenever the Secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense determines that a function, power, or duty or activity will be performed by a support services contract which had been performed by

direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform a military function administered by the Department of Defense or determines that a function, power, or duty or activity that is being performed by a support services contract will be performed by direct-hire civilian personnel employed to perform a military function administered by the Department of Defense, the civilian personnel end strength authorized for such departments or agencies of the Department of Defense affected shall be adjusted to reflect any increases or decreases in civilian personnel required as a result of such determination. The Secretary of the military department concerned or the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any adjustment in the authorized end strength for civilian personnel authorized pursuant to this subsection.

SEC. 502. When the Secretary of Defense determines that such action is necessary in the national interest, he may authorize the employment of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized by section 501: *Provided*, That the number of additional personnel authorized to be employed pursuant to the authority of this section shall not exceed 1 per centum of the total number of civilian personnel authorized for the Department of Defense by section 501: *Provided further*, That the Secretary of Defense shall promptly notify the Congress of any authorization to increase civilian personnel strength pursuant to this authority.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title V be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there amendments to this section? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VI—MILITARY TRAINING STUDENT LOADS

SEC. 601. For the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974, and ending June 30, 1975, each component of the Armed Forces is authorized an average military training student load as follows:

- (1) The Army, 97,638;
- (2) The Navy, 71,279;
- (3) The Marine Corps, 26,262;
- (4) The Air Force, 52,900;
- (5) The Army National Guard of the United States, 12,111;
- (6) The Army Reserve, 9,673;
- (7) The Naval Reserve, 2,536;
- (8) The Marine Corps Reserve, 3,903;
- (9) The Air National Guard of the United States, 2,359; and
- (10) The Air Force Reserve, 1,126.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VI be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Are there amendments to title VI? If not, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VII—GENERAL PROVISIONS

SEC. 701. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1975 \$1,400,000,000 to support Vietnamese military forces on such terms

and conditions as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to be administered as one fund and to be obligated only upon issuance of orders by the Secretary of Defense: *Provided*, That as of June 30, 1974, unobligated balances previously authorized for the above purpose are hereby repealed: *And provided further*, That nothing contained in this section shall be construed as authorizing the use of any such funds to support Vietnamese military forces in activities designed to provide military support and assistance to the Government of Cambodia or Laos.

(b) Within thirty days after the end of each quarter the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the Senate and of the House of Representatives, a report with respect to the obligations incurred during that quarter from appropriations authorized by this section.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VII be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HUNT

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. HUNT: Page 10, lines 4 and 12, strike out "Vietnamese" and insert in lieu thereof "Republic of Viet Nam".

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, this is a very simple amendment. It merely strikes the word "Vietnamese" on page 10, lines 4 and 12. It strikes the word "Vietnamese" and inserts in lieu thereof the words, "Republic of Vietnam."

The reason I do this is that at some later date someone may not get the bright idea to think that we passed a piece of legislation that entitles them to use money contained within this section for use in North Vietnam. The money that is contained within this program, as far as I am concerned and many more in this House, we feel it should be used for South Vietnam.

For that reason and that reason alone, I ask that the committee and the House consider the insertion of the words "Republic of Vietnam" rather than "Vietnam."

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the chairman of the committee.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, this is a technical amendment and we accept the amendment.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, I take this time to inquire of the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee if he can inform the House as to the action which I understand was finalized today in the conference on his supplemental authorization bill, insofar as it relates to the MASF aid to South Vietnam.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield so that I may respond?

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, the defense Department to the previously approved report—rather than in the compromise bill—which would clearly hold the Defense Department to the previously approved \$1.126 billion ceiling for military aid to Vietnam for fiscal year 1974 and prevent obligation of \$266 million which would have been available if previous year accounts had been corrected. That will carry out the intent of an amendment, sponsored by Senator EDWARD M. KENNEDY, and approved by the Senate.

The amendment itself was stricken from the bill, however, the intent of the amendment will be covered by the report.

Mr. GIAIMO. Is it clearly the understanding of the gentleman from Louisiana, that as a result of the compromise reached in the conference and as a result of the language included in the report, as I understand it, rather than its adopting the amendment of the Senator from Massachusetts, is it clearly understood then that the \$1,126,000,000 figure for MASF aid to South Vietnam is the figure agreed upon by the Congress for 1974 fiscal year and the supplemental, and that the question of the \$266 million which was in question as to whether or not it was available, has been resolved and that the bookkeeping changes will not result in the Defense Department finding and being able to use the additional \$266 million? Is that the understanding?

Mr. HÉBERT. The gentleman is correct.

Mr. GIAIMO. So that the position which the House maintained when it voted on this some weeks ago, \$1.126 billion, is in effect, and the Department of Defense cannot come back and say that it can use the \$266 million; they will not be able to use that authorization?

Mr. HÉBERT. That is correct. The figure authorized by the House in the supplemental, as it is suggested by the gentleman, is the figure.

Mr. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. HUNT).

The amendment was agreed to.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 10, line 3, delete "\$1,400,000,000" and insert in lieu thereof "\$900,000,000."

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, having in mind what we have just heard in the colloquy between the gentleman from Connecticut and the chairman of the full committee, this amendment should be relatively easy, because what the chairman has indicated has received his full support in the conference, which he has yet to bring to the floor of this House, is a total amount of \$1.126 billion for the current fiscal year for MASF, military

assistance service funded for South Vietnam and Laos.

That is the amount that has come before this House time and time again, and we have resoundingly approved that item. Now, in the current amount which is in title VII of this bill, \$1.4 billion, there is no money for Laos. Therefore, the \$1.4 billion in the bill compares to \$1 billion in the conference agreement that the gentleman has just described, because in that agreement about \$116 million was for Laos.

The Pentagon had asked originally, not for \$1.1 billion; they asked for \$2.1 billion for the current fiscal year.

Mr. Chairman, our committee cut that down first to \$1.6 billion. On a motion by the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. RANDALL), it was cut down to \$1.3 billion. I tried to cut it further on the floor but was unsuccessful last year, and now we finally have the figure near the end of the fiscal year where we are spending \$1.1 billion for Southeast Asia, or \$1 billion for Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I think in order to understand these figures we have to understand that the Pentagon, for the 1975 fiscal year, had asked for \$1.6 billion, and the committee thought that was too much. With the approval of the chairman, that amount was cut in the full committee to \$1.4 billion, and that is the amount that we are currently reviewing before this House.

That amount has not been justified before our committee. We have had some testimony on airplanes for the Army, for the Air force, et cetera, but the total amount that we have here of \$1.4 billion is \$100 million more than what our committee approved last year for Vietnam and Laos, to wit, \$1.3 billion. It is \$400 million more than we have agreed to in conference just a few minutes ago for the current fiscal year. It is \$570 million more than the \$829 million that the committee mentions as being the actual spending authority, which was actually new money appropriated for expenditure during the fiscal year 1974.

If you take out the \$266 million that we have been arguing about in conference, which was money for ammunition advanced to Vietnam in 1972 and 1973, the \$1.4 billion amount is \$656 million more than the \$743 million of really controllable expenditures that we had allowed for Vietnam during the current fiscal year.

What do they do with these funds? I have indicated before that I do not support pulling the plug totally on South Vietnam, but I think we have to exercise some restraint out of this body.

Mr. Chairman, the Senate, in the full Committee on Armed Services, has recommended \$900 million for the next fiscal year. That is what our amendment really suggests we do, that we adopt the Senate position of \$900 million for the 1975 fiscal year.

Mr. Chairman, this year is going to be a lot like 1973. If we look at some of our supplemental views, we can see that South Vietnamese soldiers killed during

the past year were some 11,093. They claim a toll of some 38,858 North Vietnamese and Provisional Revolutionary Government Vietcong-type forces.

If we extrapolate the figures that the Pentagon gave me for the first third of this year, they indicate that the losses are going to be on the order of 10,000 South Vietnamese and about 38,000 North Vietnamese during the year.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. LEGGETT was allowed to proceed for 5 additional minutes.)

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, the Vietcong and North Vietnamese are losing roughly three or four men for every South Vietnamese soldier who meets his demise.

If any Members wonder who is carrying on the aggressive activity out in South Vietnam today, I am frankly of the opinion that nobody knows. We could not rely on half a million American soldiers out there to give us reasonable intelligence as to what was going on there a few years ago. Having no people in the country today, especially out in the field, of any substantial numbers other than a small force at the Embassy, we do not know what is going on.

We do know that General Caldwell, when he came before our committee, was testifying as to what was going on, and he said the following:

Territorial and population control have changed little over the last year—what changes has been made has been in favor of the Government forces.

Mr. Chairman, if we want this war to go on for 20 years, we can just continue to spend at the rate of about a billion and a half dollars for military aid and about \$800 million or \$900 million for economic aid. We can be doing that for the next 20 years. I believe what we need to do is to get the situation in hand. We must get out of the "numbers game." We talk about the numbers; we talk about the dollars the American public is going to put up for this bill. That is really the only thing we ought to be concerned about. If we accept this amendment, we are not pulling the plug in any way, shape, or form out from the South Vietnamese forces, because we will continue to pay not only the \$900 million we are talking about in this bill, but we will expend \$800 million or \$900 million in economic aid, we will train something on the order of 25,000 South Vietnamese soldiers in the United States, and we will assist them in probably half a dozen other ways that we are not going to hear itemized.

In addition, in the economic area we have a program called commodity assistance, or Public Law 480. What this program does is this: It sends commodities of various and sundry types to South Vietnam. The figure for that is \$183 million next year. The South Vietnamese people do not pay that amount to us; they pay their own government \$183 million. The South Vietnamese Government has full authority to use that

money for payment to soldiers, payment for uniforms, et cetera. So that if we add that to the committee bill, they would be getting not \$1.4 billion, but \$1.583 billion, plus about \$800 million of economic aid, and it would bring the sum of our commitment to South Vietnam to a figure well over \$2 billion.

Mr. Chairman, I think we ought to take a leaf out of the book of the Soviet Union and China. If we look at the pamphlet that was submitted to all of us over the past few days by the South Vietnamese Minister of Information, we will find that he says as follows in the May issue of that pamphlet: "Hanoi has now begun to realize that neither Russia nor China will be willing to help it on a large scale."

I think we should likewise similarly not help South Vietnam on a large scale. It is all in the mind of an individual Member as to what a "large scale" is.

The committee's recommendation of a \$1.4 billion ceiling on military aid to Vietnam serves the best interests of neither the United States nor the Vietnamese people. As a result I am offering this amendment to reduce that figure to \$900 million. The title as recommended by the committee does some good things:

Tightens up the language by which we require the Department of Defense to report its expenditures of the MASF program. Henceforth, DOD will be required to report actual obligations instead of estimated obligations, giving us for the first time real figures to work with in evaluating our military aid to Vietnam.

It repeals the authorization for any unobligated balances remaining in the MASF account at the end of this fiscal year. This will end the guessing game we have had to play each year as to how much money is left in the MASF account.

It authorizes a ceiling on this year's MASF program of \$1.4 billion.

If not a ceiling, I am sure the House-Senate conference will make it such. This is:

The sum of \$100 million, or 8 percent more than the committee recommended for South Vietnam and Laos last year—\$1.3 billion.

Almost \$400 million, or 39 percent more than the \$1,009.5 million that the Congress finally approved for Vietnam last year—supplementary bill is still in conference.

The sum of \$570.5 million, or 31 percent more than the \$829.5 million in new money we made available for military aid to Vietnam last year, in the regular appropriation bill, and

The sum of \$656.5 million, or 88 percent more than the Defense Department had available in controllable expenditures last year. As was explained in the letter I and several of my colleagues sent to your offices yesterday, of the \$1,009.5 million available for Vietnam military assistance last year, \$266 million had to be used to replenish U.S. stocks for ammunition provided to the ARVN in prior years. When this amount was subtracted from the available funds, only \$743.5 million was available for obliga-

tion for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974.

As these facts clearly show, there is absolutely no way that the \$1.4 billion ceiling can be viewed as anything but a substantial escalation of our military aid to Vietnam; yet, the facts of that conflict are that there has been no escalation of the war. The casualty figures provided to my office show, if anything, a slight decrease in military activity this year:

COMBAT DEATHS

Year	United States	SVN	3d country	Enemy	Total
1963	78	5,665	—	20,575	26,318
1964	147	7,457	1	16,785	24,390
1965	1,369	11,243	31	35,436	48,079
1966	5,008	11,953	566	55,524	73,051
1967	9,377	12,716	1,105	88,104	111,302
1968	14,589	27,915	979	181,149	224,632
1969	9,414	21,833	866	156,954	189,067
1970	4,221	23,346	704	103,638	131,909
1971	1,381	22,738	526	98,094	122,739
1972	300	39,587	443	131,949	172,279
1973	202	11,093	4	38,858	50,157
1974	—	10,107	—	38,514	48,621
Total	46,086	205,653	5,225	965,580	1,222,544

¹ Projection based on KIA rates of 1st 4 mos.

These figures show another interesting trend; VC/NVA casualties continue to bear about the same relationship to ARVN casualties as they have in the past, with the VC/NVA losing three to four men for every ARVN soldier killed. You do not have to be a military genius to conclude from this that the ARVN is still mounting a substantial number of offensive operations. If there was ever any doubt about this, it was dispelled by the testimony of Maj. Gen. William B. Caldwell III. In his testimony before the committee, General Caldwell told us, in language which is repeated virtually verbatim in the committee report, that—

Territorial and population control have changed little over the last year—*what change has been made has been in favor of the Government forces*; (italic added).

Since the only land changing hands is coming under Saigon's control, it is impossible to believe that the ARVN has not been on the offensive. U.S. military aid is intended to help Vietnam defend itself, not to continue the war as though nothing had happened. Expert testimony shows that the ARVN has been able to mount offensives with the amount of aid they have; therefore, it is obvious that no increase is required for purely defensive purposes.

It should be understood that this is not all the military assistance that the Saigon Government can count on from the United States this year. The President's foreign aid request contains \$183 million in funds for the commodity import program. The dollars generated by this program in the past have been used by Saigon for uniforms and construction programs: in other words, to supplement their defense budget. If that \$183 million is added to the \$1.4 billion recommended by the committee, it will boost our Vietnam military assistance program to \$1.583 billion, or very nearly the \$1.6 billion requested by the Pentagon. Thus,

this bill represents an even larger escalation than appears on its face.

It has been argued that we must provide aid at this level because the Russians and Chinese are supplying Hanoi. True enough, Hanoi's aid does come from the major Communist countries; but how extensive is that aid? Hoang Duc Nha, Minister for Information and Open Arms for South Vietnam, wrote in the May 1 edition of the Vietnam Bulletin that—

Hanoi has now begun to realize that... neither Russia nor China will be willing to help it on a large scale.

Such figures as we possess on aid to Hanoi are classified, but if GVN officials are willing to describe that aid as being not on a large scale, it certainly cannot be very much.

Inevitably, we must ask ourselves exactly what our aid accomplishes. I have cited several times the report we received last year that the amount of gunfire in Vietnam on both sides was directly attributable to the amount of ammunition we supplied to the ARVN. That report was buttressed by acknowledgment by our Embassy in Saigon of a need to "restrain" ARVN ammunition consumption, especially artillery ammunition. Yesterday, confirmation of the relationship between the level of our aid and the level of violence in Vietnam was received from yet another source.

In a front page story in the Washington Post, Phillip McCombs tells of discovering the "strange accommodation" between the VC and the ARVN; if the ARVN does not shoot too much, the VC do not attack. The logical extension of this accommodation is that if we were not giving the ARVN ammunition in excess of their self-defense needs, far fewer VC attacks would be provoked. With a lowered level of activity on the battlefield thus obtained, perhaps a higher level of activity at the conference table might ensue.

In the final analysis, it is not our military aid to Vietnam that will make the difference of their ability to or not to survive. Our former colleague, Melvin Laird, recently stated:

The South Vietnamese can handle them. They have enough pilots. It is their foot soldiers who are important. If there is no will, it's their own tough luck. We have done everything that we told them we were going to do. That's what Vietnamization is all about. The fighting will continue for 20 years.

Mr. Laird and I have had our differences in the past, but that makes our agreement on this point all the more significant. Dollars do not buy victory—only the Vietnamese will can do that. If we continue as we have, dumping \$2.5 billion to \$3 billion into Vietnam every year, we can look forward to doing so at least for the next 20 years. Is this a fitting memorial to the Americans who were sent to die in Southeast Asia? I think that if those men could come back to talk to us, they would tell us we have far better things to do with our money than that. The administration has told us that we do not have \$250 million this year for programs to serve our own veterans; we propose to reduce our military aid to

Vietnam by twice that amount, and I hope that the House will agree with me that we have other, more pressing needs for that money.

My amendment does not signal an abrogation of our responsibilities to the Vietnamese; rather, it is an acknowledgement of our responsibilities to the American taxpayers. The \$900 million ceiling I propose will not leave Vietnam high and dry. It makes available more money than either the \$743.5 million in controllable money we allowed last year or the \$829.5 million in new money we appropriated for military aid to Vietnam in fiscal year 1974. A \$900 million ceiling was unanimously agreed to by the Senate Armed Services Committee just last week; and no one wants to suggest that such men as Senator THURMOND or Senator TOWER would countenance an abrogation of our responsibility to Vietnam. They and I agree that \$1.4 billion is simply too much money for this program.

I would like to insert at this point a summary of the Defense budget for fiscal years 1973-75:

DEFENSE BUDGET SUMMARY, FISCAL YEARS 1973-75

[TOA in millions of dollars]

	Fiscal year—			Changes 1973-75
	1973	1974	1975	
Current prices:				
Baseline U.S. forces	69,769	77,047	83,373	+13,604
MAP	1,120	3,295	1,279	+159
Incremental Southeast Asia costs	5,171	1,599	1,863	-3,308
Subtotal, excluding retirement pay	76,060	81,941	86,515	+10,455
Military retired pay	4,392	5,164	6,014	+1,622
Total TOA, current prices	80,452	87,105	92,529	+12,177

¹ Included in the \$1,900,000,000 for Southeast Asia costs in fiscal year 1975 is \$1,400,000 for the support of South Vietnamese forces and \$463,000,000 for U.S. forces.

This table shows that, in fiscal year 1975, our Southeast Asia costs are \$584 million greater than the total MAP budget worldwide. In other words, military aid to Vietnam will cost us 46 percent more than military aid to the rest of the world combined. If our amendment is adopted, Vietnam costs will still be \$84 million more than the rest of our military assistance budget; but we will at least have brought these expenditures into some kind of reasonable relationship with the rest of the budget.

Even Mr. Schlesinger has assured us publicly that no cataclysm will follow from this amendment:

Congress, however, appears headed on a different course. Last month, legislators rebuffed a Pentagon attempt to raise the ceiling on Vietnam aid for the current year above the \$1.1 billion level to which it had been originally cut.

Then the Senate Armed Services Committee chopped the new fiscal 1975 request down to \$900 million. The House Armed Services Committee had only reduced the \$1.6 billion request by \$200 million, holding out the prospect of a compromise somewhere in between. But the amendment now pending on the House floor would match the Senate panel's \$700 million reduction.

Pentagon critics argue that Saigon's armies have traditionally wasted vast amounts of U.S. ammunition and supplies. They also argue that increasing aid rather than cutting it would signal South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu to continue indefinitely—at U.S. expense—with military rather than political solutions to his problems.

Schlesinger agreed yesterday that the "real issue" in the current debate is the "signals we are giving to both North and South Vietnam." But he added that the congressional cuts would lead to dangerous interpretations in both capitals.

He claimed the image of "prodigal" wasters of ammunition is "not based on observation but on presupposition," and that Saigon's army has been on "strict rationing" of fuel and ammunition in recent months.

Calling attention to what he describes as "Massive" violations by Hanoi of the Paris cease-fire agreements, Schlesinger argued that the continuing fighting in the south is not a result of "undue aggressiveness on the part of Thieu."

From a purely military or tactical standpoint, Schlesinger conceded under questioning, U.S. national security would not be disadvantaged by what happens now in Vietnam.

"Aside from these intangibles" of a moral commitment for support, he said, "I would not describe South Vietnam or Southeast Asia as an area of the world in which our national interests are high."

But even some congressional critics privately concede that the "intangible, implicit commitments" Schlesinger mentioned will continue to provide Congress with a dual dilemma: What happens if the aid is slashed further and the fighting goes on by both sides to Saigon's disadvantage? How much real defense does a certain level of aid actually buy?

Schlesinger said he was uncertain about what the impact might really be if a \$900 million level were approved. He envisioned some morale problems and some "gradual" reductions in Saigon's million-man army and its equipment level.

He said the United States could continue supplying "significant" quantities of consumables such as ammunition, but probably would not be able to continue replacing major equipment on the one-for-one basis permitted by the Paris accords.

Under questioning, Schlesinger expressed the "feeling" that the administration's Watergate problems with Congress had spilled over to some extent onto the Pentagon's Vietnam requests.

"It's plain that in regard to our legislation on the Hill, that present discontents are not particularly helpful to gather up votes necessary to get the bills across.

"Nor," he added, "is there enormous speed over there (at the White House) with regard to processing whatever it is the White House is processing. Their attention is diverted."

Privately, White House officials, including Vice President Ford, have been critical of Schlesinger for his handling of the Pentagon requests which were cut on Capitol Hill.

Schlesinger also sought to correct his own earlier indications that as much as \$6 billion extra may have been allowed to remain in the defense budget by the White House to pump up the domestic economy.

He said about \$1.5 billion in actual spending was retained, equal to perhaps \$2 billion to \$3 billion in obligational authority.

Mr. Chairman, it is a reasonable program that I seek. The United States is at peace; Americans should not be called on to pay indefinitely for someone else's war. If we intend to participate in a meaningful peace, we must serve notice

that the U.S. Treasury is not a bottomless grab bag for another 20 years of carnage in Vietnam. This reasonable reduction will represent a continuation of the policy of fiscal disengagement from Vietnam that the Congress initiated last year. It is a policy Americans will thank us for pursuing, because they know better than anyone what a drain Vietnam has been on financial resources already ravaged by the worst inflation we have experienced in over two decades. In the name of the American taxpayer, I urge the House to consider our amendment favorably.

We have made no reductions in this bill on the floor today. I think we can reduce this particular item by half a billion dollars, reducing the expenditures to Vietnam by 10 percent, which is a very small amount, based on the amount we are expending in the current fiscal year. We ought to recognize that South Vietnam has reduced its expenditures for its own war, if we can believe the figures from the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, by about 30 percent in 1974, as compared to 1973, and if they can make a 30-percent reduction, I think this Congress, in the name of the American taxpayer, can likewise make a 10-percent reduction.

SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HÉBERT FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I offer a substitute amendment for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Substitute amendment offered by Mr. HÉBERT for the amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 10, lines 3 and 4, delete "\$1,400,000,000" and substitute "\$1,126,000,000".

THE CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I do not want us to have a very extensive debate on this because the amendment I am offering merely brings us to the same position that the House decided we should be in for the last 2 years and what the conferees decided this morning in the same amount that we spent over that period of 2 years, namely, \$1.126 billion. That is the ceiling. That is all my substitute does, simply. We do not change our position but merely reaffirm the position of the last 2 years.

That is all I have to say about it.

MR. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the substitute amendment.

I would like to say that I am certainly not an expert on South Vietnam, but I would like to point out to the committee I have been to Vietnam, to Laos, to Cambodia, and Thailand a total of 10 times. I think I do know something about the situation over there. Possibly I have been over there more than any other Member of Congress or any nonservice personnel in this country during the combat time.

I cannot say that if we approve the \$1.126 billion offered by the chairman in his substitute for fiscal year 1975 this will keep the North Vietnamese from overrunning and taking South Vietnam. I can say this, though: If we do not ap-

prove the substitute amendment and do not give financial aid to South Vietnam, they will not make it; they do not have a chance. The Russians and the Chinese are continuing to give supplies—ammunition, guns, and food—to the North Vietnamese. As long as they continue to do that, we certainly have some type of an obligation to help the South Vietnamese.

We are a lot better off in South Vietnam than we have ever been before, if you will just look back for a few minutes. A couple of years ago we were spending \$28 billion a year in South Vietnam; we were spending at one time almost \$3 billion a month. One of the nice things now in this country is that no Americans are fighting half way around the world. For several months in South Vietnam we were losing as many as 300 young Americans killed, with thousands being injured.

A Member of the other body said a couple of years ago about South Vietnam:

When the last 50,000 American servicemen are left in Vietnam the North Vietnamese will sweep in and push the remaining Americans into the sea.

That has not been proven true. We have gotten all of the Americans out of there. The only ones left are 200 Americans working in the American embassy in Saigon in South Vietnam. So the South Vietnamese have held out with our personnel help.

They need funds, and I certainly hope you will support the substitute amendment offered by the chairman.

Mr. MURTHA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support this amendment. I served 1 year in Vietnam with the 1st Marines. I do not profess to be an expert on the Vietnam war. However, I spent a year on the ground and I was out in the field every day. I saw the results of the criticisms of certain Members of Congress. It was devastating to the war effort. I do not agree that it shortened the war.

What concerns me is that we would now at this date attempt to cut back the money needed in the war when South Vietnam has no control over the determination of the aggression of the North Vietnamese.

We lost 46,000 men in South Vietnam. We had 300,000 wounded we still have 1088 men missing in action. You cannot exercise or eliminate or eradicate that.

Congress sat here in its air-conditioned offices and argued over this while the men who served there were in mud up to their knees and water up to their waists.

You cannot tell me that you can fight a war from over here. The experts in the Department of Defense say that they need the money. Ninety percent of the Members of this Congress have served during our wars, and there is no Member in this Congress who would favor what one Congressman said:

Well, if they need more money we will appropriate more money. We will send more money over there whenever they need it if the North Vietnamese do attack South Vietnam.

Let me ask the Members this, the Members who fought in the foxholes and in the snows and in the mud of the two World Wars, and in Korea, how many of those Members would have favored waiting, that they would say, "We will wait to get the bullets from Congress when we need them right now, more rations, supplies and ammunition." Not one of the Members would have voted for that idea if somebody had asked them.

Two and one-half million men served in South Vietnam willingly, doing their part, doing their duty. The Congress appropriated the money, and Congress supported their effort.

I certainly support the substitute amendment that has been offered. I think it would be a tremendous mistake if we would stand on this floor and reduce the necessary appropriations to the South Vietnamese.

I believe that a mistake of overestimating means we can save some money, but a mistake in underestimating means that there are men in the foxholes and in the swamps and jungles of South Vietnam who do not have the bullets, the rations, and the supplies that they need to fight off aggression, and then the South Vietnamese have to withdraw. And then what happens? I will tell you what happens. Then the North Vietnamese come in, just like they did in Hue in 1968, they came in and killed the leaders, the professors, the doctors, the lawyers. They came in and they killed them, and they buried them in mass graves. That is what happened, and what could happen. These people happen to be our allies. I believe it would be a serious mistake for this U.S. Congress to reduce its support from an ally, and from men who served side by side with our American fighting men.

I think it is extremely important that we support the substitute amendment offered by the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, so as to give the South Vietnamese what they need.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MURTHA. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I want to make an explanation to the Members. I am going to move that the Committee rise momentarily so as to receive a message from the Senate, and then I will move that we come back into the Committee of the Whole.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. SISK, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation

for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereof.

FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A further message from the Senate by Mr. Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 10972. An act to delay for 6 months the taking effect of certain measures to provide additional funds for certain wildlife restoration projects.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed with amendments in which the concurrence of the House is requested, a bill and concurrent resolution of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 69. An act to extend and amend the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, and for other purposes; and

H. Con. Res. 501. Concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the Congress from May 23, 1974, until May 28, 1974.

The message also announced that the Senate insists upon its amendment to the bill (H.R. 13998) entitled "An act to authorize appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration for research and development, construction of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes," disagreed to by the House; agrees to the conference asked by the House on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon, and appoints Mr. MOSS, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. CANNON, Mr. GOLDWATER, and Mr. CURTIS to be the conferees on the part of the Senate.

PROVIDING FOR ADJOURNMENT OF CONGRESS FROM MAY 23, 1974, UNTIL MAY 28, 1974, WITH SENATE AMENDMENTS THERETO

The SPEAKER laid before the House the concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 501), providing for a conditional adjournment of the Congress from May 23, 1974, until May 28, 1974.

The Clerk read the title of the concurrent resolution.

The Clerk read the Senate amendments, as follows:

Page 1, line 3, strike out "two Houses adjourn" and insert "House adjourns".

Page 1, line 3, strike out "they" and insert "it".

Page 1, line 4, after "1974," insert "and that when the Senate adjourns on Wednesday, May 22, 1974, it stand adjourned until 12 o'clock noon on Tuesday, May 28, 1974".

Amend the title so as to read: "Concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the two Houses over the Memorial Day Holiday, 1974."

The Senate amendments were concurred in.

The title was amended so as to read: "Concurrent resolution providing for a conditional adjournment of the two Houses over the Memorial Day Holiday, 1974."

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

MILITARY PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATIONS, 1975

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test, and evaluation for the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes.

THE SPEAKER. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from Louisiana.

The motion was agreed to.

THE SPEAKER. The gentleman from California (Mr. SISK) is asked to kindly take the chair pending the arrival of the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ROSTEN-KOWSKI).

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

According the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill H.R. 14592, with Mr. SISK (Chairman pro tempore) in the chair.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT TO THE SUBSTITUTE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. HÉBERT FOR THE AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. LEGGETT

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the substitute amendment for the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT to the substitute amendment offered by Mr. HÉBERT for the amendment offered by Mr. LEGGETT: On page 10, strike on line 3 "\$1,126,000,000" and substitute "\$1,000,000."

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, a parliamentary inquiry.

THE CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will state it.

Mr. HÉBERT. The gentleman from California has one amendment pending, and I offered a substitute. In a parliamentary procedure, can he offer another amendment to a substitute for his own amendment for consideration?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mr. SISK). The Chair will state the gentleman from Louisiana offered a substitute amendment for the amendment offered by the gentleman from California. The gentleman from California in turn is now offering an amendment to the substitute

amendment, which would be in order. The gentleman from California is not attempting to amend his own amendment.

MR. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to take 5 minutes.

I rise in support of the amendment. I assume that the chairman in offering the substitute amendment indicated that he did not want to escalate the effort of the United States in Vietnam over the next fiscal year above the figure that was agreed to in conference today. When he offered the conference committee the figure of \$1.126 billion, what he forgot was that about \$116 million of that amount was not for Vietnam for the current fiscal year; that was for Laos. In all good faith, the Laos money is not in this bill for the next fiscal year, and that money ought to come out.

So I think that if we settled on a nice round figure like \$1 billion, we would accomplish our objective.

I would just say that I admit maybe there has been some escalation of the cost of living, et cetera, and I am sure that the gentleman from Florida would like to bring that point out, but I would say this: While I do not agree with him in all respects, Graham Martin said in U.S. News & World Report this week, as our Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam:

I have said our objective should be to end it leaving a Vietnam economically viable, militarily capable of defending itself with its own manpower, and free to choose its own government and its own leaders. I believe this can be done within the next three years.

If we are going to do this in 3 years, as the Ambassador says, and not leave the Vietnamese high and dry, then we have got to deescalate these figures and not escalate them. If we accept the chairman's substitute without my amendment, then we are escalating 1975 over 1974. If we want to bring it into balance, and then perhaps let a further conference between the House and Senate resolve this, then accept my amendment. Take the Laos money out; keep the matter a level program; and recognize that the amendment that we have to take out some \$500 million, as admitted by the committee, had considerable merit, because the gentleman agreed to about three-fourths of what we want to do.

MR. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

MR. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

MR. GIAIMO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Will the gentleman explain whether the \$1 billion is money for just Vietnam, or does it include money for Laos?

MR. LEGGETT. No. That would be just money for Vietnam and would not include Laos. That would be exclusive of the economic aid, which is probably going to \$8 or \$900 million, which is not under the jurisdiction of our committee.

I assume the chairman is going to accept this amendment.

MR. CHAIRMAN. I yield back the remainder of my time.

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment and to

laugh heartily at the assumption of the gentleman from California that I would accept anything that he offers. I think here we have seen a demonstration of what I have to put up with in the Committee on Armed Services. We are not being capricious here; we are not dealing in numbers; we are dealing with human beings and human lives. To be as capricious as has been demonstrated by the gentleman from California would be shocking to me if I did not know his past performances and know what the record shows in the racing form. But I think it is absolutely shocking to come before this body and be as capricious as he has been here.

I ask that the amendment to the substitute amendment be rejected.

MR. GIAIMO. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

MR. CHAIRMAN, we have so many amendments pending now that we could well lose sight of what we are trying to do here.

MR. CHAIRMAN, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee has offered a substitute amendment to keep military assistance aid to South Vietnam to \$1.126 billion. That is the figure that some weeks ago we discussed and debated in this House and which was finalized in the fiscal year 1974 authorization bill which was completed in conference by both bodies of the Congress today.

We have an amendment pending to reduce that amount to \$900 million, and now we also have this parliamentary situation that we find ourselves in where instead of those amounts it would be \$1 billion—still a reduction of \$126 million from the figures offered by the gentleman from Louisiana, the chairman of the committee.

I want to stress that what is important here is not so much that we compromise out the dollar amount. What is important here is the principle. This House and this Congress marched up the hill several weeks ago and said that we were going to cease giving a blank check to the Defense Department insofar as military assistance to Vietnam was concerned. We should not now march down that hill.

We sent out a legislative message when we adopted the fiscal year 1974 supplemental authorization bill that the United States was growing tired of military assistance to South Vietnam and that we wanted to reduce it. Many of us who want to reduce it do not say that we should reduce it to zero, because we feel that would be a sellout and would be unwise, but we do have to establish the principle and we do have to send the message to South Vietnam that they should begin to abide by the Paris agreement and work out a political solution to this conflict. The United States is not going to reinvoke itself in Vietnam—God willing. The United States has got to make it clear to South Vietnam that it cannot call upon us for whatever it needs in the way of military assistance. We made that message clear weeks ago.

We apparently and obviously must give

them an additional message, and that is the one of today, that in the coming fiscal year we are going to cut them still more until we can get a political solution to this war and a final termination, and that we can then finally see by yearly reductions a complete termination of military assistance to South Vietnam.

It is not a sellout of an ally. It is signaling to the South Vietnamese to initiate and to abide by the Paris Agreement and to begin to seek a political solution to this war. It is the principle that is important here, not a compromise figure.

In many instances and many times we have compromised a dollar amount, and certainly when we are dealing in billions, \$100 million more or less unfortunately, has very frequently been lost on the floor of the House. But it is the principle here which is important; the principle that we reduce by some degree the amounts of money available for military assistance to South Vietnam.

So, Mr. Chairman, I urge the adoption of the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIAIMO. I yield to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. ESCH. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding.

I associate myself with the remarks made by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to place a ceiling of \$900 million on military aid to South Vietnam. The debate today has been put in terms of our commitment to South Vietnam. Let me begin by stressing that we are not advocating an elimination of aid to that country. Quite to the contrary. Under this amendment, aid to South Vietnam would still be some \$84 million more than our military assistance programs for the rest of the world, hardly a figure which leaves that country devoid of military assistance.

Yet I would like to remind this body of another commitment; that is our commitment to military disengagement from Southeast Asia. It was expressed in our disapproval of appropriations for further military activities in Cambodia and Laos in 1973. It was again expressed in our insistence on a strictly adhered to ceiling on military aid to South Vietnam in 1974. Let us remember that commitment as we consider this request of \$1.4 billion in military aid to South Vietnam for 1975.

It is a request of almost \$400 million or 39 percent more than that which we approved for Vietnam last year.

It is \$570.5 million or 31 percent more than the committee recommended for South Vietnam and Laos last year.

It is \$570.5 million or 31 percent more than the \$829.5 million in new money we made available for military aid to Vietnam last year.

In short, this is not a request that reflects a commitment to disengagement, but one which reflects a continuing and indeed increased commitment to a military solution.

In debate over the Defense Department's request for a supplemental appropriation for military aid to South Vietnam in 1974, I stressed the dilemma presented to us by that request in terms of our relationship to Indochina. We are again presented with that same dilemma as we consider this request for increased aid.

This administration has proclaimed a policy of peace in Vietnam. Its efforts in this regard have been substantial, culminating in the cease-fire and the Paris agreement. These achievements provide us with the long hoped for opportunity to change the nature of our involvement in this part of the world, to build, in cooperation with the international community and the Government of Indochina, a secure and lasting peace. Will shipping yet more arms to South Vietnam help strengthen the cease-fire agreement? Will an increase in the weapons of war help build the peace? This vote today then, presents us with a second dilemma, pursuing the peace with a policy of increased military commitment.

Mr. Chairman, we are committed to building the peace in Indochina. I suggest we would best make good on that commitment by adopting this amendment before us today.

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to raise a question as to the propriety or appropriateness of the remarks addressed to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) regarding his capriciousness in entering this debate regarding the amount of money going to Vietnam.

I have known the gentleman for a great many years and I have never known him to be as capricious as the chairman of the committee has implied today. I yield the balance of my time to my colleague, the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT) to reply.

Mr. LEGGETT. I want to thank my colleague from California. I am not going to take the full time. The chairman and I have an understanding when we talk to each other, either on the floor or otherwise.

I would not accuse my chairman of being capricious in reducing the amount of \$1.6 billion asked by the Pentagon to \$1.4 billion just like that; but he did, and thank God he did.

I would not accuse him of being capricious coming to the floor here today without letting me know that he was going to further reduce the item by another \$300 million; but again I say, thank God, Mr. Chairman, that he did. I think he could do better as far as reducing this particular item, and whether it is capricious or well thought out or whatever it is, I think it is a worthwhile way of establishing a new direction in this Congress as to where we are going in Vietnam.

As the gentleman from Connecticut said, the only thing we need to do is make some kind of reduction to indicate that this matter is not going back to

our previous figures. I urge support of my amendment to the substitute reducing the total military aid item to Vietnam to a flat \$1 billion.

Mr. GAYDOS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

I am not going to take all the time, but I think that it is most important that my colleagues give proper consideration to the remarks made by my colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who spoke here earlier. Every Member in the House should know his background and the platform from which he spoke. He spoke from personal experience in Vietnam. I think he is the only Member of the House that is a veteran of this conflict, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MURTHA). He volunteered his services in Vietnam. He patriotically left his business of 18 years for 4 years active duty in Vietnam where he served as a colonel. He received the Bronze Star, two Purple Hearts, and the Cross of Gallantry in the war, with numerous other campaign ribbons.

I think it is important to know this. His remarks were well framed and indicated a good background and understanding of the situation in Vietnam. I think my colleagues should be apprised of this man's background, because we then can weigh his remarks and give that much more credence and understanding to what he said. I again congratulate my colleague for his most effective and meaningful remarks regarding Vietnam. He knew whereof he spoke. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite words.

There are two points I would like to deal with.

First. The committee, that is, the Pentagon—request for military aid to Saigon is justified, in part, thusly:

Hanoi is conducting a massive military build-up in the south. . . . Since the cease-fire, Hanoi has infiltrated over 70,000 replacement troops, some 400 tanks, 150 long range heavy artillery pieces, 1,000 AAA guns and 150,000-200,000 tons of ammunition and supplies.

But on page 898 of the committee hearings, General Caldwell says:

In addition to the (deleted) tons of ammunition and supplies they have on hand we believe they have a capacity to stockpile roughly (deleted) tons in South Vietnam.

He then gives a table which lists "Ammunition—[deleted], Supplies—[deleted], Total—[deleted]."

On page 904, Secretary Doolin provides the following information:

During 1973 we estimate China provided about (deleted) percent of the total economic aid to North Vietnam with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries contributing the remainder. (Deleted).

On page 905, Pentagon-provided information notes:

The 1968 estimates of infiltration was (deleted) personnel, the highest of record. This is to be contrasted with our 1973 estimated of (deleted).

Mr. Chairman, I would suspect that the North Vietnamese have a pretty good idea how much ammunition they have

Stanton, J. William	Towell, Nev. Treen	Wilson, Charles, Tex.
Steed	Vander Jagt	Winn
Steelman	Veysey	Wright
Steiger, Ariz.	Waggoner	Wydler
Steiger, Wis.	Walsh	Young, Alaska
Stephens	Wampler	Young, Fla.
Stratton	Ware	Young, Ill.
Symms	White	Young, S.C.
Talcott	Whitehurst	Young, Tex.
Taylor, Mo.	Widnall	Zablocki
Thomson, Wis.	Wiggins	Zion
Thornton	Wilson, Bob	

NOT VOTING—32

Annunzio	Heilstoski	Nix
Blatnik	Hinshaw	Rhodes
Carey, N.Y.	Johnson, Pa.	Rooney, N.Y.
Clark	Jones, Ala.	Rostenkowski
Clawson, Del.	Jones, Okla.	Runnels
Clay	Kluczynski	Suttlefield
Collins, Ill.	Latta	Teague
du Pont	Metcalfe	Williams
Eckhardt	Minshall, Ohio	Wyatt
Ford	Morgan	Wylie
Hansen, Wash.	Murphy, Ill.	

So the amendment to the substitute amendment for the amendment was rejected.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) for the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT).

The substitute amendment for the amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. LEGGETT), as amended.

The amendment, as amended, was agreed to.

Mr. TIERNAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, despite efforts to expunge it, the political prisoner question in the Republic of Vietnam remains unresolved today. Conflicting accounts of the situation have been issued by a wide variety of people and organizations, including official representatives of the U.S. Government and congressional committees.

GRAHAM MARTIN—U.S. AMBASSADOR TO VIETNAM

We in Congress do not know for certain whether or not the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, acting in the name of democracy and freedom, is imprisoning and torturing South Vietnamese because of their unorthodox or unacceptable political views—and I speak here not of the 5,081 Communist prisoners officially acknowledged and released by the Government of South Vietnam. But rather, I speak of civilian detainees imprisoned for expressing their political beliefs and for urging the establishment of the National Council for National Reconciliation and Concord as provided for in the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace to Vietnam," signed by the United States on January 27, 1973.

Political prisoners are being incarcerated and tortured in South Vietnam, we do not know it for certain. We do not know if funds from the U.S. taxpayers are being used to support these totalitarian tactics, nor do we know whether or not the continued funding of Mr. Thieu's government will allow this kind

of inhumane governmental repression to continue in the future.

What we do know is that this Congress, in the name of the people of the United States, appropriated \$1.126 billion for military aid to the Government of South Vietnam in fiscal year 1974, and that we did it for the establishment of peace, not the incarceration and torture of political prisoners.

Today we will decide the authorized funding for military assistance to Vietnam for fiscal year 1975. Whatever that amount is, I would hope that all of us could make that authorization with a clear conscience, knowing that it will be used to bring peace to Vietnam, and not to support the political repression of the Vietnamese. As of this minute, none of us in this Chamber can claim a clear conscience in this matter, because none of us can say with certainty that there are no political prisoners in South Vietnam.

For several months a number of our colleagues, as well as myself, have been attempting to initiate a General Accounting Office investigation of the political prisoner question in South Vietnam. Our efforts, unfortunately, have been fruitless, and that is why I come before you today to ask you to join me in that effort. We have been turned away by the GAO in our past requests because the Department of State, acting in its capacity as official foreign representative of the United States, has concluded that such an investigation would be an infringement upon the sovereignty of South Vietnam. The GAO concurred in that opinion, as did the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that an investigation by the General Accounting Office would be an infringement upon the sovereignty of Vietnam, and I would hope that an overwhelming majority of the Members of the House agree with this view.

We are not asking that the U.S. Government, or any agency of that Government, infringe upon the sovereignty of South Vietnam. Rather, we are asking for an accounting of the moneys freely and generously given to South Vietnam. We are asking this not because we wish to interfere with the internal operation of Mr. Thieu's government, but because we need to know the truth about the use of these taxpayer money funds.

The Congress and the people you represent have a right to know what is being perpetrated upon the people of South Vietnam in their name, and in the name of democracy. The American people have a right to know the truth because it is their money we are committing to South Vietnam—it is their work and sacrifice which is being offered to the Republic of Vietnam. The Congress has a right to know the truth because as representatives of the people we are charged with a moral responsibility to safeguard the manner in which we authorize the appropriation of funds entrusted to us by the American people. We have a responsibility to them and to ourselves to

find out how U.S. funds are being spent and to make future decisions based upon that knowledge. Anything short of that is an abrogation of our responsibility to the citizens of the United States.

The Government of the Republic of Vietnam has refused to allow a thorough investigation of the political prisoner question in Vietnam. It has heretofore refused to allow international humanitarian organizations, such as the International Red Cross; individual parties, such as Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit and Bishop Guy Belanger of Valleyfield, Quebec, Canada; and U.S. Government investigative agencies, such as the General Accounting Office, to conduct such an inquiry. It is imperative that we approve this amendment so that the question of political prisoners so that Republic of Vietnam might finally be resolved, and so that the Congress and the taxpayer of the United States might know the truth about how U.S. funds are being spent by the Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I had intended to offer an amendment to this bill that would require that the Vietnam Government allow the General Accounting Office to make an investigation with regard to the allegations that have been made with regard to political prisoners being held in South Vietnam. I am making reference not to the 5,000 or more Communist prisoners who were released but with regard to those other men and women being held in jail in South Vietnam at the present time.

The chairman of the committee indicated to me that he will request that the General Accounting Office make such an investigation. Therefore it will not be necessary for me to present that amendment.

Mr. Chairman, my amendment would have read as follows:

An amendment to H.R. 14592, Title VII, Section 701(a), page 10, line 14. After the word "Laos" insert a colon and add the following:

Provided further, That no funds shall be made available to support Vietnamese military forces until the General Accounting Office is guaranteed the opportunity, by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, to conduct a thorough and complete investigation into the allegation that United States funds are being used by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam to support the incarceration and torture of political prisoners in the Republic of Vietnam. A preliminary report of the investigation shall be presented to the Congress 9 months after enactment of this Title, and a final report shall be submitted 18 months after enactment of this Title."

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. CARNEY OF OHIO

Mr. CARNEY of Ohio. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. CARNEY of Ohio: Page 10, between lines 20 and 21, insert the following:

SEC. 702. (a) No funds authorized to be appropriated by this or any other Act may be obligated under a contract entered into by the Department of Defense after the date of the enactment of this Act for procurement of goods which are other than American

goods unless, under regulations of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the determinations and exceptions contained in title III of the Act of March 3, 1933, as amended (47 Stat. 1520; 41 U.S.C. 10a, 10b), popularly known as the Buy American Act, there is adequate consideration given to—

(1) the bids or proposals of firms located in labor surplus areas in the United States as designated by the Department of Labor which have offered to furnish American goods;

(2) the bids or proposals of small business firms in the United States which have offered to furnish American goods;

(3) the bids or proposals of all other firms in the United States which have offered to furnish American goods;

(4) the United States balance of payments;

(5) the cost of shipping goods which are other than American goods; and

(6) any duty, tariff, or surcharge which may enter into the cost of using goods which are other than American goods.

(b) For purposes of this section, the term "goods which are other than American goods" means (1) an end product which has not been mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States, or (2) an end product manufactured in the United States but the cost of the components thereof which are not mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States exceeds the cost of components mined, produced, or manufactured in the United States.

Mr. CARNEY of Ohio. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I will take only about a half a minute.

This amendment, as I understand, is noncontroversial. It is the same amendment as the one I offered last year which was adopted unanimously by a voice vote, and then an almost identical amendment was offered in the other body by Senators THURMOND, SYMINGTON and TOWER. As I say, this language is the same as theirs, and it is introduced to conform with what was enacted last year, so that we may have that same language in this bill.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CARNEY of Ohio. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I want to say to the gentleman from Ohio that the same language as this amendment was placed in the bill last year, and therefore the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio is acceptable on this side.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, the language in the amendment, as I understand, is the same as it was last year, and is acceptable to this side.

Mr. CARNEY of Ohio. The language is identical.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. CARNEY).

The amendment was agreed to.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word.

Mr. Chairman, as a former member and perhaps somewhat suspect alumni of the Committee on Armed Services, I would like to ask the chairman, or someone else who might be knowledgeable on the subject, as to a matter which has been the subject of concern in the House,

but which has not been raised by members of the Committee on Armed Services.

Mr. Chairman, I will be brief, and this will not be an effort to add an amendment to the bill, but just an inquiry. That is the only purpose in my asking for this time.

So, Mr. Chairman, I will ask the chairman of the committee, or anyone else who might be in a position to answer it, whether or not we find ourselves again confronted with the same problem we have had in the past with this authorization which is rather sizable by anyone's definition. Does this bill contain moneys covering unspecified and so-called classified matters, or for unspecified purposes by definition, without these funds being made a matter of investigation by the committee?

Mr. Chairman, I raise this question because about 2 years ago there was around \$1 billion of this kind of so-called classified or unspecified money, but even in my efforts within the framework of this committee, and in the privacy of closed sessions, I could not extract an answer to my inquiry.

So I would like to ask any member of the committee, or the chairman, whether they could give me such information.

I hesitate to ask specifically whether the Chairman of the full committee could give me some indication of what proportion, or what dollar amount is contained in this bill for such subjects of classification or specification unknown, inasmuch as this subject has not been broadly discussed or broadly known by the members of the Committee on Armed Services. I would ask whether the chairman, or some member of the committee, could indicate, hopefully in specific dollar terms, what portion or portions of this bill cover such subjects.

Further, I would ask specifically whether or not we are going to be apprised as to whether there are such sums included in this bill—sums that are not subject to the appropriate congressional scrutiny that should be given them at this juncture, especially in view of the track record of certain executive branch agencies over the course of the last year?

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield, is the gentleman from Massachusetts referring to CIA money, perhaps?

Mr. HARRINGTON. I have hesitated to use such specificity in asking the question, but in the past there was money in the Air Force budget, at least, that had been placed there for such purposes.

Mr. HÉBERT. In the past there was CIA money. There is no CIA money in this bill.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Is there any money for any of the other so-called security agencies which has not been made the subject of general knowledge to the Committee on Armed Services as a whole?

Mr. HÉBERT. Most certainly there is money in there for security for the armed services.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Could the gentle-

man give me some indication of the amount of money?

Mr. HÉBERT. No, I could not give it out. It is classified.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Have the committee members as a whole, in executive session, been apprized of the amount of money?

Mr. HÉBERT. Yes.

Mr. HARRINGTON. The entire committee?

Mr. HÉBERT. The entire committee.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Does it represent the senior members on each side?

Mr. HÉBERT. No.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Is there any other money that would run to similar purposes that would not be for "armed services security" that would be in the bill for the same purpose and not generally known to the Congress?

Mr. HÉBERT. No.

Mr. HARRINGTON. I thank the Chairman.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, sensing the mood of the House, I will not offer the following amendment, but I would at least like to share it with the Committee. I was prepared earlier, before realizing the attitude of the House today, to offer the following amendment:

Page 10, title VII, after line 14, insert the following new language:

None of the funds authorized to be appropriated under this title for military assistance to the Republic of Vietnam shall be expended until the President reports to the Congress, in writing, that the government of the Republic of Vietnam is fully providing all its citizens—

- (1) freedom of speech;
- (2) freedom of the press;
- (3) freedom of meeting;
- (4) freedom of organization;
- (5) freedom of political activity;
- (6) freedom of belief;
- (7) freedom of movement;
- (8) freedom of residence;
- (9) freedom of work;
- (10) the right to property ownership; and,
- (11) the right to free enterprise

as guaranteed by Article XI of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, this amendment says that if General Thieu is unwilling to extend to his citizens the exact rights guaranteed them under article 11 of the Paris Agreements—which were signed by the United States and by the Saigon government—that we should not give him any funds under this title.

The amendment is based upon provisions of the Indochina Peace Pledge of 1974, a pledge that I have signed along with approximately 30 of my colleagues.

The freedoms and rights guaranteed by the Paris Agreement are one of the key components of the accords, and, in large part, constitute the critical framework of the political settlement envisioned by the signatories.

However, since he signed the Paris agreements—which he did very reluctantly and only after extreme pressures from our Government—General Thieu

has completely ignored the rights guaranteed in article 11. Instead, he has:

Prohibited opposition political parties. If proof is needed, cite—article in Chicago Daily News, April 18, 1974; June 9, 1973, Washington Post article; Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on Vietnam and Thailand—1973.

Outlawed neutralism—Proof, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 20, 1974, page 15548.

Severely censored the press—Proof, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 20, 1974, page 15540.

Prevented refugees from returning to their homes or otherwise choosing their place of residence—Proof, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 20, 1974, pages 15555 and 15561.

Prohibited citizens from traveling between zones controlled by Saigon and those controlled by the Provisional Revolutionary Government—Proof, answer by AID official to Senator BROOKE in Senate Appropriations Committee hearings.

Forbidden business transactions between zones—Proof, statement by Diane Jones of American Friends Service Committee.

Held Buddhist monks in jail for religious refusal to serve in the Saigon army—Proof, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 20, 1974, page 15544.

Reneged on land reform—Proof, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 20, 1974, pages 15552 and 15561; New York Times, January 14, 1974.

In addition to denying the rights guaranteed under the Paris agreement, Thieu has gone so far as to prohibit even the distribution of the Paris agreement to citizens under his rule.

Is this the peace with honor that we worked so hard to get? Should the American taxpayer hand over to the Saigon regime millions of dollars just so Thieu can continue his war and so he can ignore the peace agreements.

This amendment attempts to remedy the situation. It says that if Thieu continues to flaunt the Paris agreement—which he signed and which our Government signed—then he will not receive military assistance. If he complies with the agreement—and that would not be so hard—then he would be eligible for military aid. It is as simple as that.

I yield back the balance of my time.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. ASPIN

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. ASPIN: Page 10, after line 20, insert the following:

Sec. 702. Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, the total amount of money authorized to be appropriated under titles I and II of this Act shall not exceed \$21,909,820,000. Within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate for referral to the Committee on Armed Services of the House and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report setting forth in detail how the Secretary proposes to apportion the reduction required under this section among various procurement and other programs for which

authorizations are provided under such titles I and II. The recommended apportionment shall not take effect for a period of 30 days following the receipt of the report from the Secretary of Defense in order to give Congress an opportunity to revise by law the recommended apportionment.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, the amendment that I am offering here today is not my amendment alone. Others I have talked to had a very similar idea, so I am offering this amendment as part of a broad coalition who are in favor of doing something about defense spending through a ceiling amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I will include the other sponsors of this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, let me explain what this amendment does. It takes last year's level of appropriations and adds 7.4 percent for inflation and makes that the ceiling. The result of doing that is that we would be spending in this budget \$733 million less than the committee recommended. But this is a cut only from the committee request. Actually under this amendment defense spending would increase this year over last year. In fact it would increase by about \$1.5 billion. So with this amount we are offering here we will be spending more than last year but not as much more as the committee would like.

The second aspect of this amendment, Mr. Chairman, is that it is not a meat-ax approach. It does not leave the apportionment of the reduction totally up to the Defense Department. What happens under this amendment is that the Defense Department has 30 days to recommend places to which adjustments in spending should be made to stay within the ceiling.

The Committee on Armed Services and the Congress will have 30 days in which they can accept that or reject it or amend it. They can do what they want. Congress is not abdicating its responsibility under this amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the arguments for this amendment are economics and consistency. If we are going to have a strong economy in this country we have got to do something about controlling Federal spending, and if we are going to be consistent in controlling Federal spending we have to think of ways to control all Federal spending, even defense. This ceiling amendment I believe is the way to do it.

But now this raises the very fundamental question, Mr. Chairman, which is: Can we find \$733 million worth of cuts in the defense budget that the committee is recommending to us today? The committee will tell us no. They say it is a bare bones budget. They say all the fat has been cut out and this is the absolute rock bottom. But I believe the committee could find another \$733 million and I believe it for one simple reason; namely, that the Appropriations Committee does it every year.

Every year we go through the authorization process and come in with an authorization bill, and then we go through the appropriation process and come in with an appropriation bill, and every

year the appropriation bill amount is lower than the authorization amount by a good bit. Last year it was \$1.4 billion less than authorized. Over the last 5 years it has been an average of \$1.6 billion less than was authorized.

We are not asking for a cut of \$1.4 billion. We are not asking for a cut of \$1.6 billion. We are asking for a cut of \$733 million.

If the Committee on Appropriations can find \$1.4 billion or \$1.6 billion, certainly the authorizing committee can find \$733 million.

The point is that nobody ever objects to the cuts made by the Committee on Appropriations. Nobody ever gets up and says that the Committee on Appropriations has cut the bone and the muscle. Nobody says that the gentleman from Texas (Mr. MAHON), has cut the bone and the muscle. Nobody says that the gentleman from Florida (Mr. SIKES) has cut the bone and the muscle—no.

The cuts they find, are all right. So if the Committee on Appropriations can find cuts like that, I think we can find them. Nobody ever offers to add on to the appropriations that come before us, so they can find some fat in it, and I think we can cut out some of the fat by doing it on the floor right now.

What we are talking about is a cut of \$733 million, that in a budget of \$22 billion is only 3.4 percent. In any budget of \$22 billion there is 3.4 percent worth of fat. There has got to be. We know it is there. It has been proven time and time again. The Appropriations Committee finds it.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ASPIN. This is an amendment exactly like the amendment passed by the House last year. The only thing that is different is the numbers. The rate of inflation is higher, and the cut that we made is lower. Last year we made a much greater cut by voting for this amendment than we are if we vote for this amendment today.

I think the principle is important, and even though the cut is small I think the principle is important, that we should hold spending to last year's level, plus the rate of inflation.

I urge adoption of the amendment.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. HUNT. I notice my colleague, the gentleman from Wisconsin, said he wanted to place some other names in the RECORD supporting this.

I have a clipping that came down from the Newark Evening News, indicating that my colleague addressed a meeting in Newark the other evening in the company of Jane Fonda, and Tom Hayden, in which the gentleman in the well was the recipient of an award as an antiwar Congressman. Are they included in that list that the gentleman put in there?

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. ASPIN was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ASPIN. The gentleman from New Jersey knows who the cosponsors of the amendment are.

The cosponsors are the gentleman from California (Mr. JOHN ROUSSELOT) the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. JAMES BROTHILL) the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. TOM RAILSBACH) the gentleman from Vermont (Mr. RICHARD MALLARY) the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. PIERRE DU PONT) the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. JOHN DENT) the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. WILLIAM FRENZEL) the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. LES ASPIN) the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. JOHN DENT) the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. CLEMENT ZABLOCKI) the gentleman from Washington (Mr. MIKE McCORMACK) the gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. FRANK DENHOLM) the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. JAMES SYMINGTON) the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. JOHN BRADEMAS) the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTIS PIKE) and the gentleman from Colorado (Mr. FRANK EVANS).

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I yield.

Mr. HOSMER. No women?

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Aspin-Rousselot amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do not question the sincerity of the gentleman from Wisconsin in attempting to reduce this authorization bill; but he is a member of the committee, as I am. All of these items were brought before us on a line item basis. If it was his desire to cut the total authorization by a certain percentage figure, why did he not offer that percentage cut to each line item?

I think his answer would probably be because, "I want to give the Pentagon, the arm-chair generals in the five-sided building across the river, the option of cutting where they want to cut." That is exactly what the effect of his amendment is.

We are surrendering our legislative prerogative to the Department of Defense by letting them determine the line item cuts that should be made. That is the function of Congress.

I think that this amendment does extreme violence to the committee system. Let us get away from this very unpopular subject called defense, which is unpopular at this moment, and each of you think of our own committee, whatever it may be; the Committee on Public Works, the Committee on Education and Labor, or whatever.

How would the Members like to sit there hour after hour after hour, working very, very hard, going through these items intelligently—on a line item basis; and then have someone come along on the floor of this House and say, "The committee system does not work. We here will set a dollar ceiling of expendi-

ture, and all the work that you did in sorting out these line item matters, thinking about them, deliberating about them, studying them day and night, all of that can go right out the window."

If this amendment passes we do not need an Armed Services Committee. All we need to do is come in here and set a ceiling figure and that would be it. So, what this amendment does is pervert the committee system. I do not think we ought to do that.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. ICHORD. Mr. Chairman, I agree wholeheartedly with the gentleman from California. There may be a number of people who will vote for this amendment in the House, but if we analyze the amendment as directed toward an authorization bill, it is, at the very least, an extremely silly amendment because we have the authorization process in this body. We also have the appropriation process. Many other legislative bodies, as a matter of fact, do not have two processes, but have only the appropriation process.

I think this would be, perhaps, an appropriate amendment if directed toward an appropriation bill, but all the authorization committee does under our procedures is to set the limit which the Appropriations Committee cannot exceed. As directed toward an authorization bill, an amendment of this nature is indeed frivolous.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, I certainly agree with the gentleman from Missouri. The authorization is in no way intended to be the final appropriation, because that is the function of the Appropriations Committee operating within the limits which are set by the authorizing committee.

I would like to ask the Members what they think this does to the conferees when they go to sit down with the Senate to iron out the differences between our bills. Last year, had the conferees not abandoned the Aspin amendment then the minimum figure from which the House could negotiate would be the proportionate amount allowed by the Aspin amendment with each title. So what we are imposing upon our House conferees is an arbitrary limit which was not set in the committee and which was not well thought out and was done, if I may be so brash as to say so, simply because it is now popular to vote against military appropriations.

That kind of reckless action happened in the days of Neville Chamberlain before World War II. For God's sake, let us not be guilty of doing it again. Let us follow the normal legislative process, honor the committee system, go through these things line by line, item by item; cut where we need to cut, but let us not do it with a broadside, or a meat ax.

Mr. SIKES. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the bill is \$486 million below the budget. The committee has

done a careful job. I am tempted to ask the sponsors and the principal proponents of this amendment to cut defense how they will vote on the inevitable amendments which we can anticipate for very large increases in the HEW appropriations when the Health, Education, and Welfare bill is before the House. Will you seek to cut that bill or will you vote to raise it far above budget requirements?

But that is another question. There is now before us an amendment to cut military procurement by \$733 million. It claims to provide for fiscal 1974 levels plus the inflationary increase. The fact is it does not meet the inflationary increase. It does not take care of pay raises and I find nothing in the amendment that would provide for a rollback of wage increases. The amendment simply denies most of the limited modernization which is sought under the bill.

Under this amendment, there are options which would be open. The Secretary of Defense could eliminate the new weapons systems to a very large extent, leaving the field of modernization to the Russians, or the Secretary could cut back on conventional forces which would complete the job of leaving us largely defenseless if there were a sudden attack, or the Secretary could cut deeply into the request for funds to Indochina. This would help to complete the speedy take-over there by the Communists—something they have not been able to do despite an effort which has been going on for a quarter of a century.

Have we forgotten so quickly the lessons learned in the Middle East? Surely, the suddenness and ferocity with which the outbreak of war occurred there has increased the essentiality of adequate defense and firm policies for America.

Have we forgotten the Russians tried to take over in the Middle East when they felt we were too engrossed in our own problems to stand up to them.

Do we not know that the Russians have among their naval shipyards a submarine base with more construction capacity than all of ours combined. They are building full scale aircraft carriers for the first time. They have a new long-range bomber, more fighter aircraft than we and three times as many tanks and armored personnel carriers. They are not playing games.

Do we not realize that the Soviets are embarking on a new multibillion dollar ICBM technology development and deployment program. The SALT talks permitted the Soviets to do this and undoubtedly they have chosen to do so.

I think we have to be certain to realize that America's military might is being overtaken and can soon become inferior. I want this country to be militarily secure. I think it is necessary for our survival.

The amendment which has been offered will turn the tide—against America.

We will cripple the efforts to provide an adequate defense within a budget which already has been severely curtailed. It is too dangerous to risk.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SIKES. I yield to the gentleman from California, who has waited so patiently.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding.

I think it was indicated last year by several Members, including myself, who supported the concept of a reasonable increased procurement budget and an increased authorization, that we needed to apply the same principle of a reasonable and rational increase to this defense area of expenditure. As the gentleman in the well suggested, as in the case of HEW appropriations. I want to assure the gentleman that I support the Appropriations Committee efforts to cut that overinflated budget.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, this committee has been so responsible and realistic today in considering this bill that I cannot really believe we are going to allow ourselves to be distracted now by what is not only an unrealistic amendment, but really an impractical amendment.

There are basically three reasons why this amendment is improper and ought not to be considered.

First of all, I had the opportunity last night, along with a number of other Members, to participate in the first congressional seminar that I have ever gone to, sponsored by the Library of Congress.

I think we had a larger turnout there than they had had before, according to my understanding, because it was addressed to the subject of inflation. I am not sure, when the three experts got through giving their views about inflation, that I really learned a great deal more than I knew when I went in. But one thing did come out clearly from that meeting, and that was the statement that the minimum rate of inflation at the present time is 11.8 percent; and all the experts agreed that probably before the end of the year it will be up around 14, 15, or 16 percent.

Mr. Chairman, this bill offers only a 7-percent increase; and even if the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) had been realistic enough to offer a 12.9-percent increase, the total would have been \$23 billion instead of \$22.6 billion, as our bill provides.

So if we are going to talk realistically, we must understand exactly what the real rate of inflation is.

The second point is that we cannot intelligently write a defense authorization bill simply by taking the figure that we approved last year. Things are different this year. There are three essential differences, compared to the situation that confronted us a year ago.

The first is that for the first time in 6 or 7 years, if this bill is passed intact, we are going to be building more ships than we are putting in mothballs. For year after year after year now the U.S. fleet has been going down while the Soviet fleet has been going up. At the instigation of our committee, we decided

to turn that around this year, and so we put in money to start an increase in the building of American Navy ships.

The second difference is that we have had a war in the Middle East since last June; and from that war we found that some of our own equipment was either not good enough technically or not plentiful enough in terms of quantity.

And so in terms of tanks, antitank weapons, and antiaircraft defenses, we are trying in this bill to incorporate in our own defense establishment the lessons that the Israelis learned at such great expense to them last October.

Third, we have finally begun to realize that we can no longer neglect our military research and development. The Soviets are spending two to three times what we are on R. & D., so we are turning around this year in this bill, in terms of R. & D., and increasing our research and development.

So, in summary, one cannot come in and say that an adequate defense bill can be developed simply by taking the same figure we had last year.

Finally, the third reason why this amendment is not only unrealistic but idiotic is that when we get to conference between the House and Senate on this bill, we are constrained under the rules to deal between the limit set in the Senate bill and the limit set in the House bill on each particular lines item and each particular section.

When we have some broad amendment like this one that says that the Secretary of Defense can make any cuts he wants to, we in the conference committee intelligently conduct our negotiations between the House and the Senate. We were not able to conduct them last year under the Aspin amendment and so that amendment had to be deleted.

Let us not follow that track again. Let us support the budget that the Armed Services Committee has reported out, and if there are to be any cuts, let the Committee on Appropriations make them in the normal course.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, sometimes I get into these debate when perhaps I am out of my field. I hope that is not the case tonight. I have cosponsored this amendment for certain reasons that have, I believe, a significance as to what we have been doing and what we ought to be doing. I do not think any Member in this room has a greater respect and a greater regard for the chairman of this committee, the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. HÉBERT) than I do.

There comes a time when we must stop and think about where we have been and where we intend to go. As many years as I can remember, every time this legislation comes up and every time the foreign aid bill comes up, we suddenly discover a great bugaboo.

I remember—I think it was the first year I was in Congress—there was a foreign aid bill up and we were worried about submarines off the coast of Florida. All throughout this legislative body's lifetime since 1946 when we started this

program and other programs of aid to foreign countries which were occupied we have been led to believe that we had a common enemy.

Speaking from the heart, as a citizen, an ordinary, common, everyday citizen, not a Member of Congress, I find day after day in the discussions that we hear that if we do not do this, then the Soviet Union will do that.

This morning I read in the paper the President approved \$180 million worth of Export-Import Bank loans at 2.5 percent. The American banks have individually, without any guarantees except for OPIC, given to them \$180 million on a \$400 million project to create a chemical plant, which is a war plant in every instance of its operation, and the Soviets are going to put up \$40 million.

Somehow I cannot believe in the morning at 10 o'clock that I can read a paper saying that we have to have a détente and friendly relations with the Soviets and then in the afternoon I find that unless we do something to maintain a certain posture against the very people we are giving money to at low rates that we have to pass a \$29 billion tax limit increase tomorrow, that we are going to do something to help an enemy.

Mr. Chairman, no nation could make as many mistakes as we make accidentally; there has to be a blueprint somewhere hidden in the archives of this country of ours. Someone has to have a blueprint for disaster.

Mr. Chairman, I understand Mr. HÉBERT's job just as he understands mine in the labor movement. He understands in the Committee on Education and Labor I have to come through with minimum wage laws and black lung laws and things of that kind for the little people. They do not always agree with me there and I do not always agree with them.

However, I think the time has come when we must realize it is not 1946 but, rather, it is 1974. This is a day in our history when this Congress is either going to be a failure or else it will rise above the mediocrity, above talking about things that are not and things that were not and things that will not be.

We have no more to fear from the Russians than they have to fear from us. They do not drive themselves into a frenzy such as we do about a cut of such an insignificant sum, which is something that should have been done years ago.

Mr. Chairman, I know where the troops are overseas. I have traveled all over this world. Most of them, as you know, are not military but they are maintenance troops.

They have to have payrolls there to sustain themselves so that they can create products to send back here and destroy our economy. Unless this Congress starts to realize that we are in a situation of life and death of the democracy, then, believe me, most of you who will be here when I am gone will wake up to a realization of this.

This is not much we are asking; it is not significant probably in the period coming on after we go, but it is significant with regard to what we stand for

tonight to say that there must be a limit some day, sometime, and that time is now.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I have joined with many of my colleagues in sponsoring this amendment to H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization bill for fiscal year 1975. The amendment calls for an increase of 7.4 percent over last year's total appropriation for military procurement, and research development, test, and evaluation.

The amendment proposes a ceiling of \$21,909,820,000, and I wish to repeat again, this is an increase of 7.4 percent over the total amount appropriated for these same functions in fiscal year 1974. The amendment we are proposing would provide a more than adequate compensation for inflation to continue these activities at the same levels as in 1974, although some will claim that it needs to be more.

I would like to remind the members of this House that on December 5, 1973, 386 members voted for the Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1973, which provides a responsible procedure for just that—budget control.

This amendment to establish a ceiling of \$21,909,820,000 for military procurement and R.D.T. & E. for this coming fiscal year, is drafted in the spirit of the budget control act, which was passed overwhelmingly by this House. Let no one in this House tell us that our amendment would cut appropriations for this year; it would, in fact, allow for a substantial increase over last year's appropriations bill.

Last week, I joined with a substantial number of my colleagues in cosponsoring a resolution, House Resolution 1105, and participated in a special order on this resolution, urging immediate consideration of a strong budget control bill. This resolution calls not only for immediate action on the part of the conference committee on the budget control legislation, but also asks for "a strong bill which will mandate an overall spending limit as well as provide the necessary committee structure, staff, and resources by which Congress may review and control expenditures," and more important, control inflation. This amendment being offered today totally fulfills the message and mission of that resolution. During the special order last week, many, including myself, indicated our deep concern about the lack on the part of Congress to express a sense of adequate budget control.

Let me repeat, the amendment we are proposing today sets a ceiling on authorizations for military procurement, title I, and research, development, test and evaluation, title II, and is totally consistent with the provisions in the Budget Control and Impoundment Act of 1973 which we adopted last December.

Recently, in a U.S. News & World Report interview, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger was asked why a total defense budget of nearly \$86 billion was necessary at this time. He replied that—

(The American people) will have to expect to spend about 6% more on the Department of Defense each and every year just to retain the same general defense posture as in the previous year.

Mr. Chairman, I infer that the Secretary believes a 6-percent increase over last year's budget is adequate to maintain our same defense capabilities. The bill we are considering today, as reported by the committee, calls for approximately an 11-percent increase over last year's total appropriations, while the amendment we are offering would hold the line at 7.4 percent, which meets the needs of the Defense Department but is not excessive.

Federal deficit spending is the root cause of inflation, and one of the primary reasons is that pressure is put on the Federal Reserve to finance the deficits by increasing the money supply. Figures released by the Federal Reserve Board on May 16 show that the money supply—currency plus demand deposits—has grown at a rate of 6.4 percent over the last year, but the growth over the last 6 months would annualize at a rate of 7.5 percent, and the growth over the last quarter in the money supply would annualize at a dangerously high rate of 10.7 percent.

The argument that this amendment would drastically close down bases across the country and will cut back on personnel is a fallacy. The military and civilian strength figures which are authorized by titles III, IV, and V in this legislation are end strength figures. Almost all the funds to allow for military and civilian defense strength are interpreted into dollars in the defense appropriations bill, and are not a subject of authorization in this legislation. Our amendment applies only to titles I and II, which includes a small amount of authorized funds for personnel, and our amendment would clearly allow the programs authorized in these titles to continue at the same level as in 1974.

In conclusion, there is not a member here in this House that is more concerned than I am that our military strength be maintained. I have spoken many times and argued aggressively for an adequate defense posture, but I sincerely believe that a 7.4-percent increase is more than adequate to allow for the inflation that has occurred since the last approved appropriation, and is a sufficient amount to permit military procurement, and research, development, test, and evaluation to proceed at an appropriate rate. As a matter of fact, most of the time the appropriations committee recommends amounts to be appropriated that are anywhere from 3 to 10 percent below the amount authorized. Last fiscal year, the authorizing bill that was finally enacted for these functions authorized approximately \$21.4 billion, but the appropriation that was enacted was approximately \$20.162 billion—plus \$238 million in transfer add-on. The amount recommended by the House Appropriations Committee was a little over \$20 billion. I have spoken out several times urging that authorization bills be brought

more in line with the money that is actually available to be appropriated.

Our amendment provides that the House and Senate Armed Services Committees will share in the decisionmaking with the Defense Department as to exactly where the decrease of \$733 million shall be effected, and the whole Congress can oversee the decision and by law revise the apportionment.

If the 386 members of the House of Representatives who correctly voted for the Budget Impoundment Control Act of 1973 on December 5 of last year wish to begin the process of responsibly setting ceiling, this is the time and this is the amendment.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I will yield to the gentleman in just one moment.

Mr. Chairman, last week I joined on this floor with several other Members, my colleague, the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BAFALIS) in a reemphasis of our effort to exercise budget control, right here, right now. A great many of the Members participated in that special order, including some of those who are now saying we cannot cut this recommendation of the committee because it is too much; it is irresponsible.

I would like to refer my colleagues to that statement in the U.S. News & World Report as recently as 2 weeks ago. These are the words of the Secretary of Defense. He suggests a 7.5 percent increase. Let us hold him to his word.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Roussetot was allowed to proceed for 1 additional minute.)

Mr. ROUSSELOT. We are not asking to meat ax all of these fine weapons systems we are talking about. This is a substantial increase. If we vote for this amendment, we are voting for a responsible increase in an important area of our defense budget: procurement.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I yield to the gentleman who is always responsible in his approach to budget control.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

That is exactly what I wanted to ask about—responsibility. I know the gentleman says this is a responsible amendment, and that he has based the figures that are in the amendment upon sound factual data.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. Including the Secretary of Defense. Who suggested a 7.5-percent figure?

Mr. GUBSER. Would the gentleman tell me where the 7.4 percent figure came from?

Mr. ROUSSELOT. If the gentleman would like to have yielded to me 5 additional minutes, I would be glad to outline the specifics.

Mr. GUBSER. The gentleman would have to have a crystal ball to talk about it.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. The gentleman should know that in the amendment it-

self it is clearly included, and I should like to read it.

Within a period of 30 calendar days immediately following the day on which such report is submitted to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, the Congress may, by law, revise the apportionment proposed by the Secretary of Defense. So the responsibility comes again to our fine Committees on Armed Services.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

(By unanimous consent, at the request of Mr. GUBSER, Mr. ROUSSELOT was allowed to proceed for 2 additional minutes.)

Mr. ROUSSELOT. I appreciate my colleague obtaining the extra time.

On page 38 of this report—I am now referring to the report of this committee on this bill H.R. 14592—in the section "Inaccurate Cost Reporting":

The Department of Defense cost estimates for our weapon system development programs are too often inaccurate. More frequently than is desirable, the Committee had to ask repeated questions to ascertain actual system costs. The Department escalation factors have not and do not represent the state of the economy.

Typical escalation factors have ranged from one to six percent in times when nearly eight percent was more representative.

I repeat 8 percent. Then the committee shows a chart of the different areas: Research and development, procurement, et cetera. If we applied the figure of 7.4 percent—or if the gentleman would rather take the highest figure of 8 percent, that is up to him—I say 8 percent is more near the value than the 11 percent that has been suggested by this particular bill we have before us in title I and title II. By its own report, this committee has said that 8 percent is the high figure for inflationary costs, in its own report. The reason that I have relied on the gentleman from Wisconsin is he is on the committee.

By the way, there are other members of this committee who believe—and I have discussed this with them—that this is a responsible approach to the whole bill. Again, I want to say this amendment is a logical increase in cost; it is not a decrease.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ROUSSELOT. My colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana, has been terribly anxious to talk, and I certainly do not want to deny him free speech.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment. I know the Members wonder why some of us who are not on the Committee on Armed Services enter the debate at all. We have waited until the end of this debate to do so simply because during the whole year we have wrestled with the problem of being told that the amounts to be spent on every program we consider are to be cut. Earlier this year we voted for a ceiling of \$267.1 billion on the total budget. The amendment that has been suggested by the gentleman from Wisconsin, and just supported by the gentleman from California, simply says that we will control spending by the Department of Defense

by holding it where it was last year, plus a 7.4 percent increase for inflation.

We think this is a responsible amendment, and we will have a very difficult time explaining to our constituents in a year when we are not fighting a war any place in the world, when we have supposedly established détente, when we are now involved with SALT discussions, when we have the Secretary of State settling the war in the Middle East, why is it that we should not take out of the budget ceiling, which we have limited the drastic increase in the budget for the Department of Defense.

I do not blame at all the members of the Armed Services Committee for any of the positions they take. They are advocates for their position. We listen to this every year. They come forward every year. But those of us who must work with the other programs and must take our cuts—and we do—are simply asking that this be applied to this budget also. And if we did not stand up and say something today, then I know all of the others would wonder why we did not care or did not understand.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, as the House of Representatives considers this military procurement authorization legislation for fiscal year 1975, I believe it is incumbent upon us to remember just what age we are living in today. I am concerned that we address the Defense Department problems in the context of the total budget.

The United States is engaged in no major or minor military combat. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is working daily on a peace settlement in the Middle East. The United States is also involved in the strategic arms limitation talks, to achieve a limit on nuclear arms. While these peace efforts are underway, and the United States is endeavoring to enhance détente between the East and West, it does not seem to me to be a time for Department of Defense—with the aid of the Congress—to be increasing the Defense budget, and thus inflation.

The Pentagon, bolstered by the Nixon administration really is requesting a total of almost \$100 billion for defense-related expenditures for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974. The Defense Department has tried to make this seem smaller by dividing that amount into: \$92.9 billion in budget authority, in addition to \$6.2 billion in supplemental funds for the current 1974 fiscal year.

Thus, when looking at the total defense spending figure in conjunction with the rest of the Government's budget, defense amounts to a 30 percent larger slice of the budget pie.

In fact, if you discount the portions of the Federal budget which go for the social security, the highway and the railroad retirement trust funds—funds which the Government cannot spend for anything but those three programs because they come from contributions directly to those funds—the defense budget suddenly shows its true size. That is, 40 percent of the total Federal budget for the military, plus another 19 percent for the costs of past wars—veterans payments and interest on the na-

tional debt—for a grand total of 59 percent.

President Nixon continually reminds us that this is the "generation of peace." Yet he requests more money for defense than has ever been spent before either in a period of war or peace. Worse than this penchant for military spending, however, is a continuing reduction and limitation of spending for domestic problems.

I have always believed that the United States should have a strong national defense. Consequently, I have usually supported the Defense authorization and appropriations bills when they have come before the House of Representatives. However, I do not think it is a necessary part of our Nation's defense to be preparing for such contingencies as two simultaneous conventional wars as well as stopping a guerilla war—the so-called "two and a half" war system.

The most dangerous part of the new 1975 Defense budget is the funding proposal for new "counterforce" weapons and strategies. New counterforce weapons would introduce a major new and very dangerous element into the present strategic position between the United States and the Soviet Union. They would be seen as a threat to the entire Soviet land-based missile deterrent and also provide a strong impetus to the false belief that a nuclear war could be won with a "first strike" capability. This could only add to the arms race. I regret that an amendment was not directed toward eliminating the funding specifically for the new "counterforce weapons and strategies," because these are new programs the United States can live without—literally.

In addition to the arguments of budget priorities and our national defense posture, my overriding concern is that the Nixon administration's huge increase in Defense spending will add fuel to the fire of inflation.

The administration argues that over \$6 billion in the 1975 Defense budget request is provided to create jobs and thus ease unemployment. However, it apparently takes at least \$20,000 to \$30,000 worth of Defense spending to create one job. Why not put the \$6 billion economy-stimulating money into domestic programs that create more jobs for less money—areas such as education, health, housing, agriculture, and public employment.

To bring the Defense budget back into line with the rest of the programs within the Federal Government, I am supporting the amendment offered today by my colleague, Congressman LES ASPIN, which would place a ceiling on overall Defense spending at the 1974 level and grant a 7.4-percent increase for inflation. Passage of this ceiling will result in a reduction of Defense spending by \$733.1 million.

As Congressman ASPIN stated:

Last year's overall budgetary ceiling of \$267.1 billion and the passage last year of the Budget Control Act clearly indicates the House's desire to control rapidly rising federal spending. The budget of the Department of Defense should be treated no differently than that of any other department or

agency; the Pentagon should live within a budgetary ceiling like everyone else.

I voted for a similar spending ceiling amendment last year when the Defense budget came up on the House floor. I hope that this ceiling amendment will be enacted into law.

I have also supported the amendment to reduce the Pentagon's request for \$1.6 billion for military aid to South Vietnam. That request is far above the spending ceiling on Vietnam aid which the Congress enacted into law last year. The House Armed Services Committee cut the Pentagon's request by \$200 million, but that is not enough. We should limit military aid to \$900 million—the same level which has been approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Another major area in which the Defense budget should be changed significantly is U.S. troop strengths. Presently, the United States is spending about \$30 billion a year to maintain its military presence abroad. That amount contributes to a deficit in our balance of payments which we are trying so hard to push into the black.

I have supported the amendment for a major troop cut which would reduce U.S. military spending abroad and which would serve to reduce the burden on the U.S. Treasury for troop strengths which are based on a World War II military posture. I do not support excessive cuts in U.S. troop deployment in countries friendly to the United States that are essential to our security as well as theirs and help maintain stability in Europe and Asia. However, I do believe that the Defense Department must reshape U.S. troop deployment to achieve a smaller, more efficient and more capable armed force, and that a rapid rotating of troops with the consequent reduction in support units and maintenance of dependents should be a first order of business.

There are many other areas in the fiscal year 1975 Defense budget which could be reduced substantially. For an excellent, brief but thorough examination of that budget, I would recommend to all my colleagues the pamphlet recently published entitled "Military Policy and Budget Priorities." The study has been prepared by many defense experts, including: Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense—International Security Affairs; Adrian S. Fisher, former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense—Manpower. They state:

The Nixon Administration has proposed to Congress the largest peacetime military budget in our history. The Administration juggles its figures to seek to give the impression that the proposed increase over last year is only large enough to cover pay and price increases—about \$5 billion. But the truth is that, if all the requests that are really part of the FY 1975 program are counted, the actual increase is about \$13 billion. This proposal comes at a time when the Administration is freezing budgets and impounding funds appropriated by the Congress for vital domestic programs.

It is incumbent upon the Congress to scrutinize the 1975 Defense budget carefully, critically and—most important—

to act independently on the Pentagon's requests. The country can no longer afford a Congress which nitpicks at the budgets for vital domestic programs while it virtually issues a blank check for Defense spending.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, the thought has suddenly struck me about this so-called increased cost because of inflation, I wonder how many Members of this House are so well off individually financially that for the last 7 years there has not been any consideration given to those Members of this House who live on their salaries even though the cost of living index has risen? Do we have some secret source of wealth or secret source of income? Why is it that every department and every employee we have has been given a cost of living increase for their living expenses, but I did not get one. Fortunately I have only my wife and myself and we have learned to live within our income.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRENZEL. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I congratulate the gentleman for his statement. As cosponsor of this amendment I think what the gentleman has said explains my feeling on this subject directly.

Mr. Chairman, I support the Aspin amendment. As indicated in our letter to colleagues, I am a cosponsor of the amendment.

In supporting the general cut in this amendment, I feel obliged to vote against cuts in specific systems unless I am sure the specific system is not needed. The theory of the Aspin amendment is to allow the Department of Defense to determine for itself where it wants to reduce expenses.

It is true that the Defense Department has received a sharply declining share of our annual budget, but it is also true that its share should decline. I am not sure the Aspin amendment itself goes deep enough, but when combined with the O'Neill amendment, the sum is probably as far as we dare go this year.

We want our country to be strong and secure. If we must err, we want to err on the side of safety, rather than risk.

But, we have to hold down our continuing spending if we are ever to slow down galloping inflation. We must make difficult priority decisions in every spending category. We need a vigorous domestic program. Military spending, with due regard to national security, must be reduced.

I believe that the Aspin amendment is modest reduction. Without its adoption, we will either be guilty of misplacing our priorities, or promoting inflation, or both. I urge its adoption.

Mr. NICHOLS. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NICHOLS. I yield to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

I am sorry the gentleman from California (Mr. ROUSSELOT) did not yield to me earlier because I think he is playing a little game of apples and oranges with these statistics. The gentleman said his figure was an increase over last year of 7.4 percent. What he did not say, however, was that his increase is over the defense appropriation bill for last year and not over the defense authorization bill. The authorization for last year was \$21.3 billion and Mr. ROUSSELOT's figure for this year is \$21.9 billion. That is an increase of only 2.4 percent, not 7.4 percent.

The fact of the matter is that we are going through the legislative process. The bill goes from authorization to appropriation. Yet what these people who are offering this amendment are doing is cutting the authorization bill on the basis of figures relevant to the appropriation bill, and I think that fact ought to be made very clear. If this is an honest attempt to try to do what the gentleman says he is doing then the 7.4 percent should have been figured on the \$21.3 billion figure and not on the \$20.1 billion.

Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, again I have waited until the end to avail myself of the opportunity of summarizing the situation.

It is very interesting to note that the majority of the individuals who spoke for this amendment are individuals who have never sat on the Committee on Armed Services. We have sat for 3 months hearing the testimony and hearing the evidence and we have come to the conclusion that we have. We feel that we are in a position to make these decisions.

I am just wondering if these individuals who are not members of the Committee on Armed Services will pay the same tribute to the committees of which they are all members and bring out a similar resolution when their authorization comes to the floor. I think it would be a very excellent policy to show that kind of consistency.

We hear a great deal about the Congress giving up its prerogatives and letting the executive department run the country. The gentleman from Wisconsin has just been on the committee a few years. It was the Committee on Armed Services which established what we call the 412 requirement which outlined by line item every weapon in the armory of the United States. Every line item is reviewed, every weapon is reviewed, we do not leave to the Department of Defense to decide or the Secretary of Defense to decide. We accept the responsibility of the Congress and exercise it.

Here by this particular motion today we are abandoning that. We just throw out the power of the Congress to control its own destiny and to decide exactly what we are going to do. This pro-

posal is something that just eliminates committee control. It puts a ceiling on. It tells the Committee on Appropriations what it can and cannot do. It tells the authorizing committee what it can and cannot do.

The gentleman who is the chief sponsor of this amendment today sat on the committee and had every opportunity in the world to follow those line items, item by item, and opportunities to offer amendments to cut down on them, and did not.

This is a meat-ax approach and we cannot dress it up in any pretty words. This is a meat-ax approach right across the board. I appeal to the House, do not destroy the power of the Congress to control its own destiny and its own future.

Mr. TREEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HÉBERT. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. TREEN. It seems to me there is only one criterion for determining what we should spend on national defense, and that is need. As the gentleman is pointing out, and I have the privilege of serving on the Committee on Armed Services, we went into these questions on the basis of need and the mission that our Armed Forces have to accomplish in the world.

We might quarrel about what that mission should be, but I do not think we should come on this floor and talk in terms of dollar amounts in last year's budget, plus an inflation factor, or approach it on any other basis than that which is needed to accomplish our mission.

At least this Member of the House, who is also a member of the Committee on Armed Services, does not believe we are spending enough for our mission. Our Navy is almost hopelessly behind our potential adversary. Expert testimony before our committee indicates that the Russians are spending twice what we are on research and development. Yet by this amendment we would slash research and development.

So as one member of the committee, I ask that we approach this on the basis of need for our defense forces. That was the basis on which the members of the Armed Forces Committee approached this problem. I urge that we sustain the committee.

Mr. HÉBERT. I think everybody understands and I urge a vote on this point.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin. I take the well on this particular amendment with some reluctance—mindful of the fact that I voted for a similar proposal last year. But I have come to the firm conclusion that it would be neither wise nor in the national interest to do so again and, therefore, feel an obligation to explain the reasoning for my decision.

In the first place, I interpreted the amendment last year as signaling noth-

ing more than a spending standstill: By allowing for a 4.5-percent inflation adjustment to the fiscal year 1973 appropriation total it was to have maintained real fiscal year 1974 procurement and R. & D. spending at the previous year's level. But in supporting that standstill approach, I did not, nor I am sure did many of my colleagues, anticipate the astronomical rates of inflation we have suffered since last summer. Dr. Burns of the Federal Reserve Board refers to it as two-digit inflation; others have warned that recent price increases are putting us in the Latin American League.

As a result, that 4.5-percent inflation factor was not nearly enough to cover the actual price increases during the past year. No matter how you measure it, fiscal year 1974 price increases amount to two or three times the amount allowed. If you measure from the middle of fiscal year 1973 to the middle of fiscal year 1974, the WPI for manufacturing durable goods—the most relevant index for procurement purposes—rose to 9.3 percent. Alternatively, from the end of fiscal year 1973 to the end of fiscal year 1974 the increase will be 14.1 percent if the trends of the last 4 months continue through June. So rather than effecting a standstill, last year's amendment, had it become law, would have resulted in a substantial decrease in real outlays.

The inflation situation is obviously even more uncertain this year. While all of us hope that the rate of inflation will abate substantially, I would certainly be reluctant to premise national security questions of the highest importance on that assumption. I know my colleagues will find this statistic incredible, but the fact is that the WPI for manufactured durable goods increased at 29 percent annual rate between December of 1973 and April of 1974. Obviously those rates will not continue during the entire course of fiscal year 1975; the U.S. economy would go bankrupt if they did.

But let us face the unpleasant fact that the 7.5 percent inflation factor incorporated into the Aspin amendment will be no more adequate this year than 4.5 percent was last year. The worldwide surge of fuel, metals and raw materials prices that hit the economy last year is now working its way through the manufacturing sector and into the price of finished manufactured goods. And it is precisely these price increases that DOD will have to absorb during the coming year.

Therefore, let us be very clear: this is not a standstill amendment; it is an amendment which will have the practical effect of substantially reducing the real purchasing power of the Defense Department in the procurement area.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to these difficulties with the precise content of the amendment, I have also developed significant reservations about the basic premise which it embodies. We have indulged in much rhetoric over the past year about restoring the rightful role of Congress in national decisionmaking and have taken some important steps

toward that end, such as passage of the war powers bill.

But let me remind my colleagues that the annual defense authorization bill is the best, if not the only, opportunity we have to participate in the formation of our basic national security posture and strategic policy. Every one of the major weapons system authorized in this bill is literally laden with basic policy implications. For example, do we wish to preserve the Triad strategic retaliatory posture, or should that be reduced to a Diad of even to a solely sea-based capability? Will the development of limited counterforce and hard-targeting capabilities provide us with constructive strategic nuclear flexibility or will it appear as a provocative move to the other side, and thereby have a destabilizing effect on the arms race?

Now the plain fact of the matter is that you cannot address these basic policy questions by means of an across-the-board cut in the authorization. Indeed, I fear that if we become too comfortable with the Aspin-type amendment there will be an increasing reluctance to deal with the fundamental policy questions implicit in individual weapons systems; that rather than seizing an opportunity to make policy, we will end up abdicating to the executive branch entirely. Last year, for example, all five amendments addressed to specific weapons systems were heavily defeated and the performance today has been the same.

So, I would remind my colleagues that the defense authorization bill is not merely a chance to save money or to strike a blow at an allegedly "swollen" defense budget: It is more properly an important opportunity to participate in shaping the basic premises of our national security posture and the mix of forces and weapons which will be used to implement them. But to utilize that opportunity effectively and successfully requires the employment of discrimination and selectivity, not a meat ax.

Third, Mr. Chairman, I am also disturbed by the implicit assumption in this amendment that the procurement and R. & D. account should bear the full burden of defense cuts. Certainly, the other side does not view matters that way. In the area of ICBM's alone, they have underway a \$30 billion development program which will culminate in the deployment of a whole new generation of launch vehicles during the coming year—the SS-X series. The pace and scope of their efforts have been no less constrained in the area of naval power, to cite another obvious example.

Meanwhile, I would hasten to point out, the share of our own defense budget devoted to procurement, and especially strategic systems, has declined substantially. Prior to the Vietnam buildup in 1964, total procurement and R. & D. spending accounted for about 44 percent of the defense budget. By contrast, last year it was less than 31 percent.

And while we are talking about the inflation factor let me underscore another important point. In 1964, total obligational authority for procurement and R.

& D. amounted to \$22 billion. If you add the new authority in this bill to carryovers available to the Department, fiscal year 1975 total obligational authority will amount to \$18.2 billion in constant 1964 prices. That is a drop of nearly 18 percent in the procurement purchasing power of the Department over the past decade. Yet it has been precisely during this period when Soviet outlays for military hardware, strategic systems and new technology have climbed dramatically.

I would certainly not advocate, of course, reflexively matching the weapons expenditures of our adversaries on a dollar-for-dollar basis. That would be both a prescription for a perpetual arms race and for ultimate bankruptcy of the national treasury. Nevertheless, I cite these figures to underscore the fact that we have not been increasing, but have been steadily decreasing, real procurement expenditures; that procurement and R. & D. are not the source of rising defense spending totals; and that while we have exercised comparative restraint in this area, the other side has doggedly pressed forward. Taken together, these facts raise questions in my own mind as to whether this bill is the place to reduce the defense budget.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I question whether the timing of this amendment would be in the best interest of our national security policy. It would now appear that the second stage of the SALT talks will not be as comprehensive as we had hoped, and that an agreement may not be forthcoming as early as we expected. From the reports currently available, it is clear that over the past year the Soviet's have bargained hard and have put our resolve to a very stringent test in the talks at Vienna.

Meanwhile, away from the bargaining table they have relentlessly pressed forward with their own weapons development programs. Last August, they successfully tested their MIRV and would now appear to be in a position to have it fully operational 2 years earlier than was anticipated last year at this time. According to the Pentagon, they will also begin deploying the new SS-X-19 within the next month or two, with the SS-16 to follow shortly thereafter. In the last year the Soviets have also deployed a new class of strategic submarines capable of bearing heavier SLBM payloads, and are set to deploy the Backfire bomber which, in the view of some, has strategic bombing mission capabilities.

While I think it would be rash to interpret these developments as signs of bad faith regarding the SALT talks, they make it clear that the other side is prepared to push forward with a major escalation of the arms race if those talks fail. For that reason I believe it is imperative that we not detract from our own bargaining position in the critical weeks and month ahead; that we not encourage the other side to think that it can forego the road of negotiation with impunity, or that the U.S. Congress will deliver up to it what our negotiators are unwilling to yield at the bargaining table.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman who preceded me in the well is one of the most articulate speakers in this body, and he has done a superb job.

I would like to address myself to some of the points which have been raised, not only by him, but by some of the other Members.

Mr. Chairman, it was the Secretary of Defense who picked the 7.5 percent inflation rate, and this has been alluded to earlier. It was not the Committee on Armed Services; it was the Secretary of Defense. But the Secretary of Defense said something else, and nobody has mentioned it. The Secretary of Defense has admitted that this Defense budget this year was padded. The Secretary of Defense admitted that the Defense budget this year was padded as a sort of a Defense WPA project.

Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Defense has backed off from his \$6 billion pad that he originally talked about, and now he says it is only a \$2 or \$3 billion pad.

Is anybody trying to cut \$2 or \$3 billion out of it? No, \$733 million is the figure, when the Secretary of Defense has admitted a \$2 or \$3 billion pad in new obligation authority in the Defense budget this year.

Mr. Chairman, we have heard a lot about not surrendering our legislative prerogatives. What is this bill? Is this a creature of the Congress? This is the bill that the Department of Defense has sent over here, that the executive branch sent over here, changed by the grand total of 2.2 percent by the Committee on Armed Services. It is 97.8 percent executive branch and 2.2 percent Congress. If the gentleman's amendment passes, what will it be? It will be 3 percent Congress and only 97 percent executive branch. That is what it will be.

Mr. Chairman, are we really surrendering our legislative prerogatives? I submit, honestly, that we surrender our legislative prerogatives a little bit when we let the Pentagon write speeches for us, but nobody complains an awful lot when the Pentagon writes speeches for us.

If we agree with them, they are fine. If they agree with what I want to say, they will write me a speech. Everybody knows that one can get speeches written over there.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PIKE. I will yield briefly.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, the Pentagon did not write my speech.

Mr. PIKE. I am aware of that, and I do not think the Pentagon ever writes the gentleman's speeches, which is why they are a cut above the average.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman from New York will yield, the Pentagon did not write my speech, nor did the Members of Congress.

Mr. PIKE. Mr. Chairman, I will just say that my speech is on the back of this committee report, so it has not been

written yet. I do not know what I am going to say until I hear it.

I want to bring up one other point. We have talked about the inflation rate here, and now Members are making this big fuss, saying that the inflation rate is not enough. When we were talking about the B-1 bomber, all the Pentagon admitted was a 3.3-percent increase in the inflation rate.

And then they say, "Oh, that's wonderful." They want to sell something. They tell us that it is only going to inflate at the rate of 3.3 percent. But if they do not want us to cut anything, they claim that it is going to inflate at 14 percent or maybe 29 percent—who knows?

Mr. Chairman, the only chance that the Congress is going to have to exercise any legislative prerogative is to do something about the amount of money we spend.

My own constituency says: "Cut Government spending."

They said, "First of all, cut Government spending in foreign aid," and I have voted against the foreign aid program. "And after that," they said, "cut it in Defense," and I am trying to cut it, not irresponsibly, but at the inflation rate put out by the Secretary of Defense, in order to try to put just a little bit of congressional prerogative in a budget which was wholly written by the executive branch.

Mr. BRAY. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know whether the Members are exactly aware of what they are voting on here, so I will take just a very few moments and read what this amendment says:

* * * Within 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act—that is this authorization bill, meaning after the House acts on it, the Senate acts on it, and we have a conference and the President signs it—within 30 days after that, "the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate for referral to the Committee on Armed Services of the House and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report setting forth in detail how the Secretary proposes to apportion the reduction required under this section among various procurement and other programs for which authorizations are provided under such title I and II.

Let us see what the time frame is. That is very important. Thirty days after this becomes law, after we have acted on it and the Senate has acted on it, and after the House and Senate have had a conference and have finally agreed and we have approved the conference reports and the President then signs the bill, at that point it does not go right to the Committee on Appropriations, which is the way we used to do it. No, it does not. It says that then, within 30 days after the enactment of this act they will send to the Speaker of the House and to the President pro tem of the Senate what the Department of Defense wants us to do.

How long that will take them to go through this whole thing again, I do not know. If we have ever seen an abdication

of the right of Congress, to vote for this amendment that would be a perfect example.

Then the amendment says that "the recommended apportionment shall not take effect for a period of 30 days," after all of that has been done, "following the receipt of the report from the Secretary of Defense in order to give Congress an opportunity to revise by law the recommended apportionment."

In that case, if we are able to vote on this appropriation bill by Christmas, we will be doing very well. Imagine such chaos.

Every item within this bill was passed on by the Committee on Armed Services. A great deal requested by the DOD was cut out. In a few instances, items were added, and every member had a right to talk as long as he wanted to. We were months on this bill. Finally a bill did come out.

Mr. Chairman, I am not claiming perfection for the bill, but I am saying it is a better bill than the one the Department of Defense gave to us.

By the time you give 30 days and then give another 30 days and go on and on, imagine the paralysis that will set in if we do not get the bill out until late winter. That is exactly what would happen.

Mr. Chairman, I wish that every Member had taken the time to read carefully the amendment on which we are voting.

Mr. LEGGETT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment.

I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN).

Mr. ASPIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I would like to talk a little bit about some of the statements that the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON) raised, because I think they are very, very important.

The first point is about the rate of inflation and what is the right rate of inflation to use—durable goods, consumer prices, or what. The one index of inflation that is important in this area is the Federal purchases of durable goods. Last year that index rose by 6.8 percent. We have added in a little bit here to give them a hedge; 7.4 percent is based on that rate of inflation which comes from the Department of Commerce.

A second point about the rate of inflation is what the Secretary of Defense said about it in the U.S. News & World Report which came out last Monday. I would like to quote him. When he was asked about the increase in the cost of defense he said:

The first point that should be understood is that every budget for every Government department each year is a record. Unless the American public is willing to tolerate a gradual erosion of our defense capabilities, they will have to expect to spend about 6 percent more on the Defense Department each and every year just to retain the same level of defense posture as in the previous year.

Six percent. And we are giving 7.4 percent. So that is the rate of inflation—7.4 percent.

The gentleman from Illinois said that had the amendment passed last year and had we had only a 4.5-percent rate of inflation, we would have been stuck because inflation was higher. Not so, because the Committee on Appropriations every year cuts this budget by more than that. The authorization bill which passed this floor last year came to \$21.4 billion, including the ceiling. The bill that came out of the Committee on Appropriations was \$20.2 billion. They cut it by more.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I just want to say that my point is simply this. The gentleman refers repeatedly to the statement of the Secretary of Defense of a 6-percent increase in the Defense budget. He is talking about the entire budget, which is made up of 58 percent personnel expenditures.

Mr. ASPIN. Which is higher?

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. And you are talking about hardware.

Mr. ASPIN. Personnel is higher.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. That is where the relevancy of the index of the manufactured durable goods comes in. We are talking about hardware.

Mr. ASPIN. If the gentleman will let me state this to him—

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. You cannot expect the same thing to apply to different indexes.

Mr. ASPIN. Will the gentleman from California yield me just 1 additional minute to respond to the gentleman from Illinois?

Mr. LEGGETT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. ASPIN. The index which is relevant is the Federal purchases of durable goods, which is a 6.8-percent increase. We are giving a 7.4-percent increase. The point is no matter what kind of an increase we give, the Committee on Appropriations is going to cut it by more. You can vote for this cut and do not worry about it. Whatever we do with it here the Committee on Appropriations will cut it and they will cut out the fat. I say they will obviously cut out the fat because nobody objects to the cuts they make. Not one single person gets up on the floor and offers amendments to put things back in. It is not only that it has the support of the Congress, but it has the unanimous support of Congress because not one person objects. Now, if the Appropriations Committee can find those cuts, then the Committee on Armed Services can find those cuts.

Mr. HUNT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ANDERSON).

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I do not know what time frame the gentleman from Wisconsin is using when he gives us the 6.8-percent rise in the index of manufactured durable goods.

But the gentleman cannot stand here in the well or any place else in this Capitol and tell the American people that we have any assurances that the rise in the

index will be confined to 6.8 percent in fiscal year 1975. That is the whole thing I object to, after the experience that we have had with inflation this past year and since we adopted the amendment last year—and I voted for it—I cannot feel any real faith, security, or assurance in using a flat figure of 7.5 percent as an inflation adjustment factor. If the gentleman can tell me that there will be no greater rise in the index for manufactured and durable goods than 6.8 percent by the time the outlays called for in this bill are made, by the end of 1975, I would vote for the gentleman's amendment, but the gentleman cannot give that kind of an assurance.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield so that I can respond to the statement made by the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HUNT. I yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, the point I am trying to make to the gentleman from Illinois is that we are dealing with a 7.4-percent rate of increase, it may be higher, as the gentleman says, than their expectation, over the year it may be higher—the point is that they are predicting it would be a little lower. So my point is that even if it is a little higher, do not worry about it, the Committee on Appropriations is going to cut the bill more than that anyway.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a few remarks on some things not yet brought out; and they deal with the question of responsibility.

Frankly, Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that if we do accept the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), we will be simply destroying congressional control.

I think that the Members can test this out in their own minds by asking themselves: Do you think it would be a responsible thing for the House Committee on Armed Services to have put this amendment in this bill before it brought the bill to this floor?

Would the Members think that would have been a responsible thing to do? Because, if you do think that would be a responsible thing to do, which I do not think you could, but if you do, then you are saying that this committee of the Congress cannot come to a conclusion about the logical things to spend money on, and what the particular defense objectives should be, but that instead we should turn it over to the Pentagon to take care of the mistakes that we may make.

Another thing concerning the responsibility of this amendment, if this should really catch on, I would suspect that every committee of the Congress would be expected to come in when they bring their bills in, be it authorization bill or appropriation bill, and then the very last amendment they would put on the bill would be an amendment like this.

This would merely be to say that the administration would control the spending. It would mean that it would destroy the responsibility that each one of us

took when we swore to be the best Congressmen we could be. We said we would do our very best to be good Congressmen and we took an oath on that. And by saying that promise we promised not to turn our legislative responsibilities over to the Executive.

Mr. Chairman, I am not going to belabor this much more, except to say that I feel that if this policy is a sound policy then it ought to be applied to every committee of the Congress, legislative committees and appropriation committees, and this ought to be done before they bring legislation to the floor of the House.

But I do not think it is the kind of a policy we should adopt, and I believe it is not a responsible or a reasonable thing to do, because if we do it, then we will be turning over to the administration the decisions about these things, decisions that we ought to make ourselves. That is all I have to say.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words, and I rise in opposition to the amendment.

I thank the Chairman. I will not take all of my time. I am sure all of the Members appreciate that.

Mr. Chairman, I do want to point up the fact that our Committee on Research and Development did meet for 30 days, took these items, item-by-item, and we do not just blindly accept what the Department of Defense and Secretary Schlesinger sends over to us. We look at every one of these items, item-by-item.

I refer the Members to the report on page 4 which showed that in the Army the total reduction reduced in the full committee was \$140,279,000. We reduced the Navy and Marine Corps requests by \$137,397,000. On the Air Force request, the full committee reduced it by a total of \$164,300,000. In the defense agencies we reduced it by \$45,200,000, for a total reduction of this committee bill of \$487,176,000.

Mr. Chairman, we, the members of the committee, all know that attempts were made in the subcommittee that after we had taken this thing, item-by-item, where, there are those who always get up there and say, "Let us slice 2 percent off of it, or 3 percent." This was turned down unanimously by the subcommittee. Then when the same amendment was brought up before the full committee and there was only a handful of votes, these people would come in and say, "Let us cut this arbitrarily 4 or 5 percent across the board", after we had taken it in a prudent manner and cut it item-by-item and tried to use the best knowledge that the members of the committee had to do this. Then to come to the floor and just say, "Cut it 2 or 3 or 4 percent," I think is a completely irresponsible way of doing business.

Mr. WAGGONNER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, the principal author of the amendment (Mr. ASPIN) has placed his amendment in the proper perspective on at least two occasions since offering it. He has said this:

I think that there is some fat which can be cut out of this authorization.

Thinking and knowing are different matters.

I point out to you that the Committee on Armed Services has had this under their consideration all this year, and they, in their and my opinion, have cut what fat there was out, which should be cut out. Mr. ASPIN has further said:

I think the Committee on Appropriations will cut it further; that, if it is to be cut further, is the manner which should be used to effect any further reductions.

We cannot relate 1 year to another using an inflation factor. No two economists—I recognize Mr. ASPIN is an economist—agree on economic policy in this country today—relate an inflation factor 1 year as related to another. The reason for that stems from the fact that the Department of Defense uses a 5-year planning cycle, and a program one year might not require the same relative amount of money 2 years in a row.

The thing that is out of perspective here today is that sufficiency of this 7½-percent inflation figure is attributed to the Secretary of Defense. This is the basis, supposedly, of determining what the overall amount of money should be.

My colleague, the gentleman from New York (Mr. PIKE) has attributed this recommendation to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense has not and does not recommend what Mr. PIKE says he recommends. Here is a letter addressed to the chairman of the committee from the Secretary, dated yesterday, May 21. Listen to it. This is the basis for his decision. He has not said that there is fat in this armed services authorization, this procurement authorization. Listen to what he said and what he still says:

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., May 21, 1974.

Hon. F. EDWARD HÉBERT,
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee,
House of Representatives, Washington,
D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Some confusion seems to have arisen regarding the possible impact of domestic economic considerations on the formulation of the FY 75 Defense program. I am writing to amplify the record of my response to Chairman Mahon's question on this point when I appeared before the Appropriations Committee on 28 February 1974.

As you know, our Defense program is based on a five-year planning cycle. The program now before the Congress represents a real reduction from the Five-Year Defense Plan current at the time this budget was submitted. This reduction resulted from the recognition of the realities bearing on formulation of the Federal Budget. Any such budget necessarily balances revenue against competing demands for these revenues, and takes account of the impact that the resulting total budget may have on the national economy. Needless to say, I believe that the entire Defense request resulting from this process is wholly justified on its merits and is essential to the maintenance of our national security.

During the course of the formulation of the FY 75 budget there was a time when it appeared that the Defense outlays might be reduced even further below the Five-Year Defense Plan by perhaps as much as \$1-1½

billion; that would have been a very unwise decision in my judgment. This possibility was considered in the course of studying various alternatives—a normal budgetary procedure for assessing the impact of total Federal spending on the national economy. It was concluded that such a reduction would seriously impair our national defense capability, and subsequent study resulted in the budget that is now before you.

The most serious misunderstanding regarding the formulation of the FY 75 program arises from the association of an \$85 billion outlay figure with the requested TOA of \$91.3 billion. In mentioning a figure of \$85 billion before Chairman Mahon's Committee, I was referring to outlays, not TOA. The illogical association of \$85 billion with the \$91.3 billion has led some observers to the erroneous conclusion that \$6.3 billion was added to the program in order to stimulate the national economy. Such a conclusion is presumably based on ignorance of the simplest budgetary fundamentals according to which a change of \$1 billion in outlays would be associated with changed obligational authority of perhaps \$1.5 billion, and this would apply to the entire defense appropriation, including O&M, military personnel, etc., as well as the procurement bill. Distortion of this issue interferes with serious and constructive consideration of the Defense budget request.

Fiscal policy is regularly and properly adjusted to macroeconomic conditions in accordance with the Murray Act, so as best to maintain employment, output, and income. This is a normal budgetary procedure that takes place in December when the final assessment of outlays and prospective revenues is made. This is not only consistent with law but is responsible fiscal policy. I do hope that there will be no retrogression in the attempt intelligently to formulate fiscal policy simply because such formulation has the effect of enhancing the national security.

It is my considered judgment that this FY 75 Defense budget is certainly no greater than—and may indeed be less than—that which is necessary to maintain our national security establishment at a level required by the current world situation. There are specific categories in which I might have wished to see larger authorizations and appropriations, but, taking into account all the considerations which bear upon our budget formulation, it is in my view an austere, but prudent, budget for the present time and circumstances.

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

Mr. Chairman, the situation is absolutely this. If the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN) knew what ought to be cut out, he would be trying to cut it out item by item. He would have in committee and he would have today, and we would not, even though he says this is not a meat ax approach, be now considering this meat ax approach. If cuts ought to be made, let the gentleman point out where the cuts ought to be made.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN).

The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Chairman, on that I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 185, noes 209, not voting 39, as follows:

[Roll No. 241]

AYES—185

Abzug
Adams
Addabbo
Anderson, Calif.
Andrews, N.C.
Ashley
Aspin
Badillo
Barrett
Bergland
Blester
Bingham
Blatnik
Boland
Bolling
Brademas
Brasco
Brooks
Brotzman
Brown, Calif.
Brown, Mich.
Broyhill, N.C.
Burke, Calif.
Burke, Mass.
Burilson, Mo.
Burton
Carney, Ohio
Chisholm
Clausen, Don H.
Cleveland
Cohen
Conte
Conyers
Corman
Cotter
Coughlin
Cronin
Culver
Daniels
Dominick V.
Danielson
Delaney
Dellenback
Dellums
Denholm
Dennis
Dent
Diggs
Dingell
Donohue
Drinan
Dulski
Edwards, Calif.
Ellberg
Esch
Evans, Colo.
Fascell
Findley
Foley
Fraser
Frenzel

Froehlich
Fulton
Gaydos
Giaimo
Gibbons
Grasso
Green, Pa.
Griffiths
Gross
Gude
Gunter
Hamilton
Hanley
Hanna
Harrington
Hastings
Hawkins
Hechler, W. Va.
Heckler, Mass.
Heinz
Holtzman
Howard
Hungate
Johnson, Calif.
Johnson, Colo.
Jordan
Karth
Kastenmeier
Koch
Kyros
Leggett
Lehman
Litton
Long, Md.
Lujan
Luken
McCloskey
McCormack
McDade
McKay
McKinney
Macdonald
Madden
Mallary
Matsunaga
Mayne
Mazzoli
Melcher
Mezvinsky
Miller
Minish
Mink
Mitchell, Md.
Moakley
Moorhead, Pa.
Mosher
Moss
Nedzi
Obey
O'Hara
O'Neill
Owens
Patten

Pike
Pritchard
Quie
Rangel
Reuss
Riegley
Rinaldo
Robison, N.Y.
Rodino
Roe
Roncalio, Wyo.
Rosenthal
Roush
Rousselot
Roy
Roybal
Ryan
St Germain
Sarasin
Sarbanes
Schneebeli
Selberling
Shipley
Shoup
Shriver
Sisk
Skubitz
Smith, Iowa
Snyder
Stanton
James V.
Stark
Steele
Steelman
Steiger, Wis.
Stokes
Stuckey
Studds
Sullivan
Symington
Thompson, N.J.
Thomson, Wis.
Thone
Tiernan
Towell, Nev.
Traxler
Udall
Ullman
Vander Jagt
Vander Veen
Vanik
Vigorito
Walddie
Whalen
Winn
Wolff
Wydler
Yates
Yatron
Young, Ga.
Zablocki

NOES—209

Abdnor
Alexander
Anderson, Ill.
Andrews, N. Dak.
Archer
Arends
Armstrong
Ashbrook
Bafalis
Baker
Bauman
Beard
Bell
Bennett
Bevill
Biaggi
Blackburn
Boggs
Bowen
Bray
Breaux
Breckinridge
Brinkley
Broomfield
Brown, Ohio
Broyhill, Va.
Buchanan
Burgener
Burke, Fla.
Burleson, Tex.
Butler
Byron

Camp
Carter
Casey, Tex.
Cederberg
Chamberlain
Chappell
Clancy
Cochran
Collins, Tex.
Conable
Conlan
Crane
Daniel, Dan
Daniel, Robert W., Jr.
Davis, Ga.
Davis, S.C.
Davis, Wis.
de la Garza
Derwinski
Devine
Dickinson
Dorn
Downing
Duncan
Edwards, Ala.
Erlenborn
Eshleman
Evins, Tenn.
Fish
Fisher
Flood
Flowers

Flynt
Forsythe
Fountain
Frelinghuysen
Frey
Fuqua
Gettys
Gilman
Ginn
Goldwater
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gray
Green, Oreg.
Grover
Gubser
Guyer
Haley
Hammer- schmidt
Hanrahan
Hansen, Idaho
Harsha
Hays
Hébert
Henderson
Hicks
Hillis
Hogan
Hollifield
Holt
Horton
Hosmer

Huber
Hudnut
Ichord
Jarman
Jones, N.C.
Jones, Tenn.
Kazan
Kemp
Ketchum
King
Kuykendall
Lagomarsino
Landgrebe
Landrum
Lent
Long, La.
Lott
McClory
McCollister
McEwen
McFall
McSpadden
Madigan
Mahon
Mann
Maraziti
Martin, Nebr.
Martin, N.C.
Mathias, Calif.
Mathis, Ga.
Michel
Miford
Mills
Mitchell, N.Y.
Mizell
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead,
Calif.

Pike
Pritchard
Quie
Rangel
Reuss
Riegley
Rinaldo
Robison, N.Y.
Rodino
Roe
Roncalio, Wyo.
Rosenthal
Roush
Rousselot
Roy
Roybal
Ryan
St Germain
Sarasin
Sarbanes
Schneebeli
Selberling
Shipley
Shoup
Shriver
Sisk
Skubitz
Smith, Iowa
Snyder
Stanton
James V.
Stark
Steele
Steelman
Steiger, Wis.
Stokes
Stuckey
Studds
Sullivan
Symington
Thompson, N.J.
Thomson, Wis.
Thone
Tiernan
Towell, Nev.
Traxler
Udall
Ullman
Vander Jagt
Vander Veen
Vanik
Vigorito
Walddie
Whalen
Winn
Wolff
Wydler
Yates
Yatron
Young, Ga.
Zablocki

Murphy, N.Y.
Murtha
Hunt
Natcher
Jones, N.C.
Jones, Tenn.
O'Brien
Kazan
Kemp
Ketchum
King
Kuykendall
Lagomarsino
Landgrebe
Landrum
Lent
Long, La.
Lott
McClory
McCollister
McEwen
McFall
McSpadden
Madigan
Mahon
Mann
Maraziti
Martin, Nebr.
Martin, N.C.
Mathias, Calif.
Mathis, Ga.
Michel
Miford
Mills
Mitchell, N.Y.
Mizell
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead,
Calif.

Spence
Stanton,
J. William
Myers
Nelson
Nichols
O'Brien
Parris
Passman
Patman
Pepper
Perkins
Pettis
Peyser
Poage
Podell
Powell, Ohio
Preyer
Price, Ill.
Price, Tex.
Quillen
Randall
Rarick
Rees
Regula
Roberts
Robinson, Va.
Rogers
Roncalio, N.Y.
Rooney, Pa.
Rose
Ruppe
Ruth
Sandman
Satterfield
Scherie
Shuster
Sikes
Slack

Trean
Talcott
Taylor, Mo.
Taylor, N.C.
Thornton
Treen
Van Deerlin
Veysey
Waish
Wampier
Ware
White
Whitehurst
Whitten
Widnall
Wiggins
Wilson, Bob
Wilson,
Charles H.,
Calif.
Wilson,
Charles, Tex.
Wright
Wyman
Young, Alaska
Young, Fla.
Young, Ill.
Young, S.C.
Young, Tex.
Zion

NOT VOTING—39

Annunzio
Carey, N.Y.
Clark
Clawson, Del
Clay
Collier
Collins, Ill.
du Pont
Eckhardt
Ford
Hansen, Wash.
Hinshaw

Hutchinson
Johnson, Pa.
Jones, Ala.
Jones, Okla.
Kluczynski
Latta
Meeds
Metcalfe
Minshall, Ohio
Morgan
Murphy, Ill.
Nix
Railsback

Reid
Rhodes
Rooney, N.Y.
Rostenkowski
Runnels
Smith, N.Y.
Staggers
Stubblefield
Teague
Williams
Wyatt
Wylie
Zwach

So the amendment was rejected.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows:

TITLE VIII—NUCLEAR NAVY

SEC. 801. It is the policy of the United States of America to modernize the strike forces of the United States Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels and to provide for an adequate industrial base for the research, development, design, construction, operation, and maintenance for such vessels. New construction major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy authorized subsequent to the date this Act becomes law shall be nuclear powered, except as provided hereafter.

SEC. 802. DEFINITION.—For the purposes of this title, the following definition shall apply:

Major combatant vessel(s) for the strike forces of the United States Navy shall mean—

(a) combatant submarines for strategic and/or tactical missions;

(b) combatant vessels intended to operate in combat in aircraft carrier task groups (that is, aircraft carriers and the combatants which accompany them);

(c) those combatant vessels designed for independent combat missions where essentially unlimited high speed endurance will be of significant military value.

SEC. 803. The Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress each calendar year, at the same time the President submits the budget to Congress under section 11 of title 31, United States Code, a written report regarding the application of nuclear propulsion

to major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy as defined in section 802 of this Act. The report shall identify contract placement dates for their construction. Further, the report shall identify the Department of Defense plans for construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels for the succeeding five years and certify whether such plans are adequate to provide a modern striking force for the United States Navy and to maintain the necessary industrial base for design and construction of such vessels.

SEC. 804. Neither the Department of Defense nor the Office of Management and Budget, nor any other executive department or agency, nor any employee thereof shall make any request for authorization or appropriation from Congress for construction of any nonnuclear powered major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the United States Navy unless and until the President of the United States has fully advised the Congress that construction of nuclear powered vessels for such purpose is not in the national interest. Such report of the President to the Congress shall include for consideration by Congress an alternate program of nuclear powered ships with appropriate design, cost, and schedule information.

Mr. HÉBERT (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that title VIII of the bill be considered as read, printed in the RECORD, and open to amendment at any point.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

Mr. HOSMER. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. Chairman, the Defense procurement authorization bill, H.R. 14592, before us today includes a special provision that all future major combatant warships for the strike forces of the Navy must be nuclear powered. I wholeheartedly support this provision.

We are all aware of the current energy crisis and constantly hear about gasoline shortages and heating oil shortages. We must remember that we are facing these issues now in a peaceful world. This problem can only worsen in the future as the individual demand for energy to help us do our daily chores increases and the world population continues to increase. Our energy resources to meet these demands are finite, it takes hundreds of millions of years for nature to make fossil fuels and man but a few centuries to consume them.

Think about what we would face if our Armed Forces were required to fight for our national interests without adequate fuel. It was once said an army travels on its stomach. Not anymore, all our Armed Forces have insatiable demands for fuel. Our newest weapons systems consume much more fuel than ever before. Our ability to fight a modern war is totally dependent on our ability to get fuel supplies delivered to our combat forces where we need them.

For many of our weapons systems there is no choice but to use fossil fuels. But for our warships we can and should use nuclear propulsion. With the technology developed by the Atomic Energy Commission and in use today in the Navy it is possible to build surface warships and submarines that can operate for 10 years or more before there is any

need to refuel. This means we can build into them in peacetime all the fuel they would need to fight an entire war.

Ten years ago, following extensive hearings and a lengthy report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels," I introduced a bill on the floor of this House which would have required that the aircraft carrier *John F. Kennedy* be nuclear powered. But Secretary McNamara was adamant in his opposition, and the *Kennedy* was hamstrung for life with conventional propulsion.

Remembering that experience, it is particularly gratifying to me today to vote for this authorization bill which will require all future major combatant ships for our strike force—all combatant submarines, aircraft carriers, and their escorts—to be nuclear powered.

Year after year the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy review extensive testimony showing clearly the need for nuclear powered warships. Year after year, despite all the evidence, the Department of Defense buries its head in the sand and the advantages of nuclear propulsion are ignored. The commander of the task force in the 1962 Cuban crisis, which included the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* and the conventional carrier *Independence* concluded that his experience in *Enterprise* convinced him that the military advantages of nuclear propulsion in surface warships more than outweigh their extra cost. Adm. Chick Hayward said:

In Washington the often cited advantages of nuclear propulsion seem to get lost in a shuffle of paper. Off Cuba they were real. I think the Cuban crisis made all of us do a lot more thinking about how we will fare in war. On blockade duty our conventional escorts were usually refueled every other day. Protecting that oil supply train under air and submarine attack would have been tough enough right here in our own backyard—in an advanced area the problem will be magnified manyfold. I am certain that the naval commanders facing the problem of large numbers of Soviet nuclear submarines and the missiles and the aircraft of the 1967-87 era will consider that the added cost of nuclear propulsion in combatant ships is a cheap price to help solve the problems facing them.

He said his experience told him that nuclear propulsion offers the Navy tremendous military advantages that will be sorely needed in the years ahead, that to maintain fleets at sea against the hostile forces that are sure to oppose us will require every technical advantage we can possibly master. He said:

I do not believe you can weigh victory or defeat on a scale of dollars and cents—yet the margin between victory and defeat in future naval engagements may well depend on the availability of nuclear-powered ships to the fleet commanders of the future.

Since that time the Soviets have embarked on the largest peacetime naval expansion in history. Their naval forces now vastly outnumber ours. Even in nuclear submarines they now outnumber us by 20 percent and they continue to build three times as many annually as we do. The need for nuclear power in our warships is greater than ever.

The commander of the first task force including nuclear ships to go into combat wrote a detailed report on the advantages of nuclear power and its utilization in a combat environment based on his experience with the nuclear carrier *Enterprise* and the nuclear frigate *Bainbridge* when they first entered combat off Vietnam in 1965. He concluded:

The evolution of the Navy to a progressive program of nuclear power can revolutionize our naval establishment and naval warfare in a more dramatic manner than that realized by the change from sail to steam or from coalburning to oil burning propulsion plants. The future of the U.S. Navy is nuclear power. We must not ignore it.

Incidentally, Adm. James L. Holloway III who has been designated to be our next Chief of Naval Operations was at that time in command of the *Enterprise*. While in command he wrote many letters emphasizing the importance of nuclear propulsion for carrier task forces.

In December 1971 during the India-Pakistan War, a task force, named Task Force 74 consisting of the *Enterprise* and several conventionally powered ships was dispatched to the Indian Ocean. The commanding officer of the *Enterprise* reported:

The absence of nuclear-powered escorts was sorely felt at the very beginning of the operation, as the first evolution that took place after formation of Task Force 74 was the refueling of all *Enterprise* escorts. Whenever it was tactically desirable to operate at high speed, we had to consider our escort's fuel status and then steamed at slower speeds.

The commanding officer went on to state:

Even though Task Force 74 was joined by several units of the Soviet Fleet, some of which remained in close proximity to our forces, the nominal speed of our task force was kept at 15 knots. In spite of the increase in vulnerability, this low speed was accepted because of the logistic constraints on the supply of fuel for the other ships in the task force.

The commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet reported:

The primary lesson re-learned from Task Force 74 operations is the great advantage of nuclear power.

These are not the words of analysts and statisticians isolated in air-conditioned offices. They are the words of the men who must fight with the ships we provide. They are the men who must fight to defend our country. We must not neglect their words.

Mr. Chairman, I urge this body to support to the fullest title VIII Nuclear Navy incorporated in this bill which will make it the policy of the United States that henceforth all new major combatant vessels built for our naval strike forces shall be nuclear powered.

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the requisite number of words.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592. I particularly want to stress my support for title VIII—

Nuclear Navy which will make it "the policy of the United States of America to modernize the strike forces of the U.S. Navy by the construction of nuclear powered major combatant vessels and to provide for an adequate industrial base for the research, development, design, construction, operation, and maintenance for such vessels." This is a policy that has long been advocated by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

As one of the two remaining charter members of the Joint Committee I speak to you as one who has been intimately familiar with all phases of the naval nuclear propulsion program as it has evolved from its inception a quarter century ago.

It seems as yesterday that a then little known naval engineer captain named Hyman George Rickover testified to the Joint Committee about the frustration he faced in getting the Navy bureaucracy to accept the importance of proceeding with construction of the first atomic submarine, the *Nautilus*. The Joint Committee solved that problem. We authorized the funds for the nuclear propulsion plants for the *Nautilus* and later the *Seawolf*, in the Atomic Energy Commission budget. That got the nuclear Navy started, but it has been one continuous fight ever since to keep it going.

The Navy, of course, gave Rickover typical recognition. They gave him a medal for the *Nautilus* stating that it was the outstanding naval development of this century and then passed him over for promotion to rear admiral so they could force him to retire. They have been trying to do that ever since. But Congress had its way and has arranged his last three promotions. A few weeks ago I was delighted to be present in the Oval Office when the President appointed him a full admiral by special act of Congress.

Those of us in Congress who believe in the importance of nuclear propulsion for naval warships have had to fight every inch of the way through the impenetrable thicket of studies cranked out by the Pentagon. The Joint Committee made it a practice to get its information firsthand. We visited the laboratories. We visited the land prototype site where the testing was being done. We held hearings at sea submerged in the *Nautilus* when she was finished. We later held hearings aboard the *Skipjack*, the first of the higher speed, single screw, nuclear submarines. When the *Enterprise* was finished we flew to Guantanamo to participate aboard during her shakedown trials off Cuba in early 1962.

When Secretary McNamara balked at providing nuclear propulsion for the carrier *John F. Kennedy* we held hearings in the fall of 1963 on "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels." We put out in detail the errors in the Defense Department's analysis. The 1963 Joint Committee report specifically recommended "That the United States adopt the policy of utilizing nuclear propulsion in all future major surface warships." We did not succeed in preventing the Defense Department from making the *Kennedy* dependent on a logistic train of tankers, but I am convinced that

our report was instrumental in bringing about the *Nimitz* class nuclear carriers. I well remember handing L. Mendel Rivers a copy of our report. He vowed he would never again vote for a conventional aircraft carrier.

In the early 1960's the Joint Committee and the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees engaged in an extensive dialog with the Department of Defense over the issue of nuclear propulsion for surface warships. For those of you who want to review that, the correspondence is published on pages 245 through 318 of the Joint Committee hearing print titled "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program 1967-68."

The House Armed Services Committee had to resort to mandatory language in the defense authorization bill for several years in order to get a nuclear frigate program established. I remember when the whole fiscal year 1967 Defense Procurement Authorization Act was held up for several months until suitable language on this issue was worked out in conference with the other body.

In the late 1960's the Defense Department planned to stop authorizing any more nuclear submarines. Congress had to step in and demand that we not only build more, but that we proceed with submarines of higher speed and greater quietness.

Three years ago the Department of Defense suddenly terminated plans to build more nuclear frigates and the nuclear CVN 70. They did this after a special subcommittee of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees issued an 800-page hearing record and a report which concluded we should go ahead with the CVN-70.

Senator JACKSON immediately called for hearings of the Military Applications Subcommittee. He and I alternately chaired these hearings and subsequent inquiry. We reviewed the whole subject of nuclear propulsion for naval warships, submarine and surface. In addition to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and Admiral Rickover, we obtained the written comments of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The record of this investigation is included in the Joint Committee print titled "Hearing and Subsequent Inquiry of the Subcommittee on Military Applications on Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Warships, May 5, 1971-September 30, 1972." That print on pages 123-277 includes a "Chronological Summary of the History of Nuclear Propulsion for Surface Ships" by Admiral Rickover which cites in detail all of the studies that have been made of this subject over the past quarter century. Also on pages 278 to 333 are published 26 items of official correspondence concerning nuclear carriers and nuclear frigates.

Mr. Chairman, the need for nuclear propulsion for major combatant warships for our naval strike forces is completely documented. At the end of my statement I will insert in the RECORD a

list of the hearings and reports on the naval nuclear propulsion program that have been published by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. These reports in turn cross reference many of the reports on nuclear propulsion issued by other committees. In compiling these reports the Joint Committee has been meticulous in insisting that the Department of Defense furnish the Joint Committee the official record of correspondence in conformance with its responsibility under the Atomic Energy Act to keep the committee "fully and currently informed with respect to all matters within the Department of Defense relating to the development, utilization, or application of atomic energy." The records are published in full with only information which is classified deleted.

The record spans the tours of 12 Secretaries of Defense; 15 Deputy Secretaries of Defense; 12 Directors of Defense Research and Engineering including the former positions of Chairman, Research and Development Board, and Assistant Secretary for Research and Engineering; 8 Assistants to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy including former Chairmen of the Military Liaison Committee; 14 Secretaries of the Navy; 14 Under Secretaries of the Navy; 10 Chiefs of Naval Operations; 12 Vice Chiefs of Naval Operations; 4 Chiefs of Naval Material since the position was established in 1963; and 10 commanders of the Naval Ship Systems Command including the former position of the Chief of the Bureau of Ships.

On the average each of these 111 key officials who have been in the Department of Defense and Navy chain of approval concerning naval nuclear propulsion issues has held his position about 2 years. In any given year about 4 of these positions have had a new incumbent that year. Since I have been involved in this program over this entire span, I probably have a different perspective of the issues than many of these officials. It is something like the difference in perspective of the rider of a horse on a merry-go-round and the observer watching from the side as the riders go by. From my perspective I consider the case for nuclear propulsion for strike force ships has been proven and needs no further study before a decision is made.

The passage of this bill with title VIII—Nuclear Navy is indeed an historic occasion. My only regret is that men like Carl Durham, L. Mendel Rivers, William Bates, Glenard P. Lipscomb and George Andrews whose efforts over many years helped make this event possible are not on the floor of this House to vote for it.

Mr. Chairman, this is my last opportunity to cast a vote in favor of authorization of a nuclear warship. I am overjoyed that that vote will be cast to insure that all future major combatant vessels for the strike forces of the U.S. Navy will be nuclear powered.

The list of hearings and reports on the naval nuclear propulsion program published by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy follows:

Mar. 28, 1973 and Feb. 8, 1972, hearings: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 1972-73."

May 5, 1971-Sept. 30, 1972, hearing and subsequent inquiry of the Subcommittee on Military Applications: "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Warships."

Mar. 10, 1971, hearing: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1971."

Mar. 19, 20, 1970, hearings: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1970."

April 23, 1969, hearing: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program—1969."

July 25, 1968, hearing: "Nuclear Submarines of Advanced Design," pt. 2.

June 21, 1968, hearing: "Nuclear Submarines of Advanced Design."

Feb. 8, 1968 and Mar. 16, 1967, hearings: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, 1967-68."

Jan. 26, 1966, hearing: "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program."

June 26, 27, July 23, 1963 and July 1, 1964, hearings: "Loss of the U.S.S. *Thresher*."

December 1963, report: "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels."

Oct. 30, 31, and Nov. 13, 1963, hearings: "Nuclear Propulsion for Naval Surface Vessels."

Mar. 31 and Apr. 1, 1962, hearings: "Tour of the U.S.S. *Enterprise* and Report on Joint AEC-Naval Reactor Program."

Apr. 9, 1960, hearing: "Naval Reactor Program and Polaris Missile Systems."

Apr. 11 and 15, 1959, hearings: "Review of Naval Reactor Program and Admiral Rickover Award."

Mar. 7 and Apr. 12, 1957, hearings: "Naval Reactor Program and Shippingport Project."

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Chairman, I regard title VIII, entitled "Nuclear Navy," as of major importance.

The committee's rationale for inserting this language in the bill is fully justified. I have, as a charter member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and as the ranking majority member of the Armed Services Committee, long watched the Navy's resistance to building nuclear warships, submarine and surface, in spite of the many advantages nuclear propulsion gives to a warship.

I well remember when the Joint Committee decided to fund the nuclear propulsion plants for the *Nautilus* and *Seawolf*, our first two nuclear submarines, through the Atomic Energy Commission budget because the Navy could not see the intrinsic value of nuclear propulsion. I remember the Armed Services Committee taking the initiative to change an oil-fired frigate in the fiscal year 1962 program to the nuclear-powered frigate *Truxtun*.

I remember the Department of Defense arguments against starting the *Los Angeles* class high-speed nuclear attack submarine program—fallacious arguments that the Navy could not afford them and that they were not necessary to combat the Soviet nuclear submarine threat. The Soviet submarine threat is greater today than ever before. In spite of this the Navy this year only asked for three new *Los Angeles* class submarines compared to the five a year building rate Congress has been supporting.

It is only through the initiative and foresight of Congress and the leadership of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, and the Joint Com-

mittee on Atomic Energy that we are building the nuclear frigates of the *California* and *Virginia* classes. And I am sure many of you remember the terrible fight we had a decade ago to convince the Department of Defense that aircraft carriers should be nuclear powered.

I have been shocked and chagrined to hear that some in the Navy are now considering going back to building diesel submarines and oil-fired aircraft carriers and guided-missile escort ships for carrier task forces. These are ships planned for our naval strike forces and must be able to operate in the areas of highest threat. Such ships may make cheap commands for peacetime naval officers but they would be of very little value in war against an enemy that has the capability to deny our forces their sources and means of delivering propulsion fuel in strike areas. An oil-fired warship out of fuel is of no value whatsoever.

In December 1973 the report of the special subcommittee on the Middle East chaired by my colleague Mr. STRATTON concluded that one of the lessons of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War was that nuclear propulsion has become a must because of the logistic realities. In addition to the danger of a shortage of oil for ships, the rising cost of oil when available has made scrap paper out of past comparative cost estimates for nuclear and conventional power.

In looking at Defense Department and Navy plans for the future, it seems that the U.S. Navy has not learned that lesson. However, there is evidence that the French have learned this fact of operational and economic life very well indeed. The April 9, 1974, edition of the Paris newspaper *Le Monde* reported on a recent speech by Admiral Marc de Joybert, French Naval Chief of Staff:

The Chief of naval staff expressed the view that "We are ahead of the directives included in the naval plan adopted three years ago," which provided for both nuclear and conventional equipment for the navy up to 1985. Admiral Joybert recalled that it had been decided to build nuclear strike submarines and nuclear helicopter carriers. "Research and supplies connected with the first nuclear strike submarine are proceeding in such a way that the first vessel will in fact be launched on 1 January 1976. The so-called PH-75 nuclear helicopter carrier represents only a first step. It will be followed by many more. From an as yet undetermined date and with a view to as yet undetermined tonnages and power, it will be necessary to convert the surface fleet to nuclear power as rapidly as possible. Nuclear power makes it unnecessary to refuel surface vessels either at sea or in port."

As long as the Navy bases its modernization decisions in the context of the long-lost days of cheap readily available oil the Navy will continue to make the mistake that they are now making—only very slow progress toward a modern nuclear-powered surface Navy. The Congress must correct that mistake.

I wrote the Secretary of Defense on January 5, 1974, expressing my concern and suggested a review of the planned shipbuilding program with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear warships. The reply dated March 11 con-

tained many platitudes of the type we have been getting from the Navy and the Department of Defense on this subject for years, but no commitment to action. I must say I do not consider the reply responsive to my suggestion. I will insert in the record both my letter of January 5 and the reply of March 11.

Mr. Chairman, I support unequivocally the need for the provisions contained in title VIII of this bill which establishes the policy that future new construction major warships for the strike forces—submarines, aircraft carriers, and carrier escorts—be nuclear powered. These are ships that must be able to operate in the areas of highest threat.

These are ships which must have the enhanced military capabilities provided by nuclear propulsion.

Title VIII does not preclude the Navy building oil-fired sea control ships, patrol frigates, surface effect ships, or other such ships, because these ships are not included in the definition of "major combatant vessels for the strike forces" covered by title VIII.

Mr. Chairman, the Armed Services Committee was unanimous in its support for including title VIII in this bill. I urge the Congress to give its full support to this important legislative action.

Under unanimous consent previously granted I include herewith an exchange of correspondence between myself and Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger.

CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES,
Washington, D.C., January 5, 1974.
Hon. JAMES R. SCHLESINGER,
Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR JIM: The increasing severity of our energy problem should, in my view, call for an accelerated effort in the application of nuclear power for the propulsion of naval warships. I fully appreciate your personal efforts in making additions of some nuclear propelled ships to our Navy although I believe recent events call for a sharply increased effort in this vital area of national defense. Accordingly, I suggest that a review of the planned shipbuilding program be made with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear powered warships. We are indeed fortunate that we have the proven technical base to immediately proceed with additional applications of nuclear propulsion. It certainly would be most unfortunate if we didn't take advantage of our position especially since nuclear power provides such positive solutions to our growing and irreversible global petroleum problem.

I want to emphasize that I am not suggesting the initiation of additional studies. From the Committee's detailed involvement in the review of the various studies I can assure you we need no additional effort in this area. Such comprehensive reviews as the Committee's 1963 and 1971-72 hearings and report on nuclear propulsion clearly illustrate the military value and justification of this application of nuclear energy. The growing petroleum problem has just increased the importance of the factors justifying nuclear power especially in the area of foreign access to petroleum supplies. Of course, although secondary to the primary factor of military effectiveness, the increasing costs of petroleum fuels also increase the economic justification of nuclear power.

You can be assured of Congressional support in immediately moving ahead with more

naval nuclear propulsion projects. As you know the Congress, through its various Committees of responsibility in the defense area, has led in bringing about nuclear propulsion for our navy.

Sincerely yours,
MELVIN PRICE, Chairman.

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D.C., March 11, 1974.
Hon. MELVIN PRICE,
Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to your letter of January 5, 1974, in which you suggested that a review of the Navy's planned shipbuilding program be made with the objective of increasing the number of nuclear powered warships.

By mid-1974 our 107 nuclear powered combatants will constitute over one-third of the active warship fleet. These nuclear powered warships include 41 strategic ballistic missile submarines, 61 attack submarines, one aircraft carrier and four fleet air defense guided missile ships—the Navy's first line ships. Additional nuclear powered combatants authorized by Congress are, or soon will be, under construction: the first Trident SSBNs, four 637 Class SSNs, and twenty-three 688 Class SSNs, three nuclear powered aircraft carriers and four guided missile frigates. In addition to the nuclear powered ships in service, under construction, or authorized by Congress, the FY 75 budget request includes funding of two Trident submarines, three high-speed attack submarines, and one guided missile frigate. Delivery of the five nuclear frigates (DLGNs) under construction, together with the cruiser and the two frigates now in the fleet, will give us eight nuclear powered surface combatants which will be adequate to form two all nuclear powered carrier task forces, when none of the ships are in overhaul.

As you know, in FY 72 the Department of Defense continued the DLGN construction program by awarding a contract to the Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydock Company for the construction of DLGN 38 Class Frigates. At that time it was decided to construct three units of this new class while retaining a contract option for two additional units. Recently Congress added to our fiscal year 74 budget request \$79 million for advanced procurement of long-lead items for the two additional nuclear ships, DLGNs 41 and 42. We have included DLGN-41 in the FY 75 budget and are protecting the option for procuring the second in FY 76. When the full scope of our current nuclear ship program is considered, we find that the ship-builders involved have a very large backlog ahead of them.

There are several important factors influencing the selection of nuclear or non-nuclear propulsion systems for a warship. Three of the most significant items are the relative procurement and operating costs, individual ship capability requirements, and overall Navy force level and modernization needs.

To date, the use of nuclear power has been limited to surface ships of 8,000 tons or more. These relatively large ships (frigates and cruisers) with highly capable anti-air and anti-submarine systems, are at the high end of the high-low mix of surface combatant ship types. The high-low mix concepts of balancing overall fleet capability between larger numbers of capable low-cost ships and fewer numbers of highly capable but expensive first-line ships is essential for maintaining our overall combat capabilities.

In spite of the many attractive features of nuclear ships, both their acquisition costs and manning costs tend to be higher than for

conventional ships having the same weapon systems. As you are aware, over the past several years there have been extended discussions of the degree to which indirect costs tend to offset these differences. The major increase in the cost of fuel oil since October 1973 has tended to add some weight to this concept. On the other hand, the introduction of significantly more efficient conventional propulsion systems will result in lower acquisition and operating costs for such ships due to reduced manning requirements and reduced engineering plant size. As an additional consideration, the peace-time flexibility of deployments for nuclear ships is constrained by the apprehensive attitude of many countries towards port visits by nuclear ships. In my view, these apprehensions are largely unfounded, but progress in dispelling this barrier to nuclear ship visits has been slow.

Requirements for overall naval combat effectiveness depend in large part on the expected threat. In some ocean areas where our Navy is planned to operate, the threat is expected to be of relatively low intensity and to consist of principally submarine-launched torpedoes and cruise missiles with only small numbers of ship- and aircraft-launched cruise missiles. Requirements for individual ship effectiveness are less demanding in such areas than would be required in higher threat environments, where additional threats from aircraft would be expected. I am sure that you recognize that, in addition to the need for first-line ships capable of operations in high threat areas, there are many important missions that can be effectively carried out by less complex and less expensive ships.

In this decade, we must phase out virtually all of the remaining World War II surface combatants because their deteriorating material condition and declining combat value is making them increasingly inefficient. If we are to procure the large number of ships needed to maintain even current force levels, the bulk of the new ships must be from the "low" side of the "high-low" spectrum. The numerical requirements alone for surface escorts needed to protect military and commercial shipping in open ocean and lower threat areas of the world lead us to the use of less complex ships under present budgetary constraints.

Your personal efforts and the support of the Congress in attaining our present posture in nuclear propulsion in the Navy are very much appreciated. I solicit your continued support of our shipbuilding program and assure you that nuclear propulsion will be actively considered for all future Navy major surface warship building programs.

Sincerely,

JAMES R. SCHLESINGER.

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Chairman, the emotional rhetoric of this debate is directed at the Russian peril, that is, if we reduce our troop strength around the world, we will be inviting Russian takeover in Europe and in the Far East.

The Russian bait is being made an anachronism by our country's own leadership. Every Member here is invited to a reception in the Senate Wing of the Capitol tomorrow afternoon to meet eight members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., which is being hosted by the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House and the U.S. Group of the Interparliamentary Union.

The morning's paper carried the administration's announcement of a \$180 million Export-Import Bank loan to help finance a \$400 million foreign investment in the Soviet Union. The announcement advised that the 6 percent interest loan

was to supply eight ammonia fertilizer plants—which can be easily converted to gun powder factories, chemical storage facilities, pumping stations, railroad tank cars, and a 1200 mile pipeline in the Soviet Union.

With our leaders playing political footsie with the Soviets and our industrialists and financiers collaborating for a fast buck, it doesn't seem unreasonable to wind down our 29-year role of using our military personnel as mercenary police officers around the world.

I intend to support the O'Neill substitute.

Mr. ARENDS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to rise in support of the fiscal year 1975 defense authorization bill and the cause of an adequate defense budget. This is the first budget in a decade which is not required to support American troops in combat, but I want to emphasize that defense preparedness is even more important as the Soviet Union approaches strategic parity with the United States. We in the Congress have a particular duty to make clear to the American people why we must stay militarily strong while at the same time we are pursuing peace and détente.

Détente is and must be based on a balance of military forces between ourselves and our opponents. We cannot fail to see, however, that while the Soviets espouse détente, they continue a substantial momentum in developing military capabilities. I do not see how we can ignore Soviet capabilities in calculating our own defense needs. We must have sufficient defense forces and programs to maintain the military balance and to provide a basis for conducting arms negotiations. The key areas that are of particular concern to us, as Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has pointed out, are the strategic balance, NATO Europe and naval forces.

A steady defense budget which supports adequate levels of readiness and modernization will be essential for maintaining the strategic, NATO-Warsaw Pact and naval balances. We must also recognize the fact that inflation and pay costs for our military and civilian personnel will continue to contribute substantially to the size of the defense budget. This means that the budget will have to go up in current dollars each year just to permit us to stand still or maintain current capabilities. It is clear to me that the administration's Defense requests this year are reasonable ones which barely keep up with inflation. Therefore, I believe we must support defense spending of around the level proposed as essential to maintain the deterrent forces we need.

Let me now develop some of these points in a little more detail.

Turning to the strategic area, we find that not only is the Soviet Union approaching parity in nuclear capabilities with the United States, they are also pursuing a vigorous and varied development program in strategic weapons. If the Soviets deploy these systems and if we took no offsetting action, the Russians could move from strategic inferiority to strategic superiority. They have tested four new ICBM's in the past year,

and also developed their first multiple warhead submarine-launched missile. Deployment of all three of their heavier, new ICBM's would give them a substantial increase in ICBM throw-weight. If they exploit this throw-weight margin with MIRV's and high accuracy, the Soviets could achieve a major advantage in counterforce capabilities.

I believe it would be folly to let the Soviets gain a significant edge in this or any other area important to the strategic balance. We must maintain essential equivalence, as Secretary Schlesinger phrases it, between Soviet forces and our own.

We hope to achieve this in SALT II, but I also feel that the R. & D. hedges and modernization programs proposed by the administration are necessary, given the uncertainty about what the Soviets are doing, while we are pursuing a favorable SALT outcome. We would prefer to reduce strategic forces through negotiations. But we are also prepared to stay level or increase them if necessary. Soviet actions will determine which course we must follow.

While it is, of course, essential to maintain the strategic balance, we must also recognize that in an era of approximate nuclear parity conventional forces are of progressively greater importance. We are particularly concerned about the need to maintain a balance of conventional forces in NATO Europe and at sea.

Western Europe, today and in the foreseeable future, is where we have our most important foreign interest—an area of the world where Soviet forces are deployed most directly against us. Our hope is that the MBFR talks will enable us to maintain the balance in Europe at lower force levels. But here again we must recognize that maintaining NATO conventional forces that are adequate for deterrence and defense is an essential part of the negotiating process. We must face the fact that a strong U.S. force commitment to Europe will be necessary for years to come, even while our allies are doing more. We should reduce those forces only through negotiation, not through belief in the illusory notion that détente no longer demands defense.

We must expect our allies to continue more to the conventional forces defending free Western Europe, and we must also continue our efforts of the last few years to achieve a more equitable distribution of the defense burden in NATO. But I must emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that our efforts have already been successful. Allied defense budgets have increased by 40 percent since 1970, while our outlays in the current fiscal year are up only about 2 percent over those of fiscal year 1970. The Germans have recently agreed to offset our NATO costs, and our allies are doing likewise. In fact, our allies contribute most of NATO's ready forces in Europe—90 percent of the ground forces, 80 percent of the ships, and 75 percent of the aircraft. So, it is clear that they are doing more.

The naval area is also important because of our dependence on the sea to support our allies and to maintain our economy. We must have adequate naval forces to maintain a balance because,

quite simply, we are a maritime nation dependent on the seas for commerce and for lifelines to our allies. In this area, however, Soviet capabilities and their expanded naval operations around the world have been growing, while our Navy has been getting older and smaller. We have had to substantially reduce the size of our Navy in the last 5 years, from almost 1,000 ships to just over 500, both to eliminate worn-out, older ships and to provide the funds needed for modernization. We have halted the decline and are pursuing the very-much-delayed modernization program. Because of the tremendous budgetary pressure we face, it must be based on the high-low mix concept. This means we will buy only a few high capability-high cost ships such as aircraft carriers, while buying more lower capability-lower cost ships such as the proposed new sea control ship. With this approach we can build a more modern Navy over the next decade—one fully capable of maintaining the balance—and I am confident that the House will support the programs necessary to do so.

The proposed defense budget contains vitally needed funds to support all three of these key balances. I am fully aware that this budget is a substantial one, but by any measure I want to emphasize that it will take less of our national resources than any for more than a decade. The fiscal 1975 budget, in fact, will take less of our GNP than any since 1950. We must, however, face up to the fact that even in an era of peace and détente a large defense budget is still essential. Prices are up substantially. Manpower costs are also much higher than they were a decade ago, primarily because of our national decision to pay our men and women in the volunteer force comparable wages to civilian jobs. The result is that this year's budget, in real terms, is actually less than the one for 1964, the last year before the Vietnam buildup began.

We must accept the fact that in a period of inflation—when we have decided to pay our servicemen a fair wage and while the Soviets are continuing very aggressive increases in their budgets and forces—we must pay the costs if we are to maintain our security. Let me repeat that I support defense spending of about the level proposed by the administration. I believe the American people are willing to spend 6 percent of the Nation's resources to insure the viability and survivability of the remaining 94 percent. Our Nation has always in the past been willing to defend itself and its principles. I do not believe the American people want to do less than that now.

I urge your support for the bill now before you.

Mr. SPENCE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak on behalf of the manning level for our Army.

For fiscal year 1975 the Army has requested a military end strength of 785,000, which represents only 3,000 over the fiscal year 1974 force, the smallest Army this Nation has had in two decades. This manpower level is consistent with the current world situation and the fact that the Army is not now committed in combat. We are all hopeful that these con-

ditions will not change and that the process of détente may continue and contribute toward that goal. Unfortunately, we have no assurance that peaceful conditions will always prevail. In our imperfect world the possibility of an unwanted war remains with us and that threat requires a strong and ready Army. In fiscal year 1975 it will also be a smaller Army.

The primary consideration in determining the number of Army divisions required is the threat posed by the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact divisions. General Abrams has testified that approximately 30 U.S. Army divisions would actually be required to control the initial phases of a conventional global war with the Soviet Union. Most of those divisions would be committed to the critical central European sector of NATO. The remaining Army divisions would enable the United States to protect its vital interests in areas other than central Europe and provide a credible strategic reserve. A 30-division force would assure a high probability of accomplishing our national strategy without using nuclear weapons. That force is not attainable, however, in peacetime.

For many years the Army has stated that 16 active divisions were required to provide the capability to meet the strategy within a prudent level of risk. They would provide sufficient Army forces to give us a reasonable prospect, if deterrence fails, of not having to resort to nuclear weapons in the early weeks of a war with the Soviet Union. The pre-Vietnam army, of course, consisted of 16 active divisions. The current Army force of 13 active divisions falls 3 divisions short of the 16 active division objective. The present force of 13 active and 8 Reserve component divisions is a high-risk force. General Abrams has referred to this force as one that leaves "no room for error." In the past, however, the Army has not felt it possible to achieve the larger force within the budget levels approved by the Congress. The Congress has suggested that greater combat forces could and should be achieved in the Army. This gentlemen, is what is new in the Army in fiscal year 1975.

The Army has begun major management initiatives to reduce headquarters and support to improve its capabilities by placing more soldiers in battalions and divisions. Basic and advanced individual training will be conducted at one rather than two Army posts, and Army headquarters in the United States and abroad are to be reduced and in some cases consolidated. These economies will enable the Army to begin to structure a more austere force in fiscal year 1975 with an objective of achieving 16 active divisions by the end of fiscal year 1978. All of this will be accomplished within the requested Army end strength of 785,000.

Of the 16 active divisions, 13 will be structured with 3 brigades and an average of 10 battalions each. The other three divisions initially will have two brigades and six battalions each. The Army will have sufficient forces to respond to minor contingencies, but will rely on its Reserve components to round out or fill up these divisions in the event of a major conflict. This is known as the

Army Reserve component affiliation program. Not only are the Reserves expected to augment active divisions, but where possible they will also train with the active divisions. This means improved readiness for and increased reliance on the Army Reserve components. Programs of this type have also been recommended by the Congress. Army forces deployed abroad will not be affected by these programs; they will remain unchanged.

These changes to the Army structure do involve some risk. The heavy reliance on Reserve components will require their timely mobilization in the event of a national emergency. Also, there is the risk of reduced support. The new divisions have been added with almost no increase in support capabilities. There may be a greater degree of risk, however, in 13 fully structured, fully manned, fully supported active Army divisions.

In summary, the 785,000 military end strength requested for fiscal year 1975 will provide a lean, austere Army with more teeth and less tail. It will be at least 13½ divisions in fiscal year 1975 with an objective of 16 active divisions by the end of fiscal year 1978, all within an end strength of 785,000. These force improvements and management initiatives are responsive to the recommendations of the Congress. I strongly recommend that the Congress approve the requested end strength of 785,000 for the U.S. Army.

Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Chairman, as the House of Representatives considers this military procurement authorization legislation for fiscal year 1975, I believe it is incumbent upon us to remember just what age we are living in today.

The United States is engaged in no major or minor military combat. The Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, is working daily on a peace settlement in the Middle East. The United States is also involved in the strategic arms limitation talks, to achieve a limit on nuclear arms. While these peace efforts are underway, and the United States is endeavoring to enhance détente between the East and West, it is hardly the time for the Department of Defense—with the aid of the Congress—to be increasing the Defense budget.

The Pentagon, bolstered by the Nixon administration really is requesting almost \$100 billion for defense-related expenditures for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1974. The Defense Department has tried to make this seem smaller by dividing that amount into: \$92.9 billion in budget authority, in addition to \$6.2 billion in supplemental funds for the current 1974 fiscal year.

Thus, when looking at the total defense spending figure in conjunction with the rest of the Government's budget, defense amounts to a 30-percent larger slice of the budget pie.

In fact, if you discount the portions of the Federal budget which go for the social security, the highway and the railroad retirement trust funds—funds which the Government cannot spend for anything but those three programs because they come from contributions—the defense budget suddenly shows its true size. That is, 40 percent of the total Federal budget for the military, plus another

19 percent for the costs of past wars—veterans payments and interest on the national debt—for a grand total of 59 percent.

President Nixon continually reminds us that this is the "generation of peace." Yet he requests more money for defense than has ever been spent before either in a period of war or peace. Worse than this penchant for military spending, however, is a continuing reduction and limitation of spending for domestic problems.

I have always believed that the United States should have a strong national defense. Consequently, I have usually supported the Defense authorization and appropriations bill when they have come before the House of Representatives. However, I do not think it is a necessary part of our Nation's defense to be preparing for such contingencies as two simultaneous conventional wars as well as stopping a guerrilla war—the so-called "two and a half" war system.

The most dangerous part of the new 1975 Defense budget is the funding proposal for new "counterforce" weapons and strategies. New counterforce weapons would introduce a major new and very dangerous element into the present strategic position between the United States and the Soviet Union. They would be seen as a threat to the entire Soviet land-based missile deterrent and also provide a strong impetus to the false belief that a nuclear war could be won with a first strike capability. This could only add to the arms race. I regret that an amendment was not directed toward eliminating the funding specifically for the new counterforce weapons and strategies, because there are new programs the United States can live without—literally.

In addition to the arguments of budget priorities and our national defense posture, my overriding concern is that the Nixon administration's huge increase in defense spending will add fuel to the fire of inflation.

The administration argues that over \$6 billion in the 1975 Defense budget request is provided to create jobs and thus ease unemployment. However, it apparently takes at least \$20,000 to \$30,000 worth of defense spending to create one job. Why not put the \$6 billion economy-stimulating money into domestic programs that create more jobs for less money—areas such as education, health, housing, agriculture and public employment.

To bring the Defense budget back into line with the rest of the programs within the Federal Government, I am supporting the amendment offered today by my colleague Congressman LES ASPIN, which would place a ceiling on overall defense spending at the 1974 level and grant a 7.4 percent increase for inflation. Passage of this ceiling will result in a reduction of defense spending by \$733.1 million.

As Congressman ASPIN has stated:

Last year's overall budgetary ceiling of \$267.1 billion and the passage last year of the Budget Control Act clearly indicates the House's desire to control rapidly rising federal spending. The budget of the Department

of Defense should be treated no differently than that of any other department or agency; the Pentagon should live within a budgetary ceiling like everyone else.

I voted for a similar spending ceiling amendment last year when the defense budget came up on the House floor. I hope that this ceiling amendment will be enacted into law.

I have also supported the amendment to reduce the Pentagon's request for \$1.6 billion for military aid to South Vietnam. That request is far above the spending ceiling on Vietnam aid which the Congress enacted into law last year. The House Armed Services Committee cut the Pentagon's request by \$200 million, but that is not enough. We should limit military aid to \$900 million—the same level which has been approved by the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Another major area in which the Defense budget should be changed significantly is U.S. troop strengths. Presently, the United States is spending about \$30 billion a year to maintain its military presence abroad. That amount contributes to a deficit in our balance of payments which we are trying so hard to push into the black.

I have supported the amendment for a major troop cut which would reduce U.S. military spending abroad and which would serve to reduce the burden on the U.S. Treasury for troop strengths which are based on a World War II military posture. I do not support excessive cuts in U.S. troop deployment in countries friendly to the United States that are essential to our security as well as theirs and help maintain stability in Europe and Asia. However, I do believe that the Defense Department must reshape U.S. troop deployment to achieve a smaller, more efficient and more capable Armed Force, and that a rapid rotating of troops with the consequent reduction in support units and maintenance of dependents should be a first order of business.

There are many other areas in the fiscal year 1975 defense budget which could be reduced substantially. For an excellent, brief but thorough examination of that budget, I would recommend to all my colleagues the pamphlet recently published entitled "Military Policy and Budget Priorities."

The study has been prepared by many defense experts, including: Paul C. Warnke, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs; Adrian S. Fisher, former Deputy Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Alfred B. Fitt, former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Manpower. They state:

The Nixon Administration has proposed to Congress the largest peacetime military budget in our history. The Administration juggles its figures to seek to give the impression that the proposed increase over last year is only large enough to cover pay and price increases—about \$5 billion. But the truth is that, if all the requests that are really part of the FY 1975 program are counted, the actual increase is about \$13 billion. This proposal comes at a time when the Administration is freezing budgets and impounding funds appropriated by the Congress for vital domestic programs.

It is incumbent upon the Congress to scrutinize the 1975 Defense budget carefully, critically and—most important—to act independently on the Pentagon's requests. The country can no longer afford a Congress which nitpicks at the budgets for vital domestic programs while it virtually issues a blank check for Defense spending.

Mr. DAN DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 14592 and want to particularly direct my remarks to title III of the bill—that title relating to active duty personnel.

During general debate yesterday, Mr. Fisher recited the pertinent statistics requested in this bill and I will therefore not duplicate his effort. CLARK FISHER has provided outstanding leadership as chairman of the personnel subcommittee. His guidance and inspiration will certainly be missed.

The all-volunteer concept is still in the experimental stage. In some areas, the services have done a better job than anticipated, while in others, there are many critical questions to be answered. Our problem, as was expected, is in the combat arms area, where we have a shortfall of 12 percent. This program bears careful monitoring, and we have therefore inserted in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD each month the recruiting experience of the services. There are several subjects which I would like to discuss—primarily the cost of personnel connected with the Defense Department. In fiscal year 1975, personnel and personnel-related costs will represent at a minimum 55 percent of the total defense expenditures. I strongly favor comparability of pay for our service personnel. I am disturbed that funds may not be made available for the weapons of peace.

In 1954, defense outlays were almost \$44 billion; in fiscal 1974, \$79 billion, approximately. Over a 20-year period, we had an increase of roughly \$35 billion. Of this \$35 billion increase, Mr. Chairman, it is reported that 93 percent went for pay and operating costs, and only 7 percent for procurement, research and development, and military construction.

For the 10-year period beginning in fiscal 1964, the experience has been even more dramatic. Defense outlays increased \$28 billion. Of this increase, 96 percent was for pay and operating costs, while only 4 percent was for procurement, research and development, and military construction.

I make this observation to indicate that there is no validity to the contention of the antimilitarists that we are building a vast arsenal. We are not building up; we are barely keeping up. And I might add that the increase for fiscal year 1975 barely offsets the inflation factor.

In examining costs, we must be careful to put them in perspective. There is no question that pay levels have increased in the Department of Defense, just as they have in all sectors of the U.S. economy. The genesis of recent DOD pay increases is found in legislation passed in 1967, which established the principal of full comparability between Federal Civil Service salaries and those in the private sector. At the same time, a similar

measure was passed to cover military pay. Provisions were also enacted for periodic upward adjustment of civilian and military retirement annuities—this was in 1967, well before the all-volunteer force was considered.

In 1971, as a part of the \$3 billion so-called project volunteer package, Congress granted a special "catchup" pay increase for junior officers and enlisted personnel. Prior to that time, first-term enlistment personnel had received no increase between 1967 and 1971. As a result, the first-term enlisted member found himself earning less than the Federal minimum wage, and frequently living at the poverty level—and in some cases, actually on welfare. The first-timer was earning about 60 percent of what his nonmilitary friends could earn in the civilian sector. This simply meant that our first-termers, many of them draftees, were bearing far more than their share of the cost of the Nation's defense program. They were being heavily burdened through the maintenance of poverty-level wages. The best that could be said for the situation was that it was disgraceful.

I backed this pay raise in 1971, and I am sure most of the Members who were here at that time did so, as well. But it has and does continue to escalate the cost of our defense structure.

Cost figures do not reflect cost savings brought about by the volunteer force program which are currently estimated to be about \$400 to \$500 million in fiscal year 1975 and \$500 to \$600 million in fiscal year 1976 and beyond. Let me illustrate.

The 2-year draft period virtually guaranteed a high rate of turnover in the Army. High turnover is costly, in terms of recruiting and training. It also reduces readiness. A dramatic example of increased efficiency brought about by the volunteer force can be found in the Army's combat arms—the infantry, armor and artillery jobs that represent a significant portion of the Army's total manpower requirements.

In 1971, with the draft operating, the average amount of time on the job after formal training was 21 months, for those who did not reenlist. Today, 90 percent of those going into the combat arms are serving for 3 years or more, and the average amount of time after training is 33 months. This represents a 57-percent increase over 1971. Obviously, the resulting reduction in turnover in the higher level of experienced and combat units contribute to greater preparedness. Moreover, as the direct result of this increase in productive time, the Army's new manpower requirements for the combat arms in 1976 will be reduced between 15,000 and 20,000, a reduction of about 40 percent. This has saved the taxpayer in excess of \$100 million in annual training costs.

I cite all these figures to indicate the diversity of the subject, and I am pleased to say the action taken by the Armed Services Committee will save approximately \$121 million during fiscal year 1975 on the manpower area alone.

Now, there are those who criticize the numbers that we maintain in our active

forces. Just last week, a group of former defense officials did this very thing. Yet, if we look at the record of those same defense officials who are now urging a reduction in our active forces, we will find that they are the same ones who increased the military forces at a faster rate during their time in office than has been done since the time of the Korean War. It gives pause why their actions and their words are so much at variance.

We are moving on uncharted waters, Mr. Chairman. Our troops are not engaged in combat anywhere in the world. We seek a lessening of tensions in many historic trouble areas. We are embarked on an all-volunteer concept experience which is still in the testing stage. We are living day-to-day in a world troubled politically and economically. It is incumbent on us to be prudent in our actions as we work toward the peace in the world which we all seek.

Mr. RHODES. Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose two of the amendments to H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization bill. One amendment, proposed by the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. ASPIN), would slash \$733 million from the defense budget. The other amendment, proposed by the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. O'NEILL), would weaken our Armed Forces' troop levels abroad.

The fiscal needs of the Department of Defense have been thoroughly studied by the House Armed Services Committee for 3 months. That body has not concluded that the cut proposed by Mr. ASPIN is desirable.

This amendment is unjustified. It would circumvent the appropriations process, and be damaging to our military security.

This authorization bill is not the place to make a straight cut. The Appropriations Committee has had no opportunity to consider this bill and to work its will. A cut of more than \$733 million in this authorization is not supported by economic reality.

The percentage of our natural resources going to defense has gone down steadily as a portion of our gross national product. Today it takes only 6 percent. Thus there is no current justification or crucial need to change defense spending to reduce further its percentage of our national resources.

We cannot slash authorizations and expect to have adequate defenses in today's economic climate. I might call to the attention of my colleagues the succinct testimony of Admiral Rickover, who has reminded us that planes on our aircraft carriers today cost 25 times as much as World War II aircraft. "Should we," he asks, "cut the number of planes on our carriers from 100 to 4 or 5 as a cost-cutting move?"

We must face the truth of today's economic life. Straight dollar costs do not really reflect massive increases in defense spending. Taking inflation into account, military expenditures have been relatively static since 1969.

I urge my colleague to recognize the facts of world relations, the need for a defense second to none, and the realities

of our economy. This amendment should be defeated.

I also want to express strong opposition to the amendment by Mr. O'NEILL. The proposal would be detrimental to our relationships with our allies at a time when we need all the friends we can get around the world.

This proposal would offer us unwholesome choices in allocation of what would remain of our overseas forces.

We could make the cutback in Asia. To do so we would have to withdraw all of our supportive forces from all of Asia. This would leave us with no land presence. It would invite resumption of hostilities in Korea where our being there has helped preserve our hard-won peace. The alternative in Asia, withdrawal of large numbers of personnel from Japan, would be unsettling, putting further stress on our relations which already have been strained by the economic crisis.

If we took all of the 100,000 cut from Europe, we would weaken NATO. We have spent many years, and many taxpayer dollars, to establish a balance of conventional forces in Central Europe. Precipitous withdrawal of our forces would be an unkind cut to our NATO allies, whose own defenses are at stake. Since they are offering to pay more of the costs of having our troops there, this amendment seems pointless.

The proposed cut would be most damaging if it is aimed primarily at Europe, as I believe the sponsor from the other body has implied. There are negotiations under way for mutual balanced force reduction. They are making progress. Unilateral withdrawals by the United States most certainly would be detrimental and could possibly cancel these negotiations.

If the 100,000 reduction were split between Europe and Asia, we would have succeeded in simultaneously weakening our relationships with our friends on both sides of the globe. We would also weaken our own defenses, which depend on our alliances and our readiness.

If we cut back on forces overseas, we are going to have to pay for a giant airlift capacity. Mobility is the name of today's defense game—we cannot afford to take days if action is required in hours.

I feel strongly that neither of these amendments are in the best interests of our defense today. This is still a world of unrest and potential peril. We do not note any cutback in the Soviet Union military spending program, and many reports indicate that they have massive commitments to a land army as well as an accelerated program of weaponry development.

Now is not the time to take a meat ax approach. It is no time to indiscriminately slash funds or forces. I am hopeful that both of these amendments will be voted down.

Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I support the amendment offered by Congressman ASPIN to the military procurement authorization bill, H.R. 14592, which sets a spending ceiling for the Department of Defense. I firmly believe it is long past the time for Congress to introduce fiscal responsibility

into DOD, and I believe this amendment is a responsible approach to the problem.

This amendment will set a spending ceiling of \$21.9 billion for the Defense Department in fiscal year 1975. This is a 7.4-percent increase over last year's DOD appropriations of \$20.1 billion, and a reduction of \$733.1 million in the authorization recommended for this year by the House Armed Services Committee.

There are three basic reasons why I feel favorable consideration should be given this amendment.

First, in an interview appearing in U.S. News & World Report, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated that the Defense Department needs a 6-percent increase in last year's appropriation to keep up with inflation. This amendment permits a 7.4-percent increase for inflation, 1.4 percent more than is needed to retain the same general defense posture as last year.

Second, the Congress has repeatedly reduced the Defense Department budget request. The House Armed Services Committee has already reduced the original request by \$487.2 million, and it can be anticipated that the Appropriations Committee will reduce it further. By mandating a specific spending ceiling, the Defense Department will be required to request only those funds which are essential to their operations, procurement, research and development. This will necessarily reduce wasteful spending and require a more thorough study on the part of DOD as to what programs are worthy of being continued and which should be phased out.

Third, U.S. financial resources are finite. We cannot continue to spend dollars we do not have available to spend. My colleagues would agree with me, I am sure, that doing so is unsound business practice. A byproduct of continued increases in defense spending is the reduction of spending in other areas in which the Federal Government is involved. Do we increase defense spending at the expense of the many worthwhile social programs designed to aid our citizens in obtaining a better standard of living? Or do we strike a balance between the two, by providing a sound defense structure to protect our citizens so they may continue striving for a better standard of living?

Mr. Chairman, the Congress must regain its control of the Federal purse strings and it must establish Federal spending priorities. I believe this amendment is both reasonable and responsible, and I urge its adoption.

Mr. ROBISON of New York. Mr. Chairman, although we have had a series of votes on a variety of amendments to the pending bill, I would wish to address these remarks to only one—but certainly a major one—of those amendments. In doing so, I would note that for the second year in a row, I was not able to vote for the Esch troop-reduction amendment, and I want my colleagues to understand why this was so. Last year, and again this year, my colleague and friend from Michigan (Mr. Esch), did the hard work necessary to propose a troop-cut amendment and to solicit support for that proposal from colleagues on both

sides of the aisle. It was the intelligence and conscientiousness of MARVIN ESCH which convinced me last year that a cut in the military manpower ceiling was a necessary response to changing world conditions and domestic priorities; and so I did support the O'Neill-Esch amendment this year because the gentleman from Michigan argued so convincingly that we should—and responsibly can—move to a leaner, tougher military force.

My colleague from Michigan (Mr. Esch) was the prime force behind the Esch-Carter troop reduction amendment to last year's military procurement authorization, and he was likewise pivotal in this year's move to reduce overseas troop strength by 100,000 men. However, the parliamentary situation on both these occasions did not permit the man who so forcefully worked on behalf of these amendments to take the lead in presenting them to us during floor debate, but it should be recognized that our present discussion largely grows out of the considerable effort of the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Chairman, we in Congress must exert our constitutional responsibility to raise and support armies in a manner which insures the strongest possible national defense, while properly addressing domestic needs which are equally as important to the health and vitality of the country. Congress is not fulfilling that responsibility if it continues to sanction a full-strength division in South Korea. That nation has a population one-tenth the size of the United States, yet it supports a military force which is almost one-third as large as the total U.S. active-duty strength. While the United States deploys its troops throughout the world, virtually the entire Korean force is committed to the defense of its homeland—a considerable defense, I might add, since the Korean army possesses a 2-to-1 advantage in manpower over the North Korean army.

The same serious scrutiny must be directed at our 36,000-man force in Thailand, a country with a sufficient military force to send a division of its troops to Vietnam during military hostilities there, while maintaining its defense commitments at home.

Gen. Creighton Abrams, Army Chief of Staff, is now in the process of "beating fat into muscle." Like the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Esch) who did so much on behalf of this amendment, the general wants a leaner, tougher fighting force. That is all that some of us in Congress are asking. General Abrams feels that he can mold the present logistical fat in the Army into three more fighting divisions. We shall consider in future years whether it is in the best interests for the Nation to support an additional three divisions; but the message for us today is clear.

If there is enough fat within the 785,000 manpower ceiling to beat out three more divisions, it would have taken only a little, healthy exercise to reduce overseas troop strength by 100,000 men.

I strongly suggest that we should have done so, Mr. Chairman, so that we can render this useless military fat into domestic manpower programs, and educa-

tion programs, and programs for the aged—all of which can contribute right now to the personal security of our citizens.

I do not know, of course, that my position in support of this amendment was the right—and responsible—position to take. Since the amendment failed to carry, one supposes that any such doubts are, therefore, academic. Nevertheless, I should think that the votes cast in favor of the O'Neill-Esch initiative do constitute a signal not only to the administration, for it to get on with the mutual troop reduction negotiations with the Soviets, but to the Soviets as well, that the American people will welcome—and honor—a reduction of forces on both sides as soon as such an agreement can be worked out by our respective governments.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the amendment to hold the military procurement authorization for fiscal year 1975 to the current year's level, plus a 7.4 percent increase to compensate for inflation.

While this does not represent a new departure on my part, since I supported a similar bipartisan initiative last year, I think it well to indicate my reasoning.

Many Members, doubtless including some supporters of this amendment, have supported or will support other amendments to reduce specific categorical items in H.R. 14592. I do not question their reasons. I merely do not share them.

I happen to think that this country faces a prolonged period of international tension in which a strong defense establishment—a capability in being backed up by political support in the Congress and the country—is absolutely essential.

I also recognize, however, that this country faces grave economic problems which continue to argue for restraint in other areas. Thus I feel that our military establishment must be made to live within the same sort of constraints over the long pull.

The discipline induced by this approach hopefully will stimulate a greater sense of economy on the part of the military. My experience in 12 years in this body as well as two tours of military service have convinced me that there is indeed an unconscionable amount of waste throughout our military services which can be trimmed without detracting from their real capability to perform their missions.

Therefore, I am joining again in this effort to set a reasonable ceiling, while declining to join in efforts to cut individual programs for weapons systems, support for South Vietnam, or troop strength abroad.

The \$21.9 billion ceiling is reasonable, as is the provision of the amendment requiring the Secretary of Defense to strengthen congressional oversight over priorities. It is only by action of this sort, combined with final passage of legislation equipping the Congress to exercise overall budget control, that we can truly get a handle on inflation and restore the stability to the economy on which our domestic prosperity and ability to sustain a sufficient degree of military effort must depend.

Mr. BAUMAN. Mr. Chairman, I have certainly not been alone among the Members of this House in contending that the preoccupation of the Congress and of the public at large with Watergate has obscured from view subjects which are at their roots much more important to the Nation over the long haul. The legislation before us today represents one such area, and I welcome the opportunity to lend my support to H.R. 14592 as the bare minimum we can afford to endorse in order to maintain the Nation's security in an age when that security is under dire threat.

I find it both curious and disconcerting that so little national attention has been given to the fact that the United States is fast becoming a second-rate power. The extraordinary and extravagant efforts on the part of the Soviet Union in the past few years to catch up with the United States militarily, and now to outstrip us entirely in many areas, have gone on largely undeterred by the SALT accords. Meanwhile, we have apparently become content to allow the Soviets to surpass us in several strategic categories, issuing nothing more than a mild protest when they deploy a new and much more powerful generation of ICBM's.

The decline in American military might vis-a-vis the Soviet Union has been accompanied by a dangerous evolution in the goals we have set for ourselves. For a long while following World War II, American military superiority was the acknowledged goal, and this superiority enabled us to hold a "big stick" in reserve while we spoke softly, but firmly, in world affairs. With the advent of the McNamara era at the Defense Department, the idea that military equality, or parity, with the Soviets was enough to deter major conflicts somehow gained credence, and by 1970 this idea had become policy. But in order to achieve some sort of agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, we apparently needed a new rationale, which is best termed military sufficiency. Thus, today our policymakers no longer deem it necessary for us to maintain simple equality with the Soviets, as long as we have some strange, vague, overall equality which is deemed sufficient to provide the needed deterrent to war.

The practical result of all of this has been to relegate the United States to either real or potential inferiority to the Soviets in the total number of ICBM's, number of nuclear submarines, missile throw-weight, overall naval strength, and number of warheads aimed in our direction. The threat which this situation poses to our national security should be obvious to all, as should the need for reestablishing American military strength.

As I noted earlier, this authorization bill provides the bare minimum in this category. It will allow us to produce and deploy additional Minuteman III missiles, with their improved yield, accuracy, and response characteristics. It will allow continued progress in the Trident nuclear submarine program, with the first deployment in 1979, and additional production at the rate of two per year. This program is vital if we are to improve the quality of our naval strategic forces.

It will allow the procurement of tracked combat vehicles to replace and update the supply which was depleted during our assistance to Israel during the fighting in the Mideast last fall. It continues the development of the B-1 bomber, which I believe to be essential. Whatever the shortcomings of the B-1, it is important that it be fully developed now. We cannot continue to rely on the B-52, an aircraft which was designed 20 years ago, and hope to possess an effective strategic long-range bomber force. We do not have the luxury of time which would be necessary to develop a new strategic bomber from scratch.

The bill before us continues vital research into ballistic missile defense systems, though at a lower level than I believe to be prudent. For the present we are forced to rely on the theory known as "mutual assured destruction"—MAD—for our security. If we can wipe them out, and they can wipe us out, the theory goes, why build antiballistic missile defenses? But basing our continued existence on the slender thread of mutual assured destruction seems to me to be truly "MAD," since it relies on the theory that all parties involved will be rational enough to avoid a risk of incredible destruction by declining to fire the first shot. But rationality cannot always be relied upon, as a man named Hitler proved with bloody finality only a few decades ago. I, for one, will feel better about our security once we have developed an effective ABM system.

Mr. Chairman, the cries which have been heard in this Chamber today for an arbitrary cut in expenditures in defense procurement are cause for alarm.

Some of the calls for cutting defense spending have come from those whom I particularly respect, and this saddens me. Arbitrary cuts, without careful attention to the effect this would have on a program-by-program basis, could be disastrous to our overall defense posture. I believe that our margin of credible defense is so narrow today that we can ill afford any cuts in what is already a minimum program to maintain an adequate defense of the United States.

I strongly recommend to the Members that they refrain from the natural inclination to cut funds from this bill at a time when it is admittedly important to trim the Federal budget. I, too, am dismayed at the rate at which our budget has grown, and have spoken out on the subject many times in recent months. If the Soviets were moving at less than breakneck speed to outstrip the United States militarily, I might feel more disposed to support cuts in this area. But they are devoting an unimaginable amount of their resources to developing a military force superior to ours, and the consequences should they succeed would be catastrophic. We cannot afford for a moment to let up our development and procurement of weapons systems as long as this threat exists. Arbitrarily, across-the-board cuts in this measure could seriously weaken our military strength in the years to come, and I must oppose any such efforts.

I am proud to note that much of the Army's research, development, testing and evaluation of new weaponry is done

in my district, at Aberdeen Proving Ground. This installation, in Harford County, Md., is one of the largest and most important such facilities in the Nation, and is an essential part of the effort to provide our Armed Forces with the most modern, reliable, and effective equipment available anywhere in the world. The men and women at APG perform a vital and ongoing service, and they help insure the value of the action we will take here today.

Performing a similar function for the Navy is the Patuxent Naval Air Test Center, in St. Mary's County, Md. This facility is also within my district, and the servicemen assigned there perform the same function in R.D.T. & E. for the Navy as their counterparts at APG perform the Army.

The money allotted in this authorization bill under title II will support the efforts at Aberdeen and Patuxent, and I heartily endorse it.

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, once again, as in so many years passed, we have reached the point where we are about to approve, virtually intact, almost every request for military weapons and manpower sent to us by the Pentagon. While I must concede that there are some good features to this bill, such as the decision to retain certain National Guard units, there are too many glaring deficiencies remaining, in my view, to enable me to support this measure.

I am compelled to ask why, for the first time in our history, we are presented with an increased military budget following the end of a war? Where is the evidence in this bill that we are attempting to reduce the arms race? Where are the results of the détente we have heard so much about? Where is our reduced military involvement in South Vietnam? Why must we tighten our belts in the areas of education, health and housing, but not in military weapons?

Mr. Chairman, it is long past the time when we should begin to treat the military budget in the same manner we treat the budget for our domestic needs. I, for one, am tired of seeing the House, year after year, sanction wasteful spending, perpetuate repressive governments through military weapons, and, in effect, starve domestic programs because of the fat in our defense budget.

Several excellent amendments were offered this afternoon which would have corrected many of these deficiencies. The action on these amendments, however, leaves the bill basically unimproved. Consequently, despite the few good features of this bill, I cannot support it in its present form and will vote against final passage.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I will support and vote for the defense procurement bill, but only reluctantly. I had hoped that amendments cutting back the B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, and making personnel cuts of our overseas Armed Forces, and across-the-board cuts would have passed the House. They did not, but I would hope that the Senate will see fit to make these cuts. The defense program must go on and that is why I will vote for the bill even though I opposed some of the provisions. I am

pleased that the funds for Vietnam have been reduced but regret it was not cut further to \$900 million. This Nation spends far too much money on unnecessary defense forces and far too little money on various social programs. We have seen education, veterans, and other programs suffer for lack of money; in New York City a number of remedial programs have had to be curtailed because not enough money has been made available. Yet it seems Congress will vote millions of dollars for unnecessary exotic weapons systems that will most likely be out-dated by the time the procurement is made.

I will make every effort in the appropriation bill for the Defense Department to make further needed cuts.

Mr. BURKE of Florida. Mr. Chairman, it might be interesting during our deliberations on H.R. 14592, if we pause and remember that one of our principal responsibilities is to see to the security of our Nation. All the arguments of those who would like to reduce our military to a point of less than that of the superiority of any of the potential enemies of our country apparently misread the motives of one of the leading military powers in the world, namely, the Soviet Union, for world domination.

What has the Soviet Union done to prove that it is sufficiently dedicated to world peace, that would lead us to think we should let our guard down; militarily or otherwise? The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks certainly can hardly be termed a success in eliminating future use of nuclear weapons. We know that the Soviet Union is building its military—its navy—its air force, its ground forces, and support units at a rapid pace. We also know that many of our naval vessels are reaching the point of obsolescence. In fact we have taken almost 40% out of service for the very reason since 1968. We have reduced our Air Force also because of obsolescence and must rebuild just to keep pace.

Mr. Chairman, a recent study of Soviet nuclear arms strategy published just this week lends strong credence to the fact that the U.S.S.R. maintains a strong and permanent nuclear strike capability in Cuba that could wipe out as much as two-thirds of the United States in the event of a nuclear confrontation. Thus, while some of our colleagues and others in our country talk about détente as if it was a love affair with the Soviet Union, let me state that to presume this is a mistake. Love of course is blind—but then the strategy of the U.S.S.R. for world domination still remains the same.

The strike capability of the Soviets is in the form of ships docked or anchored in Cuban waters. Whether they have land-based nuclear weapons is still uncertain, but even without it the report, which was only issued this week, makes it apparent that Soviet ships, with nuclear warheads are cruising in the waters off Cuba and in the Atlantic and Caribbean. These ships cruise with a range of strike capabilities of from 1,200 to 15,000 miles—capable of striking areas as diversified as New York, Chicago, or Arizona. They are maneuverable because of

a system of relief vessels at Cienfuegos, Cuba, and elsewhere on the islands.

I can see nothing that has indicated to me that we should feel safe in today's world of uncertainty if we should reduce our military strength. If the U.S.S.R. would seriously indicate by some action its willingness to do so, then we could sit down and perhaps think of this possibility. To be sure, we have indicated that we no longer intend to be the world's policeman, and I agree we should not. However, let me state that it is my opinion that I think it would be foolish for our country to weaken our military potential during these times of uncertainty.

Mr. Chairman, to presume that the Soviet Union has changed its goals, or to fail to see that it has continually been building up its military potential at a pace faster than ours, is perhaps a beautiful dream, but this can well turn out to be a nightmare unless we wake up before it might be too late. For this reason, Mr. Speaker, I support the passage of H.R. 14592 for appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for the procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, and other weapons, and for the other purposes set out in the bill. If there is any nation that is playing the numbers game in military buildup it is the U.S.S.R. When will our need for a strong military to preserve our own security end? Hopefully someday, but the day has not, in my opinion, yet arrived.

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Chairman, the questions raised by recent defense budget requests go beyond the matter of national security.

Certainly, no loyal American wants to jeopardize the Nation's safety. But the most loyal Americans are beginning to wonder just how many billions of dollars it takes to assure security—or to satisfy the Pentagon. When even former Defense Department officials maintain that \$11 billion can be cut with no harmful effects, it is high time to examine the requests more closely.

That \$11 billion could be used for alleviating a lot of problems at home. It could be used, for example, to fund some of the programs whose money was impounded, supposedly for the sake of economy and budget balancing.

The cities in my own district, like cities around the country, are in desperate need of Federal assistance. Mayor Stanley M. Makowski of Buffalo, N.Y., posed the question of reordering priorities in a recent letter to me.

At this point, I am inserting his letter, and I urge a thoughtful consideration of its contents:

CITY OF BUFFALO,
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR,
May 10, 1974.

HON. THADDEUS J. DULSKI,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I want to join with the other mayors in the nation and strongly support resolutions of the United States Conference of Mayors which, since 1967, has called for a reordering of national priorities. The priorities set by the Nixon Administration in its fiscal year 1975 budget are still grossly misplaced from the perspective of urban areas.

Funding for important federal grant programs remains inadequate. The transition from the old to the New Federalism still falls

to relieve the bite of inflation and fails to fill the budgetary gaps created by the elimination or curtailment of categorical programs.

The most alarming feature of the FY 75 budget is that despite the fact that U.S. military involvement in Vietnam has ended, the President advocates an unprecedented increase in military spending—\$13.7 billion or 16.4 percent higher than FY 74. Allowing for inflation, the increase in real dollars (or net expansion of military forces) is 9.3 percent.

Astonishing from a city point of view is the admission by the Secretary of Defense that \$6.3 billion was added to stimulate the economy and create jobs. Thus, it is obvious that the President prefers military projects over public employment and releasing impounded funds or beefing up urban programs as the way to beat the present recession. From our past experience with unemployment problems, we know that spending through local government is more effective, because it creates more jobs quicker and can be targeted to critical areas of need in terms of services and unemployment.

President Nixon's budget is the first in history to increase military spending after a war. By 1947, the military budget was less than 10 percent of its World War II high; after the Korea conflict military spending fell to 45 percent of its 1952 peak.

This continuing problem of misplaced priorities has prompted leaders of national labor, business education and civic groups to form the Project on Budget Priorities. The Conference of Mayors is a part of this effort. We want to urge the Congress to make appropriations that more properly address the needs of the cities. If fiscal responsibility is to be maintained, cuts should be made in the military budget to free adequate resources for vital domestic needs.

Such cuts are feasible. The Conference of Mayors is advised by a group of former high level officials of the Defense Department who maintain that at least \$15 billion in waste and inefficiency can be pared from the military budget while maintaining a high level of defense preparedness.

I would appreciate your help in this endeavor to legislate reductions in military spending. This year mayors are undertaking a concerted effort to pass two major amendments on the military authorization bill which will go to the House floor in early May and then to the Senate soon thereafter. The first will be a dollar ceiling on research and procurement at the level appropriated last year plus inflation. The second will call for deactivation of about 125,000 of the 180,000 troops still stationed in Asia.

It is my sincere hope that you will find it possible to support this reordering of American priorities which I have outlined. As you may know, today the City of Buffalo confronts a critical financial crisis. If national priorities are reordered, Buffalo may receive additional aid from the Federal government which is so desperately needed.

Best personal wishes.
Sincerely yours,

STANLEY M. MAKOWSKI.

Mr. VANIK. Mr. Chairman, in our considerations of defense spending bills, I am often struck with a feeling of going through a futile exercise. Last year, the year before it, and the years before that, we were called on to cast our votes for what amounted to a ratification of committee and Department of Defense requests. This year was no different. We were asked to vote for a bill that was essentially an unchanged Department of Defense statement, modified in only the most minor aspects by the House Armed Services Committee.

It is unfortunate that the Congress does not have opportunity to more fully work its will on defense bills—bills that together consume almost a third of the total Federal budget. Although there are usually a small number of floor amendments offered, they are often either too large and comprehensive, or too small and specific.

Consequently, Members must simply take or leave what the Armed Services Committee has accepted as writ from the Department of Defense. The dependence of the committee on the Department was demonstrated by its committee report on H.R. 14592, parts of which were lifted verbatim from a Department of Defense witness that had appeared before the committee, and then presented to the Congress as official committee viewpoint.

We are too seldom offered alternatives to Department of Defense-armed services programs and legislation—we must either vote for the bills—and be labeled pro-arms race, or against it, risking the label of antimilitary or "weak on defense." There is no middle ground.

Although I do not advocate line-item votes by the Congress on defense spending bills, I do think that some categorical consideration between line-item and overall authorization votes would benefit our country. It could allow us to pare the fat from budgetary budgets, which is undeniably there, while at the same time retain the strength and foundation that we know it must have.

The present method of congressional ratification leaves no room for the Member who has every wish to vote to provide a strong national defense, but also wants defense spending to be considered as part of a whole budget picture.

In the future interest of providing Members with alternative positions to the DOD mandate, I would like to include in the RECORD portions of the May issue of the Defense Monitor, published and researched by the Center for Defense Information in Washington.

Although I do not necessarily subscribe to the views presented in the Monitor, I think that Members can benefit from the alternatives that are presented. They show that there can be more than only a yea or nay position—but existing in between are options that save huge amounts of money that can be used for other important domestic considerations while still maintaining U.S. defense superiority.

Mr. Chairman, the Center for Defense Information is an independent clearinghouse of defense information. It has helped many Members make some sense out of the complicated obfuscation that the Department of Defense presents as argument and defense of their programs. It is headed by a 31-year veteran of the Navy, Adm. Gene R. LaRocque.

The portions of the Defense Monitor follow:

STRATEGIC FORCES

Offensive weaponry at the strategic level includes intercontinental ballistic missiles, bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. For each of these forces there are expensive follow-on programs underway. Research is underway to develop three new weapons for the strategic arsenal—air and

submarine launched cruise missiles and a mobile ICBM. In addition, about \$286 million of counterforce programs, designed to increase the hard target kill effectiveness of nuclear warheads, have been requested. These programs have been requested even though the fact is that the U.S. now has 7,940 strategic nuclear warheads to the Soviet Union's 2,600.

Defensive strategic weaponry includes research funding requests for the site defense of ICBM's and advanced ballistic missile defense programs. In spite of the ABM treaty, the Pentagon has requested funds for research on weapon systems that are clearly barred by the agreement.

Analyses of the weapon systems proposed by the Pentagon indicate there are options which will not adversely affect U.S. defense posture.

LAND-BASED ICBM'S

Three hundred million dollars has been requested in the 1975 budget for the last new Minuteman III missiles to replace older Minuteman missiles. The funds would provide for the acquisition of 61 missiles, 40 of which are programmed for operational tests. Also, the Pentagon has requested \$136 million to increase the performance characteristics of Minuteman:

[In millions]

Increase warhead yield for Minuteman	
II	\$25
Increase Minuteman accuracy	32
Increase MIRV from 3 to "X" reentry vehicles per missile	19
Develop missile performance measurement system	33
Advanced ICBM technology	37
Total	146

In addition, \$349 million has been requested for site hardening such as silo hardening, etc.

Option 1—Maintain current yield and accuracy of Minuteman III by not increasing performance characteristics and cease MIRVing Minuteman. This will avoid the appearance of changes in targeting doctrine to that of first strike. Cessation of the MIRV program could serve as an inducement for Soviet cooperation during SALT II. Savings—\$436 million.

Option 2—Maintain current yield and accuracy of Minuteman III by not increasing performance characteristics but continue MIRVing. Justification: Same as Above. Savings—\$146 million.

COUNTERFORCE PROGRAMS

Funds have been requested for several other measures to enhance the counterforce capability of the United States. These proposed measures are parts of the Trident the Poseidon and the Advanced Ballistic Missile Re-entry System (ABRES) programs.

[In millions]

Terminal guidance MaRV (maneuverable reentry vehicle) (ABRES)	\$20
Advanced ballistic reentry vehicle (ABRES)	5
Evasion MaRV for Minuteman (ABRES)	25
Submarine-launched ballistic missile accuracy (Poseidon)	33
Evasion MaRV (Trident)	57
Total	140

Option 1—Maintain present performance characteristics of Poseidon, Minuteman and Trident missiles. This will reduce the likelihood that sea-based and land-based missiles are being modified to give them first strike capability. Savings—\$140 million.

Option 2—Pursue the Trident and Poseidon warhead programs but eliminate the ABRES programs. Sea-based weapons systems are less likely to have the capability and

appearance of first strike forces. Savings—\$50 million.

CRUISE MISSILE

A total of \$125 million is requested for a joint Air Force-Navy cruise missile program. The purpose is to develop an air and sea-launched, air breathing, jet propelled, low flying missile that would attack strategic targets in the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

Option 1—Stop all research and development on the cruise missile. This would preclude the addition of a "primitive" weapon to the strategic arsenal of the United States. Savings—\$125 million.

Option 2—Eliminate research and development on a sea-launched cruise missile. The Navy terminated its Regulus cruise missile program in the late 1950's. Continue an Air Force cruise missile which could make the proposed B-1 bomber unnecessary. Savings—\$45 million.

B-1 BOMBER

The B-1 would be a supersonic, manned bomber proposed as a follow-on to the B-52 with the purpose of carrying out a nuclear attack against the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. The entire FY 1975 request is for a \$499 million continuation of research, development, test and evaluation.

Option 1—Cancel the present research and development program and start limited research on a new manned bomber for the 1980's. The B-1 bomber is of questionable design and adds only a slender increment to the deterrent Triad highly disproportional to its cost. Also the cutback would afford a fresh start (\$50 million) on a follow-on aircraft to the still useful B-52 bomber, assuming that a follow-on is necessary. Savings—\$449 million.

Option 2—Slow down research and development on the B-1 by not beginning work on air vehicle #4. The Air Force has or is constructing three air vehicles which it is using for test purposes. Testing would be restricted to those aircraft. Savings—\$44 million.

TRIDENT

The FY 1975 request for Trident is \$2,034 million. Of that figure, \$1,167 million is for procurement of Trident submarines and \$649 million is for research and development of the Trident I (C-4) missile. The C-4 is being designed for retrofitting into Poseidon submarines as well as the Trident.

Option 1—Continue research on the Trident I (C-4) missile and the Trident submarine. Cease expending funds for the procurement of the nine remaining boats. Production of the first boat would continue as would the research programs. This would accomplish two things. First, the preparation of the Trident C-4 missile for the Poseidon submarine would go on. Secondly, the construction of new Trident submarines will be slowed to allow the consideration of a less-costly ballistic missile submarine (Narwhal) which the Navy has proposed. Savings—\$1,167 million.

Option 2—Continue research and development on the Trident I (C-4) missile and the Trident submarine. Procure submarines at the rate of one per year instead of two per year. The Navy has not made a convincing case for an accelerated program of two subs per year. Savings—\$600 million.

SITE DEFENSE AND ADVANCED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY

The Pentagon has requested \$251 million research and development funds for the site defense program and the advanced ballistic missile defense technology program. Both of these programs are proposed to provide an ABM system for defense of Minuteman missiles.

Option 1—Maintain the present capabilities of the ABM system. In the debate on the ABM treaty it was argued that it was impos-

sible to build an ABM to counter ICBM's, sea-based missiles and bombers. Only failure of the ABM treaty, which could be precipitated by accelerated research on site defense and advanced ballistic missile defense technology, would afford the opportunity for these improvements to be used. Savings—\$251 million.

Option 2—Halt research (\$160 million) on site defense and continue advanced ballistic missile defense technology at the requested level. The U.S. could keep its qualitative edge on the Soviet Union in advanced BMD designs and configurations. Savings—\$160 million.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

As Secretary of Defense Schlesinger has stated, "more than 70 percent of our Defense expenditures is attributable to the general purpose forces and activities related to them." This category can be divided into four parts—manpower levels (troop and civilian), land forces, naval forces and tactical air forces.

The U.S. has more military and civilian manpower than is required for defense of the U.S. and to carry out essential foreign policy commitments. Programs in tactical weaponry can be eliminated or slowed on a selective basis. The following proposed funding options are meant to be indicative and not all-inclusive.

SSN-688

The purpose of the SSN-688 class of submarines is to defend aircraft carriers and other ships and attack Soviet submarines. The request for FY 1975 is \$548 million.

Option 1—Build one submarine instead of three requested for in FY 1975. Twenty-three boats have already been funded. The Navy is preparing a design for a smaller and less costly attack submarine. Without adversely affecting U.S. defense posture, the SSN-688 program can be slowed to allow for the design of a more cost-effective submarine. Savings—\$400 million.

Option 2—Build two submarines with Fiscal Year 1975 funds. Result: similar to above. Savings—\$200 million.

SEA CONTROL SHIP

The purpose of the proposed Sea Control Ship is to control the sea lanes by providing sea-based aircraft for the protection of Navy replenishment groups, amphibious attack groups and merchant convoys. The present request for construction of the ship is \$143 million.

Option 1—Defer production of the Sea Control Ship until tests of the purpose by the U.S.S. Guam (LPH) are complete and satisfactory. It is logical to defer production until the proposed ship's purpose is demonstrated as feasible. Savings—\$143 million.

Option 2—Halt production of the Sea Control Ship. Modify six of seven LPH's for the sea control mission (the Guam plus five others). The amphibious role intended for the LPH's can be filled by the new, planned class of five assault ships, the LHA's. These changes can be made without the need for another shipbuilding program (Sea Control Ship.) Savings—\$143 million, minus modification costs.

AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEM (AWACS)

Originally being developed for the role of providing air defense in the U.S. against a Soviet bomber attack, AWACS now would operate in a conventional war environment in Europe. The funding request for FY 1975 is \$770 million—\$220 million for research and development and \$550 million for procurement.

Option 1—Cancel entire program. The fundamental change in purpose is so great that the program should be stopped. Savings—\$770 million.

Option 2—Maintain the current level of

research of AWACS. This would defer production of the aircraft until research results indicate that AWACS is capable of performing its newly defined purpose and that the cost is warranted. Savings—\$550 million.

SAM-D

The SAM-D had the initial purpose of defending against Soviet bombers if they attacked the United States. Now it is to serve as an anti-aircraft missile system for the defense of the U.S. Army in Europe. One hundred and eleven million dollars in research and development funds are requested.

Option 1—Slow the SAM-D program and emphasize research, rather than development. This would allow for redesigning the missile to fulfill its significant change in purpose. Savings—\$56 million.

Option 2—Share the expense of SAM-D research with the NATO allies of the U.S. The \$56 million funding for a new start on SAM-D could be split between the U.S. and NATO allies. Savings—\$28 million.

UTILITY TACTICAL TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT SYSTEM (UTTAS)

The UTTAS would be an Army transport helicopter designed to move troops to the front lines. The FY 1975 request is for research and development funding of \$54 million.

Option 1—Cease research on a new class of helicopters. The UH-1, which UTTAS would replace, proved its value during the Vietnam war. The Army has not made a persuasive case to show that the UH-1 is not capable of performing its mission. Savings \$54 million.

Option 2—Slow research and development. This would provide increased time to develop a better, more cost-effective follow-on to the UH-1. Savings—\$27 million.

MANPOWER (OVERSEAS)

The current Department of Defense troop level stationed outside the United States totals 523,000.

Option 1—Reduce troop levels by 88,000 from mainland Asia and Taiwan and decrease those in Europe by 32,000. This modest reduction of 21 per cent troops overseas will not have a significant impact on U.S. defense posture abroad. Savings \$1,550 million.

Option 2—Reduce troop levels on mainland Asia and Taiwan by 40,000. Reduce troops stationed in Europe by 10,000. The Pentagon is currently studying a 10,000 troop reduction in Europe. The other cuts would not materially affect U.S. defense posture. Savings \$739 million.

MANPOWER (TOTAL)

The anticipated Department of Defense Manpower levels as of June 30, 1975, will be 2,152,000 active duty personnel and 1,027,000 civilians.

Option 1—Reduce troop levels to 2,000,000 officers and men and civilians to 1,000,000. This 6 per cent reduction in ceiling levels is in consonance with a post-Vietnam posture and will not adversely affect national defense posture. Savings \$2,278 million.

Option 2—Reduce troop levels to 2,100,000 and civilians to 1,000,000. This 3 per cent reduction will not adversely affect national defense posture. Savings—\$1,028 million.

DIEGO GARCIA

The Department of Defense has requested \$3.3 million in the FY 1975 budget for expansion of naval and air facilities at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the Pentagon has requested \$29.0 million in FY 1974 supplemental bill which will be considered by Congress along with the regular 1975 authorization requests.

Option 1—Phasing out the communication facility completely would result in a substantial savings. Major bases already exist in the Philippines and Thailand which can support naval forces in the Pacific and Indian Ocean. The Defense Satellite Communica-

tions Program provides a world-wide communications system for the armed forces which should supplement land communications facilities so the new bases do not need to be developed in remote areas such as Diego Garcia. U.S. communications facilities on west coast of Australia could fulfill the communications function. Savings—\$36 million.

Option 2—Provide for operation and maintenance and military personnel costs for the existing communications base with no expansion of facilities nor increase in manpower. This would be in compliance with the original agreement with Congress to maintain only an austere communications station in the Indian Ocean. Savings—\$33 million.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

The FY 1975 budget requests funds of \$1,913 billion for Southeast Asia. Included in this total is \$1,450 million for support of South Vietnamese forces and \$463 million for U.S. forces based in Thailand. This would represent a sharp increase in support of South Vietnam forces from FY 1974 to FY 1975.

Option 1—Cease aid to Southeast Asia. The U.S. has fulfilled its obligation and continued assistance tends to extend the war. Savings—\$1,913 million.

Option 2—Phase down military support to Southeast Asia sharply. If the United States continues to finance Southeast Asian military forces at increasingly higher levels, step by step, the U.S. will continue to increase the dependence of Southeast Asian governments upon the United States. The U.S. will find increasing involvement harder to avoid. Savings—\$900 million.

[In millions]

	Saving's option 1	Saving's option 2
Strategic forces:		
Land-based ICBM	\$436	\$136
Counterforce programs	120	50
Cruise missile	125	45
B-1 bomber	449	44
Trident submarine	1,167	600
Site defense and advanced ballistic missile defense technology	251	160
General purpose forces:		
SSN-688 (attack submarine)	400	200
Sea control ship	143	143
Airborne warning and control system (AWACS)	770	550
SAM-D (surface-to-air missile)	56	28
UTTAS (helicopter)	54	27
Manpower (overseas)	1,550	739
Manpower (total)	2,278	1,028
South East Asia	1,913	900
Diego Garcia	36	33
Total savings	9,748	4,683

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, in support of the amendment which would pull back our troops from around the world, I wish to stress two points. My colleagues have already pointed out that the deployment of some half-million troops, with the supplies and support this entails, is an enormous waste of money and provides no real security for the United States. I would further stress that in many instances, these troops actually constitute a threat to our security. In addition, they help to maintain dictatorships and prevent the emergence of any democratic form of government.

In my opinion the greatest threat consists of the troops we maintain in Thailand. We have three major and three smaller air bases there; 50 B-52 bombers, 19 fuel tankers, and 230 combat aircraft.

We also have the U.S. support activities group, a special forces battalion, the U.S. military assistance command, and 2,300 military internal security personnel. A total of 39,000 troops who provide logistics support to Laos and Cambodia. Though token reductions have started, the proposed force left in Thailand would be 27,000 troops. The primary purpose of these remaining troops is the resumption of bombing in South Vietnam if a new offensive occurs—although the Congress has specifically prohibited such bombing without prior congressional approval.

During recent hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian Affairs, many witnesses confirmed that these troops were simply shifted from Vietnam to Thailand after the Paris peace agreements made their presence in Vietnam illegal.

The people of the United States and their Representatives have repeatedly stated that they want no reinvolvement in Asian wars. Both Chambers have emphatically refused to increase aid to the Government of South Vietnam. Yet if that Government faces a threat, our troops are waiting in Thailand to swoop in again to save it. Under the misguided War Powers Act, at least 60 days of such involvement could go on without congressional approval.

Do we really want to go through the agony of Vietnam again? If we do not, we had better pull those troops out of Thailand tomorrow.

Meanwhile, in almost every part of Southeast Asia there are neutralists, neither government nor Communist groups, that would like to attempt an Asian version of democracy. Yet these are not the people our troops are sent to help. Rather, they are poised to protect a small, wealthy, elite ruling class. This hands the Communists a propaganda advantage, and discourages those who advocate the self-determination we preach about.

We are committed by the Paris peace agreements to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Vietnam. I submit that the presence next door of 39,000 American troops, or even 27,000 American troops, in addition to millions of dollars in military assistance, influences Vietnamese politics more than any other factor.

If we really intend to abide by the Paris agreements we will insist that the Pentagon pull out all American troops from Thailand.

Mr. DRINAN. Mr. Chairman, when first elected to serve in Congress 4 years ago, I pledged to work for an end to American military involvement in Southeast Asia and for rechanneling funds used to conduct the Vietnamese war into vital domestic areas. My constituents and I looked forward to a "Vietnam peace dividend" to reinvigorate Federal programs in housing, transportation, education, and health care which had been shunted aside due to the high cost of making war upon the Vietnamese.

I regret to say that we have been sorely disappointed. While American military spending in Southeast Asia declined by

\$20.3 billion between 1969 and 1974, the rest of the Defense Department budget rose by a shocking \$24 billion. And now, though Congress calls for fiscal austerity and the President speaks encouragingly of détente, the Defense Department has asked for \$99.1 billion for fiscal 1975, an increase of \$18.9 billion over the amount appropriated to date for fiscal 1974. Although the Defense Department has tried to understate its proposed budget by submitting a supplemental request along with its basic budget, the proposed military appropriation is the largest in our Nation's history.

Other departments have been asked to pare their budgets down in order to help counteract inflation. Why is the Department of Defense any different? Has the danger posed to the United States by China or the Soviet Union grown during the past year to the extent of justifying such a drastic increase in military spending? On the contrary, tensions have eased between the United States and the other super powers. Even Secretary Schlesinger has admitted that the military budget request was padded to help stimulate the American economy. Residents of our major cities plagued by high unemployment, substandard housing, inadequate mass transportation, poor health services, outmoded educational facilities, and increasing taxes might have difficulty understanding why the Federal Government has less money for them and more for the military.

Mr. Chairman, the bill before us today would authorize \$22.64 billion for weapons procurement and development, a 12.2-percent increase over the amount authorized for fiscal 1974. Substantial cuts can be made in three general areas without diminishing our defensive strength.

A. WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Several weapons systems included in the bill should be cut back or phased out. Estimates on completing the B-1 bomber program have risen to nearly \$14 billion. This program, already plagued by cost overruns and unexplained delays, will add little or nothing to our present B-52-based bomber strength. We should act now to kill the B-1 project in the development stage before any more of the taxpayers' money is wasted.

I agree with the proposal of my distinguished colleague (Mr. LEGGETT) to reduce the construction of Trident submarines to one per year. This change would save nearly half a billion dollars next year while permitting further testing to insure maximum reliability and cost-efficiency.

B. MILITARY MANPOWER

A second major target of responsible reduction is the area of military manpower. The bill before us sets a ceiling of 2,149,313 active military forces in the United States and overseas. This represents virtually no change from current manpower levels. Pay costs alone in the proposed Defense Department budget are estimated at \$47.5 billion for fiscal 1975, about one-half of the entire budget.

Many of the 435,000 land-based military forces in foreign countries could be recalled with no harm to national secu-

rity and great savings to the American taxpayer. Most of the 222,000 American troops stationed in West Germany, for instance, serve no necessary purpose. These men could hardly repulse an all-out nuclear attack launched against Western Europe, and there is little for them to do in the absence of conflict. Similarly, many of our forces stationed in South Korea and Japan should be withdrawn. I support the bipartisan effort led by the distinguished majority leader to reduce overseas troop strength.

C. MILITARY AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM

My third area of disagreement with the pending bill, Mr. Chairman, lies closest to my heart. In the late 1960's, the American people rose up to demand an end to American involvement in the Vietnamese war. In 1974, though American combat troops have been removed from South Vietnam, the United States still gives hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to the Thieu government. President Thieu has repeatedly scorned democratic principles by preventing free elections, jailing political opponents, and stifling all dissent. His is a corrupt and ruthless dictatorship, built upon the blood of countless Vietnamese and supported by American dollars.

Far from proposing a reduction or withholding of aid to South Vietnam, the Defense Department has called for a substantial increase in American military assistance to South Vietnam in fiscal 1975. If Congress docilely submits to this irresponsible request to give \$1.4 billion in weapons and ammunition to President Thieu, we will be perpetuating tyranny and expressing disdain for the popular mandate to end American involvement in the Vietnamese war.

I am heartened by the tremendous outpouring of support for responsible reductions in defense spending from individual citizens and a variety of national organizations. The imposition of a more restrictive spending ceiling on the Department of Defense has been advocated by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, the Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers International Union, Americans for Democratic Action, the United States Conference of Mayors, Environmental Action, the United Presbyterian Church, the National Farmers Union, the United Auto Workers Union, the United Mine Workers Union, and many other groups. Most of these organizations have also endorsed proposals to reduce American military manpower overseas.

Mr. Chairman, if we are serious about fiscal austerity, let us start with the military budget. If we truly want to reorder priorities to meet the crying needs of the American people, let us begin by eliminating wasteful expenditures from the proposal before us. There is much that remains to be done to guarantee all Americans an acceptable standard of living and adequate social services. That fundamental long-range goal will never be achieved unless we begin to exercise responsible control over the military budget.

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Chairman, I marvel at the effrontery of the Pentagon and the administration in coming back again

and again to get more money for President Thieu.

On April 5 the House decisively rejected any increased military aid to the Thieu government. Last week the Senate Armed Services Committee set a ceiling of \$900 million on such aid for fiscal year 1975. Earlier the other body rejected an attempt to add \$266 million to the fiscal year 1974 budget.

Both bodies reflect their constituents' desire to spend no more tax money in support of a regime that is a disgrace to our country. The American people have repeatedly stated their wish to bring their tax dollars home where they are badly needed. Constituents also continue expressing concern for the prisoners being held by the Thieu regime.

Reports of these prisoners and the conditions under which they are being held have reached the United States from all over the world. Personally, I had an opportunity during last August's recess to talk in Saigon with many Vietnamese and others, including the American Ambassador Graham Martin. Documents I brought back from that trip, confirming prison conditions, can be found in the Record for September 13, 1973. I assure you that what I heard made me ashamed that my Government is underwriting such inhumane conditions.

Yet in a campaign reminiscent of "the old Nixon" the administration is trying to counter these reports by impugning the motives and the patriotism of those who ask questions, implying that they are tools of Hanoi. Ambassador Martin even advised the State Department not to give a full and honest answer to Senator Kennedy's questions. Luckily, Mr. Kissinger ignored his advice, but did not in fact answer all questions satisfactorily.

The Ambassador claims that the total prison population of South Vietnam does not exceed 35,000 and that if there are any political prisoners, there could be only a handful. If this is true, why is the United States asked to budget \$20 million a year for Saigon's police system? and why are there some 120,000 security personnel and over 600 detention centers in a country the size of an average United States State? And why does the GVN's own budget provide for 400,000 prisoners?

These questions could be cleared up quickly and easily if the Thieu government would permit inspection of its prisons. Requests have been made by the International Red Cross, the Senate Refugee Subcommittee staff, Bishop Thomas Gumbleton of Detroit, representatives of the international press, and Buddhist monks and Catholic priests in South Vietnam. I have just learned that 300 Buddhist monks imprisoned near Saigon are on a hunger strike—but no one can find the truth, for all requests for inspections have been denied. Representatives of the military-minded American Security Council were recently permitted to interview selected prisoners at one jail, but as might be expected, they found nothing to complain about.

As you know, Ambassador Martin will soon be in this country. I have asked him

to urge President Thieu to permit me and other Members of Congress, as well as humanitarian and religious groups, to inspect the prisons under conditions established by the International Red Cross.

I have every reason to expect that this request will be granted. In April 1973 President Thieu told a nationwide television audience that anyone was free to visit his prisons. And last August, Ambassador Martin kindly used his good offices to help secure the release of an internationally known attorney and women's leader, Madam Ngo Ba Thanh. I hope that our inspection teams would find less torture and barbarism than has been alleged. I hope that worldwide protests may have had some effect in alleviating conditions.

Meanwhile, there is only one way to make sure that this cruel and repressive dictatorship cannot continue suppressing neutralists. That way is to cut off funds. Therefore I heartily support Mr. LEGGETT's amendment.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to H.R. 14592, the military procurement authorization bill. Rather than repeat my arguments of previous years against the whole of this legislation, I would rather comment upon actions taken by the House today as well as upon a number of topic areas included in the bill, some of which were raised in today's debate.

This was, I believe, an unfortunate day for the Congress, and especially for this body. It is unfortunate because we again demonstrate a fundamental unwillingness, as a body, to squarely confront the facts of today's military situation, and the facts of the budgetary resources of the United States. Perhaps most unfortunate, we seem to lack the capability—or the interest—to address the hard philosophical questions attendant with the defense budget debate.

Just moments ago, the House reversed last year's action and defeated, 185 to 209, an amendment offered by my colleague Les ASPIN to cut \$733 million from the authorization. I supported this amendment, but to at least a limited extent I must concur with a portion of the judgments of Congressman JOHN ANDERSON of Illinois, who, arguing against the amendment, noted that it was not directed at the particular problem, or the singular question. To some extent, this "ceiling" approach evidences the reticence of this body to focus on the hard questions, and the corresponding willingness to take an easier way out.

I in no way intend my remarks to reflect adversely on the Aspin amendment. Had it passed, it would have cut a portion of the massive fat padding this military budget. It would have been a deserved rebuke to the Pentagon's scornful efforts to use the military budget as some sort of works project administration, adding a few hundreds of million here, a billion there, so as to bolster the civilian economy—even though the evidence is that a Federal dollar spent on military procurement produces far less, in terms of economic activity and jobs, than the same dollar would if put into civilian problems.

But what is lacking in the "ceiling" approach is even the semblance of congressional control over where the cuts are made. We leave this judgment to the Pentagon—whose sense of priorities ought to be a national scandal by now. We have no control over whether the Pentagon cuts out this wasteful aircraft or that redundant missile, or whether they protect these bureaucratic step-children and drop instead a genuinely valuable program.

VIETNAM

We managed, not without a struggle, to cut the ceiling on MASF aid to South Vietnam from the committee's recommended \$1.4 billion to the same level of this year's aid, \$1.126 billion. To be candid, this is not much of an accomplishment, though in these days I suppose one ought to be grateful for small favors. There are, however, a few questions relating to Vietnam we did not pay much heed to as a body today—questions which ought to be of great importance.

For example, we did nothing to prevent the Pentagon from continuing to skirt both the letter and the intent of the Paris peace accords. The accords, those who remember will note, limit U.S. military assistance to South Vietnam to "armaments, munitions, and war materials." As a matter of fact, aid delivered to South Vietnam under MASF—military assistance service funded—has included not only the allowed types of aid, but funds for personnel, operations and maintenance, as well as contract assistance.

During hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 27 of last year, an administration witness, DOD Assistant General Counsel Mr. Forman, was questioned regarding the definitions of allowable aid. He said:

The words, "armaments, munitions, and war materials" were taken from the peace agreement signed in January. Those words, as defined by the Department of Defense for the purpose of complying with the peace agreement—the definitions are set forth in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Report, pages 26 to 27—do not include, as has been earlier stated, the contract services which we are providing to the Vietnamese with civilian personnel. It does not include spare parts on consumables. It does not include subsistence. It does not include petroleum products.

To cap off this remarkably candid statement, Mr. Forman admitted that if the Congress were to hold the Pentagon to the letter and intent of the peace accords, and its own interpretations of the language of the accords:

We could not provide any of these to the South Vietnamese armed forces even on a piece-for-piece basis, a replacement basis, because they are not defined as armaments, munitions, war materials."

Quite frankly, I have severe doubts that the Committee on Armed Services took a very hard look at this matter.

To touch briefly on another subject, I wonder how much the committee or the House examined the so-called war reserve—the approximately \$1 billion worth of munitions that the Pentagon has stockpiled, using appropriations for the last 2 and current fiscal year, for

possible use by our Asian "allies"—Korea, South Vietnam, and Thailand. It turns out that there is \$490 million in this year's Pentagon budget for the war reserve.

A billion-dollar stockpile of arms is a very large stockpile. What controls does the Congress have over the commitment of these arms to our Asian allies—a commitment which in foreseeable circumstances could not only circumvent congressional efforts to limit aid to Indochina and the Far East, but even possibly escape the strictures of the war powers bill, committing us to participation in hostilities. The answer, as far as I can tell, is that Congress knows virtually nothing about this billion-dollar war chest, has virtually no control over its use, and does not seem to care one way or the other.

MINUTEMAN OVERLAND TEST

Let us take a look at another area. You will not find it anywhere in the report of the Armed Services Committee, but scattered here and there is a total of \$20.6 million for a program called "giant patriot." Giant patriot is the tag-name given the Air Force program to launch a total of eight Minuteman-II intercontinental ballistic missiles from their operational silos located in the continental United States. The flight of these missiles, four to be launched this winter from Malmstrom Air Force base and four in the winter of 1975, possibly from another base, would carry them over the States of Montana, Idaho, Oregon, and possibly parts of Washington and California. The eventual target of the missiles in Canton in the Phoenix Islands, southwest of the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 5,000 miles downrange.

Taking the \$6.3 million we have already committed to giant patriot, we will have spent a total of \$26.9 million for this possibly dangerous program that will do nothing to add to the security of our nuclear deterrent, and may in fact affect our deterrent strength adversely.

The Air Force has repeatedly testified as to the proven capabilities of the Minuteman ICBM system. It is widely reported that hundreds of test launches of Minutemans have taken place from the Vandenberg Air Force Base testing facility. In its presentation to Congress this year, the Air Force "briefing book" said that these Vandenberg tests: "have established great confidence that the Minuteman force is highly effective."

If we ask ourselves what is to be gained by the costly and risky operational base launch tests proposed in giant patriot, the answer is, not much. In the Vandenberg tests, the Air Force removes operational missiles from operational silos, and then transport them, and their SAC crews, to Vandenberg, where even the Air Force acknowledges that the launches are conducted with as much realism as possible.

The difference between these tests and the giant patriot variety is that the missiles are not removed from their silos, although naturally the thermonuclear warhead is replaced with a test warhead, and that the missiles are launched over a fairly large land area of the United States with a not-inconceivable possi-

bility of damage and injury to the civilian population.

The additional data obtained through these launches is minimal, and it has been speculated that its only use would be to assist the Air Force in its increasing battle to retain a land-based missile force now that Soviet MIRV developments have begun to make the land-based missile vulnerable. As far as operational reliability is concerned, most of the data gathered by the test could be obtained without overland launch using the electronic test devices developed as part of giant patriot to verify the in-silo performance of electronic systems.

The only other kind of data that might be obtained touches more sensitive areas I do not believe we should proceed into without the fullest of investigation. The overland tests might assist the United States in developing the "counterforce" capability advocated by Secretary Schlesinger. In addition, the tests might be used to demonstrate the feasibility of altering U.S. Minuteman silos to "cold launch" or "pop-up" techniques, which the Soviets already use as a means to increase booster throw-weight without expanding the physical size of a silo. Finally, the data gathered on refurbishment requirements after a Minuteman-II launch from an operational silo might be used as part of a feasibility demonstration of multiple-launch silos—another way to get around the SALT I agreement, which restricts only the number of missiles fired from an individual silo.

Apart from the dubious benefits of this program, there is a real element of risk. The Air Force, naturally, claims to have minimized the risk. Perhaps they are right. On the other hand, we know that even if all goes well the 4,000-pound-plus first stage of the Minuteman missile will fall to the ground from an altitude of 22 miles. And, if all goes well, four 4-by-5-foot engine covers will fall to the ground, from a similar altitude, hopefully somewhere near the intersection of the Idaho, Washington, and Oregon borders. This is if all goes well.

If all does not go well, the missile can be destroyed on ground command from the range safety officer. It can also be destroyed if the monitoring devices in the nosecone indicate the missile is "breaking up." The destruction occurs through the detonation of two shaped charges located at the bottom of the test warhead. These charges are designed to fire along the linear axis of the missile frame, with the primary explosion occurring when the shaped charge detonator triggers the solid fuel in the Minuteman first stage. Command destruction of a Minuteman II, with three stages, produces what can be called a high order detonation. If the missile is destroyed before 102 seconds of flight time have elapsed—102 seconds being the amount of time necessary for the second and third stages to clear the continental United States and land in the Pacific Ocean—then we can reasonably expect that fragments of the missile and explosive propellant will be scattered over a wide area, as before clearing the con-

tinental United States the missile reaches an altitude of 78 miles.

Perhaps the chance of a catastrophic failure resulting in human injury is slight, as the Air Force suggests. I cannot say. I do know, however, that there is an appreciable risk—a risk I do not think is worth taking in view of the nominal benefits to be gained from these tests.

One last point on giant patriot: what if the tests fail? Right now, the Soviets do not know whether our Minuteman fleet works or not, but on the basis of the Vandenberg tests and as conservative strategic planners, they have to assume the missiles will function as planned. If we conduct the overland test series and the missiles work as planned, we will show the Russians nothing spectacular, and will not change their strategic doctrine one iota. If, on the other hand, these highly publicized tests, which are flatly impossible to conceal, happen to fail—well, then we have problems. Then we will have weakened the stability of our Minuteman deterrent force, and we may very well change Soviet strategic thinking—in a way hardly to our advantage.

Is it all worth it? I say no. But you will not find anything about Operation Giant Patriot in the Armed Services Committee report on this bill.

All I am trying to say, Mr. Chairman, is that there is something seriously missing in our consideration of the military budget and defense policies. When Secretary Schlesinger first began to advocate major changes in U.S. military policy, he said, as I recall, that he hoped Congress would take the opportunity of the fiscal 1975 defense budget to debate and scrutinize the choices afforded our country in the post-Vietnam era. I do not think we have lived up to that challenge today.

When we consider H.R. 14952 we are talking about more than just another budget component. We are talking about what I view to be the single most important area of governmental activity. We are not doing a good job.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, for many years I have questioned financing the Vietnam war, maintaining our troop levels abroad, and wasteful and unjustified spending by the Defense Department. Now, we have finally ended our military involvement in Vietnam and placed some limits on military procurement, but again we are being asked to authorize huge increases in the defense budget. There are many good reasons for reducing our troop commitments overseas, for placing stricter ceilings on military appropriations, for not funding boondoggles like the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber. My colleagues have argued these points long and well. Numerous groups representing a wide variety of interest and points of view have joined us in these efforts. There is a better chance than ever before to reorder our priorities by limiting defense spending.

However, the simplest and most eloquent statement of why we should do this is one I read a few days ago in a letter from a constituent:

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EDWARDS: I have been trying to picture in my mind just where all of the money could be going now, that was spent on the bombings and the supplying of our troops in the Vietnam conflict.

It is very true that we must have used and wasted such a large quantity of materiel during the time we had our servicemen in Vietnam. I know wars cost money and human life.

Since the Vietnam war has ended for our armed forces, I have not really heard or read a reasonable story of just where this money is now being spent and how it is being used to help our country.

The question on how the money is being spent by our government now is often arising, and I would like to be the one to help answer it in my group. There must be a logical answer to this question, and I would greatly appreciate it if someone would return the answer to me.

Thank you,

NORBERT W. HASSEN.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, I feel that Mr. Hasson has expressed, for most Americans, the desire to understand why so much is spent for so little when so much more is needed for education, for housing, for health care. Our voting today for these amendments to the military procurement bill will begin to answer his questions as no budget comparisons, cost benefits analysis, or spending descriptions can.

In particular, I would like to call attention to Congresswoman Aezug's amendment to delete \$250 million for a "new" nuclear targeting strategy program. In this instance, we are being asked to authorize a relatively small amount for research and development. However, the subject is one about which we have little information. In addition, it carries the potential not only for much greater expenditures in the future, but also for commitment to a radical and dangerous change in our present policy of only deterrent nuclear forces. I fear that before we have had the opportunity or taken the time to consider this proposal carefully, the Defense Department will be asking us to approve construction of a system that reinforces an already difficult nuclear arms race. Both financially and politically we cannot afford this authorization. I urge my colleagues to join me in support of Ms. Aezug's amendment.

Ms. HOLTZMAN. Mr. Chairman, once again I have been compelled to vote against the Department of Defense's annual spending orgy—the fiscal year 1975 authorization for weapons procurement, research and development, and personnel strength for the military. This year's bill authorizes a total of \$22.64 billion, which exceeds the fiscal year 1974 amount by 12.2 percent—or \$1.5 billion more than is needed to keep pace with the costs of inflation.

This is the largest peacetime weapons procurement budget in history. I am firmly committed to a strong national system. But the overblown authorizations in this bill are unrelated to real, rational defense needs. This bloated budget comes at a time of rampant inflation when taxpayers are already overburdened to a critical point. We are now being asked to fuel the fires of inflation by increased Government spending and to burden the

taxpayers even more with wasteful, faulty weapons systems which have been put in the bill primarily to pamper the pet projects of Pentagon officials.

For example, the bill authorizes \$499 million for the B-1 manned bomber program. Since 1970 the total for the B-1 has risen by \$5.6 billion and the program is still only about half way through the research and development stage. The Department of Defense estimates that an additional \$2 billion will be needed in order to complete the research. Our current, operational long-range strategic bomber arsenal is already four times the size of the Soviet Union's. Surely there can be no justification for pouring one-half million dollars into a bomber program whose research phase and cost estimates continue to expand at an unbelievable rate.

The bill authorizes \$1.6 billion for the Trident submarine program. The program is enormously expensive and, I believe, unnecessary. It is being undertaken at a time when we already have an overwhelming capacity in nuclear submarines. The program requires that two submarines a year be built. This means that 12 Trident submarines will all become obsolete within 6 years of each other. Even now we are developing a new type of steel which will vastly improve submarine hulls and will assure the prompt obsolescence of our soon-to-be-built submarines.

Moreover, the primary rationale for Trident is to provide a hedge against a possible future Soviet threat. At this point, however, that threat remains undefined, unforeseen, and unexpected. Also, \$1.4 billion is authorized for military aid to South Vietnam. This amount represents a major increase in our commitment to Saigon above last year's level. The authorization which this bill provides will serve only to continue and to deepen our former tragic policy in Vietnam at a time when we should be phasing out U.S. involvement in Indochina.

An additional \$77 million is provided for "counterforce" programs which are designed to increase our capability of striking at Soviet strategic forces and missile installations. This represents a dangerous departure from our long-standing policy of deterrence, because it gives the United States a practical first-strike capability. We cannot afford to forget that the primary objective of nuclear strategy is not to fight nuclear wars, but to avoid them.

Another source of overexpenditure and waste provided in this bill is the commitment for overseas troops. In almost no case has the Pentagon shown the necessity for maintaining such high troop levels. But because Congress has never seriously questioned the rationale for the 492,000 troops scattered all over the world, key policies continue to be determined by special needs and bureaucratic inertia. Pay costs alone for the Department of Defense military and civilian establishment are estimated at \$147.5 billion for fiscal year 1975, or over 55 percent of the budget.

The U.S. taxpayer has to pour out

over \$30 billion annually to maintain bases, troops and facilities abroad. This inflated troop commitment will certainly not insure a concomitant increase in our military effectiveness. It will, on the other hand, contribute significantly to the enormous balance of payments problem which this country now faces. According to the Economic Report of the President—February, 1974—the net negative balance of payments for all fiscal year 1973 military transactions was \$2.8 billion. We simply can no longer afford to finance troops to police and babysit all over the globe.

The authorization levels provided in this bill are particularly deplorable in light of the failure of the present administration to review our military budget with the same analytical ruthlessness it uses to analyze—and cut—expenditures for the elderly, for education, and for health care. This inflated defense budget is an insult to the taxpayer who is already forced to make tremendous sacrifices in the domestic sphere.

I am not alone in my opposition to these enormous, unwarranted expenditures. Even the National City Bank, a far-from-radical organization, has stated that the authorizations provided in the bill will serve to kindle the fires of inflation in this country and has deplored the "strongly rising trend in real defense spending" suggested by the funding levels of this bill. In addition, a group of former Department of Defense officials, led by former Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, have pointed out feasible reductions totalling \$14.9 billion in the over-all \$90-plus billion budget.

If we continue to deny large segments of the public the vital services they need to meet minimum living standards, we will not be a strong nation no matter how much money we expend on military hardware. By cutting the fat from this military budget, we could build a stronger nation, less burdened by the enormous taxes which will result from this bill.

The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. SISK, Chairman pro tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 14592) to authorize appropriations during the fiscal year 1975 for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, and research, development, test and evaluation of the Armed Forces, and to prescribe the authorized personnel strength for each active duty component and of the Selected Reserve of each Reserve component of the Armed Forces and of civilian personnel of the Department of Defense, and to authorize the military training student loads and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 1112, he reported the bill back to the House with sundry amendments adopted by the Committee of the Whole.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment? If not, the Chair will put them en gros.

The amendments were agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was read the third time.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the passage of the bill.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

RECORDED VOTE

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.

A recorded vote was ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—ayes 358, noes 37, not voting 38, as follows:

[Roll No. 242]

AYES—358

Abdnor	Cohen	Green, Oreg.
Adams	Collins, Tex.	Griffiths
Addabbo	Conable	Gross
Alexander	Conlan	Grover
Anderson, Calif.	Conte	Gubser
Anderson, Ill.	Corman	Gude
Andrews, N.C.	Cotter	Gunter
Andrews, N. Dak.	Coughlin	Guyer
Archer	Crane	Haley
Arends	Cronin	Hamilton
Armstrong	Culver	Hammer-
Ashbrook	Daniel, Dan	schmidt
Ashley	Daniel, Robert W., Jr.	Hanley
Aspin	Daniels, Dominick V.	Hanrahan
Bafalts	Danielson	Hansen, Idaho
Baker	Davis, Ga.	Harsha
Barrett	Davis, S.C.	Hastings
Bauman	Davis, Wis.	Hawkins
Beard	de la Garza	Hays
Bell	Delaney	Hébert
Bennett	Dellenback	Heckler, Mass.
Bergland	Denholm	Heinz
Bevill	Dennis	Henderson
Biagi	Dent	Hicks
Blester	Bielinski	Hillis
Blackburn	Devine	Holt
Blatnik	Dickinson	Horton
Boggs	Dingell	Hosmer
Boland	Donohue	Howard
Bolling	Dorn	Huber
Bowen	Downing	Hudnut
Bradt	Dulski	Hungate
Bradas	Duncan	Hunt
Bray	Edwards, Ala.	Ichord
Breaux	Ellberg	Jarman
Breckinridge	Erlenborn	Johnson, Calif.
Brinkley	Esch	Johnson, Colo.
Brooks	Eshleman	Jones, N.C.
Broomfield	Evans, Colo.	Jones, Tenn.
Brotzman	Evins, Tenn.	Jordan
Brown, Calif.	Fascell	Karth
Brown, Mich.	Findley	Kazan
Brown, Ohio	Fish	Kemp
Broyhill, N.C.	Fisher	Ketchum
Broyhill, Va.	Flood	King
Buchanan	Flowers	Kuykendall
Burgener	Flynt	Kyros
Burke, Calif.	Foley	Lagomarsino
Burke, Fla.	Fountain	Landgrebe
Burke, Mass.	Frelinghuysen	Landrum
Burleson, Tex.	Frenzel	Leggett
Burlison, Mo.	Frey	Lehman
Butler	Froehlich	Lent
Byron	Fulton	Litton
Camp	Fuqua	Long, La.
Carney, Ohio	Gaydos	Long, Md.
Carter	Gettys	Lott
Casey, Tex.	Giaimo	Lujan
Cederberg	Gibbons	Luken
Chamberlain	Gilman	McClory
Chappell	Ginn	McCloskey
Clancy	Goldwater	McCollister
Clausen,	Gonzalez	McCormack
Don H.	Goodling	McDade
Cleveland	Grasso	McEwen
Cochran	Gray	McFall

McKay	Powell, Ohio	Steiger, Wis.
McKinney	Preyer	Stephens
McSpadden	Price, Ill.	Stratton
Macdonald	Price, Tex.	Stuckey
Madden	Pritchard	Sullivan
Madigan	Quie	Symington
Mahon	Quillen	Symms
Mallary	Railsback	Talcott
Mann	Randall	Taylor, Mo.
Maraziti	Rarick	Taylor, N.C.
Martin, Nebr.	Regula	Thomson, Wis.
Martin, N.C.	Reuss	Thone
Mathias, Calif.	Rinaldo	Thornton
Mathis, Ga.	Roberts	Tiernan
Matsunaga	Robinson, Va.	Towell, Nev.
Mayne	Robison, N.Y.	Traxler
Mazzoli	Rodino	Treen
Melcher	Roe	Udall
Mezvinsky	Roush	Ullman
Michel	Rousselot	Van Deerlin
Milford	Roncalio, Wyo.	Vander Jagt
Miller	Roncalio, N.Y.	Vander Veen
Mills	Rose	Veysey
Minish	Roush	Vigorito
Mink	Rousselot	Waggoner
Mitchell, N.Y.	Roy	Walsh
Mizell	Ruppe	Wampler
Moakley	Ruth	Ware
Mollohan	St Germain	Whalen
Montgomery	Sandman	White
Moorhead,	Sarasin	Whitehurst
Calif.	Sarbanes	Whitten
Moorhead, Pa.	Satterfield	Widnall
Moss	Scherle	Wiggins
Murphy, N.Y.	Schneebeli	Wilson, Bob
Murtha	Sebelius	Wilson, Charles H.,
Myers	Shipley	Calif.
Natcher	Shoup	Wilson, Charles, Tex.
Nelsen	Shriver	Winn
Nichols	Shuster	Sikes
O'Brien	Sikes	Winn
O'Hara	Skubitz	Wolf
O'Neill	Slack	Wright
Owens	Smith, Iowa	Wyman
Parris	Snyder	Yates
Passman	Spence	Yatron
Patman	Staggers	Young, Alaska
Patten	Perkins	Young, Fla.
Pepper	Stanton, J. William	Young, Ill.
Perkins	Pettis	Young, S.C.
Pettis	Stanton, James V.	Young, Tex.
Peyser	Pickle	Zablocki
Pike	Steed	Zion
Poage	Steele	
Podell	Steelman	
	Steiger, Ariz.	

NOES—37

Abzug	Hanna	Royal
Badillo	Harrington	Ryan
Bingham	Hechler, W. Va.	Schroeder
Burton	Holtzman	Seiberling
Chisholm	Kastenmeier	Stark
Conyers	Koch	Stokes
Dellums	Mitchell, Md.	Studds
Diggs	Nedzi	Thompson, N.J.
Drinan	Obey	Vanik
Edwards, Calif.	Rangel	Walde
Forsythe	Rees	Young, Ga.
Fraser	Riegle	
Green, Pa.	Rosenthal	

NOT VOTING—38

Annunzio	Hutchinson	Reid
Carey, N.Y.	Johnson, Pa.	Rhodes
Clark	Jones, Ala.	Rooney, N.Y.
Clawson, Del	Jones, Okla.	Rostenkowski
Clay	Kluczynski	Runnels
Collins, Ill.	Meeds	Stribblefield
du Pont	Metcalfe	Teague
Eckhardt	Minshall, Ohio	Williams
Ford	Morgan	Wyatt
Hansen, Wash.	Mosher	Wylie
Helstoski	Murphy, Ill.	Zwach
Hinshaw	Nix	

So the bill was passed.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Annunzio for, with Mr. Helstoski against.

Mr. Rooney of New York for, with Mrs. Collins of Illinois against.

Mr. Teague for, with Mr. Metcalfe against.

Mr. Murphy of Illinois for, with Mr. Clay against.

Mr. Rostenkowski for, with Mr. Eckhardt against.

Until further notice:

Mr. Clark with Mr. Williams.

Mr. Morgan with Mr. Reid.

Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Del Clawson.

Mr. Jones of Alabama with Mr. Minshall of Ohio.

Mr. Nix with Mr. Mosher.

Mr. Jones of Oklahoma with Mr. Collier.

Mr. Carey of New York with Mr. Wylie.

Mr. Runnels with Mr. du Pont.

Mr. Rhodes with Mr. Zwach.

Mr. Meeds with Mr. Hutchinson.

Mr. Ford with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.

Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Smith of New York.

Mr. Stubblefield with Mr. Latta.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

MR. HÉBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks, and to include extraneous matter, on the bill just passed.

THE SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection.

GEOTHERMAL ENERGY CONTROL ACT OF 1974

(Mr. QUILLEN asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks.)

MR. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing a bill which I feel will have a major impact on our present energy problem. The title of my bill is the Geothermal Energy Control Act of 1974.

This measure would create a commission to grant exclusive franchises for the exploration for the commercial development of geothermal energy and for the right to market any such energy in its natural state.

We in America are just beginning to realize the immense contribution geothermal energy can make to our efforts to become self-sufficient in the energy field. It is my belief that this form of energy will become one of our major energy sources and our Government, I feel, should take the initiative now to control and conserve the development of this national resource. My bill will accomplish this.

The experiences over the past few months have strongly demonstrated the urgent need of finding new energy sources. Energy problems were brought forcefully to the public's attention by the recent Arab embargo of oil sales to the United States. However, the roots of our energy troubles go back to trends in production and consumption of energy. There is a growing gap between the growth rate of consumption and that of production. Despite the fact that the United States has only 6 percent of the world's population, we consume one-third of the world's energy.

Our ever-increasing demand for energy necessitates not

only increasing production in our present types of energy, but also finding new sources. One of the most exciting possibilities lies in the heat beneath the crust of the Earth. This is one of the world's oldest sources of power, but it is now attracting new interest. Geothermal resources can open up a whole new energy frontier and the potential importance is enormous.

Geothermal energy in the broadest sense is the natural heat of the Earth. Natural underground reservoirs of steam and hot water can be tapped by drilling wells into the ground and harnessing the steam. Geothermal energy can then be used to generate electricity. In fact, we are already producing geothermally-generated electricity on a small scale in the United States today. Direct use of the heat itself can also be a valuable application. This includes the heating and cooling of residential and commercial buildings, as well as uses for farming and for paper and pulp manufacturing.

Other countries have utilized this form of energy for years. At one city in New Zealand, a paper and pulp company uses the hot water from a wet steam field for heating in the industrial processes. In Iceland the hot water from such fields has long been applied to industrial uses and household and district heating. Househeating with hot-well water is being developed on a large scale in several countries, notably Japan, the U.S.S.R., and Hungary. In the United States, househeating from hot wells is being applied on a small scale in Idaho and Oregon.

Interest in this source of energy has quickened in the past few years. Recent explorations have revealed that the resource is larger and more extensive than had been supposed. There is now evidence that reservoirs of steam and hot water are actually widespread in the Earth's crust. The United States, particularly in its western region, has enormous extent of volcanic rocks of recent origin and an abundance of dormant volcanoes, as well as several active ones. The potential geothermal resources appear to be very large.

Geothermal energy has all the advantages. First of all, it is abundant. There are inexhaustible quantities of geothermal energy. Second, it is a clean form of energy; therefore, it is the most acceptable from an environmental viewpoint. Geothermal energy is readily available and it is much cheaper than existing sources.

The Geothermal Energy Control Act would play a significant role in overseeing the development of geothermal energy into a major source of energy within the near future.

According to my bill, the National Geothermal Energy Commission will determine areas, other than the lands included under the leasing authority of the Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, in which the prospects for the extraction of geothermal steam or associated geothermal resources are good enough to warrant expenditure of money for that purpose.

These areas will be divided into tracts and the Commission will then grant licenses to individuals wishing to explore and develop geothermal energy. These licenses will be valid for a period of 99 years.

An individual who has been granted a license to explore for geothermal energy may transfer his license to another person for the commercial development of geothermal steam, or he may also convert geothermal steam to electrical energy and sell it to an already existing utility company.

The Commission will be composed of nine Commissioners who are appointed by the President of the United States and approved by the Senate.

Americans have come to realize that we can no longer take our energy sources for granted. Instead, we must learn to plan and develop the wise use of these resources.

Over the next few years much attention is going to be directed toward geothermal energy, and I sincerely believe that our Government must make every effort to control the development of such a vital resource as geothermal energy promises to be.

THE NEWSMEN'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY ACT

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, the inclusion of freedom of the press among the first amendment guarantees reflects the conviction of the Founding Fathers that the strength of democratic government depends upon the unrestrained diffusion of information. They saw the press as that organ of society with the power and responsibility to scrutinize self-interested sources of information and, out of that scrutiny, make it more likely that the public will ultimately hear the truth. Essential to the role of the press in a free society is the greatest possible accessibility of information to the newsman himself. This explains the critical dependence of the newsman on his sources. The integrity of the press as an alternative to official organs of information is seriously jeopardized if the newsman's freedom to assemble reliable sources is infringed.

Recent years have seen an alarming upsurge of judicial and legislative demands for confidential information in the hands of the press—information which often yields the identity of confidential news sources. Rather than violate promises of secrecy, some reporters have gone to jail. Others are simply not pursuing the leads that would require confidentiality. Still others are discovering that formerly good sources are refusing to provide information. The impact of these subpoenas constitutes an indirect, but ominous form of press censorship.

A number of measures have been introduced in this Congress to protect the

press from the long arm of the subpoena. These proposals give newsmen various degrees of privilege to refuse to disclose confidential sources before courts and legislative bodies. However, we have recently witnessed the use of a means of press intimidation not covered by the measures currently pending. Last year it was reported that the American Telephone & Telegraph Co. had surrendered the records of newsmen's telephone calls in response to a court request. In April of this year it was discovered that the FBI was using Jack Anderson's telephone records to trace the identity of his sources. In view of the essential role of the telephone in news gathering, any disclosure of a newsmen's phone records constitutes a severe threat to the confidentiality of sources. It presents a coercive effect on freedom of the press as grave as any disclosure of information in the possession of the newsmen himself.

To close this avenue of press intimidation, I am today introducing for the first time, the Newsmen's Right to Privacy Act. This bill, which has 15 cosponsors, provides that the disclosure of information with respect to any member of the news media by a telephone or telegraph company will be lawful only in response to a court order requiring that disclosure. Such an order will follow a court hearing in which the newsmen involved will have the right to participate. No order requiring disclosure may be issued unless it is found that disclosure will not reveal or threaten to reveal the identity of any source of information with respect to the newsmen.

The only exception will be a finding by a U.S. district court that disclosure will serve a "compelling and overriding national interest." Enforcement will consist of criminal sanctions against companies and company employees who effect unlawful disclosure.

Mr. Speaker, I believe this bill provides a reasonable rule to guide courts in judgments on the validity of phone record subpoenas. It recognizes the necessity of confidentiality to press freedom and thus affords confidence to the newsmen and his sources that statements made in trust will remain so. At the same time, it recognizes the possibility of an overriding State interest, but places a severe burden on the Government to justify disclosure. It is a solution consistent with the primacy of freedom of the press as a first amendment guarantee. It is, I believe, a 20th century implementation of the wisdom of Tocqueville when he wrote 150 years ago:

The more I consider the independence of the press in its principal consequences, the more I am convinced that it is the . . . constitutive element of liberty.

The 15 cosponsors are Ms. ABZUG, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. DRINAN, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. KEMP, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. PODELL, Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania, Mr. VAN DEERLIN, Mr. WON PAT, and Mr. YOUNG of Georgia.

VETERANS ARE WATCHING CONGRESS

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute, and to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, 285,000 veterans going to school on the GI bill are watching the Congress this week with hope and anxiety. These are the veterans who left military service between 1955 and 1966, when there were no education GI bill benefits available. These men were extended those benefits in 1966, when the Vietnam era GI bill was enacted, and had 8 years in which to use their entitlements.

That 8-year period expires at the end of this month, threatening to leave 285,000 veterans who have not completed their educations or exhausted their entitlements out in the cold. It is ironic that both Houses of Congress have recognized this imminent disaster, have acted to extend for 2 years the period in which these GI bill benefits can be used, but have not yet sent a bill to the President for his signature. The Senate delayed acting on House-passed GI bill amendments which contained this 2-year extension for several months, and finally passed a single 2-year extension last week. The House Veterans' Affairs Committee, angry at this unjustifiable delay, refused to accept the Senate bill, and insisted on sending the bill back to the Senate with all the previously passed House amendments to the bill tacked on and calling for a conference with the Senate.

I cannot approve of these pressure tactics which use these 285,000 veterans as expendable pawns in a bizarre congressional chess game. Time is running out for these men while the House and the Senate jockey for position. Apparently the House Veterans' Affairs Committee hopes to pressure the Senate into acting on the House version of amendments to the GI bill, denying the other body the opportunity to consider its own version of such amendments in detail. In trying to hold the Senate's feet to the fire, the Congress is threatening to throw several hundred thousand veterans into the fire.

Yesterday the Senate passed S. 3398, extending the time limit for using the GI bill benefits for 30 days. This compromise proposal by the Senate deserves speedy action by the House. The Senate Veterans' Committee is beginning mark-up today and intends to bring a bill to the floor the first week in June. If the House accepts S. 3398 and the 30-day extension it authorizes, education benefits for these 285,000 men can continue uninterrupted while the Congress works on more comprehensive cost-of-living adjustments in benefits levels and other important changes in the weeks ahead. I urge the leadership of the House and of the Veterans' Committee to accept this bill today and end the deplorable brinkmanship game that has threatened the futures of so many men and women who do not deserve such shabby treatment.

LET GOVERNMENT SHARE BURDEN

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. BLACKBURN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. BLACKBURN. Mr. Speaker, on May 1 I rose to make the following suggestion:

That the Congress give—

Serious consideration to the proposition that personal income tax exemptions should be increased, and that these exemptions be increased on a retroactive basis in order to reflect the proper ratio of an individual's income vis a vis the rate of inflation which militates against that income in every given year.

As I advised the House at that time, my suggestion was based on the realization of two rather obvious facts of life in America today:

First, our present Federal income tax system is inequitable and imposes undue hardship on the American people in general.

Second, despite the heavy burden to the taxpayers, the deficits and the national debt continue to build, inflation continues to increase, and the wage earner, however he earns it, winds up with less and less control over the money he earns.

In noting these facts on May 1, I offered the following conclusion:

If the highrollers in the Federal bureaucracy found themselves compelled to live with the same problems which their economic gamesmanship impose upon others in our society, then the Federal Establishment would begin to share the burden felt by the individual taxpayer.

My remarks were received with great favor from my constituents, from many of my colleagues, and from the media. Consequently, after due deliberation and consultation I have committed my thesis to a bill "to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for annual adjustments in the amount of personal exemptions to reflect increases in the cost of living."

Mr. Speaker, it is with increasing concern for the unfair burden of frequently inequitable taxation which our citizens continue to bear, and for the continuing lack of restraint on spending on the part of all too many in the legislative and executive branches of government that I submit this bill for most serious consideration by this Congress.

COMMUNISM AND FREEDOM

Mr. BLACKBURN. For any who might accept the propaganda that under communism, individual freedom exists, let me cite but a few statistics from a great volume of statistics and facts created by communism itself during the past half century.

According to our best, yet conservative official figures, 29 East Germans were shot dead trying to escape over or through communism's hideous Berlin Wall between August 1961 and April 1963. Twelve others died from the effects

of being shot in their escape attempts. Approximately the same amount of people have died each subsequent year for the past 11 years in similar efforts. That would bring the conservatively estimated total to 451.

From August 1961 until 1972, an additional 30,000 East Germans risked death and injury to make good their escape to freedom in the West.

During the Korean conflict in which too many misguided Americans accepted the Communist line that North Korea was fighting for freedom, an officially estimated 35,000 North Koreans pressed into battle on behalf of communism, defected to South Korea, or the United States or other allied forces of freedom.

As a consequence of the Khrushchev ordered blood bath in Hungary in November 1956, approximately 190,000 Hungarians ranging from old men and women to infants in arms, fled that tragic nation in search of freedom in the West—many here in the United States, under the escapee program conceived by the late Congressman Charles J. Kersten and enacted into law by the Congress of the United States.

ENERGY PRICE EQUALIZATION NEEDED FOR NEW ENGLAND

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. CLEVELAND) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. CLEVELAND. Mr. Speaker, the entire Nation is suffering the consequences of the energy shortage and resulting higher prices, but an inequitable share of the burden is being borne by residents of New England. On May 16—page 15030—I inserted into the RECORD several excerpts from constituent letters describing the severe hardships they are encountering as a result of sharply increased electric bills. These were accompanied by facts which supported the inequity of the situation in New England.

I have subsequently received copies of resolutions adopted unanimously by the six New England Governors concerning energy price equalization. The purpose of these resolutions is to bring to the attention of appropriate Federal officials the seriousness of the problem and to ask for remedial action. The covering letter succinctly describes the intended message:

The resolutions place a high priority on less costly energy in general and equitable energy prices in particular. It is especially disturbing to us for New England to pay higher prices for energy as it clearly places the region in an economically non-competitive position with other regions of the country. As you know, the citizens of New England did much more than their fair share this past winter when they achieved targets of energy conservation which far exceeded that of any other region. They are now perplexed as to why they are penalized with higher energy costs.

Mr. Speaker, this explains quite well the frustration shared by all residents of New England and their concern that far from being over, the problems are still

very much with us and will remain so without action from Congress or the Federal Energy Office. Therefore, I commend to my colleagues the following resolutions adopted by the New England Regional Commission:

NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION
RESOLUTION No. 87

A resolution of the State members of the New England Regional Commission concerning electricity rates in New England

Whereas, the New England Regional Commission has determined that the provision of an adequate supply of reasonably priced electrical energy is essential to the economic development of the region; and

Whereas, recent increases in the price of electricity have caused economic disruption and deep public concern; and

Whereas, the electric utilities in New England are structured on a regional basis for the distribution of electricity throughout the region; and

Whereas, recent increases in electricity rates have adversely impacted the citizens of New England and the regional economy;

Now therefore be it resolved by the State Members of the New England Regional Commission

Section 1. That the importation of less expensive electricity into the region from domestic and Canadian sources should receive priority attention of the region's utilities, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Energy Office, the Department of State and the State Public Utilities Commissions.

Section 2. That the development of alternatives such as hydroelectric, nuclear and coal fired facilities should likewise receive the priority attention of these organizations as ways to reduce present price inequities caused by the high level of the region's dependence on expensive oil fired electric facilities.

Section 3. That the Federal Energy Office promptly take steps to increase the production of lower priced domestic residual fuel oil and allocate a fair proportion of this product to the region at an equitable price as required by law.

Section 4. That the New England utilities work with state public utility commissions in order to reduce costs wherever possible.

Section 5. That the staff of the Commission promptly evaluate the electric rate problem and prepare additional recommendations for the establishment of equitable price levels for the region's domestic, commercial, business and industrial consumers.

Section 6. Direct that this Resolution be transmitted to the following: the President, the Secretary of State, the New England Congressional Delegation, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Energy Office, the National Governors' Conference and NEPOOL.

Section 7. Effective Date. This Resolution is effective immediately.

NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION
RESOLUTION No. 88

A resolution of the State members of the New England Regional Commission concerning the reduction of the price of petroleum products in New England

Whereas, the New England Regional Commission has determined that an adequate supply of low-priced petroleum products is essential to the economic development of the Region because it depends upon petroleum fuels for 90% of its total energy supply as compared to the National average of 44%; and

Whereas, current Federal regulations on

the control of petroleum prices result in New England receiving a much larger proportion of higher priced petroleum than other regions of the Nation with a consequent strong negative force on the Region's economy; and

Whereas, New England has achieved a higher rate of fuel conservation than the National average; and

Whereas, a higher National achievement rate of petroleum fuel conservation could assist in the reduction of New England's dependence on higher priced foreign petroleum;

Now therefore be it resolved by the State Members of the New England Regional Commission that

Section 1. The State Members adopt the policy that the equalization of the petroleum prices across the Nation is essential for the continued development of the New England economy in accordance with the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 (P.L. 93-159).

Section 2. The State Members call upon all regions of the Nation to improve the achievements of their petroleum fuel conservation programs.

Section 3. The State Members urge the Federal Energy Office to administer the Mandatory Fuel Allocation Program so that petroleum fuel allocations are based on price as well as quantity as required by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act and further that the Federal Energy Office take the necessary steps to increase the domestic production of residual fuel oil and insure that New England receives its fair share of the increase in such production.

Section 4. The State Members call upon the Secretary of Defense to make available excess Defense Department fuel storage facilities which are enumerated in a Commission report in order to increase the Region's capacity to store lower priced petroleum products as they become available.

Section 5. The New England Congressional Delegation, the Federal Government, and the public utilities and industry of New England continue to work with the New England States to reduce New England's present heavy dependence on expensive petroleum products in a majority consistent with the protection of environmental quality and public safety.

Section 6. That copies of this Resolution be transmitted to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the New England Congressional Delegation, the Administrator of the Federal Energy Office, the Appalachian Regional Commission, all other Title V Commissions and the National Governors' Conference.

Section 7. Effective Date. This Resolution is effective immediately.

NEW ENGLAND REGIONAL COMMISSION RESOLUTION No. 91

A resolution concerning energy price equalization

Whereas, in considering issues relating to the price and availability of energy to New England consumers, the Governors of the New England States have determined that a severe price inequality exists between this region and other regions of the country; and

Whereas, such a price inequality is directly contributing to the economic problems of the region by reducing its competitive position in the national economy and by requiring consumers to devote a disproportionate share of their income to paying energy costs; and

Whereas, the New England Regional Commission is actively involved in the development of a regional energy program designed to identify problem areas and develop joint policy among the New England States;

Now therefore be it resolved by the New England Regional Commission that

Section 1. Due to the gravity of the situation, the Federal Energy Office is requested to provide, within a period of thirty days, to the New England Regional Commission and the New England Congressional Delegation a determination of the extent and nature of the energy price differential suffered by the New England region to identify the causes of that differential and to make recommendations for appropriate remedial action.

Section 2. The staff of the Commission is instructed to work closely with the Federal Energy Office in preparing an analysis of the price differential situation and to provide, within thirty days, recommendations for equalizing the price of energy to the region.

Section 3. The New England Congressional Delegation is asked to support the request for an evaluation by the Federal Energy Office and to work with the Commission in preparing a remedial program including, as appropriate, corrective legislation.

Section 4. The Commission directs that this Resolution be transmitted to the following: the President, the New England Congressional Delegation, the Federal Power Commission, the Federal Energy Office, and the National Governors' Conference.

Section 5. Effective Date. This Resolution is effective immediately.

HON. CHESTER E. MERROW

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WYMAN. Mr. Speaker, it is with regret and a deep sense of loss that we pause to mark the passing of our former colleague, Representative Chester E. Merrow of Ossipee, N.H.

Chester Merrow devoted his life to public service, first as a teacher and State legislator, setting an example of service respected by all who knew him. In 1943, he began two decades of continuous representation of New Hampshire's First Congressional District in the Congress, and after an unsuccessful bid for the Senate, distinguished himself as a special adviser to the Department of State, a post he held until his retirement in 1968.

A graduate of Colby College with a subsequent master's degree from Teachers College of Columbia University, Chester taught political science and served as dean of Vermont Junior College before entering politics.

While in the House of Representatives, Chester rose to seniority on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, traveling to many parts of the world and becoming active and influential in foreign relations. He served as a delegate to the preliminary conference to UNESCO in London in 1945 and was Congressional Adviser to the first UNESCO Conference in Paris in 1946. He served as chairman of the House Foreign Relations Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements in 1954-54.

Throughout his career, whether as educator, political scientist, foreign policy advisor, or U.N. organizer, Chester Mer-

row remained a man of New Hampshire, a man who stood by his convictions, a citizen of undeniable and laudable dedication to public service.

Virginia and I join with his many friends in extending sympathy and best wishes to his beloved wife, Nellie, to his sister Barbara, to his son Daniel, and their grandchildren of Daniel. A part of New Hampshire has been lost with Chester's unfortunate early passing. He is sorely missed by his loved ones and his many friends.

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank my distinguished colleague, Mr. WYMAN of New Hampshire, for taking this Special Order to honor the memory of a former Member of this body, Chester A. Merrow.

Chester Merrow could surely be called a New Englander. He attended Colby College in the State of Maine; he taught school in the State of Vermont; and he represented the people of the State of New Hampshire in both the New Hampshire House of Representatives and the U.S. Congress.

Chester Merrow served the residents of the First Congressional District of New Hampshire for 20 years, amassing a record of outstanding service. But, this is not to say he did not represent all of the people of this country, for he did. Most notably, perhaps, with his service as a delegate to the International Conference on Education and Cultural Relations of the United Nations and then with his service as congressional adviser to the First Conference of the United Nations' Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization.

So, it may accurately be said that Chester A. Merrow served the people of New England, his country and the global community.

I was proud to serve in the Congress with Chester Merrow and was deeply saddened at his passing earlier this year.

At this time, I wish to express my sincere sympathy to Mrs. Nellie Merrow and their son, Daniel.

Mr. FLYNT. Mr. Speaker, I join with the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. WYMAN) and others in expressing my sorrow at the news of the death of our former colleague, the Honorable Chester Earl Merrow. I wish to join in paying tribute to the life, the service, and the memory of one whom we held in the highest esteem and respect.

Chester Merrow was first elected to the House of Representatives in 1942, and he served in the 78th through the 87th Congresses. At the time of his departure from the House to run for the Senate, Mr. Merrow served on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and was very active in that field during the formative years of the United Nations. On the Foreign Affairs Committee and as a U.S. Representative at various United Nations conferences and functions, he served this Nation with distinction and dedication during a most critical period in the world's history. Following his

service in the House, Mr. Merrow continued to utilize his experience and expertise in the field of international relations for the benefit of our country, serving some 5 years as a special adviser for the Department of State.

During his 10 terms in the House of Representatives, Mr. Merrow gave untiringly to his constituents, the State of New Hampshire, and our Nation dedicated and distinguished service. While serving in the House, he earned the highest esteem of all who were privileged to serve with him.

Throughout his more than 3 decades in public life, he exemplified the model of the sincere and conscientious public servant. In his concern and devotion to the American people, he always reflected great credit on the highest traditions of the Congress and this Nation.

Mrs. Flynt joins me in extending to his family and loved ones our condolences and heartfelt sympathy.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, the Honorable Chester Earl Merrow first came to Congress in 1943. It was my privilege to serve with him in this body for almost 10 years. When he left the Congress in 1963, he continued to serve our Nation as special adviser on community relations in the Department of State.

Chester Merrow was a kind and gracious man, dedicated to the Congress and to the people he represented.

He will be missed, not only by his family, but by the people of New Hampshire, and all his friends here in Congress.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to extend their remarks during the special order taken by Mr. WYMAN in memory of the late Honorable Congressman Chester Merrow.

The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. MATSUNAGA). Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection.

OUR CONSERVATION HERITAGE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California (Mr. TALCOTT) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. TALCOTT. Mr. Speaker, I recently read a letter which showed rare and moving insight to our conservation problem. This letter was even more remarkable because it was written to the President of the United States nearly 120 years ago. It was addressed to President Franklin Pierce from Chief Sealth of the Duwanish Tribe in the State of Washington, and said:

The Great Chief in Washington sends word that he wishes to buy our land. How can

you buy or sell the sky—the warmth of the land? The idea is strange to us. We do not own the freshness of the air or the sparkle of the water. How can you buy them from us? Every part of this earth is sacred to my people. Every shiny pine needle, every sandy shore, every mist in the dark woods, every clearing and humming insect is holy in the memory and experience of my people.

We know that the white man does not understand our ways. One portion of the land is the same to him as the next, for he is a stranger who comes in the night and takes from the land whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and his children's birthright is forgotten.

There is no quiet place in the white man's cities. No place to hear the leaves of spring or the rustle of insect wings. But perhaps because I am savage and do not understand, the clatter seems to insult the ears. And what is there to life if a man cannot hear the lovely cry of the whippoorwill or the arguments of frogs around the pond at night.

The whites, too, shall pass—perhaps sooner than other tribes. Continue to contaminate your bed, and you will one night suffocate in your own waste. When the buffalo are all slaughtered, and the wild horses are all tamed, the secret corners of the forest heavy with the scent of many men, and the views of the ripe hills blotted by talking wires. Where is the thicket? Gone. Where is the eagle? Gone. And what is it to say goodbye to the swift and the hunt, the end of living and the beginning of survival.

Now, Mr. Speaker, nearly a century and a quarter later, we look back to Chief Sealth and ask, "Who was the savage? Who had the foresight to see clearly what would become of his beloved land?"

Let us hope that in the future Americans will look back on our generation and say that we had the foresight to take the necessary action to reverse the environmental damage that could destroy us all.

NATIONAL NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST FUND

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. REGULA) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. REGULA. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to establish a national natural resources trust fund to finance land and water conservation-development activities of all Department of the Interior agencies, and the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture.

Today we are facing many resource problems: Energy; inadequate recreational opportunities in proximity to urban centers where people and social pressures are the greatest; inadequate water supplies, predominantly in the West; and an environmental crisis affecting wildlife, water, and land and timber. Also a minerals shortage may become real if we do not husband our natural resources.

The Federal Government is a proprietor with approximately one-third of our country's land in its ownership. Most of this land is managed by the Department

of the Interior and the U.S. Forest Service.

The Department of the Interior revenues earned from the use or lease of minerals, fees, concessions, grazing, lands, power, timber, and water will be in excess of its appropriations, exclusive of trust funds, by an estimated \$2,665,-217,000 in fiscal year 1975. The Forest Service estimates it will receive \$458,-785,000 from timber sales, grazing, power, recreation, and land use during fiscal year 1975. It is estimated that combined receipts from the Department of the Interior and Forest Service will amount to \$6,374,841,000—Interior, \$5,-916,056,000; Forest Service, \$458,785,000—in fiscal year 1975. An additional \$3 billion could be realized from increased outercontinental shelf leasing during fiscal year 1975 as a result of intensified energy development efforts. Although these Federal lands and resources are not distributed proportionally throughout the Nation, they belong to all of the people of the United States. I believe that the revenue earned from such lands and resources should be used in a manner that will result in preservation and enhancement of the resource from which it emanated and to the maximum net public benefit.

In past experience, all proceeds collected from the use or lease of Federal lands and resources have not been returned to our lands and resources which is where the receipts came from. During fiscal year 1972 the Bureau of Land Management and the Forest Service, two major revenue earners, collected approximately \$900.3 million in receipts from the use or lease of Federal lands and resources which they administered. Of this total about 35 percent was deposited in Treasury general fund accounts; 19 percent was deposited in special fund accounts for distribution to States and their subdivisions; 46 percent was deposited in special Treasury accounts to finance various Federal programs relating to outdoor recreation, public land improvements, and national forest maintenance. A small amount was deposited in a special holding account pending determination of the rights to land and timber of the Tongass National Forest in Alaska.

Eighty-one percent of these proceeds could and should be reinvested in the natural capital investment we hold in trust for ourselves and future generations—our public lands.

My bill would create a natural resources trust fund in the U.S. Treasury, which would, by law, account for receipts held in a fiduciary capacity by the Government for use in carrying out specific Interior and Forest Service land and water conservation-development activities. The fund would be administered by the Secretary of the Interior and moneys from the fund would not be available for spending until appropriated by Congress. Special use funds, such as the land and water conservation fund and reclamation fund would not be repealed by this act but would receive

moneys appropriated by Congress from the trust fund.

At present, resource agency budgets are scattered throughout the President's budget. Within each natural resource agency budget, the portion attributable to land and water conservation-development programs is often not identifiable. Under the present structure, natural resource agency programs that are similar, and different programs within an agency, are almost assured of uneven treatment. Upon establishment of a national natural resources trust fund, Congress would be given the opportunity to make choices on expenditures as part of the appropriation process. Expected results of programs could be compared with the proposed costs by using a cost-benefit framework, and would require the President and Congress to consider the full implications of program and relationship between program authorization and appropriations.

Mr. Speaker, under my proposal, money received from the use or lease of our natural resources would be reinvested in our land and water resources which belong to us all.

The text of my bill is as follows:

H.R. 14950

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) there is established on the books of the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be known as the National Natural Resources Trust Fund (hereinafter referred to as the "trust fund"), which shall be administered by the Secretary of the Interior (hereinafter referred to as the "Secretary"). Amounts in the trust fund shall be available, as provided by appropriation Acts, for developing and maintaining the public lands for the purposes and uses which have been authorized by applicable Federal law and to make payments to other special funds, such as the Land and Water Conservation Fund, for the purposes of such funds.

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, there shall be deposited into the trust fund, from time to time, all revenues derived from any use fee, lease, permit, royalty, or other receipt relating to any parcel of the public land.

Sec. 2. (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to hold the trust fund, and to report to the Congress not later than the first day of April of each year on the financial condition and the results of the operations of the trust fund during the preceding fiscal year and on its expected condition and operations during each fiscal year thereafter. Such report shall be printed as a House document of the session of the Congress to which the report is made.

(b) It shall be the duty of the Secretary to invest such portion of the trust fund as is not, in his judgment, required to meet current withdrawals. Such investments may be made only in interest-bearing obligations of the United States or in obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States. For such purpose such obligations may be acquired (1) on original issue at the issue price, or (2) by purchase of outstanding obligations at the market price. The purposes for which obligations of the United States may be issued under the Second Liberty Bond Act, as amended, are hereby extended to authorize the issuance at par of special obligations exclusively to the trust fund. Such special obligations shall bear in-

terest at a rate equal to the average rate of interest, computed as to the end of the calendar month next preceding the date of such issue, borne by all marketable interest-bearing obligations of the United States then forming a part of the Public Debt; except that where such average rate is not a multiple of one-eighth of 1 percent, the rate of interest of such special obligations shall be the multiple of one-eighth of 1 percent next lower than such average rate. Such special obligations shall be issued only if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the purchase of other interest-bearing obligations of the United States, or of obligations guaranteed as to both principal and interest by the United States on original issue or at the market price, is not in the public interest. Advances to the trust fund pursuant to subsection (d) shall not be invested.

(c) Any obligation acquired by the trust fund (except special obligations issued exclusively to the trust fund) may be sold by the Secretary at the market price, and such special obligations may be redeemed at part plus accrued interest.

(d) The interest on, and the proceeds from the sale or redemption of, any obligations held in the trust fund shall be credited to and form a part of the trust fund.

(e) Advances made pursuant to subsection (d) shall be repaid, and interest on such advances shall be paid, to the general fund of the Treasury when the Secretary determines that moneys are available in the trust fund for such purposes. Such interest shall be at rates computed in the same manner as provided in subsection (b)(2) for special obligations and shall be compounded annually.

SEC. 3. For the purposes of this Act, the term "public land" shall include all land owned, leased, or held by the United States, except land administered by the—

(a) Secretary of Defense;

(b) Administrator of the General Service Administration; and

(c) Secretary of Transportation as part of the Federal Aid Highway System.

PROPERTY TAX RELIEF FOR LOW-INCOME ELDERLY HOMEOWNERS

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. SANDMAN) is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. SANDMAN. Mr. Speaker, the most pressing economic problem in the country in 1974 in my judgment is the plight of the older Americans who must live on fixed incomes despite rampant inflation.

The one asset 70 percent of the people over 65 have is now seriously threatened—that asset is ownership of a home.

The threat not only comes from inflation directly, but indirectly through ever-escalating property taxes which are crushing low-income elderly homeowners in New Jersey and all over the Nation.

LOSING THEIR HOMES

The Second Congressional District of New Jersey has one of the highest percentages of people over 65 of any district in the Nation.

Approximately 75,000 of my constituents are over the age of 65. About 70 percent of them own their own homes, and some 15,000 of those homes are owned by persons living on social security with an income of less than \$2,000 a year.

Mr. Speaker, things are getting so bad

for these low-income elderly homeowners that in my opinion, many of these homes will be lost for nonpayment of real estate taxes within the next few years.

Why? Simply because the growing property tax burden is so great that older Americans with low, fixed incomes are getting to a point where they cannot afford to pay these property taxes.

TAX RELIEF NEEDED

Clearly, some relief for these overburdened senior citizens is needed. Property taxes in most States are used to cover the costs of educating children in the public school systems, plus the costs of many municipal and State services.

People over 65 have paid their share of the costs of educating America's young people. They paid their share during the years when they most likely had children who benefited from their tax payments.

Surely now that they have retired, now that their own children have completed their schooling and have begun to pay property taxes on their own, these low-income elderly homeowners should be spared the continued burden of paying property taxes. I think so.

If these senior citizens lose their homes for nonpayment of property taxes, Mr. Speaker, the Government will be asked to provide other homes for them. It is therefore in the best interests of not only the elderly affected, but also of all of the taxpayers in the Nation to help these people save their homes.

REIMBURSEMENTS

I am today introducing legislation to provide property tax relief to low-income elderly homeowners through direct reimbursements by the Secretary of the Treasury to the eligible senior citizens.

Simply stated, my bill would provide monthly payments of up to \$40—\$480 per year maximum—to elderly homeowners whose household income is less than \$5,000 per year as reimbursement for their property taxes paid to State and local governments.

Naturally, only one claim per household would be permitted. The Internal Revenue Service would process claims along with the regular annual personal income tax. This will eliminate the need to establish some vast new Federal bureaucracy to administer this plan.

POSITIVE EFFECTS

This proposed legislation, which supporters of it in my district are calling "Older Americans' Tax Savings" or OATS, will have many positive effects on the target group, low-income elderly homeowners.

For example, where total property taxes accrued for a home occupied by eligible senior citizens is \$480 per year or less, this program will reimburse the entire amount directly to the homeowner in monthly payments of up to \$40.

In my home State of New Jersey, Mr. Speaker, this legislation would benefit virtually every needy elderly homeowner.

Consider the extreme cases, Mr. Speaker. There are nearly 15,000 homes

in my district that are owned by elderly people who have incomes of less than \$2,000 per year.

The average real estate tax bill in New Jersey is approximately \$600 per year. Under State law, one senior citizen in each household is entitled to a tax credit of \$160 per year, provided that his total income is less than \$5,000 for the year.

In other words, the average net payment by the senior citizens who live in these 15,000 homes is presently about \$440, a terrible blow to their budgets which are already below the poverty line. My bill would lift that burden from their shoulders altogether.

THE RIGHT DIRECTION

Mr. Speaker, I do not claim that this Older Americans' Tax Savings legislation is the entire answer to the problems facing our financially troubled senior citizens.

This legislation, for example does not cover the elderly who rent their homes or apartments nor does it cover those older Americans who live with relatives. It does focus attention on the biggest problem group: those over 65 who own their own homes and who face the loss of them as financial pressures build on their limited budgets.

It is estimated that this program will cost roughly \$4 billion a year to do the job nationally. That is what we are spending to operate the Environmental Protection Agency this year. I am convinced the goal of saving the homes of our parents, grandparents, and other older Americans is as important in terms of priorities as is the goal of protecting the environment. We must do both.

I have advocated a way to pay for this program, Mr. Speaker. In separate legislation, I intend soon to propose again that the Federal excise tax on alcoholic beverages, which last year took in over \$5 billion, should be dedicated to pay for this Older Americans' Tax Savings plan.

In the coming weeks, I am very hopeful that the Ways and Means Committee of the House will see fit to consider this proposal and include it in tax reform legislation. It is sorely needed.

PAYING TRIBUTE TO NATION'S SMALL BUSINESSES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. MILLER) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLER. Mr. Speaker, it is with a great deal of pleasure that I join with many in the Congress and across the Nation during the period of May 19–25 in honor of National Small Business Week, 1974.

In proclaiming National Small Business Week, President Nixon said:

From the earliest days of our history, the trader and the merchant, pushing westward, laid the foundation for what has become the world's greatest economic achievement.

The U.S. Small Business Administration—SBA—is proud to have been a part of that achievement. Today, 19 out of

every 20 firms are considered small business. They provide approximately 35 million jobs and contribute more than \$476 billion annually to the gross national product.

Since SBA was created in 1953 with the specific purpose of "aid, counsel, assist, and protect" the interests of small business, the number of small firms has increased from 6 million to nearly 9 million.

During the fiscal year 1973, SBA: Provided more than \$2.2 billion in guaranteed and direct loans to small businesses;

Made 215,000 disaster loans totaling \$1.5 billion; and

Funded \$141 million to community development programs.

As the president noted in his proclamation:

The history of America is in large measure the history of independent enterprise.

Having dealt on countless occasions with the small businessmen of southeastern Ohio, I have found a very distinct link between the concern of these people for their particular enterprises and the welfare of the communities they serve and the people with whom they associate. They are concerned people who have historically looked beyond the front door of their businesses to the challenges that face their hometowns. The pride they have taken in making our small businesses so vital to the Nation's economic health is exhibited to an equal degree in the pride they take in their respective towns, their fellow citizens and their country.

SOL MARKS OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE RETIRES

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. EILBERG) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. EILBERG. Mr. Speaker, Gen. Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, has informed me that Sol Marks, District Director of the New York district of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, will retire on May 24, 1974. He has had a distinguished career with the Service and has made a significant contribution to the immigration field. He began his career in 1935 as a stenographer and went on to become immigration officer where he developed a comprehensive understanding of the immigration and naturalization laws. Sol Marks then became an adjudicator in the central office and for the remainder of his career, he was appointed District Director where his managerial skills led to important changes in the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Sol Marks developed and utilized new administrative techniques, one of which was to permit 100 hearings to be heard and completed per day in the district. His requirement that total staff meetings

be held regularly in a district operation has led not only to a rapid dissemination of information, but to high morale among the employees. He was also responsible during his New York tenure for selecting the first female district investigator and the first female shipboarding inspector.

Other administrative improvements which are credited to him include "group training" for supervisors, a newsletter for employees, and the creation of a position for a district training officer. Monthly meetings with employees of the Immigration and Naturalization Lawyers Association and a Union of Immigration Employees contributed to the smooth operation of his district and the human enforcement of the law.

Sol Marks did not confine his talents to the operation of the district. In his effort to promote an understanding of the immigration law, he lectured at various colleges, before the bar association of the city of New York, the Society of Foreign Consuls of the United Nations, and at the Practicing Law Institute. He has catered to the public's right to know about immigration policies by participating in television discussions especially in connection with the media's interest in widely publicized and often misunderstood immigration cases. He testified before congressional committees and was always an informed witness.

I extend to Sol Marks my best wishes for the future.

At this time I wish to include in the RECORD an article published by Newsday in June of 1971 about Sol Marks when he was appointed district director for the New York office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service:

SOL LANDS ON HIS "MOON"

At age 57, Sol Marks is soft-spoken, trim and athletic, and enjoying the fruits of what he terms his own personal climb to the moon. He is the new district director for the New York office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and it took him 35 years to reach that plateau, which includes a beautiful view of New York harbor. The view from his lower Manhattan office also takes in Ellis Island, where his father landed as an immigrant at the turn of the century, and where Marks received his first assignment when he became an immigrant inspector in 1935.

In government service, there is no guarantee that a man's education, knowledge and experience qualifies him for a position as critical as that of chief of the nation's largest immigration office. But Sol Marks made it without political clout or connections and the 750 immigration employees he now directs are virtually unanimous in their approval of his selection.

Ed Kavazanjian, congressional liaison officer for the National Council of Immigration Officers, put it this way:

"Mr. Marks' appointment was like a breath of fresh air. It proved almost for the first time that there is such a thing as a merit system and it has encouraged the people in the office to feel that good work can be rewarded."

Sol Marks was a Brooklyn boy who had made New York City's all-scholastic basketball team as a product of Alexander Hamilton High School in 1931. He was attending the City College of New York when he decided to take a civil service exam. Sitting, Saturday, on the sundeck of his comfortable home at 566 East Chester St., Long Beach,

he reminisced about a young student's problems in the early days of the depression.

"I had finished a couple of years at CCNY and I had seen the headlines and the men on the corners selling apples. There was no money around even to keep me in a free-tuition school, so I decided to reach for the moon. Civil service was the only answer, it seemed, for security. I passed the exam and had no idea where they'd put me. The next thing I knew I was an immigration inspector on Ellis Island."

The job was to take him to many places, but wherever his assignment, Sol Marks always found time to take night courses. In 1950, he received his bachelor of law degree from George Washington University in Washington, where he was working as a special projects officer in the main immigration office.

He spent three years in Burlington, Vt., as assistant regional commissioner for the Northeast area in charge of travel control. And then he was reassigned to New York, climbing for his moon, scaling the ladder until he was appointed assistant district director under Peter Esperdy, who retired last July.

Marks was named director six weeks ago. Competing for the job was Thomas Gibney, the district's other assistant director, who members of the immigration officers union contend had powerful support from several congressmen. Gibney, who had reached the mandatory retirement age of 70, had asked for a waiver to extend his service. It was turned down and Marks received his appointment.

"One of the first things I set out to do," he said, "was improve morale in the department. All these years I've been working there, I had one particular peeve. A man would get a promotion and a file clerk would put it in his basket like any other inter-office memo. It seemed such a cold way of giving a man a piece of good news. I've put in a new system. When an employee gets a promotion, I make it my business to come to his desk and gather his friends and colleagues and say a few words of appreciation for his efforts.

"We've got the kind of guys working for us who may have accumulated 2,000 hours of sick leave. Maybe 300 working days they could have taken off and didn't. Nobody ever seemed to appreciate that kind of service before, and I thought it would be a good idea to at least let these men know we know about their efforts. So we give them a plaque and a certificate. I know it doesn't sound like much, but at least it shows we're on the same team."

Sol Marks had seen a good deal of change in the immigration service since he first started working for it. Mostly, he thinks, for the better. "A hearing officer used to arrest, prosecute, judge and carry out the sentence of deportation for an illegal alien. Now the laws have been changed to give him an eminently fairer trial. Sometimes it would take months for a man to get a hearing. Now it can be a ***."

"When Robert Kennedy was attorney general, he said one thing about immigration that I hope I never forget. He told the commissioner of immigration to 'show heart as well as muscle.'"

And now District Director Marks, just returned from an hour of tennis and a mile jog, sat on a chaise on his day off. "I know how the astronauts felt when they landed on the moon," he said.

MEMORIAL DAY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Diggs) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Speaker, on May 27, our Nation commemorates Memorial Day. It is a time to pay tribute to those heroic men and women who gave their lives in the service of their country. These men and women made the ultimate sacrifice that this Nation might remain free and strong, and we can never hope to repay the debt which we owe to them and their families. We can, however, express our unending gratitude to those who died for freedom and renew our pledge that we and future generations of Americans will always honor and cherish their memory. The strength and freedom of the democracy which they preserved for us stands as the greatest tribute to their courage and sacrifice.

Mr. Speaker, we do not do justice to the memory of those who died for their country if we do not meet our responsibility to the living—to the millions of veterans who fought selflessly and who deserve our support. As we approach Memorial Day, I take this opportunity to alert my colleagues to the fact that Congress stands on the brink of abdicating its responsibility to hundreds of thousands of these veterans. We have for several months now talked of improving educational opportunities for the Vietnam-era veteran. The House has passed a bill, and the Senate is in the final drafting stages of their measure. One of the things we have been working on is a 2-year extension of the eligibility period for those veterans whose education benefits are due to expire on May 31. These veterans are counting on us. Most of them must register for school this week, and they need the assurance that GI benefits will be forthcoming. We are talking about some 300,000 young veterans to whom we have a responsibility. The Senate and House must get together now and pass the 2-year extension. We can continue to debate and baffle for meaningful improvements in the GI bill; I wholeheartedly support the broadest reforms possible. However, we cannot jeopardize the rights and future of those veterans whose benefits are running out in a few days. We must enact the 2-year extension without further delay and then continue to fight for meaningful improvements in the GI bill. This is a responsibility we have to those who served.

THE TELEVISION INTERVIEW— PRIME MINISTER BALTHAZAR VORSTER OF SOUTH AFRICA, BY WILLIAM BUCKLEY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Diggs) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. DIGGS. Mr. Speaker, the television interview of Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster, of South Africa, by William Buckley, was widely viewed here in the United States. In this interview, Mr. Vorster manipulated historical fact and contemporary realities in an effort to present South Africa's apartheid policies as beneficial.

The following articles from South Africa and British newspapers, in response to the interview, illustrate with greater accuracy the current realities in South Africa. I would like to insert them in the RECORD for the thoughtful consideration of my colleagues.

The first article, which appeared in the London Times of April 23, 1974, reflects general dissent from right and left-wing sources in South Africa of Mr. Vorster's statements:

MR. VORSTER ANGERS FRIEND AND FOE WITH U.S. TELEVISION DENIAL OF RACE DISCRIMINATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

Statements made by Mr. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, during an American television interview have caused a furor here, two days before the general election, because of their misleading nature.

Mr. Vorster claimed that only communists were banned without trial in the Republic, that they were entitled to be given reasons for their banning and could have the banning orders lifted if they proved they were not communists. This was, he said, "the easiest thing in the world."

He also suggested that pay differences were caused by lack of skills rather than colour discrimination, that there were no disparities in income between whites and blacks and that job reservation regulations did not hinder blacks.

Government opponents here have been angered and astounded by Mr. Vorster's assertions, made during an interview with Mr. William Buckley, the right-wing television interviewer and shown nationally in the United States at the weekend.

Professors of law at Natal and Witwatersrand Universities have pointed out that many people who were clearly not communists have been banned, that reasons for banning are very seldom given and that in practice it is impossible to have a banning order set aside by the Supreme Court.

Both right and left-wing trade union leaders have contradicted Mr. Vorster's claims regarding labour affairs.

Mr. Gert Beetge, a right-wing union leader, said Mr. Vorster's statements on job reservation conflicted with a cardinal pillar of the Nationalist Party's labour policy, which was that a white worker could not, to his detriment, be replaced by a non-white worker.

The Prime Minister's claim that "in general, employers in South Africa could fire lazy whites and replace them with industrious blacks" caused Mr. Arthur Grobelaar, a left-wing union leader, to express "stunned surprise at Mr. Vorster's ignorance of labour practices".

The distorted impressions were caused in the interview mostly by what Mr. Vorster failed to say. For example he said that Government legislation outlawed pay discrimination on colour grounds but failed to mention that it specifically does not apply to the Government, provincial or local authorities.

Black doctors and nurses, for instance, are paid far less than their white counterparts for exactly the same work.

Mr. Harry Schwarz, the leader of the opposition United Party, has now challenged Mr. Vorster to make his television claims a reality in South Africa.

"However, he omits to mention that this Act is not applicable to the Central Government itself, to Provincial Administrations and to local authorities—and it is mainly here that serious discrimination in earnings exists and has done for many years.

"There are large gaps in the earnings between White doctors and nurses and their

Coloured and African counterparts who have the same training.

"These gaps are also found among people who do skilled artisan and semi-skilled operative work," he said.

Mrs. Helen Suzman, Progressive Party MP for Houghton, agreed that Mr. Vorster did not appear to be conversant with the Industrial Conciliation Act.

"If a lazy White man who is in a closed shop occupation is fired there is not the slightest chance of employing a Black man in his place.

"The Government has also always encouraged the conventional colour bar and this too inhibits the replacement of Whites by Blacks," she said.

An African Bantustan leader denies Mr. Vorster's claim that Africans were satisfied with the land reserved for them in South Africa, in the following Rand Daily Mail article of April 22, 1974:

MANGOPE SAYS: I DO NOT AGREE

Chief Lucas Mangope, Chief Minister of Bophutha-Tswana, disagreed yesterday with information the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, gave an American interviewer on television at the weekend.

Mr. Vorster, interviewed by Mr. William Buckley in a programme screened before millions of American television viewers at the weekend, was asked about the 14 per cent of land "reserved" for the homelands.

Mr. Vorster told his interviewer: "It is not a question of it being reserved of them."

Mr. Vorster then told how the African tribes had moved down from the middle of Africa at the time the Whites were moving up from the Cape.

He also told about the passing of the 1936 Land Act.

Mr. Buckley then asked: "Your point is that, historically, that land which is theirs continues to be theirs."

Mr. Vorster told him: "They settled that land; they picked that land. And let me say that, from an agricultural and rainfall point of view, it is the best land in South Africa."

Chief Mangope said last night: "I don't agree that, historically, we are satisfied. In fact the 1936 Land Act dispossessed us of land."

On the point of the land being the best in South Africa, Chief Mangope claimed that all the Homelands shared only 20 per cent of the fertile land of the country.

The General Secretary of the Trade Union Council of South Africa points out in the April 22, 1974, Rand Daily Mail that the Prime Minister's statements on labor practices contradict the actual procedures of the Ministry of Labor:

VORSTER "STUNS" TUCSA CHIEF

The general secretary of the Trade Union Council of South Africa, Mr. Arthur Grobelaar, said last night he was stunned by some of the assertions made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, about South Africa's labour policies and practices in his American television interview.

Mr. Grobelaar was referring to Mr. Vorster's claims that: In general, employers in South Africa could fire lazy Whites and replace them with industrious Blacks and that pay discrimination was based on differences in skills rather than skin colour.

Mr. Gert Beetge, Rightwing trade union leader and a leading light in the Herstigte Nasionale Party, said Mr. Vorster had directly contradicted the National Party's labour policy as set out in its election manifesto.

This policy rested on four pillars, the first and most cardinal one stating: "A White

worker may not, to his detriment, be replaced by a Non-White worker."

Mr. Beetge said Mr. Vorster had now "displayed a credibility gap as wide as the Colorado Canyon".

IGNORANCE

Mr. Grobelaar said Mr. Vorster's statements directly contradicted the practices of the Minister of Labour, Mr. Marais Viljoen, and he was "stunned by the Prime Minister's ignorance".

The Minister of Labour has consistently stated that no Non-White will ever replace a White as long as there are Whites available for the job." Mr. Grobelaar said.

On pay discrimination, he said: "The Prime Minister correctly states that the Industrial Conciliation Act outlaws discrimination in earnings.

THIRD ANNIVERSARY OF CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. FOLEY) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, today, May 22, marks the third anniversary of the Constitution of the Republic of Sri Lanka which was adopted by its people in 1972. This document declared Sri Lanka a Republic and pledged to advance "the fundamental rights and freedoms of all citizens." When Sri Lanka achieved its independence in 1948 the late Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike stated on that occasion that achieving political freedom for the people had no meaning unless it was accompanied by the larger economic freedoms of freedom from want, poverty, hunger, and disease.

From that moment on, the Government of Sri Lanka has consistently sought to give this economic content to its political independence and instituted a wide variety of remarkable measures in the areas of education, health, and living standards. Much of the success of these programs was possible, because Sri Lanka had enjoyed a comparatively favorable balance of trade, but as is the case with many developing countries, the increasing prices of essential imports has more than outpaced the prices realized from her exports even though vigorous and successful efforts have been instituted to quantitatively increase such exports. Sri Lanka has recently completed successful negotiations with the IBRD and the IMF which decided to extend economic assistance to help that nation continue its growth and development.

It was my personal pleasure to have had the opportunity to visit Sri Lanka and to meet with many of its citizens and government officials and discuss with them problems of great mutual interest. I was then and continue to be deeply impressed by the determination and ability of the citizens and Government of Sri Lanka to continue the record of achievement that country has established in domestic and international affairs.

I take this opportunity to extend my

best wishes to the Government of Sri Lanka on the occasion of the third anniversary of its Republic Day.

EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOAN TO SOVIET UNION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. GINN) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. GINN. Mr. Speaker, the U.S. Export-Import Bank has approved a \$180 million low-interest loan to the Soviet Union as part of a \$400 million deal to build a giant fertilizer manufacturing complex in the Soviet Union. This is the largest American loan of its type to the Soviets in our history.

The bank credit will be financed with funds raised by the Export-Import Bank through its resources as a Government agency and using financial resources established initially by Government appropriations. The loan is at a bargain base-
ment rate of 6 percent. As we all know, U.S. banks are now loaning money to their best American commercial customers at 11.5 percent or more.

Mr. Speaker, I have spoken out many times against this kind of loan to the Soviets. I and many of my colleagues have joined in legislation to prohibit the loans. The desperate need of the legislation has been underscored by this latest loan approval. It is so outrageous that it defied comprehension.

At the same time our Nation's farming communities are in the grip of the most severe fertilizer crisis in recent history, the U.S. government is bankrolling fertilizer factories in the Soviet Union.

Some farmers in the First District of Georgia are facing bankruptcy, because they cannot get enough fertilizer to salvage their corn crops. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has told me that it is powerless to help, but now another arm of the U.S. Government is doling out millions of dollars to build fertilizer factories in the Soviet Union.

Georgia farmers this week are beginning to blow up corn crops in a desperate attempt to plant other crops that do not require nitrogen fertilizer. Some farmers, who have already treated their crops with insecticide, do not even have this option, because the insecticide would kill new plantings. How can I explain to those farmers why we have no resources to help them, but we have \$180 million to manufacture fertilizer in Russia.

Mr. Speaker, if we do not stop this loan, every Member of Congress is going to face his own personal impeachment trial at the ballot box the next time he goes before his home State voters. The White House is railroading this loan through at top speed as part of its plan of détente with the Soviets. We may win some kind of phony peace with the Russians, but we will start a war in every rural community in the United States.

We are told that this loan will help ease our own fertilizer crisis, because ultimately we will be able to buy Soviet fertilizer made at the new plants. That

argument itself, Mr. Speaker, should be enough to defeat the loan altogether. Surely we learned some kind of lesson about the reliability of foreign resources during the Arab oil embargo. In that instance, the Soviet Union itself urged the Arabs to shut off our oil supplies. Why should we expect the Soviets to guarantee fertilizer supplies?

The fertilizer crisis is a fact, and it has hit or will hit every farming community in America. Farmers last year answered the call of the administration to plant every extra inch of land available to increase production.

Now they find that the Government ignored the fact that there would be no fertilizer to support that planting.

The Government is standing by while farmers may be financially ruined by Government error. There is no money to salvage American farmers struggling to feed other Americans, but there is money to build fertilizer factories in Russia. That is a sorry commentary on our Government.

Legislation is pending now which would block this loan to the Soviets. It must be approved.

STUDENT ASSISTANCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. O'HARA) is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Speaker, I have today introduced a bill to make certain amendments to title IV of the Higher Education Act. Title IV of the act deals with student financial assistance, and the Special Subcommittee on Education, of which I am chairman, is currently in the midst of extended hearings on student assistance, with the intention of reporting to this House this year a new title IV, which I hope we can have on the statute books well before the current law expires.

The bill I am today introducing does only one thing. It strikes all the expiration dates on student assistance programs, and extends them for 3 more years. Most of those expiration dates are June 30, 1975. One or two later dates involve residual authority on loan programs which are nonetheless scheduled to expire on June 30, 1975.

I am not introducing this bill, because I believe for one moment that all we are going to have to do in the new title IV is to extend existing law for 3 more years. I think there are going to have to be changes, some of major proportions, some of rather minor substance. I do not know yet, and I hope all of us can keep our judgments under control until the hearings have brought us the mature views of experts and practitioners in this field, what the new title IV should be.

But I have introduced this legislation today in order to preserve the subcommittee's legislative options, and to give us a base on which to construct the real new title IV.

INDIA'S TEST OF A NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, this weekend India announced that at 10:35 p.m. EDT, on May 17, 1974, a nuclear explosive was tested in northwest India. The device was tested at a burial depth of 100 meters—330 feet. Its yield was approximately 15 kilotons. It was stated that the device produced a crater and released a small amount of radioactivity. According to the announcement of the Indian Government, the test was for the purpose of developing nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes such as mining and earth moving.

Fundamentally, I believe the situation is a setback to our nuclear weapons non-proliferation course and, therefore, an unfortunate one. There is no significant difference between a basic device for peaceful purposes and a basic atomic weapon. The device used was apparently an all-Indian product, the result of India's natural uranium reactor, and its own processing and fabrication activities. The net effect is that a sixth nation must be added to the list of countries with nuclear weapons capability. In my view, this is bound to have an unstabilizing effect in the field of international relations. I do not know what India will do next. Conceivably she could stop at this point and make no more nuclear devices. She certainly could avoid embarking on a program to develop delivery systems. But the effect on other potential weapons' nations will be irreversible. In the face of this unsettling development, we must continue and intensify our efforts to reduce proliferation.

Those who have followed the progress of various nations in the nuclear field cannot be surprised by this technical accomplishment of India. Going back to the 1940's the late Dr. Homi Bhabha, first chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission, started to build up competence in the nuclear field. India has an Atomic Research Center in Trombay, now named the Bhabha Atomic Research Center—BARC—with a staff of nearly 10,000, of which 2,000 are scientists. Three research reactors are located at BARC. India also has its own sources of uranium and thorium, reactor fuel manufacturing plants and chemical reprocessing facilities. The chemical reprocessing plant, which is capable of extracting plutonium from irradiated fuel elements, started operation in 1964.

In addition India has two U.S.-type power reactors which began operation in 1969. A total of four Canadian-type heavy water moderated, natural uranium fueled reactors are also in various phases of startup or construction. These power facilities are subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards inspection to assure that material is not diverted for other purposes.

India has had a 40-thermal megawatt research reactor under operation

since the early 1960's. This is the Canada-India reactor—CIRUS—which utilizes natural uranium and heavy water. Such a reactor could produce 6 to 10 kilograms of plutonium per year, depending on its operating schedule. This reactor is not subject to inspection, but the Canadians were assured by the Indians that the reactor would be used only for peaceful purposes. However, use of the material produced by this reactor for the device tested last week would have been consistent with the Indian view that the application under development was a peaceful one. The event means that India has gone ahead and spent the time, money and effort to develop nuclear explosives, and now has the proven ability to produce them.

Here is a tabulation of the significant test dates for the six countries with demonstrated atomic explosive capability.

SIGNIFICANT DATES IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING—WESTERN HEMISPHERE DATES

UNITED STATES

First atomic device—July 16, 1945.
First thermonuclear device—October 31, 1952.

U.S.S.R.

First atomic device—October 29, 1949.
First thermonuclear device—August 12, 1953.

UNITED KINGDOM

First atomic device—October 3, 1952.
First thermonuclear device—May 15, 1957.

FRANCE

First atomic device—February 13, 1960.
First thermonuclear device—September 24, 1966.

COMMUNIST CHINA

First atomic device—October 16, 1964.
First thermonuclear device—June 17, 1967.

INDIA

First atomic device—May 17, 1974.

We must continue to strive to obtain adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. India, incidentally, along with a number of countries, is not as yet a signatory. We must also continue our efforts to support such international organizations as the International Atomic Energy Agency in its efforts to audit and inspect nuclear activities to assure that materials are not diverted for nuclear explosives. The United States in connection with its cooperative nuclear power agreement with India has entered into a multilateral agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and India which provides for the application of IAEA safeguards to materials, equipment, or devices we supply under our program. Safeguards against diversion of nuclear material for military purposes must be carried out on an international basis. Accordingly our efforts must be strengthened in support of such efforts as IAEA.

I would like to insert in the RECORD at the close of my statement two brief articles and an editorial from this morning's Washington Post commenting on India's nuclear test:

NUCLEAR AGENCY'S SAFEGUARD NOTED: INDIA USED OWN MATERIAL, UNITED STATES FEELS

(By Dan Morgan)

U.S. officials expressed strong doubt yesterday that India used fissionable material orig-

inating in this country to detonate its first nuclear explosion Friday.

A spokesman for the Atomic Energy Commission said that since 1969 the agency has supplied India with 141,000 kilograms of uranium enriched to 2 to 3 per cent purity, for use in the American-built 400-megawatt electric power reactor in Tarapur, 50 miles north of Bombay.

However, the spokesman said, all the material was supplied under international safeguards that require accountability of the material after it is used.

"We are satisfied that the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard system has worked," the official said. "We have no reason to believe that the material (used in the explosion) came from the United States."

Government experts said yesterday that it was technically feasible for India to have produced the explosion, which took place in the Great Indian Desert in Rajasthan, from locally mined and locally processed materials.

Asked yesterday if the Soviet Union or some other country had supplied the material, Indian Ambassador T. N. Kaul said "absolutely not." He added:

"We have scrupulously observed our agreements with the U.S. and Canada and produced this entirely indigenously. It is a great tribute to our scientists that we could do so."

State Department spokesman John King said in reference to the entry of India into the five-member nuclear club:

"The U.S. has always been against nuclear proliferation for the adverse impact it will have on world stability."

Ambassador Kaul took issue with this, saying that the explosion was for peaceful purposes and couldn't affect world stability.

However, diplomats here scoffed at India's assertions that the newly unleashed power was solely for industrial mining or similar purposes.

"This is rather pitiful," said one diplomat. "The United States, and the Soviet Union, with far more advanced technology, have had enough trouble using nuclear explosives for peaceful applications."

Some diplomats took the view that the Indian explosion might put pressure on the United States and the Soviet Union to halt their own underground testing program. Many countries such as India resent the fact that the superpowers have gone ahead with refinements of their nuclear explosives while admonishing other nations against "proliferation."

India signed the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty, but not the 1968 non-proliferation treaty.

Canada helped India build a 40-megawatt natural uranium research reactor in Trombay in 1960, under bilateral controls prohibiting non-peaceful end uses for the uranium but differences arose over the interpretation of this. India maintains that the explosion was for peaceful purposes.

India has no enrichment plant of its own. But it does have uranium supplies. One by-product of the natural uranium used in reactors such as the one at Trombay is plutonium used in bombs. The plutonium must be separated from other waste products in a complicated process. A facility for such a process exists at Trombay.

AROUND THE WORLD: INDIA HINTS OF SECOND A-BLAST

BOMBAY.—Chairman Homi Sethna of India's Atomic Energy Commission said yesterday the country may set off a second nuclear explosion soon if it is felt that more data is required.

Sethna said a complete evaluation of India's first nuclear test in the western Indian desert last Saturday would take six

months and there could be more explosions after that.

Sethna denied that India had broken international commitments by exploding the bomb. His denial was in response to criticism voiced by Canadian External Affairs Minister Mitchell Sharp.

Sharp said Canada had cooperated with Indian research into nuclear energy on condition that it be confined to peaceful purposes. He said Canada saw no distinction between nuclear explosions for peaceful and military purposes.

Earlier, Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram said in an interview that India would never use its nuclear capacity for military purposes.

"Our armed forces know this is not for their use," Jagjivan told the Indian Express.

At the United Nations in New York, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim expressed "serious concern" over the Indian nuclear explosion.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR BOMB

India's "peaceful nuclear explosion experiment" is, first of all, the test of a bomb. Not only is there no real distinction between a military and peaceful explosion, but even the United States, with all its time and technology, has yet to find a single feasible peaceful use for nuclear explosives. For India to call its explosion "peaceful" and to abjure all military intent is, in a word, rubbish. It is immaterial that other countries, in going nuclear, have used the same hyperbole. Indian scientists, if not Indian politicians, are too knowledgeable to claim otherwise with a straight face. The fact is that India, which has long had the capability to do so, has now gone nuclear in the political-military sense. It becomes the first country in 10 years—an interval which many had hoped would itself create a permanent barrier against new members—to join the nuclear club.

Its "right" to join is undisputed: it is a sovereign state. Nor can it be faulted for violating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, which it never accepted. New Delhi did accept the partial test-ban treaty forbidding underground tests which vent and spew fallout across national frontiers, but no such pollution has been reported—so far. Certainly no American or Russian or Briton or Frenchman or Chinese can fairly contend that his country has set an example of nuclear restraint deserving emulation by other states. Nor have the first five members of the nuclear club made the international environment so safe and orderly that no "nth" country could possibly have political reason to make its own bomb.

For all this, the Indian explosion is the height of irresponsibility. Whatever the supposed gains in national pride and governmental prestige and regional political standing, the blast can only further aggravate Pakistan's fears of Indian domination and slow the normalization process that had been unfolding recently in the South Asia subcontinent. In a wider orbit, the Indian test will in effect license and strengthen in various other countries—Japan comes quickly to mind—the internal forces partial to building national nuclear bombs. Many people and many nations have become habituated to the existence of nuclear weapons, but their proliferation is no more safe and acceptable now for having been out of our immediate consciousness in recent years. The United Nations is scheduled to hold a conference next year to review and firm up the non-proliferation treaty. The conference and its cause have been dealt a heavy blow.

But the most disturbing aspect of India's "achievement" is that Mrs. Gandhi's government could have chosen to spend on it tens if not hundreds of millions of dollars that

could have been so much better spent on the needs of the Indian people. In the light of the immense and growing privation spread through India, it is appalling that a symbolic prestige project has taken priority over steps to alleviate mass poverty. India is asking the United States for food and economic aid these days. Americans can hardly avoid asking in turn to what extent their help merely serves to buy India a nuclear bomb.

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR A STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

(Mr. PRICE of Illinois asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PRICE of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD I include herewith a press release announcing formation of a special panel to study the transportation of nuclear materials:

JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC ENERGY ANNOUNCES PLANS FOR A STUDY OF TRANSPORTATION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS

Congressman Mel Price, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, announced the selection of a special panel to study the transportation of nuclear materials from the standpoints of nuclear health and safety and the safeguarding of special nuclear material.

Chairman Price, in a speech on the House floor on April 24, which was released along with related documents on April 26, stated his intention to set up such a panel to look into the shipment of radioisotopes, enriched uranium and plutonium, and related activities, and to report to the Committee its findings and recommendations respecting health and safety aspects and the protection of such materials from loss or diversion.

The panel announced by Congressman Price will be composed of the following members:

Mr. John T. Conway (Chairman of the Panel), Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Board of Consolidated Edison Company. Formerly Special Agent of the FBI and Executive Director of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Mr. Conway is a lawyer and engineer.

Mr. Carmine S. Bellino, formerly Administrative Assistant to J. Edgar Hoover and in charge of the FBI's Accounting Unit. Mr. Bellino is a certified public accountant. He has performed a special survey of the safeguarding of nuclear materials for the AEC.

Dr. K. Z. Morgan, Professor, Nuclear Engineering Department, Georgia Institute of Technology. Formerly Director of Oak Ridge National Laboratory Health Physics Division (1943-72) and Cosmic Ray Physicist.

Mr. John G. Palfrey, Professor of Law at Columbia, formerly Dean, Columbia College, Atomic Energy Commissioner, Fellow Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard, and Chairman of the AEC's Advisory Committee on Nuclear Materials Safeguards.

Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, Chairman of International Research and Technology Corporation. Formerly consultant to International Atomic Energy Agency on international safeguards of nuclear materials, Deputy Director, Defense Atomic Support Agency, and staff member of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory.

Mr. William Wegner, Deputy Director of

Naval Reactors Division of AEC with special responsibilities in regard to nuclear materials.

In announcing the selection of the panel, Congressman Price said:

"I am very pleased that these gentlemen have agreed to undertake this study. They are individuals highly knowledgeable in the various fields involved in the handling of nuclear materials. I am sure the Committee and the public will benefit from their review. I want to thank them publicly for taking on this task."

Congressman Price stated that he has asked the panel to aim to complete its review in 2 or 3 months in order that any unsatisfactory conditions which may be found to exist can be quickly corrected.

MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH

(Mr. KOCH asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. KOCH. Mr. Speaker, Dr. Fred Seligman testified last Friday before the House Ways and Means Committee on behalf of the Association of Children and Youth Directors, the Ambulatory Pediatric Association, and the American Public Health Association on national health plan proposals. His testimony which focused on programs for mothers and children was excellent.

For the information of our colleagues, I am appending that testimony:

TESTIMONY OF FRED SELIGMAN, M.D., M.P.H., ON THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE TO THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee on Ways and Means, I appreciate the opportunity to present to you testimony concerning HR 13870, a bill amending the Social Security Act and establishing a Comprehensive National Health Insurance Program.

I am Fred Seligman, M.D., M.P.H., Director, Division of Comprehensive Health Care, Associate Professor of Pediatrics and Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Miami School of Medicine, Miami, Florida. I am here as Chairman of the Association of Children and Youth Project Directors. In this capacity I represent the staffs of the sixty-eight Children and Youth Projects throughout the United States and the more than 500,000 children and youth who receive comprehensive health services through these programs. My remarks are also on behalf of the Ambulatory Pediatric Association, a national association of more than 700 professionals primarily from the discipline of Pediatrics. The Ambulatory Pediatric Association is the major pediatric organization in this country that is concerned with medical education and health services to children in the ambulatory or outpatient setting.

My remarks are additionally on behalf of the American Public Health Association, the major national health association in this Nation. This organization has over 25,000 active members from all health disciplines.

BASIC CONCEPTS

Mr. Chairman, the Mills-Kennedy Bill is an excellent Bill. We enthusiastically support its basic concepts. We are very much aware that the more benefits existing in national health legislation, the greater the cost. Nothing is free, especially medical care. Our intent is not to comment on the financing of the Bill other than to note that the health benefits of the Bill are worth the financial costs. We wish, instead, to refer to those aspects of the Bill that realistically can be improved by modifications resulting from these hearings.

We are especially pleased with the principles embodied in this Bill in regard to mothers and children. We are pleased with the extensive coverage for mothers and children. We endorse the improvements in this Bill relative to other National Health Plan proposals. However, we caution the House Ways and Means Committee, a Committee that historically has appreciated this Nation's lack of a strong and united voice of concern and advocacy for mothers and especially children, that unless this Committee maintains a specific vigilance for mothers and children, ultimate political compromises in the process of final passage of a National Health Program may be at the expense of needed and cost-beneficial coverage for mothers and children.

NO DEDUCTIBLE OR CO-INSURANCE FOR MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH

We are enthusiastic about the Mills-Kennedy Bill because there appears to be no deductible or co-insurance required for preventive health services to pregnant mothers, and for specified preventive and therapeutic services to children. It appears, however, that co-insurance for preventive services for mothers and children will be restored. We wish to go on record as supporting the wisdom of the concept that pre-natal care and family-planning, dental care and vision and hearing examinations for children under the age of 13 years, and well-child care for children under the age of 6 years be provided with no deductibles or co-insurance.

PHYSICIAN EXTENDER SERVICES

I call your attention to section 2051 (w) of the Mills Bill which defines the term "physician extender services". The two specialties unique to mothers and children, namely obstetrics and pediatrics, are not specifically named. As long as the Bill refers to specific specialty practice, we would propose amendments to include obstetrics-gynecology and pediatrics, as well as psychiatry and surgery. This would result in the inclusion of two of the most effective physician extenders to mothers and children, namely the nurse-midwife and the pediatric nurse practitioner.

We would additionally recommend the broadening of the definition of "physician extender services" in 2051(w) to specifically include in addition to a physician's assistant and nurse practitioner, a registered nurse, a public health nurse, a nurse-midwife, a nutritionist, a dietitian, and a social worker.

We propose a doctor of medicine or osteopathy that is an intern, resident or fellow be included in this definition because a physician trainee is, correctly, not included in the definition of a physician. Physician trainees have generally concentrated in secondary and tertiary hospitals because hospitals can be re-imburied for their services on a reasonable cost basis. Alternatively, there have been few incentives for primary care practitioners to have physician trainees in their offices, because the primary physician cannot legally be re-imburied for services provided by the trainee, although in fact this frequently is not adhered to. Allowing physician trainees to be physician extenders would encourage and expand primary and ambulatory care training.

VISION AND HEARING EXAMINATIONS

Section 2011(a)(1)(H) includes a covered service "developmental vision care services, as defined in regulations, routine eye and vision examinations, and eyeglasses, for individuals under the age of 13; and "(I) hear-

ing aids and examination therefor, for individuals under the age of 13."

We believe that the intent of these provisions is for meaningful visual and auditory preventive screening of children. The majority of such routine vision and hearing examinations of children under the age of 13 years are performed directly or under the supervision of pediatricians and family physicians. For this reason, we feel that "Part E, Secs. 205 (u) and (v), Definitions of Eye and Vision Examinations, and Hearing Aids and Examinations" require re-definition. We, therefore, suggest that a comprehensive visual system evaluation in children be defined to include assessment of visual and color acuity, ocular neuromotor functioning, and fundoscopic examination performed by a physician or other individual who may legally perform such an examination in the State in which it is performed, or by a physician-extender under his direct supervision. We define a comprehensive auditory screening evaluation in children to include assessment of the tympanic membrane, bone and air conduction and pure tone audiometry at accepted threshold levels, performed by a physician, clinical audiologist, or other individual who may legally perform such an examination in the State in which it is performed, or by a physician-extender under his direct supervision.

FORMULARY

We wish to draw your attention to Section 2047(a)(1)(A). This section defines the National Health Insurance Formulary Committee. Because children have special needs, at least one of the individuals on this Committee should be an expert in pediatric medicine or pediatric pharmacology. We additionally wish to draw your attention to Sec. 2047(2)(A) which refers to the categories of drugs within the National Health Insurance Formulary. We find the suggested therapeutic categories restrictive from a pediatric point of view, perhaps underscoring our belief, that unless such committees have inputs from professionals experienced in dealing with the unique problems of children, such needs tend to be overlooked. Antibiotics are not on the list, and should be. This omission may be an oversight. Antibiotics are not only utilized as therapeutic agents, but also as preventive agents. For example, antibiotics are used to treat children with middle ear infections to prevent hearing loss, to treat children with impetigo to prevent glomerulonephritis, to treat children with strep throat to prevent rheumatic fever and sub-acute bacterial endocarditis. We would recommend that as a minimum, antibiotic coverage be available to children under age 13 years and as a therapeutic venereal disease agent to all persons, regardless of age.

We would also disagree with the Bill's specific exclusion of phenobarbital as an anti-convulsive agent. While it may be the case that phenobarbital is considered a secondary anti-convulsant in adults, this is not the case in children. Phenobarbital is a valuable anti-convulsant in children and should be covered at least until age 13 years. Repetitive convulsions in children is an accepted cause of mental retardation and such exclusion would increase the intellectual deficits among our Nation's young. We would also recommend drug coverage until age 18 years for certain miscellaneous pharmaceuticals used in the treatment of specific childhood conditions including cystic fibrosis, phenylketonuria, and other enzyme deficiency diseases, parasitic conditions, specific behavior disorders in childhood, childhood depression, specific nutritional deficiencies including iron deficiency, and electrolyte replacement therapy on an ambulatory basis.

In addition, we would recommend the provision of inexpensive mist vaporizers for asthmatic children under age 13 years for the prevention of asthmatic attacks in children from low income families as set forth in Section 2033(b).

ACCESSIBILITY OF HEALTH RESOURCES

A major improvement of the Mills Bill compared to other legislative proposals is its recognition of the basic components of a national health plan; that is, accessibility to and development of available health resources, and removal of financial barriers. We interpret the creation of a Health Resources Development Board for the purpose of assuring "that health services covered under Titles V, XVIII, and XX of the Social Security Act are accessible to every American". We are encouraged by the broad mandate of purpose proposed in the Title IV, Sec. 401(2) amendments to the Public Health Service Act, "to accelerate and broaden current Federal Programs". However, existing Title V legislation relating to major federal programs for mothers and children restricts current Title V Programs from such acceleration unless both Titles IV and XIV as proposed in HR 13870 are modified.

STRENGTHENING CURRENT PROGRAMS

We believe the intent of the Mills Bill is not only to repeal Title XIX of the present Social Security Act and to create a new Title XX, but also, to retain and strengthen current programs and services covered under Titles V and XVIII (programs and services to mothers and children, and the aged, respectively). I wish to compliment the wisdom of this Committee's Chairman in joining with Senator Kennedy in proposing this. On November 16, 1971, I appeared before this same Committee on the subject of National Health Insurance proposals and at that time stated "... if in the judgment of this committee, the counsel of our Association be considered wise and visionary, a national health plan should ultimately be phased into and expanded upon a merging of the basic triad of Title V Programs of the current Social Security Act". It appears to us that you have prudently heeded our advice, in that Title XVIII continues with amendments and Title V not only continues, but is relied upon to provide clinical resources to maximize the effectiveness of national health insurance legislation. We believe this philosophical intent is expressed in Section 1416 (c) whereby the National Health Insurance Board may assist in meeting the cost of constructing facilities for the economical delivery of covered services to persons eligible for benefits under Titles V, XVIII or XX.

TITLE V PROGRAM EXPANSION

We are not sure, however, that existing Title V Programs would be eligible for grants under Section 1416(a), whereby the Board is authorized to assist in the establishment, expansion, and operation of specific health organizations. Title V special projects—specifically Children and Youth and Maternity and Infant Care Projects—should continue to develop and expand their resources to serve a larger clientele. This expanded clientele should include the families of mothers and children served by Title V Programs. However, Children and Youth and Maternity and Infant Care Projects, because of their specialized services to mothers and children, do not provide all health service components covered under Title XX.

We propose modifying the language in Section 1416(b) referring to the financing "of planning and developing and enlargement of the scope of (health organization) services or an expansion of its resources to enable it to serve more enrollees or a larger clientele", so that Title V Programs are also

eligible for such planning and development grants.

This can be accomplished by adding to Section 1415, Sec. (a)(2)(C) "Title V Special Projects which fulfill project guidelines and which the Board finds sufficient for the primary health care of a substantial population living in the vicinity of the centers".

MENTAL HEALTH WAIVERS FOR CHILDREN

Lastly, because children do not have resources of their own we recommend for dependent children, (1) the limitation of one hundred days per calendar year for post-hospital extended day services be waived (Section 2011 (b) (1)), and (2) the thirty days of active treatment per calendar year for inpatient psychiatric hospital services, be waived (Section 2011 (b) (3)).

We would also propose a coverage limit waiver for outpatient treatment of mental illness for children under age 13 years. We recognize that psychiatric services are in short supply and costly, and that they cannot yet be provided to all segments of the population. However, families simply cannot afford to purchase extensive mental health services for their children. The result is these children simply go untreated and their mental status deteriorates even further. The result is violent anti-social behavior, drug usage, suicide, and other human and societal wastage in adolescence and adult life. Families cannot cope with their children in these instances. Child abuse is often a result. The price we ultimately pay even includes the tragedy of political assassination at the hands of these unstable adults, who had been mentally ill and psychiatrically neglected as children.

We would also propose consideration to the use of physician extenders to provide mental health services. We leave to other mental health professionals—psychiatrists, psychiatric social workers, psychologists, psychotherapists, among others—further delineation of physician extenders in the mental health field.

NATIONAL HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM

Finally, we recommend the Social Security Administration establish a Nation-wide health record system encouraging all health providers to maintain clinical health records both by family and by Social Security number, this system to be consistent with the accounts that the Social Security Administration establishes for each eligible recipient under the Comprehensive National Health Insurance Bill (Section 2034 (a)).

I would like to express my appreciation to this Committee for the opportunity to present this testimony. The leadership of this Committee has traditionally provided wise direction and support for health and welfare programs particularly for this Nation's mothers and children.

DISTRICT CONVENTION OF AMERICAN LEGION AT BROWNFIELD, TEX., SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND ADEQUATE FUNDING FOR SELECTIVE SERVICE

(Mr. MAHON asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. MAHON. Mr. Speaker, during the month of June the House is scheduled to consider the appropriations bill for Housing and Urban Development, Space, Science, Veterans. The bill will contain

certain funds for the Selective Service System.

Scheduled for a later time is the so-called Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 measure. In the consideration of that measure the House will be called upon to determine the future of the House Committee on Internal Security, the successor to the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Some time ago at a convention of the American Legion of the congressional district which I have the honor to represent, the Legion convention passed a resolution strongly urging that the House Committee on Internal Security be continued in its present status and that the Selective Service System be continued and strengthened so that it will be in a position to fully carry out its emergency responsibility. I wish to support the position of the American Legion with respect to the aforementioned resolutions.

Bill R. Neel of the Legion's resolutions committee has requested that I make known to the House the views of the American Legion of the 19th Congressional District of Texas as expressed in its district convention and I am pleased to do so. These resolutions are endorsed by Harry Riggs, commander, and Tom Wheeler, adjutant.

GREED FEEDS ON HUNGER

(Mr. PODELL asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. PODELL. Mr. Speaker, during one of the most vicious periods of inflation in our Nation's history—when the food costs are at an alltime high—the administration is doing all it can to keep the price of beef higher than it is.

To halt the slight decrease in the price of beef we have seen lately, the U.S. Department of Agriculture for its surplus foods program bought up 45 million pounds of "grain fed" prime beef at \$1 a pound. I did not know the surplus food program trafficked in prime steaks.

The real reason for the purchase was to bolster profits for the beef trust who saw a slight dip in sales reflecting consumer resistance to high prices. The deal was OK'd by Agriculture Secretary Butz. That is the same guy who last year told consumers not to buy beef—use substitutes, he said—if they did not like the price of beef. His main concern was building profits for cattlemen at the expense of a public whose meat diet was already at a minimum, or less.

The big reason—other than price supports—for the high cost of meat, we are told, is the high cost of grain—and that is another story. The reason grain is so high in America is that last year the administration sold hundreds of millions of bushels of grain to Soviet Russia at tax-supported, knock-down prices. We solved Russia's grain problems and created our own.

Now you get the picture. In this case,

the long arm of the Nixon administration reaches into everyone's pocket through the kitchen. The price of bagels and pasta are already at a peak, and will go higher. Industry sources predict that bread, the staff of life, will be \$1 a loaf in a matter of months. Agriculture Secretary Butz has plans to sell more grain abroad this year, using tax subsidies to make the price right to other countries.

The consumers should know that this kind of thing is done by the administration for special interests, the beef trust, the grain trust, the oil cartels, and a host of others.

Consider this: Secretary Butz refused to ease regulations on the domestic sale of navel oranges from the Southwest. Even the growers wanted to sell more oranges at lower prices. But he objected to fresh fruit at a price everyone could afford, so the oranges not sold at high prices were not sold at all. They were turned into animal feed, or simply destroyed. During peak inflation it is administration policy to price fresh fruit out of the common man's reach.

Other examples: Rice, a staple for the poor, has doubled in price in the last year, but the Government still pays price supports to farmers to keep the prices high.

There is a seemingly endless stream of items, particularly food products, which are manipulated by the Government to keep prices artificially high at a time when the average family can barely manage on its food budget, and when the elderly and the poor live day-to-day on starvation diets. Greed feeds on hunger.

Where milk and milk products are concerned, there were earlier suspicions that administration-granted price increases were somehow tied to a promised \$2 million campaign contribution to President Nixon by milk cooperatives. The contributions actually made were illegal, and convictions are now forthcoming in the courts. That earlier suspicion now seems confirmed that a quid pro quo existed between the contributions and the Nixon-ordered increase in the price of milk.

In any event, it was in April of 1972 that Secretary Butz made a speech before a Pennsylvania milk cooperative, and, in return, the cooperative made a \$50,000 contribution to Nixon's reelection campaign. This time, special interests were financed by the milk drinkers and cheese eaters of America. Each time a senior citizen bought a bottle of milk or a slice of cheese, he made a contribution to a political campaign.

It seems that common decency alone would call a halt to all this, but it has not. There is a determination on the part of the administration to go one step further in ignoring what ought to be its first concern, the needs of the unfortunate in the land of plenty.

The Department of Agriculture, and Secretary Butz, implementing the political promises of President Nixon, have recommended, and insist, that the surplus food commodities program be ter-

minated as of June 30 of this year. This program has provided food for charitable institutions such as child care centers, orphanages, summer camps for underprivileged children and old-age homes. The school lunch programs and Red Cross receive many millions of dollars worth of food from the USDA under this authorization, as do disaster areas throughout the country.

Think of that. Boosting meat, milk, and grain prices with one hand and with the other hand snatching away food programs in old-age homes, child care centers, orphanages, and other places of comfort for the underprivileged.

Administration indifference touches every part of the economy. The shortcomings are too much to digest at one sitting. So, at another time, I will discuss the tax favoritism of the oil cartels and problems of their godchild, the gasoline and energy industry. Each is part of the other. And then there are such things as the highest interest rates in our history, unemployment, social security, the rail crisis, mass transportation—it goes on and on.

Save a snatch of light here and a breath of air there, the political and domestic record of the Nixon administration has been dismal. Not once has the administration veered from its purpose, to favor the special interests of the few, at the expense of the everyday needs of 200 million ordinary citizens. Like the legendary lemmings driven by a mysterious urge to leap into the sea and self destruction, ignoring all warnings, the Nixon administration seems bent on the same fate.

Here in Congress it is our first duty to prevent the same fate from befalling the Nation as a whole. We must pull together, as we always have, when in our common cause we ignore petty regional and political differences and deal with the enemy, the threat at hand.

Now, the enemy is within, the threat is inflation, lack of confidence in government, shortages, depletion of resources, price gouging, unjust taxes for most and unfair allowances for others. We must deal with these immediate things. We have our eye too much on the horizon and other remote things while our launching platform, good government backed by the confidence of the people, is being eroded and torn apart by suspicion, favoritism, and indifference to the daily needs of the people.

I urge my colleagues to consider the larger issues when we vote on overriding Presidential vetoes, debate questionable special interest proposals sent up by the White House and to think of the public each and every time the bread and butter, everyday issues come before us.

An all-pervasive lack of will to govern effectively on the part of the administration places the full responsibility for the public interest squarely on the shoulders of Congress.

The only honorable thing to do is to accept it, and discharge it.

IMPORTANCE OF COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT FOR OCEAN ISLANDS

(Mr. BENITEZ asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BENITEZ. Mr. Speaker, I would like to note that since on an island the distance from cause to effect is so small, islanders often feel the effects of change more quickly and more deeply than most mainlanders.

An islander's immediate vulnerability to change indicates that islands are not, in fact, mainland in miniature. On the contrary, islands have needs and hence priorities that often differ from those of mainland areas.

On an island, the economy, the culture, and the ecosystem are tied firmly together. Thus, whenever we change one of these elements, we affect the others. For example, change in the minimum wage of an island that is industrializing will touch the prosperity of the people of the island quickly and deeply. Consequently it will affect their cultural attitudes as well as their use of natural resources. Similarly, a change in U.S. defense priorities or in shipping costs can profoundly alter the way of life of many of an island's citizens.

These points are dealt with in a sensitive and thoughtful manner in a recent article by William S. Beller. Beller, who is coordinator of marine affairs with the department of natural resources of Puerto Rico, has worked directly for the Governors of Hawaii and the U.S. Virgin Islands as well as for the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Beller himself led a citizens group of Puerto Ricans of all political persuasions to complete a comprehensive report and wide-ranging recommendations entitled "Puerto Rico and the Sea." His article, which I offer for the RECORD, is entitled "Ocean Islands—Considerations for Their Coastal Zone Management" and appears in the inaugural issue of the Coastal Zone Management Journal:

OCEAN ISLANDS—CONSIDERATIONS FOR THEIR COASTAL ZONE MANAGEMENT

(By William S. Beller)

Abstract. For most lands, the state of their ecosystems and the economic status and cultural attitudes of their people form a structure on which rests the quality of life. For citizens of ocean islands, this structure is welded together so tightly that a change in one element is quickly felt by the others. Moreover, because of the limited size and natural resources of ocean islands, these lands tend also to react quickly and sometimes radically to change. This fact can be verified by our noting that acts affecting, say, a reef system, or an island's tax structure, or a shrine, can have immediate and profound effects on the lives of islanders. We see, therefore, that islands are not chips off a mainland but unique entities with their own priorities. With respect to coastal zone management, problems of importance involve shore area planning, development of natural resources, energy management, and water management.

Nature set the stage for a satisfying life for people who live on ocean islands. Yet if

they wish to hold on to what nature gave them, they will have to use their coastal areas much more wisely than people who live on continental masses. This extra burden stems from the fragility of ocean islands, made this way by their isolation and small sizes.

Unlike continental islands, ocean islands are not slices off large land masses. Instead, ocean islands were formed by marine mountains emerging from the sea or by submarine volcanoes rising upward on layers of magma, or by coral reefs growing on top of the marine mountains or volcanoes. There is the possibility that some presumed ocean islands did at one time have a land link, which would help explain the presence on them of some mainland organisms. Indigenous forms also evolved on some of the islands, most of which lie in zones hospitable to life—the tropics and subtropics.

Ocean islands may be divided into those that depend mostly on agriculture and fishing for the livelihood of their people, or on commerce and industry. Those that rely on agriculture and fishing are usually the economically poorer islands.

If we define the coastal zone as the area where the influences of the land meeting the sea are strongly felt, then we can say that an ocean island is just about all coastal zone. In some respects, we can regard ocean islands as pure strains of coastal areas that exist on mainland. Through studies of ocean islands, we can thereby gain insights into the mainland itself (Beller, 1971).

FRAGILITY

The smallness of an ocean island fosters close and critical relationships between its ecosystems and the economic status and cultural heritage of its citizens. Pressure on one of these elements is quickly passed to all. If any become weak, we will probably find that all elements are simultaneously weakened, and the overall ability of the island to resist stress is lessened. There appears no way to plan the use of the shores or lands of an ocean island without recognizing the interrelationships of these elements, nor that seemingly unrelated factors such as tax holidays and energy policies can play basic roles.

We will also probably find that strains on an island such as pollution, marginal industries, and abuse of the culture of its citizens have far more serious effects than on a continental mass. They could destroy the ability of an island and its people to survive.

Yet some islands can withstand high stresses provided they are in line with the strengths of the islands. For instance, where rapid ocean currents pass the shores of an island and then run far out to sea, a large amount of thermal wastes could probably be absorbed without harming the inshore environment. Nearshore sand deposits could probably be mined without hurting an island if they are large in extent and play no significant hydrological role in the island's life cycle. The resistance of an island to stress may be compared to that of a sheet of glass, which can absorb large loads when placed in one direction, but will shatter when the loads are skewed.

Ecological fragility

The most fragile of ocean islands are the small ones. Less fragile are the larger ones, such as Cuba, where there is high diversity in flora and fauna. An accepted ecological principle is that the stability of an ecosystem is proportional to the diversity of its members. If one species fails, there are others to take its place.

An example of a stable ecosystem is illustrated by the experience of the deciduous forests in the Appalachian region of eastern United States, when in the 1930s they suffered the loss of their chestnut trees through

a blight. Although the trees were important members of their communities, the forest ecosystems were complex enough for other hardwood trees to move into the gaps, and the forests survived.

We can, indeed, have spartan ecosystems that thrive, one of which was brought to my attention by biologist R. Raymond Fosberg. He noted that Eskimos have lived in their sparse environment for thousands of years. Fosberg asks, though, what would have happened if one element had disappeared—the seal? There is little doubt that the Eskimo, too, would have vanished.

The work of MacArthur and Wilson (1967) shows that in a rough sense the number of species in island faunas varies as the cube root of the area of the island. Thus, as we go from one island to another one-eighth its size, we will probably find that the number of species are approximately halved. (One of the main exceptions to this formula is the species *homo sapiens*.)

We are far from suggesting that ocean islands have such a tenuous hold on life that the loss of one element in their ecosystems would be fatal. Yet we believe it important to observe that residents of small islands cannot afford to make many ecological errors. Similarly, residents of larger islands cannot afford the errors of mainlanders.

The ecological fragility of an island stems from the fact that (1) the limited diversity of organisms on an island does not give it the protection of ecosystem redundancies; and (2) the influences of major ecosystems are so large and the systems themselves so vulnerable to abuse that their injury or destruction is dire and easy.

We seek to illustrate these points by looking at two important tropical ecosystems, coral reefs and mangroves. In terms of biomass, these are among the most productive systems in the world, yet often undervalued.

Coral Reefs. The coral reefs that fringe many tropical islands help protect the shores from the sea; influence the flow of inshore waters, thereby affecting the deposit of sand, which is needed for forming and maintaining beaches; and act as shelter and commissary for many recreational and commercial fish. If the polyps, whose calcareous skeletons form the major mass and glue of these reefs, are killed, the marine animals once harbored there disappear and often perish. The reefs themselves may then be weakened by the wholesale borings of mollusks, worms and sea urchins. If a storm breaks a reef apart, island shores are opened to the full brunt of the sea.

When a coral reef is injured, nobody can be sure that it will ever recover. In Puerto Rico, some reefs that had been ravished 30 years earlier still showed no sign of live coral. Even when coral rejuvenates itself; its growth is slow; a ten-foot coral head takes between one and two centuries to form (Cheshire, 1970). Unfortunately, there is no other organism that can take the polyps' place to maintain the injured reef or build another, even though there are reef-builders in several families of sponges and in calcareous algae. These algae help convert the reefs to limestone by filling the pores and valleys in the coral (Thomas, 1965).

In the late 1960s, the "crown of thorns" starfish (*Acanthaster planci*) in epidemic numbers began attacking many coral reefs in the Pacific Ocean, and consuming the coral polyps. In Guam, the starfish killed about 90 per cent of the coral along 38 kilometers of shoreline (Cheshire, 1969). These animals also caused severe damage in other islands in Oceania, and on the Great Barrier Reef of Australia. Such destruction on some of the smaller islands would drive away many of the reef fish that the native populations depend

upon for protein, and would force the people to live on an inferior diet or flee their homes. Thus, the starfish, a single predator, could destroy an element in an ecosystem whose loss could destroy an island. Man, too, can destroy a reef by simple physical means, by poisoning it with toxic wastes, or by suffocating it with sediments.

Mangroves. In the late 1950s, mangrove trees dominated about three-quarters of the world's coastline in the 50-degree band bisected by the Equator (McGill, 1960). Their influence is much less today, many having yielded to the developers' need for property, and the farmers' need for land for agriculture. Mismanagement of the land and waters adjacent to mangroves have also helped destroy many of the trees.

Curiously enough, mangroves helped seal their own fate through the real estate their land-building activities created on the fringes of the sea. Many of the sediments that seek to flow past the mangroves are stopped by their complex system of air roots, which sprout from the bodies and branches of the trees like the tentacles of octopuses and plunge into the watery ground for nourishment. Eventually, the sediments build up around the roots to form new land with high nutrient value, and the trees march further out to sea.

When mangrove leaves drop into the water, they react with algae and fungi to form the detritus that can be traced up the food chain as far as dolphins, mackerel and flying fish (Odum, 1971). In another ecosystem chain, the roots of the mangroves contribute to the nurturing of many of an island's saltwater fish. The forests made up of mangroves support areas where native and migratory birds dwell, and where tourists, students and scientists alike can visit and learn and enjoy themselves.

Yet the role of mangroves in an island community is probably less understood than that of any other ecological unit of major importance to an island system. Although we know that some reef fish live as fry in mangrove waters, we are not sure how much energy mangroves contribute toward maintaining the health of the coral reefs. Nor do we know what contributions mangroves make toward tempering the climate of an island, nor in protecting birds that may be controlling insect pests, nor in keeping waters clean by filtering-out debris, nor in stabilizing the shore.

We do know that major mangrove forests in several islands are severely threatened. Officials on St. Thomas, U.S. Virgin Islands, contemplated for a long time transforming its last mangrove lagoon into an international airport, and only lack of money stopped the project.

We also know that mangroves are easily lost to drainage projects, dredging, pollution, fill and to radical changes in water-circulation patterns. An exotic predator of mangroves are fast-moving motor boats whose wakes jar and destroy the root ecosystems.

In short, an ocean island has so little ecosystem redundancy, that once an important element is destroyed, the ecosystem will probably die. There are no hardwood trees to take the place of the chestnuts as in the Appalachian forests. We may try turning to science and technology for help, perhaps to devise an element to take the place of mangroves in building up land and feeding marine life. Alas, the ability of man to fashion ways to do this is not as high as many islanders wish it would be.

Economic fragility

Diversity lends stability not only in an ecological system but also in an economic one. Little proof is needed to show that an island that depends for its economic well-

being mostly on a single industry will suffer severely if that industry is hurt. Mainland communities also experience "island economics". Citizens of Seattle, Washington, know the shock that hurt many of them in 1971 when the Boeing Company, a major economic artery in the city, was forced to stop work on the supersonic transport. Similarly, when the Humboldt Current, with its swarms of anchovies failed to return to the coastal waters of Peru in the Spring of 1972, the country's fishmeal industry, which accounted for 40 per cent of Peru's foreign exchange, was almost destroyed; and a "quiet panic" gripped Chimbote and smaller ports (Maidenberg, 1972).

On an ocean island, when a major industry is disrupted, the effects are usually much more severe than when it happens on the mainland. This situation stems from the over-specialization and lack of alternative avenues for income that many islands must endure because of their small sizes. We see an extreme example in the island of Nauru, an 8-square-mile member of the Gilbert Islands. When the open-cut mining of phosphates is completed near the close of this century on about four-fifths of Nauru's land, the place will not be habitable and its 3,300 natives will have to move (Trumbull, 1971). Ensuring its specialization, an island such as Nauru dedicates the skills of many of its workers to the island's major industry, and gives special privileges to this industry, which often include the use of prime lands and waters.

Unfortunately, ill-advised concessions of land and other natural resources to entrepreneurs may be some islands' answers to poor or deteriorating economic conditions. What is distressing is that the alternatives of good planning and conservation efforts are often unnecessarily put aside for immediate gain.

Political considerations. Changes in political conditions in the world can spawn new industries on an island and destroy others, sometimes bringing fundamental changes to an island's economy. One of the most poignant examples was the large increase in tourism, and the construction of its associated monuments, that took place in several of the Caribbean Islands when in early 1961 the United States broke relations with Cuba. By the same token, though, these same islands worry what will happen to their tourism, and their economy built up on this industry, when the United States again has diplomatic relations with Cuba and that nation, in turn, tries to regain its tourist industry.

When relations between the United States and Mainland China started becoming friendly toward the end of 1971, officials of Hawaii immediately recognized its significance for their islands. Acting with characteristic initiative, the State set up a workshop-conference called "Doing Business with the People's Republic of China" (Hawaii, 1972a). The islanders saw themselves as important business brokers, endowed with a strategic location and an understanding of the Oriental culture.

There was ample precedent for Hawaii's enthusiasm with the prospects of a China trade. The emergence of Japan as a highly industrialized nation, and the increased trading activity of many of the developing areas in the Pacific Basin, resulted in Hawaii's trade with the nations there increasing by 60 per cent over the three-year period between 1968 and 1971. By far the bulk of this trade was with Japan, which accounted for more than half of it (Hawaii, 1972b).

St. Thomas once had the glitter and grandeur of a great commercial center. Owned by Denmark and cloaked in that country's neu-

trality, St. Thomas during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries played a major role in trading activities between the New World and the Old (Knox, 1852). Today, this island must depend on other roles for its sustenance. Islands often cannot steer their own way but must bob in the currents of world politics.

Transportation and commerce. If railroads go on strike on the mainland, commerce can still be carried by trucks. Islands have no such safety valve. If ocean shipping stops for any reason, industry and the life styles of the people on the affected islands begin to suffer almost immediately. As a result of the dock strike on the West Coast of the United States in 1971, the sugar and pineapple industries of Hawaii had difficulty bringing their products to the mainland. One result was the closing of a sugar refinery, associated unemployment, and the loss of an important selling season (Hawaii, 1971).

Not unexpectedly, when shipping companies raise their freight rates for island commerce there is a profound effect on nearly all island industry. A Caribbean historian asserts that these charges are sometimes made by the shipping companies without consulting island governments, and can significantly exceed increases in the shippers' operating costs (Lewis, 1963). In addition, the advent of new marine technologies such as supertankers, and the commercial maturity of the developing nations act with various degrees of intensity to affect the economic status of ocean islands.

The tourist industry ebbs and flows with changes in airline passenger rates and airline schedules. For example, when the airline fare between Los Angeles and Hawaii was reduced to \$85 in 1969, the number of short-term tourists to the islands increased considerably. Then in 1970, when a large number of East Coast tourists took advantage of the low-cost charter rates to Europe, several tourist-dependent islands in the Caribbean suffered. In Puerto Rico, a few hotels closed their doors and were taken over by the government. Some tourist enclaves in St. Thomas also had to close, or change their complexion from hotels to condominiums. On the Grand Bahama Island, the \$7.5 million International Hotel shut down early in 1971 after only four months' operation. Helping here was the cessation of direct airline service from Miami to Freeport.

Taxes and special privileges. U.S. income taxes and import duties collected in Puerto Rico and in the U.S. Virgin Islands are kept by these areas for their own use. This benefit gives these islands, and others that receive similar concessions, a powerful way to attract industry. Nowhere is this case better illustrated than in Puerto Rico which, by granting partial or full tax holidays to immigrating firms, was able in less than two decades to change the area from a rural community to an industrialized one. At the same time, the island was able to raise its per capita to the highest in the Caribbean basin. As an island develops its resources, the concessions it is able to give industry in the form of tax relief, coastal locations, and other privileges must decrease to satisfy the enlarged expectations of the citizens.

Even seemingly trivial privileges can be meaningful to an island industry. The \$200 duty-free allowance the United States permits its citizens returning from the Virgin Islands is twice the ordinary allowance. There is little doubt that if this figure were reduced, trade in St. Thomas would go down significantly.

Mainland priorities. We cannot speak of the economic fragility of ocean islands without noting that islanders are strongly influenced by mainland values and actions. The influence becomes even stronger when ocean

islands have political or other firm bonds with a mainland area. The degree of enlightenment of mainlanders helps determine how an island will fare economically.

We might consider some of the money that the United States spends on its associated islands for defense purposes. Extensive facilities and personnel are in Guam, Eniwetok, and Hawaii. Hawaii's major source of income in 1971 came from U.S. defense expenditures there of \$722 million. This figure was about one-third of the State's total earnings from overseas. It was greater than total visitor expenditures in the State, and exceeded thrice the receipts from sugar production (Hawaii, 1972c). Hawaii would have to take extreme measures to maintain its economic stability should the United States Government shift downward its emphasis on defense activities in that island-State.

To illustrate priority differences between island and mainland, consider the importance the United States places on minimum wages for labor. Puerto Rico, which is seeking to enlarge its industrial base, could lose some of its advantage if such minimum wages were insisted upon. Jobs at this time may be as important as a mainland floor under wages. This point was made by Jaime Benitez, Resident Commissioner in Washington for Puerto Rico, who said, "The fundamental problem in Puerto Rico is to work for full employment and to work for the highest wage levels possible that are compatible with that objective." (Suarez, 1972).

The several examples indicate some aspects of the economic fragility of ocean islands. In essence, islands tend to have low economic inertia, responding to every impulse put on them, whether it is new airline fares or new regulations for minimum wages. The result can bring for island citizens a good quality of life, which may accompany a flourishing tourist trade or industrialization; or the opposite if tourism decreases or some of the industrial products no longer find a market.

Cultural fragility

In many important ways, the cultural heritage and present culture of a people determine the ecological and economic status of their lands. To the misfortune of many who live on ocean islands, their culture is the most fragile of ingredients and can be kept strong only with active effort. To the good fortune of islanders, a healthy culture to them is intimate and embracing.

The dominant cultures of most islands usually come from fairly recent imports from mainland. Islanders then mold these cultures in their own ways, adding their imprints and uniqueness to them. The visible signs of the old and of the changing cultural patterns are seen in ancient streets and structures, battlements and shrines. We certainly must include the environments that helped spawn the cultures: vistas of tall fern in rain forests, stony beaches along mountain streams, lava rock slipped to the shores, unbroken sights of green valleys and mountain slopes. We must also include the languages of the people, their folklore and mythology, their art and unique foods. These cultural factors, which islanders experience continuously, give them a commitment to their land and a strong interest in conserving it.

What happens to the feeling the people of Hawaii have for Diamond Head when condominiums rise to block easy view of it? When a Waikiki is built, and a Condado, which hide the beaches from the citizens, then their personal involvement in their land tends to decrease. When the residents of an island, which has a shortage of cultural symbols to begin with, find that many of these are commercialized or destroyed, then the cultural involvement of the people decreases

even further. Some islanders may never digest the sudden cultural changes marked by highway proliferation and supermarkets, motels and quick hamburgers.

When the culture of a people is challenged, their desire for a healthy land is likewise affected. People who believe they have no stake in where they live often believe they have no accountability for what happens there. As a result, the land and its resources can deteriorate without pause.

The U.S. Virgin Islands have gone through a number of traumatic cultural experiences since the seventeenth century when they were settled mostly by the Dutch and English, later by the Danes; and subsequently endured new occupations, slave rebellions, and finally were purchased by the United States from Denmark in 1917 for \$25 million. As a result of their history, the attachment of the people to their islands began developing only very recently. To help reinforce this development, the citizens writing a major study of the marine resources of the Virgin Islands (Virgin Islands, 1970) felt obliged to include a chapter outlining the history and cultural background of the people.

An organization called "The Hawaiians" recognizes the strong bonds between the land, the culture of the people who once lived on it, and their set of values. Speaking to a newspaper reporter, a young farmer from the island of Molokai, and a member of the organization, said, "We want the Hawaiian to feel tied to the land again. With the loss of the land, he lost his relationships to the kind of values that made his life stable. We want to return that sense of worth in today's community." (Aarons, 1972).

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Ocean islands are not mainland in miniature any more than a cat is a miniature tiger. Even though the instincts of the animals may be the same, their differences in size and natural power lead to different priorities for each.

The priorities of islands stem, at root, from the fragility of these lands. Therefore, we cannot safely use assumptions based on mainland experiences: (1) islands can be developed the same way as an industrialized mainland, with heavy industry, extraction of mineral resources, and the same services and gadgets of life; (2) island progress requires international airports, extensive highways, automobile access to all places of interest.

When islanders accept on faith such assumptions, they often neglect to formulate policies to meet their unique conditions. Also as a result of such assumptions, mainland agencies that seek to help islands may, instead, be imposing their own values on the residents, to their ultimate distress. For this reason, great care should be taken by mainland and island officials alike to be certain that both are not enthralled by the assets and power of the mainland.

Keeping in mind the fragilities of ocean islands, and the close relationship between all major activities that go on in these areas, we can suggest some policy considerations for the coastal-zone management of ocean islands with respect to shore areas, natural resources, energy, and water management.

Shore areas

Islanders simply cannot afford the ill-use of their land. If they paved with concrete their agricultural lands, their aquifer recharge zone, their ground covers, and let their population spread around the countryside without limit, they would end up with one large metropolitan area. The residents would be fed entirely through imports; receive all their water through desalting plants; strive to protect themselves from periodic flooding by forcing their rivers, if

they have them, to flow in concrete channels. They would have created a remarkable urban area and taken away its reason for existing.

The shore area is the most critical area in an ocean island. We use the term "shore area" to mean the area immediately adjacent to the shoreline, a matter of a few hundred yards on both sides; and to draw a distinction between the more embracing term "coastal zone," which on an island could be taken to encompass the entire island. The reasons for the high value of shore areas are much the same as for similar mainland areas except that on an island there is no economical alternative to water ports; and on tropical islands, no recreation facilities as attractive as beaches, few industrial sites more inviting than the coasts, no real estate tracts as desirable or easy to develop as those that slope gradually to the sea.

Despite the pressures on shore areas relatively little planning for their rational use has been done. Where plans do exist, exceptions to them are more often the rule than the rule itself. Opportunist building and *ad hoc* decisions on the part of local governments have often blighted many idyllic shore areas. Yet proper plans and their enforcement would not only help citizens who seek to enjoy the beaches and the views but also those who are trying to develop the areas for tourism, industry and real estate projects.

Specifically, developers would indeed come out ahead if they knew for a certainty what the government would require of them, and in turn, what they could expect from the government in terms of services and concessions. Particularly in this time of tough-environmental laws based upon water usage, and the strong U.S. Federal interest in coastal zone management, which is reflected in the parallel interest of local governments, developers would save time and money if they knew beforehand what they would have to do to satisfy the public interest (Puerto Rico, 1972).

Unless shore area planning is done on a comprehensive and nonexception basis, and resulting regulations enforced, shore area use, as history shows, will be a constant source of worry and irritation to governments and citizens alike. Clearly the best time to do such planning is when there are still choices. When heavy industry begins coming in, and tourism, then a balanced plan might not be as easy to accomplish.

Natural resources

Islanders will have to pay increasingly dearly for production and services that draw upon non-renewable natural resources. This is simply a statement of the law of supply-and-demand applied to these resources. Island residents do not have the easy luxury of going to neighboring areas for sites for industry and power plants, sand for concrete, or fresh water to augment the local supply. The problem thus becomes one of conserving or, where possible, regenerating non-renewable resources, and taking full advantage of the renewable ones.

As a consequence, islanders need to distinguish very carefully between renewable and non-renewable resources; and with the renewable, the meantime to renewability. They will have to know how long a beach takes to come back once its sand has been taken away; how quickly marine life will return to waters made turbid by dredging, or that get occasional shocks of toxics; how long it takes for a strip mine or cleared land to regain effective ground cover; when the well water that was once sweet and plentiful will lose its brackish taste; how long before oysters taken from local waters will again be safe to serve, and the fear of ciguatera poisoning from eating affected fish diminishes.

Another consequence of having a limited supply of natural resources is that the price of an island's goods and services will have to include mounting environmental costs. Eventually, an island economy may not be able to afford to dispose of any of its "waste" products. This finding could call for involving manufacturers in the ultimate fate of their products, which would add further to the environmental costs of doing business.

In essence, for every island project involving the extraction or use of the land's natural resources, islanders are going to have to base their approval on the extent of the depletion of the natural resources, meantime to their renewability, environmental impact, and waste disposal or regeneration of a resource.

Energy management

Many islands and mainlands have an energy policy: to provide all the power needed for industrial and civilian needs. This policy will increase a community's material growth and is probably fine as long as power plants do not begin taking up land needed to serve more essential uses, nor jeopardize the natural environment.

On an island that is industrializing, conflicts in land use arise very quickly. Allowing the unlimited growth of electrical power plants, and the concomitant need for shorelands, can exceed reasonable bounds. For example, the projected need for electrical power in Puerto Rico by the year 2000 would require having the equivalent of a 500-megawatt nuclear power plant every mile and a half of the island's shoreline (Matos, 1971). Clearly such an eventuality should be blunted by a formulated rather than permissive energy policy.

The questions for energy analysis and management on an ocean island involve both producers and users of energy. First, can electrical energy be produced in quantity, economically, without failure, and in environmentally benign ways? Is the transmission of the electricity effective and efficient? Are the receivers of the electricity using it in the most productive fashion? Are designers of industrial equipment, and are architects of buildings and homes considering the social need for cutting down on the use of electricity? Are the initial capital investments that are sometimes needed for a more effective use of electricity outweighed economically by the relatively cheap cost of the energy? What course does an ocean island take that anticipates that a large consumer of electrical energy such as an aluminum smelting plant wishes to locate on the island? The plant could spawn satellite industries of fabricators and assemblers, which could give needed employment to many islanders. Yet the electrical energy needed for a smelting plant is prodigious. To what policy does the island respond?

Islands should encourage the development of new technologies for power generation, ones that do not demand coastal sites, or water coolants. Techniques involving the direct use of solar energy have been suggested as well as ones that could take advantage of the temperature differences in the layers of ocean waters. The latter method, of course, would require an ocean site but would have no thermal wastes. One idea that possibly could be pursued in view of the trade winds that blow over many of the tropical islands is the development of wind turbines. One such turbine has yielded as much as 1.5 megawatts of alternating power for brief periods. This power was fed into an electrical network of a power company. Although the turbine blade failed after 1,100 operating hours, the project, which was funded by the S. Morgan Smith Company of York, Pennsylvania, did demonstrate the large-size machines could be built at a cost nearly competitive with conventional power stations (Savino, 1972).

In devising an energy policy, or any other management policy for ocean islands, officials should seek approaches that ensure the integrity or enhancement of the ecosystems. In other words, in developing an energy source, we should strive for systems that work with the natural processes, and do not unduly distort them. This would mean that if we were to design practicable wind turbines, or economical solar arrays, we should not extract all the energy out of the passing wind, nor shield great land areas from the sun. Nor should we spawn a network of eyesores.

Water management

Because many ocean islands are water short, management of liquid wastes and of water are part of the overall water-management problems. St. Thomas is probably the best example of an arid island that must go to extremes to assure itself of enough water for survival. Over the years, the island has paved acres of mountains for catch-basins; has set up in Charlotte Amalie a dual water system, a salt-water system for flushing toilets and a fresh-water system for drinking; and has collected water in cisterns, which is still the most common way of getting water for much of the population. The island has constructed desalting plants; and St. Croix, is experimenting with recharging ground water with treated liquid wastes. Yet at times, the island has been left with only a two-day supply of water, which requires barging water in from Puerto Rico.

Without a rational water-management plan, islands could proliferate desalting plants, turn their well water brackish, pay high prices for foreign water, and exacerbate the situation by possibly destroying aquifer recharge areas, and not weighing the advantages of recycling waste waters. Water-management plans for arid islands should consider the entire water cycle, from the time rain falls on the island until, after the water's use and reuse, it flows back to the sea. Then, on the basis of current technology, officials could draw up long-range plans, which if updated in step with new needs and technologies, should make water cheaper to the island populations and cut down on the number of water crises.

OVERVIEW

No doubt the highest priority for island governments is to find jobs and shelter for their citizens, and provide services such as electrical, water and waste treatment. To do this, islanders welcome industry, develop their land, entertain visitors—unless the islanders wish to emulate the residents of Nihiwai, Hawaii, whose 250 citizens choose to follow the ancient Polynesian way of life.

Modern mainlands, however, are the usual models for islanders seeking a higher quality of life. The advantage to them is the intensely good one of being able to select and adapt proven techniques to island circumstances. The danger is the possibility of islanders also acquiring, without adequate analysis, some of the goals, ethics and values useful on mainlands but not necessarily on islands. There appears to be little value in assuming the need to turn an island into a piece of the mainland. In truth, many islands are already what many mainlanders wish their own lands could be.

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AN ABUNDANCE OF SHORTAGES: MINERAL SCARCITY

(Mrs. MINK asked and was given permission to extend her remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Speaker, over the past 2 months the Subcommittee on Mines and Mining, which I chair, has been conducting oversight hearings on the important issues of mineral scarcity and mineral supply policy. My colleague the gentleman from the State of Utah, Representative WAYNE OWENS, recently delivered a speech on this subject in his home district. He has outlined the problem excellently and has raised some interesting policy suggestions. I am therefore inserting his address in the RECORD today and hope that interested Members will take note of his thoughts.

AN ABUNDANCE OF SHORTAGES: MINERAL SCARCITY

INTRODUCTION

For the past two years this country has been faced with both chronic and spot fuel shortages. The imposition of the Arab oil embargo in October of 1973 seriously aggravated this energy crunch. As surprising as it may seem, the Federal Government had no contingency plans and very little authority to deal with such conditions.

Energy fuels are of course in the spotlight these days. But we seem to be facing an abundance of shortages in basic raw materials which are vital to our economy. The energy crisis has raised the question of whether the United States is also facing a potential "minerals crisis" in non-fuel mineral materials. And we are reacting to this problem in the same way we responded to the energy fuels shortages: without a national materials supply policy.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Over 4 billion tons—40,000 pounds per person—of new mineral supplies are needed annually in our economy. Each year United States extractive industries convert mineral resources into mineral raw materials valued at \$32 billion. United States mineral processing industries convert mineral raw materials into energy and processed materials valued at over \$150 billion. There are over 100 mineral commodities that are required in industry today—42 of the elements appear in the telephone you use daily. We are only beginning to grasp the enormous complexity of the interrelationships between materials supply and the changing requirements of our technological society.

The availability of materials must be considered in two parts: resources and reserves. National resources may be defined as materials potentially recoverable from the earth or seas. Reserves are resources that are economically recoverable with present technology. Although world resources are very large, known reserves of economically extractable ores are relatively small compared to estimates of demand. Reserves are not static and over a period of time have often increased with the application of new technology.

While the United States is endowed with ample reserves for some materials, it also faces serious problems where domestic reserves are inadequate or even completely lacking. For many purposes there are great interchangeabilities among materials. However, in specialized technological applications in which a multiplicity of properties are required, the available materials are much more limited. For example, if we are to achieve substantial breakthroughs in energy, we must have vastly improved temperature resistant materials, yet there are only a very limited number of elements which possess such properties. Additional concern stems from the energy inputs required for mineral processing because approximately one-fourth of all United States energy is used in extracting and fabricating mineral materials. Higher energy prices and energy shortages can significantly impact on mineral processing.

We are encouraging increasing competition in the acquisition of nondomestic mineral raw materials as other industrialized countries also seek reliable sources of reasonably-priced raw materials. Nevertheless, our country still consumes about 33 percent of the world's developed mineral resources even though we have only six percent of the world's population.

Materials demand has been constantly increasing as the result of a growing world population and an ever-increasing per capita consumption. The demand for steel illustrates the point dramatically. In 1900, demand for raw steel was about 38 pounds per capita for a world population estimated at 1.6 billion. Today per capita demand is estimated at 395 pounds, which at the world population of 3.8 billion requires the annual production of 750 million short tons of steel. When future use patterns are projected with consideration of technological and other changes, significant increases in demand for minerals appears inevitable.

IMPORT DEPENDENCE

Although our country is blessed with vast natural resources of many basic raw ma-

terials required by industry, our reliance on foreign imports has increased markedly. This growing dependence upon foreign sources of supply coupled with the broadening specter of materials shortages of all kinds has raised serious questions regarding the Nation's basic materials posture. We are now almost completely dependent on foreign sources for 22 of the 74 nonenergy mineral commodities considered essential to a modern industrial society.

In 1973 the estimated United States deficit in the balance of trade for minerals and processed materials of mineral origin was \$8 billion. If present trends continue, the United States deficit resulting from mineral imports could approach \$100 billion a year. A key variable is that several minerals are available in only a few countries. Four countries control more than 80 percent of the world's copper. Two countries account for more than 70 percent of tin exports. Four countries possess over half the reserves of bauxite.

SPECIFIC MINERALS

Let me give you a few examples: Imports supply about 87 percent of our aluminum and bauxite manufacturing requirements.

Antimony is a strategic commodity used in the manufacture of ammunition and paint. The U.S. consumes 40 percent of world supplies. Domestic deposits provide only 15 percent of U.S. needs.

Chromium is an indispensable industrial metal and a strategic commodity for defense-related, scientific, medical, and automobile production. Without chromium, no stainless steel could be made. We have not mined chromium since 1962. We consumed 7 million long tons over the last five years.

Columbium is important in metallurgy, electronics, chemical, and nuclear uses. We depend on imports for 100 percent of our supply.

Currently known world copper resources are estimated to last 50 years at current rates of production. The U.S. share of identified world copper resources is 19 percent.

Fluorine is essential for steel and aluminum metal. The U.S. produces only 20 percent of its present requirements.

Without manganese, no steel could be made at all. The U.S. has no domestic reserves.

We consume almost 30 percent of the noncommunist world's annual production of primary tin. Current domestic production is negligible.

Titanium is used in aerospace production and in the chemical industry. We are dependent almost entirely on foreign sources.

The U.S. produces about nine percent of total world production, but we consume three times our output. Six leading countries produce more than 80 percent of the world's total. U.S. production has not kept up with demand.

These elements and others are absolutely vital to a modern technological economy, yet no long-range plan has been developed by our government to assure their long term availability, and in some cases, even short-term supply.

MINERAL CARTELS?

There is some fear that experimentation with resource diplomacy by the world's commodity-producing countries could follow in the wake of the successful example set by the Arab oil producing states. The U.S. was able to withstand a short-term oil embargo largely motivated by political considerations. But what about a long-term embargo on cobalt, chrome, or nickel? We import less than one-third of our petroleum but close to 100 percent of these vital minerals.

I doubt that the interplay of factors which produced the Arab countries' monopoly power in trade for oil could be duplicated in even a handful of raw materials markets.

The diversity of suppliers, the need for continuity of income to low-income producing nations, the ability to postpone some demands, and the possibilities of substitution would appear to make Arab embargo-like actions more difficult and less productive than was the case with petroleum. Nevertheless, Chile, Peru, Zambia, and Zaire have agreed to restrict exports of their copper if the present favorable international price structure threatens to collapse.

MINING IN UTAH

The minerals supply-demand situation requires improvement of domestic productivity in the mining, minerals, metal, mineral reclamation, and energy industries. The state of Utah will play an important role in addressing this need. Mining has always been fundamental to the state's economic well-being. Utah ranks among the five leading states in employment or income derived from the mining and processing of minerals. Most of Utah's mineral production enters national or world markets. Production in 1973 was valued at \$644 million, of which copper accounted for approximately 48 percent. Oil, gas, coal, lead, zinc, and gold are just a few of our riches. And the potential mineral resources under Great Salt Lake are reported to be substantial. The entire nation will be depending to a large extent on mining activities in Utah as vital to the mineral scarcities problem.

POLICY SUGGESTIONS

We must manage materials policy more effectively by recognizing the complex interrelationships of the materials-energy-environment system so that laws, executive orders, and administrative practices reinforce policy rather than counteract it. At present, some 50 departments and agencies of the Federal Government have responsibilities in the materials fields. In many instances, the scope of activity is specialized and limited. However, all are ultimately interrelated and there is undoubtedly a need for consolidation of responsibilities and a more comprehensive policy. Development of such a comprehensive policy and creation of a proper mechanism for monitoring and evaluating developments in the materials field are needed now.

On the supply side, one of the proposed solutions is the establishment of an economic stockpile replacing or supplementing the current military stockpile. The existing government stocks of critical materials were established in the early 1950's and were designed to fulfill defense requirements for anticipated five to six year World War II-type conflicts. It is now generally acknowledged we will never face this type of military contingency. Wars of the future are likely to be limited-scale conflicts or all-out nuclear holocausts, neither of which justifies maintenance of a purely military national reserve of critical materials. The basic policy this country should adopt in the face of foreign cartels is the stockpiling principle which should be modified to include economic defense as well as military defense.

Acquisition and disposal of the economic stockpile must be sensitive to the economic cycles which it will both create and respond to. These buffer stocks would serve to act against any interruption of foreign supplies or sudden increases in price due to supply constrictions or sudden demand increases. There is some evidence that Japan, France, and other countries are already in the process of creating economic stockpiles of critical materials.

Minerals supply policy should encourage intensive research to improve through better technology the recovery ratios in the mining and mineral processing stages. For example, we should move toward increased recovery of seabed materials. In addition, we must concentrate our great scientific brain power to develop substitution methods in which

plentiful minerals can be used instead of scarce materials in industrial processes. Finally, we must conserve our virgin natural resources and environment by treating waste materials as resources and returning them to use through efficient recycling techniques.

On the demand side, the conservation ethic advocated for energy fuels will in many cases need to be adopted for minerals. A concerted effort by industry to conserve on mineral factor inputs will be essential. Emergency contingency plans for allocations should be formulated before—not after—a potential minerals crisis develops. Americans will have to realize and accept the fact that for certain commodities this country will be forced to assume a minerals diet. If we recognize this problem and take action now, threats to economic growth and environmental degradation will be minimized.

As a general principle, we should rely on market forces as a prime determinant in the production of minerals but at the same time decrease and prevent wherever necessary a dangerous or costly dependence on imports. Self-sufficiency is not attainable in total and may not even be desirable—other countries need our markets, and trade with them is mutually advantageous. But a domestic production capacity enhances our national security and gives us leverage in the international markets.

CONCLUSION

Minerals are as important as energy to industrial society, for directly or indirectly they play an essential part in the production of all the goods we consume. Many experts have recognized for over 25 years that the country could be faced with serious shortages of raw materials needed to feed its industry. But raw materials are remote from people's lives. Basic mining employs only about one percent of American labor. Basic metallic production uses less than three-tenths of one percent of the United States surface area. Most mineral activities are located in sparsely populated geographical areas.

These are the reasons why many citizens and many public leaders do not know how vital raw mineral supplies are to our economy. If this lack of public awareness persists, shortages will not be evident until it is too late to overcome them quickly. We are talking about the physical basis of our industrial society, and we are a have-not nation in many minerals. That is why I have chosen to speak on this subject today, and that is why all of us must become activists in telling the minerals story.

NATIONAL MARITIME DAY

(Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to extend his

remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. BURKE of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, May 22, 1974, has been designated as National Maritime Day, in honor of the many accomplishments of our maritime industry in the past, and, I know, the future.

I was one of the supporters of the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, which provided an expanded program of Federal construction and operating subsidies for shipowners. This was, and still is, a vital piece of legislation. The shipbuilding industry needs all of the help we in the Federal Government can give it. As the October 1973, report of the Commission of American Shipbuilding indicates, the U.S. commercial shipbuilding industry is not a competitive branch of the world market. I feel that the open seas are just too important to our Nation, both from the point of view of national security and national economy, for us to remain unconcerned about the future of the industry. This Nation deliberately, in administration after administration after World War II, allowed other nations to do the merchant marine job for us.

I, for one, feel that this can no longer go on. We must rededicate ourselves to the improvement of the American shipbuilding industry. For me, representing a coastal shipbuilding district in Massachusetts, there are additional implications to the task of rebuilding our shipbuilding industry. In my many years of representing the 11th Massachusetts District, I have had the opportunity to meet the skilled individuals among the shipbuilding workers of Massachusetts. Their abilities at their craft, and their dedication to the hard work of improving the American shipbuilding industry is commendable. New England, as I have noted many times before, is in the midst of disastrous economic times. My only hope is that we can do something in this Congress to help ease their burden, and to help these workers who have done so much for America is indeed a good start.

So, Mr. Speaker, let us on this National Maritime Day commend those associated with the shipbuilding industry, and let us get on with the work which needs to be done to return American shipbuilding

to the status in the world market that is appropriate to the great Nation which this industry represents abroad.

IMPACT AID: WHERE, OH WHERE DID THE TAXPAYER DOLLARS GO?

(Mr. HUBER asked and was given permission to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.)

Mr. HUBER. Mr. Speaker, the controversy surrounding Public Law 874, the school assistance in federally affected areas, commonly referred to as impact aid, has not ended by its extension for 3 additional years through fiscal 1977 by the House this past March 27. In the near future, the House will vote on the House-Senate conference report on elementary and secondary education amendments.

The fact that I was stymied in my attempts to modify this legislation did not stop me from a more searching inquiry into the administrative practices of the Office of Education, HEW, as well as those of the local educational agencies. Some aspects of these practices are disturbing to say the least, because if my apprehensions are correct, we may be faced with a shocker. Many of us recognize that impact aid was a well-conceived program which over the years, because of the liberalizing amendments, became a first-class boondoggle. The disturbing aspect of impact aid administration I would like to acquaint you with deals with actual annual disbursements by the Impact Aid Administrator—U.S. Commissioner of Education, and annual reports by local educational agencies—LEA's—listing impact aid receipts for corresponding years.

My first impression looking at individual fiscal years, comparing disbursements by the Commissioner of Education—HEW/OE—with receipts of LEA's was that the money disbursed by HEW/OE in a given year was in the "pipeline" and would eventually reach LEA's the following fiscal year and that it will so reflect in their annual balances. Apparently this was not the case when I made the following comparison of aggregate disbursements versus receipts over a 4-year period:

TABLE I.—U.S. AGGREGATE IMPACT AID PUBLIC LAW 874 DISBURSEMENTS¹ BY HEW/OE VERSUS RECEIPTS BY LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES (LEA'S)

Fiscal	1968	1969	1970	1971	Total
Reported by HEW/OE					
Receipts by LEA's	\$462,586,000	\$515,479,000	\$491,068,000	\$484,353,000	\$1,953,586,000
Difference	404,224,000	430,781,000	506,588,000	449,244,000	1,790,855,000
LEA's receipts in percent of HEW/OE disbursements	87.37	83.69	103.16	92.75	91.67

¹ Includes disbursements under Public Law 874, title I, secs. 2, 3, and 4 only. Aggregate HEW/OE disbursements for 1970 were approximately \$491,000,000 instead of \$557,000,000 as erroneously reported in table D, 20th, 21st, and 22d Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Education, HEW.

Sources: For HEW/OE disbursements: HEW/OE, "Administration of Public Law 81-874," 19th through 22d Annual Reports by the Commissioner of Education. For receipts by LEA's: HEW/OE, "Statistics of Local Public School Systems, Finances," Reports for 1967-68, 1968-69, 1969-70 (in print) and 1970-71 (on tape). (National Center for Education Statistics).

Mr. Speaker, the difference between HEW/OE disbursements and LEA's receipts during these 4 fiscal years—1968-71—amounted to about \$163 million, or about \$40 million plus per year. It appears to me that either the above funds failed to reach LEA's, an unlikely situation since HEW/OE is reportedly in pos-

session of canceled checks, or that LEA's obviously did not report in their annual reports the full amount of funds received from the Impact Aid Administrator. Spot checking individual LEA's throughout the United States, I found that the Board of Education of the State of Hawaii reported as receiving during fiscal 1968 and

1969 about \$4.9 million—or 25.8 percent—less than the amount disbursed by the Impact Aid Administrator during the corresponding years. The figures for the Board of Education, Montgomery County, Md., for the corresponding period were \$1.7 million—or 13 percent—less; for the Weber County and Granite school

districts, Utah, \$0.72 million—or 21.5 percent—less; for the Fairfax County School Board, Va., \$4.58 million—or 22 percent—less; and for the Bourne school community, Mass., \$0.65 million—or 22.3 percent—less.

Even the minuscule, by comparison, school districts around Fort Crowder, Mo., I have referred to in my floor remarks on April 11, claimed receiving about 18 percent less in impact aid funds than reported by the Administrator for fiscal 1968, 1969, and 1970.

Mr. Speaker, these figures prompted me to go into a more detailed statistical

analysis of available data over a more extended period of impact aid disbursements by the Administrator of Public Law 874 in order to avoid the pitfall of money in the "pipeline" situation. I have selected 16 school districts in the State of Massachusetts—tables II, III, IIA, and IIIA—for which accurate statistical data were available for fiscal years 1964 through 1970; two school districts in Florida—tables IV, IVA, and IVB—with data for fiscal 1958 through 1972; four school districts in Rhode Island—table V—with data for fiscal 1966 through 1972; and three school districts in Mary-

land—table VI—with data for fiscal 1966 through 1970. Also included are aggregate data for the State of Missouri—table VIII—for fiscal 1961 through 1972. I would like to emphasize at this point that my choice of these was prompted by the almost perfect agreement of select figures published by the respective State departments of education and the data contained in reports by the U.S. Office of Education for fiscal 1968 and 1969 entitled "Statistics of Local Public Schools—Finances," compiled by the National Center for Educational Statistics.

My tabulation of impact aid disbursements and receipts follows:

TABLE II.—IMPACT AID, PUBLIC LAW 874, MASSACHUSETTS—8 SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS DISBURSEMENTS BY IMPACT AID ADMINISTRATOR VERSUS RECEIPTS BY INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS

[In dollars; fiscal years ending June 30]

HEW/OE Appl. No.—County and school district	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Totals
1022—Norfolk: Town of Brookline School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	55,870	64,797	59,490	72,702	79,484	84,691	72,919	489,953
Received by Brookline	62,555	67,729	63,930	10,166	106,600	44,474	73,105	428,559
1010—Middlesex: Cambridge School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	93,034	88,478	85,697	95,351	100,093	95,357	101,803	659,813
Received by Cambridge	86,718	99,907	87,278	82,507	79,490	117,139	117,787	670,826
0904—Suffolk: Chelsea School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	44,743	38,124	35,609	47,518	58,686	46,049	39,643	310,554
Received by Chelsea	47,904	40,909	35,192	45,999	40,602	24,471	42,289	277,366
1018—Worcester: Fitchburg School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	25,665	13,943	-----	37,376	50,412	38,797	49,764	215,957
Received by Fitchburg	24,681	15,524	3,852	-----	61,626	36,733	1,512	143,928
1907—Essex: City of Lawrence Public Schools:								
Reported by HEW/OE					64,819	55,284	70,236	190,339
Received by Lawrence						61,578	50,593	112,171
0816—Norfolk: Randolph School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	39,623	46,883	46,402	61,716	72,004	51,619	49,625	367,872
Received by Randolph	37,181	47,811	7,486	58,560	52,137	47,587	46,278	297,040
2001—Essex: Salem Public Schools:								
Reported by HEW/OE						45,517	61,019	106,536
Received by Salem							34,137	34,137
0912—Middlesex: Somerville School Community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	96,275	98,570	76,210	88,566	100,591	72,796	66,406	599,414
Received by Somerville		98,976		76,950	29,323	153,287	6,728	365,264
Total, reported by HEW/OE	355,210	350,795	303,408	403,229	526,271	490,110	511,415	2,940,438
8 school districts, received by the school community	259,039	370,856	197,738	274,182	369,778	485,269	372,429	2,329,291

Sources: HEW/OE disbursements—HEW/OE, "Administration of Public Law 81-874 * * *," 14th through 20th annual reports by the Commissioner of Education, Massachusetts selected school districts—Commonwealth of Massachusetts, "Department of Education Annual Reports * * * for 1964 through 1970."

TABLE III.—IMPACT AID, PUBLIC LAW 874, MASSACHUSETTS—8 SELECTED SCHOOL DISTRICTS DISBURSEMENTS BY IMPACT AID ADMINISTRATOR VERSUS RECEIPTS BY INDIVIDUAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS

[In dollars; fiscal years ending June 30]

HEW/OE Appl. No.—County and school district	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	Totals
0015—Barnstable: Bourne school community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	916,405	1,069,049	1,030,911	1,052,514	1,366,984	1,539,933	1,364,209	8,340,005
Received by Bourne	846,804	1,037,809	1,072,656	984,053	970,577	1,287,146	1,614,630	7,813,675
0812—Berkshire: Pittsfield public school community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	303,059	287,589	288,218	321,596	406,053	408,162	405,576	2,420,253
Received by Pittsfield	326,913	296,528	272,169	326,056	343,387	334,841	375,331	2,275,225
1007—Essex: Lynn school community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	95,109	55,412	48,071	135,967	226,538	202,043	240,702	1,003,842
Received by Lynn	119,326	71,837	27,658	111,017	117,948	196,494	114,913	759,193
0010—Hampden: School community of the City of Chicopee:								
Reported by HEW/OE	897,623	945,221	1,018,566	1,018,574	1,319,832	1,383,017	1,216,951	7,799,784
Received by Chicopee	702,718	1,313,031	1,038,019	1,011,248	1,454,476	1,043,844	1,324,595	7,887,931
0001—Middlesex: Town of Ayer school community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	606,296	728,463	833,377	993,465	1,100,595	1,227,905	1,046,472	6,536,573
Received by Ayer	535,071	705,967	819,718	888,892	1,212,619	1,139,593	1,097,031	6,398,891
0009—Middlesex: Town of Bedford school community:								
Reported by HEW/OE	183,445	191,470	203,843	230,747	281,102	312,344	273,211	1,676,162
Received by Bedford	192,932	185,780	199,081	219,694	194,441	366,650	205,937	1,564,515
0602—Norfolk: Quincy School Department:								
Reported by HEW/OE	234,951	269,929	241,154	265,175	321,303	318,256	303,138	1,953,906
Received by Quincy	181,493	240,506	276,060	257,991	67,644	400,256	190,271	1,614,221
1508—Suffolk: School community of the city of Boston:								
Reported by HEW/OE	None	None	630,435	748,552	816,694	642,999	552,493	3,391,173
Received by Boston	None	None	None	627,832	751,155	756,250	590,340	2,725,577
Total, reported by HEW/OE	3,236,888	3,547,133	4,294,575	4,766,590	5,839,101	6,034,659	5,402,752	33,121,698
8 school districts, received by the school community	2,905,257	3,851,458	3,705,361	4,426,783	5,112,247	5,525,074	5,513,048	31,282,513

Sources: HEW/OE disbursements, HEW/OE, Administration of Public Law 81-874, 14th through 20th Annual Reports by the Commissioner of Education, Massachusetts selected school districts—Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of Education Annual Reports, for 1964 through 1970.

TABLE II-A.—SUMMARY, MASSACHUSETTS—8 SCHOOL DISTRICTS—PUBLIC LAW 874
DISBURSEMENTS BY HEW/OE VERSUS
AGGREGATE RECEIPTS BY LEA'S

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumula- tive variance
1964	\$355,210	\$259,039	+\$96,171	+\$96,171
1965	350,795	370,856	-20,061	+\$76,110
1966	303,408	197,738	+105,670	+\$181,780
1967	403,229	274,182	+129,047	+\$10,827
1968	526,271	369,778	+156,493	+\$467,320
1969	490,110	485,269	+5,441	+\$472,761
1970	511,415	372,429	+138,986	+\$611,747

Source: Based on table II.

TABLE III-A.—SUMMARY, MASSACHUSETTS—8 SCHOOL DISTRICTS—PUBLIC LAW 874

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumula- tive variance
1964	\$3,236,888	\$2,905,257	+\$331,631	+\$331,631
1965	3,547,133	3,851,586	-304,325	+\$27,306
1966	4,294,575	3,705,361	+589,214	+\$16,520
1967	4,766,590	6,426,783	+339,807	+\$95,327
1968	5,839,101	5,112,247	+726,854	+\$1,683,181
1969	6,034,659	5,525,074	+509,585	+\$2,192,766
1970	5,402,752	5,513,048	-110,296	+\$2,082,470

Source: Based on table III.

TABLE IV.—SUMMARY, FLORIDA—PUBLIC LAW 874

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumula- tive variance
1951	\$471,089	None	+\$471,089	+\$471,089
1952	791,406	None	+\$791,406	+\$1,262,495
1953	1,156,636	\$1,148,772	+7,864	+\$1,270,359
1954	1,509,102	1,411,125	+97,977	+\$1,368,336
1955	1,368,370	1,808,332	-439,962	+\$928,374
1956	1,821,277	1,744,577	+76,700	+\$1,005,074
1957	2,990,146	2,731,185	+258,961	+\$1,264,035
1958	3,500,099	3,171,217	+328,882	+\$1,592,917
1959	4,169,476	3,946,314	+223,162	+\$1,816,079
1960	4,802,573	4,790,815	+11,758	+\$1,827,837
1961	5,499,543	5,156,172	+343,371	+\$2,171,208
1962	6,169,273	6,192,118	-22,845	+\$2,148,363
1963	7,083,235	7,338,365	-255,130	+\$1,893,233
1964	9,210,853	8,544,089	+666,044	+\$2,559,277
1965	10,422,396	9,707,629	+714,761	+\$3,274,038
1966	13,325,355	12,625,912	+699,443	+\$3,973,481
1967	14,942,495	14,026,860	+915,635	+\$4,889,116
1968	16,373,647	13,018,885	+3,354,762	+\$8,243,878
1969	17,291,828	12,618,596	+4,637,232	+\$12,917,110
1970	18,809,065	19,416,671	-2,607,606	+\$10,309,504
1971	16,472,036	14,792,100	+1,679,939	+\$11,989,443
1972	117,741,029	20,186,546	-2,445,517	+\$9,543,926

1 Estimate.

Sources: HEW/OE disbursements—HEW/OE, Administration of Public Law 81-874 . . . 1st through 22d annual reports by the Commissioner of Education Florida aggregate receipts—Biennial Report of the Superintendent of Public Instruction for the State of Florida, Fiscal 1959 through 1968. Annual beginning with fiscal 1969.

TABLE IV-A.—PUBLIC LAW 874, BREVARD COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, FLORIDA DISBURSEMENTS BY HEW/OE VERSUS RECEIPTS BY BREVARD COUNTY

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumula- tive variance
1958	\$453,593	NA		
1959	732,987	\$710,397	+\$22,590	+\$22,590
1960	945,347	943,928	+1,419	+\$24,009
1961	1,219,494	1,219,054	+440	+\$24,449
1962	1,445,719	1,379,843	+66,074	+\$90,523
1963	1,827,389	1,857,037	-29,648	+\$60,875
1964	2,732,104	2,595,243	+136,861	+\$197,736
1965	3,268,152	2,728,211	+539,941	+\$737,577
1966	4,243,099	4,618,695	-375,596	+\$362,081
1967	4,684,908	4,739,510	-54,602	+\$307,479
1968	4,513,865	4,353,613	+160,252	+\$467,731

cation Rhode Island Department of Education, 1965-66 through 1971-72, statistical tables, Rhode Island State Department of Education.

TABLE VI.—SUMMARY, MARYLAND—PUBLIC LAW 874 DISBURSEMENTS BY HEW/OE VERSUS AGGREGATE RECEIPTS BY LEA'S

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumulative variance
1969	\$4,891,565	\$2,993,326	+\$1,898,239	+\$2,365,970
1970	3,850,033	5,379,557	-1,529,524	+\$836,446
1971	3,404,371	2,879,283	+525,088	+\$1,361,534
1972	3,580,814	4,141,037	-560,223	+\$801,311

TABLE IV B.—OKALOOSA COUNTY BOARD OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, FLORIDA

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumulative variance
1958	\$360,756	NA		
1959	395,582	344,001	+51,581	+51,581
1960	543,877	545,891	-2,014	+\$49,567
1961	645,202	559,330	+85,872	+\$135,434
1962	690,010	673,744	-16,266	+\$151,700
1963	725,759	741,238	-15,479	+\$136,221
1964	1,077,036	985,921	+91,115	+\$227,336
1965	1,312,231	1,258,987	+43,244	+\$270,580
1966	1,519,748	1,478,001	+41,747	+\$312,327
1967	1,667,470	1,602,165	+65,305	+\$377,632
1968	2,031,276	2,252,813	-221,537	+\$156,520
1969	2,503,145	2,043,709	+459,436	+\$615,531
1970	2,391,097	2,263,732	+127,365	+\$742,896
1971	2,488,448	2,329,650	+158,798	+\$901,694
1972	2,799,514	3,143,663	-344,149	+\$557,545

TABLE V.—SUMMARY, RHODE ISLAND—PUBLIC LAW 874 DISBURSEMENTS BY HEW/OE VERSUS AGGREGATE RECEIPTS BY LEA'S

Fiscal	HEW/OE disburse- ments	State/LEA's receipts	Disburse- ments minus receipts	Cumulative variance
1966	\$2,636,136	\$2,540,517	+\$95,619	+\$95,619
1967	2,898,216	2,815,051	+83,165	+\$178,784
1968	3,442,704	2,316,507	+1,126,197	+\$1,304,981
1969	3,790,902	3,114,236	+676,666	+\$1,981,647
1970	3,664,177	3,921,387	-257,210	+\$1,724,437
1971	4,310,812	3,730,821	+579,991	+\$2,304,428
1972	4,296,289	5,670,564	-1,374,275	+\$930,153

TOWN OF MIDDLETON SCHOOL COMMITTEE

Fiscal	TOWN OF N	KINGSTOWN	SCHOOL	DEPARTMENT
1966	\$605,471	\$578,623	+\$26,848	+\$26,848
1967	590,681	603,325	-12,644	+\$14,204
1968	637,562	619,077	+18,485	+\$32,689
1969	669,076	608,239	+60,837	+\$93,526
1970	677,196	742,936	-65,740	+\$27,786
1971	1,095,403	631,145	+464,258	+\$492,044
1972	1,859,446	1,335,391	-473,945	+\$18,099

TOWN OF NORTH KINGSTOWN SCHOOL DEPARTMENT

Fiscal	TOWN OF P	PORTSMOUTH	SCHOOL	COMMITTEE
1966	\$461,545	\$436,128	+\$25,417	+\$25,417
1967	494,060	510,483	-16,423	+\$8,994
1968	527,182	None	+527,182	+\$536,176
1969	601,314	485,177	+116,137	+\$652,313
1970	618,765	719,935	-101,170	+\$551,143
1971	606,812	522,604	+84,208	+\$635,351
1972	1,681,208	784,984	-103,776	+\$531,575

TOWN OF PORTSMOUTH SCHOOL COMMITTEE

Fiscal	TOWN OF P	PORTSMOUTH	SCHOOL	COMMITTEE
1966	\$314,476	\$301,770	+\$12,706	+\$12,706
1967	313,466	312,355	+1,111	+\$13,817
1968	333,115	260,619	+72,496	+\$86,313
1969	373,703	374,110	-407	+\$85,906
1970	350,344	367,074	-16,730	+\$69,176
1971	421,020	290,902	+130,118	+\$199,294
1972	1,508,337	678,995	-170,618	+\$28,676

1 Estimate.

Sources: HEW/OE Disbursements—HEW/OE, administration of Public Law 81-874 . . . 9th through 22d annual reports by the Commissioner of Education Missouri aggregate receipts—Reports [109th, fiscal 1959 through 123d, fiscal 1972] of the Public Schools of the State of Missouri, issued by the Commissioner of Education, Jefferson City, Mo.

Mr. Speaker, data contained in the above tables seemingly confirm my apprehension that less than the full amount of impact aid funds disbursed by the Administrator of Public Law 874 is acknowledged by local school districts affected by Federal activities. Since the court cases *Hergenreter v. Hayden* (D.C.

Kan. 1968, 295 F. Supp. 251) specifically prohibited State manipulation of Federal "impact area" funds and *Harvey v. Town of Sudbury* (1966, 214 N.E. 2d 718.350 Mass. 212) adjudged that Federal funds received or anticipated providing for financial assistance to local educational agencies in areas affected by Federal activities must be taken into consideration in preparing local school committee's budget, we all must ask ourselves the question: Where, oh where did the money go? I am sure that we will have an answer when the General Accounting Office completes its audit of this program, but this may not come before the end of this year. In the meantime the wide open Federal money spigots are funneling taxpayers dollars into LEA's which for some strange reasons do not acknowledge in their annual reports the full amount of funds disbursed by the Commissioner of Education for impact aid purposes.

THE INFLATION RATE

(Mr. ECKHARDT asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Speaker, the news that the inflation rate reached 11.5 percent in the first quarter of 1974 is most distressing. It is unfair to all Americans and cruel and unjust to the millions who live on fixed incomes. The prime interest rate is racing the rate of inflation nose to nose and also stands at 11.5 percent. To ease this financial burden I today introduced a bill to help curb high interest rates and improve the home mortgage situation.

The full text of the bill follows:

H.R. 14943

A bill to increase the actuarial soundness of the Government National Mortgage Association

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. (a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, every person who makes a finance charge for any extension of credit at an annual percentage rate in excess of 8 per centum shall pay an annual interest stabilization fee to the Government National Mortgage Association in an amount equal to 1 per centum of the annual interest charge for each one-tenth percentage point by which the annual percentage rate exceeds 8 per centum. Where the amount financed varies during the year, or the period of repayment is less than a year, the amount of the fee shall be ratably adjusted. Where the period of repayment is more than a year, the fee shall be paid with respect to each year during which there is at any time an unpaid balance outstanding, but need not be paid in advance of receipt of the finance charge.

(b) The provisions of subsection (a) do not apply to any loan meeting all of the following conditions:

(1) the amount of the loan is under \$10,000, and

(2) the making of the loan is regulated by an agency of a State under a small loan law or similar statute.

Sec. 2. For the purposes of this Act, the terms "finance charge", and "annual percentage rate" shall be defined as in sections

106 and 107 of the Truth in Lending Act, but shall not be restricted to consumer and agricultural transactions.

Sec. 3. The Government National Mortgage Association shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Act.

Sec. 4. Any fees paid pursuant to this Act shall be held by the Government National Mortgage Association in a separate fund, and pursuant to title III of the National Housing Act, as amended, to stabilize and strengthen the national housing market.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

(Mr. DULSKI asked and was given permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. DULSKI. Mr. Speaker, I was away from Washington, and so missed several votes. I would like the RECORD to show that had I been present I would have voted as follows:

Tuesday, May 14, Roll No. 219, "yea"; Roll No. 220, "yea."

Wednesday, May 15, Roll No. 222, "yea"; Roll No. 223, "yea"; Roll No. 224, "yea."

Thursday, May 16, Roll No. 226, "no"; Roll No. 227, "yea"; Roll No. 228, "yea."

Monday, May 20, Roll No. 230, "yea."

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted as follows to:

Mr. HELSTOSKI (at the request of Mr. O'NEILL), for today, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. BLACKBURN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. CLEVELAND, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WYMAN, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. HOGAN, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. TALCOTT, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. REGULA, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. SANDMAN, for 15 minutes, today.

Mr. SKUBITZ, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. MILLER, for 5 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SEIBERLING) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. EILBERG, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. WOLFF, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. DIGGS, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. FOLEY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. GINN, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. O'HARA, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. PRICE of Illinois, and to include extraneous remarks, in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. BENITEZ, and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact that it exceeds two pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$731.50.

Mr. HUBER, and to include extraneous matter notwithstanding the fact it exceeds two pages of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and is estimated by the Public Printer to cost \$470.25.

Mr. GROSS and to include extraneous matter.

Mr. RONCALLO of New York and to include extraneous matter in the Committee of the Whole today.

Mr. BINGHAM to revise and extend his remarks on the Abzug amendment.

Mr. KING to revise and extend his remarks immediately prior to the vote on the Leggett amendment.

Mr. ANDERSON of California, prior to the vote on the O'Neill amendment.

Mr. LEGGETT, to extend his remarks prior to the vote on the O'Neill amendment.

Mr. FRENZEL to revise and extend his remarks prior to vote on O'Neill substitute amendment.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. HANRAHAN.

Mr. GUBSER.

Mr. PRICE of Texas.

Mr. MARTIN of Nebraska.

Mr. BROTHILL of Virginia.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois in two instances.

Mr. WYMAN in two instances.

Mr. HUBER in two instances.

Mr. ZWACH.

Mr. SCHNEEBELI.

Mr. DERWINSKI in two instances.

Mr. GILMAN.

Mr. SARASIN.

Mr. PARRIS.

Mr. VEYSEY.

Mr. RONCALLO of New York.

Mr. DU PONT in three instances.

Mr. HOGAN.

Mr. ASHBROOK in two instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of Alabama.

Mr. GROVER.

Mr. HOSMER in three instances.

Mr. HILLIS.

Mr. HEDNUT.

Mr. LENT.

Mr. MYERS.

Mr. THONE.

Mr. CRONIN.

Mr. HUNT.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. SEIBERLING) and to include extraneous material:)

Mr. EVINS of Tennessee in two instances.

Mr. BRASCO in 12 instances.

Mr. ADDABBO in two instances.

Mr. BOLLING.

Mr. MINK.

Mr. JAMES V. STANTON.

Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances.

Mr. RARICK in three instances.

Mr. EDWARDS of California in three instances.

Mr. STOKES.
 Mr. ANNUNZIO in six instances.
 Mr. SISK.
 Mr. DENT.
 Mr. MINISH.
 Mr. CARNEY of Ohio in two instances.
 Mr. MILLS.
 Mr. LUKEN.
 Mr. BARRETT.
 Mr. GRAY in three instances.
 Mr. DULSKI in five instances.
 Mr. VANIK in two instances.
 Mr. ANDERSON of California in two instances.

SENATE BILLS REFERRED

Bills of the Senate of the following titles were taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 1018. An act to create a National Commission on the Olympic Games to review the question of U.S. participation in the Olympic games and to evaluate and formulate recommendations concerning such participation; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

S. 3458. An act to amend the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, the Food Stamp Act of 1964, and for other purposes, to the Committee on Agriculture.

ENROLLED BILLS SIGNED

Mr. HAYS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled bills of the House of the following titles, which were thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 6541. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain mineral interests of the United States to the owner or owners of record of certain lands in the State of South Carolina;

H.R. 6542. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain mineral interests of the United States to the owner or owners of record of certain lands in the State of South Carolina;

H.R. 7087. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to sell reserved mineral interests of the United States in certain land in Missouri to Grace F. Sisler, the record owner of the surface thereof;

H.R. 10284. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to sell certain rights in the State of Florida; and

H.R. 12920. An act to authorize additional appropriations to carry out the Peace Corps Act, and for other purposes.

BILLS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT

Mr. HAYS, from the Committee on House Administration, reported that that committee did on this day present to the President, for his approval, bills of the House of the following titles:

H.R. 6541. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain mineral interests of the United States to the owner or owners of record of certain lands in the State of South Carolina;

H.R. 6542. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to convey certain mineral interests of the United States to the owner or owners of record of certain lands in the State of South Carolina;

H.R. 7087. An act to authorize the Secre-

tary of the Interior to sell reserved mineral interests of the United States in certain land in Missouri to Grace F. Sisler, the record owner of the surface thereof:

H.R. 10284. An act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to sell certain rights in the State of Florida.

H.R. 10942. An act to amend the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of July 3, 1918 (40 Stat. 755), as amended, to extend and adapt its provisions to the Convention between the United States and the Government of Japan for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction and their environment, concluded at the city of Tokyo, March 4, 1972; and

H.R. 12920. An act to authorize additional appropriations to carry out the Peace Corps Act, and for other purposes.

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 8 o'clock and 46 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, May 23, 1974, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

2348. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Education of the Handicapped Act by consolidating the discretionary authorities for projects for handicapped children, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

2349. A letter from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, transmitting the seventh annual report of the Rochester Institute of Technology on the establishment and operation of the National Technical Institute for the Deaf, pursuant to section 5(b)(3) of Public Law 89-36 [20 U.S.C. 648]; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

2350. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, transmitting notice of the intention of the Department of State to consent to a request by the British Government to transfer U.S.-origin spotter tracer ammunition to the Government of Kuwait, pursuant to section 3(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended [22 U.S.C. 2753(a)(2)]; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2351. A letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, transmitting notice of the intention of the Department of State to consent to a request by the British Government to transfer U.S.-origin machinegun spare parts to the Governments of Kuwait and Jordan, pursuant to section 3(a) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended [22 U.S.C. 2753(a)(2)]; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

2352. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Power Commission, transmitting a copy of a publication entitled "Statistics of Publicly Owned Electric Utilities in the United States, 1972"; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

RECEIVED FROM THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL

2353. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a report that better methods are needed for canceling orders for materiel no longer required by the Department of Defense; to the Committee on Government Operations.

2354. A letter from the Comptroller General of the United States, transmitting a re-

port on the examination of the financial statements of the National Credit Union Administration for fiscal year 1973; to the Committee on Government Operations.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. PERKINS: Committee on Education and Labor. Senate Joint Resolution 40. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to call a White House Conference on Library and Information Services in 1976; with amendment (Rept. No. 93-1056). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. HALEY: Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. H.R. 12165. A bill to authorize the construction, operation, and maintenance of certain works in the Colorado River Basin to control the salinity of water delivered to users in the United States and Mexico; with amendment (Rept. No. 93-1057). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ARCHER:

H.R. 14940. A bill to amend the provisions of the Social Security Act to consolidate the reporting of wages by employers for income tax withholding and old-age, survivors, and disability insurance purposes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BAFALIS:

H.R. 14941. A bill to amend title XI of the Social Security Act to repeal the recently added provision for the establishment of Professional Standards Review Organizations to review services covered under the medicare and medicaid programs; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BOWEN:

H.R. 14942. A bill to amend the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to provide an exemption from minimum wage and overtime coverage for babysitters; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. ECKHARDT:

H.R. 14943. A bill to increase the actuarial soundness of the Government National Mortgage Association; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. FRASER:

H.R. 14944. A bill to provide youth services grants, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. FREY (for himself, Mr. ASPIN, and Mr. ROGERS):

H.R. 14945. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code in order to provide service pension to certain veterans of World War I and pension to the widows of such veterans; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. HANNA:

H.R. 14946. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code in order to provide service pension to certain veterans of World War I and pension to the widows of such veterans; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

H.R. 14947. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to establish a program of long-term care services within the medicare program, to provide for the creation of community long-term care centers and State long-term care agencies as part of a

new administrative structure for the organization and delivery of long-term care services, to provide a significant role for persons eligible for long-term care benefits in the administration of the program, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McDADE:

H.R. 14948. A bill to amend the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, title 39, United States Code, to eliminate certain restrictions on the rights of officers and employees of the Postal Service and for other purposes; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

H.R. 14949. A bill relating to withholding by the United States of certain taxes imposed by States, and political subdivisions thereof, in the case of Federal employees; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. REGULA:

H.R. 14950. A bill to provide for the more equitable administration of revenues derived from certain Federal lands, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. McFALL:

H.R. 14951. A bill to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965 to extend the authorizations for a 2-year period, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. MARAZITI:

H.R. 14952. A bill to amend chapter 23 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (relating to the Federal Unemployment Tax Act) to provide for the eligibility of school teachers for unemployment insurance under the unemployment insurance program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. QUIE:

H.R. 14953. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow the deduction of certain expenditures for food and lodging primarily for medical care; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. QUILLEN:

H.R. 14954. A bill to create a commission to grant exclusive franchises for the exploration for and the commercial development of geothermal energy and for the right to market any such energy in its natural state, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. SCHERLE:

H.R. 14955. A bill to incorporate the U.S. Submarine Veterans of World War II; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself, and Mr. CONTE):

H.R. 14956. A bill to designate the birthday of Susan B. Anthony as a legal public holiday; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WALSH:

H.R. 14957. A bill to prohibit any person engaged in the business of marketing or distributing natural gas, propane, butane, or electricity, from terminating service to any customer unless prior written notice is given to the local law enforcement and welfare agencies; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. WHITEHURST:

H.R. 14958. A bill to amend title 5, United States Code, to correct inequities in the determination of rates of basic pay in conversions to the General Schedule of employees and positions subject to prevailing rate pay schedules; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. WOLFF:

H.R. 14959. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide a 10-year delimiting period for the pursuit of educational programs by veterans, wives, and widows; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. WYMAN (for himself, and Mr. CHAPPELL):

H.R. 14960. A bill to amend the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966

to prohibit the Secretary of Transportation from imposing certain seatbelt standards, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. BLACKBURN:

H.R. 14961. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide for annual adjustments in the amount of personal exemptions to reflect increases in the cost of living; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CLEVELAND (for himself, Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina, Mr. WRIGHT, Mr. REES, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. BYRON, Mr. WALSH, Mr. FISH, Mr. HANSEN of Idaho, Mr. DUNCAN, Mr. QUIE, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. GUDIE, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mr. FROEHLICH, Mr. GILMAN, and Mr. WYMAN):

H.R. 14962. A bill to amend title 23 of the United States Code to authorize a grant program for research and development of alternative fuels for motor vehicles, to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. CLEVELAND (for himself, Mr. QUIE, Mr. RIEGLE, and Mr. WYMAN):

H.R. 14963. A bill to amend section 203 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to provide for State certification; to the Committee on Public Works.

Mr. EILBERG:

H.R. 14964. A bill to establish in the State of Pennsylvania the Edgar Allan Poe National Historical Park; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

Mr. ESCH:

H.R. 14965. A bill to amend the Sugar Act of 1948 to prescribe minimum wages and conditions of employment for farmworkers, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Agriculture.

H.R. 14966. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code so as to entitle veterans of World War I and their widows and children to pension on the same basis as veterans of the Spanish-American War and their widows and children, respectively, and to increase pension rates; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. FISH:

H.R. 14967. A bill to amend title 18, United States Code, further defining the manner in which a witness in a Federal court or grand jury proceeding may be ordered to provide information after asserting his privilege against self-incrimination; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FLOOD:

H.R. 14968. A bill to establish university coal research laboratories and to establish energy resource fellowships, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science and Astronautics.

By Mr. HEDNUT:

H.R. 14969. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to authorize the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to make loans to students in graduate health profession schools the repayment of which will be based on income earned after graduation; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KUYKENDALL (for himself, Mr. SKUBITZ, and Mr. DEVINE):

H.R. 14970. A bill to amend section 410 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to provide financial assistance during the energy crisis to U.S. air carriers engaged in overseas and foreign air transportation; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. LITTON (for himself, Mr. COHEN, and Mr. COUGHLIN):

H.R. 14971. A bill to amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to provide that the Administrator of the Small Business Administration may render onsite consultation and advice to certain small business employers to assist such employers in providing safe and healthful working con-

ditions for their employees; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. LITTON (for himself, Mr. TIERNAN, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. CONTE, Mr. ROSE, Ms. SCHROEDER, Mr. REES, Mr. FROEHLICH, Ms. HOLTZMAN, Mr. MURPHY of New York, Mr. YOUNG of Illinois, Mr. MOAKLEY, and Ms. CHISHOLM):

H.R. 14972. A bill to establish a Department of Social, Economic, and Natural Resources Planning in the executive branch of the Federal Government; to the Committee on Government Operations.

By Mr. MURPHY of New York:

H.R. 14973. A bill to amend the Public Health Service Act to provide for programs for the diagnosis and treatment of hemophilia; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. O'HARA:

H.R. 14974. A bill to amend the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, by extending certain expiration dates, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. PETTIS (for himself and Mr. BROWN of California):

H.R. 14975. A bill for the relief of certain students harmed by the insolvency of Riverside University of Riverside, Calif.; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PRICE of Texas:

H.R. 14976. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and certain other provisions of law to provide for automatic cost-of-living adjustments in the income tax rates, the amount of the standard, personal exemption, and depreciation deductions, and the rate of interest payable on certain obligations of the United States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SANDMAN (for himself and Mr. MARAZITI):

H.R. 14977. A bill to provide property tax relief to low-income elderly homeowners through direct reimbursements; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SYMINGTON:

H.R. 14978. A bill to establish an Earth Resources Observation Administration within the Department of the Interior, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Science and Astronautics.

By Mr. TAYLOR of North Carolina (for himself and Ms. GRIFFITHS):

H.R. 14979. A bill to establish a Sewall-Belmont House National Historic Site, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BOB WILSON (for himself, Mr. ESCH, Mr. MOLLOHAN, Mr. WYATT, Mr. LOTT, Mr. BEARD, Mr. STEELE, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. FREY, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. MOORHEAD of California, Mr. DOMINICK V. DANIELS, Mr. DOWNING, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. STUDDS, Mr. FLYNT, Mr. COUGHLIN, Mr. McCOLLISTER, Mr. SHOUP, Mr. HALEY, Mr. BROTMAN, Mr. BERGLAND, Mr. SPENCE, and Mr. BAKER):

H.R. 14980. A bill to authorize recomputation at age 60 of the retired pay of members and former members of the uniformed services whose retired pay is computed on the basis of pay scales in effect prior to January 1, 1972, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. KOCH (for himself, Ms. ABZUG, Mr. BADILLO, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. DRINAN, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. GOLDWATER, Mr. HARRINGTON, Mr. KEMP, Mr. LEGGETT, Mr. MITCHELL of Maryland, Mr. PODELL, Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania, Mr. VAN DEERLIN, Mr. WON PAT, and Mr. YOUNG of Georgia):

H.R. 14981. A bill to restrict the disclosure of information in the possession of telephone companies or telegraph companies

concerning members of the news media; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. MARAZITI:

H.R. 14982. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and certain other provisions of law to provide for automatic cost-of-living adjustments in the income tax rates, the amount of the standard, personal exemption, and depreciation deductions, and the rate of interest payable on certain obligations of the United States; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. ROY:

H.R. 14983. A bill to provide for the modification of the project for Tuttle Creek Lake, Big Blue River, Kan.; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. SKUBITZ:

H.R. 14984. A bill to amend title 38 of the United States Code in order to provide service pension to certain veterans of World War I and pension to the widows of such veterans; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia:

H.J. Res. 1025. Joint resolution to authorize the President to proclaim the third week in October of each year as National Screen Printing Week and to proclaim Tuesday of such week as National Screen Printing Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. COUGHLIN:

H.J. Res. 1026. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to issue a proclamation designating the calendar week beginning April 20, 1975, as National Volunteer Week; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DULSKI:

H.J. Res. 1027. Joint resolution to designate the third week of September of each

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

year as National Medical Assistants' Week; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ESCH (for himself, Mr. CONLAN, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina, Mr. MAZZOLI, Mrs. CHISHOLM, Mr. MILFORD, Mr. ROE, Mr. SYMINGTON, and Mr. WINN):

H.J. Res. 1028. Joint resolution designating the premises occupied by the Chief of Naval Operations as the official residence of the Vice President, effective upon the termination of service of the incumbent Chief of Naval Operations; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. SYMINGTON (for himself and Mr. MINSHALL of Ohio):

H.J. Res. 1029. Joint resolution authorizing the President to proclaim the week beginning on the second Monday in November each year as Youth Appreciation Week; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DULSKI:

H. Con. Res. 502. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the President, acting through the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Organization, take such steps as may be necessary to place the question of human rights violations in the Soviet-occupied Ukraine on the agenda of the United Nations Organization; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. ESCH:

H. Res. 1142. Resolution creating a standing Committee on Small Business in the House of Representatives; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. MINISH:

H. Res. 1143. Resolution declaring the sense of the House with respect to a prohibition of extension of credit by the Export-Import Bank of the United States; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

May 22, 1974

By Mr. STEELMAN (for himself, Mr. ERLENBORN, Mr. SHUSTER, Mr. WHALEN, Mr. PARRIS, Mr. BROWN of Ohio, Mr. JOHNSON of Colorado, Mr. McCLOSKEY, Mr. MAYNE, Mr. REGULA, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. THONE, Mr. MCCOLLISTER, Mr. BELL, Mr. PRITCHARD, Mr. CLEVELAND, Mr. HORTON, Mr. MITCHELL of New York, Mr. ESHLEMAN, Mr. MATHIAS of California, Mr. SHOUP, Mr. COCHRAN, Mr. QUIE, Mr. CONTE, and Mr. GUYER):

H. Res. 1144. Resolution providing for the consideration of House Resolution 988; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. STEELMAN (for himself, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. YOUNG of South Carolina, Mr. BURGENER, Mr. SHRIVER, Mr. ROBISON of New York, Mr. SARASIN, Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina, Mr. DU PONT, Mr. McEWEN, Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia, Mr. GUDE, Mr. KEMP, Mr. FROELICH, and Ms. CHISHOLM):

H. Res. 1145. Resolution providing for the consideration of House Resolution 988; to the Committee on Rules.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mrs. SULLIVAN:

H.R. 14985. A bill for the relief of Ebinger Electronics, Inc.; to the Committee on Judiciary.

By Mr. BOB WILSON:

H.R. 14986. A bill for the relief of Rear Adm. F. B. Gilkeson of the U.S. Navy; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

FEDERAL AID MEANS MORE FEDERAL CONTROL

HON. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.

OF VIRGINIA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Wednesday, May 22, 1974

Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR. Mr. President, the Richmond News Leader of Tuesday, May 7, 1974, published a provocative editorial entitled "Federal Aid Means Federal ***." It deals with the controls which the Federal Government is putting on the States and localities through the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

The editorial concludes by stating:

So it goes. Further proof, if further proof were needed, that federal aid means . . . federal control.

How accurate that editorial is, Mr. President.

The more the States and localities accept Federal funds, the more Federal funds are appropriated to them, the more Federal control goes along with it.

I ask unanimous consent to have this editorial printed in the Extensions of Remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

FEDERAL AID MEANS FEDERAL ***

Early in the debate about federal aid to education, it became a cliche of the anti-statist argument that "federal aid means

federal control." During the past several months, three occurrences relating to education in Virginia have verified the truth of that cliche.

(1) In February, the news columns carried accounts of dismay among officials of the National Collegiate Athletic Association—dismay caused by a provision of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1972. The provision requires that colleges which accept federal aid spend as much money on their athletic programs and facilities for women as they spend for men. Failure to comply could mean a cut-off of federal funds to the transgressing colleges and universities. (In fiscal 1972, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare—the conduit for federal aid to education—provided \$4.1 billion to American colleges and universities.) Walter Byers, the executive director of the NCAA, has informed the NCAA's 775 member institutions that "this regulation will dismantle the structure of intercollegiate athletics in this country. Right now, we do have a crisis." So, as the result of a regulation intended to eradicate "sex discrimination" from the nation's colleges, the federal government possibly will put intercollegiate athletics at many colleges out of business.

(2) As a result of unrest at Handley High School in Winchester during the week of April 15, school authorities in Winchester suspended or expelled 15 students—all of them black. And abracadabra, within 10 days those school authorities found themselves "consulting" with two representatives from HEW. The alleged purpose of the visitation? To determine whether the school authorities had "discriminated" in their suspensions and expulsions. If the HEW representatives detected such discrimination, they will demand corrective action; if corrective action is not initiated, HEW will cut off federal cash

to public education in Winchester. This type of remedial—i.e., punitive—procedure is set forth in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Never mind that during the current school year, Handley officials have expelled or suspended 65 white students and 40 black students. The charge is made that because only black students were suspended or expelled in the aftermath of the April unrest, those who run the public schools of Winchester are "discriminating" on the basis of race. If federal cash were not involved, such a charge would be correctly dismissed as merely a mischievous allegation.

(3) And during the past year, both Governors Holton and Godwin have haggled with HEW about "desegregation" of Virginia's public colleges and universities. The Governors have argued that Virginia already is complying with 1964 Civil Rights Act provisions pertaining to higher education. HEW has argued that, well, maybe Virginia is complying and maybe Virginia is not complying, but until HEW decides, Virginia would be well advised—for instance—to increase the numbers of blacks at predominantly white schools, greatly increase the number of whites at predominantly black schools, hire more black teachers at predominantly white schools, etc., and file progress reports with HEW every six months. HEW euphemistically describes its position as "conciliatory." That is about as subtle as a mailed fist. The implied threat that has run through these year-long dealings with HEW is that if Virginia does not knuckle under to HEW's demands, HEW will halt the flow of millions of dollars of federal aid to Virginia public education.

So it goes. Further proof, if further proof were needed, that federal aid means . . . federal control.